AFRICANS IN CAPE TOWN: STATE POLICY AND
POPULAR RESISTANCE, 1936-73
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Thesis Presented for the Degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
in the Department of History
UNIVERSITY OF CAPE TOWN
December, 1992

The financial assistance of the Institute for Research Development towards this research is hereby acknowledged. Opinions expressed in this work, or conclusions arrived at, are those of the author and are not to be attributed to the Institute for Research Development.

ABSTRACT
This local history focusses on Cape Town's black African population, tracing the development of regional 'Native' (later 'Bantu') policy, as well as the escalating organised resistance which arose in response. The study relies as far as possible on archival sources to disaggregate these themes. On this basis, it provides a detailed analysis of the evolution of policy with regard to influx control, squatter control and residential segregation in the local context. Escalating resistance is discussed in a similarly nuanced manner, focussing particularly on mounting tensions between the pragmatic 'united frontists' of the Communist Party and the progressive wing of the local ANC, and 'principled' political opponents to the left and the right.

Considerable continuity in 'Native Policy' is revealed over what used to be seen as the great divide of 1948, when segregation was supposed suddenly to have given way to something qualitatively different named apartheid. The regionally-specific policy of 'Coloured Labour Preference' is shown to have been, in practice, nothing but empty rhetoric employed in a failed attempt to justify a cruel policy aimed at safeguarding the racial exclusivity of the franchise, while at the same time providing cheap and tractable labour.

The thesis calls into question a common assumption that class-concepts best explain changing patterns of resistance in the urban areas of South Africa. Ideological and strategic tensions, irreducible to class-differences, are shown to have played a significant role in retarding the struggle for national liberation.

ABBREVIATIONS
(phonetically-pronounced abbreviations are not capitalised)
AB Advisory Board
Add NC Additional Native Commissioner
AG Attorney-General
AGM annual general meeting
ANC African National Congress
APP African Progressive Party
Ass NC Assistant Native Commissioner
AYL African Youth League
BAAB Bantu Affairs Administration Board
BAC Bantu Affairs Committee
BALC Bantu Affairs Liaison Committee
CA Civic Association
CAC Cape African Congress
CBC Chief Bantu Affairs Commissioner
CC City Council
CCI Cape Chamber of Industries
CDC Cape Divisional Council
CLP Coloured Labour Preference
COD (South African) Congress of Democrats
COP Congress of the People
CP (South African) Communist Party
CPA Cape Provincial Administration
CPC Coloured Peoples' Congress
CPLCLWC Cape Peninsula Local Committee on Labour in the Western Cape
CPIDAMA Cape Peninsula Inter-denominational African Ministers' Association
CPMA Cape Province Municipal Association
CTMWA Cape Town Municipal Wo.:rkrs' Association
CWABVA Cape Western Advisory Boards and Vigilance Associations
DC Detective Constable
DCI Divisional Criminal Investigating
Dep Deputy
EC Eastern Cape
FCI Federated Chambers of Industry
Fedsaw Federation of South African Women
GN Government Notice
JC Joint Council
LCC Labour Consultative Committee
(formerly Labour Co-ordinating Committee)
LP Liberal Party
MK Umkhonto we Sizwe
MM Mayor's Minutes
MNA Minister of Native Affairs
NAC Native Affairs Committee
NASC Native Affairs Sub-committee
NC Native Commissioner
NCC Native Central Committee
NCWSA National Council of Women of South Africa
NEUM Non-European Unity Movement
NEUF Non-European United Front
NHC National Housing Commission
NLL National Liberation League
PAC Pan-Africanist Congress
PM Prime Minister
PS Provincial Secretary
RA Ratepayers' Association
SAAU South African Agricultural Union
Sabra South African Bureau for Racial Affairs
SACP South African Coloured People's Organisation
SAIRR South African Institute of Race Relations
SAP South African Police
SAR & H South African Railways and Harbours
sec secretary
SNA Secretary for Native Affairs
Soya Sons (later Society) of Young Africa
TAC Technical Advisory Committee
TC Town Clerk
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Introduction
This thesis is the sequel to an earlier dissertation which traced the development of state policy towards Africans in Cape Town up to 1936, and began to document organised resistance during that early period. The present study thus begins where the previous one left off, with the emergence of the coherent and codified 'Native Policy' enshrined in the 'Hertzog Laws' of the mid-1930s.

Initial interest in this research developed as part of a move towards urban historical studies which developed during the late 1970s. In Cape Town at that time, growing confrontation between the state and local Africans focussed attention sharply on the related issues of policy and...
resistance. Silk and Cole have documented the intensifying victimisation of local Africans from the mid-1970s, through administrative action including pass-raids, squatterclearence operations and mass removals; as well as the answering movement towards open insurrection.2

In its investigation of the history of these phenomena, this thesis makes use of a growing body of historicallyoriented work on both the implementation of policy and the development of resistance in Cape Town. This includes studies by Humphries, Posel, Van der Westhuizen and UCT's Saldu on Coloured Labour Preference, Elias on housing policy, Kingwill on the ANC, Lodge on the PAC, Karon on Sacpo, Schreiner on the ANC Women's League, and Alexander on non-collaboration. Also relevant are such micro-studies as Swart's thesis on Windermere and Sayers' work on Retreat. Methodologically, these works range from a mainstream reliance on primary research of varying depth and intensity, to Sayers' more extensive use of interviews on the one hand, and the orientation towards participant observation of Silk and Alexander on the other.2

Two doctoral theses, one published in full and the other in part, have unconvincingly purported to build on these secondary sources. They are discussed in an appendix, which is included on advice and under protest. Having been accepted for higher degrees at Oxford University, these efforts cannot, unfortunately, be ignored or brushed aside.

This uneven and fragmented collection of work on Cape Town forms part of a wider urban focus in South African historiography. A number of researchers have focussed specifically on the recent history of Africans in particular urban areas. These include Baines on Port Elizabeth; Davenport on Graham's Town; Edwards, La Hausse and Maylam on Durban; Redding on Umtata; and Sapiro on Brakpan. A recent overview mentions additional works in progress on Durban, East London, Johannesburg, Port Elizabeth and several smaller towns.4

As is the case with the relevant studies on Cape Town, analyses of developments in different urban areas embody divergent methodological perspectives. These vary from the archival focus of Baines and Davenport, to the greater preoccupation with interviews of scholars such as Edwards and La Hausse.

Influenced by the use of anthropological and literary-critical methods to make up for sparse documentation in biographically-based and rurally-focused studies, the latter trend towards reliance on oral evidence is increasingly favoured by those who seek an academic understanding of the extraordinarily complex concept and phenomenon which is urban culture. It seems that an earlier dominant dogma in South African urban studies, namely 'the pervasive idea that all non-workplace issues could be explained under the rubric of the catch-all concept "reproduction"',5 has been replaced by a new academic orthodoxy of extreme 'culturalism'. Prominent academics have actually suggested that oral evidence is superior to the ideologically-tainted material found in the archives.6

Eschewing the 'musty security' of the archives and the 'institutional histories' produced by primary research, urban 'social historians' have consequently taken to the turbulent township streets looking for insights into the development of consciousness. As they have yet to answer satisfactorily Morris' unfortunately over-stated and

ideologically dogmatic expression of exasperation at the sheer triviality of too large a part of their output,' it is no wonder that the friendliest of foreign commentators raise the 'question of how well white historians may serve as historians of all South Africans'?6

La Hausse concedes that there are several pit-falls involved in the culturalist project. Overlooking the obvious problems of verifiability of oral evidence and the impact of cultural differences in the interview-situation, he points to difficulties with the vernacular, with transcription and with translation. La Hausse goes on to say that questions such as 'the structure of memory and its relation to social process, narrative forms and conventions; issues of representation; and[ ] the role of the unconscious in oral history' have recently been taken up in the work of South African literary critics.9

It is ironic that a humanist historiographical tendency, which started off as a reaction to the arid abstractions of the structuralists, should end up practicing the over-intellectualised craft of literary criticism. Bozzoli's latest work moves decisively into this rarefied field, insisting that interview-transcripts
should be seen as texts or discourses, to be analysed in their own terms and no longer used merely to flesh-out the old-fashioned type of history based on primary sources. Yet the entire elaborate conceptual structure of Bozzoli's latest book would collapse like a house of cards were it not for the solid foundation and framework provided by more properly historical studies, not only of the particular geographical area which yielded her interviews but also focussing on the broader issues of state policy and resistance. Of the completed studies of particular urban areas, Sapire's doctoral study of 'African Urbanisation and Struggles Against Municipal Control in Brakpan, 1920-1958' most directly shares the concern of the present thesis with the 20th Century development of state policy and popular resistance in a local context. The least-successful sections of this path-breaking study are those in which Sapire bows to the current 'social' fad by incorporating interview-based discussions of consciousness and culture alongside her main focus on what primary sources reveal about policy and resistance. Sapire tends to conceptualise the policy of Urban Labour Preference in the rather static terms of a 'blueprint', without exploring the possibility that Brakpan municipality and its white constituents, as well as organised local employers, may have played a role in the evolution of policy. Her discussion of resistance reflects a common ambivalence regarding the question of class-analysis. Sapire insists, in her introduction, on following Feit in distinguishing between 'middle class African politicians' and the 'urban masses', and she carries this through with very little substantiation. Her conceptual map has her at one point searching unsuccessfully for a bourgeoisie class in the impoverished Tshakane location. The only serious division she actually discovers among Brakpan's African population is between urbanised residents and squatters, but this is not analysed in class terms. Culturalists criticise what they term 'institutional' resistance-histories (meaning those which focus on formal political organisations), so Sapire feels obliged to include diversionary discussions of such forms of 'informal resistance' as gangsterism and shebeening. She has to admit that these practices were 'largely apolitical' and of little significance to the main thrust of her analysis. Prominent among the secondary sources of most of these narrowly-focussed histories are the more general works of Posel and Lodge, who have, through solid archival research, provided the most developed analyses thus far of the evolution of apartheid policy and of organised resistance respectively. In many cases, however, these two excellent studies are merely used as the historiographical substructure of a discussion conducted in terms of a different discipline, such as anthropology or literary criticism. There is also a tendency to treat such prominent sources as the last word on their related subjects, although Posel concentrates almost exclusively on policy-formation, at the expense of resistance-politics, in her impressive study of The Making of Apartheid, while Lodge largely ignores the development of state policy in his similarly-seminal analysis of Black Politics in South Africa Since 1945. With Hindson and Lazar, Posel is in the vanguard of scholars challenging the orthodox 'Grand Plan' view of apartheid, in favour of a 'process' perspective. She argues that the swing within the white electorate which brought the National Party to power was a reaction to intensifying resistance among disenfranchised Africans in the cities. The emerging NP policy of Urban Labour Preference is seen as a compromise between Afrikaner nationalism between pettybourgeois and working-class 'visionaries' or 'purists' demanding total territorial segregation, and more pragmatic rural and urban capitalists determined 'to prevent the growth of surplus labour in the towns and to redirect it to the farms'. This policy is shown to have had political as well as economic aims, as the new government realised that virtually-uncontrolled urbanisation threatened the continued racial exclusivity of the franchise. Posel goes on to show that Urban Labour Preference was soon stripped of all but political content, in a complex trade-off involving not only 'visionaries' and capitalists, but also politicians, bureaucrats, voters/ratepayers and local authorities.1'

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When it comes to resistance-politics, Lodge's magnum opus is the reference-point for modern researchers. Without wishing to detract from this valuable work, it is difficult to ignore an apparent
contradiction between Lodge's introductory stated 'implicit' assumption that 'class related concepts' are required to analyse resistance movements, and his failure to apply anything of the kind in his actual analysis.

In the only chapter which directly addresses the issue of class, Lodge rejects Feit's claim that resistance to the destruction of Sophiatown location in the 1950s was divided on class lines of 'ownership or non-ownership of property'. He steers a middle course between Feit's characterisation of the ANC as having a 'bourgeois dynamic', and O'Meara's insistence that the organisation had acquired a 'proletarian orientation' during the previous decade. Lodge says that the movement was changing, but this was a 'complicated, gradual and often painful process'. In other chapters, he underlines the fact that the ANC in the 1950s was neither oriented towards workers nor socialist revolution.

Moving on to analyse the uprising which began in Soweto in 1976, Lodge concludes that this marked a 'qualitative transformation in African political life'. Yet he sees as 'forlornly romantic' the ANC 'workers' tendency' which subsequently sought 'to transform the nationalist movement into a truly working class organisation'. He dismisses Hirson's argument that the African working class set the pace of renewed resistance in the 1970s, and says that Hirson's criticism of the allegedly limited revolutionary potential of the students and the popular classes implies 'the assumption that things could have been otherwise, that the potential of the situation was not exploited to the full'.

Hirson now edits a journal dedicated to this assumption, using class-analysis of the resistance-movement to stress the alleged petty-bourgeois nature and consequent historical failings of the ANC and the Communist Party. "Class-analysis is, of course, employed less teleologically and to more constructive effect in the burgeoning historiography of South Africa's socialist labour movement." The utility of 'class-related concepts' for the academic analysis of broader resistance-history - and particularly of urban struggles - cannot, however, simply be taken for granted. It has to be substantiated, and Lodge makes no attempt to do so. In fact his analysis disproves his initial assumption, suggesting an element of the same wishful thinking he attributes to Hirson.

Lodge mentions in his book the insistence of the ANCaligned sociologist Bernard Magubane and of the Communist Party's Joe Slovo that such class-divisions as had been allowed to develop among the African population were never a significant factor. In a later paper, Lodge distances himself from this 'ANC Historiography', in which he includes the works of the Simonses, Bunting, Meli and Pampallis. At issue is their insistence that the struggle had a national rather than a class character. All Lodge can say is that the 'content ... of these 'national' preoccupations is never clearly defined'.

Hirson and company would dismiss this school for its imputed petty-bourgeois apologism, but Lodge will not go that far. Neither is he prepared to say (along with those such as Ranuga who tie nationalism to ethnicity) that the 'ANC was, strictly speaking, not a nationalist movement for national liberation and independence, but a movement for the promotion and protection of democratic rights for the African people within a multiracial state'.

The other point which needs to be mentioned regarding Lodge's work. In contrast to the ANC tradition he reviews, Lodge explicitly excludes from his definition of resistance any form of legally-sanctioned opposition to the agents and policies of the state. As with his assumption of the heuristic value of class analysis, he finds this a priori exclusion difficult to reconcile with the evidence he uncovers.

He acknowledges differences over the issue of 'dummy' representation, and notes the emerging majority view which favoured participation in Advisory Board and Native Representative elections, arguing that these bogus institutions provided useful platforms, which should not be yielded to reactionaries in the absence of more meaningful avenues of representation. Lodge concedes that Advisory Boards were popular and progressive bodies in certain locations, but he fails to consider the possibility that participation in such structures might at certain points have been politically necessary or advantageous.

It is evident from this overview of secondary literature that old certainties about apartheid policy and its organised opponents are beginning to give way to a more nuanced approach. The present thesis uses
archival material to build on the completed research of others, in order to bridge an historiographical gap in the history of Cape Town between the mid-1930s and the mid-1970s. This is an institutional history inasmuch as it examines processes of regional policy-formation within the 16 structures of the racist state, as well as organised political opposition to the developing policy. Questions of consciousness and culture are at best peripheral to this project, and interviews have proved useful only to a very limited extent, in illuminating minor lacunae. As a sociologist, Bozzoli specifically dismisses this 'more history' approach to oral sources, but even if one agreed with her extreme position, the entrenched sectarianism in local resistance-politics, as well as the subsequent escalation of violence, have created a climate unconducive to meaningful interviewing.

With prospective informants differing fundamentally over basic facts for political reasons, it has been necessary to fall back on documentary evidence, which is abundantly available due to the opening-up of the archives in the present inter-regnum. This tendency to concentrate on primary sources has been reinforced by the dangers of the current situation in the townships. La Hausse apparently perseveres with interviews in the midst of troopdeployment, but the reliability and validity of evidence gathered under such dramatic circumstances could well be called into question. Thus grounded in verifiable and reliable hard historical facts, this thesis is able to show, in its concluding chapter, the extent to which the archival record contradicts the existing secondary literature. This is how historical science advances. Those who would not hesitate to condemn such an approach as inherently positivist, empiricist and antiquarian should bear in mind that the task of unearthing all available relevant data differs enormously from the process of marshalling the resulting body of information into an historical analysis.

The available primary material has determined not only the content but also the shape of the thesis. The time-span which the study covers has on this basis been divided into six distinguishable periods. Separate chapters focus on policy-formation and resistance within all but the last of these periods, when there was no organised resistance to speak of. Chapter 1 sets the scene by identifying the precise interests involved, immediately before the war, in pressurising for control and segregation of Africans. The measures adopted in response are shown to have been both farcical and ineffective. Similar epithets could well be applied to aspects of the pre-war political scene discussed in Chapter 2. This chapter shows how, in an atmosphere of sectarian intrigue and in-fighting, local progressives forged a strategy which would become a major political driving-force in the following decades - that of building a broad-based 'united front' of anti-racist forces. Chapter 3 concentrates on policy-development, from the beginning of the war to the National Party takeover in 1948. The chapter outlines the administrative system and the social problems which the new government inherited. Still focussing on the last decade of United Party rule, Chapter 4 returns to the subject of 'united front' politics. This includes not only illegal actions such as pass-burning and arson, but also working within the system through, for example, Advisory Board and Native Representative elections.

The regional policy which emerged between 1948 and the mid-1950s is the focus of Chapter 5, while Chapter 6 shows that the resistance-movement remained preoccupied with factional wrangling during this period. Chapter 7 discusses the implementation of the Coloured Labour Preference policy during the second half of the 1950s, in the midst of further political in-fighting which marked the rise of the Africanist challenge to multi-racial 'united frontism'. This is the subject of Chapter 8. Chapter 9 documents the crushing of organised resistance, both overt and underground; and Chapter 10 is concerned with the implications of the policy-shift towards 'homeland' independence. The difficulties involved, and the consequent move towards centralisation of control, are outlined in Chapter 11. The thesis
concludes with the takeover of control by the newly-formed Peninsula Bantu Affairs Administration Board in 1973.

7. M Morris, 'Social History and the Transition to Capitalism in the South African Countryside', Africa Perspective, 1 (5-6), 1987; T Keegan, 'Mike Morris and the Social Historians'.

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9. La Hausse, 'Oral History',
17. Lodge, Black Politics, 92.
The uneven development of racial capitalism had by the mid-1930s locked the Western Cape into a long-standing exploitative relationship with the Xhosa tribal reserves of Transkei and Ciskei. Xhosa-speaking migrant labourers had for generations carved out, extended and maintained the Western Cape's basic economic infrastructure of docks, roads and railways. Xhosa migrants had proved essential too in industries such as quarrying and building construction, which were dependent on heavy manual labour. So valuable was their contribution that a prominent City Councillor could declare in 1939 that Cape Town had been built 'by the sweat and blood of its Native population'.

Ingrained colonial racism, reinforced by the processes of military subjugation and proletarianisation, ensured that Africans were never accepted as full and equal citizens of the 'Mother City'. Pressure from various class-based local interest groups for the enforcement of residential segregation led, at the beginning of the twentieth century and again in the mid-1920s, to the bitterly-contested establishment of 'Native locations'. These proved, however, inadequate to fulfil the purpose for which they were intended, and the perceived problem of the unrestricted residence of Africans persisted.

Ignoring the historical links between the Western Cape and the Xhosa 'homelands', and contending that Africans were alien to this 'natural home' of the 'Coloureds', the Nationalist-Labour 'Pact' government had during the 1920s adapted its 'Civilised Labour' policy to Western Cape demographic and geographical realities by means of a policy of 'Coloured Labour Preference'. But the influx of Africans into the region escalated, despite the adoption of increasingly harsh control measures.

New restrictions on Africans' rights to own land and to reside in urban areas were introduced in terms of the Native Trust and Land Act of 1936 and the Native Laws Amendment Act of the following year. The former entrenched the policies of territorial segregation and migrant labour enshrined in the 1913 Land Act; while the latter revised the 1923 Urban Areas Act to ensure that urban areas remained 'white' enclaves, through intensified measures of enforced residential segregation and influx control.

This chapter traces the prewar development of 'Native' policy in the local context. The analysis begins by establishing the interest of employers in the perpetuation of the migrant-labour system, and goes on to examine the pressure for segregation and influx control mounted by organised ratepayers during this period. The third and fourth sections discuss administrative measures adopted in deference to the demands of such interest groups. These measures were the racial census conducted in mid-1938, and the proclamation which one year later declared Cape Town a 'closed city' as far as Africans were concerned.

The Pre-war Preference for Migrant Labour

Urbanisation and the consequent proletarianisation of Africans accelerated with the rapid development of manufacturing industry during the second half of the 1930's. Superintendent Cook, the City Council's Manager of Native Administration, reported early in 1936 that there had recently been 'a decided increase in the number of male natives arriving from the territories...They are practically all in debt and if they get work will live on next to nothing so that their earnings can be sent home to release, in many instances, their cattle'.

Towards the end of that year, the Superintendent reported that there was evidence that even these 'tribal' men were 'getting their women-folk here immediately they have permanent work, and the women seldom return to their homes again'. He told the Native Affairs Committee one year later that 'the drift from the Territories of women joining their husbands here is increasing, due, of course, to the men obtaining work of a more or less permanent nature'. At a conference between Native Affairs Department officials and...
the representatives of various municipalities in Pretoria in September 1937, the Secretary for Native Affairs alluded to problems which had recently arisen along the Reef through the influx of African women. He called on municipalities to make use of the provisions of Section 12(1)(d) of the new Native Laws Amendment Act 'to control the influx of these vicious women in their urban areas'.

The Secretary for Native Affairs and the Assistant Native Commissioner discussed the issue with the City Council's Native Affairs Sub-Committee and various Council officials in February 1938. This meeting agreed that denying entry to the wives of 'Natives brought within the area for the performance of a definite contract only' was more feasible than a blanket restriction on the entry of all African women.* Pressed for quantification of the African female influx, Superintendent Cook disclosed that his officials had details of a mere 37 women who had arrived during February and 18 who had arrived during March.† Revised Native Registration Regulations adopted by the City Council at the end of June made provision for controlling the entry of African women into the Cape Town urban area.‡

Although both the central and local authorities were thus clearly concerned and watching the situation as closely as possible, the influx of women could hardly be described as a serious problem at that stage. The continued arrival in Cape Town of growing numbers of unskilled African workmen was, on the other hand, becoming a major threat to the policy of residential segregation. The City Council's Native Affairs Committee chairman expressed concern in August 1937 over the continued 'abnormal influx of natives from the country to Cape Town'. I In September, the Assistant Native Commissioner reported that unnamed 'Coloured deputations' had protested to the Labour Department against the displacement of 'Coloured' workers by 'Natives'. The Assistant Native Commissioner was satisfied though that this had only taken place in the building and hotel industries, and that there were in fact fewer 'Coloureds' out of work than there had been for some time. Officials were aware of 4,553 Africans having entered Cape Town during 1936, while the figure from January to August 1937 was 3,946, which was 400 more than for the corresponding period during the previous year. Many of the new arrivals merely replaced unenumerated Africans leaving for their rural homesteads, and the influx did not seem to the Assistant Native Commissioner to have exceeded the demand for African labour.13

In November the Mayor of Cape Town publicly criticised the central authorities for failing to control the African influx.14 This drew an outraged protest from the Langa Vigilance Committee, and a reminder from the Native Affairs Department that, before any action could be taken, the City Council was required (under Section 5(6) of the Urban Areas Act) to request that the central authorities proclaim the urban area of Cape Town an area prohibited to 'Natives'. The Secretary for Native Affairs told the Town Clerk that the Department is aware of the difficulties that have arisen in your area but as there are no pass laws in force in the Cape Province (outside the Transkeian Territories), controlling the movement of Natives from one area to the other, it is not possible to prevent Natives from proceeding to the larger urban centres in search of employment. It is true that a Native requires a pass to enable him to leave the Transkeian Territories but once he has crossed the Kei River there is nothing to prevent him from proceeding to any centre in the rest of the Province without hindrance.

Once the Native Laws Amendment Act came into operation at the beginning of the following year, it would be possible to repatriate to their homes or last known places of residence all Africans who entered the urban area in contravention of a proclamation issued under section 5(6).1 As matters then stood, Africans arriving in Cape Town through the proper channels received from the municipal officials at Langa permits to seek work which were valid for fourteen days. They were required to leave the urban area if they had not secured employment within that period; but the existing administrative machinery could not enforce compliance with this provision.

The imposition of a Coloured Labour Preference Policy in the Western Cape was made considerably more feasible by the 1937 amendment to the Natives (Urban Areas) Act. Under the new provisions, Africans were denied entry to South Africa's cities unless their labour was needed, and 'surplus' Africans were to be removed from the urban areas to the already rapidly deteriorating 'Native Territories'.1 The Native Laws Amendment Act of 1937 came into
operation from the beginning of 1938, in terms of proclamation 217 of 5 November, 1937.1 All that remained was for its provisions to be applied to specific urban areas. This process started with the promulgation of Proclamations 115 and 210, in May and September 1938. Under section 5(2) of the Natives (Urban Areas) Act, Proclamation 115 restricted the 'Right of Natives to Enter Areas Under the Control' of 106 urban local authorities, 39 of which were in the Cape Province (including the Western Cape municipalities of Caledon, Hermanus, Montagu and Worcester). Proclamation 210 applied the provisions of the Act to a further 43 towns in the three northern provinces, and to 49 in the Cape (including Bellville, Paarl, Simon's Town, Somerset West and Wellington).2

The rationale underlying these developments was understood at the time in what seem now to be rather simplistic economistic and functionalist terms. When the amendment to the Urban Areas Act was first brought before parliament at the beginning of 1937, the editor of the Bantu World saw this simply as an attempt to relieve the agricultural sector's chronic labour shortage.2 That shortage was said, in compelling evidence placed before the Native Farm Labour Committee later that year, to be due primarily to low wages and the often brutal treatment to which farm labourers were subjected.2 A Guardian editorial concurred with this analysis, contending towards the end of the following year (in response to growing agitation for such a measure) that only farmers would benefit were strict controls effectively implemented over the influx of Africans to Cape Town.24 The Spark went so far as to suggest that influx control was detrimental to commerce and industry, but that industrial and commercial capital, which were equated with 'liberalism', had capitulated in the parliamentary struggle over cheap African labour.2

In fact, organised employers and the local authority (representing not only employers' but also ratepayers' interests) clearly feared the political consequences of African urbanisation, and had a definite economic interest in the perpetuation of the migrant-labour system. Although it had not yet formulated a policy or made official pronouncements on this issue, the Cape Chamber of Industries took for granted the continued availability of the contractworkers on which the local economy had long relied. The workers on which the local economy had long relied. The Chamber's orientation towards profit without social responsibility is evident also in its opposition to proposed 'socialistic legislation' providing for enforceable minimum wages, sickness insurance and unemployment benefits.2

At the February 1938 meeting between the Secretary for Native Affairs, the Assistant Native Commissioner, City Council officials and members of the Council's Native Affairs Sub-Committee, the local authority representatives stressed the financial implications of the continued influx. This included not only the 'heavy capital expenditure in which the Council was involved in the provision of houses for Natives who came into the area with their wives', but also the 'burden of providing free medical and hospital treatment in the case of sick and indigent Natives who arrived at Langa from beyond the boundaries of the municipality'. The Secretary urged the Council to 'apply without delay for the proclamation of Capetown (sic) under Section 5(bis) of the Act with a view to controlling the influx of natives', but he conceded that it would be impossible, in the absence of a pass system as obtained in the Transvaal - a system which no Parliament was ever likely to introduce in the Cape Province - to compel a native before leaving his home district to secure the approval of the local authority of the urban area to which he desired to proceed, to his entry into such urban area. He held out the hope that improvement of conditions in the 'Native Territories', coupled with administrative propaganda by the Department of Native Affairs, would help dissuade Africans from proceeding to proclaimed urban areas.27

The African influx was being increasingly complemented at this stage by a growing influx of unskilled 'Coloureds' from the Western Cape platteland. By March 1938 the local labour office had on its books 1,350 unemployed men who were classified in this racial category. They were disadvantaged by the preference of many local employers for lower-paid and more 'robust' African labour. Approximately half
were people who had recently moved into the city from outlying country districts, where Africans unable to find work in the urban areas could pick up jobs at starvation wages on the national roads and on the farms which 'the Coloureds' were apparently deserting. 20

Representatives of the Wage Board discussed the deteriorating situation with the Secretary for Native Affairs in April. It was agreed that the problem at Cape Town is that the Native is usurping the work that is ordinarily done by Coloured people, and the problem is becoming very acute. Those who employ Natives argue that the

Native is cheaper and more efficient, but as against that it is urged that the minimum wage should be fixed at a rate at which the Coloured man can compete. Anything lower than that would mean that the Native would drive the Coloured people out of employment."

A deputation of trade unionists from the Trades and Labour Council attempted in August to persuade the Minister of Labour to remedy the problem by fixing unskilled wages at a minimum rate of ten shillings per day, but the Minister was convinced that the solution lay in the effective policing of the African influx. 30

In May 1938, the South African Railway and Harbour Workers' Union held a mass meeting on the Grand Parade to protest against the discriminatory treatment to which its African members were subjected in the Cape Town docks, by being limited to handling coal and grain cargoes, and restricted from employment in any less arduous capacity. 31 The South African Railways and Harbours Administration had in fact been pioneering the local implementation of a policy of 'Coloured Labour Preference' for more than a decade. 2

The Railways' general manager told the protesting dockworkers bluntly that a racial division of labour was necessary in order to restrict the influx of 'Natives' to the Cape Peninsula, which had 'always been regarded as the home of the Coloured many. Any departure from this practice would, he averred, immediately create considerable discontent among the local 'Coloured' population." 'Coloureds' were, incidently, also 'preferred' on the massive harbour extension works then being undertaken, but it was allegedly found that about sixty percent of the labourers engaged on the project were unfit for heavy work due to the ravages of alcohol. 4

Most local employers were neither keen to raise minimum wages nor to give preference to 'Coloured' labour. Their complacency was reflected in a report which the local Assistant Native Commissioner sent to his superior in April, saying that there had been great industrial activity in this district for some time past, particularly in undertakings involving heavy work and requiring the manual labour for which the Native is particularly suited. The demand for Native labour has increased enormously during the last couple of years and is likely to continue for some time. Consequently the Native is being attracted to Capetown in greater numbers. As far as I can gather the labour market has not yet reached saturation point, and the able-bodied Native, willing to work, has no difficulty in finding employment." 5

Ratepayers' Pressure for Segregation and Influx Control

While jobs were thus relatively easy to come by, even for 'illegals', finding accommodation was a far more difficult prospect. Langa was the only place in Cape Town where unexempted Africans were legally permitted to live, 26 but this squalid and overcrowded location could house a mere 6,000 people. Provision was made for 690 families (660 in the 'married quarters' and 30 in the 'single women's rooms') and for approximately 3,000 migrant-labourer 'bachelors', 'not living under conditions of family life.'

The inadequacy of accommodation at Langa resulted in a movement of poverty-stricken Africans into the outlying squatter camps, the inner-city slums, and even the suburbs, making as much of a mockery of the policy of residential segregation as had the previous mass overflow of Africans during the 1920s. 0

Organisations of small property-owners, whose position in the housing-market was threatened by competition from the growing numbers of Africans infiltrating their areas, exerted considerable pressure for segregation and influx control immediately prior to the Second World War. The Cape Flats (Britten) Committee report of January 1943 outlined the manner in which local shantytowns had developed since the 1920s, through a process of continual sub-division and sub-letting involving land-companies, private landlords, tenants and hire-purchasers. African
squatters had formed settlements both within the municipal boundary (particularly around Retreat at places such as Blaauwvlei, Hardevlei and Vrygrond), and throughout the undeveloped outlying area under the jurisdiction of the Cape Divisional Council."

The largest of the local squatter settlements was in the impoverished Kensington area, the more distant eastern portion of which fell under the Cape Divisional Council and was known as Windermere. Kensington ratepayers began agitating against the African influx in late 1928, and the CDC (lacking the resources and statutory powers needed to tackle the problem), suggested that the municipal boundaries should be extended to include the whole area. After careful consideration of the financial implications, the City Council eventually in 1931 decided against such expansion. The 1932 Native Economic Commission was subsequently appalled by conditions at Windermere and elsewhere in the Peninsula, but the number of squatters continued to increase and the illegal settlements (many of them small and undocumented) remained beyond control.40 Windermere's 'respectable and civilised class of residents', represented by the Kensington Ratepayers Association, campaigned from late 1936 for the City Council to remove the 'undesirable' Africans. A petition was drawn up as the renewed outcry gathered force, with public meetings being held and at least one deputation despatched to the City Council. This resulted only in an increased incidence of raids for 'illegals' and for 'kaffir beer' (African sorghum beer, a mainstay of the squatters' informal economy) by police and municipal inspectors. The City Council's Superintendent Cook, pointed out in May 1937 that the solution had to involve the provision of alternative accommodation, but this was not forthcoming.41 As the situation deteriorated, the authorities took steps to prohibit the practice, increasingly common among local Africans, of buying through hire-purchase a plot on which to build their own shelters. The 1937 Native Laws Amendment Act, effective from the beginning of 1938, prohibited the acquiring of land by Africans from non-Africans in urban areas, thus extending to the towns the 'principle of possessory land segregation' introduced in rural areas by the 1913 Land Act.42 Of the 2,000-odd Africans in the Kensington-Windermere area, 29 legally owned their illegally-occupied land (22 in Windermere under the Divisional Council and 7 within the municipal borders at Kensington).43 Other areas in which Africans actually owned land (having survived the notorious forfeiture clauses, high interest rates and unforeseen additional charges which characterised these hire-purchase agreements)44 included not only Retreat but also places such as Athlone, Crawford, Welcome Estate, Rylands Estate and Hazendal.45

The Burger focussed attention in mid-1938 on the deteriorating conditions in Windermere, and a report in the Cape Arqs said that, with the accelerating 'influx from the Territories', 'Natives' were 'beginning again to swarm into the slums or to drift over the City boundaries into the noman's land of Kensington and Windermere'. The Assistant Native Commissioner warned that 'unless the ingress is checked the major portion of the Kensington area will be almost entirely Native before long', but the Chief Native Commissioner felt that it would be unwise to act against Africans residing illegally outside the location while local industries required their labour and no alternative legal accommodation could be offered.47 A public meeting convened by the Kensington Ratepayers' Association in mid-June 1938 appointed a deputation to impress upon the Mayor the 'seriousness of the Native influx to Kensington Estate', where conditions were 'going on from bad to worse'. This deputation, led by City Councillor I Albow and including a member of the Provincial Council and a Divisional Councillor, met with the Native Affairs Subcommittee early in July. The City Council informed the ratepayers one month later that 'the earliest possible action would be taken to remedy the conditions complained of. The major and essential factor in dealing with the problem was, however, the provision of adequate accommodation at Langa'.40

The Native Affairs Department was told, when it pressed for action against deteriorating conditions both within and beyond the municipal boundaries, that 'until the Council is in a position to furnish accommodation to Natives it is unable to exercise the powers vested in it by Section 5(3) of Act No. 21 of 1923, as amended'. Squatters outside the municipal area were, the CC further insisted, a problem which could only be dealt with by the police (probably under the Private Locations Act), but municipal officials would assist in any way possible.4
The problem of the illegal and uncontrolled residence of Africans in the Peninsula was by no means confined to the squatter camps, as growing numbers of the homeless moved into inner-city slums and suburban 'black spots', exacerbating existing conditions of overcrowding and squalor. The Maitland Ratepayers' Association complained of a 'Native' influx in March 1936, and Cook reported that two of his inspectors were making weekly visits to the area. Most of the Africans in question proved, however, to be either registered voters or legally married couples who could not be accommodated in Langa. City Council policy, explicitly stated two years later by the Town Clerk, was that 'married Natives' could not be evicted unless alternative accommodation was available.50 All the Council could do in the interim was to remove 'bachelors' to the Langa hostels while continuing to prosecute 'illegals' and the landlords who 'harboured' them.51

The Ratepayers' Association in the upper part of Woodstock known as Walmer Estate raised strong objections in June to the presence of Africans in two houses in Marsden Road. Municipal inspectors found no trace of illegal unexempted Africans or of illicit liquor, but Superintendent Cook seems to have persuaded the landlord to terminate the main tenant's lease. The problem was far worse in the older slums elsewhere in Woodstock and in Salt River. Agitation against the presence of Africans in these areas had occurred sporadically during the previous forty years.02

The chairman of the Salt River Ratepayers' Association, Provincial Councillor Mr C Abrahams, expressed the fear in May that lower Woodstock and Salt River were being turned into a 'Native Location'. 'European and respectable nonEuropean' tenants were allegedly being replaced by 'invading' Africans, particularly in the decaying Durham Street and Bromwell Road areas.04

A combined meeting of the Walmer Estate and Salt River ratepayers' associations' executives resolved in July to demand a meeting with the City Council. A deputation subsequently attended a Native Affairs Committee meeting in mid-August, to insist that 'no Native should be allowed to live in any area where there was already a large Coloured and European population'.0

The Salt River Ratepayers' Association chairman complained in May 1937 of the continuing alleged 'danger and disgraceful behaviour' of Africans in his ward, especially in the area around Bromwell and Strand Streets. Cook advised that the problem would continue until married accommodation became available in Langa and exemption from the segregatory provisions of the Urban Areas Act was withdrawn from registered voters.56

The City Council received complaints during 1937 of Africans living in localities such as Albion Road in Rondebosch, Kent Street in Newlands, Hazendal Estate, the Princes Street-Second Avenue area in Claremont, and Waterford Road in Plumstead.57 Day and night raids by municipal inspectors and police officers became more frequent in response. The difficulties involved were highlighted when an Inspector Halley was said to have been severely reprimanded towards the end of the year for handing a registered voter over to the police for arrest (along with four 'illegals' who were subsequently convicted) during a raid one night in Bromwell Street. The offended man's legal advisor remarked on the irony of municipal regulations requiring both exempted and unexempted Africans to carry documents which could only be construed as passes.5

In April 1938 the Salt River Ratepayers' Association complained that the African population of Woodstock, Salt River and Observatory had approximately doubled in the previous few months, as there was no room in Langa for the Africans 'flooding into Cape Town in truckloads'. The poorer residents of these three areas were consequently 'now faced with the necessity of living next to Kaffirs', and the City Council was called upon to ensure that surplus Africans were expelled from the Peninsula forthwith.5

The Association requested a meeting with the City Council, asserting that 'the time has arrived that drastic steps should be taken as the position is now very serious'. At the ensuing meeting with the Native Affairs Sub-Committee, the ratepayers' delegation (which included a Provincial Councillor and a - presumably retired - Colonel) alleged that the presence of a large number of Africans in the area had resulted in deteriorating living conditions, falling property values and an increase in the number of shebeens. The deputation pressed for the 'urgent removal of the
Natives, the Council to provide tents to enable this to be done until proper housing accommodation at Langa becomes available. but the sub-committee chairman, Colonel Quirk, could only say in reply that the Council was seeking a loan to finance the extension of Langa.61 With Assistant Superintendent Stuart Rogers, Quirk drew up a report recommending the establishment of a potentially profitable municipal beerhall in Langa, to replace the system of licenced domestic brewing made redundant by the 1937 Native Laws Amendment Act. The beerhall question is further pursued in Chapter 4.

Responding to CC's evident lack of urgency, the Woodstock Ratepayers' Association thereupon requested the over-arching Joint Council of Ratepayers' Associations 'to make representations to the City Council urging the Council to acquire legal powers to bar the further influx of natives into this city' and 'to expel natives already in the city'. The Woodstock and Salt River ratepayers' association executives met jointly and threatened to hold protest meetings if the Council failed to act.'

The racist chorus of the ratepayers was soon joined by the Citizens' Housing League, which likewise called on the Council to act against the continued influx of Africans.6 Meanwhile the Department of Native Affairs persisted in pressing the City Council to set in motion the process which would result in the proclamation of Cape Town under Section 5(2) of the amended Urban Areas Act.64

The Council had decided, though, to await the results of the biennial 'census of natives in urban areas' provided for under Section 16 of the Act. The Town Clerk asked the Salt River Ratepayers' Association to let Cook's successor Rogers know, ostensibly for census purposes, exactly where 'Natives' were living in the Salt River-Woodstock area. The Citizens' Housing League and the Department of Native Affairs were both informed that nothing could be done until

the results of the census (held on July 12) had been analysed.5 The census is discussed in the following section of this chapter, in the context of the battle to halt the accelerating influx of Africans.

Towards the end of 1938 the Council's revamped Native Administration Department, armed with the requested list of addresses, embarked on a series of night-raids which resulted in eviction-notices being served on at least 233 'single male natives' and fines being imposed on a number of property-owners for 'unlawfully harbouring natives'.'

This was followed during the first half of 1939 by, for example, action being taken against the owner of certain properties in Sackville Street, District Six;7 and the eviction of small numbers of 'illegal' Africans from the vicinities of Albion Road, Rondebosch;6 Princes Road, Claremont;9 and Main Road, Retreat.7 These latter suburban developments resulted respectively from the representations of a concerned Rondebosch housewife, a Cape Argus expose of 'Shebeeners in the Suburbs',2 and a petition drawn up by nine Retreat ratepayers.7 The Maitland Ratepayers' Association protested in mid-year that 'a large number of natives [were] still living in certain parts' of that suburb, and requested urgent measures 'to accommodate these natives in the areas set aside for native habitation'.74 The Town Clerk reported at the same time that 'complaints regarding the residence and congregation of natives in various parts of the city and suburbs are continually being received'.?

By May 1939 (one month before the promulgation of Proclamation 105), the Town Clerk could report, without giving any details, that 'systematic inspections are being carried out and unexempted single Natives ordered into the Location'.76 This was the work of the Council's Native Registration Branch, which at the end of 1942 comprised six inspectors under Senior Inspector Mr DB Geddie."

Married Africans were also threatened. A press release, issued at the insistence of new Acting Superintendent and Acting Manager of Native Administration Rogers (who took over from Cook in June), warned that owners and others responsible for the letting of premises appear to be under the impression that if a native claims to be married he is exempted in terms of the Act and they are authorised to let accommodation to him. This is not the case, and if it is desired to let premises to an unexempted native, whether married or not, it is necessary to obtain a licence from the Council to do so.7" Official letters, signed by the Superintendent, were despatched to people suspected of misunderstanding or ignoring this warning. These letters informed their recipients that
it has been brought to my notice that a number of unexempted natives are being accommodated on premises situated at which you are the

I have to draw your attention to the provisions of Section 5(5) of the Natives (Urban Areas) Act, as amended, which makes it an offence for any owner, lessee, occupier or person in charge or control of any premises (other than a native hostel) situate in an area proclaimed under subsection (1) and not included in any location or native village, who, without the authority of a licence issued in terms of subsection (4), accommodates on those premises any native who is not exempted by or under subsection (2) or permits him to be so accommodated, or who, being the holder of such a licence, accommodates on those premises a number of natives of one or other sex in excess of the number specified in that licence, or permits them to be so accommodated....

The accompanying application-form for a licence to accommodate Africans specified the scale of fees payable in this regard. These fees ranged from one pound and ten shillings for five or fewer Africans to fifteen pounds for twenty-five to fifty. Licences were valid for a maximum period of six months.*

Minister of Native Affairs Fagan fully supported the Council in its efforts to effect residential segregation. In July 1939 he decreed, lest aspersions be cast on the legality of the ongoing Council-initiated night-raids and general harassment, that not only the police but also any 'European' municipal official upon being satisfied that there is reason to suspect that any native is residing or is being employed or accommodated on any premises situate within the urban area of Cape Town, in contravention of the provisions of the Natives (Urban Areas) Act, 1923, as amended, may enter and search without warrant such premises at all reasonable hours during the day and night.'2

Prosecutions for the crime of 'harbouring natives' had become a routine procedure by that stage, detailed with monotonous regularity in the monthly reports of the Superintendent."

The African National Congress and the National Liberation League protested in writing to the City Council at the end of July against what ANC leaders Moses Kotane and Joseph Nkatlo termed the 'present drive against Africans residing in the city'. The Council was adamant, however, that (as its Native Affairs Sub-committee put it) 'such action as was being taken represented ordinary routine administration of the Natives (Urban Areas) Act'."

These segregatory developments coincided with a growing determination on the part of the authorities to finally bring under control the movement of people between the Western Cape and its labour-reservoirs in the Xhosa reserves. The following two sections of this chapter focus on influx control, beginning with the census of Africans held in July 1938, and moving on to discuss the futile proclamation which during the following year declared Cape Town a 'closed city' to African in-migrants. The 1938 Census of Africans The census date had been agreed upon in September 1937, at the above-mentioned conference at which the Native Affairs Department had spelt out the provisions of the Native Laws Amendment Act to municipal representatives from all over the country.6 Departmental officials explained to the assembled delegates at this conference that the census was 'one of the documents upon which the removal of redundant natives in the urban areas will be based'. At a similar conference which discussed some of the finer points of 'Native Policy' in February 1938, Under-secretary of Native Affairs Mr JS Allison told the municipal representatives that the 'main aim of the census is to get rid of surplus Natives in the urban areas'." The Pretoria-based Inspector of Urban Native Locations, Mr CS Slarke, confirmed to the City Council's Native Affairs Sub-Committee that 'excess Natives would be removed by the Government in pursuance of the policy enshrined in the Act.'

Native Affairs did not propose, however, to take such action unilaterally. The half-baked influx control scheme seems to have required three things from the local authorities. In the first place, they were required to initiate the proclamations applying the amended Urban Areas Act to their areas. The Cape
Town City Council was unenthusiastic, apparently accepting legal advice that the intended proclamation would be identical to, and as ineffective as, that which had previously applied the Act as it then stood to some eleven towns throughout South Africa." The Council decided in any event, as mentioned above, to await the census result before considering such a step. Secondly, while the City Council evidently considered that the African influx could best be controlled at its source in the 'Native Territories' by the Department of Native Affairs, the Department insisted that local authorities were responsible for effecting influx control under Section 5 of the Act. The Council was presumably expected to somehow ensure that newly-arrived Africans who failed to find employment within the fourteen days allowed in terms of the 'seek-work permits' issued by the Council staff at Langa, actually left the city. This provision had been a dead letter since its inception in 1926," and the City Council did not have the machinery or the funds to enforce compliance."

Thirdly, the Council had to conduct the census, and thus establish the number of Africans within its area of jurisdiction. This figure, together with an estimate of the area's 'normal Native labour requirement', had then to be reported to Pretoria, where the Minister of Native Affairs and the Native Affairs Commission would decide if any action was necessary. If so, the Council would be called upon to provide a list of names of 'redundant Natives' to be removed from the urban area. The Council went through the motions of fulfilling only the first part of this third requirement. Its failure in this regard may be ascribed at least partly to resistance among local Africans to the census procedure in view of its intended consequences. Africans in Cape Town were at that time severely disorganised (as discussed in the following chapter), and the major political organisations seem to have played little part in opposing the census. Local resistance against the census was initiated by the Langa Vigilance Committee, which began holding protest meetings in April 1938. The Vigilance Committee was critical of the Langa Advisory Board's apparent acquiescence in the proposed census, and despite the Board's denial of this charge, the Vigilance Committee won increased support within the location at the Board's expense."4

Outside the location, the anti-census agitation seems to have been led by the Dock Workers' Union. It was reported at the end of June that the 'Native dock workers have already swamped Langa with pamphlets stating: the census is coming and you may be driven out of your jobs and sent away from Cape Town'. Protest meetings held in Cape Town, including a large gathering on the Grand Parade two days before the census was conducted, were presumably convened by the Dock Workers' Union." The anti-census agitation was sufficiently worrying to evoke from the Minister of Native Affairs a 'message of goodwill' assuring Africans that they would benefit from the equilibration of labour supply and demand which local authorities would be in a position to effect once the census results were known. The provisions of the Native Laws Amendment Act would, said the Minister, be 'sympathetically enforced' *6

The editor of the Cape Times called on the City Council to follow this lead. If expulsions proved necessary, 'foreign natives' should be the first to go, followed if necessary by newcomers to Cape Town, who should be sent 'to places where employment opportunities exist'. The Argus, perhaps reflecting the interests of employers anxious to preserve the local reservoir of unskilled labour, insisted that 'repatriation' was, for financial and moral reasons, 'highly unlikely'. If the census did reveal any great surplus of labour, the Cape Peninsula would merely have to be 'closed as a labour area until wastage [had] brought the position back to normal'. If repressive measures were adopted, there would be 'time enough for an appeal to Parliament, backed by European sympathy'.

The actual process of enumerating the African population within the Cape Town municipal area on July 12 seems to have been quite farcical. Employers were required to fill in two forms, one listing all Africans sleeping on their premises, and the other all African employees residing outside the municipal area. Fifty 'European' and twenty-four 'Native' canvassers supposedly visited every dwelling in the municipality, leaving a census form with each tenant." Bearing in mind that employers were then paying
one shilling per month for each African legally employed in terms of a service contract, and that illegally accommodating Africans was a criminal offence, the whole procedure was certainly questionable.

To compound the problem, many local Africans were understandably unwilling to be included in the count, and thousands were reported to have skipped beyond the municipal boundary. This was by no means difficult. In Kensington, for example, the boundary bisected 6th Avenue, the eastern side of which thus marked the beginning of the area of jurisdiction of the Cape Divisional Council. This body, not being an urban local authority, was not required to conduct a census of its African population. A significant migration across 6th Avenue was consequently noted in the local press from the end of June.100

It is hardly surprising, in view of these confounding factors, that a mere 15,788 Africans (including 9,916 adult males and 2,815 adult females) were found to be resident in the municipal area.101 This extremely low figure was nevertheless more than double the City Council's official pre-census estimate of 7,000 Africans in Cape Town,02 and it was unquestioningly accepted as being correct.

Having thus come up with a population figure, the City Council had only discharged part of its duty. It was further expected, as noted above, to estimate the number of Africans necessary for the local economy, list those who were surplus to requirements, and formally request the application of the amended Act to Cape Town.102 Nearly three months after the census, the Council's Native Affairs Sub-Committee finally decided to simply take the census figure as the municipal area's 'normal native labour requirements'. The Sub-Committee recommended that the Department of Native Affairs be notified that while there were no 'Natives' in Cape Town who were 'not necessary for the reasonable labour requirements and who it is desired to be removed', the issuing of a Proclamation by the Department under Section 5(2)(1) of the amended Act was necessary in order 'to restrict the entry of further Natives into the urban area'. 104 This would make Cape Town the first major urban area in which the provisions of the 1937 Act were applied.106

The concluding section of this chapter analyses developments leading up to the proclamation of Cape Town as a 'closed city' to Africans in June 1939.

The 'Closed City': Proclamation 105 of 1939

The Native Affairs Sub-Committee's recommendation that the Native Affairs Department should be asked to issue a proclamation barring the further entry of Africans to Cape Town was initially opposed by the City Council. The matter was referred back to the sub-committee, after a vigorous debate in which the moderate 'Coloured' leader and City Councillor Dr Abdurahman argued convincingly that 'Coloured' jobs were being threatened by 'poor whites' and not by 'Natives'. He was supported in this stand by his daughter, Councillor Cissie Gool, whose radical National Liberation League had spoken out on these issues in 1936 and 1937.106

The Native Affairs Sub-Committee was satisfied that sufficient reserves of unemployed 'Natives' existed to satisfy local demand, and insisted that the influx control proclamation was necessary if the municipality was not to incur escalating obligations in the field of housing. Control would additionally, it was argued, protect Coloureds from 'Native' competition in the labour market. The sub-committee was backed up by racist ratepayers strongly pressing their demand for influx control in order to protect their interests in the housing market, but the City Council remained unmoved.107 When the question came before the full Council for the third time on 22 December 1938, it was decided, by twenty-one votes to eight, that the City Council would 'take no part in applying to the Government to issue a proclamation to control the influx of natives into the urban area of Cape Town'.100

A Cape Times editorial, while decrying the 'rather pointless vehemence against the principle of the Native Laws Amendment Act' shown by certain Councillors, considered that the Council had acted wisely. Although the Act could only be tested in practice, the practicalities of the influx control provisions should be spelt out before any decision as to its implementation could be taken. Where, for instance, would 'redundant' Africans removed from the cities be resettled? The 'native reserves' were already 'grievously overcrowded', and the Act was surely not intended as a means of providing forced labour for the agricultural sector. All in all, said this influential editor, the
City Council, having, in terms of the Act, ascertained, by means of the special census held in July last, the number of natives resident in the municipality, and having also in terms of the Act, determined by some mysterious process of calculation the number of natives representing the 'reasonable labour requirements of the urban area', seems to have discharged its immediate duty. 109

Organisations such as the Salt River Ratepayers' Association and the Citizens' Housing League, on the other hand, persisted with their demand that the Council should assist the Government in keeping the 'Natives' out in order to protect 'Coloureds' in the labour and housing markets.**° Meanwhile the Minister of Native Affairs assured the opposition National Party in parliament that the situation in Cape Town was being closely watched, and that action would be taken 'under Section 5 bis of the Natives (Urban Areas) Act, 1923, should it appear that more natives are coming in than is necessary to meet the reasonable labour requirements of the urban area'."

Although the number of 'Coloured' males registered for employment at the local labour exchange had declined from 1,350 the previous March to a mere 636, the Cape Times in March 1939 reported concern in 'Government circles' and among certain unnamed 'Coloured leaders' regarding the alleged growth of unemployment among 'Coloureds' due to the continued influx of Africans."12 The Department of Labour was particularly perturbed. Secretary for Labour Walker informed his Native Affairs counterpart Douglas Smit that in addition to the registered unemployed, his department was helping support 359 unskilled 'Coloureds' temporarily employed on local relief works. There were thus almost one thousand 'Coloureds' who could not find work, as employers of unskilled labour preferred the reputedly more robust and reliable Africans even where minimum wages had been fixed. The Secretary for Native Affairs informed his Minister that the 'Labour Department feels that there can be no justification for its continuing to subsidise coloured labour while there is so much employment offering in Cape Town ... Mr Walker suggests that the only solution is to prevent undue competition by Natives'. The Minister was reminded, in view of the City Council's recalcitrance, that the Farm Labour Committee in its report had recommended central government administration of the mechanisms of influx control. The Secretary had to admit that the NAD had 'not had time to work out a scheme to give effect to this suggestion', which would obviously be a financial burden and would probably prove ineffective without municipal cooperation.1"

The Minister of Native Affairs urged the City Council to reconsider its refusal to request the disputed proclamation, as its attitude was hampering efforts 'to restrict the entry of Natives into the urban area in such a manner as to curtail undue competition with the coloured man whose natural home is in the Cape Peninsula'.114 The Minister of Labour, for his part, assured a deputation comprising two Peninsula members of parliament and three delegates from the Coloured Welfare Association (presumably the 'Coloured leaders' to whom the Cape Times had earlier referred) that the Departments of Labour and Native Affairs were collaborating in an endeavour to stem the influx of natives to Cape Town, as these appeared to be displacing coloured unskilled workers'. "5 The concerns of the intended victims of the policy were easily brushed aside. When, only one month later, the Langa Workers Association wrote to the Minister of Labour saying that Africans feared being made scapegoats for social ills beyond their control, the Minister replied that no new laws were intended. The Government was merely talking to the City Council about the continuing 'Native' influx, which could cause problems for the Africans themselves as well as for the 'Coloureds'.1" The matter was referred to the Native Affairs Commission, which recommended that 'for some time to come' Cape Town should be declared a 'closed city' for Africans. If? Donald Molteno, the sole recognised representative of Western Cape Africans, protested in parliament that there was no conflict between Africans and 'Coloureds' in Cape Town, and reiterated his conviction that the African influx could best be stemmed by raising unskilled wages in other centres.110 Molteno's liberal sentiments were obviously not shared by a Citizens' Housing League deputation which met the Secretary for Native Affairs in mid-April, to urge that action be taken to compel all 'Natives' to live in Langa and to repatriate 'surplus Natives' in order to protect 'Coloured people ... pushed out of the housing quarters by the Natives who were coming into the town'. Bishop Lavis, who was a member of this deputation,1" was subsequently criticised for being inconsistent in vigorously opposing the segregation-
policy insofar as it affected 'Coloureds', while simultaneously advocating segregation and influx control with regard to Africans.2

A meeting of the Cabinet forestalled further debate by deciding to issue the long-awaited proclamation restricting the influx of Africans to Cape Town, even without a formal request from the City Council. The Council was reminded that the Native Affairs Department expected local authorities to enforce such proclamations once they had been issued.1 The Cape Times suggested that the Council should agree, as it stood to lose registration fees and could no longer be accused of having taken the initiative.122 By a majority of twenty votes to nine, the City Council meekly acquiesced in this racist measure, despite the strong arguments for the rights of Africans put up by interalia 'Coloured' councillors Dr Abdurahman and Cissie Gool.120 Proclamation 105 was duly issued on 9 June 1939,124 to be effective as from the beginning of July. Any African entering the Cape Town urban area without a prior firm offer of employment was thereafter guilty of an offence. The City Council could, at its own discretion and depending on the state of the local labour-market, authorise the entry of temporary visitors and of work-seekers. The registration of 'Native Service Contracts' remained central to the new system, and the Council retained responsibility for the discharge of this function. In order to make the system financially viable, the registration charge payable by employers was from the end of June raised to two shillings per month per service contract.126 An influx control system was thus applied to Cape Town immediately prior to the Second World War, without recourse to pass laws as they existed in the other three provinces. A Cape Times editorial commented that the administration of Proclamation 105 would have been easier had pass laws existed in the Cape, but the Cape had a tradition of generosity in these matters, and although it has fallen into line with all that complex and potentially irksome machinery which is apparently necessary to achieve segregation, it still expects the wheels of that machinery to be set in motion with the greatest possible degree of understanding and sympathy for the native.27

As mentioned above, the closing of Cape Town to Africans under Proclamation 105 (which the ratepayers of Woodstock and Salt River, incidently, claimed as a victory for their racist campaign)28 followed the adoption of similar measures in Simon's Town, Bellville and Somerset West under Proclamation 210 of 1938. The northern municipalities soon followed suit, Parow and Durbanville in terms of Proclamation 39 of 1940 and Goodwood in terms of Proclamation 241 of 1941.129 Only in Cape Town and in Simon's Town, (where the mayor said less than one year after the promulgation of Proclamation 210 that the system was working well, after initial difficulties in getting 'Natives' into the location and removing the 'surplus'),30 was any attempt made, however, (in terms of 'Native Registration Regulations') to enforce the system of 'Native Service Contracts'. The influx into the areas controlled by the northern municipalities and by the Cape Divisional Council thus remained virtually unimpeded.31

Chapter 3 traces the subsequent further collapse of control during the Second World War, and documents the process of policy-development during the final years of United Party rule. The following chapter briefly outlines the fragmented state of forces opposed to the segregationist state during the prewar era.

3. Kinkead-Weekes, 'Africans in Cape Town'.
6. 3/CT 1/4/6/6/4/1/1, 128, CC legal advisor to TC, 5-10 Jan. 1938, reporting on 28-9 Sep. 1937 conference. 9. NTS 4232 77/313, notes of meeting, 8 Feb. 1938. 10. 3/CT 1/4/6/6/4/1/1, 147, NASC minutes, 11 Feb. 1938; GN 5/2, TC to Cook, 22 Feb. 1938; 3/CT 1/4/6/6/4/1/1, 205-7, Cook's report, 9
Mar. 1938; GN 5/2, Cook to TC, 5 Apr. 1938. 11. handwritten marginal note on GN 5/2, extract from NASC minutes, 13 May, 1938.

12. Cape Times, 23 Aug. 1937, quoting Councillor WH Ross. 13. NTS 4232 77/313, Ass NC telegram to SNA, 2 Sep. 1937. 14. Burger, 16 Nov. 1937. This criticism was softened by the Town Clerk's acknowledgement that 'the statement by His Worship the Mayor did not receive the prior approval of the Council, and to that extent cannot be said to represent the official viewpoint of this Council' (NTS 4232 77/313, TC to SNA, 8 Dec. 1937).


33. ibid, SAR & H general manager to Molteno, 13 Sep. 1938. 34. Cape Times, 14 May, 1938.

35. NTS 5314 77/313E, Ass NC to CNC, 14 Apr. 1938. 36. African parliamentary voters were exempt from these provisions in terms of Section 5(2)(c) of the Urban Areas Act. There were 3,841 registered African parliamentary voters in Cape Town in 1943 and this was said to be almost double the 1938 figure (NTS 4504 581/313, Rogers' report, 12 May, 1943). 37. 3/CT 1/4/6/4/1/1, 230, Cook's report, 5 Apr. 1938; Cape Times, 22 Apr. 1938; NTS 4504 581/313, Rogers' report,


50. Cape Argus, 5 Nov. 1938.

51. 3/CT 1/4/10/1/1/8, 120, Cook's report, 10 Mar. 1936
52. 1N 4/4/1/1, Upper Walmer Estate RA sec to TC, 18 June, 1936; ibid, TC to Upper Walmer Estate RA sec, 30 June, 1936; ibid, TC to Cook, 30 June, 1936; ibid, Cook to TC, 14 July, 1936; ibid, Upper Walmer Estate RA sec to TC, 6 Aug, 1936; ibid, Cook to TC, 18 Aug. 1936. 53. Kinkead - Weekes, 'Africans in Cape Town'. 54. Cape Argus, 7 May, 1936.

55. Cape Standard, 17 Aug. 1936. See also GN 4/4/1/1, Salt River RA chair to TC, 24 July, 1936; ibid, TC to Salt River RA chair, 7 Aug. 1936; ibid, Salt River RA chair to TC, 10 Aug. 1936. 56. GN 4/4/1/1, Salt River RA chair to TC, 10 May, 1937; ibid, Cook to TC, 23 June, 1937. 57. GN 4/4/1/1, Mrs M Stain of Albion Road to TC, 21 Mar. 1937; ibid, Rogers to TC, 20 Apr. 1937; ibid, TC to Mrs Stain, 22 Apr. 1937; ibid, TC to Cook, 26 May, 1937; ibid, Cook to TC, 2 June, 1937; ibid, Cook to TC, 9 June, 1937; ibid, Cook to TC, 22 June, 1937; ibid and 3/CT 1/4/10/1/1/8, 393, NAC minutes, 13 Aug. 1937.

58. GN 4/4/1/1, Salt River RA chair to TC, 10 May, 1938. 59. Cape Times, 18 May, 1938; Cape Argus, 26 May, 1938. 60. GN 4/4/1/1, Salt River RA chair to TC, 4 May, 1938. 61. 3/CT 1/4/6/6/4/1/1, 243, NASC minutes, 13 May, 1938. 62. Cape Times, 18 May, 1938; Cape Argus, 26 May, 1938. 63. GN 5/1/1, CHL sec to TC, 29 Aug. 1938. 64. 3/CT 1/4/6/6/4/1/1, 374, SNA to TC, 29 June, 1938. (annexure D to NASC minutes, 8 July, 1938). 65. Cape Times, 21 Sep. 1937; GN 4/4/1/1/1, TC to Salt River RA chair, 22 June, 1938; GN 5/1/1, TC to CHL sec, 29 Sep. 1938; NTS 5314 77/313E, TC to SNA, 19 July, 1938. 66. GN 4/4/1/1, (undated and unsourced) suggested reply to 21 Sep. 1938 letter from Salt River RA chair to TC; 3/CT 1/4/6/6/4/1/1, 539, Rogers' report, 8 Nov. 1938; ibid, 576, Rogers' report, 5 Dec. 1938, 5. 67. GN 4/4/1/1, Attorney D Prisman to TC (on behalf of client Mr M Lewenson), 17 Feb. 1939; ibid, TC to Prisman, 22 Feb. 1939. 68. GN 4/4/1/1, Rogers to TC, 25 Apr. 1939; ibid, TC to Mrs Stain of Rondebosch, 17 May, 1939. 69. 3/CT 1/4/6/6/4/1/2, Rogers' report, 8 May, 1939. 70. GN 4/4/1/1, Rogers to TC, 21 Apr. 1939; ibid, TC to Mr C de Wet of Retreat, 17 May, 1939. 71. GN 4/4/1/1, Mrs M Stain to TC, 19 Feb. 1939; ibid, TC to Mrs Stain, 28 Feb. 1939; ibid, Rogers to TC, 28 Mar. 1939. 72. Cape Argus, 28 Mar. 1939; NTS 5314 77/313E, Ass NC to TC, 29 Mar. 1939; ibid, Rogers to TC, 6 June, 1939. (The latter two documents are also in GN 4/4/1/1). 73. GN 4/4/1/1, petition of nine Retreat ratepayers to TC, 27 Mar. 1939.

74. GN 4/4/1/1, Maitland RA sec to TC, 27 June, 1939.

75. GN 4/4/1/1, TC to legal advisor, 16 June, 1939. 76. GN 4/4/1/1, (actually marked GN 7/6), TC to SNA, 13 May, 1939. 77. 3/CT 1/4/10/1/1/9, 173, NAC minutes, 11 Dec. 1942. 78. Cape Times, 6 June, 1938. 79. GN 4/1/1/4/3, Rogers' draft memo to TC, 16 Nov. 1938; ibid, undated press release on 'Accommodation of Natives on Private Property', with accompanying letters to editors of Cape Argus, Cape Times, Burger and Suiderstem, 30 May, 1939; Cape Argus, 30 May, 1939; Cape Times, 1 June, 1939. See also Budow, 'Urban Squatting'. 80. GN 4/1/1/4/3, example of standard letter, signed by Rogers, nd. 81. GN 4/1/1/4/3, 'Form of Application', nd. 82. Government Notice 1041 of 14 July, 1939. (In Government Gazette 2661, 14 July, 1939). 83. eg 3/CT 1/4/6/4/1/2, Rogers' report, 5 June, 1939 (annexure 8 to NASC minutes, 9 June, 1939); ibid, Rogers' report, 10 July, 1939 (annexure 5 to NASC minutes, 14 July, 1939); ibid, Rogers' report, 8 Aug. 1939 (annexure 6 to NASC minutes, 11 Aug 1939).

84. 3/CT 1/4/6/4/1/2, ANC (Cape Town branch) chair Kotane and sec Nkatlo to TC, 28 July, 1939 (annexure 7 to NASC minutes, 11 Aug. 1939); ibid, NLL chair Z Gool and sec B Lakey to TC, 31 July, 1939 (annexure 8 to NASC minutes, 11 Aug. 1939); ibid, NASC minutes, 11 Aug. 1939, 3; Guardian, 11 Aug. 1939; GN 4/4/7/1, Acting TC to NLL sec, 18 Sep. 1939. 85. See pp 3-4 above.


2: NON-COLLABORATIONISM, ANTI-COMMUNISM AND POLITICAL PRAGMATISM. 1936-9 Underpinning the hardening ‘Native Policy’ which characterised this period of intensifying segregation and repression was the widely-held conviction, expressed by National Party leader General JBM Hertzog as early as 1924, that nothing could be more detrimental for South Africa than to grant ‘Natives’ the franchise.’ Twelve years later (as leader of the coalition United Party), Prime Minister Hertzog was eventually able to push the necessary new constitutional arrangements through the all-white parliament. The 1936 Representation of Natives Act provided for separate communal representation, dashing long-nurtured hopes for an extension northward of the qualified Cape ‘Native’ franchise. This measure exacerbated existing divisions within an already faction-ridden local resistance movement, which consequently proved impotent in the face of the increasingly repressive actions of the authorities,
allowing 'Native' policy to evolve almost without challenge. Historians such as Roux, Bunting and the Simoneses have discussed the 'principled' opposition which arose against the 'united front' strategy pursued by the Communist Party in the Western Cape during this period, through organisations such

at the ANC, the National Liberation League and the shortlived Non-European United Front. The two main sources of anti-communist agitation were organised factions of ultra-left boycottists and anticomunist Congress conservatives.' The first two sections of this chapter focus on these groupings, while the concluding section discusses the attempted revival of the African National Congress just before the war.

Non-Collaborationism: The 'Boycottists' of the Ultra-Left
Local Africans made little fuss about finally being deprived, by means of the Representation of Natives Act of 1936, of their remaining limited political rights. Organisations such as the Communist Party and the African National Congress, which had previously mobilised local Africans into sporadic militant resistance, were by 1936 respectively 'virtually dead' and 'in a state of chaos.' The first stirrings of organised protest and mobilisation in the local context seem in fact to have found expression through the fragmented local ultra-left. The Communist League of South Africa, a short-lived 1934 offshoot of the influential Trotskyist 'Lenin Club' which had been formed in Cape Town in 1932,4 organised at

least one meeting in Langa, during August 1935, at which Hertzog's 'Native Bills' were unanimously rejected. The approximately 250 people present at this meeting adopted a resolution pledging an unrelenting struggle for the retention of the qualified franchise in the Cape Province, and for the extension of the Cape franchise to Africans throughout the country.0

The Communist League's 'generally aggressive attempts to broaden its base' did not however elicit the expected response among the demoralised, disorganised and generally uneducated local African population.' Neither did the League's 'purist' approach find support at the level of national politics. Dr Goolam Gool, who had been the chief speaker at its Langa meeting,7 was repeatedly denied a hearing at the first national conference of the All African Convention in Bloemfontein during December 1935.0

The hundreds of delegates, representing all shades of the political spectrum, who constituted this 'largest and most representative African conference ever held in South Africa' unanimously rejected the 'Franchise Bill' and demanded a common citizenship for all South Africans.' The Convention furthermore 'unanimously accepted a proposal by a Cape Town Coloured Communist, John Gomas, that mass protest meetings be organised throughout South Africa'.1

The National Liberation League, founded in Cape Town during that same month," was the only local organisation capable of responding coherently to this call. The League was a fragile alliance between Trotskyist elements (including the Communist League) and Communist Party-oriented Stalinists from the October Club. These two factions, headed respectively by Goolam Gool and by his sister-in-law Zainunissa (Cissie) Gool, were united in their adherence to a 'two-stage' theory of social change in South Africa: 'Only once a non-racial bourgeois democratic state had been achieved could the second, ultimate stage be attempted - the socialist revolution.'

This was in line with the policy adopted in 1935 by the isolated and debilitated Communist Party to underpin its new strategy of maximin unity of democratic forces in the face of the increasing authoritarianism of the state.'s By the mid-1930s the communists were beginning to recover from the crippling Stalinist purges and police repression which characterised the first few years of that decade. Early in 1936 John Gomas contributed two seminal articles to the party newspaper Umsebenzi, in which he argued forcefully that communists should work tirelessly within non-Party organisations without - as had previously been the case attempting to manoeuvre them into toeing the party line.14 This strategy of building a 'united front of all democratic and liberal-minded people' was supported by a significant pragmatic faction, particularly strong in the Western Cape, which would soon take over the national leadership of the

Party from the tired ideologues who had steered it to disaster. The National Liberation League, together with the
League Against Fascism and War,5 organised a ‘Monster Demonstration’ against the Hertzog Bills in Cape Town in February 1936,1” but there is no evidence of any sustained campaign of mobilisation or protest being mounted. Once the Bills had been passed, the existence of contradictory tendencies within the National Liberation League precluded the formulation of a coherent policy towards the new institutions of bogus 'Native Representation'.

The Goolam Gool faction, unable to secure support for its policy of non-collaboration and its tactic of boycotting the elections due to be held under the new system,? formed a Western Cape regional committee of the All African Convention in April 1936, “0 while remaining within the League. Delegates from this committee (including Gool, Ben Kies and Isaac Tabata) attempted unsuccessfully to propagate their ideas at successive annual conferences of the All African Convention,” but it was only in the 1940s that the spirit of non-collaboration began to prevail as the boycott weapon was taken up by major political organisations.

