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The years 1990 and 1991 were as important as they were eventful. The agreements recorded during this period ensured that obstacles in the way of substantive negotiation were removed. The Groote Schuur Minute, the D. F. Malan Accord, and the Pretoria Minute were the first formal agreements signed between the government and the ANC, and set in place measures designed to establish an environment conducive to negotiation.
Considering the heightened conflict and increasing tension, the parties' supporters viewed any compromise with much suspicion. There was little tangible change in people's lives. Most white people watched this period with growing concern and trepidation as property prices plummeted and hundreds emigrated. There was constant talk of 'selling out' on all sides: even the PAC denounced the scheduled meetings. According to the PAC, 'slaves have nothing to gain from negotiating with their masters.... We do not need reform. We need a complete overhaul of the entire economic and political system'.' The Azanian People's Organization (AZAPO) also stood impatiently in line to dole out its own condemnation of the talks: according to Strini Moodley, 'the De Klerk regime has succeeded in tying up the ANC in the perennial structures designed to delay the struggle, and to water down solutions to our problems in this country'. The right wing was growing in support and militancy, and even P. W. Botha, the NP leader responsible for the first contact with Mandela, publicly renounced the talks as 'unacceptable'. Even ANC members questioned the agreement to halt armed activities because they were suspicious of the government's motives in granting indemnities. It was hardly surprising, therefore, that these early discussions were extremely tense. Most participants were uncertain about the eventual outcome of negotiation, and generally there was a great deal of mistrust among them.
The quality and foresight of the leadership in both negotiating parties during this period were most crucial. Were it not for their political maturity and shared commitment to a negotiated settlement, it would not have been possible to steer the country through the stormy waters they encountered.
The Groote Schuur Minute
THE AGREEMENT
The first formal meeting between the ANC and the government began on 2 May 1990 at Groote Schuur in Cape Town, and lasted three days.
The first day of the meeting dealt with a general exposition by each party on the obstacles to negotiation, several of which were identified. These included security legislation, the return of exiles, the presence of troops in the townships, political prisoners, the state of emergency, the adherence to armed struggle, and the need to end violence. The discussions were characterized by openness on both sides. A commitment to making the maximum effort at finding common ground to eliminate tension, and the desire to make a success of the meeting were equally evident in both parties. By the second day, delegates were asking why these talks had not taken place years ago. According to Thabo Mbeki, within minutes of sitting down, 'everyone understood that there was nobody there with horns'.
The meeting produced an agreement, hailed as a major breakÂthrough, that came to be known as the Groote Schuur Minute. More than 400 journalists and diplomatic personnel attended the historic international news conference announcing the agreement. The Minute consisted of several major points: the ANC committed itself to reviewing its policy of armed struggle; a joint working group was formed to work on a definition of 'political offences', the release of prisoners, and the granting of immunity; and the government reÂiterated its intention to review security laws, lift the state of emergency, and enable exiles to return to the country. This working group, the first of many, was instructed to table a report by 21 May 1990. In the meantime, some offences were to receive immediate attention by the government, including leaving the country without a valid travel document and any offence relating to previously prohibited organiÂzations. In addition, temporary indemnities for the ANC's National Executive Committee and other members were to be processed and issued urgently.
THE SIGNIFICANCE OP THE AGREEMENT
The Groote Schuur Minute showed that problems which were previously perceived to be intractable really could be amicably resolved. Within three days a remarkable rapport had been established between parties in an experience described as 'cathartic'. The government delegation learnt about the frustrations of being banned and why the ANC was forced to take up arms, while the ANC learnt about the economic implications of sanctions. Both sides realized that they had to rethink some of their previous assumptions."
The excitement of many South Africans was reflected vividly in the media. A Sunday Times editorial entitled "The hopeful spirit of Groote Schuur' asked:
Who but incurable bigots or escapist clingers to apartheid myths could fail to be moved by the television images? The youngish, imperturbably calm and sure-footed State President, and the tall, dignified and articulate black leader sitting side by side, making history together.
True, there was much on which they still differed. True, grinding months of hard talk lie ahead. True, many anxious or angry people still need persuading that there is a peaceful way out of our crisis.
But the signs were evident as much in the body language as in their calm, measured speech. Two South Africans. Two generations and from separate poles of the political spectrum, had begun to discover each other as humans. More, there was dawning recognition that our future lies in the same diversity, which, by making victory impossible for any party, makes compromise inescapable for all parties.
The Sunday Star editorial entitled 'Road to normality is irreversible' stated, 'Bearing in mind that this week's contact between the Government and the African National Congress was not about constitutional negotiation, but a means to that end, the historic accord reached by the two sides is the most promising political development in our country yet'.
The Sowetan editorial commented that 'Last week's breakthrough talks between the ANC and the Government have shown it is possible for even the fiercest antagonists to sit down and discuss their problems'.
The editorial of New Nation was no less excited and confirmed that:
The talks this week should hopefully see some of the obstacles to negotiation removed and, for the first time this century, the prospects of peace for our people have never been so encouraging.
In spite of the great hope the talks have given the majority of our people, there are those who have tried to trivialise the event. These represent that cynical fringe that has a vested interest in continued apartheid rule. They also represent those whose claimed leadership may in the not too distant future be put to the test and found wanting.
The Sunday Tribune editorial was appropriately entitled 'Now there is hope', and stated, 'Today, all South Africans who yearn for the chance to live in peace - and to work for enduring prosperity and a better quality of life for all - will have good reason to feel on top of the world'. 16 The meeting had been delayed by two months because of the violence gripping the country and the failure of the government to arrest it. When it eventually took place, the Groote Schuur Minute was a watershed in the negotiation process for a number of reasons. It was the first formal meeting between the two sides, and both delegations consisted of senior leaders. While the meeting took place behind dosed doors, it was a matter of public knowledge that the meeting would and did take place. The meeting also concluded the first formal agreement of its kind and was the first public commitment by both sides to continue with the talks. A common feature in later talks, working groups were established to attend to detail.
