

FIGHTING

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TALK



MANDELA
DELEGATE



KAUNDA
CHAIRMAN



DELEGATE
TAMBO

THE ADDIS TALKS —

THE ROAD TO FREE
AFRICAN FEDERATION

SELASSIE
HOST



- ★ TRANSKEI FRAUD ★ POGROMS IN PARIS
- ★ ★ MADEIRA KEITA ★ ★ ZEKE MPHAHLELE

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TOWARDS ALL-AFRICAN UNITY —

TOWARDS ALL-AFRICAN FREEDOM!

● The Addis Ababa Conference last month was sponsored by PAFMECA — the Pan-African Movement of East and Central Africa. PAFMECA — an offshoot of the All-African People's Conference — widened its boundaries to admit delegates from Southern Africa for the first time. It is now the co-ordinating body for East, Central and

Southern Africa. Its governing body now includes two representatives of each region — Oliver Tambo (African National Congress) and J. Kozonguizi (South West Africa National Union) for the Southern Region; Joshua Nkomo (Rhodesia) and Kanyama Chume (Nyasaland) for Central Region.

THE ADDIS TALKS

● Nelson Mandela, former leader of the A.N.C. and spokesman of the National Action Council left South Africa by an undisclosed route, to join Oliver Tambo at the Conference. This is Mr. Mandela's first public appearance since he 'went underground' during the round-up of prominent strike leaders during May last year. He told the Conference that the South African situation was explosive. The Congress movement still hoped for peaceful ways of achieving freedom, and would pursue them wherever possible. But the situation was working against non-violent solutions; the Government was building new arms factories, expanding the police and armed forces, preparing for force against the people. The acts of sabotage in December, he said, "was only a small beginning." Umkonto we Sizwe "... has certainly raised the morale of the people ... This organisation can hit back in reprisal for attacks on innocent people by the Government."

● Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia, who opened the Conference, strongly condemned "... the untold oppression" in South Africa, the colonial regime of Northern Rhodesia and also the "tragic suppression" of defenceless Africans by Portuguese imperialism. This was Ethiopia's first participation in PAFMECA. The Emperor, in an impressive analysis of the problems of East, Central and Southern Africa, gave his support to the proposal that the organisation work towards a Federation of East Africa, including Ethiopia, Somalia, Kenya, Uganda, Tanganyika and Zanzibar. "The problem of establishing such a federation would not be very difficult" he told reporters.

● Mr. Kenneth Kaunda of Northern Rhodesias UNIP (United National Independence Party) was elected chairman of PAFMECA, both because of the great impression his speeches at the Conference created, and also because — as he himself put it — Northern Rhodesia is the country that "... the spearhead of African liberation has now reached." Telling the Conference of some of the wanton brutalities of British

imperialism in his country, Kaunda broke down and sobbed. The conference filled the pause by singing Nkosi Sikelela i'Afrika — the song which is becoming the really international anthem of Africa — now sung in Swahili and Nyanja as well as Xosa. Stating that the questions of ideology are NOT now the issue for Africa, Mr. Kaunda said: "THE ISSUE IS FREEDOM. WE SHALL CONSIDER as friends those who behave as such, and we shall consider as enemies those who behave as enemies."

● Kenya's Mr. Oginga Odinga (KANU), pushed aside the written notes from which he had been speaking to say bluntly; "Communism is not the issue at the moment. Our main concern is the snake in the house — colonial exploitation. We don't want to be told about snakes in the bush. The snake in the bush might even be useful to us; it might even come and bite the vermin that it worrying us."

● Conference resolutions call for more intensive sanctions and boycotts of South Africa; for a trade boycott on goods from Rhodesia and from the Portuguese territories; for the liquidation of imperialist military bases in Africa, and the dissolution of the Central African Republic. Most far reaching is the resolution to establish an East African Federation. Since Uganda, Kenya and Zanzibar will not be independent for some months at least, the final shape of the Federation cannot be established now; steps are already being taken to bring the members together into an East African Common Market, and a Common Services Organisation. The Federation, the resolution states would be "... the first logical step towards the full realisation of the total African political unity" and also "... the best method of speeding up the liberation of Africa." The constitution of the Federation — which would have a population of about fifty million, and be the biggest political unit in Africa — will provide for the inclusion of countries from Central and Southern Africa, as soon as they become independent.

Verwoerd's Crown Colony

Whatever advantages the government hoped to get from the dramatised announcement of its Transkei policy must have been largely lost in controversy about its intentions and suspicions of its motives.

For this the government is to blame. The Prime Minister's statement in the House fell short of desirable standards of candour and precision in such matters, and invited conflicting interpretations and surmise.

He said that the Transkei would choose its own constitution, but went on to specify conditions that correspond closely to the terms of the draft which leaked out from Umtata some ten days later. Was he aware of its contents when he spoke? Did the chiefs who constitute the Transkei Authority draw up the constitution themselves, or has it been imposed on them?

He spoke of the 'Bantu separate areas' as states, but in no other way suggested that they are to become independent. He said that there would be a Black parliament with representation for chiefs, if so desired. The draft constitution provides for a legislative assembly of 131 members, of whom 95 are to be chiefs or the nominees of chiefs. He promised a cabinet with a premier who would appoint his own ministers, but did not say how the premier would be appointed or by whom.

It would have been better if the government had acceded to the request for a National Convention to hammer out a new constitution for the whole country. Piecemeal negotiations with chiefs in tribal areas which contain about 40 per cent of the African population will not satisfy the rest. Constitutions so arranged will not even be acceptable to the politically active section in the reserves.

'WE WANT INDEPENDENCE'

This is what Chief Tutor Ndamase, the son of Paramount Chief Victor Poto of Nyanda (West Pondoland) and the next in line of succession to the paramountcy, told Mr. de Wet Nel in November, 1961. The Chief said: 'We want self-government for the Transkei by the end of 1963; and complete independence as soon as possible after that'.

In a subsequent interview he admitted that Pondo had written letters threatening him for supporting Bantu Authorities. He added that Transkeians would continue to bring pressure to bear on the government until they received self-rule in their homelands.

They have been pressing this demand at least since 1944, but not in a spirit of isolation. The old Bhunga set its face steadily against attempts to detach the Transkei from the rest of the country. Councillors wanted to take over control from the White officials and manage their own affairs. But they never thought of the Transkei as a separate state.

The Transkeian Scheme And the Future of the Chiefs

They coupled the claim to self-government with a demand for the vote and direct representation in parliament. The Bhunga unanimously carried motions to this effect in 1946, 1948, 1952 and 1953. Then came a new constitution, which held out a promise of African control of the council system. Two years later the Bhunga agreed to accept the principle of Bantu Authorities.

DECLINE OF THE CHIEFS

Reversion to tribal rule has whipped up greater opposition to chieftainship than ever existed in the old days, when headmen were minor functionaries and chiefs had no place in the administration. The identification of chieftainship with unpopular measures has hastened its decline everywhere in Africa, and the Transkei is no exception.