The League’s boycott faction was without an independent voice, but its views were supported by the Spark, the organ of the Workers' Party of South Africa,20 which had come into being along with the Communist League when the Lenin Club had split in 1934.21 The Spark took a principled stand against the liberal argument that Africans should adapt to the new political situation by trying to ‘make the best’ of the new institutions, and dismissed the Communist Party's stress on the need for a high degree of prior organisation before a boycott could be attempted. The Spark claimed that it was more difficult to fight an election than to organise a boycott. “Political leaders who participated in elections under the Act were vilified as corrupt ‘jackals and hyenas’ by this often intemperate journal.” When it advocated a boycott of the first election under the new system, it did so alone.*4

While non-collaborationists thus remained on the margins of local politics, antipathy between the conservative and progressive wings of the local Congress became increasingly central. The concluding sections of this chapter document this further aspect of the factionalism for which Cape Town has become renowned.

The ANC: Western Cape versus Western Province

The Western Cape Congress languished during the Depression under the leadership of the increasingly conservative 'Professor' James Thaele.” The initially radical Thaele had in the mid-1920s led the unconstitutional secession from the then moribund Cape African Congress of his African National Congress (Western Cape), gaining de facto recognition from the Congress national leadership of the independent provincial status of this new body, despite his refusal to accept national supervision.2

The Western Cape Congress adopted a radical programme including passive resistance against unjust legislation, ‘non-cooperation with the Europeans’ and ‘a boycott of all parliamentary and provincial elections’.2 The movement gained substantial support from Africans and 'Coloureds' not only in Cape Town but also in the surrounding country districts, where a vigorous rural mobilisation campaign was undertaken. This evoked increasing opposition from 'white' vigilantes and from the police, culminating in May 1930 in a riot at the Worcester location which left five Congress members dead. Confronted thus with the stark and painful reality of the intransigence of the state and the white population, and fearful of losing his position as leader, the vacillating Thaele embarked on a reactionary purging of all communist sympathisers from his organisation. This led to the establishment by the ousted radicals of an Independent African National Congress, which had by the early 1930s succumbed to the repressive actions of the state.”

The promulgation of the 'Hertzog Laws' in 1936 gave rise to the re-emergence of serious divisions within the local ANC, thus contributing to what Kingwill has called ‘a resurgence of African political expression.” The reawakening national executive seems to have reacted to Cape Town’s quiescence in the face of the Hertzog Bills by dispatching emissaries instructed to breathe some life into the local organisation.36 By May 1936, dissatisfaction with the leadership of ‘Professor’ Thaele was being openly expressed at the ANC’s meeting-place on the Grand Parade. Dixon Makhato (who was in September 1939 deported to Basutoland, which he had left 19 years previously to work in
Cape Town)21 took up the popular call for 'leaders who are not afraid to speak out ... to die, or to go to gaol for their people.'2 This was initially dismissed by Thaele as the 'squabbles' of 'a few ignorant Basutos, who knew nothing about politics',' but a majority of Cape Town branch committee-members thought otherwise, and resolved to remove the 'Professor' from the office he had held since 1924.

In mid-1936, it was reported that the rank and file demanded reports of monies collected to purchase plots of land for the Congress, and also action against the Native Bills. They were advised to wait as usual, and fight against Communists who are trying to undermine the Congress, and also against the All African Convention. They refused to listen, and continued to pass motions of no confidence in Thaele and his brother Kennon at every meeting for the past two months.

Police intervention, allegedly at the Thaeles' request, restored order on a number of occasions. It could not counter the groundswell of opposition to their autocratic and ineffective leadership, and a conference of local branches resolved towards the end of May to act against the unpopular pair."

Thaele was left, according to a police confidant, 'holding on tenaciously in the hope that the rank and file may come to the rescue.' His conservative faction arranged a meeting towards this end in the Caledon Street 'Congress Hall' on 21 June, but this was pre-empted by the militants, who met the preceding day to confirm Thaele's dismissal and to elect a new Western Province committee comprising Alfred Vuma Coto (president), Sam Hofo (organising secretary), Noor Salie (provincial secretary), and J Makeer (vice president).27 Stephen Oliphant was subsequently made provincial secretary with Salie as his assistant, while Hoho became principal organiser and Stephen Kolokoto chairman of the Cape Town branch. John Motiki was made provincial treasurer, assisted by Peter Nyambo."

The new committee was forced on several occasions to request police assistance to restore order at the rowdy meetings which ensued almost nightly in the Congress Hall, while Thaele and his principal lieutenant, the 'Garveyist' Arthur McKinley, were said, immediately after their defeat, to be 'working hard to arrange an election by the rank and file.' This election took place in the Congress Hall on the evening of 5 July. McKinley's popularity with the 'regular crowd of hangers-on, unemployed and won't-works' on the Grand Parade paid off,40 for the new committee's insistence that only members should vote was shouted down, and a majority of the approximately 1,200 people present passed a vote of full confidence in Thaele.41 The Coto committee, apparently determined 'to attract the better class native and coloured persons to the Congress and to exclude the scolly (sic) type', moved into new headquarters in Wale Street, abandoning the Caledon Street premises to Thaele and his supporters.42 The Thaele faction retained the old title of 'African National Congress (Western Cape)', while their opponents preferred the appellation 'Western Province'. Political tensions within the local African population were greatly exacerbated in the course of the 1937 election of the idealistic young lawyer Donald Molteno as the region's first 'Native Representative'.

Molteno was nominated in December 1936 by the All African Convention, and his candidature was subsequently endorsed by the national executive of the ANC and by the Cape Native Voters' Association.49 He and a colleague on the local Joint Council of Europeans and Natives, advocate Douglas Buchanan, had prior to the promulgation of the 'Hertzog Bills' drawn up proposed alternatives envisaging a colour-blind franchise restricted to those who had attained matriculation or higher educational qualifications.46 Once the Bills became law, Molteno and Buchanan became involved in a belated attempt, on behalf of an ANC-sponsored Native Vote Test Case Committee, to challenge the validity of the Representation of Natives Act, on the grounds that it had been passed by separate sittings of the two Houses of Parliament, contrary to the provisions of Section 35(l) of the Act of Union which said that no person who, under the laws of the Cape of Good Hope at the time of Union was or could become capable of being registered as a voter in the Cape could, by
reason of his colour, be disqualified from being so registered unless the majority of both Houses of Parliament in joint session agreed thereto.47

Nominally contested by Albert Ndlwana, the matter was unsuccessfully taken first to the Supreme Court and subsequently to the Appeal Court by Advocate Buchanan, with Molteno as his junior counsel.48

The Native Vote Test Case Committee split following Molteno's above-mentioned nomination as 'Native Representative'. There were, for example, angry scenes at a volatile public meeting called (allegedly without the knowledge or consent of the full Test Case Committee) by its secretary, the Communist John Masiu,41 in the Langa Market Hall in March 1937.5

The political basis of the opposition to Molteno is apparent in the agenda of the tenth annual conference in February 1937 of Thaele's African National Congress (Western Cape). The prime concern of this conference was the countering of 'Bolshevism and Communism under different manifestations'. Attention was specifically focussed on the 'subversive influence of the All African Convention' and on the 'mischievous propaganda' of the rival African National Congress (Western Province), led by Alfred Coto. Thaele proposed to negate these 'communistic tendencies' with the aid of his opportunistic ally SM Bennett Ncwana,Ol by using Ncwana's newly-formed African Progressive Party as 'a whip party within the Congress to control and direct voters', and by adopting Ncwana's new newspaper Umafrika Omtsha (The New African) as the official mouthpiece of his faction of the local ANC.0

This conservative bloc, after initial vacillation,"3 announced its support for a rival candidate to Molteno, the textile manufacturer Morris Mauerberger. Roux says of Mauerberger that he was 'a man whose only interest in Africans hitherto had been to sell them blankets'. He had apparently undermined attempts to unionise his factories by playing on the prejudices of privileged white workers.54 Mauerberger's supporters claimed, on the other hand, that their candidate would be able to create employment opportunities and to influence other industrialists to oppose discriminatory legislation."58

The conservatives' strategy was stillborn, however, for Um-Afrika Omtsha folded after only two issues, while Ncwana soon deserted the Mauerberger camp (apparently due to personal differences with renegade Western Province Congress secretary Stephen Oliphant, who had aligned himself with Thaele). Ncwana came out in support of a third candidate, Mr JT Thompson of the United Party. His attempt to take the African Progressive Party and Thaele's ANC faction with him was strongly resisted.6

Mauerberger's election committee was soon elevated to the status of a 'Native Central Committee', which described itself as 'a federation of all the organised bodies in and around the Peninsula'. It united conservative elements from the Voters' Association and the Eastern Cape-based Cape African Congress, together with Western Cape Congress supporters on the Langa Advisory Board and the Langa Vigilance Committee. Stephen Oliphant chaired this 'Native Central Committee?', and James Kenke, who represented a group of Langa traders, was its secretary.0

Molteno mainly relied on the Western Province Congress for support against these conservative elements. The chairman of his election committee was the above-mentioned John Masiu, a member of the executive committee of that organisation, which in February pledged Molteno the support of its members and followers, and strongly repudiated any of its members who have, without the knowledge, authority nor consent of this body, aligned themselves with political organizations other, than those working for the above candidate. Such members are, ipso facto, without mandate and all they represent are their own personal interests.59

The ANC's conservative secretary-general and senior chaplain, Reverend James Calata, likewise gave influential support to Molteno, as did newspapers such as the liberal Umteteli wa Bantu and the Communist-oriented Cape Guardian and Umvikeli-Thebe (The African Defender). 6

With this backing and support, Molteno scraped in with a small majority of votes, to become the Western Cape's first parliamentary 'Native Representative' in July 1937, at the tender age of 29.6 Molteno retained
his enemies despite his best efforts in the African cause during the ensuing five years. In the following election in 1942, he would again (as shown in Chapter 4 below) have to deal with the machinations of politicians such as Oliphant, Ncwana and Thaele.

The split within the local Congress was sufficiently worrying, in the wake of this election, to merit the appointment of an arbitration board. This included top officials such as the newly-elected national president, the Reverend ZR Mahabane, and secretary-general James Calata. The arbitration board ruled that the 1936 meeting which elected Coto was in order. Thaele refused to take this withdrawal of recognition lying down, and when Coto's Western Province Congress advertised a 'grand national social' in June 1938, Thaele's executive committee issued a hand-bill headed 'Kaffer Verneukery (Nyakafatane). This warned 'the rank and file' against the 'unscrupulous machinations of eight Natives who were expelled from Congress and recently ejected from 51, Wale Street premises and are now affiliated to Cape Congress. Steven (sic) Oliphant is their supposed secretary'.

Congress' national executive resolved at a meeting in July 1938 'to make it known... that Messrs James Thaele and Kennon Thaele are not Officials of the African National Congress and have therefore no authority to hold meetings or collect moneys under the auspices of, or for, this Organisation'.

Unity remained elusive despite this high-level intervention. An attempt by Congress radicals to revive the organisation in Cape Town immediately prior to the outbreak of the Second World War is discussed in the following section.

The Attempted Revival of Congress

The in-fighting in Congress was eclipsed during 1939 by a well-documented anti-segregation campaign led by the Communist Party and the two united front organisations, the National Liberation League and the newly-formed Non-European United Front. Kotane, who believed that the NEUF could unite 'different organisations ... with different points of view and methods of struggle', was elected secretary at the new organisation's April 1939 conference." In her opening address to this conference, the movement's president Cissie Gool made a 'special appeal to the Native delegates to organise their people and persuade them to sink their tribal differences' in the United Front, which the Communist Party's Sam Kahn declared to be 'the vanguard of the non-European peoples'.

Congress conservatives remained aloof, however, and Secretary-General James Calata said in his presidential address to the Cape African Congress conference in June 1939 that the formation of the Non-European United Front in the Transvaal and the Western Cape was 'useless... while ordinary racial groups do not yet recognise their own leaders.'

Although the ANC annual national conference held in Durban during December did resolve to accept the NEUF movement in principle, it still vainly emphasizing the necessity of 'getting the Bantu into the United Front'.

As the anti-segregation campaign built up towards its climax, the celebrated demonstration of 20,000 people on the Grand Parade in March 1939, an attempt was launched to resuscitate the local Congress. The Cape Town Central branch, with Moses Kotane as chairman and fellow-Communist Joseph Nkatio as secretary, called in early 1939 for new members who 'must be prepared to do real work and make real sacrifices for their national emancipation' and announced the adoption of a new political programme. This envisaged a determined struggle against interalia the pass system, the colour bar, the Representation of Natives and Native Laws Amendment Acts, low wages, the denial of trade union rights to Africans, the barrack system and the general housing and sanitary conditions in Langa. This progressive initiative could not surmount the deeply-rooted divisions which had long bedevilled local resistance.

The refusal of Congress conservatives to support the Communist-dominated united front was reinforced by the continued influence of 'professor' Thaele. Although no longer an office-bearer of the Congress, Thaele retained the loyalty of a substantial conservative constituency. At an ANC national executive meeting in mid-1939, president Mahabane 'reported that James Thaele had ignored the decision of the Arbitration Board and gone recalcitrant'. Stephen Oliphant, attending in his capacity of secretary of the
Western Province Congress and also apparently as General Secretary Calata's assistant on the executive, endorsed a report that Thaele 'was not running the Congress in view of his position with the Authorities, but was surrounded by an element of hooliganism for purposes other than the benefit of the Congress'. In view of Thaele's alleged majority following in the region, Mahabane staved off several calls for his expulsion, but the executive decided to keep a close watch on developments in the Western Cape.6 Kingwill says that 'some branches remained favourably disposed towards Thaele and did not recognise the new leaders'. This misplaced loyalty led to the virtual disintegration of the Worcester and Paarl country branches, which had previously been 'the bulwark of the Congress in the Western Province'.0 The position in the Peninsula remains unclear, but local adherents of Thaele would certainly not have supported the communists' attempt to reconstitute the Cape Town branch.

Kingwill refers to 'a widespread defection from the ANC(WC) as a result of an internal struggle...partly directed against the Communists'. She mentions a number of organisations which local Africans of different political persuasions joined when they left the Congress at this time." One organisation omitted from her discussion is the National Liberation League, which provided a political home for disaffected ex-members of Congress who were Communist sympathisers. Van der Ross reveals that the League recruited no fewer than 450 African members in the second half of 1939 alone.10 In the months leading up to the Second World War, the National Liberation League supported the location residents in a largely spontaneous confrontation with the authorities over the related issues of exorbitant rentals and intolerable living conditions. The relatively unorganised location residents responded to their deteriorating situation by refusing to pay rentals. Five hundred and thirty-one rent defaulters were summoned before the Native Commissioners Court during 1938 by City Council officials attempting to reduce the Council's loss in carrying out the obligations imposed by the Natives (Urban Areas) Act.61 Both the League and the Joint Council of Europeans and Natives expressed growing concern over the deteriorating situation in Langa towards the end of 1938 and early in 1939.02

These prosecutions had little effect, and in January 1939 the Council charged a further 109 rent-defaulters who were allegedly unwilling (rather than unable) to pay. The number of such cases increased to 156 in March, 162 in April and 247 in May. Irrecoverable rent arrears totalled over 1,650 pounds by mid-year, and the City Treasurer complained that the Assistant Native Commissioner continually suspended the sentences of those convicted, under the Location Regulations, of the criminal offence of not paying their rent.83 The Assistant Native Commissioner assured the Chief Native Commissioner (who put the Council's charges to him) that he had 'tried to be fair and just and to exercise my powers in a reasonable manner.'4 His superior officer duly advised the Native Affairs Department that its malign local representative seemed to have 'exercised his discretion in a judicial manner'.9s By the end of September the number of rent prosecutions since January had reached a total of 939," and the City Council informed the Assistant Native Commissioner that 'the necessary arrangements have been made for the collection of rentals through 53 employers of natives, under the provisions of subsection(3) of section 9 of the Natives (Urban Areas) Act. The Superintendent of Natives reports that 510 natives are affected and that the results have been satisfactory'. Steps were being taken to extend this indirect method of rent-collection,7 but the practice seems to have remained circumscribed, due presumably to the reluctance of employers to involve themselves in the scheme. The Native Affairs Department advised the City Council that the 'strict enforcement' of the Location Regulations would to a great extent avoid the accumulation of large amounts of arrear rentals.' A National Liberation League branch member then lost what appears to have been a test case and was sent to jail for non-payment of rent arrears.9

A deputation from the League executive had visited Langa towards the end of August. Conditions in the location were found to be 'appalling', and the City Council was accused of being Cape Town's largest slum landlord.0 Then in October a League deputation (including Cissie Gool, Sam Kahn and John Gomas, with Langa branch representatives including Sam Hoho and William Ndunyana) met with the Council's Native Affairs Sub-Committee to demand a rent reduction; the abolition of the barrack system, and improved sanitation, accommodation and health facilities."
These representations were predictably ignored, although sub-committee chair Colonel Quirk and a number of sub-committee members did subsequently accompany Cissie Gool on a tour of Langa to witness at first hand the 'dreadful' conditions prevailing there.2

The intensification of conflict between the City Council and the League's Langa branch during the Second World War is discussed below (Chapter 4). The intervening

72 chapter documents the development of state policy towards local Africans during and immediately after the war.

3. NTS 7670 86/332(1), DC White's report to DCI Officer, 2 July, 1936.
13. Bunting, Kotane, 75-6. 14. Umsebenzi, 11 Jan. 1936 and 16 Jan. 1936. 15. Simons and Simons (Class and Colour, 471) contend that this organisation was formed in 1934, while Lewis (Between the Wire, 181) says that the 'Anti-Fascist League' was founded in 1930.
31. I/CT 384 17/7/12 v2, SAP Deputy Commissioner to Magistrate, 25 July, 1939; ibid, Magistrate to SAP Deputy Commissioner, 26 July, 1939; ibid, SAP Deputy Commissioner to Magistrate, 4 Oct. 1939. 32. NTS 7670 86/332(1), DC White's meeting, 20 May, 1936. 33. NTS 7670 86/332(1), DC White's meeting, 22 May, 1936. 34. NTS 7670 86/332(1), DC White's within the local ANC, 22 May, 1936. 35. Umsebenzi, 27 June, 1936, letter Member of the A.N.C., Cape Town'. 36. NTS 7670 86/332(1), DC White's within the local ANC, 22 May, 1936. 37. NTS 7670 86/332(1), DC White's report on Grand Parade report on Grand Parade report on divisions from 'Rank and File report on divisions report on Grand Parade and Congress Hall meetings, 22 June, 1936. 38. NTS 7670 86/332(1), DC White's report on 'stalemate' in the local ANC, 20 Aug. 1936. 39. NTS 7670 86/332(1), DC White's report on 'chaos' in the local ANC, 2 July 1936; ibid, DC White's report on Grand Parade and Congress Hall meetings, 22 June, 1936. 40. NTS 7670 86/332(1), DC White's report on Grand Parade meeting, 22 May, 1936.
41. NTS 7670 86/332(1), DC White's report on Grand Parade and Congress Hall meetings, 6 July, 1936.
42. NTS 7670 86/332(1), DC White's report on 'stalemate' in the local ANC, 20 Aug. 1936.

43. This is evident from the Coto committee's letterheads (eg ABX 410424a, Oliphant to Baloyi, 24 Apr. 1941) and their handbills (eg BC 579 E3.11, handbill advertising a 'Grand National Social' organised by the ANC (Western Province), 24 June, 1938).
59. Umteteli wa Bantu, 6 Mar. 1937, letter from JG Masiu. (Original in BC 579 E3.10). Despite this strong stand, Oliphant somehow retained his position of Western Province Congress secretary.
60. For example, Umteteli wa Bantu, 20 Mar. 1937; UmvikeliThebe, Apr. 1937 and May 1937; Umteteli wa Bantu, 15 May, 1937; Cape Guardian, 4 June, 1937. 61. Scher, Donald Molteno, 13-4 and 17; Umvikeli-Thebe, Mar. 1937 (report of Molteno's speech at a meeting in Langa); Roux, Time Longer Than Rope, 297.
67. CKC, reel 6B, 2:D2:30, NEUF conference minutes, 8-9 Apr. 1939.
68. BC 579 E3.23, Presidential Address at CAC conference, 25-7 June, 1939.
78. Kingwill, 'The ANC', 36-7. 79. Van der Ross, The Rise and Decline of Apartheid, 136. Kotane was a case in point, although of course a special case considering that he was then secretary of both the CP and the NEUF. In 1940 he became assistant secretary of the League's influential Cape Town branch. (Guardian, 5 July, 1940) which had the previous year boasted over 1500 members, one-third of the total strength of the NLL. (Van der Ross, The Rise and Decline of Apartheid, 136). 80. NTS 4232 77/313, City Treasurer to NAC, with annexures, 1 July, 1939; NTS 4233
3: POLICY-DEVELOPMENT DURING AND FOLLOWING THE WAR, 1939-48

The world war beginning in September 1939 provided a massive boost to the process of industrialisation already accelerating with the boom which followed the Great Depression of the early 1930s. Houghton reveals that the value of South Africa's manufacturing output rose by 116 percent during the six years of hostilities, and he emphasises the contribution of the 106,000 workers of 'other races' than white, who joined the industrial labour force during this period.' Welsh says that industrial and infrastructural expansion in Cape Town during the war greatly increased the demand for African labour. He cites the Minister of Native Affairs to the effect that the local African population had more than tripled from its pre-war total to approximately 60,000 by 1944.2 Despite this increase in economic integration, the economic and political interests of white employers, ratepayers and voters required the persistence of racial discrimination.

The Mayor expressed the view of the majority of Cape Town's enfranchised citizens in 1941, when he said that the 'Native is a useful person so long as he maintains touch with his family in his native land. When he loses that touch he becomes a menace rather than an asset in the centre where he is living.' Posel notes that, with the intensification of African resistance during that decade, Afrikaner nationalists increasingly took up this refrain of the alleged susceptibility to subversion of detribalised Africans.4

This chapter shows how the authorities struggled during the war firstly to measure and secondly to control the accelerating influx of Africans to Cape Town. It then examines the perpetuation of long-standing patterns of residential segregation, in the face of the worsening housing-crisis brought about by rapid urbanisation. A final section focusses on growing controversy over the siting of proposed 'Native' locations. The Caudwell and Slarke Reports

Posel shows that nationally, even in the 1950s, the 'overwhelming demand amongst urban employers was for unskilled labour, which in most cases was expressed as a strong preference for "tribal" labour.' This preference was even more pronounced in this earlier decade; and particularly in Cape Town, where Kaplan has shown that heavy manufacturing industry failed to develop and to create a demand for semi-skilled African labour.6

Local employers repeatedly stressed in the early part of the war that influx control should not be so stringent as to erode the local reservoir of unskilled labour.7 The value of African labour is evidenced in the generally positive response of Cape Chamber of Industries members to its suggestion at the end of 1940 that the wages of African workers should be increased in view of the rising cost of living.0 In these circumstances, the Native Affairs Department was reluctant to stem the influx at source by refusing train-tickets to "Africans in the reserves who wished to travel to Cape Town. Proclamation 105 of June 1939 was supposed to have closed Cape Town to further African in-migration as from the beginning of July. The editor of the Cape Times commented towards the end of that month, however, that the influx was continuing as if the edict had never been issued.' The Assistant Native Commissioner suggested to his Chief at the beginning of August that actual enforcement should commence on 1 October, and both the Department and the City Council assented.10

The mere 16 men who arrived aboard the Mbombela train on 3 October were the first to bear the brunt of the new policy. Three who refused to sign on for employment at the labour-starved Klipheuvel quarry were hauled before a magistrate and sentenced to a fine of one pound (or ten days imprisonment). Rogers reported a subsequent fall-off in the
number of known in-migrants,” while in the Xhosa reserves magistrates-cum-Native Commissioners and Railways staff disseminated dire warnings of the consequences of travelling to Cape Town without prior permission.2

But the absence of formal pass-laws in the Cape meant that Africans in the Xhosa regions were legally entitled to buy train tickets to any destination in the province, and could not be refused by Railways officials if they insisted on exercising their right to travel to Cape Town.3 The number of known new arrivals consequently rose to 268 and 333 in January and February 1940 respectively, before stabilising at a monthly average of 285 up to the end of November. Some two-thirds of recorded in-migrants during this period proved illegal.4 These figures, of course, exclude those who made their way undetected into the ‘closed city’, using alternative means of transport either for the entire journey or after travelling by train to places such as Worcester.3 Renewed warnings issued in the Xhosa reserves proved futile,”6 and the magistrate and Native Commissioner in Butterworth explained that the admonishments of his headmen were discredited by the common knowledge that people did travel to Cape Town and manage to find work without the necessary documentation.”7

Municipal officials adopted the procedure of refusing seek-work permits to surplus ‘illegals’, and instead issuing warnings to leave the prescribed area within three days.

Local magistrates, however, objected to the anomaly whereby ‘Natives’ were allowed to travel hundreds of miles only to commit an offence by arriving at their destination, and insisted on suspending the sentences of those arrested for ignoring these municipal warnings.”8

Approximately 400 Xhosa-speaking in-migrants were recorded in both December 1940 and January 1941, and the figure shot up to over 600 in February and over 500 in March. Some 3,460 new arrivals had by that stage been turned away by municipal officials.105 began in October 1939.”

After urgent discussions with Rogers and Inspector of Urban Locations Caudwell (who had been sent from Pretoria to conduct an investigation into the Peninsula’s intractable ‘Native’ problem), the Native Affairs Committee recommended the prosecution of all who failed to obey orders to leave the prescribed area within three days of entry in contravention of Proclamation 105. This suggestion was readily supported by both the City Council and the Department of Native Affairs.20

In his April 1941 report on ‘Natives in the Cape Peninsula’, Caudwell recommended the repatriation of such offenders.21 He stressed, though, that ‘the Native is deeply entrenched in the labour market at the Cape .... The fact is therefore that in the Cape Peninsula the Native now forms a part of the economic life of the community and he has come to stay’.22

At a conference in early May at which representatives of various Peninsula local authorities discussed this report with central government representatives, the Acting Town Clerk was concerned that magistrates were unwilling to implement so drastic a solution as the policy of repatriation proposed by Caudwell. He therefore suggested transferring jurisdiction over contraventions of Proclamation 105 from the Justice Department to Native Affairs, in the person of the local Additional Native Commissioner. The conference chairman, Secretary for Native Affairs Douglas Smit, supported this proposal while cautioning (presumably for financial reasons) that the question of repatriation presents some difficulty.2 Criminal jurisdiction over influx control offenders was duly conferred on the Additional Native Commissioner in June, under Proclamation 112 of 1941.24

Before such jurisdiction could be exercised, however, it was discovered that the dire warnings and threats broadcast among the African population in the reserves, together with the haphazard influx control measures adopted in the Peninsula, had resulted in there being insufficient unskilled labour for a new Defence Department building programme which commenced in August. Attempts to control the influx of Africans to the Cape Peninsula were thereupon temporarily abandoned.25

The relaxation of influx control in the Cape Peninsula thus preceded the short-lived national move in this direction which followed the Smit Committee report on the condition of urban Africans. This report suggested the abolition of pass-laws, and instructions were consequently issued to the police in certain urban areas that these laws were not to be enforced except where a criminal offence was suspected. Cape
Town was not among the cities listed in this liberal-sounding directive, but the City Council had assured the Native Affairs Department during the previous year that documents were only demanded locally from Africans who were suspected of criminal activity. Although central and local government representatives claimed that the lifted restrictions on the influx of Africans to Cape Town were reimposed within a matter of months, it is clear from other sources that the attempted enforcement of the proclamation had little effect throughout 1942 and during the first half of 1943. In mid-1942 the Department of Labour, anxious to avoid a rise in 'Coloured' unemployment, reiterated the argument that the Coloured community in Cape Town have a right to expect preference in the matter of employment in the area in which they are permanently resident. The Secretary for Labour requested from the Secretary for Native Affairs his views on the possibility of imposing a stricter measure of control in regard to the influx of Natives into the Municipal area of Cape Town.

The Secretary for Native Affairs replied that although the Cape had hitherto been regarded as the natural labour field of the coloured population, it had been found that 'Coloured' unskilled labour could not be procured for Defence Department construction projects. Large numbers of Natives had therefore of necessity been brought in. There was, furthermore, 'evidence of a growing preference for Native labour at the Cape, not only among industrialists and private employers, but by Government Departments also'. Repeated warnings issued to Africans in the Transkei and Ciskei by Native Affairs officials and by the Railways administration had not proved effective in stemming the influx, and it was for political reasons impossible to introduce a full-blown pass-system in the Cape Province. 'Under these circumstances', concluded the SNA, 'it would seem that the remedy for the conditions which you mention lies in the direction of active propaganda among employers rather than in recourse to further restrictive legislation, which would be futile.' There is no evidence that such a campaign of persuasion was ever initiated, but employers of 'illegal' Africans continued to be sporadically harassed and prosecuted by the City Council's inspectors. Pressure for more effective influx control was maintained during this period by a broad spectrum of disparate bodies. After an outbreak of typhus in Windermere during November 1942, the Cape Divisional Council demanded that the government should halt forthwith the daily increasing influx of Africans to the Cape Peninsula, and repatriate those who were surplus to local labour requirements. A deputation from the Docks Coloured Employees' Union early in 1943 expressed similar sentiments, while the Claremont Ratepayers' Association complained in March that a number of unauthorised Natives are roaming the streets, and we would ask you to use your influence to arrange for their return to their own territories. The Wynberg Ratepayers' Association added its voice to the racist chorus, as did the Cape Province Municipal Association and the unpopular Coloured Advisory Council. The January 1943 report of the Britten Committee of Enquiry into 'Conditions Existing on the Cape Flats' noted the 'steep rise in the number of Natives entering the Peninsula since 1936', but predicted that 'future industrialisation should absorb all and more of the Native labour now available in the area, provided, of course, that this labour is subjected to planned distributive control'. The five members of this committee - seconded from the departments of Lands, Labour, Health and Social Welfare therefore rejected the principle of Coloured Labour Preference. Their report further argued that proper housing would have to be provided for all Natives employed in the area before the authorities could gain control of the deteriorating situation.

This report made as little impact as all the other reformist reports which characterised the period, including those of the Young-Barrett and Smit committees in 1935 and 1942 respectively, the Fagan Commission in 1948, and several issued by the Social and Economic Planning Council between 1943 and 1948. 'Native' policy continued to be shaped not by the logical argument and economic rationality embodied in such pleas for liberalisation, but through the complex institutionalised interplay of economic exploitation, political domination and racial prejudice. Gropping towards a solution to the 'serious position that had arisen through the influx of large numbers of Natives into the Cape Peninsula', the Secretary for Native Affairs and his Under-Secretary met in March 1943 with the local Acting Assistant Native Commissioner, the head of the municipal Native Administration and two senior police officers. Smit explained that...
we can only deal with the problem from a legal point of view when the Native arrives in Cape Town. Apart from an old law in force in the Transkeian Territories which requires that any person leaving the Territories shall have an exit permit, I have no power to stop a Native from travelling to Cape Town or anywhere else he likes to go.

Rogers had little to say at this conference, being apparently content to rely on market forces augmenting existing control measures to stabilise the situation. The police representatives took a less optimistic view, declaring that the 'only solution that can be offered by the Police is that steps should be taken to prevent more Natives from coming to Cape Town'. The African influx had, according to the police, thrown large numbers of 'Coloured people' out of work, some of whom were living on the proceeds of illicit liquor selling to Natives. There is also a good deal of social intercourse taking place between Native women and Coloured men which will have very far-reaching effects on the future of the Coloured race.

Smit mooted the possibility of stopping the incoming Mbombela train at Worcester or Laingsburg to remove passengers without permits or proof that they had jobs to go to."
The Acting Assistant Native Commissioner had by that stage already discussed the worsening situation in the Peninsula with representatives of the three northern municipalities and the Cape Divisional Council." Delegates from these bodies were joined towards the end of March by dominees from the Dutch Reformed Church, at a conference with Inspector of Urban Locations CW Slarke. The latter was reported to be 'making a survey of the position in the Peninsula at the special request of the Minister of Native Affairs'.

At the conference he prevailed on the local authority representatives to establish a sub-committee and draw up a memorandum for submission to the Minister. The resulting document recommended the imposition of effective influx control, and the repatriation of all surplus and detribalised natives ... especially those falling within the terms of Section 12 of the Urban Areas Act (idle, dissolute and disorderly persons) and particularly the women who, by resorting to illicit liquor selling, shebeening and all the vices that go with it, are degrading the individual - and through him contributing to the problems resulting from miscegenation, semi-fits and wont-works.

The Divisional Council emphasised 'that a solution can only be reached if the problem is handled by the Government and at Government expense', and was assured that once Slarke's report had been completed, a conference of all local authorities concerned would be convened.

Slarke submitted his report on 21 April 1943, estimating that 'a labour force of at least 40,000 Natives is being employed in the Peninsula'. He agreed with the Caudwell Report that 'the Native has come to stay', and anticipated that 'the demand for Native labour will increase as time goes on'. Ignoring the fact that the Britten Committee had (just three months previously) opposed the policy of 'Coloured Labour Preference' on precisely these grounds the Slarke Report entertained no doubts about the necessity for such a regional policy. In subsequent correspondence with the Secretary for Native Affairs, Slarke referred dismissively to the Britten Committee's position.

Noting that 'with the possible exception of the Cape Town and Simonstown [sic] urban areas, Native movements to and from the Cape Peninsula are for all practical purposes unrestricted', the Slarke Report recommended the 'extension to the whole of the Cape Peninsula' of the City Council's successful system of registration of service contracts as 'the best and most immediate means of controlling influx'.

This would involve the proclamation of all four Peninsula magisterial districts under Section 12 of the Act, and the establishment of a reception depot and labour bureau (to be administered by the CC). The strict application of Proclamation 105 of 1939 would thus be facilitated, and the supply of 'Native' labour at last effectively regulated according to demand.

One week after the Slarke Report was submitted to the Minister of Native Affairs, a conference was held in the
City Hall at which both the Minister and the Secretary of Native Affairs - backed by their own officials as well as by representatives of the Police, the Provincial Administration and the departments of Defence, Health and Labour attempted to persuade local authority representatives from the Peninsula and from as far afield as Paarl, Stellenbosch and the Strand of the necessity of implementing the report's recommendations regarding the inextricably interrelated problems of housing and influx control.

The Secretary explained to the assembled delegates that in the Cape Province 'the Native is free to travel at will, and the imposition of any pass law at this time of day would be deeply resented and is impossible'. If however, agreement could be reached on the building of a reception depot 'at a place like Bellville, the Native could be regulated under a proper permit system', and could be repatriated under Section 17 of the Act if deemed 'idle and disorderly', under Section 5(2) if found to have entered the envisaged proclaimed area of the Peninsula without authority, or under Section 12 if at any time unable to produce a 'certificate' (such as a service contract) on demand. Due to continuing disagreements over details of cost and responsibility, however, all that could be agreed upon at this conference was that further discussions would be necessary.47

The Cape Times commented that if Major van der Byl succeeds, as he shows every sign of doing, in tackling this problem radically and effectively, he will earn the gratitude not only of the Western Province but of the country as a whole. Conditions in Cape Town are symptoms of a national disease; if the Minister can eradicate the trouble here it will mark the beginning of a new era of drive and efficiency in the administration of one of the country's most important Departments of State.40

Such appreciation for the efforts of the authorities was not universal. Cape Western Native Representative Donald Molteno pointed out that local authorities in the Peninsula needed cheap African labour, but were not prepared to accept responsibility for the provision of civic amenities or to recognise the right of workers to establish homes near to their workplaces. He charged that the majority of conference delegates 'do not mind what retrogressive measures are taken so long as the municipalities and Divisional Councils which they represent are not involved in trouble or expense'. The Cape District Committee of the Communist Party was even more dismissive, contending that only a conference which accepted the basic rights of the African people to freedom of movement, housing, fair wages and land could 'hope to provide any sort of solution to the so-called African problem in Cape Town'.41

The most detailed indictment of the repressive policy which was emerging from the racist agitation, the departmental reports and the problem-solving conferences which characterised this period was contained in a closelyargued fifteen-page memorandum on the Slarke Report signed by William Ndunyana and Lennox Nongaza of the Langa Advisory Board, Bell Ntshinga of the Langa Vigilance Committee and Robert Ndimangele of the Retreat Vigilance Committee." This memorandum was adopted at a joint meeting of the three organisations in mid-June, and despatched to the Minister the following day by Molteno, who emphasised 'the necessity of consultation between your Department and the local African leaders and organisations before any decisive steps are taken'.1

The memorandum rejected Slarke's recommendation that the service-contract registration system should be used in effect as a pass law, and urged the abolition (rather than the envisaged extension) of this system. It totally condemned the proposal to establish a reception depot and suggested that influx control could best be accomplished not by forcibly perpetuating the migrant labour system but by raising minimum unskilled wage levels in other centres, encouraging the permanent urbanisation of a larger settled African community in the Peninsula, and including African workers alongside workers of other races within the labour distribution mechanisms of the Labour Department, instead of separating them under Native Affairs.32

Such suggestions had no chance whatsoever of gaining support from the shapers of the evolving racist policy. Increasingly harsh administrative measures are discussed in the following section.
Native Registration, Efflux Control and Harsher Policing

It was reported in early March 1944 that Africans had been streaming into the Peninsula at the rate of one thousand per week since the beginning of the year. This rapidly accelerating infiltration of 'illegals' into the region signalled the onset of a devastating three-year drought in the Eastern Cape reserves.

As the legislature manoeuvred to regain control of the situation, members of parliament walked out of the House of Assembly during an attack by Molteno on a Native Laws Amendment Bill which included a 'reception depot' clause said by the Minister of Native Affairs to have been specifically framed with the Peninsula situation in mind. National Anti-Pass Committee chairman Yusuf Dadoo telegraphed his congratulations to Molteno for his outspoken stand.

Ignoring this growing agitation and concern, the City Council decided two months later (after protracted deliberations) to go ahead with the 'Native Registration Scheme' and to establish the proposed reception depot in Langa. Only Communist councillors Betty Sacks and Sam Kahn, together with councillor Cissie Gool, voted against the motion.

A subsequent conference between Secretary for Native Affairs Smit, Inspector of Urban Locations Slarke and representatives of the various Peninsula local authorities unanimously endorsed the City Council's decision and pledged their support for the scheme.

A deputation representing the Joint Council of Cape Town Ratepayers' Associations and the Chamber of Commerce had already conferred with Slarke and the SNA during May. The Secretary was told, at this meeting, of the ratepayers' concern over the fact that a large proportion of the 'Natives' who continued to arrive in Cape Town from the 'Territories' were unable to find work, and consequently 'walk about workless and hungry'. Those who did find employment did so at the expense of 'our own people, the Coloured people of Cape Town'. What was required, explained a Chamber of Commerce representative, was for the government 'to prevent the surplus natives coming to the cities, particularly Cape Town, and also... to repatriate the excess natives who are here'. The Native Laws Amendment Bill, which had passed its third reading the previous day, might eventually have the desired effect, but 'quick action' was necessary 'and we are wondering whether such immediate action could not be obtained by invoking a War Emergency Measure to place a Pass Law, as a temporary expedient, upon natives travelling in the Cape Province'. Smit replied that the introduction of actual pass laws in the Cape would be bitterly opposed and would in any case probably not be effective. The authorities were instead, in the face of strong criticism, 'trying to establish a Depot which will enable us to get the Cape Town Municipality to take charge, register the labour as it comes at a focal point, and to act for the whole area and not merely for Cape Town'.

Ten months later a Joint Council of Ratepayers' Associations deputation again met Dr Smit, who on this occasion was accompanied by his Minister, while the ratepayers were reinforced not only by the Chamber of Commerce, but also by representatives of the Chamber of Industries and the Divisional Council. Members of this deputation stressed that the majority of the 80,000 Africans then estimated to be in the Peninsula were unemployed, living under appalling conditions, and increasingly mixing with 'Coloureds'. The deputation members had to be satisfied with the Minister's assurance that the establishment of the proposed reception depot would be as effective as the stronger measures which they continued to advocate.

On that same day, the Secretary for Native Affairs attended another meeting, at which he and his Labour and Social Welfare counterparts discussed representations which the Minister of Labour had received two months before from the recently-established Coloured Advisory Council. This unpopular body had urged the imposition of effective control over the African influx, and the protection of 'Coloured' labour against African competition.

The three Heads of Department decided to recommend to the Cabinet 'that the Cape Western districts should be the labour preserve of the Cape Coloured worker'. Although private employers should not be dictated to in this regard, it was for the Cabinet to decide whether avenues of...
Government employment in the Western Province should be reserved for Coloured unskilled labour' and whether more active steps should be taken to control the Native migration to the Western Province at its source eg by means of War Measure 64 of 1943 (Proclamation No. 153 of 1943) under which the Railways Administration can refuse to issue tickets.' This is what was eventually resorted to in the middle of the following year.

While resistance among local Africans intensified towards the end of the war (as detailed in the following chapter), the Native Affairs Department was pressing the Cabinet to set up experimental rural labour bureaux 'in the areas from which Natives are migrating', lint-ed to the municipal bureau in Langa and to the similar facilities which would come into operation when the registration system was extended to the Reef. Further forshadowing post-1948 developments, the Department argued that labour policy in the Western Cape should not just protect 'Coloureds', but also 'Natives' above the unskilled level.'2

The Department was at the same time trying to persuade the City Council to adopt revised 'Native Registration Regulations' stipulating that if an African who had been permitted to enter the Peninsula was unable to find work within fourteen days, he or she would be expelled and not allowed to return for a period of two years.64 The Department had first suggested recourse to this measure in June, but (much to the chagrin of Inspector of Urban Locations Slarke) the City Council had by September still not reached a decision on the matter.

Communist Councillor and Native Affairs Committee member Betty Sacks had in August succeeded in getting the proposed regulations referred back to the committee, where their promulgation could be delayed indefinitely by the protracted hearing of 'communistically-inspired protests'. As a temporary reception depot in Langa was ready for occupation, Slarke felt strongly that the regulations should be adopted as soon as possible, and he reported that he was holding discussions on the 'Communistic campaign of incitement of the Natives' with the Native Commissioner and the Deputy Commissioner of Police.65 The storm of protest which erupted over this issue is discussed in the following chapter. The upshot of it all was that the Native Affairs Committee decided to recommend that the Council should reject the controversial draft regulations, and instead extend its existing regulations to a. over the whole Peninsula. S Ignoring the arguments of progressive councillors such as Kahn, Sacks and Cissie Gool, the Council resolved on 12 December to adopt this course rather than risk further polarisation.67

In fact this threadbare concession achieved nothing more than the postponement of the confrontation made inevitable by the Council's continued insistence that without Proclamation 105 and the 'Native Registration Regulations' which were coupled to that measure, 'Cape Town would be swamped with Natives and chaotic conditions quite beyond the powers of the Council to deal with would unquestionably have arisen.'

By early April 1946 a temporary reception depot, consisting of sufficient army-surplus huts to accommodate one thousand African in-migrants, was fully functional in Langa. The vast majority of the weekly Mbombela train-load of hopefuls were declared surplus to the Peninsula's labour requirements on arrival, and served with notices ordering them to leave within three days. There was, however, still no way of ensuring that they did so.9

The promulgation in mid-April of Proclamation 74 of 1946 (which declared the whole Cape Peninsula a 'proclaimed area' in terms of Section 23(1) of the Natives (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act of 1945), supplemented by Government Notice No. 790 (which set out the registration regulations to be administered by the City Council within this area)70 did not solve the problem. The difficulty of enforcing control at point of entry caused the NAD to again consider attempting to: stem the influx at its source, by bringing into operation a War Measure restricting the sale of rail-tickets to Africans.71 This was ratified by a conference of Peninsula local authorities," and from 1 July 1946
the provisions of War Measure 81 of 1943 were applied so as to restrict the sale of railway tickets to Africans wishing to travel by rail from the Cape Eastern districts, bounded by De Aar in the North and Messel Bay in the west, to stations in the Cape Western region. This measure was bolstered by the appointment of eight additional municipal inspectors plus the requisite clerical staff, and the opening of nine new 'Native registration' offices throughout the Peninsula.

The local press was soon pleased to report that the weekly Mbombela train from the 'territories' no longer brought in hundreds of 'Native' workseekers for whom jobs were not available. The Minister of Native Affairs disclosed in a newspaper interview at the end of October that the Mbombela had, in the four months since the ticket restrictions became operative, transported over nine thousand more Africans out of Cape Town than it had brought in.

There were, of course, other ways of getting into the city, and the authorities soon resorted to harsh policing in their efforts to stem the influx of 'illegals'. United AntiPass Committee chairman Lucas Phillips reported at the end of 1946 that police in the Retreat area had for the previous few months been rounding up Africans 'found without permits or passes' and taking them to the 'registering officer'. (This official, who was none other than Rogers, either instituted criminal proceedings or ordered the 'illegals' to leave the proclaimed area within three days.) Similar raids occurred in Windermere and Langa.

Native Representative Molteno protested that the service contract system was being administered in such a way as to introduce the 'worst features of the Transvaal pass system into the Peninsula'. The Town Clerk replied that it would seem to be a perfectly natural, legitimate and reasonable procedure that in making his enquiries under the Section referred to the police or other authorised officer should ascertain at the outset whether or not the Native concerned is possessed of a current document relating to his presence in the proclaimed area.

Control over the employment of Africans in Cape Town was considerably tightened from the beginning of 1947. Under Section 11() of the Urban Areas Act, the issuing of service contracts was from January 1 of that year made conditional on prospective employers guaranteeing to repatriate their African labourers to the 'Native Territories' on expiry of their contracts. A ban on the influx of 'foreign Natives' from neighbouring states was introduced at the same time as this provision for the repatriation of unemployed 'Union Natives'.

Such refinement of the control system at first showed dramatic results. Rogers claimed in May 1947 that the rate of influx had dropped since July 1946 from an average of 5600 per week to a mere 70-odd. After farmers on the outskirts of the Peninsula, as well as employers in the Bellville area, had complained of a shortage of suitable labour, Minister of Native Affairs van der Byl told local authority representatives that the labour-needs of industry were the prime consideration in the difficult task of trying to 'regulate the labour.. to our needs and send the surplus away'.

The Cape Times clearly reflected the insecurity of employers when it suggested in May that the system of influx control had become 'too effective'. Although the newspaper did not say so, this was at least partly due to the fact that the City Council's Native Administration Department, in collusion with the local Native Commissioner's office, was illegally withholding the right to look for suitable employment from Africans whose service contracts had expired or been terminated, and not just from illegal entrants as envisaged by the Act.

The issue was taken up by the South African Institute of Race Relations, after Africans resident in the Athlone and Kensington areas had complained to Molteno that seekwork permits were being withheld from the approximately 80 unemployed African workers in those areas. Council officials instead persisted in warning them to leave the area within three days. The CC was forced to curb the excessive enthusiasm of its administrators, after it had been established in mid-year that their interpretation of the law was in fact faulty.

Native Affairs Committee chair Mr AA Balsillie was then able to report that there existed in the Peninsula a 'pool' of about one thousand unemployed Africans, who were, however, said to have become overly
selective in the type of work they were prepared to accept. The local Chamber of Industries was satisfied that a labour-reserve of this size was ‘sufficient for immediate use,’” although employers had been pressing for a ‘pool’ twice as large.’0

Although the Cape Times optimistically reported at the beginning of 1948 that the control of rail-tickets had proved ‘most effective’, the NAD figures it mustered in support were not entirely convincing. These showed that the initial sharp decline in the number of new arrivals had rapidly dissipated, and that the Native Commissioner was aware of 6,193 Africans arriving in Cape Town during 1947, as compared with 11,253 during 1946.91

The influx was obviously difficult to quantify, for a Langa official had at the beginning of the previous year quoted as saying that 14,253 Africans had arrived in Cape Town from the ‘territories’ during 1946.92

Departures of Africans from Cape Town to the ‘territories’ numbered 25,372 and 17,118 respectively during these two years, giving an excess of departures over arrivals of 13,463 in 1946 and 9,988 in 1947.93 Whatever one makes of these figures, from the authorities’ point of view they were certainly a considerable improvement over those for the constructionboom years of 1944 and 1945. The over 32,000 officially recorded arrivals during 1945 had exceeded departures by more than 700, while in 1945 there had been 1,500 more departures than the 28,203 recorded arrivals.94

These figures clearly exclude illegal entrants, 225 of whom were prosecuted in Cape Town during 1947, as compared to a mere 15 in 1946.95 Fines and jail-sentences were proving ineffective in persuading these offenders to leave the restricted area, and municipal ‘Native Superintendent’ Rogers was concerned that local magistrates and the Native Commissioner were (for financial reasons) reluctant to issue repatriation-warrants under section 14 of the Urban Areas Act. "The Native Commissioner was concerned that the railtravel restrictions were being evaded by ‘illegal’ Africans still ‘trickling through’ in lorries and buses or on foot.7 Men whose service-contracts had expired or been terminated were furthermore found to be illegally purchasing return tickets on the Eastern Cape passenger-train, avoiding the Mbombela (for which only single tickets were available). The return tickets, which were apparently taken by Railways staff as sufficient proof of employment, were easily sold if not required by the purchasers."

There was considerable controversy during the last months of United Party rule over the continuation of the ticket-sale restrictions instituted in 1946, as the War Measures Repeal Act of 1947 provided that all such edicts would fall away as from the beginning of July 1948.9

Despite the arguments of councillors Sam Kahn and Cissie Gool for ‘the democratic right of every South African citizen to travel freely in search of work and the means of livelihood’, the NAC prevailed on the initially reluctant CC to press for the continuation of this restriction. '0

In consultation with the Department of Native Affairs, the Railways administration agreed to amend section 7 of the Railways and Harbours Regulation, Control and Movement Act of 1916, so as to incorporate the ticket-sale restrictions.11 Chapter 5 shows that this did eventually occur in 1949. Prior to the Railways agreeing in principle on the need for permanent legislation to replace the defunct War Measure, the Minister of Native Affairs was informed that ‘Natives’ were evading the control-measures by entraining at Kimberley. He suggested in response that the ‘closed area’ for ticket-sales should be extended from De Aar to Mafeking.102 The incoming National Party administration never took this step, but the ‘closed area’ re-emerged from the beginning of 1955 as the infamous Eiselen Line, which for three decades marked off the outer limits of the ‘Coloured Labour Preference’ area of the Western Cape. (Chapters 5 and 7 below).

Influx control was not the only area in which ‘Native Policy’ hardened and a new infrastructure of control began to emerge during this period. The focus must now shift back to the housing question, highlighting specifically the continuing trend towards residential segregation in the face of the acute housing crisis which developed locally during the war. Of particular interest here is the persisting antiAfrican racism of segregationist ratepayers and officials.
Residential Segregation and the Wartime Housing Crisis

The number of African squatters on the city's periphery grew during the war, due to the failure of the authorities to provide accommodation, as well as their above-mentioned efforts to implement Proclamation 105 and the segregatory Section 5 of the Urban Areas Act. Native Representatives Molteno and Ballinger argued in May 1947 that, by focusing exclusively on employment and neglecting the very important factor of housing, the influx control system was itself contributing to the rapid increase in the squatter population. Despite the protests of liberal lawyers such as Mcolten., 104 the CC and the NAD furthermore interpreted and administered the denial of the right of Africans to acquire land or an interest in land in any urban area under Section 4(2) as a blanket prohibition on 'the hire of a room or rooms in a building' outside a demarcated 'Native Location'.

Thousands of 'illegals', either undetected on arrival or turned away by municipal officials, consequently moved into the belt of shanty-settlements beyond the municipal border, where they were joined by a smaller number of refugees from the inner-city slums and the suburbs. By 1944, according to Molteno, 'the whole of the Cape Flats and enormous areas adjoining various Western Province towns, such as Bellville, Paarl, Worcester etc [were] covered with these African shack dwellers'.

To deal with the growing accommodation-crisis, the Caudwell Report of 1941 had echoed the 1939 Urbanised Areas Administration Committee's suggestion that Windermere should be incorporated within the municipal area. Caudwell further recommended that the City Council should extend Langa and establish both an additional location in the southern suburbs and a central-area hostel, and that the municipalities of Goodwood, Parow and Bellville, together with the Cape Divisional Council, should establish a third location to serve the northern suburbs. The Secretary for Native Affairs stated at the conference which followed this report that large numbers of Natives, attracted by good wages and for other reasons, have during recent years migrated to the Cape Peninsula and surrounding districts. In doing so, they have trespassed on fields of employment hitherto filled by the Coloured man, but there is nevertheless a constantly growing demand for their labour. But while there is this demand, adequate steps have not been taken by local authorities to ensure suitable accommodation and, in my view, it is the question of accommodation which is the crux of the whole situation.

Assuming a very low legal African population figure of 22,500, the City Engineer estimated at the beginning of 1942 that 5,500 dwellings were required to house Africans living within the municipal area. Little was done to initiate provision of even this low target, and in 1943 the Cape Flats (Britten) Committee report reiterated Caudwell's recommendations regarding housing with added urgency, calling additionally for the eventual extension of leasehold and even freehold rights.

Slarke found in his 1943 report that the vast majority of Africans in the Peninsula lived under conditions which had 'degenerated to an alarming degree' since Caudwell had reported two years previously. Slarke repeated Caudwell's recommendations regarding the extension of Langa and the establishment of additional locations at Retreat (by the City Council) and at Bellville (jointly by the Divisional Council and the three northern municipalities). As for the squatter problem, while the Britten Committee insisted that clearing-operations could only be mounted once alternative accommodation was available, Slarke called for prosecutions under the Cape Private Location Act of 1909, the Natives Land Act or the Natives (Urban Areas) Act. Slarke's report commended the City Council for recently agreeing to extend the municipal boundaries to include Windermere, and suggested that the three northern municipalities should follow suit by incorporating outlying squatter areas and thus bringing them under control.
Africans naturally objected both to the Slarke Report's specific recommendations and to the broader segregatory assumptions it embodied. A memorandum (mentioned earlier in this chapter) which the Langa Advisory Board and Vigilance Committee and the Retreat Vigilance Committee sent to the Minister of Native Affairs argued that it was 'cruel and monstrous absurdity. Until adequate housing facilities are available the operation of all proclamations under S.5 'segregating' Africans should be suspended. The proposed establishment and extension of locations was reluctantly supported, but the memorandum insisted that barrack-accommodation was totally unacceptable, and suggested that local-authority housing schemes should be supplemented by home-ownership opportunities for the more advanced and educated stratum. Another recommendation was that 'the general right of Africans to purchase property in the Peninsula should be restored to them, at all events in areas such as Athlone village, Kensington and Lansdowne where many Africans own property at present and many more reside'. Slarke's hard-line attitude towards illegal squatting was considered 'utterly unjust' by the authors of this memorandum, which demanded that 'no African home should be condemned unless adequate alternative accommodation is available'.

Despite its compelling logic, this memorandum evidently made little impression on the authorities. After conferring with Rogers, Slarke wrote dismissively to the Secretary for Native Affairs that it had actually been drawn up not by the signatories but by Native Representative Molteno. The memorandum had, Slarke alleged, been adopted at a meeting of a mere 'dozen Natives', despite severe criticism from the Langa Vigilance Committee, which was said to have felt that the document could be used to bolster arguments for the total exclusion of Africans from the Peninsula. The City Council, however, simply chose to ignore the document, and pressed ahead with its plans to build more barracks. Molteno protested at this to the Minister, who said that he had not yet read the memorandum, as he was 'rushed off [his] feet'.

There was one particular issue on which the City Council's Native Administration Department and its constituency of organised ratepayers vehemently disagreed with Siarke's views. His report recommended increasing use of the licencing system, governed by regulations issued in 1931 under Section 5(4) of the Urban Areas Act (but only very recently implemented), in order to accommodate a small stratum of privileged Africans outside the distant locations. Rogers, however, cautioned the Native Affairs Committee against this. The only substantial objection he raised was that the system encouraged the 'cohabitation' of 'Natives' with 'Coloureds', leading to shebeening and immorality. Rogers? segregationist sentiments were echoed by vocal elements among the local ratepayers, ensuring that the licencing system remained circumscribed.

At the beginning of 1944, City Councillor I Frank raised the issue of Africans residing in parts of District Six, and attending dance-halls there. The matter was referred to the police for action against 'illegals' and alleged disturbers of the peace. According to the Guardian, incidently, the local police achieved the dubious distinction in mid-year of being the first in South Africa to institute successful prosecutions against Africans arrested for sitting on 'European' benches. (The 'crime' took place at Bellville station).
Against this background of increasingly-harsh control and intensifying resistance, unemployment rose as the war came to an end and the economy began to cool down. This exacerbated long-standing social problems which had been greatly magnified during the war-years. The following section focusses on difficulties facing the authorities in their efforts to eradicate the Peninsula's proliferating squatter-settlements, and in particular on heated controversies over the siting of the 'Native' housing needed to resolve the squatter-problem.

The 'Location Site' Controversy

The issue which initially most alarmed the ratepayers at the end of the war was the growing number of mainly 'Coloured' vagrants in and around the central business district and on the mountain-slopes above the 'City Bowl'.

suburbs of Vredehoek and Oranjezicht. A Cape Times editorial declared in August 1945: 'people that hardly look human creep through our streets. The cave man is back here in the Peninsula ... Let this menace of the submerged social failures be set right. They can be salvaged, and this is the most urgent task of the moment'. White sensibilities were protected by police action which soon became routine, and most of the vagrants were driven off relatively easily.

The squatters on the Cape Flats, and in particular the African squatters, were more difficult to deal with. By mid1945, according to the Assistant City Engineer, shanties were 'springing up like mushrooms', as 'Natives pouring into the Peninsula to look for work' found refuge in expanding illegal settlements. The population of Windermere alone was estimated to have grown to 25,000 by that stage.

Slarke reported towards the end of 1945 on progress with regard to the provision of accommodation, which the first chapter revealed as the necessary corollary of entry restrictions in the official strategy of control. Progress had evidently been somewhat slow since Slarke's detailed 1943 report.

The first 26 (out of just over 200) houses in the Divisional Council's new location at Nyanga were ready for occupation, but nothing had yet come of the planned joint development in Bellville South. In the City Council area, 2 three-storey hostels were ready for occupation in Langa, with a further 6 under construction and 24 more planned, as well as a number of family dwellings. Land had additionally been acquired for the planned location in Retreat.

This first phase of development in Nyanga progressed steadily, although by no means hurriedly, and was completed in 1948. Langa's construction-programme, by contrast, was bedevilled by the City Council's inability - due largely to the organisational strength of location-residents - to comply with the cost-cutting prescriptions of the central authorities. Building operations consequently ground to a halt in Langa by May 1946. The organised opposition of ratepayers and other interest groups furthermore forced the eventual scrapping of plans for the two additional locations which were considered necessary to normalise conditions in the southern suburbs and the northern municipalities respectively.

The Retreat scheme was finally ratified by the CC in June 1945, despite reported opposition from ratepayers in the southern suburbs. Van der Byl and Slarke stood firm in the face of arguments against the scheme presented in January 1946 by a deputation of anti-African 'Coloured' land-owners, accompanied by a member of parliament and a member of the provincial council.

The majority of small land-owners proved less susceptible to manipulation by dominant white interests, and were soon organised under a Retreat People's Action Committee, which was affiliated to a broader AntiExpropriation Committee active also in Windermere and elsewhere. The People's Action Committee opposed segregation on principle, and its non-collaborationism precluded negotiations with the City Council over the land required for the location.

The resulting stand-off was aggravated by conservatives on the City Council, backed up by bodies such as the Wynberg and District Civic Reform and Cultural Association, continuing to oppose the scheme from the opposite, segregationist stand-point. The issuing, by the Department of Native Affairs in December 1946, of the necessary proclamation for the proposed Retreat location's establishment did nothing to break the stalemate, and the City Council's plans in this regard were eventually scrapped in 1954.
While the Retreat situation remained deadlocked during the rest of this pre-1948 period, growing controversy erupted over the proposed northern joint location. Slarke's April 1943 report assumed that this would be sited in the Hardekraaltje Forest Reserve, which had been earmarked ... for location purposes since 1931. Unexpected obstacles arose, however, before detailed planning had even begun. Bellville ratepayers expressed their strong opposition to a location in their vicinity, while the Railways Administration and the Department of the Interior came forward with rival claims to the site.

A deputation from Bellville municipality and the Bellville South Civic Association met the Minister in February 1944, to argue that the proposed location should be situated in the Bellville Forest Reserve, three miles from Bellville station. Representatives from the four local authorities concerned formed a committee which confirmed this choice, but the SNA insisted (at a conference early in May) that his department remained 'very attached to the site at Hardekraaltje’ and considered the Bellville Forest Reserve unsuitable.

The Village Management Board of the adjoining hamlet of Kuilsrivier raised objections to the proposed new site. Bellville Municipality and the Cape Divisional Council then agreed that Lot 00, on Modderdam Road in Bellville South, would be a better site for the proposed joint location. Goodwood Municipality promptly withdrew its cooperation from the scheme, on the grounds of excessive distance.

There the matter stood until after the end of the war, while negotiations continued at all levels. Undaunted by the chilly reception afforded the Retreat deputation in January 1946, a similar group of worried ‘Coloureds’ (apparently representing the segregationist Bellville South Civic Association) was accompanied to the Minister's office in February by the National Party's Stellenbosch member of parliament and a Dutch Reformed Church dominee. They too were virtually shown the door. Bellville municipality responded to this growing agitation by initiating discussions with the other northern Peninsula local authorities on alternative location-sites, whereupon the Divisional Council (already pressurised by anti-African petitions) halted levelling-operations at Modderdam Road. The Minister and Inspector Slarke, together with the Secretary for Native Affairs, were confronted in May by a far more forceful delegation of white Bellville women, introduced by the members of parliament for Stellenbosch and Hottentots' Holland. These 'moeders', representing the local Ratepayers' Association and the Afrikaanse Christelike Vroue Vereniging (ACVV), were adamant that no location could be countenanced within five miles radius of Bellville station. Their leader referred to the opposition of local 'Coloureds' and of the northern municipalities to the 'voorgenome kaffer-lokasie' in Bellville South. The women's objections centred on the danger posed to their daughters by the proposed concentration in the area of unwelcome 'kaffers', who were alleged to be resentful of whites and to have little regard for human life. The Minister was urged to consider the prospect of racial mingling between location residents and neighbouring 'Colo ureds'. He could only promise, in response, to give the matter further thought.

Representatives of the Divisional Council and of Bellville and Parow municipalities agreed on an alternative site at a conference in August, but this turned out to be earmarked for 'Coloured' housing. Bellville and Parow consequently pressed, at a further conference in December, for Nyanga to be extended and plans for the Bellville South location dropped. A deputation from the reactionary Coloured People's National Union addressed the latter conference, supporting this proposal in the interests of race-purity and job-protection.

Superintendent Rogers, on the other hand, told Cape Chamber of Industries members in March 1947 that the labour shortage which had developed in Bellville by that stage was due to the shortage of 'Native' housing in the northern areas, and not (as they alleged) to the recently-implemented travel-restrictions. Backed up by the NAD representatives present at this meeting, Rogers urged industrialists to pressurise the reluctant northern municipalities into providing the necessary accommodation.
'Natives' to be housed at six points in the Peninsula: the existing locations at Langa, Nyanga and Simon's Town; and

the proposed developments in Retreat and Bellville (as well as in Fish Hoek, but on a much smaller scale).51

The Minister of Native Affairs reiterated the dangers of deviating from the housing master-plan, at a meeting in April 1947 with the Divisional Council's chairman, members of its Works Committee, and a representative of Bellville municipality. The latter argued for the rigid geographical separation of races, but the Minister linked this dismissively with Dutch Reformed Church advocacy of 'parallel Native cities'. The Minister was convinced that the 'Native' labour force had to be housed near places of work, and expressed exasperation at the succession of delays which continued to impede local progress in this direction. He told the local authority representatives:

Every time I get an agreement, new elements crop up and a completely new situation faces me. ... I can see no way out. The position is that nobody wants the location in his area, he wants it to go into somebody else's area. But everyone wants the Natives' labour.133

Approval of the desired Nyanga extension would most likely serve only to evoke fresh objections and give rise to further delays in getting to grips with the Peninsula's urgent squatter problem, which (as Slarke stressed in support of his Minister) could not be tackled in the absence of alternative accommodation.154

Chapter 5 shows that agreement on an accommodation scheme was not reached until 1954. But let us first focus on political developments in the period up to 1948.

3. NTS 4504 581/313, minutes of conference between central and local government representatives, 7 May, 1941, 15.
7. eg NTS 5689 513/313/1, Cape Dairyman's Association sec to SA Federated Milk Union sec, 8 Nov. 1939; GN 5/1/4, CCI sec to TC, 15 Feb. 1940; 3/CT 1/4/10/1/1/9, Boxes and Shooks (Pty) Ltd to TC, 5 Nov. 1940; NTS 4504 581/313, Rogers to SAR & H system manager, 30 Dec. 1940.
8. BC 848 C193, CCI sec's circular, 5 Dec. 1940, with eight positive replies.
9. Came Times., 25 July, 1939, editorial. 10. NTS 5689 513/313/1, Ass NC to CNC, 1 Aug. 1939; ibid, CNC to SNA, 10 Aug. 1939; ibid, SNA to TC, 28 Aug. 1939; 3/CT 1/4/6/6/4/1/2, NAC minutes, 15 Sep. 1939, 3; NTS 5689 513/313/1, Acting TC to SNA, 29 Sep. 1939. 11. 3/CT 1/4/6/6/4/1/2, Rogers' report, 12 Oct. 1939, 5 (annexure 4 to NAC minutes, 19 Oct. 1939).
12. Cape Times, 25 July 1939, news item and editorial; NTS 5689 513/313/1, SNA to Cape Times editor, 29 July 1939; Cape Times, 3 Aug. 1939; Cape Times, 5 Oct. 1939; NTS 5689 513/313/1, Transkei Chief Magistrate to all Transkei magistrates, 7 Oct. 1939; ibid, SNA to Cape Times editor, 12 Oct. 1939; ibid, SNA to Transkei Chief Magistrate, 12 Oct. 1939; ibid, SNA to Ciskei Chief Magistrate, 12 Oct. 1939. 13. NTS 5689 513/313/1, SNA to SAR & H general manager, 1 Dec. 1939; ibid, 'Instructions for the Guidance of Ticket Examining Staff', nd; 3/CT 1/4/6/6/4/1/2, Rogers' report, 5 Mar. 1940, 3 (annexure 2 to NAC minutes, 8 Mar. 1940); NTS 4504 581/313, Rogers to SAR & H system manager, 30 Dec. 1940. 15. Cape Times, 25 July, 1939; NTS 5689 513/313/1, Transkei Chief Magistrate to SNA, 10 Apr. 1940. 16. NTS 5689 513/313/1, Acting SNA to Trankei Chief Magistrate, 7 Mar. 1940; ibid, Transkei Chief Magistrate to all Transkei magistrates, 16 Mar. 1940; ibid, SNA to TC, 13 Apr. 1940.
17. NTS 5689 513/313/1, Butterworth magistrate to Transkei Chief Magistrate, 1 Apr. 1940; ibid, Transkei Chief magistrate to SNA, 10 Apr. 1940. 18. NTS 5689 513/313/1, Rogers to TC, 16 Jan. 1940; ibid, TC to SNA, 22 Jan. 1940; 3/CT 1/4/6/6/4/1/2, Rogers' report, 8 Apr. 1940. 4-5 (annexure 3 to NAC minutes, 17 Apr. 1940); NTS 5689 513/313/1, Deputy TC to SNA, 9 Apr. 1940; ibid, Caudwell Report on 'Natives in the Cape Peninsula', 30 Apr. 1941; 19. NTS 5689 513/313/1, TC to SNA, 22 Jan. 1941; NTS 5689 513/313/1, Acting TC to SNA, 3 Mar. 1941; ibid, SNA to Acting TC, 17 Mar. 1941; ibid, Caudwell Report, 30 Apr. 1941, 14. 20. NTS 5689 513/313/1, Caudwell Report, 30 Apr. 1941, 16. 21. NTS 5689 513/313/1, Caudwell Report, 30 Apr. 1941, 16. 22. NTS 5689 513/313/1, Add NC to SNA, 4 June, 1942; NTS 4504 581/313, Langa AB and VC and Retreat VC memo on Slarke Report, nd, 4; BC 580 H1.1, minutes of JC AGM, 3 Aug. 1943. 23. NTS 5689 513/313/1, Secretary for Labour to SNA, 25 June, 1942; ibid, Acting SNA to Secretary for Labour, 2 July, 1942; ibid, Secretary for Labour to SNA, 9 July, 1942. 24. ABX 420405, Department of Justice instructions, nd; Hindson, Pass Controls, 56; Walshe, The Rise of African Nationalism, 312; Davenport, Modern History, 345. 25. GN 6/7/6/6, SNA to TC, 5 May, 1941; ibid, Rogers to TC, 11 June, 1941; ibid, Acting TC to SNA, 19 July, 1941. 26. BC 580 H1.1, 151, minutes of Bantu-European Joint Council (JC) AGM, 2 June, 1942; BC 579 A54.35.3, Molteno's election manifesto, nd, 2; NTS 4504 581/313, Langa AB and VC and Retreat VC memo on Slarke Report, nd, 4; BC 580 H1.1, minutes of JC AGM, 3 Aug. 1943. The Additional

Native Commissioner gives the reimposition date as 'towards the end of January, 1942' (NTS 5689 513/313/1, Add NC to SNA, 4 June, 1942), while Rogers says that the administration of Proclamation 105 was relaxed from 12 Sep. 1941 to 22 Nov. 1941 (NTS 4504 581/313(3), Rogers to Slarke, 13 Apr. 1943). 29. NTS 5689 513/313/1, Secretary for Labour to SNA, 25 June, 1942; ibid, Acting SNA to Secretary for Labour, 2 July, 1942; ibid, Secretary for Labour to SNA, 9 July, 1942. 30. NTS 5689 513/313/1, Acting SNA to Secretary for Labour, 25 Sep. 1942. (The concluding phrase in the last quotation is handwritten in the original). 31. eg 3/CT 1/4/10/1/1/9, 50, Rogers' report, 7 Apr. 1942, 3, ibid, Rogers' report, 8 Dec. 1942 (annexure 2 to NAC minutes, 11 Dec. 1942); ibid, 280, Rogers' report, 6 July, 1943 (annexure 2 to NAC minutes, 9 July, 1943). 32. NTS 4527 616/313, CDC sec to SNA, 26 Mar. 43; NTS 4504 581/313, Slarke's 'Report on Inspection of Conditions of Natives in the Cape Peninsula', 21 Apr. 1943, 11. 33. NTS 5689 513/313/1, CDC sec to SNA, 20 Nov. 1942 34. NTS 5689 513/313/1, Minister of Transport's administrative sec to SNA, I Mar. 1943; GN 4/4/1/1, Claremont RA sec to TC, 24 Mar. 1943. 35. 3/CT 1/4/10/1/1/9, 223, NAC minutes, 9 Apr. 1943 (mentions Wynberg Ratepayers' Association letter to TC dated 23 Mar. 1943). 36. NTS 4527 616/313(1), MNA's memo on 'Control of Influx of Natives', nd [Aug. 1943]; NTS 4233 77/313 and NTS 4504 581/313, Slarke to SNA, 28/10/1943. See also Lewis, Between the Wire, 219. 37. UG 18/1943, 'Report of a Committee of Enquiry Appointed to Enquire into Conditions Existing on the Cape Flats and Similarly-Affected Areas in the Cape Division' (Britten Committee Report), 26 Jan. 1943, 4 and 8. 38. NTS 4504 518/313(3), notes of meeting held on 3 Mar. 1943, 4 Mar. 1943. 39. No record of this conference has been found, but it is mentioned in: NTS 4527 616/313(1), conference minutes, 24 Mar. 1943, 1; ibid, Parow Municipality memo on 'Native Affairs', nd. 1. 40. 3/CT 1/4/10/1/1/9, 229, Rogers' report, 6 Apr. 1943, 3 (unnumbered annexure to NAC minutes, 9 Apr. 1943). 41. NTS 4527 616/313(1), conference minutes, 24 Mar. 1943. 42. NTS 4527 616/313(1), confidential memo, nd. 43. NTS 4527 616/313(1), CDC sec to SNA, 26 Mar. 1943; ibid, SNA to CDC sec, 27 Mar. 1943. 44. NTS 4504 581/313, Slarke Report, 21 Apr. 1943, 13, 17. 45. NTS 4233 77/313 and NTS 4504 581/313, Slarke to SNA, 28 Oct. 1943. 46. NTS 4504 581/313, Slarke Report, 21 Apr. 1943, 2, 17-9. 47. NTS 4504 581/313 (also in NTS 4504 581/313(3) and NTS 4527 616/313(2)), notes on conference, 28 Apr. 1943, 7-8,
11, 17. See also Cape Argus, 28 Apr. 1943 and Cape Times, 29 Apr. 1943.
52. NTS 4504 581/313, memo on Slarke Report by Langa AB and VC and Retreat VC, nd, 2, 3 and 7. 53. Cape Times, 9 Mar. 1944.
55. Guardian, 23 Mar. 1944; Cape Times, 28 Mar. 1944. 56. Cape Times, 3 June, 1944; Cape Argus, 6 June, 1944; ge Times, 7 June, 1944.; Guardian, 8 June, 1944. 57. NTS 4504 581/313, minutes of conference, 6 June, 1944; NTS 4504 581/313(3), Acting TC to news editors of Cape Argus, Cape Times, Burger and Suiderstem, 6 June, 1944. 58. NTS 4504 581/313, Joint Council of Cape Town RAs sec to MNA, 2 May, 1944 reveals that this Joint Council comprised twelve affiliated ratepayers’ associations, including the Womens' Municipal Association.
59. NTS 4504 581/313(3), minutes of meeting, 10 May, 1944, 1, 3, and 6-8.
70. Proclamation 74 of 1946 and Government Notice 790 of 1946, both published in Government Gazette 3630, 12 Apr. 1946.
71. Cape Arus, 23 May, 1946; Cape Times, 23 May, 1946; Cape Times, 25 May, 1946.
72. GN 5/1/16/2, conference minutes, 6 June, 1946; Cape Arus, 6 June, 1946; Cape Times, 7 June, 1946.
88. BC 579 A7.2156, Molteno to TC, 13 June, 1947; BC 579 A24.1079, Molteno to NAC chair AA Balsilie, 23 June, 1947;
98. GN 1/2/1, NAC minutes, 13 Feb. 1948, item 8. 99. GN 1/2/1, CC minutes, 26 Feb. 1948, 10 Mar. 1948, 30 Mar. 1948 and 7 Apr. 1948.
101. NTS 4527 616/313(1), Slarke memo to SNA, 17 Jan. 1948; ibid, PM's sec to SNA, 20 Jan. 1948; ibid, SAR & H general manager to SNA, 28 Jan. 1948; ibid, MNA to Minister of Transport, 29 Jan. 1948.
102. NTS 4527 616/313(1), SNA to SAR & H general manager, date illegible.
104. GN 1/2/1, NAC minutes, 13 Feb. 1948, item 8. 105. GN 1/2/1, CC minutes, 26 Feb. 1948, 10 Mar. 1948, 30 Mar. 1948 and 7 Apr. 1948.
117. Molteno had told Slarke that the memorandum had been written with his cooperation (see BC 579 A24.309, Molteno to Slarke, 23 June, 1943). Molteno had also in 1941 assisted the Langa AB and VC in drawing up a joint memorandum for submission to the Smit Committee (see NTS 4515 585/313, Molteno to Ass NC, 20 Oct. 1941). 118. NTS 4504 581/313, Slarke to SNA, 16 Aug. 1943. 119. NTS 4504 581/313 and BC 579 A24.381, Molteno to MNA, 4 Aug. 1943.
120. BC 579 A24.382, MNA to Molteno, 13 Aug. 1943. 121. NTS 4504 581/313, Slarke Report, 21 Apr. 1943, 6, 18. 122. 3/CT, 1/4/10/1/1/9, Rogers' comments on Slarke Report, 12 May, 1943, 4 (annexure 3B to minutes of NAC meeting with Slarke, 21 May, 1943).
123. GN 4/4/1/1, Claremont RA sec to TC, 7 May, 1943; 23 Mar. 1943; ibid, Acting TC to Claremont RA sec, 10 June, 1943; 3/CT 1/4/10/1/1/9, Rogers' comments on Slarke Report, 12 May, 1943, 4 (annexure 3B to minutes of NAC meeting with Slarke, 21 May, 1943).
129. Cape Argus, 12/2/1945, quoting a Friends of Windermere Association official. BC: 580 H1.1, minutes of JC AGM, 3 June
1945, gives a lower estimate of only about 22,000. 130. NTS 4527 616/313(1), Slarke's 'Influx of Natives to the Cape Western Districts: Review of Conditions as at the 30th September, 1945', 7 Nov. 1945, 2. 131. Elias, 'An Historical Review', 61. 132. NTS 4233 77/313, SNA to TC, 23 Oct. 1945; Cape Argus, 1 Nov. 1945; ibid, PS to TC, 23 Jan. 1946; ibid, Slarke memo on squatting, 8 May, 1946. 133. Cape Argus, 5 June, 1945; Cape Times, 6 June, 1945. 134. NTS 4233 77/313, notes of 17 Jan. 1946 meeting of deputation with MNA, 19 Jan. 1946. 135. Cape Times, 1 Apr. 1946; Cape Times, 17 June, 1946; Cape Argus, 27 June, 1946; Cape Argus, 19 July, 1946, letter from Retreat People's Action Committee chair GL Abrahams;


4: THE GROWING STRENGTH OF THE ANTI-SEGREGATIONIST 'UNITED FRONT', 1939-48
The failed attempt by radicals to revive the ANC in Cape Town immediately before the war was mentioned earlier (Chapter 2), as was the growing influence, especially in Langa, of the National Liberation League.