Beyond the Groote Schuur Minute
Before the ink had time to dry on the Groote Schuur Minute, two important developments emerged. Firstly, the government secured the passage of the Indemnity Bill through Parliament on 7 May 1990. The aim was to grant permanent indemnity to people who, in the process of conflict and in the pursuance of a cause, may have committed a political offence. However, the extent of the application of the law was to depend on the definition of a 'political offence'. The only opposition to the bill came from the Conservative Party (CP). 17 On 19 May the government indemnified ANC leaders for a period of six months. Secondly, the progress in the working group established by the Groote Schuur Minute was better than had been anticipated, and there was even hope that the timetable for future talks might be accelerated. However, there were still several outstanding issues to be dealt with, including amnesty for the estimated 22 000 exiled ANC personnel, the lifting of the state of emergency, and a review of security and repressive legislation. The report by the joint working group was tabled on time. But it became increasingly evident that the breakthrough had generated expectations that were not immediately realizable. In view of the successful talks, the media and the public, locally and interÂnationally, expected that the parties would immediately proceed into negotiation of a new constitutional dispensation. There was now pressure on parties to maintain the momentum gathered by the agreement, but this did not take place for at least another ten weeks. Despite timeous tabling of the working group report, nothing happened, and both sides alledged the other was dragging its heels. Ken Owen, a prominent liberal editor, may have been right when he suggested that the euphoria had been overdone." On the other hand, considering the nature of the agreement, there was every reason to be euphoric, and every reason to put pressure on the parties. Once it was recognized that change was possible through negotiation, why should the parties not get on with the job? Their apparent inaction only served to generate further doubt and uncertainty, and it was a feeling that would well up often over the next few years of negotiation.
One of the reasons for the delay was that both Mandela and De Klerk separately visited a number of countries to mobilize support for their political positions. Various new developments meant that frequent delays became a general characteristic of the negotiation process. However, it is not unusual for political negotiations to be protracted; they are never smooth, and almost always take place in spurts rather than continua.
Mistrust between the parties
Despite the agreement at Groote Schuur, both parties were fresh from their trenches after waging war for over thirty years, and mutual suspicions and mistrust remained. Each party, for example, remained uncertain as to whether support for the process of negotiation extenÂded to the other's security forces. The most difficult aspect of their mistrust stemmed from the personalities involved, so that it was often perception more than fact that led to the mistrust. By the same token, parties used the excuse of mistrust as an effective negotiating tactic.
During this period several developments deepened this mistrust, the main one being that violence continued unabated. At the same time as the report on the definition of a 'political offence' was tabled, at least twelve residents of Thabong, a township south-east of Johannesburg, were killed by police, shortly after similar killings in the township of Welkom and in Natal. Speaking in Zimbabwe, Mandela claimed that 'while the Government is talking about peace and negotiation, it continues to wage war against us and against neighbouring states'. He also condemned the continuing violence, adding that it was not clear whether the government was actually unable to control its armed forces or whether the violence was a deliberate ploy.
Another aspect of mistrust was a fear of communism. Barely two days after the Groote Schuur Minute, journalists such as Ken Owen studied the composition of the ANC delegation to consider how many of them were communists. Some weeks later, Owen pursued this theme in greater detail, arguing that, 'We know very little else about the SACP, and still less about its role within the ANC. We can see the horse, but the rider is wrapped in mendacity and deceit, Mbeki says we have no future without trust, and he is right: it is time for the SACP to come out of the shadow'.
This mistrust extended to the fear of majority rule. A week after the first formal talks, Nigel Cunningham, a member of the DP, argued in the Sunday Tribune that:
Society is made up of minorities. Democracy is concerned with the protection of the rights and liberty of those minorities. Majority Rule, on the other hand, may deny the rights and liberty of individuals and of the minority groups to which they belong. It is based on the premise that the individual and the minority have no rights and liberties, other than those determined by the majority. There is a danger that all minorities are subordinated to the will of one majority of society, thereby replacing individual choice and liberty with mob rule.
Public debate
Vigorous public debate arose on four crucial questions: whether an interim government was necessary to oversee an election before the drafting of a constitution; whether the new constitution should be drafted by a constituent assembly (should this be after an election or before?); whether sanctions should continue; and whether or not group rights had a place in the constitution. These debates dearly identified the battle lines in future talks.
There were three competing scenarios. The perspective of the National Party had not evolved since the views put forward by P. W Botha in 1988, in terms of which the present government would remain intact while a 'Great Indaba' (a concept drawn from the KwaZulu Indaba experience) representing the different parties would negotiate a new constitution. This constitution would then be passed by the white-dominated Parliament and brought into effect. This proposal was criticized for its lack of representativeness. The government's response to the criticism was that an election could be held among African people only to verify the representativeness of the negotiators; as for whites, coloureds, and Indians, they had already elected their representatives. The PAC's position was that a new constitutional dispenÂsation could be drafted only in a constituent assembly, but this proposal lacked substantial ideas on the nature of the process leading to the constituent assembly.
The view of the ANC was contained in the Harare Declaration. Thabo Mbeki elaborated the party's ideas further, explaining the framework within which the ANC envisaged constitutional change. The first step was to remove obstacles to negotiation, towards which the Groote Schuur Minute was a start. The second step would be to determine who would be at the negotiating table. The ANC preferred the Namibian process, where the new constitution was drafted only after an election: 'That would stop all the debates about who is bigger, and who is genuinely represented'. The third step would be to agree on the supervision of elections, for the government could not be both referee and player in the same game. The fourth step would be the establishment of an interim government that enjoyed the confidence of all political groups. Another aspect was the question of who would direct the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC): 'It is a public corporation, not the property of the NP. It is a very powerful voice. We need to have confidence in their impartiality. They must be able to operate with no pressure from either side'.