The chiefs and headmen who formed a majority of the Bhunga accepted the Bantu Authorities Act for two main reasons. It entrenched and strengthened their positions; and seemed to be the quickest way of eliminating the White officials and bringing the administration under the control of Africans.

Their estimation has proved correct in as much as the government is prepared to transfer to the chiefs powers that it will not surrender to a popular assembly. Self-rule for the Transkei means rule by the chiefs. It is important to say this, because self-government should mean democratic government by the mass of the people.

ASSEMBLIES OF CHIEFS

Unlike other Bantu Authorities, the Transkei Authority contains an elective element, but it is so carefully sifted through a four-tiered mesh of tribal, district, regional and territorial councils that only persons acceptable to the administration can emerge. In this respect the system is less democratic than the former Bhunga, and it was no model of popular government.

The Bhunga had 109 members: the chief magistrate as chairman; 26 magistrates (the district chairmen) who could not vote and who were being replaced by African chairmen; 45 nominated by the district councils from among their members with the approval of the administration; 7 district councillors nominated by the paramount chiefs of Pondoland; 26 nominees of the Governor-General; and 4 paramount chiefs *ex officio*.

The Transkei Territorial Authority was instituted by proclamation in 1956.

It consists of the heads (chairmen) of the nine regional authorities, all chiefs *ex officio*, the heads of district authorities who are not chiefs, one member of each district authority appointed by the native commissioner and one appointed by the paramount chief or head of a regional authority. Taxpayers elect representatives to tribal authorities at the bottom of the pyramid, and some of them rise to the apex through the intermediate levels and selection by chiefs and government officials.

MIXTURE AS BEFORE

Chiefs and headmen make up five-sixths of the Territorial Authority. It includes 57 chiefs, 43 headmen, and 20 other members. The 26 Bantu Affairs Commissioners attend its sessions in an advisory capacity, take part in discussions, and advise the select committees which do much of the spade work.

Under the new constitution, as disclosed unofficially to the press, there will be a legislative assembly of 131 members, consisting of 68 chiefs, 27 nominees of the paramount chiefs and regional heads, 27 representatives elected by taxpayers in the Transkei, and 9 elected by Transkeians in urban areas. If past patterns recur, the chiefs will nominate mostly headmen, and the Transkeian voters will also choose some headmen. In so far as composition is concerned, the legislative assembly is likely to be the Territorial Authority under another name.

Chiefs receive their appointment under existing law from the State President, who may recognise or appoint any person as chief and depose any chief. Chiefs and headmen are not members of the public service, but are none the less salaried officials of the government and must carry out its policies.

CROWN COLONY RULE

Who is to appoint the chiefs under the new constitution? That is probably the most vital point, but it remains a secret. There seems to be three possibilities.

If existing arrangements continue, whereby the South African Government makes the appointments, then it and not the people or even the chiefs will be the real rulers. The legislative assembly will be a creature of the government and must carry out its policy.

An alternative method would be to allow the legislative assembly itself, perhaps acting through the prime minister, to appoint the chiefs. This would mean that the assembly, which has a majority of chiefs, perpetuates itself and is responsible to no one else. It and the prime minister would constitute a virtual dictator.

A third possibility is for each tribe to appoint its own chief. Such a procedure would be the most democratic, and also the closest to tribal custom. But it would not provide machinery for the

TRANSKEI

Continued

appointment of district and regional heads, who preside over multi-racial units, and might accentuate tribal divisions at the expense of territorial unity.

WHO MAKES A KING?

Another great mystery is the position of the future prime minister. He is to choose his cabinet, but who will select him? Under the parliamentary system this function is left to the Head of the State. The draft constitution indicates that the President of the Republic is to fill this role, for he will assent to bills passed by the legislative assembly. But the President must surely act on the advice of his South African ministers, and not of the Transkeian cabinet. If this is so, the Transkei's premier will be an agent of the Republic, responsible to the South African government and not to the Transkeians.

This is not responsible government; it is not even representative government in the proper sense. Its closest analogy is the British Crown Colony, which is ruled by a governor advised by an executive council of officials and a legislative council with a majority of official and nominated unofficial members. In the proposed Transkei constitution, the chiefs take the place of the officials and the prime minister plays the part of a governor. A crown colony is not 'self-governing'; it is one of the lowest rungs on the ladder leading to responsible government.

PROSPECTS AND POSSIBILITIES

There is no reason to suppose that Transkeians will not take over the administration within the limits of the framework here outlined. There are other colonies in which tribal courts exercise wide powers, greater even than those of our magistrates' courts. The 'Africanization' of the public services is as feasible in the Transkei as in other African territories.

Transkeians want to run their own affairs. That much is certain. It was Cr. Pinyana, of Tabankulu, who is neither a chief nor a headman, who moved in 1957 that qualified Africans be appointed as native commissioners. The Territorial Authority responded by asking that qualified Africans be appointed to all posts in the reserves exclusively occupied by Whites.

The new constitution is going to speed up this process. Mr. Leibbrandt, the chief magistrate, is a pessimist when he foresees another ten years of White supervision ahead. Africans will take over the management of their affairs long before then.

THE START OF A PROCESS

Progress towards African self-government in the Transkei will speed up a similar movement in other reserves. Chiefs everywhere will clamour for more powers and for the replacement of White officials by Africans. All this means

greater opportunities for the employment of educated men and women in public services, commerce and industry. A rapid growth of the African middle class can be expected.

It will parallel the emergence of a working class in the reserves. The proposed settlement of landless peasants in villages within the reserves will create serious social problems, but also produce long-term benefits. Coupled with greater economic activity, it will help to destroy the vestiges of a stagnant, dying tribalism and unleash new forces for a dynamic society.

Wage earners, intellectuals, clerks and business men do not fit easily into tribal life or readily accept rule by hereditary chiefs. Political movements are bound

to arise to challenge the dominant position of the chiefs and demand a democratic, people's government. If the chiefs resist they will find themselves being brushed aside.

Popular movements of this kind will not limit their demands to the reserves. They will continue the offensive against racial discrimination in all parts of the Republic, and assert claims to take part in the government of the whole country. Political and economic factors, as well as social and kinship ties, will promote unity between the people in the reserves and the six million Africans living in the rest of the Republic. The reserves may yet become a great asset, instead of being something of a liability, to African Nationalism.

Interview with Kaunda . . .

TOWARDS REAL UNITY

How can the independent countries help those who are still fighting?

In the case of some countries like Angola, Mozambique and South Africa, you need assistance to meet the situation, and by the same token in the case of Northern Rhodesia one needs assistance that will meet the requirements of the situation. I realise I am not being specific — but I leave it to the people to guess what the situation is.

Can you not be more specific? Obviously for Angola you need arms.

I have said this before.

I believe in non-violence, not only as a method of achieving independence, or a method of getting what you want, but as a means that I would like to use — and I am sincere about this. All the same we have got to be realists. By this I mean, non-violence is a big experiment in human activity, and I believe I am right in saying that the saintly man Mahatma Gandhi whom we are trying to emulate also called it an experiment.

