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- African Trade Union Congress : Memorandum for Consideration and Adoption by Interim Government of Zimbabwe, December 1976. Bulawayo. Page 105
- Central Statistical Office : The Cash Wage Distribution of African Workers in Zimbabwe. (June 1976) Page 117

COMMENT

The economy on which this volume focuses is going through major social and economic changes at the present time. The contributions included attempt to capture aspects of these changes as well as characteristics of the structures on which new socioeconomic dimensions are being impressed.

Riddell examines alternative development strategies for the future contrasting present policy with an approach designed to meet "basic needs". As noted, it attempts to raise for debate those issues that are likely to preoccupy planners in the future.

Harris' paper on wage and occupational structures, although slightly dated in origin (it was produced in 1973) has pertinence and historical significance - in regard to the latter especially, it being one of a number of works of a similar character written by a small group of Salisbury-based economists during the period 1971 - 1975. It is here published for the first time.

The study on social security and subsistence by Clarke looks at the postwar historical roots of aged African impoverishment in the economy. It represents the opening chapter of a longer study of an empirical nature on the problems facing aged workers in the process of leaving urban-industrial and/or agricultural employment, the results of which are due for publication in 1977.

Davies' discussion on the "informal sector" is a critique of this set of notions in the context of his study of petty production in Hartley - a small town 50 miles from Salisbury. It is supplemented by some case studies of various producers who might be classified in the "informal sector" - these case histories being provided by O'Cleary on the basis of his work on the issue in 1973.

These data are particularly relevant at the moment because, as a result of structural developments, reliance on petty production, trade and employment has become more widespread throughout rural and urban areas.

A more up-to-date piece on informal employment and its environment is found in the work of Seager who deals with the now famous Derbyshire squatter settlement in Salisbury.

Phimister's note on labour relations in prewar agriculture helps provide some significant perspectives on this element of rural society, about which little is known.

The Memorandum of the African Trade Union Congress on social and economic policy recommendations for a prospective interim government reflects some of the concerns of organised African workers in the economy.

The tables on cash wage distribution are published because they are not available elsewhere. A scrutiny of them however helps to pinpoint the issues of low wages and contemporary stratification patterns within African work force. Of course, whilst this is a growing issue, it must be viewed in the context of the aggregate distribution of income between wages and profits and African workers and non-African labour.

WHICH WAY ZIMBABWE? ALTERNATIVE
DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES FOR THE FUTURE

by Roger C. Riddell

It has always been dangerous to predict Zimbabwe's political development and the recent failure of the Geneva conference should make one even more wary about commenting upon the future. Yet what does seem clear is that after more than ten years of isolation the country will, perhaps quite soon, re-join the international community as the independent state of Zimbabwe. The world that Zimbabwe will join is in many ways a very different world from the one that Southern Rhodesia left in 1965 and this difference is dramatically seen in relation to Third World development strategies. Present development strategy is explicitly one of development through rapid growth and high investement in the modern sector of the economy. In the last decade growing disillusion about the ability of such a strategy to solve the basic problems of the Less Developed Countries (LDC's) is leading to a new consensus for the adoption of a new approach: the Basic Needs Approach (BNA).

The purpose of this paper is to open up the debate of alternative development strategies by comparing the present approach with one based on basic needs. The discussion of these two approaches will show that present policies go no way towards solving the problems which the BNA addresses and this suggests that a radically different strategy will have to be adopted if the pre-suppositions of the BNA are to be accepted as the starting point for development planning in Zimbabwe. As we shall see a BNA necessitates radical changes in the structure of the economy so that the benefits of growth are channelled to a very different group from the small group which benefits from the present strategy. This brings us right back to the political arena because any development strategy is intimately linked to the distribution of power within the country: the uncertainties surrounding Zimbabwe's political future have a direct bearing upon the ultimate development strategy which will in practice be adopted. However, while the political and

military confrontation is critical and will be discussed below, the main focus of the paper will be centred upon the underlying economic development strategies that the future state of Zimbabwe could adopt. As the topic is so vast all that can be done here is to provide a general evaluation rather than attempt a rigorously argued analysis.

The ideology behind Rhodesia's present development strategy is encapsulated in the 1967 report of the government's economic advisor Professor J.L. Sadie, *Planning for the Economic Development of Rhodesia*. (1). This report was published by and in essence accepted by the government; it has been the basis for policies since then to the present day although its concept of development is not particularly new to the country and similar policies have been used both explicitly and implicitly in the past.

According to Sadie, the aim of development is to produce the highest possible growth rates in the economy; development is defined as a rise in the national product per capita. (2) The basic strategy is thus to produce the conditions for these high rates of growth through 'the maximum growth of employment dependent upon the maximum productivity per factor of production'. (3) If this strategy should lead to a potential conflict between a higher rate of growth for the economy and a more equal income distribution then the latter is to be ignored 'as less harmful and likely to be at variance with and to impose a harmful restraint on the basic premise'. (4)

The economy is seen to consist of two distinct parts: the modern sector and the traditional or "tribal" sector. Now theoretically, the ends of development could be achieved through modernising farming in the "traditional" subsistence sector, and hence raising its productivity, and through generating productive employment opportunities outside the subsistence sector. But in the present strategy the first option is rejected as inefficient and all effort is concentrated on the expansion of the modern sector. Furthermore, development in the modern sector has to be in the hands of the Europeans

in the country because ' from their ranks emanates the spirit of enterprise which is the *fons et origo* of economic advancement and the generation of economic opportunities'. (5) Africans are to be incorporated into the lower levels of employment, under the strategy: they are to be the labourers in the expansion of the modern economy. (6) Indeed such prominence is given to the most rapid expansion possible of the modern sector that stagnation in the tribal economy is an accepted by-product of the whole process. (7)

All legislation in the country and government policies can be understood in relation to this development strategy. For example industrial legislation and practice are designed to prevent strike action being taken, to restrict black union activity and to check potential competition between white skilled and semi-skilled workers and the unskilled. (8) The educational system ensures that there is a steady flow of suitably qualified personnel available at minimum cost to the state and the various vagrancy and 'pass' laws prevent too many blacks from coming to the modern sector to look for work (9) There is no black unemployment in the country, according to the Minister of Labour, and little concern was expressed last year by the Minister of Finance when he remarked that between 1955 and 1975 the proportion of the black population in paid employment fell from 19 to 15 per cent because, he argued, 'Rhodesia was fortunate to the extent that the accommodating mechanism of the rural economy existed'. (10)

The remarkable "success" of this strategy over the past twenty years is shown by rates of growth achieved. From 1954 to 1974 the economy grew at over 5 per cent each year in real terms and from 1964 to 1974 the growth rate has been over 6 per cent. In spite of sanctions, the economy has expanded rapidly and all leading sectors have achieved success: manufacturing output doubled from 1959 to 1969 and doubled again from 1969 to 1974. Profits also doubled from 1969 to 1974 and with strict control on the export of capital it has been possible to maintain high rates of investment. (11) The

government's Economic Surveys proudly state these achievements, especially by comparing the economy's growth rates with those of Western developed economies; no reference is made to poverty or income inequalities in these reports because, as Sadie argues, these are not considered important in comparison with the overall growth rates. (12)

In stark contrast to present development strategy is the Basic Needs Approach (BNA) to development. This approach has emerged through a concern for poverty and inequality and because of the general inappropriateness of past strategies of development to provide adequate employment opportunities for hundreds of millions of people in the Third World. The crystallization of support for an alternative development strategy can be seen in a 1975 United Nations document on *The Realisation of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights*. (13) This assumes that every government has the objective of improving the living conditions of its people and that economic policies will be promoted to provide adequate living standards. (14) It proposes that all countries should institute necessary measures so that distortions in income distribution might at least stop by 1975 and begin to narrow by the end of the decade. Finally, it states that the basic principle governing all human rights in development should be participation in development and in decision-making related to both individual and corporate life.(15)

These rather general proposals were spelt out more explicitly in the World Employment Conference (WEC) held in Geneva in June 1976. Here the BNA was formally proposed as *the development strategy* to be adopted by all Less Developed Countries (LDCs), reflecting as it does an emerging international consensus. (16) Basic needs are defined as the minimum standard of living which a society should set for the poorest group of its people and the fulfillment of these needs are to be the starting point and explicit goal of development. The aim is to meet the basic needs of the poor in the time period of a generation, roughly by the year 2000.

Basic Needs consist of three elements. First, the

satisfaction of minimum family requirements for private consumption: adequate food, shelter, clothing, household equipment and furniture. Second, certain essential services provided by and for the community at large such as safe drinking water, public transport, health and basic educational facilities. The third need is for mass participation in decision taking and in the making of decisions which effect the people. This last need is neither to be considered peripheral to basic human needs nor an optional extra: it interacts with the progressive achievement of the first two basic needs. Flowing from these three elements are two further ones. The first is the provision of a physical, human and technological infrastructure and a capital and intermediate goods industry to provide these basic consumer goods and services. The second is the provision of productive employment for all which will yield high output and equitable remuneration so that individuals, families and communal units earn (and produce for their own use) enough to have effective access to consumer goods. (17)

This BNA to development was in general endorsed by the President of the World Bank in October 1976. Although he was not as explicit as the WEC, Mr. McNamara argued that the governments of the poorest nations have to redirect their efforts to accelerate economic growth and reduce absolute poverty. He added that a reasonable objective for them would be to reduce absolute poverty by the end of the century by changing national investment priorities and by putting greater emphasis on assisting the poor to become more productive. (18)

The BNA differs from the traditional growth-oriented strategies because it lists a concrete set of objectives to be achieved (by the year 2000) rather than focusing on the abstract indicator of growth rates. Nevertheless it needs to be stressed that even the objectives of a BNA to development will not occur automatically with just a verbal adherence to its pre-suppositions. As McNamara argues, governments will have to *act*; they will have to play a critical role in development both by making the general goals of the strategy explicit to their

particular countries and also by intervening in the economy to ensure that the strategy is successful.

Even from these general comments it can be seen that the economy's present development strategy and the BNA are radically different. To begin with the assumptions on which they are based are seriously at odds with each other. The BNA aims principally at removing absolute poverty through satisfying basic human needs, at narrowing inequalities and at creating widespread participation in decision-making. Every one of these aims is rejected in the present approach. Poverty for the 60 or so per cent of the country's rural subsistence-dependent population is an *accepted* by-product of present strategy. Furthermore, poverty among those in wage employment is also accepted: the 1974 PDL study showed that over 80 per cent of all black workers receive less than the minimum income necessary for an average family yet the Minister of Labour specifically rejected the idea of need being a basis for wage determination when he declared that the size of a family could play no part in the setting of wage levels. (19) As wages in the modern sector are set at levels far lower than is necessary for the satisfaction of a family's minimum requirements the shortfall has to be made up by recourse to the tribal economy; thus growth in the modern sector is not only built upon stagnation of the tribal economy but upon its progressive underdevelopment. These growing sectoral inequalities are accompanied by a rapid widening of the black-white wage gap within the modern sector. In 1965 the gap between white and black monthly wages was R\$195 but by 1975 this gap had doubled to R\$383. (20) Finally, there is no mass participation in government at either the national or local level. Under the Constitution, Africans have no effective voice in parliament and they can only vote if they have an income far higher than the average wage. (21) At the local level, participation is strictly controlled: any locally elected representative can be removed from office at the whim of white officialdom (22).

The first set of obstacles preventing the achievement of the BNA's objectives are thus the racist and

discriminatory principles upon which the present approach are based. For Zimbabwe to take her place in the international political community, these will have to be removed. Assuming that this happens and that the country's institutions, legislation and social and economic policies were no longer racially-based we need to ask whether the aims of the BNA could be achieved through the present "growth-oriented" strategy of development. Would the rapid expansion of the modern sector and the absorption of surplus labour from the "tribal" sector lead to an elimination of absolute poverty by the year 2000?

Under the present development strategy all effort is concentrated on the expansion of the modern sector and only an insignificant quantity of funds is channelled into the "tribal" economy. (23) Although this has led to high rates of growth it has not led to an absorption of the potentially available labour force. From 1955 to 1975 the proportion of Africans absorbed into the modern sector declined from 19 to 15 per cent of the total population. In each successive year, more black men and women have reached employment age (assumed to be 16) than have been absorbed into the modern economy. Between March 1969 and March 1975, the modern sector failed to provide work for 50 000 men and 210 000 women. This was both a period of rapid employment growth and also when the foreign content of the labour force fell by 15 000 from 33,8 to 23,5 per cent of the total. In the period 1969 to 1975 with a real growth of 5,8 per cent, the modern sector absorbed 35 000 new employees each year. Yet between 1975 and 1985 at least 52 000 male jobs would have to be created just to keep pace with the increase in the potential male black labour force. As Hawkins argues, on the basis of the 1969/1975 experience a real growth rate in the order of 10 per cent would be necessary to keep employment growing in line with the growth rate of the adult male population. (24) Further, the potential female black labour force for the same period is estimated to be 61 000, so to absorb even part of this group, growth rates would have to be even higher.

To expect these incredibly high growth rates to be achieved at the same time as a move is made to ful-

fil the broad aims of the BNA to development is completely unrealistic. For growth rates as high as at present to be achieved, and even more so to obtain higher rates, the present high rate of investment in the modern sector needs to be increased. But to achieve even higher rates of growth than under the present strategy would further preclude the possibility of relating wage rates to basic needs (which would imply a sizeable increase in minimum wages of over 50 per cent) or of reducing income inequalities. What is more, if the present strategy is maintained, investment would continue to be directed to luxury and semi-luxury goods industries instead of into mass consumption goods industries as the BNA demands; and this is even more likely to happen with an indiscriminate reopening of the economy to normal trading relations. Nor can the "tribal" sector be ignored. The assumptions of the BNA would require a massive reallocation of resources to the rural poor, both to provide productive employment for those unable to be absorbed into the modern sector and to provide the basic minimum of social services for these areas: clean water, adequate sanitation and a move to universal education. This would again divert resources away from the rapid growth of the modern sector and lead to even lower rates of absorption of the potential black population into wage employment.

From the above, it is clear that the present strategy, focusing as it does on growth, is incapable of incorporating the goals of the BNA and of eliminating absolute poverty by the year 2000, even if discrimination were removed. The inappropriateness of the present strategy is highlighted even more by considering what explicit steps need to be taken if the over-riding aim is to meet basic minimum needs and a development strategy is implemented specifically to achieve this end. In this case instead of concentrating on raising an abstract index of output, the purpose of development is human welfare and *all* efforts are channelled to this objective. This does not mean that growth is to be abandoned but rather that productive growth is to be a means of eliminating poverty and each aspect of economic growth is to be evaluated in terms of its efficiency in meeting basic needs. What follows is

a broad description of what a basic needs strategy would mean for Zimbabwe: we focus first on the social and economic changes necessary for the success of such a strategy and then on the political implications of this approach.

Focusing attention on the poorest sectors of the population, a BNA to development would demand radical changes in the rural economy where the majority of the poor live. The present inequitable distribution of land needs to be changed so as to allocate land to peasants with too little land and to landless labourers in order to establish them on plots that will provide them with productive employment. This is possible because of the vast tracts of unused and under-utilised land at present reserved for European use only. (25) Further, as the Kenyan experience shows, highly productive small farms can be established through the subdivision of large white farms which tend to be inefficient, highly subsidised and more capital-intensive than a productive employment strategy requires. (26) Of course a genuine land reform though essential is not a sufficient condition to provide productive employment for the rural poor. A whole range of supporting institutions and government policies will also need to be fundamentally changed to ensure that farmers are able to make full use of their land. At present small peasant farmers face discrimination in pricing policies, marketing facilities, the availability of extension and credit, in access to the rural infrastructure and in the availability of necessary farm inputs. All these need to be altered in order to assist farmers to increase production. Similarly aid needs to be given to the informal rural sector so as to promote the growth of locally-produced goods and to counter-act the urban bias that exists at present.

Dramatic though these changes in the rural economy have to be, they only form part of the overall strategy. Urban industry also has to be radically restructured to ensure that industrial production is geared to mass consumption rather than to luxury and semi-luxury needs. To achieve this end steps will have to be taken first to call a halt to the growing gap in income distribution and then to nar-

rowing the gap. The aim is not only to achieve a more equitable income distribution in the urban area but also to narrow the rural-urban income gap. Higher incomes for the low income groups and placing more weight on mass services will alter levels of demand in favour of production to basic goods industries. The whole strategy should also provide the opportunity for a greater use of small-scale and more labour-intensive production processes and lessen the dependence on inappropriate technologies embodied in the production of expensive consumer durables and certain luxury services.

Eventually a new industrial base geared to the production of necessary consumption goods should contain its own internal dynamism, but initially, the radical changes that are necessary to achieve this end will require a thorough and consistent set of policies which will set this virtuous circle in motion. (27)

Moving from changes within the economy to Rhodesia's external links, it must not be thought that this need-oriented strategy implies a policy of autarky: the country is far too dependent upon and integrated with the rest of the world for this to be a realistic option for the foreseeable future. Much of existing industrial and commercial agricultural development has been the result of foreign capital penetration and the country needs both foreign technology and foreign know-how to achieve its development goals. The essential point, however, is that as with the rural and urban economies, foreign capital in general and the Multinational Corporations (MNC's) need to be incorporated into the basic strategy. At present MNCs tend to promote a limited high growth sector isolated from the rest of the economy, to produce goods that are of high quality and in principle internationally tradable and to use capital-intensive methods of production. In contrast, the need-oriented strategy aims at integrating the rural and urban economies, at producing mass consumption goods (which does not necessarily require them to be internationally tradable) and at channelling scarce capital to these ends. What is needed is a new relationship between foreign investors and managers to bring the MNCs more in line

with the overall strategy. In the first instance steps need to be taken to reduce the dominance that foreign capital has on domestic production. The economy has obviously gained from its relative isolation over the past eleven years and has built up local industries, but this advantage needs to be augmented through an increase in local research and development geared to appropriate products and more appropriate technology. Whatever successes are achieved, however, the country will still need the MNCs. Thus it is essential to produce a long term strategy for the future spelling out in detail the respective roles that foreign capital and emerging locally-based industries will play in the development process. It hardly needs stressing that this exercise is extremely complex, involving as it does linkages right through the economy.

Because foreign capital is so essential for development, a high level of exports remains crucial to the need-oriented strategy. Agriculture and mining must continue to be the two most important sources of foreign exchange earnings. Yet this does not mean that changes in these sectors should not occur. In the plantation sector, wages are desperately low and will have to be increased. If this means that a shift to more capital-intensive techniques of production is necessary then a more appropriate policy would be to move over from large farms to smaller and more labour-intensive units of production. Kenyan experience shows that exports can be maintained with small farms producing the export crop and Ghanaian experience shows that this is true even for tobacco farms. (28) Similarly, research needs to be carried out to examine the possibilities of expanding down-stream activities in the mining industry.

To achieve the aims of the need-oriented strategy these changes in production need to be accompanied by a change in the inequitable provision of essential basic services to the population. At present, the poor and especially the rural poor by no means have equal access to health, education and other social services. First priority should be given to providing minimum services where at present there

are none rather than continuing present policies which tend to consist in improving facilities for the elite which are already far in excess of minimum requirements. For example a radical restructuring of the country's health services is needed both to provide universal access to safe water and adequate sanitation and also to alter the inequitable doctor-patient ratio in favour of the rural areas. (29) Education is another area which demands radical change. There is a need to provide universal education: at present over 30 per cent of all black children do not attend primary school. (30) Further, the 1969 Census revealed that over 70 per cent of the adult population is illiterate so a massive literacy campaign is called for. On the qualitative side, the educational system needs to be changed so that it is more at the service of universal productive employment; at present it is geared to the needs of modern sector growth. Major changes are also needed in the provision of urban housing: at present many families are forced to live apart and many houses are over-crowded and scarcely provide adequate shelter. All these examples illustrate the fundamental changes that are needed to provide minimum basic services for the mass of the population.

These remarks by no means present a complete picture of all the changes necessary if the country is to embark on a need-oriented development strategy; the intention has been to show that radical and far-reaching changes need to be taken if such a plan were implemented. But one critical factor has so far been excluded; no mention has yet been made of the third element in the BNA: the demand for self-reliance and participation in decision-making. Self-reliance is of course crucial because it focuses attention on the political possibilities of changing to a need-oriented strategy and on the state which is the key actor in any development strategy. The state is not an impartial overseer of development, nor has it ever been; rather it acts in such a way as to reflect and promote the interests of the various power groups in the country. (31) The present Rhodesian state supports the interests of the white farmers,

local industrialists, white shopkeepers and artisans and foreign capital interests. It is the state apparatus which decides that 'growth at all costs' will constitute the current strategy of development because this reflects the interests of those who have political power, favouring the few at the expense of the majority of the population. The state creates laws and institutions to further its ends: it manipulates the price system, organises the infrastructure and allocates subsidies so that the benefits of the system are channelled to its supporters. Finally, it plays the key role in suppressing the power of those who do not benefit and in checking the evergrowing opposition of those who are marginalised by its policies. It is precisely because mass participation in decision-making is rejected that a need-oriented strategy does not exist.

