

PHAMBILI SPECIAL SUPPLEMENT

➤ NATIONAL UNITED
ACTION

➤ THE ANTI-APARTHEID
ALLIANCE

➤ BUILDING THE UNITED
FRONT



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PHAMBILI EDITORIAL

CHANGES IN THE BALANCE OF FORCES

SINCE publication of the April edition of *PHAMBILI*, there have been important shifts in the balance of forces in Southern Africa. The pace of events is so rapid both in the region as a whole and inside our country that it is often difficult to decipher and interpret the significance of many of these events.

The Angolan/Namibian conflict is one such situation. The rapid changes in this area are so profound, that our analysis often has difficulty keeping up. Why has South Africa come to the negotiating table: What is the significance of PW Botha's diplomatic offensive in Africa; is the regime serious about implementing independence in Namibia under UN resolution 435; is UNITA about to be crushed or is it about to become part of a 'government of National Unity' in Angola? *PHAMBILI* carries a detailed and careful analysis of the forces at work in the Angolan situation, to enable comrades to go beyond the superficial and often confusing reports which we read in the commercial press.

At the level of world forces, too, established patterns are changing with amazing rapidity. All over the world, the eyes of progressive humanity are on developments in the Soviet Union. How do we understand the development of **glasnost** and **perestroika** in the Soviet Union, and the role of Mikhail Gorbachev in world politics? We try in this edition to give some insight into internal developments in the Soviet Union. We also reproduce Gorbachev's interesting and profound comments on the situation in the Third World from his best-seller "Perestroika".

Broad anti-apartheid unity

Inside our country, there are very important developments taking place that could have major implications for the course of our struggle. The historic fifth anniversary of our much-loved Front has been marked by the rapid development of the democratic movements political and moral leadership of the broad masses of our country. The process of convening a Anti-Apartheid Conference, the 3-day stayaway in June, and the COSATU special congress in

May all point to the development of a broad national anti-apartheid unity incorporating all the patriotic and freedom-loving forces in our country. *PHAMBILI* carries a special supplement analysing the development of this broad front of anti-apartheid forces.

While the forces of democracy broaden daily, the regime is becoming increasingly isolated and desperate. It is currently doing everything in its power to ram its institutions of minority rule down the people's throats. *PHAMBILI* sets the record straight on the democratic movement's attitude to the municipal elections, by publishing a paper which was widely circulated in the democratic movement, explaining why we are opposing the elections, and why the people refuse to participate.

Counterposed to the minority municipal elections, *PHAMBILI* publishes the ANC's constitutional guidelines, an initial draft of the ANC's vision for a constitution for a non-racial democratic South Africa where the people govern. Unlike the regime's constitutional concoctions, the ANC is not imposing its constitutional vision on the people, but has distributed these guidelines for discussion and revision, based on responses from us, the people of South Africa.

USE PHAMBILI IN YOUR ORGANISATION

PHAMBILI is a journal for political education and discussion. It is aimed at activists of the Front and the entire democratic movement. To get the greatest benefit from *PHAMBILI*, organisations should set up discussion groups to read and discuss the articles.

Make the ideas in PHAMBILI available to the masses

PHAMBILI is not designed for mass distribution. However, the articles can be used as a basis for discussion at a mass level. One way of doing this is to translate and simplify useful articles and use these as a basis for discussion.

Distribution of PHAMBILI is a political task.

Comrades should try to develop methods of distribution which are appropriate for the repressive conditions.

FIVE YEARS OF THE UNITED DEMOCRATIC FRONT

STATEMENT RELEASED ON 20 AUGUST 1988

ALTHOUGH the United Democratic Front is restricted, and formally prevented from operating, it remains a vital source of inspiration to our people. Its achievements over the last 5 years continue to be felt today, and it remains a dynamic force in guiding the democratic movement. The regime has been able to prevent the Front from having a public profile, prevented its office bearers from speaking, but it has been unable to remove the Front as a critical factor in the equation of struggle in South Africa.

The masses of our people refuse to accept the silencing of the Front and other formations of the mass democratic movement. They openly align themselves with the Front, and take actions in its name. Among the organisations of the democratic movement, the authority and unifying influence of the Front continues to be invoked and respected. In short the masses of our people and our democratic organisations, are jealously guarding the achievements won through five years of hard fought battles, under the banner of the Front.

Achievements of the UDF

The Unity Of Our People:- the Front has provided an umbrella which has united our people from every walk of life, in every part of the country.

The United Action Of Our People:- the campaigns of the Front have united our people into effective action against the regime, frustrating it in all its programmes and bringing about the most serious crisis of apartheid rule ever experienced.

The Creation Of A Democratic Culture:- the Front has built on our peoples heritage of democratic culture codified in the Freedom Charter, and has spread this to every part of the country. Entire generations of our people have become unified around one vision of

FIVE YEARS OF THE UDF

a liberated South Africa.

The Creation Of A National Political Centre:- When it comes to the open, mass organisations of our people the Front has unquestionably become the national political centre for opposition to apartheid. Where mass organisation previously existed at a localised and dispersed level, the Front became the vehicle for generalising the democratic movement to all parts of the country, and uniting the disparate organisations into a co-ordinated national formation. The national, regional and local authority of the Front remains a vital factor of cohesion to this day.

The people refuse to accept the banning of the Front. The symbols and slogans, and positions of the Front continue to be popularised by the masses in the streets, factories and schools. The coming struggle against the Black Local Authorities and the municipal elections will be inspired by five years of united action.

The May 5,6 anti-election protest, the Sharpeville stayaway, and most recently the June 6,7,8 - three days of national protest have been waged under the banner of the Front and its fighting ally, Cosatu. The special national congress of Cosatu was stamped by the open and rapidly developing alliance between Cosatu and the affiliates of the UDF. Our youth continue to mobilise in the name of the Front and its mighty youth affiliate, SAYCO. Our students in the schools continue to wage their battles under the banner of the Front, its fighting ally, the NECC and the student congresses. Our women, cultural and sporting bodies, churches, even businessmen, continue to look to the Front for inspiration. The Front is a spectre which continues to haunt the regime even after its banning and will haunt the regime to its grave. The UDF has survived four emergencies, the detention and restriction of thousands of its activists, the banning of affiliates, the assassination and harassment of its activists, and now it will survive the restrictions. This is because the Front is rooted in the masses, it is a product of the masses, it cannot be destroyed.

FIVE YEARS OF UNITED ACTION !

FIVE YEARS OF NATIONAL UNITY!

UDF UNITES, APARTHEID DIVIDES!



THE FRONT HAS EMPHASISED THAT IT IS VERY IMPORTANT FOR AREAS TO START DOING THEIR OWN PROPAGANDA: EXAMPLE OF A PAMPHLET DISTRIBUTED TO MARK FIVE YEARS OF THE UDF

UDF LIVES!

5 years against Apartheid

5 COMBAT YEARS AGAINST APARTHEID COLONIALISM

REORGANISE! CONSOLIDATE! AND ADVANCE!

On the 20th of August, we celebrated the birth of one of the formidable components of our liberation movement against apartheid, the UDF.

On this day 5 years ago at Mitchell's Plain democrats of our country in all their formations, community, students, workers and civic organisations etc. met to build a broad front against apartheid in general and in particular the:-

- * the tricameral parliament and
- * black local authorities.

It was exactly the experience of our people in fighting isolated, unco-ordinated, localised but related struggles in different areas, that led to the formation of a vehicle where all these struggles could be solidified into one and related to the overall national and class struggles waged inside the country.

Through our tireless and committed work on a 24hr. professional basis the racist tricameral parliament was exposed for what it was - an entrenchment of White Supremacy - and the majority of the people rejected it with one voice - DOWN WITH APARTHEID IN ALL ITS MANIFESTATIONS - UDF UNITES - APARTHEID DIVIDES.

The black local authorities, a brainchild of the apartheid system, an institution created:-

- * without consulting the entire oppressed and exploited masses
- * having no power to change our ghettos (townships)
- * having no money to solve our problems
- * to confuse our demand for one man one vote to perpetuate racism in our townships.

FIVE YEARS OF THE UDF

Under our slogan: ORGANISE! MOBILISE! and FIGHT! we threw all our efforts leaving every house in every street, and area and therefore the entire township organised. The people responded with a concentrated fire of rejection - AWAY WITH TOWN COUNCIL ELECTIONS! THE PEOPLE SHALL GOVERN!

The apartheid regime nonetheless forced the tricameral parliament and the black local authorities down our throats in contempt of our rejection. A government which disregards the wishes of the people, only teaches the oppressed to disregard its laws - WE BECAME UNGOVERNABLE AND RENDERED THE RACIST INSTITUTIONS UNWORKABLE.

Today 5 years later, our UDF and other organisations are banned by the racist regime of Pretoria, at the same time it calls on us the people of Pretoria to vote on the 26th of October 1988.

What are we, the people, to do? Are we to give in to the show of force of the state of emergency and other laws and the implied threat against future campaigns? Our course is just and we have every right to fight for and defend it, anything else would be a shameful surrender. Fighting injustice is a heritage we so much cherish. When did we surrender in the face of:-

- * overcrowding due to lack of housing and schools?
- * rent being increased without consulting with us?
- * supply of electricity being cut every blessed day without any explanation?
- * people being evicted in this cold weather?
- * dusty roads causing our houses and clothing to be dirty all the time?
- * digging done on every street corner, left unmarked causing an inconvenience for both pedestrians and motorists and dangerously so for our beloved children?
- * our school children being taken to concentration camps (the so-called NINJA CAMPS) for indoctrination against the struggle?

WE DEMAND HOUSING, SECURITY AND COMFORT, THE END TO THE STATE OF EMERGENCY AND THE RELEASE OF NELSON MANDELA AND OTHER POLITICAL PRISONERS!

Udlala NGATHI uMatthews Mahlangu! Uhlutha ka kubi!

issued by ASRO-SAYO-ASSCO alliance.



LETTERS TO PHAMBILI

THEORY IS A TOOL FOR STRUGGLE

Dear Comrade Editors

CONGRATULATIONS on the first issue of *PHAMBILI*! In your editorial you said that no struggle has ever been successful without a clear theory to guide it. I want to second this, and to comment on the letter in *PHAMBILI* written by a comrade on the question of language. I agree with the main point of the letter: that our struggle is mass in character and that this must be reflected in the language we use in our struggle. In short it must be the language of the masses, language that the masses can speak and understand. Unfortunately, in emphasizing his/her point, the comrade gives the impression of being anti- theory, even if this wasn't the intention.

Thus the comrade complains that "we always talk about Marx, Mao, Lenin and all dialectical concepts... We must talk the language they (the masses) understand i.e. not use concepts like capitalist accumulation and so forth." By expressing the point this way, the comrade runs the risk of throwing the valuable baby (theory) out with the dirty bath water (wrong language). This is because the comrade has confused two separate points - the development of scientific theory on the one hand and the correct use of that theory in mass work on the other.. Both of these aspects are vital to our struggle: without a **mass approach** our struggle would be hollow; and without a **scientific theory** our struggle would be directionless. We should not have to choose one or the other. Rather we should **combine** both scientific theory with a mass approach, making sure that we never neglect the one for the other.

Some problems with theory

There are reasons why comrades sometimes develop a negative attitude towards theory.

(i) Very often comrades don't understand theory. This is sometimes because it is used in a way which makes it difficult to understand- in a highly academic way.

(ii) On the other hand many of our organisations neglect to train our activists to develop theoretically as part of their all-round development.

(iii) Another problem is that we grow up in a society which teaches on the one hand you have great thinkers, and on the other you have people who have the thinking done for them. Our organisations have to struggle to fight these attitudes.

(iv) To make matters worse, theory is often abused. People appear to throw around concepts in a meaningless way. The same concept is often given different meanings, and sometimes one wonders whether a person is latching onto the most impressive-sounding phrase, without them or others really knowing what they are talking about.

All these problems lead to activists **devaluing** theory because:-

(1) we feel unconfident with concepts, and convinced theory is beyond us or - (2) we feel that theory is meaningless, and something which is only designed to make a few people sound important.

Those of us who misuse theory and those of us who consider it unimportant are both making equally serious mistakes which will lead to the same consequences: that is disarming the struggle of one of its most important weapons - revolutionary theory.

The value of theory

A well-known freedom fighter said that "Theory without practise is sterile. But practise without theory is blind." This sums up the dynamic relationship between theory and practise - the fact that the one only develops its maximum potential when combined with the other.

Theory is so important for the simple reason that if we want to change a situation, we have to understand what is at stake, what are the forces at work, and how we can harness these forces for historical progress. We need a system of concepts which tells us how to understand, how to analyse the apparently chaotic and random events going on around us.

If we want to act politically in a situation, we must have a more or less accurate picture of what makes up that situation.

This is not something which we achieve simply through our intuition, no matter how good our intuition may be! Intuitive understanding is not likely to be revolutionary understanding since we are constantly bombarded with ideas and interpretations of our society which ultimately have their origin in ruling class ideas.

We therefore need a progressive system of concepts, or theory, which enables us to understand our society in order to change it. We can only do this adequately if we are constantly feeding back our practical experience in the struggle to develop our theory - to keep it in line with the demands of the struggle.

This system of concepts, or theory, is dynamic and constantly developing. As with all other historical forces, it must grow and develop - or die. Comrades will be disappointed if they expect a "ready-made theory" which like the bible provides a ready made answer to everything.

What theory provides us with is a set of **tools** or **concepts** which we can use to understand our society, its contradictions, and process of development (eg the concept of National Democratic Struggle). We constantly develop and sharpen these tools in a process of **analysis** (eg analysing the state of our struggle in 1988). Our theoretical tools produce analysis by working on the material around us that is called **social reality** (or the material conditions that exist around us). The aim of theory is to develop to such a point that the social reality around us is **captured** in our analysis. At that point our analysis becomes scientific. In the process of struggle, this theoretical development immeasurably increases our power to correctly characterise the situation, identify our tasks and chart the way forward. This is a collective task of the democratic movement as a whole: to constantly build on and elaborate the rich treasure house of concepts and analysis which our tried and tested organisations have developed.

Our theory of the National Democratic Struggle is part of an all-round theory which enables us to understand, and act on, our reality. This theoretical approach is the product of decades of struggle, and the application in the South African context of scientific concepts which have developed in struggles throughout the world resulting in the elaboration of new concepts which capture our unique situation. Our task is to harness this theory as a powerful force in our struggle, and to creatively apply it to our constantly changing situation. This

task is the task of the democratic movement as a whole. We must not leave it to one or two "thinkers". Let us encourage our activists to develop these theoretical tools, comrade editors. If we are to take command of the political situation, rather than merely reacting to events, this is an absolute necessity.

Yours in the struggle

Comrade P.

MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS

This paper, which was widely circulated in the democratic movement, examines the state of our organisations and clearly explains why the democratic movement firmly rejects participation in the municipal elections.

BEFORE the banning of the UDF and other democratic organisations, speculation was rife about the possibility of UDF participation in the October municipal elections. The suggestions and discussions about this possible scenario were raised by a whole range of people and groups: liberal press, academics, political groups, government supporters and indeed comrades within our structures.

The mass democratic movement, pursuant to its tradition of free, open and democratic debate before deciding on any issue did not treat this matter lightly. It must be emphasised from the outset that no single democratic structure proposed participation in the coming elections. What happened however, is that people have requested that we fully explain our position in relation to the October elections.

Can we use the elections to further the struggle for freedom? If so how? Are there possibilities of further deepening the crisis faced by the state? This paper does not pretend to answer all these questions but aims to facilitate discussion in our search for the best way of advancing our struggle under the present conditions.

The challenges facing the mass democratic movement on the question of elections in the white areas are different from those facing the oppressed communities. The better part of the paper will deal with debates in the oppressed communities.

Our approach to the municipal elections will in the first instance be determined by the state of our organisations, the mood of the masses and the strengths and weaknesses of the regime. Let us take

a general look at our organisations.

STATE OF OUR ORGANISATIONS AND THE MOOD OF THE MASSES

Most of our mass organisations are facing the deepest crisis in the history of their existence. The state has reacted viciously to the proliferation of popular organisations and the emergence of grassroots structures like the street, block and area committees.

The attacks on our organisations vary according to regions, areas and sectors. As far as regions are concerned the area most affected by repression is the Eastern Cape. We need not scratch our heads very hard to find out why.

Layer after layer of leadership in most parts of the country has disappeared into detention. In some areas organisations have been rendered inoperative as the state desperately tries to break the people's resistance.

Cadres have to constantly duck and dive from the South African regime as well as the bantustan repressive forces. In some places like Northern Transvaal naked terrorism and at times attacks by bandits from Renamo and Zimbabwe became common place.

As a result many activists have to operate from outside their areas. This has had a negative impact on our organisations. But while it is difficult to freely and openly conduct the activities of the mass democratic organisations in most areas, this does not necessarily mean that organisations are dead.

A significant number of organisations have managed to adapt to the repressive conditions. This has been clearly demonstrated by the sustenance of rent boycotts, the success of the recent stayaways; the May 5th and 6th's last year in protest against all-white elections, the 21st March protest against the banning of the UDF and other organisations and the June 6 - 8th stayaway.

In Natal our organisations in the Midlands sub-region have not only won many people to the side of the mass democratic movement, but have built strong democratic structures. The defence against Inkatha's aggression has even spread to rural areas.

This is a clear proof that beside the most severe repression in the history of our country, our foot soldiers are quietly doing a remarkable job. The fact that we have managed to take the struggle to higher levels can be attributed to our ability to adapt to repressive

conditions and to the mood of the masses.

In all the struggles of the people against oppression and exploitation, the mood of the masses, their preparedness and determination has always brought liberation day near. It is the masses who help determine the pace of the struggle. But what is the state of the masses of SA today? The mood of the masses will be best gauged by their response to calls by the mass democratic movement, their participation in campaigns and their reaction to initiatives from the state and its collaborators.

Since the State of Emergency, the mass democratic movement has called a number of campaigns. At the national level, the UDF and Cosatu have spearheaded them. Locally, the civics, youth and other structures have been responsible for most of the initiatives.

The positive response of the masses to our calls has given us a clear message that notwithstanding the three years of the two emergencies our people have not shifted their political support away from the mass democratic movement. The spirit of resistance amongst our people is still very high.

It is clear that the state is trying to use repression and reform to win the support of our people. But as of now they have not succeeded. They have managed to destroy few of our organisations and weaken others, but have failed to smash most of our structures and win the political support of our people.

Our organisations are still able to meet, plan, strategise and advance the struggle. This is demonstrated by some of the successful campaigns carried out so far. Beside this, we have managed to open up new ways of continuing with the struggle. This is illustrated by the demonstrations staged by our unions in the factories against the Labour Relations Bill.

THE GOVERNMENT

By the beginning of this year the government had to a large extent regained the confidence and support of its natural allies: big business, a section of the imperialists, the majority of whites and its stooges in the oppressed community. This is not surprising. The government seemed to have delivered the goods to its friends and supporters. Especially to the business community it liberally gave the privatisation, deregulation and now the Labour Relations Bill. To the imperialists it was still keeping their little ugly puppy, Savimbi,

alive and kicking. It still destabilises the Frontline States thus making economic independence impossible.

To whites it has provided "security" so that they can sleep soundly at night. This was done by restricting and muffling the press so that the truth of what is happening in the country today can only be known when we attain our freedom. And finally to the poor "baas boys" in the townships, the government has promised them a seat near "baas-Botha" in the Great Indaba. The state has also shown that it can intervene whenever its loyal puppets are in danger as has happened in Bophuthatswana.

The regime is desperately attempting to regain the strategic initiative. Thus it is very important for them to have successful polls in the townships. The state is trying to do this by:

- Brutal repression, the state of emergency, banning of organisations etc. This they hope will help them regain control of the townships. (It has already happened in some townships.)
- Trying to win the support of our people through upgrading schemes, building of a few fancy houses. But the state is unwilling to provide enough money to build houses for all the people.
- Trying to sell its constitutional concoction to the oppressed people. The state is trying to mollify the anger and militancy of our people by promising to make us part of the decision making machinery, though we will not be part of parliament.

The state is grappling with many schemes and ideas as to how to contain the militancy of the masses. It has no long term political solutions to the crisis facing our country. It offers few houses, scattered upgrading schemes and a powerless National Council. But the people want full political power. It tries to promote spurious leaders and organisations but the people are not impressed. They want Mandela and his organisation.

The reasons behind the municipal elections

It is no accident that the state has called for municipal elections for all national groups on the same day. Firstly, the state wants to prove to the world that the policy of separate but equal is a viable option for the problems facing South Africa. If the polls are high, this will be concrete proof to this belief.

Secondly, as far as the Africans are concerned, the state wants to use the elections to prepare the ground for its National Council.

Thirdly, the state hopes that by October, repression will have taken its toll on the mass democratic movement and the masses will flock singing Hallelujah to the polls.

Fourthly, the state further wants to use the elections to revive its puppet structures which collapsed under the intense pressure of the people in the townships.

Lastly, there is speculation that upgrading schemes in most townships will be completed by October, thus giving the councillors enough ammunition to argue for people to vote.

SHOULD WE PARTICIPATE OR NOT?

As stated in the beginning there is no UDF structure which has suggested that we should participate in the coming elections. But because of a number of insinuations about this possibility, we should look closely into the issue.

But before we get to the crux of the matter, it will perhaps be instructive to re-state the belief of the mass democratic movement on the question of participation and non-participation in government created structures. We are always informed on this issue, as on many other issues by our understanding of three important concepts viz. principle, strategy and tactic.

A principle. What is that?

A principle is a set of fundamental beliefs held by a person, a group or an organisation which guides and instructs their conduct, behaviour and response to issues. Principles may not be bent to accommodate particular demands on different occasions. They are to a large extent fixed and to change them will need a major restructuring of an organisation. Some of the most important principles of the mass democratic movement are non-racialism, accountability and democracy.

A strategy

A strategy is an elaborated plan worked out by an organisation or institution to achieve its aims. The strategy of the mass democratic movement to bring about a non-racial democracy in our country is to use a combination of different forms of pressure on the regime eg mass political work.

And a tactic

Our understanding of a tactic is that it is a weapon by which a strategy can be effected. A boycott, a strike, a petition or a sit-in are some of the examples of a tactic. Both the strategy and the tactic varies from one situation to the other and changes according to time and material conditions. Unlike principles they are not fixed.

It should be clear from our brief explanation of the three concepts that embarking on a boycott of a structure, commodity or an event cannot be a principle. It is a way of expressing anger or advancing one's principles. Students might boycott classes because of corporal punishment, workers might boycott a canteen because of bad food and the leader of the Damara Council may boycott PW Botha's meeting because of the latter's withdrawal of charges of murder against the SA troops. But students can go back to school and workers might decide to eat at the canteen without breaking their principles. A boycott is a weapon in the hands of the people to advance our struggle. It is used on specific occasions and when the situation so demands.

Boycott as a Strategy

It should also be stated that while in most cases a boycott might be a tactic, it can also develop into a strategy. A good example is the boycott of bodies of minority rule like Black Local Authorities. This is different from a tactical boycott on the one hand, which would be ad-hoc and specific in character, and a principled boycott, which would be totally fixed and general in character.

The boycott of institutions of minority rule is understood as a strategy in that it is a coherent and ongoing form of opposition designed to isolate these institutions and to render them as ineffective as possible. Ever since 1976, these institutions have been identified as the weak link in apartheid rule in that they rely for their effectivity on a degree of support from the oppressed community.

On the one side the apartheid system was turning more and more to these institutions to preserve itself as it went deeper into crisis. In particular it was attempting to generalise the system of bantustan rule which has proved so effective by extending something similar to urban areas.

On the other side the intensification of struggle, the advance in mass consciousness, mobilisation and organisation made it increasingly possible to isolate these institutions totally from the

masses. Thus making it impossible for them to function. This cracking of the most immediate and weakest shackle of apartheid rule created the possibility of building alternative centres of people's power.

Arguments in favour of participation

Different reasons have been put forward in favour of participation in the elections. Let us look into some of them. The commonly held argument for participation goes like this: The relentless repression of the past few years has smashed and weakened our structures. Repression will continue, thus we will not be able to have an opportunity to revive structures and be in a position to effectively oppose the municipal elections and continue with the struggle. We should therefore use the space provided by the elections to propagate our views.

The argument goes further. Upon being elected our candidates should refuse to take their seats thus making the structures collapse. The other side of the argument is that we should in fact take our seats, continue to engage apartheid using the space to fight for our rights and destroy the structures from within.

Other people, particularly within government circles and amongst its junior partners have dared us to participate and prove our claim of representing the majority of South Africans.

So are we convinced about participation?