International pressures
The support of the international community was important to both the ANC and the NP. Various reforms were instituted by the South African government to shape international opinion, and to this end Minister Gerrit Viljoen confirmed a significant policy shift by the NP. He said that the government did not regard the concept of group rights as non-negotiable, arguing that the protection of minorities was not a principle but rather an element to be considered in the nation-building process. 'Petty apartheid' and other discriminatory laws such as the Separate Amenities Act were to be scrapped. There was also a change of policy in the public service. The Own Affairs ministries, National Education and Agriculture, were consolidated into a single administration the government abandoned its policy of 'independent homeland. Quite apart from the reform they represented, these measures were cost-efficient and made financial sense. They also assisted De Klerk in presenting the case of the government to the European nations that he visited.
De Klerk's visits were successful, for several countries were to consider lifting embargoes and restrictions to trade. In his international tour, however, Mandela urged countries to maintain sanctions until there was positive proof that the process of transformation irreversible. Apartheid was still intact, there were still political prisÂoners, and the violence continued unabated. Moreover, there was also growing evidence of security force complicity in what came to be called 'third force' violence. Mandela argued that the government made sufficient changes to warrant the lifting of sanctions, summing up his argument by pointing out that 'twenty-seven years ago I could not vote. Twenty-seven years later I still cannot vote'.
Public pressure
Public pressure had an enormous impact on the conduct of both negotiating parties, as was the case throughout the process. Upon the announcement of the breakthrough at Groote Schuur, Harold Pakendorf warned in a sobering article:
Both need to show progress, both need the talks to develop into negotiation - and for the same basic reasons. For the National Party and the ANC know that they are not the only actors on the political stage, that there are others waiting to take over their positions instead of joining the process which has now begun. For the NP it is the Conservative Party and those to its right. For the ANC, it is the Pan Africanist Congress.
The CP walked out of Parliament in protest at what it saw as a sell-out by the NR The PAC publicly called the ANC sell-outs for talking at Groote Schuur. The oppressors and terrorists have overnight begun to represent the centre of South African politics.
The difficulty the NP found itself in became apparent when P W Botha publicly repudiated the Groote Schuur Minute and the talks, revealing that he had not renewed his membership of the NP and that he differed substantially with De Klerk on the path he had forged. De Klerk responded by arguing that his approach was a continuation of that laid down by Botha. The Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (AWB) leader, Eugene Terre'Blanche, put his boere (Afrikaner farmers) army on ' display for the benefit of the local and international media. By all accounts they were proficient, well trained, and duly inspired by their leader and a patriotic duty to defend the volk (the people) and their land against a black take-over.
Considering such opposition evoked by De Klerk's reforms, it took great courage and leadership to stick to them. This opposition became clearer in a by-election that took place in Umlazi, Natal, and a predominantly English-speaking constituency of lower-middle-class NP supporters. The NP majority dropped from 3 000 to only 547 in a year, representing a 27 per cent shift in the vote to the CP. De Klerk maintained that the mandate he had obtained in the 6 September 1989 elections was sufficient, and that he did not require further approval by the electorate for his reform programme.
The ANC also had to deal with the mixed reactions engendered by the Groote Schuur Minute by allaying the fears of its supporters that it was selling out on its objectives of liberation, majority rule, and democracy. The Sowetan, on 17 May 1990, argued that negotiation is not a good strategy for liberation: 'Any oppressed people who were fighting for liberation had to bargain with the oppressor from a position of strength - a position which could only be achieved if fundamental liberatory programmes were embarked upon by black people'.
Preparations for constitutional negotiation
The preparations carried out by each of the parties after Groote Schuur dearly showed the seriousness with which they approached the process. The ANC's Constitutional Committee, headed by Zola Skweyiya, convened in South Africa for the first time on 11 June 1990. 44 This committee was assigned to carry out detailed research into the development of the ANC's negotiating positions on a new constitutional dispensation. The National Party, for its part, had the benefit of the Department of Constitutional Development and Planning, which was specifically streamlined to prepare for the negotiation. By mid-June 1990 several cabinet members had produced an important charter of bottom-line principles for a new society, intended as a precondition for all parties intending to participate in the negotiation. It was put to the test in a meeting between government and homeland leaders on 18 June 1990. The meeting agreed that:
the common interests, aspirations and needs of all South Africans could be expressed in the following six principles:
. There should be efficient government and administration at national, regional and local levels at all times, before and during the process of negotiating a new constitutional dispensation.
. There should be economic growth and development to create jobs for our people, to fight poverty and to ensure business and investment confidence in our country and the Southern African region.
. Intimidation and political and other violence should cease, not only for the sake of reconciliation but also because a new, peaceful, just and prosperous South Africa cannot be attained through violence and destructive and unjust methods.
. Peaceful protest as a political method should be used sparingly and responsibly because of its disruptive and emotive effects.
. For any new constitutional dispensation eventually to be approved and supported by the majority of South Africans, all political entities and interests committed to peaceful solutions and having a proven base of support should be involved in negotiating a new constitution.
. The real negotiation for a new constitution should be the highest priority, and should start as soon as possible.
The purpose of this agreement was to put pressure on the ANC to abandon some of its policies.
The obstacles to negotiation
On 25 June 1990, European Community (EC) leaders met at a summit in Dublin and agreed not to ease any of the pressure the EC had previously put in place.