As an experiment it is bound to meet with a great many handicaps and this is why we have Sharpeville and other incidents — where people obviously go to demonstrate peacefully, and they are mowed down as if they were ordinary beasts. In other words non-violent methods will only be effective when the people you are struggling against are sufficiently sophisticated as to respect what you are doing in your position.

I criticise the British Government at home, I go to their own country and embarrass them by appealing to the British public. I am not singing songs of praise to the British — they have put me in prison and even exiled me once, but all the same they still tolerate my activities. Let us suppose an Angolan African Nationalist decided to go to Lisbon — let alone agitate in Angola—we would hear the last of him. This is true of such colonial countries as France, Spain and Belgium.

So that when you speak of non-violence, where these colonial countries with ragged minds are concerned, you might as well be prepared to wave a red rag in front of a wild bull, and expect it to accommodate you. This I am afraid is just the situation, and this is precisely why I am giving my full support to organisations that are trying to make the training for non-violent activities as international as is humanly possible, because thus lies the future hope of mankind.

With so many Conferences at this time, the subject of African unity is very topical. What are your views on the subject?

This topic has reached a point of exhaustion in so far as talking about it is concerned, and I believe it is high time those who mean what they say when they talk about this, start walking this road instead of just discussing it. The trend of events in the world today, shows clearly that there is no place for balkanised states. The powerful countries today are unions of some sort—USA, USSR and newer countries like India. Rather late in the day we see the people of Europe trying to organise themselves in a similar way.

We are not different in our thoughts and plans, in so far as the creation of larger states goes, but we remain uncompromising over the question of the Central African Federation, because it was imposed on us for wrong reasons under the cloak of unity and economic benefit, and indeed it has been run very badly. It is therefore our intention to break that one up and then we will have to encourage our people, as we are already doing of course, to decide to join hands with other countries of their own choice. You might call it a common market, a Federation, a Confederation, or any other name — the most important thing is: whatever happens in the way of joining any other country, whether it be A, B, C, or X, Y, Z, it must be based on the consent of the ruled.

DEMOCRACY—AND THE ONE-PARTY STATE

By Madeira Keita

"Madeira Keita, is the Minister of the Interior in the Republic of Mali. He founded and built up the Parti Democratique de Guinea, later taken over by President Sekou Toure. Arrested nine times for his political activities, he finally returned to Mali and became member of the Political Bureau of the Union Soudanaise. He has played a considerable part in the organisation and development of the Union Soudanaise, the Governing Party in the Republic of Mali."

THE few observations which I shall make relate to the unified party, to the need for the unified party in Africa, in the light of its prospects of development.

We, in French speaking West Africa, embarked on political life by way of elections, and we had not much experience at the time of the first elections in September 1945. It was only gradually, with the help of awakening consciousness, that we were to see the situation clearly and realise the contradictions that existed between the declarations made about freedom, the declarations made about democracy and the real facts.

While the elections served to divide Africans, they also served to accentuate the awakening of consciousness among the masses, because the leaders who wanted to sit in the General Councils, the Territorial Assemblies or the French Parliament, were obliged, for want of organised parties, to play upon what we have called internal racism. Was it opportunism to set the different regions and the different ethnic groups in opposition to each other within the same constituency? For a while we were obliged to pass through that phase.

And now all the African countries are moving towards independence in an irresistible manner.

NEW AGE — NEW PROBLEMS

The situation poses a certain number of problems to African political leaders. We are in countries which are said to be underdeveloped. We are conscious of our economic backwardness, and yet, we want to move fast. And in general, our European friends, do not always understand the African positions. Perhaps it is because they do not know Africa very well; it might also be because the French, proud of their country and their culture, want to set up their own institutions as a model. So much so, that when we speak of freedom and democracy, I sometimes have the impression that we are not reaching a very good understanding with our French friends. Be-

cause for us the essential thing is to mobilise all the forces of the country to move forward. And we believe that freedom is not threatened in Africa. We believe that we are acting with the fullest respect for democratic rules.

WITHOUT PARTIES

Does democracy necessarily imply more than one party? We say no.

We believe that there have been forms of democracy without political parties. We also say that if a political party is the expression of a class, which itself represents certain interests, we obviously cannot assert that Negro African society is a classless society. But we

In this article, we carry on a discussion started in our last issue by the article by Julius Nyerere. Next month, we will publish the views of Guinea's Sekou Toure.

do say that the differentiation of classes in Africa does not imply a diversification of interests and still less an opposition of interests.

With a few exceptions, all the African leaders, if we must put them into classes, applying obviously French-style definitions and criteria, were nothing more than lower middle-class or "petit bourgeois." And it is very interesting to note that these leaders are neither bankers nor industrialists: that Mr. Senghor, Mr. Modibo Keita and Mr. Sekou Toure, if they have bank accounts, merely have them in respect of their salaries; that very few of them are company shareholders, and if they are it is almost a token holding.

Thus, as I have already said, we have not the same reasons as France, Italy or Belgium, for having several parties and indulging in the luxury of a ministerial crisis every six months. Our position is thus quite different; it is true that we have more experience in analysing African problems.

There remains therefore the organisation of democracy based on the action of the party. And as we have no reason to multiply parties, because the differentiation of interests is not very sharp, the most important problem for the countries of Africa arises out of our aspirations to unity, just as for the countries which have been deprived of liberty, the countries which have only had liberty of association for 15 years, the most important problem is the problem of international independence, the problem of sovereignty.

UNITY IN OUR RANKS

We have aspirations which are for the most part very clearly defined, although the consciousness of some people is confused; but we are all in agreement in thinking that Africa cannot give itself the chance of moving rapidly except in very large groups.

Philosophical problems, religious problems, problems of ideology, do not divide us. The only aspiration which animates us is the rapid march towards liberty. The only aspiration, the only determination which inspires us is that of being able to establish a State mechanism at the service of economic development, of social and cultural development. We are studying the arrangements which might enable us to achieve this development as rapidly as possible.

If we analyse the situation well and even remembering that colonialism divided Africans by its electoral system, and especially by its frauds and electoral chicanery, we shall recognise that there is nothing fundamental opposing us to each other. It is true that we played the game for a long time, but on comparing programmes, on comparing congress resolutions, you could feel our agreement on every point. And yet we fought each other to the death, passionately and furiously — only the word passion can express to the Africans, to the people of the land of sunshine, all the violence of our fights and our oppositions.

But was there any real reason, since

M. KEITA

Continued

we are in agreement on the essential and pursuing the same objects, why we should remain divided, why we should remain lined up in parties mutually fighting each other? It is thus that the countries have progressively moved towards the formula of the unified party. I would have said "Single Party", but in the end I have accepted President Senghor's expression, "unified party." French has many shades of meaning and the word "unified" has been adopted, because there is always the legal possibility of forming other parties. We use the word "unified" because other parties and political groups have voluntarily sacrificed themselves to unite.

And thus it is that in the Sudan, as in Guinea, there is a single party.

ON GUARD FOR LIBERTY

But how are we to safeguard in a single party the criteria of liberty and democracy? I have already said that with regard to democracy, we understood it in what I might call a naively original meaning. Democracy is the management of public interests in accordance with the will of the masses, the will of the greatest number. But while we want to clean up the situation, to deprive the colonialists or the adversaries of the weapon of division, while we want to prevent corruption and give the team leaders greater assurance, it must nevertheless be recognised that the system of a single party is not without its dangers.

