

On the outbreak of war and the barbarity of the English - Paul Kruger

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In the final chapter of his memoirs exiled ZAR President describes his battle against the world's greatest imperialist power

CHAPTER XII

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PAUL KRUGER'S FOURTH PRESIDENCY

The result of the new election came as a surprise to friends and enemies alike ; for, although my re-election was certain, no one suspected that I would obtain such an overwhelming majority. The official figures were:

Kruger .- 12,858 votes

Schalk Burger - 3,750

Joubert .- 2,001

On the 12th of May 1898, I took the oath for the fourth time as State President. On this occasion I made a speech which took almost three hours to deliver, and in which I set forth my religious and political views on the actual situation and on the problems confronting the State.[1]

[1 This speech, by far the longest speech that President Kruger ever delivered, is really a series of addresses to the First and Second Volksraad, the Executive Raad, the representatives of the Orange Free State, the corps diplomatique, the burghers, the naturalized foreigners, the new immigrants, the judges, the clergy, the schoolmasters and mistresses and the children. It will be found in the Appendix. - **Note by the Editor of the German Edition.**]

During the session of the Volksraad of 1898, Dr. Leyds was almost unanimously re-elected State Secretary, but was shortly afterwards appointed Envoy Extraordinary of the Republic in Europe. As his successor, Abraham Fischer was elected, one of the ablest and most sagacious statesmen in South Africa, and at that time a member of the Executive Raad of the Orange Free State. He refused, however, to accept the proffered appointment, whereupon Mr. F. W. Reitz, who had recently been promoted to a judgeship in the South African Republic, was elected State Secretary, a happy choice, for Mr. Reitz is looked upon by friend and foe alike as one of the most honest men that have ever played a part in politics. Moreover, he possessed an abundant knowledge of affairs, thanks to his long political career.

At the same time, J. C. Smuts, a representative of the younger generation of Afrikaners, was appointed State Attorney. Smuts is one of the cleverest lawyers in South Africa and a man of versatile attainments besides. He is personally a very simple man, and, to meet him, one would not suspect that he possesses so firm a will and so determined a character as he does. Although scarcely 30 years of age and without the slightest previous experience of military affairs, he developed, in the later phases of the war, into a most brilliant general, so that he added to his position as State Attorney that of an assistant commandant general of the South African Republic.

Smuts will yet play a great part in the history of South Africa.

Shortly after the swearing-in of Messrs. Reitz and Smuts, the Bunu question became urgent, and Sir Alfred Milner received his first chance to provoke and thwart the Republic.

The Bunu question was briefly as follows: according to the old custom, the Swazi king had the right to put any of his subjects to death whenever he pleased. This condition was naturally altered from the moment when the Republic took over the administration of Swaziland. In the early part of 1898, Bunu murdered one of his indunas, named Umbaba, in addition to some others. It was stated by eye-witnesses that Bunu had killed Umbaba with his own hand. When Bunu was summoned by the State Attorney to appear before the court at Bremersdorp, he at first refused to come, and, when eventually he did come, arrived accompanied by an armed suite, and adopted a threatening attitude towards Krogh, the Special Commissioner for Swaziland. Krogh was consequently obliged to let the matter drop, and Bunu returned to his town.

The Government had no choice but to send an armed force to Swaziland, in order to protect life and property and to compel Bunu, if necessary by force, to appear before the court. Meanwhile, the High Commissioner deemed it necessary to interfere in the matter, probably with no other object than to cause the Republic needless annoyance.

Perhaps, also, he thought that the Bunu question would give him the occasion to involve the Republic in war with England. He contended, namely, that the Government had not the right to summon Bunu before the Swaziland court, notwithstanding that the Swaziland Convention contained an article stipulating that criminal cases occurring in Swaziland should be tried by the Supreme Court at Bremersdorp. When Bunu saw that the Government of the Republic was in earnest, he fled to Zululand and placed himself under the protection of the British Government. In order to avoid getting into difficulties for Bunu's sake, the Government was obliged to conclude an agreement with the High Commissioner which determined that Bunu should be allowed to return, and that he should only be punished with a fine. At the same time, a clause was added to the Swaziland Convention, distinctly deciding which cases should, in future, be within the competence of the Supreme Court of that country.

Already at that time, and shortly after the settlement of the Bunu question the English in and outside South Africa were adopting a defiant attitude towards the Government of the Republic. At Johannesburg, a branch of the South African League had been established, at the undoubted instigation of Cecil Rhodes. This league did its utmost to involve the Republic in difficulties with England.

No methods were too base or too mean to attain that end. When the Government arrested some colored persons, British subjects, because they were without the passes which they were obliged to carry by the Pass Law, a great hubbub was raised and the League leaders called a meeting in the Amphitheater at Johannesburg to protest against the action of the Republic. The burghers' blood boiled at the attitude of this Rhodes institution : they attended the meeting in large numbers, with the result that a brawl arose and the demonstrators were dispersed with sticks by the burghers. That this brought grist to the mill of the Jingoese, that it was probably just what they desired, is easily understood.

Shortly after, another incident occurred which caused yet more excitement and which was represented by the English press in a shamefully distorted fashion. Even Mr. Chamberlain did not blush to make use of these misrepresentations, although it would have been easy for him to learn the whole truth. What was the question? On the night of the 18th of December 1898, a certain Foster, a British subject, was attacked by another British subject called Edgar, and so maltreated that he was left lying for dead. He was taken to the hospital and died a few days later in consequence of the blows which Edgar had given him. Immediately after the perpetration of his crime, Edgar fled to his room and soon a few police came upon the scene, attracted by the screams of the bystanders.

Among the police was one named Jones, a son of a former coachman to the Queen of England, who

had, however, in his quality as a policeman, become a burgher of the Republic. This Jones, thinking that Foster was dead, followed Edgar to his apartment to arrest him for murder. As Edgar was caught in the very act, the police had the right, according to the laws, not only of the Republic, but of the whole of South Africa and of England herself, to enter his house, if necessary by force, and arrest the culprit.

As Edgar had locked the door and refused to open it, Jones broke it open and, while doing so, was struck a violent blow by Edgar with a bar of iron. Thereupon Jones shot Edgar dead. Although every one will admit that the policeman only did his duty, he was nevertheless prosecuted by the State Attorney for manslaughter, in order to remove any ground for complaint on the part of England. He was, however, as was to be expected, acquitted by the court.

But how did Mr. Chamberlain represent this matter? As follows : that policemen broke into a man's house at night without a warrant on the mere statement of one person, which subsequently turned out to be untrue, that the man had committed a crime, and killed him there and then, because, according to their own account, he hit one of them with a stick! Can malevolence go further than this? And ought not a minister to be ashamed thus to violate the truth in an official dispatch?

We now come to the period immediately preceding serious crisis. In the meantime, the English and the English press, both in South Africa and England, were agitating and vociferating against the Republic.

An election had taken place, in the previous year, in Cape Colony, in which the Afrikaner party had gained the victory, a fact which drove Rhodes and all his Jingo clique to fury. Sir Alfred Milner, instead of confining himself to his role of Governor, showed himself in his true colors and openly espoused the side of the Jingo in Cape Colony. It was evident to all that a crisis was at hand which, if not carefully treated, could end only in catastrophe. But where there are two parties, it avails nothing that one is yielding and compliant, when the other at all costs pushes matters to extremes and, as in this case, to a war.

That the Government of the South African Republic, in the negotiations that preceded the war, was yielding and compliant is shown by the manner in which the correspondence with England was conducted at this time. The question of the franchise was that which Sir Alfred Milner and Mr. Chamberlain employed as a pretext to force a war upon the Republic.

Before, therefore, discussing the negotiations concerning the franchise question, it is well to mention the fact that, as early as the beginning of 1899, I had held meetings of the burghers at Rustenburg and Heidelberg in order to obtain their support for my proposal to reduce the period required for securing the full franchise from fourteen years to nine years. From there I went to Johannesburg and there declared at a public meeting that I hoped later to reduce the period of nine years' residence to a still shorter period. This fact deserves special mention, because it was probably that which startled Mr. Chamberlain and Sir Alfred Milner and impelled them to hurry on the crisis. Firmly determined as they were to force a war upon the Republic, these two men saw that they must lose no time, since I myself had begun to introduce reforms which might presently deprive them of their pretext for going to war. Sir Alfred Milner was in England at that time, and doubtless turned his stay to account to arrange with Chamberlain how they must set to work to carry out their imperialist programme. By the time he returned, the whole thing was settled and arranged.

The League at Johannesburg began by drawing up a petition to the Queen in which they enumerated a mass of grievances which, as British subjects, they claimed to have against the Republic, and ended by asking for the intervention of the British Government. Mr. Fraser, the acting British Agent, refused to receive the petition. For this he was rapped over the knuckles by the Colonial Secretary, who was just seeking an opportunity to meddle with the internal affairs of the Republic, with the result that, on a later occasion, Mr. Conyngham Greene, the real representative of the British Crown at Pretoria, who had also been to England with Sir Alfred Milner, knew better what was expected of him. In the meantime, Sir Alfred Milner had declared that an anti-British movement existed among

the Afrikaner population throughout South Africa. This, nota bene,, after he had cabled to England in 1897, on the occasion of the Queen's Jubilee, that the Afrikaners in Cape Colony were very loyal to England.