Both the ANC and the NP were agreed that it was necessary to create a climate conducive to negotiation. The Harare Declaration listed five conditions to create such a climate. By the end of June, forty-eight more political prisoners were released, organizations were unbanned, the state of emergency was lifted in all areas but Natal, there was a moratorium on all executions, and a joint working group was formed to deal with the definition of political offences affecting poliÂtical prisoners, and returning exiles requiring indemnity.
For De Klerk, South Africa was irrevocably on the road to far-reaching constitutional change. Sanctions and armed struggle were therefore inimical to a negotiated settlement. However, according to Roelf Meyer, the NP was not ready to remove the remaining obstacles identified in the Harare Declaration until the ANC committed itself to abandoning its policy of armed struggle. Mandela argued otherwise: both sanctions and the ANC's policy on armed struggle were weapons of change that had to remain in place until change was irreversible. Armed struggle, for example, could be ended only by a mutually binding cease-fire agreement.
The ANC, for its part, complained that the government failed to deal with the paramilitary right wing and was unwilling to deal with the lack of discipline in the police force. The ANC described the Harms Commission of Inquiry into politically motivated crimes as 'toothless'. The government, it claimed, also failed to dismantle the Civil CoÂoperation Bureau (CCB), which was a military intelligence front carrying out 'dirty tricks' against opponents of the government. As confirmation of the bona fides of the ANC, the commander of Umkhonto we Sizwe, Joe Modise, promised to agree to a cessation of hostilities if the obstacles in the way of negotiation were removed.
By the end of June 1990, however, the tide of media opinion had begun to turn against the ANC, and it was accused of delaying the negotiations unnecessarily. Because the ANC did not timeously respond to these concerns, it was assumed that the ANC could offer no credible reason for the delay. Finally, on 10 July, a meeting of the joint working group took place and agreed to a revised report containing recommendations to be made to their principals.
The Pretoria Minute
DEALING WITH THE OBSTACLES
In the meantime, bilateral discussions continued around the shape of future negotiations and key constitutional issues. At the beginning of July 1990 Mandela's statements reflected greater optimism, and for him, the prospects for dismantling apartheid were better now than ever before. 55 There were also other signs that the ANC was prepared to reÂview its stand on several matters including sanctions and armed struggle.
The ANC's review of sanctions was informed by the reluctance of the international community to maintain heavy sanctions and the negative impact they made in the media. According to Mandela, the ANC was 'even more concerned than government' about sanctions because they were destroying the economy and blacks were the first to suffer through the loss of jobs. However, this debate was a red herring. As pointed out by former leader of the opposition, F. van Zyl Slabbert, the most dangerous illusion created by the sanctions debate is that when De Klerk and Mandela agree to end the call for sanctions, untold millions of investment capital will pour into SA. Nothing of the kind will happen. If the process of transition does not lead to confidence no turnabout on the sanctions debate will have any effect whatsoever. It is far more important to persuade investors of the viability of the society that will result from transition than to score debating points in the campaign for or against sanctions.
The real issue was not so much the economic impact of sanctions but their symbolism. The question of armed struggle was more difficult, for it was a symbol of hope of liberation to the majority in the country. Yet it was, by the same token, evident to the ANC that liberation would not come from the 'barrel of the gun'. For the government, however, the concept of a 'mutual cessation of hostilities' posed real problems.
Aside from the lack of clear meaning in the phrase, the government interpreted this demand to mean that the ANC wanted the security forces hamstrung. Related to this was the question of legislation that made armed acts unlawful. The government mooted a 'cut-off date' for purposes of indemnification, which was convenient as the date could also be applied to the return of exiles and the release of political prisoners. There was still some hesitation, however, in allowing exiles to return and in releasing prisoners while the ANC maintained its policy of armed struggle. It was during this period that the ANC began to recognize that it was not possible for the government to address all the obstacles identified in the Harare Declaration, and that it needed to review its position.
The first indications of such a review came from the ANC's educational publication entitled The Road to Peace early in July 1990. In its evaluation of progress, it recognized that:
In the present situation, it seems that we need to consider some of these questions afresh or in greater depth. Do all our preconditions need to be met before there can be negotiation'? Must all apartheid laws be scrapped before the democratic forces can negotiate with the forces of apartheid?
We need to be more precise and examine which preconditions need to be met immediately to ensure participation of authentic leaders acting with a mandate from organisations in an atmoÂsphere where consultation is possible. What is suggested here, is a shift in the way we tackle preconditions. In no way do we abandon our demand for the total abolition of apartheid laws. ... We cannot conduct a struggle in some pure form where one tactic serves us all the time, or where we use only one weapon. We must change if the struggle needs it. What we need now is to reorient ourselves towards the questions of negotiation.
The agitation of the ANC was obvious, never more so than during Mandela's international tour, when his concerns were apparent in the changing tone of his statements. In the last few weeks of this tour he was more optimistic and reconciliatory, and promised to meet De Klerk within 48 hours' of his return to the country.
The NP was also agitated, aware that ongoing public parrying was damaging to themselves and to the process. The urgency of the encounter between the two leaders injected an air of immediacy into the negotiations and served to restore some of the momentum lost in the weeks past. They agreed to a further round of formal talks on 6 August 1990.
There was also concern about the effect of the delay on the planning of the process of negotiation. It was necessary to have a new constitutional dispensation by no later than 1994, because in that year the mandate of the De Klerk government expired, and it was obliged to call an election in 1995. According to Roelf Meyer, 'we would have to have some resolutions before then.... We can't foresee another election in South Africa to elect a parliament and a new executive without blacks participating in that as well'.
The idea developed by the NP over the preceding months was for a two-chamber parliament, a concept much like that of the 'Great Indaba'. In terms of the proposal, the upper house (senate) would consist of representatives elected by 'cultural groups'. By giving the upper house significant powers, positions adopted in parliament would not adversely affect any particular group. This was the NP's response to the fear of a black majority, while the ANC, though it remained opposed to a minority veto, was not averse to rights for minorities.