There are conditions for democratic organisations and individual democrats to participate in dummy bodies. These are:

- The dummy bodies should be so popular that the only way to have access to the people is to take part in them.
- There are possibilities of taking part in these structures so as to render them ineffective.
- That we can use the structures to propagate democratic views.

On the first condition we will all agree together with those who think we should participate, that the dummy structures are unpopular and have been rejected by our people. The percentage polls in the 1983 and 1984 elections were very low. This happened when the UDF had just been launched and many civics were still ad hoc structures or were not formed.

But even at that time the bodies of minority rule were unpopular. The reasons for their unpopularity are not hard to find.

Firstly, these structures have no political power and no matter how hard the participants may try to satisfy the aspirations of their constituencies, no positive results will ever be forthcoming.

Secondly, the government is not prepared to carry the burden of building, improving and maintaining black areas. The financial responsibility to do this is left on the shoulders of the people living in these areas. With inflation, unemployment and low wages rampant in black areas, it is impossible for the oppressed people to carry this burden. At the same time, the government always puts pressure on the councils to get money to run their areas. One of the easiest ways for the puppet structures to get money is to increase rentals. Even with upgrading schemes and RSCs, the problems of the majority will not be solved - only a few.

Thirdly, the councillors and their friends in the Indian and coloured areas have on numerous occasions proved to be a corrupt lot. Bribes, swindles, evictions and other forms of immoral conduct have become their second nature.

Fourthly, our people have correctly identified that a participation strategy involves more than simply participation in the tricameral parliament and black local authorities. But it also means participation in the SADF, SAP, JMC's and other oppressive institutions.

Masses stand outside the local authorities

Today the bodies of minority rule are more unpopular than ever before. The struggles of the masses against these structures in the last few years have discredited and in some areas destroyed them. More than ever before the masses have correctly linked them to apartheid. Today, those who remain in these structures are thought to be doing so for financial and personal interests. The attitude of the people to these structures is not only negative but antagonistic.

It is therefore clear that we cannot participate in the elections so as to gain access to the masses. The masses are outside these structures and are engaged in fierce battles against them.

The second condition namely that we can enter the structures so as to render them ineffective need not occupy us for long. The structures are ineffective thanks to the rejection by our people. You don't enter an ineffective structure to make it ineffective. Do you?

The last condition of making the structures to propagate our views is also not feasible. If our analysis is correct that the state is out to crush the mass democratic movement, what makes us think that it

will let it thrive within its own structures. Even if we were able to contest seats in these elections, the space gained will be short lived. Even the puppet black local authorities have been threatened this year that they would be disbanded because they have not done enough to collect rents.

There are other important reasons why we think participation is not a viable option for the oppressed. The boycott strategy is linked to the nature of the South African state. The state's origin in colonial conquest gives it a racially exclusive form. While whites enjoy formal democratic rights, the vast majority of our people have been excluded.

Thus opposition in the 1950's took the form of an externally based confrontation with state structures. The crisis, which this precipitated forced the state in the 1960's to begin devising co-optive strategies. The Bantu Advisory Boards, bantustans, CRC and SAIC were established on ethnic lines as junior partners.

The boycott strategy evolved to prevent institutions of minority rule from becoming successful alternatives to real political power, to fight against attempts to divide us on ethnic lines and preserve the unity of the oppressed.

We have seen how the boycott of dummy structures has forced the state again and again to change its constitutional agenda to try to buy off and pacify the oppressed. Our boycott of the SAIC and Advisory Boards, forced the state to come up with tricameral parliaments and black local authorities.

Therefore the boycott of dummy structures is not a limited ad-hoc tactic to be used only in limited situations. Nor is it an inflexible principle. Rather it is a **strategy** i.e part of a general coherent approach to build united opposition and move towards one person one vote.

THE WAY FORWARD

For us to be able to move forward, we need to regroup the centre, reorganise our structures, strengthen our alliance with our fraternal organisations and broaden ourselves.

Regroup the centre

To challenge the coming elections effectively, we must have strong political centres at all levels of our movement. But what are

political centres? To refresh our minds let's borrow Isizwe's (Vol 2 No 1. Sept 1987) description:

"By 'political centres' we are referring to organisational collectives that are capable of providing political leadership, that are able to strategise, to lead. Political centres are collectives that do not simply react to one crisis after another. They are able to plan ahead, carrying the struggle to the enemy on the people's terms..."

The main reason for the need to regroup the centre is because the political centres are the engine of our movement. The state is aware of this, that is why it always directs its repressive energies against the nucleus of our organisations whether at street, block and area level or at regional and national level. In regrouping our centre at all levels, the following are important:

- Revitalise activists. This is important because some of our activists have been demoralised by repression. We need to encourage our cadres to draw inspiration from the increased level of consciousness on the part of the people (as explained earlier).
- We must master the techniques of secret and underground work. This is imperative because more often than not large scale detentions breaks the nucleus of our organisations. Activists must learn to operate underground because the state of emergency will be with us for many years.
- Vigilance and discipline should guide our work.
- Rumour-mongering, unnecessary personal clashes etc should be done away with.
- Under the present conditions, the need for education and training increases.
- We should strive for more ideological unity. When the state is attacking us like now, we need each other more than ever before. We should therefore vigorously fight against factionalism, regionalism and individualism.

We should keep in mind that without a strong centre our attempts to seriously challenge the state will be futile. We need a strong and firm centre to propel the mass democratic movement.

Re-organise structures

Most of our structures are still in existence, though some of them are weak. One important reason for the weaknesses of our organisations is that they are unable to adapt to repressive conditions. This brings us to the point discussed earlier viz, that we must

master secret and underground work. We must however be careful not to mistake our tactical adoption of underground work with the strategic adoption of underground work by the ANC.

We adopt underground methods so as to be able to continue with open, above board mass work. The most important task facing us is to re-organise and strengthen our grassroots structures like street committees. These structures are crucial for our campaign against municipal elections because in most parts of the country we will never be in a position to hold mass meetings and organise openly.

Civic organisations are the most important structures in our struggle against the municipal elections. All sectors should help rebuild and strengthen them. In areas where it is impossible to revive civics, other structures should be set up to oppose the municipal elections.

Strengthen alliances with fraternal organisations

With increasing repression, there is an urgent need for the mass democratic movement to plan, work and move forward as a solid block. The alliance between the UDF affiliates, Cosatu and the churches should be strengthened at all levels from national, regional and to the local level.

Through the campaign for National United Action we have demonstrated that when we strike in Unison our blows have a desired impact. The Pietermaritzburg experience is a living example of how important united action can be.

In attempting to strengthen our alliance with fraternal organisations we should pay special attention to our inter-action with Cosatu. This is so particularly because of the centrality of the working class in our struggle. But also because it is important for Cosatu to play an active role in reviving community organisations where they have been smashed by repression. The fight against bodies of minority rule is not the concern of the UDF affiliates only. It is a challenge facing all democrats and oppressed people.

By strengthening our alliance with our natural allies we must be aware that we are helping to build our structures. For victories registered by Cosatu will always be celebrated by the entire democratic movement. Workers who belong to Cosatu unions also belong to our civics, youth and women structures. At the street, block and area levels Cosatu and UDF have worked together without any distinction between the two structures. What we need to do is to consolidate and co-ordinate this process.

We should also work very closely with the churches. Recently and particularly after the bannings, church leaders have shown their preparedness to confront the state. The mass democratic movement must guide and give lead to the progressive initiative taken by church leaders.

Finally it is only when our unity with our allies is strong that we can influence the rest of the community and together effectively challenge the municipal elections in October.

Broaden the Front

Before the banning of the UDF, organisations in different parts of the country had dedicated themselves to work with structures outside the UDF and the broad democratic movement. This approach is more important now than before.

The government is trying to win over uncommitted sections of our community to join the collaborators. It is attempting to build a block of "moderate" leadership. The state will only succeed in this initiative if we fail to spread our moral and political influence to all sections of our community.

Our political influence and directive must guide the entire community if we hope to frustrate the municipal elections. While we have managed in the people's camp to influence many people, there is still a lot of work to be done. Our relationship with people outside our structures has been uncoordinated. We need to draw taxi-owners, sports bodies, traders and religious groups closer to the mass democratic movement.

Position in the white areas

As we have already said, the mass democratic movement is calling for a boycott of the municipal elections. However we recognise that conditions in the white areas are different. Strategies and methods used in the enemy camp will always be different from those used in the people's camp.

White democrats should use the elections to strengthen the alliances forged in the white community and to win more whites to the mass democratic movement. We further call on all whites to continue to build anti-apartheid alliances and isolate the Nationalists and their allies.

Approaches to the elections need to be determined by material conditions and should be worked out in consultation with local UDF structures. However no affiliate can participate as a UDF structure

and no UDF activist can stand as a candidate.

Conclusion

The campaign against the municipal elections is not the only one facing the mass democratic movement this year. It is however, one of the most important ones. It is important because the state hopes to drag itself out of its political crisis especially in the oppressed communities.

It is also important because like in the past, our people should use this challenge to move to higher levels of organisation. We have correctly identified bodies of minority rule as a weak link in the apartheid chain. We therefore, need to concentrate our energies into this area and frustrate the state in its attempts to rationalise our oppression. Objective conditions are favourable for us to use the October elections to further deepen the crisis facing minority rule.. What we need is to re-organise ourselves and grab this opportunity to move forward.

MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS

STATEMENT BY CHURCH LEADERS ON THE OCTOBER MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS, JUNE 29 1988

We, the undersigned Church leaders, meeting in Johannesburg on 29 June, have consulted together about the serious issues raised for South Africans in connection with the local authority elections for City and Town councils, Town and Local Authority Committees, on 26 October 1988.

1. We have noted that:

1.1. The Councils elected on that day will provide the basis for an electoral college to choose nine persons to sit on the new national council which we reject as being undemocratic and unable to produce just or representative constitutional proposals;

1.2. These elections cannot be free or fair as they take place under the stringent restrictions of the State of Emergency;

1.3. Many of the leaders of the people are prevented from deciding whether or not to stand for election because they are in detention and the people's organisations are banned;

1.4. The issues cannot be properly debated because the emergency restrictions prevent any person from urging a boycott of the elections or propagating non-participation;

1.5. This statement of ours cannot be published in South Africa or sent from South Africa by correspondents under the emergency regulations;

1.6. We are committing an offence in terms of the emergency regulations by issuing this statement.

2. Nevertheless:

2.1. We are committed to standing for the truth in the light of the Gospel;

2.2. We believe that Christians cannot accept structures of racial discrimination which violate human rights. The structures of the constitutional system in South Africa are based on racial and ethnic identity. These structures constitute the apartheid system which we have declared to be evil and sinful and its theological justification a heresy.

3.3. Therefore:

3.1. We cannot participate in the elections and we call on all Christians not to participate in the implementation of their own oppression or the oppression of others, either by voting on 26 October or by standing for election.

4. We declare our intention to:

4.1. Communicate this decision to our church courts and congregations so as to enable the fullest possible open debate so that people may arrive at an informed and responsible decision;

4.2. Ignore the emergency restrictions that require our church news network to register as news agencies and to use them and all other means at our disposal, to make these decisions known;

5. The truth cannot be bound by unjust laws.

We have committed ourselves to non-violent direct action, and if necessary, to civil disobedience, in order to bring about justice and peace and to work for the Kingdom of God.

ANGOLA AND NAMIBIA: COUNTER-REVOLUTION IN RETREAT

What was it that forced the South African government to the negotiating table on Angola and Namibia? PHAMBILI examines the combination of factors leading to the new developments in the balance of power in the region.

ONE year ago the SADF was pouring troops into Angola in a counter-offensive designed to install a UNITA government in Luanda; six months later after the historic battle of Cuito Cuanavale, South Africa was preparing to settle for an "independent" Southern Angola under Savimbi's control; and in March this year PW Botha warned that the South Africans would stay in Angola until the Cubans left.

Now, one year later, the SADF has left Angola, UNITA faces total destruction, FAPLA and Cuban troops have taken control of the border with Namibia, and South Africa has undertaken to implement independence with Namibia under UN Resolution 435.

This dramatic reversal is the result of a **special combination of factors** which have fundamentally shifted the balance of forces in the region, in favour of the forces of progress and national liberation, and against the forces of apartheid and counter-revolution. This special situation is made up of military, economic, international and "Namibian" factors. Anyone of these factors by themselves may not have decisively tilted the balance of force, but together these factors are so powerful that they forced the South African regime to totally reconsider its position in relation to Angola and Namibia.


1. THE MILITARY FACTOR:

"We're waiting for PW Botha to bring his cowardly carcass to Cunene and we'll send that fascist back in a box".(FAPLA captain)

The last year has seen a major shift in the military balance of forces in the region, particularly in the Angolan conflict. The SA armed forces in all its forms (SADF, SWA Territory Force (SWATF), UNITA and the various mercenary forces) has lost its military superiority over the Angolan armed forces (FAPLA) and their allies - Cuban troops, Swapo and the ANC. It is now history that the turning point in the struggle for military superiority was the defeat of the South African combined forces in the battle for Cuito Cuanavale, the strategic base from which FAPLA launches its offensives against SADF\UNITA strongholds in Southern Angola. The combined SA forces failed to take Cuito Cuanavale after more than six months of fighting, 40 000 bombs against Angolan positions and many military assaults.

The defeat of SA forces at Cuito Cuanavale was a dramatic demonstration of the shift in the military balance of forces which had been taking place in this period. Faced by intensified South African aggression particularly since 1985, the Angolan government had been forced to massively upgrade and expand its armed forces, and to request extensive assistance from its Cuban and Soviet allies. The decisive factor in the development of Angola's military capacity was the recent strengthening of its air force to the point where it achieved military superiority over the SA air force. This was a critical factor because previously SA fighters had virtually unchallenged control over Angolan air space, and were able to raid virtually at will. The introduction of advanced fighter planes, including MIG 23s, flown by Cuba and Angola's most skilled pilots now decisively tilted the balance in favour of the Angolan forces. South Africa's outdated fighter planes were no match for the Soviet planes. South Africa could ill-afford to lose the planes that were shot down, being unable to replace them due to the arms embargo. The situation was now reversed, with Angola asserting control over its air space, and developing the capacity to strike even further South, if needs be.

The strengthening of Angolan forces enabled FAPLA/Cuban troops to push South to assert control over abandoned tracts of Angolan territory. Previously Cuban troops had been concentrated on holding a defence line further North. Now greatly strengthened



they were being actively deployed in large numbers in the South for the first time in assisting FAPLA forces to secure the territorial integrity of Angola against South African aggression. The extent to which the military initiative had shifted out of SA's hands was illustrated in June this year when SA troops attacked Angolan troops near the Caleque water scheme, 10 miles from the Namibian border. The Angolan forces retaliated by attacking SA troops at the Caleque dam (held by SA, although inside Angola) wrecking devastation from the air and leaving a large number of South African casualties.

By this time Angola's forces had advanced 200 km southwards and had deployed FAPLA, Cuban and Swapo troops in a line 400 km along the Namibian border. The Angolan air force had gained control of border airspace, having built airfields with sophisticated radar, air surveillance and missile equipment close to the Namibian

border. Angolan air and radar cover now extends 50 km inside Namibia, and there have been reports of Angolan aircraft entering Namibian airspace. The Angolan government had demonstrated its will and capacity to drive South and defend the territorial integrity of Angola against SA aggression. Angola's and Cuba's preparedness to move even further South if needs be was made clear, particularly by Cuba's leaders, although Fidel Castro and Angola's leaders have stressed that they would prefer a diplomatic solution on the basis of independence in Namibia and an end to the foreign intervention in Angola.

South Africa's Vietnam?

The shift in the military balance of forces was also reflected in the heavy casualties taken by SA/UNITA forces, their rapidly sinking morale, and the rejection of the war by growing numbers of white South Africans. Angola was fast becoming "South Africa's Vietnam". The extent of the moral crisis around the Angolan war was reflected when the official mouthpiece of the Afrikaans church, NGK, came out against the war. "It appears to us that the more or less permanent presence of SA troops in this foreign land can be questioned on Christian ethical grounds". The seriousness of this challenge to the regime's presence in Angola can be seen if we consider that the NGK has 1,7 million Afrikaner members, including PW Botha and 80% of his government.

Increasing numbers of young South Africans, both English and Afrikaans youth, rejected the illegal occupation of Namibia and invasion of Angola. Many others were simply not prepared to fight in a war which they didn't understand and where growing numbers of South African conscripts were getting killed and injured. This was expressed by 143 white conscripts who publicly refused to serve in the SADF, despite the fact that David Bruce had recently been sentenced to 6 years imprisonment for taking the same stand.

If morale was low among white troops, it was even lower amongst black members of the Namibian battalions making up the 24 000 strong SWA Territory Force (SWATF). There were mutinies in at least three SWATF battalions (101, 202, 701) during the recent Angolan invasion. More than 400 troops in 101 Battalion mutinied rather than fight against the Angolan army. One of the men who deserted said that they were sent to Angola "to fight against our will on the side of UNITA...FAPLA are using sophisticated weapons while we are armed only with light ones". Their unit of black

Namibians was forced to fight in the frontline while SADF troops held back in "a cowardly way". The notorious 32nd Battalion was virtually wiped out in fighting in Angola. The SADF has refused to release details of casualties of black troops, fearing that morale will sink even lower.

The loss of military superiority was an important factor in forcing SA to the negotiating table, to try and stave off the growing threat to their hegemony in the region. In particular, they were anxious to negotiate the rapid withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola, in order to reestablish their military superiority over Angola.

ANGOLA: THE COSTS OF THE WAR

- > Population: +_ 9 million (42% under 15, 4% over 60)
- > Displaced by the war: 700 000 to 1 million
- > Dead: 60 000 Crippled: 20 000
- > 1986: 53 000 children died as a result of war according to a UNICEF report, and about that number in previous years
- > One in four children die before their fifth birthday and nearly half are undernourished
- > The International Red Cross is feeding 100 000 people driven off farming land by UNITA attacks and the use of landmines to turn fields into death traps.
- > The Angolan government estimated that war damage has cost the country over R30 000 million

After liberation from Portugese colonialism

- > More than 30 000 middle/high level technicians left the country
- > +_ 2 500 factories were inoperative, mostly abandoned and sabotaged by their owners
- > Only 8000 of 153 000 registered vehicles were still in use, and scores of bridges linking the national roads had been destroyed

An added factor was that thousands of SA troops were bogged down around Cuito Cuanavale and failure to negotiate would have resulted in an even more disastrous and politically unacceptable defeat for them. On the other side, the Angolan people have not had a minute's peace since independence in 1975. They are eager to end the war providing they can replace it with a lasting peace.

2. ECONOMIC FACTORS

The economic crisis facing the regime grows more serious by the day. Sanctions are really beginning to bite, the country goes deeper and deeper into debt, loans are unobtainable, the country is rapidly running out of foreign reserves which are being used for loans, imports and to try and prop up the rand, the currency continues to slide with foreign investor confidence, inflation and unemployment are high, the growth rate is low, and the price of gold continues to fall. Despite the state of emergency's declared aim of stabilising the political and economic situation, the economy is in a deeper crisis than confronted it when the American banks demanded repayment of loans in 1985. Economically, things have gone from bad to worse, and the economic crisis threatens to degenerate into outright economic collapse.

In this context, the war in Angola and SA's occupation of Namibia has become economically insupportable. The SADF budget has more than doubled, from R3,8 billion in 1984 to R8,2 billion in 1988. A conservative estimate of SA's financial involvement in Namibia is about 1,5 billion per year, and the Angolan war costs roughly the same. With the rapid intensification of the conflict recently and the loss of expensive equipment such as planes, the cost of the war is escalating even higher.

The arms embargo also raises the cost of war materials for the regime, since it either has to develop its own weapons or pay inflated prices on the black market. The financial stakes are further raised by the fact that the Angolan forces are fighting an increasingly high-technology war, subsidised and equipped by the Soviet Union. The size of the burden the Angolan war is placing on the SA economy is indicated by the estimate of a well-known economist who said an end to the Angolan war could cut taxes by a quarter. The South African government hopes that a negotiated settlement will have further economic spin-offs by opening the way for expanded trade relations in the region, and the continent as a whole.

For the Angolan people, too, and their socialist allies, the economic burden of the war has been enormous. Defence expenditure takes up over half of Angola's national budget. Exports have been disrupted by the war, as has peasant food production, since UNITA mines the fields. Railway lines, water and electricity supplies are constantly sabotaged by SADF and UNITA bandits. As a result of the war, the currency (kwanza) is virtually worthless and barter is common. Angolans have a deep material interest in ending the war, since this will free Angolan society to plough their resources into social development and reconstruction, rather than war.

3. INTERNATIONAL FACTORS

As SA has stepped up its aggression against Angola so have Angola's allies, particularly Cuba and the Soviet Union, stepped up their support. They have been the source of enormous technical, military, material and moral support which has been vital to the survival of Angola. Cuba, in particular, with every fresh attack on Angola's independence, has sent more internationalist troops and technical personnel to defend it. This support has ultimately been the decisive international factor which has helped shift the balance of forces in Angola's favour.

Recent major developments in world politics have also been important: developments in the Soviet Union in particular have had a profound impact on the approach of the international community to regional conflicts.

The Soviet Union, under Gorbachev's leadership, has taken the political initiative in resolving regional conflicts, guided by the approach that where possible political rather than military solutions need to be found. This approach has contrasted sharply with the open militarism and interventionism of the Reagan administration, and has exposed it to the international community and the American people.

As a result, the Reagan administration has been forced to change direction. By being seen as a peacemaker in various regional conflicts, it hopes to regain some of its lost prestige. This is particularly important with the upcoming Presidential elections in November: a solution to the Angola/Namibian conflict could play an important role in getting the Republican candidate Bush elected. This helps explain why America is putting so much pressure on the SA government to see a negotiated settlement through to the end.

UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 435

Adopted by the Security Council on September 29 1978
The Security Council, reaffirming the legal responsibility of the United Nations over Namibia:

1. Approves the report of the Secretary General of the council for the implementation of the proposal for a settlement of the Namibian situation, and his explanatory statement.

2. Reiterates that its objective is the withdrawal of South Africa's illegal administration of Namibia and the transfer of power to the people of Namibia with the assistance of the United Nations in accordance with resolution 385 of 1976.

3. Decides to establish under its authority a United Nations Transition Assistance Group (Untag) in accordance with the report of the Secretary-General for a period of up to 12 months in order to assist his Special Representative to carry out the mandate conferred upon him by paragraph 1 of Security Council resolution 431 (1978), namely to ensure the early independence of Namibia through free and fair elections under the supervision and control of the United Nations.

4. Welcomes Swapo's preparedness to co-operate in the implementation of the Secretary-general's report, including its expressed readiness to sign and observe the ceasefire provisions as manifested in the letter from the President of Swapo dated September 8 1978.

5. Calls on South Africa forthwith to co-operate with the Secretary-General in the implementation of this resolution.

6. Declares that all unilateral measures taken by the illegal administration in Namibia in relation to the electoral process, including unilateral register of voters, or transfer power, in contravention of Security Council resolutions 385 (1976), 431 (1976) and this resolution are null and void.

7. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council not later than October 23 1978 on the implementation of this resolution.

Reagan and Botha are also hoping that the prospect of an Angolan\Namibian settlement will take pressure off in the USA for further sanctions measures such as the Dellums Bill.

The Americans have probably made it clear to Botha that this is the government's last chance of getting a sympathetic deal from the US administration. If Dukakis is elected president, he has said he will recognise the Angolan government and cut all aid to UNITA. He has also promised to take a much harder line on South Africa. Commentators have said that even a Bush administration would result in a worsening of the SA regime's position in the region. The Reagan administration, on the other hand, has seen that the tables have turned and wants to salvage the situation for UNITA as best it can.

4. THE NAMIBIAN FACTOR

The balance of forces in Namibia have also swung against Pretoria in recent months. There has been an upsurge of armed and mass struggle led by SWAPO. Reports indicate that the armed struggle has not only intensified in the rural areas, but in the cities too, where there have been armed attacks on army convoys and other military targets by urban insurgents of PLAN (the Peoples Liberation Army of Namibia).

The last year has seen the rapid development of mass worker and student organisation in Namibia. Student organisation asserted itself in the four month schools boycott of 40 000 students, under the leadership of NANSO (National Namibian Students Organisation). Students were demanding that army bases situated next to the schools be removed, since students were getting injured and killed in fighting. On June 20 and 21 well over half of Namibia's workers came out in support of the students demands, led by their trade union federation, the National Union of Namibian Workers (NUNW). The worker-led two days of national protest also demanded the release of detainees and an end to SA's military occupation of Namibia.