Focussing now on the period up to 1949, this chapter first traces the NLL's expanding leadership role in the location, and the weakening of the ANC by intensified factionalism generated during the second parliamentary 'Native Representative' election in 1942. The struggle in Langa drew the League, which was being subjected at that time to vitriolic attacks from both the Trotskyist left and the anti-Communist right, into a closer association with Molteno and the local Joint Council of Europeans and Bantu. This created problems for Molteno when he contested the election.

Sections 3 and 4 study respectively the establishment of the militant Western Province Joint Vigilance Association in 1943, and the local implementation of the 1944-6 Anti-Pass Campaign. This is followed by accounts of campaigns during 1947 against the proposed establishment of a
municipal beerhall in Langa, and against the imposition of a racist curfew in the northern part of the Peninsula.

The National Liberation League and Resistance in Langa

The National Liberation League's activities among local Africans during this period have been surprisingly neglected by historians. Kingwill4 and Lewis* merely mention the existence of the Langa branch of the League, while Van der Ross does at least state that 'the NLL took up issues, such as black housing, with the City Council'. In fact the Langa branch of the League became the leading resistance organisation of local Africans from 1939 through to 1942, when the second Native Representation election caused as much polarisation as had the first in 1937. The people herded into this location had specific and deeply-felt grievances. Their confinement in the location provided opportunities for organisation which were fully exploited by militant and capable leaders.

The long-standing antagonism between location residents and the City Council intensified with the resurrection of the unpopular argument that the problem of perennially inadequate funds for location development and maintenance could best be solved by the establishment of a municipal beerhall in Langa. Superintendent Cook had told the Native Affairs Committee in 1936 that 'municipal control of Native beer is not, and never will be, popular with the Natives themselves, but all their objections to it are based on personal grounds, and not on grounds of public welfare'.7 Brushing aside the representations of a women's deputation, his staff had before the end of that year further extended their control over location residents by refusing to issue brewing permits to families whose rents were not paid up to date. The harshly-administered system allowed some 140 weekly permit-holders to brew four gallons per day, but only on Thursdays, Fridays and Saturdays.7 The 1937 Native Laws Amendment Act put an end to this arrangement by recognising for the first time, to quote a Cape Arqus editorial, 'that a native has a right to his kaffir beer which must not be denied by his white master'. Effective from the beginning of 1938, the new law sanctioned domestic brewing unless municipalities initiated specific new provisions for municipal brewing or for the licencing of individuals.10

The Native Affairs Sub-committee resolved in August 1937 to combine licencing with domestic brewing when the latter was legalised, and this was subsequently ratified by the City Council. At a conference during the following month between representatives of the four provincial Municipal Associations and the Native Affairs Department, the Council's legal advisor learnt, however, that experts and the majority of local authorities rejected licencing in favour of the beerhall system. Growing numbers of municipalities, including Colesburg and several (most recently Johannesburg) in the eastern Transvaal, were following the Natal example by monopolising the brewing and distribution of traditional beer, and the City Council was advised to fall into line.12 Smit suggested to the NASC early in 1938 that an inspection of existing municipal beerhall-systems might be instructive.2 The sub-committee was already convinced that municipalisation would not only provide a sound economic basis for 'Native' administration, but also discharge the accumulated deficit of almost 42,500 pounds in the Council's Native Revenue Account. Rogers and the NAC chairman, Colonel WH Quirk, were consequently instructed to visit Durban, Pietermaritzburg and Johannesburg, and to report on their findings.14 The resulting document was submitted in May to the subcommittee, which strongly recommended in response that the City Council should go ahead and establish a municipal brewery, beerhall and eating-house.13 The Council, however, bowing to outraged representations from organisations such as the Vigilance Association, the Advisory Board, the Bantu Commercial Union and the local Joint Council,16 decided in July to hold the question in abeyance for one year.'

A proclamation issued early in March 1939 confirmed that all Langa householders were permitted to brew and possess up to four gallons of African ('Kaffir') beer at any one time.10 This applied in practice only to occupants of the 660 'married quarters', less than half of whom reportedly exercised this dubious new privilege. With the police force at that time far less interested in African beer than in preventing Africans from consuming 'European liquor', Rogers 'made himself extremely unpopular by personally organising regular beer-raids in an attempt to clamp down on the illegal trade. On one such raid in mid1939, 'the Superintendent was besieged in one of the dwellings by a crowd of infuriated women, until
rescued by the police'. With Rogers' active assistance, the NASC drew up a new report on the 'Municipal Manufacture and Sale of Kaffir Beer', which the Council referred back to its authors. This verbose and sophistical document, which was strongly criticised by progressive councillors such as Cissie Gool, stated rather unconvincingly that 'it is apparent that in the possibility of financial gain lies the germ of the whole project. Your sub-committee simply desires to record that the possible profit-making aspect of the matter is purely fortuitous. It suggested without substantiation that domestic brewing of African beer fosters crime, lawlessness, drunkenness and immorality. Langa residents roundly condemned this report. Several protest meetings were convened (apparently by the Vigilance Committee), and there was talk of a petition being drawn up and sent to the City Council. The authorities responded by taking stronger and more coordinated measures against both the illegal trade in African beer and the illegal consumption of 'European liquor'. The Langa branch of the National Liberation League sought clarification of the legal position from Molteno, who advised that the police and the Location Superintendent were entitled to search dwellings for African beer, while policemen could legally search pedestrians on the streets and passengers at the railway station. Any African suspected of contravening the liquor laws could be summarily arrested. The League's Langa branch, having been informed by Molteno that Rogers denied any knowledge of police harassment, protested in a letter to the Superintendent that beer and liquor raids routinely occasioned the infliction of 'indignities' on the location residents, who 'only want...to be treated honestly and justly'. The Council informed the League that the location Advisory Board was the sole constitutional channel through which grievances could be articulated, and that representations from 'self-appointed interests' would not be recognised.

The League's response was to capture the Advisory Board. Ignoring left criticism of its participation even in central and local government elections, the League remained committed to its allegedly 'collaborationist' policy of entering every available arena of struggle. In December 1939 - ironically the very month in which the Council so haughtily insisted that grievances should be channelled through the Advisory Board - the Langa branch of the League contested elections for this purely consultative body. It was reported that 'of the nine candidates returned, four were League and two others have since joined the Langa branch. Six of the nine members are now connected with the League', which protested the following month against the CC's refusal, in the light of this election result, 'to regard the League as an official mouthpiece of the people of Langa'. AB chairman Mears upbraided the Council in April 1940 for continuing to ignore the widely-supported views of the one body which it ostensibly recognised as the mouthpiece of Langa residents.29 The CC's distinct 'lack of sympathy' towards the new AB stemmed in fact from Rogers' insistence that it was a mere rubber-stamp for the decisions of the communistically-inclined Vigilance Committee.20

Meanwhile the Joint Council, though troubled by declining African attendance, continued to support the popular agitation against the proposed beerhall plan. A JC deputation led by Molteno and the AB chairman and headmaster of Rondebosch Boys' High School, Mr WG Mears, attended a Council meeting in January 1940 to argue against the beerhall plan. This deputation included Sir James Roselmanes, the Reverend Fathers Savage and Bull, and four African members, among whom were the Congress leader Malangabi and a City Council nominee on the Advisory Board named CN Citashe. The African members of the deputation were reportedly 'satisfied with the manner in which their case had been stated to the Council', and a mass meeting of barracks' residents, convened by the Advisory Board, 'enthusiastically endorsed' the arguments of the Joint
Council deputation. The CC was called upon to abandon its beerhall plan, maintain the existing home-brewing system, and improve living conditions in the Main Barracks prior to their replacement by more suitable accommodation.2 The NASC reiterated its insistence on ‘the introduction of municipal manufacture and supply of kaffir beer in Cape Town’,24 and the CC decided in March, by a majority of only one vote, to proceed with the beerhall plan.2 While prominent JC members lobbied city councillors to reverse this decision,2 the Langa branch of the NLL convened a mass meeting in protest. Resolutions against the proposed beerhall were also passed by several NEUF anti-segregation campaign meetings, and by meetings of the Garment Workers’ Union, the Domestic Workers’ Union and the Office Cleaners’ Union. An AB spokesman declared that Rogers should resign if he continued to favour the unpopular scheme.27

Molteno met with both the Secretary and the Minister of Native Affairs, who agreed to receive a deputation representing the people of Langa, before making any final decision.3 The necessity for such a high-level meeting fell away, however, when the CC at the end of April bowed to the sustained pressure with which it was confronted, and abandoned the beerhall scheme.2 This development was hailed by the Guardian as a ‘worker victory’ won through ‘united effort’, vindicating the NLL’s ‘Unite to Fight’ slogan and embodying ‘a big lesson for the oppressed peoples of South Africa’.40

The harassment of Langa residents over the question of liquor by no means ended with the tactical abandonment of the beerhall scheme. Towards the end of May 1940, NLL General Council member and Langa branch secretary William Ndunyana,41 in his capacity as a member of the Advisory Board, asked Molteno to meet the ‘Women's Section of Langa’ to discuss the ongoing searches and raids, as well as the severe sentences meted out to those found in possession of more than the permitted four gallons of African beer.42 Molteno could offer little prospect of relief, and early the following year the League commenced a renewed recruiting campaign in the location, putting itself forward as the only organisation capable (in conjunction with the Advisory Board and the Vigilance Committee) of organising the residents against the alleged routine brutality of the police.43

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The concern of the authorities with Langa's informal economy extended beyond the beer-trade. Official attention soon focussed on the Main Barracks ‘eating houses’, a nexus of this unregulated sector where women could sell plain home-cooked food such as bread and sheep's heads without undue interference. In September 1940 the AB considered a VC memorandum stating that ‘the Vigilance Committee understands that the Superintendent has decided to do away with the eating houses and turn the building into a large cafe with a number of tables, believed to be 24, which will be hired out every day to applicants’. A similar cafe would (it was understood) be built at the North Barracks, and the selling of cooked food would be prohibited outside of these cafes, while the sale of bread would be confined to licenced bakeries which would be established at both barracks. The existing widespread practice of outdoor vending or hawking would thus be criminalised. The memorandum pointed out that the ‘result must be an increase in the prices that the men would have to pay for their food and [clearly expecting consumer resistance] asked if the revenue obtained should be much smaller than is expected, and the Council loses money on the new buildings, will it take over the bakeries and enter into business itself? Or would a demand be raised again for the building of a beer hall as part of the cafes?’ Is there a belief that the

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women who hire the tables, when they find business to be low, will be influenced to support a beer hall in the hope that it would bring them trade? These are questions on which the Vigilance Committee would like an answer. The AB was requested, and unanimously agreed, ‘to press for the dropping of the scheme’ and for ‘effect [to] be given instead to the requests of the eating house tenants and the men in the barracks that the conditions of the eating houses be improved’.44 This memorandum was sent to the NAC, with a covering letter from the AB which stated that ‘we regard the table system as a feeler and the application of the thin end of the wedge behind which lurks the dreaded beer hall’.40 The fears of the location leadership regarding the intentions of the authorities proved well-
founded. The establishment of beerhalls continued to be propagated as a solution to the problems of location-administration by the Native Affairs Department and by the City Council's Native Affairs Committee and its Native Administration Branch. The central authorities upheld this viewpoint, and the Advisory Board felt compelled in April 1941 to repudiate a statement made by Smit at a recent Municipal Congress to the effect that Africans benefited from the establishment of beerhalls. The rationale for this claim is evident in an exchange between AB chairman Mears and Smit at a local sitting of the

150 Interdepartmental Committee of Inquiry into the Social, Economic and Health Conditions of Urban Natives in October 1941. Mears made the point, on behalf of the Joint Council, that the provision of housing for Africans was beyond the capabilities of local authorities. This was contested by Smit, who cited the example of Johannesburg, to which Mears replied: 'Yes, but...they are floating to prosperity on beer'. The subsequent development of a militant squatter movement in the townships around Johannesburg gave the lie to claims that beerhall profits could adequately accommodate a rapidly-urbanising African population.

The NAC in September 1941 unsuccessfully pressed the CC to request an amendment to the Native Laws Amendment Act so as to permit the coexistence of domestic and municipal brewing of African beer. Clearly seeking to manipulate for their own purposes the 'kinship of the kraal' which communist JC member Jack Simons said was still evident in Langa at that time, Rogers and committee chairman Quirk attended a meeting of approximately 800 barracks residents at which a resolution in favour of a beerhall was adopted. This meeting was apparently convened by the two Barracks representatives on the Advisory Board, James Msutu and Mackie Mnqongqo, who the following month gave evidence in favour of the establishment of a beerhall before a local sitting of the Native Affairs Commission's inquiry into 'Kaffir Beer'. Further arguments for the proposed beerhall were placed before the commission by Quirk and Rogers, as well as by the local Acting Assistant Native Commissioner and the Deputy Commissioner of Police. Following a NLL protest meeting which was addressed by councillors Cissie Gool and Sam Kahn, the VC issued a statement deploiring 'the continued efforts of certain white men, who use intimidation, suggestions and inducements to secure the support of a number of natives who are neither responsible nor even concerned with the well-being of Langa'. The VC called for Msutu's resignation from the Advisory Board, and convened two mass meetings to emphasise opposition to the beerhall scheme. Molteno spoke at both meetings. At the second, held outside the main barracks, 1,500-2,000 men unanimously repudiated Msutu's claim that the 'bachelors' wanted a beerhall. Arguments against the establishment of a beerhall were submitted to the Native Affairs Commission by a broad range of organisations, including the CP (which favoured a dual system of home-brewing and the licencing of African canteenowners), the CAC, the AAC, the Langa AB and VC (whose joint memorandum Molteno helped to draft), the ANC(WP) the JC and the NLL. This was a very different procedure from that adopted at the sittings of the Commission in Johannesburg, where a variety of organisations withdrew their submissions to support an ANC memorandum demanding home-brewing.

The authorities wisely allowed the question of the proposed Langa beerhall to rest in view of its almost universal rejection, but elements within the CC remained convinced of the proposed beerhall's necessity. When the issue was resurrected in early 1947 by Rogers and the NAC, the result was a night of rioting in which one man died and several were injured. While their inability to carry out the beerhall scheme was certainly a setback for the Superintendent and his tame committee, the eating-house question was resolved more to their satisfaction. The three - out of five - Native Affairs Commissioners who, together with Slarke, visited Cape Town for the local sittings of their 'Kaffir Beer' Inquiry were appalled by the conditions they discovered in Langa. They were particularly critical of the state of the eating-houses which the municipality rented out to African tenants,
including incidentally the Congress leader Malangabi and (some time previously) Ndunyana from the Advisory Board. The MOH was forced to concede that the eating houses were in a ‘disgraceful’ condition, but by the close of their sitting the Commissioners had received satisfactory assurances that the eating house ‘scandal’ would be rectified.

The AB was summarily informed by the CC towards the end of October 1941 that a municipal dining hall would be established in Langa. ” The Board replied that such a development would be against the wishes of the residents, and a public meeting early in November confirmed this position. The JC wrote in protest to individual councillors, stressing that ‘Africans should have the fullest possible rights to carry on business in African townships’. Overriding the objections of the AB and the VC, the City Council responded by appointing NAC member SJ Fort as AB chairman in place of the unacceptably liberal Mears.

After a personal inspection of the eating houses, the Minister urged the CC to expedite the planned municipal feeding scheme for the barracks. Rogers and the City Council’s Chief Architect consequently set off in March 1942 to study the dining-hall and kitchen arrangements at four gold-mine compounds on the Rand.”

At a NLL meeting during the following month, five hundred Langa residents resolved to press for effective representation of Africans on the City Council. Molteno was asked to lead a deputation in this regard to the Provincial Administrator and to the CC. These representatives were eventually granted an audience in June with the Council’s Finance and General Purposes Committee, but their arguments for democracy at local-government level evidently made little impression.

Conditions in Langa deteriorated alarmingly during 1942. Councillor Cissie Gool told the Native Affairs barracks sleeping outside during a recent night-visit, as the sleeping-quarters were uninhabitability vermin-infested. Rogers assured the committee that there were ‘less vermin than ever before’, and attributed the phenomenon to the warm weather and the desire of ‘illegals’ to escape arrest during night-raids. There had been 95 prosecutions for residing in the location without permission during the previous month. The number of such prosecutions fluctuated substantially during this period, with 96 cases in August followed by a drop to less than 20 per month during September, October and November, and rising again to 94 in January 1943.

Sanitary measures, including long-overdue deverminisation, were eventually instituted after an outbreak of typhus fever at the end of October. Location residents had by that stage been polarised yet again through participation in a parliamentary ‘Native Representative’ election. Chapter 2 discussed the divisiveness of the first such election in 1937. The following section of the present chapter focuses on the second election in 1942. The 1942 ‘Native Representative’ Election

Controversy over the question of South Africa’s entry into the Second World War in September 1939 further widened the gulf between the contending factions of the local ANC. The national leadership of Congress resolved, not without reservations, to support the war effort, while the Communists were initially totally opposed to this ‘struggle between rival imperialisms’. This issue deepened existing divisions and distanced the radical local leadership of Congress not only from the moderate national executive, but also from a substantial body of local opinion.

Joseph Nkatlo argued, for instance, that Africans should first be ‘accorded all the rights inherent in an orderly democracy here at home, before we fight for its maintenance elsewhere’. Conservative Africans were appalled by such sentiments, which were, however, confined to the ultra-left after the CP swung round to conditionally support the Allies when the Soviet Union was attacked by Germany in June 1941.

The upshot of all this disagreement and conflict was that the Cape Town branch, with just over fifty members, was by the end of 1940 the sole remaining affiliate of the regional Congress. The moderate shopowner and Joint Council member Julius Malangabi had replaced Kotane as branch chairman.
October," while regional president Alfred Conto was deposed, apparently early in 1941, by the conservative Peter Nyambo.60 Matters were further complicated by the decision of the national conference in December that only one Congress would be tolerated in the Cape Province, as provided for in the constitution. The question of amalgamating the Eastern Cape-based Cape African Congress and the African National Congress (Western Province) was held over for one year. The Eastern Cape body thereupon claimed the right to organise in the Western Province and began establishing a Peninsula branch.8 This provided a convenient platform for the arch-opportunist Bennett Newana (who became its vice-chairman),8 and for Thaele, who now rejoined the CAC - from which he had led the Western Cape secession in the 1920s.04 The Western Province delegates at the December conference refused to discuss the issue of amalgamation, as they had no mandate to do so. Following publication of a defiant article by provincial secretary Oliphant in his newspaper Inkokeli ya Bantu, secretary-general Calata assured Xuma, the president-general, that 'Oliphant and Company...will get a severe whipping from Newana and Thaele'.06 When the showdown between Congress factions in the Peninsula did eventually occur during the course of the 19412 parliamentary Native Representative election campaign, Oliphant, Newana and Thaele were ironically all on the same (losing) side. The two groupings were apparently not very active in the interim. The new Peninsula branch of the CAC could, for instance, think of no more pressing issues to address at a meeting it held in the Banqueting Hall in February than the employment of Italian prisoners of war on roadworks and the low pay of African military servicemen.7 The rival ANC (Western Province) resolved to revive existing branches and to establish new branches". Malangabi was appointed chief organiser with this end in view, and he was soon reported to have 'set about his task of reorganising and resuscitating the Provincial branches in real earnest'. His efforts were however retarded by the failure of national headquarters to provide repeatedly-requested membership cards.90 This attempted moderate revival proved no more successful than the earlier efforts of the radicals. Assistant-secretary Bulana reported in August 1942 that the Cape Town branch had not held a single meeting since the previous year.'1 Unity talks initiated by the new CAC president Frank Pendla in September 1941 proved predictably fruitless,12 and the two sides moved further apart after the CAC decided at its annual conference in December to put up Air Force Second-Lieutenant Hamilton Russell as a candidate against Molteno in the forthcoming election.12 This was in defiance of the Congress national executive's ruling that the organisation would not officially sponsor candidates.4 The AAC at its annual conference that same month endorsed the earlier Cape African Voters' Convention decision to 'return all the African representatives en bloc and unopposed'.1 This was despite Goolam Gol's impassioned plea for the rejection of any form of collaboration with the system of separate representation." The Western Province Committee of the Convention, chaired by Western Province Congress stalwart AV Coto, convened two public meetings at the beginning of 1942, to report back on the AAC and Voters' Convention conferences, and specifically to discuss the issue of 'Native Representation'. Molteno was guest speaker at both meetings.97 At the first of these public forums, held in the Banqueting Hall on 8 January, Molteno's candidacy was supported even by Tabata and Goolam Gool, who spoke critically of the CAC decision to nominate Russell in Molteno's place. Oliphant's new newspaper Inkokeli ya Bantu commented that 'Dr Gool attacked the Congress and we had a picture of a fight between Trotsky communism and the Congress'. Tabata and his supporters were subsequently harangued at a meeting of their opponents in the Caledon Street 'African Social Hall', where speakers assured these 'Trotsky Section gentlemen' that Congress was ready to take up the challenge of the Convention."8 Molteno and other speakers were heckled in a manner which Cape African Congress treasurer Nikiwe described as 'disgraceful', at a meeting attended by ANC President Alfred Xuma in the Catholic Institute Hall in early March." This can only have strengthened Xuma's evident resolve to act against the Cape rebels at the next meeting of the Congress executive.100 He was apparently powerless in the interim, and
the CAC seized the initiative by convening a 'joint annual provincial Congress' with the ANC(WP). The latter body had by that stage been reduced to a state of total disarray through internal conflict. Its extremely few paid-up members in Cape Town included, however, such prominent anticommunists as provincial president Peter Nyambo and provincial secretary Stephan Oliphant, who were prepared to go to great lengths in order to prevent the re-election of Mctenono. Oliphant in fact played a leading role at the joint conference, which decided unconstitutionally to amalgamate the Cape and the Western Province Congresses. An executive committee was appointed which included Pendla as president, Ncwana as one of two vice-presidents, Nyambo as Western Regional vice-president and Malangabi as treasurer. This conference further considered a letter from Russell, stating that he was no longer available for election. A building contractor, Mr U.P. Raubenheimer, who 'had apparently shown no previous interest in politics or in Africans' was, allegedly in return for financial inducements, nominated to stand against Mctenono in Russell's place. A confidential resolution was passed protesting against Xuma's alleged 'interference in the domestic affairs of Congress in the Cape' through his strong stand on the election question. Xuma took this as unwarranted personal abuse, and this challenge to the central authority of Congress was to prove (as discussed below) to be the undoing of the conservative Cape rebels when the national executive met in August. Meanwhile the first meeting of the newly-established Cape Western Regional Committee of the CAC defiantly decided to appoint a Congress Campaign Committee to muster support for Raubenheimer. This committee issued a circular calling on electors to vote for their 'official candidate'. The continued existence of oppressive laws was cited as proof of the ineffectuality of the 'mere eloquence of speech' of the sitting Native Representative. Xuma declared in response that 'the activities of these men in the Cape are a challenge to all of us, as 'no section of the Congress has any right to use the name of the Congress in sponsoring or supporting candidates for election'. He called for a campaign against 'these elements who are not only trying to discredit our national organisation...but are discrediting African leadership as being venal and using it for personal motives', and asked CAC president Pendla what action he proposed to take to put a stop to their activities. No reply seems to have been forthcoming. Further evidence of Xuma's attitude towards the local rebels is contained in his response to an impudent letter in which Ncwana contended that the revival of the 'dying' Congress required the appointment of a 'full-time salaried organiser-in-chief', and offered his services for the position. Ncwana was told that if Congress is a dying organisation, you and some of my friends, in conducting your election propaganda, have done a great deal more ... to bring the leadership of the organisation into disrepute than anything I know of in recent times. I Undaunted by such criticism, the anti-Molteno faction continued on its chosen course. In response to a Guardian article criticising the role of Oliphant's Inkokeli ya Bantu in the campaign to unseat Molteno, it was suggested that support for Molteno from such communist quarters supported the veracity of charges of Commumism levelled against him in the House of Assembly during the previous parliamentary session. Dairy Workers' Union secretary L.H. Msila refuted this baseless accusation. Molteno himself was discouraged by the fact that his opponents were 'up to their old tricks' again, and his election campaign only got off the ground in late August. He informed his colleague Margaret Ballinger that he had little stomach for the 'wearisome' and 'farcical' process of electioneering. 'I hope', he wrote to Ballinger, 'never to go through this business again.' Raubenheimer, meanwhile, backed by speakers such as Thaele, Oliphant and Nyambo, addressed several election-meetings. On at least one of
these occasions the aspirant Native Representative committed the remarkable gaffe of referring to his intended constituents in racially insulting language.112

With the progressive faction of the local African National Congress unable to play the rallying role it had fulfilled in 1937, Molteno looked to the AAC for support. Convention regional chairman AV Coto and secretary AJ Jayiya became respectively chairman and secretary of his election committee, which included (among others) fellow AAC leader IB Tabata, Bell Ntshinga from the Langa VC, J Malangabi and CN Citashe of the Langa Voters' Association, Langa AB members P Petu and W Ndunyana. A Ndlwana of the Langa branch of the NLL, and Dock Workers' Union representatives Welcome and Veldtman. This committee published a circular in support of Molteno, stressing that he was the official candidate of the All African Convention and of the Cape African Voters' Association. 14

While the Convention thus swung into action behind Molteno at the end of August, the ANC leadership finally took a stand against its rebellious Cape office-bearers, who were leading the agitation against Molteno. A national executive meeting held over the weekend of August 29-30 in Bloemfontein dismissed as 'unjustified' the so-called 'amalgamation' conferences' condemnation of Xuma's alleged interference in the domestic affairs of Congress in the Cape. The CAC's participation in the election was found to be 'a deliberate violation of the National Conference decision', and Xuma was instructed to 'deal with the matter and to take whatever steps and disciplinary measures which he may find fit'. Only Pendla and Oliphant (who attended the meeting in Nyambo's place) demurred.114

The rebels remained recalcitrant, and Malangabi was forced to telegraph Xuma in mid-September, asking him to repudiate Raubenheimer's claim of official Congress endorsement, as Molteno was unable to issue a manifesto until the question had been resolved.116 This seems to have goaded the President-General into taking decisive action, for on that same day he dashed off letters to Oliphant, Newana, Pendla and the Reverend F.J. Tladi (secretary of the CAC), informing them that they were suspended from their respective positions until further notice."17

Tladi evidently first heard of his suspension when it was announced at a Congress Campaign Committee meeting in Athlone on 21 September.111 He wrote an indignant letter to Xuma, demanding an explanation and declaring that he was 'not going to permit you or anybody to use me as a tool to further your own interests in this election'. Xuma replied that he was sick and tired of your impudence and personal attacks on me. This is the second time you have done this and but for Congress there would have been nothing in common between us to give you the privilege of writing me as you do, You can rest assured that you have done it for the last time and you are going to answer for it.'"18

This strong opposition from the national executive seems to have taken the wind out of the Congress Campaign Committee's sails, for there is no apparent record of any further pro-Raubenheimer meetings being held during the month remaining before polling day on 21 October.

Molteno and his supporters, on the other hand, were extremely active during this period. Molteno published his long-awaited manifesto, which listed a number of reforms allegedly attributable to pressure from the three parliamentary Native Representatives, and pledged to continue the 'struggle against the poll tax,...against the pass laws,...for more land, greater economic opportunities, the extension of democratic rights to Africans in the Northern Provinces and the complete defeat of the policy of segregation'.120

Molteno's election committee issued a 'Circular Letter to Electors', which quoted Xuma to the effect that 'not only is Mr Raubenheimer not a Cape Congress Candidate, but Messrs. Pendla, Oliphant and Tladi have been suspended as officers of that body for claiming that he is!'.121 The AAC's regional committee, for its part, put out a manifesto which argued that as 'the African people were not sufficiently organised to boycott the Acts and launch a demand for direct and proportional representation', they should vote for Molteno and avoid 'rich Europeans who may buy the support of one or other African leader, who in turn gets a few people round him to support his "Boss"'.22

Backed by his election committee and by such colleagues and supporters as Margaret Ballinger and Douglas Buchanan,123 Molteno addressed a series of meetings throughout the Peninsula, at which he declared that he hoped to be reelected because he and his fellow Native Representatives had 'done all in our power to help to build up the organised strength of the African people', on which national
liberation ultimately depends. Raubenheimer's supporters attempted to disrupt at least one of these meetings (in the Cathedral Hall), but the tide had clearly turned against them, and Molteno won the election by a comfortable majority of 1,577 votes. Xuma said that he was 'pleased with the results of the elections in the Cape Western circle, and I feel we acted in time and exposed those fellows and showed the world what little following they have'.

The election had not only resulted in the suspension of 'those mischievous fellows', whom Nikiwe accused of having 'no other interest in the Congress but to make money through it'. For a brief period it had also united, on Molteno's election-committee, a number of local African leaders who, previously been unaccustomed to working together.

This led during the following year to the establishment, by prominent Communist ex-members of Molteno's 1942 election committee, of the Western Province Joint Vigilance Committee. The following section focusses on this development, in the light of intensifying conflict with the City Council.

The Western Province Joint Vigilance Association

Conflict in Langa took a new turn in the wake of this divisive election. The strong representations of the statutorily-established AB and the VC were again dismissed when a group of Mfengu (led by Garcia Nongauza, a former City Council nominee on the Advisory Board) formed a Fingo Association early in 1943. This Association announced its intention of annually commemorating the 1935 migration of government-supporting Mfengu onto land from which the amaXhosa had been driven. Rogers encouraged this grouping without consulting the AB as legally required, and a VC deputation met him to express its concern. He then brought the two sides together for talks, but the VC protested that, by allowing 'deep and wounding language and insults to the amaXhosa' at this confrontation, Rogers 'permitted himself to be used as an instrument to fan racial and tribal hatred in this township'. Rogers, however, convinced the NAC that these fears were groundless, as such commemorations took place annually in several other centres. He attributed the growth of tribalistic feelings to the alleged partisanship of the now exclusively-Xhosa Advisory Board.

Rogers ignored a resolution, subsequently passed at a protest meeting convened by the Vigilance Committee, demanding that he withdraw permission for the 'Fingo Celebrations'. The NAC rejected arguments put forward by a VC deputation in early April, and reaffirmed its previous decision to allow the Fingo Association to go ahead despite objections. The Mfengu commemoration, held over a weekend in mid-May, did in fact pass without incident.

Lessees at the Main Barracks eating houses had by that stage received notices to quit, and the NAC refused to hear further arguments which the JC wished to put forward in favour of fostering private enterprise among local Africans. Rogers reported during June that he had at the beginning of that month 'commenced supplying food to the residents of the Barracks from the temporary kitchen which the Committee decided should be erected while the old

building is being altered and renovated'. The scheme reportedly made a loss of about thirty pounds on a turnover of just under four hundred pounds in its first month of operation, due to the dishing-out of over-generous portions of meat. Starke told the SNA towards the end of July that the municipal kitchen was proving successful, despite an attempted boycott organised by the Advisory Board.

The Vigilance Committee convened a meeting at the Main Barracks on the last Sunday in July, at which James Msutu came under attack by the elected Main Barracks representative on the AB, Lennox Nonyaza, for supporting the establishment of the dining hall and kitchen. (Msutu was no longer an elected member of the Board, but served as one of three City Council nominees.) Rogers intervened with a lengthy speech allegedly peppered with 'objectionable remarks', despite meeting chairman Bell Ntshinga's repeated calls on him to desist.
The VC thereupon queried the right of municipal officials to attend meetings uninvited, but Rogers insisted that this was part of his duty, and that he had saved Msutu from a threatened mob-assault. Sunday meetings in the location were in any case, he declared, held entirely at his discretion, as they were in fact specifically prohibited by Location Regulations which would be strictly enforced in future.140 While Molteno called on Rogers to reconsider the 'long-standing tradition' of Sunday meetings in Langa,141 his constituents sought to develop greater organisational strength in order to press their demands more forcefully on the unyielding authorities.

Langa Vigilance Committee members joined their counterparts from other Peninsula localities in August to form the Western Province Joint Vigilance Association, whose office-bearers included such prominent ex-members of Molteno's 1942 election-committee as its chairman FC Welcome, vice-chairman Bell Ntshinga, and assistant secretary Lucas Phillips. Tabata and a group of 'Trotskyites' disrupted and forcibly postponed the inaugural conference of the Joint Vigilance Association, but such tactics had little effect on the increasingly-militant mainstream of local resistance.142 Attempting to 'unite all Africans in the Peninsula under one body and to educate them towards the necessity for coordinated action',14 the WPJVA began holding meetings throughout the Peninsula. These focussed largely on local authority issues such as rentals and municipal representation.144 The CP continued to campaign separately on working-class issues, having bounced back from a local drubbing in the mid-year parliamentary general election, with the election of Betty Sacks and Sam Kahn to the City Council in September.100

170 After a public meeting in Langa in mid-October, a delegation of Langa women approached Molteno for assistance in securing a personal interview with the Mayor, to protest against the clampdown on food-vending which had been instituted since the opening of the municipal kitchen. Also on the suggested agenda were such issues as influx control, rents and electricity-charges.41 The Langa women united with women from other areas to form an African Women's Council, affiliated to the Joint Vigilance Association. This WPJVA (Women's Council Section) convened a meeting in mid-November in the Banqueting Hall, to rally support for the right to earn a living in the informal sector without undue municipal interference.14 The proposed meeting with the Mayor took place towards the end of that month, but the women's arguments were overruled on the strength of a memorandum from the MOH stating that the sale of food cooked in private kitchens could not be condoned. The women's deputation pointed out in vain that the practice had been overlooked for decades before the opening of the municipal kitchen.14 This consolidation of progressive forces in the Joint Vigilance Association caused disgruntled conservatives to establish their own Langa Vigilance Association, in opposition to the body already existing there. The alternative Vigilance Association pledged itself to cooperate with the Department of Native Affairs, with the Committee for Natives on the City Council and finally and firstly with the Manager 'of Natives'. Its chairman, CN Citashe, was an Ethiopian Church pastor, a Joint Council member and a former City Council nominee on the Advisory Board.4 He accused the existing Vigilance Committee of rigging its en-bloc re-election at the beginning of that year. Citashe criticised specifically the radicals' antitribalism (as evidenced in the furore over the Fingo commemoration) and alleged that his opponents had no mandate to participate in political initiatives outside the location, such as the Joint Vigilance Association.n.130

Bell Ntshinga, the Vigilance Committee chairman since 1941, was re-elected in February 1944, and again one year later, at meetings presided over by members of the Advisory Board.101 The conservatives questioned the legitimacy of the latter body, casting aspersions in particular on the election to the AB of Plaatjie Petu and William Ndunyana.152 Barracks residents were evidently unimpressed by the Citashe group's claim (at a meeting early in May) that they, rather than Molteno, Ntshinga's Vigilance Committee or the Advisory Board, enjoyed the confidence of the City Council.1 3 The boycott of the 'Municipal feeding scheme' had flared up again with the recent prosecution of illegal 'eating house' operators in the 'single quarters'. Female food hawkers were also caught up in this crack-down,54 and barracks residents seem to have subsisted for a time on
bread and sugar-water, while the few remaining patrons of the municipal kitchen were sporadically stoned. Rogers was threatened with force when he attempted to intervene.159 He accused William Ndunyana, in particular, of inciting violence at a series of public protest-meetings convened by the VC. 156

Popular opinion was tested in the AB elections at the end of the year. The combined forces of the CP and the VC obtained 900 of the slightly more than 1,500 votes cast, with almost 600 residents voting for what the Guardian referred to as the 'Citashe clique'.157 Citashe was early in 1945 replaced by H Gcilashe as chair of this Vigilance Association, of which he remained an ordinary member. 16

An African Town Vigilance Committee (based in Kent Street and presumably comprising registered voters) attempted unsuccessfully to mediate between the rival Langa Vigilance committees during the first half of 1945. Rivalry between the two location bodies persisted, but the rightward trend in state policy (outlined in the previous chapter) favoured the radicals, who were being drawn increasingly into the ambit of broader national resistance. The WPJVA had merged in February 1944 with the Western Province Regional Committee of the ANC, to form a local Anti-Pass Committee.0 The ensuing campaign against the pass-laws is discussed in the following section.

The Anti-Pass Campaign, 1944-6

Roux, Karis and Walshe all make the point that the national anti-pass campaign of 1943-6 arose in response to the reimposition of rigid controls after the brief moratorium which was mentioned in the previous chapter.161 Following an anti-pass conference convened by the CP in Johannesburg in November 1943, the ANC annual conference at the end of 1943 issued instructions that local Anti-Pass Committees should be set up without delay.162

The local Cape Town (later Cape Westerin) Anti-Pass Committee was formed in February 1944, with Hudson Kalipa in the chair and Jellicoe Ntshona as secretary,"2 It was soon convening meetings throughout the Peninsula and as far afield as Stellenbosch,14 the change of name reflecting its growing regional influence and activity. Communist Party secretary-general Moses Kotane declared the pass laws 'a badge of servitude imposed on the African people', and called on 'all progressive forces to join the struggle' for their abolition. "s The local Anti-Pass Committee convened a 'Monster Protest Meeting' at the

well as Kotane, who proposed three resolutions which were unanimously carried. These resolutions comprised demands for the immediate withdrawal of the pass-laws and the Native Laws Amendment Bill (also mentioned in the previous chapter), and an expression of whole-hearted support for the stand taken on these issues by the 'Native Representatives'.167

As shown in the previous chapter, Peninsula local authorities wasted no time in ratifying the 'Native Registration Scheme' for which the Native Laws Amendment Bill provided. The CP called a public meeting in the Langa Market Hall, which resolved that this was 'contrary to the ideals embodied in the Atlantic Charter for which South Africa and the Allied armies are fighting.' The Guardian called on 'Europeans' to rally to the Africans' aid,169 but 'white' public opinion tended very much in the opposite direction.

Meanwhile the anti-pass agitation intensified, under the leadership of the re-organised and renamed Anti-Pass Committee (Western Cape). This committee had in August 1944 appealed to the public for financial assistance and although the response had been disappointing, successful Anti-Pass Campaign mass meetings were held during the last quarter of 1944 in Retreat, Kensinaton, Donkieskraal, Stellenbosch, Elsies River, Parow, Bellville, Kraaifontein, Worcester, Langa and Somerset West. An Anti-Pass Committee meeting in

Langa in early March 1945, chaired by William Ndunyana from the Communist-dominated Langa Advisory Board, was addressed by Party secretary Kotane together with Native Representatives Molteno and Ballinger. Resolutions were passed supporting the Anti-Pass Campaign and the Native Representatives at i ves. 170
Three months later, at the beginning of June, Acting Prime Minister Hofmeyr refused to receive an anti-pass petition 'said to contain some hundreds of thousands of signatures'. This gave rise to a mass demonstration of 5,000 Africans and other 'non-Europeans' on the Grand Parade, culminating in a march on Parliament. The subsequent prosecution of the leaders of this protest (including CP John Gomas and Lucas Phillips) did not prevent a similar demonstration of some 2,500 people on the Parade at the end of July. This also ended with a march to Parliament.

The proposed introduction, just at this point, of draconian new 'Native Registration Regulations' evoked a veritable storm of protest. The CP and the Langa VC convened two mass meetings in that location, the first of which was reported in the press to have attracted 2,500 people and the second double that number. These meetings unanimously ‘demanded the right of free entry and residence for all Africans in Cape Town’ and called on the City Council ‘to resist the application of these savage, unjust, undemocratic and unChristian laws to our people’.

Ntshona, Thomas Lwana, Bell Ntshinga and Johnson Ngwevela were among the speakers at these meetings, the second of which ended with marchers taking to the location streets, shaking fists and sticks as they passed the administration office and the police station.

Also in October, a large crowd of dockworkers at a South African Railway and Harbour Workers' Union at the foot of Dock Road resolved to ‘fight this vicious and humiliating system to the very end’.

Representatives from fifty local organisations (including trade unions, churches, sports associations and political bodies) held an ‘emergency conference’ in the Banqueting Hall during that same month, under the auspices of the Anti-Pass Committee. The conference elected an action committee and resolved ‘to mobilise the people of Cape Town against these draft Regulations and existing regulations, and to wage a relentless struggle for their withdrawal and for the repeal of Proclamation No 105 of 1939’.

Sixteen organisations submitted written protests against the proposed regulations to the City Council’s Native Affairs Committee. These included the Anti-Pass Committee (Cape Western branch), the district committee of the CP, the regional committee of the SAIRR and the local Joint Council of Europeans and Africans. Van der Byl and the Secretary for Native Affairs, George Mears, were confronted in late October by representatives from twenty-three local organisations. The Minister insisted that the draft regulations were not ‘fascist’ (as some members of the delegation would have it), and neither were they in fact pass laws. He declared that he had always resisted the introduction of pass laws in the Cape, and expressed surprise that ‘all this fuss’ was being made before the City Council had come to any decision on the matter.

This view was irreconcilable with that held by a majority of politically-conscious local Africans, who by that stage sought nothing less than the dismantling of the entire structure of racial discrimination. The Anti-Pass Committee had opposed the new compromise influx control system when it was first suggested by the NAC, before its ratification by the full Council. At meetings held on the Grand Parade, in Parow, Kensington, and in Huguenot, for example, during November and early December 1945, resolutions were passed calling for unity in the struggle for the abolition of the pass laws and all legal discrimination.

This unity was not forthcoming, however, and apart from a rally on the Grand Parade in March (chaired by Phillips and addressed by Kotane, Ngwevela, Dr Simons and Lwana), there is no record of any activity on the part of the Anti-Pass Committee during the first half of 1946.

Disunity stemmed primarily from the critical position adopted towards the local Anti-Pass Committee by uncompromising Trotskyist elements, when they intervened in the campaign against the NAD’s proposed ‘fascist’ registration regulations. The ‘non-collaborationists’ had consolidated towards the end of 1943 under the umbrella of the Non-European Unity Movement, 14 which convened a local conference on this issue at the end of September 1945.

This conference, chaired by Dr Goolam Gool and addressed by Isaac Tabata, proved an acrimonious occasion, with Dr Gool denying Sam Kahn's charge that the organisers had neglected to invite the CP, and
his sister-in-law Cissie Gool launching an attack on 'European' leadership in general and on Molteno in particular. Lewis reveals that during the following month ANC supporters in Langa disrupted an anti-pass meeting organised by Tabata there, and marched him off to another meeting, which convicted him of being a 'war criminal' and denied the right of the NEUM to hold meetings in Langa. NEUM leaders bitterly denounced the CPSA in particular for "deliberately sabotaging" their campaign. Kotane, on the other hand, referred to the boycottists as 'people who are at present fiddling about with the wonderful idea of the unity of the non-European people' and he accused them of 'being more concerned with fighting the Anti-Pass Committee than in fighting the actual pass laws'.

Thomas Lwana of the Advisory Board was the reported leader of the group of young men who dragged Tabata from the Unity Movement meeting, after he had earlier that same day been chased away from an anti-pass protest of some 900 Langa residents. Ntshinga chaired this meeting, and speakers included Lwana, Malangabi, Mrs Siqwana and Molteno. A Vigilance Committee deputation (comprising Ndunyana, Lwana and Kbebulana) which in October met what Ndunyana called the 'hard-hearted and ... hopeless lot of old men' of the NAC was outraged to find a deputation from the rival Vigilance Association in attendance. Prevented from speaking on the pretext that they had not submitted a memorandum beforehand, the radicals left in disgust, determined to meet Minister Van der Byl and 'tell him that he and his department are totally rejected'. Lwana was allegedy by a police informant to have threatened at a subsequent reportback meeting to 'go together with the youths and ... get rid of such men who tried to stab us in our backs'. Lwana reportedly characterised the rival Vigilance members as a bunch of 'traitors who are seeking for their death'.

If such threats were in fact uttered, they certainly did not scare the conservatives, whose 27-member 'Langa Rent Payers' Vigilance Association' for 1946 included Citashe and two other clergymen, as well as Geilishe and Nongauza. All five were members of the original 1944 breakaway group. Ntshinga and Bhedu had recently been reaffirmed as chair and secretary respectively of the established Vigilance Committee.

Inspired by the example of the Natal Indian Congress' passive resistance campaign against the Asiatic Land Tenure and Indian Representation Bill, the National Anti-Pass Committee in June 1946 decided to mount a similar campaign against the pass laws. Passive resistance was enthusiastically taken up by the local Anti-Pass Committee, which issued a pamphlet announcing a meeting in Langa on 4 August, at which Africans would 'light the flame to freedom by burning their passes of slavery'. Kotane claimed that approximately 7,000 Africans attended this meeting, and that at least 3,000 voters' registration certificates and service contracts were burnt, after a resolution had been taken to rid ourselves of the pass because we recognise it as the most important administrative instrument by which the Government is able to carry out its policy of impoverishing us economically, by denying us the right to move freely in search of employment in the land of our birth. We are resolved not to carry passes any longer, and, if arrested, not to pay fines. The meeting ended with a march through Langa, behind banners bearing slogans such as 'Abolish the Pass Laws' and 'We Demand Equality, Not White Supremacy'.

This outburst of organised mass defiance was denounced in the local press. The editor of the Cape Times pronounced the protesters 'extremely ill-advised' and their actions useless and senseless, for (he declared sophistically) The documents which Natives in Cape Town are required to possess are not a badge of subjection or a mark of shame. The enforcement of the Urban Areas Act as carried out in the Peninsula is designed to protect urban natives from the inevitable wage-cutting and other distresses that would take place if, in the present difficult times, job-hunting migration were unrestricted.'
The Cape Argus added, in an editorial addressed, in Xhosa and English, 'To The Natives At Langa', that the 'Natives will win more with the consent of the European population than they can ever do by ... defiance and provocation.'"

The local Trotskyists, on the other hand, were concerned only to down-play the significance of the pass-burning. Echoing a Cape Argus report describing the incident as a 'damp squib', the Torch account said that 'the number of passes burned did not seem in proportion to the size of the gathering'.

The Cape Argus report was based on an interview with an unnamed 'Langa official', who estimated that no more than three thousand Africans had taken part in the demonstration, and that a maximum of three hundred documents 'mistakenly called"passes" had been burnt. These were said to comprise mostly voters' registration certificates due to expire at the end of that month with the bringing into operation of a new voters' roll, together with a few service contracts which (it was suggested) were either out of date or belonged to registered voters and were consequently redundant.

The Torch said that the crowd numbered 'many thousands' and that 'several hundred forms were handed up and burned, but it is difficult to say how many of these were actually passes'. This dismissive and uninformed attitude is taken to its logical conclusion by a clearly embittered Tabata, who says of the Anti-Pass Campaign (in a book published four years later) that a 'few people in isolated locations burned their passes, and paid the penalty'.

The national Anti-Pass Campaign was followed in mid-August by the famous mineworkers' strike on the Rand. Repression followed swiftly in the wake of this development. In Cape Town, offices of the CP, the ANC and the Guardian newspaper were raided, and the entire Communist Party executive (including local leaders Kotane and Phillips) was arrested in November, and transported to Johannesburg to face charges of sedition which were eventually thrown out of court two years later. These arrests followed an earlier trial, which failed to prove conspiracy-charges against 52 trade-unionists and party leaders.

This stifling of large-scale dissent suppressed country-wide campaigning until its re-emergence with the Defiance Campaign of 1952 (discussed in Chapter 6). It by no means dampened the militancy of local activists. The two concluding sections of the present chapter focuses on campaigns during 1947 against the establishment of a beerhall in Langa, and against the imposition of a racist curfew in the northern suburbs.

The 1947 Beerhall Riot

Relations between local Africans and the City Council were shown above to have become severely strained during the war. Tensions between the NAC and the Langa Advisory Board had built up to such an extent by May 1945 that the Board asked Molteno to draft a memorandum which was sent to the Mayor. When a satisfactory reply had still not been received in February 1947, the AB resolved to adjourn until such time as the CC responded to 31 specific recommendations which it had ignored over the past few years. National Party mouthpiece the Burger quoted Rogers on the role of communist Board members in motivating this decision, which was clearly influenced by the Native Representative Council's indefinite adjournment in August 1946, following the brutal suppression of the above-mentioned mineworkers' strike.

The AB's protest had little effect on the CC, which believed that the Board had 'degenerated into little more than a body uttering ill-founded grievances and complaints and continually railing against authority'. In fact the intransigent and insensitive attitude of the Council's Native Affairs Committee and its Location Superintendent provoked an anti-beerhall riot in Langa during the month following the Board's adjournment.

Superintendent Rogers and a majority of committee members had for years been pressing for the establishment of a beerhall in Langa, in order not only to gain a measure of control over the burgeoning
informal economy based on the existing system of domestic brewing, but also to make residents pay for
the increasing cost of administering the location. Earlier developments in this regard, including the City
Council's retreat in the face of popular opposition in 1941, were discussed in the opening section of this
chapter.

Langa residents were understandably outraged early in March 1947, when they learned from the press that
the Native Affairs Committee had recommended that the Council should answer one of the questions on a
Native Laws (Fagan) Commission of Enquiry questionnaire by stating that municipal manufacture and sale remained the
preferred method of supplying 'kaffir beer'. The Langa Vigilance Committee immediately convened a
protest meeting and issued a declaration that the 'people of Langa are as much opposed as ever to the
establishment of a beer-hall', which was described as 'an outrage to our traditions and our social customs,
and as subversive of good relations between the people and the local administration'.

This strong stand did not prevent the over-zealous Superintendent Rogers (convinced as he was that
the representatives don't always voice the opinions of the people they represent') from calling a meeting of
Main Barracks residents on the following Sunday morning. He informed this gathering that he had been
approached by certain barracks residents who supported the proposed establishment of a beer-hall, as
they were unable to procure sufficient supplies from the authorised home-brewers.

The meeting ended in uproar when the tame former Barracks representative on the Advisory Board, Mac Mnqongqo (whose support for Rogers' previous attempt to establish a beerhall in 1941 was mentioned earlier), spoke up in support
of the Superintendent. Convinced that he had been bribed, the angry crowd threatened Mnqongqo, who
lashed out with a stick before being hustled away into protective custody. Rogers later named AB
members Thomas Lwana and William Ndunyana as leaders of the crowd of about 800, which stoned his
party as he left the barracks.

The Board that afternoon summoned Molteno, City Councillor Sam Kahn and NAC chairman AA
Balsillie to address a volatile meeting of Langa residents, convened under the joint auspices of the AB, the
Langa branch of the CP and the Anti-Pass Committee. After Balsillie had given this 'large gathering' his
assurance that the City Council did not intend to build a beerhall, Molteno and Kahn appealed for calm, but
to no avail. Once the 'Europeans' had left, they were replaced on the platform by militant speakers
demanding direct action.

The proposed target of the crowd's anger was the municipal kitchen and dining-hall at the Main Barracks,
which had in February 1946 replaced the temporary municipal kitchen shown above to have opened there
in June 1943. The residents of Langa much preferred the old system of African-owned 'eating houses', and
resented 'municipal trading' in the location, but the CC characteristically chose to ignore repeated
representations in this regard from the AB and the VC.

A section of the Natives surged towards the hall...nothing else happened... until after nightfall.

Molteno and Balsillie returned to Langa at eight that evening, apparently at the behest of Thomas Lwana.
They found Superintendent Rogers and a few policemen besieged in the administrative offices by
hundreds of residents vociferously demanding his resignation. With Lwana interpreting, they tried
two hours to pacify the crowd, but as they prepared to leave they heard the dining-hall windows
breaking. The reinforced police mounted batoncharges, which were fended off with sticks and stones.
Further reinforcements were rushed in and stronger measures resorted to, but the authorities only gained
control of the situation early the following morning. By that stage the dining-hall, the post office, the
office of the Native Recruiting Corporation and three staff-houses (including that of Mr Rogers) had been
damaged. One resident, a man named Elijah Mbuda, died with a police bullet in his stomach, and
six others required hospitalisation.

Twenty-two Langa residents, including Lwana and Ndunyana, faced criminal charges as a result of this
riot. They were originally defended by Sam Kahn, who was however called as a witness in the trial, and
was therefore unable to represent the accused. His place was taken by Mcolteno, who received instructions from the legal firm of Kahn and Snitcher. Convictions for malicious damage to property were eventually secured against six of the less prominent accused.221 After studying representations from (among others) Molteno, the JC and the SAIRR,222 the NAC abandoned its support for the beerhall proposal. This was confirmed at the end of April by the full Council, which resolved to advocate domestic brewing in the evidence required by the Fagan Commission.222 The VC complained in August 1947 that Rogers was still ‘trying to incite people to use violence through his ‘divide and rule' system”.4 Two months later, this body expressed the residents’ perception that ‘Rogers was the sole cause’ of the beer-hall riot, and was ‘not fit to be our Superintendent’. The AB (which had resumed its sittings in May)222 again adjourned in protest against the City Council’s autocratic attitude towards the residents of Langa. The VC envisaged that this second 1947 adjournment would last until the expiry of the term of office of the Board’s chairman, Reverend Fort, from the NAC, who was one of Rogers' most ardent admirers.222 Due to the intensity of opposition to the proposed establishment of a municipal beerhall, the City Council only felt sufficiently confident to resurrect the issue in 1954. (Chapter 5 below). With the introduction of a racial curfew towards the end of 1947, local authorities in the northern part of the Peninsula maintained the pressure on the African community during the last months of United Party rule.

Anti-curfew Agitation Versus Non-Collaboration

Despite increasing tensions between Molteno’s solidifying moderate convictions and the growing militancy of his constituents, local African leaders continued to cooperate with their ‘Native Representative’ when the next wave of issue-related protest arose during the following month. This further alienating the less pragmatic supporters of the NEUM. These protests focussed on curfew regulations promulgated on 11 July,227 requiring Africans found out of doors between 11pm and 4am in the municipal areas of Goodwood, Parow, Bellville, Durbanville and Kuils River to produce letters of authorisation from their employers or from designated officials. The timing of this proclamation was portrayed in the local press as a simple bureaucratic blunder. Bellville’s mayor was quoted as saying that the measure was ‘unnecessary and somewhat tactless’. It had, he said, not been expected by the local authorities concerned, although they had some two years previously (before the institution of adequate controls over the African influx) unsuccessfully urged the imposition of such a curfew.22’ The Minister of Native Affairs, for his part, averred that his action in issuing the curfew-proclamation had been ‘based on a misapprehension of the true facts’, as he had been under the mistaken impression that a location would shortly be established to serve these northern areas.22” The true explanation was revealed in a ‘personal and confidential’ exchange between Molteno and SNA George Mears. While the Cape Times reported, one month after its imposition, that the curfew was ‘having little practical effect’,230 Molteno despatched two letters to Mears. The first was a strong protest against the introduction of ‘this detestable system...which elsewhere in the world is imposed only on a civilian population that is suffering military occupation’. Molteno said that if ‘this unwarranted and drastic step’ was a UP pre-election bid to prove itself as capable of repression as the Nationalists, the effect on the ‘white’ electorate could be the opposite of that which was intended.201 His second letter discussed the likely effect of this measure on African political opinion. He emphasized that ‘the application of mistaken and foolish policies’ had contributed to the contemporary upwelling of unrest and dissatisfaction among the Africans and had made it ‘impossible for moderate people like the present Native
Representatives...to maintain an influence’ in the face of the ‘reckless and irresponsible propaganda’ of the Communist Party. Molteno feared that ‘the imposition of the curfew, on top of the travel restrictions’ would strengthen the boycott-movement, which was already making his position increasingly untenable. He was seriously considering whether he could continue as a Native Representative.222

Mears replied, confidentially, that he had issued the proclamation against his own better judgement. Under existing (admittedly discriminatory) legislation, however, it had proved impossible to resist the ‘lawful demands’ of ‘Europeans’ who had ‘not only no love for the Natives but a definite fear of them’. After his Department had rejected Bellville municipality's request for the imposition of a curfew in 1945, Mears told Molteno, there had been innumerable deputations to the Minister, sometimes men, sometimes women, painting a grim picture of crime and the spectre of fear in their homes through the uncontrolled movements of Natives through the townships day and night.

Finally under extreme pressure the Minister found it almost impossible to resist the request and reluctantly yielded... My point is that the issue of the Proclamation is in accordance with the views of the overwhelming majority of the people.

This was in any event nothing new to ‘the Natives’, as no fewer than 108 such Proclamations had already been issued in the Cape Province alone.232

Molteno appreciated the spirit of Mears' letter, but declared that his duty was 'to continue to press for the removal of these restrictions'.234 In mid-August, the Cape Times reported a growing volume of anti-curfew protest, led by Molteno (in his dual capacity as Native Representative and as regional representative of the SAIRR) and supported by the ex-servicemen's Springbok Legion, together with 'various non-European organisations'.

Agitation against the curfew subsequently brought Molteno and the local Communists closer together. This development was bitterly resented by the NEUM, and anti-curfew meetings at which Molteno shared the platform with Communists were subjected to disruption by disgruntled proponents of the principled boycott.

At issue here was a tactical divergence over the manner in which the decision to boycott 'dummy institutions' was to be implemented. The NEUM was adamant that the boycott decision implied the immediate resignation of the 'Native Representatives from the Native Representative Council and from Parliament’.2” The majority of CP and ANC members were clearly not against the boycott-tactic, but remained convinced that ‘an effective boycott demands a high degree of political consciousness, organisation, unity of purpose

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and action’,27 if it were not simply to result in 'the field being left open to collaborators'.29 Following the 1946 mine-workers’ strike and the consequent adjournment of the Native Representative Council, an emergency conference of the ANC had in October 1946 called for all institutions of dummy representation to be boycotted in the struggle for full citizenship rights.23’ In November, a ‘Conference of African Organisations of the Western Province’ (convened by the Cape Town branch of Congress) called on ‘members of the N.R.C. to resign forthwith and cease collaboration with the Government’. The conference further resolved ‘to set up a Committee to campaign for the boycott of elections under the Representation of Natives Act’.240 This resolution does not seem to have specifically mentioned the parliamentary Native Representatives, who were unanimously against the proposed boycott.241 The Congress national conference at the end of 1946 instructed its incoming national executive committee ‘to conduct a nation-wide campaign for a boycott of all elections under the 1936 Act’. The boycott-call was endorsed during the following month at the CP's annual conference, which resolved (despite 'doubts about the advisability or feasibility of a boycott at this stage') in favour of participation in 'any campaign to make the decision effective’.242 The Cape African Voters' Association also followed the Congress lead. 242 Congress and the CP alike were so divided over this issue, however, that the anticipated
boycott-campaign never materialised. As shown below, both organisations at their following annual conferences in fact reversed their decisions on the boycott-question, further outraging the local advocates of the principle of noncol labour at ion.

The depth of the split between the two camps became apparent in August, when an anti-curfew meeting in Elsies River at which Molteno shared the platform with speakers including Communists, churchmen and members of the Springbok Legion, had to be abandoned due to continual disruptions by Unity Movement supporters who objected to Molteno's presence. When Communist central committee members Kotane and Phillips tried to intervene they were 'met with shouts of "bosshoys"'.

Molteno said afterwards that the 'wreckers' were mainly 'Coloureds' who were unaffected by the curfew, together with 'two or three Africans who are without influence or status among their own people'.

Lucas Phillips contended dismissively that the 'self-styled Unity Movement... (which is in fact a disunity movement)' had failed to secure a mass following and was resorting to hooliganism 'in an attempt to attain political recognition'.

The Torch, for its part, suggested that the meeting had been convened not so much to oppose the curfew as for 'the sinister purpose of breaking the boycott movement of the African people against the so-called 'Native Representatives'. The Communists and the liberals had, according to a speaker from the floor, 'formed an alliance to boost up Molteno and make him acceptable once more'.

Passions were similarly inflamed at an ANC-organised anti-curfew meeting held in Bellville early in September, but there Phillips (acting as chairman) was able to retain control. Molteno was allowed to speak and was subsequently authorised by the meeting to make representations to the authorities. The Cape Times reported only two persistent hecklers at this predominantly pro-Molteno meeting, while the Torch claimed that most of the audience had left by the time that he spoke.

Although the ill-conceived curfew-scheme was soon withdrawn by the authorities, the pattern had been set for further confrontation between factions on the left. An ANCanorganised report-back on the recent session of parliament, for example, was disrupted in November 1947. The two sides drew further apart in December, when the ANC annual conference (unlike that of the AAC, which reaffirmed its earlier decision to boycott all elections under the Representation of Natives Act), resolved for tactical reasons to rescind the similar resolution it had passed at its previous conference. The CP followed this lead, resolving at its annual conference that the introduction of a universal franchise recognising the right of Africans to sit in parliament could best be secured by 'the election of ... candidates pledged to repeal the Act'.

This retreat from the boycott-position was compounded for the boycottists by the Communist Party's continued participation in the Advisory Board system. Five of the six successful candidates in the Langa AB election at the beginning of 1948 were Party members.

When Communist city councillor Sam Kahn announced months later that he would contest the retiring Molteno's seat as 'Native Representative', the Unity Movement declared that 'this must surely be one of the most reactionary steps ever taken by the Communist Party'. Kahn was given a hard time at a number of election meetings, but he went on to win by a large majority, becoming South Africa's first Communist member of parliament. Another prominent local Party-member, Fred Carneson, successfully contested a Provincial Council election during the following year, giving the Communists platforms at all three levels of government, from which they could demand equal rights and attempt to stimulate organisation among the disenfranchised.

The demise of the system of 'Native Representation' is discussed in Chapter 6, which focusses on political currents during the early years of Apartheid. The next chapter analyses the emergence of Apartheid policy between 1948 and 1954.
2. Guardian, 8 Dec. 1939, report on Grassy Park VC's condemnation of the NLL as 'communistic and anti-Christian.' 3. The name was changed in mid-1941 to 'Joint Council of Europeans and Africans' (BC 580 H1.1, JC minutes, 3 June, 1941).
5. Lewis, 'The Reactions', 4.2. This reference in Lewis' thesis is absent from his book.
7. 3/CT 1/4/6/6/4/1/1, 143-7, NASC minutes, 11 Feb. 1938. 15. 3/CT 1/4/6/6/4/1/1, 295, NASC minutes, 2 June, 1938; ibid, 329-36, Quirk/Rogers report on beerhalls, 9 May, 1938 (annexure F to NASC minutes, 2 June, 1938). 16. 3/CT 1/4/6/6/4/1/1, NASC minutes, 8 July, 1938; Cape Times, 26 July, 1938; ibid, minutes of meeting between NASC and AB, 19 Oct. 1938 (with attached statement by AB); 3/CT 1/4/6/6/4/1/2, NASC minutes, 10 Mar. 1939; ibid, NASC minutes, 16 Mar. 1939; ibid, NASC minutes, 17 Mar. 1939. 17. 3/CT 1/4/6/6/4/1/2, NASC minutes, 15 Sep. 1939. 18. MM, 1939, 20, referring to GN 288 of 3 Mar. 1939. 19. NTS 4504 581/313, NASC report on the 'Municipal Manufacture and Sale of Kaffir Beer', nd. 20. Guardian, 29 Sep. 1939.

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29. 3/CT 1/4/6/6/4/1/2, Mears to TC, 17 Apr. 1940 (annexure 5 to NASC minutes, 17 Apr. 1940). 30. 3/CT 1/4/10/1/1/9, AB minutes, 17 Sep. 1940 (annexure 1 to NASC minutes, 8 Nov. 1940); NTS 4504 581/313, Rogers' report, 7 Nov. 1940. 31. BC 580 H1.1. 59, minutes of JC monthly meeting, 7 Nov. 1939. 32. BC 580 H1.1, 71, minutes of JC executive meeting, 16 Jan. 1940; BC 580 H1.1, 72, minutes of JC monthly meeting, 6 Feb. 1940; BC 579 A24.66, Molteno to SA Temperance Alliance general sec, 14 Mar. 1940.
33. 3/CT 1/4/6/6/4/1/2, resolutions of 28 Jan. 1940 mass meeting, in AB minutes, 13 Feb. 1940, 3 (appendix 1 to NASC minutes, 17 Apr. 1940); Guardian, 2 Feb. 1940. 34. 3/CT 1/4/6/6/4/1/2, NASC minutes, 9 Feb. 1940. 35. BC 580 H1.1, 74, JC monthly meeting minutes, 2 Apr. 1940. 36. BC 579 A24.66, Molteno to SA Temperance Union general sec, 14 Mar. 1940.
38. BC 579 A24.69, Molteno to SNA, 22 Apr. 1940. 39. 3/CT 1/4/6/6/4/1/2, Rogers' report, 7 May, 1940, 2 (annexure 3 to NASC minutes, 10 May, 1940); BC 580 H1.1, 76, minutes of JC monthly meeting, 7 May, 1940; 3/CT 1/4/6/6/4/1/2, minutes of AB meeting, 14 May, 1940, 2 (annexure 2 to NASC meeting, 14 June, 1940. 40. Guardian, 3 May, 1940.
41. Guardian, 12 Apr. 1940; Kingwill, The ANC, 92. 42. BC 579 A24.87, W Ndunyan to Molteno, 23 May, 1940. 43. Guardian, 20 Feb. 1941. 44. NTS 4504 581/313 and BAAB 44, statement on eating houses
85. Inkokeli ya Bantu, Jan. 1941. 86. ABX 410212a, Calata to Xuma, 12 Feb. 1941. 87. Inkokeli ya Bantu, Feb. 1941. 88. Inkokeli ya Bantu, May, 1941. 89. Inkokeli ya Bantu, June, 1941. 90. ABX 410424a, Oliphant to Baloyi, 24 Apr. 1941; ABX 410626b, Xuma to Oliphant, 26 June, 1941; ABX 410630a, Oliphant to Xuma, 30 June, 1941; ABX 410704a, Xuma to Oliphant, 4 July, 1941; ABX 411022a, Xuma to Oliphant, 22 Oct. 1941; ABX 411027, Oliphant to Xuma, 27 Oct. 1941. 91. ABX 420816, Bulana to Xuma, 10 Aug. 1942. 92. Inkokeli ya Bantu, Sep. 1941. 93. Inkokeli va Bantu, Dec. 1941; Izwi lase Afrika, 16 Jan. 1942 (in BC 579 A54.15).


117. ABX 420916a, Xuma to Oliphant, 16 Sep. 1942; ABX 420916b, Xuma to Newana, 16 Sep. 1942; ABX 420916c, Xuma to Pendla, 16 Sep. 1942; ABX 420916d, Xuma to Tladi, 16 Sep. 1942. 118. See BC 579 A54.55, pamphlet advertising this meeting. 119. ABX 420922a, Tladi to Xuma, 22 Sep. 1942; ABX 420925, Xuma to Tladi, 25 Sep. 1942. 120. BC 579 A54.35.3, Molteno's undated election manifesto; Guardian, 1 Oct. 1942.