The concept of an interim government was also elaborated upon. The ANC insisted that a new constitutional dispensation had to be drafted by an elected constituent assembly after the installation of an interim government, the scenario proposed in the Harare Declaration. However, what the ANC did not elaborate on was the constitutional dispensation under which such an interim government would operate. For the NP, its opposition was based on the fear of a constitutional hiatus during the interim period. The DP and the Labour Party shared the NP's opposition to an election for a constituent assembly and an interim government. This argument was not valid, however, because there could be no constitutional hiatus until the prevailing constitution was repealed or replaced. Nevertheless, the issue was that if the country continued to have parliamentary sovereignty, an interim government over which the NP had no control could effect legislation that might not be in its interests. What concerned the NP was the lack of a guaranteed protection of its interests during the tenure of an interim government. Naturally, the party was also concerned about the impression that would be caused by the installation of a government in which it would have no control.
In the meantime, the ANC was preparing a massive campaign to mobilize public support in favour of its demand for an interim government and constituent assembly. The government feared mass action, and did everything possible to persuade the ANC to desist from such tactics; but during November 1990 the powerful Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vereeniging (PWV) region of the ANC launched such a campaign, demanding the release of all political prisoners and the return of exiles, as well as the suspension of political trials, before the end of the year. It also demanded the establishment of an interim government and the reincorporation of Bophuthatswana into South Africa. In a further show of strength, the ANC held large marches in several major centres. The response of the government was to question the ANC's commitment to peace.
OVERCOMING THE OBSTACLES
On the eve of the scheduled 6 August meeting between the ANC and the government, news broke of the arrest of the leadership and a number of operatives of Operation Vula, among them Mac Maharaj, a member of the ANC's NEC since 1985 and the operation's commander. Ronnie Kasrils, Maharaj's deputy, was on the run. It has been noted above that Operation Vula was an ANC operation planned after the ANC's Kabwe Conference in 1985, and that it aimed at relocating some of its most senior leadership inside South Africa. Hence Maharaj, an NEC member, and Kasrils and Siphiwe Nyanda, both senior members of the ANC, had been deployed inside the country by 1988. The operation had been treated with such sensitivity that not even the NEC was aware of it; it was directly accountable only to Oliver Tambo and, in his absence, Alfred Nzo, the ANC's Secretary-General.
There was immediate speculation that there would be either a split in the ranks of the ANC or a plot to overthrow the government by force. The ANC denied this and demanded the release of Maharaj. But the organization had been tardy in its response to the arrests, and this gave rise to allegations based on significant negative media speculation and coverage. Despite the media hype, both parties agreed not to allow anything to jeopardize the scheduled meeting, despite demands by the right wing that the meeting be called off. The ANC announced its team as comprising Nelson Mandela, Alfred Nzo, Thabo Mbeki, Joe Slovo, and Joe Modise, and the government's delegation included De Klerk, Gerrit Viljoen, Kobie Coetsee, Adriaan Vlok, and Pik Botha. Since Operation Vula had been labelled a communist 'insurrectionary plot', De Klerk again unsuccessfully called upon Mandela to exclude Slovo from the delegation.
Despite these events, there was increasing hope and speculation that the 6 August meeting would produce another major breakthrough. However, the troubled experience did highlight two points, namely the commitment of both parties to negotiation, and the recognition that the situation in the country was extremely dynamic and volatile. It was therefore necessary to allow the process of negotiation to continue post-haste. The Business Day editorial of 6 August 1990 said:
The air of fragility that surrounded the Groote Schuur meeting of the ANC and the National Party has dissipated, thanks in part to the testing events of the past fortnight during which the 'Red scare' did its worst, and failed to derail the process. Nelson Mandela and the ANC are committed, beyond much doubt, to a search for peace; President de Klerk and his Cabinet have staked their political future on the same purpose.
Precarious hope has given way to confidence; the odds favour continuing negotiation rather than breakdown.
THE AGREEMENT TO REMOVE OBSTACLES
On 6 August 1990 the government and the ANC met at the Presidensie in Pretoria for talks that started at 9a.m. and continued for a marathon thirteen hours. This meeting gave birth to the Pretoria Minute, an agreement that all the obstacles identified by the ANC as obstructing negotiations would be removed or addressed.
Both parties accepted the amended report of the joint working group. Moreover, the ANC announced its decision to suspend its armed actions 'In the interest of moving as speedily as possible towards a negotiated peaceful political settlement and in the context of the agreements reached'. Target dates were set for the phased release of political prisoners to start on 1 September 1990, and for the granting of indemnities as of 1 October 1990. A working group was established and instructed to draw up a plan for the release of ANC political prisoners and the granting of indemnity to exiles. The working group was also authorized to appoint a body of local experts to assist it in its task. This process was to be completed by the end of the year.
In addition, the government undertook to lift the state of emergency in Natal as soon as possible and to review the Internal Security Act. Both parties committed themselves to steps aimed at normalizing and stabilizing the situation 'in line with the spirit of mutual trust obtaining between the leaders involved'. Finally, they agreed that 'against this background, the way is now open to proceed towards negotiation on a new constitution'.
OPPOSITION TO THE AGREEMENT
The Pretoria Minute also recognized the need to include other political parties in the process of negotiation. With this in mind, the government invited the PAC on 17 August 1990 to hold similar talks. The PAC rejected this invitation, in spite of the fact that the PAC would not be able to derive any benefits from the Pretoria Minute as its terms only affected the ANC. AZAPO was also invited and also responded with a rejection.