A second petition was drawn up by the League and signed by 21,684 British subjects. The signatures were collected by every kind of fraud. The Government of the Republic obtained many sworn declarations which stated that individuals had signed as many names as came into their heads. In the same way, the names of deceased and absent persons were placed on the lists. This is easily understood, when one realizes that the persons who went round with the lists were paid according to the number of names which they obtained. A few days later the Government at Pretoria received a petition with nearly 23,000 signatures in which the signers, Uitlanders of every nationality, declared that they were satisfied with the administration of the country.

But it was not Mr. Chamberlain's object to receive a genuine petition, so long as he could obtain a weapon with which to attack the Republic, and this weapon was afforded him by the aforesaid petition, which was speedily dispatched to him by the British Agent, Mr. Greene.

Meanwhile, at the commencement of May, Sir Alfred Milner had sent a cablegram to England which would have done credit to a sensation-mongering journalist. In this dispatch, he declared that Her Majesty's Government must give some striking proof of its intention not to be ousted from its position in South Africa, that thousands of British subjects were kept permanently in the position of helots and that the case for intervention was overwhelming.

Mr. Chamberlain thereupon sent a dispatch, dated 10 May 1899, in which he acknowledged the receipt of the petition to the Queen, recapitulated all the grievances of the Uitlanders and ended by suggesting to Sir Alfred Milner that a conference should take place between him and myself at Bloemfontein at which the question would be discussed. In the meantime, prompted by a sincere desire to put an end to the prevailing disquiet, President Steyn, before the receipt of this dispatch, had made the same proposal to both myself and Sir Alfred Milner. We both accepted the invitation and the well-known Bloemfontein Conference met on the 31st of May 1899, and lasted several days. With me were Schalk Burger and A. D. Wolmarans, members of the Executive Raad, and J. C. Smuts, the State Attorney.

Mr. Abraham Fischer, a member of the Executive Raad of the Orange Free State, kindly offered to act as interpreter.

The conference came to nothing. Sir Alfred Milner showed from the commencement that he had not the least desire to come to an agreement. He demanded:

1. Franchise after five years' residence.
2. An alteration in the oath of naturalization.
3. Increased representation of the new burghers in the Volksraad.

After several days' discussion, I offered:

1. Naturalization after two years' residence. Full franchise after five years more (or seven years all, instead of fourteen, as the law then stood) .
2. Increased representation of the Uitlanders in the Volksraad.
3. An oath of naturalization similar to that in the Orange Free State.

I demanded, however, that the franchise should be made to depend on the possession of a certain amount of property and naturalization on the production of proof that the individual concerned possessed civic rights in his own country. I also asked that, as a compensation for the concessions which I was making, the British Government should accept the principle of arbitration in the case of differences between the two States. Sir Alfred Milner, however, declared that the concessions were quite insufficient.

During this conference, I pointed out to Sir Alfred that a quantity of the signatures appearing on the petitions to the Queen were spurious, whereupon the latter answered: "Very well, we will investigate the matter."

He asked me whether the petition which had been addressed to the Government of the Republic did not also contain false signatures. I denied this positively, and said I was prepared at once to appoint a committee to inquire into the genuineness of both petitions. I said I was further prepared to grant the British Government the right of nominating Englishmen to act as members of this committee. Only the committee must not be appointed from England or acquire an official character, as this might make it appear as though the Republic were under British suzerainty. Hereupon Sir Alfred would hear no more, and said: "Let us drop the subject."

For the rest, he continued to insist upon what he called "his irreducible minimum." He declared that he had other grievances, which would remain, even if the franchise question was settled, and refused to produce them until the franchise question had been settled in his way.

The same evening, I sent to Sir Alfred asking him to meet me again the next morning for further deliberation; but Sir Alfred answered that he "considered this unnecessary and that the conference was ended."

As soon as I had returned to Pretoria, the State Secretary wrote a letter to the British Agent touching the proposed arbitration tribunal, towards which proposal Sir Alfred Milner had adopted an apparently friendly attitude. This letter was dated 9 June 1899, and in it the State Secretary made the following proposal to the British Government :

(1) All future differences between the two Governments arising out of varying interpretations of the London Convention shall, subject to what is set forth under paragraph 3, at the instance of this Government or of Her Majesty's Government, be referred to an arbitration tribunal, on the understanding, however, that no matters or differences of trifling importance shall be submitted to arbitration.

(2) The arbitration tribunal shall consist of an arbitrator to be nominated by this Government and an arbitrator to be nominated by Her Majesty's Government (as, for example, the Chief Justices respectively of the South African Republic and the Cape Colony or Natal). These two must agree respecting a third person, who shall act as President of the arbitration tribunal, this person not to be a subject of one of the arbitrating parties; and failing agreement upon this point, the two Governments shall together name a President; the decision in every case to take place by a majority of votes.

(3) The Act of Submission shall in every case be drawn up jointly by the two Governments, so that each shall have the right to reserve and exclude points which appear to it to be too important to be submitted to arbitration, provided that thereby the principle itself of arbitration be not frustrated.

(4) The arbitration tribunal shall itself decide the place of its sittings, and shall deal as it thinks fit with the condemnation of parties in the costs, unless special arrangement has been made concerning these points in the Act of Submission.

(5) The regulations of procedure of this arbitration tribunal can be similar to those agreed to by the Institute of International Law in the Hague in 1875, in so far as they do not conflict with the foregoing provisions, and in so far as they are not amended by both parties in the Act of Submission.

(6) In order to obtain a test of the suitability of such tribunal, this Government has no objection to its being agreed that this reference of Conventional differences shall provisionally take place for a period of five years.

The letter ended by expressing an earnest hope that Her Majesty's Government would accept the proposal, which would put an end to the permanent feeling of anxiety from which South Africa was suffering.

The proposals were made in the manner set forth above, with the special purpose of meeting the views of the British Government, as that Government objected to an arbitration court composed of foreigners and, in any case, declined to submit all questions to arbitration.

Meanwhile, of my own initiative, I introduced a draft law into the Volksraad which fixed:

1. A seven years' residence for obtaining the franchise.
2. The immediate grant of the franchise to all who had lived nine years in the country, while only five years' residence should be necessary for those who had been in the country for two years.
3. All adult sons of foreigners, born in the Republic, to receive the franchise immediately on attaining their majority.
4. An increase in the representation of the goldfields in each Raad by four members.

The bill was passed on the 19th of July. In the meanwhile, the Intelligence Department of the War Office in England had already issued "military notes " indicating how war should be waged against the Republic. At the same time (although this was not yet known), Lord Wolseley had laid his plans before the British Government for the conquest and seizure of the two Republics.] On the 26th of June, the British Agent replied to the arbitration proposals as set forth in Mr. Reitz's letter. In this answer he stated that Sir Alfred Milner could not recommend the acceptance of the proposal to the British Government, as he considered that the question of finding a remedy for the grievances of the Uitlanders should first be disposed of.

Furthermore, he intimated that the scheme drawn up by Mr. Reitz was not acceptable to Her Majesty's Government, seeing that, to make no mention of other objections, the president of the court, according to that scheme, could not be a subject of either of the arbitrating parties.

At the beginning of July, the leaders of the Afrikaner party, Messrs. Hofmeyer and Herholdt, went from Cape Town to Bloemfontein and thence to Pretoria to persuade the Government still further to simplify the new Franchise Law in such a way as to make the seven years' clause retrospective : so that every one who had spent seven years or more in the Republic could obtain the franchise at once; those who had been six years in the country would have to wait one year more in order to obtain the franchise ; those ones who had spent three years in the country must wait four years more, and so on. Their suggestions found a ready hearing among the members of the Government and the Volksraad, who were inclined to make even more concessions for dear peace' sake.

On the 18th of July, probably after having been informed by Messrs. Hofmeyer and Herholdt of the result of their mission, the Cape Ministry issued a note in which they expressed the conviction that there existed not the least occasion for intervention on the part of England in the internal affairs of the Republic.

On the 20th of July, the so-called Uitlanders' Council telegraphed to England that they were not satisfied with the Franchise Law which had just been passed (the law of the 19th of July).

On the 27th of July, Mr. Chamberlain sent a dispatch in which he recapitulated the events since the conference, persisted in his contentions that not only the letter but the spirit of the London Convention of 1884 had been constantly violated by the Government of the Republic, and ended by maintaining his contention that the preamble to the Convention of 1881 (respecting the Suzerainty) still held good.

He rejected the proposed arbitration court, although he suggested that certain questions might be submitted to some judicial authority.