121. BC 579 A54.36.1, undated circular signed by Coto and Jayiya. 122. ABX 421008, AAC Committee (Western Province), 'Manifesto on Elections', no date. 123. Guardian, 15 Oct. 1942.
136. BC 580 H1.1, 173, JC minutes, 5 May, 1943; 3/CT 1/4/10/1/1/9, 247, JC sec Z Friedlander to NAC clerk, 10 May, 1943; ibid, 239, NAC minutes, 14 May, 1943; 2; ibid, np, NAC special meeting minutes, 21 May, 1943, 137. 3/CT 1/4/10/1/1/9, 263, Rogers' report, 7 June, 1943, 5; ibid, 284, NAC minutes, 9 July, 1943, 7, 138. NTS 4504 581/313, Slarke to SNA, 28 July, 1943. 139. 3/CT 1/4/10/1/1/9, AB minutes, 18 Feb. 1941, 1 (annexure 3 to NAC minutes, 14 Mar. 1941); ibid, 175, NAC minutes, 11 Dec. 1942, 3.

140. BAAB 44 and BC 579 A24.379, Langa VC sec to TC, 3 Aug. 1943; BAAB 44 and GN 9/32/1/1, Rogers to Acting TC, 14 Sep. 1943.


167. BC 579 E3.33, draft resolutions of City Hall meeting, 1 Apr. 1944; Guardian, 6 Apr. 1944. 168. GN 68/1, CP district committee sec Rex Close to TC, 9 June, 1944. 169. Guardian, 8 June, 1944.


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This chapter focusses on the early Apartheid period from 1948 to the mid-1950s. It was during this period that the new National Party (NP) government developed and refined its racially discriminatory policies, including (in the form of ‘Coloured Labour Preference’ (CLP)) particularly harsh restrictions on the presence of Africans in the Western Cape. CLP is often seen as a unique aberration, very different to the policy adopted in other parts of the country. This is called into question by Posel, who argues that this was a regional variation of a broader national policy of Urban Labour Preference, devised to address the problems dominating the NAD’s agenda - the farm labour shortage, allegedly wasteful use of African labour in the towns, massive squatter settlements, accommodation shortage, and upsurge of African resistance.' Posel sees 'the policy in the Western Cape as a form of ULPP’,2 but overlooks the fact that CLP had (as shown above in Chapter 1) been official Western Cape policy for two decades before the National Party came to power. The experience gained during the pre-apartheid period, in refining what was originally a regional variant of Hertzog’s policy of ‘civilised labour’,a clearly influenced the attempt to extend nation-wide a similar system of division and exclusion over three decades from the mid-1950s. The themes which would dominate policy-making during this period were confronted, soon after the National Party came to power, at meetings initiated by Bellville municipality and the Cape Divisional Council. Here the new Minister of Native Affairs, Dr EG Jansen, was easily persuaded that the solution had to involve the removal of all African squatters to a central area where ‘illegals’ could be sifted out prior to ‘repatriation’. It was further agreed that the issuing of removal orders by magistrates and Native Commissioners should be complemented by the setting up of a national system of labour bureaux through which African labour could be channelled. A third point on which agreement was reached was the necessity for intensified police-raids on squatter-camps.4 This chapter discusses the development of these aspects of policy. It begins by tracing the emergence of institutional consensus regarding residential segregation and the housing question. The practical difficulties of influx control are discussed in the second section. This is followed by an analysis of the nature and workings of a committee of ideologues and bureaucrats known as the Western Cape Committee for Local Native Administration (WCCLNA), through which Sabra's radical segregationist solution to the
problems of the Western Cape was advocated with most force and influence during the 1950s. Two concluding sections outline respectively the local inauguration of the labourbureaux system and the intensification of efforts to remove 'illegals' through repressive measures such as police raids and general harassment.

Renewed Agreement on 'Native' Housing and Squatter Control

Chapters 1 and 3 emphasised the role of ratepayers' organisations in exerting pressure for residential segregation. After 1948, ratepayers continued to express periodic concern over the failure of the authorities to segregate Africans completely from the rest of the compartmentalised local community. This was, however, a different situation entirely from the earlier period, as the ratepayers' lengthy battle for an official state policy of rigid residential segregation along racial lines had already been won. The Group Areas Act of 1950 moreover sought explicitly to extend the enforced geographical segregation already applied to Africans under the Urban Areas Act to the legislatively-defined 'Coloured', 'Malay' and 'Indian' 'races'.

The dispute with the central authorities which halted the City Council's housing-programme was discussed in Chapter 3, which noted also the role of ratepayers and other interest groups in blocking the development of locations at Bellville and Retreat. In mid-1948, the Native Commissioner was still pinning his hopes of solving the squatter problem in the Cape Town municipal area on the speedy development of the long-awaited Retreat location. As for the rest of the Peninsula, the call led by Bellville municipality for the extension of Nyanga had never been answered. Neither had the originally agreed-upon choice of 'Lot QQ' in Bellville South as the site of the proposed Divisional Council-northern municipalities joint location ever been rescinded.

Minister Jansen, however, argued against satellite locations at a meeting with the Divisional Council in September. He had come to the conclusion by that stage that the only way to control the local 'Native' situation was 'to have one central area where they can all be put'. Sufficient land was available at Nyanga to accommodate every 'Native' in the Peninsula (including those in Langa), initially under conditions of 'controlled squatting'. The only uncertainty the Minister admitted to was the thought that 'if provision is made for Native families where is it going to end? What will be the position in another fifty years' time?'.

The proposed extension of Nyanga (where the Divisional Council had managed to construct a mere 200 houses since 1946) was strongly supported by that body and the northern municipalities. Employers and the City Council, for their part, continued to advocate extending Langa and going ahead with the Retreat development as the best way of tackling the growing squatter-problem within the municipal boundaries. Opposition arose when, after lengthy delays, the relevant local authorities showed signs of actually intending to develop Nyanga and Retreat.

The Cape Flats Farmers' Association and the 'Coloured' residents of Klipfontein Mission Station protested against the CDC purchasing additional land early in 1950 for the controlled squatter-camp at Nyanga. Objections centred on the rising crime-rate which had allegedly accompanied the existing limited development in the area, as well as perceived threats to property-values and to the womenfolk of the white and 'Coloured' communities.

Pressed towards the end of the following year by the Kalk Bay-Muizenberg Ratepayers' Association and the United Party's South Peninsula member of parliament (Mr LC Gay), Native Affairs ordered the CC to suspend its plans for a controlled squatter camp at Retreat. Ratepayers in this area similarly feared race-mixing and social disruption. One year later, towards the end of 1952, the Kalk Bay-Muizenberg Ratepayers' Association was reported to be spreading 'vicious anti-African propaganda' among 'Coloured' residents in the area, in an attempt to persuade them to sign a petition demanding the deproclamation of Retreat as a 'Native' location-site. Within the CC, a conservative 'New Civic Group' faction (led by Joyce Newton-Thompson among others) actively lobbied towards this end. These uncertainties were dispelled by act of parliament. Local authorities were statutorily obliged, in terms of the Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act, No. 52 of 1951, to co-operate with the central
authorities in establishing emergency camps where squatters could be concentrated and controlled. The new Act's provisions were applied to the four Peninsula magisterial districts of Cape Town, Wynberg, Beliville and Simon's Town as from 30 May 1952.12 The emergency camps only materialised in mid-1955, after prolonged negotiations between all the interested parties (except, of course, the 'illegal' Africans).13

Prompted by Verwoerd, the CDC and the three northern municipalities of Bellville, Goodwood and Parow finally reached formal agreement on the joint approach to the squatter problem first suggested by the UP government in 1943. At a conference held in mid-1952, these bodies decided to move all African squatters in their areas to a controlled camp at Nyanga location.14

In the interim, the Divisional Council embarked on an extension-programme to provide accommodation in Nyanga for 700 families (in 350 'dual occupancy dwellings') and for 448 'single natives'.15 That body and the northern municipalities seem to have begun forcibly moving squatters into this rudimentary housing towards the end of 1953.16

Nyanga's population consequently grew from 1,300 in March 1953 to 4,000 in October 1954.17 Once agreement had been reached in mid-1952 regarding the necessity for a controlled squatter camp at Nyanga, Verwoerd called on the City Council to play its part by establishing a similar scheme in Langa for 'Natives' employed within the municipal boundaries.10 The extension of Langa did not, however, fit into the Group Areas blueprint then being drawn up for the Peninsula by the Planning Committee of the Land Tenure Advisory Board. Secretary Eiselen therefore told the CC that it would have to build another more conveniently situated location, either supplementary to Langa or in its stead. He mentioned also a third possibility, that of making up one's mind that the Western Province is not really native country, and it is not in the interests of the City or the country as a whole to have a huge permanent native population here.18

Almost three months later, the CC received from the Minister of Native Affairs definite instructions to provide hostel-accommodation for 17,000 'single Natives' in Langa, as well as a 'site and service' camp plus family housing at a site south of the Divisional Council's Nyanga development.20 Following a meeting with a CC deputation which insisted that the area south of Nyanga was unsuitable, the Minister appointed an interdepartmental committee to find a suitable site for a new municipal location. Chaired by Urban Areas Commissioner (Western Cape) CJ van Schalkwyk and comprising representatives of the Native Affairs Department, the Cape Provincial Administration, the National Housing and Planning Commission, the Department of Transport and the Group Areas Administration, this committee was briefed to concentrate on the Eerste River and Nyanga areas.21

The Eerste River Property Owners' Association refused to accept responsibility for 'thousands of Natives working in the Cape Town and Tygerberg areas'. Affected local authorities, as well as organised employers (through the medium of a newly-formed Labour Coordinating Committee which claimed to be 'fully representative of the views of local commerce and industry') argued that Nyanga West was a far more suitable site. This view was duly supported by the Van Schalkwyk Committee in its report to the Minister in October. 22

The only controversial recommendation made by the inter-departmental committee was that families should be removed from Langa. Assured that such removals would only occur in the long term, the initially-dubious City Council resolved in January 1955 to agree to cooperate with the strategy of centralising squatters in controlled camps.23 This about-face reflected concern that continued obstruction of the government's prescriptions could be circumvented, as was the case in Johannesburg, by the simple expedient of establishing a new local authority to by-pass the City Council. Great controversy was raging at the time over the activities of the Western Areas Resettlement Board, which had recently been created for the specific purpose of effecting the removal (to the planned Soweto complex) of Africans from certain of Johannesburg's worst 'black spots', in the face of opposition from that city's municipality.24
Following the distribution of notices ordering 'illegal' women to leave the Peninsula within periods apparently varying from one month to one year, Rogers explained to a protest-deputation of Blouvlei women (led by Dora Tamana and accompanied by Ben Turok of the Congress of Democrats) that the policy of the Government is to reduce the number of African families in the Western Cape as much as possible. The labour needs of the Cape Peninsula are to be met by migratory African labour. The Government says there are 60,000 African working men here. Most have not got their wives here, and most of (those) who have their wives here are not living in Nyanga and Langa but are living in pondokkies. If each man brings his wife here the Government would have to build 60,000 houses. The Government has no intention of doing so.

The failure to provide accommodation for the burgeoning African population during this early-Apartheid period resulted not only in the further proliferation of squatter settlements, but also in the inability of the authorities to remove pockets of 'exempted' Africans from their homes in the more developed parts of the city and suburbs. The CC's Native Administration Department estimated that the Peninsula's African population had grown by the end of 1954 to a total of 105,000 (comprising 60,000 males, 25,000 females and 20,000 children). Only 12,009 were housed in locations, with almost 24,000 residing on employers' premises. The largest concentrations of Africans outside locations were at Windermere (15,000), the northern areas (13,000), the slums of Cape Town, Woodstock and Salt River (9,300), Retreat (5,500), Athlone/Rylands (5,200) and Cook's Bush (3,800).

The state's attempt to remedy this situation during the subsequent decade is discussed below: Chapter 7 documents action taken against 'bachelors' during the second half of the 1950s, while Chapter 10 discusses the removal of families during the early 1960s. As residential segregation made little sense without measures to limit further immigration, the remaining parts of the present chapter focus on the theme of influx control. An analysis of the role of the WCCLNA in propagating the racist conception of Coloured Labour Preference sets the tone for further discussion of this complicated topic.

Sabra and the WCCLNA
The previous chapter highlighted concern among white politicians that urbanisation of Africans would inevitably lead to irresistible demands for enfranchisement. By 1948 there was 'overwhelming consensus among the country's whites' that the state would have to take drastic action to safeguard white supremacy from the threat posed by the growth of the urban African population.'

The Minister of Native Affairs consequently had little difficulty convincing local private-sector representatives that 'the basic problem was to maintain the European in his superior position'. Without such measures as influx control, Minister Verwoerd argued, a stage would be reached when 'Natives' would 'no longer be satisfied with a communal franchise. Their demands for the common franchise with the Europeans [would] become irresistible.'

Despite basic agreement on broad principles of policy, there was considerable controversy over particulars, even within the ruling party itself. Following Lazar, Posel shows that the NP's 'Native Policy' represented a dynamic balance achieved within the Afrikaaner establishment between levelheaded, pragmatic Afrikaner nationalists and the idealistic segregationist hardliners -of, in particular, a National Party think-tank named the South African Bureau of Racial Affairs (Sabra). She shows that the Afrikaanse Handelsinstituut and the South African Agricultural Union argued against the Sabra ideologues that further economic integration of 'racial' groups and the continued urbanisation of Africans were essential for economic growth. Sabra, on the other hand, had since 1948 been lobbying for an allegedly-just policy of 'total segregation'.

Posel quotes its argument that 'as long as Africans were de facto permanent members of the urban workforce and population at large, it would be immoral, and finally impossible, to resist African demands for political and trade union rights.' Probably the clearest exposition of this viewpoint is contained in a 1948 paper on the 'Meaning of Apartheid' written by WWM Eisleen. His Eisleen was a former Professor of Bantu Studies at Stellenbosch University, then a centre of Sabra activity and by all accounts a hothouse of racist ideology.
outspoken racist idealism was rewarded with a chair in Pretoria, and he rose rapidly to become Secretary for Native Affairs in September 1949, under Minister of Native Affairs Jansen (who had held the identical position in Hertzog's cabinet between 1929 and 1933, when the ideology of Coloured Labour Preference was in its infancy).4

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Within the corridors of power, Eiselen's extremist convictions came up against the hard-headed pragmatism of his successive political bosses. The 'Native Policy' actually pursued by the Cabinet thus differed in several crucial respects, from the radical vision of 'total' segregation through proposed policies (necessarily demanding increasing 'sacrifices' from 'whites') aimed at reducing 'economic integration' while encouraging accelerated development in the reserves.36 Posel attributes the new government's pragmatism, to its initially shaky (in terms of electoral strength) hold on power, combined with the moderating and economically-rational influence not only of organised capital as well as local authorities, but also of the Native Affairs bureaucracy itself.37 Posel traces the promulgation in 1952 of a legislative programme reflecting this historic compromise between pragmatists and hardliners within Afrikaner nationalism. The establishment of effective control over the intensifying African influx was the object of three new measures. The Natives (Abolition of Passes and Coordination of Documents) Act in the first place provided for strict control over the influx of non-'qualified' Africans. This was backed up by the Native Laws Amendment Act, which revised the 1915 Native Labour Regulation Act to provide for the establishment of a coordinated system of labour bureaux, and also rephrased Section 10 of the Natives (Urban Areas) Act.38

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The latter amendment, as Humphries notes, made a rigid distinction 'between those blacks who could enjoy permanent residence rights in the cities and those who could not.9 The new Section 10 was thus central to the policy of 'Urban Labour Preference'.40 Posel points out, however, that pressure from various quarters (including organisations representing the 'entire spectrum of African political opinion')41 resulted in loopholes which allowed rural 'outsiders' to earn section 10 rights through ten or fifteen years' residence in the urban areas, thereby creating a major contradiction at the heart of the whole system of racist laws.42 The provisions of the new Section 10 were for this reason resented by Bantu Administrators throughout the country. Only in the Western Cape, however, was the repeal of section 10 advocated in order to effect the eventual removal of all Africans from the region, in terms of a policy of avowed 'Coloured Labour Preference'.48 According to Humphries, Sabra was the source of the view that apartheid policy with regard to Africans could most easily be implemented in the Western Cape. This was seen as the obvious ('aangewese') region in which any attempt to reduce the numbers of blacks could be made. Humphries assumes that the relatively small number of Africans in the region must have been a major consideration in this regard.44 He suggests that these protagonists of CLP were influenced also by such additional factors as the existence of a substantial indigenous 'Coloured' population, and the great distance separating the region from its reservoirs of 'Native' labour.45

While recognising the importance of Sabra itself, however, Humphries emphasises specifically the role of the WCCLNA, a Sabra affiliate. This he describes as 'an organisation which represented municipal councillors and officials involved in the implementation of the policy'. His account focuses on the 1960s, and he consequently has little to say about the influence of the WCCLNA in the earlier period. It was through the workings of this committee, which became a 'specialised committee' of the Cape Province Municipal Association in June 1952,11 that Sabra developed its policy towards Africans in the Western Cape during the early 1950s. Posel shows that this was the policy of pursuing Coloured Labour Preference 'irrespective of economic costs'.7 The WCCLNA was established after a conference held in Stellenbosch in early 1951. At this meeting, the Native Commissioner discussed the problem with officials from the municipalities of Stellenbosch, Cape Town, Simon's Town, Paarl, Wellington, Strand and Somerset West, as well as the Cape and Stellenbosch Divisional Councils.4 This was not, incidentally, the first instance of 'Native Administrators' in a particular region combining in the interests of efficiency and control. Posel mentions the existence of an
of Administrators of Non-European Affairs on the Witwatersrand in the 1940s. 49
Van der Westhuizen says (without providing any reference) that this conference was initiated by Sabra and attended also by representatives of the University of Stellenbosch. Invitations were actually issued by -the Bureau's secretary in his alternative capacity as Town Clerk of Stellenbosch, and Elias cites City Council minutes to the effect that the meeting took place at the initiative of that town’s mayor. 0
The fact that Stellenbosch was the leading light among Sabra-affiliated municipalities (which numbered seventy by 1956) is hardly surprising. The Bureau's headquarters were, after all, located there during the 1950s, while Stellenbosch academics led by Professor NJJ (Nic) Olivier dominated the organisation's 'Dagbestuur' and provided most of its intellectual input. The prominent Sabra leader Dr Erika Theron, who had studied in Berlin during the heady early 1930s and had subsequently risen to prominence in the pro-Nazi Ossewa Brandwag, was elected to the municipal council in June 1951. 1
The WCCLNA constitution provided for the establishment of a Technical Advisory Committee 'that would meet more often and devise strategies'. 52 Soon after the City Council joined in May 1951,” its Manager of Native Administration, Stuart Rogers, was elected to the first of several terms as chairman of the Technical Advisory Committee. His long-term deputy was the Sabra leader Nic Olivier. In the regular secret meetings of this committee, Stellenbosch's leading racist intellectual thus joined forces in the 1950's with the region's authoritarian senior 'Native Administrator', to thrash out a solution to the Western Cape's chronic 'Native Problem'.
Olivier's keynote address to the WCCLNA annual conference in 1952 stressed the necessity of the total exclusion of African families from the Western Cape. He noted a TAC statement that 'though it deplored the moral undermining of natives as a result of the lack of family life outside the reserves, it could at this stage not see a practical way of allowing natives working in the Western Province to bring their families with them'. Olivier and a doctoral-candidate protege, by the name of Mr EMK Schuler, were coopted as permanent members of the committee at this conference. 04 Schuler later became treasurer of Sabra. When Munger met him in the mid-1950s, he found him 'still imbued with some Nazi ideas', which he had apparently picked up as a schoolboy in Hitler's Germany. 55
These misguided Nazi-influenced intellectuals had come to the conclusion that the entire problem resulted from the unsuitable establishment of industries in the Western Cape, which had strengthened the immigration of natives to this area. By allowing a state of affairs to continue which meant integration, a solution would be made impossible.
It was necessary that an area be created in the Union where there would be no natives. 56
These views were further refined in an article by Olivier entitled 'Die Naturel in Wes-Kaapland', which was published in the Sabra journal in January 1953, and later submitted as a Sabra memorandum to the Tomlinson Commission. Its main recommendations were a prohibition on the further settlement of Africans (particularly families); the gradual reduction of the number of African employees, or (in some job categories) their total replacement by 'Coloureds'; and an insistence that African labour, where required in the Western Cape, should take the form of migrant labour only. 57
For Olivier, the basic problem was the economic integration of incompatible races. Industrialisation had been encouraged by Western Cape local authorities without consideration of the problems inevitably arising from the development of large concentrations of African workers. Olivier argued that, without tribal ties and effective tribal control, 'this group is in the true sense of the word the country's black proletariat, which will assert itself more and more strongly'. Their intensifying organised challenge to the 'traditional order' was sufficient evidence for Olivier that Africans were unassimilable in the 'white' and 'coloured' Western Cape. He argued furthermore that their growing presence in the region adversely affected the fragile relationship between the two latter racial groups.
The only solution he could envisage was thoroughgoing economic and territorial segregation. He insisted that, just as some areas were demarcated exclusively for Africans, others should be developed into 'non-native areas'. Through the strict implementation of a policy of 'Coloured Labour Preference', the Western
Cape could within one or two generations become the first region from which 'natives' were totally excluded.5"

On a national scale, capitalist scepticism regarding the apartheid policy had, during the first three years of National Party rule, been placated by assurances that 'total segregation is only the ideal, probably unattainable' and that the 'implementation of apartheid must take into account economic realities'.

Following the publication, in January 1953, of Olivier's radical vision of future regional policy, Secretary for Native Affairs Eiselen similarly hastened to reassure employers that what was envisaged in the short term was the 'cleaning up' (rather than the abolition) of the Western Cape's 'Bantu communities'.0 This assurance must have satisfied local employers, for there is no record of any further protest by organised commerce and industry against Olivier's views. The Cape

236 Chamber of Industries did express concern that employers' freedom of choice with regard to labour might be restricted by the municipal labour bureau provided for under the Native Laws Amendment Act. Of particular concern to the Chamber was the possibility that service contracts might have to be registered for casual African workers employed for less than three days at a time, particularly in the building industry and on the docks. It was evidently reassured by the City Council on both counts.01

The authorities were no less accommodating towards the interests of Western Cape farmers. Following a Farmers' Association deputation to Minister Verwoerd, and a call in the Ossewabrandwag organ the Republikein for the utilisation of channelled labour rather than convicts on farms in the region, the Native Commissioner informed the CC that Africans who refused to accept agricultural employment would have to be removed.02 One year later, it was reported that the municipal labour bureau was sending Africans to labourstarved farms in the Worcester district, after Minister Verwoerd had given agricultural interests renewed assurances of full co-operation.0

In his capacity as TAC chairman, Rogers led a discussion with the NAD's Urban Areas Commissioner in September 1953, on the need to remove African families from the region. Rogers very pertinently asked exactly where the large number of families born and bred in the Western Cape

237 could be resettled. Urban Areas Commissioner HL Smuts replied that if the Committee wanted to achieve its objective to remove natives from the Western Cape, then it should make representations through the parent body at the very earliest opportunity. The Government was the body to decide whether families could be removed. The principle could be submitted to the Government whether all native families should be removed from the Western Cape and the Government would have to judge whether it could implement this. Land had been purchased which might be available. The parent body could give expression to the idea that only migratory labour should be considered for the Western Cape and if the idea was submitted to the Government as strongly as possible with all the arguments in its favour at the very earliest opportunity, the Government could consider it and reply.064

The WCCLNA annual conference during the following month unanimously carried Professor Olivier's motion that strong representation should be made to the Government, through the Action Committee of the Cape Province Municipal Association, to peg the posit icr by preventing the influx of further native women and native families into the Western

Cape and to remove all native families from the area as soon as possible. On behalf of the TAC, Rogers formally stated that wits members wished to assure industrialists that they wished to co-operate with them in supplying the necessary migratory labour.065

The provincial body naturally supported the views of its regional advisory group, and the necessary approach was duly made to Pretoria. In response, the UAC requested from the CC full statistical data on the Peninsula's African population, and assurances of the Council's cooperation in administering the provisions of both Section 10 and the 1951 Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act, should the NAD decide to
implement the recommended policy for the Western Cape. Rogers undertook to supply the requested information, while the Native Affairs Committee resolved to remind the Department that the City Council was already implementing Section 10 to the best of its ability. The capacity of the state to contain the African influx remained limited, however, even under such optimal conditions as allegedly existed in the region. The following section discusses some of the factors which impeded policy implementation.

239
The 'Practical Difficulties' of Influx Control
Chapter 3 mentioned agreement between the Department of Native Affairs and the South African Railways at the beginning of 1948, regarding incorporation of the ticketsale restrictions under War Measure 81 of 1946 in the Railways and Harbours Regulation, Control and Movement Act of 1916. Due to the Railways chief legal officer's disapproval of this proposal,” the Department and the City Council had at first to be satisfied with a temporary solution, in terms of the War Measures Further Continuation Act of 1948, whereby the provisions of the War Measure were extended from the beginning of November.” The 1916 Act was thereafter amended in terms of the Railways and Harbours Acts Amendment Act of 1949, empowering the Railways administration to refuse to carry persons (or classes of persons) whose movements were restricted by any law.70 Chapter 3 discussed also the reluctance of magistrates and the Native Commissioner to repatriate 'illegals', immediately prior to the National Party's accession to power. Early in May 1948, the CC requested that the outgoing Mbombela train be utilised for this purpose, but the NAD was unwilling to commit itself prematurely to such a plan. Realising that considerably more than a couple of hundred Africans per annum would require repatriation, the Department pointed out in July that the detection of 'illegals' was hampered by the continued growth and proliferation of squatter-settlements, and rhetorically enquired what the municipality was doing in this regard.71

Although the Council had by the end of September 1948 successfully prosecuted 653 Africans for entering the urban area in contravention of Proclamation 105 of 1939, Cape Town's African population continued to increase.72 The CC's efforts were frustrated by the continued reluctance of the courts to issue repatriation-orders, and the Town Clerk complained that convicted offenders usually escaped with a fine, which amounted in effect to a 'tax on illegal entry'.73 The processing of a further 827 'illegals' through the courts by mid-1949 did nothing to solve the problem.4

These meetings with the Minister bore more immediate fruit in the form of a series of intensified squatter-raids. Sixty-nine 'illegals' were arrested when armed police and NAD officials descended on Windermere during October, and a further 157 were netted the following month in raids on squatter-camps in Bellville, Goodwood, Matroosfontein and Oakdale Estate. A third raid in eight months took place at the beginning of June 1949, when 191 Africans were arrested in a swoop on Elsies River. The victims of these operations were sentenced to fines ranging from ten shillings to five pounds, alternatively a period of imprisonment of from seven to twenty-one days with hard labour, for the crimes of entering the proclaimed area without a permit, failing to produce service contracts or togt licences on demand, or for failing to report for registration within twenty-four hours.5

It was, of course, easy enough to mount raids such as these, but the existing legislative and administrative framework did not facilitate the removal to the 'Territories' of 'illegals' convicted as a result. Bureaucratic and statutory stumbling-blocks in fact delayed the implementation of all aspects of the newly agreed-upon 'solution' to the local 'Native problem': influx control, the concentration of squatters in a central sifting-area; and the establishment of labour-bureaux.
It was decided in the first half of 1948 that the Mbombela train should no longer stop at the uncontrolled Bellville railway-station. This resulted in the sudden marked popularity of Paarl as an alighting-point for incoming Africans. The Bellville halt was consequently reinstituted in September, with provision for a one-hour delay during which CC inspectors would board the train to examine the passengers' papers. This too proved futile, for 'illegals' continued to detrain in the Boland, from where they easily made their way into the restricted area. Others continued to use alternative means of travel, such as lorries and motor-cars, in order to avoid the control measures. Matters were not helped by the emergence of a difficult-to-control black market in illegal transport, illicit permits and forged letters of appointment.  

242 Bellville municipality insisted that 'much stronger steps' should be taken to curb the continuing influx into its area of jurisdiction. This would necessitate the granting of powers of arrest to Cape Town City Council inspectors, who were (in terms of Government Notice 790 of 1946) responsible for administering the registration regulations throughout the whole proclaimed area of the Cape Peninsula. The City Council's Native Affairs Committee considered the inability to arrest offenders an 'absurd and illogical handicap' retarding efficient 'Native Administration', while local Africans were outspokenly opposed to the further entrenchment of the municipality's policing role. Bodies as disparate as the ultra-left NEUM's local Coordinating Unity Committee and the liberal SAIRR protested when the CC in January 1949 ratified the adoption of such powers. The action on this resolution was, however, suspended as more than one-third of Council members supported a 'notice to review and rescind', which was eventually passed at the end of August. 

Bellville municipality, on being informed of the City Council's continued timidity in this regard, suggested that the central government should confer police powers on Council officials under the 1917 Act which was eventually used for this purpose. Although the NAC resolved to support the suggestion during the first quarter of 1950, the necessary regulation was only issued in 1955. Meanwhile the CC, at the insistence of its Native Administration Department and Native Affairs Committee, continued to press the central government to 'repatriate' the growing number of 'illegals' in the Peninsula. The local press pointed to the example of the Witwatersrand, from which at least twelve and a half thousand Africans had been removed between September 1948 and May 1949. On Rogers' initiative, he and the local Native Commissioner met in early September with representatives of the Police and the Railways Police, to discuss 'various practical difficulties connected with the control of influx of Natives into the Cape Peninsula'. It was acknowledged at this meeting that the NAD was not in a position to effect deportations on a mass scale. The four parties seem moreover to have agreed that it would be preferable to restrict the flow of Natives to this area at the source by means of the authentification of documents ... and by the establishment of a system of labour bureaux as has been foreshadowed. In the meantime, there was no way of redistributing surplus labour turned away by the municipality, but the authorities were confident that 'illegals' could be sifted out once African squatters were moved into the controlled camps which had been agreed upon during the second half of 1948. The imposition of an effective system of control came a step nearer when a new set of standardised registration regulations, published under Government Notice 1032 in May 1949, was applied to the Cape Peninsula from the beginning of April 1950, in terms of Government Notice 527 of 10 March. This replaced Government Notice 790 of 1946. The CC was simultaneously empowered, under Proclamation 35 of 1950 (which replaced Proclamation 74 of 1946), to enforce these registration regulations in terms of Section 23 of the Urban Areas Act.  

243
These legislative developments had little immediate effect, for the 'controlled squatting' scheme and the labour bureau network were still in the planning stages. The influx remained virtually unimpeded, and the local Native Commissioner explained that his department was able only to order the removal from Cape Town of 'illegal' Africans under Section 14 'in appropriate circumstances ... and at least in selected cases where employers contravene sub-section 3 of section 12 of the Act by employing foreign Natives without permission'. A shortage of staff and prohibitive costs precluded the implementation of more effective measures, but the establishment of labour bureaux was expected to greatly reduce the number of 'illegals' requiring removal."

245 The municipal Native Administration Department announced in November 1950 that its officials would no longer retrospectively sanction 'illegal' employment in unpopular fields such as brickfields and dairies. It was felt that the practice of turning a blind eye to such transgressions had encouraged African workers to become more choosy about the type of work they were prepared to sign on for, and had fostered their unacceptable but growing propensity to change jobs until they found the position which was most to their liking."9 In an effort to further restrict freedom of choice with regard to employment, the Secretary for Native Affairs announced early in 1951 that the Urban Areas Act would be amended to provide for the issuing to Africans of entry permits stipulating the specific purpose for which entry was granted. He told the Chief Native Commissioner that this would enable the municipality 'to admit a Native conditionally to seek work in the Cape Town urban area'.90

The System of Labour Bureaux

Local Native Administration officials, impatiently awaiting the establishment of the 'controlled squatting' scheme and the labour bureau system which they hoped would together curb the ongoing influx of Africans, opposed the new policy of Urban Labour Preference even before it was promulgated. The City Council's Native Affairs Committee resolved in February 1952 to reject the proposed amendment to the Urban Areas Act, after hearing Rogers' unfavourable assessment or its full implications. Rogers portrayed the proposed amendment as a response to the situation in centres such as Johannesburg and Port Elizabeth, where local authorities had resisted accepting responsibility for the registration of service contracts under the Native Registration Regulations. Posel, incidentally, mistakenly assumes that local offices of the central NAD performed this function in all centres during the 1940s.4 In fact the Cape Town City Council began issuing service contracts in 1926."

Rogers pointed out that Section 27 of the Native Laws Amendment Bill amended Section 10 of the Urban Areas Act, to stipulate that no African man, woman or child could remain in any urban area for longer than 72 hours without local authority permission. As this could take the form of documents issued under the Registration Regulations, the City Council would not need to issue documents to the 31,500 Africans who already held service contracts and seek-work permits. The CC would, however, have to issue an additional 30,000 documents to females, juveniles and the approximately 9,000 exempted males (mainly registered voters). A further 10,000 permits would be required for Africans outside the municipal area."

The expense involved in the exercise of issuing such documents could probably be at least partly offset, Rogers advised, by the increased revenue which was expected to accrue from fines imposed for contraventions of the proposed new Section 10. (Johannesburg and Port Elizabeth local authorities, in contrast, were faced with the cost of issuing documents to their entire African populations).4 The CC requested that the application of Section 27 to its area of jurisdiction be suspended until April of the following year, and this was supported by the Cape Times.5 When the clearly out of touch Minister of Native Affairs Verwoerd saw a Cape Times report on the matter, he asked his departmental secretary
Eiselen whether this was the first time that the City Council was being forced to accept the responsibility of influx control." Brushing aside the CC's further pleas for a delay, Verwoerd instructed that body to 'take all possible steps in terms of that section and so ensure that further influx into the proclaimed area is effectively controlled.'

The local Native Commissioner expressed concern to his superior at the failure of the authorities to remove 'illegal' Africans. Although prosecutions under Section 10 in 1950 and 1951 had totalled 1,615 and 1,158 respectively, the magistrates concerned had failed to issue removal orders. The Native Commissioner's office itself had managed to effect only about twenty deportations during these two years, while Lip to 500 Africans per month were entering the Peninsula.

According to Rogers, the policy of the municipal Native Administration Department had 'always been to assist Langa residents to find employment'. A formally constituted 'Employment Bureau' had been operating in Langa since the beginning of 1945 at the latest. This office found jobs for almost 1,800 Africans during that year and in the first two months of 1946, mostly with the larger local firms, but also with government departments and private employers.

The Chief Native Commissioner was reminded that the NAD had agreed to remove 'illegals' 'in appropriate circumstances' in 1950, when it was hoped that the imminent establishment of labour bureaux would reduce the number of 'illegals' who would have to be removed. The Native Commissioner suggested 'the extensive use of the provisions of Section 14, if only for a few months'. This suggestion was not taken up, but the agreed-upon control-system was slowly taking definite shape. According to Rogers, the policy of the municipal Native Administration Department had 'always been to assist Langa residents to find employment'. A formally constituted 'Employment Bureau' had been operating in Langa since the beginning of 1945 at the latest. This office found jobs for almost 1,800 Africans during that year and in the first two months of 1946, mostly with the larger local firms, but also with government departments and private employers. The CC's employment office was able, for example, to channel surplus "Native" labour to the West Coast fishing industry during 1952. Control remained limited, however, due to the continuation of the seek-work permit system, the lack of rural-urban coordination and the failure of other local authorities to make use of the provision under Government Notice 1032 of May 1949 for the voluntary establishment of municipal labour bureaux.

A conference on the compulsory, coordinated national labour bureau system provided for under the Native Laws Amendment Act of 1952 was held at the Native Commissioner's office in September of that year. Here departmental officials and representatives of the CC, the CDC, Simon's Town municipality, the Durbanville and Kraaifontein Farmers' Association and the SAP agreed on the principle that local authorities should enforce influx control by means of the registration regulations, while the NAD would be responsible for removing 'surplus Natives'. Rogers was gratified that the growing numbers of 'illegals' would no longer be prosecuted needlessly and then set free to remain in the prescribed area. He and two of his senior municipal Native Administration officials stayed on after the conference for further discussions with their central government counterparts. Both sides agreed that, to gain control over the deteriorating situation, all influx control cases should be tried in the Native Commissioner's court. The municipality would have to enforce the regulations vigorously and the department would have to be prepared to send large numbers back home.

While the Torch condemned the NP mouthpiece, the Burner, for 'consistently publishing propaganda in favour of keeping Africans out of the Western Cape' in an attempt to create divisions among different legislatively-defined categories of 'Non-Europeans', the Daqbreek reported that industrialists were already beginning to replace African workers with 'Coloureds'. This tendency, which was ascribed to employers' fears of labour unrest among Africans, was supported by this newspaper as being in line with the state's policy of 'giving preference in the cities to 'civilised labour' - white and coloured'. Verwoerd was heartened at the news that industrialists were protecting their interests in this way, and he issued instructions that his department should take all possible steps to ensure that Africans rendered jobless as a result were returned to their tribal areas.

A regional labour bureau, covering the area as far east as Oudtshoorn and all the way north to Springbok in
Namaqualand, was established in the office of the local UAC at the beginning of 1953, in terms of Government Notice 66 of 9 January 1953. This measure removed Western Cape magisterial districts from the jurisdiction of the regional labour bureau which had recently been established in the office of the Chief Native Commissioner in King William's Town. 106 Government Notice 621 of 27 March 1953 gave the City Council powers and duties connected with the running of 'Native Labour Bureaux' in the Cape Peninsula. 107 The Council formally accepted these powers at the end of April 100 thereby undertaking to enforce draconian 'Regulations for the Establishment and Control of a Native Labour Bureau', published (in terms of the Native Labour Regulation Act, No. 15 of 1911) under Government Notice 2495 of 31 October 1952, and subsequently twice amended.110 Hindson shows that these regulations provided for the coordinated functioning of urban and rural labour bureaux, thus linking control over influx to urban areas with efflux control in the reserves. They also protected established urban Africans from competition by immigrants.111

Besides the above-mentioned regional and local labour bureaux, the new system provided for district labour bureaux, run by the NAD with a view to removing illegal Africans from prescribed to non-prescribed areas.112 The precise date on which Cape Town's local and district labour bureaux began to function remains unclear, but Rogers reported to a WCCLNA conference in October 1953 that the newly-instituted system was working satisfactorily.112 Despite Rogers' optimism, this system of harsh and racially-discriminatory regulation of labour soon proved ineffective. Its further refinement was, however (as will be shown in Chapter 7) postponed until early 1958, when seek-

work permits were abolished and service contracts incorporated locally into the reference books provided for under the Natives (Abolition of Passes and Coordination of Documents) Act of 1952.

The Weeding Out of 'Illegals'

Stemming the influx and removing 'illegals' proved far more difficult than anticipated. Rogers announced at the end of 1952 that the City Council was already issuing documents in terms of the new Native Laws Amendment Act, but was not contemplating any 'mass drive' against 'illegals', (although Africans without documents were clearly guilty of a criminal offence). 114 Swart reveals nevertheless that 'the onslaught against illegals began in earnest' at the beginning of the following year. She mentions a raid on Windermere by four hundred policemen early in January 1953, which resulted in 1,184 arrests and the destruction of ten thousand gallons of African beer.115 Apparently unaware of the extent to which local 'Native administrators' were hampered by a lack of funds and facilities, the impatient Secretary Eiselen in February 1953 instructed the local Native Commissioner to ascertain the extent to which the CC was implementing the new Section 10. The Council replied that, despite regular visits to squatter camps by its 'Native Inspectors' and those of other local authorities, 'illegal' Africans were still entering the Peninsula. Both men and women found without permits were being prosecuted, and African women were not being allowed into the area to join their husbands unless suitable accommodation was available.116 The Council's inspectors also continued routinely to visit workplaces in search of employees without service contracts.117

The Department's Native Commissioner, for his part, reported a 'fairly steady flow' of convictions under Section 10(4), and of removals under Section 14(1), since the recent decision that all contraventions of the Urban Areas Act would be tried in the Native Commissioner's court in Langa. Mainly because of a lack of staff, however, the City Council had 'not yet systematically applied the provisions of Section 10 to Native women already living in the Proclaimed Area'. Rogers and his lieutenants had, however, undertaken to initiate this process by issuing permits to African women working in government and municipal institutions.

The Native Commissioner warned that continually raiding squatter-camps to detect 'illegal' women would 'badly upset' local Africans, and would severely disrupt the work of the Commissioner's court. He counselled patience in this regard.
at least until most squatters had been removed into the Langa and Nyanga locations."

Bureaucratic obstacles to the implementation of regional policy had been sufficiently remedied by the end of 1953 for the police to begin a new attempt to enforce the letter of the law. Permits were demanded of beleagured Africans during intensive raids in all parts of the Peninsula during the last six weeks of that year. The Native Commissioner's court, which had dealt with approximately 750 contraventions of the Urban Areas Act since June, processed over four hundred cases per week after mid-November. Hundreds of Africans, convicted of not having valid seekwork permits, service contracts, tax receipts or marriage certificates, ended up being deported from the region.11

The burgeoning squatter-camps were a particular target of this onslaught. In what was described as the biggest raid in twelve months, eight hundred policemen, (augmented by municipal Native Administration Department staff under Chief Inspector DB Geddie), descended on Windermere on 1 December. More than two hundred 'illegals' were arrested and over four thousand gallons of sorghum beer destroyed in this particular operation, which was followed by a further two in the space of a fortnight, and by a fourth on Christmas Eve. 120

The raids continued into 1954. In February and March respectively, for example, the Langa 'bachelor' quarters and

255 the Blouvlei squatter camp were the targets of two such raids.121 A senior police officer claimed in mid-year that the main aim and effect of the periodic operations undertaken by the police in shanty-settlements such as Windermere, Cook's Bush and Marabastad was to prevent 'too many undesirable Natives from the rural areas from remaining in the municipal area without a permit'. Hundreds of 'illegals' were then still being arrested every week.122

Western Cape Urban Areas Commissioner (and 'Location Site' committee chairman) JC Van Schalkwyk confirmed at a meeting with representatives of employers' organisations and local authorities in mid-1954 that 'it was the point of view of his Department that the Western Province is the only field in which the Coloured man could make a living, and Native labour should only be introduced to augment such Coloured labour'. He disclosed that the Department intended repatriating recently-arrived Africans to ensure that they retained their land-rights in the Reserves.123

Verwoerd addressed the National Party's Cape congress that same month, supporting a resolution which demanded effective measures to discourage the growth of the settled African communities in the Western Cape; and revealing that he had requested municipalities such as Paar I and Stellenbosch to give preference, as far as Africans were concerned, to the employment of migrant labour.124

The CC had also been approached in this regard, and had assured the NAD of its continued cooperation in ensuring that 'Natives are not permitted to remain in the urban area unless their services are required here'.25 Africans born in neighbouring states were in October 1954 denied the right to change jobs in proclaimed urban areas,126 but the Council during the following month requested the suspension of proposed further restrictions on the employment of 'foreign Natives', in the light of the prevailing acute shortage of labour.127

Rogers' municipal staff had by that stage issued about five thousand permits to African women in the Peninsula, and in November a small number of women were removed to their 'last places of residence' in terms of Section 14, after conviction under Section 10(4). This set in motion an 'unprecedented rush' of women applying for permits. 12

The fact that many African women had been issued with permits allowed the authorities to initiate action against those who were 'illegal'. Those falling into this category began receiving notices ordering them to leave the Peninsula 'within periods varying from one month to one year'. In Windermere and Blouvlei, African women were reported to have 'hounded' for their permits.129

Life became even less secure for 'illegals' during the second half of the 1950s, as will be shown in Chapter 7's discussion of the further development of state policy. The
intervening chapter focuses on resistance during the early apartheid period with which the present chapter has been concerned.

4. NTS 6511 616/313S, Bellville Municipality memo on squatters, 18 Aug. 1948; ibid, notes for MNA re 26 Aug meeting with Bellville Municipality representatives, nd; ibid, notes of meeting between MNA and Bellville Municipality representatives, 26 Aug. 1948; ibid, notes of meeting between MNA and CDC representatives, 3 Sep. 1948.
5. NTS 6443 77/313R(1), NC to TC, 22 July, 1948; NTS 6511 616/313S, NC to SNA, 6 Aug. 1948.


34. Davenport, Modern History, 266; Kinkead-Weekes, 'Africans in Cape Town'
Commonwealth Studies, Collected Seminar Papers No. 37 (The
71. NTS 6443 77/313R(1) and GN 5/9, TC to Acting NC, 4 May, 1948; ibid, Acting NC to TC, 14 May, 1948, (with note to SNA); ibid, SNA to NC, 1 June, 1948; ibid, NC to TC, 2 July, 1948.
72. NTS 6511 616/313S, SNA to SAR and H general manager, 6 Nov. 1948; GN 5/9, Rogers to TC, 16 June, 1949. 73. NTS 6A43 77/313R(1), TC to NC, nd (reply to ibid, NC to TC, 22 July, 1948).
74. GN 5/9, PC to NC, 2 Sep. 1949. 75. Swart, 'Windermere', 66; Kinkead-Weekes, 'Influx Control and Squatter Control', 7-8; Torch, 29 Nov. 1948; Guardian, 2 Dec. 1948; Cape Times, 2 June, 1949; Guardian, 9 June, 1949. 76. NTS 6511 616/313(S), SNA to SAR and H general manager, 1 Sep. 1948; ibid, SAR and H general manager to SNA, 5 Oct. 1948; ibid, SNA to NC, 16 Oct. 1948; GN 5/9, NC to TC, 10 Jan. 1949; ibid, NC to TC, 12 Feb. 1949; ibid, MNA private sec to SNA, 21 May, 1949; ibid, SNA to MNA private sec, 28 May, 1949; ibid, Rogers to TC, 16 June, 1949; GN 5/9 and NTS 6443 77/313(R), TC to NC, 12 July, 1949.
77. Cape Arqus, 1 July, 1949; Cape Arqus, 1 July, 1949;
regional sec to Mayor; Torch, 21 Feb. 1949; ibid, SAIRR regional sec to Mayor, 22 Feb. 1949; ibid, NAC minutes, 13 May, 1949.

81. GN 5/12/1, CC minutes, 27 Jan. 1949; ibid, CC minutes, 30 June, 1949, item 13; Guardian, 7 July, 1949; Cape Argus, 30 Aug. 1949; Guardian, 1 Sep. 1949; Torch, 5 Sep. 1949. 82. GN 5/12/1, Dep TC to Bellville TC, 28 Jan. 1949; ibid, Bellville TC to SNA, 11 Nov. 1949. 83. GN 5/12/1, NC to TC, 25 Jan. 1950; ibid, NAC minutes, 10 Mar. 1950, item 4.

84. NTS 4527 616/313(1), TC to Acting NC, nd (4 May, 1948); GN 5/9, Rogers' report, nd (annexed to NAC minutes, 12 Aug. 1949); ibid, TC to NC, 2 Sep. 1949; ibid, Dep TC to NC, 10 Feb. 1950.


100. GN 19/7/1 v1, TAC minutes, 3 Oct. 1952, 1.

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101. This provision is mentioned in Hindson, Pass Controls, 63.

102. The establishment of a national system of labour bureaux is discussed in Hindson, Pass Controls, 63-4.


110. GN 6/11/3, NAC minutes, 6 Aug. 1953, item 8; ibid, CC minutes, 27 Aug. 1953; ibid, NAC minutes, 18 Sep. 1953, item 13.


6: DISUNITY AND INCREASING DESPERATION: RESISTANCE, 1948-54
The prewar origins and the subsequent development of schisms within the liberation movement during the segregation era were discussed above (Chapters 2 and 4). These divisions were shown to have centred on the Communist-dominated United Front, which was consequently weakened by continual attacks from left-wing 'non-collaborationists' and right-wing anti-communists. This factionalism intensified while regional policy crystallised (as discussed in the previous chapter) during the first few years of apartheid rule.

This chapter begins by outlining the continuing controversy over the issue of parliamentary 'Native Representation'. Against this background, the second section discusses some of the campaigns which characterised this period, and the third section focuses on attempts by scattered Africans in and around the Peninsula to resist forced removals. The concluding part of the chapter analyses political developments in Langa.

The Furore Over Parliamentary 'Native Representation'

270 The long-standing division within the local left over the question of participation in 'bogus institutions' deepened as the apartheid programme began to take shape, bedevilling any attempt at united resistance. Strategic differences were clearly outlined in a rare debate conducted under the auspices of the New Era Fellowship study-group in February 1950. Here the communist Provincial Council member Fred Carneson argued against elevating the boycott-tactic to a principle. Referring to Lenin's 'Left-Wing Communism - an Infantile Disorder', he reminded his audience that the Russian leader had supported a boycott of the Duma in 1905, but not in 1906. He declared that the tactic of boycotting separate representation and advisory bodies in South Africa had become outmoded, and that these institutions should be defended against capture by liberals or reactionaries. His detractors argued that it was not the Russian Duma (which was based on a limited but direct franchise) but the advisory Zemstvos which corresponded to the South African 'dummy institutions', and that the Bolsheviks had consistently boycotted the Zemstvos.1 As acrimony over the question of alleged 'collaborationism' intensified, supporters of Soya (the Sons - later Society - of Young Africa, the NEUM equivalent of the ANC's Youth League) broke up an ANC meeting in Simon's Town's Luyolo location in January 1952, vociferously condemning the ANC's participation in the system of Advisory Boards. Parliamentary Native Representative Sam Kahn was prevented by Soya militants from addressing a meeting in Langa during the following month. After Kahn and Carneson had been investigated by a parliamentary select committee, they were (in terms of the Suppression of Communism Act) expelled from their respective positions in May. They seem to have immediately begun campaigning for re-election, but this was not allowed by the authorities. Neither was it supported by all of their constituents. At a meeting in Langa in mid-June, for instance, Kahn and Carneson were prevented from speaking by Soya members who loudly objected to being addressed by 'collaborationists'.2

The All African Convention began organising a boycott of the by-election which would have to be held to fill Kahn's seat in Parliament. Meetings were held in various parts of the Peninsula, and United Party candidate AG Long was mercilessly heckled in Langa and in Kensington.4 The boycott-strategy was, however, specifically rejected in August by the annual conference of the Cape Western Advisory Boards and Vigilance Associations.4
This body went on to direct Brian Bunting's subsequent election-campaign, in which he pledged (if elected) to act as 'a voice of the Defiance Campaign in Parliament'.

Kingwill points to the irony of claims by Congress regional leaders Joseph Nkatlo and Lucas Phillips 'that the ANC had imposed a strict boycott of the election, in conformance

272 with the C1949] Program me of Actin", while such prominent colleagues as Ngwe'vela, Greenwood Ngclyana and John Mtini participated as members of a separate organisation.5

Bunting was elected in November 1952, despite the government's insistence that he would not be an acceptable 'Native Representative' (he was the Communist Party's former Cape District Committee chairman and was at that time the editor of the Guardian's successor, Advance).6 Bunting was unable to fulfil his election promise. He was in rapid succession prohibited from addressing meetings, charged with contravening the Suppression of Communism Act by becoming a Member of Parliament, and expelled from his newly-won position.7

Western Cape Africans were then deprived until April 1954 of the dubious advantage of having a white "Native Representative" in parliament. Unity Movement organisations such as the AAC and Soya campaigned in the interim for a boycott of any future 'Native Representative' elections. Banned ANC -egional president Johnson Ngwe'vela rejected this position, urging Africans to 'use every stick to fight against our oppressors, however small it might seem'.

The election of parliamentary Native Representatives in 1954 brought the issue of separate representation back into the spotlight. The banned trade unionist Ray Alexander was nominated as the leftist candidate for the Western Cape, although she was warned that she would be expelled from parliament if elected.8 She was rejected as a 'neo-liberal' at a Unity Movement meeting in Athlone during February, and a Torch editorial declared that 'insofar as she is a victim of fascist tyranny we are with her, but insofar as she is a candidate in an election to perpetuate part of the political machinery of fascist tyranny we are flatly against her, and she must be boycotted along with the others'.9

A meeting of the Cape Western Advisory Boards and Vigilance Associations decided, after a great deal of argument, to support her in the election, as she was the only candidate who stood for the right of Africans to represent themselves in parliament. This resolution apparently caused splits within both the Athlone and Nyanga Vigilance Associations.10

Alexander won the election, but she was prevented from taking her seat in parliament, in terms of the Suppression of Communism Amendment Act of 1954.12 An Advance correspondent pointed out that there had in fact been a substantial boycott of the election, with only slightly more than onethird of the 15,500 possible votes being cast. The newspaper was castigated for supporting Alexander's candidacy, as this was clearly a contravention of the ANC's 1949 decision (which had never been rescinded) to boycott elections which perpetuated the system of 'bogus representation'. This letter (reflecting a significant body of concerned opinion) closed by asking rhetorically whether the Advance editorial

274 staff wished to further the cause of the liberation movement, 'cr are you in truth anxious to reward the White 'professional friends' of the Africans for services rendered?", is

Len Lee-Warden of the South African Congress of Democrats, the 'white' progressive organisation formed in the wake of the Defiance Campaign, succeeded Alexander as 'Native Representative' for the Western Cape in December 1954. He had never been a member of the CF, and thus could not be prevented from taking his seat, which he occupied until the system was abolished in 1960.13 Standing against the same Liberal Party candidate who had opposed Alexander, the less well-known Lee-Warden won a significantly decreased majority c.f. votes. 14
As a result of the NEUM's insistence from the start that there could be no question of a united front with so-called 'collaborationists' (including the CF and the ANC), the two camps were soon conducting separate campaigns against the NF's barrage of repressive and discriminatory legislation. The following section traces these developments.

Defiance and its Detractors

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Despite their entrenched mutual antipathy, communist and non-collaborationist activists managed to work together for a brief period during the second half of 1948, on the Train Apartheid Resistance Committee. Kingwill shows that cooperation between these bitter political rivals soon ended with the resignation of the committee's CP members, 'on the grounds that they had lost faith in its leaders'. Both Lodge and Karon show that this was due to disagreement over tactics, with the communists insisting that actions in defiance of the new 'train apartheid' regulations should be initiated immediately by the available small groups of volunteers, while the NEUM members and others favoured patience, insisting that the Communists envisaged mere 'small-scale' 'token resistance'. Karon notes the exchange of mutual vilification, in terms of adventurism and 'shying away from action', which ensued.7 Karon says that the TARC had 'faded from the scene by the end of 1948', but in fact the depleted committee continued unsuccessfully to prepare for mass action during the following year. By the middle of 1950 it had apparently accepted segregated rail-transport as a fait accompli, and was throwing its remaining weight behind the Unity Movement's campaign against such discriminatory impending legislation as the Population Registration Bill, the Group Areas Bill and the Unlawful Organisations Bill.20

Meanwhile a separate and far more visible campaign against these measures by the CP and the ANC gathered momentum. About one thousand people assembled on the Grand Parade on May Day in 1950 in response to the call by these bodies for mass demonstrations throughout the country to demand the repeal of the Unlawful Organisations Bill. Six thousand people marched through the streets of Cape Town on the previous day (a Sunday) in protest against this anticommunist Bill and the segregatory Group Areas Bill.21 The Unlawful Organisations Bill was replaced by the more repressive Suppression of Communism Bill early in June. Its promulgation was marked locally by police baton-charging a demonstration outside Parliament on 14 June.22 The CP dissolved itself later that same month, prior to the promulgation of the Suppression of Communism Act in July.

Local communists supported the ANC's call for a Day of Mourning on 26 June, in protest against the killing of May Day demonstrators on the Rand. Kingwill says that this was 'about 50% successful', and mentions 'lack of co-operation from the NEUM', which condemned the stay-away as a 'farce' organised by 'quislings, collaborators and confused, hysterical...Eadventurists'. The next issue to deepen the feud between the two camps on the left was the proposed disenfranchisement of 'Coloureds' through the Separate Representation of Voters Bill. The NEUM predictably called for a boycott to make the separate representation of 'Coloureds' unworkable, while former CP members joined members of the ANC, the APO and the SAIC to form the Franchise Action Committee (later the Franchise Action Council). This new organisation, condemning the Unity Movement's position as 'negative' and 'defeatist', set about organising to prevent the passing of the disenfranchising legislation, and to demand 'the extension of the vote for South Africans of all races on an equal basis'.26 The Anti-Cad (which led the NEUM campaign on this issue) and the Franchise Action Council held meetings in various parts of the Peninsula to propagate their tactically-divergent views and to establish rival local committees.27 The deadly animosity which was generated in the process is evident for instance in the claim by the editor of the Torch that the Frac campaign was 'just a pre-election stunt' so that, after they have put up a 'glorious fight' they will try to get themselves elected to the House of Assembly, Provincial Council or Board for Coloured Affairs'.20
When a Frac conference in April 1951 resolved to initiate a stay-away to back up demands for the franchise, the NEUM argued that this was tantamount to 'debasing the political general strike', as the effect of such a move 'in the present state of organisational weakness is to open the door to the use of strike breakers of one race or colour.

278 Against stikers of another'. Karis points to the discrepancy between the NEUM's position on this issue and that which it had adopted with regard to the 'Train Apartheid' campaign in 1948.30 Karon shows that hecklers attempted to disrupt Frac area meetings, and that parents were urged not to allow school pupils to heed the strikecall 1.

Roux says that 'many thousands of African and Coloured workers stayed away from work' in Cape Town and Port Elizabeth in the general strike which ensued on 7 May. Karon suggests that 47 local factories 'were completely on strike', with partial attendance at many others. He says that 50-60% of 'Coloured school pupils observed the stayaway' and that '95% of shops in Coloured areas ... were closed'. While the Franchise Action Council hailed the success of the stayaway in the Cape Peninsula, Somerset West, Strand, Worcester, Paarl and Port Elizabeth, the Unity Movement denigrated the event as a 'fake political strike' in a relatively small number of factories, shops and primary schools'.32

The disenfranchisement of 'Coloureds' was in any event delayed by protracted constitutional wrangles in Parliament, and only took place in 1956. The issue of whether or not to boycott separate 'Coloured' elections was thus held in abeyance for five years. During this period the feud between the two camps on the left became even more intense.

Towards the end of 1951, the Anti-Cad decided to broaden the campaign for a boycott of separate 'Coloured' representation to include a boycott of the Group Areas machinery and of the Van Riebeeck Tercentenary Festival, which was to be held the following year.33 The Franchise Action Council had simultaneously, but apparently quite independently, called for a boycott of the official Van Riebeeck celebrations,4 and the ANC, the Langa Vigilance Association, the Cape African Teachers' Association (a NEUM affiliate) and Soya were among the bodies represented at a meeting concerned with the preliminary planning of the Van Riebeeck Festival boycott.5 The prospect of unity on this issue foundered due to the ironically-named Unity Movement's 'principled stand' on non-collaboration and its attitude towards the Defiance Campaign of 1952.

When the ANC and the South African Indian Congress first announced that they would mount a campaign in which unjust laws would be defied, a Torch editorial commented that the leaders of these organisations were merely 'trying to convince the Herrenvolk that they are not played out and can't be summarily retired without pension'.2 The ANC 'collaborators' were said to be beyond reform by the Youth League, and the militant youth was said to be going over to Soya. The Defiance Campaign was denounced as an adventuristic political stunt, which could not be seen as part of the struggle for democracy.27

Local preparations for the Defianee Campaign proceeded despite this torrent of condemnatory-n from a 'numerically unimpressive' (but no-nethel ess in fluent ial) sect ar ian minor ity, 3 with the Franchise Act-ion Council joining the ANC and the Indian Congress in planning demonstrative acts of passive resistance against discriminatory laws. Fiftyeight organisations from all parts of the Western Cape were represented at a conference convened by the Franchise Action Council in March, at which an unanimous decision to support the campaign was taken. This conference was opened by ANC secretary-general Walter Sisulu, with trade-unionist Oscar Mpetha acting as interpreter.

A Western Cape Co-ordinat ing C-ommittee, compr ising Frac, CPIA and regional Congress activists and chaired by Ngwevela, took charge of the ensuing mobil isation. Ten thousand people attended a mass meeting (organised by the Iccal ANC, the Cape Indian Congress and the Franchise Action Council) on the Grand Parade on 6 April 1952, to protest against the Van Riebeeck celebrations and show support for the Defiance Campaign.39

The Unity Movement remained adamant that this was not a struggle against 'Herrenvolkism', but against the National Party. ANC leaders were alleged to envisage the reinstatement of a United Party
government, which would guarantee them jobs.4" Passive resistance was said to be the reactionary and outmoded weapon of 'col laborators' bent on

improving their bargaining position, without principled unity or coherent planning."

While the ANC and its allies geared up for the Defiance Campaign, the Unity Movement and its affiliates went ahead with their campaign to boycott the Van Riebeeck Tercentenary Festival. This campaign was officially opened in January 1952. Meetings were held throughout the Peninsula during the first quarter of the year to drum up support for 'noncollaboration', and the boycott-campaign's climax was a demonstration of 5--6,000 people on the Grand Parade at the end of March.42 The boycottists' determination not to have anything to do with the Defiance Campaign partly accounts for the fact that it never progressed in Cape Town beyond the initial stage of law-breaking by limited numbers of volunteers. Cameron cites Tabata's claim that the 'Coloured people stayed out of the Defiance Campaign thanks to the AntiCad',4" and Soya exercised a similar influence over sections of the militant African youth.

Musson points additionally to tensions within the regional Co-ordinating Committee, apparently centering around its treasurer, the Frac leader Johnny Gomas. "Karon shows that Gomas was among those who were becoming increasingly alienated at that time by Frac's non-racial or ient at ion, demanding an exclusively-'Coloured' organisation.-s Division around such manifestations of

282 perfectly-understandable inverse racism, which (in the form of 'Pan-Africanism') would replace boycottism as the major line of cleavage within local resistance during the second half of the Fifties, spilled over into the Co-ordinating Committee. Kingwill refers to 'organisational and tactical problems, in part related to disagreement among leaders as to the role of Whites'. 4 The Defiance Campaign, while on the one hand transforming Congress into an 'embryonic mass movement', simultaneously evoked 'the beginning of systematic effort by the government to ban, prosecute and generally immobilize the ablest and most experienced leaders.‘’ In the regional context, the removal from the area of convicted resisters was at the beginning of October suggested at a meeting of the WCCLNA's Technical Advisory Committee, by its chairman Roger s.4 Rioting had occurred in Port Elizabeth's New Brighton location by the time that the ensuing resolution came up for discussion by the Cape Province Municipal Association executive. A telegram was despatched to the United Municipal Executive, requesting a meeting of officials from all four provincial Municipal Associations, as the 'present situation is critical in the extreme, not only in the Cape but throughout the country. Information indicates the presence, in a large number of centres, of agitators who are prepared to renew the New Brighton experience'.49

Before the meeting of the four provincial bodies took place on 19-20 November, unrest had spread to Johannesburg, Kimberley and East London, entailing hundreds of casualties (some forty fatal) and extensive damage to government buildings and churches. The Native Administration offices and three churches in Langa were subsequently torched in mid-December. Such hooliganism was denounced by the Congress leadership in Cape Town and in Port Elizabeth, while the organisation's national working committee called for discipline and non-violence in the face of provocation. Although there was no evidence to connect the resistance movement with the disturbances nor was violence at any time advocated by the resisters as a means of strugglel,51 the UME provincial executives' meeting took a very hard line against the Defiance Campaign, and called for stringent measures to prevent the recurrence of such dangerous agit at ion. 2 Pressures of this nature led to the drafting of the Public Safety Bill and the Criminal Laws Amendment Bill, providing respectively for the declaration of states of emergency during which laws could be suspended and the judicial process by-passed, and for three-year sentences for civil disobedience in protest against any statute.3 Before these measures became law, ANC president Albert Lutuli told a large gathering on the Grand Parade that we are co-operating with all democrats who have confidence in our policy and our tactics. The ANC,
the SAIC, the Coloured people and progressive Europeans are all marching forward towards democracy. With this goal in mind, it is the duty of all of us to strengthen our organisations and throw our full weight into the struggle. We must give money, time and care. If necessary, we must give our lives. We must join trade unions and other bodies, so that these smaller bodies can strengthen our national movement.

The apparently renamed regional 'Co-ordinating Committee of Peoples' Organisations' convened a special conference in February 1953, to discuss opposition to 'Swart's Bills' (as the proposed repressive laws were named, after Minister of Justice CR Swart). At this conference, representatives of local trade unions, political organisations and civic bodies were addressed by Dr Jack Simons, who said that the Bills would 'entrench the ruling class' and allow opposition only on the National Party's terms.

More than one thousand demonstrators subsequently marched past parliament in protest, after resolving to support the Congress Movement against fascism and to fight the Group Areas Act. This was the final act of the Defiance Campaign in the Western Cape. Lodge says that both the Cape and Transvaal provincial conferences of the ANC during that month resolved to follow Port Elizabeth's recent lead by organising stay-aways. Although this tactic was endorsed in principle by the national executive, its implementation was forestalled by the banning of leaders and by 'organisational confusion' due allegedly to the rapid growth in membership which resulted from the Defiance Campaign.'

ANC and trade union representatives at a rally on the Grand Parade on May Day in 1953 declared their 'solidarity with all workers struggling for freedom and the full value of their labour', and called for support for the democratic trade union movement and the national liberation organisations. A conference convened by the Co-ordinating Committee was attended later that same month by representatives of seven trade unions and eleven ANC branches, as well as a number of other bodies (including one ratepayers' association). This conference resolved to develop the unity of Africans, 'Coloureds' and Indians in the Western Cape.

Karon says this was to be achieved through the formation of a federal body of progressive organisations', but he reveals that the Co-ordinating Committee had folded by mid-1953, despite good attendance at 'mass meetings on the Group Areas Act and the Coloured Franchise in June and July'. He details the formation in September of the South African Coloured Peoples' Organisation (later renamed the Coloured Peoples' Congress), without mentioning the Unity Movement's knee-jerk condemnation of the new organisation as the 'fraudulent and sectional' reincarnation of Frac.'

Increased repression in the wake of the Defiance Campaign resulted in a definite decline in local political activity.61 Thousands did, however, gather on the Grand Parade early in December, to be addressed by banned leaders such as Ngwevela (whose appeal against his banning made the occasion possible) and the former Native Representatives Kahn, Carneson and Bunting.2 ANC branches throughout the region held meetings to protest against greatly-intensified police action against 'illegals' (including armed incursions into squatter camps) then taking place. People were urged to join the ANC and to take an active role in the struggle against unjust laws.

The Congress of Democrats joined with the ANC, the SAIC and Sacpo to form the Congress Alliance, which decided in March 1954 to hold a Congress of the People at which a Freedom Charter for the people of South Africa would be framed.4 The Unity Movement opposed the idea from its inception, commenting that the 'political exhibitionists' of the Congresses were planning a 'new political escapade'.

The annual conference of CWABVVA, on the other hand, passed a resolution supporting the call for a Congress of the People, and demanding the abolition of the Natives (Urban Areas) Act. Gf
The divisive campaign for the Congress of the People is discussed in Chapter 8. The remaining two sections of the present chapter focus respectively on broader opposition to forced removals and influx controls in the region, and on the complexities of local location-politics, particularly the politics of Advisory Boards and Vigilance Committees.

Agitation Against Removals and Influx Controls

Against this background of factionalism and disunity, Africans in the Western Cape attempted to organise against the implementation of the increasingly repressive policy of the state. Opposition to the emerging housing policy, the removal of squatter communities and the tightening of influx control was predictably divided from the outset.

Following the appointment by Parow municipality of two officials to oversee the demolition of unauthorised structures, Goodwood municipality towards the end of 1948 conducted a survey of its African workforce, and ordered illegal squatters to demolish their shacks and leave the area. Soon the Goodwood-Vasco Ratepayers' and Vigilance Association was protesting against the demolition of shacks at Goodwood Acres. AAC leader Isaac Tabata called for 'Non-European unity' at a meeting of Africans and 'Coloureds' in Vasco, at which this association declared that large-scale resistance would be mounted. The necessity for such action fell away, as mass squatter-clearance operations in the northern areas were (as mentioned in Chapter 5) delayed for another four years. The CC had at the end of May 1948 rejected the Secretary for Health's suggestion that site and service schemes were the solution to the growing housing problem. The Council declared that it would 'direct all its energies and funds towards the speediest possible provision of permanent housing', and persevered with attempts to lower the cost of such accommodation. Its boffins came up with an asbestos hut which would cost a mere one hundred pounds to produce - without floors, water, lights or toilet facilities. The City Engineer proposed to erect hundreds of these shelters in '0 Town' (now Kew Town) and Retreat, but there were realistic fears of creating a 'second Windermere'.

These efforts on the part of the City Council were roundly condemned as 'extending and legalising the pondokkie system' at a conference of Western Cape Advisory Boards, Vigilance Associations and other African organisations. This conference elected a delegation to see the Minister of Native Affairs and put to him the popular view that the shortage of housing could best be solved by paying workers a 'living wage'. A proposed housing levy on employers of Africans was dismissed, as it would place people in this category at a disadvantage in the labour market. The Langa AB, as the only constitutional channel of communication between the CC and local Africans, protested against the demolition of shanties in Windermere and Blaauwveli during the second half of 1950. It was pointed out that, in the absence of alternative accommodation, such action was bound to have repercussions on the already depressing situation in Langa. Due to the complexity of the position in the Peninsula, however, more rural outlying areas constituted the main focus of action against 'illegal' communities in the early 1950s. Worcester municipality turned its attention at the end of 1950 to the growing number of squatters in that area, ordering 'Coloureds' and Africans to move into separate controlled squatter camps. 72 Karon refers to a march by 1,200 residents through the streets of Worcester, in protest against removal to these camps, during the week prior to the Frac general strike of 7 May 1951. This squatter-protest was organised by Frac and the Congress-aligned Worcester United Action Committee. 73 Paarl and Huguenot delegates at a CWABVA conference in Langa during June 1951 reported that Africans in those areas had been ordered to demolish their shacks and re-erect them on land set aside for that purpose. Africans living on private land in Stellenbosch, raafontein and Firgrove were also reported to have received eviction orders, but in their cases no provision was made for alternative accommodation. The conference adopted a resolution calling on the authorities not to evict people...
from their homes unless accommodation, transport and financial compensation were provided. Letters were despatched to the local authorities and to the Secretary for Native Affairs.

The CWABVA executive committee, the Elsies River Vigilance Association and the Franchise Action Council protested in August and September against demolitions without the provision of alternative accommodation in Kraaifontein, Sir Lowry's Pass and Elsies River. Frac apparently decided to form an affiliated squatters' association, but nothing seems to have come of this idea. The struggle against removals continued in Worcester, where another small victory was won when a landowner on trial for allowing squatting on his land was acquitted, as the municipality was unable to prove that the shacks in question had been built before the promulgation of squatter control regulations in May 1950. An estimated two thousand squatters marched through Worcester in October 1951, to protest against the application of the Prohibition of Illegal Squatting Act, under which they were to be moved out of town into the above-mentioned controlled and segregated camps.

Stellenbosch Divisional Council continued to threaten squatters at Sir Lowry's Pass village, and the CWABVA continued to defend them. In Paarl, five hundred African families and three hundred 'single' migrant workers refused to move into the Langabuya emergency camp. The case of thirty of these people who were charged under the Natives (Urban Areas) Act was successfully defended by Sam Kahn, establishing the principle that local authorities were not entitled (under this Act) to move Africans from their homes without providing alternative accommodation.

Shacks on farms in the Paarl area were then bulldozed in terms of the Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act, which made no mention of such niceties. The bulldozer and its police escort were forced to retreat on one occasion early in June, when their path was blocked by a particularly determined crowd. Almost one thousand Africans marched down the main street of Paarl on that day, to protest outside the magistrate's court.

