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CONTENTS

A MANAGERIAL CHOICE

The copy in this issue focusses on a central issue
in industrial relations. This is the control that
management exerts over its workforce. Managements
task is, stated simply, to ensure the profitability
of the enterprise. This requires the minimisation
of costs whilst still producing the output level
that will be marketable. In achieving the end of
profitability management are, therefore, concerned
with efficient techniques of production. However,
they are also concerned to ensure that the activi-
ties of workers are directed toward the same end
rather than any other. It is in this sense that
management exerts control over the workforce in its
enterprises.

This control is, therefore, a problem of attaining
certain ends in a situation where those ends are not
automatically realised. However, a given end can be
achieved in different ways and consequently the exact
way in which the control is exerted can differ wide-
ly. In this situation theories of management design-
ed to best achieve these ends have proliferated.
These theories have become more precise and "scient-
ific". Broadly speaking the one focus has been on
breaking down the components of every job so as to
make them more subject to measurement and control
that will eliminate the element of human caprice.
The other focus has been to mould and manipulate
the behaviour of the human agents in production so
that they will meet managerial requirements of their
own accord. The two approaches are of course not
contradictory.

The fascinating studies by Bozzoli and Bosquet in
this issue show the complexity of the factors that
can influence the particular "style of management"
adopted. Changing economic structures, changing
technology and the growing power of labour all inter-
act to influence management policies. The particu-
lar style of control adopted by management is, there-
fore, not entirely of their free choice since some
of the factors that influence the choice are not con-
ciously seen by management to be doing so. However,
this does *not* mean that management have no choice.
As Bozzoli and Bosquet illustrate graphically cer-
tain events - the 1946 African mineworkers strike
in South Africa and the events of May 1968 in France -
often confront management with the clear realisation

that they do have a choice.

In South Africa at present the general political situation, worker discontent, the inadequacies of existing industrial legislation and foreign critic- ism are all serving to renew the pressures that call for management to make their choice.

Exactly how management will respond to these press- ures depends on their perception of the issues at stake. In general this perception is based on the assumption of an identity of interests between management and workers in the workplace. Only bad communications or outside agitators are seen to be capable of preventing the realisation of this iden- tity by workers. Management are often misled by so-called experts on "Bantu customs" to define the problem as one of a difference in culture between black and white. Large sums of money are wasted on films and courses to educate the white super- visor and manager into "the culture of the African". (See SALB Vol 3 No 1 - Dave Webster, "Some Popular Anthropological approaches to the understanding of the Black Worker".)

We've argued consistently in editorials that this is a naive perception on managements part that does more harm than good in the long-run. The problems that arise in the work-place arise from the work process itself - not from alleged African customs or mythical agitators. Management are often un- able to perceive this because they are not immune from the racial prejudice that permeates white atti- tudes, and as Prior's brief case study illustrates this can lead to substantial misunderstanding of workers actual position.

Furthermore, this perception generally leads manage- ment to respond harshly to any independent worker initiative. The case studies of industrial disputes contained in the last issue dealt with this in con- siderable detail.

In general management have not hesitated to call in the Labour Department, police and Security Police to help "solve" the problems that they mistakenly see as being the result of outside agitators. As a result workers are understandably sceptical of any

notion of an identity of interests when they see the power of the State harnessed by management to deny what seem perfectly reasonable demands made by them.

A particularly pernicious tendency is for management to make concessions that are basically designed to retain effective control in their hands. So Liaison Committees or Works Councils are seen as a means of prempting the emergence of independent worker organisations. But factory based committees cannot meet the requirements of independent worker representation and as a result they also fail, through a loss of credability, in their limited function of channels of communications. As a result the misconceived concession does not create the institutions that can resolve conflicts of interests but only increases worker bitterness and frustration.

However, management elsewhere has come to realise this. To realise that they cannot have it all their own way and that there are conflicts of interests involved. That conditions of employment have to be negotiated with autonomously powerful trade unions. In effect an absolute power to control has to be sacrificed for the long-run stability of collective bargaining. Furthermore, management will have to acknowledge that workers are human beings with aspirations that will frequently clash with the profit motive.

The recommendations of the British Bullock Report, some of which are summarised in this issue, embody a clear realisation of these factors. These recommendations are far ranging and regretably not as yet part of our industrial relations debate.

That debate, however, has reached an interesting point with the appointment of the Wiehahn Commission of Enquiry. The problem of the managerial choice is posed fairly clearly. It is up to them to make their views known to the Commission. In doing this they can use this as yet another occassion to make concessions that they hope will divert the pressure of the outside world and may appease their workforce but which will not in anyway threaten their control over that workforce. However, far more positively

they could use this as an occasion to move South Africa toward stable industrial relations based on independent, democratic trade unions and collective bargaining.

We urge the latter course. In the meantime, we advocate that the following steps in the right direction be taken.

1. Give a written undertaking to the workforce that no worker will be victimised in *any* way for being a union member or for being active in union affairs.

2. Be prepared to discuss worker complaints with union officials.

3. Give the Union reasonable access to the factory. The purpose of this is to allow workers to have the functioning and policies of the union explained to them. They are, therefore, in a better position to be involved with union decisions. This involvement means that the Union can be truly representative of the workforce and obtain its support in negotiating. Management attempts to prevent this in any way only defeat the purpose of talking to a Union. You can't negotiate with a body that can neither represent or influence its members.

4. Where a works or liaison committee exists allow the union access to that committee. Remember, however, that this does *not* constitute full recognition of a union. This requires that the union have the legal standing to enforce any contract made between itself and management.

5. Wherever it is at all possible the Labour Department should not be a party to disputes and negotiations. These should be matters between elected worker representatives, including the union of their choice, and management.

6. Prevent all police and Security Branch involvement in labour relations.

7. Treat grievances seriously and timeously. The best way of doing this is to work out a simple grievance and dismissal procedure that involves the

union. The unions independent expertise and presence reinforce workers trust and confidence in such a procedure.

None of these steps are illegal. All they require is that management exercise the choice they have in a positive way. Here is an opportunity for management to take the initiative in moving towards a resolution of the conflicts between management and labour, rather than leaving it to a cumbersome and inefficient state bureaucracy.

COMMENT

SMITH AND NEPHEW

The recent EEC Code of Conduct on Investment in South Africa is more comprehensive than the British guide-lines. However, as with all such Charters it is the resolve with which they are implemented that gives them credability.

A very crucial test of this exists at Smith and Nephew in Pinetown. To their credit the company was the first and only company to sign a comprehensive agreement with the unregistered National Union of Textile Workers. Then on the 18th July 1977 the company refused to renew the threee year old agreement. They denied NUTW access to the factory whereas under the Agreement officials could enter the factory for 3 hours every Wednesday. Management then proceded to propose a Works Council that excluded the Union in any legal sense. This has been maintained in spite of worker rejection.

NUTW claims at least 70% membership of all Indian and African workers and by all accounts these workers were very happy with the old Agreement. Management themselves have acknowledged that it was a successful Agreement.

All this is not only a sad blow for the recognition of unregistered unions but it also seriously conflicts with the steps advocated in the EEC Charter.

If the Charter is not going to help workers at Smith and Nephew then it can't expect to earn a great deal of credability.

MANAGERIALISM AND THE MODE

OF PRODUCTION IN SOUTH AFRICA

by Belinda Bozzoli

INTRODUCTION

This paper is concerned with outlining a general theory of managerialism in South Africa which relates it to the developing and changing mode of production dominant in this region. It is concerned to define the complex ways in which we can explain the changes over both time and place in the management of black workers in industries and mines. It strives to advance our understanding of 'management' beyond the categories in which it is usually presented to us by its agents; and also, hopefully, beyond some of the more conspiratorial or 'real-politiek' explanations of it which tend to arise spontaneously amongst trade unionists and other opponents of capital. Management, no less than any other aspect of capital, needs to be understood in dynamic historical and conceptual terms, and to be related to the overall constraints operating in any one social system at any particular stage in its development.

The first task in this undertaking is to define management in rigorous terms. Here the definition is based upon the assumption that capital and labour have interests which contradict one another, based on capital's interest in extracting surplus from workers. Where capital finds it necessary or desirable to mediate this contradiction, it appoints managers to assist it. Managers are thus initially defined as *the mediators of the contradictions between capital and labour*, to the ultimate benefit of capital.

This simple formulation covers as many complexities as there are contradictions. For it to be in a position to actually undertake the extraction of surplus, for example, capital needs to create and subordinate a working class. It then needs to get it to produce, and because of the tendency of the rate of profit to fall, to increase continually the rate of production - the productivity of workers. And precisely because these processes require the subordination of labour to capital it needs to pre-

vent its work-force from perceiving and rejecting
its inferior position.

It is the performance of these several, interrelated
and changing functions - which could be summarised
as proletarianisation, subordination, productivity
and suppression - on behalf of capital, that is the
task of what are usually known as managers.

A wide variety of methods can be adopted in the per-
formance of the functions of management, depending
on the particular circumstances of both capital and
labour at any one time. Circumstances do not vary
in a random and arbitrary fashion, but in a discern-
ible pattern, determined by the nature, structure
and operation of the mode of production (1) on the
one hand, and by the nature of the social formation
(2) in which the mode of production is situated, on
the other. Capital, labour, capitalism and the
South African social formation are the variables
whose mutual articulation provide the foundations
for the interpretation of management put forward
here.

Before this interpretation can be pursued it is
necessary to make two important points. First, any
study of the rather unsatisfactory category 'manage-
ment' raises the general question: at what stage
does 'management' end, and the control of labour
through other means, such as trade unions, political
parties and the state, begin? And in fact it is
as inadequate to confine one's understanding of the
control of workers to management as it is to consider
worker resistance and consciousness only in terms
of their expression in trade unions. In South Africa
this problem is accentuated by the fact that the
working class is divided into white and black partly
in terms of the access of the respective groups to
political power and the state. The confrontation
between white workers and capital tends to be medi-
ated through the whole range of conciliatory insti-
tutions, from state to management; while that be-
tween black workers and capital occurs without any
significant political or trade union conciliatory
machinery whatsoever. The manager confronts the
black worker with the unmediated power of the capi-
talist state behind him. The dual character of the

contradiction between capital and labour in South
Africa should be understood *in toto*. Thus to the
problem of the impossibility of isolating manager-
ial practices from other forms of control is add-
ed that of the South African divided working class.

All that it is possible in a brief analysis such
as this is to keep alive an awareness of these
issues, for to cover the entire range of relation-
ships between capital and both groups of workers
is clearly impossible.(3) This article focusses
only on black workers, and only on 'management'.
The reader should however bear in mind the wider
context in which both of these groups are situated.

Second, it should be remembered that management
is not a monolithic entity. In every enterprise
there exist two levels of managerial activity - the
upper level where managerial ideologies are evolved
and broad strategies conceived; and the lower,
'supervisory' level, where the actual control of
workers within the resulting structure is carried
out. Workers experience management at this latter
level, nearly always in crude, more or less authori-
tarian forms. This is particularly so with black
workers in South Africa. There must inevitably be,
therefore, a considerable amount of scepticism
amongst workers about the pronouncements of 'upper
level' managers, because supervisory managers ap-
pear to stay the same whatever the prevailing
upper level ideology. This is, however, not the
point. The pronouncements of upper level managers
are not as important as their ability to translate,
with the power of capital itself behind them, those
prescriptions into structural institutionalised
realities. The supervisor works within structures
dictated for him by upper level management, which
is itself the arm of capital.

MANAGERS AND PRIMITIVE ACCUMULATION

The role of managers during primitive accumulation
has barely been touched upon in the literature on
the subject. Thus, although this paper is primarily
concerned with managers within an existing and esta-
blished mode of production, it seems essential to

outline, briefly, how they assisted in the very process of its entrenchment. (4)

In South Africa it is quite clear that managers were of crucial importance to capital in assisting in the processes of the proletarianisation and sub-ordination of black labour, between 1886 and 1910. Managers of the late 19th century mining industry barely resembled the modern manager, being as con-cerned with the creation of methods whereby workers could be *obtained* under conditions favourable to capital, as with matters of productivity and work relationships. The obtaining of black workers im-plied the removal of black farmers from the land, the establishment of bureaux of labour recruitment, the establishment of a labour monopoly, the devel-opment of labour control systems, and the evolution of crude methods of surplus extraction.

The concerns of managers with these processes lent them power and independence such as would be rare in managers of established capitalist firms. The mine manager was a wealthy man, with high status (higher than that of small local manufacturers for example). His 'big house' on the mine provoked white workers to complain of extravagence, and he was given freedom to run 'his' mine more like an independent plantation than a factory - and in fact many early mine managers were drawn from plantation systems, within and outside of South Africa. He was also permitted to make agreements and alliances with other managers as he saw fit, even on crucial matters such as wages. Managers took on the appear-ance of being competing entrepreneurs rather than subordinate agents, and their independence was en-hanced by factors arising from the isolation and large size of many mines. Because he lived on his mine, the manager was in fact often placed in a better position to perceive the requirements of his and his colleagues' mines than the more remote mineowners themselves.

In Kimberley, for example, it was a mine manager, Gardner Williams, who developed and perfected the institution of the compound - which has been des-cribed as the basic labour-repressive institution of South African capitalism. Subsequently the com-

pound system was transferred, through the actions
of mine managers, to the Rand mining industry. On
the Rand itself it was the powerful Mine Managers'
Association (MMA) that pressurised the Chamber into
developing a refined and effective system of pro-
letarianisation in 1893, as soon as it had become
clear that gold mining's future would be a great
one. The MMA's committee on Native Labour was set
up at that time to inform and pressurise the Cham-
ber on such basic matters as hut tax, labour re-
cruitment and the pass laws, suggesting in its
report that

> hut tax be raised to such an amount that
> more natives will be induced to seek
> work, and especially by making this tax
> payable in coin only; each native who
> can clearly show that he has worked for
> six months in the year shall be allowed
> rebate on the Hut Tax. (5)

To the extent that the Transvaal political and eco-
nomic system inhibited the mines from obtaining
sufficient labour, it was the MMA that pressurised
the Chamber into petitioning and lobbying the Kruger
government. (6) The early chamber was still a re-
latively weak organisation which seems even to have
relied on the stronger MMA for direction and sug-
gestions, such as that 'the Government be petition-
ed to enforce, and if necessary amend, the Pass and
Vagrancy Law so as to prevent an accumulation of
idle Kafirs in the neighbourhood of the towns,' (7)
or that it be 'approached' with a view to assisting
in the refinement of the systems of labour move-
ment and recruitment. (8)

The fact that a violent and brutal conflict was tak-
ing place between capital and labour during the
period of primitive accumulation was the fundament-
al truth about relations on the mines themselves.
The management of mineworkers was an entrepreneurial
matter, undertaken by managers and their subordinate
compound managers with the systematisation of sur-
plus extraction as the major motivation. According
to one report:

> Some managers, having secured a competent

> compound manager, experienced in the
> treatment of natives, incontinently gave
> him carte blanche to follow his own meth-
> ods. Almost every man of long residence
> in South Africa who has been in contact
> with the natives has his own peculiar
> system which he believes to be the best.
> Sometimes he may be animated by the sin-
> gle purpose of 'running' the compound as
> an estate farmed out to him to yield him
> the maximum amount of private profit. He
> proceeds to 'sweat' the boys by every
> kind of petty imposition.(9)

The management of production tended to be an ad hoc
affair, with managers fulfilling productivity require-
ments in a violent and comparatively arbitrary fashion;
the possibility of increased profitability through
the further proletarianisation of workers still lay
open to capital, thus rendering highly refined and
systematised productivity methods unnecessary.