On the 1st of August, Mr. Chamberlain telegraphed to the High Commissioner proposing that England and the Republic should appoint a joint commission to revise the Franchise Law which had been passed, and to enquire whether this law would afford a sufficient representation to the Uitlanders and, if this were not the case, to see what additions or alterations might be necessary to attain this object.

This proposal of Mr. Chamberlain's was a direct violation of the London Convention of 1884, for it is hardly possible to imagine a clearer case of interference with the internal affairs of the Republic.

The State Secretary, accordingly, replied on the 12th of August, calling Mr. Chamberlain's attention to the fact that, according to the Convention of 1884, the British Government was not to meddle in the internal affairs of the Republic, and expressed the hope that, in making his proposal, Mr. Chamberlain did not mean to encroach upon the rights of the Republic. The State Secretary further gave expression to the opinion that the object which Mr. Chamberlain had in view in the appointment of a joint commission could be as easily attained by asking questions and obtaining information about the measure. He also observed to Mr. Chamberlain that a judgment could only be formed as to whether a law answered its purpose or not, if it had been in operation for some time.

On the 15th of August, the State Attorney, Mr. J. C. Smuts, had an interview with the British Agent, in which he asked him whether Her Majesty's Government would consider the seven years' retrospective franchise, with an increase of seats for the Uitlanders in the Volksraad, to be sufficient and, in that case, waive the joint commission. Mr. Greene answered that he did not know whether Her Majesty's Government would consent to abandon their demand, but that the position was very critical; that Her Majesty's Government had made promises to the Uitlanders, and that they would, therefore, be obliged to insist on their demands and, if necessary, to employ force. He added that the only chance for the South African Republic was to comply without delay with the demands put forward by Sir Alfred Milner at Bloemfontein.

On the 19th of August, the State Secretary wrote to the British Agent making the following alternative proposal to Her Majesty's Government:

- (1) The Government are willing to recommend to the Volksraad and the people a five years' retrospective franchise as proposed by His Excellency the High Commissioner on June 1st, 1899
- (2) The Government are further willing to recommend to the Volksraad that eight new seats in the First Volksraad, and, if necessary, also in the Second Volksraad, be given to the population of the Witwatersrand, thus, with the two sitting members for the gold-fields, giving to the population thereof ten representatives in a Raad of twenty-six, and in future the representation of the gold-fields of this Republic shall not fall below the proportion of one-fourth of the total.
- (3) The new burghers shall equally with the old burghers be entitled to vote at the election for State President and Commandant General.
- (4) This Government will always be prepared to take into consideration such friendly suggestions regarding the details of the franchise law as Her Majesty's Government, through the British Agent, may wish to convey to it.
- (5) In putting forward the above proposals to the Government of the South African Republic assumes
 - (a) That Her British Majesty's Government will agree that the present intervention shall not form a precedent for future similar action, and that, in the future, no interference in the internal affairs of the Republic will take place.
 - (b) That Her Majesty's Government will not further insist on the assertion of the Suzerainty, the controversy on this subject being allowed tacitly to drop.
 - (c) That arbitration from which foreign element, other than Orange Free State, is to be excluded, will be conceded as soon as the franchise scheme has become law.
- (6) Immediately on Her British Majesty's Government accepting this proposal for a settlement, the Government will ask the Volksraad to adjourn for the purpose of consulting the people about it, and the whole scheme might become law, say, within a few weeks.
- (7) In the meantime the form and scope of the proposed tribunal are also to be discussed and provisionally agreed upon, while the franchise scheme is being referred to the people, so that no

time may be lost in putting an end to the present state of affairs.

The State Secretary ended by saying "that the Government trusts that Her Majesty's Government will clearly understand that in the opinion of this Government, the existing franchise law of this Republic is both fair and liberal to the new population, and that the consideration that induces them to go further, as they do in the above proposals, is their strong desire to get the controversies between the two Governments settled; and, further, to put an end to the present strained relations between the two Governments, and the incalculable harm and loss it has already occasioned in South Africa, and to prevent a racial war, from the effects of which South Africa may not recover for many generations, perhaps never at all; and, therefore, this Government, having regard to all these circumstances, would highly appreciate it, if Her Majesty's Government, seeing the necessity of preventing the present crisis from developing still further, and the urgency of an early termination of the present state of affairs, would expedite the acceptance or refusal of the settlement here offered."

On the 21st of August, the State Secretary again wrote to the British Agent to explain and complete his letter of the 19th of August. In this second letter, he makes it clear that the proposals regarding the question of franchise and representation in the dispatch of the 19th of August must be regarded as expressly conditional on Her Majesty's Government consenting to the points set forth in paragraph 5 of the dispatch, viz. :

- (a) In the future no interference in the internal affairs of the South African Republic.
- (b) No further insistence on the assertion of the existence of the suzerainty.
- (c) The acceptance of arbitration for the settlement of questions in dispute.

These proposals were made after the State Attorney had had a new interview with Mr. Greene, the result of which was to convince him that the British Government would be prepared to take those proposals into consideration. This would cause the proposal for a joint commission to lapse.

On the 25th of August the so-called Uitlanders' Council and the South African League declared that the franchise reforms were still insufficient, and demanded further " reforms," such as the disarming of the Boers and the demolition of the forts.

On the 26th of August, Mr. Chamberlain made a speech on the occasion of a garden-party at his place at Highbury, in which, among other things, he said:

Mr. Kruger dribbles out reforms like water from a squeezed sponge, and he either accompanies his offers with conditions which he knows to be impossible, or he refuses to allow us to make a satisfactory investigation of the nature of these reforms. . . . The sands are running down in the glass. The knot must be loosened ... or else we shall have to find other ways of untying it.

On the 30th of August, he sent a dispatch in which he stated, among other things, that Her Majesty's Government assumed that the adoption in principle of the franchise proposals would not be hampered by any conditions which would impair their effect; that Her Majesty's Government were unable to appreciate the objections entertained by the Government of the South African Republic to a joint commission of inquiry; that Her Majesty's Government, however, would appoint a commission on their side to institute an inquiry into the law and to make the necessary suggestions to the Government of the Republic, and trusted that different conditions, as to previous registration, qualification and behavior, would be omitted from the proposed new law.

With regard to the conditions of the Government of the South African Republic, Mr. Chamberlain said, as regards intervention, Her Majesty's Government hoped that the fulfilment of the promises made and the just treatment of the Uitlanders in future would render unnecessary any further interference on their behalf, but that Her Majesty's Government could not debar themselves from their rights under the conventions. (N.B. The convention of 1881 had lapsed, as is known.) With regard to the suzerainty, Mr. Chamberlain referred the Government to a former dispatch, in which he maintained that the suzerainty still existed. With regard to the proposed tribunal of arbitration, he

agreed to a discussion of the form and scope of such a tribunal, from which, however, foreigners and foreign influence were to be excluded.

He moreover proposed that a further conference should take place between myself and the High Commissioner at Cape Town, and ended by reminding the Government of the South African Republic that there were other matters of difference which could not be settled by the grant of political representation to the Uitlanders and which were not proper subjects for reference to arbitration.

Mr. Chamberlain afterwards declared that, in this dispatch, he accepted the proposals of the Government of the South African Republic as set forth above. He is probably the only man in the world who read his dispatch in this light: every impartial judge will think the opposite.

On the 31st of August, Sir Alfred Milner telegraphed to Mr. Chamberlain: The purport of all the representations made to me is to urge prompt and decided action; not to deprecate further interference on the part of Her Majesty's Government. British South Africa is prepared for extreme measures fear seriously that there will be a strong reaction of feeling against the policy of Her Majesty's Government if matters drag.

In reply to Mr. Chamberlain's dispatch of the 30th of August, the State Secretary, on the 2nd of September, wrote to the British Agent at Pretoria that the Government of the South African Republic had heard with the deepest regret that Her Majesty's Government had not seen their way to accept the proposals which were set forth in the notes of the 19th and 21st of August, under the conditions attached thereto, the more so as the Government had supposed from semi-official discussions that it might infer that its proposal would have been acceptable to Her Majesty's Government. In consequence, the Government of the South African Republic considered that its proposal had lapsed. With regard to the unilateral inquiry, the Government was willing, if it should appear that the existing franchise law might be made more effective, to lay proposals before the Volksraad. It appeared, however, to it that the findings of a unilateral commission, especially when made before the working of the law had been properly tested, would probably be of little value. Passing to the remarks made by Mr. Chamberlain in connection with the conditions attached to the proposals in the note of the 19th of August, the State Secretary observes:

(a) That this Government has never, with reference to the question of intervention, either asked or intended that Her Majesty's Government should abandon any right it may have, as a matter of fact by virtue of either the Convention of London of 1884 or of general international law, to take action here for the protection of British subjects.

(6) That with regard to the alleged existence of suzerainty, the denial of its existence by this Government according to its view has already been so clearly explained in its dispatch of 16th of April, 1898, that it would be superfluous to repeat the facts, arguments and consequences mentioned therein: it merely wishes to observe that it adheres to its contentions stated in that dispatch.