This upsurge of mass action against SA's illegal occupation also coincided with the collapse of Namibia's "Muzorewa option". South Africa's so-called Transitional Government of National Unity (TGNU) was designed to pave the way for an internal settlement in Namibia - ie elections under SA rather than UN supervision. Alternatively, if UN supervised elections were unavoidable, Botha

wanted the TGNU to form a 'moderate' bloc which would protect SA's interests and block SWAPO. For either option to succeed, the TGNU would have to win a degree of mass support, and this is what the South African government told them to do.

The TGNU tried to win mass support by projecting a liberal image. They campaigned for the release of detainees and started scrapping ethnic authorities. This brought them into conflict with SA: Botha stepped in this year and gave the Administrator General vast powers which enabled him to overrule decisions of the TGNU. This has exposed the TGNU for the sham that it is, and created even greater support for SWAPO. It is widely believed by 'Namibian experts' that SWAPO now has the support of over 70% of Namibians. It is being said that the TGNU option has collapsed and the regime is being forced to come to terms with the fact that they are going to have to deal with a SWAPO government in Namibia, like it or not.

Why is South Africa negotiating?

As has been shown above, a combination of factors has made it unviable for the regime to continue its course of attempting to impose its will in Angola and Namibia through force. A decisive shift against the regime in the military balance of forces, their inability to continue financing the war, heightened resistance by the Namibian people to SA's illegal occupation, and the pressure of international factors have all combined to force the regime to the negotiating table.

WHAT DO THEY HOPE TO GET OUT OF NEGOTIATIONS?

Negotiating could take the SA government down three possible roads. Obviously the best the SA government could hope for was that they would be able to impose their will at the negotiating table, where they had failed on the battlefield. The second best option was to salvage what they could out of the situation, with the assistance of the US government, by negotiating a deal which offered them a degree of protection. The third option, the one they have always chosen in the past, was to use the negotiation to buy time, only to sabotage the negotiation process when it suited them to do so.

Option one: imposing their will

In the third round of talks (in Cairo on June 24) the SA

delegation, headed by Pik Botha and the head of the NIS, attempted this option. They demanded the closure of ANC bases in Angola; an indefinite delay in implementing Namibian independence under Resolution 435; and an Angolan agreement that SADF control a strip of Southern Angola to prevent SWAPO fighters entering Northern Namibia. These demands were totally rejected by the Cuban and Angolan delegations.

Option two: total compromise

By the fourth round of the talks (New York on July 11) the SA delegation had shifted their position, and agreed to a radically different approach. This demonstrates the extent of the pressures on the regime, and the fact that they were negotiating from a position of weakness. The most important elements of the New York agreement represented a turnaround from what SA had proposed in Cairo. The principles they agreed were "indispensable to a comprehensive settlement" were:

- The total withdrawal of SA from Southern Angola
- The independence of Namibia under Resolution 435
- With the implementation of 435, the redeployment of Cuban forces to Northern Angola over 13 months, followed by the staged withdrawal of Cuban troops
- Respect for the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and borders of states; to abstain from the threat and use of force against states; not to interfere in the internal affairs of states; and not to allow their territories to be used for acts of "war, aggression or violence" against others
- Superpower guarantees both of Angolan security and Namibian independence

Probably the most significant indication of the shift in the balance of forces was the reversal of SA's position on the so-called 'linkage' question: SA had always maintained that UNTIL the Cuban troops left Angola, SA would continue to occupy Angola and Namibia, and SA would withhold independence from Namibia. Now Angola and Cuba had successfully turned this 'linkage' on its head: effectively all parties agreed that Cuban troops would only be finally withdrawn from Angola AFTER the withdrawal of SA forces from Angola and Namibia, and the implementation of independence for Namibia.

Another significant aspect of the agreement is that it totally excludes the question of UNITA. SA has again reversed its previous

position that UNITA would have to be part of any talks, by agreeing to leave UNITA out. Angola's position has been that the question of UNITA is an internal matter for Angolans, and that once SA aggression has been removed from Angola, the resolution of the UNITA problem would automatically follow. The question of UNITA is the subject of separate bilateral talks between Angola and America.

Option three: Sabotage

Although at this stage SA has committed itself to implement these agreements, there is no reason to believe that they are not considering the sabotage option. One view is that the reason SA committed itself to an agreement was to rescue its troops from Angola. By agreeing to a ceasefire and withdrawal, they could rescue the thousands of SA troops trapped around Cuito Cuanavale. This view goes on to predict that SA will now sabotage the peace process on one pretext or another. It has been pointed out that there are many issues over which SA is able to create stumbling blocks. Let us look at some of these issues.

A. Cuban troop withdrawal -

It is possible that SA will go back on the agreement and start insisting again on their old 'linkage' formula: that Cuban troops have to start withdrawing before 435 can be implemented. Even if they don't do this, SA could still create obstacles by insisting on an unreasonably short period for withdrawal of Cuban troops; or to insist as has been suggested that all Cubans including doctors, engineers, and other internationalist volunteers vital to Angola's development, be withdrawn. Clearly any of these scenario's would be unacceptable to the Angolan government. Already SA has suggested a 10-month withdrawal period, as opposed to Angola and Cuba's three to four years. Even the pro-American journal "Africa Confidential" has conceded that it will take two years to train FAPLA to fully take over the functions of the highly trained Cuban troops. Therefore any insistence by SA on a period of less than two years can be expected to be rejected by the Angolan government.

B. The question of ANC bases

Although the issue of ANC bases was not actually part of the talks, SA tried to introduce it, and may introduce it a later stage as a complicating factor. Angola and Cuba have taken a firm stand that ANC bases in Angola are not up for negotiation: "our support for the ANC is not a coin of exchange in the talks. The ANC, as well as

SWAPO, are recognised liberation movements, and the liberation movements, are not on the negotiating agenda". (Angolan negotiator). Angola has said that Namibian independence can not be made conditional on closing down ANC bases in Angola: "this would convert the Angolan government into a gendarme of the aspirations of apartheid". Nevertheless, SA may stand firm on its position that the agreement forbidding territories from being used for "acts of war, aggression or violence against others" means the ANC bases have to go.

C. Namibian independence

There are a whole series of issues around Namibian independence which SA may use to try and sabotage the peace process.

- Date for implementation of Resolution 435 - SA could delay the peace process indefinitely by refusing to set a date for the implementation of 435. The New York agreement stipulates that all parties have to agree on a date.
- Withdrawal of SA troops - there is a major build up of SA troops in Namibia. Under resolution 435 all but 1500 SA troops have to be withdrawn within 12 weeks of 435 being implemented, and finally SA has to disband or withdraw all troops from Namibia. An important part of the SADF in Namibia is the 24 000- strong SWA Territory Force. SA claims that SWATF is Namibia's "own national army", whereas Angola and Cuba (and the international community) insist that it is part of the SA forces and must be disbanded. A refusal by SA to do this could sabotage the peace process
- The role of the UN - according to Resolution 435 Namibian independence will be implemented under UN supervision. SA has already questioned the "bias" of the UN in favour of SWAPO (its aid to SWAPO and recognition of SWAPO as the authentic representative of the Namibian people). It could obstruct the UN on this basis. SA could also set up obstacles to the deployment of the UN peacekeeping troops in Namibia.
- "Free and fair elections" - there is some doubt as to whether SA will allow free and fair elections to take place in Namibia. Magnus Malan has already said that the SA government is not prepared to accept "SWAPO's red flag over Windhoek", although this contradicts other government statements. The

SA government may look for ways to make it impossible for SWAPO to participate in Namibian elections. The possibility remains that if the peace process breaks down, SA may hold its own elections, as it has often threatened to do in the past.

Other issues which may obstruct Namibian independence include the status of Walvis Bay (SA claims it as its own); SA's economic obligations to Namibia, and the imposition of a Nkomati-type accord as a condition for independence.

THE ROOTS OF COUNTER-REVOLUTION IN ANGOLA: CIA INVOLVEMENT

Less than a year after MPLA armed struggle was launched, a counter-revolutionary movement, the Union of the People of Angola (UPA) under the leadership of Holden Roberto, emerged.

The UPA -which later was renamed FNLA- revealed its true character by fomenting internal strife within the ranks of the oppressed resulting in the massacre of 8000 MPLA patriots.

As early as 1962, the FNLA formed GRAE (Government of the Angolan Republic in Exile). Based in Zaire this movement's aim was the elimination of MPLA rather than the Portuguese colonial system.

With its military wing under the leadership of the American mercenary, a so-called "Vietnam veteran" by the name of Bernard Meniherz it became abundantly clear that American imperialism was fighting against the liberation of Angola.

And later, it became known that FNLA was an aborted child of the notorious American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

About the true character of CIA leadership, John Stockwell, former chief of CIA Angola Task Force, has this to say: "a protected clique of ignorant and truculent men running a lawless machine which can lay waste a vulnerable nation in the space of a few months".

The UNITA Question

UNITA have been totally marginalised in the process of negotiations. SA has in effect been forced to leave them out of the negotiations, and leave the question of UNITA to be handled by America. Reports claim that American officials attempted to force the Angolan government to negotiate with UNITA as a precondition to negotiating the main settlement plan. But the Angolans and Cubans have steadfastly refused to include the question of negotiation with UNITA as part of the plan. In fact they have said that Cuban troop withdrawal is dependent on an end to South African aid to UNITA, as well as an end to South African occupation of Namibia and Angola, since these are the main sources of foreign aggression against the Angola government which had forced them to ask for Cuban assistance in the first place.

The US and SA governments are attempting to put pressure on Angola to negotiate with UNITA using other methods. The most prominent one seems to be to use a bloc of moderate African states to push for a 'government of national reconciliation' with UNITA. South Africa has even tried to call for 'Africans to solve Africa's problems' involving a government of 'national unity' in Angola, expulsion of Cuban ('foreigners') and bypassing the superpowers - as an alternative to the current peace talks!

The Angolan government's position is that there can be no negotiations with UNITA, but members of UNITA have been offered amnesty if they lay down arms. According to Angola's representative at the UN, United States calls for a settlement with UNITA are "an interference in the internal affairs of Angola." UNITA was created from outside Angola and is able to survive only because of the oxygen it receives from foreign forces. We do not see any possibility, even remote, of a dialogue with UNITA." President Dos Santos has explained why Angolans refuse to negotiate with UNITA: "Angolans see UNITA as synonymous with division, terrorism, suffering, mourning, grief, treason and a blot on Angola's history that must be erased."

In fact with the removal of SA forces "UNITA's oxygen" is in serious danger of being cut off. The dramatic shift in the balance of forces in the region is cutting off UNITA's options one by one:

1. Government of national reconciliation - after recent developments the Angolan government is objectively in a greater position of strength to maintain its hard line on UNITA. However

COUNTER-REVOLUTION IN ANGOLA: SAVIMBI'S LINKS TO PORTUGAL

Roberto's twin brother in counterrevolution was Jonas Malheiro Savimbi, a dropout from medical school in Portugal. This political chameleon, after having flirted with MPLA and FNLA formed UNITA in 1966.

From the outset like FNLA, UNITA's enemy was MPLA. This was confirmed after the coup de'etat in Portugal in 1974 when secret files of the fascist regime were opened. Savimbi's letters to Portuguese authorities about plans and strategies to liquidate MPLA were found.

In his own words Savimbi had this to say: "...it was our intention to weaken MPLA with hard blows and to undermine its authority aboard, so the world would wonder if it even existed". "The authorities know that we possess a mobile force on the banks of the Luanquinqa close to Zambia. It was this force that attacked the MPLA during April and May in Zambia and forced them out of Lutembo". (Extracts from letters Savimbi wrote to General Luis Cunha former Commander-in-Chief of the Portuguese armed forces in Angola -1972).

it is to be expected that the imperialists will intensify pressure on Angola to negotiate with UNITA.

2. Solution involving UNITA without Savimbi - analysts have raised the possibility of the Angolan government talking to a UNITA without Savimbi. But the Angolan government has rejected this, again from a position of strength. Splits have developed in UNITA over Savimbi's dictatorial style and collaboration with Pretoria. It is possible that UNITA may disintegrate under the pressure, with the dissident elements accepting the Angolan government's offer of amnesty.

3. The 'Savimbistan' option - SA and UNITA's plan to declare an independent republic in Southern Angola under UNITA control collapsed with the SADF/UNITA defeat around Cuito Cuanavale. FAPLA's counter-offensive has prevented UNITA taking towns along the Benguela railway line which would have been vital to their plan for a Savimbistan. With Angolan forces having sealed the Namibian border and launched a new offensive in September,

UNITA stands to be militarily crushed. Namibian independence only worsens the situation for UNITA, separating it from SA forces by hundreds of kilometres.

4. The Zaire option - the only remaining option is for UNITA to move its main base to Zaire and North/East Angola (see map). They would be supplied through Zaire by America, and effectively sever their link with South Africa. This option is extremely risky because it relies fully on US support which won't be forthcoming if Dukakis wins the presidential election.

Even if he doesn't win, they will be isolated from South Africa, and without any social support base in the north of Angola. Angola is also unlikely to allow Zaire to provide a base for aggression against it. Therefore UNITA is in serious trouble.

What does all this mean?

Progressive opinion seems to be split between those who think the negotiations are a gigantic con by Pik Botha and his diplomats; and those who believe that Sam Nujoma will be in Windhoek by the end of the year! The truth is probably somewhere in between these two extremes. As Cuba's chief negotiator put it, it is no longer a question of whether SA is serious about a solution: "it is a matter of realities" which determine the seriousness of the various parties. It has been correctly pointed out that SA has signed several agreements to leave Namibia, and has gone back on all of them. Therefore the scepticism of in particular the Namibian people is not surprising. However the situation in 1988 is **qualitatively different** from the situations in 1978, 1981, and 1984 when agreements were reached and then broken by the regime. In that period the balance of forces was clearly in favour of the SA regime, which could act virtually as it pleased.

Now the SA regime can no longer act as it pleases. Reality dictates otherwise. Nevertheless, we should have no illusions that Botha and company have suddenly committed themselves to peace and justice in the region. They will do what they can to manoeuvre out of the situation or reimpose their control, if they are allowed to. The difference now is that the regime is hemmed in all fronts with enormous pressure being placed on them to implement whatever is negotiated. This pressure has resulted in serious divisions in the regime as to how to handle the situation, with various factions openly clashing with each other at the talks. But even the out and out militarists, like Malan have been forced to confront the reality that

South Africa can no longer unilaterally impose its will on the region, by force or by other means.

Prospects for a global negotiated political solution are therefore better than they have ever been before. However, the road to Namibian independence and peace in Angola is still fraught with landmines. The decisive factor will be the stepping up of the pressures which led the regime to negotiate in the first place: military balance of forces, international economic and diplomatic pressure, and the struggles of the Namibian people. Important too will be pressure on the regime from the people of South Africa to implement Resolution 435 and to end aggression against the people of Angola.

IMPLICATIONS FOR SOUTH AFRICA

The future of the peoples of Southern Africa is indivisible: progress for the peoples of Angola and Namibia strengthens the struggles of South Africa's majority for national liberation, and weakens the forces of apartheid and imperialism. At the same time, as long as white minority rule remains intact, the people of Namibia and Angola will not be able to fully exercise their right to self-determination. Their freedom and independence will constantly be under threat from a decaying ruling class desperate to hold onto power. There is therefore a reciprocal duty of our peoples to assist each other in the fight for self determination and independence.

If a global political settlement is reached involving independence for Namibia under 435 and an end to foreign aggression against Angola, it will have major implications for the situation in South Africa. Firstly it will demonstrate that the regime is not invincible. Secondly it will confirm the position of democrats throughout the world that only comprehensive and effective pressure **at all levels** will force the South African government to the negotiating table. The Reagan- Thatcher- Kohl plea for "quiet diplomacy" will finally find its true place in the dustbin of history.

Finally, such a settlement will focus enormous pressure on the regime to negotiate with its own people.

Increasingly people in South Africa and in the international community will ask why on the one hand the regime is prepared to recognise the rights of neighbouring states to independence and self-determination; yet on the other hand it refuses to come to terms with the organisations of the majority in its own country, or indeed

to recognise its own peoples right to national self- determination.

COUNTER-REVOLUTION IN ANGOLA SOUTH AFRICAN DESTABILISATION

Since MPLA seized state power in 1975, the people of Angola never tasted any peace due to the American/South African/ UNITA counter revolutionary onslaught. On the eve of the victory of the revolution the new People's Republic of Angola (PRA) was invaded by the combined forces of UNITA and SADF from the southern flank while FNLA was attacking from the Zairean border in the north - all this at the instigation of US with former secretary of state Henry Kissinger master-minding the whole operation. Hence the so-called Kissinger's war.

On 23 October 1975 South African regular army troops supported by tanks and artillery penetrated deeply into Angola advancing between 60 and 70 km a day heading towards Luanda. At the request of the MPLA the Cuban party leadership decided to send, with great urgency, a battalion of regular troops with anti-tank weapons to help the new Angolan state to resist the invasion. However Angola was to know no peace as counter revolutionary forces of UNITA and SADF alliance with US support embarked on a protracted program of ruthless destruction of Angola's infrastructure and mass murder of innocent civilians. A series of invasions were launched; each time with intensified ferocity: Operation Protea, Operation mokescreen, Operation Askari, Operation Modular, the list appears endless as forces of counter-revolution unleashed terror against the PRA until the recent mighty battle of Cuito Cuanavale. These brutal aggressions were said to be aimed at SWAPO bases in Angola and sometimes to the ANC's military wing MK.

FIDEL CASTRO ON WHY CUBAN VOLUNTEERS ARE IN ANGOLA



WHY CUBAN VOLUNTEERS ARE FIGHTING IN ANGOLA

"Those who once enslaved man and sent him to America perhaps never imagined that one of those peoples (the Cubans) who received the slaves would one day send their fighters to struggle for freedom in Africa.

On November 5, 1975, at the request of the MPLA, the leadership of our party decided to send with great urgency a battalion of regular troops with antitank weapons to help the Angolan patriots resist the invasion of the South African racists. This was the first Cuban troop unit sent to Angola. When it arrived in the country, the foreign interventionists in the north were 25 kilometres from Luanda, their 140-millimeter artillery was bombing the suburbs of the capital, and the South African fascists had already penetrated more than 700 kilometers into the south from the Namibian border, while Cabinda was heroically defended by MPLA fighters and a handful of Cuban instructors.

The enemy has talked about the number of Cubans in Angola. It is sufficient to say that once the struggle began, Cuba sent the men and weapons necessary to win that struggle. To give due honour to our people, we must say that hundreds of thousands of fighters from our regular troops and reserves were ready to fight alongside their Angolan brothers.

Cuba alone bears the responsibility for taking that decision. The USSR had always helped the peoples of the Portuguese colonies in their struggle for independence, provided besieged Angola with basic aid in military equipment, and collaborated with us when imperialism had cut off practically all our air routes to Africa, but it

never requested that a single Cuban be sent to that country.

No country of Black Africa has anything to fear from Cuban military personnel. We are a Latin-African people - enemies of colonialism, neocolonialism, racism and apartheid, which Yankee imperialism aids and protects.

The Yankee imperialists have hundreds of soldiers abroad; they have military bases on all continents and all seas. In Korea, Japan, the Phillipines, Turkey, Western Europe, Panama, and many other places, their military installations can be counted by the dozens and hundreds. In Cuba itself they occupy by force a piece of our territory.

What moral and legal right do they have to protest that Cuba provides instructors and assistance for the technical preparation of the armies of African countries and of other parts of the underdeveloped world that request them?

What right do they have to criticize the aid and solidarity we give to a sister people of Africa such as Angola, who have been criminally attacked?

The imperialists are pained that Cuba, the attacked and blockaded country they tried to destroy fifteen years ago by a mercenary invasion, is today a solid and indestructible bulwark of the world revolutionary movement, whose examples of bravery, dignity, and determination gives encouragement to peoples in their struggle for liberation.

On the other hand, our revolutionary action is in keeping with the world balance of forces and in the interest of world peace. We are not enemies of detente or of peaceful coexistence between states with different social systems based on strict respect for the norms of international law. (An African Giron: April 1976)

ON THE QUESTION OF WITHDRAWAL OF CUBAN FORCES

The positions occupied by the forces in the south can't be vacated in a few weeks, because the Angolan army must take over, and it needs time and cadres, new units and means, because it must fight the UNITA mercenary bands. They need some time, as we see it, not less than three years to be able to take on this task; that is reasonable, perfectly reasonable. If they did otherwise, they would face some very serious problems. They need more time to replace the other troops, since it is a huge country with a series of strategic

spots; airports, bridges, industries, and hydroelectric plants. We are currently defending many of those points.

They have a strong army, which is gaining in experience, cadres and fighting spirit. They have increased their forces and, in time, in the future they will be able to defend their country against foreign attack while also opposing subversion and fighting UNITA.

UNITA exists because of foreign aid. UNITA struck a deal with South Africa. For Black Africa this is treason, a deal with the South African racists is treason. We are the ones who benefit most from a settlement. I tell you frankly, we benefit most; we have been there for nine years, more than 200,000 Cubans have been to Angola. This is a real effort and we have no economic interest in Angola at all. But if a solution acceptable to Angola does not materialize, we will firmly continue with our support to that country as long as necessary. (Interview - January 1985)

ON THE BASIS OF CUBAN INTERNATIONALIST CO-OPERATION

It has often been claimed, that the Angolans pay for the Cuban troops stationed there. I want to say that no life of any Cuban has its price. It cannot be paid for with \$1trillion or \$100 billion. Our military cooperation has never been paid for in any country of the world where we have given it, never! Neither in Angola nor anywhere else. Some countries with the means have paid for civilian cooperation: doctors, engineers. In the great majority of countries, that cooperation is also free.

We pay salary here in Cuba for all those rendering internationalist cooperation; civilians, military, officers, all have their salary paid here. Many are from the reserves, workers from the reserves who are in military units.

We have thousands of people working in those conditions now, without involving hard-currency expenditure. Nor does their return mean unemployment, because we are paying them here. Nor does it mean a cut in spending because they would do other work in Cuba. It doesn't create unemployment or any other problems.

We can do this for a basic reason which is not economic: we have the people to do it. That is the secret, and that is what the revolution has created....when we had 2000 teachers in Nicaragua, it is because we could do it; but we could send 30,000 or 100, 000 because they

have been educated with that idea. These are motivations and moral values the revolution has sown in them all.

Sometimes the country we are helping is very poor and we also pay part of the expenses of our personnel. But the general rule is: housing and food are provided by the country and we pay the salaries. We send eight doctors to one apartment; it proves easier for the host nation to have eight doctors in small lodgings. If they seek a doctor in Europe, they must provide a home for the family, pay his vacations, and spend about \$40,000 or \$50,000 a year. Meanwhile, eight of our doctors live in one apartment, they are provided for, and are not paid for their work. Those are the bases of our cooperation in all countries.

A few countries with the means to do so pay for civilian cooperation, a few countries, for the doctors, teachers, engineers, construction workers...About 90 percent of the countries are very poor and we don't charge for our help.

We also have about 22, 000 scholarship students in Cuba from more than eighty countries; many doctors, engineers, and technicians from these countries have been trained in Cuba. We are sincerely concerned about the situation in Third World nations. It is not simply diplomatic and political activity, it is a reality which we feel and have experienced and which we raise at all international forums. **(We will stay as long as necessary: January 1985.)**

WHY I REFUSE TO SERVE IN THE RACIST SADF



In July David Bruce was sentenced to six years jail for refusing to serve in the SADF. "I'm not a pacifist", he said, shortly before his trial. "I'm prepared to serve in defence of the people of this country, but not in defence of a racist system". Shortly after David Bruce's stand on conscription, the End Conscription Campaign (ECC) was restricted. PHAMBILI prints some of his motivations for refusing to serve in defence of a racist system.

DAVID BRUCE MOTIVATION

1. My reasons for refusing to serve in the South African Defence Force are based on my understanding of the situation in South Africa and my own political and moral convictions which revolve around my opposition to racism.

2. South Africa is a deeply divided country which faces the possibility of an intensifying war. While some South Africans and especially those in positions of authority in this country would have us believe that it is a war being conducted by South Africans against an external threat I have little doubt in my own mind that it is essentially a civil war which is being conducted by those seeking to

defend the privileged position of a minority of South Africans against the legitimate aspirations and demands of the majority of people in this country.

3. This system of privilege which is being defended in South Africa is based fundamentally on racism. While racism was only fully entrenched within the South African political system with the coming to power of the national Party in 1948 and their implementation of the policy of apartheid, the apartheid system itself represents only a modification of policies which were implemented by successive South African governments following the achievement of union in 1910.

4. In recent years the South African government has in important ways sought to modify the political system within this country. However it remains essentially racist in character and the government has through its actions indicated firstly that it intends to dictate by force the terms on which any settlement is reached and secondly that entrenched white privilege and domination are in its terms the precondition for any settlement.