The demolitions continued, and many people were left sleeping in the open in mid-winter, both in Langabuya and on outlying farms. The regional Congress and the African Food and Canning Workers' Union mounted protests, and a deputation of 28 women was taken by Carneson to see Secretary for Native Affairs Eiselen. They were bluntly told that 'one of the objects of getting all the people into one camp was to screen them and to send the surplus African labour back to the Reserves.' The Textile Workers Industrial Union and the African Textile Workers Industrial Union collected money during the following month for those who remained without shelter, and towards the end of the year it was reported that Africans in Paarl were still being 'hounded day and night'.

Chapter 5 mentioned the stepped-up pressure on 'illegals' in the Peninsula from the beginning of 1953. The Cape Times published a resolution passed by an emergency meeting in January of the regional Congress executive, protesting against the intensified police raids on Windermere. The Langabrand called a public protest-morning when the onslaught against 'illegals' spread beyond the squatter camps towards the end of that year.

Blcuvlei residents resolved not to flee when raided, but to face arrest together; while threatened squatters in Cook's Bush formed a local branch of Congress, although they had previously resisted taking such a step. ANC branches throughout the Western Cape held meetings to protest against the ongoing intimidatory raids and indiscriminate arrests. Communities suffering under these measures were called upon to join organisations fighting against the unjust laws of the racist system.

The Elsies River Vigilance Committee appealed to the Commissioner of Police in mid-1954 to investigate police action in Marabastad, which had (according to the local branch of Congress) become a training-ground where raw police recruits could polish brutal tactics. The annual conference of the CWABVA resolved in July to send a deputation to the inter-departmental Location Site Committee to argue against the proposed removal of thousands of families from their homes.
After a meeting organised jointly by the ANC, Sacpo and the COD towards the end of that year, hundreds of squatters in Kraaifontein marched behind their elected committee to demand the rescinding of demolition orders issued by Paarl Divisional Council. A group of prominent citizens of Cape Town, including Molteni, Bishop Lavis and Dr Wollheim, as well as 'Native Representative' Lee-Warden and COD leader Ben Turok, came out in their support. Six hundred established residents of Paarl, including a number of whites, signed a petition urging the Paarl DC to desist." One year later it was reported that scores of homes in Kraaifontein were being demolished under the provisions of the 1919 Public Health Act.

Chapter 5 mentioned a deputation of Blouvlei women (led by Dora Tamana of the ANC and accompanied by Turok), which protested to Rogers at the end of 1954, against notices ordering them to leave the Peninsula. Turok and George Peake of Sacpo were among the speakers at a regional conference convened by the ANC in January 1955 to discuss the threatened removal of African women. This conference elected an action committee to take the lead on this issue, and demanded the immediate repeal of the Urban Areas Act.

Delegates at the annual conference of the regional Congress during that same month re-elected the banned Ngwevela and Ngwenya as president and vice president respectively, with Oscar Mpetha as secretary and Greenwood Ngotyana as his assistant. Shortly after this conference, militant women at a Sunday afternoon meeting on the Grand Parade expressed their determination to oppose the system of influx control. Here Langa leader Annie Silinga declared that for threatened Africans, 'protection lies in the card we get from the ANC'. It was argued that the Western Cape removal scheme was more cruel than the projected clearance of Africans from the Western Areas of Johannesburg, as the victims here would be removed from any means of survival."

Resisting the Johannesburg Western Areas removal-plan was one of the three major campaigns then pre-occupying the ANC national leadership (the other two being the aforementioned Congress of the People campaign and the Bantu Education boycott). Cameron has analysed the failure of the latter in this regard the 'countervailing pressure' of two Unity Movement-affiliated educational organisations, the Cape African Teachers' Association and the Teachers' League of South Africa.

Chapter 7 outlines the further extension of racial control during the second half of the 1950s, and Chapter 8 analyses the Congress of the People campaign and subsequent developments which challenged the system. The concluding section of the present chapter concentrates again on the formal political process conducted in Langa location through the Advisory Board and the Vigilance Committee.

Further Developments in Langa Location

The discussion above (Chapter 4) on the role played by the Communist Party, through the Vigilance Committee, in the Langa Advisory Board during the 1940s ended with a shortlived adjournment of the AB in February 1947, in protest against the routine dismissal of its representatives. This was followed in March by anti-beerhall agitation which ended in a major riot. The Advisory Board then adjourned for a second time in October.

The burning down of the municipal dining-hall during the March 1947 riot deprived the City Council of an important source of income. Convinced by Rogers that this 'would probably never have occurred had not a meeting of residents held under the auspices of the Communist Party and composed of persons antagonistic to the Council's Dining Hall scheme been addressed by certain Europeans', the Native Affairs Committee pushed for more effective control over entry to the location through an amendment to Langa Location Regulation 24. 1 The issue of restricting entry to Langa soon become interlinked with even more contentious proposals to increase both location-rentals and the powers of municipal officials.
Under pressure from the local Joint Council of Ratepayers' and Civic Associations and the National Housing and Planning Commission, which argued respectively that the cost of housing Africans should not be subsidised by ratepayers or by the central authorities, the NAC urged the Council to raise rents in Langa to ‘economic’ levels. To cap it all, the Committee recommended the conferring of powers of arrest on the municipal inspectors responsible for administering the Registration Regulations whereby ‘illegal’ Africans were detected.

The municipal legal adviser suggested that the easiest way to prevent the entry into Langa of ‘persons whose speeches at public meetings which they convene there are supposed upon reasonable grounds to be likely to have an inflammatory affect upon the natives who listen to them’, would be to withdraw the qualifications mentioned in the regulation, thus simply requiring all visitors to report to the Superintendant’s office. Is Councillor Kahn, who evidently considered the proposed amendment unenforceable, spoke at a protest meeting in Langa, convened by the local branch of the Communist Party, which attracted over one thousand people.

These proposals threatened not only political but also religious freedom, and the Cape Peninsula InterDenominational African Minister's Association said that it would be a ‘downright insult’ to make church-attendance by Africans subject to regulation by the municipal ity.' Although there is no record that this was the case, senior CC officials may well have taken the view (expressed in a Bellville municipality memorandum on squatting) that African church services were ‘usually nothing but Communist propaganda.’ A deputation of African ministers put their uncompromising point of view to the Deputy Mayor and eventually to the Native Affairs Committee.

The Advisory Board abandoned its adjournment in the face of these threats, while the conservative self-styled Vigilance Committee (mentioned in Chapter 4) deplored the CP’s control of the AB through the established rival VC. The minority of nominated AB members had become so obstructive by this stage that the elected majority took independent action in requesting that the NAC meet with a widely-representative deputation, to hear arguments against restricting entry to Langa, and against Council officials being given police powers.

The NAC was confronted in August 1948 by an AB deputation, accompanied by Kotane and Nkatl, and mandated not only by the AB, VA and Parents' Association, but also by the ANC, the CP, the Cape African Voters' Association, the Stevedores and Dockworkers' Union, the Western Province Bantu Teachers' League, and even the Western Province Bantu Rugby Union and two tribalist groupings, the Chiefs Entertainment Committee and the Moshoeshoe Memorial Association. This deputation presented to the NAC a memorandum which warned that the ‘general unrest of the oppressed classes evident in every country in the world is not due to outside or “foreign” influence but from a desire to throw off the yoke which has kept them down for so many centuries’. Trying to ban political leaders from Langa by turning the location into a ‘concentration camp’ would, the memorandum argued, certainly not ease existing tensions, while an increase in rentals would merely make paupers of low-wage and unemployed people who had already paid many times the cost of the hovels they occupied. The memorandum of protest thirdly denounced the proposal that Council inspectors should be given powers of arrest, as further evidence of the intention of the authorities to introduce a full-blown pass system in the Peninsula. The outcome of this local campaign against the intensification of racial repression was hardly decisive. Regulation 24 was in any event withdrawn later that year, on the recommendation of a special committee appointed by the Council to look into the three matters. This followed a second report from the legal adviser conceding that other regulations actually provided adequate control over the entry of politically-undesirable
individuals. As for the question of rentals, the Council settled at the beginning of 1949 for a lower increase than initially envisaged, but made good the shortfall with a further adjustment later that year. The third issue was the most controversial and the hardest-fought, and it was only in mid-1955 that municipal Native Administration Branch officials were made ‘Peace Officers’ (with the long-desired powers of arrest), under an amendment to the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act of 1917.

The Advisory Board adjourned again in November 1948, protesting against the replacement of its secretary (Mr KV Ntshona) by WB Lubelwana, a member of the conservative alternative Vigilance Committee. The AB demanded also the abolition of the system whereby the CC nominated a proportion of Board members, and the dismissal of Reverend Fort from the position of Board chairman to which he had been re-elected against the expressed wishes of the members. The demand for direct representation at least on the Native Affairs Committee of the Council was repeatedly reiterated.

Three out of four communist nominees were elected to the Advisory Board in the annual elections at the end of 104e, and the Board resolved in March of the following year to debar Rogers from its meetings. Rogers' unwelcome attendance remained a sore point during the first half of 1950. Call Ling for his replacement by someone more sympathetic, Board members decided to adjourn again in July, after handing in a memorandum of complaints even more detailed and specific than its predecessor."

An AB deputation, led by Kahn, interviewed the Minister of Native Affairs early in 1951, to raise at the highest level the issues of Rogers' presence at their meetings, and of Langa residents’ inability to bear another proposed rent increase." This meeting, which was scornfully denounced from the Unity Movement camp, proved in any event to be fruitless. The rent increase was gazetted in March, as was an amendment to the Langa Native Location and Advisory Board regulations, giving the Location Superintendent the formal right to attend meetings of the Advisory Board."

Four dissident members of the Board, including the three City Council nominees, called in mid-1951 for the opening of a channel of communication outside of the nonfunctioning Board, which was then still being boycotted by the 'irresponsible' majority of its members. Nothing much seems to have come of this initiative." When the CC's tardy response to the Board's latest memorandum of complaints was eventually received towards the end of that year, married quarters representatives Ngwevela and Stuurman regretted that not one complaint had been favourably received. It was agreed that the AB as then constituted was 'absolutely undesirable', and should be replaced by a 'responsible body with real administrative powers and executive authority'. The nominated members continued to criticise behind-the-scenes manipulation by the VC, but the NAC expected the problem to be eliminated by a new set of location-regulation guidelines on which the government was then working.

The AB went into a decided decline after the resignation of Ngwevela and Stuurman at the beginning of the following year. Their conservative opponents would not be given a free hand, however, for the Congress’ Langa branch chairman W Zihlangu was elected to the Board at this time. He seems to have adopted rather a low profile though, and the only immediately-apparent signs of life within the Advisory Board and the Vigilance Association during 1952 came from the Women’s Section of the latter body.” Rogers reported a 'very poor' response to the Advisory Board elections at the end of that and the following year. No less than six by-elections had consequently to be held in the first half of 1954 to bring the AB up to strength. None excited much interest among the residents. Rogers judged this an opportune time to resurrect the issue of municipal beer-brewing. His role in sparking-off the 1947 beerhall riot was noted in Chapter 4, but Rogers (along with the District Commissioner of Police) remained convinced that municipal brewing was necessary to counteract the illicit beer-trade. The NAC recommended the institution of such a system in March 1954, persuaded by Rogers that this would require capital investment of a mere 300 pounds to supplement the existing steam-cooking plant at the Main Barracks dining-hall, and could co-exist quite happily with the customary practice of home-brewing. The City Council agreed at the end of April.
A public meeting convened by the Langa branch of the ANC reminded the Council that it was legally obliged to consult the AB before taking any such decision. This was backed up by further protests registered at a VC public meeting and at an ANC regional conference. Every church in the location expressed its opposition, as did the Liberal Party, the National Council of Women, the South African Temperance Alliance and the African Textile Workers' Industrial Union. The conservative Garcia Nongauza and a Barracks representative who had been the sole nomination in the most recent by-election were the only dissenters when the AB resolved early in June to oppose the City Council's plan. Over one thousand Langa residents attended an ANC protest meeting later that month, which was addressed not only by COD and LP members, but also by a speaker from the UP. The annual conference of the CWABVA, after re-electing to office both its banned chairman Ngwevela and its secretary Ngotyana, expressed uncompromising opposition to the proposed beerhall. The NAC beat a tactical retreat in July, advising the CC to bow to 'general public opinion' and abandon the beerhall plan. This the Council did in July, 30 but the issue did not remain dormant for long. Rogers and committee chairman Councillor RF Henry convinced the NAC at the end of 1956 that the rapid growth of Langa's 'bachelor' population had created an entirely new situation in which municipal brewing was imperative. Following protests from the Temperance Alliance and a meeting of church-ministers, the CC ruled that the NAC should ascertain the views of Langa residents by means of a referendum, before proceeding with its resuscitated plan to build a beerhall. This was opposed by Rogers, who claimed that polling the residents could spark off a riot. He pointed instead to the example of Paarl, where the municipality had resolved to establish the Western Cape's first beerhall without reference to the views of location residents (other than a largely-nominated AB). The Paarl facility opened in 1959, but the CC waited until the harsh repression of the early 1960s had broken the back of resistance before proceeding further with the beerhall scheme. This will be discussed in Chapter 9. The development of state policy, and of anti-apartheid politics, during the second half of the 1950s must first be considered in the two intervening chapters.

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104. GN 9/4/1/4, memo presented to NAC by representatives of various African organisations, 16 Aug. 1948 (appendix 14c to NAC minutes 17 Sep. 48).
107. GN 5/12/1, SNA to Chief NC, 3 June, 1953; ibid, NC to TC, 21 Apr. 1954; ibid, NAC minutes, 20 July, 1955, item 22. 108. GN 9/19/2 vi and v2, AS memo to CC, 19 Apr. 1949 (annexure 7 to NAC minutes, 10 June, 1949); Guardian, 22 Sep. 1949; GN 9/19/2 v2, AD minutes, 11 Oct. 1949; Guardian, 22 Oct. 1949.
111. GN 9/4/2/4, NAC minutes, 15 Feb. 1950, item 3; ibid, NAC minutes, 24 Feb. 1950, item 1; ibid, NAC report, nd, S (in CC minutes, 30 Mar. 1950; ibid, AD minutes, 18 Apr. 1950, item 2 (in NAC minutes, 12 May, 1950); GN 9/19/2 v1, AB memo, 17 Oct. 1950 (annexed to NAC minutes, 8 Dec. 1950); Guardian, 19 Oct. 1950.
116. GN 9/4/2/5, AB minutes, 18 Dec. 1951 (in NAC minutes, 7 Feb. 1952); ibid, NAC minutes, 3 July, 1952, item 3. 117. GN 9/19/1/7, Rogers to TC, 25 Feb. 1952. 118. GN 9/19/1/18, Rogers' report, 4 Feb. 1953 (in NAC minutes, 5 Mar. 1953, item 14); Advance, 26 Nov. 1953. 119. BAAB 164, Mrs D Mapila to TC, 22 Aug. 1952; ibid, TC to Mrs Mapila, 26 Aug. 1952; ibid, TC to Mrs Mapila, 8 Oct. 1952.
120. GN 9/19/1/18, Rogers to TC, 4 Feb. 1953; GN 9/19/1/19, Rogers to TC, 4 Jan. 1954.
121. GN 9/19/1/19, Rogers to TC, 29 Jan. 1954; ibid, Rogers to TC, 3 Mar. 1954; ibid, Rogers to TC, 25 Mar. 1954; ibid, Rogers to TC, 12 Apr. 1954; ibid, Rogers to TC, 24 May, 1954; ibid, Rogers to TC, 8 June, 1954, 122. Guardian, 13 July, 1950.
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123. GN 14/8/3 v1, Rogers to NAC, 27 Feb. 1954 (annexure 8 to NAC minutes, 4 Mar. 1954); ibid, NAC minutes, 4 Mar. 1954, item 8; ibid, Rogers to NAC, 8 Mar. 1954; ibid, NAC special meeting minutes, 11 Mar. 1954. 124. Advance, 13 May, 1954.
127. GN 14/8/3 v1, AB minutes, 8 June, 1954; GN 9/19/1/19, Rogers to TC, 12 Apr. 1954.
130. GN 14/8/3 v1, NAC minutes, 22 July, 1954. 131. GN 14/8/3 v1, NAC minutes, 6 Dec. 1956, item 7; ibid, NAC minutes, 11 Dec. 1956.
132. GN 14/16, SA Temperance Alliance sec to TC, 14 Dec. 1956; ibid, Ministers' meeting chairman J Ndaliso to TC, 19 Dec. 1956; GN 14/8/3 v1, CC minutes, 31 Jan. 1957, item 9. 133. GN 14/8/3 v1, NAC minutes, 7 Feb. 1957, item 24; ibid, Rogers to TC, 27 Feb. 1957; ibid, Rogers to NAC chair, 20 May, 1957. 134. GN 19/7/1 v1, TAC minutes, 12 June, 1959, 1.

7: COMPROMISE AND CONTROL, 1955-59
Propagation of 'Coloured Labour Preference' as the
solution to the social and political problems of the Western Cape was discussed in previous chapters. The present chapter focusses on the period in which CLP first became the official policy of the National Party regime.

In an address to the Sabra annual conference in January 1955, Secretary for Native Affairs Eiselen explained that NP policy for the Western Cape envisaged the ultimate elimination of ‘Natives’ from the region, which he termed the natural Lebensraum’ of the ‘Coloureds’. The removal of Africans would, he insisted, be a gradual process, so as to cause minimal economic disruption. At the same time he suggested, echoing Olivier's earlier contention (above, p234), that certain industries in the region were not only overly dependent on African labour but also had no valid economic 'reason for existence there owing to environment'. Such enterprises could, he argued, equally well be established in other areas, where they would not contribute to 'the great social, and later economic, evils flowing from a mixing of Coloured and Native'.

The one thing missing in Eiselen's circumspect presentation to the Sabra conference is any explicit reference to the grave political dangers which Olivier had earlier attributed to the growing African presence in the Western Cape. In a revealing parliamentary declaration that month, Verwoerd emphasised the political rationale underlying the newly-declared regional policy. He warned that Cape Town was ‘in the greatest danger of being dominated by the black stream’, and insisted that the Western province is the area where the application, in its preliminary stages, of the policy of apartheid in regard to the Bantu is the easiest ... certain steps can be taken here, and taken speedily, steps which show what our aims are.2

But Verwoerd's aims were not exactly those of Eiselen. Posel points out that there was no suggestion of sacrificing economic objectives for political considerations in the Minister's pronouncement, which was entirely in line with the broader and economically rational policy of Urban Labour Preference.3 Thus although Eiselen's announcement had evoked a 'storm of criticism ... on economic grounds' from employers' associations and opposition parties,4 both Pose! and Van der Westhuizen show that the interests of employers were never in fact subordinated to ideological considerations in the application of Coloured Labour Preference.5 The ruling National Party was actually quite prepared to compromise on this issue, and capitalists adapted happily to the policy actually implemented in the

region, which was a very watered-down version of the Sabra/ WCCLNA prescription.

The Cabinet's refusal to implement the politically and economically costly alleged "'positive" aspects of "separate development'" and CLP created a well-documented deepening rift between Sabra and the party hierarchy. These differences arose from the NP's recognition that 'white' South Africans would not readily relinquish traditional exploitative privileges.7

Three issues proved especially contentious: the failure to effectively control the urban influx of Africans, the Cabinet's refusal to develop the 'Native reserves' as recommended by the Tomlinson Commission (on which Sabra leaders played a vital role), and its insistence on a hardline segregationist policy towards the 'Coloured' community.0 By 1961, Verwoerd had purged WCCLNA leader Olivier and his followers not only from the party and the elite Broederbbond secret society, but also from Sabra itself,1 and had embarked on a policy of naked repression, with little concern even for the racist 'justice' of the part it ionists.

The first part of this chapter stresses the rationality of regional policy and its compatibility with employers' interests, while the remaining sections discuss various aspects of state policy towards local Africans during the

second half of the 1950s: influx control, squatter control, and the development of the new Guguletu location.

Capitalists and Coloured Labour Preference
Although Eiselen's January 1955 speech was greeted with vehement criticism by employers, an assurance from Verwoerd that there would merely be 'differentiation between married and single migratory labour, and an adequate supply of the latter, until such time as other (Coloured) labour is available, will not be endangered' was sufficient to mollify the anxieties of organised industry, commerce and agriculture.10 The Minister told the Cape Chamber of Industries that Eiselen's speech should not be construed as a statement of official policy."

The bottom-line for organised employers, as the CCI director told Verwoerd, was that certain occupational categories would always require 'Native' labour, in some cases of a settled rather than migrant nature.12 This was clearly no problem for Verwoerd, and employers were sufficiently appeased by March 1955 to necessitate the cancellation of a meeting which the City Council (at the behest of the 'liberal' wing of its Native Affairs Committee) convened to discuss Eiselen's pronouncement. The Afrikaanse Sakekamer and the Master Builders' Association failed to respond to the Town Clerk's invitation, while the Cape Chamber of Industries and the South African Agricultural Union felt that such a meeting was inappropriate in view of assurances they had received through direct communication with the Minister.13

There was no rigid insistence, in practice, on the exclusive employment of 'Coloured' or migrant African labour in the Western Cape. As a Native Affairs Department official told local government representatives in 1959, the essential innovation introduced by the National Party in respect of regional labour policy was the curtailment of the practice whereby employers were able to select African workers at the factory gates. In terms of the new policy, such workers had to be chosen (through the newly-established network of labour bureaux) from among the legal residents of the local authority's African location, and 'a percentage had to be migratory as it would be quite impossible to house all natives on a family basis.'4 This was very much in line with the national policy of Urban Labour Preference.

The refined system of control was introduced at the beginning of 1958. Employers expressed reservations at the end of that year, through the renamed and now formally recognised Labour Consultative Committee (formerly the Labour Co-ordinating Committee mentioned in Chapter 5). Difficulties being experienced with the stricter control-

system were discussed behind closed doors at this body's mid-December annual conference, which was attended by representatives of both central and local government. The local pool of 'Native' labour had dried up by that stage, and the brick-making and quarrying sector in particular was experiencing difficulties in procuring workers when needed at short notice. A spokesman for the Western Province Brick and Clay Manufacturers' Association moreover told the Urban Areas Commissioner that whereas before the stringent application of influx control a native who refused to work could easily be replaced, the native now knows that the employers' hands are tied and that labour cannot be replaced without a considerable time lag and expense. 15

Officials from the NAD and from local authorities similarly attended a special meeting of the LCC in March 1959. The department's Assistant Director of Native Labour was urged at this meeting to allow a pool of approximately one thousand unemployed 'Natives' to develop again, and also if possible to permit workseekers to approach employers directly. Assistant Director Van Rensburg insisted that there could be no going back to the old system, but he did promise greater flexibility. The department was, he announced (clearly with tongue in cheek), even willing to permit the existence of such a labour pool, as long as employers would accept responsibility for housing and feeding the requisite number of unemployed Africans.

A prominent quarry-owning member of the CCI pointed out that the jobless were traditionally supported by their more fortunate kinsmen, but the urgency felt three months before had dissipated with an improvement in the labour-situation, due apparently to renewed drought in the reserves. There were in fact already well over 400 registered unemployed Africans in the Peninsula by March 1959, and the number was growing.
Chapter 10 shows that the labour-shortage nevertheless persisted into the 1960s. The developing system of influx control (strongly supported by employers and 'whites' in general) is subjected again to closer scrutiny in the following part of this chapter.

Refining the System of Influx Control

Authorities concerned with the Peninsula's 'Native Problem' began in 1955 to implement the CLP policy agreed upon during the previous year. Its aim, bluntly stated at a later stage by an unnamed senior municipal Native Administration official, was to ensure that there were no more African men in the area than could be absorbed in suitable employment, and no more women than could be accommodated in planned locations.17

African men were (as noted in Chapter 5) increasingly controlled by the system of labour bureaux, with a municipal bureau directing 'legals' to local jobs if available, and a district bureau channelling 'illegals' towards employment outside the prescribed area.18 African women were not included in this system until 1959, but municipal registration of African women under Section 10 of the Urban Areas Act was facilitated in the interim by the opening of a central Female Registration Office in Rutgers Street, just off the main Sir Lowry Road at the bottom end of District Six. 8,550 women were registered by March 1955, to be added to the 5,000 previously registered before November 1954.19

It was reported that increasing numbers of women were being refused permits allowing them to remain in the Western Cape, and were being charged with disobeying notices ordering them to leave the region.20 Rogers explained that, in order to comply with the policy of discouraging the permanent settlement of 'Native' families, 'care had to be exercised to avoid issuing a permit ... to a female whose presence in this area is not lawful'.21 The municipality's senior Native Inspector, Mr DB Geddie, told the NAC in September 1956 that approximately 25,000 African women had by that stage received permits legalising their presence in the Peninsula. This was confirmed by Rogers during that same month, at an Institute of Administrators of Non-European Affairs (Iana) conference. Rogers went on to disclose that almost five thousand less fortunate women had between 1954 and 1956 'left the area of their own accord, or ... had been refused permission to remain'.22 Although hundreds of 'illegals' had (as mentioned in the Chapter 5) been deported to the reserves in 1953, it would be mistaken to assume that thousands were suffering this fate every year by the middle of the decade, as costeffective means of physically removing and resettling thousands of surplus people from the area had yet to be found.23 It is in fact impossible to estimate the number of Africans who actually left the Peninsula at this time. Even for recent arrivals, returning to the overcrowded and ecologically devastated Eastern Cape reserves (from which the Western Cape traditionally tapped its complement of largely-landless, unskilled black labour) can hardly have been an attractive option.24 The prospect of remaining illegally in the urban area was no less daunting, as the unskilled labour market was saturated by the swelling ranks of refugees from the 'starving countryside'.25

The WCCLNA and Stellenbosch municipality, in particular, continued to press for the implementation of a radical segregationist policy in the region. The increasing repressiveness of 'Native policy' initially fuelled the hopes of these arch-conservatives, but by the end of 1956 concern was being expressed over the Cabinet's abovementioned willingness to compromise with capitalist interests over the policy of 'Coloured Labour Preference'. In his capacity as chairman of that body's TAC, Rogers was pleased to report to a WCCLNA conference in November 1956 that 'Government teams' had during the past year visited most areas in the Western Cape to issue 'Natives' with the 'reference books' which they would soon be required to carry under the Natives (Abolition of Passes and Coordination of Documents) Act of 1952. Another development which Rogers was able to report was the inclusion of a new provision in Section 29 of the 1956 Natives (Urban Areas) Amendment Act, empowering local authorities to order 'agitators' and 'undesirable elements' out
of their areas of jurisdiction. The conference was further gratified that exemptions under Section 10 would in all likelihood not apply in the Western Cape. This was taken as an acknowledgement of the region's uniqueness (presumably in terms of racial demography).

Concern was, however, expressed over several drawbacks and ambiguities. Conference delegates were told that many Africans wrongly believed that their new reference-books entitled them to enter and remain in prescribed urban areas. The amended Section 10 furthermore restricted the right of Africans to remain in urban areas for more than 72 hours, nullifying the restriction on entry embodied in Proclamation 105 of 1939, the War Measure introduced in 1946, and the Railways and Harbours Acts Amendment Act of 1949.

Africans could no longer be legally denied tickets on trains bound for the Western Cape. As local authorities in the region could only act against 'illegal' African entrants three days after their arrival, it was feared that tracing 'illegals' and effecting their repatriation would clog up the legal system and involve local authorities in 'very heavy expenditure'. The issue of repatriation was, moreover, proving more complicated than had been envisaged. A TAC member expressed the conference's consensus that the removal of the 'considerable number' of permanently-resident African families from the Western Cape should not be delayed by the fact that the regional economy could not yet function efficiently without 'Native' labour. It was agreed that such labour should only be supplementary and of an exclusively migrant nature.

Local authorities in the tribal areas, however, were struggling to house their own burgeoning populations, and refused to accept urbanised families from the Western Cape. The conference resolved that the Cape Province Municipal Association should be requested to make urgent representations for the establishment of towns in the Transkei and Ciskei where such families could be resettled.

A further resolution instructed the TAC to press for legislation forbidding African women from entering the region without the prior consent of the SNA and the responsible local authority. 'Great concern' was expressed, at a TAC meeting in March 1957, over the continued 'delay in bringing to fruition schemes for the resettlement of Natives from the Western Cape in the 'native reserves'. At the CPMA conference during the following month, a Stellenbosch municipality resolution in this regard (introduced by Erika Theron) was considered too controversial for discussion, and referred to the incoming executive. When it surfaced again at the Association's next annual conference in May 1958, this resolution was revealed to embody a call for a start to be made with the forced removal of at least 'the aged, pensioners, widows, receivers of disability grants and youths without family ties'.

The NAD's inadequate response to preliminary representations arising from the November 1956 WCCLNA conference were discussed by the TAC in May 1957. It was felt that more could be done 'to control the establishment of Native families in the Western Cape', and that priority should be given to accommodating 'Natives to be removed from Urban areas' in planned resettlement villages in the reserves. Committee members were exasperated by the fact that the emerging resettlement policy initially focussed primarily on accommodating the reserves' own homeless populations, as well as Africans scheduled for removal from 'black spots' in the 'white' rural areas.

Chief Native Commissioner Parsons regretfully informed the TAC in March of the following year that little progress had been made with the establishment of resettlement villages, due to continued disagreement over responsibility for the costs involved in repatriation. The committee expressed its unwavering support for the Stellenbosch position.

The illegal influx of Africans from the deteriorating reserves meanwhile continued unabated, exacerbating existing social problems. The unemployment situation was reported to be critical by mid-1957, with about 5,000 Jobless workers having been registered in Cape Town since September 1956. 'Europeans', who
comprised one-fifth of this total, were evidently well provided for, while unemployed ‘Coloureds’ received temporary payouts of less than half their normal low wages. Africans without work who came to the attention of the authorities were, of course, simply given 72 hours to leave the area. This might account for the apparent stabilisation of such a suspiciously-low official unemployment figure over a full ten-month period.33

Addressing a conference of municipal officials in Natal during September 1957, Rogers revealed furthermore that growing numbers of African women were seeking full-time employment, so as to qualify for permits to live with their families in Cape Town.4 His department's Influx Control Office estimated that a monthly average of 202 such women entered the municipal area between August and December of that year.34

Although removal orders issued under Section 14(1) could no longer be challenged in court, a press report disclosed that only fifteen African women had, according to the records of the Native Commissioner's court in Langa, been removed from the Peninsula during this period. Removal orders issued to a further fourteen had been suspended. The majority of these ‘illegal’ women were, however, not prosecuted on discovery, but simply warned to leave the prescribed area.35

African men were, of course, under the stricter discipline of the labour bureaux. 81,405 were registered at the local bureau during 1956, of whom 67,360 were placed in employment (almost 46,000 on registered service contracts).3 Rogers complained in July 1957 that growing numbers of African youths were ignoring the labour bureau regulations, and making their own way into the Peninsula to ‘seek their fortunes’.36 Asked to comment on the apparent drying up of the supply of labour from his district to the Western Cape, the Native Commissioner at Lady Frere in the Ciskei confirmed that ‘since the Western Cape Areas are so popular but calls for labour therefrom so rare, Natives are

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using or trying to use forged documents to enable them to go

to the Cape’.37

A Government Notice issued early in November stipulated that the deadline for ‘Native’ men to obtain reference books would be 1 February 1958. About 62,000 of these ‘dompasse’, obligatory for workseekers, had already been issued in Cape Town.41 The old system of seek-work permits was abandoned from January, and unemployed Africans were no longer permitted to look for work themselves. They were forced to join the labour bureau's pool of work-seekers, and to accept whatever work was offered through official channels, either within the Peninsula through the local (municipal) labour bureau, or outside the area through the district labour bureau.42

The district bureau continued to be ‘used as a means of exit only for surplus, undesirables and those who arrive without permission under Regulation 9(5). Men falling into these categories were offered the choice of accepting work outside the prescribed area (usually in the agricultural sector) or returning to the reserves. The more fortunate were channelled by private recruiting agencies to the mining compounds of the Transvaal.43

Strict enforcement of the labour bureau regulations seemed initially to be succeeding where previous measures had failed. Towards the end of May, an unnamed senior CC: official and the Deputy Commissioner of Police were

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reportedly satisfied that the illegal influx had been effectively checked.44 Chief Native Commissioner Parsons instructed Rogers to ensure that in future no workseeker is allowed to enter the Proclaimed Area unless he is duly authorised to do so in terms of Regulation 9(5) of the Labour Bureau regulations or qualifies for entry in terms of Section ten (1) bis of the Natives (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act, No. 25 of 1945. It is also requested that the entry of native women should be rigidly controlled.46

New Native Labour Regulations, promulgated at the beginning of 1959 in terms of the 1911 Native Labour Regulation Act, were framed so as to apply for the first time to women as well as to men.47
The King William's Town-based Chief Native Commissioner for the Eastern Cape pointed out in August 1958 that the 'real problem, however, has yet to be controlled i.e. illegal influx ... onto the peri-urban farms from which they gradually infiltrate into the urban area'.

In an effort to prevent precisely this form of more gradual influx, and also to rationalise agricultural labour, further vast areas of the Western Cape platteland (including Hermanus, Velddrift, Darling, Saldanha Bay, Vredenburg, Langebaan and Moorreesburg) had by that stage been brought under the ambit of the registration regulations. Ceres, Tulbagh, Caledon and Clanwilliam were among the handful of Western Cape districts still to be proclaimed under Section 23 of the Urban Areas Act (which had, of course, been applied to Cape Town municipal area in 1926, and to the rest of the Peninsula twenty years later).

Chapter 3 discussed the arrangement arrived at in 1946, whereby the CC assumed responsibility for the registration of Africans throughout the Peninsula. The CDC had in the interim formed its own Native Administration Department, which pursued a vigorous anti-squatting policy and had by 1958 concentrated considerable numbers of Africans from the northern areas in its Nyanga location and transit camp. The 1946 arrangement was now proving cumbersome, and the CDC requested the CC to relinquish control of 'Native' registration in areas outside the municipal boundary.

The issue was raised at the LCC's annual meeting at the end of 1958, and that body's secretary, Mr FK Lighton, told Rogers of employers' concern at 'the intention of the Divisional Council to depart from the principle of treating the Cape Peninsula as an "economic whole" for the purposes of native affairs'.

The central authorities evidently favoured the Divisional Council's position, for a proclamation was issued three months later to repeal a 1944 proclamation which had included part of the CDC area within the proclaimed area of the Cape Peninsula.

At the end of 1959, the Cape Argus reported 'bitter recriminations' over this issue between the CDC on the one side, and commerce and industry backed by the CC on the other. The CDC had apparently 'rejected the last of a series of appeals by the City Council and the Cape Chamber of Industries to postpone its plans for six months', as had the Department of Bantu Administration and Development.

A proclamation authorising the CDC to register 'Natives' employed in its area and in the municipalities of Beliville, Durbanville, Goodwood and Parow was promulgated at the end of January 1960. The CDC assured employers that this decentralisation of labour control would not in any way disrupt production.

The further development of the system of influx control in the context of the changed political situation of the 1960s will be discussed in Chapter 10. The remaining sections of the present chapter focus on the forced removal of Africans from the Peninsula's squatting areas and 'black spots' of removals from the Northern and Divisional Council Areas to Nyanga.

Of the 105,000 officially-enumerated Africans in the Peninsula in 1955, just over 12,000 were living in Langa and a little more than 6,500 in Nyanga. (The area's only other recognised 'Native location', the Luyolo 'hanging slum of Red Hill' at Simon's Town, housed a mere 1,400 people at the end of the following year).

Almost all the remainder were settled in 70-odd illegal squatting camps, which the authorities now confidently expected to eradicate in the not too distant future. The CDC seems by this stage to have filled its 'bachelor' barracks at Nyanga, but still had to house some 4,800 squatter families in its planned emergency camp, where 'illegals' could be sifted out and expelled from the region. The CC had to deal in like manner with 7,800 squatter families, and also provide accommodation in Langa for about 17,000 'bachelors'.

No longer would the Peninsula's scattered squatting camps provide any sort of safe haven for 'illegals'. The Divisional Council and the three northern municipalities of Bellville, Goodwood and Parow had by the
beginning of 1955 managed to reach an agreement regarding the extension of Nyanga, and had formed a Combined Native Affairs Committee as envisaged in that agreement.5 So-called 'bachelor' Africans in these areas were reportedly soon being ordered to move into barracks at Nyanga. Their 'unofficial families were brutally told to fend for themselves'.7 The CDC's transit camp was officially opened at the beginning of May 1956, but families were being moved in long before that date. Bellville's remaining Africans were reported in October 1955 to have received notices ordering them to move into Nyanga (hundreds of 'bachelors' had of course already been moved by that stage). After months of harassment, and repeated demolition of shanties by the Paarl Divisional Council, a number of Kraaifontein residents were reported in March 1956 to be among the first Africans to be herded into the colossal camp the Divisional Council was preparing to house all squatters in the Cape Peninsula and immediate vicinity.0 Some one hundred Kraaifontein 'illegals' faced pass offence charges.1 Kraaifontein refugees were within months discovered squatting at Stikland, where 'illegal' women were refused permits to remain in the Peninsula and warned to leave.2

Driven by raids and the local authorities' refusal to renew uncooperative women's permits, 800 families (mainly from Bellville, Goodwood and Parow) had moved into Nyanga by the following month, leaving some 5,000 families, in 38 'black spots', within the Combined Native Affairs Committee's area of jurisdiction. A further 200 families had been resettled in the transit camp by mid-May.63 Police action intensified with the introduction of a night-curfew for Africans in the Goodwood and Bellville municipal areas,64 and it was reported in September that Goodwood, Elsies River and Vasco were being rapidly 'cleared' of Africans.5 The momentum of removal was maintained by 'never-ending police raids' aimed at weeding out 'illegals' (particularly women) for processing through the judicial system and endorsed out of the area.6 The Torch reported that some 4,000 women were endorsed out of the Western Cape between January 1955 and July 1957.67

In January 1957, Goodwood municipal officials served notices on all African residents in Elsies River, ordering them to move to Nyanga within one month.7 Demolitions were under way by May,6 and 11 prominent residents were arrested during the following month, and charged with disobeying the removal notices. New Age commented that these arrests were 'the culmination of months of forced removals, bulldozing of homes and utter misery for hundreds of African families in the Elsies River area'.70 By January 1958, African squatters had been removed from Bellville, Parow and the greater part of Goodwood.71 Residual Africans remained among the 'Coloured' squatters in Elsies River, for a March 1958 pass-raids netted at least 26 'illegal' African women in that locality,72 but the vast majority had by that stage been moved into the Nyanga transit camp for screening. As the process of removing Africans from the northern suburbs drew to a close in the last quarter of 1957, the Divisional Council was able to attend to the approximately 5,000 African families squatting in 'black spots' within its own boundaries.73 Early in September 1957, it was reported that Africans living in Hout Bay were being driven into Nyanga.4 The DC's Manager of Native Administration, Pansegrouw, had given two month's prior notice of this forced removal.7 Four hundred African families at Cook's Bush in the Grassy Park area received notices in September, ordering them to move to Nyanga within thirty days.7 ('Bachelors' and their families had evidently been removed at an earlier stage, the population having already decreased by at least 4,000 people).7 A number of Cook's Bush shacks were demolished early in October,7 and final notices to vacate the area within one week were served on all residents in January 1958. Africans were ordered to move to Nyanga and 'Coloureds' to new 'Coloured' townships such as Bishop Lavis Town on the Cape Flats. The demolitions that followed left many African families homeless, as they could not afford the cost of transport or building materials with which to...
erect their own shacks at the site and service camp.\textsuperscript{79} Further information on the CDC's squatter-clearance operations during this period is hard to come by, for settlements of Africans in the outlying parts of the Cape Flats were small and scattered, making their removal less likely to come to the attention of the press and the general public. These communities were easily destroyed, and in June 1958 it was reported that all African squatters had been removed from the Divisional Council area.\textsuperscript{0}\textsuperscript{0} Altogether 2,506 'pondoks' were erected in Nyanga during that year by Bantu who were previously squatters spread over the whole Peninsula,\textsuperscript{9} increasing the developing location's population to a total of 18,110. More than two-thirds of this number were living in self-built shacks in the transit camp, where they could be 'screened' and moved into permanent housing as development proceeded.\textsuperscript{02} While the screening continued, there was no respite for 'illegals' in the new location. Hundreds of Nyanga women were refused permit-extensions and instead ordered to leave the Peninsula within a matter of weeks. Some reportedly did so, while regular house-to-house raids and police monitoring of bus-stops mopped up some of those who ignored the expulsion-orders.\textsuperscript{0} Clearing of the City Council Area, and the Development of Guguletu

As the cumbersome machinery of state thus moved to confront the national housing problem through the provision of site and service schemes for 'legal' Africans, the Native Affairs Department urged the City Council to cooperate with the Divisional Council in planning the provision of services in a new municipal location next to Nyanga. The Secretary for Native Affairs stressed, though, that in Cape Town there could be no question of Africans in any way owning the rudimentary dwellings which would be provided. Renewable thirty-year leases would be granted to 'legal' ex-squatters elsewhere, but here the planned ho'Luses would have to be convertible to single quarters, so as to facilitate the implementation of the long-term policy of replacing 'married natives' with migrant labourers in the Western Cape. As these African migrants could themselves 'ultimately be replaced by Coloureds', the envisaged dwellings would additionally have to be easily 'reconverted to family dwellings'.\textsuperscript{m4} The CC readily agreed to cooperate as requested with the CDC. Native Affairs was assured that the principle of convertibility, first raised by the TAC in 1953 and insisted upon by the National Housing Board during the following year,\textsuperscript{8} had already been incorporated in the design of the existing Langa hostels and would certainly not be overlooked in planning family accommodation in the proposed new location.\textsuperscript{66} The CC's full cooperation in all the ramifications of the scheme was secured at the end of November, after the Department had dismissed a municipal deputation's arguments against 'controlled squatting', and threatened to withhold funding for the development of the location unless an emergency camp was first established. On the recommendation of its Housing Committee, which could see no alternative course of action, the Council agreed to comply. As discussed below, however, the development of Nyanga West (soon renamed Guguletu.) only commenced in 1958.

As shown in the previous section to have been the case in the rest of the Peninsula, the absence of provision for family housing meant that 'bachelors' (including many men married according to tribal rites or common law) were targeted in the initial phase of the CC's removal programme. Rogers' deputy, Worrall, reported in April 1955 that 76 of the first group of 148 new Langa hostels had been completed and filled with 1,216 'bachelors', mainly from Windermere. A further 2,500 Windermere 'bachelors' were moved by mid-year. Additional quarters for 1,500 men were completed in November, and summonses ordering them to move
in were accordingly served on 1,390 Africans caught in a massive raid on Windermere during that month. A

Many of Windermere's so-called 'bachelors' chose to ignore the notices issued by the CC, under Section 9(1) of the Urban Areas Act, which ordered them to move to Langa within three days of receipt.9 Normal procedure in these cases was for a municipal demolition-gang to arrive at 4am on the expiry-date 'to give notice that when daylight comes the shack will be razed to the ground'.90 This contravened the CC's standing orders, as the Planning Committee, which was responsible for the control of unauthorised structures, had in 1956 secured a ruling that the demolition of any occupied shack within the municipal area required its prior authorisation. 91 Alienate from the Planning Committee and its cumbersome prescriptions, Rogers successfully appealed to the Housing Committee to sanction demolitions.92

By April 1956, Worrall could report a 'substantial reduction in the number of single men' among African squatters in the municipal area. At least two-thirds of the 6,000 involuntary residents of the new Langa hostels had been removed from Windermere.9' Other 'bachelors' had been moved in from 'black spots' throughout the municipal area, including Athlone, Retreat, and Newlands.94 When the Maitland Ratepayers' Association called towards the end of that year for the removal of bachelors from Windermere to be extended into a 'combined operation clearing Ward 8 of all its native inhabitants', the CC had to reply regretfully that only 'bachelors' could be removed at that stage, as alternative family accommodation had not yet been provided.95 Police raids on this sprawling shantytown had become 'regular weekly occurrences',9' and it was reported towards the end of 1957 that over 12,000 'bachelors' had been removed from Windermere during the past year. 17

Further action against the remaining 'bachelors' living outside the Langa barracks (many, of course, in family units),96 was hampered by the fact that registered parliamentary voters remained exempt from the provisions of Section 9 of the Urban Areas Act. The Town Clerk, clearly quoting Rogers, reported that the job of removing them to Langa is difficult. Every effort is being made to clear them out of the black spots but until such time as the families are removed, these fellows will try and dodge our Inspectors. No effort is being spared in this connection and it is hoped that with a start being made in the near future in the clearance of families from the black spots, the balance of bachelors will be cleared at the same time and brought into the units at Langa. Approximately 3-4,000 'single men', mostly registered voters, then remained at large.' The intensified victimisation of de facto families in the doomed shanty-town gave rise to a public outcry, and to growing opposition within the CC to the ruthless actions of its Native Administration Department.

The director of the Shawco welfare organisation's Windermere clinic resigned in protest against the demolitions, pointing out that expulsion of 'illegals' to the famine-stricken Transkei could only result in starvation. 102 Leaders of the main Christian church denominations expressed their concern, by way of deputations to the Mayor and the CC. Though not prepared to unequivocally condemn the actions of Council officers, these church-leaders were not entirely convinced by Rogers' sophistical argument that none of the 75 huts demolished during the previous three months had been occupied at the time by women or children. Presumably referring to the predawn threats of the demolition-squads, Rogers maintained that 'illegal' families invariably left of their own accord after being warned and
given a reasonable time to do so. The president of the Cape Peninsula Church Council observed that the victims were 'possibly not families in the legal sense, but family units none the less'.

Criticism of these demolitions was more pointed within the CC itself, as the Native Affairs and Housing committees came under increasing attack from liberal-minded councillors for sanctioning Rogers' ultraviolence actions. Housing Committee chair Mrs C Bakker was dubbed the 'Dr Verwoerd of the Council' by her Planning Committee counterpart, and after hearing arguments that intimidating people out of their huts and then demolishing them was not only illegal but also 'inhuman and shameful', the Council at the end of January 1958 resolved to fall back on the standing order that huts should not be demolished unless alternative accommodation was provided for all the occupants.

Mrs Bakker, who apparently deemed Rogers' actions the obligatory exercising of powers delegated to the Council at its own request, disclosed dismissively in response that the Housing Committee had given Mr Rogers instructions what to do and to carry on until those instructions are withdrawn. According to an official of Shawco, there were 1,500 shacks left in Windermere in April 1956. People whose homes had been demolished were sleeping in the bush, the men refusing to move to the Langa hostels as they insisted they were not 'bachelors', and the women similarly defying orders to leave the Peninsula. The 'illegal' population was at the same time reported to be rapidly increasing.

The municipality was by that stage preparing for the second phase of its squatter-control operation. The majority of 'bachelors' had already been removed to Langa (not only from Windermere but from squatter-camps and slums throughout the municipal area), but the removal of families depended on progress in establishing the planned location at Nyanga West (soon renamed Guguletu). In a mid-1958 test case involving a Mr C Matiwane, the Native Commissioner's court ruled that the City Engineer's Department providing only the basic infrastructure and services. Construction of roads, sewers, water-pipes and drainage commenced at Nyanga West in mid-1958 and was completed by the end of that year.

The central and local authorities were by that stage involved in a dispute over the cost of the new township. Native Affairs had stipulated that each dwelling should cost no more than 250 pounds, and the CC had applied to the National Housing Commission for a loan of funds to build 734 houses at this price, plus a further 100 at 162 pounds each (both figures including the cost of services). The NHC, however, insisted that the cost per dwelling should be lowered, as the CDC was spending far less on the development of its scheme in Nyanga. The CC was requested in June to reconsider the cost of developing Nyanga West, and to submit a new application. The City Engineer was adamant that the CDC's Nyanga development could not be compared to the CC's proposed scheme, which involved individual (as opposed to communal) toilet and ablution facilities.

The Cape Town Chamber of Commerce wrote to the Housing Committee, arguing that housing could be provided more cheaply by private enterprise than by the CC itself. This contention was supported by the disclosure that one of the Chamber's member companies had built 146 'housing blocks' in Nyanga at a cost well below the DC's already low estimates.
The process of ‘screening’ the inhabitants of the remaining 3,000-odd shacks in Windermere (about half of which were situated on Council-owned land) was completed by the end of the following February.6 This involved requesting, from the various Native Commissioners in the Xhosa reserves, information on ‘illegal’ families who claimed they had no homes there to return to.”7

The affected families were on this basis divided into three categories: those ‘qualified’ for permanent housing; ‘illegals’ who retained links of some sort with the tribal areas and could thus easily be split up by the removal of breadwinners to the Langa barracks and the endorsing of dependents out of the Peninsula; and ‘displaced’ families, without such links, who would be allowed to remain temporarily in self-built shacks at the Nyanga West emergency camp.

The number of Windermere families deemed ‘qualified’ seems to have declined as the screening-process unfolded. It was finally announced, towards the end of 1958, that about 1,200 of the 2,500 African families left in Windermere qualified to remain in Cape Town.”8

To expedite the process of squatter-clearance, the CC was given permission to erect 500 ‘prefabricated hutments’ at the new location, to house ‘qualified’ families awaiting accommodation. The first thirty of these four-roomed galvanised-iron sheds were in position by the end of 1958, as well as a number of brick lavatories which would form part of the planned permanent dwellings. A few families were moved in from Windermere during December.”9

The pace of removal picked up during the following month, but not sufficiently to satisfy the new Chief Native Commissioner, Mr JS de Wet.120 The removal-process was thereupon accelerated. 12k Nyanga West accommodated 735 families by mid-May, and 930 one month later.22

The last of Windermere’s ‘bachelors’, 226 registered voters, were ordered to move to Langa at the end of 1959. This left 1,451 legally-recognised African families remaining in the area: 478 officially categorised as ‘qualified’, 381 as ‘illegal’ and 592 as ‘displaced’.23

The majority of ‘Coloureds’ had already been moved from Windermere into the adjoining Facreton township,24 and the whole Kensington-Facreton area had been declared a ‘Coloured group area’ in July of that year.125

The net was cast wider during 1959, to encompass families living in places such as Athlone and Blouvlei (or Blaauwvlei) in the Retreat area.126 In Athlone, the impetus came from the newly-formed Group Areas Advisory Board, which began buying up properties occupied by Africans and then liaising with the NAD and the CC to have them removed.”27 The CC was more directly involved in Retreat, where it was anxious to press ahead with planned ‘Coloured’ housing.

Other areas where African communities were under threat by the end of this period were Schotsche Kloof and Simon’s Town. The former had been declared a ‘Malay group area’ in July 1957,”8 and preparations for removal from this area began in mid-1959 with the drawing up of a preparatory list of some seventy families.” At the opposite end of the Peninsula, the Group Areas determination for Simon’s Town made no provision for African residents. The central authorities subsequently vetoed Simon’s Town municipality’s decision to build a new location on Red Hill to replace Luyolo, which was impossible to upgrade due to its limited area and steeply-sloping terrain.

Mass removals to the locations from these and other areas during the first half of the 1960s are discussed in Chapter 10. Chapters 8 and 9 document the further rise, and the subsequent suppression, of opposition to the developing system of control.
1. GN 19/6/ v1, Paper entitled 'The Coloureds and the Native', delivered by Eiselen to the Sabra conference in Stellenbosch in January 1955 (annexure 18 to NAC minutes, 3 Feb. 1955). This paper was subsequently published (under the title 'The Native in the Western Cape'), in the Journal for Racial Affairs, 6(3), 1955.


34S

12. GN 19/6 v1, CCI director to MNA, 10 Mar. 1955. 13. GN 19/6 v1, TC to NAC chairman, 16 Mar. 1955; ibid, SAAU sec to TC, 18 Mar. 1955; ibid, CCI Director to TC, 23 Mar. 1955.


21. GN 5/2/2/3 and BAAB 133/2, Rogers to TC, 21 Mar. 1955. 22. GN 5/2/2/3, NAC minutes, 19 Sep. 1956, item 15; M Horrell (ed), Survey of Race Relations, 1956-1957, 71. 23. Cole makes this mistake, and has been blindly followed by Goldin and Muthien. See J Cole, NWhen Your Life is Bitter You Do Something', in D Kaplan (ed) South African Research Papers, Economic History Department, UCT, 1986, 35; J Cole, Crossroads, 7.


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40. BAAB 133/2, CNC (Ciskei) to Rogers, 5 Nov. 1957, quoting the NC, Lady Frere.

officials issued Travelling Passes to Native Recruiting Corporation recruits, and confirms that the NC's recently-established Langa sub-office would henceforth assume responsibility for this duty.

44. Cape Times, 26 May, 1958.

61. New Age, 29 Mar. 1956. 62. BAAB 140 v1, Ass Inspector of Private Locations (WC) to UAC, 29 June, 1956; BAAB 140 v1, UAC to Rogers, 2 July, 1956; BAAB 140 v1, Rogers to Female Registration Officer, 4 July, 1956.
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89. NTS 5314 77/313E, 99, undated and unsigned blank example of roneoed CC notice served on Windermere residents. 90. Cape Times, 25 Nov. 1957. 91. GN 4/4/2/6, NAC minutes, 3 Nov. 1955, item 4 refers to the Plans Committee's recent resolution in this regard. H(GN) 9/21/1/27, TC to Housing Committee, 4 Mar. 1958. 2 (annexure 21 to Housing Committee minutes, 6 Mar. 1958) suggests that this resolution was adopted as a standing order of the CC in August 1956. 92. H(GN) 9/21/1/27, Rogers to TC, 27 Feb. 1957. ibid, TC's report, in Housing Committee minutes, 5 Mar. 1957, item 15.


8: MULTI-RACIALISM AND THE AFRICANIST CHALLENGE, 1955-60

Chapters 2, 4 and 6 above have stressed developing tensions between the 'united front' faction of the ANC and groupings to its left and right, namely the ultra-leftists on the one hand, and the conservative anti-communists on the other. The repressive tendency of state policy during the second half of the 1950s increasingly isolated both the boycottist theoreticians and those who sought accommodation with the crystallising racist system. Demographic changes brought about by the implementation of state policy at the same time encouraged the emergence of a new political force, in the form of Africanism, which would increasingly confront both the embattled Congress and the unyielding authorities. The previous chapter noted the increased proportion of 'bachelor' migrants in the local population, and Kingwill suggests that this facilitated the spread of the new ideology.

Before tracing the rise of Africanism in Cape Town, this chapter discusses two major ANC campaigns which spotlighted the difficulties of its multi-racial policy these two campaigns being the Congress of the
People campaign and the campaign against passes for women. Following an assessment of the growing power of Africanism,

1960 Anti-Pass Campaign.
The Congress of the People Campaign, 1955
In elections for Native Representatives during the 1940s and the first half of the 1950s, the regional Congress had built upon and entrenched an historical legacy of interracial co-operation. This tendency was strengthened during the Congress of the People campaign, which was directed in this region by a Cape Western Action Council comprising representatives of the four Congress Alliance organisations. A further 23 bodies sent delegates in early August to the inaugural Cape Western regional Congress of the People conference in the City Hall.
This was followed by meetings in urban and rural areas throughout the region, to encourage the attendance of grassroots representatives at the planned Congress of the People and to collect demands for inclusion in the envisaged Freedom Charter. Local preparations for the historic meeting (which took place at Kliptown in the Transvaal on 26 June, 1955) reached their climax during that month with a torchlight procession on the Grand Parade and a delegates' conference in the City Hall.2

Great stress was laid, at COP mass-meetings in the region, on the multi-racial character of the struggle against apartheid. According to undisputed police testimony at the Treason Trial, speakers from the ANC, Sacpo, COD and Sactu at these joint meetings urged 'swartes', 'wittes' and 'kleurlinge' to join the united front against the emerging South African police state, and thus ensure that the NP leaders suffered the fate of the Nazis and the Italian Fascists.2
Native Representatives Turok and Lee-Warden adopted a high profile at these meetings. Praising one such gathering for its 'wonderful strong spirit ... - the spirit that encouraged Sam Kahn, the spirit that encouraged Brian Bunting, Fred Carneson and Ray Alexander, and so lately Mr. Lee-Warden', Turok justified participation in sectional elections in terms of opportunities thus provided 'to fight the Liberals'.4
The issue remained divisive, although organised dissent no longer emanated mainly from the ranks of the ultra-left 'non-collaborationists' shown in Chapter 6 to have been influential during the first half of the 1950s. Now a faction within the local ANC was alienated by the regional leadership's participation in the system of Native Representation, which contravened the policy adopted in the 1949 Programme of Action and reaffirmed at the June 1954 provincial conference. Opposition to dummy representation was carried over into rejection of the allegedly whitedominated Congress of the People campaign, by this significant minority of embryonic Africanists in the region.
Disaffection over these issues was strongest, Schreiner reveals, in the ANC's Langa New Flats and Crawford branches, which were consequently 'expelled' from the Western Cape Regional Conference on 16 January 1955. These branches chose to align themselves with the Eastern Cape-based provincial committee, rather than the still-unconstitutional regional committee supported by the majority in the Western Cape.
Their stand was backed by TE Tshunungwa, the Cape provincial secretary and COP national organiser, who was then visiting the region. He reported to the Provincial Executive that these were the only branches in the region which were correctly following Congress policy and administrative procedure. Special approbation was reserved for 'the C.O.D. men taking a lead in the A.N.C. meetings' at certain branches.6 In order to counteract the 'extreme form of confusion' allegedly retarding the COP campaign in the Western Cape, Tshunungwa summarily announced that the regional committee had been abolished.7
Tshunungwa's 'Report on the Regions of the Cape' to the provincial conference (held in Port Elizabeth one week before the Congress of the People) welcomed close cooperation with fraternal organisations, but insisted that

'the leaders of these organisations should devote their efforts in organising their own national groups'. He castigated Western Cape ANC leaders for allegedly neglecting their own people 'to run around with the Europeans of the Congress of Democrats and Coloureds of the South African Coloured People's Organisation'. This had led, according to Tshunungwa, to widespread flouting of policy, particularly as regards participation in Native Representative elect iLns."

The Western Cape boycotted this provincial conference, and such opposition did not prevent the multi-racial united front strategy (popular in the Western Cape) From winning broader acceptance at the Congress of the People. Kingwill stresses the Western Cape origin of the Freedom Charter's controversial 'economic clause' calling for the nationalisation of land, banks and monopoly industry. The multi-racialism enshrined in the preamble's insistence that 'South Africa belongs to all who live in it, black and white' was criticised from an Africanist perspective and from the supposedly 'nonracial' position of the Non-European Unity Movement (itself still paradoxically organised, like the Congress Alliance, as a union of racially constituted ent iTes). 10

In-fighting over the issue of multi-racialism seems to have paralysed local resistance in the aftermath of the 'Kliptown Congress'. Kingwill says that the 'subsequent campaign to popularise the Freedom Charter was conducted largely by COD in Cape Town, frequent references having been made to the 'inactivity' of the ANC(WC) and Sacpo at that time. 11 Karon does, however, mention participation by members of these organisations in a 'house to house 'Million Signatures' campaign' to popularise the Freedom Charter during the last quarter of 1955.12

Tshunungwa informed the ANC national leadership in November 1955 that the Western Cape remained recalcitrant, continuing to act independently in defiance of the provincial decision to place branches in the region under direct provincial authority. The provincial committee was, he reported, on the point of suspending these branches. 13

Local leaders were undeterred by such threats. John Mtini and David Ngugunyeka (for instance) strongly supported multi-racialism at a COP meeting on the Grand Parade during the month following Tshunungwa's report. Both stressed that the Congress Alliance sought to unite people of all races in the face of the regime's strategy of divide and rule. COD speaker B Gosschalk declared at this meeting that 'until we have removed the Nationalist Government there will never be peace in this country. That is our one central aim, and the Congress movement will work with anyone who works on that platform. 114

The threat of suspension was, in any event, not carried out. According to a report of the national executive committee the 'small clique within the A.N.C. calling itself Africanist... was routed and silenced' when a special conference of that body formally endorsed the Freedom Charter early in 1956.15 Schreiner reveals that the national leadership resolved to remove Tshunungwa from the position of provincial secretary. This decision was endorsed at the next annual provincial conference, which was delayed until the end of the following year by the provincial executive. 16

While the Africanists regrouped, the united front strategy was vigorously opposed by the Unity Movement during the mid-1950's. Disunity consequently bedevilled attempts to oppose various aspects of the implementation of apartheid. Karon provides an interesting discussion of local politics during this period, focussing on divisive campaigns against the threatened further restriction of the municipal franchise, and against official segregation not only of residential areas but also of buses and civic amenities. He discusses as well the controversial participation of the Congress Alliance in the separate 'Coloured' election in 1958. Cameron focuses on the divided struggle against the system of Bantu Education."

More relevant to the present discussion, and certainly the most sustained and controversial of all the local campaigns during this period, was the campaign against passes for women.
The Campaign Against Passes for Women, 1955-9

Forced onto the defensive by the increasingly oppressive actions of the police, the Congress Alliance was moving into an uneasy alliance with the Black Sash and other liberal bodies over the question of passes for African women. This was despite a fundamental disagreement with bodies such as the Black Sash over constitutional matters. This is best expressed by Sacpo's Alex la Guma, who criticised the recently-established Black Sash, at a Congress of the People meeting on the Grand Parade in December 1955, for mounting independent protests (confined to its small and exclusive membership of 'European' women) in defence of the Constitution and against the government's growing abrogation of the rule of law. The crowd applauded his insistence that the old constitution was indefensible. What was needed, he declared, was a new constitution based on the Freedom Charter.1

Resistance against stricter controls on women was galvanised by developments discussed in Chapter 7, namely the intensifying raids, the opening of the local Female Registration Office early in 1955, and the subsequent refusal of the authorities to register growing numbers of illegal women.

Schreiner shows that the regional Congress in January of that year convened a conference on women which elected an action committee to take the lead on this issue. She stresses that this was not an all-women committee, although it was known as the Women's Anti-Pass Committee. Schreiner says that 'it was through the activities of this committee that the beginnings of the ANC Women's League in the Western Cape came about.' The conference on women resolved further to hold a mass demonstration against passes, particularly as applied to women, on the Grand Parade on 23 January.20

During the following week the ANC's Cape Western regional annual conference, which re-elected the banned Ngwevela and Ngwenya as president and vice-president respectively (with Oscar Mpetha and Greenwood Ngotyana remaining secretary and assistant secretary), took a strong stand against the inclusion of women in the mechanisms of influx control.21 According to Schreiner, ‘about 760' women were recruited into the Women's League as a result of this conference.22

The militant tone of the mass-meeting on 23 January is perhaps best encapsulated in a passage from police evidence presented at the Treason Trial. This quotes Annie Silinga exhorting the predominantly female crowd to 'get up and fight for your country. Will you get your freedom without fighting for it? Will you eat your food without cooking it? Africa for the Africans. Afrika!' John Mtini chaired this meeting, which was also addressed by Sonia Bunting of the Congress of Democrats.22

Representatives of Vigilance Associations throughout the Peninsula sought an interview with the Town Clerk in February, to discuss the issuing of 'Passes and Permits to Native women'. They were at first fobbed off on Rogers, who was going on leave just then and couldn't see them. Eventually in mid-year Vigilance Association delegates were granted the courtesy of a frank explanation of regional 'Native Policy' by Government Information Officer Mr FN Malan.24

While the grassroots male leadership thus grappled with the implications of Coloured Labour Preference and the strategies required to oppose it, growing numbers of women were drawn into organised resistance. It was reported in April that African women in Retreat, Kensington, Langa, Elsies River and Nyanga were united under the ANC banner, in order to fight for family life.2

The issue seems to have become briefly subsumed in the broader Congress of the People campaign, and the abovementioned campaigns against such issues as Bantu Education and the Group Areas Act. Schreiner mentions a local Women's Anti-Pass Committee conference in June.26

Intensified harassment towards the end of the year prompted the Federation of South African Women (FedSAW), which included the extremely active ANC Wo-men's League, to convene a march in late November. This was graphically described in New Age: 'Singing Mayibuye iAfrika and holding aloft banners demanding the repeal of the Urban Areas Act and an end to deportations, African women from all parts of the Peninsula marched through the streets of Cape Town', led by Mtini, Silinga and Mrs E Ngose of Retreat.27
The ANC's annual national conference in December resolved to resist the imposition of passes on African women, and a special Cape provincial conference during the following month promised a 'vigorous campaign' on this issue. A local Women's League conference almost two months later decided to set this campaign in motion. 29

Lodge shows that the ensuing national campaign adopted tactics which were borrowed from the Black Sash by Fedsaw in the Transvaal during the second half of the previous year. Efforts were concentrated on presenting petition-forms to the authorities, the Transvaal campaign climaxing with a march to the Union Buildings by 2,000 women on 27 October 1955. On 9 August 1956, ten times as many women (from all over the country) took part in a similar march, the high point of the national campaign. Lodge says that in the months preceding this Pretoria demonstration, 'in virtually all the major towns, women marched from the locations into city centres to hand in petitions and protests to Town Clerks, Native Commissioners, ...'

368 Magistrates and other local officials'. Fedsaw secretary Helen Joseph (a founder member of the Congress of Democrats) and the Women's League's Transvaal secretary Bertha Mashaba embarked on a tour of the country to drum up support. 2 These Transvaal women, accompanied by Transvaal ANC firebrand Robert Resha, addressed meetings in Langa and on the Parade during July. The Langa meeting was hosted by the local branch of Congress, with Welcome Zihlangu chairing and Zollie Malindi introducing the speakers. Cape Town branch secretary Joseph Morolong officiated at the Parade meeting on the following day. 20 Lodge says that local demonstrations against passes for women commenced in March, "but the split between the Cape and the Western Province Congresses over the question of multi-racialism seems to have delayed the women's mass action in Cape Town." It was only on the day of the famous march to the Union Buildings that a delegation of women from various parts of the Peninsula (led by Mrs Ngose of Retreat and representing the Women's League, Fedsaw, Sacpo and the COD) presented the Native Commissioner with thousands of signatures on some eight hundred petition-forms. He undertook to forward these to Minister of Native Affairs Verwoerd. 2

According to Schreiner, the Fedsaw national executive during the following month instructed all branches to broaden the campaign by drawing in 'other women and other women's organisations'. The ANC national executive in October endorsed the strategy of broadening the anti-pass campaign through cooperation with liberal groupings. 34 Griessel shows that the local Black Sash had by that stage already made preliminary contact with women from Fedsaw, the ANC and the COD. A decision to formalise these links had been made by the beginning of 1957. 35 Prior to the formation in mid-year of a local united front against passes for women, the Women's League and Fedsaw in May 1957 stepped up their Western Cape campaign on this issue. Public meetings and house-meetings were held throughout the region, to collect the signatures of women pledged to defy the pass-laws. 6 Approximately one thousand women marched through the streets of Cape Town on 13 June 1957 to present these pledges to the Chief Native Commissioner for transmission to the Minister. 7

Early the following month Fedsaw initiated a broadbased meeting from which developed the Cape Association to Abolish Passes for African Women (ratapaw), initially comprising representatives of Fedsaw, the Women's League, the Black Sash, the National Council of Women, the Anglican Mothers' Union and the Society of Friends. The Unity Movement predictably disapproved, describing Catapaw as a 'sorority of liberals and Quislings attempting to organise the anti-pass movement on Africanist, feminist (sex-segregation) lines, completely and purposely divorced from the franchise demand'. 3 Griessel shows that Catapaw was weakened from the outset by the 'viciously anti-communist stance' of particularly the Black Sash and the National Council of Women. 'This found expression inauspiciously at the new committee's first public meeting, a protest against passes for women held in the Drill Hall on 9 August 1957, the first anniversary of the women's march on the Union Buildings. The meeting spilled over onto the Grand Parade, where liberals intervened to halt an 'unscheduled and unauthorised'
demonstration of militancy by some one thousand women.40
The disproportionate liberal influence within the new organisation (both Griessel and Schreiner emphasise the unchallenged monopoly of skills and resources by the NCW and the Black Sash) ensured that the main role of the Catapaw committee from then on became one of ‘information gatherer’
Encouraged by the Chief Native Commissioner, efforts were directed in the harmless avenue of seeking ‘to prove beyond all doubt the terrible devastation that is being caused in the lives of African women by the implementation of the pass laws’.” Schreiner points out, though, that the Federation and Women’s League were in fact involved in running a campaign outside the Cape Association to Abolish Passes for African Women as well.

The Congress Alliance’s Cape Western Co-ordinating Committee of Peoples’ Organisations held a series of meetings to protest against the pass system and the removal of ‘illegals’ from the Western Cape, as the 1 February 1958 deadline for the compulsory carrying of passes by African males over the age of sixteen approached.43 Schreiner mentions in this regard Women’s League activity in Worcester, which led to the formation there of a broad antipass committee and culminated in a march to the location offices during November 1957. In Cape Town during January, a meeting at Nyanga of approximately one thousand people sent a deputation comprising members of the location’s Women’s League, led by a Mrs Lefele, to interview the mayor.

Later that same month a second women’s deputation (this time comprising Women’s League members from various parts of the Peninsula, accompanied by ANC regional secretary Oscar Mpetha) secured the mayor's assurance that he would make representations to the central authorities against the breaking up of African families. Church leaders added their voice to the women's protest, condemning the migrant labour system and stressing the sanctity of family life.44

Mrs Lefele led a deputation which spoke to the mayor again in March, after a protest by some 150 women on the Grand Parade.41 Women in Paarl similarly pressurised their local authority in July, while in Cape Town a campaign of ‘extensive door-to-door canvassing leading up to area meetings' characterised preparations for a mass-meeting on 9 August (already celebrated as National Women’s Day). This meeting apparently sent a deputation requesting the parliamentary Native Representatives to intercede with the CC over its treatment of African women.46

Shortly before the Department began issuing passes to African women in the towns of the Boland towards the end of 1958, the ANC called on ‘all women in the Western Cape, and African women in particular, to intensify the struggle against the pass and permit system’.4” In Paarl two hundred women handed their newly-issued passes back to the location superintendent’s office, 46 but there is no record of such action in the Peninsula.

Catapaw remained firmly under liberal control, although the NCW, the Quakers and the Anglicans had been replaced within its structures by the SAIRR and the Civil Rights League. Griessel says that the role of this women’s united front had by that stage virtually merged with that of the Black Sash. She quotes the mouthpiece of the latter organisation stressing Catapaw’s educative role, with regard both to the public and the authorities.49

The independent mobilisation and organisation of African women pioneered since 1955 by the Women’s League and the Federation was hamstrung not only by the timid equivocation of their liberal allies. Repression had (as will be shown in the following section of this chapter)

373 taken its toll among the African leadership, while intimidating and disorganising the rank and file. These two factors - the growing influence of the liberals and the increasing harshness of state policy - contributed additionally (with the rise of uncompromising Africanism, which is also discussed in the following section) to the emergence of a growing rift within the local African community. This in turn facilitated the eventual subjugation of women under the full rigours of the pass laws by the end of the following year.
When government teams began issuing reference books to African women in the Peninsula towards the end of October 1959, the Women's League announced at a 'meeting on the Parade attended by 400 people' that the struggle against passes for women would be intensified. The ANC convened protests in the townships against the pass-system, which was considered 'the number one enemy of the African people'. These gatherings included 'a number of area meetings' organised by the Women's League in such places as Langa, Nyanga, Nyanga West and Athlone.

A departmental registration and photographic team nevertheless began issuing reference books to African women in the Sea Point Town Hall on 26 October, 1959, while Women's League members mounted a placard demonstration outside. There were disturbances at the Rondebosch Town Hall early in November, when a group of protesting African women obstructed the cameras and resisted being moved by the police. A number of women were arrested, while members of the Black Sash (who had pleaded with the Women's Leaguers not to cause trouble), continued with their own dignified placard demonstration and dissociated themselves from this illegal disturbance. More arrests ensued when police moved in on African women demonstrating noisily at this venue on the following day, while the Black Sash staged a separate, silent protest on the opposite side of the building.