Against this background it was not difficult to un-
derstand why ideology in the era of primitive accu-
mulation did not attempt to mask violence, hierarchy
and exploitation. Indeed any reader of original
sources of the period is struck by the explicit way
in which these matters are discussed, used as we
are to the mystifications of a more developed sys-
tem. Mines are depicted in militaristic, hierarch-
ial terms, with a few masters whose rule needed no
justification, masses of undifferentiated servants,
violence, danger, and the assumption of progressive-
ly decreasing intelligence down the hierarchy. Mines
were armies, blacks were troops, who were 'recruited'
and had a tendency to 'desert', and their housing
was in the form of barracks. White workers were
officers, their housing accordingly better and their
social centre the officers' mess. Orders were given,
punishment meted out and training undertaken, in a
military, hierarchical mode.

Within this framework the division of the working
class into black and white, to some extent pre-given,
was encouraged and exploited. Through the develop-
ment of the gang system, white and black workers were
placed in an inherently antagonistic relationship

to one another, resulting in further violence in
the form of assaults, beatings and murders. White
workers were not encouraged to identify with capi-
tal (as in later times) but in accordance with the
hierarchical design of the system were placed be-
tween blacks and capital, so that the hierarchy
came to embody a peculiar, unique combination of
racist and class-based divisions which was to
persist beyond the period of primitive accumula-
tion into that of accumulation itself.

MONOPOLY CAPITAL, ACCUMULATION

AND SCIENTIFIC MANAGEMENT

The era of primitive accumulation could be said to
have ended with the 1913 Land Act. From the first
world war onwards, the mining industry ceased to
be concerned with the creation of a capitalist mode
of production in Southern Africa, and turned to
the matters of its operation and profitability.
The managerial function changed accordingly.

Once primitive accumulation had ceased, profitabil-
ity requirements tended to be directed towards the
labour force in the workplace itself. The labour
process came to assume a centrally important func-
tion in the industry. There are two aspects to the
resulting managerial strategy. On the one hand it
is clear that gold mining in South Africa displayed
the characteristics of any large, monopolistic,
capital intensive (though this should not be taken
to exclude labour-intensiveness) industry seeking
to sustain and increase its rate of profit. For
this reason it is not surprising that the general
direction and character of managerialism in the
developing mining industry would be familiar to all
students of management. On the other hand, the
uniqueness of this industry in South Africa at this
time should not be forgotten. It was the combina-
tion of the general and the unique that began to
lend to South African management a character all
of its own.

Firstly, an industry with the characteristics and
strength of the most advanced monopolies in the world
had come into existence in a region with a conquered,

powerless and unorganised working class. Capital had
not evolved simultaneously with labour, but had en-
tered South Africa armed with weapons developed else-
where, over many years and through many struggles.
The weakness and inexperience of black labour ren-
dered its resistance ineffectual and slave-like -
desertions, sabotage and what was known as 'loafing'
prevailed. More organised forms of resistance were
easily crushed. Capital was therefore in a position
to impose its profitability requirements upon black
workers in an unbridled fashion, possessing a free-
dom of action which even the most active practition-
ers of "Fordism' and 'Scientific Management' in
European or American countries were unable to achieve.
Second, managers in the mining industry were con-
fronted with a contradiction within the strategy of
capital whose resolution required the strengthening
of their managerial capacity. This contradiction
lay between the decision made by capital to keep its
labour force both 'migrant' and 'ultra-cheap' on the
one hand, and the ongoing and relentless pursuit of
profitability on the other. Technological refinements
and improvements in mining rapidly reached limits
beyond which it was difficult and costly to go within
existing mines; while the creation of a stable and
therefore trained labour force could not be resorted
to in the case of black migrant workers. The burden
of increasing profitability thus fell more heavily on
the organisation and perfection of the actual process
of production by workers than is usually the case.
Third, the strict division of the working class, while
it assisted in neutralising worker resistance, also
presented problems to those concerned with productivity
problems of control and conflict, of dissatisfaction
and resentment.

Managerial strategies as they developed through the
decades following World War I reflected and attempted
to mediate these peculiarly South African contradic-
tions as much as they revealed the universality of
capital's demands upon labour.

Thus there seems to be an ideological purpose to the
mining industry's conceptualisation of its overall
strategy as it developed, and is indeed still develop-
ing, as 'Scientific Management' -for many of the ideas

embodied in South African mine management seem to go
far beyond even the more dehumanising methods used
by scientific managers elsewhere. With this in mind,
I would now like to outline some of the major feat-
ures of this form of management as it developed in
South Africa, in the light of the many contradictions
within the mode of production and the social forma-
tion.

In the 1910's and 20's a gradual interest in the
ideas of Henry Ford and Frederick Taylor, the two main
protagonists of what came to be known as 'Scientific
Management' in the United States, began to develop
in South Africa. By the early thirties the problem
of profitability had reached grave proportions in
the mining industry during the gold standard crisis;
and when that was resolved, the ultra-cheap labour
policy was threatened both by competition from grow-
ing secondary industries, and by worker organisation.
For reasons already outlined these crises were diffi-
cult to solve through proletarianisation, mechanisa-
tion or the training and stabilisation of the work-
force. All existing forces pushed the industry to-
wards the increase of profitability through pressure
on workers in the workplace itself.

Whereas in 1892 the Association of Mine Managers had
been concerned with the compound system, hut tax, and
labour supply monopoly, by 1937, when its first publ-
ished papers became available, and entirely new
ideological structure had been developed. J.S. Ford
the pioneer of Scientific Management (S.M.) in South
Africa pointed out the feasibility of implementing
its main tenets in a region with so weak a working
class:

> By reason of the particular type of native
> labour available, the gold mines should
> lend themselves more to Scientific Manage-
> ment than do the industries of Europe and
> America where the greatest retarding power
> ......has been the human element which is
> subject to neither calculation nor measure-
> ment. The workers are prone to a strong
> prejudice against working or living in a
> mechanical manner. (10)

The first task of the protagonists of SM was to destroy
the existing managerial ideology, a hangover from
the era of primitive accumulation. Old managers were,
it was said,' distrustful' of the idea that manage-
ment could be a 'science', for they, as we have seem,
existed in a structural context which lent itself to
an interpretation of management as an 'art'. As one
manager said:

> the expression 'scientific management' has
> become almost a catch-phase on the mines of
> the Rand and under its banner many practices
> of doubtful value have at times been publi-
> cised and advocated. It cannot be too often
> reiterated that mining is an art and not a
> science, and that the application of factory
> methods to mining is only advantageous with-
> in a very restricted field. A mine is a
> living entity with a normal life cycle of
> birth and growth to maturity followed in
> due course by old age and ultimate dissolu-
> tion.... ample scope must be allowed for
> the exercise of individual judgment, initi-
> ative and swift decision. These invaluable
> human factors cannot grow to their natural
> limits in an organisation the greater part
> of which is stifled under a blanket of in-
> flexible standard instructions. (11)

Such views were widely held, and so programmes to
'educate' managers, and strategies to replace them,
were devised, as the new ideologists sought to
establish ascendancy over the old. (12) We have al-
ready seen the new structural demands upon capital
to which pioneering managerial ideologists such as
Ford were responding. What was the corresponding
ideological structure?

The assumption on which the structured ideology of
Scientific Management is based, and which is common
to SM ideologies everywhere, is that the fundament-
ally alienated relationship between capital and
labour may be bridged by the imposition by managers
of sets of rules, laid down in universal code-books
and learnt by all. Humans themselves are reducible
to such rules, and their place and role in industry
may be governed by them. (13) On the basis of this

an elaborate ideological and prescriptive structure
is developed, whose aim is to increase the productiv-
ity of labour by improving its performance in the
workplace. How it does so in any particular social
formation, and how ideology and practice are blended,
is of course determined by the nature of the work-
force and the configuaration of forces operating
there. The 'scientific' instruments developed by
managers from the 1920's onwards should be seen as
practical attempts to reduce the disadvantages of
migrant labour, to increase productivity and to con-
trol the workforce; and also as ideological devices
to encapsulate, legitimate and regulate these things.

As has already been suggested, to increase product-
ivity in the mines is to reconcile the fundamental
contradiction between the need for efficient produc-
tion, and the migrant labour system. To elaborate
upon this: the advantages of the migrant labour
system accrue to capital at the level of its cost,
its control, and of the costs of its reproduction.
Migrant workers are employed for six to twelve months
on contract, and thus costs of sustaining the family
of the workers of caring for redundant workers, and
of other welfare matters, are borne by surviving or
reconstructed precapitalist systems on the periphery
of the system. However these overall benefits to
capital contradict the tasks of management, which is
denied a well-trained stable labour force. Because
he is merely the arm of capital, the manager tries
to work within the system by adapting his profitabi-
lity requirements to the peculiarities of contract
labour.

First, he tries to 'stabilise' labour within the
migrant system, by trying to attract workers back to
the same mines again and again on successive contracts.
In the era following primitive accumulation attempts
to evolve a system to this end were made within a
'scientific' framework and justified by a scientific
ideology. On one level this concern of management was
merely an extension of the managerial concern with
reducing 'turnover' common to all enterprises in all
parts of the world. However there developed more
refined and particular systems designed to make maxi-
mal use of the twelve month contract period. Most
important of these were 'scientific' selection, (14)

acclimatisation, work standardisation and labour control.

With the assistance of industrial psychologists the industry developed a series of simple aptitude tests to assist in the placement of new recruits into the categories semi-skilled, unskilled and 'boss-boy'. According to these tests, workers can be almost instantly classified, thus saving wasted training time, and experience-gaining time. New recruits are first treated entirely uniformly, (the assumption being that until and unless scientific tests are applied to them, all men are equal). They are then taken to a testing centre where a 'battery' of tests is applied. Under the silent instruction of a film, in which the actions and movements required of them are illustrated by a black actor, they are then required to perform certain tasks one by one. The tests are crude in the extreme. Some require the fitting of square pegs into square holes; others the simple screw-ing of the correct sized nut onto a bolt. All are done under a time restriction. Some are per-formed outdoors, such as the 'leadership' test in which a gang of 'boys' is given a task, such as crossing a 12 ft. wide ditch, and a few implements. The assumption is that out of each 'gang' one leader will emerge who will devise a method of crossing the ditch. He is 'boss-boy' material.

All of these tests are performed under the most rigorous scientific conditions. The people ad-ministering them believe implicitly in their validity, which in fact depends on their ability to separate very crudely those familiar with mechanical apparatus from those unfamiliar, and to discover a few potential commanding types. The scientific validity accorded to them by those who invent and administer them is far greater. They are talked of in high-flown jargon, over-administered and bureaucratised. Their function as ritualistic and propagandistic introductions to the 'superior' technology of capitalism sometimes seems at least as important as their testing ability.

Some mention should be made of the relationship
between these tests and the labour process it-
self, for here too the system is overlaid and
interwoven with a scientific ideology. The labour
process on the average mine is performed by
black workers, and supervised by white workers.
For a complex set of reasons too elaborate to be
explored here, the white workers came to be sep-
arated from one another, and each attached to a
'gang' of black workers, which itself was con-
trolled by two or three 'boss-boys'. Each gang,
plus its white transmitter of commands, skills
and managerial requirements, seems to have acquir-
ed, in the eyes of managers, an *organic* nature.
White workers were not operational unless they
had blacks to supervise; blacks had to be inter-
grated into the productive process by the
'catalyst' of the white supervisor. This organism
of production was suited to the mining process it-
self, for workforces were separated from one an-
other throughout the working day by the very
nature of the mining operation, and possessed a
high degree of autonomy, while the militaristic
structure of the industry lent itself to a hier-
archical organisation of the work process.

This organic system was regarded by managerial
ideologists of the scientific age in dehumanised
terms. The members of the organic gang were
simply the agents of the higher aim of product-
ivity. This in turn was concerned with the rais-
ing of the efficiency of the organism, which was
composed of 'productive units'. The older, pat-
ernalistic idea of the 'native as child' was thus
replaced by the scientific one of the 'native as
part of a machine'. As such his position in the
organism was of crucial importance to its eff-
iciency. To place a 'boy' of 'boss-boy' potent-
ial in an unskilled position in the gang would
be as inefficient as using expensive fuel in an
engine unable to utilise it efficiently. Each
member of the organism had an optimal position,
and it was the task of 'scientific selection' to
discover this.

The ritualistic and initiatory aspects of the
second major SM device - 'acclimatisation' - are

even more visible than those of selection. To
'acclimatise' a mineworker is to get him accus-
tomed to the extremely high temperatures under-
ground. In the pre-science days, a recruit would
be given two weeks or so of light duty to acclim-
atise him, but this came to be considered wasted
time, as the pressures of productivity increased
and the period of contract work did not. A more
rapid method was developed over the years, which
by 1963 had been perfected in City Deep Mine.
According to a description made a mine manager,
African newcomers are weighed, and a tag hung
around their neck to indicate which weight range
they fell in (blue = 120 lb. and under; green =
120 - 140; white = over 140.) They strip in the
change room and are given a loin cloth from
'synthetic drip dry material'. They are then
taken to what is called the "stepping area":

> concrete floored, sloping to a small drain.
> It is divided into 15 bays, each with 15
> stepping blocks ... arranged in three
> rows of five. Blocks are 3 ft. apart in
> both directons. Between successive stepp-
> ing bays, a revival bay, 3 ft. wide, is
> situated, equipped with 6 ft. long air and
> water hoses. A boss boy can thus wash
> down a person while still observing the
> rest of the gang. The whole stepping area
> is well illuminated. An electronic metro-
> nome with four sets of blinking red and
> green lights provide the timing for stepp
> ing. It is set at 24 changes of colour
> per minute i.e. 12 changes to red and 12
> to green. Thus two stepping rates can be
> used, viz. 12 per minute and 24 per minute.
> Wet and dry bulb thermometers at the start,
> middle and end of the stepping area are
> read every hour and the airflow regulated
> to give a temperature gradient of 89°F wet
> bulb at the start to about 92°F at the
> finish. The stepping blocks are of con-
> crete and are 18 in. long, 12 in. wide and
> 12 in. high. A board 2 in. thick is used
> to give three stepping heights, ...
> (for different weights). The stepping

rate on each of the eight days is accord-
ing to a schedule. They move along two
bays daily to obtain the effect of the temp-
erature gradient ... At the start of the shift
there is very little temperature difference,
but as the stepping gets underway heat produc-
tion from their bodies soon raises the end
temperature ... Stepping is accompanied by
singing in time to the metronome and
clapping of their hands. The latter was
found necessary as circulation tended to
stop in their arms if they did not move
them vigorously. Temperatures are taken
at hourly intervals. Elderly persons are
carefully watched.....(15)

If in the tragi-comedy which is SM aptitude tests re-
present the comedy, then the tragedy by all accounts
is 'acclimatisation'. For three hours by day for
eight days, recruits undergo these 'stepping' exer-
cises, at a rate of 550 new recruits each month. At
the end they are reclassified according to their
pulse rate during stepping, into three categories -
those able to perform strenuous, less strenuous, and
light work respectively. And yet there are other
motivations underlying the acclimatisation procedure:

Physical conditioning by means of the accli-
matisation procedure is necessary to enable
the worker to adapt to working in the high
temperatures underground....