Here again there is one aspect of the problem of African life which must be underlined. That is our sincerity with ourselves, and if the party is a single party the paramount requirement is that it can be the true expression of the aspirations of the people. It is not enough for it to be the expression of veritable aspirations for a moment. It must continue to be so. That is only possible so far as there is real discipline in the party, so far as decisions are only taken inside the party after long discussion, after long free debate.

I would add that the unified party calls upon the leaders for greater honesty, greater disinterestedness, greater devotion and, moreover, that in Africa you cannot remain a leader for very long unless you are really effective.

TEST FOR LEADERS

I think that in the case of a unified Party, the leaders must not only be able, but must encourage discussion and give the example of discipline. The Party must be strongly organised, be-

cause if universal suffrage also constitutes a criterion of democracy, we must go on periodically re-electing the assemblies by popular suffrage. Moreover, our democracy does not stop there.

In the Sudan we have given the villages an elected council; naturally we have specified the functions of the chief whom the government retains the right to nominate on the advice of the elected council so that the chief can do nothing without consulting it. In other words the chief and the elected council can only take decisions in common. Soon we hope to be able to establish Provincial Assemblies elected by universal suffrage which will be responsible for managing local interests.

The motive power behind all this is the Party. And in order to avoid the political committee and the elected council of the village coming into conflict, conflicts of interests, rivalries, personal conflicts between individuals, the most outstanding and competent leaders are elected to the village council to liaise, co-ordinate and harmonise, the party always remaining the motive force.

In a recent resolution of our last conference we asserted the dominance of the political machine over the administrative machine. Thus we have placed at the head of the districts, administrators, African officials who have proved themselves at the head of political sections or trade unions and have shown themselves to be efficient administrators.

DEMOCRATIC ELECTIONS

Thus, from the point of view of internal democracy, with liberty of discussion, discipline, democratic elections not only in the directing bodies of the party, but also in the legislative and managing bodies like the provincial assemblies and the village councils, we believe that the criteria of democracy are respected.

At the present moment in Africa's history there is no need to multiply parties, there is no need to give oneself the luxury of sterile and fratricidal opposition, there is no need to give ourselves a ministerial crisis every three months if we have decided to go for independence, to consolidate the independence of the African states and if we want to achieve African unity and speedily raise Africa from the economic and cultural point of view to the level of other countries and other people.

You must go to the spot, move round the villages, attend meetings of the village committees, and of the Political Bureaux in the sub-divisions and circles, and meetings of the Central Political Bureau to realise that the system of the unified party as it presently exists in Guinea and the Sudan is a truly democratic system.

An Eye-witness

Account of The

Treatment of Algerian

Prisoners in France

The arrested Algerians had been transferred from the Palais des Sports (which served as the provisional headquarters for the prisoners and where a concert by an American singer was to take place) to the Exhibition Park. Everything was in ferment. Coming in, through the porch, in which scores of police were mounting guard, we were only conscious of the noise, the arrival and departure of police cars and escorts; of knots of guards heavily armed, talking in small groups; of inspectors in civilian clothes, pushing their way through the crowd; and of a gleam of helmeted shadows with slung rifles in the surrounding darkness.

Through the porch shone a glare of lights over the immense arena, hazed over by a pall of sand, dust and earth, kicked up by the feet of 800 to 1,000 Algerians herded inside. Apart from a kind of giant murmur one is surprised at the lack of noise. The prisoners are herded behind railing in enclosures about twenty yards wide. Between these, patrolled by guards, are corridors, some four yards across. The guards are armed with automatic pistols, safety catches down, finger on the triggers. The Algerians remain huddled one against the other, shivering with cold. Others are lying on the ground. There is a stench of army sanitary buckets. On the right a tent for ten people as a dispensary and hospital. On the left four or five tables covered with files form the interrogation centre. A loudspeaker blares orders.

New prisoners arrive. This is one of the famous "unloading" operations. Behind each lorry some twenty police stand in two rows, armed with truncheons, bits of wood, rubber coshes.

From inside the truck, a guard beats the prisoners with the stock of his rifle. Any who hesitate, blinded by the glare of searchlights, are dragged cut and thrown on the concrete. Between the entrance and the lorries they are obliged to walk with their hands over their heads while blows rain on them from every side. Those too exhausted to run, slump to the ground, and are kicked in the stomach, face and groin. Those who start running are tripped up. Anyone who is unable to rise is thrown to one side. We can see some seriously wounded cragging themselves on their knees beneath the descending truncheons. Younger men shielding their heads, have their fingers and arms broken. The stock of a rifle splinters like dry wood on the back of an Algerian — the policeman wielding it contemplates it with disgust. The nightmare is added by the screams of pain and fright of the prisoners. One of my comrades turns away and vomits.

Inside the Algerians are searched by

The Paris Pogroms

"We clubbed some, and shot them . . ."

the municipal police. Lighters, spectacles, matches, nail-files are thrown into a corner. Wallets are taken. No inventory is made. Covered with dust, and trodden under foot everything becomes smashed and unusable, except cash and notes which are expropriated. The Algerians — protesting against the theft of their belongings — are herded into various enclosures — more blows are being dealt out against those who are slow getting over the railings. Orders are given, the police cars depart to pick up more prisoners; the police wipe off traces of blood on their weapons and wander off.

We enter the park again. The medical tent houses one doctor and four nurses. It is surrounded by police. Two tables and some stools comprise the equipment. There are no camp-beds and the desperately wounded lie on the ground on blankets. Supplies are as follows: liquid soap, surgical spirit, iodine, gauze, bandages and lint. An orderly informs us that this is barely sufficient for light wounds. "We have no antibiotics, or drugs for deep injuries — as we have no splints we are bandaging fractures with bits of wood picked up from the ground. Some wounded can't urinate as the result of being kicked in the stomach. We can't treat them as we have no equipment. We can give no injections. We haven't even enough bandages to maintain broken ribs in place. We cannot treat delirious cases, and the Algerians refuse to take any form of pills for fear of being poisoned. The police are often in charge of the wounded. They isolate them into small rooms and club them into a coma. The police prevent us from evacuating the seriously wounded to hospital. The police are supposed to ferry the wounded and don't do so, and we have not a single ambulance. Above all, we want to know what happens to the wounded if the police start taking them away. We need a medical register and we haven't one.

More Algerians come in, amongst them an old man covered in blood, pouring down from a scalp wound. An orderly leads him to the infirmary. In the beginning it was not like that. The police refused immediate medical help. It was the soldiers taking food around, who sought out the wounded and tried to get the sentries to let them out for treatment. The latter often refused. At least ten people died for this reason during the first twenty hours. Saturday morning found an Algerian with a tommy-gun bullet in his thigh. He had been hiding his injuries for fear of reprisals. How many others are there in the same state? Many have nervous breakdowns and become dangerous in this state to their fellow prisoners. Some throw themselves at the feet of the police and beg to be finished off. Two soldiers carry a

stretcher, on it an epileptic. The orderlies are overwhelmed. Soldiers from the garrison at Vincennes came as volunteers to help them, but on their return to barracks the next morning their commander threatens them with prison sentences if they went again.