The international community was unanimous in applauding the outcome of the talks, as were the South African business and religious communities. The Conservative Party, on the other hand, rejected the agreement; in his response to the Pretoria Minute, Dr Ferdi Hartzenberg called on whites to 'resist the moves of the government and to fight for our liberation'. Similarly, the PAC and AZAPO recorded their unequivocal rejection of the agreement reached. There was also a considerable amount of disquiet within ANC ranks, especially from its youth. To ease matters, the ANC asked senior leaders to explain the agreement to its supporters throughout the country, and to this end a report was also placed in several newspapers.
The Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) and its leader, Mangosuthu Buthelezi, welcomed the ANC's announcement of the suspension of its armed action and the Pretoria Minute. However, Buthelezi threatÂened that the violence would not end until there was agreement between himself and Mandela, for it seemed that the IFP leader felt slighted by the fact that he was not respected as a role-player and invited to these meetings. This theme would surface throughout the process and poison the relationship between the two leaders.
On 16 September the IFP's Central Committee resolved to urge De Klerk to hold an urgent conference for all those who hoped to sit around the negotiating table. At the same time it called on the OAU and the UN to demand that Mandela meet with Buthelezi to deal with the question of violence. However, when Mandela first requested a meeting with Buthelezi, it was rejected.
THE ESCALATION OP POLITICAL VIOLENCE
The ANC's NEC met in October 1990 to discuss the escalation of violence, and resolved that a meeting be called with the IFP. This time Buthelezi welcomed the invitation. It was to be the first face-to-face encounter between the two since Mandela's release from prison. Meanwhile, Buthelezi met with Dr Andries Treurnicht, leader of the CP, early in November 1990 to exchange views on negotiation. At the meeting, Buthelezi again vented his anger at being 'marginalized' by the ANC, stating that it was necessary to take ethnic and group realities into account in a new South Africa.
As these parties manoeuvred, violence was escalating to frightening proportions. Ironically, just as the Pretoria Minute was being negotiated, twelve people were killed in a clash between supporters of the ANC and IFP in Kagiso, a township west of Johannesburg. This followed battles the previous month between the same parties in Sebokeng, south of Johannesburg, in which at least twenty-two people died. The conflict that had resulted in the loss of 3 000 in Natal in the previous three years was now spreading to the PWV (Pretoria/ Witwatersrand/Vereeniging) region. According to the South African Institute of Race Relations, deaths as a result of political violence increased to 3 699 during 1990, up from 1 403 deaths the year before. Roughly half of the victims in 1990 came from Natal. A related problem was the growing evidence of a 'dirty tricks' campaign waged by the security forces and their involvement in the violence. Allegations were also made that the security forces were not doing enough to curb the violence.
At the end of August the parties announced the names of their members on the Pretoria Minute joint working group that would consider the question of a cessation of hostilities. The ANC delegates included Joe Modise, Thabo Mbeki, Jacob Zuma, Joe Nhlanhla, and Pallo Jordan, as well as Chris Hard, included in the team despite the fact that the government refused to renew his indemnity. The government's delegates were Adriaan Vlok, Roelf Meyer, General B. J. Beukes of the Security Police, Johan Geyser of the Department of Justice, Dr H. P. Fourie of the Department of Foreign Affairs, and Maritz Spaar-water of the National Intelligence Service.
At the beginning of September 1990 the mood in the country was buoyant, for it was becoming evident that negotiating the transformation of South Africa could succeed. Mandela confirmed that 'the next stage of the talks between the government and the ANC should be concerned with the question of identifying the people who are going to be entrusted with the task of drawing up a new constitution'. The excitement was short-lived, however, as the escalation of violence again began to threaten the negotiation process. Mandela argued that the government had the capacity to put an end to the violence and should be held responsible for this failure, while it was also alleged that the government was waging war and talking about peace at the same time. The dreaded 'Operation Fist' was intended to prevent intiÂmidation and deal with the political conflict, but the result was a continuation of repression that made it difficult to carry out free political activity. Even under this cloud Mandela refused to abandon the negotiations, arguing that this would only serve to play into the hands of those responsible for 'third force' violence.
The ANC believed that the situation was serious enough to warrant a further summit with the government, but the government disagreed. It was during this period that another form of potentially violent resistance was beginning to emerge in the form of the right wing. After the government announced its plans to reform or repeal the Land Act, the CP confirmed that it had plans for a resistance campaign. To this extent, there was added criticism from black people that the government was not acting even-handedly
DEVELOPING CONSTITUTIONAL PROPOSALS
In a separate development, the National Party announced that its membership was open to all races, a decision that was welcomed by many. De Klerk was confident enough to confirm that 'South Africa will never go back to the pattern of racism and apartheid'. The development of the NP's constitutional proposals was also at an advanced stage as the Broederbond prepared its constitutional model.
The proposal included a multi-party cabinet with rotating chairÂpersons; a ceremonial head of state; and two chambers of parliament including a one-person-one-vote house of representatives and a senate with ten members elected by each region and ten members elected by each group (defined non-racially). There would be ten regions, each with a democratic regional government and its own constitution. The dispensation would also include a bill of rights. An important development in government thinking was the move away from the system of provincial and homeland governments to one comprising strong regional governments. According to De Klerk, expanded powers of local and regional government would prevent any single group from monopolizing power at central government level. Such devolution of power would play an important role in protecting minorities. In November 1990 the National Party considered abandoning its ideas of parliamentary sovereignty and the protection of racial or ethnic minorities. With regard to the concept of minorities, Gerrit Viljoen stated "The minorities will, of course, have to differ in two respects from the existing groups in South African society in order to gain credence. In the first place, they must not be based on race or colour, and in the second place the definition must allow freedom of association. The rights and values the government wants to have protected for minority groups are moreover not special privileges for a particular minority group alone, but rights and values that must be available to the nation as a whole'.