But:

It also serves to make him fit after a pro-
longed period of ease at his home. (16)

Not only that but

Psychological conditioning of the newcomer
to underground conditions is just as impor-
tant. He usually comes from a primitive,
rural environment to the bustling life of
the compound. He is often told hair-rais-
ing tales of the work and dangers under-
ground. He only loses his apprehension
when he has gone underground himself and

> becomes familiar with the conditions of
> darkness, heat, enveloping rock walls
> and cramped working space ... we believe
> that his adjustment is not only hastened
> but far more thorough if it takes place
> in the sympathetic atmosphere of under-
> ground training and acclimatisation cen-
> tres, where his mentors are trained
> specifically to listen to him and help
> him solve his problems. (17)

Acclimatisation, like scientific selection, is
closely linked to the system of 'gang' production,
for one of the aims of the stepping tests is to
divide workers into categories according to their
physical abilities. Once more, the gang is con-
sidered to be a form of machine, and the slotting
of workers of the correct capabilities into the
correct job positions is of crucial importance to
its smooth functioning.

The third SM strategy - the training of workers -
is also scientific, and related to the gang system.
The aim in training is outlined by Ford:

> Scientific management tends to remove from
> all members of any personnel the confusion
> of mind which tends to lower productive
> capacity and which is engendered by their
> inherent fear that they are unable to per-
> form satisfactorily the tasks set them.
> Scientific management requires that in-
> structions regarding every task be con-
> veyed to the personnel'in a manner leav-
> ing no room for misunderstanding and at
> the same time that the management provide
> the utmost facilities for these instruct-
> ions to be carried out with the minimum of
> effort, both physical and mental. (18)

With this prescription for the standardisation of all
mining activity and its reduction to the lowest com-
mon denominator, managers set about eliminating 'all
confusion of mind'. Detailed job instructions were
developed, along the lines followed by scientific
management in many other industrial systems. Ford's

description of the job of 'lashing' (shovelling) is illustrative of this: only a small extract will suffice

    a)   Loading the shovel:

        1.   the principal useless movements in shovel-loading are those due to taking too many pushes.
        2.   these excessive pushes may be due to a variety of causes. (19)

The description continues for two closely typed pages. Manuals for job training were developed and each job was described down to the finest detail.

This standardisation of work was related explicitly to the gang system of production, and was seen by ideologists of management as being a solution to the difficult problem of the divided and mutually hostile working class. Science sought to 'bridge the gap' between working classes. The violence and hatred engendered by the gang system were seen as a problem of ' bad communication', made worse by the high turn-over of white workers:

new natives on their arrival at the mines are often sent to gangs in the temporary charge of such peripatetic and casual employees, who have no particular interest in the welfare of the mine, and so these natives learn very little, if anything, from them.(20)

The "scientific" solution to this is firmly centred on the gang system:

Therefore...a general organisation for the training of natives must be set up and if this organisation is successful the evils of an ever-changing white personnel are largely mitigated. (21)

Based on the organic conception of the gang, this solution holds that the 'organic whole' or machine, consisting of a score or more black workers, can be taught to operate mindlessly on its won, but that it requires the presence of a white miner to activate it. All

other functions of the white miner may, however, be
removed by 'training the native', rendering the white
simply a catalyst, a cog in the machinery of the or-
ganism, replaceable at any time by any other cog.

The solutions for assaults and mutual antagonism be-
tween workers are also seen to lie in training:

> The effect of standardisation is to induce
> close cooperation between white and native
> employees and generally makes underground
> management a less onerous task.(22)

Moreover, standardisation effects one of the primary
aims of scientific management: it removes the 'human
factor':

> The issues are no longer fogged, the dis-
> tinction between the 'good' man and the
> 'bad' man no longer has its previous signi-
> ficance, nor does experience alone mark out
> a man for special consideration.(23)

Linked to the idea of standardisation is that of edu-
cation: the 'qualified' man will be able to act ob-
jectively and correctly:

> Too many men are discharged due to a lack
> of knowledge of handling men by those in
> control. Much bitterness, resentment and
> many assaults at work are due to the same
> cause. A large percentage of labour turn-
> over is due to the wrong attitude, unfair
> methods, and arrogant, blustering ways of
> some officials towards workmen.(24)

However, these suggestions were met with hostility by
the majority of white workers. Just as in other com-
munities, Scientific Management found it difficult to
cope with a powerful and organised working class.
As Ford said 'the decline (in assaults) is not as
pronounced as it would be if the underground white
personnel were as instruction-minded as the native
labour force'.(25) This encouraged the already power-
ful tendency for scientifically-mined managers to
direct their energies towards the weaker black sect-
ion of the working class, and to emphasis the process

of 'de-skilling' implied by its treatment of the white working class in the gang system.

The science of management in this era also entered the field of labour control, which had been a vital concern of managers throughout the period of primitive accumulation. Then it had been with the fundamental architecture and structure of the workers' housing and work environment that managers had been involved. As far as black workers were concerned, the migrant labour system made it necessary for the thousands who worked on each mine to be fed, transported, housed, paid and prevented from threatening the system of production in as cheap a manner as possible. The compound system and its related control mechanisms had, as we have seen, been the solution to these problems. In the scientific era managers sought both to streamline and to bureaucratise this system, without altering its basic structure. Managers and mineowners showed their approval of the compound system by introducing it on all new mines throughout the twentieth century. After World War 2, the compound system was introduced, with refinements and a scientific and bureaucratic rationale on the new Orange Free State goldfields. On the issue of the control of labour, for example:

> the change-house and Native single quarters (compound) will be connected with the man-loading bank of the shaft by means of an underground tunnel, and persons will therefore be able to travel between these three points under cover. Shifts will be raised to and lowered from this position only. A further advantage of this set-up is the *complete control of Native labour* between the shaft and Native quarters, a matter of some significance to mine personnel during that important daily task of lowering and raising shifts. The system of handling men in this way had many obvious advantages and, although used in Kimberley diamond mines for security reasons, is an innovation as far as the gold mines of the Anglo-American group are concerned. (26)

Labour control systems were refined by the development of surface checking systems 'to check natives on and off shift'. These too were conceptualised by the bureaucrats of the age of science rather than the authoritarians of the age of primitive accumulation.

> For convenience the checking offices are
> placed as near the shaft as is practicable.
> The only means of entrance to or exit from
> the bank area is by numbered aisles through
> the checking office proper. This is accom-
> plished by fencing and policing the area.
> The amount of fencing required depends
> upon the policy adopted at individual mines.
> It can be kept to a minimum by fencing in
> the immediate bank area, or, as is the case
> at West Springs the entire shaft area con-
> taining vital buildings. *This latter method
> affords protection during periods of emergency as
> exist at present.* (27)

This method replaces that of the 'ticket book' which prevailed on earlier mines and which was a more primitive form of bureaucracy. But the author of the new system expresses the scientific ideal of control through bureaucratic refinements when he writes

> we might, with the discussion which is sure
> to arise, attain some measure of foolproof
> control of our underground labour (28)

while a participant in the discussion said:

> I feel that the scheme he has initiated
> at West Springs takes us a long way towards
> *a more efficient and watertight method* of native
> labour control (29)

and followed with a detailed description of the bureaucracy involved in this.

An important concomitant of scientific management is 'social science'. As has already been implied, a continual problem for aspiring scientic managers lies in the fact that in spite of ideological prescriptions to the contrary, black and white workers are in

fact human beings. In order to bridge the gap between ideology and reality, ideologists made use of the human sciences, such as sociology and more frequently psychology.(30) As early as 1930 a British psychologist was invited to develop theories whereby his developing science could be applied to black workers in South Africa. Of psychology's relevance to industry he wrote:

> psychology may be described as the science
> of behaviour. Why do human beings behave
> in a certain way in certain circumstances?
> Why do different human beings behave dif-
> ferently in essentially similar circum-
> stances? Before attempting to elucidate
> these problems it is important to stress
> that psychology, as a science, is not con-
> cerned to decide whether observed behaviour
> is good or bad, right or wrong. It is con-
> cerned solely with the 'hows' and 'whys'
> of behaviour. When these have been ascer-
> tained, it is possible to apply the know-
> ledge to the practical affairs of life.(31)

To adapt this 'value-free' theoretical perspective to the problem of black labour, Stephenson used the idea of 'civilisation' versus 'primitiveness' (an idea whose freedom from value-judgments is debatable). Human behaviour is said to be understandable in terms of its place along the continuum between these two variables:

> The degree of self-control which an adult
> can exercise over his primitive tendencies
> to certain patterns of behaviour is a
> measure of his stage of civilisation.(32)

The 'environment' of the individual limits this behaviour according to the stage of civilisation he has reached. As far as black workers were concerned the various degrees of limitation and the various kinds of environment lead the psychologist towards the conceptualisation of different 'kinds of natives'. Psychology thus paves the theoretical way for the scientific manager's division of the black working class into sub-groups according to scientifically determined criteria. But while management is con-

cerned with physical fitness and 'intelligence' or 'aptitude' this particular psychologist raises questions of 'primitiveness' and 'tribal differences':

> In their territories their behaviour has been influenced by the various conditions under which they have lived, and consequently their outlook is quite different from that of a white man who has been born and bred in a more civilised and more industrialized environment. In many respects their behaviour is child-like and the 'values' which appeal to them differ essentially from the values which appeal to the more highly civilised white man.(33)

writes Stephenson. The implications are complex:

> When, therefore, compound officials have to deal with large bodies of native labour, of several different tribes, removed from native surroundings, tribal customs and discipline, family ties, etc. and precipitated in many instances into a new and strange industrial environment, it behoves them to endeavour to view the new world which the native has entered from his point of view...Natives of some tribes may appear more adaptable than others. Certain tribes are characterised by a sunny, joyous disposition, in contrast to the morose and distrustful appearance of others... Provided that the supply of native labour is ample, there is no serious reason why the cheerful and apparently willing native should not be given preferential treatment, but when a shortage threatens, it behoves the compound officials to make the best of the labour force available. (34)

The simple ideological patterns underlying the scientific management policies outlined already in this discussion are lent a more sophisticated, complex and subtle backing by this genre of racism. What is important about it is that the scientific ideology is enriched by the introduction of concep-

tual and historical referents and also that the science
of the psychologist complements and reinforces that
of the manager. It concerns with the fact that new-
ly proletarianised labour is no longer available
('Make the best use of the labour force available');
with ascertaining the motives for behaviour and
applying them to 'practical affairs'; with pro-
viding categories within which managers can deal
with the 'human factor' without prejudicing their
abilities to control humans; and with productivity
as an overall aim, demonstrate the relevance of
'human' or 'social' science to specifically manager-
ial science. The relationship established in the
thirties grew and flourished in South Africa as
elsewhere in the succeeding decades with the estab-
lishment of such bodies as the National Institute
for Personnel Research and other less formal links
between the academic and the industrial aspects of
scientific management.

There is, unfortunately, too little space to elabor-
ate on other aspects of the Scientific Management
school of thought. Its use of "Fanakalo" as a lingua
franca for the transmitting of low-level instructions,
its relationship to the anti-communist "Training
within Industry" movement and a variety of other
facets need and deserve fuller treatment. In con-
clusion, I would like to quote from one author in
whose mind there was little doubt of the relation-
ship between scientific management, on the one hand,
and the ending of primitive accumulation, the pres-
sures of productivity, and changes in the work pro-
cess on the other:

> It has long been realised that there is
> room for much improvement in the distribu-
> tion, control and efficient use of our
> labour. The explanation may be that in
> the past native labour has been plentiful
> and cheap, and that the general attitude
> has been to put on two boys if one did not
> manage the job. Within recent years the
> scientific investigation of underground
> work based on numerous time studies, has
> revealed the extravagant use of labour,
> particularly non-productive labour. (35)

LOCAL   CAPITAL   AND   LIBERAL   MANAGEMENT

South African capitalism is peculiar in that it ex-
perienced the development of monopoly capital be-
fore that of competitive indigenous manufacturing
capital. Its managerial ideologies and practices
evolved in a correspondingly unorthodox manner. While
scientific management, epitome of monopoly capital's
repressive capacity, was being adapted to the condi-
tions of South African mining production, battles
were being fought in the sphere of manufacturing
which under the conditions of normal capitalist de-
velopment should have long been won or lost. As a
result, scientific management found itself having
to exist along side a growing school of managerial
philosophy which may be labelled 'liberal', and
which was concerned with solving problems arising
out of South Africa's transition from a state of
underdevelopment to one of incipient capitalist de-
velopment.

After 1924 the South African political and economic
system began to experience a fundamental change. From
being an imperial enclave dominated by mining, it was
rapidly becoming a system of industrial capitalism
in its own right. From small beginnings, industries
had been developing steadily since the first world
war, and with them, the numbers of urban-dwelling
black workers. When, after 1924, the balance of
power between imperial and local interests began to
change with the introduction of protective tariffs,
the interest of non-mining capitalist employers be-
gan to make themselves known and felt on all levels
of the South African social formation. Mining, whose
hegemony had been the mark of the pre-1924 era, was
forced to adapt itself to the needs of a system seek-
ing to liberate itself from underdevelopment by the
growth and diversification of its productive forces.
In other words, two fractions of capital - imperial
and national - coexisted, each with its own primary
interests and ideology, each forced to make room
for the other. (36) While scientific management ful-
filled the needs of the monopolistic repressive
mining fraction, with its migrant labour force, dif-
ferent ideological and practical solutions were re-
quired to satisfy the needs of 'national' capital,

with its black working class. In the early years,
before 1924, the imperial and national fractions of
capital were more or less synonmous with mining
and 'manufacturing'.   But as the forces of local
capital developed, so the mining industry, or at
least certain sections of it, sought to localise
itself, diversify into industry, and to take on the
problems of national capital as its own. Its size
and power made it a suitable base from which ideolo-
gists of management and of capital itself could work.
As South Africa's indigenous capitalist system came
into its own, so the distinction between mining and
manufacturing ceased to hold its earlier signifi-
cance in certain crucial fields. It is for this
reason that the apparent paradox exists whereby the
mining industry produced ideologists both of
scientific management and of 'liberal' management.
In the one case it was attempting to solve problems
arising from its monopolistic character and its de-
pendence on migrant labour; on the other, it was
taking on the role of solving problems of capital
as a whole, particularly with respect to the growth
of a black proletariat in the towns.

Capital had long concerned itself with the problems
of how to handle its growing and increasingly mili-
tant proletariat, both black and white. Whilst
mining and manufacturing tended to develop separate
solutions to these problems it would seem that as
far as white workers were concerned, both fractions
had come to terms with the necessity for conciliation
through state and industrial machinery, by the mid-
1920's. The encouragement of certain forms of trade
unionism, and the passing of the Industrial Concilia-
tion Act, were both products of this.

However, those sections of capital concerned with and
by the development of an urban black proletariat, did
not consider it necessary or desirable to develop
similar state-regulated machinery, at least in the
initial stages. Liberal personnel management can be
seen as capital's compromise with black labour, dur-
ing an era when it began to organise along increas-
ingly threatening lines.