A BNA to development requires the state to promote the demands of the poor and to do this it is essential for the privileged groups, who at present gain from the maintenance of the status quo, to give up their power. What is required is a state that represents the interests of all the people and particularly the interests of those at present with no political voice, the growing numbers of the poor. As Green argues 'it is necessary to underline that in talking of self-reliance in terms of basic needs one is talking about basic structural changes not marginal tinkering and of revolution and not of "reformism". Very major changes are needed in a relatively short period if the process is to be sustained not encapsulated, co-opted or reversed'.
(32)

This debate about power and whose interests the state represents brings us right back to the uncertainties of Zimbabwe's political future. Ultimately the type of economic and social strategy which the country adopts depends critically upon the outcome of the present deadlock. It is because the present strategy has become unworkable and because more and more people are in consequence becoming marginalised by the process that violence has erupted and change is demanded. The BNA maps out a far more radical alternative, an alternative where economic and social developments inter-

act with increases in the decision-making process by the mass of the people. As President Nyerere argues, only as his (the subsistence farmer's) poverty is reduced will his existing political freedom become properly meaningful and his right to human dignity become a fact of human dignity. This essential economic change will not, and cannot, take place in isolation. It depends upon and it brings social and political change. (33) Zimbabwe's choice of development strategy lies between the present approach and a radically different approach, of which the BNA is an example; it depends upon the power of the various interests groups involved in the political struggle and this is based, in the last analysis, upon military power.

To predict the final outcome of the power struggle, and hence of the development strategy for the future, would be presumptuous, but the example of Kenya at independence is a useful guide to the impasse because some sort of compromise (albeit an unequal one) between the forces demanding radical change and the continuation of the status quo took place. In the late 1950's in Kenya a black mass movement was gaining increasing support, especially amongst the Kikuyu, and this posed the real possibility of radical change in the political economy of the country. In the event widespread violence was pre-empted through the incorporation of the black elite into the white power structure and the emergence of a new elite which has left the previous economic structure largely intact. This was achieved by buying out the white farmers, chiefly through massive UK financial support, replacing them with black farmers and by continuing the rapid expansion of the modern sector of the economy. The land 'reform' of both the white highlands and the "tribal" areas has led to growing inequalities and poverty in rural Kenya and the emergence of a black rural bourgeoisie. (34) Government support has come from this rural elite as well as from local and foreign-based industrial capital interests. Though changes have occurred in Kenya's development strategy and the rhetoric suggests a more basic-needs policy than in colonial times, the actual development path is leading to increases in inequalities in the country and is in practice far removed

from a strategy whose primary aim is to reduce inequalities and to eliminate absolute poverty.

The Kenyan analogy is useful, only up to a point. While similar interest groups can be located as were present in Kenya around independence, there are differences and, most importantly, the Zimbabwean situation presents problems on a far larger scale. The white farming community was much smaller in pre-independence Kenya than in present-day Zimbabwe and it compromised much earlier on: in Zimbabwe the war is far more widespread and better organised than it ever was in Kenya. The industrial sector is much more developed and the penetration of foreign capital includes significant South African and United States interests as well as British. (35) Finally, because the economy is so close to and integrated with South Africa, the core of capitalist development in the whole of Southern Africa, the outcome of the problem has far wider international significance than was the case in Kenya.

In Zimbabwe the power of both sides is great, both the power of those wishing to maintain the status quo and the power of those demanding radical change, and with the escalation of the war there has been an increasing polarisation of attitude. The political outlook is uncertain and as a result it is not possible to say which particular development path will be chosen in the future. If there is only limited political change and the present growth-oriented strategy remains largely intact then the aims of the BNA will not be fulfilled and poverty and inequality will not be eliminated. If there is a radical and significant change in the power structure then the problems which the BNA addresses are far more likely to be confronted directly. It does seem, however, that a Kenyan-type solution is becoming increasingly more difficult to envisage: the relative ease with which Kenya slipped into neo-colonialism is unlikely to be repeated in the case of Zimbabwe.

FOOTNOTES:

1. *Rhodesia, Report by J.L. Sadie on Planning For The Economic Development of Rhodesia 1967.* CSR 35-1967, Salisbury.
2. *Ibid* p. 12
3. *Ibid*
4. *Ibid*
5. *Ibid* p. 2.
6. "It appears to be much easier, in fact, to transform tribesmen from subsistence plot-holders into efficient industrial labourers than into productive farmers", p 7
7. In a revealing comment Professor Sadie argues: "if one wanted to retain average standards of living you need a growth rate in real terms at least equal to the growth rate of the population. But you could also divide the economy into two sector and change your calculations accordingly provided you accepted that the people in the less developed sector were satisfied with their existing standards of living". J.L. Sadie *Economic Growth Through Industrialisation*, The Rhodesian Journal of Economics Vol. 3. No. 3, 1969 p. 54-55.
8. For the practical implications of the country's labour legislation see P.S. Harris *Industrial Relations in Rhodesia* The South African Journal of Economics Vol. 42 No. 1, 1974 p.65-84.
9. In 1972 the Minister of Internal Affairs argued in parliament: "It is no good Africans flocking to the towns if there is no work for them there. They are very welcome if there is work and the European is doing everything in his power to increase job opportunities for Africans". *Rhodesia Parliamentary Reports* Vol 84 Column 1647, 1972.
10. Minister of Labour in RCBC interview 12th Janu-

ary 1976 and the Minister of Finance in his 1976 budgetary speech. Both quoted in A.M. Hawkins, *African Labour Supplies in the Rhodesian Economy*, *The Rhodesian Journal of Economics*, Vol 10, No. 2, June 1976 p. 103 and 106.

11. Figures calculated from *Rhodesian Monthly Digest of Statistics* August 1976, CSO Salisbury Tables 29 and 51.
12. "The other two elements in the economic welfare function, maximum stability and equitable or more equal distribution of income shall be ignored as less important and likely to be at variance with and to impose harmful restraint on the basic premise." Sadie 1967 *op cit* p. 12.
13. *The Realization of Economic Social and Cultural Rights: Problems Policies Progress*, United Nations New York 1975 E/CN/4/1108' rev 1.
14. *Ibid* p. 15.
15. *Ibid* p. 300, 304.
16. International Labour Office, *Employment Growth and Basic Needs : A One World Problem*, ILO, Geneva 1976.
17. *Ibid* p. 31-33 and R.H. Green *Basic Human Needs, Collective Self-Reliance and Development Strategy*, Institute of Development Studies Sussex, mimeo, p. 11-12.
18. *Address to the Board of Governors* by Robert s. McNamara, President World Bank Group, Manila Philippines, 4th October 1976, IBRD Washington 1976
19. *The Rhodesia Herald* 6th September 1974. In Zimbabwe wages are set not by the market forces of supply and demand but by highly regulated structural devices which maintain wage levels at artificially low rates. See R.C. Riddell and P.S. Harris *The Poverty Datum Line As A Wage Fixing Standard*, Mambo Press, Gwelo, 1975 p. 27-36.

20. Calculated from MDOS, *op. cit* Tables 14-17.
21. To vote, blacks need an annual income of R\$600. The annual average income of black employees in 1976 was R\$462.
22. *Rhodesia Parliamentary Reports* Vol 84, Column 1686 July 1972.
23. The proportion of government capital spending allocated to development projects in the African rural areas fell from 2,8 per cent of total spending for the period 1966 to 1969 to 1,7 per cent for the period 1973 to 1976. In the period 1975 to 1976 1,2 per cent of government revenue was allocated for African rural development. Figures calculated from *Public Sector Investment 1966-1969* CSR 32- 1966, 1968-1972 CSR 16-1968, *Rhodesian Investment in the Public Sector 1973-1976* and *Rhodesia Estimates of Expenditure For the Year Ended June 30th 1976*, RR 8-1975.
24. Hawkins *op. cit* p. 112. Most of the figures in this paragraph were taken from Hawkins' paper.
25. See H. Dunlop, *Land and Economic Opportunity in Rhodesia*, *The Rhodesian Journal of Economics*, Vol. 6 No. 1, March 1974, p. 1-19.
26. Kenyan Government 1971 Ministry of Finance survey results quoted in G. Holtham and A Hazelwood *Aid and Inequality in Kenya* ODI, London, 1976, p. 113.
27. At present of course state intervention in the economy is widespread, but its purpose is to achieve different ends. See D.G. Clarke, *The Growth and Impact of the Public Sector*, *The Rhodesian Journal of Economics*, Vol 6 No. 3, September 1972, p.48-60
28. M. F.G. Scott, J.D.A. MacArthur and D.M.G. Newberry *Project Appraisal in Practice* Heinemann, London, 1976 p. 248 and A.J. Sofranko et al *Agricultural Modernisation Among Ghanaian Farmers* University of Illinois 1976.

29. In 1971 in the urban areas the doctor-patient ratio was 1 : 1 650; in the rural areas it was 1 : 45 446. M.H. Webster, *The Employment and Management of Human Resources in Health Service Administration in Rhodesia, Zambezia*, Vol 4, No. 1 December 1975 p. 62.
30. Figures from MDOS, *op. cit* Table 12 and *Rhodesia 1969 Census Interim Report Volume II*, CSO Salisbury DL/537/550; 1971 Tables 10,18-20.
31. See for example G.S. O'Cleary, *Note on the Official Ideology of the State and its Role in the Political Economy of Rhodesia*, South African Labour Bulletin, Vol. 2 No. 7. February 1976, p. 47-55.
32. R.H. Green *op. cit* p. 11.
33. Julius Nyerere, 1969, quoted in Green *op. cit* p. 7.
34. See J. Heyer (ed) *Agricultural Development in Kenya*, OUP Nairobi 1976.
35. For a discussion on foreign capital in Zimbabwe's development see C. Stoneman, *Economic Development with Unlimited Supplies of Capital : The Case of Southern Rhodesia*, South African Labour Bulletin, *op. cit.* p. 3-16.

22 THE WAGE AND OCCUPATIONAL STRUCTURE
OF THE ZIMBABWEAN ECONOMY * X

by P.S. Harris

* AUTHOR'S NOTE

I did not intend to publish this paper in its present form. I have tried to detail my analytical methodology and isolate my basic propositions in order to provide a basis for discussion on the more fundamental aspects of my general approach.

X EDITOR'S NOTE

This paper was originally produced as a Labour Research Seminar (No. 5, 1973) held at the University of Rhodesia in the Department of Economics. It is now published for the first time - to make it available to a wider audience.

I. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

This paper attempts to explain the wage and occupational structure within the Zimbabwean economy by reconciling certain apparent anomalies or paradoxes that are observable in the structure.

There are certain underlying assumptions that may invalidate the entire approach, and these are therefore recorded at the outset.

It is assumed that the socio-political system and the economic arrangement that has developed to serve that system (the overall system sometimes being referred to as the "political economy" of Zimbabwe) is a highly rational one, and that it serves with efficacy the established objectives of the ruling power group. In this assumption, I do not imply that the *objectives* are rational in a wider "moralistic" sense. These objectives have two dimensions - the materialistic dimension (to which I will be returning), which gives the objectives operational form, and the temporal

dimension, which establishes a planning horizon and thereby provides a focus for the formulation of policy. "Rationality" implies a certain appreciative sophistication - *viz.* that the policy makers are aware, as far as is possible, of the consequences of their action insofar as they are likely to help or hinder the achievement of the final objectives. Where the objectives have general form, the possibility of conflicting objectives arises, and this establishes the requirements of compromise (or government by coalition). Once more, it is assumed that compromises, when made, are neither arbitrary nor irrational, but calculated against the broader background of the system's dominant objectives.

Secondly, it is assumed that it is impossible to analyse this system in an historical vacuum. The dynamic development of the system implies two sources of change. On the one hand, the composition of the ruling group will alter over time (albeit gradually), thus causing the broader objectives to change, or "evolve". On the other hand, the politico-economic situation (structured in very wide terms to embrace technological developments, the discovery of resources to "service" the system, the development of forces outside of the "controlling" group that challenge its position of power dominance, etc.) is changing, and policies must therefore change in the light of the changing politico-economic environment. Thus, policies which are different in differing periods of time need not necessarily reflect the irrationality of the actions in either of those time periods. Further, the time lag associated with adjustment may cause anachronistic policy structures to exist. However, my argument is that these structures will gradually be replaced, and that the direction of change will always be evident and predictable (*i.e.* towards the *prevailing* rationality).

However, although the importance of historical influences cannot be denied, this approach does not endorse or accept the operation of historical determination. Rather the dynamics of the system

are seen to be mutable, and various policies are framed in the light of their potential dynamic impact.

The paradoxes with which the paper is concerned relate specifically to the wage and occupational structure of the economy, and this is therefore a *partial* analysis set against a wider background.

To an extent, they are inter-related, and hence an element of duplication is inevitable in their recording.

The paradoxes are:

1. That in a situation in which wages are ostensibly set *via* the unrestrained inter-action of free competitors in both supplying and demanding labour services (or a situation in which imposed restraints are regulatory rather than directional in intention and impact), extremely wide wage differentials are found to exist between occupational categories.
2. That whilst specifically racially-based legislation does not exist in respect of delimiting occupational boundaries, the occupational categories tend to follow a broad racial delimitation.
(By extension, the wage differentials noted under 1. above follow a basic racial division).
3. That occupational mobility tends to be extremely limited vertically, such that the structural rigidities intensify, and do not weaken under the pressure of market forces.
4. That in a situation of labour surplus, the state continues to pursue, at substantial cost, a policy aimed at the recruitment of foreign labourers for specific occupational tasks.
5. That in a situation in which recurring shortages of supply are found in certain occupational categories, facilities for expanding the internally generated supply of suitably trained workers

are not expanding, nor are significant efforts being directed towards reforming technological approaches to production which will allow existing vacancies to be filled more expeditiously, and at lower cost.

If these paradoxes are in fact simply reflections of the "irrationality" of aspects of the system's arrangement, then the remainder of my analysis falls away. On the other hand, if they can be explained, or the discrepancies reconciled, then the basic cause for the prevailing structural arrangement is established, and a finer appreciation of the internal dynamics of that structure is made possible.

The vehicle of reconciliation is, I would argue the discrepancy between the short-term micro-economic interests of the constituent elements (firms and individuals) of the ruling group, and the longer-term macro-economic stability of the political-economy as a whole.

Reconciliation is possible only if compromise is actively sought by the elements of the ruling group. Compromise is sought because these elements realise that ultimately their material welfare derives from and is dependent upon the maintenance of the system. They are therefore prepared to subordinate immediate self-interest (this subordination involves acceptance of lower returns than those that are obtainable in the immediate future) to the interests of the system as a whole. The economics of collusion are influential here. The difficulty is that collusive agreements usually take the form of an "uneasy truce", as each element stands to gain by departure from the general pattern, particularly if his individual departure is unlikely to cause the system to collapse. However, the system *will* collapse as a consequence of the simultaneous independent actions of self-interested constituents and a type of internal *enforcement* procedure is then required as a means by which the system disciplines its members in order to ensure survival.

This broadly stated proposition needs to be explained and this involves

- a specification of the objectives of the ruling group, and a detailing of the two dimensions of this objective
- a quantification of the seriousness of the paradoxes isolated
- a description of the internal self-regulating mechanism developed by the system as a means of preventing "deviant" behaviour on the part of individuals
- the testing of the hypotheses *via* selected micro-economic case studies.

II THE OBJECTIVES OF THE RULING GROUP

In terms of physical resources, Zimbabwe is relatively abundantly endowed. However, these resources are underdeveloped, and an equitable sharing of the national product would only enable a moderate standard of living to be enjoyed by the resident population. (Per capita income in 1972 was approximately \$234).

A high level of materialistic consumption is only possible if the distribution of resources follows a highly inequitable pattern. It is my contention that the "power elite" has conspired, during the last eighty years, to ensure that its members are the beneficiaries of the economic system.

Political control thus becomes identified with the defence of economic privilege. Initially, this control rested with a particular corporate enterprise, the shareholders of which were largely resident outside the country. Direct company rule ultimately could not continue with effectiveness, and in 1923 the shareholders "sold" political power to a particular group of residents. This group has been forced to expand its numerical size in order to continue to "govern" efficiently, and has done so *via* a process of selective absorption. This absorption process

has had to be based on some criteria of selection, and the most convenient criterion has been racial category. The ruling white group thus extended privilege to other whites, but this process of extension was not rigid. In certain areas, economic coalition had to be struck with non-white groups. In these instances "absorption" was conditional, and beneficiaries had to be prepared to accept certain restrictions (these are said to have conferred "second class citizenship" on the groups concerned) in order to receive the advantages associated with economic dominance. The numerical strength of this non-white element of the control group (Asians, Coloureds and Black capitalists) may be fairly small, but its effect at the margin (as a buffer, and as a source of flexibility) is often underestimated.

The "control group" as presently demarcated has thus evolved as the previous group has been forced to make "side-payments" to emergent groups in order to maintain control and now includes

- an important remnant of multi-national capitalistic enterprise
- a growing sector of (white) resident controlled capitalism
- a somewhat stagnant, but strategically important and hence influential sector of white landowners
- the numerically large (and electorally important) group of white skilled and semi-skilled workers who have a limited influence over the operation of various forms of wealth and are ultimately economically dependent on white capitalists.

The "coalition" is effective precisely because each constituent group is dependent on others in some important sense.

White landowners are dependent on the coalition for subsidies and product price support schemes,

but offer in compensation the political and military stability associated with land stabilization.

White capitalists require support from the coalition in order to maximise the "rate of exploitation" by maximising the difference between the marginal revenue product of labour and the wage rate, but are able, out of the surplus thus accumulated, to subsidise white landowners and workers.

The importance of white workers is felt initially at the level of their influence in the electoral system (administrators - civil servants etc. - are included here), but their long-term strategic role is important since they form a reliable industrial-administrative base for the system.

Thus, white capitalists and landowners receive satisfactory profits, and the white workers satisfactory wages. The returns are secured out of the relative deprivation of black industrial workers and black peasants, although in both historical and present terms, the greatest deprivation has been felt by the black peasants.

The "development of underdevelopment" in the black rural sector, as a strategy designed to secure a satisfactory supply of low paid workers to the white economy is, however, an issue beyond the scope of this paper which is designed to reflect structures *within* the core economy.

The attainment of both general and specific objectives thus requires control over the rate at which the "system" absorbs other participants, and the terms on which such absorption takes place. If it is accepted that the distribution and ownership of land is a somewhat fixed factor, and that capital accumulates largely in the hands of current owners, the wage and occupational structure within the economy assumes added importance as an area within which the "political dynamics" have a profound impact on the maintenance of the entire socio-political framework.

III THE PARADOXES

(a) WAGE DIFFERENTIALS

The "wage-gap" has been discussed in a number of publications. Some elementary comparative figures are listed below:

Average earnings of Europeans in employment:
(1972) \$3 632

Average earnings of Africans in employment :
(1972) \$ 332

Distribution of cash wages paid to Africans during June, 1972:

Under	\$10	per month	245 410
	\$10-20		172 610
	\$20-50		251 270
	\$50-90		63 170
	\$90-150		9 270
Over	\$150		3 800

This very wide differential arises not purely because Europeans are more productive than Africans, but because (amongst other things):

- a number of occupational categories are "reserved" (although not on a formal or official basis) for Europeans. Various clerical and administrative positions in central and local government offices, with large statutory bodies such as Rhodesia Railways and within larger private companies would fall into this category.

- there are traditional "European" wage rates paid to white employees irrespective of productivity.

- there are unequal *per capita* inputs in training members of the different race groups.

- there is unequal access to formal on-the-job training schemes (including apprenticeship training) since the pace of admission is determined by white employers.

Thus, the entire supply structure is distorted to

ensure an almost automatic occupational protection for members of the ruling group, and to reduce the directness of the challenge to that occupational security from members of the disadvantaged majority.

It was stated earlier that in part the "profits" of the system are maximised by ensuring an abundant supply of low paid black workers. Explanations of the high wages paid to whites provide an incomplete basis for explaining the *differential*, because this must also be explained in terms of factors causing black workers to receive low wages.

The mechanisms of the system are complicated, and include:

- the importation of short-term "contract" workers from neighbouring states to maintain a satisfactory supply at *prevailing* wage rates (i.e. to dampen the upward pressure of limitations of local supply)

- the "development of underdevelopment" in the rural areas, (for details of the method see Arrighi; 1967) to create a "push" force out of economic impoverishment.

- the maintenance of homogeneity of supply by restricting the growth of skilled groups (through training) and thereby weakening the bargaining potential of strategically important and irreplaceable (in the short-term) groups of black workers.

(b) RACIAL DELIMITATION OF OCCUPATIONAL CATEGORIES

The "absorption" process is based on the exercise of discretion by the *employer*. The general tone of employer practise is set by the major institutional employers.

According to the 1969 Census of Employees, the employment of Europeans by employer status was as

follows:

Central government	21 395
Local government	3 181
Statutory bodies	10 317
Private employers	56 841

The dominant position of state and quasi-state bodies establishes these institutions as dictators of the pace of "Africanisation". The scope for private sector initiative is, however, not insignificant, and private sector following of the public sector "lead" is secured by

- a series of policies (such as "rate for the job") which reduce the profit advantage associated with an independent labour policy

- implied threats of non-co-operation from both customers and other whites employed within the organisations. Thus, where the advantages of deviation are essentially short-term, it would be irrational to expect an employer to follow a labour policy that is rational in a long-term micro-economic context when the attainment of such long-term rationality implies the collapse of the system upon which his long-term profits are dependent.

These factors reduce the potential benefit to an employer and thus enable the (white) employer's personal race prejudices to be translated into operational form without harming his profit position.

(c) VERTICAL MOBILITY OF LABOUR

The government policy of maintenance of standards of workmanship is implemented at the level of occupations designated for apprenticeship in terms of the Apprenticeship Training and Skilled Manpower Development Act (1968). Access to skilled occupations at this level (artisan trades) requires the completion of a formal apprenticeship or the passing of a recognised trade test (usually conducted under the auspices of the responsible National Industrial Council). There is thus little

scope for vertical progression from unskilled to skilled occupation through informal, on-the-job acquisition of skills, since the formalised training system introduces a vertical barrier. (Many workers who acquire non-certified skills probably enter informal employment - self-employed painters, upholsterers, mechanics, etc. - but the quantitative relevance of the "informal sector" as an "employer" of skilled labour has yet to be estimated).