With reference to a tribunal of arbitration the Government was pleased to see that Her Majesty's Government were prepared to enter into negotiations with regard to the form and scope of such tribunal.

It was however not clear to it:

(a) If Her Majesty's Government consents that burghers of the Orange Free State may also be appointed as members of such tribunal.

(6) What subjects shall be submitted to the decision of such court.

(c) What are the subjects Her Majesty's Government thinks cannot be laid before such court. Her Majesty's Government states that there are such points, but does not specify them.

The object contemplated by the Government of the South African Republic, i.e., the securing of a

final regulation of all points at issue, would, it opined, be altogether frustrated by these limitations. With reference to the recommendation of a conference to be held, the Government would await further communications from Her Majesty's Government. The State Secretary went on to remark that the proposal made by his Government with reference to the franchise and representation of the Uitlanders was extremely liberal, and, as a matter of fact, went further than the propositions of the High Commissioner put forward at the Bloemfontein Conference ; that the conditions attached by his Government did not demand from the side of Her Majesty's Government any abandonment of existing rights under the Convention of London of 1884 ; that the Government of the South African Republic could never have expected that the answer of Her Majesty's Government to its proposal would be unfavorable; that it continued to cherish the hope that a solution of existing differences might be arrived at; and, in order to attain this peaceful solution, the State Secretary ended his letter by accepting the joint commission formerly proposed by Mr. Chamberlain.

On the 12th of September, Mr. Greene, on behalf of the British Government, answered Mr. Reitz's dispatch of the 2d of September, and said that Her Majesty's Government could not now consent to go back to its former proposal of a joint commission; that Her Majesty's Government were still prepared to accept the proposals, provided that the inquiry which Her Majesty's Government had proposed, whether joint or unilateral, showed that the scheme would not be encumbered by conditions which would nullify its intentions. His Government assumed that the new members of the Volksraad would be permitted to use their own language. He ended his letter by pressing for an immediate reply, and stating that, if the reply was negative or inconclusive, Her Majesty's Government reserved to itself the right to reconsider the situation *de novo* and to formulate its own proposals for a final settlement.

To this the State Secretary replied, on the 15th of September, that his Government learned with deep regret that Her Majesty's Government withdrew its invitation and substituted in its place an entirely new proposal; that the proposal contained in the notes of the Government of the 19th and 21st of August was induced by suggestions given by the British Agent to the State Attorney, and these were accepted by his Government in good faith, and on express request, as equivalent to an assurance that the proposal would be acceptable to the British Government; that his Government could not disguise from itself that, in making the proposal contained in its note of the 19th of August, it probably ran the danger not only of its being disclaimed by the Volksraad and by the people, but also that its acceptance might affect the independence of the state by, as therein proposed, giving an immediate vote in the legislature of the state to a large number of inpouring foreigners ; but it set against that the continuous threatening and undoubted danger to its highly prized independence arising from the claim of suzerainty made by Her Majesty's Government, from the interference of that Government in the internal affairs of the Republic and from the want of an automatically working method of regulating differences between Her Majesty's Government and the Government of the Republic, and was in consequence prepared to recommend to the Volksraad and to the people to run the danger attached to the offer made in order to avoid the certainty of the greater danger; inasmuch, however, as the conditions attached to the proposal, the acceptance of which constituted the only consideration for its offer, had been declared unacceptable, it could not understand on what grounds of justice it could be expected that it should be bound to grant the rest.

As regards the point that the new members should speak their own language in the Volksraad, the Government could not enter into this and denied having made any such promise. The State Secretary ended his letter by expressing the hope that the British Government would abide by its own proposal for a joint commission and thus put an end to the present state of tension.

To this letter of the State Secretary the British Agent replied, on the 25th of September, that Her Majesty's Government had on more than one occasion repeated its assurances that it had no desire to interfere in any way with the independence of the South African Republic (N.B. It was always doing so) ; that it had not asserted any rights of interference in the internal affairs of the Republic other than those which were derived from the conventions (N.B. There was only one!); and ended by saying that it was useless to pursue further a discussion on the lines hitherto followed, and that

Her Majesty's Government was now compelled to consider the situation afresh, and to formulate its own proposals for a final settlement of the issues which had been created in South Africa by the policy constantly followed for so many years by the Government of the South African Republic.

On the 17th of September, the State Secretary asked the High Commissioner for explanations regarding the concentration of troops on the frontiers of the South African Republic. The High Commissioner replied that those troops were there to defend British interests and in order to be prepared for "possibilities." On the 22d of September, the mobilization of an army corps for South Africa was announced in England, and, on the 28th of September, it was announced that the greater part of that army corps would leave for South Africa without delay. The Government thereupon commandeered the greater part of the burghers to take up their position near the frontiers of the Republic, in order to be prepared for a sudden attack on the part of England.

On the 30th of September, the State Secretary informed the British Agent that he would be glad to know the decision of the British Government (i.e. with reference to the "own proposals" announced in the dispatch of 25 September). Mr. Chamberlain answered, on the 2d of October, that the dispatch of Her Majesty's Government was being prepared, but that it would not be ready for some days.

It is clear that Mr. Chamberlain only desired to gain time, in order first to have sufficient troops in South Africa, before sending his promised dispatch, which was nothing else than an ultimatum.

Before the final steps were reached, President Steyn of the Orange Free State had intervened in order to make every effort, on his side, to avoid war.

On the 19th of September, the High Commissioner telegraphed to President Steyn that a detachment of troops, ordinarily stationed at Cape Town, was being sent to assist in securing the line of communication between the Colony and the British territories lying to the north of it; and that, as this force, or a portion of it, might be stationed near the borders of the Orange Free State, he, the High Commissioner, thought it desirable to acquaint His Honor with this movement, and the reasons for it, in order to prevent any misconception. He added that Her Majesty's Government was still hopeful of a friendly settlement of the differences which had arisen between it and the South African Republic, but that, should this hope unfortunately be disappointed, the British Government looked to the Orange Free State to preserve strict neutrality.

President Steyn replied, on the same day, that he was unable to see that the differences justified the use of force as their only solution. Seeing the state of tension in South Africa, he noted with apprehension and regret the stationing of troops near the borders of the Orange Free State, since the burghers would consider this a menace to that state. If, therefore, unwished-for developments should arise, the responsibility would not rest with the Government of the Orange Free State. His Honor concluded his telegram by stating that he would view with deep regret any disturbance of those friendly relations which hitherto had existed between Great Britain and the Orange Free State.

On the 27th of September, the Volksraad of the Orange Free State adopted a resolution in which it declared that no cause for war existed, that such a war would be morally a war against the whole white population of South Africa, but that, come what might, the Orange Free State would honestly and faithfully observe its obligations arising from the political alliance with the South African Republic.

At the same time the Government was instructed to do everything in its power to contribute by peaceful efforts towards the solution of the existing differences.

That same day, the 27th of September, President Steyn sent a dispatch to the High Commissioner in which he reminded him of the ties of blood and friendship by which the Orange Free State was bound both to Cape Colony and the South African Republic, and, in addition, of the close political alliance between the two Republics. He said that it was this strong feeling of amity towards both Great Britain and the South African Republic that led him to bring about the conference between the

High Commissioner and myself ; that it was largely due to the Orange Free State and other friends of peace that such radical reforms had been effected by the South African Republic in so short a time; that the Orange Free State ever kept in view the spirit in which it assumed that the British Government was willing to act, viz., "to adopt an attitude of friendly suggestion and not of dictation in the internal affairs of the Republic ; " that, while the Government of the Republic, encouraged thereto by the advice of the Free State, was busy in meeting the wants of the Uitlanders, the British Government had departed from the basis of non-interference in the internal affairs of the Republic; that the request for the joint commission of inquiry emphasized that fact beyond any shadow of doubt; that, notwithstanding this, the Government of the Orange Free State advised the South African Republic to accept the invitation of the British Government, in the hope that an impartial investigation might inaugurate a renewal of the employment of friendly methods of negotiation ; that great, therefore, was the disappointment of the Government of the Orange Free State when it transpired that the British Government now rejected its proposal and that the unfortunate tension seemed to be only increasing; that the Government of the Orange Free State was still prepared to tender its services to procure a peaceful solution of existing difficulties, but that it felt itself hampered now as in the past (a) by a want of knowledge as to the definite object and extent of the demands of the British Government, compliance with which that Government considered itself entitled to insist upon ; and (b) by the fact that, notwithstanding the repeated assurances of the British Government that it did not wish to interfere in the internal affairs of the Republic nor to disturb its independence, that Government had pursued a policy which seemed to justify a contrary conclusion. As an instance in support of this contention, His Honor mentioned the enormous and ever-increasing military preparations on the part of the British Government, indicating a policy of force and coercion, notwithstanding the alleged friendly nature of the negotiations. His Honor, therefore, trusted that Her Majesty's Government might see its way clear to stop any further movements or increase of troops on or near the borders of both States, pending the arrival of the further dispatch intimated as about to be sent, and further to give an assurance to that effect ; and added that his Government would be glad to be favored with the precise nature and scope of the concessions, the adoption of which Her Majesty's Government considered itself entitled to claim, or which it suggested as being necessary or sufficient to ensure a satisfactory and permanent solution of existing differences.