The organisation of the black working class affected
both manufacturing and mining employers. In the

sphere of manufacturing, black workers joined the 'new' industrial unions of the 1930's in great numbers, both reflecting and challenging their new status as fully proletarianised workers, and thus firmly locating the contradiction within South African capitalism between urban workers and indigenous capital, of whatever fraction. But the challenges presented by black workers were not confined to the smaller, competitive industries of the manufacturing sector. Indeed it has been argued that the most important trade union of this period was not in that sector al all, but in mining. And confirmation for this view is provided by the fact that the culminating event of the years of black trade union organisation was the African mineworkers' strike of 1946 involving hundreds of thousands of workers and confronting capital on a substantial scale for the first time for twenty five years.(37) Several ideological and strategic responses on the part of industry, followed.

Almost immediately after the strike, the most progressive, diversified and 'national' mining house, Anglo American, appointed J D Reinhallt-Jones as its adviser on 'native affairs'. A leading proponent of the new liberalism of the 1930's, Reinhallt-Jones seemed well-placed to provide not only the mining industry, but all sections of capital, with conceptual and practical tools for the handling of the increasingly threatening and only recently proletarianised black working class. A second major structural basis for 'liberal' ideas emerged, with financial support from the Central Mining and Investment Corporation, when the South African Institute of Personnel Management was formed with the purpose of developing an ideology of personnel management suited to both mining and industrial conditions in South Africa. Later this was incorporated into the National Institute for Personnel Research, a government supported institution. A third structural bases for the development of liberal 'personnel' ideas came with the formation, again with the backing of Anglo-American, of the National Development Foundation, while a fourth arose when E Raymond Silberbauer, an idiosyncratic advocate of personnel management who combined it with his beliefs in Moral Rearmament and his experiences in 'rehabilita-

ting' participants in the 'Mau Mau' revolt in Kenya,
founded the Bantu Wage and Productivity Association.
probably in the early 1950's.

These four developments (and there were probably
others) demonstrate the range of interests which
the new ideology was to serve. Both mines and in-
dustries were to benefit; while the corpus of lib-
eral thought which had flourished in the 1930's
around such individuals as Hoernle, and such insti-
tutes as that of Race Relations, and which had con-
cerned itself with the grander issues of South Afr-
ican capitalism, such as its overall class structure
and future path,was harnessed to the specific end
of catering for industry's black working class pro-
blem. Intellectuals of an academic or otherwise re-
latively independent kind were employed. Even
scientific management was represented, in the form
of individual mining ideologists and interested
persons - F G Hill, for example, was a mining man
able to theorise on scientific and personnel aspects
of management. This range of represented interests
is indicative of the extent to which the interests
of national capital sought ideological 'hegemony'
at this time; the range of the ideological network
placed capital in a position to begin to propagate
the view that its interests coincided with the 'gen-
eral' interests.

The aim of personnel management ideologists was to
develop a set of generalisations from which practical
suggestions could arise, concerning the place and
role of the black working class. While scientific
management could be said to have been concerned with
the production process, or the labour process, per-
sonnel management was more explicitly political in
its aims: at their most innocuous these were to en-
sure the 'well-being' of employees; to 'improve em-
ployer-employee relations' or to 'build up an esprit
de corps'. Its manipulative purpose and 'liberal'
orientation lent to the ideology a particular tone,
a combination of the 'science' of the age, Christian-
ity, moral rearmament and paternalism. Its early
supporters were fervent and there was a sense of ur-
gency about their discussions- not surprisingly,
considering the extent of the challenge represented
by the 1946 strike.

The earliest statements concerning the need for per-
sonnel management emphasise that it is seen as a pos-
sible means of counteracting, redirecting and chann-
elling the working class's new-found organising abi-
lity. (38)   The immediate problem was that the ex-
isting 'machinery' of black working class control was
now unsuitable, based as it was, on the needs of the
imperial mining industry;   Reinhallt-Jones spoke of:

> the sanctions of the Native Labour Regula-
> tions Act of 1911 and of the Masters' and
> Servants' Laws in respect of individual
> breach of contract. They were *never intend-
> ed to deal with organised strikes* , and the use
> of these sanctions, with the consequent
> use of the police to impose them, is a
> potent cause of bitterness amongst Native
> workers, and the application of the sanc-
> tions in industrial disputes cannot be
> continued without increasing the tension
> and greatly lessening race relations..the
> police should be kept out of Native indus-
> trial disputes..(39)

What were the solutions proposed. First, Reinhallt-
Jones made clear that 'liberalism' was essentially
concerned with control rather than with freedom.
He wrote, soon after his appointment, of the extent
to which he agreed with the Lansdown Commission into
the mining industry:

> The commission has very definitely been
> forced to the conclusion that the Native
> mineworkers have not yet reached the stage
> of development which would enable them
> safely and usefully to employ unionism as
> a means of promoting their advancement.(40)

The problem as he saw it was the workers were not
yet 'ready' for unionism, and therefore their mili-
tancy was a reflection of their tendency to get
'carried away':

> The strike of 1946 was due to the mine-
> workers having been worked up to a high
> feeling by the Union's organisers, but
> the workers anticipated the plans of the

> Union which was caught unready for a
> strike at that time. (41)

The implication is that there is nothing wrong with
trade unionism as such - it is only a problem if
workers are not 'ready' for it, and are therefore un-
likely to exercise the restraints which union lead-
ers naturally will impose upon them. In making this
point he was not simply referring to mineworkers -
as he said: 'Experience of the workers in secondary
industries shows that these Africans at any rate
understand the strike weapon and have developed soli-
darity'.(42)

The fact that South Africa had now become a developing
rather than an underdeveloped, country meant that
workers were required more actively to believe in the
values and structures of the society - after all they
were to become consumers of, and participants in, a
new system of production. Capital's interests lay
not only in defusing trade unionism, but in ensuring
that such structures of communication between workers
and employers that did exist, were able to project
the validity of capitalism as such, as well as to
assist in the more usual functions of management such
as the constant raising of productivity and keeping
the process of production harmonious. This made
personnel management more comprehensive than most
managerial strategies - indeed it could explain its
need for the ideological assistance of intellectuals
not strictly concerned with specific industrial pro-
blems but with the overall class structure of the
society as a whole. This comprehensiveness is re-
flected in the range of issues discussed by Reinhallt-
Jones. Elaborating on the matter of trade unionism,
for example, he pointed out that methods of worker
control such as the Elder system, used in imperial
enclaves such as pre-1924 South Africa and Zambia,
were useful only as long as Trade Unions were simply
channels for complaints to 'impartial' government
observers. But under a 'more developed' industrial
system, personnel management was necessary, because
without it:

> this would leave the workers without com-
> petent help at a point where they might
> easily be misled by agitators and go astray.

> It seems to call for the help of someone
> whom the workers can regard as at their
> service to give advice, to 'open doors'
> for them, and to show them how they should
> conduct themselves in making representat-
> ions. (43)

Other managers saw the ideological potential of
personnel management as great enough to make it
a viable basis for the prevention of trade unionism
altogether. The organiser of AE and CI's workers
councils claimed that they were a substitute for
unions:

> The non-European is shrewd and likes value
> for his money. Trade Unions will be interest-
> ed in him only as long as he pays his member-
> ship subscriptions. Do not levy any fees
> for membership (of workers councils). If the
> non-European finds that his requirements are
> met through this automatic membership of the
> council he is not likely to remain a strong
> supporter of the Trade Unions. (44)

However he too recognised the potential usefulness
of recognising Trade Unions, under suitably con-
trolled conditions:

> on the other hand, there is no need to de-
> nounce openly Trade Unionism as, with a grip
> on your employees it might be possible, and
> perhaps advisable, to keep in touch with their
> officials. (45)

If their requirements for 'control' could be met,
the more progressive ideologists such as Reinhallt-
Jones supported black trade unionism, or some
State-regulated substitute:

> It is necessary to consider possibilities other
> than those which now exist for carrying out the
> first principle of personnel management as
> given by Northcott .. ie 'Recognition of the
> rightful claims of the workers for adequate
> working conditions, wages and amenities and

the discharge of the employers' responsibil-
ities on this count ... Recognition of the
status of those who serve the employer in
realising mutual aims'. Northcott claims
that the primary aspect of personnel manage-
ment is to secure the 'greatest degree of
collaboration' between employees in the
working out of the principles and securing
the aims of sound industrial relations. (46)

he wrote. If these principles were applied to
black workers in South Africa, then, he continued,
two aspects needed to be considered:

One is consultation between employer and
employee on general working conditions.
The other is the fixation of wages. (47)

It was the second of these that lacked any struct-
ured communication mechanism:

At present there is no arrangement for collect-
ive bargaining or for independent wage reg-
ulation. We must realise that there will
be increasing pressure for the establishment
of conciliation and arbitration machinery
to which more Natives can have access. This
pressure will come not only from those who
are supporting the effort now being made to
organise a trade union of Mine Natives. A
considerable body of opinion which does not
necessarily sympathise with these efforts
will feel that justice requires that there
should be conciliation and arbitration
machinery. (48)

Such proposals must be seen in the light of the
liberal concept of 'repressive tolerance', in
terms of which they were put forward, The
Transvaal Steel Pressing syndicate, for example,
articulated this notion well in its discussion of
Native Works Councils:

The Natives know that the Management has no
objection to the workers being members of a
Native Trade Union, but only approximately
15% are members. When asked why they do
not support Trade Unions to a greater

> extent, their reply is that as they are well-
> treated and able to bring their grievances
> before the Management, they see no reason
> why they should be members and go to the
> expense of paying subscriptions. The Trade
> Union is permitted to collect subscriptions
> on pay-day as the workers leave. The
> secretary of the Union is also permitted
> to address the natives, but does not make
> use of the permission. (49)

The repressive tolerance is made even more ex-
plicit:

> But the workers will come under the influence
> of the African trade union movement, and
> the more the attempts to organise the
> workers are opposed by the mining industry,
> the more the spirit of hostility will be
> bred among the workers. The development of
> trade unionism amongst native mineworkers
> must be regarded as inevitable ...and...
> they should be recognised. (50)

The element of propaganda in personnel management
was important from all points of view. 'If the
Union is to develop industrially', said one per-
sonnel ideologist, 'it can only do so by taking
the African increasingly into industry, training
him, and fitting him for urban industrial living.'
(51) In this and most other respects, personnel
management was put forward as a supplement to,
and advance upon, the prevailing and growing con-
cepts of Scientific Management. As one writer put
it:

> The greater his integration into the economic
> life of the country, the greater the need
> to treat the African as a human being, with
> all the failings, all the hopes and fears,
> all the aspirations and potentialities of
> a human being.' (52)

What this meant to the average, shop-floor manager
is perhaps better expressed by another speaker:

> I have long felt that the raw native should
> be regarded, not as ignorant, stupid nigger,
> devoid of any intelligence, but as a
> peasant, mentally undeveloped, but other-
> wise reasonably intelligent within his own
> element. He may have a thicker skull than
> his European counterpart, but he has ears
> through which access may be had to a brain
> of ordinary human pattern.   (53)

(An appropriate reminder of the realities of
South African racism to those who may possibly
have been carried away by the appearance of
'liberalism' in management.)

The means whereby propaganda is undertaken in per-
sonnel management, so that the new, more 'human'
black worker may be incorporated into the devel-
oping capitalist system, are usually spoken of
under the general heading of 'communication'.
Hence once again we find the growth of an import-
ant liaison between industrial and academic in-
tellectuals. Hudson, in his history of personnel
management, writes:

> A number of factors aroused this interest
> in communication (when personnel management
> began). Indeed it is a little surprising
> that the discovery of communication was left
> so late by the personnel people...The
> sociologists and historians recognised
> the importance of communication before we
> did, and gave it pride of place among the
> civilising agencies ...(54)

Once personnel managers came to realise the im-
portance of communication, Hudson makes quite
clear its meaning:

> As industry grew and spread after the
> (second world) war, management came to
> realise the need for *selling other things
> besides the product,* of being interested
> in productivity, in good human relations,
> in morale. *With the collapse of the master-
> servant relationship, with the development of*

> *Trade Unionism, with the introduction of mass*
> *media, it became possible and at the same time*
> *necessary and desirable to sell capitalism to*
> *the workers.* (55)

The idea of communication covered other matters.
For one thing, Fanakalo, the lingua franca used in
mines to convey instructions, and considered to be
ideal for those purposes by scientific managers,
was, by contrast, viewed as totally inadequate by
personnel managers:

> Its scope is limited. It can handle only the
> simplest of operational concepts. New ideas,
> new attitudes, which can motivate personnel,
> and build morale are not easily expressed
> through this medium. (56)

The reason is that:

> In communication we are trying to do more
> than transmit facts. We are concerned with
> with the inculcation of ideas, attitudes
> and ultimately a way of life...The problem
> is to change the social character of people
> who belong to a traditional community to
> meet new social and economic requirements. (57)

This form of communication would fulfil another
need of management - the need to raise productivity;
in an interesting reference to the recent change
in the industrial system the writer says:

> In a country in the transition stage between
> the primary and secondary spheres of economy,
> communication, or the lack of it, may make
> the difference between a productive and un-
> productive labour force. Certainly it will
> determine whether or not the labour force
> will understand the notion of productivity,
> of individual effort, of work for work's
> sake. Without adequate communication such
> notions cannot be readily internalised, and
> the traditional attitudes to work and en-
> deavour will continue to predominate in
> the workforce. (58)

Neither the hierarchy of the old mining management ideology developed during primitive accumulation, nor the 'management by the book' of scientific management, is evident in this more 'liberal' ideology. Instead industry's problems are conceived of in terms of lack of communication, and of the correct structured systems to facilitate it. Personnel management propagates the concept of 'all pulling together'. Harmony, esprit-de-corps, and racial and cultural unity are the stated values of the liberal managers, and they are encapsulated within a generalised capitalist ethic. The division of the working class into black and white is deplored and its unharmonious consequences lamented: 'in the training of workers special attention must be given to the cultivation of sound racial attitudes on both sides of the colour line' according to Reinhallt-Jones, (59) while another liberal concerned with industry wrote that:

> While the principle of personnel management and the results of research and experience in Britain and the United States are applicable, and available to the Union, they must be applied in an environment conditioned by the peculiar setup of a multi-racial society ...Employer-employee relations in the Union are not only class relations, but they are in the main race relations. This is a factor which personnel management cannot disregard. (60)

As was the case with Scientific Management, only the barest of outlines of this ideology has been possible in this discussion. Its relationship with the broader liberal ideology being perfected at the time has scarcely been touched upon; other facets, such as its concern with the various forms of social control (recreation, education, alcohol) and the complex internal structure of the ideological network in which it was developed must unfortunately remain unanalysed. The emphasis here has been on the contrast between this ideology and the scientific one, on the 'controlling' functions of this type of 'liberalism' and on the

relationship of the ideology to the 'problem'
of the black working class.

CONCLUSIONS

Three different managerial ideological structures
have been described. In each case, an explanation
of the ideology was put forward in terms of part-
icular contradictions and needs of the capitalist
mode of production. In the first instance, it
was the process of primitive accumulation that
shaped the managerial function and the ideology
of the early mining period. In the second example,
the contradictory requirements of the large, mono-
polistic mining industry for profitability in-
creases through the increased productivity of
workers in the labour process, gave rise to the
South African version of scientific management;
while in the third case, it was the rise of
national capital, and the concomitant rise of an
organised black working class, that dictated the
need for capital to develop 'liberal' personnel
managerial strategies.