Catapaw convened an apparently poorly-attended protest meeting in the Banqueting Hall on 15 November 1959. This was chaired by City Councillor and Black Sash leader Eulalie Stott, who said that Africans should 'take courage' from the fact that 'many white people were coming to realise that the pass system should be abolished'. The registration team seems to have encountered little opposition when it moved to Retreat and then to Nyanga. A Women's League delegation (led by Annie Silinga, who had also addressed the mid-November Catapaw meeting) protested to Rogers against the issuing of 'reference books' to women in that location, but there too the operation proceeded smoothly. Rogers reported early in December that about 13,000 African women had received 'reference books' and that only a few had still to be issued.

In early January 1960, it was reported that uniformed male and female ANC volunteers were conducting a door-to-door investigation in Nyanga to ascertain the number of women who had received reference books. A mass meeting called by the Nyanga branch of the ANC towards the end of that month demanded the repeal of all unjust laws and condemned the issuing of reference books to women, the banning of popular leaders and the imposition of increased taxes on unrepresented people.

The defeat of the women's campaign was a blow to the Congress Alliance. The militant African women taking part in this campaign locally had, furthermore, clearly been disappointed by their white liberal allies in the women's united front. This strengthened the appeal of the Africanist faction, which would soon mount a serious challenge to both the ANC and the apartheid state.

The Rise of Africanism

The women's campaign further alienated the growing Africanist faction, which was shown above to have coalesced locally in opposition to the Congress of the People. This response to the increasingly repressive nature of the state became a powerful force in Cape Town by the end of that decade. While the previous section showed that the women's campaign was retarded by the vacillations of 'multi-racial' liberals, this section notes the ironic influence of the anti-communist 'Contact group' of white Cape Town liberals on the rise of support for Africanism among local Africans.

Congress provincial secretary Tshunungwa's role in the local emergence of Africanism during 1955 was mentioned above, as was the national executive's decision to replace him as provincial secretary during the following year. Schreiner reveals that he was reinstated at the provincial conference at the end of 1957, although the majority of delegates not only endorsed his removal from office, but voted to expel...
him altogether. The Western Province delegates insisted that the matter be further discussed at a special provincial conference, which the Cape executive called on branches to boycott.9

Thirty-seven branches did nevertheless attend this emergency conference, held in Elsies River in February 1958. Here the split between Congress and the Africanists became irrevocable. The meeting was disrupted by armed and uniformed Africanists.60 When order was eventually restored, the conference elected an interim caretaker committee to replace the unpopular provincial executive until new leaders could be decided upon at the annual provincial conference.

The emergency conference chairman, Western Cape Congress secretary and prominent trade unionist Oscar Mpetha, was

appointed vice-president of the worker-oriented interim committee.6

The Torch commented on this split that the ANC's 'opportunistic' politics (its 'adventuristic' campaigns, alleged lack of principles, and its membership of a multiracial alliance, with separate organisations for each racial group and no over-arching federal structure) had played into the hands of the 'racist' Africanists. Racial chauvinism, said the Torch, is merely an extension of multi-racialism.62

Shortly after the confrontation at the emergency conference, Africanists attempted unsuccessfully to break up an ANC meeting in Nyanga.2 Africanist opposition and the weakness of local trade unions made the SaCtu-initiated stay-away during the general election in April 1958 a 'dismal failure' in Cape Town.4 As was the case in locations throughout the country, the police staged a massive show of force in the Peninsula's African townships on 14 April, the first day of the planned three-day strike. Twenty-three ANC Youth League members were arrested in Langa for incitement and for marching through the streets, contrary to regulations prohibiting gatherings of more than ten Africans, which were published the previous day. Twenty were eventually convicted and fined on the latter charge.5 The Torch commented that 'the failure of the stunt cannot but harm the workers in their struggle ... what is needed is

thorough organisation, political education and coordinated struggle'.6

Davenport says that the failure of this 'stay-at-home' resulted in further 'recriminations' between the leftist and Africanist wings of the ANC." Ex-ANC and CP member Joseph Nkato (now a prominent African member of the Liberal Party) renewed the attack on COD's alleged domination of the ANC.60 Africanists consequently boycotted the annual provincial conference of the Cape Africanist Congress, held in Paarl during August, although this was presided over by national president Lutuli. The annual conference elevated Oscar Mpetha to the position of provincial president, at the head of 'a new Provincial committee under the control of a new, more militant, left wing and decidedly non-Africanist group". Kingwill comments that this was 'the first time in the history of the ANC in the Cape that an African from the Western Cape presided over the CAC', and she reveals that Zollie Malindi (the banned Ngwevela's replacement as regional president, who was elected to the provincial executive at this conference)," became vice-president of the CAC in 1959.71

Three local Africanist branches broke away in response to CAC's new leftist leanings,2 and the dissidents were from May 1959 formally constituted under the Pan-Africanist Congress, which had been established the previous month." A close relationship developed between the emerging

Africanists and the Contact group of white liberals, then seeking (according to Everatt), 'to develop a mass black base as ... a counter to the Congress Alliance'.4 Local Africanist leaders accepted liberal support and assistance, despite PAC president Sobukwe's insistence in this very journal that 'no white man can identify himself with the struggle of the black people in this country'.73 While the Congress reeled under the blows of the apartheid state, the Contact group lashed out at its alleged domination by communists. What Everatt calls 'the most
notorious of these attacks' was Patrick Duncan's 'Open Letter to Chief Luthuli', published in Contact in May 1959.7

Two of Duncan's closest Liberal Party colleagues, Nkatlo and the journalist Randolph Vigne, worked hard to develop a working relationship on the basis of early social contacts.77 The PAC's chief local organiser, national executive member and UCT student Nana Mahomo, had lodged with Nkatlo; while fellow-student and PAC Langa Flats branch assistant secretary Philip Kgosana subsisted on what his autobiography describes as a 'generous commission' which Duncan allowed him for selling copies of Contact. Nyanga leader Christopher Mlohoti visited the LP office soon after the Africanist break-away, and was apparently greatly encouraged by his reception. Everatt quotes Duncan's satisfaction at the 'happy and most effective partnership' which grew from their shared antipathy to socialism.7

Reacting to Karis and Gerhart's contention that 'townsmen' formed the social basis of the Poqo movement which later developed from the PAC, Lodge stresses that 'the Cape Pan-Africanists were more broadly socially representative than this description implies. ... It would appear from the very incomplete evidence available that the PAC succeeded in evoking support from a broad cross-section of the Cape Town African community'.0 He suggests that what could be termed 'old guard! ANC defectors comprised the original grassroots leadership,21 and traces the consolidation of the movement through the establishment of branches in squatter-camps and locations throughout the region. About one thousand members had been recruited in the Peninsula by the end of 1959, but Lodge says that the PAC 'did not appear to have had an enormous impact on the African population. Initial enthusiasm seems to have waned'.02

The beleaguered local Congress Alliance continued during the first half of 1959 to mount largely ineffectual and usually issue-related protests against the onslaught of apartheid. A local Drop the Treason Trial Committee attracted crowds of hundreds to meetings in Langa, Nyanga and Kensington at the beginning of the year.88 The local press reported ANC meetings during February and March on the Grand Parade and in Nyanga, both resolving inter alia to call on the government to halt the ongoing destruction of African families by repealing the Urban Areas Act.94

At a meeting in the original Africanist stronghold of Nyanga, attended by regional committee members and an inspectorate committee from Cape headquarters, the depleted ANC merged its three former Nyanga branches, in accordance with a provincial conference ruling that only one branch could exist in each area. While the ANC provincial committee considered an appeal against the merger on the grounds that the area was divided into districts one and a half miles apart,5 the Africanists made significant gains particularly among the displaced squatters in Nyanga West, which was soon (according to Lodge) the best-organised PAC branch in the Peninsula.9

With police approval, Rogers refused repeated requests from the ANC and the ANC-oriented Vigilance Committee for permission to hold meetings in Langa.87 The right to hold such meetings was eventually established in September, when the ANC went ahead with an illegal meeting as a test of the ban's legality.87 The Golden City Post (a Johannesburg newspaper which, as Rogers reminded the Town Clerk, was usually biased against the author ities') published a stolen report of this poorly-attended meeting, at which even police assistance in al iing the volume of singing failed.

382 distract the crowd watching a nearby rugby-match.'89 While illegality and close monitoring by the police could partly account for this evident lack of interest, the boycott of Nationalist products announced in mid-1959 seems to have contributed to growing local alienation from the ANC and sympathy for the PAC. One week after a 'mass national conference' of the ANC in Johannesburg at the end of May carried Resha's suggestion
that a potato boycott be instituted in protest against 'the bestial treatment of African farm labourers', an ANC meeting in Nyanga East resolved to boycott 'European' shops as from 26 June. According to information received by the Chief Bantu Affairs Commissioner, this meeting further supported proposals for a stayaway and a public burning of women's registration documents on that date. The national boycott of potatoes was in fact expanded into a 'wider boycott of the products of Nationalist-controlled firms' as from 26 June, but the ANC leadership did not endorse the locally-favoured stronger action.'

The 'Cape Peninsula ANC' issued a pamphlet calling on supporters to observe 26 June as 'a day of self-denial', and to attend a mass meeting in the Drill Hall on the following Sunday. A number of products to be boycotted along with potatoes were listed on this and a second supplementary pamphlet. These included various brands of canned fish and fish-meal, as well as ten varieties of Rembrandt cigarettes and one brand each of tea and coffee.91 Regional secretary Joe Morolong, together with Sacpo's Alex la Guma and RL South editor Ronald Segal, were arrested while distributing these pamphlets in Nyanga in the middle of that month.2 (The Torch had two years previously condemned Segal's journal as a platform for Native Representatives and liberals).92

The Drill Hall meeting was subsequently disrupted by tear-gas. It continued on the Grand Parade, addressed by 'Treason Trialists' including Morolong and David Ngugunyeka.4 Morolong was banished to Vryburg during the following month, and provincial president Mpetha was served with a five-year banning-order as he bade him farewell at the station.5

Elements within the weakened local ANC were alleged to have returned to the violent picketing of shops in an attempt to sustain the consumer boycott,96 which was condemned by the PAC in a locally-distributed pamphlet attributed to its Johannesburg headquarters. This pamphlet proclaimed that 'the ANC is no longer fighting for the African people. It wants to kill the people! How can we live if we may not buy food? The ANC has been taken over by Communists. It is leading our people to disaster and death! .17 By the time that the boycott was called off nationally at the end of August,’ teams of volunteers had been

mobilised (particularly in Nyanga) to maintain its momentum." Lodge shows that this boycott did force the giant Langeberg Co-operative canners into negotiations with the Food and Canning Workers' Union, while also lowering potato prices and gaining farm-labourers some measure of protection against abuse." The ANC national annual conference on 12-13 December resolved to commence a campaign against the pass laws on 31 March, 1960, the anniversary of an early episode of pass-burning which took place in 1919. The PAC adopted a similar resolution at its first annual conference one week later, but did not specify the date on which its campaign would begin. Rather than the mere protests envisaged by the ANC, the PAC plan was for a general strike in which Africans would present themselves at police-stations without their pass-books and demand to be arrested. This strike was planned to continue until the pass-laws were repealed and Africans granted a minimum wage of 35 pounds per month." The PAC regional executive was replaced towards the end of January by a more militant group including Kgosa and Mlohoti. A mobilisation campaign was launched, which climaxed with mass meetings addressed by national leaders Sobukwe and Leballo. "2 PAC pamphlets headed 'Passes Must Go Now! No Bail! No Defence! No Fine!' advised local Africans to hoard food and money, in anticipation of the coming call to action. 103

The 1960 Anti-Pass Campaign

Tensions rose markedly in the Peninsula's African locations and squatter-camps at the beginning of 1960, following the PAC's call for a prolonged political strike to bury the pass-laws. Police patrols came under attack in
Langa and Windermere, but activists retained a residual faith in the politics of protest and petition. The Congress Alliance stepped up boycott-activities at this time. Cartons of 'Nationalist' cigarettes were burnt at a Sactu meeting in Salt River, and MacMillan's 'winds of change' speech fuelled a growing campaign against South African products in Britain.5

Uniformed Congress volunteers canvassed in Nyanga East against the imposition of passes on women, and a mass meeting demanded the repeal of all unjust laws.6 In Nyanga West, residents rallied behind the youth and the VC against the increasingly-brutal nature of the ongoing pass-raids.7 The state violence and political repression unleashed by the anti-pass campaign of the PAC put an end to decades of peaceful protest, while adding impetus and urgency to the international anti-apartheid movement.

The PAC's local campaign-preparations included public addresses during February by its fiery Transvaal-based president Robert Sobukwe and secretary Potlake Leballo. African males were urged to prepare for the call to immobilise the legal system by demanding arrest en masse, without defence or bail, for refusing to carry passes any longer.100 Enthusiastic local crowds were urged by these and local speakers to stay away from work until 'these fascist laws of a white minority pseudo-government' were repealed and the required minimum wage granted. 1t

It was announced three days beforehand that the planned action would commence on Monday 21 March. Local leaders stressed, at a series of large meetings in the Peninsula on the Sunday, that the campaign would be strictly non-violent, and that it formed part of a PAC* programme aimed optimistically at ending apartheid within the following three years. The ANC officially refused to take part, considering the plan ill-prepared and unlikely to succeed.110

The strike (which began on the morning of 21 March) is well documented in the secondary literature. Large crowds gathered early that day in Langa, Nyanga and Windermere. The 6,000 protesting men in Langa were dispersed by police without incident, while some 1,500 passless men from Nyanga unsuccessfully demanded to be arrested at the Philippi police-station. A smaller number marched on the Windermere police-station, but only the leaders were arrested (and subsequently released).

The crowd of up to 10,000 Africans from all parts of the Peninsula which assembled at Langa that evening (in defiance of a ban on further meetings) was baton-charged and then fired upon, inaugurating a night of rioting. Roux notes that Justice Diemont, who later conducted the unpublished official enquiry into these events, castigated PAC leaders for misleading their followers by falsely suggesting that the authorities would deliver a reply to popular demands at this meeting. The Diemont Commission found that two protesters were killed and 49 injured in this clash, together with a newspaper employee who was fatally injured by the enraged mob. These are the figures usually cited, but the PAC leader Philip Kgosana (who denied Diemont's charge of bad faith) insists in his published account that three supporters died. He says that one succumbed in the initial police action, the second later in hospital, and the third at the railway station as police pursued fleeing protesters. “Rogers confirmed in a memorandum to the Town Clerk that ‘three Bantu victims ... had been shot in the riot’.2 These man were named Khashi, Makiwane and Tshuma. A fourth victim, Ngcule, fell the following day.”21

Diemont condemned the undisciplined and indiscriminate use of force by the police. At the same time he accepted police evidence (given also in the resulting trials and inquests) that the resistance which met their initial baton-charge included not only 'a barrage of stones, half-bricks, bottles, pieces of iron and other missiles', but also smallarms fire.4 This finding (which made no attempt to explain the lack of serious injury among policemen) is overlooked in existing secondary accounts, although Gerhart stresses the general role in the PAC anti-pass campaign of large numbers of 'unruly action-oriented youths yearning to strike out at symbols of white authority in any possible way and on any pretext'.115
Rogers told the Diemont Commission that his subordinate McLaughlin had later exchanged shots with would-be arsonists creeping towards the municipal residences under cover of darkness.” The homes of 'Bantu' policemen had been attacked by that stage, and a number of public building torched or damaged: first the rent office, then the labour bureau, and thereafter the high school, library, civic hall, dining hall, post office and three churches. Order was restored by mid-night, with the assistance of a Defence Force armoured column which moved in to reinforce the police.’

The ensuing ‘three tense weeks of violence and confrontation’ in the Peninsula 'presented the biggest challenge which had faced the South African government since the Defiance Campaign in 1952';” Lodge and Kgosa provide detailed accounts of these events, differing most centrally and explicitly on the question of liberal involvement and direction. Lodge's analysis stresses undue liberal influence, relying partly on early accounts by Kgosa, but the latter's most recent version of these events vigorously refutes any such suggestion.”

Lodge and Kgosa differ also, but only by implication, regarding the ANC's role in this extended stay-away. Kgosa ignores his political rivals. He merely mentions that when he met Nationalist-supporting industrialist Anton Rupert at the height of the crisis at one of Patrick Duncan's dinnerparties (described also by Lodge, who provides a different date), ANC leader Thomas Ngwenya had 'sat there, smiling, as the racist capitalist babbled a lot of nonsense'.”20 Lodge stresses the 'closeness of the PAC to the Langa Vigilance Committee', without making the necessary point that this still-influential body was strongly ANC-oriented. He reveals that ANC deputy president Oliver Tambo paid a brief visit to Cape Town 'to help coordinate local ANC responses to the PAC campaign'. He mentions examples of practical co-operation and shows that PAC control over Langa was never as complete as was the case in Nyanga.2” Despite the level of co-operation achieved at the height of the stay-away, VC chairman Bell Ntshinga reportedly considered 'reasonably fair' the Diemont Commission's subsequent criticism of the PAC leadership along with the police.22

In an effort to break the strike, troops and policemen began a massive raid on the Langa hostels early in the morning on Tuesday 22 March. The Torch says that this

390 commenced with rifle-fire raking the hostel-windows, following an unheeded warning to vacate the premises immediately. Lodge mentions that 'policemen burst into rooms and beat up anyone they found in them', while Kgosa reveals that doors and windows were smashed in the process, and that workers thus flushed out were herded onto trains for despatch to their places of work.24 An estimated two thousand who eluded the drag-net were pursued through the bushes beyond Vanguard Drive with sporadic machine-gun and rifle-fire, alarming residents of neighbouring Pinelands. Strikers were reportedly also shot at in Epping and Nyanga,”2 which Worrall was advised by police not to enter early the following morning. 126

According to his own account, Kgosa boarded one of the city-bound trains after narrowly evading capture, 'giving orders to the men that as soon as we reached town, we would not go to our work places but would invade town and see to it that nobody worked'. This apparently resulted in the closing of most central businesses, and in African dockworkers joining the strike.27 Kgosa took the opportunity that afternoon of visiting Patrick Duncan, who the following day pledged Liberal Party assistance in feeding residents of the strike-bound locations. The two met again on Thursday 24 March at the Contact offices, after Kgosa had negotiated with New Age editor Brian Bunting for a truck-load of food from the congress of Democrats. Duncan's strong disapproval of any dealings with former Communists resulted in COD members being barred from the locations by the PAC-oriented youth gangs which had seized effective control. Everett quotes from Duncan's diary 'that Bunting was deeply hurt and aggrieved by the way that the left was totally isolated in Cape Town. I believe that this is the first time for thirty years that it has happened.'“

...
Kgosana's most recent account incorrectly suggests that these meetings with Duncan and Bunting occurred on the first day of the strike. He places himself in Langa on the Thursday, listening to Black Sash leader Eulalie Stott's protests against the continuation of the strike, and eventually accepting an offer of food from her organisation. Some one hundred volunteers were arrested at the central Caledon Square police-station after a march from Langa that Thursday, and a crowd of up to 5,000 demonstrated there on the following day. Kgosana was taken into custody but soon released, along with Thursday's volunteers, after negotiations initiated by Duncan. Kgosana claims to have been angered by Duncan's alleged effrontery in presuming to act for the PAC, but Lodge shows that Kgosana himself had telephonically summoned his liberal mentor to the scene prior to being arrested.

These negotiations with the police resulted not only in the release of prisoners, but also in regional police commissioner Colonel Terblanche announcing a one-month moratorium on pass-arrests in the Peninsula. The moratorium was officially extended nation-wide that evening, as the first concession to African opinion ever made by the National Party government. PAC control over the distribution of food supplies trucked in under LP, BS and Sacpo auspices that weekend strengthened the Africanist influence in the townships, while Duncan and his Contact group helped create channels of communication between the previously uncoordinated PAC committees in Nyanga East, Nyanga West and Langa. Duncan urged the Nyanga East committee to ensure that the barricades still blocking roads in that location were removed, and he assured Colonel Terblanche of liberal support as long as the police restricted themselves to humane methods of peace-keeping.

Terblanche apparently assisted Duncan and Kgosana to procure a public address system for the funeral of three riot-victims on Monday 28 March. This coincided with an ANC-initiated national stay-away to mourn the martyrs of Sharpeville and Langa, which was (according to Lodge), 90% successful in Johannesburg, Port Elizabeth and Durban. The majority of local Africans had already been on strike for a week, and less than 5% were reportedly at work on the Monday, alongside growing numbers of 'Coloured' scabs. Karon shows that many local 'Coloureds' did observe this one-day stay-away, and that most shops and half the schools in the Peninsula's 'Coloured' areas were closed, despite the NEUM's condemnation of the strike as 'adventurist'. Lodge says that the funeral-crowd included many ANC supporters, while Karis and Gerhart comment that no urban African population had ever been "so solidly united in its determination to defy white authority'. The proceedings remained peaceful (despite sporadic stoning of vehicles along Vanguard Drive), in contrast to the situation in the city centre and Worcester, where the forceful breaking-up of protests led to incendiaryism that night in District Six and in Worcester's Zweletemba location. Further demonstrations were held in Stellenbosch and Grabouw.

Lodge says that many ANC supporters burnt their passes on this Day of Mourning in the Transvaal, where attacks on scab-workers and public-buildings resulted in the suspension of trainservices. Gerhart quotes Minister of Justice F Erasmus arguing in parliament on the following day, during the second reading debate on the Unlawful Organisations Bill (which sought to ban the ANC and the PAC), that these organisations aimed 'to bring to its knees any White Government in South Africa which stands for White supremacy ... [They] do not want peace and order; what they want ... is ... our country!' Only the Progressive Party and the three Native Representatives voted against this measure, which was duly passed, and came into operation on 6 April.
country's 300-odd magisterial districts on Wednesday 30 March, and some 1,500 activists and sympathisers were arrested nation-wide (more than 230 of them in the Peninsula). Police moved in force into Langa and Nyanga, attempting to break the strike with extreme brutality. This was answered by the well-documented 'march of the 30,000' residents of these locations into the city-centre, where Kg. sana gave the order to disperse outside Caledon Square, in return for a promised meeting with the Minister of Justice. The day ended with Kgosana in prison (arrested on arrival for the expected meeting) and a cordon of heavily armed troops encircling the local locations.142

Would-be protest marchers were peacefully dispersed in Klipfontein Road and at Sakkieskamp in Wellington on the Saturday, while a 'white' school was torched in Eerste 3915 River. In Paarl, a sackful of passes was set alight outside the magistrates court (presumably by ANC supporters), and unruly elements in the location attacked the administration office, as well as a school and a shop. The stayaway had reportedly been called off in towns such as Stellenbosch, Worcester, Wellington and Grabouw by Monday 4 April, but the strikers were holding out in Paarl and in the Peninsula. Rogers reported hundreds of African workers returning by train to the reserves that weekend. Over two million man-hours had been lost in the Peninsula by that stage. The cost of the strike thus far was estimated at some two million pounds, with the docks idle and the building and engineering industries severely affected, together with the stock and property markets. H5

The truckloads of food (provided by religious bodies and the Red Cross in an operation co-ordinated by the Liberal Party) which had sustained many of the strikers during the previous week were banned from that Monday." The strike had almost collapsed by then in Langa, but in Nyanga West and Nyanga East the residents still refused solidly to leave for work before the daily early-morning deadline. Large-scale intimidation was allegedly responsible for this situation, which the security forces moved resolutely to remedy. "47 Leaflets dropped that morning from a police helicopter warned of drastic action against continued defiance."O

Lodge records that in F he mistakenly says was a restraint on the streets arbitrary beatings taking in fact received by characteristically focussed batons in the city centre police resorting to the use of siamboks and in Rondebosch, and on the of live ammunition in Nyanga. "O

Rogers told the NAC on the following day that his staff were still unable to enter Nyanga West." The police 'reign of terror' continued, and Langa had been sufficiently pacified by Thursday 7 April for its cordon to be lifted.152 1,500 suspects were arrested in Nyanga that day (of whom some 250 were detained), after resistance had been subdued by baton-charges and further gunfire. Job-attendance figures were sufficiently boosted for the remaining cordons of tr.-,ps t.-, be withdrawn on the following day, when the new law banning the ANC and the PAC came into effect.4 Colonel Terblanche was able to report on Monday 11 April that the crisis had passed, and the pass-laws were again being enforced in the Western Cape. 'Minister of Justice Erasmus informed a press conference that intimidation, allegedly involving beatings on the hands and feet, had been behind the unrest. A number of men were brought forward on crutches as evidence."5

The state of emergency was lifted in August, " but (as Lelyveld has noted) emergency powers had by that stage been 'incorporated into the structure of criminal law'. Draconian restrictions on political activity were thereafter regularly expanded during the following five years, transforming what had been a racially-segregated authoritarian society into a fully-fledged police state.O

New strategies of resistance arose in the hardened political climate. These are discussed in the following chapter.
4. BCZA 87/66, 9022-3, quoting Turok's speech at a meeting in Stellenbosch on 4 Nov. 1954.
5. Schreiner, 'Thina Singoomama', 93.
8. BCZA 87/78, Tshunungwa's report to National Head Office, 16 Nov. 1955, 4.

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24. GN 6/10 and BAAB 44, Western Province Vigilance Associations' secretary A Jack to TC, 10 Feb. 1955; GN 6/10 and BAAB 44, Acting TC to A Jack, 19 Feb. 1955; BAAB 44, A Jack to Rogers, 13 Mar. 1955; ibid, Rogers to A Jack, 14 Mar. 1955; ibid, unaddressed invitation to 11 December meeting at Langa Administration Office board-room to hear address by FN Malan, 9 June, 1955; ibid, list of those present at this meeting, 11 June, 1955.

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37. Torch, 18 June, 1957; New Age, 20 June, 1957. Schreiner says incorrectly that the pledges were handed to Verwoerd's secretary.
64. GN 9/20/14 and BAAB 146, Worrall (for Rogers) to TC, 22 Apr. 1958; Kingwill, ‘The ANC’, 80.

64. GN 9/20/14 and BAAB 146, Worrall (for Rogers) to TC, 22 Apr. 1958; Kingwill, ‘The ANC’, 80.

69. Lodge, Black Politics, 214; Karis and Gerhart, Challenge and Violence, 314.
73. Lodge, Black Politics, 214; Karis and Gerhart, Challenge and Violence, 314.

89. Golden City Post, 13 Sep. 1959; BAAB 146, Rogers to TC, 15 Sep. 1959.
90. Karis and Gerhart, Challenge and Violence, 292; BAAE: 140 (volume 2), Chief Bantu Affairs Commissioner WC de Wet to Rogers, 22 June, 1959.
conference is given in Kgosana, Lest We Forget, 15. 102. Lodge, Black Politics, 215; Cape Times, 15 Feb. 1960. 103. BAAB 201, undated pamphlet issued by PAC national executive.


115. Gerhart, Black Power, 239. See also Karis and Gerhart, Challenge and Violence, 335.


130. Kgosana, Lest We Forget, 26-9; Lodge, Black Politics, 218-9.

131. Cape Times, 28 Mar. 1960 refers to a lorry-load of food collected by Sacpo and sent to Langa for distribution by the PAC.


133. Lodge, Black Politics, 224.


144. GN 2/3/1/2, NAC minutes, 5 Apr. 1960. 2; Cape Times, 2 Apr. 1960.


This chapter shows how local resistance was crushed during the first half of the 1960s, allowing state policy to develop in the oppressive direction outlined in the following two chapters. The analysis begins by outlining the situation which existed in the aftermath of the revolt discussed in Chapter 8. It moves on to discuss the aborted stay-away in May 1961, and the emergence of armed cells among ANC and PAC supporters. Two concluding sections focus on the last-ditch non-cooperation campaign organised by the ANC-aligned African Youth League, and the rise of conservatism following the inevitable clamp-down.

The Aftermath of the Unrest

This outburst against oppression in March 1960 cost local Africans dearly. Many reportedly lost their jobs as a result of the stay-away. Rogers insisted on sacking 36 of the CC's 'Bantu' labour-force for merely supporting the strike, but victimisation of this sort seems to have mainly affected those detained during the state of emergency.

Many such political prisoners simply 'disappeared', as the police were under no obligation to inform relatives of their incarceration, and the press was prohibited from publishing their names. At least 100 alleged 'tsotsis' were railed, under heavy guard, to a rural prison near East London for the duration of the emergency, after a 'special court' session in mid-May. Several anxious mothers, assisted by the SAIRR, petitioned the Minister of Justice and issued writs of habeus corpus against the Prisons Department; and the issue was subsequently raised in parliament.

Following the unrest and the banning of organisations (mentioned in the previous chapter), the authorities clamped down heavily on political activity in the locations. When the LP approached Rogers in July for permission to hold a meeting in Langa, the officer in charge of the local police station advised that although the 'Liberal Party as such has not been banned ... we fail to see why they should be allowed to address the Bantu people of Langa, seeing that the Bantu are no longer represented in Parliament, and they have no vote'. The Chief Native Commissioner, for his part, ruled that no 'non-Native' was to be allowed into Langa on the day of the proposed meeting, which was consequently cancelled under protest. The Liberals were told to direct their complaints to the central authorities.

The Cape Division of the LP planned another meeting in Langa in September (after the lifting of the state of emergency), but this was banned by the Wynberg magistrate on the advice of Rogers and the District Commandant of Police. Rogers explained that there was an 'undercurrent of tension' in the location, fuelled by the anger of recently-released ex-detainees at being held for months without trial. Mayor Newton-Thompson refused to meet a deputation demanding that the CC should refuse to implement illiberal measures which denied the right of free association to Africans. The authorities subsequently forestalled LP meetings planned for Langa and Nyanga West in April and August 1961 by barring entry to non-residents of the locations.

It was not only national political organisations which were affected by the ban on meetings. When the Vigilance Committee of Nyanga West (the one location to which public political activity seems to have been largely confined during this period immediately following the rebellion) requested permission to hold a public meeting in November, Rogers ruled that this could not be allowed 'as no provision is made in the Natives (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act, No. 25 of 1945, for the establishment and recognition of vigilance associations...'. It was 'left to the women of Nyanga West to deliver the residents' protests. The
women's deputation was told by location superintendent Goosen that police activities were outside the jurisdiction of the City Council.

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The Nyanga West VC had become embroiled by that stage in a boycott of that location's four official shops. This resulted from the municipal Native Administration Department requesting police action against illegal traders in November. Prices apparently rose as a result in the official shops, and illegal traders were convinced that the four shopkeepers concerned (including the only legal butcher) were behind the renewed attempt to stamp out the informal sector. The boycott commenced at the end of January, following the distribution of pamphlets saying that the butcher and the shops must sell to their Dutchmen ... They are boycotted as from Monday the 30th January, 1961. If a person is seen going to buy, well we do not know. He himself knows because he will be betraying the African people.

At a no-longer-banned public meeting convened by the VC one week later, a six-month boycott was announced and speakers demanded that the location should be run by the residents themselves, not by the 'European' municipality and the police with whom the favoured shopkeepers colluded.

Municipal officials provided the police and the licencing authorities with a list of illegal traders (including an L Phillips - presumably the former Communist leader) who were said to be behind the boycott. Rogers reported to the District Commandant in March that a meeting had recently been convened by the VC at which the lives of boycott-breakers had been threatened. He suggested that this organisation's minute-book might contain evidence of subversive activities, and in this regard gave the address of its secretary, Elias Zuba. Rogers at the same time issued a circular, in English and Xhosa, calling on victims of intimidation to come forward. When the shop-boycott showed no sign of abating by mid-May, Rogers called for police action against illegal traders and the 'politically-inspired' unruly youths allegedly intimidating prospective customers. 10

This local shop-boycott was overshadowed at the end of that month by renewed conflict over an anti-republic stayaway decided on by an ANC-dominated 'All-in African Conference' in March. The controversial May 1961 stay-away is the subject of this chapter's following section.

The May 1961 Stay-Away

The organisational methods of protest politics (with publicly-elected leaders openly convening public meetings, rallies and conferences) were fraught with difficulties once popular organisations were declared illegal. Although existing committee-structures continued to function at first under various guises, the shift towards revolutionary strategies during the early 1960's called for the painful transformation of ANC and PAC branches into networks of underground insurrectionary cells. While the Pan-Africanists remained apparently inactive locally until 1962, the Congress, with its far lozinger organisational tradition, began slowly to revive after the lifting of the state of emergency. Its recovery owed as much to the old visible methods of organisation as it did to the much-discussed Mandela Plan's suggested guidelines for working underground under conditions of illegality. 12

The first public meeting of the Congress camp was convened by Sactu on the Grand Parade at the beginning of September, to welcome ex-detainees back into circulation. 13

Former Langa branch secretary Cecil Yakobi, an undercover policeman who had been detained along with the rest to maintain credibility, later claimed to have attended a reception for released detainees in a hall in Salt River. A statement given to his interrogators in 1963 by a detainee named Eddie Siboza (and subsequently disowned in court by its allegedly-coerced author) similarly mentions a multiracial Salt River meeting, chaired by Thomas Ngwenya, at which ANC members were exhorted to work for the movement's revival. 14

Early in 1961, Ngwenya and Welcome Zihlangu established an African General Workers' Union, through which support was subsequently rallied for Sactu and the broader Congress.
movement. Karon reveals that the CPC (assisted by the C:OD) assumed a leadership role locally while the banned ANC began to gather its forces. He mentions mass-meetings convened by the CPC in October and November 1960, to protest respectively against the white electorate's decision to leave the Commonwealth, and against the harsh suppression of the Mpondo revolt in Transkei.

The urgency of such issues gave rise to a 'Consultative Conference' in Johannesburg in December, at which a broad spectrum of African leaders decided to convene a larger and more representative gathering in Pietermaritzburg in March, to organise support for a national constitutional convention. Hopes of unity were soon dashed, however, by LP suspicions of a hidden communist agenda. A locally distributed pamphlet specifically decried Patrick Duncan's allegedly divisive attitude, and called on all Africans to 'work towards arranging for delegates to travel to Maritzburg'.

A Cape Town delegation did attend the ensuing ANC-dominated 'All-in' conference. Here some 1,400 representatives from a wide spectrum of organisations resolved to stage country-wide protests (as part of a broader campaign of non-cooperation with the authorities) if the government refused to convene a constitutional convention before 31 May, the date on which South Africa was due to become a republic. Briefly emerging from underground for this gathering, ANC leader Nelson Mandela announced that

the planned action would take the form of a three-day general strike. He was elected secretary of the National Action Council which would direct the campaign. A series of mass-meetings on the Grand Parade drummed up local support in the interim. Karon mentions a CPC meeting in commemoration of the victims of Sharpeville and Langa, which attracted almost 2,000 people on 21 March. This was followed by an anti-republic protest in early April, also organised by the CPC, at which a crowd of at least 5,000 resolved to support the expected strike-call. Up to 10,000 demonstrators declared their support for a national convention at an 'Africa Day' rally subsequently convened by the LP. This was addressed by Zolli Malindi and C Mase of the newly-formed African General Workers' Union, as well as by Liberals and representatives of the CPC and the COD. A meeting of 4,000 Muslims similarly backed the proposed protest-action.

A massive show of force by the police and the army, involving some 10,000 arrests country-wide during May, failed to weaken the resolve of the disenfranchised communities. Clandestine ANC meetings were by then being held at night in the bushes surrounding the local locations, and pamphlets warning of unspecified consequences for those who ignored the strike call were handed out for distribution (allegedly by Sactu leader Looksmart Ngudle) at one such meeting in Nyanga West on 20 May. Elijah Loza (another Sactu activist) was one of two men arrested later that night, when police interrupted a group of men sticking these leaflets under the doors of township-dwellings.

Rogers issued a leaflet of his own in response, assuring residents of the two City Council locations of police protection against intimidators. Besides Rogers' contribution, a second anti-strike pamphlet was issued by the PAC, urging its supporters to avoid becoming 'Russian slaves' by ignoring the allegedly cowardly ANC leaders' call for a stay-away. Those who supported the Congress Alliance by striking would show themselves to be against the PAC, and the pamphlet darkly hinted that 'we know what to do with our enemies.' Lodge cites a 'statement signed by a Langa PAC member which condemns the (coloured) Non European Unity movement of distributing anti-strike leaflets in the PAC's name'. He suggests though that this claim merely reflected a split between moderates and extremists within the PAC ranks.

Whatever the case may be, few local Africans (and a surprisingly large number of 'Coloureds') participated in this national stay-away, which proved of shorter duration than anticipated. Mandela ended the strike on the second day, apparently misled by press reports which deliberately masked the fact that industry and commerce were severely affected not only in the Peninsula but also in Johannesburg, Durban and Port Elizabeth.
Unruly elements, either disappointed at the poor turnout among local Africans or disillusioned with the old methods of struggle, struck more directly at the authorities. Files were destroyed by fire at the Bantu Affairs Commissioner's office in Salt River on the first night of the strike (Monday 29 May), and at the municipal Native Affairs Department's branch office in Retreat on the second night. There were also reports of sporadic stoning of buses. Such attacks on the infrastructure of control and exploitation became more organised and more frequent with the formation of armed underground cells within the ranks of both ANC and PAC supporters.

The Advent of Underground Armies: Umkhonto we Sizwe and Poqo

Both the ANC and the PAC shifted towards strategies of violent resistance following this strike. While the isolated PAC moved towards unmitigated terror (practiced in this region by its off-shoot named Poqo), the Congress Alliance turned to arms less totally, remaining committed to the campaign of non-cooperation launched by the National Action Council.

A mid-1961 meeting of representatives of the Congress-aligned organisations officially decided to establish an armed liberation force, following a resolution along these lines by the South African Communist Party the previous August. Barrell reveals that a regional command structure of this embryonic armed wing (named Umkhonto we Siswe - the 'Spear of the Nation') was formed during the second half of 1961. The two men who assumed command of military activities in the Western Cape were Sactu leader Looksmart Ngudle and former Communist provincial Native Representative Fred Carneson. In an extremely difficult political climate, local MK operatives joined the national campaign of sabotage directed at installations of the racially-exclusive central and local authorities. Lodge says that the subsequent indictment against the underground army's high command listed 35 such attacks in Cape Town between December 1961 and the middle of 1963.

An Umkhonto we Sizwe recruitment-drive was exposed in March 1962, when an apparently-routine late-night police patrol stumbled upon a gathering of some three hundred men near the hostels. Shots were apparently exchanged before petrol bombs hit and destroyed one of the police vehicles, whose occupants were then attacked with stones and knives. Six 'Bantu' policemen were wounded, one (a Sergeant Moyi) fatally. It was rumoured that two Langa Youth League members also died in this clash.

Ndzima Isaac Mtsekana, the reputed leader of the 'antipolice terrorists' allegedly involved, was killed in the Langa hostels when he reportedly resisted arrest in early April. A number of Congress activists (including Looksmart Ngudle, Elijah Loza, Simon Xamlashe, Gilbert Hani, Mountain Qumbela, Archibald Sibeko and Charlie Makholiso) subsequently faced charges of incitement.

The Cape Town locations were by late 1962 reportedly 'being denuded of activists as they went for guerrilla training abroad'. Two men who left during June for three months' military training in Ethiopia appeared as state witnesses in a 1964 trial of local ANC leaders, after falling into the hands of the Rhodesian police at Bulawayo station and re-entering the country as prisoners. Part of their testimony was that Ngudle and Mountain Qumbela had been their local recruiters, and had used Archie Sibeko's house for this purpose. Sibeko was convicted in August of furthering the aims of the ANC, and he fled into exile when his appeal failed. Ngudle and Qumbela were able to continue with their political activities (both underground and overt) for another year. Ngudle brushed up against the law once more in December, when police discovered a military-training camp being held miles from the nearest road in a bushy area near Mamre. African Youth League members were evidently being instructed there in such skills as square-bashing, motormechanics, duplication of documents, field-communications and also allegedly petrol-bomb making, by 'Comrade Commandant' Dennis Goldberg and 'Comrade Sergeant' Ngudle, assisted by Albie Sachs and certain CPC activists.

Umkhonto was not the only secret army then recruiting in the local townships. Lodge quotes a leaflet distributed in Nyanga in December 1961, announcing that 'Freedom comes after bloodshed. Poqo has started.' Karis and Gerhart note that 'much intimidation and petty corruption accompanied the collection of dues of two shillings and sixpence' in Poqo's 1962 recruitment campaign. At the beginning of May, six
weeks after the above-mentioned Umkhonto attack on the police patrol, resistance to forcible recruitment by this new millenarian off-shoot of the Pan-Africanist Congress led to sporadic clashes over an entire weekend in Langa's 'bachelor' quarters. The police killed one man and injured two when they were reportedly attacked as they moved in to restore order on the Monday evening, and Rogers subsequently issued an appeal to residents to support the police by reporting any further incidents of intimidation. Gerhart says that, in the new terrorist movement with its 'minimum of formal leadership and organization', the PAC had been 'reincarnated minus its top level of more sophisticated leadership, allowing the urge towards a

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Fanonesque apocalypse to overwhelm all other considerations of ideology, strategy or even organizational survival'.40 Lodge stresses, though, that Poqo did succeed in developing a structure of underground cells, often organised on a 'homeboy' basis, in the local 'bachelor' quarters (particularly in Langa). From these bases the movement's influence spread as new cells were formed among migrants in outlying suburbs, towns and rural areas, amid preparations for the expected bloody uprising which would somehow win back Africa.41

Karis and Gerhart contradict this view of the movement's social composition, asserting in a footnote that 'Poqo members were not mainly migrants to the Western Cape from the Transkei, as is sometimes suggested'. Apparently relying only on an interview with the anthropologist Archie Mafeje (who ignores politics completely in his co-authored work on social groups in Langa),42 they insist that a substantial proportion were urbanised (or at least semiurbanised) and relatively well-educated youths.43 This is how Lodge characterises the 'clandestine Transvaal PAC', which he says was 'strikingly different to the Cape Poqo' in terms of its membership profile.44 There seems actually to be a degree of dissonance between Karis and Gerhart's analysis of the PAC and their analysis of Poqo. In their discussion of the 1960 strike, they ascribe a supportive and contradictory role to the

'unruly action-oriented youths - the tsotsi or pettygangster element', whose reckless militancy soon became uncontrollable. Yet these same tsotsis are alleged to have formed the core of the Poqo movement. Relying on Mafeje's oral account of the difficulties sometimes experienced in recruiting migrants, these authors say that Poqo 'activists (often called tsotsis, or gangsters, by the migrants) began to intimidate and even terrorise the countrymen'.43 Albie Sachs, who acted for the defence in a number of Poqo court-cases before being forced into exile, confirms Lodge's view that, in the Western Cape, the PAC's 'strength lay mainly among the migrant workers'. According to Sachs (as quoted in Kingwill), Poqo was indeed organised on a 'homeboy' basis. He suggests that it may have 'represented a brave but misplaced attempt to apply rural ideology and methods of struggle in an urban setting'.46 The movement's overt activity seems in any event to have been limited to the physical elimination of its enemies. Lodge says that sporadic attacks on policemen and informers began in Paarl in April 1961, and spread to Langa one year later. He mentions also 'defensive murders' carried out by Poqo in the local townships during 1962-3, as well as the involvement of local cells in repeated attempts on Matanzima's life.47 Gerhart reveals that Poqo members had by mid-1963 'murdered a handful of whites, some dozen or more

African policemen and police informers, and ... a number of Transkeian chiefs and headmen'.4 Lodge comments on the failure of local Poqo leaders to organise promised diversions on the night in November 1962 when Poqo members in Paarl (provoked beyond endurance by a corrupt and repressive municipal Bantu Administration Department) staged a premature and pointless armed uprising.49 The Torch reported a series of police raids on Poqo suspects in Langa and Nyanga following this bloody debacle.0 Presumably due at least in part to the extent of Poqo support, the local ANC had little success in creating the underground structures envisaged in the Mandela Plan.51 The Congress consequently complemented its campaign of sporadic sabotage with tried and tested overt methods of protest while the authorities geared up for further repressive measures during the first half of 1962.

The African Youth League and the Campaign of Non-Cooperation
ANC president Albert Lutuli emphasised that the Congress Alliance's turn to arms by no means implied abandonment of the traditional method of ... militant, nonviolent struggle, and of creating in the process a spirit of militancy in the people'.

It may seem surprising that the authorities actually continued to tolerate a certain amount of open political activity in the locations. Roux suggests that the security police had deliberately held back to a certain extent during the 1950's, in the interests of gathering information and identifying leaders. This certainly seems to have been the case in Cape Town during the early 1960's.

The focus of local resistance shifted to concerns more parochial than the republican question following the abovementioned aborted strike of May 1961, as the promulgation in mid-1961 of the new Liquor Act (No. 72 of 1961) and the Urban Bantu Councils Act (No. 79 of 1961) concentrated attention on the proposed establishment of beerhalls and Urban Bantu Councils. The newly-formed ANC-aligned African Youth League took the lead in a non-cooperation campaign which enjoyed considerable support in the three local locations.

The new legislation envisaged Urban Bantu Councils being established through resolutions passed by existing Advisory Boards, which had however collapsed in the Cape Town locations due to a total boycott following the March 1960 revolt. Although (as will be shown) the municipal authorities did manage to scrape together a tame Advisory Board in Langa towards the end of 1964, bureaucratic inertia prevented further development along these lines. The introduction of Urban Bantu Councils was consequently delayed for more than a decade.

The procuring of liquor-revenues was of more immediate concern, as funds were urgently required to administer 'Bantu Affairs' at the levels of both local and central government. (The latter was currently absorbing 80% of such revenues generated by local authorities). The CC therefore decided on a referendum to ascertain how many township residents would accept any form of municipal liquor-supply. As discussed in Chapter 6, Rogers had in 1957 advised against holding a referendum on the beerhall question. He had pointed instead to the example of Paarl, where the municipality had resolved to establish the Western Cape's first beerhall without any reference to the views of location residents (other than a largely-nominated Advisory Board). This Paarl facility had opened in 1959.

The Langa branch of the African Youth League convened a public meeting in early July 1961 to protest against the proposed Urban Bantu Councils and beerhalls. Speakers at this meeting (including Looksmart Ngudle and Zwelakhe Simon Xamlashe, a former ANC member then serving on the VC), condemned the extension of the hated Bantu Authorities system from the rural areas into the towns, as well as the suggestion that Africans might settle not for full democratic rights but for the so-called privilege of drinking municipal beer and 'European' liquor. Resolutions were passed in favour of a national convention and rejecting the new legislation emerging from the unrepresentative white parliament.

Two public meetings, advertised as forming part of the National Action Council's non-cooperation campaign, were called by the Langa VC in August. The beerhall referendum and the intended introduction of Urban Bantu Councils were denounced at these meetings by leaders including Bell Ntshinga, Gilbert Hani, treason trialist David Ngungunyeka and Xamlashe. The latter wrote a letter to New Age severely criticising also the very rudimentary accommodation provided by employers for so-called 'bachelors'.

Following a similar meeting in Nyanga West towards the end of August, that location's Vigilance Committee wrote to Rogers condemning the 'slavish and oppressive' conditions under which residents were forced to live. The committee's letter voiced the residents' total rejection of both the envisaged new 'organs of oppression' and the CC's renewed attempt to introduce long-rejected beerhalls into the local townships.

A further meeting in Nyanga West during the following month also passed resolutions along these lines, while the COD urged the municipal authorities to press for the
extension to Africans of the right to 'full and equal participation' in civic affairs, and warned that the introduction of Urban Bantu Councils could well extend the ongoing violent conflict over Bantu Authorities into the urban areas."

Due to a boycott led by the Vigilance Committees, only just on 15,000 of the 25,000 adult residents of Langa and Nyanga West voted in the City Council’s liquor referendum. 11,167 voted against any form of municipal liquor-supply, with only 2,916 in favour.4 The Council thereupon decided that municipal control of 'European' liquor-sales would be the best system to adopt if the central authorities insisted on going ahead with this form of revenue-collection, without the consent of affected communities.”2

Anti-beerhall agitation led by the Nyanga West VC continued towards the end of that year,”6 and an AYL conference in January 1962 pledged support for the broader campaign of non-cooperation. On the Athlone District Commandant’s submission that ‘this organization is propagating the same teachings as the A.N.C.’, a meeting which the new youth body intended to hold that same month in Langa was banned. The organisers simply switched venues to Nyanga West, where local Youth League leader and Sactu activist Elijah Loza led the call for non-cooperation with the authorities.67

Conservative opposition to the re-emerging (though indirect) influence of the ANC had already surfaced by that stage in Nyanga West, where a group of aspirant businessmen

began in July 1961 to challenge the popular VC. Rogers helped draft the constitution of this so-called 'Civic Association', which declared its intention to 'cooperate with the City Council Authorities in an endeavour to achieve good relations between the City Council and the residents.' Rogers' previous efforts in this direction were mentioned in Chapter 4.

The entire audience reportedly walked out of this new body's first public meeting in January 1962, and Loza declared that 'in Nyanga West we have always opposed Government stooges and Bantu Councils. We see the Civic Association as a variant of these. We will not have it here at any price.'1 Civic Association chairman Albert Ncapaii (or Ncapai) wrote to Rogers and to Athlone District Commandant Rheeder urging strong measures against the VC, which he described as ‘a bunch of uncivilised, uneducated, uncultured barbarians’.70

Thousands gathered at two unannounced meetings, convened in Langa's bachelor area by that location's Youth League early in February. One of the key speakers was again Loza, who declared that Africans would 'accept nothing less than universal adult suffrage in a united South Africa' and denounced the Civic Association as a bunch of ambitious 'educated fellows with new cars'.1

Another Langa Youth League gathering later that month condemned self-government and the beerhall system, and called again for a national convention.72 The AYL was no less active in the Divisional Council location of Nyanga East, where Loza and fellow Sactu activist Howard Marawu were among the speakers at a meeting chaired by Mountain Oumbela at the beginning of March. The CDC had by this stage evidently also come out in favour of building a beerhall in that location.72

Further verbal attacks on the Nyanga West Civic Association, at subsequent meetings in that location and in Langa, led to a confrontation which Civic Association secretary JS Tulwana termed a ‘big knife war’, and to alleged damage to the property of Civic supporters. Tulwana urged strong action against the 'menace' of the VC, and his chairman Ncapaii expressed the conservative faction's frustration when Rogers adopted a low profile at subsequent talks in his office between the two sides.74

Further conflict was created by an attempt on the part of the NEUM to intervene in the developing situation. Isaac Tabata was reportedly 'forced to flee with a broken lip' from a meeting which ended in disorder in Langa during early March. Residents of the 'bachelor zones' had not forgotten a strike-breaking pamphlet warning against 'careerists, adventurers and self-styled messiahs' which Tabata had allegedly issued during the 1960 stay-away. A barracksresident explained to him roughly that 'people are tired of this big talk, all they want is FREEDOM NOW! FREEDOM IN OUR LIFETIME!'.73
The City Council's Native Affairs Committee (with the connivance of the Finance Committee) took
advantage of the factionalism in the locations by announcing plans in April for municipal liquor-outlets in
Nyanga West and Langa. This evoked a storm of ineffectual protest from liberal, religious and
temperence groups." When the Langa VC wrote to remind Rogers of the above-mentioned referendum-
result and to request an interview, he replied dismissively that the only recognised channels for such
communication were the defunct Advisory Boards."
Although the Sabotage Act of June 1962 'meant that henceforth radicals could speak out in South Africa
only at the sufferance of the minister of justice',7 the AYL was able to respond with a renewed campaign
of agitation in July, after Minister de Wet Nel had (as will be discussed in the following chapter) unveiled
his department's repressive regional policy-prescriptions.
The first of these meetings took place on 1 July in Nyanga East, chaired by Qumbela and addressed by
(among others) Howard Marawu and Cecil Yakobi.7 (The latter, as revealed above, was later exposed as an
undercover security policeman). Further meetings followed at the Langa Main Barracks on 8 July, and in
Nyanga West one week later. Ngudle, Loza, Qumbela and Douglas Mangina addressed the

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Langa meeting.0 while speakers in Nyanga West included Jackson Tayo and Joseph Ndabezitha.91
The security police began at this point to tape-record these public gatherings, rather than continuing to rely
on unskilled African policemen translating from Xhosa to English, while taking notes in long-hand.
Douglas Mangina expressed the vain hope that the peoples' demands would be conveyed to Verwoerd
through these recordings,2 but the resulting poorly-translated transcripts would serve only as State
evidence when the Youth Leaguers were eventually brought to trial.
Exhumed for academic purposes, these records reveal the plight of closely-watched activists, isolated since
their constituency had been beaten into sullen submission. Attendance at these meetings was poor,
although they focussed on burning issues such as the 'homelands' policy, removals, and the renewed threat
of a municipal beerhall. Speakers could only reaffirm their commitment to socialism and their
determination never to surrender to apartheid.
The first tape-recorded meetings were held in Langa on 22 July, one in the morning at the Main Barracks,
and the second in the afternoon at Bunga Square. At the earlier meeting, Ngudle called for a boycott of
the planned beerhall, and lashed out at the allegedly parasitical capitalists whom he accused of
sheltering behind the Nationalist government. Douglas Manqina similarly railed
against 'the vultures, the greedy people, the capitalists', and called on workers to join trade unions.
Christmas Tinto supported this plea, stressing that capitalists were the real enemy, and not the policemen
they merely employed.02 Similar concerns dominated the meeting held in Bunga Square that afternoon.
Here Manqina emphasised that the opening of a beerhall would deprive widows of the pittances they were
able to earn from home-brewing. Jackson Tayo called on the youth to 'stand on their feet and fight for our
country'.4
The Youth League held another meeting at Bunga Square the following week. Ngudle declared at this
similarly militant meeting that the AYL intended to unite location residents by provoking the authorities into
renewed military action. He called on followers of Sobukwe to fight the enemy together with the followers
of Lutuli.05
At an anti-beerhall public meeting convened by the African Youth League in Nyanga East one week later,
Ngudle was quoted as saying: 'I am going to poke these bees and Saracens will come, and that will stop you
from standing afar. We shall come together. You can see the Nationalists are united. In 1899 they
were beaten by the English people and that caused them to unite'. Qumbela and Marawu pointed out that
the policemen who attacked residents in 1960 had not been interested in their victims' political
affiliations. Fence-sitters would not escape the expected reprisals."0

The AYL issued a press-statement demanding full rights of citizenship, and warning that 'an undying
hatred would be stirred up among Africans who were forced to leave the Western Cape'.07 At meetings
in Nyanga West on the morning of 9 September 1962, and in Nyanga East that afternoon, Ngudle and
Qumbela urged non-cooperation with the nefarious schemes of the central and local authorities."
Ignoring such protests, the CC had by the beginning of October ratified municipal involvement in the
manufacture, sale and supply of 'Bantu Beer'. Rogers advised that
'opposition including boycotts may be expected, but such initial difficulties will be overcome as in other large centres.’ Incendiary bombs exploded two weeks later in cities all over the country, coinciding with the appearance in court of the captured Mandela. Reported local targets included the Nyanga West administration building and post offices in Langa and Paarl. The home of a municipal registration-clerk who had recently hosted Matanzima was also attacked.90

In December, speakers at poorly-attended AYL public meetings in the local locations announced that a last-ditch campaign of defiance would be launched in 1963 against passlaws, beerhalls and Bantu Authorities. Speakers called for unity in the last-ditch battle to come, in which state violence would have to be met with revolutionary force, and appealed to the youth to join us because next year we are taking action. We have got work for the youth. We are going to teach them what to do.12 Loza warned that uncommitted bystanders would be the first victims of the Saracens in the expected confrontation.

Resolutions were passed totally rejecting passes, forced removals, Bantustans and beerhalls, and calling on Africans to unite and fight for freedom.”

A statement issued from underground by the CP's central committee at the end of February 1963 noted the ‘desperation and bitterness of the Africans in the Western Cape’ and revealed ‘proposals for mass pass burning, to be followed if needs be by a local general strike’. The communists urged discipline if such a campaign was not to degenerate into indiscriminate Poqo-style violence under the onslaught of the ‘savage reprisals’ which could be expected on the part of the police. Tactics of armed self-defence were advocated to protect participants in what would (in view of the disorganised state of the liberation movement) have to be an isolated campaign confined to the Western Cape region.4

Govan Mbeki was evidently sent by the Congress national leadership to calm Cape Town activists, who were said by secretary-general Walter Sisulu to be ‘seething and planning acts of violence’. The increasingly-desperate local militants were apparently persuaded to wait until preparations for a national anti-pass campaign could be completed during the first half of 1963.9

The outlawed ANC national executive declared in April that the government had ‘chosen the Western Cape and the Transkei as the battle fields in the fight between their forces of reaction and ours. We accept this challenge without regret’. While warning that ‘burning of passes requires a political crisis, and such a crisis must be built up’, the national leaders' statement conceded that ‘if the Western Cape is ready for action, ... they must go ahead. The other areas must double their pace so that action taken by one area must snow-ball all over the country’.

In a ‘strictly confidential’ memorandum issued towards the end of that month, the national executive requested ‘all regions and branches’ to prepare for an anti-pass campaign, which would escalate into a national general strike. The document explained that ‘this time we shall not expect the whole country to go into action on the same day. But as soon as action starts at any place the others should be ready to step in. The important thing is to take the enemy by surprise’.7

The planned anti-pass campaign was forestalled, however, by the mass arrests which followed the promulgation on 1 May of the General Laws Amendment Act (No. 37 of 1963). Under the provisions of this notorious ‘Ninety Days Law’, political suspects could be held, without trial or legal access, for repeated three-month periods of often-brutal interrogation. Karis and Gerhart reveal that 682 people were detained nation-wide in these circumstances during the following ten months.”0

Among the new law's victims were those local Congress leaders who had managed thus far to stay out of jail and avoid banishment or exile. An ANC pamphlet distributed locally in August swore that these latest arrests would not stop the struggle, and warned informers that they would be tracked down if it takes us five years or a hundred.”9

Ngudle was captured that same month in an Elsies River hide-out, along with David Singqomo and Balisane Jackson Tayo. A pistol, ammunition, and primitive bomb-making materials were found with them, as were a number of documents. These included a pencilled draft Xhosa-language pamphlet saying (according to the translation subsequently released by the police): ‘In the Western Cape a thousand of our leaders are in prison, but that has been of no avail since the fire is still burning. There is not sufficient
room for twelve million people in jails. Forward Africans! ... Let us unite and crush them against the wall'.

Ngudle died two weeks later in Pretoria, after intensive interrogation by his arresting officer, the Pretoria-based Detective-Sergeant Petrus Ferreira. His death was officially classified as a suicide.101 Pampallis notes that Ngudle was the 'first of a long line of detainees to die in detention as a result of their refusal to cooperate with the police'. He goes on to, say of the Congress Alliance

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that by 1966 'the entire leadership inside the country were either in prison or banned. Very little remained of the underground structures and communication with the external mission was difficult'.02 The PAC had been similarly smashed by that stage. Rumours of an apocalyptic national uprising (rivalling the ANC's more pragmatic plans) had been nipped in the bud with the arrest of 3,246 Poqo suspects between April and June 1963, following the confiscation of membership lists in Maseru.103 The crushing of militant resistance created a political vacuum which (in Cape Town at any rate) was soon filled by conservative elements. The concluding section of the chapter considers this development.

The Rise of Conservatism Following the Clamp-down

While the security forces laboured to extinguish the last sparks of resistance, the City Council, still without any official channel of communication with residents of the locations under its control since the above-mentioned boycott following the 1960 strike, began treating the unpopular Nyanga West Civic Association as a de facto Advisory Board. Civic Association representatives met Rogers in September to discuss not only the allocation of houses to its members as previously, but also such topics as the provision of shops, stop-streets, street lights and playgrounds, as well as the creation of links between the Civic Association and representatives of tribal chiefs.104 This cosy developing relationship was strained, however, when Rogers' Registration Officer McLachlan apparently accused the Civic Association of corruption concerning assistance to victims of the pass-laws.105 The Bantu Affairs Committee therefore instructed Rogers in mid-1964 to convene an evening meeting of prominent Langa residents (such as 'ministers, shopkeepers and nurses') in order to explore the possibility of re-establishing an Advisory Board after four years of boycott.105 This initiative bore fruit with the election in November of a new board, which held its first meeting in February of the following year.107 Members of the new AB noted Rogers' retirement with regret in June, expressing the hope that he would remain available for advice.*** A similarly close relationship soon developed with new Acting Director of Bantu Administration Worrall, who thanked Board members in September for helping to make Transkei Chief Minister Matanzima's recent return visit to Cape Town such a success. 109

The situation in Guguletu (the former Nyanga West) was somewhat more confused, and the CC decided not to establish an AB there, in view of the intended replacement of these bodies by Urban Bantu Councils.110 The Vigilance Committee in that location had by that stage degenerated into nothing more than a burial society headed by its secretary, Zuba. A new body, calling itself the Vigilant League of Decency, came into being, and eventually secured the stationery and rubber-stamps considered necessary for efficient functioning from the reluctant Zuba (who apparently found such items useful in his undertaking business). The Vigilant League also gained a measure of recognition from the CC, but Worrall stressed that this was conditional on its remaining non-political.” This provisional sanction was evidently withdrawn after repeated instances of thuggish behaviour on the part of the strongly anti-trotski League, which soon resorted to breaking the arms and legs of those who did not recognise its authority.”12 Worrall then took the initiative (in February 1966) in forming a more restrained conservative grouping, known at first as the Guguletu Civic and Welfare Association, which was chaired by the unpopular former Civic Association chairman, Albert Ncapayi. This new body aimed to assist the authorities in taking action against 'undesirable
Instead of employing physical violence to curb juvenile delinquency, this more sophisticated group advocated the repatriation of families with problem children. Members of the Langa Advisory Board and the Guguletu Civic and Welfare Association were among the 120 prominent Western Cape and Orange Free State Africans who were taken in May 1966 on a two-week tour of the Transkei and Ciskei 'Bantu homelands'. Their trip was subsidised by the City Council, and all concerned were evidently much impressed by the practical implementation of the universally-abhorred Bantustan system.

The Guguletu Civic and Welfare Association had by 1970 changed its name to the Guguletu Community Services Association, which was chaired by the former vice-chairman of the Vigilant League, Mr WS Gusha. Worrall reported that the Community Service Association members ‘assist this administration in all matters affecting the Guguletu residents’, and had been instrumental in forming a police reserve in the location. When the CC began considering the establishment of Urban Bantu Councils during that year, Worrall recommended that this body and the Langa AB could form the basis of the proposed new councils, which should (he stressed) not be granted anything more than advisory powers.

Worrall’s caution in this regard must have seemed justified when the Guguletu Community Services Association was moved to protest in the second half of 1972, after the City Council had consulted only with the Langa AB before promulgating rent-increases in Langa and Guguletu. This slight prompted the Community Services Association to request the establishment of an Urban Bantu Council as a formal channel of communication with the authorities. Gusha subsequently became chairman of the first local Urban Bantu Council, after the Native Administration Department staff of the CC and the CDC had been transferred to central-government controlled Cape Peninsula Bantu Affairs Administration Board in 1973. It was only during the country-wide unrest of 1976-7 that overtly-organised progressive leadership was able to re-emerge in the Peninsula's locations, with the formation of a 'Council of 15', presided over by former ANC provincial president Oscar Mpetha. The authorities had a free hand in the interim to impose apartheid policy on the subjugated Africans. This is discussed in Chapter 11, while the following chapter focusses on the development of policy between 1960 and 1965.

1. BAAB 201, CTMWA sec to CC Senior Staff Officer, 4 May, 1960; ibid, Rogers to TC, 9 May, 1960; Cape Argus, 19 Sep. 1960; Cape Times, 24 Sep. 1960.


9. BAAB G20, Rogers to SAP Athlone district commandant, 3 Feb. 1961 (with attached English translation of pamphlet); ibid, handwritten report on Nyanga West VA meeting, 7 Feb. 1961 (with list of illegal shopkeepers allegedly involved); ibid, Rogers to Athlone district commandant, 20 Mar. 1961; ibid, Rogers' circular, 20 Mar. 1961. 10. BAAB G20, Rogers to Athlone district commandant, 19 May, 1961; ibid, Rogers to Trade Licencing Section, Receiver of Revenue, 19 May, 1961.


12. Lodge, Black Politics, 75-6 and 231.


14. AR 444/64, State versus Mbolompo and 44 others, 217-28, (testimony of Bantu Constable C Yakobi); ibid, exhibit AZ, statement of E Sibozo, 8 Nov. 1963, 4-7. Yakobi says the meeting took place in the latter part of 1960, while Sibozo thinks that the meeting to which he referred took place 'on or about March or April', 1961. 15. AR 444/64, State versus Mbolombo and 44 others, 781 and 793 (testimony of Buchanan Ntongana). 16. Karon, 'Vryheid Nie Op 'n Skinkbord Nie', 143. 17. Karis and Gerhart, Challenge and Violence, 353-4; Lodge, Black Politics, 231-2.


19. AR 444/64, State versus Mbolombo and 44 others, 1005 (testimony of J Seitshegeo) and 1393 (testimony of A Gaika).


23. AR 444/64, State versus Mbolombo and 44 others, 879-81, (testimony of J Giladile), 963-5 (testimony of Bantu Sergeant A Masina), and 1347 (testimony of E Loza); SAAB 201, translation of undated Xhosa-language pamphlet entitled 'We Are Not Going'.

24. GN 2/3/1/8, Rogers to Acting TC, 24 May, 1961 (with attached circular 'To All Residents of Langa and Nyanga West Townships', 22 May, 1961). The circular is also in BAAB 201, without the covering letter. 25. Undated pamphlet entitled 'Poqo. Poqo. Poqo.', in Karis and Gerhart, Challenge and Violence, 639-40. (Also in BAAB 201). Karis and Gerhart trace this only to Port Elizabeth, but it was clearly distributed also in Cape Town. 26. T Lodge, 'The Poqo Insurrection', in Lodge (ed), Resistance and Ideology in Settler Societies, Johannesburg, Ravan, 1987, 185.

27. Lodge, Black Politics, 197; Karis and Gerhart, Challenge and Violence, 364.


34. AR 444/64, State versus Mbolombo and 44 others, 289-313 (testimony of Alfred Jantjies) and 327-338 (testimony of Isaac Rani); E Feit, Urban Revolt in South Africa, 19601964: A Case Study, Evanston, 1971, 246-7. 35. AR 444/64, State versus Mbolombo and 44 others, 1320 (testimony of Lettie Sibeko).
36. AR 444/64, State versus Mbolompo and 44 others, 678-93, (testimony of C Mboxele); 694-8 (testimony of Detective Sergeant Johannes Van Wyk); 926-32 (testimony of Cyril Davids); Feit, Urban Revolt, 225-8; V Alhadeff, A Newspaper History of South Africa, Cape Town, 1976, 93. Lodge, Black Politics, 243. 38. Karis and Gerhart, Challenge and Violence, 669. 39. AR 444/64, State versus Mbolompo and 44 others, Supreme Court judgement, 6-7. (Exhibit DW, statement by SACP Central Committee, Feb. 1963, 16 says more generally that Congress has long spoken about the M Plan. Of course, this important plan has yet to be carried out.) 52. Karis and Gerhart, Challenge and Violence, 651 and 799 (Lutuli's comment on the Rivonia Trial verdict, 12 June, 1964). 53. Roux, Time Longer Than Rope, 421-2. 54. Government Gazette 31, 5 July, 1961; Government Gazette 37, 7 July, 1961.


52. AR 444/64, State versus Mbolompo and 44 others, Supreme Court judgement, 6-7. (Exhibit DW, statement by SACP Central Committee, Feb. 1963, 16 says more generally that Congress has long spoken about the M Plan. Of course, this important plan has yet to be carried out.) 52. Karis and Gerhart, Challenge and Violence, 651 and 799 (Lutuli's comment on the Rivonia Trial verdict, 12 June, 1964). 53. Roux, Time Longer Than Rope, 421-2. 54. Government Gazette 31, 5 July, 1961; Government Gazette 37, 7 July, 1961.

55. GN 58, NAC's UBC sub-committee minutes, 14 Aug. 1961, 1; Cape Times, 18 Sep. 1961; GN 58, TC to Ass TC (Legal), 18 Sep. 1961; ibid, Ass TC (Legal) to TC, 22 Sep. 1961, 56. New Age, 10 Nov. 1960; Torch, 26 Dec. 1962. 56. New Age, 5 May, 1964; Cape Times, 7 June, 1961; GN 58, NAC minutes, 1 Aug. 1961, item 2; ibid, NAC minutes, 14 Sep. 1961, item 6; ibid, NAC minutes, 3 Oct. 1961, item 3; BAAB 44, Rogers to Langa VC chairman G3 Hani, 25 May, 1962;

57. GN 14/8/3 v1, Rogers to TC, 27 Feb. 1957; ibid, Rogers to NAC chairman, 20 May, 1957; GN 19/7/1 v1, TAC minutes, 12 June, 1959, 1. 60. AR 444/64, State versus Mbolompo and 44 others, 1458 (testimony of Z Xamlashe) shows that he joined the ANC in 1953.


64. AT McCutcheon, 'Liquor Legislation', in Wilson and Perrott (eds), Outlook on a Century, 502; Cape Times, 1 Sep. 1961; New Age, 7 Sep. 1961; GN 14/16, SA Temperance Alliance chairman to Mayor and City Councillors, 27 Apr. 1962.


70. BAAB G27, Nyanga West CA chairman to Rogers, 19 Jan. 1962 (which mentions a letter to Colonel Rheeder).  
71. AR 444/64, State versus W Mbolompo and 44 others, 100 and exhibit Z, (Bantu Detective-Sergeant L Jubase's notes on 4 Feb. 1962 meeting); New Age, 8 Feb. 1962.  
73. AR 444/64, State versus W Mbolompo and 44 others, 101-8 and exhibit AA, (Bantu Detective-Sergeant Jubase's notes of 4 Mar. 1962 meeting).  
74. BAAB G20 and G27, Nyanga West CA sec JS Tulwana to Rogers, 21 Feb. 1962; BAAB G27, Nyanga West CA chairman A Ncapai to Rogers, 8 Mar. 1962.  
75. New Age, 29 Mar. 1962, letter from AM Mangqekwana of Langa Main Barracks.  
76. Cape Times, 25 Apr. 1962; GN 14/16, Methodist Church (Wynberg and Simon's Town circuit) superintendent to Mayor, 26 Apr. 1962; ibid, Methodist Church Women's Auxiliary district president to Mayor, 26 Apr. 1962; ibid, Methodist Church (Christian Citizenship Department) sec to Mayor, 27 Apr. 1962; ibid, Women's Christian Temperence Union of Cape Province president to Mayor, 26 Apr. 1962; ibid, Women's Christian Temperence Union of SA superintendent to Mayor, 27 Apr. 1962; ibid, SA Temperence Alliance (Cape) chairman to Mayor, 27 Apr. 1962; ibid, Women's Christian Temperence Union (Wynberg branch) sec to Mayor, 27 Apr. 1962; ibid, National Council of Women of SA president to Mayor, 28 Apr. 1962; ibid, Religious Society of Friends clerk to Mayor, 29 Apr. 1962; ibid, Black Sash (Cape Western Region) telegram to Mayor, 30 Apr. 1962; ibid, National Council of African Women (Langa branch) to Mayor, 15 May, 1962; ibid, antiliquor deputation chairman to TC, 28 May, 1962; ibid, Western District Congregational Women's Association sec to Mayor, 13 June, 1962; ibid, Claremont Congregational Women's Association president to Mayor, 28 June, 1962; ibid, Rondebosch Congregational Church Women's Association sec to Mayor, 23 July, 1962; ibid, NAC minutes, 16 Aug. 1962, item 16.  
77. BAAB 44, Langa VC chairman G Hani to Rogers, 21 May, 1962; ibid, Rogers to Hani, 25 May, 1962.  
78. Karis and Gerhart, Challenge and Violence, 663.  
79. AR 444/64, State versus W Mbolompo and 44 others, 20 (evidence of Detective Warrant Office Johnson) and 50 (evidence of Bantu Detective Constable Jubase). Also exhibit R (typescript of Jubase's notes on this meeting).  
80. AR 444/64, State versus W Mbolompo and 44 others, 204-10 (evidence of Bantu Detective Sergeant Headman Sibuta) and exhibit AB (typescript of Sibuta's notes on this meeting).  
81. AR 444/64, State versus W Mbolompo and 44 others, 64-7 (evidence of Bantu Detective Constable Jubase) and exhibit S (typescript of Jubase's notes on 15 July meeting).  
82. AR 444/64, State versus W Mbolompo and 44 others, exhibit AE (transcript of recording of afternoon meeting at Bunga Square on 22 July, 1962), 10; exhibit AG (transcript of recording of meeting in Nyanga East on 5 Aug. 1962), 30.  
83. AR 444/64, State versus W Mbolompo and 44 others, 396-389 (testimony of Bantu Detective-Constable M Ngceba) and exhibit AD (transcript of AYL meeting at Main Barracks, Langa, on 22 July, 1962).  
84. AR 444/64, State versus Mbolompo and 44 others, 389-436 (testimony of Bantu Detective-Constable M Ngceba) and exhibit AE (transcript of AYL meeting at Bunga Square, Langa, con 22 July, 1962).  
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85. AR 444/64, State versus Mbolompo and 44 others, 436-86, testimony of Bantu Detective-Constable M Ngceba; and exhibit AF (transcript of AYL meeting at Bunga Square, Langa, 29 July, 1962). Ngudle is quoted on pages 480-2 and 24-7 respectively.  
86. AR 444/64, State versus Mbolompo and 44 others, 486-533, (testimony of Bantu Detective-Constable M Ngceba); and exhibit AG, (transcript of AYL meeting in Nyanga East, 5 Aug. 1962).  
88. AR 444/64, State versus Mbolompo and 44 others, 71-9 (testimony of Bantu Detective-Sergeant L Jubase) and exhibits U and V (Jubase's notes of AYL meetings in Nyanga West, 9 Sep. 1962).  
89. GN 14/29, Rogers to TC, 1 Oct. 1962.  
90. BAAB 201, Rogers to TC, 15 Oct. 1962; Burger, 15 Oct. 1962; Torch, 24 Oct. 1962. Matanzima seems to have been in Cape Town on a low-profile visit in July (AR 444/64, Exhibit R, L Jubase's notes on AYL meeting in Nyanga East on I Jul. 1962, 1).
91 AR 444/64, State versus Mbolompo and 44 others, 79-85 (testimony of Jubase) and exhibit W (Jubase's notes on meeting in Langa, 2 Dec. 1962). 92. AR 444/64, State versus Mbolompo and 44 others, 85-91 (testimony of Jubase) and exhibit X (Jubase's notes on meeting in Nyanga West, 9 Dec. 1962).