At the other end of the occupational scale, professional occupational categories similarly require formal certification of skill.

The only range of occupations within which there is a possibility of mobility is in the intermediate administrative/clerical grades. Here, the system is forced to rely on an efficient "screening" by employers, to ensure that the "rate of absorption" proceeds at a politically acceptable pace.

(d) IMMIGRATION PROMOTION

This is the one area in which the "irrationality" of the government is perhaps most pronounced.

The justification of the "importation" of unskilled contract workers has been detailed by Clarke (LRS Seminar Paper 2 of 1973) who shows how this device has had an important impact at the margin, and has helped to depress the wages paid to workers in the (white) agricultural sector.

The recruitment of skilled immigrants to fill vacancies that arise in professional, technical and clerical categories, as opposed to training local personnel to fill these vacancies is necessary (from the point of view of the system) because the locally generated flow of trained whites is insufficient to "service" the expanding economy. In a situation in which economic privilege cannot be completely centralised, some criteria for extending privilege have to be decided upon. "Visibility" provides an easily identifiable and

therefore more controllable basis of extension. (In the Portuguese colonies the "assimilado" policy envisaged the same sort of selective extension of privilege, but there the visibility criterion was not employed). Further, whites are usually recruited externally, and full employment becomes a *sine qua non* of their participation in the economy. In times of economic recession, there is a strong probability that unemployed whites will leave, and thus there is no burden of the unemployed to be carried by the remaining members of the elite group. The source of supply ensures flexibility and an almost exact equation between the size of the elite group and the size that the economy can support at any stage.

(e) TRAINING FACILITIES

The increase in the supply of skills locally is thus seen to be a function of the needs of the economic elite. This factor helps to explain a number of features of training programmes that might otherwise simply be discarded as "irrational". There are, in effect, a number of sub-paradoxes that can be reconciled by reference to the systems view of training programmes fulfilling a service function of the sort required by the dominant group. This could explain the apparent anomalies in

- the wide base of primary education, but the "telescoping" of facilities for secondary and post-secondary schooling. This system *appears* to waste the initial educational input, but in fact, it is creating a reservoir from which it is able to draw with efficacy and at short notice by selectively feeding additional pupils leaving primary schools into selected training programmes.

- the closing of the highly successful pilot scheme for the training of local personnel in the technical trades (Luveve College)

- the fairly adequate provision of facilities for blacks to train for professional occupations (teachers etc) but the glaring inadequacy of

facilities for technical training.

- the increase of obstacles placed in the way of blacks acquiring administrative qualifications (C.I.S. etc.).

IV THE "SELF-REGULATING" MECHANISM

This section is based on the assumption that if the system survives only by tolerating short-term micro-economic inefficiencies, the constituent elements within the system will maximise profits by adopting more efficient short-term policies. These would involve

- the adoption of more "rational" productive techniques in order to minimise the high costs associated with the employment of white labour:

- the training of black labour in order to replace high-cost white workers in certain work categories.

The system prevents these "deviant" policy shifts by constituent firms by the operation of two forces

(a) THE REGULATION VIA OFFICIAL POLICY MEASURES

(i) The Industrial Conciliation Act enables the system to dictate the pace at which individual firms employ non-coalition members in work categories reserved for "members". However, there are a number of occupational categories that are not covered by the provisions of the ICA, but within which progress in "Africanisation" has been slow. The government, as employer, is very important here, and is able to reserve in absolute terms, a "block" of jobs for whites. The forces operating on firms to extend "reservation" beyond the civil service are listed under (b) below.

(ii) The educational system itself influences the rate at which various groups acquire skills and enter the market for certain job types. The

apprenticeship system, linked with the ICA, has been most effective in this area. However, it has produced a large number of potential clerks and administrators within the African sector of the population who are nevertheless unable to compete effectively with whites and hence once again "external" factors need to be isolated.

Thus, official policy reserves wage and occupational privilege for:

- artisans whose employment categories are specified under the provisions of industrial agreements and employment regulations published in terms of the ICA

- employees of the central and local government authorities, and of quasi-government state bodies

The remainder of work categories have to be explained away by reference to non-official pressures.

(b) UNOFFICIAL PRESSURES

The public sector is an extremely important part of the Zimbabwean economy, in terms of both expenditure and regulatory impact. Deliberate, public sector administrative actions could prove ruinous to individual firms, or even to groups of firms, who do not follow the official policy on employment. Such actions could include:

- the withdrawal of subsidies
- the withdrawal of major government contracts to supply goods and services
- an unfavourable realignment of allocations of foreign currency

and a number of more specific "sanctions" that could be applied to individual sectors.

It is my belief that these direct, unofficial administrative sanctions have *not* been applied in Rhodesia, nor have they been used as "threats" to

ensure co-operation. This does not imply tolerance, but rather that other pressures are themselves sufficiently effective. These other pressures include:

- threats from white staff to resign in the event of an employer promoting a black into either a position of superiority or into a position traditionally regarded as a "white" job. (These threats are sometimes formalised into petitions, but often employers are unwilling to risk alienating white staff and will not even put their reactions to the test. Undoubtedly, in a number of cases, their reluctance to employ a suitably qualified black in a particular position, whereas in fact this is used as a rationalisation for the employers own prejudice. Where employers are salaried managers and not owners, their personal prejudices may be given operational effect without regard to impact on profitability.

- threats from customers to boycott or transfer loyalty in the event of their being attended to by blacks. Once again, salaried managers often justify their discriminatory actions by using this as an excuse, when it may not in fact be an important factor in practice.

In part, the decline in the importance of multinational corporate enterprise, and the emergence of the owner-manager has meant that salaried managers, remote from the scrutiny and control of shareholders are perhaps becoming less important as framers of employment policies. Thus, the personal identification of the manager with the system and not with the enterprise, enabled the system to anticipate a "satisfactory" response from policy makers at firm level.

The profit motivation of owner-managers is likely to weaken the force of these unofficial regulatory pressures. If this does become important, the system may have to resort to more direct controls, and in some ways this movement is discernable. (e.g. the proposed amendments to the ICA allow the Minister of Labour to vary the employment

conditions agreed between employers and employees).

(c) THE STRATEGY OF ABSORPTION

In occupational terms, "concessions" have been on a racial basis, in a very selective way. When the elite or dominant group has been unable to continue to staff all of the vacancies arising in the group of occupational categories reserved for it, there has not been a "random" absorption of non-group members. Rather, a particular *task* has been "Africanised", and a degree of "racial purity" thereby retained in the occupations still reserved for whites. Thus in the transport industry, the occupational category "driver" has been Africanised, in preference to the admission of blacks along a wider employment spectrum within the industry.

This strategy is effective in preserving "European wages" in the occupational categories still reserved for whites, but is creating some hardship for unskilled whites who cannot gain access to the "higher" reserved occupational category. This has led to suggestions of a deliberate creation of a range of jobs for unskilled whites where wage rates will continue to be acceptable.

CONCLUSION

This system of economic dominance thus requires a type of "fine-tuning" in order to maintain itself. There are problems of internal conflicts arising out of the way in which individual interests are sub-ordinated to that of the group, and the system, whilst efficient at present, is therefore mutable.

38 SOCIAL SECURITY AND AGED SUBSISTENCE :
ROOTS OF THE PREDICAMENT IN ZIMBABWE

by D.G. Clarke

Many changes have taken place in the socioeconomic character of the economy in recent years. One has been the extent and form of provision and acquisition of subsistence consumption amongst aged and/or 'retired' Africans.

To date, relatively little literature has been published on the subject of pensions and gratuities or, more appropriately, post-employment subsistence consumption for African workers (1). It has also been very narrowly based within a highly restrictive analytical paradigm (2). Even the 'revisionist' literature has assigned little concern for this issue although it has been assumed that the reserves have been a prime source of social security and subsistence amongst the aged.

Because of the *complex* character of the socio-economic system and the diverse relationships of households to a variety of modes of production and sources of subsistence, it is really necessary to consider the system of post-retirement subsistence in a holistic manner. This enables the avoidance of some pitfalls such as those exemplified by economists who, considering *formal* pension or gratuity provisions, ignore their historical evolution and articulation with kinship-based social security systems located in the rural areas. It will also enable avoidance of a trap into which social anthropologists fall when, considering the latter, they underplay their integration with the former (3). The conventional dualism in conception of these issues has unavoidably concealed some of the important structural changes which have taken place and which are taking place at present.

SOCIAL SECURITY FROM PRE-COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT : AN IMPORTANT GAP IN THEORY AND ANALYSIS

This paper will briefly highlight some contrasting features of social security and old age subsistence from the pre-colonial period to the present. The emphasis will be on identifying different means of securing social security followed in the past compared to the contemporary period, in respect of incomes and means of subsistence for the aged.

It has some obvious weaknesses which should be made explicit. The view of the pre-colonial past is somewhat 'stylised'. It is also of an 'homogenising' character and probably does not do much justice to the wide variations in actual conditions of the past. It is also not 'historically connected', i.e. the empirical analysis does not adequately cover the whole period. It raises a number of implicit questions, but this is partly one purpose of the paper. One which might be mentioned is the effect of historical transformations in production and in the character of the State on the demographic situation, as well as the political economy of the latter on the subsistence of the aged.

THE LINEAGE/KINSHIP SYSTEM AND MODES OF PRODUCTION

The position, status and social security of the aged in the so-called 'traditional' societies, which constituted the Shona and Ndebele social formations of the 19th century, must be understood in terms of both the character and constraints upon these (largely) agrarian-based economies.

Available historical evidence *suggests* that production and indeed society itself was organised on the basis of a kinship/lineage system in which wage-relations as such were non-existent. No sale of labour took place although *exchanges* of labour equivalents were organised on a more or less reciprocal basis. Hierarchical control exercised through a gerontocracy (at different levels: in the household, village and State), enabled a

special place for the aged, especially men, in the political process. Their control over land, the distribution of food, cattle, commodities and women provided the aged with an influence over the means of production and the process of social reproduction. Furthermore, with land relatively abundant and a minimal divorce of people from it, as well as an ideology geared to ensuring the provision of basic subsistence for all, the incidence of *relatively* impoverished aged persons was probably very low. The functions performed by the aged, and their status within the lineage system, invested them with a 'productive' social role. This may be partly 'idealised', but it is to be contrasted strongly with contemporary realities.

The establishment of a colonial State set the pattern for profound changes. Households became losely linked to produce and (more significantly) labour markets in which 'market prices' of commodities and labour supplied, in conjunction with production-for-own-consumption in the reserves, effectively determined the level of subsistence. Previously pertaining social formations began to disintegrate under the weight of these developments. The rural areas assumed a greater though not exclusive role as 'labour reserves' for the unemployed, temporary migrants, the sick, the destitute and the aged for whom in the new State system no *direct* provisions were available.

Both the particular social status and political power of the lineage-based gerontocracy wilted in the process. New lines for authority were established *albeit* in some instances being grafted onto pre-existent structures. Now, too, the impoverished *aged-worker* appeared as a feature of *rural life*, there being no other options through which subsistence could be obtained on farms, in mines and factories or from domestic households of previous employers.

Prior to World War II no formal gratuities and/or pensions were provided for African workers.

Housing and influx control, as well as wage policy, forced retirees to 'return home', an expectation typically *prepared for* by the long-term maintenance of a rural dependence upon the lineage system of support. Because these costs fell upon and were effectively met by the peasant economy, neither the State nor employers had an interest in providing other means of subsistence.

THE TRANSITION TO GRATUITIES AND PENSIONS DURING THE PROCESS OF INDUSTRIALISATION

In the pre-1940's most African workers were left wholly dependent on the peasant economy for post-employment subsistence consumption. The African 'labour reserves' were required to perform the function of providing an 'indigenous pension' for the bulk of the work force. Employers did not make pension provisions because they were interested in the mobilisation and maintenance of labour-power, not labourers themselves. Once workers became 'non-functional', they were dispensable (4). The existence of the reserves provided the necessary means for the disposal of 'surplus' labourers. However, the growing incapacity of the reserve economy to provide adequate subsistence to support this practice caused revisions to have to be made to payments practices by employers. Thus gratuities were introduced extensively in the early phase of industrialisation in order to provide for *some* means of subsistence for workers in the post-employment period inevitably spent *inside* the reserves (a pattern ensured by urban policies). The levels of gratuities were raised as the availability of means of subsistence in the peasant economy diminished and as African unions placed greater priority in bargaining on reform in gratuities policies (5).

Here it is important to note the manner in which workers purchased their personal social security - a quasi-equivalent to a 'pension plan' - in the peasant economy. Typically, this was done through a variety of alternative or complementary policies

of maintaining kinship links, sending back regular remittances, or purchasing inputs for the rural household, which were either of an investment or consumption good nature, in order to help maintain its long-run viability. These were forms of 'savings' or, more properly, *deferred consumption*. But, as Arrighi has pointed out, under conditions of severe land constraint, the 'worker's savings' could be illusory (6). For most workers (those receiving sub-P.D.L. wages) the act of 'saving' for retirement implied a real *postponement* of necessary consumption. In practice, the worker was attempting to realise his rights vis-a-vis the 'traditional' economy. The 'saving' was not a precursor to the accumulation of capital in the form of substantial productive assets in the reserves. In some reserves heavily dependent on wage-labour, there was little possibility for workers to fully realise retirement 'plans' in the rural economy because the changing and deteriorating character of the peasant production system did not allow it to 'fulfil' its social security obligations. From being food 'exporters', households in the reserves became net importers, especially in poor years. As labour stabilisation in the 'industrial complex' proceeded, fewer new vacancies became available to the 'average migrant'. More dependents (the young, the old and women) became reliant on means of subsistence derived from within the reserves. Under these conditions a smaller portion of the labour force was able to *wholly realise* their 'rights' and find adequate subsistence in rural society.

Employer *recognition* of the potentially disruptive impact of these structural trends in the 'labour reserves' was behind the transformation of gratuity arrangements into more beneficial pension plans in the late 1960's and 1970's. The introduction of pension schemes did *not* reflect a departure from cheap labour policies for the bulk of African workers. Rather it transformed the social security provisions in the light of 'modern' requirements. The form of gratuities and pensions introduced after the 1940's confirms this judgement.

The Old Age Pensions Act (1936) provided for non-contributory pensions for all *non-Africans* over the age of 60 (if they had lived in the colony of Southern Rhodesia for 15 years or more) (7). No pensions were paid to Africans under statute law; these were left to private arrangements that employers *might* make with their employees. Few employers at this time even had gratuity schemes for their workers. By contrast one-quarter of white employees were covered by private pension schemes and in 1944 the State Old Age Pension Act provided for 1 202 whites and 115 Asians and Coloureds. In instances of chronic destitution, non-Africans received either 'rations' and/or the payment of maintenance grants to institutions. In the case of sickness free health services or reduced rates were made available (8). Africans, as the Report of the Social Security Officer recorded in 1944, 'received no old age pensions and very little in the way of relief, *the general assumption being that 'the Reserve will support their old, sick and destitute'*' (9). Private employers, largely followed this policy of *primitive accumulation*. Social insurance at the time existed only in the sphere of occupational disability (except for casual workers and domestic employees in private households) and then only to a limited extent, with compensation geared to the low-wage system.

With rapid permanent African urbanisation, it was realised that changes would eventually have to be made to State pension policies. Thus the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner argued in 1943 : 'Natives who are capable of earning the same wages as Coloured or Asiatic workmen should be taken out of the Native *class* and should enjoy the same benefits... that is, payment of a pension.' This was in accordance with recommendations to divide the African population into two categories, the other group being 'kraal natives' to whom it was considered equivalent pension rights should *not* apply. The definition of 'kraal natives' embraced the bulk of African workers. Under then prevailing ideology, their labouring days spent outside the reserves were regarded as 'an interlude' between departure from and ultimate return to the rural

areas (10). It was thought that there was no *need* for formal pensions or sickness and unemployment benefits. This was not wholly accurate, however, since the reserve economy even as early as the 1940's was not adequately able to meet *all* its social security liabilities. And too, as Ibbotson reported at this time, 20 percent of Africans (out of an urban sample of 2 388 cases he investigated) could be regarded as 'permanent town dwellers, some of whom have known no other mode of life' (11). This implied that up to 40 000 more-or-less permanent urban African dwellers existed at this time. The two inter-related socio-economic pressures of rural underdevelopment and rising workers' needs thus provided the State and employers with a major problem in providing for the future subsistence of Africans in their post-employment period. To have left the situation to deteriorate *beyond a certain point* would have courted costly and possibly irredeemable involution of rural society, upon which the whole wage-labour system and economic complex ultimately rested.

The first significant co-ordinated initiative and strategy adopted was to provide lump-sum cash benefits, in the form of gratuities upon retirement, even though in 1944 such policies were actively opposed by influential groups such as magistrates (because they would be 'premature and inadvisable') and many Native Commissioners (because 'they would weaken the sense of tribal responsibility') as well as many employers (12). The introduction of the Native Labour Board's system of wage regulation, followed by collective bargaining bodies after 1959, together with constant demands from African workers and unions, provided the pressures necessary to spread the use of these schemes and raised the level of benefits received. From the 1940's to the mid-1970's, a system of gratuities provided the prime form of provision of post-employment subsistence for African industrial workers. In many smaller enterprises and a number of industrial sub-sectors not even gratuities were provided. However, these employers often provided periodic and informal cash or kind rewards to employees

for 'long service and loyalty' (13). Typically these outlays were small and therefore of little benefit to workers in terms of meeting post-retirement costs of subsistence. The extension of statutory wage determination, especially under the post-1959 Industrial Board system, generalised the *legal* obligation of employers to provide gratuities for African workers in all grades of employment covered by the Act (thus *excluding* agricultural and domestic employment). The level of benefits remained tied to the wage structure. The amounts laid down were fairly small and varied in accordance with the worker's length of service (with the *same* employer) and the level of earnings at the termination of the contract of employment. The typical Industrial Board and Industrial Council gratuity was only payable if the worker had been in *continuous* service for *at least* 10 years (14). When introduced, gratuities were *not* made retrospective. In other cases, like the Engineering, Iron and Steel Industry, the minimum qualifying period was 20 years (15). For many workers - those dismissed, those who changed employers and others who failed to maintain 'continuity' of employment - these were theoretical benefits at best. Thus a significant portion of the permanent African labour force was *not* able to *rely* on receipt of gratuity payments, let alone pensions.

Other disadvantages experienced by workers with regard to gratuity schemes provided additional incentive for African unions to negotiate pension schemes. The Railways Associated Workers' Union, for instance, had been negotiating since 1965 for a pension scheme to be introduced, but up to 1972 had had no success (16). This request had been a union demand since the 1945 Railway strike.

Even as late as 1971 the State was still opposed to statutory old age pensions for Africans. At the time this left 141 390 Africans over 60 years of age without access to statutory old age support, a legal right from which qualifying white old age pensioners received \$47 monthly (17). At this stage the Minister of Labour noted government's opposition to the provision of an old age pension of \$5 monthly for all Africans over 60

years, a provision that would have cost \$8,5 million per annum (18). Nonetheless, the State was prepared to make first moves towards bringing *selected* groups of Africans in government employment (significantly enough also in the Police, Defence Forces and Prisons) into a State pension plan in 1971 (19).

Around this time, private employers began to respond to long-standing worker demands for pension schemes to *replace* the system of gratuities. Both ACCOR and ARNI established industry-based pension schemes, the former in 1974 and the latter a few years earlier (20). These two schemes provided for benefits to be transferable between companies operating in the *same* pension scheme, so removing an important disadvantage for *some* workers. The Mining Industry Pension Fund was also selective and only began to provide benefits for those earning less than \$60 in 1968. Only 500 of the Industry's 40 000 Africans were on the scheme in 1973 (21). Salisbury City Council only began to *study* pensions for African workers in the same year (22). A few private industrial employers, mostly large/foreign companies, were a little more 'progressive' than this, however. Elsewhere, the introduction of private pension schemes, as in the Catering and Hotel Industry and the Clothing Industry, was closely linked with instances of long established unionism. However, many industries were non-unionised or regulated under Industrial Board arrangements and thus the bulk of African industrial workers by 1976 remained on gratuity schemes. Large numbers, however, who were outside even the Boards system, were left without statutory provision. Meanwhile, domestic workers were wholly unprotected and had to rely on benevolence and paternalism, a position in which plantation workers also found themselves until the establishment of the compulsory Rhodesian Agricultural Pension Scheme in October, 1975.

The differences amongst African workers in terms of retirement benefits was part of the general stratification found in the 'industrial complex'. The introduction of pensions was heavily dependent upon management-union negotiations, themselves

confined to specific industries and their willingness to pay. Benefits thus varied from employer to employer. Nonetheless, the adjustment made in labour policies to introduce pensions for African industrial workers became pronounced and clearly *confirmed* the divorce of large numbers of Africans from any access to means of production in the reserves as well as the incapacity of these areas to provide *adequate* means of subsistence for the rapidly expanding population, constitutionally confined as they were to the land areas of the Tribal Trust Lands.

CONSERVATION AND DISSOLUTION OF LINEAGE/KINSHIP RELATIONS

The industrialisation process, attended by rapid and sustained proletarianisation, has brought major changes upon the old African social order (23). It has also created new forms of social relationships.