These three ideological forms exist separately,
but it should be pointed out that they are
separated less by chronological factors than by
structural ones. They do not 'evolve' from one
another; the idea of the 'evolution' of managerial
ideas from crude and unrefined ones to subtle,
refined ones is itself ideological. What evol-
ution does exist rests more in the evolving
strategies of labour, and management's consequent
responses to them, than in any inherent tendency
within capital to 'progress'. In particular it
should be noted that 'personnel management' was
not an "advance" and an "improvement" upon
'scientific management', and nor did it follow
chronologically. The two strategies evolve, and
are still evolving, together. That they co-exist
and are even to some extent expressed by the same
ideologists in different contexts, is an indicat-
ion, not of their inseparability, but of the
variety of interest-structures which capital
posses in complex social formations such as the
South African one.

This raises, thus, the issue of the explanatory framework used here. If it is true, as has been suggested, the managerialism is related to the mode of production, then what does the relationship consist of, in specific terms? Changes in the nature and functioning of capitalism have indeed been shown to exist, and a relationship between these changes and managerial responses has been suggested. But throughout it has been implied that neither set of changes is arbitrary, governed by semi-mystical sociological concepts such as 'evolution', or the 'importation of new ideas', both of which must themselves be explained. Instead it is suggested that the 'interests' of capital are structured and ordered, and that in particular phases of its development, or in particular areas where the interests of capital as a whole and those of its different fractions are not identical, separate interest structures come into being. It is the structures of capital's interests that give rise to the corresponding ideological structures in any one area or phase of its operation.

This phenomenon is thrown into sharp relief in South Africa because of its rapid transition from pre-capitalism to capitalism; the peculiar reversal in which the hegemony of monopoly capital came to precede that of competitive national capital; and finally, the weakness of the black working class. The first factor, the rapidity of South Africa's transition, makes possible an analysis of managerial participation in the process of primitive accumulation, and provides, within a space of fifty years, contrasts of a most illuminating nature, between this and other functions of management. The second factor, the reversed development of capital, has numerous consequences of great importance in the understanding of South Africa. From the point of view of this discussion, it places beyond doubt the relationship between scientific management and monopoly capital. Further, it was one of the determinants of the third factor, the ultra-subordination of the black working class, and thus of its subjection to scientific managerialism

in an extreme form; and the consequent need for
'personnel management' to address itself to the
crucial problems of black working class organ-
isation rather than simply to the matters of work
organisation and work relationships. The relat-
ionship between interest structures and ideolog-
ical structures is clearly linked to the question
of domination. 'Interests' here are not subject-
ive categories arising simply from the perceived
needs of particular groups; but objective categ-
ories arising from the manner in which the laws
of capitalist development manifest themselves in
particular situations and at particular historical
moments. The 'interests' which managerial ideol-
ogies serve are not any interests but those of
the class or fraction seeking to attain and sustain
its dominant position within the mode of product-
ion. In the first phase, managerial assistance
is required in the actual achievement by capital
(in this phase, monopoly imperial capital) of
domination over the existing African modes of
production; in the second phase two distinct
areas of interest arise; on the one hand, exist-
ing, imperial monopoly capital requires the assist-
ance of management in sustaining its rate of
profit, without disturbing the manner in which
it exercises dominance over the reconstructed
African modes of production; on the other hand
a massive transformation of the capitalist mode
of production itself is taking place in which
imperial capital comes gradually to be replaced
by national capital. Managerial assistance is
required in the development of methods whereby
the dominance of capital may be extended, to the
sphere in which a black working class needs to
be controlled and if necessary appeased, without
permitting it to gain power in the sphere of
legitimate politics. An important indication of
the dominating place of capital is the harnessing
of the wider ideological resources of the social
formation - academic and other intellectual con-
tributions to managerialism play a major part in
its development.

As was pointed out at the beginning of this essay,
these aspects of capital's strategy towards

subordinate groups are not the whole story, but
merely the part in which managerial assistance is
required and used, in relation to black workers.
At the same time as these strategies were being
developed so were others, as capital sought to
establish suitable relationships towards the state,
white workers, black workers in spheres other
than those mentioned, and other dominant or second-
ary groups, in all three 'phases'. Managerial
ideologies and strategies should always be
assessed in the light of these more general fact-
ors.

These then are the major conclusions of this essay
and are specifically concerned with its central
thesis- the relationships between management and
the 'mode of production'. However this leaves
the essay somehwat in mid-air as far as the
historical aspect is concerned, for we are left
with the picture of national capital putting for-
ward 'liberal personnel management' solutions to
the problem of the black working class after
world war 2, but we know that such solutions were
not implemented after the advent of the National-
ist Government in 1948. Instead, apartheid pol-
icies attempted to resurrect the pre-capitalist
modes of production in the black 'reserves' and
to make of the fully proletarianised black labour
force, a migrant one. It also tolerated no
'liberal' solutions to black working class milit-
ancy. How is this to be interpreted?

It is certainly not to be interpreted in terms of
the 'liberal' conventional wisdom, in which it
is argued that (English speaking,) national
capital represented a progressive force, while
Afrikaner nationalism represented the forces of
white working class and rural conservatism. On
the other hand, the fact that Afrikaner national-
ist policies were, as it turned out, extremely
'functional' to the needs of capital as a whole
is in itself not adequate as an explanation either
 - for there was clearly a powerful and ongoing
opposition to certain aspects of these policies
by English capital throughout the 1950's. This
is not the place to put forward a sustained

argument in which these problems are resolved.
I have neither the space nor the historical
material appropriate to such an argument.
However what can be suggested is that the con-
flict between English capital and Afrikaner
nationalism during the 1950's should be inter-
preted primarily as a conflict between *fractions
of capital*. While English capital considered itself
to be secure enough to appease the black working
class, nascent Afrikaner capital, represented
by the National Party, was not even established,
let alone secure. To allow the proposed 'liberal'
policies to be implemented would be to guarantee
that Afrikaner capital never got off the ground.

NOTES:

FOOTNOTES:

1. 'Mode of production' is used here to refer
    not only to the particular configuration of
    forces and relations of production at the
    economic level, which determine the nature of
    the mode (capitalist or otherwise), but also
    the ideological and political levels at which
    that mode is expressed, reproduced or main-
    tained.

2. 'Social formation' is used here to refer to
    the social, economic, ideological and polit-
    ical system in which a particular mode of
    production is embedded. A social formation is
    always dominated by one mode of production,
    but may include other, sobordinate, modes.

3. However elsewhere I have attempted a broader
    analysis of the strategies and ideologies of
    capital in South Africa until 1940. See
    B. Bozzoli, *The Roots of Hegemony: Ideologies,
    Interests and the Legitimation of South African*

Capitalism, 1890-1940, University of Sussex, D. Phil. 1975.

4. This outline is based largely on material drawn from Bozzoli, *The Roots of Hegemony,* (op cit. note 3), Chapters 1 and 2.

5. 'Report of the Committee of the Mine Managers' Association on the Native Labour Question', *South African Mining Journal* (hereafter *SAMJ*) September 23rd, 1893.

6. 'Report of the First Annual General Meeting of the Mine Managers' Association, 8th January 1894', *SAMJ*, January 13th 1894.

7. 'Report of the committee', (op cit, note 5).

8. ibid.

9. 'Editorial', *SAMJ*, April 21st, 1894.

10. J.S. Ford 'Scientific Management, with particular reference to a Witwatersrand Gold Mine', *Association of Mine Managers of the Transvaal Papers and Discussions,* 1942-45, Vol. 2, Transvaal Chamber of Mines, 1948, (hereafter Papers and Discussions).

    This is a fascinating journal, and even the titles of some of the articles are indicative of the 'scientific' ideology's tenets: 'Mechanisation applied to mining in relation to native labour', 'Compound Administration', 'Surface Checking of Underground Native Labour', 'Native Labour Control and Conservation', 'Physical grading of native labour', 'A study of the underground work of Boss Boys', 'The determination of Native wages by job evaluation', 'The economics of mechanisation in relation to the cost of Native labour', 'Control of food waste', 'Some notes on feeding with special reference to breakfast feeding', are some of the issues raised, all of whose implicaitons cannot possibly be discussed here.

11. G.R. Heywood, 'Some aspects of mining practice', *Papers and Discussions,* 1942-45.

12. This is an interesting illustration of the structural nature of ideologies, and of the disjointedness of a process often depicted as evolutionary - that of ideological change.

13. See, for comparison, Harry Braverman, *Labour and Monopoly Capital* (1975) and Antonio Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks,* (London 1971) both of which give penetrating analyses of Scientific Management in Europe and the United States.

14. There is a great deal of published material on selection processes in the mines. The following brief analysis is based on my own observation of such selection procedures at the National Institute for Personnel Research and on individual mines.

15. P.G.D. Pretorius: 'Underground Training and Acclimatization at City Deep L d', *Papers and Discussions,* 1966-71.

16-17 ibid.

18. J.S. Ford 'Scientific Management', (op cit, note 10)

19. J.S. Ford *Underground Management,* 2nd. Edition, Johannesburg Consolidated Investment Co. Ltd, 1950.

20. J.S. Ford, 'Scientific Management', (op cit, note 10)

21-23. ibid.

24. Comment by U.V. Glatthaar, on Ford's paper.

25. Ford (op cit, note 10)

26. W.D. Lyle, 'Opening up the Orange Free State Mines of the Anglo American Corporation of

South Africa Ltd.,', *Papers and Discussions,* 1948 49.

27. J.G.W. Couperthwaite, 'Surface Checking of Underground Native Labour at West Springs Ltd.' *Papers and Discussions,* 1942-45.

28. ibid.

29. Comment by G.B. Batty, on Couperthwaite's paper.

30. The harnessing of academic and other intellectual resources of the society is an ongoing theme of capital's attempt to achieve ideological domination, and takes place in the spheres of economics, history and conventional sociology and psychology (as opposed to their industrial varieties) as well, in South Africa, particularly from the 1930s onwards, when national capital was gaining ascendancy.

31. A. Stephenson, 'Psychology and the South African Native Worker,' (pamphlet) London 1931, pp. 8-9.

32. ibid.

33. ibid. p. 10.

34. ibid.

35. A.S. Knight, Comment on paper by Couperthwaite, (op cit. note 27)

36. The following analysis is based on Bozzoli, *The Roots of Hegemony,* (op cit, note 3) Chapters 3, 4 and 5).

37. See D. O'Meara, 'The 1946 African Mineworkers' Strike and the Political Economy of South Africa'. *Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics,* July 1975.

38. It is revealing how managerialism adapts itself to the degree and sophistication of consciousness and organisation of the working class. While management presents itself as being 'evolutionary', it is in fact the workers' initiatives which provide the basis and the reasons for change. Management is essentially reactive rather than innovative. It is the workers who are innovative in their attempts to challenge and transcend capital's

39. J.D. Reinhallt-Jones, 'Personnel Management
    in Relation to Native Labour Problems on the
    Gold Mines', Address Delivered to the
    Institute of Personnel Management, 28th
    September 1948, *Personnel Management*, July,
    Aug, Sept. 1948.

40-43. ibid.

44. Vernon Atkinson, 'On forming Workers'
    Councils for Natives', talk given to Rotary,
    cited in Reinhallt-Jones, (op cit. note 39).

45. ibid.

46. Reinhallt-Jones, (op cit, note 39).

47-48. ibid.

49. Transvaal Steel Pressing Syndicate, Memor-
    andum on Native Welfare, submitted to the
    Native Laws Commission of Enquiry, Johannes-
    burg 1947.

50. ibid.

51. Quintin White, 'Editorial', *Personnel
    Management*, Jan, Feb, March 1950.

52. ibid.

53. T.A. Stannard, vote of thanks (to A.J. Fox),
    Personnel Management, Jan, Feb, March 1950.

54. N. Hudson, 'The Notion of Communication with
    Bantu Workers', *Journal of the South African
    Institute of Personnel Management*, January 1964.

55-58. ibid.

59. Reinhallt-Jones, (op cit, note 39).

60. Whyte, (op cit, note 51).

THE 'PRISON FACTORY'

by Michel Bosquet

Try putting 13 little pins in 13 little holes 60
times an hour, eight hours a day. Spot-weld 67
steel plates an hour, then find yourself one day
facing a new assembly-line needing 110 an hour.
Fit 100 coils to 100 cars every hour; tighten
seven bolts three times a minute. Do your work in
noise 'at the safety limit', in a fine mist of
oil, solvent and metal dust. Negotiate for the
right to take a piss - or relieve yourself furtive-
ly behind a big press so that you don't break the
rythm and lose your bonus. Speed up to gain the
time to blow your nose or get a bit of grit out
of your eye. Bolt your sandwich sitting in a
pool of grease because the canteen is 10 minutes
away and you've only got 40 for your lunch-break.
As you cross the factory threshold, lose the free-
dom of opinion, the freedom of speech, the right
to meet and associate supposedly guaranteed under
the constitution. Obey without arguing, suffer
punishment without the right of appeal, get the
worst jobs if the manager doesn't like your face.
Try being an assembly-line worker.

Monday how you'll make it to Saturday. Reach home
without the strength to do anything but watch TV,
telling yourself you'll surely die an idiot.
Know at 22 that you'll still be an assembly-line
worker at 60 unless you're killed or crippled
first. Be as old biologically at 40 or even 35
as a woodcutter of 65. Long to smash everything
up at least once a day; feel sick with yourself
because you've traded your life for a living;
fear more than anything that the rage mounting
within you will die down in the end, that in the
final analysis people are right when they say:
'Aah, you can get used to anything. It's been
like that for 50 years - why should it change
now?'

MAY 68 WAS NO ACCIDENT

The French bosses were still asking this question
10 months ago when a particularly sharp emergency

changed their minds for them. This happened in
May 1971. The major issue at that time was gener-
ally thought to be the question of retirement at
60; for many workers, however, those in their
twenties and thirties, retirement seemed as re-
mote as the day of judgement. 'If we have to go
on like this for 40 years', they were saying,
'we may as well drop dead right now'. These
workers had already made themselves heard at the
Batignolles, Ferodo and Moulinex factories, and
at the Polymécanique works at Pantin. But these
were small or isolated concerns. It was only in
May, when the assembly-line workers at Le Mans
came out on strike, that the bosses began to get
really worried. *Renault* on strike could start a
forest fire. This was now an extremely serious
business.

It later emerged that this five-week strike
traumatized the bosses as much as May 1968. The
fear of another May was such that country-wide
emergency measures were taken. At one point,
CGT squads came from outside to help their out-
numbered comrades prevent the occupation of
Renault-Billancourt. The strengthening of security
services, the methodical hunting down of militants,
the now-familiar sackings on the slightest pro-
test, all originated in this long, botched strike.
The Renault management will never be the same
again and neither will the rest of the bosses.

How long *can* one run a factory by repression and
intimidation, in fact? What is the value of work
carried out by someone with a supervisor breath-
ing down his neck, under threat of punishment or
arbitrary harassment? What does this barrack-room
atmosphere cost in terms of spoilt parts, discreet
sabotage, disabling accidents, breakages, daily
disturbances, growing difficulty in replacing the
workers who leave? What is to become of an
industrial country which has to look as far afield
as southern Africa for its manpower because its
own citizens, even the unemployed, reject impris-
onment in its factories?