On the 2d of October, President Steyn informed the High Commissioner that, in view of the totally undefended state of the border, of the prevailing unrest, and of the continual increase and movement of troops on two sides of the Orange Free State, he had deemed it advisable to call up his burghers in order to satisfy them that due precautions had been taken to guard their borders, adding that he was still looking forward to a reply to his dispatch of the 27th of September.

The High Commissioner replied on the same day regretting that the President had called up the burghers and declaring that His Honor was aware that the South African Republic had placed a very considerable army on the borders of Natal.

The President replied, on the 3d of October, that the concentration of burghers on the Natal frontier by the South African Republic was only the natural result of the constant increase of British troops and their movement in the direction of the Transvaal border. He did not, however, anticipate any immediate aggressive action on the part of the South African Republic, unless further forward movements of British troops should indicate an intention of attack upon the Transvaal. He went on to press for an answer to his dispatch of the 27th of September.

The High Commissioner answered, on the same day, that all the movements of British troops had been necessitated by the natural alarm of the inhabitants in exposed districts and were not comparable in magnitude with the massing of armed forces on the borders of Natal by the Government of the South African Republic.

The President replied, also on the 3d of October, that he did not consider that the movements of British troops had been necessitated by the natural alarm of the inhabitants in exposed districts, nor

in fact had he ever thought that there were any grounds justifying such movements. On the contrary, the ever-increasing military preparations, both in England and South Africa, had retarded and hampered the efforts that had been made to effect a fair settlement. He ascribed the failure to arrive at a solution of existing difficulties to the bitter and hostile tone of utterances, made both by responsible men and by the English press in South Africa and England, bristling with misrepresentations and menace to the Transvaal, accompanied by ever-increasing military preparations, not only in South Africa and in England, but throughout the British Empire, which were openly stated to be directed against the Transvaal. He wished to place on record his earnest conviction that on those in authority who introduced the military element, and who thereby inaugurated a policy of menace and forcible intervention, would rest the responsibility, should all efforts fail to secure peace and an honorable settlement. He could not but recognize the fact that, in view of the action of the British authorities already alluded to, the Transvaal Government could not be blamed for acting as it had done.

He was the more confirmed in this view by the fact that while he was still without any reply to his telegraphic dispatch of the 27th of September, the reasonable request therein made that the increase and further movement of British troops should be stayed, which if acceded to would probably have prevented the calling out of the burghers both in the South African Republic and in this State, had not only been ignored but activity in military preparations and the dispatch of troops had been going on more persistently than ever. He was not in a position to judge whether the movement of British troops on the border of the South African Republic was comparable or not in magnitude with the recent massing of armed force by the South African Republic on the borders, but it must not be forgotten that on all sides, in the English press and elsewhere, the assertion constantly found expression that the British troops already in the country were more than a match for the undisciplined burgher force of the Republic. Moreover, troops were being dispatched almost daily from England, which would justify a conviction in the minds of the burghers of the South African Republic that England had abandoned any idea of attempting to arrive at a solution of differences except by force.

On the 4th of October, the High Commissioner replied that there was, he thought, a conclusive reply to His Honor's accusation against the policy of Her Majesty's Government, but that no good purpose would be served by recrimination; that the present position was that burgher forces were assembled in very large numbers in immediate proximity to the frontier of Natal, while the British troops occupied certain defensive positions well within those borders.

He would not despair of peace and felt sure that any reasonable proposal, from whatever quarter proceeding, would be favorably considered by Her Majesty's Government.

On the 5th of October, the President replied that he was prepared to make a proposal, but that he considered it would not be practicable to induce the Government of the South African Republic to make or entertain proposals or suggestions, unless the troops menacing their states were withdrawn farther from their borders, and an assurance were also given by Her Majesty's Government that all further dispatch and increase of troops would at once, and during negotiations, be stopped, and that those now on the water would either not be landed or at least would remain as far removed as might be from the scene of possible hostilities. The President urged upon His Excellency the urgent necessity of intimating to him without delay whether His Excellency saw his way clear to give effect to these his views and wishes ; and if so he would take steps to obtain an assurance from the South African Republic to safeguard against any act of invasion or hostility against any portion of Her Majesty's territories.

He would further support all reasonable proposals which would possess the element of finality and give the assurance of a lasting peace.

The High Commissioner replied, on the 6th of October 1899, that he regretted that the President should suggest, as a condition precedent to further negotiations, an assurance from Her Majesty's Government hampering its freedom of action with regard to the disposition of British troops in

British territory. Such an assurance it was impossible for him to ask Her Majesty's Government to give. If, on the other hand, the President could obtain an assurance that, pending negotiations, no act of hostility would be committed, he was prepared to advise Her Majesty's Government to give an assurance to the like effect.

Steyn replied, on the same day, that he could not be expected to ask the South African Republic to continue negotiations in the face of the fact that from all sides of Her Majesty's dominions troops were being poured into South Africa with the avowed object of coercing the South African Republic into accepting whatever terms Her Majesty's Government might decide to impose. The President added that he had no doubt that, in so far as Her Majesty's troops were intended for the defence of Her Majesty's possessions, the same purpose could be effected in another way, and he would be willing to assist in its being effected; but the point which he thought it fair to urge was that it would be taken by the South African Republic as virtually amounting to an act of hostility on the part of Her Majesty's Government to be continuously increasing their forces during the negotiations. .

On the 7th of October, His Honor received a reply to his dispatch of the 27th of September, in which the British Government stated that it had repeatedly explained its views on the questions at issue between it and the Government of the South African Republic, and did not think its position open to misunderstanding; but, if the President of the Orange Free State desired elucidation of any special point, it was prepared to give it. As regards the military preparations, they had been necessitated by the policy of the South African Republic of converting that country into a permanent armed camp.

In view of the rejection of its last proposals by the Government of the South African Republic, Her Majesty's Government was reconsidering the situation, having regard to the grave fact that both Republics had now placed themselves on a war footing.

On the same day, 7 October 1899, a royal proclamation appeared in England, summoning Parliament and calling out the reserves; at the same time an order was issued for the mobilization of an army corps for South Africa.

On the 9th of October, President Steyn sent a telegram to the High Commissioner demurring to the statement that the military preparations made by Her Majesty's Government had been necessitated by the action of the South African Republic.

He again urged the withdrawal of forces on both sides, such withdrawal to include an undertaking by Her Majesty's Government to stop the further increase of troops.

I have now given the course of negotiations and described events precisely as they occurred. Any one who views these matters impartially must admit that the British Government, and particularly the High Commissioner and Mr. Chamberlain, did their utmost to cause the negotiations to fail and to bring on a war.

The Government of the South African Republic clearly saw what the British Government wanted, that a collision was inevitable, and that the British Government was only waiting to send its ultimatum until sufficient troops had arrived in South Africa to overwhelm the Republic from every side.

When it realized that a war was inevitable, that to make concessions availed nothing and that its only chance lay in compelling the British Government to display its real intentions before all the British troops were landed, the Government of the South African Republic had recourse to extreme measures, and, on the 9th of October, wrote a letter to the British Agent, the so-called "Ultimatum." In this document the Government once more set forth how England had not the slightest right to interfere in the internal affairs of the Republic; how the Republic had yet found occasion to discuss in a friendly fashion the franchise and the representation of the people with Her Majesty's Government; how on the part of Her Majesty's Government the friendly nature of those discussions had assumed a more and more threatening tone; how Her Majesty's Government had finally broken

off all friendly correspondence on the subject ; how the Republic was still waiting for the proposal which the British Government had promised to make for a final settlement ; how, in view of the British military force on the frontiers, the Republic had been obliged, as a defensive measure, to send a portion of the burghers to protect the frontiers; how the unlawful intervention of Her Majesty's Government in the affairs of the Republic, in conflict with the London Convention of 1884, had caused an intolerable condition of affairs to arise to which the Government felt itself obliged, in the interest not only of the Republic but of all South Africa, to make an end as soon as possible, and therefore felt itself called upon and obliged to press earnestly and with emphasis for an immediate termination of this state of things, and to request Her Majesty's Government to give it the assurance:

(a) That all points of mutual difference shall be regulated by the friendly course of arbitration, or by whatever amicable way may be agreed upon by this Government with Her Majesty's Government.

(b) That the troops on the borders of this Republic shall be instantly withdrawn.

(c) That all reinforcements of troops which have arrived in South Africa since the 1st June 1899 shall be removed within a reasonable time, to be agreed upon with this Government, and with a mutual assurance and guarantee on the part of this Government that no attack upon, or hostilities against, any portion of the possessions of the British Government shall be made by the Republic during further negotiations, within a period of time to be subsequently agreed upon between the Governments, and this Government will, on compliance therewith, be prepared to withdraw the armed burghers of this Republic from the borders.