Today access to land is more restricted. Yet the ability of the kinship/lineage mode to *fully* sustain all its members has depended vitally on this asset. Further, out-migration from the reserves on both a temporary and semi-permanent basis has drained these agrarian-based economies of crucial labour supplies necessary for expanded production. Demographic imbalance *within* the reserves has resulted in a disproportionate resident population of young, old, women and ill or retired persons. At the same time, the extended family system of mutually interdependent support (during unemployment and in old age) has come under severe pressures in the urban-industrial and the mining/plantation complexes into which African workers have moved in large numbers over the years. In urban society, wage policies, housing scarcities and rental as well as other costs have made it impossible for most *extended* families to reside together. In the case of most households, even nuclear families have been residentially *dis-united*. As a consequence the security provided for the aged under the lineage mode has been more difficult

to provide. This tendency has been reinforced by the dissolution of 'traditional' forms and ideologies which have become transformed as notions of private property and private 'wealth' - more often than not accumulated via wage labour - have undermined and begun to supercede the 'communal consciousness' and ethics which underpinned social relations in the lineage system. Obligations to meet lineage-based social requirements (as exemplified by the provision of adequate subsistence for the aged) have thus become less regularly and/or extensively met. The growing numbers of aged destitutes is evidence of this process. Extensive migration from almost all reserves has also tended to undermine the gerontocratic authority of elders over the production and distribution of income and commodities earned by the group as a whole. Thus, whilst the labour-power itself has become 'lost', so too has the *effective control* over the means of subsistence acquired via wage-labour.

Remittances to reserves - in cash and/or kind - have thus come to more significantly represent *residual* transfers of balance of income not directly consumed by wage-recipients. Even though those have also been directed at meeting the longer-term consumption needs in retirement of the wage-earner, they have assumed a *more* personal/private provision as opposed to the social one more typically the case under the 'redistributive' lineage mode in its 'pure form'.

Extended family relations, upon which old age support has depended, have also dissolved for other reasons. The absence of men from the reserves has had the effect of placing women in greater effective control over the rural domestic household, its assets, land and cattle, as well as the rural 'labour process'. The balances and checks inherent in the male-dominated lineage system have had to give way to capitalist 'economic reality'. A weakening in one area of the system has probably made it easier for dissolution to take place in other integral components of it.

Constraints on land supply and its productive capacity have been a major erosive influence. Surpluses have become more difficult to produce for many households, especially those in poorer areas distant from markets or in areas affected by drought. The war in the North-East and elsewhere has also seriously affected production and hence the ability of households to provide adequate assistance for the aged (24). Land limitations have also reduced holdings and led to fragmentation into 'uneconomic units'. In effect, some progeny of the original holder have been made 'landless'. The latter condition, with its consequence that people are forced off the land, has complicated the social security situation for the aged parents who remain.

Kinship and lineage relations have also been weakened by the on-going process of stratification and class formation resulting from the rapid industrialisation of the last three decades. Closely related to the division of labour in capitalist production and the transformations in this latter mode, social divisions have been exacerbated by minimum wage policies, wage-regulations and even the union formation process in some instances.

The stability of the social order upon which the kinship/lineage system has depended has also been shaken by the 'development' process. The community is no longer self-reproducing *in situ* but is dependent on commodities produced elsewhere and income transfers from other sources. The unity of production and consumption has been destroyed. Rural society is now also more fragmented than before even though migration to towns, mines or farms has not always involved permanent absence. At retirement, the structures of employment and urban life have dictated a return to a rural existence. This life-long *flux* has generated a degree of rootlessness which has weakened older social bonds (25).

Changing economic conditions have also in part been responsible for the reduction in the capacity of the lineage mode to provide for the demands

placed upon it. Unemployment has increased amongst all age groups, especially the young. Older workers or work-seekers now face a more 'competitive' labour market. The burden of unemployment results in more requests on the employed for assistance for food and shelter. Not all these demands are met willingly or even adequately. Not all the unemployed are able to exploit these lines of lineage. These pressures add to the demands coming from the aged - a group increasing in number in any event. Conditions of rising inflation and low wages (usually below the Poverty Datum Line) make it difficult for households to allocate a significant portion of their means of subsistence to aged parents or relatives. The fixed-sum so allocated may not be adequately adjusted for inflation, even though year by year its real value is eroded by (now) 8 to 10 percent.

Despite all these powerful socioeconomic pressures, however, the lineage/kinship mode of production and 'redistribution' has *not* disappeared or been fully dissolved. It remains and has been transformed to function and provide *some* social security in areas where State or other formal structures do not provide any. Indeed, some State policies *deliberately* function to prop up the lineage mode. The reserves serve as the base for this *reconstituted* 'redistributive system. The maintenance of a State sponsored ideology of '*tribalism*' and the practice of ethnically-defined community development, promoted by constitutional, political and tenurial arrangements, tend to lend support to the *re-structured* lineage system. State underpinning of the role of the Chiefs, now radically different in function and character from the past, can also be understood as bureaucratic support for quasi-State 'pension managers'.

SOCIAL SECURITY AND INTER-RELATED FORMS OF PRODUCTION

In the case of a peripheral social formation like Zimbabwe, then, it is not sufficient to evaluate

the provision of social security without explicit reference to the changing *and* interrelated character of support provided through an articulation of different modes of production. Both kinship and modern forms of provision of post-employment subsistence consumption have functioned *together* to provide old age subsistence for Africans. The latter mechanism has been grafted upon the former, with its ascendancy becoming more pronounced as time has gone by.

FOOTNOTES :

- (1) See however the long article by Mr Joe Herman, Old Mutual Pension Manager (Africans Look More To The Security of a Pension) in *Business Herald*, 20th January, 1975.
- (2) For example, R.L. Cole, "Pensions and Inflation in Rhodesia", *Rhodesian Journal of Economics*, 8, 2, June 1974, which follows the conventional view of considering only 'formal' pension schemes. The point to be made here is that in the local structural context such a view is inappropriate when 'informal' pensions are clearly so important.
- (3) For example, see M.F.C. Bourdillon, *The Shona Peoples*, Mambo Press, 1976.
- (4) Provision for Africans under the Workmen's Compensation Act in the 1940's were based on the assumption that disabled African workers *could and would* return to the reserves. See Southern Rhodesia, *Report of the Social Security Officer : Part I Social Security*, September, 1944, p.53.
- (5) Rhodesia Railways African Employees Association began demanding pensions before 1945. See Southern Rhodesia, *Report of Commission Appointed by His Excellency The Governor To Investigate The Grievance which gave rise to the Strike*

Amongst African Employees on the Rhodesia Railways, Salisbury 1946.

- (6) G. Arrighi, *The Political Economy of Rhodesia*, Mouton, The Hague, 1967, p.39.
- (7) However, Asians and Coloureds received less than whites. This was rectified in 1973.
- (8) However, there were marked differences in the European and African 'ration scales'. The latter's followed the Mines and Minerals Act (originally formulated in 1911 and based on the needs of *single* migrants at that time). See Southern Rhodesia, *Report of the Social Security Officer : Part II Social Services*, October 1944, pp.18 - 19.
- (9) *Ibid*, Part I, p.46. Emphasis added.
- (10) *Ibid*, p.53. 'The years he spends in the town are merely an interlude. Consequently, natives who are too old to work, or too sick, or unable to find work in European areas, will return to their homes, to live out the declining days, to regain health, or to maintain life in their traditional manner.'
- (11) *Ibid.*, p.57.
- (12) *Ibid.*, p.60.
- (13) This practice still pertained in the 1970's (e.g. *Moto* 31 August, 1974). However, as one firm reported, the foreign exchange shortage has caused some to only give cash or domestically produced commodities.
- (14) See an analysis of the 'standard gratuity' in D.G. Clarke, "The Economics of African Old Age Subsistence in Rhodesia", School of Social Work, Salisbury, (f/c).
- (15) R.G.N. 1072 of 1973.

- (16) *Rhodesia Herald*, 10 January, 1973.
- (17) See *Rhodesia Herald*, 2 April, 1971 and *Rhodesia Herald*, 11 June, 1971.
- (18) *Rhodesia Herald*, 12 June, 1971. Another way to interpret that data is that it provides a useful *minimum* estimate of the subsidy provided by the peasant economy to other sectors in respect of old age consumption. It is a minimum because it is unlikely that \$5 monthly would account for all costs of subsistence.
- (19) *Rhodesia Herald*, 2 April, 1971.
- (20) ACCOR, *Annual Report*, 1974; *Rhodesian Financial Gazette*, 26 July, 1974.
- (21) *Rhodesia Herald*, 29 March, 1973.
- (22) *Rhodesia Herald*, 15 September, 1973; *Rhodesia Herald*, 28 August, 1974.
- (23) See for instance the following reports : G. Kingsley Garbett, *Growth and Change in a Shona Ward*, Occasional Paper No.1, Department of African Studies, UCRN, 1960 ; G.L. Chavunduka, *Social Change in a Shona Ward*, Occasional Paper No.4, Department of Sociology, U.R., 1970 ; and M.F.C. Bourdillon, *op. cit.*
- (24) See Grain Marketing Board, *Annual Report 1975*, Salisbury.
- (25) See data in J.C. Mitchell, *An Outline of the Sociological Background to African Labour*, Ensign, Salisbury, 1961, where the Appendix provides data on the proportion of absentees in African areas in 1958. For 60 year olds plus, the male and female absentees constituted 2,76 and 1,60 percent respectively of total age group. This contrasts with 45,77 and 24,05 percent for the age group 15 to 19 and 79,28 and 32,93 percent for 20 to 24 year olds.

NOTES ON THE THEORY OF THE INFORMAL SECTOR
WITH REFERENCE TO ZIMBABWE (1)

by R.J. Davies

This paper is concerned with identifying the urban informal sector and analysing its role in an underdeveloped economy. It is a tentative attempt to build a model of the sector. As such it is not directly concerned with aspects dealt with by most other writers in this field, namely the assessment of the size and importance of the sector, comparisons of certain characteristics of the sector with their formal sector counterparts, or the implication of the sector's existence for development policy (2).

The model is presented in a somewhat oversimplified and crude form: in order to keep the paper short, it has been necessary to make statements without qualifying them, and to ignore certain refinements which might be made. However, in spite of obvious drawbacks, this does have the benefit of making the central features of the model stand out all the more clearly.

Section I attempts to define the informal sector in terms of its structural relationship to the formal sector. Section II then examines some characteristics of the sector, partly in order to illustrate the use of the concept developed in section I. Sections III and IV are concerned with the role of the sector; more particularly, section III examines explanations of the origins and existence of the sector, while section IV looks briefly at the relationship between formal and informal sector in Zimbabwe. In conclusion, section V makes a brief observation about the relevance of the analysis for development policy.

I

Many attempts have been made to define the informal sector. Some of these, however, have really defined the dominant attitude towards the sector,

and are not useful for analytical purposes. The first section of this paper will attempt to build up an analytically useful description drawing on some of the earlier definitions.

Keith Hart states that "the distinction between formal and informal income opportunities is based essentially on that between wage-earning and self-employment" (3). However, this distinction precludes the possibility of workers being employed by informal sector operators. Furthermore, it does not provide criteria by which the self-employed in the formal sector can be distinguished from those in the informal sector.

Another approach has been simply to list the types of jobs regarded as informal. Although this makes use of implicit criteria which are never clearly stated, it is an acceptable methodological approach to a concept which may in fact defy formal definition. However, in dealing with the informal sector, this approach is not sufficient by itself, because of the overlap between categories of informal and formal activities. Thus Hart, in his taxonomy of urban income opportunities, lists under the heading "Informal income opportunities; legitimate: (a) primary and secondary activities", the activities, "farming, market gardening, building contractors and associated activities, self-employed artisans, shoemakers, tailors, manufacturers of beers and spirits" (4). But each one of these activities is to be found in the formal sector. Wherein lies the difference ?

Wallace suggests that the difference lies in the structure within which they operate. Thus she gives the following example: "Someone who works as a porter digging on a government farm, or portering for a large expatriate building firm is in a formal job, enumerated, under government labour regulations and earning the minimum wage in contrast to a porter who works for a small cash crop farmer or a self employed builder who may earn about 40/- to 50/- per month, has no government body to turn to if he is mistreated, has no security of tenure or way of ensuring

he gets paid, he is unenumerated and in informal employment." (5) This emphasis on structural differences is correct. But Wallace's description is incomplete in so far as it does not account for the fact that the self-employed builder might well be a member of the informal sector himself.

The sectors differ mainly because their modes of production differ. The formal sector is based on highly capitalised social productive forces; the informal sector is not : both its means of production and its techniques of production are non-capital intensive. In the formal sector the means of production are privately owned by a small class, and are operated on by labourers for the benefit of that owning class. In the informal sector the means of production are in general owned by those who operate them. In the formal sector production relations are based on highly developed division of labour, with hierarchical relations between supervisor and worker, both nationally and internationally, whereas in the informal sector such division of labour as there is, is rudimentary, and horizontal rather than vertical. Thus there are obvious and important differences between the modes of production of the two sectors.

But there are also important differences between the relationship of these modes of production to the superstructure. In oversimplified terms, in the formal sector the mode determines the superstructure whereas the reverse is true in the informal sector. On the one hand, the formal sector represents the dominant social formation, thus influencing political, legal and social relations and also social consciousness. The informal sector, on the other hand, represents a subsidiary, peripheral and dependent social formation, its mode of production (particularly its social productive forces and its production and distribution relations) having to exist within a superstructure which it cannot directly influence. The informal sector's nature and existence depend on the formal sector. This is not to suggest that the informal sector is irrelevant to

the formal; as will be shown later the functional relationship between the two is asymmetrically symbiotic: that is, they feed off each other, but in a hierarchical rather than co-equal way.

This conception of the informal sector has no particular substance until placed in an historical context; It is impossible to lay down universally applicable particular characteristics of informal trades and activities, since these characteristics will vary from economy to economy, depending on the nature of the dominant social formation. The following sections attempt to apply the concept to the Zimbabwean situation.

II

Certain characteristics of the informal sector, and activities within it, have been regarded as of prime importance in distinguishing it from the formal sector by other workers in this field. For the sector as a whole, it has been noted, firstly, that there is considerable freedom of entry, both as employees and entrepreneurs, in contradistinction to the formal sector where barriers to entry in the form of institutional restrictions are crucial. Secondly, and related to this first point, the scarcity of monopolies in the informal sector is in direct contrast to the monopolistic nature of the formal. Thirdly, it has been noted that in the informal sector the means of production are indigenously owned, as opposed to the high degree of foreign ownership in the formal sector. Finally, the non-institutionalised price setting mechanisms of the informal sector differentiates it from the formal, where prices are institutionally set and maintained. With regard to informal *activities*, it has been noted that many operations are illegal in terms of the dominant social formation, that most informal activities are small scale compared to their formal counterparts and that production techniques are labour intensive with respect to the capital intensive operations of the formal sector. This section will examine how these characteristics

arise, looking in particular at the part played by the interaction of the mode of production of the informal sector with the superstructure of the formal.

BARRIERS TO ENTRY : One of the ways in which returns to formal sector activities are maintained is through barriers to entry into these activities. These barriers are often in the form of professional qualifications requirements, as in the case of lawyers, doctors and the like. Of more importance, however, are indirect barriers to entry, particularly in production enterprises. These include large initial capital requirements; limitations on the use of land; methods of allocating scarce resources; economies of scale (which give a competitive advantage to those already in the industry); patent rights, etc. All of these serve to protect those within an industry from competition, and represent an important departure of the real world from the perfectly competitive one of neo-classical economists. In some cases - economies of scale, capital requirements - they derive from the technology of the industry; in others - patent rights, limitation on land use - they derive from political and legal activity by the state to protect the privilege of those within industry. They represent therefore the impact of pressure groups on the superstructure.

These barriers do not obtain to the same extent in the informal sector, and when they do, they do not reflect action by those they protect to alter the superstructure. Clearly the technological barriers do not operate to the same extent; capital requirements are lower, and economies of scale are of little importance because the scale of operations is so small. In some cases skill requirements constitute a barrier to entry, as with, say, watch repairing, but this is more like technological than institutional barriers in the formal sector. Institutional factors are more important. These include in Zimbabwe measures like influx control and licencing regulations. For example, licencing regula-

tions imposed by municipal authorities (in order to limit numbers or to impose control for health purposes, etc.) confer some advantage on those who can obtain licences and are in effect the same as professional qualification requirements and other barriers to entry in the formal sector. The difference is that such regulations do not arise out of the impact of informal hawkers on the superstructure. Indeed, as will be shown, they are designed to protect the formal sector and only incidentally confer this privileged status on some informal sector members. Enforcement of the regulations depends upon bodies over which these people have no control and is carried out haphazardly *as far as their interests are concerned.*

MONOPOLIES : The situation with regard to monopolies is very similar. The formal sector in Zimbabwe, as in most capitalist economies, contains a large number of monopolistic and oligopolistic industries. In many cases this situation is brought about and protected by institutional and technological factors that constitute barriers to entry. In some instances in Zimbabwe the monopoly power is conferred by Government action, either directly, as for example in the Fertiliser industry, or indirectly, as in the case of sections of the Distilling industry, where it is conferred through exchange allocation policies. There also tends to be a high degree of (implicit) price collusion in the formal sector, partly through the effects of Government price controls, partly through cartel-type activities. This is particularly true of services such as provided by the medical and legal professions.

The monopolies which exist in the informal sector arise from the technological factors of certain activities, or from the impact of the superstructure in the same way as barriers to entry. Collusion in price setting is rare; in a survey of the sector in Hartley only one case of an attempt to fix prices was found, and that had been rebuffed by other members of the trade.

OWNERSHIP OF THE MEANS OF PRODUCTION : The formal sector in Zimbabwe is characterised by a high degree of foreign ownership and control of industry. This arises out of the historical development of this sector in Zimbabwe, developing as a colonial economy based on exploitation of natural resources for the capitalist metropole. The informal sector on the other hand is characterised by entirely indigenous ownership of its means of production. This situation arises out of the nature of informal production and its techniques of production, which are not amenable to the large scale investment which typifies foreign ownership. Furthermore, as has been argued above, the informal sector constitutes a peripheral or marginal activity in the world system of capitalist production. Its function, as will be shown, is to 'service' the formal sector through its impact on wage structures and labour supplies. Because of this it does not attract investment funds from international capital.

PRICE SETTING MECHANISMS : Prices in the informal sector are generally set by bargaining between the individuals involved in the transaction; in the formal sector they are far more likely to be set institutionally. The reason for this difference lies in the different production and distribution relations of the two modes of production and the different scales of the operations. By the very nature of production the informal operator has a closer contact or more personal relation with his client than do most formal operators. This is not to suggest that the institutional factors have no influence on prices in the informal sector. On the contrary, such factors are of prime importance, but they enter into the price setting mechanisms through their influence in the relative bargaining positions of buyer and seller. Prices are not fixed prior to a transaction; in the formal sector they are. Also, as has been mentioned above, price collusion is common in the formal sector but not in the informal.

LEGAL STATUS : While most formal activities are overtly legal, many informal activities involve some degree of illegality. This ranges from, say, hawking without a licence or renting accommodation illegally, through to prostitution, pick-pocketing, theft and burglary. However, this illegality derives from legal institutions embodying the values of the dominant class and designed to serve their interests. These might not be shared by members of the informal sector, who would therefore regard such activities as legitimate. In other words, this difference between the two sectors is another case of the nature of the informal sector being determined by the impact of the superstructure related to the formal mode of production. The distinction between illegality and illegitimacy is an important one for the understanding of the informal sector and will be dealt with in more detail in the following section.

SCALE : The scale of informal operations is smaller than that of formal operations. To an extent this arises out of the centre/periphery relationship between the two sectors, although it is not logically necessary that this macro-economic relationship need obtain between individual operations. It is also a consequence of differences in the two modes of production. There are also other important factors which explain the difference in size. Firstly informal operators do not have the same access to credit facilities that their formal counterparts have. This obviously limits the scale of operations, since it means that the periods between making outlays for materials and receiving income for products must be small. It also means that growth within the sector must be financed by internally generated surplus, while the formal sector has recourse to formal fund raising institutions. Secondly, because of the semi-legal nature of many informal activities vis a vis the dominant social formation, the risk involved in such activities is high. There is therefore no incentive to expand activities beyond a certain viable level. This would apply also to legal informal activities, since they do not have access

to the risk averting strategies of formal business (insurance, etc.)

PRODUCTION TECHNIQUES : Operations in the informal sector are more labour intensive than those in the formal sector. As with differences in scale, this also arises out of differences in the modes of production. It is also a consequence of the lack of credit and the slow rate of capital accumulation in the informal sector. Furthermore, the superstructure of the formal sector in Zimbabwe provides incentives for it to use capital intensive techniques, as do its links with international capital: these incentives do not exist for the informal sector.

III

The explanations of the formation of the informal sector can conveniently be categorised into two separable groups, those that look at the problem from the side of the informal workers, and those that emphasise the importance of the demand for informal goods and services.

Two different theories of the first type can be discerned in the literature. Firstly there is what might be termed the 'lumpenproletariat' theory. In oversimplified terms this approach paints the following scenario. Informal workers are unskilled in formal terms and therefore can only be suppliers of wage labour to the formal sector, or must lead the life of rural peasant farmers. However, the formal sector cannot provide enough urban employment, and the process of underdevelopment of the peasant economy has rendered it incapable of supporting adequately the entire rural population. Therefore potential wage labourers have to find temporary alternative means of subsistence: they find this in the informal sector. The informal sector, according to this view, thus consists of wage-labourers-in-waiting.