The crisis in local government and the government's demand for strong regional power forced the debate around a regional dispensation to the centre stage. Viljoen argued that the most likely scenario was for 'development regions' to replace provinces, where each of these units would have a large measure of fiscal autonomy and its own tax base. This idea was rejected by the ANC, which in turn proposed a strong central government, while recognizing the need for decentralization of power. According to Zola Skweyiya, the head of the ANC's legal and constitutional department, 'There is a general feeling that although central government must have some control over the issues that are vital to the conduct of government, national, regional and local authorities must be given some leverage on exercising a choice among competing priorities'.
Skweyiya went on to criticize the proposals as an attempt to entrench white privilege while appearing to concede some powers to black communities. This the NP hoped to achieve by ensuring that the future South Africa would be a capitalist state in which class would balance race in a system of checks and balances. The proposals embraced a weak parliament, a constitution that institutionalized privatized apartheid and maintained inequalities, the entrenchment of powerful economic privileges, and a judiciary to defend this arrangement.
It was on this subject that the government met again with the leaders of all homeland governments, including Buthelezi.' The meeting gave rise to speculation that the NP could go into an electoral alliance with other 'moderates', as the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance had done in Namibia. During this period, De Klerk also hinted at a possible alliance with the DP, announcing that, 'our aim is a winning alliance. I believe absolutely that it is attainable'.
Late in October the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) released a study arguing that a new constitution would only enjoy legitimacy among the majority if drafted by an elected constituent assembly, and cautioning against any 'quick fix' solutions.
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PRETORIA MINUTE
Within two months of the Pretoria Minute, the progress made seemed to be rendered virtually meaningless. The joint monitoring group established to track the ANC's suspension of armed action could not even arrive at a definition of' armed struggle'. Moreover, the report was delayed until November because the government refused to indemnify Chris Hani. When it was finally released, the report was met with some relief. It recorded progress, especially on the sensitive issues of ANC arms caches, military recruitment, and an enforcement of the suspension of armed actions.
Despite the report, however, controversy around the implications of the agreement to suspend armed actions remained. The government insisted that such a suspension include the surrender of arms caches, an end to the recruitment of new MK members, and the abolition of mass action'. The ANC disputed this, insisting that the government first disband covert security force units. The ANC also objected to the NP's linking the release of political prisoners and indemnity of exiles to the armed struggle in order to force further concessions from the ANC.
Furthermore, only forty-five prisoners were released between August and September, and a further twenty-seven a few weeks later, just before De Klerk was to undertake yet another tour of European nations. The delay in releasing political prisoners also resulted in disturbances within the prisons as many prisoners went on hunger strike to apply further pressure. There was no movement on the return of exiles either, since the ANC was unhappy with the amount of detail required on the questionnaire provided by the government for those requiring indemnity.
To help the process along, the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) offered to assist in the repatriation of some 20 000 refugees. At a meeting between Mandela and De Klerk it was agreed that the cut-off date for indemnity be fixed as the date of the meeting: 8 October 1990. This came after agreement on the report by the joint working group on this question was reached. In addition, the joint working group agreed on 1 November 1990 that the indemnities offered affected members of all groups, and not only the ANC.
At another level, the dreaded Reservation of Separate Amenities Act was repealed on 15 October 1990, thus removing the legal basis for 'petty apartheid'. During November De Klerk reshuffled his cabinet in a bid to clear the decks for negotiation, a process that he would repeat later on. In the case of Minister Gerrit Viljoen, while he shed responsibility for one department, he had an additional Deputy-Minister, Tertius Delport, appointed to assist Roelf Meyer. Both government negotiators were to play an increasingly important part in the negotiation effort.
During this period the country also witnessed an intensification of political conflict at the level of local government, as people demanded the resignation of local government councillors and 'bantustan [homeland] regimes'. At the same time, there was a mushrooming of 'organs of people's rule' such as street and village committees. Local authorities in black areas were rendered incapable of governing.
A financial crisis was developing in local government as well, since more than half of the local authorities in the Transvaal, a total of forty-seven, were in the throes of rent and utilities boycotts. The councils faced a total debt of more than R1 billion to the Transvaal Provincial Administration. Eskom, the parastatal responsible for power supply, was taking legal action against seventeen councils that owed R23 million for electricity. Another ten councils were facing similar action. Cut-offs of electricity and water led to unrest and mass action, and a troubled government had to ask itself whether it was still effectively in control.
As the country moved towards a new constitutional dispensation, business and labour began to assert their right to influence the negotiations, adamant that the drafting of the new constitution should not be the task of politicians and lawyers only. The general upheaval and the government's perception of mass action as obstacles to negotiation were cause for a further meeting between Mandela and De Klerk on 27 November 1990. The concern precipitated by the crisis was evident in the editorials of major Sunday newspapers. The meeting confirmed that negotiation was still on track and that progress depended on the outcome of the reports of the joint working groups.
It was against this background that De Klerk's cabinet went into a 'bosberaad', or retreat, to plan its priorities for the approaching parliamentary session.' They decided to establish a negotiating team for the NP separate from that of the government. Immediately after the bosberaad, Mandela and De Klerk met several times to consider a wide range of issues, including the ongoing violence and the current dispute with regard to the interpretation of paragraph 3 of the Pretoria Minute, which dealt with armed struggle and armed action. The dispute related to continued recruitment and training by Umkhonto we Sizwe.
Between 14 and 16 December 1990 the ANC held a National Consultative Conference at NASREC near Soweto. This conference called for the establishment of defence units and threatened to suspend participation in the negotiation process if all outstanding obstacles were not removed by 30 April 1991, which was the date agreed to in the Pretoria Minute for the removal of obstacles to negotiation. Delegates were suspicious of the bilateral discussions taking place, and criticized the leadership for not consulting the membership or reporting to them, highlighting the level of mistrust and suspicion that existed even within the party. While the conference mandated the leadership to continue with the talks, its main resolutions set the ANC on a course of mass action aimed at applying further pressure on government.