(d) That Her Majesty's troops which are now on the high seas shall not be landed in any port of South Africa.

The dispatch ended by requesting Her Majesty's Government to return an answer before or upon Wednesday the 11th of October, not later than 5 o'clock p.m., adding that, in the event of no satisfactory answer being received within that interval, the Republic would with great regret be compelled to regard the action of Her Majesty's Government as a formal declaration of war and would not hold itself responsible for the consequences thereof, and that, in the event of any further movements of troops taking place within the above-mentioned time in the nearer directions of the borders of the Republic, the Government would be compelled to regard that also as a formal declaration of war.

On the 11th of October, Mr. Greene brought the reply of the British Government to the effect that the conditions demanded by the Government of the South African Republic were such as Her Majesty's Government deemed it impossible to discuss. At the same time he asked for his passports, in order to enable him to leave the country. And so, in spite of all the concessions, all the patience and indulgence of the Republic, the war broke out. The Volksraad, which was still sitting, adjourned when it became evident that hostilities were soon to begin ; both our Volksraad and that of the Orange Free State unanimously declared themselves ready to risk their lives and property for their rights and for their liberty; and both repeated this vow in their last session during the turmoil of war.

The course and the vicissitudes of the war do not come within the scope of these Memoirs, since I took no personal part in the fighting. I had a different work before me, which kept me employed day and night. All looked to me for advice, hints and consolation. Daily I sent off telegrams to all the commandos, encouraging, advising and exhorting the burghers. These labors fully occupied the mornings from eight to twelve and the evenings from two to four or five o'clock. Not till then did I leave the Government buildings. I went to bed at eight, only to get up again at eleven to go through the telegrams that had come to hand. I rose once more at two, to inspect any dispatches that had arrived in the meantime, and it was often four o'clock before I could seek my rest again.

[1 Official reports of President Kruger's speech at the closing of the First and Second Volksraad and

of the speeches of both Presidents at the last meetings of the Volksraads of the Transvaal and of the Orange Free State will be found in the Appendix. - **Note by the Editor of the German Edition.]**

In the later stage of the war, when the federal troops were being driven back on every side, my sleep was interrupted regularly three times every night, and frequently as often as four times, in order that I might deal with the telegrams without delay. I was thankful for every success and did not lose courage when reverses were announced, as many of my telegrams could show, had they not been scattered to the winds.

After the relief of Ladysmith, I went myself to Natal to exhort the burghers to keep courage. At Glencoe, where the burghers had once more taken up their position, I addressed them in a long speech, pointing out the urgency of keeping up the fight.

General Joubert spoke to them to the same effect.

I had scarcely returned to Pretoria, when I went to Bloemfontein in order to proceed thence, by wagon, to Poplar Grove, on the Modder River, where I intended also to address and encourage the burghers. But I could not come so far, for I had only just reached General De Wet, when I was obliged to go back, as French, with his mounted troops, had effected a turning movement and I was in danger of being cut off. Heavy fighting took place on my arrival, for the English general in command knew of my presence, and I had only just time to retire: I had hardly crossed the Modder River, when French arrived with his cavalry. Here, however, De la Rey, who had just arrived with his staff, flung himself against him and held him in check until the laager and guns were safe. As I resumed my homeward course, the shells were flying all around me, and one fell just behind the cart in which I was seated. I was, therefore, obliged to return to Pretoria, but went straight on to Kroonstad, there to encourage the burghers and attend a general council of war.

It was on this occasion that the deeply-lamented Colonel de Villebois-Mareuil received his promotion to General of the Foreign Legion.

Shortly after, I received a heavy blow through the death of General Joubert, who had worked together with me for so many years in building up the Republic. His death was profoundly mourned by the whole people, and there is no doubt that the decease of this upright lover of his country exercised a discouraging influence upon his fellow-burghers. Fortunately he had, before his death, appointed a successor in the present Commandant General Louis Botha, who has shown that the confidence placed in him by the dying general was well deserved.

Shortly before the capture of Bloemfontein, the two Governments resolved to send a deputation to Europe to endeavor to secure intervention. This deputation consisted of Mr. Abraham Fischer, a member of the Executive Raad of the Orange Free State, who had taken a prominent part in the negotiations during the crisis, and who now acted as a delegate for both states, with Mr. C. H. Wessels, President of the Volksraad of the Orange Free State, for his own state, and Mr. A. D. W. Wolmarans, a member of the Executive Raad of the South African Republic, for his state. All three were men in whom the Government and the people of both Republics placed the greatest confidence.

A short time before the surrender of Cronje, the two Governments sent a dispatch to Lord Salisbury, in which they declared that the Republics were willing to make peace if their independence, the only thing for which they were fighting, were acknowledged. Lord Salisbury replied that he could not accept this proposal; for the Republics were not to be allowed to retain a shred of independence: and that after he had declared, only three months earlier, in a public speech, that England sought no goldfields and no territory.

Although the preceding days made heavy claims upon me, those that followed made even more strenuous demands. After the relief of Mafeking, when the British troops began to stream into the Republic from every side, it became daily more clear that, in my old age, I should have to leave my

wife, my home and all that was dear to me, in order to seek a refuge in the east of the Republic, and there begin the struggle anew. The thought of this departure lay heavy upon my heart, the more so as my wife was so old and weak that I could not think of taking her with me.

The doctor had declared that such a journey as this would mean death to her; and yet I felt sure that I should never see her again in this life. The day of our separation after a long and happy marriage came ever closer and closer, and an uncertain future, full of dangers and privations, faced me. It was with this knowledge that I opened the Volksraad at the beginning of May.[1] Many of the best-known figures in public life were already at rest in their graves, and their seats in the Volksraad stood empty.

Lord Roberts had at last pushed forward to Johannesburg, and, as we were informed that he intended, with a flying column, to cut the Delagoa Railway line to the east of Pretoria, it was resolved that I should leave Pretoria with the Government and transfer the seat of government to the east of the Republic. On the afternoon of my last day at Pretoria, 29 May, 1900, while my things were being packed, I received the American lad, Jimmy Smith, who brought me an address, in which thousands of school-boys in Philadelphia, the children of a city which was the first to declare its independence of Great Britain, "sent a message of sympathy to the leader of the people which was now engaged in defending its independence against the same nation."

[1 For President Kruger's speeches delivered on this occasion, see the Appendix. They show that he had not lost confidence. - **Note by the Editor of the German Edition.**]

He also handed me a Transvaal flag which had been embroidered in America. I thanked the boy and the American gentlemen who had accompanied him, and, one hour later, when it was already dark, I drove with a few faithful friends to Eerste Fabrieken, the first station on the eastern line. From there I went by railway, over Middelburg, to Machadodorp, where the seat of government was provisionally established.

I lived in my saloon-carriage, to which a telegraph apparatus had been fitted: my work was no less arduous than at Pretoria, and I was constantly sending telegrams to encourage the burghers in the fight.

The first days of June are among the darkest of my life. On the 5th of June, Lord Roberts occupied Pretoria, and many of the burghers, discouraged by recent events, listened to the tempting proclamations by which that general sought to seduce them from their allegiance and their duty to the land and people, laid down their arms and took the oath of neutrality. I warned and admonished them, for my faith in the future was still unshaken. On the 7th of June, I sent the following telegram to all the officers:

Tell the burghers that it will avail them nothing to lay down their arms, as Lord Roberts has issued a proclamation that in future he will release no more burghers on their oaths, since he has found that the burghers continue to fight in spite of their oaths. He has moreover decided to take all male persons above twelve years of age prisoners, whether they be armed or not. If they are taken prisoners, they will be sent to St. Helena. Children also are therefore no longer safe. We have resolved to fight to the end. Be faithful and fight in the name of the Lord, for they who flee and leave their positions or run away from commando are fleeing straight to St. Helena.

And in longer telegrams I set forth the religious grounds for my hopeful persistency.[1] As Machadodorp is one of the coldest places in the Transvaal, and at that time I was suffering greatly from my eyes, I yielded to the pressure of the burghers and moved on to Waterval Onder, which lies on the Eland River, among high mountains, and enjoys a very mild climate in winter. Here I occupied a scantily-furnished little house, where I spent the happiest two months that I have known since my departure from Pretoria. The seat of government, however, remained at Machadodorp; and

the State Secretary and the members of the Executive Raad also remained there, but came every morning by train to Waterval Onder to the sittings of the Executive Raad, in order to attend to the current business.

From here, too, were issued the decrees and requisitions, the provisos for furlough, the enactments against dilatory burghers and officials, and the orders for the reorganization of the army, and the necessary measures were taken to frustrate the proclamations of the enemy and their consequences. [1 Some of these telegrams will be found in the Appendix.]

Towards the end of August, President Steyn and his escort arrived at Waterval Onder to discuss the position in the country.