Such a simplified approach ignores the stratification which exists in the sector. Not all informal workers are seeking formal employment, although this may well be a reflection of the inadequacies of such jobs, rather than the desires of the workers. Accepting this reservation, the theory does have validity, particularly in independent Africa. In Zimbabwe, however, because of the institutional factors referred to in section II above, which confer a certain degree of monopoly status on informal workers and thus raise their income, the theory is not as valid. The evidence from the Hartley survey referred to indicates that although informal workers might initially intend seeking formal work, once they have worked in the sector for a short while they would not prefer the alternative formal jobs for which they are qualified.

The second theory in this broad category regards the informal sector as comprising incipient capitalists, or petty merchant capitalists. Work in the sector is either a viable income source for a small trading entrepreneur, or it is a stage in the process of capital accumulation, with workers eventually being incorporated into the formal economy.

Again this theory has a certain degree of validity. For example in the Hartley survey one of the informants was a firewood wholesaler. He had entered the sector after leaving formal employment as a driver "because the income was too low". He had chosen firewood selling after "investigating people's difficulty in obtaining firewood in Hartley". He estimated his income to be \$300 per month. He employed four labourers paying them \$3 per month each. He intended continuing the job until he had raised sufficient capital to establish a public transport business. But it would be as erroneous to suggest that the entire sector is made up of incipient capitalists as it would to suggest that all informal workers are potential formal sector wage labourers.

It is likely that a combination of these two views in part explains the formation of the urban

informal sector. It can be a buffer against unemployment; it can also provide a viable means of living and of raising capital. But clearly this is not a sufficient cause for its existence. It is necessary to show that there is in fact a demand for the goods and services produced by the informal sector, and to explain why this demand is not satisfied by formal activities.

There is no doubt that the demand exists. As far as the clients of the sector are concerned, it provides goods and services which would otherwise be unavailable or available only at a higher cost.

In some instances goods would not be available at all were it not for the informal sector. The shebeen provides a very different service from the municipality-run beer-hall. Illegal lodgings are often the only form of shelter available in a society which requires formal employment before providing housing. Of more importance, however, is the provision of lower cost goods and services. With trades such as radio, watch and cycle repairing, building, carpentry, clothes-making and so on, there do exist formal alternatives but generally only at a higher cost. In most cases the reasons for the higher costs are obvious: informal operators avoid overhead costs, taxes, and the restraints of minimum wage legislation. But what is often overlooked is that in many formal services the customer is paying for more than simply the nominal service which is being provided, but also for what might be called the 'ensurance of standards'. When a radio is repaired by a formal repairer there is the implicit guarantee that the work is carried out by competent (certified) workers. When one buys food from a formal foodseller one pays for the fact that the seller observes legislated health standards. Generally, however, these standards, particularly when governed by legislation, derive from the morality of the dominant class. For any subordinate class, such standards might be regarded as irrelevant or antithetical, and having to pay for them might be regarded either as a waste of money

or as inhibiting a desired life-style. In the words of the ILO Report "the regulations ensure a high quality of services and commodities for the wealthy few at the expense of the impoverished many" (6). By avoiding the costs imposed by having to observe these regulations the informal sector is able to satisfy the demands of the urban working class at a lower cost than the formal sector.

Thus the demand for the products of informal activities clearly exists. To an extent it derives from the relatively impoverished state of industrial workers. In Zimbabwe certain of the demands are created by the institutions which regulate the lives of urban black workers. For example, if male workers are not allowed to be accompanied by their wives in the cities, this creates a fairly obvious demand for prostitutes, or at least increases the demand above the level which would otherwise obtain.

It is now necessary to explain why the formal sector does not satisfy these demands. After all, capitalist development requires not only the increasing immiserisation of workers so as to ensure sufficient low cost labour supplies, but also the expansion of the market; indeed herein lies one of the basic contradictions of capitalism. Why then do the capitalists not expand into the existing market presently supplied by the informal sector ?

The failure of large scale capitalist industries to do this can be explained, firstly, by the technology of such enterprises, and secondly, by the orientation of such industries towards foreign rather than domestic markets. The technological characteristics (large scale operations requiring large markets) explain why these industries are not in the informal market in the first place. The large export markets reduce the necessity to develop internal markets.

One would rather expect competition to informal activities to come from small scale formal operators. Such competition does exist and often the

distinction between it and informal operations is ambiguous. In Zimbabwe many of the legislative restrictions on informal activities have either been explicitly designed to have the incidental effect of limiting the ability of the informal sector to compete with these petty formal capitalists. For example, all of the bye-laws regulating the issue of licences to hawkers allow municipal councils to refuse to issue them on the grounds that "in the opinion of the council such issue... would result in overtrading of the goods listed in the application" (7). The prime function of the legislative and administrative restrictions on informal activities is to limit competition between the informal sector, as black petty bourgeoisie, and small scale white capitalists. Arrighi places the whole legislative structure of Zimbabwe in perspective in this regard when he says, "(i)n restricting competition in these markets the Land Apportionment Act drew the general lines whereas more specialised legislation tightened the restrictions in the individual spheres" (8). It is in this connection that the distinction between illegal and illegitimate activities made in section II are important.

It may be observed in this respect that the main competition to the informal sector comes from black petty capitalists. Certainly they form one of the groups which is threatened most immediately by it. Given the structure of the Zimbabwean power system, and the limited (but possibly growing) ability of this group to press for legislation in its interests, it is likely that the restrictions which are imposed on informal activities only incidentally limit competition between the two groups. It is this subsection of the capitalist class which in fact has the greatest share of the informal market; African owned transport services compete directly with the pirate taxi operators, and probably cater more for the needs of the urban and rural working and peasant classes. But here it should be noted that in a number of cases these black petty capitalists have themselves developed out of informal sector origins. The sector has provided the

initial source for capital accumulation. One has a picture therefore of capitalist activities being internally generated within the sector, rather than systematically reducing the sector from outside.

There do exist several large scale operators within the informal sector who develop many capitalist traits but nevertheless remain essentially informal. The Hartley firewood wholesaler referred to previously is a good example. The reasons for this prolonged informality are, firstly, that many such operators achieve their growth through occupational pluralism, and none of their activities individually warrant formalisation; secondly, the institutional and legal structure provides an incentive to avoid formalisation as long as possible. Such a step effectively places more obligations on the operator than it initially grants advantages. This is particularly true of black operators in Zimbabwe who, as stated above, do not have the access to policy making bodies that would protect their interests. Thirdly, official attitudes to such activities, and to black businessmen in general, often block formalisation even if the operator desires it. The Land Tenure Act which restricts the siting of black businesses is an obvious example.

IV

It was stated in section I that the relationship between the formal and informal sectors is asymmetrically symbiotic. Some idea of what is meant by this should have been gained from section II. There it was shown that the informal sector requires the existence of the formal sector for its own existence. In a sense, this is a logical necessity, in the same way that day requires night to be 'day'. But the necessity is much more than that, since, as has been argued, the very nature of the informal sector is determined by the dominant formal social formation.

The formal superstructure defines the limits and boundaries of the informal sector. The informal sector depends on formal wages and demand generated in the formal sector for a great proportion of its markets. It also depends on the formal sector for supplies of certain inputs (for example informal watch repairers obtain parts from a formal sector supplier). Furthermore, as has been argued, monopoly status conferred on certain informal workers by formal laws designed to limit such activities, is important in maintaining formal incomes. But, and this is the crucial point, the informal sector is a dependent sector; perhaps this point can best be made by saying that these laws impose monopoly status on the informal sector but not monopoly power. The power still resides in the formal sector.

What the formal sector derives from the informal is more complex. Broadly speaking the informal sector is a result of the underdevelopment of the formal capitalist sector. Such development requires adequate supplies of low cost labour, which are ensured by the underdevelopment of the peasant economy, which forces workers off the land into industrial employment. (At the same time such underdevelopment limits the competitiveness of the peasant economy vis a vis capitalist producers, particularly formal agricultural producers.) The economy can therefore be regarded as consisting of two interlocked components, one which is being developed, the other which is being underdeveloped, both interacting to form a unified whole. The informal sector represents a sub-group of that part which is being underdeveloped. It provides both a field of activity for petty commodity producers who have been forced out of the peasant economy and an alternative to formal employment for peasants who have been forced off the land.

This being so one would expect the formal sector to seek to eliminate the informal, for it apparently interferes with the working of the underdevelopment process. If those who have been forced out of the peasant economy through the development of

underdevelopment can find employment other than in the formal economy, then one of the purposes of underdevelopment is thwarted.

The reason why its elimination is not sought, is because of the role the sector plays in regulating wages, in keeping them low. This it does in several important ways.

Firstly it lowers the minimum urban/rural differential necessary to cause migration. The migrant not only looks at the differential but at the probability of finding employment. The higher that probability, the lower the differential need be. The possibilities of informal employment increase the overall probability of finding urban employment and therefore lower the necessary differential. In this way the sector serves to keep the costs of labour supplies to the formal sector down.

Secondly, in acting as an alternative form of employment to formal employment, the sector takes on a social security role. It removes, or lowers, the need for the formal sector to provide unemployment insurance for its workers. Much has been made of the rural subsidy to industrial wages. The informal sector provides a similar subsidy, albeit quantitatively less important.

Thirdly, the informal sector, as has been argued, provides some services and goods at a lower cost than the formal sector. It can therefore be regarded as lowering the costs of subsistence i.e. the PDL. Again this allows formal sector employers to pay lower wages, either, if they are 'moral' employers, because their yardstick, the PDL, is lower, or as is more likely, because it weakens pressure from workers for higher wages.

It can be seen that the formal sector derives direct benefit from the existence of the informal. In view of this, the optimum strategy is not one of elimination but rather of keeping the sector an optimum size, not too big to be competitive, not so small as to have no influence on wages.

The operation of this strategy in Zimbabwe is demonstrated by the way that the legislative apparatus, which on paper restricts the sector drastically, is administered with varying effectiveness; periods of general laxity are followed by drives to clear slums, to remove beggars and 'vagrants' and generally to clamp down on informal activities.

V

Recognition of the existence of the informal sector has serious implications for development policy. Essentially these are that the informal sector must play an important part in any development strategy which is concerned as much with the distribution of the benefits of development as with maximising them as a whole. Indeed the ILO Report gave a central role to the informal sector in its recommended strategy for Kenya. Although this paper has been primarily concerned with identifying the informal sector and building a conceptual framework within which it can be analysed, it obviously has relevance for policy analysis. In particular, if the model put forward is valid, it leads one to conclude that, for Zimbabwe at least, there is little chance of an ILO-type strategy being adopted. That will have to wait until the dominant, formal mode of production is radically changed.

FOOTNOTES AND REFERENCES :

- (1) I would like to acknowledge the influence of my colleague Duncan Clarke on this paper, and to thank him for it. He is responsible for arousing my interest in the "informal sector" in the first place and for helping to form many of the ideas expressed on it.

- (2) The first of these aspects has been dealt with for Zimbabwe in Rob Davies', "The Informal Sector in Rhodesia : How Important ?" *Rhodesia Science News*, 8(7), July, 1974. A paper which deals admirably with the second is Tina Wallace, "Working in Rural Buganda : a Study of the Occupational Activities of Young People in Rural Villages", 8th Annual Conference of the East African Universities Social Science Council, (mimeo) December, 1972, Niarobi. The policy implications of the informal sector are dealt with most fully in the ILO's excellent report, *Employment, Income and Equality : a Strategy for Increasing Productive Employment in Kenya*, ILO, Geneva, 1972.
- (3) Keith Hart, "Informal Income opportunities and Urban Employment in Ghana", *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, II(1), 1973 p.68
- (4) Hart, *op. cit.*, p.69
- (5) Wallace, *op. cit.*, p.5
- (6) ILO, *op. cit.*, p.504
- (7) RGN 37/71. This relates to Hawking bye-laws in Hartley, but the wording is identical to that of any other municipal or Town Management Board bye-laws
- (8) Arrighi, *The Political Economy of Rhodesia*, Mouton, 1967, p.33

INFORMAL EMPLOYMENT IN URBAN ZIMBABWE:
SELECTED CASE STUDIES IN SALISBURY (May, 1973)

by G.S. O'Cleary

A: HAWKER AND ILLEGAL LANDLORD

A is a 50 year old man with 7 children and a wife in the rural areas. He has lived and worked in Salisbury for 26 years and goes home 2 or 3 times each year. After working as a trainee builder and trainee carpenter, A began to trade as a hawker in 1950 selling vegetables mostly to Whites and domestic workers in the suburbs and flat areas. His gross income from trading is in the vicinity of \$216 monthly. In addition, A operates two houses, one in Salisbury and Bulawayo, which he lets out to lodgers at very high rentals. The 4 lodgers in Bulawayo pay \$7 each month and in Salisbury A charges \$4.50 monthly. After costs, which include licensing, rental, transport and costs of supplies, A's net income approximates \$118 monthly. A regards this return on the 6 hours he spends on the job as 'highly pleasing'. He does sell on credit, up to approximately \$6 monthly, and is restricted by his hawker's license from selling in the central business district. A is accommodated legally and has no desire yet to take on a different job, but when he gets older he would prefer to have more regular employment before he finally retires, to open up a small shop, in the rural areas.

B: VEGETABLE SELLER

B is 56 years of age. She has 5 children and her husband is a retired police sergeant. She has been selling vegetables since 1957 and her business is the principle source of family income. B has lived in Salisbury for 35 years and has had no education. Apart from selling vegetables, B has been selling firewood since 1963 and is also involved in transporting vegetables from the Main Market to the township on behalf of other sellers. For this purpose she owns two vans. Chicken sales are another sideline activity. She is involved, therefore, in 4 different, though related, trades. B's net receipts above costs total

around \$520 monthly, an exceptional amount, even for an independent small-scale trader whose risks are hedged and revenues are boosted by 'occupational pluralism'. All sections of B's trades are thriving, vegetable selling accounting for over 60 per cent of her net income. B works a 10 hour day, mostly ordering and supervising the 5 employees in her firm. The total wage bill for the latter amount to \$50 monthly. All of B's 5 children are overseas in Britain studying: 3 are training as nurses and 2 as motor mechanics. She does not have credit problems as she sells mainly for cash to her African customers. B will continue her trades for 'as long as (she) can manage'. She does not wish to start any new ventures and looks forward to 'retirement and rest'.

C: VEGETABLE AND FRUIT MIDDLEMAN

C occupies an important niche in the vegetable market. Before becoming a middleman, trading between the Main Market and the townships, C had been a farm-hand and a domestic worker at low and 'unsatisfactory' wage rates. In 1960 he moved to Salisbury and in 1963 began his present job. He terminated work with his employer in 1963 after his employer had left the country and 'began selling bananas, starting with 4d.' because he could not find work. Today C's net income ranges around \$600 monthly and he employs 2 workers at a monthly total cost of \$30. C regards the return as 'very satisfactory' though he works 17 hours daily (from 4.00 a.m. to 9 p.m.) on his business. Much of C's income consists of returns resulting from the oligopolistic character of the vegetable trade at the middleman level, though his turnover level is very high (\$8 000 - \$9 000 monthly). C's customers are other vegetable sellers, mainly in the townships. At one time he employed 18 workers. He is starting to sell chickens and hopes to open up a grocer shop as well as buy a house in order to take in lodgers. Eventually, he wishes to open up a hotel and buy a farm.

D: VEGETABLE AND FRUIT SELLER

D has been selling vegetables since 1968 because it is the only job she knows of which provides sufficient returns for her to provide for her large family (8 in all). D has only received education up to Standard 5 and has been in Salisbury for over a decade. She sells vegetables from a stall in the township and also trades occasionally as a hawker. Her income of \$75 after costs have been met, supplements her husband's wages from formal employment. D works 9 hours daily at her trade and operates legally. Her ambition is to open up a grocer's shop with her husband.

E: DOMESTIC WORKER AND FIREWOOD SELLER

E is a 42 year old father of 6 children, half of whom live in the rural areas together with his parents and a second wife whom he must support. Before taking a job as a cook in Salisbury in 1964, E worked as a tractor driver on a farm for approximately 14 years, a period during which his cash wage increased from \$5 monthly to \$14 monthly. His formal job now pays a cash wage of \$17 monthly and, in addition, E receives wages in kind estimated to be valued at about \$8 monthly. He took on an informal job, as a firewood seller, in order to supplement his income. E has been doing this since 1970. His business operates in the township and he employs a young girl for \$7 monthly to operate his enterprise whilst he is at work. E also rents a house in the township and grows some of his food requirements. The net income from his firewood selling trade averages \$22 monthly and accounts for 44 per cent of E's total monthly income. E regards his returns as satisfactory for his present level of operations. He hopes to concentrate on his business and eventually leave his formal job once he has acquired a stand of his own in the township.

F: COW DUNG SELLER

F is a 28 year old married man with one child in the rural areas. At present he is looking for a secure, formal job in Salisbury and divides his time between this pursuit (in the afternoons) and a small informal trade of gathering and selling cow dung manure to white clients in the Northern suburbs of Salisbury. He has lived in Salisbury for 8 years having worked as a domestic worker in 1965 for \$5 monthly and as a brickmaker and building assistant at various times. He left this latter job because his 'contract expired'. F's informal trade enables him to live in the urban area, look for a permanent job and obtain sufficient to survive on whilst doing this. F owns a bicycle, an important asset in his business and has zero production costs. His net income averages around \$12 monthly and he lives illegally with various friends for different periods of time in their rooms in the suburbs. He will continue his trade until such time as he can obtain employment in a building or a factory job. He does not wish to work either on a farm or in domestic employment because of the low return in those occupations. F wishes for his child to become a teacher.

G: CARPENTER

G use to work as a factory worker until 1968 when he took up earning his income from carpentry because his weekly wage of \$4,50 was too low for all the hard work he put into his job. Today he employs 2 assistants for \$30 monthly each and earns a net income of \$165 monthly. G makes some of this income from apprenticeship fees and he usually has 1 apprentice at a time, each person for a 3 month period, charging \$8 monthly. In addition, G has a lodger in his residence who contributes \$5 monthly to his income. G has been in Salisbury for 13 years and operates in the township. His two children live in the rural areas with his parents whom he visits regularly. For his 9 hours of work daily G regards the returns

as satisfactory. Most of his customers are Africans. Eventually G hopes to open up on a stand of his own and to install sophisticated electrical equipment. He hopes that his two children will become school teachers or carpenters.

H: BASKETMAKER AND SELLER

H, an unmarried young man of 19 years, has been in Salisbury since the age of 5 and has received no formal education. His father persuaded him to enter his present trade which he conducts in the Northern Suburbs in Salisbury with 2 other sellers in the form of a collective though he operates independently within the 'firm'. H's net income averages \$53 monthly. Since he lives with his parents his single most important cost is transport. Most of H's time is taken up producing his wares. All his customers are Whites and he has no intention of taking up a formal job. In the future, he intends to expand his business and employ one or two assistants. His eventual ambition is to open up a shop.

I: SHOE SHINER

I is a 19 year old youth who has been in Salisbury for 3 years. He has a Standard 5 education and was formerly employed as a domestic worker for a cash wage of \$9 monthly, as well as \$5 payments in kind. He has been unable to find another job and so took up shoe shining in the city area. His net monthly income seldom falls below \$8 and he shares a rented room with a friend in an illegal lodging. He has no licence and his main problem is being caught by the police for illegal lodging. Most of I's customers are Africans and his price of 5c per pair of shoes shined, partly reflects the income class of his customer. I would take a job in industry or domestic service if he could obtain one, but would not work on a farm because 'the work is hard, wages are low and it is dirty'.

J: SHOE REPAIRER

J is 47 years of age and has lived in Salisbury for 25 years. His 6 children live with his wife in the rural areas and he visits them regularly. Prior to taking up as a shoe repairer in 1967, J worked as a domestic worker, first as an 'inside worker' until he acquired the art of cooking, and then as a cook. His last wage rate was \$21 (cash and kind). At present J lives with his cousin in Seki Tribal Trust Land close to Salisbury. His net monthly income from shoe repairs totals \$22 and this is supplemented from food produced in the place in which he is domiciled valued at \$6 monthly. J goes into the town daily, works from 8 a.m. to 5 p.m. and operates illegally under a tree in the townships. His major fear is being arrested and fined because he has no license or premises on which to operate. He does not wish to take any other job on a farm, in a factory or in domestic employment and he is always hoping to expand his trade. J eventually wishes to retire to the rural areas with his family and 'attend to (his) affairs at home'.

K: SECOND-HAND CLOTHES DEALER

K is a man in his late thirties with 5 children, all of whom live with him. He has had a Standard 6 education and has been living in Salisbury for 18 years. He has worked as a second-hand clothes dealer for the last 15 years, his previous employment being that of a professional boxer. This latter job yielded insufficient remuneration, uncertain earnings and had no long-term prospects. K began his present trade after hearing from friends that it was profitable. He employs one other person in his business, for \$8 monthly, and he nets up to \$250 monthly. K's trade is voluminous and he has carefully built it up over the years. Being reasonably capitalized, K runs a small van to help him in his business. K lives in his own house, does not take in lodgers, but does grow some of his own food requirements. He

rents a stall in the township and is a legal trader. He would like to expand his business interests to open up a hairdressing saloon. K wants his daughters to become State Registered Nurses and to marry successful men. He would like his sons to become (initially) University graduates.