5. At present the SADF plays a pivotal role in maintaining this racist system. This is evident from:

- the role which it plays in the regional war in South Africa
- its involvement in suppressing civil unrest internally
- its key role in the Joint Management Centres and the National Security Management System

6. While the latter two examples point most directly to the fact that the SADF is in essence involved in a civil war i.e. that it is involved in suppressing internal resistance to the apartheid system, the first example is perhaps the most controversial as it is in relation to the regional war in Southern Africa that the SADF and the South African government base their claim that they are in fact defending South Africa against an external threat rather than conducting a civil war.

7. In looking at this question I think it is important to emphasise that the SADF has been involved in a variety of activities across a spectrum which has included armed raids into neighbouring countries, destabilisation activities and all out war in the countries surrounding South Africa - Lesotho, Swaziland, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Botswana and Angola. Furthermore it has now for some time served as an army of occupation in Namibia, contrary to the will of the majority of Namibians.



MANDELA: FREEDOM AT 70

A major demand of the South African people is for the release of our leader, Nelson Mandela and all political prisoners. This year his 70th birthday on July 18 was marked by millions of people throughout the world showing solidarity with the oppressed people of South Africa.

IN HIS OWN WORDS

On why he joined the ANC in 1944 (from court records of his 1962 trial for organising the 1961 general strike):

"Its policy was one which appealed to my deepest inner convictions. It sought for the unity of all Africans, overriding tribal differences among them. It sought the acquisition of political power for Africans in the land of their birth. The ANC further believed that all people, irrespective of their colour, all people whose home is

South Africa and who believe in the principles of democracy and the equality of men, should be treated as Africans."

On the choice to take up arms (from an address delivered in Addis Ababa in January 1962, two months after the founding of Umkhonto we Sizwe):

"In all our campaigns we repeatedly stressed the importance of discipline, peaceful and non-violent struggle ... because we felt there were still opportunities for peaceful struggle and we did not want to expose our people to situations where they might become easy targets for the trigger-happy police of South Africa. But the situation has now radically altered. South Africa is now a land ruled by the gun. The Government is increasing the size of its army, navy, air force and police. Officers of the South African army have visited Algeria and Angola where they were briefed exclusively on methods of suppressing popular struggles. All opportunities for peaceful agitation have been closed".

From No Easy Walk to Freedom on the government clampdown in 1953:

"We had to analyse the dangers that faced us, formulate plans to overcome them and evolve new plans of political struggle. A political movement must keep in touch with reality and the prevailing conditions. Long speeches, the shaking of fists, the banging of tables, and strongly worded resolutions out of touch with conditions not bring about mass action, and can do a great deal of harm to the organisation and struggles we serve. We understood that the masses had to be made ready for the new forms of political struggle. We had to recuperate our strength and muster our forces for another and more powerful offensive against the enemy. To have gone ahead blindly as if nothing had happened, would have been suicidal and stupid. The conditions under which we meet today are, therefore, vastly different. The Defiance Campaign, together with its thrills and adventures, has receded. The old methods of bringing mass action through public mass meetings, press statements, and leaflets calling upon the people to go into action have become extremely dangerous and difficult to use effectively. The authorities will not easily permit a meeting called under the auspices of the ANC; few newspapers will publish statements openly criticising the policies of the Government, and there is hardly a single printing press which will agree to print

pamphlets calling upon workers to embark upon industrial action, for fear of prosecution under the Suppression of Communism Act and similar measures.

These developments require the evolution of new forms of political struggle which will make it possible for us to strive for action on a higher level than the Defiance Campaign. The Government, alarmed by the indomitable upsurge in national consciousness, is doing everything in its power to crush our movement by removing the genuine representatives of the people from the organisation."

On defending trade unions from No Easy Walk to Freedom:

"You must protect and defend your trade unions. If you are not allowed to have your meetings publicly, then you must hold them over your machines in the factories, on the trains and buses as you travel home. You must have them in your villages and shanty-towns. You must make every home and every shack and every mud structure where our people live a branch of the trade union movement, and you must never surrender."

On friends and enemies from No Easy Walk to Freedom:

"The friends of the people are distinguishable by the ready and disciplined manner in which they rally behind their organisations, and their readiness to sacrifice when the preservation of the organisation has become a matter of life and death. Similarly, enemies and shady characters are detected by the extent to which they consistently attempt to wreak the organisation by creating fratricidal strife, disseminating confusion, and undermining and even opposing important plans of action to vitalise the organisation".

From Mandela's statement to the court on 20 April 1964 during the Rivonia trial:

"During my lifetime I have dedicated myself to this struggle of the African people. I have fought against White domination, and I have fought against Black domination. I have cherished the ideal of a democratic and free society in which all persons live together in harmony and with equal opportunities. It is an ideal which I hope to

live for and to achieve. But if needs be, it is an ideal for which I am prepared to die."

On renouncing Botha's offer of conditional release in 1985, read by Zinzi Mandela:

YOUR FREEDOM AND MINE CANNOT BE SEPARATED 1985

My father and his comrades wish to make this statement to you, the people, first. They are clear that they are accountable to you and to you alone. And that you should hear their views directly and not through others.

My father speaks not only for himself and for his comrades at Pollsmoor prison but he also speaks for all those in jail for their opposition to apartheid, for all those who are banished, for all those who are in exile, for all those who suffer under apartheid, for all those who are opponents of apartheid and for all those who are oppressed and exploited.

My father says, "I am a member of the African National Congress. I have always been a member of the African National Congress and I will remain a member of the African National Congress until the day I die. Oliver Tambo is much more than a brother to me. He is my greatest friend and comrade for nearly fifty years. If there is any one among you who cherishes my freedom, Oliver Tambo cherishes it more, and I know that he would give his life to see me free. There is no difference between his views and mine."

My father says, "I am surprised at the conditions that the government wants to impose on me. I am not a violent man. My colleagues and I wrote in 1952 to Malan asking for a round table conference to find a solution to the problems of our country but that was ignored.

"When Strijdom was in power, we made the same offer. Again it was ignored.

"When Verwoerd was in power we asked for a National Convention for all the people in South Africa to decide on their future. This, too, was in vain.

"It was only then when all other forms of resistance were no longer open to us that we turned to armed struggle.


"Let Botha show that he is different to Malan, Strijdom and Verwoerd. Let him renounce violence. Let him say he will dismantle apartheid.

"Let him unban the people's organisation, the African National Congress. Let him free all who have been imprisoned, banished or exiled for their opposition to apartheid. Let him guarantee free political activity so that the people may decide who will govern them.

"I cherish my own freedom dearly but I care even more for your freedom. Too many have died since I went to prison. Too many have suffered for the love of freedom. I owe to their widows, to their orphans, to their mothers and to their fathers who have grieved and wept for them. Not only I have suffered during these long lonely wasted years. I am not less life-loving than you are. But I cannot sell my birthright nor am I prepared to sell the birthright of the people to be free. I am in prison as the representative of the people and of your organisation, the African National Congress, which was banned. What freedom am I being offered while the organisation of the people remains banned? What freedom am I being offered when I may be arrested on a pass offence? What freedom am I being offered when I need a stamp in my pass to seek work? What freedom am I being offered when my very South African citizenship is not respected?

"Only free men can negotiate. Prisoners cannot enter into contracts. Herman Toivo Ja Toivo, when freed, never gave any undertaking, nor was he called upon to do so.

My father says, "I cannot and will not give any undertaking at a time when I and you, the people, are not free. Your freedom and mine cannot be separated. I will return."



Freedom at 70

ANC GUIDELINES ON A CONSTITUTION

In August this year the ANC released a draft document, intended to form the basis for discussions about the type of constitution the forces of democracy would like to see in a liberated South Africa. In the interests of debate and progress, PHAMBILI introduces the Guidelines and then reprints them.

INTRODUCTION

THE document called "Constitutional Guidelines for a Democratic South Africa" is the product of two years of research and discussion inside the ANC, spearheaded by the movement's legal and constitutional department. Department head Zola Skweyiya, and others in the ANC, have stressed that these are intended to be **guidelines** for discussion and not to produce a final constitution.

Even after suggestions from the mass democratic movement have been incorporated, the revised document would retain the status of guidelines, according to Skweyiya. This is for two reasons: Firstly a "complete constitution could only correctly be drawn up by elected representatives of all the people of our country - ideally sitting as a constituent assembly". Secondly "the nature of the transfer of power from the apartheid regime to the majority will obviously play a major part in defining the terms: An armed seizure of power will bring with it different requirements and demands from a negotiated hand-over."

Nevertheless, the ANC regards it as important that discussions

around our future constitution begin now. Contrary to suggestions in the commercial press, the Guidelines are not meant to replace the Freedom Charter. They are based on, and must be read with the Charter. In the Preamble to the Guidelines, the ANC emphasises the need to build on the vision contained in the Freedom Charter: "The Freedom Charter was the first, systematic statement in the history of our country of the political and economic vision of a free democratic, non-racial South Africa. (It) remains unique as the only South African document of its kind that adheres firmly to democratic principles ... The stage is now approaching where the Freedom Charter must be converted from a vision of the future to a constitutional reality".

The Guidelines are intended as the first step in this process of converting our "vision of the future into a constitutional reality.". Revisions to the Guidelines will be made on the basis of ongoing discussions in the broad democratic movement. The ANC hopes that a seminar will be held before next year to discuss the Guidelines.

As Skweyiya points out, all sorts of international forces are making constitutional proposals for our future, but it is the people of South Africa who must provide the answers. "We cannot allow ourselves to be dictated to by outsiders on this issue - we have the experience of Zimbabwe and the Lancaster House constitution, and of Zambia which was handed a constitution by Britain. We will not get our freedom tomorrow, but our people need to start knowing what is involved. These are political issues, and should not be allowed to be the exclusive preserve of the intellectuals, of governments and of party politicians. This is something which should involve every member of the mass democratic movement, of the ANC and of Umkhonto we Sizwe."

PHAMBILI calls on readers to discuss the Guidelines and to submit their views for publication.

CONSTITUTIONAL GUIDELINES

The state

A. - SA shall be an independent, unitary, democratic and non-racial state;

B. - Sovereignty shall belong to the people as a whole and shall be exercised through one central legislature, executive, judiciary and administration.

Provision shall be made for the delegation of the powers of the central authority to subordinate administrative units for purposes of more efficient administration and democratic participation;

C. - The institution of hereditary rulers and chiefs shall be transformed to serve the interests of the people as a whole in conformity with the democratic principles embodied in the constitution;

D. - All organs of government, including justice, security and armed forces, shall be representative of the people as a whole, democratic in their structure and functioning, and dedicated to defending the principles of the constitution.

Franchise

E. - In the exercise of their sovereignty, the people shall have the right to vote under a system of universal suffrage based on the principle of one person/one vote;

F. - Every voter shall have the right to stand for election and to be elected to all legislative bodies.

National identity

G. - It shall be state policy to promote the growth of a single national identity and loyalty binding on all South Africans. At the same time, the state shall recognise the linguistic and cultural diversity of the people and provide facilities for free linguistic and cultural development.

Bill of rights and affirmative action

H. - The constitution shall include a Bill of Rights based on the Freedom Charter. Such a Bill of Rights shall guarantee the fundamental human rights of all citizens, irrespective of race, colour, sex or creed, and shall provide appropriate mechanisms for their

protection and enforcement;

I. - The state and all social institutions shall be under a constitutional duty to eradicate race discrimination in all its forms;

J. - The state and all social institutions shall be under a constitutional duty to take active steps to eradicate, speedily, the economic and social inequalities produced by racial discrimination;

K. - The advocacy or practise of racism, fascism, nazism or the incitement of ethnic or regional exclusiveness or hatred shall be outlawed.

L. - Subject to clauses (I) and (K) above, the democratic state shall guarantee the basic rights and freedoms, such as freedom of association, thought, worship and the Press.

Furthermore, the state shall have the duty to protect the right to work and guarantee the right to education and social security.

M. - All parties which conform to the provision of (I) to (K) above shall have the legal right to exist and to take part in the political life of the country.

Economy

N. - The state shall ensure that the entire economy serves the interests and well-being of the entire population;

O. - The state shall have the right to determine the general context in which economic life takes place and define and limit the rights and obligations attaching to the ownership and use of productive capacity;

P. - The private sector of the economy shall be obligated to co-operate with the state in realising the objectives of the Freedom Charter in promoting social well-being;

Q. - The economy shall be a mixed one, with a public sector, a private sector, a co-operative sector and a small-scale family sector;

R. - Co-operative forms of economic enterprise, village industries and small-scale family activities shall be supported by the state;

S. - The state shall promote the acquisition of managerial, technical and scientific skills among all sections of the population, especially the blacks;

T. - Property for personal use and consumption shall be constitutionally protected.

Land

U. - The state shall devise and implement a land reform

programme that will include and address the following issues;

- Abolition of all racial restrictions on ownership and use of land;
- Implementation of land reform in conformity with the principle of affirmative action, taking into account the status of victims of forced removals.

Workers

V. - A charter protecting workers' trade union rights, especially the right to strike and collective bargaining, shall be incorporated into the constitution.

Women

W. - Women shall have equal rights in all spheres of public and private life and the state shall take affirmative action to eliminate inequalities and discrimination between the sexes.

The family

X. - The family, parenthood and children's rights shall be protected.

International

Y. - SA shall be a non-aligned state committed to the principles of the Charter of Organisation of African Unity and the Charter of the United Nations and to the achievement of national liberation, world peace and disarmament.

In Mazimbu

In Mazimbu
when I see the mountains
In Mazimbu
when I see the fields
I think of my Motherland
I think of South Africa.

In South Africa
I see the mountains
In South Africa
I see the fields.
But these are only dreams
Dreams of my Mother land.

I will not forget Mazimbu
I will not forget South Africa
For this is my land
Land of my people
My South Africa.

Lentsoe Serote
11 years (1985)

ASPECTS OF PERESTROIKA

South African activists are deeply interested in the radical changes happening in the Soviet Union. In this article we look at some of the internal and international restructuring taking place as part of the USSR's new policy of perestroika. Following this is a series of extracts on the Third World and South Africa by CPSU General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, taken from his book 'Perestroika - New thinking for Our Country and the World'.

RESTRUCTURING IN THE USSR

THE South African struggle for national liberation is taking place in a period of a worldwide transformation from capitalism to socialism.

Imperialism and capitalism through its policy of plunder and extermination has left a legacy of economic underdevelopment in the Third World. There is poverty, ignorance, hunger, epidemic diseases, malnutrition, a high infant mortality rate and corruption. The struggle for national liberation can only be meaningful if it is aimed at defeating imperialist domination in the underdeveloped and developing countries.

Political and economic liberation from imperialism inevitably strengthens the world's progressive forces. The USSR as the leader of the socialist bloc plays an important role in the international struggle against imperialism. The general direction of this struggle is dependent on the general development of political and economic

events in the USSR itself. So any radical changes taking place in the USSR are of international significance.

The repercussions of change in the USSR could have either disastrous or beneficial results for the whole of progressive humanity. This is why it is important for progressives and South African activists to study developments in the USSR.

What is perestroika and glasnost?

Although there is no precise translation in English, generally **perestroika** refers to 'restructuring', 'renewal' or 'reconstruction' while **glasnost** means 'openness'. Glasnost is political and social openness, self-criticism and criticism in the interests of socialism.

In a speech last year to the 18th Congress of Trade Unions of the USSR, USSR General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev said referring to socialist democracy: "The more democracy we have, the faster we shall advance along the road of restructuring and social renewal, and the more order and discipline we shall have in our socialist home".

Perestroika is the process of radical transformation of socio-political, economic and philosophical ideas and practise taking place in the USSR. According to Gorbachev: "Perestroika concerns virtually every main aspect of public life". He is the first to point out that although identified with him, the success of perestroika depends on millions.

The radical reforms being implemented in the Soviet Union are viewed by the nation as being deeply rooted within the socialist system based on Marxism-Leninism. Implementation of perestroika, then, marks another stage in the development of socialism.

Why perestroika?

According to Gorbachev, this process of renovation is based on the history of socialist experience since the October revolution of 1917.

Armed with the analytical tools of Marxism and Leninism, the Bolsheviks transformed the semi-feudal Russia into a modern industrial giant in less than five decades of socialist experience - an economic miracle capitalism realised after 300 years.

Imperialist aggression in World War Two caused incalculable destruction to the Soviet economy, and 20 million people perished. The defeat of Nazism by Soviets demonstrated the capacity of the socialist society. This was further emphasised by the post-war

economic recovery.

Before full economic recovery could become a reality, however, another phenomenon came onto the world political stage - nuclear weapons, with consequent heightened tension with the imperialist camp.

It was in the mid 50s that Soviet economy developed to higher levels with more attention being given to development of agriculture, housing, light industry and consumer goods. However, lack of democratic processes to match these developments stifled the economic reforms.

The CPSU attempted to correct the situation by formulating new approaches to economic management. This move paid dividends in its initial stages as evidenced by the general rise in the standard of living. However it was not long before economic stagnation set in with consequent degeneration of other aspects of social life.

Crisis and economic failures

This crisis was described by Gorbachev in these words: "The country began to lose momentum. Economic failures became more frequent. Difficulties began to accumulate and deteriorate, and unresolved problems to multiply. Elements of what we call stagnation and other phenomena alien to socialism began to appear in the life of society."

It was at the April 1985 plenary meeting of the CPSU Central Committee and at its 27th Congress that the problem was roughly diagnosed. The diagnosis revealed that problems stemmed from the economy. Serious lack of efficiency in production was the major problem.

It manifested itself in the dropping of growth rates, the wastage of natural resources, the underutilisation of the electronic and computer revolution for economic progress, poor quality and shortages of goods and the lagging behind in scientific and technological development.

This economic dislocation had negative effects on other aspects of social life. The growing requirements of housing and education, health services and foodstuffs were not being met.

There was, too, a gradual erosion in the ideological and moral values of the people: "eulogizing and servility was encouraged, the needs and opinions of working people ignored". Many leaders stood beyond control and criticism. The arts, science and culture were affected by mediocrity and formalism.

Perestroika: the radical option

It was against this background that the April 1985 plenary meeting of the Central Committee of the CPSU adopted revolutionary steps for modernising the Soviet life. At the core of this modernisation process under the banner of perestroika is radical reorganisation of the economy so as to accelerate the socio-economic development of the whole Soviet society. The new economic policy was combined with glasnost and the democratisation process with its emphasis on giving the people full participation in modernising socialism rather than being the task and responsibility of a few leaders.

Perestroika is viewed as a lengthy revolutionary process which has definite stages. Its revolutionary character is understood as the imparting of a new quality to socialism rather than a change in property relations or transference of state power from one class to another. The revolutionary reforms envisaged by perestroika are basically aimed at realising socialism's potential to the fullest. It is thus not a radical move from socialism to its highest stage - communism.

Workers at the heart

Central to its success is the support of socialism's central force - the worker. The worker's material and spiritual life could be enriched and elevated when the full potentialities of socialism are realised and thus becoming a truly humanitarian system.

The worker must not only master the process of production, he has to be a full participant in deciding matters of state and social life in general. Hence the deepening of democracy in practise is the indispensable component of perestroika. Contrary to reactionary voices from imperialist sectors, perestroika does not mean revision of socialism but its development.

Two stages

As a process, restructuring completed its first stage in the mid 1980s: theoretical formulation and adoption of decisions. The second stage, that of practical implementation of perestroika, is in its initial stages. This is the stage in which perestroika will come into contact with the practical activity on the part of millions of Soviet people: "... the creative endeavour of the masses is the decisive power for acceleration." The current slogans of perestroika: "Land to the

Tillers!" Factories to the Workers!" And Power to the People!" expresses the radical commitment of perestroika to the deepening of socialism.

EFFECTS OF PERESTROIKA ON THE INTERNAL SITUATION

Economics

The Soviet economy, which is based on socialism and public ownership, is seen to hold unlimited possibilities for economic progress and intensive development.

Some of the shortcomings of the old economic machinery were identified as the lack of inner stimuli or initiative for self-development, bureaucratization and top heavy management, the "gross output drive" which meant an emphasis on productivity rather than quality or needs, the failure to maintain and upgrade existing factories, wastage of resources, and the policy of wage equalising.

The new economic mechanisms emphasise the process of acceleration and the adoption of resource-saving technologies. An aim is to equal world technological standards and modernisation, priority being placed on the development of Soviet mechanical engineering, electronics etc. New forms of democracy and the encouraging of shared planning at work include new management mechanisms, the election of managers and the setting up or revitalising of work collective councils.

Explaining economic reform, Gorbachev says that while in a planned economy it might be more obvious to start from the centre, reality and accumulated experience dictated a different logic. The result was that they started with enterprises, factories, collectives to create good economic conditions and on that basis introduce changes to the higher echelons of economic management.

In order to facilitate rapid social and economic reform the centralised command system is being replaced by the new democratic system based on centralism and self-management. In order to ensure that economic units serve Soviet society properly a number of measures have been adopted.

Cost accounting envisages an enterprise using publically owned means of production, and meeting all expenses to the state budget with profits made from the sale of products, etc. The state would

finance expansion and modernisation.

New concepts of centralisation involve democratising planning beginning with collectives and enterprises. The emphasis will be on a transition from the centralised distribution of resources (state orders) to wholesale trade (direct ties between producers and consumers). "In short, the advantages of planning will be increasing combined with stimulating factors of the socialist market", writes Gorbachev.

It is hoped that the composition and volume of state orders will be gradually reduced, with central bodies playing a role in gauging labour productivity, monitoring and encouraging development, scientific and technological progress.

The principles of self-financing and self-maintenance are already in operation in a number of industries - construction, transport and agriculture. It was envisaged at the beginning of this year (1988) 60% of industries would be operating on this principle.

The role of the trade unions is seen as giving a stronger social orientation to economic decisions and acting as a counter-balance to technocratic tendencies, and encroachments on the rights of workers. "Trade union committees should have teeth, and not be convenient partners for management".

Political changes

Perestroika sees a strict demarcation between the functions of the state and of the Communist Party in conformity with Lenin's conception of the party as the political vanguard of society, and the role of the Soviet state as an instrument of government by the people. The party has come under criticism for falling prey to bureaucratic centralism, and is being challenged to revitalise democratic centralism.

Representation of working people into the top ranks of government is being increased. Direct representation of civic organisations is to be added to the direct territorial representation of the population. These deputies, elected for a five-year term, would comprise the Congress of USSR People's Deputies. The deputies would also elect a smaller body of about 450 to consider legislative, and monitoring questions.

Democratisation of the political process means developing and deepening Leninist principles of accountability of popular representatives, ensuring that they are subject to recall, and operating on the basis of popular mandate. Gorbachev is also

determined to challenge the stagnation of democracy, by limiting the terms of office of top public representatives.

Social policy

Housing and food production are viewed as the key to improving standards of living. Other aspects of social life have improved due to the improvements in the economy. Housing construction has increased while health services show noticeable improvement. Economic improvements made it possible for the increase of salaries of teachers and medical personnel.

The Soviet legal system is coming under review with special attention being paid to consolidating socialism's guarantees of human rights and freedoms.

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN THE ERA OF RESTRUCTURING AND OPENNESS

"We need lasting peace in order to concentrate on the development of our society and to cope with the task of improving the life of the Soviet people", writes Gorbachev. Perestroika's international aspects involve a programme for the advancement to peace without nuclear weapons as an indispensable condition for humanity's survival. Perestroika recognises the development of new factors in world politics: the threat of nuclear war, unprecedented social and economic consequences arising out of science and technology, the universal ecological threat, and the spread of communications systems. It recognises there is a worsening of global problems such as starvation and Third World debt, and calls for international co-operation for the benefit of peace.


Underlying perestroika's international relations is the principle that "every people and every country has the freedom of social and political choice". It counterposes the concept of the "balance of power" and reciprocal equal security to the militarist and interventionist doctrine on which imperialist politics is based.

Universally shared values combined with class values form the general approach to peaceful coexistence to ensure survival of life on this planet. In the face of imperialist domination and aggression the socialist world is appealing to the vast majority of humanity which is concerned with social progress and peace.

Nuclear war, says Gorbachev, cannot be a means of achieving political, economic, ideological or other goals. While socialism is gaining prestige and lessening anti-communist sentiment, giant strides have been made towards disarmament and the cutting of nuclear weapons. The historic signing of the agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States on a cut on intermediate and shorter range nuclear weapons is a notable achievement of perestroika.

There are many lessons that a liberated South Africa could learn from the Soviet Union - how the people built a nation, problems of industrialisation, questions of democracy and socialism.

Political activists and all progressive minded people must be able to judge for themselves whether socialism is gaining strength or weakened by policy changes in the Soviet Union. The current changes being enacted in the USSR as embodied in two concepts: **perestroika** and **glasnost** signify a radical and progressive change in the development of socialism since its victory 70 years ago.