It was at about the same time that Lord Roberts, acting in conjunction with General Sir Redvers Buller, delivered his decisive attack on Botha's positions at Dalmanutha. The result is well known. After the burghers had fought for eight days like lions and defeated every attempt of the enemy to break through, Buller at last succeeded in capturing a weak post occupied by 79 men of the Johannesburg police and in thus forcing his way into our men's positions.

Botha had about 4,000 men and had to defend a line that extended for over 30 miles. Roberts attacked him with over 50,000 men and a mass of heavy guns.

The result of this battle made it clear to the Commandant General and the other officers that it was not possible for that small force of burghers to repel the enemy or to continue to fight him in the way they had done hitherto, and that it was better to send the President away, so as to leave the commandos freer in their movements. We moved on to Nelspruit, a station on the Delagoa Railway, about half-way between Waterval Onder and the Portuguese frontier.

The removal of all the baggage, wagons, carts, horses, mules and so forth gave great difficulty, but the excellent manner in which the Netherlands South African Railway Company had so far satisfied every demand made upon it was now repeated. On arriving at the spot which had been selected as the seat of government, we received Lord Roberts's proclamation annexing the South African Republic. I at once issued a counter-proclamation:

Whereas, in the month of October 1899* an unjust war was forced upon the people of the South African Republic and the Orange Free State by Great Britain, and those two small Republics have for ten months maintained and are still maintaining an unequal contest against the mighty British Empire; Whereas I am informed that a certain proclamation, dated 1 September 1900, has been issued by Lord Roberts, Field Marshal, Commander-in-Chief of the British forces in South Africa, stating that the South African Republic has been conquered by Her Majesty's troops and that the South African Republic is annexed to the British Empire, while the forces of the South African Republic are still in the field and the South African Republic has not been conquered, and the aforesaid proclamation is therefore opposed to international law;

And whereas the independence of the South African Republic has been recognized by nearly all the civilized Powers;

Whereas I deem it desirable immediately to inform all whom it may concern that the aforesaid proclamation is not recognized by the Government and people of the South African Republic:

Now I, Stephanus Johannes Paulus Kruger, State President of the South African Republic, by the advice and consent of the Executive Raad, in accordance with Article 147 of its Minutes of the 3d of September 1900, do hereby proclaim, in the name of the independent people of this Republic, that the aforesaid annexation is not recognized, but is by these presents declared null and void.

The people of the South African Republic is and remains a free and independent people and refuses to submit to British rule.

Given under my hand at Nelspruit in the South African Republic on the third day of the month of September 1900.

S. J. P. KRUGER.

Meanwhile, it became evident that the hope that we should be able to arrest the enemy's progress in the mountains, was futile, thanks to his overwhelming superiority of numbers ; and, when the enemy began to advance from every side on Nelspruit, a decisive step became necessary. A council was called, consisting of the members of the Transvaal and Orange Free State Governments and a number of officers, including the Commandant General, and it resolved to send me to Europe as a delegate, to endeavor to promote the cause of the Republics. General and Vice-President Schalk Burger was to hold office as Acting State President during my absence. A proclamation was issued, giving notice of this resolution in the following terms:

Whereas the' great age of His Honor the State President renders it impossible for His Honor to continue to accompany the commandos;

And whereas the Executive Raad is persuaded that His Honor's invaluable services can still be profitably employed in the interests of the land and people: Now the Executive Raad does hereby resolve to grant His Honor a six months' furlough in order to proceed to Europe and there promote our cause. His place will be filled, in accordance with the law, by Mr. S. W. Burger, Vice-President.

S. W. BURGER, V ice-President.

F. W. REITZ, State Secretary.

GOVERNMENT OFFICE, NELSPRUIT, 10 September 1900.

If my departure from Pretoria was a bitter blow to me, my departure, under such sorrowful circumstances, from the land to which I had devoted my life was doubly bitter. I saw it swarming with the enemy, who, in his arrogance, was already declaring that the war was over and that only guerrilla bands now infested the country. I had to bid good-bye to the men who had stood beside me for so many years and to leave my country and my people, my grayhaired wife, my children, my friends and the little band of lion-hearted fighters who, surrounded as they were on every side, had now to make their way through an uninhabited district to the north of the Republic, there to reorganize and recommence the struggle.

But I had no choice. I must either submit to the decision or allow myself to be taken prisoner. My age prevented me from riding and it was, therefore, impossible for me to accompany the commandos further. On the other hand, it was a consolation to leave the Government in the hands of such true men as Schalk Burger, Reitz, Louis Botha and De la Rey, and I knew the loyal support which they would receive from the noble President Steyn. On the evening of the 10th September we took leave of one another at Nelspruit and I was left alone with the escort which the Executive Raad had given me for my protection.

On the next day, after spending the night at Crocodile Poort, I began my long pilgrimage to Europe, a journey the result of which neither had nor could have been anticipated. From Crocodile Poort I traveled in the private railway-carriage of the manager of the Netherlands South African Railway Company. At Hectorspruit I waited a few hours for President Steyn and a few other friends, who had come there to take leave of me, and then continued my journey to Lorenzo Marques over Komati Poort, the last station in the Republic, past the frontier station, Resano Garsea, where the director of the Portuguese railway took charge of the train.

At Lorenzo Marques, the train was not stopped at the station, but shunted to a siding, so that, as darkness had already set in, I was able to reach Consul General Pott's house unobserved. It was my intention to remain there until I could embark for Europe on board the first outgoing steamer, which would have been the steamship Herzog, of the German East African Line. But, on the next day, the Portuguese Governor arrived and said that he had been instructed to take me to his own house as the guest of the Portuguese Government. When I showed some hesitation, the Governor declared that I must accompany him at once and that, if I refused, he must employ force. This action on the part of the Portuguese Government must undoubtedly be ascribed to the pressure brought to bear upon it by

the British Government, for the Portuguese Governor governed only in name: the real governor was the British consul at Delagoa Bay. Governor Machado, who was probably fulfilling a disagreeable task much against his own wish, treated me with great kindness, but would not allow me to move without accompanying me.

None of the members of my escort, who were also quartered at the Governor's house, was allowed to set foot in the town unless accompanied by an aide-de-camp; and even then they were not permitted to enter into conversation with any one. At first, the two gentlemen who traveled with me, as well as a few other friends, were at least allowed to visit me ; but this, too, was very soon forbidden, on the ground, as we were informed, that the British consul had complained. This situation lasted some weeks, during the whole of which time I was practically a prisoner in the Governor's house, and it was there that I kept my seventy-fifth birthday. I was not allowed to receive the congratulations of the burghers who thronged the town and who were reduced to shouting good luck to me from the street outside.

The first ray of light that broke through this night of affliction was the Queen of Holland's offer to carry me to Europe on a man-of-war, an act which was appreciated in the highest degree by the whole 'Boer nation. Now at least all uncertainty was removed as to my being able to pursue my journey.

As the ship, however, was still at some distance from Delagoa Bay, I was not able to embark until the 21st of October, and then the Gelderland, whose captain and officers received me with every mark of friendship and loving-kindness, had first to take in coal. The journey from Delagoa Bay to Dar-es Salam, where the Gelderland arrived on the morning of the fifth day, passed off very well. It is true that, at first, I suffered a little from sea-sickness, for the first time in my life ; but I was soon able to light up my pipe again, a certain proof that the sickness was past. At Dar-es-Salam, some German officials came on board and invited me to a dinner which they wished to give in my honor. I begged, however, to be excused, in view of the sorrowful circumstances of my country. The same thing happened at Djibouti, where we arrived on the 2d of November.

From here the journey was continued to Suez.

Every ship that passed the Gelderland saluted, and I was cheered by the passengers on board those which came close enough. One French ship even went out of her course to salute the Gelderland, and the only exceptions were the majority of the English ships, of which, at one time, as many as five were in sight, near Sardinia. From Suez we proceeded to Port Sai'd, where we stopped to take in coal. The voyage from here to Marseilles was exceedingly unpleasant, quite apart from the number of newspaper correspondents who made fruitless attempts to interview me. A storm raged which sent the waves flying over the ship; and the vessel pitched and rolled to such an extent that my sickness returned.

At the end of the voyage the captain of the Gelderland invited my friends and myself to an official dinner. The saloon was decorated with the Dutch colors and with a Transvaal banner, the same flag which the American school-boys had sent me, with an address, from Philadelphia. In consequence of the bad weather we arrived one day late, on the 22d of November, in the harbor of Marseilles.

A few days before our arrival, the members of the South African deputation, with the exception of Wolmarans, who was unwell, had gone to Marseilles, with Dr. Leyds and some other gentlemen, to receive me. Professor Hamel, of the University of Groningen, kindly acted as interpreter. From the deck of the man-of-war, to which the members of the deputation put out in a long-boat, one saw nothing but one mass of people, all cheering and waving their handkerchiefs. Even the steamers lying at anchor in the harbor swarmed with people.