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In the wake of the 1960 Anti-Pass Campaign, the state abandoned the compromising, pragmatic form of apartheid which chapters 5 and 7 show to have characterised the 1950s. To forestall the growing demand for political rights, the accent fell increasingly on ethnic separate development. Separate 'group areas' were carved out in urban areas for the different legislatively-defined 'races', while the initially limited provisions of the 1959 Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act were elaborated to envisage eventual elevation of the reserves to the status of independent states.

Posel analyses the implications for national urban policy of the latter development. She shows that 'curbs on economic integration, previously rejected as undesirable, were now endorsed; and a removals programme, previously thought unnecessary, was initiated to reduce the size of urban African communities in white areas'. These changes reflected a growing concentration of power at the level of central rather than local government, and constituted a departure in practice, if not in rhetoric, from the policy of Urban Labour Preference. The rights of settled urban Africans were increasingly threatened, while the urban industrial and commercial sectors of the economy continued to rely heavily on contracted migrant labour. The situation in the Cape Peninsula conformed closely to this pattern during the first half of the 1960s, although curbs on economic integration, in the form of a quota system, were only introduced here during the second half of the decade. This is discussed in the following chapter.

The present chapter begins by documenting the removal of families to the new location at Guguletu, from 'black spots' throughout the municipal area and further afield. This leads on to an analysis of the contradictory and controversial role of the City Council in administering the system of influx control. The remaining parts of the chapter show that, despite organised pressure for the resettlement of local Africans in their distant 'homelands', the local economy remained dependent on migrant labour.

The Clearance of 'Black Spots'

Chapter 7 discussed the forced removal of Africans from the northern and CDC areas to Nyanga, and of 'bachelors' within the municipal boundaries to Nyanga West (Guguletu). The corralling process was largely completed by the mid-1960s, with the relocation in Guguletu of families from such places as Athlone, Schotsche Kloof, Retreat and Simon's Town.

As mentioned in Chapter 7, Athlone and Schotsche Kloof were in mid-1957 declared 'group areas' for 'Coloureds' and 'Malays' respectively. An 'evacuation period' of three years was allowed, during which ethnically-excluded residents were expected to leave. The authorities discussed the removal of Africans with increasing urgency as this period of grace drew to an end. Towards the end of 1959, the Chief Bantu Affairs Commissioner asked the CC to consider giving preference, in the allocation of houses at Guguletu, to Africans occupying properties bought in Athlone by the Group Areas Development Board. Rogers drafted the official response, stating that removals from Windermere and Blouveli were the Council's top priority, and that action to be taken in Athlone would depend on the category of 'Bantu' involved. Those who were 'qualified' (including registered voters) would have to remain until alternative accommodation could be offered in Guguletu. Displaced families would be allowed to move their pondoks to the emergency camp, pending either relocation in planned rural resettlement camps or eventual qualification for urban rights under Section 10. The Council was not in favour of granting emergency-camp sites to the third category of plain 'illegals', fearing that this might increase the difficulty of getting them to send their families back to their homes, eventually.

The GADB reported that investigation by the special police unit charged with Group Areas enforcement had found approximately 400 'Bantu' families living in Athlone, as well as about 300 in both Rylands Estate and Elsie's River, and some 60 in Duinefontein. Rogers and Chief Inspector Geddie met the GADB's regional representative in December 1959, and agreed 'to give Bantu categorised "C" immediate notice to move'. The men in question were soon moved into the barracks, while women who remained in the area faced prosecution.

About 400 houses were already occupied in Guguletu by mid-1960, when the first phase was completed of a scheme involving some 800 additional dwellings. Scores of 'qualified' families were soon
relocated from Athlone, but the central authorities pressed for more drastic action. Rogers was adamant, however, that equally urgent cases in Windermere, Retreat and Grassy Park could not be over looked. He wrote in exasperation to his Chief Inspector that ‘they must realise that we cannot move more than we are doing at present’.

Early in 1961, the GADE requested the Department of Bantu Administration and Development to secure from the CC an undertaking to remove the remaining 600 African families from Athlone and Rylands Estate by the end of that year.

Rogers replied that this would not be possible, as there were over one thousand families in Windermere whose removal could not be further delayed.

Various authorities, (including not only the CC and the GADB but also the Commission for the Preservation of Natural and Historical Monuments, Relics and Antiquities) were concerned by this stage that the ‘spirit and traditions’ of the so-called Malay Quarter were being spoilt by the presence of large numbers of Africans. The Town Clerk reported to the CBC that 11 ‘Bantu men living under bachelor conditions’ in this area had been ordered to move to Langa, but some 70 families remained to be housed in Nyanga West. Squatters from Windermere, Athlone and Retreat would in the short term, however, have to remain at the head of the queue for family housing.

The situation remained unchanged one year later, with only ‘bachelors’ being targeted for removal, while Schotschi Kloof. While the Department of BAD pressed for further action, the GADE and the newly-created Department of Community Development agreed with the municipal order of priorities. Particular efforts were made during the first half of 1962, despite the vigorous protests of victims and supporters, to start clearing the remaining 648 families from such places in the Retreat area as Plouvlei, Hardevlei, Vrygrond and Steenberg. This followed the proclamation of Retreat as a Coloured Group Area in 1961.

Removals from the Peninsula’s ‘black spots’ were expedited when new developments in Guguletu began yielding dozens of houses per week later that year, and the tempo of construction was maintained throughout most of 1963. This building programme was expected to leave only 1,300 ‘qualified’ families still to be accommodated within the municipal area, and it was reported in October 1963 that a mere 30 families remained in Windermere. Guguletu’s population consequently had grown from over 19,000 one year earlier to almost 28,000, which was already roughly 500 more than the corresponding figure for Langa.

Schotche Kloof was cleared of remaining Africans in June, while most of the additional 354 dwellings completed in Nyanga West towards the end of that year seem to have been earmarked for families from the central-city area. Despite the ongoing screening of transit-camp residents, and the consequent removals and expulsions, the population of Guguletu was reported in mid-1964 to have increased by a further 2,000. There were then 3,500 permanent houses (and the 552 prefabricated ‘hutments’ mentioned in Chapter 7) in the growing location, as well as 800 shack shacks in the transitcamp. Hostel-accommodation was planned for 3,000 men, but double that number had been crammed into new dormitories by 1966.

The decision to demolish Simon’s Town’s Luyo:lo location was mentioned in Chapter 7. In January 1965, the local Advisory Board petitioned the GADB to reverse its ruling that there was no place for Africans in that part of the Peninsula. The Department, however, issued instructions in mid-year that the long-delayed removal of Luyolo should be finalised without delay, and the AB was persuaded ‘with great sorrow to accept the inevitable. Location residents, praised by the town’s Mayor as ‘the most loyal people we have had in Simon’s Town during two World Wars’, acquiesced at an emotional meeting.

On a tour of Guguletu towards the end of July, Mayor Gay was able to offer ‘qualified’ families the meagre consolation of being resettled en bloc near Heideveld station, and not dispersed throughout the growing township.
Worrall reported one month later that 56 families and 262 men 'living under single conditions' had already been moved. The legality of these proceedings was questioned on the basis of Molteno's legal opinion, but this was brushed aside by both Simon's Town and Cape Town municipalities. Luyolo had been cleared by the end of the first quarter of 1966. In all, some six thousand families had been transferred to Guguletu by that stage, leaving only 34 African families officially known to be residing outside locations in the Cape Town municipal area.

Chapter 11 takes up the discussion of residential segregation during the second half of the 1960s. The rest of this chapter is concerned with influx control, and this recurrent theme is reintroduced by considering first the segregationist City Council's controversial involvement in administering pass-laws.

Influx Control: The City Council and its Liberal Critics

The shock-waves of March 1960 jolted the CC into lobbying for the easing of excessive controls, while its Bantu Administration Department continued enthusiastically to enforce the letter of apartheid laws. Liberal tendencies within local authorities were countered nationally during this period by the conferring of additional powers on Urban Areas Commissioners, and in the Peninsula this was augmented by the appointment of a Bantu Affairs Liaison Committee. Such measures laid the groundwork for the takeover of responsibility for urban 'Bantu Administration' by the central authorities in the early 1970s.

One month before the March disturbances, City Councillor ASA East (a NAC member not noted for his leftwing sympathies) called for a relaxation of the rigid system of influx control, which he identified as a major and justified grievance. Suggested improvements included the amendment of Section 10 to allow workers to return to employment after eighteen months rather than twelve, and to provide for the earning of urban rights (including freehold 465 tenure) simply and without qualification after ten years continuous residence. East's concern extended as far as conceding to African workers the right to live as families for at least six months of the year.

The CC two months later unanimously adopted a suggestion by prominent NP-supporting City Councillor Andrag that the NAC be instructed to 'consider and report on the advisability of making representations to the Central Government ... to change the present system of migratory labour in the Urban Areas to a system of family life settlements'. It was hoped that this would avoid repetition of the 'recent unfortunate incidents', which had convinced Andrag that 'we have erred in our handling of the problem of the treatment of the Bantu'. Such self-criticism had definite limits, and when Councillor Cissie Gool joined the debate to elaborate on the errors of the local authority, she was warned by mayor Joyce Newton-Thompson and other councillors that her speech contravened the recently promulgated Public Safety Act.

After Verwoerd had stressed in parliament that there could be no question of a relaxation of the pass-laws (although efforts would be made to avoid jailing technical offenders), Rogers addressed the NAC on two separate occasions during April. The committee agreed that Andrag's proposal 'cuts across the high policy of the central Government', and members clearly shared Rogers' concern that liberalisation would involve the Council in responsibility for housing at least 40,000 additional African families. A sub-committee was formed to investigate the matter and report to the CC. This sub-committee unfortunately abdicated responsibility for what it referred to as 'this complex and difficult subject', merely calling for a memorandum from Rogers and the long-serving committee-member Councillor C' Bakker.

In the event, Rogers and Bakker provided separate submissions for the committee's consideration. Rogers stated in his contribution that the committee would have to decide once and for all whether it agreed with the government's stated policy of gradually removing 'Natives' from the region. He stressed the value of migrant labour, particularly the allegedly 'generally apolitical' orientation of migrant labourers, but called for modification of the system to preserve family life and links with the reserves. This could best be accomplished, he recommended, by allowing migrants into...
urban areas for eighteen months or two years at a time, and then compelling them to return home for at least six months. (Such 'Natives' would, moreover, thus be prevented from ever qualifying under Section 10). Rogers suggested that consideration should also be given to the possibility of reimposing restrictions on the issuing of train-tickets to Africans. On the issue of wages, he reported that rates in the Peninsula compared favourably with those in other large centres,

although the majority of local Africans did not receive a 'living wage'.36 Bakker's memorandum asserted that 'the use of migratory labour and the strict application of influx control is essential in the Western Cape in order to prevent competition between the Coloureds and Natives in the Labour Market to the detriment of the indigenous Coloured group'. This second submission went so far as to recommend that, in order to minimise disturbances among the 'Natives', they should be allowed to live as families while employed in the region. Other suggestions encompassed affordable rents, the provision of adequate transport, services, schools and amenities, the early elimination of transit camps, and the establishment of the long-awaited rural villages which were euphemistically expected to absorb 'natives without homes in the territories who do not wish to remain permanently in the urban areas'.37 A deputation including Andrag, Bakker and Rogers, as well as (committee chairman) Councillor Santilhano and mayor Newton-Thompson, placed these recommendations before de Wet Nel in May.23 It was not until the third quarter of the year that the central authorities responded to this input. Towards the end of September, police acting against corruption at the local level arrested officials and impounded records at registration offices in Langa, Nyanga, Stellenbosch and Paarl. (This precipitated the early retirement of Rogers' Assistant Registering Officer Mr JOA Palmgren).38 De Wet Nel announced within days of these anti-corruption raids that a draft Bill revising all legislation governing 'Bantu in European Areas' had been drawn up and would be circulated for comment prior to promulgation.40 Rogers, having studied this draft, told the Town Clerk that 'the theme running through the whole Bill appears to me to be that the Government Bantu Administration and Development Department will take over many of the functions which are now carried out by local authorities'. He quoted a departmental statement claiming that the recent disturbances had been worst where 'local authorities are controlled by opponents of Government policy', who shifted the blame for their own lack of vision and efficiency onto the central authorities.41 The CC, meeting in committee, decided to inform de Wet Nel that several aspects of the Bill were objectionable, and particularly the proposed conferring on Urban Areas Commissioners of powers usurping those of local authorities.42 Widespread municipal opposition, as well as the protests of commerce and industry, ensured that this draft legislation was dropped before being formally gazetted.43 The abandoned Bill's envisaged replacement of Advisory Boards by Urban Bantu Councils was incorporated into the Urban Bantu Councils Act, which was promulgated in July 1961.44 Only in the early 1970s, however, were its provisions implemented locally, after the eventual transfer of control over urban Africans from municipalities to newlyformed Bantu Affairs Administration Boards. The following chapter discusses these later developments.

More significant at the time was the appointment of a new regional Urban Areas Commissioner (Mr M van der S Kellerman), who assumed the expanded duties of this position in early 1961.45 He soon established an excellent working relationship with Rogers and his CDC counterpart Pansegrouw, through the workings of the WCCLNA and of the Bantu Affairs Liaison Committee, which was established in the first half of that year. As was the case with the WCCLNA, elected representatives were specifically excluded from the new liaison committee, despite the protests of the City Council.
Rogers and his municipal Bantu Administration staff joined forces with the police and the central bureaucracy in a drastic tightening-up of procedures following the abovementioned crackdown on corruption. After an early morning 'routine inspection' during which some forty 'illegals' were detained by police and municipal officials in Windermere in January 1961, the Cape Provincial committee of the Liberal Party criticised the CC's 'callous disregard of human rights and dignity'.47 NAC chairman Santilhano defended municipal officials, telling the local press that they are carrying out the law only because ... it is the law of the land .... It is shocking to think that a law can keep a husband from his wife, but such is the law'.4' The LP responded with a memorandum alleging brutality on the part of municipal staff. This was sent to individual councillors, who were urged to protect the city from National Party domination.49 Santilhano refuted the charge of brutality with the lame assurance that he was personally acquainted with the unnamed official in charge, and emphasised that people arrested in ongoing pass raids were in the area illegally.5' LP provincial chairman Peter Hjul acknowledged that the CC could not change 'evil' laws, but insisted that it should 'curb the zeal of officials carrying out these laws'.51 Rogers reminded the NAC that the Council had accepted responsibility for implementing government policy, and that this implied taking action against people guilty of breaking the laws of the land.52 At a later meeting, he pointed out that the influx control measures were being applied by the Government with extreme strictness and its policy was also that the entry of Native women into the Western Cape area should be rigidly controlled. If Native women were allowed to enter the area and stay with their husbands, it would be extremely difficult to get them to return to the territories after they had tasted the fruits of city life.53 He and his staff would, he assured the Town Clerk, 'conscientiously carry out the Council's obligations' with regard to influx control.04 Pansegrouw similarly insisted that 'it is Government policy that only migratory labour is permissible in the Western Cape and every reasonable effort must be made to carry out that policy'." The enthusiasm of these local authority officials was by no means universally condemned. It was certainly appreciated by the Department of Bantu Administration and Development. In an address to the local Afrikaanse Sakekamer in March, the Deputy Minister, MC Botha, praised the staunch efforts of the Bantu Administration officials of the Cape Town and Paarl municipalities, and also those of the Cape Divisional Council.56 After intensified police action against 'illegal' workers at local bus stops and railway stations (part of a national offensive in mid-May 1961), the NAC uncharacteristically rejected Rogers' arguments, and resolved to request the amendment of influx-control laws, 'to enable legally married Bantu women to live with their husbands in the Western Cape'. Former CATPAW leader Councillor Eulalie Stott was the proposer of this liberal motion,3" which was passed by the Council at the end of June, and despatched to the Department early the following month.90 The Secretary for Bantu Administration and Development eventually replied in early 1963 that in view of the general policy aimed at restricting the bringing in of further Bantu families into the White areas, and having regard to the special attention now being given to the whole question of the presence of Bantu in the Western Cape in particular, the suggested relaxation or amendment of the law ... cannot be entertained. The government would instead press ahead with border industrialisation and homeland development schemes, so as to provide a sounder economic basis for racial separation.' Liberal councillors and critics were effectively sidelined by the establishment in mid-1961 of the abovementioned BALC. This body's deliberations were so secret that no minutes were kept of its meetings." It is probably not coincidental that the Cape provincial branch of the NP, through its
mouthpiece the Burger, began agitating for the removal of Africans from the Western Cape region soon after the establishment of this new liaison committee.

Goldin quotes a September 1961 Burger report on a speech by the NP’s Cape provincial secretary, Malmesbury MP PS Marais, advocating ‘greater action in the disappearance of Bantus from the Western Cape.’ Marais told a public meeting at De Doorns in November that it was ‘necessary to demonstrate the feasibility of Apartheid by rapidly reducing the number of Africans in the Western Cape.’ He pointed out that the government had a mandate for such action, and suggested that ‘Bantu’ state-employees should be the first to go. Other members of parliament expressed their conviction of the absolute necessity of systematically removing ‘Bantu’ from the region,’ and the Burger was still stridently editorialising on the topic, in July and August 1962. The Johannesburg newspaper the Transvaal emphasised that ‘what is being planned in miniature for the Western Cape is the government’s policy also for the rest of the Republic.’

The call for long-existing policy to be implemented regardless of economic and human costs was immediately condemned by (among others) the Cape Chamber of Industries, by individual farmers, and by dissident Stellenbosch professor SP Cilliers. Liberal organisations and the local press maintained a low-key and ineffectual public opposition. The Cape Times commented editorially that ‘Africans are just about as unlikely to go back to rural life willingly as the Afrikaners would have been when their industrial revolutions brought them into the towns’. Black Sash’s Eulalie Stott pointed out that Verwoerd’s announcement ‘gives the quite erroneous impression that the removal of Africans from the Western Cape is going to be put into effect only … when the necessary arrangements for their well-being in the Transkei have been made. The true facts are … that the removal of Africans from the Western Cape began some years ago’. She cited as evidence Minister de Wet Nel’s recent admission in parliament that some 26,000 illegal Africans had been ‘endorsed out’ of the Western Cape in the three years up to early 1962. Hundreds of Africans who were on the point of qualifying under Section 10 were among those expelled in this way. By that stage the ‘screening’ of Nyanga West residents was well advanced, and notices signed by Rogers were being distributed to non-qualifying families, ordering the women and children to return to the Reserves, and the men to move into the Langa ‘Single Quarters’. Rogers countered criticism of these edicts by insisting that his duty was to carry out government policy.

The SAIRR organised a symposium in October at which speakers such as Molteno and the prominent trade unionist Norman Daniels put the case against Coloured Labour Preference, while Professor Sadie of Stellenbosch University argued for the segregationist SABRA position. That body’s chairman, Dr AL Geyer, had on the eve of the SAIRR symposium stressed that the viability of separate development as a practical policy was at stake in the Western Cape.

Representatives of the SAIRR and the Black Sash attended a BAC meeting at the beginning of April 1963, to protest against the excessive zeal with which CC officials continued to implement regional policy. Molteno pointed out that until the Bantu Laws Amendment Bill then before parliament became law, the breaking up of families through ‘endorsing out’ illegal women occurred entirely at the Council’s discretion. Both bodies requested inter alia that the warning notices issued in Guguletu be withdrawn. The Black Sash warned against creating a climate of resentment in which political agitation would thrive, and said that it was ‘quite wrong and unfair’ for councillors to ignore the effects of their decisions and ‘leave it all to Mr Rogers.’ Asked by the Town Clerk for his comments, Rogers replied that the Council would be ‘most unwise’ to ignore repeated instructions from the Department ‘to discourage the influx of Bantu, particularly women, with a view to avoiding the establishment of Bantu families in the Western Cape on a permanent basis’. After the issue of ‘legal’ Africans being arrested was raised by Councillor Stott at a meeting of the NAC, the CC requested restraint on the part of the police when conducting pass raids in the municipal locations of Langa.
and Guguletu. Instructions - presumably tongue-in-cheek - that such operations should in future be conducted more 'tactfully' were duly issued by the District Commandant.

The raids continued, as did the accompanying brutality. By the end of the following year, the CC was regularly and routinely providing funds to transport the belongings of 'homeland'-bound displaced families to Langa railway station. (All other costs were met by the Department.)

Pressure for the drastic extension of this low-key removal programme mounted throughout this period. The following section analyses the role in this ultra-segregationist agitation of the WCCLNA, whose earlier interventions were discussed in Chapters 5 and 7.

'Resettlement' and the Homelands Policy

The widespread disaffection evidenced in the violently suppressed demonstrations of March 1960 set alarm-bells ringing not only within the City Council (as shown in the previous section), but also within the WCCLNA. At a meeting of that body's Technical Advisory Committee in June, Professor Nic Olivier sketched the 'vast changes in the world scene' which had 'boosted the cause of the nonEuropeans immensely'. Shaped by anti-colonialism, independence, and Western repugnance of racialism, world opinion posed a 'grave threat' which would in future be exploited by Bantu agitators 'in order to isolate white South Africa from the rest of the world and thereby to achieve their political aspirations'.

Olivier was convinced that repression offered no solution, insisting that 'only separate development - in separate areas can solve the problem'. This required the immediate implementation in the 'Bantu territories' of the extensive development programme which 'should have been initiated six years ago on receipt of the Tomlinson Committee report'. Only through thorough-going separate development, he argued, could the number of 'Bantu' in 'European areas' be kept to the minimum. With regard to those residual 'Bantu' who would remain permanently in such areas, Olivier advocated that 'we should play for time in order to relieve internal and external pressure', while retaining only those discriminatory measures necessary for political survival. He mentioned four 'points of friction' requiring urgent attention, these being the harsh administration of the reference-book system, the discriminatory liquor laws, starvation wages and the failed Advisory Boards.

Rogers asked the CBC towards the end of 1960 to ascertain when the Department would begin absorbing into resettlement 'villages' in or near the Reserves the 'displaced' families in the municipal area (1,128 in the Nyanga West transit camp and some 2,000 'outside the Bantu residential areas'). In his capacity as TAC chair, he reported at the tenth annual conference of the WCCLNA in November that various such enquiries remained unanswered, despite the rumoured possibility of resettling local Africans around Kingwilliamstown.

In November 1961, the WCCLNA urged the Cape Municipal Association to press for the amendment of Section 10, so as to prevent Africans from acquiring permanent residence rights in the Western Cape. The TAC recommended in March 1962 that the provisions of Section 10(1)(a), (b) and (c) should be scrapped, so as to ensure that 'Bantus' could never win permanent residence rights in any White areas. Further recommendations included a compulsory return to the tribal 'homelands' after serving a limited contract-period, heavy penalties for 'illegals' and their employers, and the exercising of 'efflux' control by homeland Bantu Authorities. The TAC at this same meeting adopted a motion, put forward by Pansegrouw, that the Department be 'requested to establish transit camps on a temporary basis in the reserves in order to expedite the resettlement of Bantu in Bantu villages'.

At a TAC meeting in mid-1962, Mr JH le Roux of Paarl advocated 'drastic steps' to remove Africans from the Western Cape. He was convinced that half of all Africans could be removed 'without any ill effects to the economic development' of the region.

Verwoerd had by that stage announced in parliament that the Transkei would, under the Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act of 1959, become the first homeland to achieve limited self-ruling status.
that 'Bantu Areas in the Transkei and Ciskei are the homelands of the Xhosa-speaking Bantu of the Republic of South Africa wherever they may be in the Republic'. The political aspirations of those in the cities would be directed towards their homelands by the appointment of urban representatives of the tribal chiefs.05 One year later, deputy-minister MC Botha announced a 'comprehensive programme of building towns in the homelands', in his opening address at the United Municipal Executive annual congress in Cape Town. A meeting of the TAC regretted that little progress had been made with the establishment of resettlement areas for Western Cape Africans, and that there was no provision for the accommodation of local deportees in the Mdantsane development near East London.06 De Wet Nel nevertheless announced at a press conference towards the end of July 1962 that the Cabinet had decided to proceed with the planned Western Cape removals.07 This was confirmed, as anticipated, at the NP congress in August. Here Verwoerd announced the establishment of three committees to oversee the removal-process. These committees

would ensure that the policy was implemented with the minimum of economic disruption, and only once those scheduled for removal could be offered a reasonable livelihood elsewhere. Verwoerd's announcement was seen as a compromise between such hot-heads as SF Kotze, MP for Parow, who argued in favour of his branch's resolution urging swift and ruthless action, and the pragmatic caution of a substantial body of more moderate delegates.08 Opening the annual congress of the Namaqualand Development Association in Springbok towards the end of November, PW Botha, the Minister of Coloured Affairs, Community Development and Housing, announced steps taken since Verwoerd's August announcement. A standing Cabinet committee had been appointed, chaired by Botha himself and including the Ministers of Bantu Administration and Development, Economic Affairs, Agricultural Economics and Marketing, and Labour and Immigration. Officials from these departments, and also Forestry, Trade and Industry and Water Affairs, as well as the SAR and the CPA, had been appointed to a permanent inter-departmental committee chaired by the deputy secretary for Coloured Affairs, DJ Bosman. A number of 'prominent persons' had also been appointed to the third committee mentioned by Verwoerd, a public committee (also chaired by Bosman) which would submit proposals to the inter-departmental committee and assist with the establishment of local committees for each magisterial district in the region.09

The Public Committee held its first meeting in March 1963.10 Local committees had been formed in every magisterial district in the Western Cape by September,92 with one such committee covering the entire Peninsula. This was after the Inter-departmental Committee secretary, Mr J de la Rey de Kock, had requested from Cape Town's Chief Magistrate a list of prominent people who would be prepared to serve on the committee in their individual capacities. Such nominees would be expected to 'participate actively to give effect to the declared policy of the Government in connection with the gradual replacement of Bantu labour in the Western Cape.' City Council representatives served from the outset on this Cape Peninsula Local Committee on Labour in the Western Cape (CPLCLWC).94 Its secretary was CCI secretary FK Lighton. In a paper delivered at a meeting of the Scientific Agricultural Society in May, Stellenbosch sociologist Professor SP Cilliers cast doubt on the possibility of totally removing Africans from the Western Cape. What was far more likely, he suggested, was that settled 'Bantu' labour would be replaced by Coloured labour, while 'Bantu migratory labour' replaced Coloureds in the unskilled and casual categories.11 His colleague Professor 01 ivier appealed to local authorities, at a TAC meeting at the beginning of March, to implement the law as humanely as possible. At the same time he called on the government to take immediate steps to 'develop the homelands into viable economic and political units'. Otherwise, he charged, the continued forcible breakup of families would only fan the flames of resistance and thus weaken the position of 'whites'. Olivier was now in a sense the conscience of the WCCLNA. He was even prepared to admit that the total removal of Africans from the region would be detrimental to the 'Coloured' group, as it would block their upward mobility and force many back into
unskilled labour. The regional economy, Olivier belatedly comprehended, would inevitably be adversely affected.96

In the House of Assembly during May 1963, UP leader Sir De Villiers Graaff criticised the government’s apparent rejection of the Tomlinson Commission’s view that there would always be Africans in South Africa’s urban areas. Graaff deplored the singling out of the Western Cape as the site of the first practical apartheid experiment, while his lieutenant Myburgh Schreicher argued that the removal policy would be detrimental for both the Western and the Eastern Cape regions, and that the choice was between economic development with African labour, or stagnation without it. Minister de Wet Nel scoffed at this elevation of ‘a little economic growth before a matter of great principle’, averring that homeland development would absorb ‘Bantu’ removed from urban areas.”

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Far from reconsidering the wisdom of the Eiselen Line, de Wet Nel announced its extension to include a further 22 magisterial districts.” He assured the Assembly that the flow of African labour would be reversed by 1978-80,” but stressed in the Senate that this would be a gradual and voluntary process, and also that there was no question of dismembering the country by trying to force ‘independence’ on territories such as Transkei.”

At the NP’s Transvaal congress in September 1963, De Wet Nel again stressed the necessity of homeland development, to absorb those Africans who were surplus to the labour-requirements of urban areas.” The MP for Parow led the call, at the party’s Cape congress later that month, for the relatively ‘insignificant’ number of Western Cape Africans to be sent not only to the homelands but wherever their labour was needed. PW Botha responded by suggesting that ‘people should not dwell on the negative idea of African removal but should think more of the positive and fundamentally important task of creating a safe White homeland which would also provide a future for the Coloured people’.102

Despite the earlier conviction shared by Sabra and Verwoerd (quoted in Chapters 5 and 7 respectively) that the Western Cape was the ideal region in which to launch the Grand Apartheid experiment, Humphries makes the point that this region’s great distance from the nearest ‘homelands’

484 meant that resettlement here ‘involved the permanent removal of families and individuals and not simply transforming them into commuters’, as was successfully accomplished in places such as Durban, Pretoria and East London. He provides details of the slow progress made in resettling Western Cape Africans in the ‘homelands’, citing TAC minutes to the effect that ‘115 families had been resettled by the office of the Chief Commissioner’ before January 1964. It seems, though, that this date is misprinted in the minutes and that the reference is actually to resettlement during (rather than prior to) that year. Humphries goes on to show that only 41 families were similarly processed by the Chief Commissioner’s office during the first six months of 1965. The committee minutes show that 5 resettled families were referred by the CDC during this 18-month period, and that 18 families were removed from the area under the jurisdiction of the CC, which had referred 283 families to the Chief Commissioner’s office for this purpose. 10

The mayor of Stellenbosch revealed that the Cabinet Committee overseeing the development of regional policy was investigating the feasibility of canalising ‘Coloured’ labour through a system similar to that applied to Africans. He also referred to objections raised by local authorities in the Eastern Cape border regions to the repatriation there of ‘destitute Bantu’ from the urban areas.

The problems involved in giving effect to the removal policy were compounded when Eastern Cape local authorities and Transkei’s Chief Kaiser Matanzima objected to having the Western Cape’s surplus population dumped on their doorsteps.104 A special committee was appointed by the UME to ‘discuss with the Director of Bantu Settlement the problem of displaced natives endorsed out of the Western Cape who cannot find anywhere to live legally’. At a meeting in Langa during the following year, Matanzima failed to pacify a hostile audience with the assurance that we cannot call
people back to the Transkei until there is work for them’. He was chased from the platform he shared with the CBC and the Mayor of Cape Town.10’

PW Botha expressed the Cabinet’s insistence that we will not have a black proletariat in our midst. We grant them the right to develop in their own areas. With White labour, and with the help of Coloured labour, we will make this part of the country safe for the White man’.10’

The opposition UP’s Cape congress towards the end of 1964 responded with a resolution put forward jointly by the party’s Cape Peninsula regional council and its Western Province women’s council, and supported by six divisional committees in the Peninsula’s Bol and and Swartland hinterlands. This resolution warned that the removal of

Africans would ‘cripple every phase of economic activity in the Western Cape’.10’

The concluding part of this chapter shows that there was never any question of so drastic a policy being actually implemented. The local economy continued to rely on African labour, and the NP’s hardline rhetoric and threats served merely to mask a legislatively-backed attempt to transform ‘settled African workers back into a class of migrants’.100

The Continued Demand for Migrant Labour

As discussed in Chapters 5 and 7, influx control subjected Africans to several forms of administrative and judicial oppression. They could simply be informally warned to leave the urban area, or they could be officially ‘endorsed out’ with stamps in their pass-books. Those ‘idle and undesirable’ or ‘destitute’ Africans with remaining tribal links could be ‘repatriated’ to the reserves, while those in the ‘displaced’ category were destined for ‘resettlement’ in housing-schemes to be provided there at some time in the future. 102

The previous chapters showed that ‘endorsing out’ did not (as is commonly assumed) involve physical removal to ‘the already overpopulated reserves’.10 Many thousands who ignored orders to leave the area continued, as during the 1950s, to be harassed, prosecuted, and fined or jailed.

Silk notes the irony of pass-offenders being forced to labour on farms in the region. He claims that, despite the authorities’ ‘energetic’ efforts, the Peninsula’s African population had grown to 180,000 by 1960.111

This seems, as good a guess as any, although that year’s census enumerated only some 75,000 (and more than 255,000 in the region).112

The ‘endorsing out’ of almost 19,000 men and more than 7,000 women from the Western Cape between January 1959 and March 1962 is well documented in the secondary literature, as is the fact that more than 18,000 of this 26,000-odd total were from the Cape Peninsula.113 Scores of Africans who had been in the Peninsula for many years were by November 1960 reportedly being endorsed out every day. Unemployed men who would normally receive fourteen-day ‘seek-work permits’ were expelled, as were the wives of ‘unqualified’ workers (who were in turn moved to the bachelor quarters). The rate of prosecution under the pass-laws had risen to four hundred per month by December, with many more victims reportedly expelled without the benefit of even the existing biased and discriminatory token legal proceedings.114

Daily raids on Langa were reported towards the end of November 1961, and in February 1962 Africans were still being ‘hunted like game’ in the Western Cape & with regular raids in Nyanga West and at the Nyanga East bus-terminus.

'Tilegalas' continued to be convicted and endorsed out after three-minute trials in the Bantu Affairs Criminal Court,113 which (despite the objections of the City Council and of local ratepayers) had moved to Standard House in Ooravatory during October 1961, along with the offices of the Chief Bantu Affairs Commissioner and the Bantu Affairs Commissioner.”

The municipal Labour Bureau in Langa was simultaneously endorsing out growing numbers of unwanted African workseekers.” A circular sent by the CBC to all local
authorities in the region in August 1962 reveals the frustrations to which these work-seekers were subjected. This circular referred to a complaint from the CBC in Umtata that Transkeians sent away from urban areas were being incorrectly advised by registering officers to obtain entry permits from BC's in their home districts. On reporting to the rural offices, they were informed of the correct position, which was that permits could only be issued by urban local authorities. This was creating distrust in the labour bureaux system, and the local CBC suggested that officials should carefully explain that the rural offices merely processed applications and could not themselves issue permits.

There were 8,434 pass law convictions in Cape Town in 1962, and Silk says that about 1,500 men and more than 2,500 women were endorsed out during that year. A further 8,633 'illegals' were expelled from the Peninsula during 1963 and 1964. A break-down provided in parliament of this two-year total shows that 1,070 men and 2,033 women suffered this treatment in the CC area during 1963, together with an undifferentiated total of 660 in the area (including the municipalities of Goodwood, Parow, Bealville and Durbanville) in which the CDC (as mentioned in Chapter 7) assumed responsibility for the registration of 'Bantu' as from February 1960. There were 1,976 male and 1,505 female victims in the CC area during 1964, plus 1,003 men and 486 women in the area under the CDC. 121

Humphries shows that 'in the Peninsula alone 24,101 men and women were prosecuted between May 1963 and June 1965 - a rate of 893 per month'. He does not specify the proportion of convictions among these cases, but reveals that there were nearly 14,000 successful prosecutions in the region as a whole during 1965.122

Intensified repression of this nature did not by any means imply decreased reliance on African labour. According to van der Horst 'between 1955 and 1962 the official number of registered male African workers fell by nearly 20 per cent' in Cape Town. Greatly encouraged by this trend, Deputy-Minister MC Botha in early 1961 proclaimed that the flood has been stemmed! May the ebb now begin.124 In the boom which followed the post-Sharpeville crisis of investor-confidence in 1960-1, 212 economic factors 490 (particularly the continued unavailability of suitable Coloured labour) militated against such an outcome. So too did the representations of employers, the municipality and other interest groups. Although MC Botha explicitly stated his department's objective of 'stopping the urbanisation process of the Bantu' through the enforcement (with municipal co-operation) of the Urban Areas Act, registration regulations and labour bureau regulations, 26 infrastructural development (such as the construction of new road-systems, the new station and the new tanker berth in the docks) at the same time necessitated the importation of thousands of additional migrant labourers from the Transkei. Employers were initially unhappy with the new arrangement which stipulated that where in the past local Native labour officers had been required to give a certificate that Coloured labour was not available, it had been decided that in future all applications for the introduction of Bantu labour should themselves obtain a certificate from the Department of Labour or the local magistrate in support of their applications.

The CBC told a meeting of the Labour Consultative Committee that this was essential in the interests of Coloured Labour Preference, but he was able to assure those starved of suitable heavy labour that their problems would be met with greater flexibility.1'2

Such employers were consequently reporting within months that their labour-position had considerably improved. Now the LCC and the CCI expressed concern, in their meetings and in deputations to the appropriate authorities, that 'nothing constructive had been done to improve the position of the Coloureds despite their responsible behaviour during the disturbances in March last year'.20 The central author ities were far more concerned at the time with repression than with upliftment.

A mid-year meeting of the CCI warned that 'uncertainty about the future of African labour' in the region was affecting investment.29 LCC and CCI secretary Lighton argued in July that, far from depriving others
of jobs, Africans played an important economic role in the Western Cape and thus contributed to the process of job-creation. The Winter Rainfall Area Agricultural Union congress resolved, in view of the accelerating absorption of Coloured agricultural labour by industry, 'to request the government to make Bantu labour available when necessary.' Similar protests made by the Durbanville-Kr aifontein Farmers’ Association secured the assurance from de Wet Nel that farmers’ interests would always be protected.1” Lighton complained, at a meeting of the LCC in February, that ‘over-enthusiastic’ administration of policy was having unintended and economically disruptive consequences. Employers were reassured that the envisaged

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‘gradual replacement’ of *Bantu* would be achieved ‘with no disruption whatsoever of industry’.132 CCI chairman LH Barrett told that body's half-yearly meeting in June of the state's welcome new emphasis on Coloured progress, rather than the elimination of the 25.7% of Western Cape industrial workers classified as ‘Bantu’.133 Barrett believed that economic development would eventually ensure the abandonment of the more extreme aspects of existing policy, which the Chamber would have to accept and accommodate in the interim. 34 Lighton reported at a routinely-secret meeting of the LCC in September that regional policy so far 'appeared to be developing with no harmful effects on industry'.13 Lowerpaying sectors of the local economy were affected more adversely, and Rogers informed the CBC in October that the shortage of labour in the Peninsula had become 'critical' for many employers. He suggested reviving the old system whereby 'specified' African labour was returned for reemployment by previous employers, not under the Registration Regulations but in terms of Section 11 of the Urban Areas Act. ‘Nothing came of this, and it was reported in November that red tape was starving regional industry (particularly the farming, milling and dairy sectors) of much-needed African heavy manual labour. 27

Silk refers to two batches of contract workers being brought in, the second early in 1964. Each comprised about 4,000 men. ’ Towards the end of 1964, one year after the Transkei had been launched as a semi-autonomous state, it was reported that the ‘homeland’s’ Department of the Interior had placed 15,000 Bantu' labourers in employment (mainly in Western Cape industry and agriculture) during that year. This was more than double the 6,500 similarly placed during 1963, and excluded 93,000 Transkeians channelled through private recruiting organisations, mainly to the mining industry.13 Almost 1,800 of these men had been brought into the municipal area by mid-March 1964, with a further 500 requisitioned to arrive before the end of the following month.140 An impatient Parow representative at the WCCLNA’s thirteenth annual meeting in November 1963 was told that the region's flourishing economy necessitated increased labourrecruitment in the Transkei, and that 1,200 unfilled vacancies had been reported at the CC and CDC labour bureaux during one recent but unspecified month.14 The local economy remained buoyant into the third quarter of that year. Little space remained for further industrial development in Paarden Eiland and Bellville South, and new growth points arose in Epping and Milnerton. Capital projects underway included a new oil refinery and a fertiliser plant, while existing vehicle-manufacturers geared up for expansion. All categories of labour remained, however, in critically short supply. 142

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Rogers complained to the BAC in July that central government officials tended to overlook the principle that the removal of Africans from the region should not disrupt industries which relied on their labour.143 This was particularly the case on the platteland, where Coloured farm-workers were reportedly moving into factory jobs vacated by Africans. Despite the resulting labour-shortage, some African labourers born on farms in districts such as Malmesbury and Ceres were ‘endorsed out’ to the Transkei. The families of many who remained were similarly removed. Farmers apparently resorted to
Deputy Secretary of Coloured Affairs DJ Bosman (in his capacity as chairman of the Public Committee on Labour in the Western Cape) exhorted all concerned to apply existing control measures strictly ‘in order to adhere to the principle of migratory labour’. He stressed the necessity of ensuring that ‘Bantu’ labour was only recruited through the labour bureaux system, on contract and for a specified period, concluded by repatriation to place of origin. This call was strongly supported by the Provincial Administration.

While Die Burger's influential columnist 'Dawie' argued that the NP's Bantu policy 'succeeds here, or it succeeds not at all', a Cape Times editorial urged the Public Committee to heed the arguments of industrialists against removing the African 14% of the region's workforce (however gradually). The policy was said to be thankfully ‘well hidden in a welter of committees at all levels’.

The Athlone Advice Office reported in mid-1964 that migrants were replacing settled African workers, as ‘people who have been here many years but who do not yet qualify are being endorsed out of the area in spite of being offered employment’. Cape Times editorials confirmed in August and October that regional policy, rather than reducing the Western Cape's African labour force, in practice tended to substitute migrants for settled workers.

Eight City Councillors, plus Rogers and the Town Clerk, met members of the above-mentioned inter-departmental committee in mid-1964, to demand compliance with Verwoerd's assurance that the removal of 'Bantu' would not interfere with economic development. The CC's position was that if the removal of Africans was not to harm the regional economy, it would have to take place over a lengthy period, and in step with the process of replacing manual labour by mechanization. This meeting seems not to have been reported in the press, nor have any minutes come to light. Like a similar discussion just days beforehand between representatives of Paarl local authorities and the inter-departmental committee, it was presumably held in camera. Topics on the agenda included repeated instances in which undertakings were denied the ‘Bantu’ labour on which they remained dependent, and the department's insistence that only ‘Coloureds' could be employed in developing the new Epping industrial area.

Provincial Administrator JN Malan urged receptive delegates at the Association of Divisional Councils annual congress in August to ensure that Bantu labour remained merely supplementary and exclusively migrant, pending its eventual replacement by white and coloured labour. There was little disagreement on this principle at NP's Cape congress in Port Elizabeth during that same month, although resolutions put forward by two Western Cape branches did show distinct differences of emphasis. Heidelberg delegates expressed concern at the 'slow progress' of the removal process, and urged greater vigour and determination in the face of ‘small-minded and selfish' opposition, while those from Citrusdal sought official assurance that the interests of both employers and employees would be safeguarded.

Referring to the Western Cape's African population, PW Botha declared at this congress that we will not have a black proletariat in our midst. We grant them the right to develop in their own areas. With White labour, and with the help of Coloured labour, we will make this part of the country safe for the White man. He announced a number of measures which would be introduced in an effort to uplift the 'Coloured' community. These included the establishment of a Directorate of Coloured Labour.
This new body, charged with facilitating the replacement of ‘Bantu’ labour by ‘Coloureds’, became operational during the following year. Its activities made little impression on long-established local employment patterns, and migrant Africans continued to be preferred for unskilled positions.

With the economy still expanding and influx controls intensifying, demand for unskilled labour continued to outstrip supply. Employers in such fields as security, building, local government and engineering reportedly expressed concern. Minister de Wet Nel responded at a Rapportyters function in Tulbagh during May, stressing that although its ultimate aim was the replacement of ‘Bantu’ by ‘Coloureds’, his department remained committed in the short term to the provision of migrant contract labour for employers who could prove that ‘Coloureds’ were not available. 130 Permits were issued for the introduction of an additional 3,729 ‘Bantu’ in the first six months of 1965. 159

De Wet Nel revealed an increase in the number of contract workers in the region as a whole of about 12,000 between 1962 and 1964, from 119,455 to 131,414. 160 Almost half of this regional increase occurred between 30 June 1963 and 30 June 1964. 161 In the Peninsula though, the turnover rate of African labour seems to have been unacceptably high during the first half of the 1960s. Here the number of registered African workers remained remarkably stable, notwithstanding the above-mentioned regular importation of thousands of new recruits.

The local total of nearly 46,000 in the first quarter of 1959 rose to just under 49,000 later that year, and then again up towards 50,000. 162 At one point in 1960 a high of some 56,000 was reached (46,000 of whom were registered in the municipal area and 10,000 in the area under the CDC), 163 before decreasing to 53,000 in mid-1962. By 1964, the figure had dropped back to 49,000 (38,000 and 11,000 in the municipal and CDC areas respectively). 164 The 46,500-odd service contracts registered in the Cape Peninsula in mid-1965 increased to over 54,000 at the end of that year, with almost 41,000 of the latter total registered in the Municipal area. 165

When a member of the TAC enquired at a committee meeting in March 1965 how continued reliance on African labour could be allowed despite the declared policy of the government, committee chairman Rogers replied that this was the result of economic expansion and industrialisation. He pointed out, though, that these workers were not permitted to live with their families in the region, and were recruited under contract for a specific period only. 17 Problems persisted, and the CBC expressed concern, one year later, that the families of such workers continued to ‘stream into white areas without permission’. Policy required that these law-breakers ‘must undoubtedly be sent back’. 18 Continued difficulties in putting this policy into effect will be discussed in the following chapter.

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5. BAAB 274, CBC to TC, 23 Nov. 1959.

18. BAAB 274, Geddie to DCD regional under-secretary, 5 June, 1963.


27. GN 83, Worrall to Town Clerk, 31 Aug. 1965. 28. GN 83, Mrs BD Willis to Simon's Town TC, 10 Nov. 1965; ibid, Simon's Town TC to Mrs Willis, 6 Dec. 1965; ibid, Mrs Willis to Mayor of Cape Town, 8 Dec. 1965; ibid, Worrall to TC, 17 Dec. 1965; ibid, TC to Mrs Willis, 3 Jan. 1966.

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35. GN 19/7/1 v, TAC minutes, 12 June, 1959. 36. GN 2/3/1/2, and BAAB 201, Rogers to NAC sub-committee, 25 Apr. 1960.


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of notice of 'expiration of right to occupy residential site', 6 Sep. 1962 (attached to annexure 2B, BAC minutes, 2 Apr. 1963); Cape Times, 10 Oct. 1962; Evening Post (Port Elizabeth), 11 Oct. 1962. 72. Cape Times, 27 Sep. 1962; Cape Times, 12 Oct. 1962. 73. Cape Times, 9 Oct. 1962. 74. GN 5/10 v1, BAC minutes, 2 Apr. 1963, item 2, with annexures 2, 2A, 2B and 2C (SAIRR and BS memoranda on removals, BS 'Notes on CC Memorandum and Athlone Advice Office's 'Immediate Positive Suggestions to the CC'). 75. GN 5/10 vi and BAAB 243/1, Rogers to TC, 30 May, 1963. 76. GN 5/12/1, BAC minutes, 6 Aug. 1963, item 6; ibid, Acting TC to SAP Athlone district commandant, 6 Aug. 1963; ibid, Athlone district commandant to TC, 17 Aug. 1963; Cape

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94. Cape Argus, 30 Apr. 1963; Cape Times, 1 May, 1963; GN 5/10 v2 and BAAB 243/2, TC to CPLCLWC sec, 1 May, 1963; GN 5/10 v2, CPLCLWC sec to TC, 25 June, 1964; ibid, CC minutes, 30 July, 1964, item 2; ibid, TC to CPLCLWC sec, 6 Aug. 1964; ibid, CPLCLWC sec to TC, 4 Jan. 1965; ibid, TC to CPLCLWC sec, 26 Feb. 1965.

95. Cape Times, 8 May 1963.


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11: THE SHIFT TOWARDS CENTRAL CONTROL, 1966-73
The previous chapter showed that state policy had evolved by the mid-1960s to envisage the replacement of 'Bantu' labour by 'Coloureds' in the Western Cape, as part of a national process of reducing the number of Bantu labourers in 'white' urban areas and resettling as many as possible in their own 'homelands'. A
tendency to replace settled African workers with migrants was shown to have become apparent in the Peninsula by 1965. Hindson and Davenport show that this replacement of settled workers by migrants was encouraged nationally by the promulgation (in May and June 1964 respectively) of the Bantu Laws Amendment Act, No. 42 of 1964, and a new Bantu Labour Act, No. 67 of 1964. Both came into operation at the beginning of 1965. While the latter eroded the legal status of urban Africans, the former strengthened influx and efflux controls, in particular through the tightening up of the 1945 Natives (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act. Women and children were in terms of the amended Section 10 specifically denied urban rights, unless they could prove that they had 'lawfully entered' and 'ordinarily resided' in an urban area. Under the new Section 29, unemployed Africans could (even if technically qualified under Section 10 to remain) be declared 'idle and undesirable' and 'endorsed out' of the cities. The Urban Labour Preference policy had thus already become something of a 'dead letter' by this stage. Posel says that 'as long as the ULPP was not enforced, influx control unwittingly heightened the very tendency it was designed to over-rule - namely, the prevailing preference for so-called 'raw' migrant labour for unskilled work'. The result was that the proportion of migrant workers under contract of service increased, and the proportion with Urban Areas Act rights diminished.2

The first section of this chapter shows that, following the early introduction in the Peninsula of a quota system designed to decrease demand for migrant labour, token attempts were made to utilise 'unsuitable' Coloureds and 'choosy' qualified Africans. Employers thereafter followed the national trend, by falling back on their traditional preference for contracted migrant labour. This growing disparity between economic policy and practice was compounded by a second contradiction, namely the retention (under Section 10 of the Urban Areas Act) of the right of Africans to earn, through length either of service or of residence, the right to remain permanently in an urban area. The second part of this chapter discusses the contribution of local administrators to the unsuccessful national campaign to have this provision rescinded.

Labour: Quota, Shortage, and Continued Compromise
The country-wide tendency towards replacing settled workers by migrants had, as mentioned in the previous chapter, become evident locally during the first half of the 1960s. It intensified towards the end of that decade and into the early 1970s, after initial half-hearted attempts to reverse the trend. New Bantu Labour Regulations issued in December 1965 required Labour Department certificates not only for contract labourers but also for settled urban location residents, including domestic workers.4 The CBC's Circular No. 2 of March 1966 was categorical on this point, insisting that 'in the Western Cape a vacancy for a Bantu does not exist, unless it is proved by the submission of the said certificate'.5 Hendrie notes, that, for vacancies which could not be filled by Coloured labour, labour officers were required to utilise as far as possible the pool of Africans who qualified to remain in the area. Those whom it was necessary to import on contract (for a maximum of 12 months) had to return thereafter to their homelands to apply for readmission to the prescribed area, even if they merely wished to renew their contracts with their present employers. This precluded the earning of residence rights under Section 10(1)(b).6 A Departmental official explained to Cape Peninsula Committee re Labour in the Western Cape (CPLCLWC) members (including Rogers' successor Bertie Worrall and his lieutenant H McLachlan) that re-admission to the urban area under a new contract with the same employer 'would still represent broken service so would not count towards permanent residence'.7 The CBC's above-mentioned circular stressed further that the proviso in Section 28(1) of the Bantu Labour Act that 'Bantu' could not be refused permission to return to their last employer within twelve months only applied to regulations issued under that paragraph. All provisions of other applicable regulati-ons remained in force. These stipulated that migrants could not be imported in the absence of accommodation, and required application
by employers on the prescribed B.A. 403 forms, after obtaining the obligatory certificate from the Labour Department stating that Coloured labour was unavailable.'

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Both Worrall and Lighton confirmed at a CPLCLWC meeting in February 1966 that employers did not object to the new system whereby permits were required even for qualified Africans. The CBC admitted in a circular that 'Bantu who qualify for permanent residence in prescribed areas, and are thus not compelled to move to a Bantu Homeland, sometimes pose problems' for those charged with the implementation of government policy. Officials should however, not be discouraged, but should tackle the problem with 'the same devotion as before'.

The situation continued to deteriorate, and an exasperated TAC member exclaimed in August that the authorities were 'thrusting around in the dark', without up-to-date statistics of the region's total labour needs, its Coloured labour potential or the minimum number of 'Bantu' labourers required to meet any short-fall." Faced with serious shortages of suitable Coloured labour and of accommodation for Bantu labour,12 the Department of Bantu Administration and Development eventually acted by discontinuing the issuing of permits for African labour in view of the acute lack of accommodation.12

When the CCI protested, Minister MC Botha called on 'industrialists and other employers themselves to take active steps to recruit Coloured persons and to train them and not to leave it to another body to supply the required Coloured labour'. In the meantime they should provide local

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authorities with funds for migrant accommodation. The Minister conceded, in view of the acute shortage, that this could even be of a temporary, prefabricated nature.14 The CCI bulletin expressed appreciation at being allowed to bring in 'replacement African contract labour whose admission to the region had not been authorised because of a lack of accommodation'.15 Employers responded by providing (in most cases extremely rudimentary) accommodation for 8,610 'bachelors' by the mid-1970s.16

Botha went on to summarily inform the CCI that his department had 'recently adopted a formula which will henceforth be followed in the Western Cape when considering applications by industry and commerce for the replacement of Bantu workers from the Bantu homelands'. The 'Bantu labour complement' of each employer (the number legally employed plus registered vacancies) had been retrospectively frozen as from 31 August, and would be decreased by 5% per annum from that date. 'In this way', said the Minister, 'the complement should be reduced to zero over a period of years, but if Coloured labour should become available meanwhile, the replacement process would, of course, be accelerated.'7

Employers were less alarmed at this development than might have been expected, for the authorities remained sensitive to their over-riding economic and political interests. Botha's deputy, Blaar Coetzee, met with CCI leaders, who reportedly supported government policy in principle, while fearing disruption of labour-supplies. The Deputy Minister was able to offer assurances on this point, and the CCI seems not to have been unduly concerned about the Department's newly-imposed racial quota.10

Coetzee issued a press statement on 21 December, reaffirming 'after further discussion with Mr. Walter Goldberg, President of the Cape Chamber of Industries, ... that the formula is not to be regarded as inflexible'. The generally co-operative attitude of employers clearly encouraged the Deputy Minister to enumerate ten jobcategories (including drivers, cleaners, delivery-men, clerks and packers) from which contract labour would henceforth be excluded. He stressed also that Bantu women would not be allowed to enter the region, and promised that he would personally ensure that employers of 'illegal' Africans were prosecuted in future."

The Cape Argus pointed out that the approximately 30,000 'qualified' Africans in the Peninsula were excluded from the new ban, and quoted the view of employer representatives that Coetzee's announcement was 'not as bad as it looks'.2 The newspaper's municipal reporter confidently predicted that 'economics rather than ideology will dictate how far the removal of Natives from the Western Cape can be taken and at what speed'.21
Though The Department issued a fierce-sounding circular demanding a tightening up of record-keeping, with increased vigilance against migrants becoming too choosy and against wives joining husbands in the urban areas,22 Worrall reported early in February that applications to increase 'Bantu' labour complements were being granted daily. Vacancies were being filled through the labour bureau from the local pool of 'qualified' Africans, on production of the required Labour Department certificates stating that Coloured labour was unavailable.23 This arrangement was ratified by a second circular from the CBC, which confirmed that 'qualified' Africans could be employed despite the 'freeze', as long as the Bantu Labour Regulations were obser ved. 24

The CCI chairman stated that support for government policy was predicated on its continued flexibility.21 CEA secretary Lighton said that the new measures to reduce employment of Africans in the Western Cape were inconvenient and complicated, but had not caused any serious problems for employers. Industry was adjusting well, and he expected the high 'Coloured' birth-rate and increased mechanisation to eventually facilitate the required 5% per annum reduction in the number of Bantu labourers.26 The Western Cape was thus an 'early candidate' for attempts by the apartheid state to reduce economic integration by means of racial labour quotas. Posel shows that 'similar measures in other industrial regions followed the promulgation of the Physical Planning Act in 1967'.27

Coetzee's December quota-announcement gave early warning of this latest intervention, insisting that new industrial development and expansion could no longer normally be based on the employment of additional 'Bantu' labour.20 Seeking to encourage the concentration of labour-intensive industries in the Bantustans and not in the urban areas,2 this Act allowed the Minister of Planning to control the establishment and extension of factories employing African labour in proclaimed areas. It was passed in May 1967, and applied from January 1968 to the Peninsula, as well as the surrounding areas of Somerset West, Strand, Stellenbosch, Paarl, Wellington and Worcester.20

Months before the promulgation of this new measure, the central authorities moved to block industrial development in Athlone Extension 9, ostensibly in order to curb inflation. The local press pointed out that the real aim was to curb the further influx of Africans, and the City Council's Works and Planning Committee promptly recommended acceptance of a ban on the employment of Africans there, as the previous chapter shows to have been the case in Epping.31 The Department of Bantu Administration and Development soon came out in opposition to industrial development not only in Athlone but also in Retreat, Parow and Maitland. CCI director RM Lee protested to the Minister of Planning at the beginning of 1967 that this was despite employers' cooperation with every facet of stated government policy, and the Cabinet, unlike organised employers, clearly considered such restrictions necessary on a national scale in order to curb the African influx. Announcing the imminent introduction of the Physical Planning Bill early in February, Minister MC Botha suggested that the 5% per annum reduction in the number of contract workers which was being implemented in the Western Cape should also be extended country-wide.2

The Cabinet, unlike organised employers, clearly considered such restrictions necessary on a national scale in order to curb the African influx. Announcing the imminent introduction of the Physical Planning Bill early in February, Minister MC Botha suggested that the 5% per annum reduction in the number of contract workers which was being implemented in the Western Cape should also be extended country-wide.2 His deputy Coetzee reportedly told the executive committee of the FCI in Cape Town during the following month that it would be 'tantamount to the suicide of the White nation if the inflow of Black labour into the Western Cape and the Witwatersrand was allowed to continue'.4 One year after the launching of the phased reductionscheme, Lighton revealed that the number of contract workers had decreased by about one thousand (less than half of the desired 5%). He stressed that employers were in complete agreement with the principles of influx control and Coloured Labour Preference, and were co-operating in reducing their need for Bantu labour to the minimum." Deputy Minister Coetzee met again with the CCI president, to assure him that the policy would not be forced on employers.36

Influx control remained ineffective during 1968, with Lighton estimating that 'several hundred Bantu entered the area illegally every month'. The Cape Flats Farmers' Association complained that 'Bantu'
labourers arrested for absconding after entering the Peninsula on the strength of requisitions by farmers were placed on outgoing trains without supervision, and simply alighted at Bellville and other nearby stations.2

In a speech to the Cape Town Rapportryers in February 1969, Deputy Minister of Justice, Mines and Planning Mr Sampie Froneman referred to the families of African workers as 'surplus appendages'.

Removal of the approximately 3.8 million such 'surplus appendages' from the urban areas was the government's top priority. The new Deputy-Minister of Bantu Administration and Development, Piet Koomhof, told the IANA conference in September that the NP aimed to eliminate 'surplus Bantu' from white areas and to minimise the presence of 'Bantu' outside the 'homelands'. He stressed the relationship between housing provision and influx control, insisting that no more 'Bantu' could be allowed into the cities than could be legally accommodated.29 The Riekert Commission echoed this opinion in 1979, by which stage Koomhof had become the Minister responsible for defusing the explosive squatter-situation in the Peninsula.

Bodies such as the CEA, the Epping Industrialists' Association and the Master Builders' Association insisted that there was no suitable alternative to African labour in certain job categories. This created a division between employer representatives and officials on the Cape Peninsula Local Committee towards the end of 1968 and during the first half of 1969. When central and local government representatives tried to force a ruling that the committee was not competent to discuss the employment of Africans in Epping, its secretary Lighton protested that officials served on the committee solely in an advisory capacity.40 Lighton insisted that this CPLCLWC, 'the largest and possibly the most important in the chain of Committees' directing regional policy, was established to represent the interests of employers. It seems that the question of voting rights had never arisen in the past, as officials had always been treated as full members.41 This flexing of industrial muscle ended anti-climactically, in consensus that 'the Committee's traditional method of operating would not be changed'.42 This followed an amicable meeting between employer representatives and the Deputy-Minister of Planning on the Epping issue in February.4

An insufficiency of labour became a problem again towards the end of 1969, initially in the building industry. Builders had during the second half of 1968 encountered a measure of reluctance on the part of the authorities to implement an agreed-upon moratorium regularising the employment of some 3,000 illegal? construction workers.44

Restrictions on employment of African labour were reported in October 1969 to have resulted in acute labour shortages at local building-sites and brickworks. The necessary labour was said to be 'hiding for the most part in the bushes, and employed by most small builders illegally due to no other labour being available and always running the risk of being raided every week by White officials from the Bantu Administration'.44 The Minister of Labour disclosed in mid-1970 that there were then only 8,800 Africans legally employed in the Cape Peninsula's building industry (alongside 28,705 'Coloureds' and 1,194 Whites).46

While over 17,000 Africans were prosecuted for working illegally in the Peninsula during 1969 (and a large proportion of those 'endorsed out' were forced by economic necessity to remain in or return to the prescribed area),47 thousands of African labourers were imported for heavy labour on projects such as new roads and defence contracts.4 Two thousand were deployed on the docks expansion necessitated by the continuing economic boom.4 City Council figures reveal an increase of more than four thousand in the registered 'Bantu' male labour force' between March 1969 and March 1970, and the CDC registered nearly one thousand more 'Bantu' in employment in mid-1969 than in September 1968. About 2,400 additional quotas had been granted in the Divisional Council area by mid-1970.50

In a confidential report on 'Bantu Labour and Kindred Matters', Pansegrouw's successor as CDC Manager of Bantu Administration, H Pridham-Jones, ascribed this increased reliance on Africans to an unsuccessful period of endeavour by employers to replace Bantu labourers with coloureds followed by an enforced return to the use of Bantu labour'.01 Central and local authorities, as well as employers,
heartily endorsed his recommendation that the process of legally employing Africans should be simplified and penalties for illegal employment increased.52

Available figures show that 457 employers of 'illegals' were prosecuted in the Divisional Council area between mid-1967 and mid-1969.5 In the Peninsula as a whole during 1969, 401 employers faced 878 separate charges of illegally employing African labourers.4 Councillor Stott 'queried the wisdom of not allowing a fuller flow of Bantu from their homelands when insufficient work was available for them there', and revealed that 'some R25,000 had been imposed in fines in recent months in respect of some 2,000 Bantu found to be illegally employed in Cape Town'. Committee secretary Lighton stressed the complexity of the task of 'regulating the entry of Bantu to meet the economic needs of the area' while at the same time attempting to utilise greater numbers of less-suitable Coloureds'.5

In a second report submitted in mid-1970, Pridham-Jones stressed the need to provide accommodation for the growing numbers of 'Bantu' labourers needed locally (in the absence of suitable 'Coloureds') if the current unprecedented development was to continue. He suggested that local employers follow examples set in Stellenbosch and East London, by either themselves erecting 'single quarter' hostels or providing funds for local authorities to do so.

Sixty-eight percent of participating members in a CCI survey in 1970 stated that 'Coloureds' were unsuitable for certain categories of work. The survey revealed that 27% of requests for 'Bantu' labour were refused, 41% granted in full, and 21% granted in part. (The remaining applications were still under consideration).7 Lighton argued at a CPLCLWC meeting in July that the Peninsula would remain a 'magnet' for illegal Africans as long as 'Coloureds' refused to perform heavy labour. He called for 'an element of compulsion' in policy towards 'the work-shy element', and for a moratorium in which employers could 'declare' their illegal African workers and have them replaced by 'Contract Bantu,.59 Citing the CCI survey as evidence that 'Coloureds' were unsuitable for heavy and dirty labour, the CC's Housing and Bantu Affairs Committee urged the Council to press for industrialists to be allowed additional Transkeian contractworkers on demand, subject to the provision of suitable accommodation. While emphasising its support for the basic principles of existing policy, the committee suggested pressing for greater flexibility through a 'high-level approach to the authorities'.59 This proved unnecessary, and nothing more was heard of this suggestion after committee chairman Councillor AZ Berman had separate meetings with the CBC and the Divisional Inspector of Labour.0

Lighton confirmed, however, in April 1971 that the acute labour-shortage was persisting."1 The CCI's annual general meeting during the following month heard that representations had been made at the highest level for an additional 3-4,000 African labourers to be brought into the Western Cape, as a 'bridging action' until there were sufficient 'Coloureds' to fill vacant posts.62 The central authorities were clearly receptive to such pleas, for Wilson reveals that between 1968 and 1974 the employment of African contract workers in Cape Town more than doubled. Within the construction industry alone, employment of such workers trebled, and within the government sector, where the Colored (sic) labour-preference area policy was likely to have been most rigorously applied, the number of such workers more than quadrupled.'3

Hubbard found that, concomitantly, the 'proportion of the African population living in household conditions (either as family members or lodgers) dropped considerably during the 1960s'.6 Formidable squatter movements would arise by the middle of the following decade, in response to this policy of family-separation. Meanwhile the authorities stepped up their efforts to control the process of economic integration. The Attorney General of the Cape warned in 1971 that spot fines would no longer be imposed for employment of 'illegals'. Employers would in future be required to appear in court, where prosecutors had been instructed to press for maximum penalties.63 A large timber and hardware distributor was among the first to fall foul of this ruling. Its representative was brought before a local magistrate in May, charged with illegally employing 37 African labourers at an Epping factory. The court imposed a lenient fine of
five pounds for each illegal worker, after hearing that the company had done everything possible to get the racially discriminatory clause in its title-deed waived, and had fought for concessions from various government departments. Permission to employ sixty Africans, but only for a sixmonth period, had eventually been granted after the April raid which led to the court-case. The number of employers prosecuted rose from over 600 in 1971 to almost 900 in 1972, before settling back slightly to more than 700 and 800 respectively in 1973 and 1974.6
Employers thus demanded African labour, and were prepared to break the law if this demand was denied. But economic integration held political implications, especially

in view of Section 10's provision for the earning of urban rights through length of service or of residence. Hindson emphasises continued differentiation in the labour market between unskilled migrants and increasingly-needed skilled or semi-skilled urban workers," while Posel stresses the role of national employers' organisations in successfully defending the right of Africans to 'qualify' under Section 10. The following part of this chapter examines the contribution of local officials to the intensifying clamour for removal of the Section 10 loophole.

The Retention of Section 10
The previous chapter mentioned WCCLNA opposition to the provisions of Section 10 of the Urban Areas Act, whereby Africans could over time win the right to remain in prescribed urban areas. Posel shows that the new emphasis on separate development, 'homelands' and resettlement resulted in a 'sustained attack on section 10(1) rights' during the first half of the 1960s. Opposition from organised industry and commerce staved off attempts, in terms of the 1960 Bantu in European Areas Bill and the 1963 Bantu Laws Amendment Bill, to undermine Section 10 rights.6
The possibility of earning urban rights through length of residence thus remained, but the judiciary was beginning to take a harsh view of the matter. This is evident in the August 1965 Supreme Court judgement in the appeal of one Mtobi Houghton Hlahleni. His conviction under Section 10 was upheld, as the judge ruled that residence or employment since the introduction of Section 10 on 24 June 1952 had to be legal to count towards qualification under this section. This appeared to conflict with a legal opinion given by the Department of Justice in 1953, but the municipal legal advisor pointed out that this earlier ruling merely prevented the withdrawal of urban rights won through legal residence or employment.7
The 1965 report of the Louw Committee (a housing-oriented subcommittee of the Interdepartmental Committee on Labour in the Western Cape) urged that Africans in the region should no longer be allowed to qualify for permanent residence in terms of Section 10. The Interdepartmental Committee itself subsequently made a similar recommendation. When the mayor of Paarl in June 1966 argued that the existence of Section 10 precluded the implementation of the policy of Coloured Labour Preference, Chief Bantu Affairs Commissioner FH Botha acknowledged that his Department was thoroughly aware of the problem but asked that the matter be left in the hands of the Department.71
The 1967 Interdepartmental Committee on Control Measures thereafter called for the repeal of Section 10, as apparently did conferences of Iana and Sabra. The WCCLNA
appointed a sub-committee to examine problems experienced in the administration of Coloured Labour Preference, and the report of this WCCLNA sub-committee repeated the call during the following year.72 Municipal Native Administration Department head Worrall was sufficiently concerned to stick out his neck on the question of Section 10 rights in a 'personal and confidential' letter to the CBC in September 1967. Worrall explained that as far as my Council is concerned I am treading on dangerous ground but I think that ... there is no "middle road". It must be separate development or complete integration. For myself, it is separate development with each National Unit getting its fair share of the wealth of this great country.
Worrall proffered his 'own personal draft amendment to Section 10', the main features of which were the removal of any reference to 'qualifications' or to the 72-hour period of grace during which new arrivals were legally permitted to remain in urban areas. Successful implementation of regional policy, Worrall contended, 'will depend almost entirely on not disturbing existing qualified Bantu but rather to carry on as heretofore but with propaganda and persuasion building up, in the minds of the qualified Bantu, the idea of returning to the "Homelands" voluntarily'. He reminded the Chief Commissioner that the whole process hinged on 'full-scale development of the "Homelands" which must obviously take some time'.

Such views were clearly common among officials throughout the country. Central and local government Bantu Administration staff attended a biennial meeting organised by Iana in October, to discuss 'the possible removal from legislation of Section 10(0) of Act 25 of 1945'. The Institute's Cape Provincial Division was convinced that regional policy could not succeed while Section 10 continued to provide for permanent residence.

Employers, on the other hand, were keen to retain the status quo. Hindson shows that the South African Federated Chamber of Industries in 1968 'opposed the removal of Section 10 on the grounds that this would antagonise urban Africans'. Deputy Minister Koornhof insisted that the repeal of Section 10 was not politically feasible due to the unrest which could be expected to result. Section 10 remained on the statute book, although considerably weakened by a provision in the 1968 Bantu Labour Act, which precluded the earning of residence rights through continuous service, and insisted that migrant workers had to return annually to their places of origin.