MIKHAIL GORBACHEV ON THE THIRD WORLD AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

These excerpts from "Perestroika" look at some of the problems faced by Third World countries in trying to assert their economic and national independence.

MIKHAIL GORBACHEV ON THE THIRD WORLD AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

THE emergence into the international arena of over a hundred Asian, African and Latin American countries, which have embarked upon the path of independent development, is one of the great realities of the present-day world. We acclaim this twentieth century phenomenon. This is a huge and diverse world with vast interests and difficult problems. We realise that the future of civilisation hinges on how this world develops.

The responsibility for these dozens of countries with their aggregate population of many millions, and the responsibility for harnessing their enormous potential for the benefit of world progress, does not lie with them alone.

On the one hand, in the Third World we see examples of rapid, albeit uneven and painful economic growth. Many countries are becoming modern industrial states, and several are growing into great powers. The independent policy of most Third World states,

which rests upon acquired national dignity, is increasingly affecting international affairs as a whole.

On the other hand, poverty, inhuman living conditions, illiteracy and ignorance, malnutrition and hunger, alarming child mortality, and epidemics remain common features of life for the two and a half billion people who inhabit these former colonies and semi-colonies. Such is the bitter truth. In the early eighties the per capita income in Third World countries was 11 times lower than in the industrialised countries. The gap is widening rather than narrowing.

Nevertheless, the rich Western states continue to collect neo-colonialist "tribute". Over the past decade alone, the profits US corporations have siphoned off from the developing countries have quadrupled investments. Americans may call this profitable business. We appraise the situation differently. But I'll go into that later.

The developing countries bear the burden of an enormous external debt. When combined with the volume of the profits taken out every year, the growing debt spells one thing - a bleak development outlook and the inevitable aggravation of social, economic and other problems that are already extremely serious.

I recall a conversation I had with President Mitterrand (of France). It boiled down to the following. Clearly, each capitalist enterprise strives for maximum profit. However, a capitalist or a company are forced, largely under worker pressure, to reckon with the fact that, if the enterprise is to function effectively, it is imperative that employee's incomes are guaranteed, and, despite their low level, are sufficient to enable them to restore their production capacities, maintain their health, upgrade their qualification and raise their children. The capitalist is forced to do this, realising that in doing so he is ensuring himself profit today and tomorrow. But capitalism taken as a whole, represented by the Western countries, does not want to understand even this simple truth in its relations with its former colonies. Capitalism has brought economic relations with Asia, Africa and Latin America to a point where entire nations are doomed to economic stagnation, unable to meet their own essential needs, and bogged down in monstrous debts.

These countries will be unable, of course, to pay back the debts under the present conditions. If a fair solution is not found, anything could happen. The debt of developing countries has turned into a time bomb of sorts. Detonation could have desperate results. A

social explosion of tremendous destructive force is accumulating.

The developing countries' debt is one of the most serious problems in the world. It has been in existence for a long time. But it was either put off, overlooked or discussed in general terms. Western leaders underestimate the danger; they refuse to see the seriousness of the economic upheavals that may happen. That is why they propose half-baked measures and attempt to salvage the situation with palliatives. There is a patent reluctance to take real, substantial steps to normalise economic co-operation with the developing countries.

Extensive efforts are required if genuine changes are to be made and a new world economic order established. It will be a long and hard road, and one has to be prepared for any unexpected turn. The restructuring of international relations demands that the interests of all countries be considered, it requires a balancing of interests, but many do not want to give away anything of their own.

REGIONAL CONFLICTS

THE dire strait of the developing countries is the real reason for many of the conflicts in Asia, Africa and Latin America. Discussing this with President Reagan (of the United States) at our meeting in Geneva, I told him first of all one had to realise where regional conflicts come from.

The truth is that, although they are dissimilar in essence and in the nature of the opposing forces, they usually arise on local soil, as a consequence of internal or regional conflicts which are spawned by the colonial past, new social processes, or recurrences of predatory policy or by all three...

Let us take a volatile area of the globe - Central America. What is the conflict all about here? The unpopular Somoza regime has been overthrown in Nicaragua, and the popular revolution has emerged victorious. The Sandinista revolution was declared out of hand to be the "work of Moscow and Cuba". Such is the standard, hackneyed ideological substantiation for an undeclared war against a small country whose only "fault" is that it wants to live in its own way, without interference from the outside. Incidentally, what has happened in Nicaragua shows what can be expected in other countries. We find it preposterous when we hear allegations that Nicaragua "threatens" US security, and that Soviet military bases are going to be built there - bases which the Americans are supposed to

know about but which I, for one, have never heard of.

Margaret Thatcher (British prime minister) and I had a lively debate on this point. I said that unbearable living conditions had forced the Nicaraguans to carry out the revolution. These conditions had been created by Britain's American friends, who have made all of Central America into their backyard, mercilessly scooping up its resources, and are now wondering why the people revolt. What has been happening in Nicaragua is the business of the Sandinistas and the Nicaraguan people. Our talk was a straightforward one. I asked Mrs Thatcher: "You accuse us of solidarity with Nicaragua, but do you consider it normal to render assistance to apartheid, or racists? Doesn't the way you look in the eyes of the world public opinion bother you? We sympathise with the liberation movements of people fighting for social justice, while you, as I see it, do not. Here our approaches differ."

Really, if the United States left Nicaragua in peace this would be better for the US itself, for the Latin Americans, and for the rest of the world.

Explosive problems cannot be shelved; they will not go away by themselves. The situation in Southern America has long been tempestuous. The South African population opposes both apartheid and the immoral oppressive regime whose international isolation is growing. But many in the West see a communist plot and Moscow influence behind that conflict situation, too, though there isn't a trace of a Soviet presence in South Africa, which can't be said of the US and its allies...

Such is the assessment of all regional conflicts as seen through the prism of Soviet-American confrontation. We have the impression that the United States needs regional conflicts so as to always have room to manoeuvre by manipulating the level of confrontation and by using a policy of force and anti-Soviet propaganda. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, holds that these conflicts should not be used to engender confrontation between the two systems, especially when they involve the USSR and the USA.

NATIONS HAVE THE RIGHT TO CHOOSE THEIR OWN WAY OF DEVELOPMENT

EVERY nation is entitled to choose its own way of development, to dispose of its fate, its territory, and its human and natural resources.

International relations cannot be normalised if this is not understood in all countries. For ideological and social differences, and differences in political systems are the result of choices made by the people. A national choice should not be used in international relations in such a way as to cause trends and events that can trigger conflicts and military confrontation.

It is high time Western leaders set aside the psychology and notions of colonial times. They will have to do this sooner or later. As long as the West continues to see the Third World as its sphere of influence and continues to exert its sway there, tensions will persist, new hotbeds will appear and anti-imperialist resistance mounts.

Our Western opponents do not like it when we talk to them in this way. They lose their composure and grow indignant when we call a spade a spade. They interpret our evaluations as encroachment on traditional links between the United States and Western Europe, on the one hand, and developing countries on the other. They say we want living standards to fall in capitalist countries.

I have explained on many occasions that we do not pursue goals inimical to Western interests. We know how important the Middle East, Asia, Latin America, other Third World regions and also South Africa are for American and West European economies, in particular as raw material sources. To cut these links is the last thing we want to do, and we have no desire to provoke ruptures in historically formed, mutual economic interests.

But it is high time to recognise that the Third World nations have a right to be their own bosses. They have attained political independence after many years of hard struggle. They want to be economically independent as well. These countries' leaders (I have met many in person) enjoy the support of their people and want to do something for them. They want their countries to be genuinely independent and be able to co-operate with others on equal terms. The desire of these nations to use their vast natural and human resources for national progress is understandable. They want to live no worse than people in developed countries. What they have now is undernourishment and disease. Their resources are exploited by developed states and incorporated into the latter's national incomes through the channels of a non-equivalent exchange. Developing countries won't put up with the situation for much longer.

Such is a contemporary reality which not all in the West wish to

take into consideration, even though they are well aware of it. But it is something to be reckoned with, especially since dozens of countries are concerned.

The sooner this reality is brought home to everyone, in all continents, the sooner international relations will become normal. The global situation will thus improve. That's crucial. That's the key issue.

It is high time to consider the problem on a global scale, to seek a way to solve it on a basis of balanced interests and to find organisational forms for its solutions in the framework of the world community. The United Nations is the best forum to discuss the issue. We are preparing our proposals on that score. I informed UN Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar about this during our meeting. He approved of bringing up the issue in the United Nations.

Most developing countries adhere to non-aligned policies. The non-aligned movement arose on that platform to unite over a hundred countries, which account for the bulk of the world's population. The movement has become a mighty force and a major factor in world affairs.

It helps to form a new kind of international relations, whatever special features and nuances the movement has. The non-aligned movement personifies the desire of newly free nations to co-operate with others on an equal basis, and to abolish dictat and hegemonistic attempts from international relations. The Soviet Union understands the goals of that movement and is in solidarity with it.

Quite recently, many non-aligned countries thought that disarmament and the elimination of nuclear weapons were the prerogatives of superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, and were of little concern to developing countries. However, the movement displayed profound understanding of the interconnection between disarmament and development at the eighth conference of heads of state and government of the non-aligned countries in Harare.

Its stand was officially voiced there: a well-grounded stand. If the arms race is stopped and disarmament effected, enough funds will be saved to settle the Third World's gravest problems.

I discussed the connection between disarmament and development with Mr Perez de Cuellar. We agreed that the issue deserves the United Nation's close attention. The Soviet Union tabled specific proposals at the UN Conference on the Relationship Between Disarmament and Development. It can only be regretted

that the United States refused to take part in the conference.

Today, not just the socialist countries but even capitalist states note the non-aligned movement as a major and positive factor in world politics. The Soviet Union welcomes this fact and takes it into consideration in its foreign policy.

ON SOUTHERN AFRICA:

AT A DIFFICULT WATERSHED

I have met many African political leaders in the last year and a half or so (some of them more than once), and have had thorough discussions with them. These were Robert Gabriel Mugabe, Mengistu Haile-Meriam, Marcelino dos Santos, Oliver Tambo, Moussa Traore, Mathieu Kerekou and Chadli Bendjedid, to name but a few. All of them are influential, widely recognised national leaders. I got the impression from our talks that Africa is going through an active period in its development which requires responsibility. Africa is in ferment. Vital changes are under way there, and many acute problems face that part of the world.

We don't see Africa as a homogenous continent where all processes evolve to one and the same pattern. Like every other country in the world, every African country possesses its own inimitable features and conducts policies all its own. African leaders also are different. Some have been at the helm for relatively long periods of time, so that the world knows them. Others have only lately appeared on the African and world scenes, and are gaining practical experience.

We fully appreciate the formidable tasks facing progressive regimes in Africa. The fact is that their countries have historically been linked with their former colonial mother countries, and some of them continue to be dependent on them economically. And although imperialism is out to retain its positions by economic and financial means, even by resorting to arms, they are determined to pursue a course towards consolidating gains.

The Soviet Union supports these efforts and these policies, for only inviolable political sovereignty and economic independence can provide a sound basis for international relations in today's world. Every African nation is lawfully entitled to a free choice of a way of development, and we resolutely condemn all attempts to interfere in

their domestic affairs. Our country has always acted, and will continue to act, in support of the national liberation struggle of African nations, including those in Southern Africa, where one of the last bastions of racism is situated.

When I met Oliver Tambo, President of the African National Congress, I said to him: " We side with you in your struggle against the apartheid regime and its henchmen, for a democratic state and independent development, for equality of all races and ethnic groups. Significantly, more and more white South Africans are condemning apartheid, voicing support for the ANC's goals, and seeking contact with it. That proves once again that there is no future in apartheid.

We have bonds of friendship with the frontline states in Southern Africa. We support their just stances and strongly condemn South Africa's hostile actions against them.

The Soviet Union has no special interests in Southern Africa. We want only one thing: nations and countries in the region must at last have the chance to settle their development issues, their home and foreign affairs independently in peace and stability.

Excerpts from Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev's book, 'Perestroika - New thinking for our country and the world'



UNITED STATES ELECTIONS



Since this statement was released, Mike Dukakis, the Democratic Party candidate for the USA elections in November has said if elected he will push for South Africa to be isolated as a "terrorist state".

MIKE DUKAKIS: "TOWARD PEACE AND JUSTICE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA"

Apartheid is wrong. In the context of the late 20th Century, it is the equivalent of slavery. Yet the South African government's token "reforms" have left the apartheid system firmly entrenched, as it continues to deny the vast majority of its citizens the most fundamental political, economic and human rights.

South Africa also persists in its determined efforts to destabilize the governments and economies of many of its African neighbours. Despite international condemnation, it continues its illegal occupation of Namibia, defying world calls for free democratic elections to determine the future of that state.

To Namibia's north, the United States remains the only member of the United Nations - except for South Africa - not to recognize the Angolan government, while Angolan rebels, supported by the U.S. and South Africa, threaten American-owned oil refineries guarded by Cuban soldiers! And while the Reagan Administration insists that the Cubans leave Angola as a condition of South Africa leaving Namibia, our military aid to the UNITA rebels in Angola only prolongs the Cuban presence and the Namibian stalemate.

Throughout my public life, I've opposed apartheid and supported the cause of human rights and self-determination in Southern Africa. I'm proud that Massachusetts was one of the very first states in the nation to terminate its pension fund investments in

South Africa.

I believe that America can play a meaningful role in promoting the cause of peace and human rights in Southern Africa. But we must make our opposition to apartheid crystal clear. And we must take firm measures to demonstrate the depth of our concerns for the future of the entire region.

As President, I will:

- Promote democracy and human rights in South Africa by strongly asserting U.S. support for rapid and peaceful change, and by using tougher economic and diplomatic pressure in support of such change. We must stop sending mixed signals to the South African government and the oppressed majority, and start affirming - by word and deed - our total disapproval of the continuation of apartheid in that country.
- Encourage the development of non-racial leadership committed to a peaceful transition to political and social equality in South Africa. Leaders like Archbishop Tutu and Allan Boesak deserve our support in their struggle for human rights for peoples of all races in South Africa.
- Toughen U.S. economic sanctions against South Africa and seek multilateral agreement with our allies for a more comprehensive trade embargo against that country, in the absence of agreement by the South African government to enter into prompt and meaningful negotiations for the abolition of apartheid and the creation of a non-racial South Africa.
- Support the holding of internationally-sponsored, all-party negotiations for the abolition of apartheid and the creation of a constitutional, non-racial democracy committed to respect for the political and economic rights of ALL South Africans - talks that include the African National Congress.
- Call for the immediate release of Nelson Mandela, Walter Sisulu and other political prisoners, and for the unbanning of the African National Congress.
- Strongly support international efforts to pressure South Africa to withdraw from Namibia, and to bring about free elections in that state.
- Stop U.S. aid to the UNITA rebels in Angola, recognize the Angolan government, and work towards creating conditions that will lead to the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola

and improved relations between Angola and the West.

- Assist South Africa's neighbours, such as Botswana, Zambia, Zimbabwe and Mozambique, to attain greater economic independence from South Africa, and to become less vulnerable to South Africa's military and economic pressure, and support the efforts of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) to improve the lives of the 65 million Africans who live in its member states.

Change is coming in South Africa. The question is whether it will be peaceful and controlled or bloody and cataclysmic. We must not stand idly by while South Africa drifts towards chaos and bloodshed. We must do all we can to bring change to South Africa that is rapid and peaceful, and that provides for all peoples of that country and its neighbours those fundamental human rights and protections that America seeks for all the peoples of the world.

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COSATU SPECIAL CONGRESS



The COSATU Special Congress succeeded in regrouping and unifying the democratic movement around a concrete programme for moving forward. This programme consisted of concrete mass action (the three day protest) and a longer term strategy of alliances based on action.

WHAT was really impressive about the COSATU Special Congress was the consciousness amongst delegates of possessing real political power. The organised working class has become a force powerful enough to actively shape the course of history in this country.

For two days 1500 delegates from all industries, from all corners of South Africa, discussed the strategies of the state. They argued about the overall balance of forces. They considered the strengths and weaknesses of the democratic movement. And with militant confidence they resolved on immediate action against government repression, as well as adopting a bold plan for a broad anti-apartheid alliance to challenge the strategies of the state. With these decisions, the workers and their organisations demonstrated their belief that the strategic initiative still rests with the democratic movement.

COSATU emerged from the Special Congress a stronger organisation. Fears were expressed beforehand that the Congress might founder on the political differences between affiliates. But despite sometimes heated discussions, the final political resolution on alliances was a compromise hammered out between four affiliates and adopted unanimously. This represents a new level of political maturity in the federation.

The mood of the Congress was militant, and delegates obviously believed they had the support of their constituencies in calling for action. Contary to some newspaper reports, there was minimal support for "caution" or retreat. The debate around the three days of "peaceful national protest" centred on whether the protest should last for two days or three, and whether it should be linked to National Youth Day on June 16 or not.

It was highly significant that COSATU had invited "guests from the community" to attend the Congress. One hundred and twenty delegates from UDF affiliates, church and sports organisations attended with full speaking rights. This was a special provision, because the current political clampdown makes it extremely difficult for the democratic movement to assemble in any other way. The Congress was regarded as a forum for the country's democratic forces to assess the situation and agree on the way forward.

The masses provide direction

The Congress was dominated by the mood of the delegates, by their determination to take action and advance. They were coming from constituencies that had been deeply politicised by the struggles of 1984-7, and that had taken part in unprecedentedly widespread industrial action in 1987. They had mobilised demonstrations and protests against the Labour Bill, were deeply angered by the political restrictions on COSATU and the effective banning of UDF and 16 other democratic organisations. In many cases they had stayed away on Sharpeville Day.

The Congress was a forum for these delegates to come together nationally as a federation to decide the concrete steps for mobilising and resisting the attacks of the state. The shopfloor leadership was able to provide the direction and confidence that had been lacking before the Congress. One organiser offered the following explanation: "You have to draw a line between the activists and the masses. The officials see that we do not have good attendance in COSATU structures, that our campaigns have not been successful, and they conclude that it would be suicidal to advance. They say, let us strengthen our structures. That is true, but it is wrong to go further and say if we have problems we must retreat.

"At the same time the masses were speaking a different language. Despite three states of emergency, their industrial action had not stopped. Their struggles had not stopped. So the two groups were reading the situation from different angles. The masses were not

saying this by talking. Their actual actions showed that they were not talking about retreat, they were advancing."

Lack of direction in Cosatu?

But while there were signs of militancy and readiness for action on the ground, the key question was whether COSATU would be able to channel this mood in a united programme of action. There seemed to be a degree of indecision and lack of direction in the national leadership of the unions and the federation about how to respond to the Bill and the political restrictions. This was reflected in the decision of the Executive Committee to postpone the Congress by a month - a decision which drew angry flak from the leadership of COSATU locals at a national meeting a week later. Tension mounted, as some affiliates accused others of wanting to postpone action, and were in turn criticised for wanting to rush into action without a thorough assessment of the conditions. Some observers believed there would be a fundamental division between affiliates urging retreat and "survivalism" and affiliates calling for action and advance.

Discussing the balance of forces

Despite differences over how to assess the weaknesses and strengths of the state and of the democratic movement, almost all speakers stressed the point that the state lacked political direction, and that the oppressed people have the will and the organisation to go forward. The key task was to decide on a programme of action for guiding the advance. Speaker after speaker pointed to the political bankruptcy of the regime - "there is no government, we are governed by security councils, soldiers and martial law" (NUMSA); The presence of the military in the townships "shows that the state is weak. Caspirs are part of the township furniture. We say to Botha, let him bring in the navy, we will deal with it" (NUM); The fact that "the state cannot rule in the old ways, but nor does it have new ways" meant that the strategic initiative still lay with the democratic movement (SARHWU). "The democratic movement is still strong, the people's will to resist is unquestionable" (NUM).

Some speakers pointed out that "the state has a clear programme for advancing step by step" (T&GWU) and that "community structures have been weakened" (PPWAWU), but this simply meant the Congress needed to "come up with a clear programme to move forward" (T&GWU).

NUMSA pointed out that "there are divisions in the camp of the oppressor. People in Parliament speak to the ANC. The AWB is splitting to the right. The oppressors are losing confidence. Botha is also losing confidence. We must deepen these divisions. The state is not meeting the real grievances of the people, they are using security to eliminate the leaders of the community. The state is introducing new repression because of the strength of our resistance - this means we must strengthen our resistance and go further." SARHWU argued that it was necessary to advance, "otherwise the government will simply increase its attack. The conditions for resistance are still there, it is open for us to go forward. We cannot co-operate with the state-imposed restrictions."

To applause from the hall-full of delegates, CWIU pointed to weaknesses in the union movement. "We have failed to take action against the Bill - that is a weakness. We failed to support NUM and SARHWU in their struggles last year - that is a weakness. We have to overcome these weaknesses, we have to take action."

This point was taken up by a speaker from the community delegation: "Organisation is consolidated on the basis of struggle. Organisation is not built in an office and then afterwards launched into the struggle. It is built through struggle, so if we are not going to act against Botha, we cannot build organisation." The community speaker also introduced an important distinction into the discussion of the state: "The state is militarily strong, we cannot doubt that. But we are campaigning on the **political** terrain - where the state is weak. The state's weakness on this terrain is our strength."

Although there were differing emphases, the discussion during this session established substantial common ground between affiliates. The fact that there was so much common ground suggests that at the mass base of most of the unions the members hold a similar view of the situation in South Africa: that the mass democratic movement has by no means been defeated; that the state is politically weak though militarily strong; that the state's repressive measures must be resisted by all means; and that survival will be secured through decisive advance rather than retreat - that retreating would simply invite further attacks by the state.

Such an interpretation is supported by reports that shop stewards in some unions rejected suggestions by their officials that COSATU should adopt a more cautious approach.

New strategies, new tactics?

Before the Congress it had seemed that one of the major issues for debate would be whether it was time for the democratic movement to retreat and consolidate organisation. This was linked to the question whether the state is strong or weak: if the state is strong, the democratic movement should retreat; if weak, it should advance. However, this way of posing the problem is not very useful. Both the trade unions (in the 70s and 80s) and UDF (in 1983/4) made great advances when the state was strong. The more useful way of posing the problem is to ask, given a specific balance of forces at this time, what is the best way to advance?

By the time of the Congress most affiliates had reformulated the question. Virtually no-one was arguing that COSATU should retreat because it was weak and the state was strong. All but one affiliate argued the need for decisive action. All argued that the state lacked political direction.

However, there were different emphases. A NUMSA delegate believes that underlying this debate was a difference over tactics. NUMSA and other unions were arguing that although the state has suffered setbacks, it is still fundamentally very strong. Organisations should not automatically call for mass protests such as stayaways, said the delegate, but should also develop "fighting tactics" on the shopfloor. Alliances should be broadened to include all organisations of the oppressed and exploited, not just the dominant Charterists. There is a need to question the effectiveness of "protest politics" - stayaways, boycotts, non-participation.

The NUMSA delegate felt that unions such as SARHWU and NUM were arguing that the state is fundamentally weak because of the success of the strategies and tactics used by the democratic movement. They were, he felt, calling for an intensification of these tactics and strategies, rather than a reassessment.

It is true that SARHWU and NUM argued that the state has been fundamentally weakened by the mass resistance of the past few years. One discussion paper argued that "we have succeeded in smashing any illusions that the state may have about 'winning over' large sections of our people to support their reformist solutions. They have been forced to resort to 'naked force' to try and impose their solutions on our people."

But the discussion paper does not argue against new tactics: "Our level of support in most areas remains very high, and it's up to us to

find new ways of channelling this into new open mass struggles - as well as into other forms of organisation that can survive despite high levels of repression." A unionist and UDF activist from this grouping said, "Our critics do not understand the complexity of struggle against the state. We do not see the political struggles of the last few years as "protest politics". There was a period of mobilisation that led into a period of semi-insurrection and new forms of organisation, which inflicted enormous damage on the state. The result is that it has no coherent political strategy, it is isolated locally and internationally, it has no legitimacy. "On our part, the Congress movement has always been tactically flexible. We do believe organisations are currently developing a range of new tactics, but at the same time we see no need to abandon tactics that have been successful."

To the observer, the debate at the Congress produced a rich combination of old and new tactics. There was the call for three days of protest (old), to be combined with factory demonstrations (new). A range of powerful shopfloor tactics (new) were suggested by unions across the political spectrum - NUMSA, CCAWUSA, T&GWU, PPWAWU. The united front with COSATU's allies is to be strengthened (old), and a broad anti-apartheid conference convened (new). No doubt different affiliates will emphasise different tactics, but the interaction between different strategic and political viewpoints has been fruitful. The overall assessment of COSATU assistant general secretary Sydney Mafumadi is that "a composite position was achieved - that the state is strong, that it has reserves of power, but that it has its own weaknesses. Congress was unified on the need to engage those weaknesses so as to undermine its strength and drain its reserves."