Today the CNPF (the French employers' federation) is having to face all these questions. Since the May 1971 revolt at Le Mans it has felt that its hold on the working class is slipping, that May '68 was no accident and the bosses' control mechanisms are really disintegrating. Repression only escalates the conflict without solving the problem; if you persist in that direction, it isn't long before you can only maintain 'order' in the factories by extending your 'fascism' into the rest of society - if you can do it at all. Most bosses daydream from time to time of introducing fascism (a new *kind* of fascism, naturally) as the lesser of two evils, but the thinking minority is well aware that it would solve nothing: look at the workers' risings in Spain or the workers' insurrections in Cordoba (Argentina). Anyway , fascism is bad for business; it's too crude, a last-ditch expedient to be used only when all other means of domination have failed.

This is why, last autumn, the CNPF sent fact-finding missions all over the world to study possible solutions. It is possible to reconcile workers with the nature of their work? Are despotic management methods really necessary? Is *the fragmentation and hierarchization of tasks indispensable in this day and age?* Could the jobs performed by assembly-line workers be done away with and replaced by more interesting ones, thus reconciling control by the bosses with the introduction into the workshops of the principles of 1789? The CNPF study group wrote in its report on *'The Problem of the Assembly-line Worker'*: 'This problem is both vast and difficult. We believe that it is inescapable'. Fontanet, the Minister of Labour, expressed much the same opinion.

DISQUIETING RUMBLINGS

The first to take an interest in this problem were almost certainly the American managers of the 1930's. Starting from the viewpoint that man is an infinitely adaptable animal, they concluded that those who did not get used to production-line

work were 'unadaptable'; they must, it was felt,
suffer from 'psychological problems'. Industrial
psychologists were hired to help the workers
gently to 'overcome their personal problems'.
This opened the era of *'human relations in industry'*
- a gigantic brainwashing enterprise.

After the Second World War when labour became
scarce in the US, the managers started to combine
'human relations' with material incentives in
various ways. It became necessary to give the
workers an 'interest' in the level of product-
ivity. They had to be rewarded when they agreed
to increase production. The thirst for consumer
goods which lasted through the 1950's seemed to
confirm the managers' basic belief that you can
get anything out of a worker provided you pay him
for his trouble; that there is nothing a man will
not do for money; you can buy his labour power,
his health, his youth, his sanity, his sleep, his
very reason.

All good things must come to an end. Towards the
mid-sixties disquieting rumblings began to be
heard in the big factories. A few years ahead of
their European colleagues, American workers were
rebelling against production-line speeds, the
meagreness of rest periods, the tyranny of super-
visors, the nervous exhaustion that resulted from
performing monotonous tasks. In 1963 tens of
thousands of Detroit workers stayed out on strike
in defiance of their union, which had just signed
a package agreement making no provision for rest
periods or for the reduction and control of line
speeds.

The American bosses reacted to these spontaneous
revolts in much the same way as their European
counterparts: they replaced white workers with
black and brown ones on a larger and larger scale.
These workers, hardly ever represented in the
union machinery, isolated and despised by manage-
ment and skilled white fellow-workers alike,
found themselves saddled with jobs nobody else
would accept. Production lines manned by Blacks
travelled 20 or 30 per cent faster than those
served by Whites. Black militants ('This isn't

automation, it's *negro*mation') set up DRUM, the
Detroit Revolutionary Union Movement; the tension
had become so unbearable that in one 'line
incident' a black worker downed tools, walked up
to his white foreman, killed him on the spot and
left without a word to hand himself over to the
police.

There was no French 'May' in the United States,
none of the prolonged rebellions which from
September 1968 onward turned Fiat's vaunted organ-
ization of labour upside down and are still tor-
menting the Turin factory in the form of argu-
ments over production norms, job-quotas, piece-
work rates, and so on. Absenteeism in the United
States has never reached the 15 per cent recorded
by large French and Italian Firms; it remains
between 5 and 10 per cent. Labour turnover
attributable to voluntary departures has not yet
reached Sweden's 30 per cent per annum, let alone
the 100 per cent plus of certain Fiat plants; at
Ford of Detroit, annual turnover is 'only' 25
per cent of the total work-force.

It was however, an article in the July 1970 issue
of the American business magazine *Fortune* that made
the clearest statement to the bosses in every
country on the 'inescapable' nature of the pro-
blem, and its resistance to disciplinary or punit-
ive solutions. This article, *'Blue Collar Blues'*,
painted a picture of industrial stalemate: the
assembly-line workers were invincibly stubborn;
their resistance was costing a great deal; it
was necessary to reconsider the *technical division*
of labour from top to bottom.

AT THE END OF THEIR TETHER

'Some assembly-line workers are so turned off,
managers report with astonishment, that they just
walk away in mid-shift and don't even come back
to get their pay for the time they have worked...
In some plants worker discontent has reached such
a degree that there has been *overt sabotage*. Screws
have been left in brake drums, tool handles welded
into fender compartments (to cause mysterious,

unfindable and eternal rattles), paint scratched and upholstery cut... The result of all this churning labour turmoil is, inevitably, wasted manpower, less efficiency, higher costs, a need for more inspections and repairs, more warranty claims - and grievous damage to company reputations as customers rage over flaws in their glistening, but all too often defective, new cars.'

In brief, the race for more production leads to a decline in productivity and over-exploitation leads to a decline in profits. What can be done about it? Delmer Landen, personnel director of General Motors, comments: 'One thing is sure: if they won't come in for $32.40 a day, they won't come in for a monogrammed glass.' In the States as in Europe, plenty of young workers take a job for a few months to save money and then leave to enjoy it in freedom.

According to American statistics (there are no equivalent figures for Europe), in 1966 employees were staying in the same job for an average of 4.2 years. By 1969 this average had dropped to 3.9 years; the latest figure for young people under 24 is 0.7 years. In 10 years' time the number of young adults (i.e. those under 34) will have increased by 46 per cent, roughly equivalent to 19 million people. 12 million of them will belong to 'anti-system' age-groups and strata; nearly 80 per cent of the country's adolescents will pass through the universities. Without basic changes to the nature of industrial work, it is difficult to see where industry will find its manpower.

The CNPF is facing this question squarely. 'It is not unreasonable to predict', wrote the study group quoted above, 'that in a few years' time there will be jobs for which no labour will be available. It is significant that even immigrant labour only takes certain jobs on a very temporary basis; there are many functions for which it has always been necessary to import manpower of a less developed character... *Has it occurred to anyone that a more searching economic analysis would undoubtedly show that*

the cost of employing foreign labour which is sometimes very backward seems infinitely greater if adaptation problems, retouching of sub-standard work, and irregular production are taken into account?' Besides, even for non-immigrant labour, has nobody ever weighed 'the minutes or seconds gained by a fragmented work-system against the cost of retouching, botched work and strikes...incidents, accidents, absent-eeism and labour turnover, not to mention the consequences of a lack of job-satisfaction?'

The study group also reached some startling conc-lusions on the 'economic cost' of industrial accidents: 'Losses attributed to accidents, according to company figures, represent 4.5 per cent of labour costs on average; if, however, the *indirect* cost of accidents, resulting from disturb-ance of the production process, is taken into account, this figure can be roughly doubled.'

Nothing but good, in fact, can come from 'humaniz-ing' and 'reorganizing' factory work, 'adapting the task to the man' and abolishing fragmented, repetitive tasks which exhaust the worker with their intense monotony. But is it possible? How is it that the bosses did not think of it sooner? That is the first thing to understand.

The whole history of industrial techniques has been marked by the original sin of capitalism: separation of the workers from the means of pro-duction. The reason for this separation was not, in the first place, a technical one. The first factory bosses were 17th-century merchants who monopolized the looms in order to gain possession of the *entire production* of the weavers. The weavers had to be deprived of their machines to prevent them from selling their products on their own account. Once they were obliged to go to work in the boss's own workshop and on his machines, the first proletarians could be subjected little by little to other constraints. They could be re-quired to work to the limit of their strength, something no man will do for long if left to his own devices.

Subsequent technological innovations have always
had a double purpose: to make human labour as
productive as possible, and also to force the
worker to work to the limit of his capabilities.
The need for this constraint goes without saying
in the eyes of the classic boss. The worker is
suspected of idleness by definition; how could
it be otherwise? Neither the product itself nor
the purpose of its manufacture has anything to do
with him. *The purpose of all this production is not to
fulfil the workers' needs but to make the largest possible
profit, so as to buy more machines which will yield still
greater profit.* It is impossible for the boss pur-
suing this aim (the *accumulation* of capital) to
rely on the workers' basic will to work; their
daily or weekly production must be imposed on
them and to this end must be fixed in advance as
rigorously as possible.

All that remains is to see how this can be done.
The obvious solution is to link payment to yield,
but this is not as simple as one might think;
workers doing *piecework* never go all-out for
maximum pay. Beyond a certain level of energy
output, they lose interest in money. The tendency
is for workers to settle on a cruising rhythm and
then try to get that rhythm to correspond to a
reasonable wage. Work study makes no difference:
the more they are constrained by shackles imposed
from above, the more ingenious workers become in
leading the boss up the garden path.

THE   MACHINE   GIVES   THE   ORDERS

Work study is also extremely difficult to apply to
highly skilled workers (e.g. toolmakers, fitters,
adjusters) whose jobs demand initiative, intell-
igence, application and skill - all qualities
which cannot be closely controlled. As long as
skilled workers are necessary, the boss will be
dependent on their goodwill. Their influence was
at its peak in the era of the 'universal machine'.
The only way of breaking their power was to simp-
lify the work to such an extent that anyone would
be able to do it without the slightest training.

From 1920 onward *Taylorism* provided the means:
the work was split up into extremely simple
tasks; assembly-lines were supplemented by
powered conveyor belts and became fully automatic;
'scientific work organization' completed the
picture. Fifty years after the beginning of
Taylorism, skilled workers have become a marginal
'aristocracy' and work-quotas are predetermined
with mathematical rigidity.

The rational fragmentation of work has produced
productivity increases which have often been
spectacular, but it can be seen today that these
increases could have been gained in other ways
and that productivity was not the only objective.
A hidden (and successful) aim of these develop-
ments was to make the forces constraining the
worker to work more anonymous and 'objective'.
The work quota is no longer laid down, negotiated
and imposed by a human authority which remains
open to argument, but ordered by the machine
itself, imposed by the inexorable programmed ad-
vance of the assembly-line. The compulsion to
work now appears as a law of nature reinforced
with the wonders of science. Behind the scenes,
doubtless, are engineers and technicians, but the
worker never meets them face to face, any more
than he sees the remote boss. All he sees are
supervisors and foremen, and it is with these *'boss's
lackeys'* that he has to deal.

Thus work has been fragmented, simplified and made
more and more moronic mainly to deprive the workers
of any vestige of power over the production pro-
cess, to shield the process from 'human hazards'
such as skill and intelligent initiative. Every-
thing, including the workers, has to become math-
ematically predictable to the nearest thousandth.
Cost prices, profits, the production plans and in-
vestment programmes of a great capitalist enter-
prise cannot be left at the mercy of 'human
hazards'.

But some of the more enlightened big bosses began
to discover that the organizational passion of
technocrats trained and hired to rationalize

production down to its last detail could provoke
flashbacks which the technocrats were unable to
foresee. The misadventures of Olivetti are a
classic example.

'UNADAPTABLES' AND 'HARD CASES'

The workers on Olivetti's calculator assembly-
lines were used to working in fixed positions.
Each worker would take a partly assembled machine
from the man on his left, put it on his bench,
fit a part to it and send it rolling along the
conveyor to his right-hand neighbour. The work-
study engineers felt this method to be irrational
and decided to hang the machine from a continuous
overhead line. This made it unnecessary for the
workers to get up and pass the machine along;
thus several seconds were gained and, more import-
and, they no longer controlled the speed of
assembly, which was now determined by the speed of
the line.

As soon as the new line was installed the workers
came out on strike. Engineers visited the shop to
explain to the workers that the whole thing had
been thought up for their benefit, but in vain.
The management then called in industrial psy-
chologists, ordering them to get 'unadaptable'
and 'contentious' elements out of the shop. In-
stead of doing what they were told, however, the
psychologists sided with the workers and accused
the engineers of stupidity: how could they have
been so gross as to deprive the workers of their
last shred of freedom, *the freedom to produce their
daily quota while working fraternally and in unison, faster
or slower according to the time of day?* How could they
fail to see that it is contradictory to expect
precision work to be carried out at a steady,
sustained, monotonous rhythm?

Mishaps of this kind in the United States have
given birth to a new school of psycho-sociology
whole leading exonents have been *McGregor* and
Scanlon, Argyris and *Herzberg*. Stripped of its
academic jargon, their reasoning is good simple
commonsense. Workers or employees, they maintain,

are concerned first and foremost with ensuring
their subsistence. As long as their *primary needs* -
health, security, food and housing - are not
secure, it is quite useless to ask psychologists
to solve factory problems. Furthermore, however
high the wages, dissatisfaction will persist if
the working 'environment' is bad and the worker
is frustrated in his secondary, affective needs:
if he finds a barrack-room atmosphere instead of
comradeship.

Before passing to the third point (which is the
most important), we might do worse than listen to
the CNPF beating its breast on the first two. The
bosses' report quoted above states that assembly-
line wages in France are 16 per cent lower than
in Germany, while engineers' salaries are 11 per
cent higher. A 'comfirmed' engineer earns four
times as much as an assembly-line worker, against
2½ times as much in Germany, Britain or the
United States. The 'environment' of factories is
almost universally detestable. Newly employed
workers are received by barking supervisors.
confronted with their task without preparation or
advice and told to fulfil the norm if they want to
keep the job. 'They often "crack" after three or
four days' and suffer 'lasting traumas'. Every-
thing seems designed to convince the workers that
factory work is some kind of expiatory punishment.
Talking about 'participation' and 'job-interest'
in these conditions is tantamount to asking the
oppressed to 'participate' in their own oppression.

Here is the third point: if the pay and environ-
ment are good, but the work is idiotic, the worker
will still try to escape from it in a thousand
ways. Managers respond by trying to increase the
pressure to work; the results are absenteeism,
lowered quality and sabotage. 'Idleness, indiff-
erence and irresponsibility', notes Herzber 'are
healthy responses to absurd work.' It is equally
absurd, he adds, to think that work can be made
more attractive by varying tasks which are indiv-
idually fragmented and repetitive: 'The combining
of two senseless tasks adds nothing to their sum'.

ABOLISH   THE   CLOCK

The only correct solution is to re-frame, broaden
and enrich jobs so as to make them intrinsically
interesting. Man is, according to this school of
psycho-sociology, an 'active animal' who likes to
work provided the work gives him the opportunity
for 'self-realization': a flowering of the
intellect, an enrichment of knowledge, recognition
and appreciation for his ideas and inventions in
the context of a collective effort and co-operation.
In short, *the fragmentation of work, external pressures
and hierarchical quasi-military relationships* should all
be abolished.