On 18 December, the government gazetted legislation that allowed for most exiles to return to South Africa. This went a long way to satisfying one of the remaining obstacles to negotiation. In view of the threatened mass action, De Klerk felt moved to bring forward his annual Christmas message and provide a state-of-the-nation address. In a hard-hitting broadcast, he challenged the ANC to choose between supporting peaceful negotiation and reverting to the old order of confrontation and conflict.
The end of 1990 was a disappointing anti-climax to a year filled with great hope and expectation. Some of the most momentous changes in the history of the country had taken place, but the spectre of violence had begun to show its ugly face in the guise of the 'third force'. Furthermore, little was being done to bring about peace, and the people of South Africa were left in a state of great uncertainty.
The D. F. Malan Accord
PAVING THE WAY TO MULTI-PARTY NEGOTIATIONS
The New Year began on a more positive note. Every year on 8 January the ANC released on its birthday a policy statement of the challenges facing the organization and its constituencies. In its 1991 statement, it proposed an all-party conference on constitutional negotiation that would include the IFP and the CP. This conference would have three tasks: to set out broad constitutional principles, to determine the composition of the body that would draft the constitution, and to establish an interim government to oversee the process of transition. While the government, the DP, and the IFP welcomed the idea, the PAC, AZAPO, and the CP remained opposed. It was also agreed that the first meeting between Mandela and Buthelezi would take place on 29 January.
The meeting was a success and a joint declaration was released calling on supporters of both parties to desist from vilification of other organizations or their leaders. The declaration also called on people not to 'coerce or intimidate anyone in the pursuit of their organisation's strategies and programmes'. A mechanism to monitor violations of the agreement was settled, and it was resolved that the two leaders would jointly tour the violence-torn areas. Further meetings between the leaders were also agreed to, and the meeting was hailed as an important breakthrough for peace. 158 However, violence continued to escalate without reprieve. A further meeting between the two leaders took place on 31 March 1991 to discuss the problem, in which they agreed to discuss the question of violence jointly with De Klerk. This meeting sought to deal with the establishment of peace committee structures throughout the country.
On the first anniversary of his 2 February 1990 speech, De Klerk was keen to be seen taking the initiative, especially after the ANC's call for an all-party congress. In his opening speech to Parliament he announced the total scrapping of major discriminatory laws, including the Population Registration Act, the Group Areas Act, and the Land Act. Apartheid was given its official death warrant: De Klerk expected these laws to be repealed by June 1991. The requirements for the lifting of the ban on trade by the European Community had now been met, and he accordingly wasted no time in challenging these countries to 'translate basic feelings into real deeds'.
What De Klerk did not explain was that the repeal of the Population Registration Act did not mean that there was a common voters' roll, for the three separate racially-based voters' rolls remained, and the change only affected new citizens. Notwithstanding this indiscretion, the move was a positive development. The NP had argued previously that the Population Registration Act would only be repealed as part of the negotiation for a new constitution, so now it was no longer a bargaining chip. On the other hand, although this was a perfect opportunity for De Klerk to remove all the outstanding obstacles to negotiation, he failed to provide for a general amnesty and amend security legislation.
THE AGREEMENT
In another breakthrough, an agreement was brokered on the meaning of the 'suspension of armed action and related activities'. The agreement was confirmed at D. F. Malan Airport in Cape Town on 12 February 1991 and thus came to be known as the D. F. Malan Accord. The accord effectively removed most obstacles in the way of a multi-party conference. In terms of the agreement, the ANC undertook not to carry out armed attacks or infiltrate South Africa with men or weapons. Recruitment of cadres for military training inside the country would also cease. There would be no statements inciting violence, threats of armed action, or the creation of underground structures. 166 There was no agreement, however, on the surrender of ANC weapons, the identification of arms caches, the demobilization of cadres, or the establishment of self-defence units. It was further agreed that membership of Umkhonto we Sizwe would not be unlawful, individual weapons would be licensed, and the right to peaceful demonstrations would be maintained.
With regard to indemnities, two former judges (Justices Solomon and Leon) and an Appeal Court judge (Justice Steyn) were appointed to chair committees to determine whether awaiting-trial prisoners and exiles should be granted individual indemnity. On 12 March there was a further breakthrough, when it was agreed that ANC members who had undergone military training automatically qualified for indemnity. In March 1991, thirty-three political prisoners were released after being granted unconditional indemnity, these releases bringing the number of political prisoners released to 310. At the same time, the National Coordinating Committee for Repatriation (NCCR) was facilitating the return of a number of exiles. Another positive development was the lifting of the ban on outdoor political meetings. This ban had been in force for the last fifteen years and was a source of much contention and frustration. Its removal greatly assisted the move towards free political activity.
However, many in the ANC were suspicious of the agreement, believing that the negotiation was a trap from which the ANC would not be able to recover. However, the ANC leadership remained confident about the negotiations. The agreement also led to relations between the PAC and the ANC being further soured: the PAC denounced the agreement and asked the ANC to review its decision to participate in the all-party conference. The PAC's Benny Alexander asserted, 'in the absence of the ballot, the bullet cannot be abandoned'.
Meanwhile, De Klerk met with leaders of the homelands, including Rev. Allan Hendrickse, Dr J. N. Reddy, and Mangosuthu Buthelezi, late in February 1991. They supported the need for the multi-party conference. Speaking to leaders of the Venda government a month later, De Klerk argued that the agreement to hold the multi-party conference opened the door for the reincorporation of the TBVC states (Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda, and Ciskei) into South Africa, and would allow their participation in such a conference.