Regrouping the democratic movement

The Congress succeeded in regrouping and unifying the democratic movement around a concrete programme for moving forward. This programme consisted of concrete mass action (the three day protest) and a longer term strategy of alliances based on action. The three day protest was seen as important for harnessing the anger of COSATU's membership as well as the community, and mobilising them for further sustained resistance to the Bill, the political restrictions, and general state strategy. The protest would demonstrate to liberals and the international community that repression had not succeeded in crushing the democratic movement,

and warn capital and the state of the anger of the people.

A number of delegates stressed that the protest should not be seen as a "once-off" action - action should be "continuous". A range of tactics were suggested for resisting the Labour Bill if it becomes law. Speakers also rejected the political restrictions on COSATU, and reaffirmed the political policies of the federation. The longer term programme to challenge Apartheid is contained in the resolution on alliances. There are several important points in this resolution. Firstly, it sums up the mood of the Congress by stating that "we have the capacity to seize the initiative".

Secondly, it resolves to convene a conference organising committee "comprising the COSATU CEC and its allies as defined in the political policy resolution." This committee will "consider proposals for the development of a programme of action and organisation against repression," as well as call a conference of a broad range of anti-apartheid organisations to further deliberate" on repression and action against it, and which would work "on the basis of democracy, disciplined mandates and free and open debate".

Thus the resolution contains both NUM's suggestion that an ongoing programme of action should be developed by COSATU and its proven allies (ie. the "democratic movement"), as well as the NUMSA/CWIU suggestion of calling a broad anti-Apartheid conference in order to broaden the base of resistance to Apartheid.

This process recognises the centrality of COSATU's united front with its "proven allies". Some observers have interpreted the resolution to mean that the united front has failed or been superceded, whereas the resolution places the united front at the core of a broad anti-Apartheid alliance.

The significance of the Congress

Some observers have suggested that the Congress showed that the trade union movement has become politically more important than the community organisations, the UDF, and so on. They suggest that it is now the trade union movement that is setting the direction. It is certainly true that the trade unions have got the legal space, the democratic structures, the organised constituency, and the power on the shopfloor, which community organisations lack at this point. However, it is difficult to make such a clear distinction between trade unions, community organisations and the liberation movement. Many of the trade unionists who spoke are also UDF and civic activists. Many shopstewards are active in street committees and

youth organisations. At least four speakers had spent periods on Robben Island for ANC activities. The political reference points in many slogans, songs and speeches are the organisations and personalities of the liberation movement. It is only through understanding these factors that one can explain why shopstewards participated in and organised the Sharpeville stayaway, despite a lack of mobilisation on the part of formal union structures.

There are differences though. One union delegate criticised the community delegation for taking a "partisan stand by strongly attacking the NUMSA/CWIU resolution. They should have let the unions debate thoroughly before putting their views. They should also have been open in admitting that state repression has seriously affected structures in the community." Despite these differences, with great unevenness and regional variation, trade union, community and political organisation are meshing into one movement. At the same time the significance of COSATU and its structures is that it is placing organised workers at the centre of decision-making and action in this movement.

One of the most important achievements of the COSATU Congress was the unity it achieved between affiliates with political differences. The common threats and problems faced by all workers and all affiliates no doubt contributed to the drive for unity. At the same time there is a new political maturity in the federation, a recognition that the costs of division are too high. It is also probably true that the mass political struggles since 1984 have heightened political consciousness, so that the sharp division between 'workerism' and 'populism' has given way for a more uniform political perspective in which most people agree on the need for alliances with the community, and for unions to take up political issues.

The road ahead

The Congress might well provide a turning point in resistance to apartheid. Mass militancy has been channelled into a concrete programme of action. The Congress deepened and strengthened the united front. At the same time, a broad anti- Apartheid conference could provide a massive boost to the anti- Apartheid movement by strengthening the unity of the opposition and further isolating and discrediting the government and its reforms. If successful, these initiatives could resolve the current stalemate in favour of the democratic movement. (FROM SALB REPORT: JULY 1988)

CONGRESS RESOLUTIONS

Two important resolutions were passed at the Special National Congress.

RESTRICTIONS ON COSATU:

Noting:

1. That the international community has declare apartheid a crime against humanity;
2. That attempts to preserve this system have lead to increaded conflict, violence and the imposition of various States of Emergency, in a blind attempt to destroy the peoples' struggle to assert their humanity;
3. That the latest clampdown by the Nationalist government has declared that:-Cosatu is restricted from doing the following:-
 - campaign for the unabnning of banned organisations;
 - campaign for the release of detained people;
 - campign for the lives of people on death row;
 - or for the release of leaders in prison;
 - campaign for the doing away with all structures like the local authorities;
 - commemorate important days in the history of our struggle;
 - commemorate the founding of organisations like the UDF;
 - participate in, or establish, any 'alternative structures' to those imposed on us by government;
 - campaign for pressure to be put on the SA government through disinvestment or trade boycotts;
 - campaign for other governments to cut ties with the government;
 - call for academic or cultural boycotts of this country;And the UDF and 17 leading organisations within the Democratic Movement are totally banned;
4. That COSATU remains committed to struggle for and defend the basic human rights of our members in every sphere of their lives;

as reflected in our policy and resolutions;

5. That the Nationalist government intends to celebrate 40 years of Nationalist Party Rule from the 31st of May;

And believing:

1. That the UDF and 17 other organisations represent the legitimate and peaceful attempt by millions of our people to end apartheid;

2. That it is our birthright and duty to remain committed to:

- the struggle against high rents and poor housing;

- the struggle against the government's attempts to impose upon us illegitimate and corrupt apartheid structures such as the tricameral parliaments and the bantustans;

- the struggle against the arbitrary actions of the government our people - like bannings, detentions and restrictions;

- the struggle to intensify peaceful attempts by the international community to end apartheid;

- commemorating important events in the history of our struggle against repression;

2. That it is totally illegitimate for the Nationalist government to try to restrict our activities to those it defines as the 'proper' functions of a trade union;

3. That all peace-loving people committed to peace and justice support our condemnation of these restrictions and reject the bannings of the UDF and 17 other organisations;

4. That no amount of repression will succeed in crushing the people's resolve to continue to organise against apartheid;

And resolves:

1. To reject these restrictions;

2. To reaffirm our commitment to carrying out our policies and resolutions to the full;

3. To initiate a campaign, both locally and internationally, to fight the restrictions and bannings;

4. To put aside three days at the beginning of June (6,7 and 8) during which all freedom-loving people in our country will get together to discuss ways of opposing these restrictions and bannings to demonstrate our rejection of the results of forty years of Nationalist rule.

(This resolution was censored before publication because of the Emergency regulations.)

RESOLUTION ON THE UNITED FRONT AND AN ACTION PROGRAMME

This congress:

Noting:

1. The recent attempts by the state to stifle all mass based anti-apartheid organisations, and the attempt through the labour relations bill to restrict trade union activities;
2. The militancy, determination and confidence of the masses in struggle over the past few years;
3. In the light of the above, the need to broaden our base, and to build on the gains, already made;

And believing:

1. That it is necessary to show our opposition to the attacks by the state by both short term acts of protest and long term strengthening of our organisations;
2. That in regard to the above, we have the capacity to seize the initiative;

Therefore resolves:

To convene a conference organising committee comprising the Cosatu Central Executive and its allies as defined in the political policy resolution, which committee shall:-

1. Consider prospects for the development of a programme of action and organisation against repression;
2. Call a conference of a broad range of anti-apartheid organisations to further deliberate on the above issues and which would work on the basis of democracy, disciplined mandates and free and open debate;
3. Intensify our efforts to establish a united front as per the Cosatu Policy resolution;

And further resolves:

To intensify our shop floor campaign against the proposed amendments to the Labour Relations Act by further acts of protest, and by co-ordinating efforts to ensure our recognition agreements supercede the terms of the Labour Relations Act.



HISTORICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THREE DAYS OF NATIONAL PROTEST, JUNE 6,7 AND 8

It is by now a matter of historical record that on June 6, 7 and 8 this year our people staged the largest national mass action in the history of our struggle for national liberation. The full significance of this action goes beyond the large numbers of people supporting it, and its 3-day duration. To appreciate this, one needs only to look at the circumstances in which the action took place, and the character of mass support for the action.

THE action was called after two years of the most intensive, nation-wide assault on the democratic movement, and a campaign of systematic terror against the masses, particularly from 1986-7. The entire democratic movement, with the exception of the trade unions, had been driven underground. The most important mass formations, particularly the UDF and SAYCO, had been banned from operating since February 24, and COSATU had been restricted to dealing only with shop-floor matters. The unbridled and violent militancy of the ungovernability period (1984 to 1986) had subsided,

or rather been tempered into a more disciplined and cautious militancy by the harsh experiences of bitter battles and vicious repression. The open, highly visible profile of the mass democratic movement which had swept the country in 1984-6, was now being systematically suppressed by the state of emergency. The embryonic organs of peoples power, which spread like wildfire in 1986, first in urban and then in rural areas, had been severely hampered in many areas by the intense repression. The schools, for so long the site of intense and militant struggles, now appeared disorganised and directionless.

It was in this context that various academics and journalists predicted the failure of 3 days of national protest, decided on by the democratic movement at the COSATU special congress. They believed that the structures of the democratic movement had been smashed, that the masses had been intimidated into passivity by the emergency. In other words, they were deceived by appearances, and failed to look under the surface. The "experts" were not in touch with the mood of the masses and the hidden capacity of the democratic movement.

The state and capital move on the offensive

The bosses and the state were also taken in by their own propaganda. Convinced that the call lacked broad support they moved onto the offensive in the belief that the failure of the action would leave the organisations, particularly COSATU, isolated and defenceless. The action would then be a golden opportunity for the state and the bosses to move in and crush the organisations, particularly by victimising workers who supported the action. In this way they hoped to root out the key cadres of the trade unions, in the same way as the mine bosses had used last years NUM strike to try and break the union. This explains why capital took such a hard line, using employers associations such as SEIFSA and FCI to popularise the view that there should be mass dismissals in response to the action.

Threats of mass dismissals were supplemented by court interdicts brought by employers, intensive state and employer propaganda in the papers, TV and radio, and various repressive measures to stop people from organising for the action. Throughout the country, COSATU regional rallies held to popularise the decisions of the Congress were either banned or disrupted. Roadblocks were set up to stop pamphlets from being distributed.

In short, a range of repressive and propaganda resources were harnessed by the state and capital to ensure that the 3-day action would be an unprecedented disaster for the democratic movement. As it turned out, the 3-day action was a disaster for the state and capital, and an overwhelming success for the democratic movement.

The white minority miscalculates

What went wrong? The state and capital completely underestimated the mood of the masses, and the power of the democratic movement. They had failed to learn from the lessons of the March 21st national stayaway, where everything appeared to point to the probable failure of the action: it was called less than a month after the February 24th bannings; the media gave virtually no publicity to the action beforehand; and COSATU failed to officially endorse the action.

Yet, despite these difficulties, the action was an extremely successful one with approximately one and a half million workers staying away. It was incorrectly assumed by the commercial media that the March 21 action was successful **because** it took place on Sharpeville Day, forgetting there is no strong tradition of stayaways on Sharpeville Day. It was the first time a national stayaway had ever been called on March 21.

The response of the masses stemmed from their anger at the banning of organisations and the impending execution of the Sharpeville Six timed to take place on March 21. With minimal time for preparation and under harsh conditions, the semi-underground structures of the democratic movement were able to mobilise for the action.

The March 21 and June 6,7 and 8 actions were specific examples of a trend which has been unfolding since 1986 - the general development of a political consciousness among the masses, particularly the African people; and the capacity of the mass democratic movement to command extensive mass support in every part of the country. The call for three days of national action on June 6, 7 and 8, wasn't a wild and unrealistic call, as it was interpreted in some quarters. The call correctly identified the objective development of mass consciousness and the corresponding capacity of the democratic movement. In other words, the masses were calling for action and the democratic movement was in a position to co-ordinate and lead that action.

1984 TO 1988: THE DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL UNITED ACTION

The success of the 3-day action follows a **clear trend of development** which has unfolded over the past 4 years. This trend of development can be clearly seen if we look at the series of stayaway actions since 1986 and compare them to the stayaway actions from 1984 to 1986. What emerges quite sharply when we analyse the '84-'86 period is that there were a whole series of local and regional stayaway actions which reflected the local battles that were raging in the various parts of the country during this period. Most of the stayaways were highly successful, but all were limited to a specific part of the country. There were 12 local stayaways in the 20 months from September 1984 to May 1986, (but no national stayaway actions). From May 1986 to July 1988 there were seven national stayaway actions (involving 10 days in all), and a number of local stayaways.

This transition from localised to national stayaway actions reflects the general political transformation which was taking place over this period. The numerous local struggles which had been waged under the banner of the UDF, reaching fever pitch by the end of 1985, had paved the way for a truly national mass movement to take shape. By the beginning of 1986, mass struggles had spread from the main urban centres to towns and rural areas throughout the country. There was virtually no area in which structures of the democratic movement weren't starting to take shape. Hand in hand with this, rapid advances were taking place in mass political consciousness amongst all sectors of the population (not only the youth), and all parts of the country (not only the existing "political hotbeds".) The fierce struggles of '84-'86 were rapidly politicising large sectors of the population which had previously been passive and unaware, particularly in the rural areas, amongst older people, church goers and so on. Few people remained untouched by the campaigns of the democratic movement or the brutality of the state, SADF invasions, mass detentions, mass funerals, vigilantes attacks etc.

This "generalisation" of the struggle was reflected in the transformation of structures of the democratic movement; the UDF was being rapidly transformed from a loose front of organisations to a national political centre; the launch of COSATU in November 1985

saw the transformation of unions which had been fairly narrowly based on the shopfloor into a national worker body integrally part of the mass democratic movement; and the launching of the NECC brought all sectors into a national formation around the education question, whereas previously students had tended to fight their battles alone.

It was this combination of the rapid development of mass mobilisation, mass organisation, and mass political consciousness at a national level which coalesced in 1986. This was clearly expressed in March 1986 at the all-in conference of the democratic movement held in Durban under the auspices of the NECC. The significance of the conference went far beyond its deliberation on the education question. It was the first occasion on which the main contingents of the mass democratic movement were brought together at a national level to hammer out a programme of united action.

The conference gave direction on a wide range of issues including the education struggles, rent boycotts, and national action around May Day and June 16. The conference gave the democratic movement's backing to the May Day stayaway, the first national stayaway to take place in 25 years. The last national stayaway had been called by the ANC to protest the banning of the ANC and PAC and the declaration of a White Republic in May 1961.

May Day and June 16 stayaways 1986

It had taken years of struggle to rebuild democratic organs which had both the organisational capacity and support of the masses to successfully call a general stayaway. This national political consciousness and organisation resulted in the largest (in absolute numbers) stayaways in SA thus far, with approximately 1,5 million people staying away on Mayday and even greater numbers on June 16. Particularly significant was the fact that the June 16 action came four days after the declaration of the national State of Emergency, and the heaviest wave of repression ever unleashed by the regime.

The June 16 action was the first of nine days of national stayaway action to be taken in between June 1986 and June 1988, involving the loss of at least 18 million man-days at the cost of at least R1,500 million rand (based on Assocom's estimate that the June 6,7, and 8 stayaway cost the country's economy R500 million. This is conservative: government sources estimated that each public holiday costs R500 million.)

The 1986 -8 actions probably drew in more people than all the

stayaways of the previous ten years combined. This clearly demonstrates that the rapidly accelerating political consciousness and organisation of the masses was not reversed by the national state of emergency. While the state of emergency hit the structures of the democratic movement hard, the political support of the masses for the democratic movement continued to grow at a rapid pace - calls identified with the formations of the democratic movement (particularly UDF and COSATU) received enormous support. Stayaway calls, on the other hand, made by fringe groups without mass support were ignored by the people. Their lack of mass support was also reflected in the totally inappropriate calls made by these groups, often in an attempt to "outdo" the democratic movement (such as that made by AZAPO and other black consciousness groupings for 10 days in June 86.) Even popular leaders have been unable to get a response from the masses when going over the heads of the democratic movement, as Bishop Tutu found out when he unsuccessfully called for a national day of protest in October 1985.

Features of the national stayaways

The post-1986 period was also characterised by a level of political discipline and unity which had not been seen before. The generally low level of violence corresponded to the high level of mass support for the actions. Large SADF/SAP contingents offering to "protect people who wanted to go to work" found few volunteers. And militant youth put their energies into informing people of the actions in advance rather than physically preventing them from going to work on the day itself.

Significantly the 1986 stayaways, unlike earlier stayaways, focussed largely on national political issues, such as the State of Emergency, the Whites-Only election, the Labour Bills, the banning of organisations and so on. Before 1986, stayaways had made national political demands, but their main focus was on the burning issues affecting local residents - local massacres, student struggles, increased rents, strikes etc. The capacity of the democratic movement to mobilise support around national political issues reflected the heightened political consciousness of the masses. This consciousness found particular expression in the overwhelming support of the African masses for these actions, accurately reflecting the African majority content of the national democratic struggle. Other oppressed communities have registered significant, and in some cases, impressive support for the stayaway calls, but the general

pattern has been for the most consistent and widespread support to come from the African majority.

The recent national stayaways have consistently expressed a broad community character. Spear-headed by the working class in all its political and economic organs, they have actively drawn in wider and wider layers of the community, extending well beyond the unionised workforce. Millions of non-unionised workers, unemployed, students, and the middle strata (traders, taxi-drivers, professionals, church ministers etc) have mobilised in support of the stayaway actions. The drive by the democratic movement to broaden the Front of anti-apartheid forces was becoming a reality in most townships as previously passive strata of the community were galvanised into action. Strata of the working class (eg migrant workers) and other sections of the community (eg taxi-drivers) who had previously actively or passively opposed stayaway actions were now supporting these actions in large numbers.

Broad versus narrow mobilisation

This period has also shown that stayaway calls which are not aimed at the entire community are doomed to fail. In particular, calls aimed at exclusively unionised workers can only have limited success, given the fact that unionised workers represent a minority of the working class. This was clearly demonstrated in 1986 when COSATU called a National Day of Action on July 14 to protest against the detention of trade unionists under the State of Emergency. Unions throughout the country interpreted this as a stayaway call. The stayaway failed in Natal and the Transvaal and was called off in the Western Cape. The only area where large numbers of workers stayed away was in the Eastern Cape where the stayaway was also linked to community issues, such as the clampdown on schools under the State of Emergency. One reason for the failure of the action was because COSATU had failed to consult the UDF and community organisations and get their backing.

In addition the focus of the stayaway was too narrow (the detention of unionists) in a context when there were many other burning issues which affected the whole community, and the working class as a whole. This clearly showed that while trade unions can play a vital reinforcing and organising role in a stayaway, trade unions are unable to pull off a stayaway without community support. Stayaways are essentially community-based actions. All the successful stayaways since 1986 have involved not only the trade unions but the

entire democratic movement. The importance of community mobilisation was demonstrated by this year's March 21 stayaway, which succeeded without the formal backing of the trade unions.

ASSESSING THE THREE-DAY PROTEST

The 3 days of national protest was a major test of strength between the democratic movement and the masses on one side, and the regime and bosses on the other. It was the people's response to the regime's attempt to wipe out the democratic movement. The action was a direct answer to the state's two pronged attack:

1. The effective **banning of organisations of the democratic movement**, particularly the UDF, on February 24th, and
2. The **attempt to reduce COSATU to an ineffective body**, through restricting it from political activities on the one hand, and through breaking its economic power using the Labour Bill on the other.

This all-round political attack by the regime required an all-round political response from the democratic movement. This was the task facing the delegates to the COSATU Special Congress. The Congress identified two main thrusts: embarking on a programme of united mass action; and broadening and deepening the front of anti-apartheid forces.

The 3 days of national protest would be the first major show of strength in the programme of united mass action. The 3-day protest was specifically timed to put pressure on the regime not to renew the State of Emergency on June 10. This factor was strongly emphasised by delegates to the COSATU congress, who stressed that the protest should be separate from the June 16 action. A successful mass action would convey a powerful message to the white minority that the costs of imposing the State of Emergency would be high, and that attempts to crush the democratic movement would be fiercely resisted by the masses.

To convey this message effectively, the protest would have to be supported by the **broad masses of the people**. The stakes were very high: if the 3-day action failed it would look as if the democratic movement stood alone, that it was isolated from the people, and could be crushed. Overwhelming mass support would show that the state of emergency, the Labour Bill and the restrictions would be resisted by the entire oppressed people, and that two years of brutal repression had totally failed to isolate the democratic movement

from the masses and crush their fighting mood. A powerful national action would boost the morale of the masses and the democratic movement, and sow further confusion and demoralisation in the ranks of the ruling class.

THE CHARACTER OF MASS SUPPORT ON JUNE 6, 7 AND 8

Following in the footsteps of recent national stayaways, mass support for the 3-day action reflected the national democratic character and potential of our struggle. Nearly every class and strata of the oppressed community mobilised in support of the action, in varying degrees, and in various ways, particularly in the African areas. The full extent of mass support for the action can be better appreciated if we break down supporters of the action into various categories:

1. Organised Workers

Without detailed research, it is difficult to make an accurate assessment of the numbers of organised (unionised) workers who stayed away in different sectors, different parts of the country, and so on. But it is clear that organised workers supported the action in large numbers, and provided an active core which propagated the stayaway both in the factories and townships.

The high level of organised worker involvement in the 3-day protest reflects the rapid development of worker militancy and politicisation which has taken place in the past couple of years. The fierce struggles fought last year, in particular, have brought large numbers of workers into the democratic movement. The massive strike wave in 1987 resulted in the loss of 9 million workdays. New layers of the working class, particularly in the public sector (railway workers, health workers, postal workers etc) were brought into active struggles with the bosses and the state. Mine workers waged the biggest, and costliest, strike in the history of the country. Now all the gains which the workers had fought for were being threatened by the state's attack on the trade unions and democratic movement.

Labour analysts misinterpreted this year's decline in strike action as meaning that worker militancy had been crushed. But a degree of worker caution in the current climate was not inconsistent with a general increase in political militancy and consciousness. Worker

experiences of struggle and organisation over the last couple of years had profoundly affected them, and it was this tempered militancy which was fully harnessed in the June 6, 7 and 8 action. Worker's perception was that it would be foolhardy to fail to take action in the face of the state's onslaught.

Various indicators suggest widespread union support: -

- the union rank and file, particularly in COSATU, had agitated for action, both at the Special Congress and before the March 21st stayaway. COSATU itself had obviously played the leading role in making this call, together with its allies in the democratic movement.
- the fact that one of the main causes of the action was the state attack on the unions through the Labour Bill and the restrictions on COSATU. In a real sense, for the workers, it was a life and death battle to defend their unions and their hard-won gains.
- the decision of NACTU to support the 3-day call was an important step forward, reflecting the increasing drive from the rank and file for worker unity. NACTU workers were as members of the community supporting the campaigns of the democratic movement. NACTU couldnt afford to isolate itself from an action which their members would in all likelihood support. NACTU withdrew their call for 5 days of action, realising that such counter-calls had failed in the past. This was the first time that the black consciousness unions had committed themselves to a mass campaign. This show of unity could only benefit the action and increase the numbers of workers participating.
- In some instances, worker participation in the stayaway appeared to result from union activity rather than community mobilisation. This was true, in particular, for many unionised Indian and coloured workers who supported the action although the level of mobilisation in their communities remained relatively low. Examples of this would be the high percentage of Indian textile workers who stayed away in Natal, and the high percentage of coloured workers who stayed away in Uitenhage (boosted by the fact that car manufacturers closed down for three days, due to lack of supplies).
- The mobilisation of workers in local industrial areas is an ongoing trend. Industrial areas with a high union presence

have shown the potential to creatively combine mobilisation on an area basis (general unionism) with industrial unionism. In certain highly concentrated industrial areas this probably helped to mobilise ununionised workers for the stayaway. Delegates to the COSATU congress recognised this potential when they called for the formation of industrial area committees.

Note on the situation on the mines

Much has been made of the fact that a disappointing percentage of mineworkers participated, despite the fact that NUM had pushed hard for a 3-day action.

It is not difficult to discover why the mineworkers didn't participate in the action in large numbers (35 000 participated, or about 15% of NUM membership.)

Firstly, the mine bosses took an extremely aggressive posture. They brought court interdicts against NUM to coerce workers to go to work. Mine security was deployed against miners, mines and compounds were sealed off, and workers were harassed, intimidated, and forced to go to work.