L: CAR WASHER

L presently finds employment washing cars in Salisbury car parks. His employment record is a long one. Having only reached Standard 1 at school, he began working on a mine near Sinoia for 23 shillings monthly in 1949. He left this job because of the low wages and took a job as a domestic worker in Salisbury with various employers from 1958 onwards until recently when he lost his job after his employer was transferred. In his last job he received \$10 monthly and took up car washing because he could not obtain paid employment elsewhere. Net monthly income from L's present trade averages around \$17 monthly. He is an illegal lodger and he lives with a friend in the township. L has been in Salisbury for 15 years but has not been able to get his own accommodation. Consequently, his 6 children live in the rural areas and the family is financially assisted by L's brother who is a businessman. L works a 9 hour day and regards his returns as 'low and uncertain' particularly in the light of the risk from police prosecution for illegal trading. L has been to jail on two occasions for washing cars 'illegally'. L is sick and now getting old. He wishes to return home soon, but before doing so would take a job in domestic employment because of the security of accommodation this might provide as well as the regularity of income.

M: CYCLE REPAIRER

M is a young, unmarried man of 25 who has had a Standard 4 education and has lived in Salisbury for the last 9 years, working as an upholsterer's assistant and in a cycle shop in town. He left

these jobs because of low wages and in 1966 began his present trade, taking over his father's business in 1971 after the latter died. M operates in the township and rents a room in which he lives as a legal lodger for \$7 as well as a place to carry out his work. His net monthly income comes to \$55 and he is employed for 9-10 hours daily. M hopes to continue his trade for many years to come, to expand his business and take on employees in the future. He has plans to continue to do upholstery work and also produce kitchenware. This he hopes to do by involving his younger brothers in the cycle repair business, leaving himself more time to pursue other jobs.

N: MOTOR MECHANIC

N is 31 years of age, married with one child who lives with him and his wife in the township. He has lived in Salisbury since birth and has worked as a factory worker and assistant mechanic in a local garage until his employer transferred his business to another town. At this stage N was earning \$40 monthly. Now his net income averages \$80 monthly and N works a 9 hour day. N does not have a stand from which to operate. He therefore trades illegally, repairing cars in the streets, and does occasionally have problems with both the police and the township authorities. N hopes for his son to become either an engineer or a motor mechanic. He wishes to eventually open up his own garage.

O: UPHOLSTERER AND SECOND-HAND BED AND
MATTRESS SELLER

O has worked as an independent upholsterer since 1970 before which he had been a petrol attendant (1954-56) and a hawker (1956-69). He is 42 years of age, has 7 children, all in the urban areas and he himself has received a Standard 5 education. O terminated his work as a hawker because 'the job was becoming difficult and the distances too great'. At this stage his monthly income averaged between \$40-\$60. He learnt the art of

upholstering from a friend and now makes a monthly net income of \$80 from his two enterprises. Most of O's workers are Africans in the townships. He rents a house in the township and also rents a stand from which he operates. In addition, O grows vegetables for his family and sells maize from the rural areas to supplement his income. In his business, O employs 2 youths for a total wage bill of \$14 monthly. Eventually O hopes to open up a small shop.

P: RADIO REPAIRER AND PART-TIME ELECTRICIAN

P is a young man of 23 years who has completed a Form 3 education and has worked in various electricity jobs in three Salisbury firms. Since 1971 he has been operating his own business. He left his formal job because the 'work was unsatisfactory' and, on the last occasion, 'because (he) did not like the idea of being lined up and searched at the end of every day'. P enjoys tinkering with electrical items. He now runs a radio repair business and works at nights for a cinema group. The latter job provides him with \$48 monthly and his net business income with another \$60. P is living with his parents at present. His work hours are long and hard but the returns are 'very satisfactory'. Eventually P hopes to open up a shop selling electrical goods.

Q: WATCH REPAIRER

Q began working in 1965 as a factory worker for \$32 monthly. He left this job in 1970 because of low wages. Now he supports his 2 children and wife, as well as (partially) his ageing parents, through working as a watch repairer. Q's education only went as far as Standard 4. He operates from a shopping centre in the township and rents a place to work for \$5 monthly. His family are in the rural areas and Q rents accommodation as a legal lodger for \$5 monthly. His net monthly income is in the vicinity of \$60 at present and he hopes to expand his business eventually.

R: TAILOR AND LAUNDRY OPERATOR

R is 50 years of age. She has had 3 years of primary education and has 11 children, 5 of whom live with her husband in the urban area. She employs 3 other workers whom she provides with food, lodging and a small cash wage, estimated at \$18 monthly in total. R's net income exceeds \$22 monthly, one-third coming from the laundry service. She trades legally and has a license to operate. The family live in rented accommodation and R would like to expand her volume of trade, though this is difficult because of the large number of tailors operating, in order to further supplement her income to provide for her large family.

S: PIRATE TAXI OPERATOR AND LANDLORD

S is a 48 year old man who has 6 children living with him and his wife in Salisbury. He has been in Salisbury for 25 years and has worked as a driver's assistant (1948-53) with a transport company and as a vehicle driver (1953-67) for \$60 monthly. S lost his job because of illness and because he could not get immediate paid employment he began to operate, with an old van, as a pirate taxi. He now runs a combi and operates all over the town. S estimates his net income from his taxi operations at \$150 monthly. In addition, he has 2 legal lodgers on his rented premises. S works a long day but regards the returns as satisfactory. He does, however, have serious trading problems as he always has to be on guard against arrest and conviction. He intends to open a market stall for his wife in order to augment his income from vegetable selling. Eventually, S would like to open up 'a safer business', perhaps a small grocer's shop.

T: SHEBEEN OPERATOR AND FOOD SELLER

T has lived 24 of her 45 years in Salisbury. She has 4 children who live with her and her husband in their own (rented) accommodation. Since 1958 T has operated an illegal shebeen, selling

liquor and food to customers mostly out of hours and at the weekends. Formerly, T was a school mistress in Salisbury. Her net income from her trade is \$100 monthly. The trade is illegal but the 'firm' has not encountered any problems thus far. T's husband has a formal job and T's business makes a substantial contribution to household income.

THE STRUGGLE FOR SHELTER IN AN URBAN ENVIRONMENT

by Di Seager

INTRODUCTION

The urban areas in Zimbabwe/Rhodesia have managed to avoid the growth of large 'informal housing sectors' or 'shanty towns' which are frequently characteristic of cities of the developing world. Nevertheless during September-October 1976 a squatter settlement of some 2 600 families mushroomed on Derbyshire Estate, European land located 16 km from the centre of Salisbury. A combined exercise by the municipality and government during November relocated the majority of these people in a transitional urban settlement, where they were provided with some basic services. This article attempts firstly to investigate who these people were, whence they came and why they were there, using material from a survey conducted by the Salisbury Municipality Department of Community Development . (1) Secondly, it briefly reviews how the authorities handled the issue.

Generally the manifestation of urban squatting becomes apparent when the rate of in-migration of families from the smaller towns or rural areas is greater than the rate at which the city can absorb or integrate the families into the existing social structure of urban society. In the country as a whole the percentage of the total African population resident in the main areas has not changed appreciably between 1962 and 1975: 14,4 in 1962, 13,6 in 1969 and 16,5 in 1975. (2) The urban centres are not being swamped by a wave of rural migrants. This is primarily the result of legislation which enables authorities to control the flow of work-seekers entering the towns. (3) The Africans (Urban Areas) Accommodation and Registration Act of 1951 requires that all residents of African townships and domestic workers resident on employer's premises are registered with township authorities. Further, this Act stipulates that for a married man to obtain housing his marriage must be registered by a District Commissioner. The Vagrancy Act empowers

civil authorities to send back to Tribal areas those Africans who cannot prove they are gainfully employed or formally registered urban residents. Such a person may be banned from a town for up to 2 years by the District Commissioner who shall endorse his or her registration certificate to that effect. The Land Tenure Act specifies those areas in which persons of each race may reside, and enables authorities to sweep aside any embryonic squatter settlements. The policy in most centres is to regulate the flow of migrant men according to the availability of employment, thereby preventing the accumulation of too large a pool of unemployed, the latter being seen as a threat to civil peace in urban areas. 'Single' male workers are normally able to obtain accommodation either on employer's premises or in barrack style quarters in the African townships or as lodgers. The size of the overall urban population (including dependents) is thus very much a function of housing provision and availability of employment.

While the legislation described above has prevented a large influx of rural migrants, numerous unemployed persons do live in the urban areas, especially the larger ones. The true figure for the populations of the various townships may be as much as *double* the official figure. Furthermore, although there is no great influx of people into the cities the urban population is growing rapidly with the growth of second generation city-dwellers. Stopforth estimates that 14,7 per cent of the adult population of Highfield can be described as second generation urban, i.e. born in the town. (4) The African population of Salisbury according to the 1969 census was 280 000 while the estimate as at 31 December 1975 (5) was 430 000. Housing provision over the last ten years has been at the rate of approximately 5 000 units per annum; and this has not and cannot in any way keep pace with the demand. The waiting-list for housing in the Salisbury Municipality comprises some 14 000 *heads* of households, a figure which gives some indication of the backlog. This housing shortage, combined with strict regulations

on qualification for housing, forces a large number of people to seek alternative dwelling arrangements.

Alternative dwelling takes the form of legal, or more frequently, "illegal" lodging; lodgers generally pay exorbitant rents, such as \$8-\$10 a month for one room. Otherwise the people use their own initiative and ingenuity to construct temporary shelters using whatever materials available, such as plastic sheeting, metal sheets, poles and grass. Squatter settlements have existed in various areas of Salisbury since the birth of the city, but nothing has matched the scale of the Derbyshire Settlement. In the early 1960s a squatter establishment of approximately 2 500 people was formed on the banks of the Hunyani river. The government feared pollution of the river and Salisbury's water supply, and over a period of 2 years it moved the people from this area to plots which were individually served with running water and latrines on which the people built their own houses. Other squatter settlements have merely been 'flushed out' by the municipal authorities with no alternative arrangements provided for the people.

THE DERBYSHIRE SETTLEMENT

The core of the Derbyshire settlement, a group of about 200 people, had existed since 1958; these people were living "illegally" on European-owned land that was not being farmed but on part of which a granite quarry is operating. Over the years no attempt was made by the authorities to establish whether or not these people were employed by the quarry.

Between August and October of 1976, this small settlement grew dramatically into a population of some 12 000. The suddenness of growth in population appears to have been due to the fact that political considerations suddenly impinged upon the underlying social and economic facts. Social aspects are laid down in the legislation previously mentioned: the need for a registered

marriage. Many marriages remain unregistered because the fathers-in-law will not give due recognition to a marriage until the *lobola* payment has been completed. They consider that because of the influence of urbanisation, sons-in-law will fail to honour their payment obligations; this is different from traditional marriage which is recognised after the first instalment of *lobola* has been paid. Economic factors, in addition to the increasing unemployment brought about by the state of the Rhodesian economy, included the raising of rents by Salisbury Municipality in August 1976; lodgers were frequently prevailed upon to pay the greater portion of this rise. Political events that suddenly supervened were the Prime Minister's statement on 24 September declaring "majority rule within two years". In addition there was a statement to the press by Joshua Nkomo on 17 October in which he raised the people's expectations by stating that: 'the land belonged to the people and would be used for their benefit. If a person used the land for the people's good, no one would take his farm. Absentee landowners would not be allowed nor would land speculation'. (6) In addition to this, guerilla warfare and conditions in the rural areas resulted in men, hitherto 'single', suddenly bringing their families into the urban areas for safety. These factors, combined with the housing shortage, appear to have been the main motivating forces behind the massive move to Derbyshire.

People moved to Derbyshire in their thousands. A committee was set up among the long-standing residents under the leadership of a Mr. Chimusoro, who had been in the area since 1958. This Resident's Committee was responsible for assisting and advising in the pegging out of plots of land on which people erected shelters using whatever material was available. A rocky outcrop was used as a communal latrine, and an attempt was being made to dig pit-latrines. Water for drinking was available from wells in the area. Traders vended fruit and vegetables, and builders and tailors conducted their trade. The community had its own football and netball teams and playing fields

were set aside in the centre of the settlement.

The Department of Community Development of Salisbury Municipality conducted a survey of the people of Derbyshire at the beginning of October. The purpose of this survey was to discover who these people were, their reasons for being in Derbyshire and their previous residence. Two hundred and sixty heads of households were interviewed, constituting at that stage a sample survey of approximately five per cent of the population.

The survey showed that, of these 260 heads of households, 212 were men and 48 were women. Self-employed and employed men constituted 81 per cent (173) of male heads of households. However, in terms of the legislation only 25 per cent (53) were single or had a registered marriage and were thus eligible for municipal accommodation. This figure may be reduced further when one considers the requirements of the present housing development schemes. The figure of \$50 income is taken as an index because it is the cut-off wage figure used in assessing the suitability of applicants for housing at Zengeza, the area where the housing schemes are being developed. The survey showed that, when considering the size of income, only 11 per cent (25) would be able to take advantage of presently available housing. Those disqualified because of unregistered marriages, but otherwise earning a minimum of \$50 were 20 per cent (43) of male heads of households.

Women heads of households constituted 18 per cent of the sample. The majority of those women were divorced or widowed, generally earning less than their male counterparts; 79 per cent (38) of the women earned some form of income, but only 12,5 per cent (6) of them earned more than \$50 a month. Besides low incomes, women have further problems in obtaining housing. When a couple who are tenants of the municipality are divorced or separated, they must forfeit the house. The man may find 'single' accommodation, but for a divorced woman with children the securement of

accommodation is extremely difficult. At the discretion of the township superintendent, depending on the demand for housing in the area, widowed women may maintain the house, providing they can meet the rent; otherwise they have to find themselves alternative accommodation.

The survey showed clearly that the majority of heads of households were urban dwellers of long standing: 59 per cent (154) of the total had been living in Salisbury for 11 years or more and 21 per cent (57) had been living in Salisbury for between 6 and 10 years.

GOVERNMENT AND MUNICIPAL ACTION

On 4 October the Mayor of Salisbury and the Minister of Local Government and Housing met to decide on a policy of action for the growing squatter community on Derbyshire. At this stage the population numbered nearly 2 000, but with publicity from the mass-media this figure was to grow to 12 000 by the end of October.

As the squatter community is a few kilometres outside the city boundary, the municipality did not consider it to be its "problem", but the government was reluctant to assume responsibility for the settlement. The Minister of Local Government and Housing, referring to the large number of low-cost houses to be built at Seki to accommodate some of the squatters, made the following statement to the press on 12 October 1976:

"The Government is not normally involved with providing African housing, which is largely the responsibility of the municipal authorities. We have launched this crash programme to help them out due to the size and urgency of the problem".

It was decided at the meeting on 4 October that the squatters should be moved some 20 kms by road to land at Zengeza. This land, located approximately 22 kms from the centre of Salisbury, was previously excised from Seki Tribal Trust Land

and was scheduled for development in 1978. The area at Zengeza is being considered as a 'transitional settlement'. Here provision was made for 2 600 plots of 9,5 x 10m on to which the people, with the assistance of municipal transport, moved their belongings and building materials and constructed their own dwellings similar to those in which they had lived at Derbyshire. Communal taps, latrines and a refuse collection service were provided; plans allowed for one tap per 6 families (i.e. approximately 30 people), and one latrine per 4 families. Rent for each plot, to cover services and wages for extra staff employed by the Zengeza Township, is \$2,50 a month.

The Salisbury City Council agreed to move people to Zengeza if they could prove that they were employed; however a select number of self-employed (who could be classified as constituting part of the 'informal sector' of the economy) were also included. (8)

In the 9 days during the joint operation by the Government and Salisbury City Council, 1 909 families (approximately 9 000 people) were screened and moved. This selection process left an estimated 700 families (approximately 3 000 people); these were families of 'aliens' or unemployed, for whom the Department of Social Welfare and Internal Affairs was considered responsible. The government departments appeared unwilling to accept this responsibility and asked the Council to reconsider its decision not to accept 'aliens' and unemployed. However the Council was adamant in its decision that the responsibility for these people remained with the government.

For the people already at Zengeza, the Government policy envisaged relocation of the majority on a \$1 million government housing scheme at Seki which provided for 1 500 full serviced two-roomed houses at a rent of \$9,50 a month. These units are specifically designed for workers earning less than \$55 a month. The first 40 homes were completed by the end of November 1976 and the

remainder made available at the rate of 50 per week. Those people already on the municipal housing list were given priority in the move; legislation concerning the need for a registered marriage was waived. *The Government Gazette* of 21 January 1977 noted the revocation of the appointment of District Commissioners and Assistant District Commissioners as competent authorities for the purpose of assessing African women as "approved wives" (in terms of the Africans (Urban Areas) Accommodation and Registration Act) and listed the appointment of various competent authorities with the power to recognise women as "approved wives". (9) In Salisbury this power was granted to the Director and Assistant Director of African Administration of Salisbury Municipality.

CONCLUSION

Popular misconceptions portray squatters as poor peasants new to towns and the modern economy. The survey clearly shows that the people of Derbyshire were urban dwellers; 80 per cent of the sample had been living in Salisbury for 6 years or more. Furthermore, in the majority of cases the wages earned by these people were considered to be low. However, 18 per cent of the total sample were found to be unemployed. Van Velsen's study of 'unauthorised settlements' in Zambia also found that there was no evidence that squatter areas were largely occupied by rural migrants who continued to flock to town irrespective of the availability of employment. (10) Another popular assumption is that squatter settlements are areas of high social disorganisation; poor physical conditions are often thought to be highly correlated with the evidence of high degrees of alienation and antisocial behaviour. This spurious correlation is not supported by the inhabitants of the Derbyshire settlement, the people showed organisation, being evidenced by the existence of a Resident's Association, football and netball teams and their efforts to provide pit-latrines. Furthermore, there was no evidence of crime in the form of theft, mugging or murder.

The Derbyshire squatter settlement was an attempt by the people to meet their needs for shelter in the urban environment. The shortage of housing, in particular low-cost housing, together with legislation disqualifying them from taking advantage of available accommodation left these people homeless; 25 per cent of male heads of households were eligible for housing but due to the backlog of housing or cost of available housing were obliged to find alternative accommodation, and the unregistered marriages of 57 per cent of males disqualified them from obtaining housing. In terms of life style and social networks, it appears that no real distinction can be made between Derbyshire people and the township dwellers; rather differences appear to be in marital status and size of income (factors that have driven many from the townships). The government's relaxation of housing regulations, by waiving the requirement that marriages be registered, has now made a considerable number of families eligible for housing.

In Salisbury, urban housing for the low income population has generally taken the form of subsidised mass public housing programmes, the rationale being that public sector management and control of this section of the urban housing supply would ensure adequate housing standards and facilitate orderly urban development. However, despite legislation controlling the flow of population into the urban areas and specifying qualifications for housing, the provision of housing through these schemes has not kept pace with popular demand. In many other developing countries a smaller and smaller proportion of the population has benefited directly from the performance of urban housing authorities and the formal housing market generally; while a greater proportion of these cities' households have found or invented settlement and housing solutions *outside* the urban laws and institutions that supposedly govern their action and meet their needs. An example is the city of Lusaka whose squatter and slum population increased from 27 per cent of the city's total population in 1967 to 48 per cent in 1970.

Rethinking on housing policy in many developing countries has led to the realisation that a very substantial part of the low-income population can and do house themselves without direct control or direct housing assistance. Furthermore, there was the realisation that these popular actions are likely to happen relatively speedily and satisfactorily in a secure urban setting where families have at least the prospect of long term legal tenure of their land and the use of urban facilities and services; hence the introduction of 'site and service' schemes. Many variations of the 'site and service' scheme have been tried out in various developing countries. Zambia provides an interesting case of evolution in public housing policy towards self-help 'site and service' schemes. (11) These schemes were initially introduced in the mid-1960s as a means of resettling squatters. The government accepted the fact that available resources were grossly inadequate to provide conventional contractor-built houses for every urban family. Instead they settled for the provision of realistic services so as to create a basic environment which can be subsequently improved through a stage-by-stage process. The poor build the cheapest possible houses in the most economical way open to them by using their own resources, labour and savings.

The Zengeza 'site and service' scheme was not in terms of government policy to be considered a permanent 'transit camp' for those unable to find accommodation in the townships; rather the municipality was anxious to house those people as soon as possible in government and municipal housing schemes. However, the squatter problem is going to arise from time to time until the urban areas are able to provide adequate accommodation at rents that are within the reach of the low income groups. 'Site and service' schemes may well prove a satisfactory way of meeting the peoples' needs for shelter.

FOOTNOTES :

- (1) I should like to thank Mr D. Passmore, Senior Community Service Officer, Salisbury Municipality department of Community Development for giving me access to data gathered during the survey.
- (2) *Census of Population, 1969, 7; Supplement to the Monthly Digest of Statistics, October 1976, 2.*
- (3) The Africans (Urban Areas) Accomodation and Registration Act (Chapter 242); The Vagrancy Act (Chapter 92); The Land Tenure Act (Chapter 148).
- (4) P. Stopforth, *Survey of Highfield African Township* (Salisbury, Univ. of Rhodesia, Dep. of Sociology, Occasional Paper No. 6, 1971), 18.
- (5) *Supplement to the Monthly Digest of Statistics, Oct 1976, 2.*
- (6) *The Rhodesia Herald, 18 Oct. 1976.*
- (7) *The Rhodesia Herald, 12 Oct. 1976.*
- (8) R.J. Davies, 'The Informal Sector in Rhodesia; How Important?', *The Rhodesia Science News* (1974), 8, 216-20, gives examples of the work engaged in by these people: pirate taxi operators, shebeen queens, cowdung sellers, fruit and vegetable hawkers, second-hand clothing traders, bicycle repairers, and basket makers.
- (9) Rhodesia, *Government Gazette, 21 Jan. 1977, Rhodesia Notice No. 66 of 1977.*
- (10) Van Velsen, 'Urban squatters: Problem or solution', in D. Parkin (ed.), *Town and Country in Central and Eastern Africa* (London, Oxford Univ. Press, 1975), 294-307.
- (11) C.E. Madavo, 'Zambia: Squatters' Self-help', *South African Outlook*, June 1976, 91-91.