Odd snatches of conversation we overhear from the policemen as we pass:

" . . . were too good to them. To get rid of rats the best thing to do would be to seal off the park and finish them off with machine-guns or grenades." To some soldiers who were carrying pails of coffee: "When are you going to lace it with some arsenic."

Talking amongst themselves: ". . . he would not come out of that lavatory — so I fired through the door" or "we clubbed some and shot them on the quiet."

In fairness it must be said that not all the policemen displayed the same hatred. By far the worst were the Parisian units. The Republican Securities Companies

(C.R.S.), although brutal, were far more discreet, and readily admitted that the municipal police had on this occasion exceeded all bounds.

Walking through the corridors one gets an occasional opportunity to speak to an Algerian. Their accounts frequently tally: "I've been in France since 1937. I'm married to a French woman. We have two children. I fought for France in the last war. What else do you require of me? Do you think it's human, what the police have done to us? When I get back to work my boss will throw me out. What will my wife and children eat then? It can't last this way. Why don't they kill us and have done with us?"

All this was said in a way completely devoid of hatred. They gave us the impression of asking questions rather than telling us facts about themselves.

(Translated from *Liberté, Verité*, Paris).

OBITUARY

TRIBUTE TO A FRIEND

All the years I knew Jock Isacowitz he remained a friendly man. He had no personal enemies. A difference in political outlook was not allowed to blight a friendship. You noticed this during the months of the Emergency when a range of political views were being expressed in the Johannesburg and Pretoria Gaols. Jock was a well-liked as ever he was, even, and especially, by some of the detainees who heatedly challenged Jock's views on this and that topic.

I can picture Jock now in aged shorts, wrinkled grey stockings, dilapidated leather sandals, marching round the yard in serious discussion with an advocate. Jock interrupts the peregrination to chivvy the lazy to fall in beside him for the daily march and the daily debate.

He rapidly organised our 'news service', became one of our two spokesmen with the prison authorities, after evaluating the political advantages to the detainees, took a personal decision to engage in the hunger strike, harried the prison medical service when we all had 'gippo guts' and so on.

That was Jock all through his life. He worked with people. He used his exceptional intellect to get to the heart of a problem: he worked untiringly himself and had the knack of inspiring others to do likewise. He was never awed by position — he talked as earnestly and cracked his jokes with Gener-

al Smuts as with the chairman of a small Legion branch.

His talent for organisation never flagged. He put ex-servicemen and their furniture into unoccupied houses in 1946: he put squatters into a luxury hotel in 1947. He produced a plan to get ex-servicemen and their families in the plateland to vote anti-Nat. When this was rejected by Smuts, Oppenheimer and the press, he marshalled the Springbok Legion's resources and flung our workers and propaganda desperately into every corner of the country for the election in 1948: at an ex-service international conference in Paris he tried in the interests of world peace to blunt the weapon of the 'cold war'; Jock brought the Torch Commando into existence. Later when newcomers to the Commando's executive, urged by the United Party, threw out prominent members of the Springbok Legion, Jock warned them in the most serious speech I ever heard him make of the certain and dreadful consequences to South African democracy of their shameful decision.

In later years in the ranks of the Liberal Party Jock showed the same acute perception of people and situations, the same extraordinary gift for organisation, the same tireless energy in the political struggle for democracy.

His death has removed from us a gifted and inspiring fighter and friend.

C.G.W.

The American's literary acquaintance with South Africa is predominantly through Peter Abrahams, Alan Paton, Nadine Gordimer and — how frightening — Stuart Cloete. Americans have a reverence for Mr. Paton, both as a man and as a writer. They say he is a saintly man and generally tend to think the story in his first novel epitomises the real problems of South Africa. They don't speak of *Too Late the Phalarope* which is a much better book, one to which you respond as a whole — like a poem. Nadine Gordimer's writing is very much liked, but for much healthier reasons. The Negroes have plumbed for Peter Abrahams, perhaps because his writing reveals a strong identification with the Negro literary movement. Stuart Cloete is of course an idol of long standing. Maybe white Americans easily identify themselves with the Voortrekkers who ventured out to "tame a country", shooting down Africans, Fushmen and Hottentots in the process, same as the Indian resistance was savagely beaten down. But enough of this talk about Cloete's trashy writing.

*

Talking about the American's acquaintance with Africa reminds me that the 'African Studies Department' is becoming a common feature of American universities. This is a recent development. It is another aspect of the awakening of Americans to the importance of Africa. West Africa today teems with scholars who have had a basic degree in social science or political science or anthropology and go to Africa to study some aspect of its affairs. It is interesting to note that Britain hasn't caught on yet in this kind of study, outside the School of Oriental and African Studies in London and the peanuts that prospective colonial administrators used to be fed on. I doubt if British universities ever invite Africans to give a course of lectures on Africa. Maybe they know a lot already as colonial masters! 'African Studies' in the English academic world are rooted in the colonial tradition and centred in single revered and somewhat forbidding personages like Miss Margery Perham and Lord Hailey.

*

Four days in New York. Purely for business. It's like moving in a jungle of concrete, without feeling anything at all. The city is never so stark as when you approach these structures of concrete from somewhere on the side of Staten Island. You are overpowered by a sense of depth as you move towards Manhattan. And still when somebody asks me what my most superficial impressions were of New York, I fumble for an answer. One can't just sum these up under "impersonal city", the stock term that goes for most Western cities, with the possible exception of Paris. No. There's an awkward way in which New York doesn't affect one as one moves

"Oh, say have y

inside it. This is irritating: maybe because one expected to catch fire.

Oliver Tambo and I walk down Broadway in the dazzling glare of those lights as they quiver, explode, splash and chase one another back and forth. It's a delight to be with Oliver: he has such a reassuring warmth about him. And as we saunter down Broadway, the face of New York recedes into the distance, and all you are aware of is that you are with Oliver and speak intimately about the thing that is closest to your hearts: South Africa. He is worried about the sinister game being played by the Indian delegation at UNO, where they have been known to turn up each time with amendments to water down stern Afro-Asian resolutions against South Africa. Why are they dithering like this? . . . Oliver is certainly an overworked man. He needs a secretary very badly, even although he has abundant confidence in his own drive. There are a number of small things I know which should be left to an able subordinate so that he is only faced with the major tasks connected with planning. The ANC could not have been more blessed than to have him represent it outside. We cannot afford to ride him so hard all the time. We need him so much, and there are tougher times ahead which we must make it possible for him to endure. Oliver has all the qualities of foreign service: he's as honest as steel; he's a talented diplomat; and has an intellectual capacity of a score of brilliant men. Add to this his personal warmth, the sheer stuff of humanity he is made of, and his ability to inquire into his own motives even when this is likely to hurt him — and you have the man you want in the person of Oliver. You know you should feel humble in his presence because of your shortcomings, but of course he doesn't allow you to feel so. Strange that I talk in this vein about him, just as if I had made a startling discovery. I'm sure the greater part of my audience knows him as much as, if not more than, I do. It's simply that the things I took for granted back home stand out in bold relief now that he is free to use his qualities.