Secondly, the union was heavily battered by last years strike. About 50 000 NUM members were victimised by the mine bosses, including many of the shaft stewards and the most active and militant members. In this context, the mine bosses threats could not be taken lightly.

Finally, there are a series of material conditions which tend to isolate miners from community actions such as the political stayaway. Most obviously the compound system isolates mineworkers from political mobilisation which takes place in the communities, trains etc around such actions.

In addition, there is no tradition of mineworkers taking part in political stayaways, many of which are related to urban community issues. This is even more true for foreign mineworkers, who naturally relate firstly to political developments in their own country.

These factors have all resulted in relatively low mineworker participation in stayaways, despite the tide of organisation which has swept the mines. The main exception to this was the action by 210 000 mineworkers in 1986 to demand May Day as a paid public holiday; and to a lesser extent the action by 70000 mineworkers on June 16 last year, when the demand for June 16 as a paid holiday was part of the NUM package of demands. (The effect of recent

repression on the mines is shown by the fact that only 30 000 miners participated in the June 16 action this year, although June 16 as a paid holiday remains a key demand).

2. Unorganised Workers

The widespread and community-based character of the 3-day protest was reflected in the large number of unorganised (or disorganised) workers who participated in the action. The overwhelming support of all layers of the working class is reflected in the fact that about 3 out of every 4 workers who participated in the action were unorganised workers. That is, of the 2,5 to 3 million workers who participated approximately 2 million were unorganised workers.

This can be roughly calculated from the fact that (excluding NUM) COSATU has about 500 000 members. NACTU's general secretary disclosed after their recent congress that their membership is less than 150 000 (not the 420 000 they had previously claimed). Assuming that all COSATU and NACTU members supported the action, then it is clear that at least 2 million unorganised workers participated, a dramatic indication of the depth of worker support for the democratic movement and growing political consciousness of the working class, particularly the African working class.

3. Community mobilisation

On June 6, 7 and 8 entire townships responded to the call of the democratic movement. The entire community identified with the call, and different classes and strata contributed in ways which were appropriate to their positions. Those who opposed the stayaway, particularly apartheid functionaries, were in a tiny minority and in most areas this opposition remained silent and passive.

The task of popularising the action had fallen to the structures of the democratic movement. One method of mobilisation was to discuss the action in formal structures, such as the street committees and other organs of mass democracy. In addition cadres of the democratic movement, particularly the youth, informed residents through a variety of methods - in their homes, on trains and so on.

Propaganda, explaining and popularising the action was produced using clandestine methods in many areas. Thousands of anonymous "Azikwelwa" pamphlets supporting the 3-day stayaway

were distributed in many townships, and grafitti appeared in many areas urging residents to support the action.

At the same time, UDF affiliates placed advertisements in all the major newspapers, supporting the 3-day protest. Other organisations, such as NAFSOC, issued press statements supporting the action. Ironically, the wave of propaganda launched by the regime and bosses (particularly SACCOLA) only helped to popularise and promote the action amongst the masses!

Local structures of the democratic movement discussed the action in advance with organisations representing the "middle strata" traders, taxis, church ministers etc. The response was generally positive, and these sectors made their contributions in the 3 days. For example, in nearly all areas no taxis conveyed workers to work. This was an important contribution - COSATU estimated that taxis carried 1 100 000 less passengers than they normally would have. NAFSOC called on its members to observe the 3-day call and only to keep their shops open for limited hours.

Many Indian traders also shut down for the 3 days, both in town and in the townships. Some church ministers spoke about the forthcoming protest action in their Sunday 5th church services, and the SACC Convocation of church ministers from all demoninations pledged its full support for the action. This radicalisation of organisations of the middle ground, still a relatively new and undeveloped process, simply reflected the growing politicisation of their membership and pressure from the ground to identify more directly with the struggles of the masses.

The participation of hundreds of thousands of students in the stayaway (particularly in the Witwatersrand, OFS, Eastern Cape and Natal) took place in spite of the heavy repression which students had experienced in the past two years; and despite the fact that the stayaway took place at the same time as mid-year examinations. In some areas students successfully demanded that mid-year exams be rearranged to enable them to participate in the action. This revival of student militancy after a lull in the schools was already in evidence during the March 21 action when there had been a stayaway in many schools, particularly in Soweto, East Rand and the Eastern Cape. The supportive role of students for mass community actions reflected the political change since the early to mid eighties, when community action was in support of the students and not the other way around. To some extent, this reversal reflected the leading role which workers and parents were increasingly taking since 1985. But

the rapid decline in the role of students also arose because of the enormous repression unleashed on the schools after the 1986 State of Emergency. The resurgence in student militancy in 1988 although still patchy was becoming increasingly evident by mid- 1988 spreading from the Western Cape to Soweto and the East Rand. The June 6,7, and 8 stayaway call served to reinforce this process. Students could now play an important role in the mass democratic movement, without having to assume the leading role which had been thrust on them some years back.

3 days of peaceful protest

When COSATU called for 3 days of national protest, they emphasised that the action would be peaceful. The (anonymous) pamphlet called for the action to be carried out with "discipline and unity". The spirit of unity and discipline which prevailed in the community during the previous national stayaway actions suggested that any violent conflict would come from the side of apartheid forces. As it happened, there was no significant conflict in areas where the apartheid forces kept a low profile. The support of residents for the action was so overwhelming, that even the SAP and PUTCO were forced to admit that the action was "generally peaceful and incident-free".

By and large, the violence was confined to attacks by cadres on various state targets and the sabotage of railway lines. Natal, however, was an exception to this. The ongoing conflict between the people and the apartheid forces in the region intensified over this period, with pro-apartheid forces determined to smash the stayaway action, and the people equally determined to make the action succeed. In many areas barricades were erected, and there was street-fighting between residents and kitskonstabels (vigilantes in uniforms).

The mood of discipline and restraint prevailing in most areas reflected the high level of political unity and reluctance to act in ways which would make residents vulnerable to state brutality or risk dividing the community. The youth, in particular, displayed a far greater discipline and political maturity than a few years earlier. This was largely due to the political leadership given to the youth by the youth congresses and SAYCO, encouraging a closer political relationship between the parents and the youth particularly in street committees, trade unions, NECC and so on. The youth were playing a vital political role in mobilising and organising the residents, rather

than relying on force and coercion. The youth had displayed a high level of political consciousness and discipline in the stayaways. Workers who had been exempted from the stayaway - health workers and journalists - were able to go to work unhindered. In fact in many areas, there was no picketing of residents on June 6,7 and 8, reflecting both the conditions of repression under which the actions took place and activist's confidence that the action had widespread support in the community.

Some workers who decided to go to work, stayed in town to avoid retribution from other residents. But reports suggest that African workers staying in town "illegally" (eg in Hillbrow) observed the stayaway, although it would have been easy for them to go to work unnoticed. This indicates that people living in town have not become cut-off from the community and de-politicised, as some feared, but have in fact begun to organise themselves.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STAYAWAY IN DIFFERENT REGIONS

Despite major variations in regional conditions (politically, socially, economically), the support for the stayaway was consistent in all national centres except for the Western Cape. Support by African workers for the stayaway was between 70 to 85% in all significant industrial centres outside the Western Cape (PWV, Northern OFS, Natal, East London, Port Elizabeth/Border). The stayaway also extended to small towns, but didn't affect the agricultural sector.

This pattern broadly followed that of the previous national stayaways since 1986 (although the stayaway rate had been higher in the E.Cape - 95%-100% - and lower in Transvaal and Natal - 60-80%). The June 6, 7, 8 national stayaway received the support of residents in all major townships of the country with the exception of the Western Cape, where African workers are in a minority. In other words, the national calls of the democratic movement are receiving more or less the same degree of support from African residents in all areas of the country, with one limited exception. The stayaway calls, however, remain essentially urban-based.

The Transvaal region

Socially and economically the Transvaal is extremely important. A large percentage of industry and the industrial working class is

concentrated in the PWV region. Politically, too the region has occupied a vital role in the democratic movement: together with the Eastern Cape, the Transvaal has tended to set political trends for the rest of the country. Since the 1986 Emergency this has become more pronounced with the shifting of the centre of political gravity from the Eastern Cape to the Transvaal. At the mass level, the Transvaal has recently been the centre of many important struggles.

Examples of these would be the rent boycott, the bantustan struggles, the Front's Christmas campaigns, COSATU's living wage campaign etc. There has been increasing co-operation between trade unions and community organisations.

Despite this, some trade unions in the Transvaal resisted the pressure from the rank and file workers to step up combined campaigns, consultation and co-ordination between COSATU and the rest of the democratic movement. The Wits region of COSATU in particular was plagued by differences in political approach among the trade union leadership. The tide of events in the last couple of years however has largely swept aside these differences, as the mass of workers made it clear that they supported and demanded to be part of the politics of the democratic movement.

The massive support by workers in the region for the May 5 and 6 stayaway last year and the March 21st and June 6, 7 and 8 stayaways this year, was particularly important because it put beyond any doubt the fact that workers in the region overwhelmingly supported the politics of the UDF and COSATU. This was reflected at the Congress of the Wits region on 19 June this year where there was an unprecedented degree of political unity and support for a programme of united action with the entire democratic movement around burning issues such as the municipal elections, the rent boycott, the Angola/Namibia question, Save the Patriots campaign, and the conference of anti-apartheid forces.

A consequence of political developments over the last three years is that the floodgates for mass worker participation and leadership in all structures of the democratic movement have been opened wide.

Workers are increasingly occupying leadership positions not only in the trade unions but also in the civics, street committees, youth congresses and the Front itself. Differences of emphasis remain, but these differences are now being resolved in the heat of mass struggle, and not from the sidelines.

Eastern Cape

The people of the Eastern Cape have a rich history of resistance to minority rule and colonialism. Before 1910, they fought fiercely against the dispossession of their land. After 1910 they played a key role in building the ANC into a national liberation movement which would spearhead the struggle for democracy in South Africa (eg the E. Cape was the centre of both the M-plan and the Defiance campaign). This rich history of mass struggle in the Eastern Cape laid the basis for a high level of political consciousness in the region. This political consciousness was a vital factor in the highly advanced organisation and mobilisation which developed in the Eastern Cape with the national revival of the mass democratic movement in the mid-1980s.

The people of the Eastern Cape led the offensive against bodies of minority rule in the townships in 1984/5. It was in the Eastern Cape where nearly every council collapsed, and councillors and black police were expelled from the townships. Massive school boycotts made it virtually impossible for Bantu Education to operate in the region. It was in the Eastern Cape, more than any other area, where the people made themselves "ungovernable" and apartheid unworkable. But by 1985, people in the region began to develop creative new forms of organisation to move themselves beyond ungovernability. In the vacuum created by the collapse of bodies of minority rule, they began to develop embryonic organs of peoples power (street, block/area committees, peoples courts, peoples education etc). By spearheading this move from ungovernability to peoples power the people of the Eastern Cape were pioneers of a new form of mass organisation which was to change the face of politics throughout the country.

In the course of developing these new forms of organisation people in the region waged various mass campaigns creatively combining new and old forms of struggle. Consumer boycotts and stayaways were launched with increasingly devastating effect. By 1986, stayaways and consumer boycotts were being waged with virtually 100% effectiveness in the African townships throughout the Eastern Cape.

When the national state of emergency was declared in 1986, the Eastern Cape was hit hardest in every way. SADF, SAP, greenbeans, and vigilantes unleashed a reign of terror in the streets and schools. Whole townships were sealed off with barbed wire. About ten

thousand residents, many of them ordinary members of street committees, youth congresses, student and womens organisations were detained in the biggest crackdown in the history of the Eastern Cape. The scale of repression made it virtually impossible for campaigns to be openly conducted or for organisations to function. It became suicidal for residents to openly confront the state. On the surface, it seemed as if mass militancy and organisation in the Eastern Cape had finally been crushed. This conclusion, however, would be very misleading.

Although organisations have suffered serious setbacks in the Eastern Cape, residents have continued to demonstrate their high level of political consciousness and commitment throughout the State of Emergency. National calls for action from the democratic movement have continued to receive a higher rate of response in the Eastern Cape than any other area. The average response to stayaway calls since the state of emergency has been 90% in the African areas in Eastern Cape (compared to 73% in the Transvaal and 65% for Natal). This clearly demonstrates that the state has totally failed to crush the spirit of resistance in the Eastern Cape, although the communities there are taking a much lower political profile than previously.

Natal

If political conditions in the Eastern Cape favoured the rapid development of the democratic movement, political conditions in Natal placed numerous obstacles in the way of the democratic movement. The economic, administrative, and repressive stranglehold with which the KwaZulu/Inkatha axis gripped the Natal region had effectively contained the growth of the democratic movement there. The contradiction for the democratic movement in Natal was that while it had majority support from the people particularly in the urban areas, it was unable to transform this support into organisational gains corresponding to political developments in the rest of the country. Despite the democratic movement having the rudiments of mass-based structures, Inkatha was able to use economic and military intimidation and terror to prevent these structures from effectively harnessing their mass support.

The result was that the semi-insurrectionary situation which swept the country between 1984-1986 appeared to have little effect on the Natal region. In particular the development of un-

governability and peoples power seemed to pass Natal by. However, it soon became apparent that national political developments has not escaped the masses in Natal. Because of conditions in the area, it was taking longer for the masses to tilt the balance of forces in their favour.

By the beginning of 1986, the picture was starting to change. The masses began to effectively challenge the power of Inkatha, particularly in areas around Pietermaritzburg and to the north. In areas such as Sobantu and Pietermaritzburg Inkatha was effectively isolated and physically expelled. The ability of bodies of apartheid rule to govern was now being challenged. By the end of 1986 Inkatha was losing its grip in many areas, particularly the Natal midlands.

In this context, calls for mass action became a test of strength between Inkatha and the democratic movement. In fact, mass support by Natal workers for the May 5/6 stayaway was followed by an Inkatha backlash which had developed into open war by August 1987. Inkatha attempted to reassert control through the use of terror and forced recruitment, leading to the violent and protracted conflict between Inkatha and the residents which engulfed first the Midlands and then spread to the greater Durban area this year.

The Inkatha offensive had strengthened the UDF/COSATU alliance in the region, and forced residents to build structures to defend themselves (defence committees, street committees etc). The vicious methods used by Inkatha war-lords, kitskonstabels and police affected the entire population, regardless of whether they were UDF/COSATU members or not. The result was the mass alienation of Natal residents from Inkatha and their refusal to fight for the war lords. It became clear to residents that active involvement in the structures of the democratic movement was the only way to turn the tide of Inkatha coercion and terror, and to mobilise effectively against the regime. The democratic movement opened its doors to everyone including those who had been forcibly recruited into Inkatha. Increasingly, Inkatha was being reduced to an isolated clique of war-lords and Kwazulu bureaucrats without a mass base.

Buthelezi frustrated

This loss of control over the masses, particularly in the urban areas, but also in the rural areas, was reflected in Buthelezi's inability to effectively frustrate the June 6, 7 and 8 stayaway in Natal. He called on Natal residents to ignore the call, and gave KwaZulu MPs a week off to mobilise against the stayaway. The week before the

stayaway Inkatha held a rally in Durban urging people to defy the call. Kitskonstabels (Inkatha members in uniform) were called out in force to coerce residents to work, and pamphlets were distributed by police calling on residents to ignore the stayaway. All these attempts failed hopelessly. Despite coercion and threats, residents staged the biggest stayaway in the history of the region. The Natal stayaway was as much a mass action against Inkatha as it was a protest against the actions of the central state. Clearly, the masses in Natal had thrown their weight behind the democratic movement, decisively tilting the balance of forces against apartheid and counter-revolution in the region.

Western Cape

Although each area in the country has its own regional peculiarities, there are certain conditions which are common to all of them, which give rise at different points to national political trends. An example of this would be the development of ungovernability and peoples power. Material conditions, in the Western Cape, however, are so different that there is no certainty that they will follow national political trends at any particular point in time.

The reasons for this are complex, relating to the specific social and economic conditions in the area, political traditions and so on. Briefly some of these are:

- The policy of keeping African workers out of the Western Cape (the "Coloured Labour Preference Policy) has historically resulted in African people being a **minority** in the W.Cape, the only area in the country where this is the case. In 1980, 15% of the Cape peninsular was African, compared to over 50% coloured people and 30% white (although the number of African residents has shot up since then). This has meant that the motive force of the national democratic movement in the rest of the country, namely the African masses, has been severely limited in the W.Cape.
- The conditions of national oppression of the coloured community have differed in various ways from those in the African community. Coloured people have historically had slightly greater economic and political "privileges" in the overall schema of white domination. The apartheid regime has always done its utmost to exploit these social differences in order to create political divisions. These realities have posed serious, though not insurmountable, difficulties for

the development of the democratic movement in the W.Cape.

- This helps explain why there has historically been a weak tradition of mass-based organisations in coloured communities in the W.Cape. These conditions have also helped to give rise to ultra-left political groupings which were historically isolated from the mainstream of the democratic movement, and from the masses themselves. Groupings like the Unity Movement, although a handful of intellectuals, had a degree of influence in the coloured community and were able to confuse the people with their high-flown theory. The only grouping in the Western Cape to involve the people in mass action was the Congress movement, but they often found that mass actions were openly opposed by the ultra-left sects eg the 1961 national stayaway was opposed by the Unity Movement, which told coloured people to go to work. (Despite this, many thousands of coloured people joined the stayaway.)
- Another factor which retarded organisation and political consciousness in the coloured community was the weak tradition of worker organisation. Conservative TUCSA unions dominated most factories employing coloured workers eg clothing factories. This weak tradition of trade unionism also reflects the weak industrial development of the Cape Town region. There is very little heavy industry (eg engineering) in the area, most factories being light industries such as clothing and food processing. Factories are relatively small, and workers have weaker bargaining power because of the relatively "unskilled" and labour intensive character of this work.

Controls over squatter camps

- The African community in Cape Town was kept small and vulnerable by the heavy influx control in the Western Cape. Many of the African workers were migrants from the Transkei, and settled residents were constantly under threat of removal. This has placed the African community in an objectively weak position. On the other hand, the mushrooming of "illegal" squatter camps has further complicated the problems of organisation in the area. Many squatters are recently from rural areas in the Transkei and

Ciskei and have had little contact with the democratic movement. Squatters' conditions of vulnerability have also enabled bandit networks to run the camps like bantustans (eg Ngxobongwana in Crossroads). The system has been able to exploit the situation politically. So although the influx of people is expanding the African community and shifting the African minority character of the Western Cape; it also has the potential for creating centres of counter-revolution; particularly in the absence of a powerful mass democratic movement based in the African areas.

These are some of the conditions which form the backdrop to the history of mass action and organisation in the Western Cape. The social and political composition of the area, however, is changing rapidly, adding to the Western Cape's unpredictability. Most importantly, the democratic movement has made major breakthroughs in the W.Cape in the 1980's. The UDF and its affiliates have unrivalled mass support in both the African and coloured communities. TUCSA has collapsed in the Western Cape and growing numbers of workers are being organised under the banner of COSATU.

However, because of the factors listed above, the rhythm of struggle in the W.Cape remains largely autonomous from the rest of the country. If we look at the successful national stayaways over the last 2 years, all of them were weakly supported in the Western Cape, particularly in the coloured communities. For the national actions where figures are available, average support by coloured workers in the region was less than 15%, but the average support by African workers in the region was about 51%. This indicates that in the absence of extensive mobilisation around such actions, the degree of political awareness and spontaneous support is far higher in the African areas than the coloured areas.

This pattern of support, however, need not be a fixed one. The situation in the Eastern Cape shows that where a high level of political consciousness and mobilisation is generated, combined with strong trade union organisation amongst coloured workers, there is the potential for a high level of support for political strike action in the coloured community. The strongest example of this is Uitenhage, where there has been consistently high support amongst coloured workers for national stayaway actions, peaking on June 6, 7 and 8 with 80% support amongst coloured workers in Uitenhage.

JUNE 6,7,8 AND THE BALANCE OF FORCES

The success of the stayaway action reflects the overall balance of forces in South Africa. The state's aggressive counter-revolutionary strategy creates the impression of an overwhelming power which no opposition can stand. But this obscures the fundamental political weaknesses of the regime:

- its support base grows narrower by the day, while the regime is increasingly isolated within its own power bloc
- the forces ranged against it are increasingly united, encompassing broader and broader sections of the population

In these circumstances, a situation of apparent strength can rapidly turn into a defeat. The success of the stayaway was a dramatic demonstration of the weakness of the "powerful" when confronted by the organised strength of the "powerless". The democratic movement correctly identified the importance of the action in helping to shift the balance of forces further in our favour, thereby opening up greater possibilities to seize the initiative. This must be seen in the context of the overall shift of the balance of forces which had been gradually developing in the last 6 months: international pressure on the regime accelerated with the February clampdown on organisations; there was a decisive shift in the balance of forces in the Angolan/Namibian conflict; intensification of the armed struggle; sanctions were beginning to take a heavy toll on an economy already in crisis; the opening of a new front of struggle in the churches; growing fragmentation and difficulties in the white power bloc and the gradual disintegration of the tricameral alliance; growing corruption, squabbling and disorganisation amongst the bantustan rulers resulting in open conflict and coups; the rapid disintegration of Inkatha as a power in the Natal region; mass action in the schools after 18 months of relative quiet; and the rapid development of unity in action between COSATU and UDF affiliates despite the crackdown.

In the context of rapid shifts in the political terrain, the ability of the democratic movement to provide political leadership is a decisive factor in the struggles course of development. The 3-day action was a critical test of our capacity to implement a bold and far-reaching strategy to mobilise and unite the broad masses of the people. The

success of the broad front approach hinged on the depth and extent of mass support commanded by the democratic movement.

June 6, 7 and 8 was a powerful indicator of mass support, considering that it involved 3 days of action in a difficult climate for workers, made worse by the combined aggression of the bosses and the state. This year workers had been cautious to use the strike as an economic weapon, because of the difficulties they faced. There were no immediate economic gains to be made from the stayaway. On the contrary, the action would mean economic sacrifice and possibly large-scale dismissals.

Despite this, workers had now shown that they were prepared to use the stayaway as a political weapon to act against the state's attack on the democratic movement. This confirmed the dominant view in the democratic movement that there was a high level of political awareness and militancy amongst the masses. The masses re-emphasised this a week later when they staged a spontaneous stayaway on June 16, despite the many dismissal warnings which workers had received after June 6, 7 and 8.

The weak response by capital and the state showed that they had bitten off more than they could chew. They were forced to back off from the threats they had made before the action. Both the Minister of Labour and SACCOLA changed their tune on the Labour Bill, and threatened mass dismissals didn't materialise. Nevertheless, the Labour Bill was enacted, the restrictions on organisations remained, and the State of Emergency was re-imposed.

The victory lay in the successful demonstration of power by the democratic movement, the failure of the state's and capital's intimidation strategy, the high morale and unity of the masses, and the demonstration that attempts to attack the democratic movement would be resisted forcing the state and capital to pay a price they could ill-afford. The action served to further undermine the state's strategy, deepen divisions in the ruling bloc, and further expose the fundamental political weakness of the regime.

The masses through this action showed the enormous potential for broadening the Front and building the alliance of anti-apartheid forces. Nearly all sections of the community and all types of organisations were brought together into a broad united action, laying the basis for further alliances and mass action. The stayaway also demonstrated that the so-called "middle ground of moderate blacks" which the government loves to talk about has no support in the black community. It exposed the fact that these "responsible

blacks supporting the government" are an insignificant minority consisting of apartheid functionaries and their hangers-on; not the 30% of the community the government would like us to believe. Apartheid elements were unable to oppose the stayaway anywhere, including Natal where the use of force was insufficient to frustrate the action. This shows that the forces of counter revolution in the black community, on whom the government is relying heavily for the success of their strategy, are isolated and without support. This gives a clear indication of the difficulties which face the regime in mobilising support for the October 26 elections.

WEAKNESSES AND POLITICAL CHALLENGES

While the democratic movement's experience of the 3-day protest was generally positive, there were some weaknesses, which need to be overcome in future mass actions.

- There was inadequate strategising between COSATU and community organisations to ensure that the content and direction of the action was at all times guided by the democratic movement. In particular, the state, bosses and media consistently attempted to narrow the focus of the action by focussing only on the Labour Bill. No proper attempt was made to make sure that the demands, all equally important, were projected together. This helped to push the major issues of bannings of organisations and the re-imposition of the state of emergency into the background. As a result the political impact was not as powerful as it could have been.
- In the mine compounds and other places where workers live on employer's premises isolated from the community, it is necessary to set up alternative structures of communication with the workers.
- The participation of coloured and Indian communities in the national action was, on the whole, inadequate. The exceptions to this show that although material conditions of oppression differ in these communities, there is still the potential for mass mobilisation around such actions. We need to carefully analyse our successes and failures, and develop a creative approach which takes into account the

specific conditions in these areas.