Section 10 would have to be amended, and the NP-supporting press portrayed Section 10 as an "old U.P. law" which was wrecking the Government's policy of making the cities whiter. This followed identification of Section 10 as an obstacle to the policy of separate development by the Deputy Minister of Planning, Justice and Mines, Mr Sampie Froneman. The latter conceded that Section 10's removal was precluded by public opinion and the lack of accommodation in the 'homelands'. At the same time he lashed out at 'drawing room politicians' who 'insisted that resettlement necessarily depended on accelerated homeland development. He argued that the government had no obligations in this regard.'

The following section focuses on increasing difficulties encountered by the authorities in implementing the policy of 'homeland'-resettlement.

The Slow Progress of the Resettlement Policy

The previous chapter distinguished between the ongoing repatriation to the 'homelands' of 'illegals' with remaining tribal links, and the planned resettlement of those in the detribalised 'displaced' category. The NP's plan to resettle Western Cape Africans in the Xhosa homelands was shown to have been initiated during the first half of the 1960s. A new phase in the process of 'homeland' development opened up with the establishment in 1967 of the Xhosa Development Corporation. This body channelled vast amounts of patronage into the Transkei and Ciskei over the following decades, without ever addressing the structural imbalances of a regional economy based on labour exportation. In the absence of meaningful development, with demand for migrant labour undiminished and Section 10 remaining on the statutebook, resettlement plans were skimped and scaled-down.

Sites for the resettlement of Xhosa-speaking victims were initially provided only in the Ciskei, as Matanzima still insisted that his underdeveloped territory could not absorb Africans from the cities. He was faced with a restive population schooled in decades of militant resistance, and was unpopular too in cities such as Cape Town.

The resettlement programme began oh a low key in 1967. The Secretary for Bantu Administration and Development informed the Western Cape's Chief Bantu Affairs Commissioner in July that the
Bantu Township Ctee has recently approved the following housing schemes out of welfare funds, in order to make provision in the Homelands for aged, disabled and other pauper families who are present resident in White areas and should be settled in their Homelands in accordance with present policy. Should there be pauper families in your area who have to be settled, please contact the Chief Bantu Affairs Commissioner of the area where such families fit in ethnologically and arrange for their transfer to the towns as soon as the houses are ready for habitation. In cases where such families qualify under Section 10(1)(a) or (b) of Act No.75 of 1945, to live in the area, they can only be settled in their Homelands with their consent.

This letter detailed approximately 930 'dwellings' planned for townships scattered throughout various tribal areas of the Transvaal, Orange Free State and Natal. 890 'dwellings' would be provided in the Ciskei for members of the 'Xhosa ethnological group', 300 of these at Sada (Whittlesea) and a further 300 at Dimbaza (King William's Town), plus 200 at Ilinge (Lady Frere), 50 at Xama (East London) and 40 at Mdantsane (also in the East London district). Zwelitsha at King William's Town was reportedly already full.4 But the process of resettling the region's 'surplus' Africans in the 'homelands' had already started. People removed from the Western Cape were among the 3,000 Africans resettled in Sada by that stage.9

Policy was further elaborated by the Secretary for Bantu Administration and Development in his infamous General Circular No. 25 of 12 December 1967. Mare reveals that a General Circular issued almost four years previously (in February 1964) had listed various categories of families who had to be moved in terms of government policy, and outlined the main types of resettlement area planned in the homelands. These included 'Bantu townships', 'self-build townships' and 'closer' or 'temporary' settlements.06 The 1967 General Circular developed these typologies and called for concerted action, stressing that 'no stone is to be left unturned to achieve the settlement in the homelands of nonproductive Bantu at present residing in the European areas'. Not much headway had been made thus far in resettling this category of people, including the 'aged, disabled persons, widows and women with dependent children' and other superfluous Bantu', in the rudimentarily-serviced homeland townships where they would be relocated 'on an ethnic basis', it was hoped by persuasion in the case of those 'qualified' under Section 10). Quarterly reports of progress were called for from Bantu Affairs Commissioners and magistrates.07

In January 1967, the boundary of the CLP area had been moved eastward to a 'line drawn from near Aliwal North on the Orange River along magisterial boundaries to Fort Beaufort, and then along the Kat and Fish Rivers to the sea approximately midway between Port Elizabeth and East London.0

Towards the end of that year about 200 families in the Nyanga transit camp (some 1,000 people in all) were on the Divisional Council waiting-list for resettlement. The speed of the removal-process was 'severely limited' by a lack of funds for transport and for housing in the 'homelands', but the CDC's total 'Bantu' population was slowly decreasing while the number in registered employment increased.2 Worrall informed the CPLCLWC in April 1970 that an average of one family per day was 'voluntarily' leaving the municipal area for resettlement in the 'homelands'.92
Worrall and Pridham Jones were confidentially informed by the Bantu Affairs Commissioner in October 1970 that subeconomic housing would be provided by the South African Bantu Trust at Butterworth, Flagstaff, Libode, Mount Frere, Cala, Idutywa, Engcobo, Qumbu and Umzimkulu, for Transkei 'citizens' living outside the territory. Here they could 'exercise rights they cannot be granted in other areas'. No specific arrangements could yet be made however, as the scheme was expected to take 'some time' to materialise.14 While this plan remained on the drawing-board, a number of families were evidently resettled in Transkei, for the BC carefully explained that the labour bureaux dealt directly with the 'homelands' Native Commissioners in routine cases of repatriation, and only 'when Bantu families must be resettled does this office make arrangements with the Secretary for Internal Affairs, Umtata'." Although the planned Transkeian resettlement camps had still not materialised by 1973, those in the Ciskei were reportedly growing steadily as 'surplus Bantu' were squeezed out of the vast portion of the Cape west of the 'Kat-Fish Line'.

Plans for the mass removal of Africans from the Peninsula only began to be seriously pursued after the central authorities (as discussed in the concluding section of this chapter) took over control of 'Bantu Administration' from local authorities. Cole has documented the organised resistance and the international outcry which ensued from the mid-1970s, as well as the subsequent escalation of conflict in the mid-1980s towards insurrectionary confrontation and countervailing state-supported vigilante terror. c7

The persisting demand for African labour, together with the retention of Section 10 and the faltering of the resettlement policy, necessitated increased reliance on traditional methods of influx control. The following section turns to this topic.

Local 'Bantu Administrators' Battle the Continuing Influx

Previous chapters have highlighted cooperation between central and local authorities in attempting to stem the influx of Africans to the Peninsula, as well as the involvement of liberal groups in rendering legal assistance where possible to victimised Africans. The 1964 Bantu Laws Amendment Act left the victims of influx control defenceless, by stipulating under Section 73 that (in Worrall's words) 'no person except an attorney or advocate may accept money from Bantus for advice re employment, influx control, criminal proceedings etc, and that anyone who gives any Bantu any document to the effect that such Bantu desires to enter or remain in any Urban Area shall be presumed to have received money for doing so'.

This provision proved useful in putting an end to the unofficial arrangement whereby the Black Sash and its Athlone Advice Office had been allowed by Rogers to direct

appeals and complaints about the treatment of Africans to the municipal Bantu Administration branch, rather than following official (and invariably fruitless) channels through the CBC's office." The slow progress with regard to influx control on a national scale was sufficiently worrying for the government to establish a confidential inter-departmental 'Committee in re Control Measures' (the Van Rensburg Committee) to look into the whole question.00 In his detailed submission to this committee during August 1965, Worrall reiterated criticism of the two 1964 influx-control Acts which he originally voiced at a meeting with the CBC earlier that month. He was particularly concerned that a 'Bantu', once recruited on contract, could not be refused permission to return to that job (if still available) within one year of the contract expiring. 201 Clearly influenced by Rogers, Worrall insisted that a minimum period of six months enforced residence in the reserves was necessary to counteract detribalisation. He also urged the prosecution of 'illegals' for failing to register as workseekers at their home offices' and of employees for giving them jobs, as well as the reintroduction of the 'closed city' Proclamation 105 of 1939
with the War Measures denying Africans rail-tickets, and the 'fostering of border industries to provide employment for repatriates'.

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At a meeting in August 1965 with the new CBC, Mr FH (Frikkie) Botha (who had assumed office the previous month), Worrall raised the issue of lack of control, particularly over women. He was concerned that many of the women warned to leave the prescribed area of the Peninsula simply 'go into hiding and return in due course with medical certificates for illness or pregnancies or some other of the many excuses to remain.'

In September, the TAC discussed the problem of the rapidly increasing influx of women with Deputy-secretary (Urban Areas), Mr Louis Smuts. He gave the assurance that medical facilities in the homelands were receiving attention, which might provide an alternative for those who came for medical reasons (often connected with pregnancy). Meanwhile cases should be dealt with on merit, bearing in mind the reluctance of the Railways administration to transport back to the 'homelands' mothers on the verge of giving birth.' The TAC remained concerned almost one year later about the large number of 'illegals' of both sexes who continued to evade detection.'

When the planned 'homeland' clinics and hospitals had still not materialised by 1968, Worrall raised the issue of the continued issuing of medical certificates to 'illegals'. He informed the Medical Officer of Health in September that there had recently been a sharp increase in the number of Bantu presenting themselves at this Office, armed with medical certificates issued by Medical Officers serving the Clinics at Langa and Guguletu, particularly in regard to T.B. cases. In many cases these Bantu are in the area illegally and responsibility for treatment does not rest with the City Council, and they should be repatriated to their homes in the Ciskei and Transkei.

Medical staff were urged not to accept 'Bantu' as clinic-patients until the Administration Office had verified their status, and a new form providing for such a procedure was duly introduced. This evidently resulted in increased attendance at hospitals rather than clinics, and the CBC in May 1969 requested the Director of Hospital Services to warn the Superintendents of Peninsula hospitals that acceptance of 'illegals' as outpatients could be construed as assisting them to remain in the prescribed area, contrary to the provisions of Section 11 of the Urban Areas Act.

At the beginning of 1967, the CBC issued a circular to local authorities, urging compliance with government policy. This circular suggested that municipalities had in the past been lax regarding influx control, with the result that many local authorities are saddled with Bantu (men, women and families) who should never have been allowed there. Today, still, it is not yet too late to direct many, who have not yet obtained right of residence, ... to their places of origin in the homelands*. The solution ... does not lie in a magic formula or mass removal, but in a systematic sifting process and attention to each individual case.

City Council officials remained concerned (on the other hand) that employers of 'illegals' were being treated leniently by the courts, and the matter was taken up (to little effect) with the Chief Magistrate by the CBC.

Minister MC Botha stressed that 'the object of influx control went to the root of the question of ensuring the continued existence of the Whites in the predominantly White areas'. In response to opposition UP leader de Villiers Graaff's observation that the number of 'Natives' in the Western Cape was increasing despite the government's best efforts, Deputy Minister Coetzee expressed confidence that the flow would be 'arrested', and charged that United Party policy would inevitably lead to this becoming a Black region in which Whites were 'swamped.'

The CBC issued another circular towards the end of 1968, saying that 'it would appear very necessary to stress that the entry of Bantu women for work in the Western Cape is not permitted and that Bantu
employees (men as well as women) may not transfer with their employers to the Western Cape or even from one prescribed area to another within the Western Cape'.

Requests for ministerial concession regarding increased use of 'Bantu' labour in violation of regional policy would have to be strongly motivated in future. A third circular, issued in March 1969, reminded local authorities and their officials that they were allowed no discretion regarding the residence or employment of 'illegal Bantu' in prescribed areas. The law should be applied to the letter. Humphries reveals that 15,152 prosecutions were undertaken in the four Peninsula magisterial districts of Wynberg, Cape Town, Athlone and Bellville, together with Stellenbosch, Worcester and Paarl, in the 12 months between June 1965 and May 1966. This had risen, according to Horrell, to a similar figure for the Peninsula alone during 1967. An unknown number were additionally 'endorsed out', while Worrall reported that, between May 1965 and the end of 1967, there were just over 5,600 women in the CC area alone 'for whom a file [was] not made and who were warned to leave forthwith, without an endorsement in the Reference Book'.

Despite a continued increase in the number 'endorsed out', it was reported that the African population in the municipal area had from the end of June 1966 to the end of June 1967 increased by almost 2,000, but Worrall explained that this was due to the rehousing of squatters from beyond the municipal boundary. Davenport in fact says that enforcement of Section 10 'through the "endorsement out" of "surplus" dependents of working people did result in a slight reduction of the total African population of the Cape Peninsula in 1967-8'. Precise figures for the number endorsed out during this period are unavailable, as the Minister of Bantu Administration and Development ruled that 'compiling them would involve too large a volume of work'.

Pridham-Jones of the CDC revealed that his staff arrested 'about 3,710 Bantu' for being in the area illegally in the two years up to mid-1969. (This excluded the unquantified number arrested by the police). In the Peninsula as a whole, 17,400 'illegals' were prosecuted in 1969. The Director of Labour and Community Services of the newly-established Bantu Administration Board for the Cape Peninsula reported in 1974 that the number of Africans prosecuted in the area dropped from 16,557 in 1971 to just over 14,800 in both 1972 and 1973, and again to 12,800 in 1974.

This decline in the number of 'illegals' prosecuted is attributable to the establishment (in terms of the amended 1964 Bantu Labour Act) of a local 'Aid Centre' at the Bantu Commissioner's Court towards the end of 1971. Hindson shows that these new bodies reduced the number of prosecutions, screening arrestees and directly 'endorsing out' those whom it felt could benefit from such softer treatment. Some 1,800 of the more than 16,000 arrested 'illegals' referred to the local Aid Centre during 1972 were not prosecuted, but Aid Centre activities were curtailed nationally in 1975, and local prosecutions rose sharply to 23,577 during that year.

Despite the implementation of these increasingly oppressive control measures, Cape Town's African population actually grew during this period. This is clearly difficult to quantify. In his study on Migrant Labour, Wilson says that the 100,000 officially enumerated in 1960 had grown to 110,000 by the end of that decade. Hubbard provides similar figures, while Nash's study and that of Cilliers and Bekker both cite the Riekert Commission report to the effect that the Peninsula's African population increased by 69% during the 1960's (from 68,352 in 1960 to 115,655 in 1970). This is an increase of more than 47,000, but Humphries says, without providing any figures, that the enumerated African population of the Peninsula grew by only 33,627 during this period.
offences? was reflected by this stage even in the government-supporting press. Rapport came out in support of widespread calls for decriminalisation, a crack-down on corruption, and more humane treatment in the implementation of influx control.12

The concluding section of this chapter discusses the establishment of a new centralised administrative organ, which functioned more smoothly without the obstructive influence of liberal councillors and equivocating employers.

The Establishment of the Peninsula BAAB

Bekker and Humphries show that the unpublished 1967 report of the above-mentioned Van Rensburg Committee severely criticised existing municipal administration of influx control, and suggested that the Department assume control either directly or through the establishment of 'labour boards' replacing local authority Bantu Administration departments.12

A NP member of parliament introduced a private motion supporting the latter suggestion in February, which was countered by UP support for continued municipal administration of influx control. In his contribution to this debate, Deputy Minister Ccetzee warned that an alleged minority of uncooperative municipalities would not be allowed to wreck the government's 'Bantu' policy, and could well be replaced by the suggested labour boards. Coetzee revealed also that the Van Rensburg committee had drafted a bill which was considered too contentious for introduction in the current session of parliament.23

The draft bill, circulated to municipalities early in 1968, was strongly criticised by municipal administrators for separating responsibility for housing and labour matters. It was pointed out that this would be a return to the situation before 1945, when municipalities had provided housing and services while the central authorities concentrated on equilibrating labour supply and demand. The Bill was withdrawn in late 1968, and the first draft of the Bantu Affairs Administration Bill, circulated in early 1969 and eventually passed at the end of 1971, provided for the proposed Boards to have jurisdiction over both housing and labour matters in urban and rural areas, so signalling the imminent end of municipal jurisdiction over the townships.51

A sub-committee appointed by the Council of IANA was instrumental in persuading the Department to replace the proposed Labour Boards by Administration Boards with wider powers and functions.12* Worrall was thanked for his input by this investigatory body's secretary, who said that he had contributed greatly in giving the Sub-Committee a clear understanding of the position in the Cape.120

The Peninsula Bantu Affairs Administration Board was eventually inaugurated in September 1973," with the TAC providing most of its senior personnel.140 The new organisation combined the Native Administration Departments of the City Council and the Divisional Council, without the distraction of interference by elected representatives.

Rationalisation following the Riekert Report resulted in the amalgamation in 1979 of the Peninsula and South Western Cape Administration Boards into a single body covering the entire Western Cape.14 The new Western Cape Bantu Affairs Administration Board struggled vainly to assert its authority, before being disbanded with the abolition of influx control in 1986.

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1. BAAB NY 25/9/1 v1, CDC sec to CBAC, 6 Sep. 1966, 1.
3. Hindson, Pass Controls, 69; Davenport: Modern History, 347.
5. GN 5/10 v2, CBC to WC magistrates, 16 Mar. 1966 (Circular No. 2 of 1966), 2.
7. BAAB NY 25/9/1 v1, CPLCLWC minutes, 16 Feb. 1966, 2.

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60. BAAB 133/2, HBAC minutes, 7 Oct. 1970, item 6; ibid, TC to Divisional Inspector of Labour, 6 Nov. 1970; ibid, TC to CBC, 6 Nov. 1970.
73. BAAB G20, AH Worrall to CBC, 7 Sep. 1967 (personal and confidential).
74. BAAB NY 25/13/1 vi, Pridham-Jones to CDC sec, 5 Nov. 1968.
82. BAAB 243/1, Department of Information circular on the establishment of the Xhosa Development Corporation, 15 June, 1967.
84. BAAB 243/1, SBAD to CBC, 13 July, 1967.
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98. GN S/11/1, Worrall to TC, 18 Nov. 1965. 2.
99. GN 5/1/11, Worrall to TC, 18 Nov. 1965; ibid, AAO director RN Robb to TC, 13 Dec. 1965; ibid, TC to Mrs Robb, 3 Mar. 1966.

100. Bekker and Humphries, From Control to Confusion, 7. See also GN 84 and BAAB 303, Committee in re Control Measures chairman to TC, 3 July, 1965.

101. BAAB 243/1, Worrall’s ‘Points for Discussion with the Chief Bantu Affairs Commissioner’, 5 Aug. 1965, 2; GN 84, BAAB 303 and BAAB 133/2, Worrall’s memo to Interdepartmental Committee in re Control Measures, 24 Aug. 1965, 1. 102. GN 84, BAAB 303 and BAAB 133/2, Worrall’s memo to Interdepartmental Committee in re Control Measures, 24 Aug. 1965, 1-14; BAAB 303, Worrall to TC, 24 Aug. 1965; GN 84 and BAAB 303, TC to Interdepartmental Committee in re Control Measures, 1 Sep. 1965.


110. BAAB 140 v1, Geddie to Worrall, 21 Mar. 1968; ibid, Worrall to CBC, 26 Mar. 1968; ibid, CBC to Worrall, 23 Apr. 1968.

111. Cape Argus, 7 Feb. 1967. 112. BAAB 140 v1, CBC to WC magistrates, 11 Nov. 1968 (Circular No. 7 of 1968).


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134. Bekker and Humphries, From Control to Confusion, 7-8.
CONCLUSION
It would be gratifying, in conclusion, to neatly compare Cape Town's history with that of other South African cities, tracing regional differences and similarities in order to generalise with some degree of authority about national developments. Unfortunately, the relevant comparative evidence is not yet in. We must await completion of the studies mentioned in the introduction - and of other work which makes use of the opening-up of the archives during the present contradictory period of reform.

There can be no short-cut way of arriving at a new synthesis, without going through the necessary prior phase of detailed local studies. Bonner's recent work on urban issues demonstrates the dangers of impatience in this regard. Noting the extreme paucity of information about urban African politics, as well as the need for regional studies, Bonner employs what he calls a 'slice' approach to the history of the Witwatersrand, focussing firstly on squatter movements in the 1940s and early 1950s, and then on the Industrial and Commercial Workers' Union in the 1920s. These topics were apparently chosen because of their popularity with prior researchers.

Without the detail which may be expected from forthcoming local studies, Donner is unable to sustain a regional focus even on these narrow and well-documented subjects. His paper on Witwatersrand squatting is largely irrelevant to the situation in the Peninsula, where highly publicised large-scale organised land-invasions occurred only from the late 1970s. The availability of vast tracts of undeveloped land on the Cape Flats seems, in the earlier decades with which this thesis is concerned, to have made local squatting more an individual than a collective act of defiance. Bonner's analysis is marred in any case by the unwarranted generalisation of squatter politics as universally 'parochial', 'introverted', 'sectional' and 'divisive', due allegedly to cultural factors. Cole's work on Crossroads is cited in support of this contention. Cole herself prefers to view these aspects of squatter politics, highlighted by the vicious state onslaught against the organised illegal occupation of land in the Peninsula from the late 1970s, in the more useful terms of strategic and tactical errors and omissions on the part of the progressive movement.

Regional overviews must await the completion of narrower local studies (in particular, for the Witwatersrand, of Johannesburg). The more empirically detailed these histories of individual urban areas turn out to be, the easier and more fruitful will be the subsequent work of synthesis and comparison. The present thesis has uncovered, from archival sources, aspects of local history which until now have remained largely hidden. The benefits of an emphasis on primary sources, rather than on unverifiable interviews or free-floating literary criticism, extend beyond the purely empirical. Methodologically, this emphasis has avoided some of the problems associated with the writing of black workers' history by middle-class whites. Questionable insights into consciousness and culture have been sacrificed, but what remains is based on information which is valid, reliable and verifiable.

The thesis demonstrates the value of archival research in moving away from monolithic and ideological ways of thinking about the past. In illuminating this small part of the total picture, new light is shed on both the development of apartheid and the growth of resistance. Even the most developed and nuanced views on
these topics (represented by the works of Posel and Lodge) can begin to be refined on the basis of this single case-study.

This study certainly confirms Posel's rejection of the orthodox 'Grand Plan' view of apartheid, in favour of a 'process' perspective. Regional policy is shown to have evolved through the complex political interaction of ratepayers, capitalists, segregationist intellectuals and 'Native Administrators', central state departments, and local authorities. Shaped in this conflictual manner, the emerging policy had distinct drawbacks, (such as the inability to physically remove the vast majority of Africans expelled from the city), and loopholes (such as the retention of Section 10).

The thesis reveals unmistakable continuity in policy over what used to be seen dogmatically as the great divide of 1948, when segregation was supposed suddenly to have given way to something qualitatively different named apartheid. Under the new NP administration, policy regarding influx control, squatter control and residential segregation in the Peninsula continued very much along the old UP lines.

The evidence uncovered on the subject of 'Coloured Labour Preference' supports Posel's analysis of the compromises involved in the broader policy of 'Urban Labour Preference', and of the way in which policy was stripped of all but 'political content. In practice, 'Coloured Labour Preference' was nothing but empty rhetoric employed in a failed attempt to justify a cruel policy aimed at safeguarding the racial exclusivity of the franchise, while at the same time providing cheap and tractable labour.

While agreeing with Posel in principle, this thesis highlights a number of omissions and unwarranted generalisations in her analysis. Firstly, there is the question of pre-apartheid control measures. Posel says that local offices of the central NAD were responsible for the registration of service contracts in all urban areas during the 1940s.1 This does seem to have applied at least to Johannesburg and Port Elizabeths but Chapters 1 and 3 of this thesis show that it was not the case in Cape Town. Here the City Council assumed this duty in the municipal area as early as 1926, and throughout the Peninsula twenty years later, thereby exercising influx control in the absence of a full-blown pass system.

In her analysis of the evolution of Urban Labour Preference, Posel stresses the role of an Association of Administrators of Non-European Affairs, which united municipal 'Native Administrators' on the Rand during the 1940s. When it comes to Coloured Labour Preference in the Western Cape, she mentions Sabra but ignores the leading role of the affiliated WCCLNA, and of its TAC chairman and deputy, Rogers and Olivier.

The present thesis highlights the secrecy and nonaccountability of this body, as well as the ethnic idealism by which it was inspired. Administrators such as Rogers are shown to have played a largely-hidden role in the policymaking process, which involved compromises unacceptable to segregationist visionaries such as Olivier and his Stellenbosch cronies.

On the capitalist side of the policy-making equation, Posel claims that the NAD did not establish regular formal links with ... urban business', of the sort which she shows to have developed with organised agriculture.7 Chapters 5, 7 and 10 above show that such a liaison committee did in fact exist locally, in the form of the Labour Coordinating Committee (later the Labour Consultative Committee). This analysis further stresses the leading role of the CCI on the Cape Peninsula Local Committee on Labour in the Western Cape, and indicates that it is incorrect of Posel to suggest that employers of 'illegals' were not often prosecuted.

The situation in Cape Town clearly played a significant role in the evolution of the system of influx control. Cape Town thus has the dubious distinction of being a pioneering city in this regard, as for instance was Durban with its beerhall system; Bloemfontein with its early example of a site and service camp; Kimberley and Johannesburg with their compounds; and Graham's Town and Port Elizabeth with their formally-declared mid-19th century locations.
With its African population kept relatively small through a tradition of labour migration from distant 'Native' reserves, the Western Cape was seen by Sabra and the ultra-segregationists as the obvious region in which to begin removing 'surplus' Africans from white society. Verwoerd declared in 1955 that this was the area in which a start could most easily be made with the implementation of 'Grand Apartheid'. Yet geographical distance from the 'homelands' proved a major obstacle when mass-removals began during the following decade (pp 230, 314 and 483–4 above).

It is ironic also that repeated references to the impossibility of ever instituting a pass-system in the Cape (pp 9, 90 and 94 above) were contradicted by assurances that the control measures conceived and implemented in the Western Cape region would in due course be extended throughout the country. With the City Council achieving a measure of success in controlling the influx by means of its decades-old system of service contracts, legislation introduced as early as 1944 included a 'reception depot clause' framed with the Cape Town situation in mind (p97 above). When the implementation of so-called 'Coloured Labour Preference' was stepped up in 1962, the NP mouthpiece, the Transvaler, stressed that 'what is being planned in miniature for the Western Cape is the government's policy also for the rest of the Republic' (p473 above). The racial labour quota introduced in this region four years later preceded the extension of such measures country-wide in terms of the 1967 Physical Planning Act (p518 above). Clearly there is room for considerable sharpening of focus on policy-formation in the urban areas and the regions. The study of resistance is equally underdeveloped. This thesis traces, in the pre-1948 period, the tangled roots of divided opposition to apartheid; and calls into question Lodge's unsubstantiated assumption that class-concepts best explain changing patterns of resistance. It also challenges his exclusion of 'legally sanctioned' forms of protest.

There is no evidence here of conflicts or splits along class lines. The politics of resistance during this period seem best portrayed in terms of ideological tensions between pragmatic 'united frontists' of all classes, and those who adhered rigidly to the principles of non-collaborationism, anti-communism, Africanism or liberalism. Labelling members of these opposition groups pejoratively as 'petty bourgeois' or 'aspirant petty bourgeois' would probably not be incorrect, but seems of little analytical value. Rigid reliance on class-categories, against the grain of the archival evidence, ignores leading activists who insisted at the time on the national character of the broader struggle.'

On the question of legality, it is clear that concrete organisational advances stemmed in a number of instances precisely from working within the system, through participation in elections for 'dummy' Native Representatives, and in the activities of location Advisory Boards. This analysis bears out Communist Party leader Edwin Mofutsanyana's contention that 'fraudulent institutions' such as Native Representation can, 'at times when the liberation movement is at a low ebb ... become platforms from which to rally the masses'.0 Maylam's claim that Advisory Boards 'tended to be dominated by members of the African petty bourgeoisie who used their position to further their own interests' is shown to have little foundation in this particular case.'1 Cape Town pioneered the politics of the multi-racial 'united front', but resistance paradoxically became increasingly divided as the united front grew stronger. On the strength of unyielding principles, first noncollaborationists and then Africanists uncompromisingly confronted the pragmatic mainstream opponents of racial domination. Despite these debilitating divisions among the political leadership, Africans in Cape Town were able to stage a mass pass-burning at the end of the war, and to mount a three-week-long general strike in March 1960. Lodge characterises the latter as the most significant challenge to apartheid since the nationwide Defiance Campaign (p388 above), while Karis and Gerhart observe that no urban African community in South Africa had ever been so united in opposition to white authority (p393 above).
It seems ironic that such heights of militancy should have been reached in a town with a reputation as a political backwater, but this analysis shows that the ground had been well prepared for such confrontations, over decades of ineffectual legal protest. In these times of crisis, the 'small core of activists' universally characteristic of such movements was able successfully to call the masses to action. Control processes and opposition currents do not always mesh or engage as directly. There were long periods during which state policy evolved with little reference to the views of its victims. Political leaders among the oppressed squared off against each other during these fallow times, in bitter rivalry which had both ideological and strategic dimensions. The embryonic liberation-movement is shown to have been preoccupied with factional disputes while the foundations of racial capitalism were consolidated before the war. The 'united frontists' of the Communist Party and the progressive faction of Congress were subsequently strengthened through participation in Advisory Board and Native Representative elections, to the point where they were beginning to challenge the system of racial oppression in no uncertain terms at the end of the war. Harsher laws and administrative practices sprang into place in response, along with the ideology of apartheid. Resistance remained debilitated by factionalism during the 1950s, allowing policy to develop virtually unchallenged, through the convoluted processes of white politics, until the demonstrations and the general strike of March 1960.

The 'homelands' policy with which the state responded, and also the political clamp-down which ensued, were supported by local employers and the local authority. Despite the crushing of attempts to regroup armed and underground, urban apartheid during the 1960s was far from the monolithic and functional system portrayed by Maylam, as ethnic ideology soon began to falter against the irresistible currents of economic and political reality. Control shifted in 1973 to the central authorities, who were able to hold back the tide for little more than a decade, and the deteriorating local situation played a significant role in the decision to abandon influx control in the mid-1980s. Cole has begun to document the momentous struggles in the Peninsula which contributed to this development. It seems that sufficient primary material has come to light in the interim to justify a full-scale historical study of these more recent events. There is clearly a great deal of work to be done in the neglected field of South African urban historical studies. The present thesis will, it is hoped, prove useful in future research on the history of our fast-changing cities.

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APPENDIX: REVIEW OF STUDIES BY GOLDIN AND MUTHIEN

The recent history of Cape Town is attracting growing interest from researchers in a variety of academic disciplines. The admittedly-limited body of work produced thus far provides illuminating insights into the complexities of the social processes which shaped this city. It is, however, work of uneven quality, and has hardly yet begun to assume the form of a cumulative (and hence scientific) enterprise.

This common failure to build upon prior research is perhaps best ascribed to the institutional constraints of a competitive and non-cooperative modern research environment. There must be a point, though, at which regrettably normal academic practice degenerates into flagrant transgression of the basic rules of historical research. Glaring examples are provided in the recent Oxford University doctoral theses of the economist Goldin and the sociologist Muthien.

Bickford-Smith and Adhikari identify in the published version of Goldin's thesis numerous factual and conceptual lapses falling within their areas of competence, but Adhikari says that these 'errors and misjudgements appear to be much more frequent when Goldin ventures outside of his central theme, the Coloured Labour Preference Policy'. This generous view seems to have won wide acceptance. It is unfortunately completely erroneous.

Goldin's confusion is in fact evident even in his very conceptualisation of the policy of Coloured Labour Preference. This he correctly defines as comprising 'the interlocking regulations which seek to restrict the influx of Africans into the Western Cape'. Nowhere does he show that the policy benefited or intended to benefit so-called 'Coloureds', except for the fact that (there being no substantial 'Coloured' reserves) they were not subject to influx control. He actually documents, albeit without recourse to primary sources, their increasing oppression and exploitation and their growing resistance. Yet (apparently fooled by its title) he insists that Coloured Labour Preference 'was one side of a dual-pronged attempt to restructure Coloured identity which had as its other prong the political incorporation of Coloured people'. His insistence that the Coloured Labour Preference policy was a failed attempt to improve the position of so-called 'Coloureds' not only obscures the fundamental point that this was a measure designed to establish control over the influx of Africans. The bifurcation arising from this basic mistaken racial assumption results in a book which Adhikari shows to comprise 'extensive parallel but rather unco-ordinated commentary' on regional policy towards Africans, as well as on topics such as 'coloured politics, coloured identity, National Party policies toward coloureds and on economic development, employer practices and trade unionism in the Western Cape'.

Whether the state was or was not attempting from the 1950s to 'restructure Coloured identity' is another question, but it does seem rather far-fetched to see this as the aim of a regional policy of particularly-strict control over the influx of Africans. Divide and rule strategies of this sort had in any event (as Goldin does acknowledge in his first chapter) been used for centuries to secure the intermediate position of 'Coloureds' in the Western Cape's tripartite racial hierarchy.

Van der Westhuizen stresses that there was 'little concern for the wellbeing of the "coloured" people in NP circles' during the period when the policy was being formulated; and Humphries points out that measures intended to safeguard employment opportunities for 'Coloureds' were only announced in the mid-1960s. On the question of their 'political incorporation', Van der Westhuizen stresses that this was definitely not on the agenda of the National Party government before the second half of the 1970s.
Goldin acknowledges the fact that the implementation of this ostensible ‘preference policy’ actually disadvantaged the vast majority of ‘Coloureds’, but his deductive methodology prevents the incorporation of this insight into his analysis. Both he and Humphries note that the

‘Commission of Inquiry into Matters Relating to the Coloured Population Group’, (chaired by Dr Erika Theron, whose role in the development of regional policy is mentioned in Chapter 5 above), found in 1976 that the application of the policy’s ‘labour preference’ aspect never really got off the ground. 0

This confusion is, as will be shown, only the beginning of Goldin’s difficulties in getting to grips with his chosen topic. It might be expected that a second doctoral thesis on this self-same topic, also accepted by Oxford University, would take issue with Goldin’s conceptual problems and seek to remedy the factual errors with which his work abounds. Very surprisingly, however, Muthien’s excessively encyclopaedic work proceeds as if exploring virgin territory, ignoring Goldin’s work and relying instead on his secondary sources. These Oxford theses overlook the basic principle of historical scholarship, namely its necessarily cumulative nature. Neither makes more than a token effort to build on these sources with additional primary material.

Muthien sets out, in the introduction to her thesis, a conceptual grid encompassing such terms as segregation, apartheid, materialist analysis, the state, resistance, pass control and racial domination. Goldin’s study starts with an apparently-similar epistemological discussion (extended to include the troublesome concept of ‘Coloured identity’), but

Muthien makes no attempt to distinguish their respective positions. 11

The rest of this paper shows how Goldin and Muthien manage, with minimal original research, to provide historical analyses of the crystallisation of state policy and the development of popular resistance during the succeeding eras of segregation and apartheid. The paper is divided into four sections, the first two focussing on the way in which these two authors approach the unfolding of regional policy, while sections three and four discuss their analyses of local resistance.

The Development of Regional Policy Before 1948

In his second chapter, Goldin takes issue with Lacey’s conception of the origins of Western Cape regional policy, but his criticism fails to advance beyond her functionalist and economistic frame of reference. He simply asserts that it was not (as she would have it) the central government but ‘the local authorities together with local employers and politicians [who] began to campaign for the development of a policy of Coloured preference’. In support of this assertion, he cites (without elaboration) Saunders’ account of the municipality’s leading role, at the turn of the century and again during the 1920s, in pushing for segregation and influx control.”2

Like Lacey, Goldin overlooks the fundamental fact that municipal ratepayers constitute a local authority’s political constituency.” Neglecting archival research, he is unaware of the way in which municipal policy was shaped at an early stage by the intense anti-African agitation of organised ratepayers and other local interest groups.

Employers fare little better than the municipality in Goldin’s account of the origins of Coloured Labour Preference. Their role is inferred solely from the fact that they gave way to demands for preferential treatment which Budlender and Nicol show to have been exerted (during the early 1920s and the early 1940s respectively) by Coloured organisations such as the African Political Organisation and the Cape Garment Workers Union.14

Goldin alludes to Van der Horst’s early discussion of the subsequent accelerating influx of Africans to the Peninsula with the rapid manufacturing-based industrialisation which characterises the period from the mid-1930s to 1948. He says that in 1935 ‘Western Cape employers had not yet begun to feel the pinch on their African labour supplies. The Cape Town City Council, with the approval of local employers, therefore continued to collaborate in the stricter enforcement of influx controls’.

According to this account, local employers’ ensuing demands (evidenced only in the recommendations of the Willcocks and Britten commissions) for an increased supply of unskilled African labour had by 1939 forced the municipality to reverse its stand on this issue. Along with other local authorities, the
judiciary and the police-force, the municipality is said then to have refused to implement the Urban Areas Act until the labour market had stabilised at the end of the war. From 1946, the City Council and its alleged constituency of employers are shown (with reference only to the rather dated secondary works of Budow and Horrell) to have again collaborated with the central authorities in the stricter implementation of influx control. 

Muthien's discussion of the growth of the local influx control system merely embellishes Goldin's descriptive 'municipality versus government' account of the topic. Tucked away, almost as an afterthought in her chapter on local resistance, is the observation that 'the government's attack on urban Africans and squatter settlements of the 1940s was arguably a response to the militancy of the urban proletariat and resistance in the cities, which presented the state with an urban crisis of major proportions'. The local development of influx control during the second half of the 1930s could usefully be seen in this light, but Muthien says only that the 'need for a working system of influx control in the Western Cape was brought to the attention of local authorities by the rapid growth of the urban African population from 1936.

Muthien explains the local authorities' concern with influx control simply by indicating that she has learnt, somewhere in the 1943-6 minutes and reports of the Divisional Council's Housing, Health and Combined Native Affairs Committees - her referencing throughout is atrocious - that 'Peninsula municipalities were anxious to curb African influx due to the increased housing demands made on them.' There is not even an inference here (as with Goldin) of the interests of employers, and she ignores the continuing agitation of the local ratepayers as completely as he does. The 1937 amendment to the Natives (Urban Areas) Act is alleged to have limited the validity of work-seeking permits to a maximum of fourteen days - a provision which Goldin claims was introduced in 1949, although Saunders had previously shown that this was actually written into Section 12 of the Original 1923 Natives (Urban Areas) Act.

Muthien says that the 1945 Natives (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act 'extended the pass laws to the Cape Peninsula', leaving the registration of service contracts 'obligatory in all prescribed areas'. It was in fact precisely through the registration-system that influx control was locally imposed during this period leading up to the apartheid era, without recourse to pass laws as they existed in the other three provinces. Muthie's contention that 'Africans in possession of rail tickets were repatriated when they entered Cape Town' during this period is without foundation. The vast majority of the weekly Mbombela train-load of job-seekers were merely declared surplus to the Peninsula's labour requirements on arrival, and served with notices ordering them to leave within three days. There was, however, no way in which the authorities could actually ensure that they did so.

The Local Implementation of Apartheid

Goldin's analysis of the early implementation of apartheid in the local context differs markedly from the 'City Council versus government' thrust of his discussion of pre-1948 developments. The municipal role is now completely ignored, as the focus shifts to the influence of the ultrasegregationist South African Bureau of Racial Affairs. Goldin portrays the Coloured Labour Preference policy as some sort of a class-based 'Coloured'-policy compromise hammered out within this influential National Party thinktank. He portrays Sabra as being split between a northern faction led by future Secretary for Native Affairs Dr WWM Eiselen and backed by the 'Transvaal National Party', and a more liberal southern faction (led, he alleges, by Dr Erika Theron), which was supported by the 'Cape National Party'.

According to this account, the 'implementation of the policy was associated with the ascendancy of the Transvaal National Party and the SABRA ideologists under the leadership of Verwoerd'. The latter is quoted to the effect that apartheid policy with regard to Africans could most easily be implemented in the Western Cape. Humphries cites Sabra's earlier submission along the same lines to the Tomlinson
Commission, "S but both he and Van der Westhuizen emphasise specifically the role in the development of regional policy of a Sabra affiliate, the Western Cape Committee for Local Native Administration (WCCLNA). 21

As long ago as 1983, Elias hinted at the centrality of this body in developing the policy of Coloured Labour Preference, and emphasised the leading role of Stellenbosch municipality in its establishment. 7

Sabra headquarters were in fact located in Stellenbosch during the 1950s, while Nazi-influenced Stellenbosch University academics under the leadership of Professor Nic Olivier dominated the organisation's Dagbestuur and provided most of its intellectual input. 29

Olivier occupied the position of deputy-chairman on the WCCLNA's policy-making Technical Advisory Committee, which was chaired by the hard-bitten Cape Town City Council 'Native Administrator', Mr SA Rogers. Goldin's account of the Coloured Labour Preference policy overlooks the WCCLNA and the importance of this Stellenbosch factor, despite (or perhaps even on account of) his having conducted a lengthy interview with Erika Theron, who had studied in Berlin during the heady early 1930s and had subsequently risen to prominence in the pro-Nazi Ossewa Brandwag, 2 before being elected to the Stellenbosch municipal council in 1951.

Goldin's understanding of Coloured Labour preference is predicated ultimately on an Althusserian 'symptomatic reading' of Eiselen's infamous January 1955 pronouncement. In this public statement, Eiselen justified the intensified victimisation of Africans in the Western Cape by referring to the region as the Coloured's 'natural homeland'. Reactionaries had been loosely saying this when it suited them since the turn of the century, but Goldin reads into Eiselen's speech the definite intention to 'nurture a Coloured nation' in this region. 20 Eiselen himself only went so far as to stress that 'Europeans' had 'trusteeship responsibilities' not only towards 'Natives' but also towards 'Coloureds', whose 'natural lebensraum' is the Western Cape. 21

Goldin claims further that Eiselen had, in a paper published in 1948, suggested that the homeland policy 'should be applied to the resolution of the "Coloured" problem'. 22 This earlier paper in fact specifically declines to make any such pronouncement, saying only that if a settlement of the 'Native' question along partitionist lines could be effected, attention could then be focussed on 'the Indian and Coloured problem'. 22

Listed in Goldin's bibliography, but neglected in his analysis of this question, is a 1953 paper in which Olivier avoids the sophistry and prevarications of Eiselen's pronouncements on Coloured Labour Preference. Olivier explained here explicitly that territorial segregation is necessary in order to re-establish 'effective tribal control', and thereby weaken the growing and increasingly restive 'black proletariat'. He argued that, just as some areas were demarcated exclusively for Africans, others should be developed into 'non-native areas'. Through the strict implementation of a policy of 'Coloured Labour Preference', the Western Cape could within one or two generations become the first region from which 'natives' would be totally excluded.24

Eiselen's January 1955 announcement that this policy would be pursued was, according to Snitcher, greeted by a 'storm of criticism [emanating] from many sources - the Chambers of Commerce and Industry, Members of Parliament of all the opposition parties, Farmers' and various other Employers' Associations, amongst others. They all objected to the scheme on economic grounds'. 35

Goldin quotes only a Cape Chamber of Industries warning that any attempt to implement such a 'completely unrealistic' plan for the region would inevitably cause 'grave disruption'. He unfortunately, however, overlooks the crucial point: the fact that the ruling National Party was quite prepared to compromise on this issue. Goldin's failure to see this causes him to over-emphasise capitalist opposition to Coloured Labour Preference, while at the same time trying to argue contradictorily that the hidden hand of employers lay directly behind the policy. Three 1961 articles in the Burger newspaper lead him to the conclusion that 'Boland farmers were at the forefront of demands for the stricter enforcement of influx controls in order to create a 'cleaner whitemansland' in the Western Cape'. Yet because these farmers were among the many
organised employers of unskilled African labour who complained from time to time about technical difficulties such as temporary shortages of labour, Goldin (apparently absent-mindedly) suggests that Coloured Labour Preference was ‘by 1961 being bitterly opposed by employers’. On this basis he suggests a contradiction, bordering on the schizophrenic, between the political and economic interests of local capital (and particularly agriculture). To add to the confusion, the allegedly bitter opposition of employers is, in this analysis, transmuted in the space of five pages into mere ‘condemnation of those aspects of the policy which aimed to replace African workers engaged in heavy manual tasks with Coloured workers’. To resolve these conundrums, Goldin turns not to the available primary sources but to O’Meara’s discussion of the class-based verkrampte/verligte split which opened up within Afrikaner Nationalism during the 1950s. This broedertwis resulted eventually in the establishment of the Herstigte National Party in 1969, and O’Meara shows that it was essentially a conflict between northern-based ‘farmers and the petty bourgeoisie’ and an upcoming ‘class of aggressive, self-confident Afrikaner capitalists’, initially spearheaded by the Sanlam and Rembrandt groups, the ‘geldmag (financial power) of the Cape’. Goldin overlooks the fact that O’Meara places these conglomerates in the camp of the ‘verligtes’ (‘enlightened’ or reformist Afrikaner nationalists). Citing three interviews which apparently reveal that Sanlam at that time ‘made use only of an insignificant number of African workers’, and that Rembrandt had decided in 1957 to replace its African employees with ‘Coloured and White workers’, he asserts that only the unequivocal support of Sanlam and Rembrandt kept the Coloured Labour Preference policy alive in the period up to 1961.

These meandering thoughts on capitalist interests, based (as noted above) on the very flimsy foundation of three newspaper articles and three interviews, together with a shallow reading of O’Meara, are challenged by more thorough researchers. Both Posel and Van der Westhuizen show that the interests of employers were never in fact subordinated to ideological considerations in the application of Coloured Labour Preference.” As Goldin’s account itself contraditorily suggests, capitalists adapted happily to the policy actually implemented in the region, which was a very watered-down version of the Sabra/WCCCLA prescription. Muthien fills in none of the gaps in Goldin’s discussion. She begins her analysis of the evolution of regional policy during this period with an inaccurate and misleading quotation from the first Nationalist Minister of Native Affairs, Dr EG Jansen. He is quoted as saying (at an incorrectly-dated meeting with the chairman and secretary of the Cape Divisional Council) that Africans had within living memory been ‘unknown in the Peninsula’. Jansen actually refers here to the Western Province. More importantly, Muthien fails to mention the strong views he expressed at this meeting regarding the protection of ‘Coloureds’ and the repatriation of ‘illegal’ African families.” She also overlooks the fact that he had served as Hertzog’s Minister of Native Affairs between 1929 and 1933, when the ideology of ‘Coloured Labour Preference’ for this region was in its infancy.

The much-discussed Sabra is referred to in passing, in a single footnote.41 This influential organisation is not mentioned in Muthien’s unreferenced account of the National Party’s 1947 blueprint for apartheid, the Sauer Committee report, which Munger shows to have strongly reflected the views of ‘the theoreticians who later formed SABRA’.42 She notes the WCCCLA’s ‘important role in the shaping of NAD policy towards Africans in the Western Cape’, but makes no attempt to research this role and overlooks the committee's relationship to Sabra.42 In fact she ignores all existing primary and secondary sources on the topic, resulting in a series of ludicrous assertions regarding this body. At one point she refers to the WCCCLA as the ‘Western Cape Association for Local Native Administration (WCLNA)’; and she says vaguely that it was established by the ‘Northern Municipalities, including Stellenbosch and Paarl’. (The leading role of Stellenbosch municipality and of Sabra in the establishment of the WCCCLA are stressed by Elias and Van der Westhuizen respectively). The City Council is said to have joined this regional committee in 1952, whereas Elias says that this occurred in May 1951. Van der Westhuizen shows that the WCCCLA constitution provided for the establishment of a Technical Advisory Committee ‘that would meet more often and devise
strategies', but Muthien would have this specialised body formed only in 1955 'to advise them (sic) on the technical loopholes in the pass laws'.

Native Administration Manager SA Rogers' largely-symbolic presidency of IANA in 1957-8 ignored the far more significant long-term role which he played on the TAC. Muthien stresses the fear of race-mixing in her discussion of Coloured Labour Preference. She notes Eiselen's condemnation of the 'integration of Africans and Coloureds'; and quotes a number of warnings against such 'miscegenation', which were issued from various quarters between 1943 and 1962. She does append the unfeigned and undeveloped observation that the 'unprecedented level of black political mobilisation and resistance' in the Peninsula during the early 1950s lent an added urgency to the proposed removal of Africans. This political line of enquiry is not pursued, and (but for a not-exactly-accurate quotation from an early paper by Goldin) the above-mentioned debate on the economics of Coloured Labour Preference is completely ignored. Muthien uncritically elaborates on an un referenced table in an early paper by Goldin, which incorrectly suggests that the number of contract workers in the Peninsula steadily declined during the 1960s.

When she focuses (in a separate chapter) on an aspect of apartheid policy which is neglected by Goldin, namely squatter-control, Muthien begins to reveal a propensity for mere paraphrasing. She transcribes, virtually verbatim, passages from Swart's discussion of the removal of squatters from Windermere to Nyanga, but without acknowledgement and omitting important details. This tendency becomes more pronounced in the work of both Goldin and Muthien when they focus on local resistance.

Resistance Before 1948

Although this formative period is clearly underresearched, it can safely be said that the broad contours of local resistance (defined in the broadest sense) during the 1930s and 1940s had certainly been mapped out by the time that Goldin and Muthien appeared on the scene. Neither adds one iota to the sum of existing knowledge on the topic, although both stress its importance and Muthien goes so far as to declare in her introduction that 'the purpose of this study is to place resistance firmly on the agenda of an analysis of the SA state'.

Goldin's short discussion, based only on secondary sources, is concerned to show only that resistance to the government was increasingly divided along racial lines: the ANC pursued a path to liberation which excluded Coloureds. The Non-European Liberation League (sic) and NEUM, although in theory non-racial, were in practice preoccupied with issues of immediate concern to Coloured but not African people. Only in the trade union movement was there a practical attempt to challenge and break down the growing barrier between Coloured and African workers. Worker organisation is apparently seen as the sole initiative of local communists during this period.

Although he does refer (albeit inappropriately) to Kingwill's comparatively nuanced dissertation on the ANC in the Western Cape, Goldin persists in the monolithic and quite incorrect view that 'the ANC (WC) remained until the 1950s committed to the advance of African nationalism, and any radical tendencies within the movement were swamped'. As for the influential National (not 'Non-European') Liberation League, although Goldin claims to have consulted this movement's minute-books for the period 1938-1941, he remains unaware of the extent to which Africans were actually members. Van der Ross reveals 'the NLL took up issues, such as black housing, with the City Council', and recruited no fewer than 450 African members during the second half of 1939 alone. Walker points out that the League largely overlapped with the Communist Party in both membership and political activities, while Kingwill and Lewis mention the existence of a Langa branch. This location structure in fact became the leading resistance organisation among local Africans during the first three years of the Second World War. Muthien provides considerably more detail in her discussion of local resistance during this period. She shows that Communist Party secretary-general Moses Kotane (who was elected chairman of the ANC's Cape Town branch in 1938) was a National Liberation League member, but she overlooks the fact that he served during this period as assistant secretary of the League's
influential Cape Town branch, this at a time when its 1,500 members comprised one-third of the movement's total strength.56

She claims on the basis of interviews with 'ex-CPSA members' Fred Carneson and Brian Bunting that a Cape

District Committee of the CPSA was formed in the 1940s'.59 In his book on Moses Kotane, Bunting shows

that this beleagured advocate of the united front (as opposed to the then dominant narrower conception of a people's front) was co-opted onto the Cape Town District Committee of the Party soon after his well-documented move in February 1937 from Johannesburg to the far more sympathetic political atmosphere of the Peninsula. When the party headquarters followed him two years later, the new politburo comprised prominent members of this local district committee.60

Like Goldin, Muthien misses the point, stressed by historians such as Roux, Bunting and Karon, that in

their work within organisations such as the ANC, the National Liberation League and the short-lived Non-European United Front, communists in the Western Cape were vigorously pursuing the strategy of building a 'united front of all democratic and liberal-minded people'.61

Muthien mentions, without naming them as such, certain tensions which resulted from the implementation of such a policy. These include firstly the 'thorny issue' of the de facto autonomy from the provincial committee of the Congress regional structure. Other factors mentioned by Muthien, which can be seen in the context of strategic differences over the question of the united front, are the tensions between Africanists and communists in the 1930s and early 1940s, differences over participation in elections for advisory boards and native representatives, and the demise of the National Liberation League and the Non-European United Front due to 'fighting between the communists ... and "Trotskyite sympathisers"'.62

Without researching any of these issues, Muthien is able to gloss over the question of the united front by simply saying (ungrammatically) that the 'tradition of alliance politics of the ANC(WC) practiced in the various anti-pass campaigns, food campaigns and location politics of the 1940s, was well suited to the Congress Alliance campaigns in the 1950s'. Her failure to research local organisational politics during this period is explained away with the contention that the 'main struggles of the 1940s' (and presumably also during the second half of the previous decade) 'centred around bread and butter issues'. She says later that 'the local grassroots struggles of the 1940s gave way to mass national struggles in the 1950s'.64

She therefore concentrates, in her discussion of 'protest and resistance in Cape Town' during the 1940s, on grassroots struggles such as 'food campaigns and food boycotts', 'civic campaigns and township protests', 'liquor raids and beer protests', and 'anti-pass campaigns'. Far from breaking new ground, her discussion here actually detracts from existing accounts by deliberately down-playing the organisational aspect of these campaigns, presumably in order to stress their 'grassroots' character. Her discussion of the 1946-50 Women's Food Committee draws very heavily, but without acknowledgement, on Walker's published analysis. Walker's stress on the role of the Communist Party and the National Liberation League in guiding this campaign is, however, omitted. The paraphrasing here is so close to the original that one noteworthy passage, making the point that the food struggle was linked to the struggle for the franchise, clumsily combines two of Walker's quotations, providing only Walker's reference for the first.5 Turning to the 'ambiguities of participation' by political organisations in the workings of the Langa Advisory Board, Muthien does at least seem to consult some of the available primary material. Her discussion is, however, disappointingly vague. Even the dates she gives for the Board's establishment and abolition are mere wildly inaccurate guesses. Saunders! published account mentions the existence of a Langa Advisory Board in early 1929, but Muthien says it was 'established around 1933'. Apparently on the basis of information gleaned from two prescient 1961 issues of the Torch newspaper, she states that the Board was abolished in 1963/67. Had she properly researched the available documentary sources, she would know that this body was in 1966 still petitioning to be replaced by an Urban Bantu Council with executive powers. In fact it remained in existence, though admittedly crippled and toothless, right up to the beginning of the seventies.
When it comes to the discussion of civic campaigns, Muthien relies to a large extent, and again without acknowledgement, on the work of Sayers. She manages to emasculate his account, however, by omitting to mention his references to the role in civic campaigns of organisations such as the Tin Workers' Union, the National Liberation League and the Communist Party. A similar tendency is discernable in her discussion of the anti-pass campaign culminating in the burning of 'passes' at Langa in August 1946 and of the 'beer protests' leading up to the riot there seven months later. In her discussion of the inauguration of the national Anti-Pass Campaign, Muthien draws without acknowledgement on the works of Roux, Karis and Walshe. Despite these excellent sources, she fails to make the point that the campaign arose in response to the reimposition of rigid controls after the well-documented brief moratorium in the middle of the Second World War. She manages also to provide an incorrect date for the establishment of the National Anti-Pass Committee,” and omits to mention that the ANC annual conference at the end of 1943 issued instructions that local Anti-Pass Committees should be set up without delay. Muthien seems unaware that the local Cape Town (later Cape Western, but not, as she would have it, 'Cape') Anti-Pass Committee was formed as early as February 1944. It was soon convening meetings throughout the Peninsula and further afield, the change of name reflecting its growing regional influence and activity. Muthien says that this committee's secretary Jellicoe Ntshona was its chairman - a position filled in fact by Hudson Kalipa. She quotes the committee 'calling all non-European sections to come to the aid of their African brothers' over the issue of passes, and she mentions in a separate unconnected chapter the predominantly 'Coloured' Non-European Unity Movement's dismissive attitude towards such 'single issue' campaigns. Yet she ignores the short-lived but extremely divisive rival anti-pass campaign mounted locally by the NEUM. For some reason she down-plays the extent of individual and organisational support for the Anti-Pass Campaign. R.Loux's reported turnout of 5,000 for a particular demonstration is, for instance, reduced to a mere 2,000. She goes on to state that 'between September and December 1945 the anti-pass campaign in Cape Town escalated' without mentioning an emergency conference of fifty local organisations which took place that October. On top of all this, she gives 1944-5 references for a resolution of the 'Cape Women's League of the ANC’ never to carry passes, having forty pages earlier stated (following Schreiner) that 'there was no Women's League as such in Cape Town before 1954. Her discussion of the Langa 'beer protests' ignores the role of the National Liberation League in agitation against the proposed establishment of a beer-hall in that location. At one point she refers, without disclosing the League's involvement, to what turns out to be a Guardian report on a crowded anti-beerhall protest-meeting called by the Langa branch in April 1940. Local Resistance Against Apartheid Goldin and Muthien have clearly failed to get to grips in any meaningful way with local currents of resistance during this period of transition from segregation to apartheid? Their accounts of developments during the apartheid era are even more alarming. Here again Goldin and Muthien borrow extensively (and often illegally) from existing analyses, giving nothing of any value back in return. The sixth chapter of Goldin's book provides a short discussion of local resistance-politics during this period. Close reading of this chapter reveals a totally unacceptable degree of reliance on two main secondary sources, these being the Honours theses of Kingwill and Karon. The derivative nature of Goldin's discussion does not prevent the appearance of numerous inaccuracies. Goldin begins this chapter with a discussion of the Train Apartheid Resistance Committee, on which noncollaborationist and communist activists managed to cooperate for a brief period during the second half of 1948. Kingwill shows that such cooperation between these bitter political rivals soon ended with the resignation of the committee's Communist Party members, 'on the grounds that they had lost faith in its leaders'.77
Both Lodge and Karon show that this was due to disagreement over tactics, with the communists insisting that actions in defiance of the new 'train apartheid' regulations should be initiated immediately by the available small groups of volunteers, while the NEUM members and others favoured patience, insisting that the Communists envisaged mere 'small-scale' 'token resistance'. Goldin somehow manages to misunderstand the main thrust of these congruent analyses. He claims, without adducing any additional evidence, that 'whilst the CPSA sought to use the issue to promote mass civil disobedience, the NEUM wished to confine resistance to boycotts and petitions'.

Karon uses two references to note the exchange of mutual vilification, in terms of 'adventurism' and 'shying away from action', which ensued.00 Goldin omits the second reference, thus mistakenly attributing criticism of the Unity Movement to one of its staunchest supporters." He then moves on to quote straight from Karon - but with slight changes and citing the incorrect page of Karon's secondary source. He claims that this source is quoting a 1952 document to make a particular point, whereas Karon's quote is actually from the secondary source itself. Only on his next page does Karon use this source's quotation from a document published not in 1952 but in 1948.02 Following an unacknowledged near-quotate from Simons and Simons (the quotation in question is however correctly transcribed and acknowledged fifty pages earlier), Goldin opens his discussion of a second 'ad hoc' initiative with a straightforward factual inaccuracy. Karon shows that the Franchise Action Committee was formed in January 1951 and launched the following month, at a meeting which drew an 'enthusiastic crowd of 2 000'.1 Lodge confirms the February launch-date, 4 but Goldin (citing only Karon's reference to this February meeting) says that 'in January 1951 the Franchise Action Committee (FRAC) was launched at an enthusiastic meeting of 2 000 people'.5 Goldin's brief discussion of this committee's activities includes two further inaccurate quotations from Karon. He errs even in the process of appropriating as his own Karon's reference for the first of these quotations. Karon cites here an unpublished document in the microfilmed Carter and Karis Collection of South African Political Materials. Goldin not only omits a digit from the document number given by Karon, but also claims to have found this primary material in Carter and Karis published work.06 Turning to a discussion of the 1952 Defiance Campaign, Goldin incorrectly avers that this 'was concerned virtually exclusively with issues affecting African people',e7 The standard works of Walshe and Lodge show that among the six specific discriminatory laws targeted by the campaign were the Separate Representation of Voters Act (which had recently removed Coloureds from the Cape common voters' roll) and the Group Areas and Suppression of Communism Acts (neither of which exclusively targeted any particular racial group among the disenfranchised).g

Goldin cites Kingwill's thesis and Kuper's published work on Passive Resistance in South Africa as evidence that the Defiance Campaign 'was weakest in the Western Cape'.09 What Kingwill (following Kuper) actually says is that there was 'a slightly larger response in the Western Cape, than in the Orange Free State and Natal, though naturally none of these areas compare with the Eastern Cape and the Transvaal'.90 Kingwill shows that 'in Worcester the units of Defiance volunteers were predominantly mixed, with Africans and Coloureds, whereas in Cape Town, Stellenbosch, Paarl and Ceres the response was almost entirely among Africans'. After four pages of discussion, making use of primary and secondary material (including newspapers), she re-emphasises that response to the campaign 'was significant among Africans in Cape Town but negligible among Coloured people'.11 Goldin for his part says that 'Coloureds in Worcester participated fully in the units which defied railway and post office segregation in the town. Worcester, however, remained the exception; elsewhere in the Western Cape the response to the campaign was significant among Africans but negligible among Coloured people'. He provides a reference (a newspaper article not cited by Kingwill in this context) only for the first of these two sentences. Goldin buries his discussion of the ensuing Congress of the People campaign in a decidedly second-hand account of 'Coloured' politics, or more specifically of the South African Coloured Peoples' Organisation.
Here Goldin sticks uncomfortably close to Karon, yet he fails to transcribe the exactly correct document numbers in appropriating Karon's archival references as his own. He does acknowledge Karon (in chunks) four times in the space of two pages, twice giving an incorrect page number. Karon's newspaper references tend either to be transcribed incorrectly, or to be inserted at inappropriate points in Goldin's clumsy paraphrasing.

Karon at one point discusses three meetings convened in March and April 1961 by the renamed Coloured Peoples' Congress. Goldin writes here of a 'series of rallies', citing the single March newspaper article used by Karon to refer to the first of these meetings, and omitting the four April references which Karon provides.

Discussing state repression in the wake of the 31 May 1961 stay-away, Karon shows that 'within days of the strike a number of key CPC leaders were arrested', two of whom were subsequently banned in July and a third in September. Without any acknowledgement to Karon, Goldin says that 'within a week a number of key CPC activists were arrested'. He notes that this was followed by the banning of the three, but his reference here (taken inappropriately from Karon) is to newspapers published prior to the banning of the third.

Goldin further asserts that 'the banning of its meetings and the silencing of its leaders led to [the CPCs] demise early in 1962'. Karon refers however to the existence of the movement in exile in 1965, and he assumes that the CPC was absorbed into the ANC after that body's 1969 conference 'opened its membership to Whites, Coloureds and Indians'.

Goldin (mercifully) has nothing more to say about resistance among local Africans. Although he traces the policy of Coloured Labour Preference right up to 1984, he merely mentions Lodge's work on the Pan Africanist Congress and the Poqo movement of the early 1960s. The 1976 revolt and its aftermath is covered by a sentence concerning the 'alienation of Coloured youth and their identification with Africans'.

Muthien fails to correct the innumerable errors in Goldin's discussion of resistance during this period. In fact she does not mention Goldin in her entire account of this topic. She does, however, utilise his lamentable modus operandi, and thus (like Goldin) merely detracts from existing analyses.

Turning to the Communist Party, Muthien cites among her sources three interviews conducted in London, including one with Brian Bunting. These interviews cannot have been very fruitful, for everything she says on this topic is already well-documented in the existing literature. She refers to a number of secondary sources here, not including Bunting's above-mentioned book on Moses Kotane. From this she nevertheless quotes the views of Kotane and Mofutsanyana, giving Bunting's references in lieu of acknowledgement.

Surprisingly (considering her supposed focus on Africans), Muthien feels compelled to emulate Goldin in performing a hatchet-job on Karon's analysis of SACPO. Ignoring her Oxford colleague's prior efforts, she rambles on about this totally extraneous topic for more than three pages, neither straying from Karon's far more detailed discussion nor according him the slightest acknowledgement.

Muthien moves on to discuss the Federation of South African Women and the ANC Women's League. Her disguised adherence to Schreiner's Honours thesis here does not prevent the appearance of...
characteristically careless errors. For example, whereas Schreiner says that there were about sixty female members of the ANC in the Western Cape in June 1954, Muthien says (inappropriately citing an earlier work by Schreiner) that the Women's League had that number of members when it was banned in 1960. Muthien furthermore uses a paper by Griessel to point to 'ideological differences and different traditions of protest between liberal and Congress Alliance organisations' represented on the Cape Association to Abolish Passes for African Women, which was formed in mid-1957. She omits criticism of Griessel on this point by Schreiner, who says that 'tensions certainly did exist, but I would not characterise them as ideological differences'.

Muthien continues her encyclopaedic discussion of local organised resistance by using various secondary sources to highlight the divisive role of the NEUM. She manages here to misquote from Karon (without acknowledgement) ultra-left criticism of Congress Alliance organisations. She concludes this less-than-useful chapter by paraphrasing (with appropriate acknowledgements for a change) the views of Lodge and of Karis and Carter on the emergence and activities of the Pan-Africanist Congress.

Near the beginning of her separate discussion of 'mass protest in Cape Town during the 1950s', Muthien mentions the stayaway called by the ANC on 26 June 1950. She states that this was intended as a 'Day of Mourning for the victims of apartheid', and claims that 'the City was deserted as people heeded the call'. According to Kingwill's prior account, however, the local response was only 'about 50% successful, its partial failure having been attributed to lack of cooperation from the NEUM'. Kingwill furthermore quotes from a locally-distributed pamphlet (published in the Karis and Carter collection), which explains that the intention was not only to mourn the death of martyrs, but also to protest against the Suppression of Communism Bill, the Group Areas Bill and National Party 'tyranny' in general.

Moving on to the Franchise Action Council's stayaway in May 1951, Muthien's only innovation lies in the imaginative embellishment of existing statistics. Roux says, without any attempt at quantification, that 'many thousands of African and Coloured workers stayed away from work' in Cape Town and Port Elizabeth. Citing coverage in the Cape Times on the day following the strike, as well as that week's Guardian, Karis shows that 47 Cape Town factories 'were completely on strike', with partial attendance at many others. He reveals that 50-60% of 'Coloured school pupils observed the stayaway' and that '95% of shops in Coloured areas ... were closed'. Goldin does not mention the degree of support among factory workers or shopkeepers, but he does note, without any acknowledgement to Karon, that 'an estimated 65% of schoolchildren observed the stayaway call'. Muthien ignores both Karon and Goldin on this point. Ostensibly using Roux and only one of Karon's two references, she says that 'an estimated 65% of schoolchildren stayed at home, 95% of black shops were closed, ... and at 51 factories in Cape Town all the workers went on strike for the day'.

Overlooking Goldin's above-mentioned confusion on this issue, Muthien does not mention the regional demography of the Defiance Campaign. She paraphrases, without acknowledgement, Karon's account of its initiation, but otherwise ignores all existing secondary sources on the topic. Her brief discussion is largely anecdotal, concentrating on 'ANC armbands', 'women with babies on their backs' and the banned leader Johnson Ngwevela likening policemen who were about to arrest him at a meeting to 'a mosquito sitting on a bull's horn'. She concludes with the observation that 'very few people offered themselves for arrest without a pass'. This is hardly surprising. Not only was the pass-system not yet in operation in the Western Cape, but such actions were furthermore (as Lodge shows in his discussion of the Defiance Campaign's 'essentially demonstrative flavour') specifically excluded by its planners.

Muthien's chapter on 'Protest and Resistance in Cape Town, 1939-65' has subsequently been published in a collection of essays which allegedly provide 'insider accounts of apartheid' because their authors are all black. Her comment on people failing to offer themselves for arrest without passes during the Defiance Campaign is substituted in the published version by the statement that 'acts of defiance ... were aimed primarily at laws of racial separation rather than at the pass laws'.

As noted above, Goldin mentions local mobilisation for the Congress of the People campaign almost in passing, drawing heavily and without acknowledgement on Karon's more detailed prior account.
Muthien prefers Suttner and Cronin's non-academic book as her major source on this topic. She ignores not only Karon and Goldin, but also such additionally-relevant works as those of Kingwill and Lodge. She mentions the fact that 27 organisations were represented at the August 1954 inaugural conference of the Cape Western Action Committee of the Congress of the People, but neglects to state that 200 had been invited. Karon reveals that the delegates' names were taken by the CID. This Muthien overlooks, referring vaguely to a 'police raid on a COP meeting in the Cape Town Banqueting Hall', but failing to connect this with the inaugural conference to which she refers three sentences earlier. She claims that local and factory committees were formed to gather the demands of the people and support for the congress. This was certainly the intention, but Lodge points out that the formation of local committees 'never got off the ground', obliging ANC branches and visiting provincial organisers to perform these functions.

Her discussion of the Western Cape delegation's problems in getting to the June 1955 Congress of the People in Kliptown is particularly problematical. She says that 'the journey of the 50 odd (sic) Western Cape delegates to the COP added much to the excitement of the COP. The party of two trucks were (sic) stopped and detained at a police roadblock in Beaufort West'. (The grammar does admittedly improve in the published version)

According to this account, 'some' of the delegates 'managed to get through' to Kliptown, while 'others spent the time in Beaufort West telling people about the COP and setting up a CPC branch there'. It is just as well that Muthien's reference to the CPC is omitted in the published version of this chapter, for she herself states elsewhere that it was only in 1959 that 'SACPO changed its name to the Coloured People's Congress (CPC) in line with the other congresses'. Had she relied on existing academic accounts instead of attempting to embroider on amusing anecdotes from a single populist source, Muthien would know that only half of the 90 Western Cape delegates, 'one group ... on two lorries', were thus intercepted in the Iaroo. She would also be aware of the fact that those who remained in Beaufort West had set up not only a SACPO branch there but also a branch of the ANC.

Muthien concludes her account of local resistance with an extended discussion of developments during the early 1960s. This is notable only for the degree to which it relies (with occasional acknowledgement) on the prior, published analyses of Lodge and of Karis and Gerhart. In the course of this discussion, Muthien misquotes Walter Sisulu from pp 672-3 of Karis and Gerhart's work. She cites as reference: 'Karis and Carter, vol 3: 725-799'. On the following page, Muthien says that 'in 1963, 45 people, including Oscar Mpetha, Zollie Malindi, Elijah Loza and Welcome Zihlangu, were charged with furthering the aims of the banned ANC'. There is no mention of Kingwill here, although Kingwill refers to 'the case of 45 Africans who were accused of belonging to, and furthering the aims of, the ANC in 1963. Among the accused were Oscar Mpetha, Zollie Malindi, Elijah Loza and Welcome Zihlangu'. Muthien does cite one of Kingwill's two sources for this information, namely the 1963 Survey of Race Relations. She fails to mention the other. Perhaps she was put off by the thought of actually having to plough through the thousands of pages which constitute the freely-available 'Records of Evidence in the State vs. Willie Mbolompo and 44 others'.

Conclusion

Goldin and Muthien are clearly as unreliable on resistance as they are on state policy. Even if they had not resorted to unacceptable practices in their respective analyses, their characteristic total neglect of available documentary sources would have prevented them from assimilating and advancing beyond existing secondary accounts. The basic problem is clearly their lack of any real interest in local history or historical research. It is actually difficult to understand how such decidedly derivative work can be so riddled with inaccuracies. The obvious explanation is that these are the unintended consequences of carelessness or incompetence. Perhaps, on the other hand, mistakes are deliberately introduced to forestall charges of plagiarism.
Whatever the case may be, these theses are a serious indictment not only of their authors, supervisors and examiners, but also of the system which encourages such rushed and shoddy work.

4. Humphries (1989: 177) points out that the 'absence of comprehensive measures for the canal isation and distribution of coloured labour' ironically disadvantaged 'Coloureds', as strictly-controlled African labour was more attractive to employers.


73. Muthien, 'Pass Control and Resistance', 207; Roux, Time Longer Than Rope, 322.

74. Muthien, 'Pass Control and Resistance', 166 and 206, n49.


89. Goldin, Making Race, 111 and 112, n25.


113. Muthien, 'Pass Control and Resistance', 211-2; Karon, 'Vryheid Nie Op 'n Skinkbord Nie', 36-9; Lodge, Black Politics, 41-2.

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