Maybe there is another reason for the forcible manner in which these qualities affect one. Over the four years since I left South Africa, I have observed men like Nkrumah, Mboya, Banda, Nyerere, Azikiwe, Awolowo, Sekou Toure, Senghor, Dia, Keita, Olympio, Margai (to speak only of *Afrique Noire*) — some directly, others from reports about them and from their speeches. And then it occurs to me how very badly we need administrators, economists and technicians in South Africa. The British have certainly done much to train their colonial subjects in administration, technology and economics. How could we ever have achieved this with the jackboot on us? But then it's only a tiny class

the elite — who have been lifted almost by the scruff of the neck in countries of British influence; still much tinier in those of French influence. And power is so concentrated in this elite class that competition for the top place becomes violent. What makes things worse is that this is not happening in differentiated societies, which have enough professional and industrial activity to absorb the energies of the elite and thin down the cluster of flies at the mouth of the tin of jam.

But although we South African non-whites lack administrators and the like, we have a much larger educated and sophisticated population; we also have many more nurses and teachers, a much larger urban working population, a much older and sophisticated labour movement. And our politicians are tried men shrewd in a way many of our luminaries north of the Limpopo are not. Ours are men who have experienced an evolution of political thinking comparable with none in black Africa. It is when one feels compelled by events in Africa to draw such comparisons and contrasts that one begins to contemplate our credit balance as represented in men like Oliver and our other leaders.

*

Taxi drivers are a garrulous lot of people, but not among the cleverest. This is something of a dialogue between me and one in Cambridge, Massachusetts: Seen the paper this morning? I say no. He shows me a picture of Chou en Lai, Prime Minister of the Republic of China, at the Communist Congress in Moscow. Stinking lie, says the driver. Chou was never in Moscow — not a bit. Never showed his mug at the congress. I say surely the *New York Times* reports that he was there. I'm telling you there's not a bit of truth in 't, the old boy says, his voice pitched pretty high this time. I say maybe he's right. Chou was never in Moscow for the Congress since he (the driver) insists; and I add that newspaper men are a phoney lot anyhow. They've a way of placing important people where they weren't! But the driver won't allow me to be misled. So he says no, Moscow misinformed the world about the Congress. Just to make believe Russia and China are still chummy when they ain't. At this point the taxi man raises a fat large forefinger like a prophet of old. One thing Kennedy must do, he says breathlessly. We must tell these damn Russians that if China invades them — and those guys are going to do it one of 'em days — Krushchev mustn't run to us for help. We just won't listen. I'm telling you the Chinese are going to attack Russia. They've the aitch bomb, not the Russians. I say No? They've no aitch bomb, the Russians? No, they ain't got it, the Chinese got it. I say I think he's right, now that he says it.

Come to think of it — we've only got reports in newspapers to go by, papers like the *New York Times*, eh? Then I trail off into moaning about the general gullibility of people these days . . . we need more men like him, independent of mind, I say. What evidence have we that Chou was in Moscow and Russia has the aitch bomb simply because the *New York Times* and *Time Magazine* tell us so? Give 'em a chance, give 'em

a chance, he says, and snorts importantly. But I tell you the day Chou invades the United States, the old boy holds forth, the Americans have had it. Put twenty Chinese in this country, and we'll all be Chinamen in a short time. Just see how many they are in China! I say to him it's very very serious. But the old boy's last words jolt me and I I don't think he realises I don't mean his biological speculations are serious.

No, when a full-grown man speaks like this, then the situation isn't funny anymore. H.R.I. wrote a very important book recently called *Scratches On Our Minds*. He analyses trenchantly and painstakingly American images of Asians. Fu Manchu and Charlie Chan stories on the cinema screen are some of the sources he explores of these images. My taxi driver could easily have been one of H.R.I.'s case studies.

A LOOK AT TUNISIA

Glimpses of Life in Independent Africa

By A Special Correspondent

There is very little that reminds you that you are on African soil when you first land in Tunis.

Were it not for the Arabic signboards, the white stoles of the women and the occasional fez and burnus on a man, you might think you are in Italy.

Smart boulevard cafes on the Avenue Bourguiba, where the better-off spend their leisure hours; well-fed young Tunisians (much more so than Italians), looking splendid, like classical Roman sculpture.

No Luxuries

The moment one leaves, however, what was once the European town, the patrician element disappears abruptly — no luxury shops any more; no Italian fashions; no Leicas; no Elizabeth Arden products.

Take a bus to Kairouan — the magnificent old Arab town hardly two hours inland — and all vestiges of Western cosmetics have gone.

Here you see abysmal poverty and that typical testimony to Western civilisation: war graves, war graves, war graves.

Having been witnesses of the terrible battles between the Nazis and the Western Powers, followed by the reinstatement of the Nazi criminals, the rearmament of Germany by the West makes Tunisians ponder.

Bad Year

Even before Bizerta, 1961 threatened to be a bad year for Tunisia.

No rain for months. Fruit and vegetables ruined. The olive harvest — Tunisia's most important crop — feared to fall to well below a normal year.

Most of the export business is still in foreign hands; there is hardly any industry. Even the dates are packed in France, the oil is processed in France.

The phosphate mines are foreign property; the huge olive groves the property of big land-owners — mainly Tunisians, but many French and Italians are still in possession of vast vineyards.

Those who till the land are paid in kind; this year there will be little left for them.

The big towns, like Sfax and Sousse, appear fairly prosperous, but it is difficult to ascertain to what extent it is still the foreign elements who skim the profits.

Nearly all the hotels are owned by Frenchmen, restaurants by Italians, and the clients are nearly all West Germans.

The Children

Small boys work ten hours or more as waiters for 10s. a week.

Unemployment is acute. Nearly every family has a son in West Germany or in France, where he is forced to seek work.

Tunisian wages are roughly one-third of what they are in Britain.

A feature of delight are the children. Tunisians are extremely clean, and even the poorest child looks neat and washed. Their politeness, their self-confidence and intellectual curiosity are amazing to a visitor from the West.

Teenage boys, obliged to look after small brothers and sisters, develop a responsibility hardly to be found over here.

The Tunisians are friendly, peaceful and highly civilised people. The sharp class conflicts are moderated by the sunny climate — and held in check by a secret police.

Bourguiba

President Bourguiba's greatest supporters are the women: he abolished polygamy and wants the emancipation of women. In contrast to Morocco, the veiled woman is disappearing rapidly.

The country is kept beautifully clean, and the streets of the big towns are regularly flushed with disinfectants to keep the flies away.

On every second house there is a huge picture of President Bourguiba, and daily the people get pep talks over the radio: land distribution schemes; unemployment reduced, etc. This lack of reality has a most bewildering effect on the people.

The Government wants to introduce birth control, but this will not help.

The country could feed at least three times as many people if the wealth of the soil was properly used for the people.

There exists no Opposition party, and the "trade unions" are part of the official establishment.