- Our propaganda, although good in some areas, was inadequate in others. We need to ensure at all times that the politics of the democratic movement is effectively communicated through various forms of propaganda, from pamphlets to graffiti. We cannot rely on the commercial media to put the views of the democratic movement.

The success of the stayaway clearly vindicated our standpoint that we are far from crushed, and that the level of consciousness amongst our people is very high. But it would be a mistake to become complacent. Our actual strength is far from our potential strength: we need to continuously transform the militancy and consciousness of our people into concrete organisational forms that will advance our struggle.

One of our main tasks is to build and broaden the front of anti-apartheid forces, right from the ground at the local level up to the national level. The 3 days of national action was an important advance in this process. The conference of anti-apartheid forces will hopefully take this process even further.

But it is in the heat of mass struggle that the most effective unity will be built. A broad range of anti-apartheid organisations (such as sports, church, traders, cultural groups) need to go beyond resolutions and commit themselves to a programme of action against the regime. The tried and tested mass-based organisations (particularly the Front and COSATU) must make sure that they have joint structures which take up campaigns in an on-going way. Although our organisations will form the heart and engine of the broad anti-apartheid front, this in itself is not good enough. They must make sure at all times that they involve the broadest range of mass structures in action to ensure the broadest possible unity of our forces, and the maximum possible isolation of the enemy forces.

While we must continuously advance with a concrete programme of action, we must always make sure that we understand the mood of the masses. The militancy and political awareness of the people must not be confused with a preparedness to back any action, no matter how rash or ill-considered. While we are still capable of taking the struggle to higher levels, we should be careful not to be overconfident and embark on campaigns which do not correspond to the mood of the people. We should remember that the pace of a column is not determined by the fittest and fastest soldier but by the slowest and weakest. Let us march with the people to victory!

NATIONAL STAYAWAY ACTIONS 1986 - 1988 Available estimates

DATE	MAIN ISSUE	ORGANISATION
1. May 1 1986	Recognition of May Day as a public holiday	COSATU NECC
DECLARATION OF THE NATIONAL STATE OF EMERGENCY JUNE 12 1986		
2. June 16 1986	Soweto Day and protest against State of Emergency	UDF, COSATU NECC
3. July 14 1986	Detentions of union officials	COSATU
4. May 5/6 1987	Protest against whites-only elections	COSATU, UDF
5. June 16 1987	Part of national action against State of Emergency	UDF
6. March 21 1988	Restriction of UDF and 17 other organisations	UDF affiliates
7. June 6,7,8 1988	Restriction of organisations Labour Bill State of Emergency	COSATU UDF affiliates NACTU
8. June 16 1988	Soweto Day	

3 DAYS OF NATIONAL PROTEST

NUMBERS INVOLVED	% BY AREA	MINEWORKERS																				
1,5 million	PWV 80% E.Cape 99,5 (+_ 55% coloured) Natal 70% (35% Indians) W.Cape 15% (80% African) (8% coloured)	210 000																				
1,7 million	Tvl 90% E.Cape 99,5% Natal 60 - 80% W.Cape (78% African, 76% coloured)	50 000																				
Unknown (possibly 100-200000)	Only significant in PE and Border	N/A																				
1,5 million per day (and over 1.7 million students)	<table style="width: 100%; border: none;"> <tr> <td style="width: 50%; text-align: center;">May 5</td> <td style="width: 50%; text-align: center;">May 6</td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td>Tvl 57%</td> <td>70%</td> <td>50 000</td> </tr> <tr> <td>E.Cape 99% (35%*)</td> <td>96% (40%*)</td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td>Natal 60%</td> <td>70%</td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td>W.Cape 12% (2%*)</td> <td>42% (2%*)</td> <td></td> </tr> </table> <p>* = coloured workers</p>	May 5	May 6		Tvl 57%	70%	50 000	E.Cape 99% (35%*)	96% (40%*)		Natal 60%	70%		W.Cape 12% (2%*)	42% (2%*)							
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W.Cape 12% (2%*)	42% (2%*)																					
About 1,3 million	Tvl 60% E.Cape 93% Natal 55% W.Cape 40%	70 000																				
About 1,5 million (SAP figures)	Tvl 80% W.Cape N/A E.Cape 80% Natal 60%	N/A																				
2,5 - 3 million per day	<table style="width: 100%; border: none;"> <tr> <td style="width: 33%; text-align: center;">June 6</td> <td style="width: 33%; text-align: center;">June 7</td> <td style="width: 33%; text-align: center;">June 8</td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td>Tvl/N.OFS 75%</td> <td>70%</td> <td>65%</td> <td>35, 000</td> </tr> <tr> <td>E.Cape 87 (60*)</td> <td>85 (60*)</td> <td>85 (60*)</td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td>Border 80</td> <td>80</td> <td>80</td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td>Natal 80</td> <td>78</td> <td>72</td> <td></td> </tr> </table> <p>W..Cape (About 10% no proper figures available)</p>	June 6	June 7	June 8		Tvl/N.OFS 75%	70%	65%	35, 000	E.Cape 87 (60*)	85 (60*)	85 (60*)		Border 80	80	80		Natal 80	78	72		
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About 1,3 million	Tvl + - 85% E.Cape +_ 85% Natal +_ 40% W.Cape +_ 25%	30 000																				
<hr/>																						
18 million workdays																						

**COPY OF ANONYMOUS JUNE 6,7, 8 STAYAWAY
PAMPHLET**

AZIKWELWA!STAYAWAY!

June 6, 7, 8

**3 days of united national
action**

The workers have called for 3 days of national protest to be observed on June 6, 7, and 8 (Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday). We, the community, fully support this call and urge our people to observe these 3 days as a national stayaway. let this message be spread to every corner of the country so that our people, wherever they are, strike together in one mighty action!

Let each and every person, whether a worker, a student, a businessman, or unemployed know clearly the reasons for this 3 day protest. Indeed the regime, big business, and the international community must know why we are taking this action:

1. The boers have **banned** our organisation, the United Democratic Front (UDF)and many other mass organisations! They have also restricted Comrades Mbeki, Sisulu and many of our leaders.

2. They have restricted our mighty Federation, COSATU and now they want to use the **Labour Bill** to crush our trade unions and turn them into Useless Bosses Clubs.

3. At this very moment, they are planning to impose a third year of the hated **State of Emergency** on our people. Thousands of our leaders, and many scores of children, are still sitting in jail after 2 years of the regime's "Emergency"!

4. Every week, they are **hanging** our sons and daughters on Death Row!

5. They have **silenced** the peoples newspapers, New Nation and South, and are threatening to silence more!

6. They want to celebrate 40 years of **Nationalist Misrule** by pushing more bodies of minority rule (Great Indabas and councils) down our throats.

COPY OF ANONYMOUS JUNE 6,7, 8 STAYAWAY PAMPHLET

ARE WE GOING TO CELEBRATE OUR OWN OPPRESSION? WE SAY NO! WE ARE NOT GOING TO TAKE THESE ATTACKS LYING DOWN. WE ARE GOING TO STRIKE BACK! LET THE BOERS AND THEIR SUPPORTERS KNOW THAT THEY HAVE STRUCK A ROCK AND WILL BE CRUSHED.

TO THE BOSSES WE SAY: You are making a serious mistake by siding with the Boers on these issues. You are wasting your time attacking COSATU. The workers expressed the feelings of the entire community by calling 3 days of national protest. Be careful that we do not redirect our anger away from the regime to focus on you. By threatening COSATU, you are challenging the entire oppressed community to treat you as the enemy.

TO THE PEOPLE WE SAY: On May 5 and 6 last year and on March 21 this year we showed our capacity for mass action on a scale which surprised even our supporters. The Boers and their supporters are doing everything they can to stop this action from going ahead because it is hitting them where it hurts most. These attempts will fail! Let us make sure that on June 6, 7, and 8 we stage an action which is more powerful than any mass action in the history of our struggle.

Guidelines

1. No one is to go to work on June 6, 7 and 8 (Monday, Tuesday and Wednesday). This applies to all areas of the country (national).
2. The reasons for this action must be clearly explained to everyone.
3. Let us continue our tradition of United Action which is carried out with discipline and unity.
4. Health workers and Journalists may go to work. Health workers wear uniforms and Journalists show ID cards.

END THE EMERGENCY!

UNBAN THE UDF!

SCRAP THE LABOUR BILL!

COPY OF MAY 5,6 ANTI-APARTHEID ELECTIONS
PAMPHLET

**2 DAYS of NATIONAL
MAY 5,6 UNITED
ACTION**

Down with apartheid elections

Azikwelwa! STAYAWAY

The United Democratic Front, Cosatu and the entire democratic movement has called for TWO DAYS OF NATIONAL PROTEST on the 5th and 6th May. We, the freedom loving people of South Africa, support this call. Let us demonstrate our rejection of the apartheid elections, our rejection of the State of Emergency, our rejection of the violence against our people by staging the biggest national stayaway in the history of our country.

Let every sector of our community demonstrate loudly and clearly that we have had enough! That we refuse to tolerate this regime anymore. That we are demanding the scrapping of this racist parliament and its replacement by a democratic South Africa based on the Freedom Charter. **THE PEOPLE SHALL GOVERN! LET EVERY WHITE VOTER GO TO THE POLLS ON 6 MAY KNOWING THAT THERE IS NO FUTURE IN THE RACIST PARLIAMENT OR THE BOTHA REGIME! WE DEMAND ONE PERSON, ONE VOTE IN A UNITED SOUTH AFRICA!**

TOWNSHIP AND RURAL RESIDENTS SAY:

* Since 12 June, we and our children have been terrorised by the forces of the regime, particularly the council police, vigilantes and kitskonstabels. Thousands of our children and our leaders have been detained under the State of Emergency, many of as long as 11 months. We therefore demand: **HANDS OFF THE UDF!! DISBAND THE VIGILANTES AND KITSKONSTABELS AND COUNCIL POLICE! TROOPS OUT OF THE TOWNSHIPS! LIFT THE STATE OF EMERGENCY!**

* For over a year now millions of our people have boycotted rents. We have refused to pay high rents for bad houses and bad services. We have refused to pay for our own oppression, for the corrupt councillors and the murderous greenbeans and kitskonstabels. Now the regime is evicting residents. The people of Soweto have shown they refuse to tolerate this. Let us reinstate those who have been evicted. We demand that the regime: **STOPS EVICTIONS!! AN EVICTION TO ONE IS AN EVICTION TO ALL!**

WORKERS SAY:

* Our trade unions, particularly COSATU, are under attack. More and more the regime is sending its forces to attack the workers. We are outraged by the killing of SARHWU strikers last week. The assaults and killings of striking workers must stop. **HANDS OFF COSATU! POLICE GET OUT OF INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES!**

* The government and SATS must come to terms with SARHWU and the striking workers. They must not think that we will stand by while they fire thousands of our fellow workers. A dismissal to one is a dismissal to all. **REINSTATE ALL THE FIRED SATS WORKERS!**

**COPY OF MAY 5,6 ANTI-APARTHEID ELECTIONS
PAMPHLET**

***Down with minority!*
STAYAWAY — rule!
TUES 5 MAY and WED 6 MAY**

THE PEOPLE DEMAND:

STOP RAIDS INTO NEIGHBOURING STATES!
SCRAP THE RACIST PARLIAMENT!
UNBAN THE ANC AND RELEASE POLITICAL PRISONERS!
ONE PERSON, ONE VOTE IN A UNITED SOUTH AFRICA!

WARNING TO THE REGIME: Further mass action will be taken if our demands are not met. In particular NATIONAL MASS ACTION will be taken on 12 June 1987 if the State of Emergency has not been lifted.

=====

APPEAL TO ALL OUR PEOPLE:

1. No shopping in town on 5 and 6 May.
2. No schooling on 5 and 6 May.
3. Shebeens to close on 5 and 6 May.
4. No-one to work on the 5th and 6th, except health workers and journalists. Health workers wear uniforms, journalists show identity cards.
5. No buses or taxis to town.

PLEASE NOTE: All the above must be observed in a disciplined and united way. Our youth must take responsibility to ensure that the stayaway call is explained to the people before the 5 and 6 May.

DOWN WITH WHITE MINORITY RULE! AZIKWELWA! 5
and 6 MAY! STAYAWAY! FORWARD TO PEOPLE'S POWER!

END BOTHA'S DICTATORSHIP!!
THE PEOPLE SHALL GOVERN

ANTI-APARTHEID CONFERENCE

Although the national anti-apartheid conference was banned, the first steps in building an anti-apartheid alliance to oppose the racist regime have been taken. PHAMBILI reviews the motivations for holding a conference of all anti-apartheid forces.

IN May 1987 the National Working Committee Conference of the UDF adopted, amongst others, a resolution on the need for a "a national conference of all anti-apartheid forces in order to determine the shortest possible path to peace." This year, on 14 to 15 May, a similar resolution was passed at the Cosatu Special Conference to call a conference of a broad range of anti-apartheid organisations to deliberate on repression and action against it.

Reasons for the conference

A motivating document for the conference, said that in our country today there is more and more polarisation between the apartheid forces on the one hand and the democratic forces on the other.

"While many and different structures are involved in the fight against and defence of apartheid, the two main protagonists in this conflict are clearly the ANC and the government."

Referring to the mass democratic movement, the motivating document said that there are many other organisations in the country who share with the ANC a vision of a unitary, non-racial South Africa. These organisations, organised mainly under the UDF and COSATU, use open and legal ways to fight apartheid. "Their combined membership runs into a conservative estimate of five

million people".

But while more and more organisations were adopting the Freedom Charter and joining the mass democratic movement, "we still have a significant number of organisations that have not yet joined" while opposed to apartheid.

"Many of these groups espouse liberalism (in different ways) and are in most cases not antagonistic to the mass democratic movement. It is this group (in the townships) which is seen by the government as a moderate block which should be won over to the side of apartheid. This group consists of small businesspeople, taxi associations, teachers, sportsbodies and other professional structures. It is also this group which has become the interest of imperialist forces, particularly the USA."

Pointing out that the state had targetted the UDF and COSATU among the legal organisations for repressive attention, the document said that UDF and COSATU, as organisations of the people, should seek support from the people. "The question is how?"

The document said firstly UDF and COSATU should continue to deepen and strengthen their grassroots structures so that "to wipe us off will mean exterminating the whole population". Secondly "we should deny apartheid forces any chances of gaining more junior partners amongst our people." The anti apartheid conference offered an opportunity to win over in a disciplined and systematic way groups which are seen to be on the middle ground.

On the United Front

The document said there was no ambiguity from the UDF and COSATU resolutions about the need for a broad conference of anti-apartheid forces. The understanding of the UDF and COSATU was that the people of this country already had a united front in the form of the UDF, and the "broadening and strengthening of our united front becomes an urgent task". Quoting from the 1987 UDF Working Committee report, the document said that the friendship and co-operation between Cosatu and the Front had grown into "a true fighting alliance". The task now was to build the united front at a local level: "in which sectors are represented, especially workers, youth, women, students and civics".

The Process towards the conference

Suggesting that the conference should be before the October municipal elections, the paper said that there should be open and

frank discussion of the two themes, the anti repression campaign and working for one-person one vote in a united democratic South Africa. "Areas of difference should be frankly discussed, but more emphasis should be on areas of common agreement and ways and means explored of how to forge permanent co-operation between the mass democratic movement and other formations outside it."

In a separate paper on the themes of the anti-apartheid conference, the organisers said the challenge facing the democratic movement was to identify the key elements of the total onslaught unleashed by the state against the masses of South Africa, namely all round repression and co-option in different forms and to chart the way forward for the mass democratic movement.

The Anti-repression Campaign

The paper on the themes said that the oppressed masses, together with white democrats, had moved from mere protest to an open challenge of the racist regime. "The regime has been unsettled by the emergence of mass democratic opposition to apartheid, united and organised in such structures as the UDF and COSATU at national and regional level, by the civic associations, the youth congresses and street and block committees at local level. This movement, representing people from all sections of the South African population, has posed a clear democratic alternative, and a great threat to apartheid, and has left the regime, already suffering a crisis of legitimacy all over the world, with only one option: repressive rule."

The paper outlined various forms of repression such as the outlawing and criminalisation of mass democratic opposition to apartheid such as the bannings of the ANC, UDF and restrictions on COSATU as well as the prosecution of thousands of activists supporting legal organisations. Other forms of repression included arbitrary arrest and detention; brutal attacks and killings of opponents of apartheid; vigilante attacks and apartheid death squads; forced removals and resettlement, and hangings.

The paper said the repressive strategy of the state is aimed at crushing by force all opposition to apartheid in order to create an open field in which apartheid may be re-instituted under the guise of reform.

"The forthcoming municipal elections form part of this strategy; it is hoped that the state will shift the balance of forces in its favour

by winning more junior partners to implement its policy. To prevent the losses it suffered during the introduction of the Black Local Authorities and the tricameral elections, the state has seen fit to crush all opposition by banning the UDF and other democratic organisations, gagging the press, detaining and restricting community leaders, tightening up the Group Areas Act and outlawing extra-parliamentary boycott action against the October elections. Added to this are the restrictions on COSATU and the new Labour Bill, which takes away the democratic right to strike and curtails collective bargaining in the labour sphere."

The peaceful three day stayaway, said the paper, had shaken the state sufficiently to consider amendments to the bill and this proved "the need and power of united action against repression".

One Person One Vote in a democratic South Africa

The paper said that it was a universally accepted principle that all adults should have the right to vote for the government of their country and that the will of the majority should prevail. South Africa was not a democratic country. The right to vote was decided on a racial basis, and then it was exercised in racial compartments such as the bantustans and the tricameral parliament.

The municipal elections in October would not change this fact, although by holding them on the same day the government wants to pretend to the world that all South Africans have the equal right to vote. The oppressed majority is expected to vote for municipal policies in the makings of which they have no part, said the paper, "in short we are being asked to help the government further to undermine our democratic rights".

How can we work for a democratic South Africa?

The paper said to chart a realistic way forward we should take the prevailing material conditions, and not assume a uniformity of grievances and political consciousness in the communities.

The municipal elections provided an opportunity for a concerted campaign to expand the moral influence of the mass democratic movement, and to build alliances with all groupings to the left of the Nats.

By isolating the Nats, by distinguishing them from the majority that truly offers an alternative to apartheid, we shall be creating the best climate for a peacefully negotiated settlement based on our minimum conditions.

**PARTIAL LIST OF ORGANISATIONS BEING
ASKED TO ATTEND**

SECTORS

GROUPINGS

1. Labour
 - 1.1. Cosatu
 - 1.2. Nactu
 - 1.3. Unaffiliated unions

 2. Students
 - 2.1. Sansco
 - 2.2. Nusas
 - 2.3. Sasco
 - 2.4. Inter-church/ Interdenominational student organisations
 - 2.5. White school organisations

 3. Youth
 - 3.1. Sayco
 - 3.2. Inter-church/ Interdenominational youth organisations

 4. Women
 - 4.1. Feddraw
 - 4.2. NOW
 - 4.3. UWCO
 - 4.4. Eastern Cape women
 - 4.5. Border women
 - 4.6. Orange Free State women
 - 4.7. Black Sash
 - 4.8. Women for Peace
 - 4.9. Black Housewives League
 - 4.10 Interdenominational Women's groups
 - 4.11. Other

 5. Unemployed
 - 5.1. NUWCC

 6. Professional
 - 6.1. BMF
 - 6.2. Namda
 - 6.3. Nadel
 - 6.4. Teachers
 - 6.5. ADJ
 - 6.6. Oassa
 - 6.7. Udusa
 - 6.8. Sabswa
 - 6.9. HWA
 - 6.10 Traditional Healers Association
-

7. Political 7.1. UDF

7.2. ECC

7.3. FFF

7.4. NDM

7.5. Inyandza

7.6. DPP

7.7. Seopa Sengoe

7.8. PPP

7.9. NECC

7.10. RMC

7.11. Contralesa

7.12. Nopeco

7.13. National Forum

8. Sports and culture 8.1. Sacos

8.2. NSL

8.3. NPSL

8.4. SAFTA

8.5. Cosaw

8.6. SASF

8.7. SANA

9. Religious 9.1. SACC

9.2. SACBC

9.3. AICSA

9.4. Idamasa

9.5. Call of Islam

9.6. ZCC

9.7. Rastafari

10. Civic 10.1. Regional representatives

11. Business 11.1. Nafcoc

11.2. Sabta

11.3. Other taxi associations

11.4. Taverners associations

11.5. Hawkers associations

12. Institutions 12.1. Idasa

12.2. ICT

12.3. Sached

"WE ARE NOT PREPARED TO GIVE THE ENEMY A PRESENT"

These extracts from a paper by a well-known COSATU leader explain some of the aims, and why certain organisations were asked to attend the Anti-Apartheid conference

On bantustan organisations outside the democratic movement

We need to accept that most of those organisations that will be coming to the conference, have always been falling outside the sphere of direct political influence of the democratic movement. In a situation where the state has been pushed into the retreat, it is to be expected that it will aim to win support of such forces when it reorganises its capacity to roll back our gains. It therefore goes without saying that what people outside the democratic movement, expressing themselves in organised activity, do or abstain from doing, hastens or retards the historical process and helps or hinders the creation of conditions favourable for us to make a necessary leap forward.

The foregoing consideration brings us to questions raised by some people we encountered in the process of consultations. It should not be assumed that everybody within the ranks of the democratic movement understands the importance of inviting "Bantustan opposition parties" to the Anti-Apartheid conference. It seems inconceivable to some, that having taken a principled stand against the Bantustan system, we can invite opposition parties from the Bantustans....We hate the Bantustan system for reasons which are obvious. However, we cannot wish Bantustans away. We have

to tackle them as part of our objective reality...Our people were never consulted as to whether they wanted Bantustans though they often expressed their opposition in various forms of protest. When the first Bantustan (Transkei) was set up, the most dedicated and progressive of the peoples' leaders were either in jail, exiled or banned as was the only mass organisation - the ANC. Nevertheless, despite all these restrictions the Transkei electorate voted overwhelmingly for the Transkei Democratic Party which stood for a non-racial democratic South Africa and opposed Bantustans. Matanzima's Transkei Independent Party got only 25% of the seats and was only able to form a government with the support of nominated chiefs. In Mphahlele's Venda Bantustan the overwhelming majority of our people voted for the opposition party and Mphahlele was only able to form a government through the same tricks. The people of Kwa Ndebele rose in revolt almost to a man when Pretoria was about to force them to become "independent". The Ciskei became "independent" in open defiance to the will of the people in that part of our country. The recent uprisings in Venda, Bophuthatswana, as well as the problems encountered by the Matanzima brothers in the Transkei indicate that the Bantustans have once more become areas of instability for the Apartheid system. Yet when these schemes were launched, they were meant to stabilise the system.

It happens to be true that most of the activities of our people in the Bantustans have not taken place under the auspices of the mass democratic movement. However, this does not alter the fact that those activities have served to reduce the capacity of the Bantustan structures to serve the enemy. To sit back and wait for the day when all the people in the Bantustans will shout the slogans we are already shouting within Cosatu will amount to a dereliction of leadership duties. Working class leadership entails meeting the challenges which these activities have thrown up. If we are to broaden our moral and political influence we have to see the forces that are at play in the Bantustans as a terrain we have to contest. We are not prepared to give the enemy a present....

On white liberals

Whilst we remain committed to organising and mobilising our people, we cannot shirk the responsibility of identifying whatever forces from the other side of the barricades have a modicum of democracy. Not only do we have to identify them, but part of our responsibility is to dislodge them from the trenches of the enemy.

Years of our own unbending struggles have brought home to some of them the fact that parliament is not a viable route to a peaceful South Africa. It was the strategic blunders committed by the racist regime in the heat of battle that have pushed a significant number of whites into no-mans' land. These whites are not about to become as militant as the millions of oppressed in the squatter camps, townships and rural areas have been. However the positions they have taken and continue to take do constrain the regime.

Aims of the conference

It is important for us to understand this conference for what it is and to also understand what it is not. We have committed ourselves to fight for the reopening of the legal space which the democratic formations of our people have occupied. This means that replacing the UDF is not part of our intentions. Consequently we do not visualise a new organisation formation or a new realignment of forces to emerge out of this initiative. We know what is achievable and what is not achievable.

The best we can achieve out of this initiative is the recreation of the space we need in order to advance. To this end, an accumulation of forces and the placing of those forces firmly on the wrong side of the most reactionary sectors of our society is the most appropriate recipe. Whilst these groups that we are trying to bring into this line up of forces have not hitherto been part of our programmatic activities, they have nevertheless not been hostile to our programmes. They have only been outside our scheme of things because we have not been able to reach out to them.