That's the theory, anyway. It is currently being
applied in all or part of two or three hundred
large and small enterprises: Texas Instruments
and IBM in France; Phillips (Holland); ICT
(Britain); Lapointe, Donelly Mirrors and AT & T
(the world's biggest company by number of
employees) in the US. Here are some of the
results.

Environment: create a climate of trust by abolish-
ing the time clock. Abolish obvious class dis-
crimination: the same canteen and the same food
for everyone (including the managing director)
and, as far as possible, the same dress. Everyone
paid on a monthly basis, and a single salary-
scale. Abolish timekeepers, checkers, supervisors
slave-drivers and cops. Each worker or crew
should be responsible for the quantity and quality
of their output, the maintenance and adjustment
of their machines and their working methods.
Every group or individual makes a complete thing.
Managers who do nothing but give orders disappear:
technicians and management are now 'friendly
counsellors' who get their hands dirty.

The anticipated result is that the workers regain
their taste for work and produce more *while ex-
pending less energy;* they are spared the psycho-
logical strain of working against their spont-
aneous inclinations. Does the experience bear
out the theory? Let us look at a few examples.

Labour turnover was particularly high in the
claims and invoices departments of American
Telegraph and Telephone (AT & T), which has a
monopoly of telecommunications in the United
States. The work is finicky, involving the sort-
ing, coding , transcribing and verifying of
cheques and invoices. 'Attractive' pay and
environment were not succeeding in keeping employ-
ees. The proportion of errors had stood at 13 per
cent for 10 years and needed a cumbersome checking
system when in 1966 AT & T called Herzberg to the
rescue. He observed that the work of sorting,
checking and totalling cheques and invoices was
broken down into ten successive operations and
run along hierarchical, semi-military lines; when
a group of clerks reached the end of a stack of
a thousand invoices, the supervisor would send
them another thousand. What motivation did these
women have to work rapidly and conscientiously?
None whatsoever.

TRUST   THE   WORKERS

Following Herzberg's advice, AT & T decided to
make each employee responsible for her own sector
of town; she would always be dealing with the
same clients and would be responsible to them.
The work (basically card-punching) did not
change, but each operator became free to vary her
working speed and, within certain limits, her
hours of work. The proportion of errors fell to
3 per cent and a whole superstructure of checkers
could be dispensed with. Result: a 27 per cent
productivity increase and a saving of $558,000
in one year.

Could the same thing be done for manufacturing
industries, for mass-production? The psycho-
sociologists said that it could. Here is the
proof. Non-Linear Computers, which makes auto-
matic control mechanisms, had problems of absent-
eeism, output and reliability. Since it could
not trust the workers to turn up regularly, the
company could not trust the quality of its pro-
ducts. It could reinforce quality control,

but who would control the controllers? Argyris
advised them to approach the problem from the
other end: trust the workers, make them res-
ponsible for the quality of the product and in re-
turn do away with the time clock fragmentation of
tasks, and various controls. Each worker would
be given the (pre-tested) components of the
mechanism and would then assemble them, perform
final checks and pack the assembled unit. The
firm followed this advice, with the result that
the output of its assembly workers doubled in
two years and defects declined by 90 per cent.

At Texas Instruments, which adopted the same
principles, the time taken to assemble one navig-
ational aid fell from 138 hours to 32 in one
year, a productivity increase of 330 per cent.

Philips (Holland) is now beginning to apply
'task-enrichment' to the assembly and adjustment
of colour TV sets. Formerly this work was
broken down into a hundred operations, each last-
ing less than a minute, performed by a hundred
workers. The work was monotonous and repetitive
in the extreme. Assembly and adjustment are now
being performed by experimental groups of seven
workers who have a stock of parts at their dis-
posal, co-ordinate the work themselves, pick their
own speed and are free to move about. At this
stage output is up by 5 per cent, absenteeism is
down by 25 per cent and defects are dropping to-
wards nil.

ICI, which has already introduced work enrichment
and 'workers' control' in several factories employ-
ing a total of about 5,000 workers, has registered
a 30 per cent productivity increase in its
Gloucester synthetic fibre factory, where former
assembly-line workers, freed from the supervision
of foremen and specialists, have learned to adjust,
maintain and repair machines which are supposed to
be very complex.

Given all this, why is it that the great majority
of bosses (75 per cent in France according to a
recent poll) remain stubbornly hostile to the

abolition of fragmented, idiotic work? 'It's too expensive', say some, without even trying to work it out. To others, including Renault boss Pierre Dreyfus, 'it's by no means certain that fragmentation is such a bad thing'. Furthermore, *'it isn't established that this fragmentation can be eliminated'* from the automobile industry. This is not the opinion of the CNPG investigators: 'There is apparently no industrial sector in which job-enrichment cannot be introduced.' On mass-production assembly lines, for example, it is per-fectly viable to replace the long assembly-line with a shorter one passing in front of trans-verse alcoves. A group of workers in each alcove would receive the part-assembled machine and keep it for 10 to 30 minutes, working as a crew and fitting a number of parts and components to it before passing it on to the next crew. Each group would keep buffer stocks of parts, absolv-ing it of the need to keep working at the same rhythm. This system is now being tried out by the Swedish car industry, where the union is pressing to have it adopted.

HOW FAR CAN THIS BE TAKEN?

In reality, the bosses' hostility is not motivated by technical or economic factors; it is *political. Job-enrichment spells the end of authority and despotic power for bosses great and small.* It replaces the order and discipline of the barracks with the voluntary co-operation of workers whose autonomy and power extends to their work. It requires that these workers doing 'a man's job' be treated as men. The whole hierarchy must be recast; engineers and management, says the CNPF report, must 'modify their attitude profoundly'. Social, cultural and hierarchical barriers must be removed. 'After acquiring some idea of ergonomics, engineers and technicians should spend a year doing workers' tasks in workshops that use their specialized skills ...' Finally, the workers themselves must 'identify the problems, discuss the possible sol-utions and then reach collective decisions. Relations will no longer be as between superiors and subordinates...'

Once this road is taken, in fact, where does it
end? Managers and technicians will lose their
monopoly of science; the alleged technical or
scientific necessities in whose name they give
orders will lose their mystery and become open to
question, along with the ideology they support.
Isn't this the thin end of the self-management
wedge? the CNPF report seems to admit that it
is, but without undue alarm; in the democratized
and 'enriched' enterprise, management authority
will still prevail as long as it changes its style.

But can we be sure? Will these workers doing
intelligent, creative, responsible jobs feel, as
Herzberg wants them to, that work well done
carries its own meaning within it? What sense is
there in a job whose products are meaningless?
How long can a person remain interested in assemb-
ling colour TV sets when the programmes are
rubbish, in producing polluting detergents, in
weaving textiles that wear out in no time?
Herzberg considers research into productivity and
output an end in itself, but has it any meaning
when its purpose is the growth of profits? What
is the purpose of profit and growth? Why produce
more when we can live better by producing less,
provided we live and consume *differently?*

All these questions spring logically from any ex-
tension of job enrichment. For this very reason,
advanced elements of the workers' movement see
the struggle to 'recompose' 'splintered work' as
being far more than a mobilization issue or a
modestly reformist campaign to 'humanize' work.
What they call 'workers' control' - the re-
appropriation by the workers of some say in the
nature and organization of their work - can and
should lead workers liberated from brutalization,
oppression and boredom to struggle for their
total emancipation.

WORK IS NO LONGER AN END IN ITSELF

This is exactly what the great majority of bosses
is afraid of: 'The more you give them, the more
they want. Give them a bit of power and they want

it all.' True enough. But the CNPF invest-
igators answer this by saying that *repression is
becoming more and more expensive* both politically and
economically, that industry in the final analysis
has no choice: if it wants to find the manpower
it needs without having to face continual rebell-
ions, it must try to make the work interesting
and attractive. All these subversive questions
raised by job-enrichment are, after all, being
asked at this moment in every possible way by
millions of young workers and unemployed in the
United States and Europe. For them, work -
whatever its nature and whatever the pay - has
ceased to be an end in itself.

Do they reject it because they reject its products
and its results? The fact of the matter is that
they do not agree with Herzberg when he says:
'Leisure today is no more than a frantic effort
to forget work. When work has a meaning, leisure
will have one too.' The tendency of the young is
to approach the problem from the other end:
'Work will have a meaning when its purpose has a
meaning; not before.'

MANAGERIAL IDEOLOGY : A CASE STUDY

AN INCIDENT IN A SOUTH AFRICAN GOLD MINE:

13th AUGUST, 1975.

by Andrew Prior

On 13th August, 1975 an incident took place on a
West Rand gold mine which provides some insight in-
to managerial ideology in the South African mining
industry. The incident was not remarkable enough
to merit coverage in the national press. This is
because it did not result in a loss of life or
damage to property or , more importantly to share-
holders, a loss of production. It was examined by
managerial representatives in a remarkable document,
the exegisis of which forms the basis of this paper.

THE INCIDENT :

The physical lay-out of the mine is relevant to the
background understanding of the events of the 13th
August. At that time the black miners "hostel"
was about 20 miles from the shaft where the inci-
dent occurred. The men were transported to the
shaft by a train and trucks operating a shuttle
service. Approximately 3 000 men are transported
in this way. The men were woken at about 3.00am
and for those who wanted it a meal of coffee, bread
and porridge was provided. Trains and trucks trans-
ported the men to the shaft and they proceeded
underground from 3.30 am.

At the end of the shift the men were hoisted to the
surface in batches, but not before a long wait at
the underground "station". The first miners sur-
faced at about 1.00 pm. and waited for 45 minutes
for the first train to depart for the hostel. The
second train departed at 2.45 pm. From the time
the miners left to the time they returned it was
possible for a time lapse of between 12 and 14 hours.

The mine concerned is a deep level one. This means
that the men worked in excessively hot and humid
conditions, and they were underground for as long
as eleven hours at a time. The mine did not supply
lunch and, generally, the miners ate nothing from

the time they left the hostel in the early morning
to the time they returned in the late afternoon.

On the 13th August the hoisting of the shift was
delayed for two reasons. An accident had occurred
underground which resulted in a stretcher case
having to be hoisted before everybody else. This
delayed the inspection of the hoist which was sche-
duled for that day. Instead of the shift being
lifted at 1.00 pm, it commenced only at 2.15 pm.

Black and white miners are segregated in the hoist.
When the lift eventually started the white sections
were only half-filled. "Underground police" (mine
employees) who "control" the miners waiting for
the hoists arrived at the station only at 2.00 pm.

When the miners began to surface the first of the
trains had departed because it had a full load of
ore. At 4.15 pm. miners who could not be accommo-
dated on the trucks began to walk towards the hos-
tel - some 20 miles distant. A few hundred miners
were in this group.

Two managerial representatives attempted to persuade
the workers at various points to use the transport
which had arrived, but they refused and resorted
to stone throwing.

At 5.00 pm the train met the walkers but they re-
fused to get on, and again stoned it. The mine
security teams were called out and the South African
police were notified.

The hostel manager and a black managerial representa-
tive (an " Induna") intercepted the walkers and
attempted to talk to them, but were disregarded.

The mine security policemen then shot tear gas at
the miners, and moved in with dogs. The miners
then dispersed, and gathered together in the hostel
where they were given the opportunity of "voicing
their grievances".

MANAGERIAL ANALYSIS :

In the managers analysis of this incident it is pre-

sumed that the event took place because of "weak-
nesses" in the system. By this is meant a degree
of ineffectiveness in controlling the workers.
While it was admitted that the workers had genuine
grounds for grievance (the long hours spent away
from the hostel; the long delay in the hoisting
of the men; the absence of transport), it is in-
dicative of managerial ideology that instead of
advocating a stepping up of formal means of communi-
cation and admitting of the need for worker re-
presentation in the work structure, they called for
a more rigorous worker control. This extended to
a streamlining of the procedures for getting secur-
ity personnel, dogs and vehicles to the place of
any incident; the procuring of radio equipment
and the provision of a riot car for the mine.

It was pointed out in the report that a reason for
the delay in the hoisting of the black miners was
the custom of segregating white and black miners
in the hoist. The numerically smaller white
supervisors were transported to the surface separ-
ately, and in half empty sections. The mine manage-
ment saw this to be a point of irritation for the
black miners but, in the face of the powerful (all
white) Mine Workers Union, could not order the
whites to de-segregate. All they could do was to
recommend and "appeal" to be made to the white miners.
Implicit in this is the recognition of a tri-sect-
ional interest groups: management, white miners
and black miners.

The managers report refers frequently to the walk-
ing miners as a "mob" in spite of noting that they
were being lead by "a young Basuto...bearing a sur-
vey staff on which was attached the customary red
and white flag combination." This was, in fact, a
protest procession but managerial ideology did not
allow it to be seen for what it was. Consistent
with managerial terminology is the assumption that
they have a prerogative over "reason" (mobs, after
all, behave by impulse rather than by reason).

It is noteworthy that the miners were not prepared
to listen to the hostel manager or to the "Induna".
Nor were they willing to discuss with anybody from
the side of management. The managerial report does

not see what is implied in this. The total lack of
the recognition of the moral authority of mine
management points to the deep underlying suspicion
between management and workers. The absence of
consensus in manager-worker relations results in a
logic of the exertion of power as a determinant of
inter-group relations. In this instance consensus
was replaced by control through the use of violence.
As a further consequence the workers were reluctant
to delegate leaders from their group recognising
the dangers of exposing individuals to possible
managerial victimisation.

The tendency for management to believe that its
policies are totally reasonable does not allow it
to admit that any opposition could be rationally
based (there is the admission that bureaucratic in-
competence may prejudice its periodic application.)
All opposition is reduced to two causes: the first,
is the immaturity or inability of the workers to
understand what is reasonable (they are, after all,
still referred to as "boys" by white management);
the second is the management belief that the average
worker is perfectly contented with his lot and
when he does indicate some dissatisfaction it is
only because of the action of "instigators". At
the time of the report it was common managerial be-
lief that Shangaans from an independent Mocambique
were potential "troublemakers". It is not surpris-
ing that it is noted that the miners were "encour-
aged to walk at the insistence of two Shangaans".
Similarly, the mention made to the leader of the
procession as a Basuto man is consistent with this.
Ethnically based analysis do not admit of the
possibility of worker solidarity.

The spread of an ideology is indicated by its abil-
ity to incorporate almost any feature, no matter
how unpleasant, under its umbrella. While admitting
that the workers felt "real grievances", management
rationalised this by arguing that discomfort is an
essential part of the mining operation. The im-
personal demands of the system enable management
to abrogate responsibility in the region of inter-
personal relationships.

While the incident resulted in some slight gains for the workers in the form of managerial affirmation that the transport of workers must take priority over the transport of ore, and the provision of benches at the shaft head, these were totally outweighed by the stepping up of means of worker control. No serious questions were asked by management. Why was it, for example, that the system of managerially constructed communication was totally disregarded by the miners? Why was there total distrust, and latent hostility, between workers and management? Was it not possible that the incident was rooted in a totally inadequate form of labour utilisation where large number of men are seen as labour units and housed, transported and work in conditions dictated by managerial inclination and profit? But in terms of the analysis of managerial ideology at work in the analysis of this incident, it would be whimsical to consider even the possibility of such questioning.

In the meantime, however, given the absence of a coherent worker organisation adequately representing worker interests, and powerful enough to withstand the organisational power of management, incidents of this sort are likely to be an endemic feature of the mining industry. Given the fact that this incident was not judged newsworthy by the press is already an indication that incidents of this nature are commonplace in the mining industry.