A very good Left Wing paper, *Tribune du Progres*, is sold in the streets — but I was told it was better not to be seen reading it in public.

Dollar "aid" appears to come mainly in the form of American horror films and glossy magazines. Some weeks ago they showed "Danger from Outer Space" in four cinemas.

I think the Bizerta affair has shown where the real danger comes from.

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MOTHER-TONGUE EDUCATION

When Councillor D. D. P. Ndamase wanted to move at the 1957 session of the Transkeian Territorial Bantu Authority that:—

'The language of medium of instruction in Bantu schools be one of the official languages',

he was told by the Chairman, Mr. T. D. Ramsay, Chief Magistrate, that:—

'You are challenging one of the strongest pillars of the present government. This government is absolutely committed in an unalterable manner to mother tongue education.'

To teach children in their home language rather than in a foreign tongue appears, on the surface, to be quite reasonable. That there should be widespread opposition to its introduction in schools for African children, and that the Government in spite of opposition is 'absolutely committed' to it, indicates that the reasons for both policy and opposition are political as well as educational.

The problem of the medium of instruction raises interesting questions. In a country such as ours with many different linguistic groups — there are 7 main African language groups as well as Afrikaans and English — what should be the correct media of instruction in all schools? How have other countries with similar problems tackled them? If mother-tongue education is 'the foundation of nationalism' why is it being pushed by the Government and rejected by the Africans?

Before Bantu Education

When the Eiselen Commission investigated the educational systems in schools for Africans in 1949/50, it found the following broad general policies throughout the Union, with Provincial variations:

- * Medium of instruction up to and including Std. II (i.e. the first four years of schooling): mother tongue.*
- * From Std. III to VI an official language (usually English) was used as well as mother tongue.
- * After Std. VI English only was used as the medium of instruction.
- * Teachers were encouraged to 'experiment' with mother tongue instruction beyond Std. II when practicable.

Before discussing the reversal of these practices brought about after the Commission's recommendations, the following facts should be noted:

Only 56% of all African children of school-going age are receiving any education at all (Minister's statement, 1958).

74% of these are in Std. II or lower. Only 3% of all children in school are above Std. VI.

- * In the O.F.S. the mother tongue was used up to Std. IV.

31% of Africans above 10 years of age were literate in any language according to the 1951 Census, 11.7% being literate in English.

The Commission recommended that mother tongue instruction be used up to and including Std. VI and extended to secondary education in subjects where technical terminology is not required. Its justification for this appears to be that the African child had the 'right' to understand the knowledge that was being imparted to him! The teaching of the official languages should be

"Freedom must be the stimulus of our African languages" writes 'Umfundisi'.

commenced in the 2nd and 4th year of schooling, emphasis being placed on their 'utility' value, i.e. as a means of contact with the non-Bantu community.

Since Bantu Education

The Bantu Education Act, 1953, gave the Minister power to prescribe the medium of instruction in Government Bantu Schools (i.e. virtually all schools) and the position today is:—

Mother tongue is the medium of instruction in all schools up to and including Std. VI.

Std. VI examinations are set and must be answered in mother tongue. Candidates for J.C. examinations may still write in English, but only because as yet 'technical difficulties' have not been sufficiently overcome.

English and Afrikaans are taught as second languages from the sub-standards: 100 minutes per week each in the sub-standards, 210 minutes each in Std. I and II, and 205 minutes each in Stds. III and IV.

English A is to be done away with as a compulsory subject in order to make it easier for pupils to pass J.C.

Opposition

Criticism of mother tongue instruction and the limitation of the knowledge of English has come from many quarters, including teachers, parents, University students and pupils themselves.

Firstly, Africans emphasise the economic importance of a knowledge of English: they do not adopt the narrow view held by the Eiselen Commission that the purpose of teaching English is to enable the African child "to find his way in European communities; to follow oral or written instructions; to carry on a simple conversation with Europeans about his work." Africans need to know English in order to qualify

for technical work, professions, and white collar jobs, as artisans, doctors, lecturers, lawyers, clerks etc. They want to acquire the same technical and mechanical skills as Europeans, to understand science and obtain jobs that will satisfy their abilities and energies. Such knowledge cannot be acquired through the use of the vernacular only.

Given the necessary knowledge and means to acquire skills, there is no job done by Whites that Africans are not capable of learning to do. IT IS BECAUSE THE GOVERNMENT KNOWS THIS THAT IT USES JOB RESERVATION ON THE ONE HAND AND BANTU EDUCATION ON THE OTHER TO PROTECT THE EUROPEAN FROM AFRICAN COMPETITION.

Africans want to know English because it is an international language. "It opens up new worlds to us" wrote one University student. It is the language of Western culture, of literature, philosophy, science. Without it, Africans will be cut off mentally from the modern world, from revolutionary thought, from current news. They will be unable to follow the 'English Press' or foreign broadcasts given in English—both anathema to this government. They refuse to be restricted to membership of a 'Bantu community', which is the very purpose of Bantu Education.

When introducing the Bill, the Minister of Native Affairs, (now the Prime Minister) said that the previous educational system made the Bantu child feel that 'he was not a member of a Bantu community, but a member of a wider community'. Therefore the system has to be changed.

Finally a knowledge of English is desired because it is a lingua franca among Africans of different linguistic groups, both within the Republic and without. Mother tongue medium is designed 'to separate us not only from the Europeans, but from each other,' they allege.

There is evidence that with the change to mother tongue instruction, the whole standard of education is falling. Few teachers are proficient in all three languages. As text books have to be provided for each ethnic group, they are few and expensive. A new terminology has to be created for the translation of English and Afrikaans technical and scientific books. The 'mother tongue' that the child is being taught at school is not what his mother speaks at home, but what the Government-appointed 'language committees' think it should be.

Africans have pointed out that Afrikaans has been developed in the interests of Afrikaner nationalism until it is used as a medium from the K' dergarten to the University. 'But this does not mean that we accept the development of our mother tongue in order to instil into us a "tribal pride" or to make Bantustans successful.

Our problem is not unique. A multiplicity of languages occurs in many countries in Europe, America, Asia and Africa. The withdrawal of colonial rule has brought the problem into prominence by forcing newly-emergent states to make their own choice between one or more indigenous languages and the world language introduced by the former imperial rulers. What can we learn from experience elsewhere?

The UNESCO meeting of Experts on the Use of the Vernacular Language (Paris, 1951) agreed that from an educational point of view it was advisable to use the vernacular as a medium of instruction for as long as possible. But there were legitimate reasons which justified its limitation to the lower standards only. One of these legitimate reasons was 'popular opposition' such as there is in this country. The experts held that the people of a country must be allowed to have a free choice in the matter of the language in which their children are to be educated. The meeting was attended by Mr. P. A. W. Cooke of the South African Bantu Administration Department, and now Principal of Ngola University College — the tribal college of Zululand.