I went on shore after cordially thanking the captain of the ship and his officers for the kindness and consideration which they had shown me. I still retain the pleasantest recollections of my voyage on the Gelderland. Thousands of people were shouting their greetings with the loudest enthusiasm.

The president of the Committee for the Independence of the Boers, which had been lately formed, " interpreted the feelings of all Marseilles," as he himself said when he welcomed me and added that the enthusiasm which I beheld around me would convey more to me than any words which he could utter. I declared that I gratefully accepted the welcome offered me, although, in view of the sorrow in which my country was wrapped, I had not come in order to be festively received.

"The war in South Africa," I continued, " has exceeded the limits of barbarism. I have fought against many barbarous Kaffir tribes in the course of my life ; but they are not so barbarous as the English, who have burnt our farms and driven our women and children into destitution, without food or shelter. I hope that God will not abandon the Boer nation. But if the Transvaal and the Free State are to lose their independence, it shall only happen when both nations have been annihilated with their women and their children." On the road to the hotel stood thousands of people, who cheered me continually as I passed and, during the afternoon, a number of deputations came to welcome me.

This splendid reception was a thorn in the side of the English at Marseilles, and they tried to spoil the procession by throwing coppers from the windows of a hotel among the populace, in order to raise a tumult. But this proceeding narrowly escaped having serious results, for the people, furious at this behavior, stormed the hotel, so that police protection had to be sent for.

Immediately after my arrival, I telegraphed to President Loubet to salute him and to thank him for the sympathy of his Government and people.

The Prefect of Marseilles called on me on behalf of the President.

On the 24th of November, I started by special train for Paris, and was cordially cheered throughout the journey. The train stopped at one or two stations, and great crowds had gathered to welcome me. I stepped out of the train at Lyons, to receive the welcome of the crowd, and the mayor handed me a beautiful medal as a souvenir. At Dijon, where we spent the night, the drive to the hotel was accomplished to a salute of guns.

On the next morning, we continued our journey to Paris, where a solemn reception took place and several speeches were delivered. In reply to the address of the Vice-President of the Municipality of Paris, I said that, " as soon as I had set foot on Parisian soil, I had acquired fresh confidence, for the arms of the city, a ship floating on the waves, assured me that the Republics would not go under." On the way to the hotel, immense masses of people had gathered, who cried, " Long live Kruger! Arbitration for ever! "and continually flung nosegays into the carriage. The people in front of the hotel called out for me to appear on the balcony, and I had to do so three or four times a day, before the crowds would disperse.

At four o'clock in the afternoon, President Loubet received me at the Elysee, sending me a company of cuirassiers as an escort, and immediately afterwards paid me a return visit.

During my stay in Paris, from the 26th of November till the 1st of December, I visited some of the sights, including the Eiffel Tower, the Hotel de Ville, the International Exhibition, at which I was greatly touched to read the inscriptions on the walls of the Transvaal pavilion, containing every good wish for the Boers. In the sessions-hall of the Hotel de Ville, where the whole Town Council had assembled, the chairman expressed the admiration of the people for the heroism of the Republics and said that, " if the Republics were silent, the nations must speak," and thus bring about arbitration.

The president of the Conseil General also made a speech. In my reply, I said that, " if the Boers, who were not yet defeated, but would go on fighting much longer, could hear of the reception which had been given me in France, they would be still further strengthened in their resolve to keep up the struggle." I also thanked the press for the light which they had thrown on the English methods of warfare and added: "If you were able to send reporters straight to the seat of war, they would stand astounded at the atrocities that are being perpetrated by England."

After receiving a series of deputations, I left Paris on the 1st of December, amid scenes of undiminished enthusiasm and escorted by the authorities and private societies, for Cologne. On the way to the French frontier, the same scenes were repeated which had marked the journey from Marseilles to Paris. At every station where we stopped, I was received by great crowds. The same thing happened in Belgium. The enthusiasm which I witnessed in France not only delighted me, but confirmed me in my hope that my journey would not be in vain.

This hope, however, was doomed to be very soon frustrated. On the evening of the same day, we reached Cologne, where an enthusiasm reigned such as Cologne had, perhaps, never beheld before. Unfortunately, an accident occurred at the railway station which cost one of the spectators his life. The crowd was such that two people fell through an opening on to the platform, and one of them broke his leg and died from the effects of the fall. Owing to the size of the crowds I had to drive by a circuitous route to my hotel. Here, shortly after my arrival, I received a telegram from the German Emperor, saying that His Majesty could not receive me at that time, as he had a hunting engagement. We then resolved to proceed to the Hague; but, before leaving Cologne, I received a series of deputations, who gave me every mark of sympathy. I also received the wife of the man who had died of the accident at the station and assured her of my heartfelt condolence. I did not miss the opportunity of visiting the famous cathedral.

It is really not necessary for me to say that throughout my journey through Germany and Holland I met everywhere with the same sympathy for the cause of the Boers as at Cologne. At station after station, I was received by the representatives of the different towns, in addition to corporations and societies with their banners and badges.

The train drew up at the Hague in the evening, when it was already growing dusk. The precincts of the railway station and all the streets leading to the hotel at which I was to stay were closely packed with an endless crowd of cheering people. I had telegraphed to the Queen, on reaching the Dutch frontier, to offer her my homage.

Immediately after my arrival at the hotel, Her Majesty's ministers called upon me, and, on the next day, I went to the Court, to wait upon the Queen and to thank her for her great kindness in sending a man-of-war to bring me to Europe. I was afterwards invited to dine with the Queen and Her Majesty's Consort, the Prince of the Netherlands, called on me at the hotel.

After a short delay, I paid a visit to Amsterdam, where a great reception was held in the Paleis voor Volksvlyt and a solemn service in the principal church. On returning to the Hague, where I had not originally intended to stay, since it was necessary that I should as soon as possible consult a good physician about the condition of my eyes, I fell seriously ill: I had probably caught a cold, which very soon developed into inflammation of the lungs. I recovered, however, and proceeded to Utrecht, where I stayed for two months and a half; during which period I underwent a successful operation on both eyes, effected by Professor Snellen and my own physician, Dr. Heymans. From there, I moved to Hilversum, where I lived for eight months, at the Villa Casa Cara, with my suite. Our stay was interrupted by a visit of some weeks to A. D. W. Wolmarans at Scheveningen and by a long-promised visit to some of the other Dutch towns. At Rotterdam, I was shown a tree which I had planted in the Zoological Gardens in 1884, and took a trip up the Maas, on board the Lehmann, which the Fop Smit Steamship Company had placed at my disposal. I was proud, on this occasion, to see the old church at Dordrecht where the Synod of 1618 to 1619 was held which exercised so great an influence upon the Church to which I belong. I also revisited Kampen, the Mecca of the Protestant Church. In both towns my reception was of the most cordial nature imaginable.

Shortly after my return to Hilversum, I received the heaviest blow of my life. A cablegram informed me that my wife was dead. In my profound sorrow I was consoled by the thought that the separation was only temporary and could not last long; and my faith gave me the strength to write a letter of encouraging consolation to my daughter, Mrs. Malan. Wolmarans invited me to spend another fortnight with him at Scheveningen, to distract my thoughts a little. I then went back to Hilversum, where I lived in absolute retirement, interrupted only by the necessary conferences, and devoted

myself entirely to the perusal of my Bible.

At the commencement of the winter, on the 10th of December 1901,[1]moved to the Villa Oranjelust, on the Maliebaan, at Utrecht. Here I received the news of De la Rey's brilliant victory over Lord Methuen. I rejoiced exceedingly at the victory, but, when some one observed, during the reading of the news, that it was to be hoped that De la Rey would keep Methuen a prisoner, I said:

" I could not approve of that, and I hope that De la Rey will release him without delay; for we Boers must behave as Christians to the end, however uncivilized the way in which the English treat us may be."

When I learnt that Methuen was released, I expressed my sincere gratification. A series of further favorable tidings arrived from home, so that the position of things seemed to justify the greatest hope.

For the rest, I had, throughout the war, replied to every inquiry from the scene of war that my confidence was still unshaken, but that it must be left entirely to the generals in the field to decide whether and how, under the stress of circumstances, they wished to alter their previous resolutions. During the peace negotiations, I had only one answer to all the questions put to me as to what I thought of peace, namely, that all would happen as God wished. And, when peace was at last concluded, I applied to the generals the Bible text 2 Cor. viii. 3:

" For to their power, I bear record, yea, and beyond their power they were willing of themselves." Nor, in so far as I myself am concerned, will I consent to lose courage because the peace is not such as the burghers wished. For, quite apart from the fact that the bloodshed and the fearful sufferings of the people of the two Republics are now ended, I am convinced that God does not forsake His people, even though it may often appear so. Therefore I resign myself to the will of the Lord. I know that He will not allow the afflicted people to perish. He is the Lord and all hearts are in His hand and He turneth them whithersoever He will.

STEPHANUS JOHANNES PAULUS KRUGER

THE END

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