It may be that managerial techniques may succeed in remaining one step ahead of worker grievance through a more systematised early warning apparatus, and more decisive riot control techniques. But even the most sophisticated techniques have structural weaknesses which are likely to be fully tested by black miners in the future.

THE BULLOCK REPORT

The Bullock Committee of Inquiry on Industrial Democracy, set up in response to the crisis in British industry, received wide publicity when it was tabled in the House of Commons earlier this year. Its recommendations are based on the belief that the revival of British industry is crucially dependent on the establishment of a new relationship of "equality" and cooperation between capital and labour, which provides for the joint determination of company strategy. The main proposals are that board representation should be through bona fida trade unions choosing to exercise this right; that workers and shareholders should have equal representation; that representation should be on the main policy making board, which would take on some of the powers previously exercised by the meeting of the shareholders; and that all board members should be required to consider the interests of workers as well as shareholders.

A wide variety of techniques have been developed by management since it became apparent that it is not productive simply to coerce workers. These include: the welfare approach, providing workers with large non-fringe benefits; Taylors 'scientific management' approach, based on the idea of 'economic man'; the human relations approach, based on the idea of the 'social man'; and more recent attempts at introducing 'participation' and job enrichment.

This Report is significant for two reasons: firstly, it has the support of the British Trade Union Congress and the trade unions will be fully incorporated at all levels of decision-making. Secondly, the Report challenges the concept of the company as solely the property of the shareholders.

We publish below, with acknowledgement to the British Trade Union Congress, a guide to what the Bullock recommendations mean for trade unions.

1   WHAT NEW RIGHTS WOULD LEGISLATION ON

    THE LINES RECOMMENDED BY THE BULLOCK

    COMMITTEE GIVE TO WORKERS?

The major new right would be the right (which the workers in each company that employs 2 000 or more people can choose to take up or not) to elect through trade union machinery a number of worker representatives, equal to the number of shareholder representatives, who would sit on the board of the company that employs them. This right applies to companies that are subsidiaries of foreign-owned multinationals as well as to British-owned companies.

2   WHAT   IS   THE   "2X + Y"   FORMULA?

In addition to the equal numbers of worker and shareholder representatives, the board would also have a third, smaller group of independent members jointly agreed by the other two groups. The report calls this the "2X + Y" formula. The law would stipulate that this third group must always consist of an uneven number of people greater than one, thereby guarding against deadlock. Beyond this, the size of the third group would be a matter for agreement between worker and shareholder representatives. As a deadlock-breaking formula the 'Y element' approach has much to recommend it when compared with the other possible options, such as giving the chairman the casting vote, or appointing one isolated 'odd man', and from a more positive point of view it has the advantage of providing for the introduction of outside technical expertise to the boardroom, which worker representatives may find particularly helpful. The fact that the independent members would be jointly agreed by both the other parties ensures that the principle of equal representation, to which the trade unions attach such importance, is maintained.

3   ON   WHAT   KIND   OF   BOARD   WOULD   WORKERS

BE   REPRESENTED?

In Europe, worker representation has typically been on a 'supervisory board', which principally oversees the work of a 'management board' and deals only with long term company policy, while leaving the management board to manage. It was clear to the Bullock Committee that it would be impractical to introduce this two-tier system into the UK. It was also clear

that worker representatives on supervisory boards
have had very little power. The committee concluded
that representation should therefore be on the exist-
ing company board.

The majority report stresses, as did the TUC in its
supplementary evidence, that the most important con-
sideration is that workers should be represented on
a board that has real policy-making powers. The
danger of a formalised two-tier board structure, the
report argues, is that it can isolate worker repre-
sentatives from any constructive, positive involve-
ment in the real policy-making process, giving them
only a negative right of veto over decisions already
taken. These dangers are well illustrated by the
proposals of the minority report, which advocates
worker representation on a supervisory board separ-
ate from the management board: the supervisory
board would have no right to initiate policy de-
cussions but could only react to policy decisions
already taken by the separate management board.

4 COULD   JOINT   DECISIONS   MADE   BY   THE   BOARD

     BE   OVERRULED   BY   THE   SHAREHOLDERS   ?

If major decisions taken by boards could be over-
ruled by the shareholders' meeting, or if indeed
the shareholders' meeting could take the initiative
still on vital questions such as winding up the com-
pany, the concept of equal worker and shareholder
representation at board level would soon become a
mockery.   That is why in 'Industrial Democracy' the
TUC called for 'stringent limits on the collective
ownership rights of shareholders'. The Bullock
report accepts the need for a major shift in power
from the shareholders' meeting to the board on which
workers are represented, vesting final responsibility
for certain key decisions with the board. The report
recommends that in a number of specified areas the
shareholders' meeting would retain a right to approve
or reject the board's proposals. However, the share-
holders meeting would no longer have any right to
initiate action in these areas; the exclusive right
to submit a resolution for consideration at the
shareholders' meeting on any of the following issues
would rest with Board:

a)   winding up the company;

b)   changes in the memorandum and articles of assoc-
     iation (these cover the capital structure of the
     company, the duties and responsibilities of dir-
     ectors so far as these are not covered by law,
     procedures to be followed by the board and so
     on);

c)   recommendations to the shareholders on the pay-
     ment of dividends;

d)   changes in the capital structure of a company
     (e.g. by an increase or decrease in authorised
     share capital, or by a merger);

e)   disposal of a substantial part of the undertak-
     ing.

By reserving the right of initiative in these areas
to the board, the powers of the board vis-a-vis the
powers of the shareholders would be considerably
increased. Very rarely would the shareholders wish
to provoke a show-down by vetoing the board's pro-
posals.

The points (a) to (e) above contrast with points (i)
and (ii) under question 5 below, where the share-
holders would *not* have any standing, or veto powers.

5 HOW COULD WORKERS BE SURE THAT IMPORTANT

   DECISIONS ARE REFERRED BY MANAGEMENT TO

   THE BOARD ?

A unitary board system together with the limitations
on the powers of shareholders described above would
ensure that workers representatives were involved
in all big decisions. The Bullock report recommends
that the law should clearly specify certain key areas
where the responsibility to take final decisions
would rest with the board.

The two key areas suggested by the committee are:

i)   the allocation or disposition of resources (this
     effectively means all planning, investment, re-
     search and development and budgeting decisions).

ii)   the appointment, removal, control and remunera-
      tion of management.

The board could not delegate *responsibility* for deci-
sions in any areas to senior managment but *authority*
to act could be delegated if this was agreed by the
board. Clearly the constitution committees of the
board would be an early and important question for
discussion by the reconstituted board.

6   IF   THE   BOARD   WAS   RESPONSIBLE   FOR   ALL

     STRATEGIC   POLICY   DECISIONS,   MIGHT   NOT   THIS MEAN

     THAT   BOARD   MEMBERS   WERE   OVERLOADED   WITH

                    UNNECESSARY   DETAIL?

A considerable amount of delegation would be essential
if the boards were not to be overloaded. But the im-
portant point is that it would be up to the board on
which workers are represented to set agreed guidelines
or rules for delegation and to decide where the line
between job of the board and the job of senior manage-
ment should be drawn. As regards the general alloca-
tion and disposition of resources, clearly it would
be impossible, and indeed undesirable, for the board
to deal with all decisions involved here from company
to workshop level. The main function of the board
would be to establish the overall corporate objectives
of the enterprise over the next few years, in terms
of such central issues as investment, shares of pro-
duct markets, export and sales strategy, product di-
versification and the research and development asso-
ciated with this. In many instances this corporate
plan might take the form of a planning agreement, with
Government involvement and support. Questions of re-
source allocation which did not come to the atten-
tion of the board should of course still be discussed
through existing joint regulation machinery at lower
levels of the organisation, and any issue that caused
particular concern to the trade unions could still
be raised at board level.

7   WHO   WOULD   REPRESENT   THE   WORKERS?

Worker representatives would normally be employees of
the company, probably drawn from shop stewards and

other workplace representatives, and would be selected
through trade union machinery for a period of office
of two or three years, after which time they would be
free to stand for re-election. In exceptional circum-
stances representatives could be recalled during their
period of office if a demand for recall were signed
by all the recognised trade unions in the company. No
other party, management or shareholders, or a particu-
lar union, could remove a properly elected worker
representative from office.

Their role on the board would be as a representative,
not as a delegate - in other words, they could not be
mandated to vote in a specific way on a particular
issue. But they would be entitled to - and indeed
would be expected to - sound out the views of the mem-
bers they represent before an issue was decided at
board level.

Because workers would sit on the board as representa-
tives of the work force and not as conventional dir-
ectors, they would not receive a director's fee. Like
any other shop steward or workplace representative,
they would receive their normal earnings, and would
be entitled to compensation for loss of earning incur-
red by taking time off to attend or prepare for board
meetings. The Bullock report suggests that a code
of practice should be prepared on time off for board
representatives similar to the ACAS Code on "Time-off
for Trade Union Duties and Activities". Financial pro-
visions would also cover the training needs of worker
representatives (including JRC representatives), to
which the report attaches great importance.

8   WHAT   WOULD   THE   LEGAL   RESPONSIBILITIES

     OF   WORKER   REPRESENTATIVES   BE   ?

The respresentatives would not in a legal sense be com-
mitting the workers or the JRC to company policy. The
representatives would however carry the same legal re-
sponsibilities as shareholder representatives - that
is they would be required to act in what they believed
to be the best interests of the company. But this
would no longer be equivalent to saying, as it is at
present, "in the best interests of the shareholders".
The Bullock Committee argues that if worker representa-
tion on boards is to have any credibility and worker
representatives themselves are not to be placed in an

intolerable position, company law must be altered to require directors to have regard to the interests of employees as well as shareholders.

The report makes it quite clear that the legal responsibilities of worker representatives would in no way impede them from arguing specifically from the workers' point of view at board meetings.

9   WHAT   ABOUT   CONFIDENTIALITY – WOULD   THIS   MEAN

    THAT   WORKER   REPRESENTATIVES   WERE   BOUND   TO

            SILENCE   ABOUT   BOARD   PROCEEDINGS?

The Bullock report emphasises strongly that a precondition for the effectiveness of board representation will be the fullest possible reporting back by worker representatives to their constituents, and takes the view that the label of confidentiality is at present used much too frequently. Even where highly sensitive information is involved, the report argues that it should be quite possible for worker representatives to report the broad implications of a particular policy to their constituents without divulging sensitive figures.

The report comes out against any attempt to define in law the boundaries of confidentiality, as this would be likely to impede rather than assist communication. It should be up to the board members themselves to agree how particular pieces of information should be treated. The practice followed by the board of a particular company in Sweden is quoted as an example of how this might work. Here the board agreed at each meeting what could be reported back and what was confidential, distinguishing 3 stages of confidentiality.

1)   information that could not be released out of the boardroom;

2)   information that could be discussed with one or two senior trade union colleagues;

3)   information which could be passed on to the trade union committee and to the union members.

In practice, worker representation at board level will
be likely to act as a stimulus to the much wider dis-
closure of information for which trade unions have
been pressing.

10 HOW WOULD BOARD REPRESENTATION RELATE TO

EXISTING COLLECTIVE BARGAINING MACHINERY?

The main way of ensuring that there is no conflict be-
tween the various methods of joint regulation is, as
the majority report of the Bullock Committee accepts,
to base board representation firmly on trade union
machinery.

Some countries such as Sweden have tried to further
minimise any demarcation problem between the collective
bargaining and board representation functions of trade
unions by prohibiting worker representatives from
taking part in those boardroom discussions and decis-
ions which concern strikes, lockouts and collective
agreements. However, committee members found that
this provisions had rarely operated in Sweden; in
practice it was unusual for boards to become involved
in matters of this sort, and when they did it was felt
to be valuable for worker representatives to contri-
bute to the discussion. The Bullock report therefore
recommends against any similar legal prohibition in
UK law. It takes the view that worker representatives
are unlikely to demand that the management negotiat-
ing position is the subject of detailed and practical
consideration by the board, and that if they did
make such a demand they would almost certainly not be
supported by other board members. The only occasion
where the report envisages that worker representatives
might be obliged to abstain from boardroom voting is
a situation of actual or potential industrial dispute.
A worker representative who found that an instruction
to take industrial action amounted in effect to a
mandate on him to vote in a particular way on a
specific issue would, on normal principles of company
law, be obliged to declare this to the board and ab-
stain from voting on the issue.

Strike action is the exception rather than the rule
in industrial relations. The main concern of trade
unions would be with establishing orderly procedures
for deciding how different kinds of issues were to
be handled in terms of the relationship between collec-

tive bargaining procedures and board representation. In
practice this link between board representation and
collective bargaining machinery would be provided by
a joint union committee at company level which the Bul-
lock report refers to as the Joint Representation Com-
mittee (JRC).

11   HOW   WOULD   THE   JRC   OPERATE?

The JRC would be modelled on the combine committees
that exist in many firms already, but it would be at
company level, consisting of representatives of all
the recognised unions, manual and white-collar, in
all the plants in the company. Where workers seek
representation on the board of the holding company
of a *group*, the JRC would consist of union repre-
sentatives from all the subsidiaries in the group.
The normal practice would probably be for joint works
committees at plant level to elect representatives to
sit on the JRC at company level. Where the company
was one of a number of subsidiaries in a group, the
company JRCs would elect representatives to sit on
the JRC at holding company level. The task of select-
ing worker representatives to sit at board level
would be the responsibility of the JRC. In some
companies, such joint committees already exist, but
this is by no means common practice. The report argues
that the more systematic establishment of such commit-
tees will itself represent a major advance in trade
union organisation and in inter-union and inter-plant
co-operation and solidarity.

The JRC would have a number of specific functions in
the process of implementing board representation. But
at a more general level it would be the job of this
body to discuss and reach agreement on how various
types of issues should be handled - whether they should
be raised at board level, or through existing joint
procedures, and if so at what level. Regular reports
to the JRC from board representatives would be an
essential part of the system. And it would be in
the JRC that unions could decide how policies discus-
sed at board level with bargaining implications should
be dealt with through existing procedures and collec-
tive bargaining machinery at the various levels of
the company, in terms of reaching agreement on man-
power requirements, new methods of work, pay and so
on.

The establishment of JRCs where they do not already
exist would not only therefore help ensure compatibi-
lity with existing procedures and agreements; it
should also lead to the formulation of a more coordi-
nated union strategy at all levels of a company, and
provide a key link in a company-wide trade union in-
formation and communication network.

12   WHAT   ABOUT   TRAINING   FOR   WORKER

REPRESENTATIVES ?

The report recognises that most worker representatives
will already have acquired valuable experience and
skill as shop stewards. There will still be a need
for a substantial expansion of existing trade union
training facilities to serve the needs not only of
board representatives but also of members of the Joint
Representation Committee, who will also have new and
wider functions, as a result of the report's recom-
mendations.

An important element in the training courses would be
the acquisition of technical skills involved in com-
pany planning, but equally important would be a full
consideration of how board representation related to
general trade union principles, responsibilities and
objectives. The report recommends that the training
for worker representatives should be provided by an
expansion of existing trade union facilities. In
view of the resources needed to finance such an
expansion, it is argued that a large part of the cost
of the initial training effort should be borne by
the government.