A NOTE ON LABOUR RELATIONS
IN SOUTHERN RHODESIAN AGRICULTURE
BEFORE 1939

by I.R. Phimister

Of the many gaps remaining in Southern Rhodesian labour history, perhaps the most important concerns African agricultural labour in the plantation sector. Such studies as there have been, although from markedly different perspectives, have focused exclusively on post-1945 developments. For example, in 1950, the *Rhodesian Agricultural Journal* carried a lengthy report, in two parts, by V.M. Wadsworth on "Native Labour in Agriculture" (1) Wadsworth's work was a detailed survey of labour use and mechanisation possibilities in several branches of commercial agriculture, and was written from the point of view of its practical application by interested white farmers. Thereafter, labour studies languished for some twenty years. In the early 1970s articles by Chavuriduka (2) and by Duncan (3) appeared, and while these variously discussed the wages, mobility and supply of African labour, neither was concerned to explore Wadsworth's categorisation of black farm-workers as 'serfs of old' (4). It was only with a series of studies by Clarke (5) that this categorisation was subjected to serious analysis and, indeed, its fundamental importance to the profitability of commercial agriculture appreciated.

But while understanding of post-war commercial agriculture has become increasingly sophisticated, virtually nothing is known about African agricultural labour before the 1940s. In part, this is due to lack of archival material. By contrast to the local mining industry, farm labour conditions were never regularly investigated by compound inspectors, and consequently there is no equivalent evidence for agricultural labour conditions. However, the archival cupboard is far from being

completely bare. A picture of sorts can be built up from evidence contained in the rare conferences and commissions of enquiry into farm labour conditions.

One such conference met at the beginning of 1939 in response to concern expressed by the Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesian administrations over the incidence of scurvy on Southern Rhodesian farms. The very fact that scurvy - a disease induced by inadequate nourishment and overwork - existed in the *agricultural* industry was itself an impressive indictment of labour conditions. According to the Labour Officer for Nyasaland, a 'very great number' of Southern Rhodesian farmers gave 'little or no attention to feeding, housing and medical attention of and for their employees'. Another witness deplored the consequences of 'small' rations, and thought it necessary to point out that on 'a ration of meal and beans only a Native will develop scurvy in three months'. An inspection of a farm in the Sinoia area had revealed 7 out of 82 Nyasaland labourers suffering from scurvy. None of them were recent arrivals and all had been on the farm for at least four months. In addition, 11 cases of 'early' scurvy were diagnosed (6). Evidence of this sort would support the recent observation that if conditions on the mines were as bad as van Onselen's *Chibaro* describes them, 'those on the farms must clearly have been abominable' (7).

Poor conditions of labour themselves formed part of a wider pattern whereby most branches of commercial agriculture sought both to utilise labour as a capital substitute and to minimise labour costs in order to increase Southern Rhodesia's competitiveness in distant markets. It is this latter aspect which is closely tied to the concept of African farmworkers as 'serfs of old', and one which can be examined in some detail through the operation of labour relations in commercial ranching.

The fact that aspirant white ranchers either were

granted outright or later could purchase extensive land holdings on favourable terms, itself went a considerable distance in establishing the conditions for the acquisition of cheap labour. By taking up a large section of the land resources, ranches, like plantations in general, served as a mechanism for inducing and 'sustaining agrarian underdevelopment in the (African) peasant economy' (8). The supplies of cheap labour generated in this and other ways were vital for ranching for two related reasons. Unlike certain other branches of agricultural production, ranching was not amenable to mechanisation and, as a later survey precisely established, black labour constituted the single largest item in cattle production costs (9). And because of the extremely competitive nature of the world meat market, it was imperative that these costs be kept as low as possible.

On plantations and ranches this was achieved and expressed through a particular system of labour relations involving a 'considerable degree of non-cash or non-wage commitment on both sides of the contract. The character of the worker's relationship to the plantation was all-encompassing. His links with the employer were not simply economic but also involved a high degree of (personal) socio-political subordination and dependence... The low proportion of cash payments to payments in kind reflected this paternal (client-patron) pattern in labour policy' (10). These quasi-feudal labour relations thus minimised cash expenditure on labourers, while multiplying the services extracted from them.

Evidence for agricultural wage rates in the years between 1890 and 1939 is extremely fragmentary and unsatisfactory. There is, for example, no distinction made in available figures between wages paid in the cattle industry and those in other agricultural sectors, although it does seem reasonable to conclude that they were not sufficiently different to evoke separate comment. Monthly African cash wages on farms in 1903 varied between 10 and 20 s. (11), and over the next

25 years these rose marginally (declining substantially in real terms) to between 18 and 23 s. (12). Expenditure on labourers' rations was similarly meagre; in the early 1920s these consisted of '2 lbs. of meal a day with the occasional addition of beans, ground nuts, sweet potatoes and meat' (13).

Although stockmen (herd or cattle 'boys') probably received higher than average wages, the number and range of tasks they were expected to perform was formidable :

'Each boy must be responsible for the general welfare of his particular herd; for the maintenance of fences surrounding that paddock, in which his herd happens to be situated... and he must act as a farm policeman. He must check strangers walking in his paddock, because if this is allowed various malpractices, including even the killing of cattle, can occur. He must notice and report any bicycle or motor car spoor, the latter may indicate the activity of poachers. The removal, handing in and reporting of snares is important... Each cattle boy must be equipped with a native axe and a pair of fencing pliers, so that he can maintain the fences round his paddock, whilst he is going round his herd.' (14)

Multiple services were expected not only from the labourers themselves but also from their families. One rancher explained with satisfaction the manner in which he obtained a high protein feed for his cattle :

'I give the wives of my employees a certain sum of money per 100 kg. (200 lbs.) bag to collect them (mimosa beans). This they do by knocking down the ripe beans from the trees with a long stick. They and their children then collect them and put them into bags, which they leave near some track for collection and riding to the hammer mill. The women are satisfied to

make some pocket money and, with their children, always seem to enjoy the "outing".' (15)

Quasi-feudal labour relations of the kind just described were not restricted to the ranching activities of industrial settlers, but were also embraced by international capital. Here, the operations of the British South Africa Company on its gigantic Nuanetsi ranch provide a useful case study. The ranch, partly because of its size and isolation from all main centres, and partly because it was owned by the B.S.A. Company which had only ceased administering the entire colony in 1923, was run very much as a law unto itself. In fact, this situation was accentuated when the local Nuanetsi police post was temporarily closed at the end of October 1925, following which the assistant Native Commissioner somewhat indignantly reported that the Nuanetsi Management had 'made evident that Nelson's blind eye stunt would meet with very real appreciation' (16).

So long as the 'blind eye stunt' persisted, the ranch Management were able to exploit what was known as the 'Government idea'. 'The B.S.A.Co. cattle', explained a government official, 'are known to the Natives as "the cattle of the Government". It is generally held that the Ranch people represent "Government" - the prevalence of this idea is an unfortunate influence which it is hard to remove and the notion is exploited by these people. To what good use the idea can be put is easily to be imagined - take the matter of labour alone.' Also in use was a 'Government gaol', in which offending Africans were confined.

Buttressing this one form of social control were other cruder but apparently time-tested sanctions; these included assaults, failure to pay wages and forced labour. Far from assaults being occasional 'abuses' of power by individual Europeans, they appear to have been an integral component of the system of labour discipline. Flogging was 'not uncommon' and varied from 'minor assault to gross and uncalled for excesses'. Not only did the

ranch Management pay the fines of individuals unlucky enough to be convicted of flogging black workers, but in some instances actively joined in. Particularly notorious offenders were Section Managers, while even higher up the scale, the Ranch's Chief Stockman, although having avoided convictions, had a 'most unsatisfactory' attitude 'towards native employees and law and order'.

African lawbreakers, too, found a refuge of sorts on the Nuanetsi ranch. The B.S.A. Company was capable of turning its own blind eye when it suited it; for example, employment was offered without registration certificates having to be produced. As a result, 'natives "wanted" appreciate, so it seems, that this is a happy asylum where a man can be sure of welcome without the embarrassment of having to hold an R.C.'. Nuanetsi ranch also attracted tax defaulters and, once again, although the Management did assist the Native Department in collecting arrears, defaulters could rely on its evident lack of enthusiasm for the exercise. Herding was therefore a much sought-after occupation because it meant that defaulters were 'widely scattered... and difficult to get hold of'. An obvious consequence of this 'labour policy', though, was that such black workers were in an extremely vulnerable position and could do even less than other workers to protect themselves against Management actions.

Black wages were habitually kept two months in arrears in order to extract the longest possible service from labourers, and nor was there a pay sheet which could act as proof of payment. When these and other 'defects' in the system led to trouble, the Management responded violently. The assistant Native Commissioner bluntly reported 'proof of such treatment as brutal assault in lieu of consideration of claim to arrears and orders "Clear out! I can eat (keep) all your money and you can do nothing to me." These items are mentioned to give some idea of atmosphere'. A fairly typical example was the case of Chezhira who worked as a labourer for just over four months

for a Section Manager named Johnstone. For this entire period, Chezira received 10 shillings. His village head later explained that he knew of no reason for Chezira's 'not being paid fully, beyond that he asked to leave and was told that he would be punished in this way for wanting to go... He did not come into the (N.C.'s) office to complain as he had been told by Mr Johnstone "if you go into the A. (acting) N.C. to complain you will be flogged for running away from ranch work".' But at least Chezira was allowed to leave; other labourers were less fortunate. They were made to 'work indefinitely and the white man does not let them go. A man may work up to ten months and be unable to get his freedom'. Indefinite service was a relatively new development and undoubtedly reflected the fact that cash wages on Nuanetsi in the 1920s were well below even the national average for agriculture. Adult men were paid 10 shillings per month, and youths 5 shillings.

Meagre as this cash expenditure was, however, the ranch still exacted quasi-feudal services from its labourers and tenants. The most common obligation placed on African men was the building of cattle kraals without pay. Usual practice was for black foremen - the ubiquitous 'boss boys' - to round up labourers from selected villages: 'I was called to the work by a boss-boy Petros who said "I am sent by my master to collect you for the cattle kraals".' Sometimes between 12 and 14 kraals were constructed at once, a task which would involve a week's work. Food was occasionally supplied by the ranch. An even more frequent imposition than kraal construction was the regular demand that the wives of workers and tenants fill the ranch's dip tanks. This demand, which interrupted African agricultural activities, was much resented, as the following pieces of evidence illustrate:

'We are troubled by the people of the Ranch... Our women are taken to fill dip tanks... We have not agreed that our women should do this work; we pay dip fees for our

cattle dipped at Ranch dips; our women have to do this work without pay; they do not receive any food; if they go for days they take food with them from home.'

Confirmation came from another witness who complained that his wife was 'sometimes four days together at this work; it is far. She takes her own food and is not paid. She is away at dip work for four days, she spends three days at home and is then called again, and so on. As a result of this we cannot cultivate'.

In the middle of 1926 the Native Department finally responded to African complaints and intervened. Although the Native Department was well aware of the 'gross injustice to the Natives', pragmatic considerations also ranked high - revenue from the Nuanetsi district was unsatisfactory as a 'direct result of non-payment of wages and the facility with which natives not possessing Registration Certificates find work'.

Towards the end of July, the Superintendent of Natives for the Victoria area toured the ranch and gently reprimanded the Management. Women were no longer to be forced to fill dips and in future cattle kraals were to be built by contract at 5 shillings per kraal. Section Managers were informed of the 'necessity for better treatment in the interests of the labour supply on the Ranch', while the labourers and tenants themselves were lectured on their various responsibilities to the Nuanetsi Management. 'Everyone on the Ranch', concluded the Superintendent, 'is now acquainted with their mutual obligations, and there can be no excuse for infringements of the law in future.'

Perhaps some members of the Native Department did genuinely believe in the fiction of Management and labour meeting freely and independently in the market place, but the realities of the colonial situation were obviously very different. Although lack of evidence precludes any attempt to trace further developments at Nuanetsi, it seems highly

probable that black agricultural workers placed little faith in the good intentions of either Management or the Native Department. Again, unlike the mining industry, while nothing is known about patterns of desertion or other forms of worker consciousness in the agricultural sector, two very different examples do show that agricultural labourers were thoroughly appreciative of the need for self-reliance and protection. Early in 1929, african workers on the Darwendale Tobacco Estate in the Lomagundi district were reported as having organised themselves into 'a sort of Native Benefit Society'. The organisation was 'devoted to secular ends one of which is the payment by the organised body of fines which may be imposed by the Magistrate on any members' (17). By contrast to this sober organisation was the spectacular career of Melek, a worker on a tobacco farm in the Ayrshire district. In the only source of evidence so far discovered, a tantalisingly brief paragraph in *Rhodesiana*, Melek is described as having developed a grievance against his employers, poisoned their water supply and decamped with a bicycle and a rifle'. Thus equipped, Melek ranged through the district for several weeks in 1933, on one occasion 'unnecessarily' firing at a white motorist. Police units, together with farmers and gangs of their labourers, combed the bush with little success, while Melek 'let it be known that he amused himself by watching at close quarters the activities of the police and farmers who were plotting to capture him'. The saga ended only when Melek crossed the border into Mozambique, still armed with the rifle (18).

The picture of pre-war African agricultural labour presented in this paper is necessarily impressionistic, but is unlikely to be overly misleading. Clarke's analysis of contemporary commercial agriculture, which revealed the persistence of quasi-feudal labour relations and their importance in the process of primitive accumulation, is fundamentally applicable to earlier periods when, if anything, the position of black labourers was even more vulnerable and exploitable.

FOOTNOTES :

- (1) V.M. Wadsworth, "Native Labour in Agriculture", *Rhodesia Agricultural Journal*, 1950, v.47, (two parts)
- (2) G.L. Chavuriduka, "Farm Labourers in Rhodesia", *Rhodesia Journal of Economics*, 1972, v.6, no.4.
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- (12) S480/147, Report of the Native Labour Committee, 1927 - 8.
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MEMORANDUM
FOR
CONSIDERATION AND ADOPTION
BY
INTERIM GOVERNMENT
OF
ZIMBABWE

December
1976

BULAWAYO

1. STATUS OF THE A.T.U.C.

The ATUC wishes to point out that, whilst it has been formally denied the full status of a Registered Confederation of Labour and must therefore operate *de facto* as an unregistered Confederation, its affiliates are composed of both registered unions and others which to date have been classified as "unregistered". Its affiliated paid-up membership numbers in excess of 40 000 in total, but in terms of the effects of its activities in negotiating, representing and bargaining, the ATUC speaks for the bulk of African workers in industry, agriculture, urban employment and on the mines.

2. THE FUTURE OF ZIMBABWE

There is no doubt that Zimbabwe will be born in a short while, possibly under conditions of uncertainty, but certainly under conditions allowing and requiring a greater role for the union movement.

It is the ATUC's responsibility, as well as that of its members, to contribute to this future, in a manner both constructive and far reaching, but at the same time appreciative of the many problems to be overcome.

The present economy has been found incapable of meeting the needs of the people of Zimbabwe. This has been manifested in growing unemployment, the extension of "short-time working" in industry, the export of "surplus" labour to South Africa, restrictions on job-advancement, a wage-structure in which the bulk of employees are paid rates below restrictively-defined Poverty Datum Line levels for even small-sized families, a failure on the part of the government to democratise certain unions (notably in the mining industry), and restrictive labour policy and practices which inhibit production and meet only the requirement of a privileged stratum of employees.

These malformations have become evident in other areas of the economy which also affect workers: in rural poverty in the "Tribal Trust Lands" (in which for the purposes of security, most workers are forced to retain a base); in uneven agricultural development; in inadequate provisions for aged persons, the unemployed and those with ill-health.

Economic policy has worsened the situation of both workers and peasants. Taxes, especially indirect taxes, have increased for low income groups. Rents have been raised on urban housing. Many have been forced to dwell in ill-constructed shanties. Thousands must

face the hazards of being "illegal" lodgers. The policies of both local authorities and central government have operated against the interests of low income groups.

These conditions need to be changed. New conditions need to be created. This means new policies, new opportunities and a new future. To this end, the ATUC offers the following *Social and Economic Programme for Action*, conscious as it does so that in itself it is only a start and that it will need to be integrated into an overall social and economic plan for the development of Zimbabwe.

3. SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC PROGRAMME FOR ACTION

The ATUC and its members recommend action on the following issues :

A) THE MASTERS AND SERVANTS ACT

The Act applies to workers in agriculture and domestic employment, affecting 357 600 farm workers and 130 900 domestic workers in 1976. However, the Act is essentially a penal code. It is not a fit legislative enactment for the conduct of labour relations in modern human society. Its historical roots stem from the Cape Colony Act of 1856. The Act does not provide for collective bargaining between employers and employees. This operates to the detriment of the African workers in employment who, as a result, are left without basic rights and remedies. The workers are also denied the benefit of statutory minimum wage determination, necessary to protect their standards of living which, for agricultural workers, it is relevant to point out, have fallen in real terms in the last decade even though labour productivity has risen. The ATUC notes too that the Act has also been strongly condemned by a prominent member of the

Judiciary in the country as well as numerous unions, workers, lawyers, economists, welfare workers, and citizens. The ATUC therefore calls for the unconditional repeal of the Act and its replacement by a statute which

- i) allows all workers an unhindered right to collective bargaining as well as the right to representation on Industrial Councils ;
- ii) ensures that there are realistic efforts made to assist the development of effective and democratic trade unionism in the industries affected by the Act so that workers can exercise control over their lives in a meaningful way ;
- iii) results in the establishment of democratic unionism in industries presently affected by the Masters and Servants Act as well as in all other non-unionised industries in which present unions operate in a non-democratic manner.

This Act should also specify certain minimum conditions of employment in general and be rigorously enforced through an efficient inspectorate system.

B) THE INDUSTRIAL CONCILIATION ACT :
(Section 32(5))

Section 32(5) of the Industrial Council Act effectively prohibits the deduction of Union dues from wages where no industrial council exists. The deletion of these clauses have high priority.

Until a trade union has established a sound financial structure based on dues-paying members, there can be little hope of its representatives having any effective influence on decision making at industrial councils.

To achieve this, it must first establish its bona fide on a manual dues-collecting basis to justify its right to stop-order facilities, and until Section 32(5) is deleted, the business of firmly establishing a trade union cannot get off the ground to permit it to play its full and proper part in decision making.

C) INDUSTRIAL BOARDS AND INDUSTRIAL COUNCILS

The ATUC further notes that the original ICA was established with the purpose of facilitating the setting of conditions of employment between employers and employees. An essential precondition for this is the establishment of Industrial Councils as institutions for collective bargaining.

The ATUC notes that the original purposes of the Act have been subverted by the strong tendency of the Ministry of Labour to rely on wage-determination through the medium of Industrial Boards rather than Industrial Councils. Over the years since the Act was passed, there has been ample opportunity for the development of the Industrial Council system. Yet today and each year, more and more workers are "catered for" (i.e. - ruled) under the Boards system, a system in which they play no part.

This works to the extreme detriment of African workers who are thereby effectively denied control over their lives and the rights of uninhibited collective bargaining. A remedy is required to this deplorable state of affairs.

The ATUC therefore calls for the implementation of a statute which would immediately upgrade all Industrial Boards into fully fledged Industrial Councils within a transitional period of 6 - 12 months.

The ATUC is willing to offer its good offices to assist in the re-organisation of industry in this way, provided there is free opportunity for democratic unionism to emerge as the means for the representation of the workers.

D) WAGE POLICY

The ATUC notes that the vast majority of workers in the economy, and the bulk in those industries in which their affiliates represent African workers, are in receipt of wages that do not enable the wage-earner to support even a moderately-sized family. This is a result of a policy towards wages and profits. On the other hand, too little of the benefits of the national income and wealth are allocated to labour and on the other hand the bulk of African wage-earners are paid wages below the relevant (PDL) for their family size. The results are widespread poverty, malnutrition, hunger, inadequate family health and an inability to finance even basic education amongst the majority of workers' households. By contrast, it is noted that in the case of other social groups, the policies of companies, state authorities and private employers more than adequately cater for the basic subsistence consumption needs of households. Indeed, they foster luxury consumption whilst in the case of the vast majority of African households primary needs of workers are not met. This situation requires an immediate remedy.

The ATUC therefore, calls for the government to introduce a change in the Industrial Conciliation Act which will specify that all Industrial Councils must adopt the PDL (determined by objective third party evidence) as a *minimum* criterion in the statutory fixing of wages. This basic standard should be met within a short period of time.

E) PENSION AND SOCIAL SECURITY

The ATUC notes that the bulk of African workers do not have pension provisions for old age and existing gratuity arrangements are woefully inadequate. By contrast, this situation does not pertain in the case of other social groups. At the same time, the African rural areas do not have the economic or production capacity to support the expanding population forced to be dependent upon them as well as meet the increased social security burden placed upon them.

The ATUC therefore calls for the establishment of a National Pension Scheme, which would provide adequate pensions for all, and the transformation of all gratuity arrangements into pension rights of at least equivalent value. It further recommends that the details of the scheme be worked out in full conjunction with the trade unions and organised African labour confederations.

F) UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE

The ATUC notes that since the early sixties, when an unemployment insurance was under discussion, the government has taken no initiative to institute such a scheme. This lack of action and foresight the ATUC regards as having had disastrous consequences. It has caused great hardship amongst an increasing number of Africans who have been made jobless and have been left without even minimum support from a government to which they contribute taxes and whose income is derived directly from the wealth that they produce in factories, farms, mines and other enterprises.

The ATUC therefore recommends that a National Unemployment Insurance Scheme

be investigated and be established as soon as possible and not later than after the passing of one calendar year. The ATUC should be fully consulted on its establishment and constructive efforts should be made to financially assist unemployed African workers in the country.

G) TECHNICAL TRAINING AND APPRENTICESHIP

The ATUC would like to point out that the State's technical training programmes have been biased towards the intake of non-African trainees. This is shown by the record on apprentices, in the social composition of students at the Polytechnics, and in the difficulties Africans have in securing technical training opportunities. The ATUC believes that an expanded training programme should focus on the training of large numbers of African school leavers as well as of existing employees.

The ATUC therefore recommends that the "African Education" vote be substantially increased and resources devoted to supplying skills to African school leavers. The ATUC also recommends that provisions be made in the law for employers to contribute substantially more to the development of on-the-job training policies. In addition, all resources presently devoted to the immigration policy should be transferred to the development of local training programmes in order to reduce the economy's dependence on the foreign supply of skills. Government and employers should also be required to justify the importation of workers from outside the economy by being required to demonstrate that no local workers are available for the fulfilment of the job for which an employee is needed.

H) THE AFRICAN LABOUR REGULATIONS ACT

This Act, originally passed in 1911 and amended subsequently, contains blatantly discriminatory clauses. Under Section 21, the Act makes it an offence to offer Africans higher wages in order to attempt to persuade them to break their existing contracts of employment. Many of the provisions of the Act are similar to those in the Masters and Servants Act.

The ATUC recommends that the Act be unconditionally repealed and the right of all workers to seek their best advantage be firmly established in law. The ATUC recommends that a Statute be passed which would make it illegal for employers to collude implicitly or explicitly in the fixing of maximum rates of pay for a job of work. Practices such as these have had an adverse effect on African workers, especially those in the lower skilled grades. The ATUC has firm and undeniable evidence that employer collusion in the fixing of maximum rates of pay has taken place in the primary industries in respect of the labouring grades.

I) AGRICULTURAL WORKERS

The conditions of labour of farm workers are abysmal and require immediate attention. The ATUC calls for an immediate *Commission of Enquiry into Conditions Affecting the Welfare of Agricultural Workers*. The Commission should be empowered to examine all facets of this question. It should be constituted immediately. Its membership must include unionists and/or their representatives and it must institute an open and far-reaching inquiry. Its results, and the evidence submitted, should be published and it should be instructed to report within 12 months in

order to enable the new government to incorporate its findings in its economic plans. A concrete plan of action must be undertaken, following such a Commission, to radically improve conditions for agricultural workers.

J) DOMESTIC WORKERS

In the case of domestic workers, the ATUC recognises the specific difficulties that might arise in attempting to establish an Industrial Council. Mindful of this and of the need for urgent measures to improve the conditions of employment of workers in the economy's third largest sector, the ATUC calls for the immediate introduction of a Minimum Wage Act that would apply to domestic workers.

K) ECONOMIC POLICY IN GENERAL

The interests of workers must be given substantially greater priority in future policy - both at the stage of formulation and implementation. Mindful of present conditions - of unemployment, poverty and inflation - the ATUC recommends that :

1. PUBLIC WORKS PROGRAMMES BE ADOPTED :
to provide jobs, develop productive capacity, help reduce inflation and raise the standards of living of the urban and rural poor. Special consideration needs to be accorded rural income and employment effects in the envisaged restructuring of public expenditures.
2. EDUCATIONAL POLICY BE REVIEWED : to bias it away from present elitist tendencies; to provide equal opportunity; to provide universal/compulsory primary education; to lower school fees and costs to low-income households; to ensure that the University makes an appropriate contri-

bution to development and especially the economic conditions of the rural and urban working poor.

3. HEALTH POLICY TO BE RE-ORGANISED : to provide better preventative services; to ensure the adequacy of rural services, to eliminate malnutrition, if necessary through a good distribution programme; to lower prices and raise the quality of necessary health treatment for low-income groups.
4. HOUSING PROGRAMMES BE INAUGURATED : to provide basic shelter for all; to eliminate overcrowding; to permit free access on a non-racial basis; to improve the housing of workers on plantations and in the mines and towns.
5. TRANSPORT POLICY BE RE-CONSIDERED : to improve the quality and lower the prices of urban and rural-urban services; to eliminate the harmful effects of monopolies and the high prices associated therewith.
6. LAND REFORM BE UNDERTAKEN : to reduce the inequality of land holdings; to foster co-operative production; to eliminate land speculation; to penalise "absentee landlords"; to ensure the production of sufficient basic foodstuffs necessary for local consumption; to provide the basis for social re-organisation in rural areas; to bring into production lands presently considered sub-marginal; to ensure a self-sufficient economy.
7. MONETARY, FISCAL AND FOREIGN EXCHANGE POLICIES BE REVIEWED : to examine ways and means whereby they can promote productive employment growth, distributive justice and social equity; to ensure that credit is not monopolised by a few producers; to ensure equity on the distribution of public expendi-

tures on both current and capital accounts; to ensure an appropriate share of capital accumulation in the hands of the people of Zimbabwe.

4. CONCLUSION

The ATUC believes that the implementation of the recommendations contained in this document will assist in the restoration of better human and social relationships in this part of the world. They provide the means for the constructive development of a democratic future. Unless the defects the ATUC points to are remedied soon, the economy of the country will be further damaged by the discriminatory measures of government, employers and minority labour interests, as well as the effects of increasingly malformed structures and policies which are to the detriment of all African workers, especially the poorer groups.

THE CASH WAGE DISTRIBUTION
OF AFRICAN WORKERS IN ZIMBABWE
(JUNE, 1976) AS SHOWN BY THE
CENTRAL STATISTICAL OFFICE

The Editors

This note follows from a CSO comment on the tables which it has produced and which are shown below.

The data in the attached tables have been obtained from enquiries sent by the Central Statistical Office to employees in June of each year. As the June enquiry only covers large employers of labour and also because there is an element of non-response, some scaling-up is necessary. For 1976 this amounted to 9%.

As the results indicate that, exclusive of Agriculture, some 52% of employees receive income "in kind" of one sort or another, it is clear that the given distributions might be considerably altered in some sectors, where provision for income in kind to be made. Further work on this is being done. It is hoped that allowances may be made for income in kind in future reports.

Data on domestic workers are not collected in the employment censuses. Current estimates of the number of domestic workers are based on the 1969 Population Census data, updated according to the growth of the European population. In effect, a fixed ratio of domestics per member of the European, Asian and Coloured population has been assumed. The total number of domestic workers so obtained has been broken down into various wage categories, using the proportions obtained from sample surveys in the main urban areas. In view of these estimating procedures, the results can only be regarded as very approximate.

The figures for Agriculture and Forestry exclude casual and seasonal workers (88 711 in June, 1976) and contract labourers (24 100 in June, 1976). Many of these workers would fall into low wage categories, accordingly, the given data relates only to permanent employees. No breakdown is available of the numbers receiving cash only, cash and free housing etc, in the case of Agriculture.

TABLE 1. - WAGE DISTRIBUTION OF AFRICAN

EMPLOYEES BY INDUSTRIAL SECTOR FOR THE MONTH OF JUNE, 1976

MONTHLY CASH INCOME (INCLUDING ALL REGULAR ALLOWANCES PAID IN CASH BUT PAID IN CASH EXCLUDING ALL INCOME IN KIND)	EMPLOYEES PAID IN CASH AND SUPPLIED WITH		TOTAL
	EMPLOYEES ONLY *	Both free housing and free rations and/or meals**	
Under \$10))	(94 644
\$ 10 but under \$ 20))	(121 651
\$ 20 " " \$ 30))	(20 374
\$ 30 " " \$ 40))	(10 378
\$ 40 " " \$ 50))	(3 076
\$ 50 " " \$ 70))	(2 641
\$ 70 " " \$ 90))	(1 039
\$ 90 " " \$110))	(617
\$110 " " \$130))	(314
\$130 " " \$150))	(199
\$150 " " \$200))	(111
\$200 " " \$250))	(21
\$250 " " \$300))	(4
\$300 and over))	(8
DETAILED BREAKDOWN IS NOT AVAILABLE			
TOTAL :			255 077

AGRICULTURE AND FORESTRY

TOTAL :

255 077

MINING AND QUARRYING

Under \$10	42	836	250	55	1 183
\$ 10 but under \$ 20	591	4 378	4 974	95	10 038
\$ 20 " " \$ 30	558	2 961	11 742	7	15 268
\$ 30 " " \$ 40	925	1 726	10 303	-	12 954
\$ 40 " " \$ 50	486	1 296	6 114	2	7 898
\$ 50 " " \$ 70	411	1 010	8 758	1	10 180
\$ 70 " " \$ 90	154	545	2 129	-	2 828
\$ 90 " " \$110	178	242	803	-	1 223
\$110 " " \$130	69	57	263	-	389
\$130 " " \$150	31	24	124	-	179
\$150 " " \$200	62	17	105	-	184
\$200 " " \$250	30	10	32	-	72
\$250 " " \$300	13	16	35	-	64
\$300 and over	20	7	89	-	116
TOTAL :	3 570	13 125	45 721	160	62 576

MANUFACTURING

Under \$10	811	292	293	69	1 465
\$ 10 but under \$ 20	1 650	909	1 892	637	5 088
\$ 20 " " \$ 30	3 758	496	2 592	674	7 520
\$ 30 " " \$ 40	11 344	2 236	8 667	954	23 201
\$ 40 " " \$ 50	18 890	1 935	7 730	1 686	30 241
\$ 50 " " \$ 70	28 220	2 055	6 274	3 456	40 005
\$ 70 " " \$ 90	9 510	445	1 867	1 612	13 434
\$ 90 " " \$110	4 553	188	486	573	5 800
\$110 " " \$130	2 730	63	95	295	3 183
\$130 " " \$150	1 474	27	49	116	1 666
\$150 " " \$200	1 525	21	41	157	1 744
\$200 " " \$250	669	10	7	65	751
\$250 " " \$300	422	-	-	29	451
\$300 and over	348	2	1	38	389
TOTAL :	85 904	8 679	29 994	10 361	134 938

MONTHLY CASH INCOME (INCLUDING ALL REGULAR ALLOWANCES PAID IN CASH BUT PAID IN CASH EXCLUDING ALL INCOME IN KIND)	EMPLOYEES PAID IN CASH AND SUPPLIED WITH			TOTAL
	EMPLOYEES ONLY*	Both free housing and free rations and/or meals**	Free rations and/or meals	

ELECTRICITY AND WATER

Under \$10	27	-	19	-	46
\$ 10 but under \$ 20	39	-	15	-	54
\$ 20 " " \$ 30	53	-	57	-	110
\$ 30 " " \$ 40	577	-	426	-	1 003
\$ 40 " " \$ 50	969	-	716	-	1 685
\$ 50 " " \$ 70	1 129	-	741	-	1 870
\$ 70 " " \$ 90	71	-	274	-	345
\$ 90 " " \$110	21	-	99	-	120
\$110 " " \$130	9	-	58	-	67
\$130 " " \$150	2	-	17	-	19
\$150 " " \$200	8	-	12	-	20
\$200 " " \$250	2	-	9	-	11
\$250 " " \$300	-	-	3	-	3
\$300 and over	3	-	1	-	4
TOTAL :	2 910	-	2 447	-	5 357

CONSTRUCTION

Under \$10	393	34	140	1	568
\$10 but under \$20	1 255	461	248		
\$20 " " \$30	5 518	200	3 001	113	8 832
\$30 " " \$40	12 354	270	3 067	105	15 796
\$40 " " \$50	6 120	218	1 877	69	8 284
\$50 " " \$70	2 470	70	3 054	35	5 629
\$70 " " \$90	1 838	13	755	14	2 620
\$90 " " \$110	1 067	7	184	18	1 276
\$110 " " \$130	466	2	76	3	547
\$130 " " \$150	775	22	45	10	852
\$150 " " \$200	483	-	30	1	514
\$200 " " \$250	144	10	8	1	163
\$250 " " \$300	118	-	107	2	227
\$300 and over					
TOTAL :	34 748	1 638	16 584	683	53 653

FINANCE, INSURANCE AND REAL ESTATE

Under \$10	5	-	2	-	7
\$10 but under \$20	11	-	-	-	11
\$20 " " \$30	14	13	1	-	28
\$30 " " \$40	64	8	32	3	107
\$40 " " \$50	1 030	4	16	12	1 062
\$50 " " \$70	660	4	57	35	756
\$70 " " \$90	779	3	27	49	858
\$90 " " \$110	486	2	9	34	531
\$110 " " \$130	266	1	4	73	344
\$130 " " \$150	191	1	3	49	244
\$150 " " \$200	436	-	-	26	462
\$200 " " \$250	60	-	-	10	70
\$250 " " \$300	39	-	-	5	44
\$300 and over	99	-	-	6	105
TOTAL :	4 140	36	151	302	4 629

MONTHLY CASH INCOME (INCLUDING ALL REGULAR ALLOWANCES PAID IN CASH BUT PAID IN CASH EXCLUDING ALL INCOME IN KIND)	EMPLOYEES PAID IN CASH AND SUPPLIED WITH			TOTAL
	EMPLOYEES ONLY*	Both free housing and free rations and/or meals**	Free rations and/or meals	

DISTRIBUTION, RESTAURANTS AND HOTELS

Under \$10	175	283	89	23	570
\$ 10 but under \$ 20	870	742	659	114	2 385
\$ 20 " " \$ 30	2 385	1 177	1 961	599	6 122
\$ 30 " " \$ 40	5 359	1 177	3 697	1 197	11 430
\$ 40 " " \$ 50	5 716	647	2 063	1 023	9 449
\$ 50 " " \$ 70	10 199	321	2 092	1 287	13 899
\$ 70 " " \$ 90	5 024	115	491	600	6 230
\$ 90 " " \$110	1 890	36	178	190	2 294
\$110 " " \$130	1 188	12	70	102	1 372
\$130 " " \$150	480	12	32	64	588
\$150 " " \$200	575	15	29	42	661
\$200 " " \$250	241	3	5	20	269
\$250 " " \$300	83	-	4	5	92
\$300 and over	134	1	-	-	135
TOTAL :	34 319	4 541	11 370	5 266	55 496

TRANSPORT AND COMMUNICATIONS

Under \$10	43	20	-	63
\$ 10 but under \$ 20	154	91	-	318
\$ 20 " " \$ 30	185	34	-	277
\$ 30 " " \$ 40	2 719	105	22	3 531
\$ 40 " " \$ 50	2 768	14	161	4 601
\$ 50 " " \$ 70	2 769	2	177	6 223
\$ 70 " " \$ 90	2 190	-	74	3 209
\$ 90 " " \$ 110	2 937	-	20	1 092
\$ 110 " " \$ 130	398	-	15	448
\$ 130 " " \$ 150	621	-	23	655
\$ 150 " " \$ 200	291	-	4	296
\$ 200 " " \$ 250	150	-	-	150
\$ 250 " " \$ 300	330	-	1	332
\$300 and over				
TOTAL :	14 399	334	497	23 230

8 000

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

Under \$10	538	34	-	663
\$ 10 but under \$ 20	1 747	122	37	3 698
\$ 20 " " \$ 30	1 522	54	5	2 960
\$ 30 " " \$ 40	2 833	23	-	3 616
\$ 40 " " \$ 50	3 105	15	-	3 441
\$ 50 " " \$ 70	9 461	15	-	9 855
\$ 70 " " \$ 90	5 037	4	-	5 265
\$ 90 " " \$ 110	2 636	2	-	2 680
\$ 110 " " \$ 130	1 818	-	-	1 864
\$ 130 " " \$ 150	1 286	-	-	1 329
\$ 150 " " \$ 200	873	-	-	922
\$ 200 " " \$ 250	214	-	-	221
\$ 250 " " \$ 300	60	-	-	60
\$300 and over	141	-	-	141
TOTAL :	31 271	269	42	36 715

5 133

MONTHLY CASH INCOME
 (INCLUDING ALL REGULAR EMPLOYEES
 ALLOWANCES PAID IN CASH BUT PAID IN CASH ONLY*
 EXCLUDING ALL INCOME IN KIND)
 EMPLOYEES PAID IN CASH AND SUPPLIED WITH
 Both free housing and Free housing Free rations TOTAL
 free rations and/or meals only** only** and/or meals
 and/or meals** only**

EDUCATION SERVICES

Under \$10	49	34	-	83
\$ 10 but under \$ 20	30	194	156	390
\$ 20 " " \$ 30	70	244	346	682
\$ 30 " " \$ 40	885	111	126	1 154
\$ 40 " " \$ 50	2 929	45	132	3 123
\$ 50 " " \$ 70	4 827	16	74	4 929
\$ 70 " " \$ 90	5 928	8	41	5 984
\$ 90 " " \$ 110	7 495	2	17	7 515
\$ 110 " " \$ 130	2 866	-	10	2 876
\$ 130 " " \$ 150	773	-	1	774
\$ 150 " " \$ 200	719	-	1	721
\$ 200 " " \$ 250	287	-	1	290
\$ 250 " " \$ 300	212	-	-	212
\$ 300 and over	913	-	14	928
TOTAL :	27 983	654	919	29 661

HEALTH SERVICES

Under \$10	67	-	-	-	67
\$ 10 but under \$ 20	21	81	2	5	109
\$ 20 " " \$ 30	56	66	-	7	120
\$ 40 " " \$ 50	2 262	47	8	4	2 321
\$ 50 " " \$ 70	1 055	-	16	1	1 072
\$ 70 " " \$ 90	1 212	1	11	-	1 224
\$ 90 " " \$110	755	-	4	-	759
\$110 " " \$130	435	-	-	-	435
\$130 " " \$150	135	-	-	-	135
\$150 " " \$200	612	-	1	-	613
\$200 " " \$250	90	-	-	-	90
\$250 " " \$300	373	-	-	-	373
\$300 and over	385	-	-	-	385
TOTAL :	9 024	202	56	21	9 303

PRIVATE DOMESTIC SERVICES

Under \$10	815	9 660	600	1 286	12 361
\$ 10 but under \$ 20	2 779	51 717	3 588	9 160	67 244
\$ 20 " " \$ 30	446	30 992	3 390	4 196	39 024
\$ 30 " " \$ 40	102	4 936	743	1 085	6 866
\$ 40 " " \$ 50	38	881	-	222	1 141
\$ 50 " " \$ 70	-	-	-	-	-
\$ 70 " " \$ 90	-	-	-	-	-
\$ 90 " " \$110	-	-	-	-	-
\$110 " " \$130	-	-	-	-	-
\$130 " " \$150	-	-	-	-	-
\$150 " " \$200	-	-	-	-	-
\$200 " " \$250	-	-	-	-	-
\$250 " " \$300	-	-	-	-	-
\$300 and over	-	-	-	-	-
TOTAL :	4 180	98 186	8 321	15 949	126 636

MONTHLY CASH INCOME
 (INCLUDING ALL REGULAR EMPLOYEES
 ALLOWANCES PAID IN CASH BUT PAID IN CASH
 EXCLUDING ALL INCOME IN ONLY*
 KIND)

EMPLOYEES PAID IN CASH AND SUPPLIED WITH
 Both free
 housing and Free housing Free rations TOTAL
 free rations only** and/or meals
 and/or meals** only**

Under \$10	400	47	16	-	463
\$ 10 but under \$ 20	1 020	453	2 136	205	3 814
\$ 20 " " \$ 30	1 170	295	1 981	140	3 586
\$ 30 " " \$ 40	5 029	149	1 692	87	6 957
\$ 40 " " \$ 50	5 892	80	790	40	6 802
\$ 50 " " \$ 70	5 927	114	681	124	6 846
\$ 70 " " \$ 90	1 861	23	154	43	2 081
\$ 90 " " \$110	837	4	100	34	975
\$110 " " \$130	473	9	23	11	516
\$130 " " \$150	247	-	11	3	261
\$150 " " \$200	314	-	20	1	335
\$200 " " \$250	160	-	4	3	167
\$250 " " \$300	103	-	4	4	111
\$300 and over	237	-	4	-	241
TOTAL :	23 670	1 174	7 616	695	33 155

OTHER SERVICES

TOTAL EXCLUDING AGRICULTURE

\$ 10 but under \$ 20	10	167	59	148	15	535	10	427	95	277	
\$ 20 " "	11	964	36	663	27	499	5	797	81	923	
\$ 30 " "	35	046	10	641	30	584	3	475	79	746	
\$ 40 " "	56	390	5	325	21	642	3	133	86	490	
\$ 50 " "	70	777	3	767	22	607	5	146	102	297	
\$ 70 " "	34	815	1	216	11	547	2	523	50	101	
\$ 90 " "	22	879		489	3	438		920	27	726	
\$ 110 " "	11	858		149		888		519	13	414	
\$ 130 " "	5	483		66		391		250	6	190	
\$ 150 " "	6	520		75		314		260	7	169	
\$ 200 " "	2	527		23		96		105	2	751	
\$ 250 " "	1	599		26		54		44	1	723	
\$ 300 and over	2	728		10		217		48	3	003	
	TOTAL :	276	118	128	838	136	312	34	081	575	349

* Includes persons receiving cash allowances in lieu of housing or rations and/or meals.

** Excludes persons receiving cash allowances in lieu of housing or rations and/or meals.