India

In India, when the new Constitution was adopted in 1949, there were 231 languages and 774 spoken dialects. The move to divide India on linguistic lines had gained favour and the Government recognised 14 official Regional or Provincial languages, but made Hindi the official National language, replacing English. Hindi was chosen because more Indians (about 42%) understood it than any other language. In non-Hindi areas, the schools operate on a 'three-language-formula', mother tongue, Regional language and Hindi. In Bengal, in Anglo-Indian schools, English is the medium of instruction, Bengali and Hindi being second subjects.

Arguing in favour of Hindi replacing English as the official language, J. C. Jain¹ admits that English has been used for 100 years in the Courts, Universities, Administration; that it has a rich cultural heritage, is rich in literature, has been a unifying force in the country (all arguments used here in favour of retaining it). But, he says, none of these justify its retention. Supporting his argument by frequent references to the sayings of Gandhi, he condemns it as a 'foreign tongue' whose domination repressed the use of the vernaculars. With independence came a desire to develop the Indians' own mother-tongues.

South Africa

What is the solution here? Chief Lutuli, in an article in *Drum*, December, 1961, writes of the kind of South Africa he would like to see, and says:

"In my non-racial democratic South Africa there can be no question of a

¹ 'Hindi as a medium of instruction' in *Teaching*, June, 1961.

different system of education for different racial groups. It would only be in the lower classes—say up to fourth year of school, and never beyond the 8th year—where mother tongue instruction would predominate."

There has never been a move here from Africans to make an African language a third official language. Their one aim has been to become proficient in the language of their oppressors — because it has been in their interests to do so. Will this change?

Janheinz Jahn² in a lovely chapter on African writers, points out that it is difficult for a writer in an African language to get a publisher in the Republic unless he writes the sort of stuff satisfactory to Missionaries or the Government. The "literature of emancipation" written by Africans like Mphahlele is written in European languages. He concludes:

"We should expect to find a greater number of significant writers in South Africa if there were more freedom there."

Freedom, rather than 'Bantu education' will be the stimulus for the development of our African languages. Zulu, Xhosa, Tswana have a great future. As standard of literacy advances, a growing the African population increases and the volume of literary and technical works will be produced in these languages. The people themselves will solve the problems of terminology and modern usage that now appear almost insoluble.

But the languages cannot come into their own until the people have freed themselves from alien rule and racial discrimination. Attempts to foster the languages artificially for reactionary political ends, as part of a policy of putting the clock back to tribalism, will never gain the approval of the majority.

Africans reject this 'mother-tongue' system of instruction, not because they despise their language, but because they see in it an evil attempt to hold them back from advancing to a free and equal status in their country.

² Muntu, 1961.

CINEMA

JUDGMENT ON HERRENVOLK

Artistically, technically and politically Stanley Kramer has made a splendid film, whose effect in South Africa can only be to vitalise drugged consciences; for the film, in trying to assess and apportion the responsibility for the anti-human evils of the Nazi regime, throws a steady and disturbing searchlight on to the lunacies and ugliness of apartheid.

The film, 'Judgment at Nuremberg', an adaptation of Abby Mann's book, is highly dramatic, sensitively directed magnificently acted and politically illuminating. The primary side-wonder of the film is that it was made in America and angled in the first place to American audiences: The second is that the Nationalist government allowed its screening in the Republic. For it is a devastating indictment of war-mongering. An exposure of fascist hypocrisy which conceals its evil purposes behind an anti-Communist, anti-liberal, anti-human facade. It exposes the malign perversion of 'race-purity' gobbledegook, striking right at the heart of apartheid. The final message of the film is that ignorance of, or compliance with social evil does not absolve a man from guilt and, accordingly, he must pay the penalty.

Four German judges of the Nazi period are on trial before an American tribunal at Nuremberg for their complicity in implementing Hitler's laws against 'race-contamination' and against 'treason' by political opponents. Their coun-

sel's attempt to prove that the responsibility for society's evils cannot be placed on individuals, not even on judges, fails and the judge (Spencer Tracy) condemns them to life imprisonment. (A final announcement on the screen reveals that of 99 defendants condemned to life-imprisonment in the American trials at Nuremberg ALL had been set free at the time of making the film.)

What a rare and exhilarating experience it is to come away from a bioscope feeling that the picture has had 'something to say', that your eyes have been opened, your emotions profoundly moved, that you have seen a sample of cinematographic art at its best. That's how you feel coming away from 'Judgment at Nuremberg'.

With two exceptions, all the actors give splendid performances — Spencer Tracy, Judy Garland, Maximilian Schell (a brilliant portrayal of the Nazi personality in the new West Germany), Richard Widmark, Montgomery Clift — they are excellent. Burt Lancaster and Marlene Dietrich do not succeed in giving life to their conception of the characters they are playing. The camera brings forward interesting angles and the slow tempo of the court proceedings expertly allows us to see into the minds of the protagonists.

All in all a film worthy of the highest respect.

By RICHARD MOORE

A new South African musical—Mr. Paljas — recently opened in Cape Town, written by Harry Bloom, with music by Spike Glasser (both of King Kong fame) and lyrics by the writer's wife, Beryl Bloom.

"Fighting Talk" wrote to the well-known Cape Town writer, Richard Moore for an article around some of the problems raised by and around this show. "We believe" we wrote, "that there was a flurry of argument in Coloured leftist and intellectual circles on the fact that the show was labelled in the press as a "Coloured Musical." Was there bitterness because the show was written and produced by whites? Do they object to having an all-Coloured cast?" We sought some expression of what we termed "the Coloured's point of view."

Richard Moore replies:

"Because of my absolute mental rejection of all artificial caste barriers I felt strong resentment against the allegation that there had been a flurry of argument in "Coloured" circles. True, certain people raised what I feel were justifiable objections to racialism in South African art, of which Mr. Paljas was merely one of the many symptoms. I was also totally confused by a "Coloured point of view." I had no idea that any intellectual deliberations could be tempered by mere surface manifestations such as skin colour. Rather than maintain a resentful silence, I have decided to deal with the questions posed, as their very framework displays the same racial genesis as a Mr. Paljas performance.

My argument I hope will also be valid for all other theatrical ventures where tacit and implied approval is given to Afrikaner, Bantu and European cultural vacuums . . ."

Any venture which accepts racial labellings whether it be billed as such, or calls for segregated auditions, or plays before segregated audiences, or maintains a segregation behind the footlights, without exploring alternatives, cannot lay claim to any higher cultural aspirations. This sham sophistication can but imply a debasement of human values. Art should, and must reflect a synthesis of the highest human aspirations, which in such circumstances becomes unattainable because it is a denial of fundamental humanism. The acceptance of racial divisions denies and repudiates our common humanity.

Attempts at separatist cultures conform to the reactionary race-laws of our ruling class and debase both the artist and his art by denying links in our integrated society.

And South African culture is an integrated composite of diverse cultures drawn from inside and outside the country. Any attempts therefore to build up a South African organisation must reject a caste system which is artificially superimposed on the common roots of our culture. There needs must be an absolute rejection of any form of racialism and especially of the all-pervading privileged-class racist patronage which encourages separatism and parades under the guise of cultural guardianship.

Bitterness was certainly felt because the show was written and produced by "Whites" as such. It would also have been felt had it been written and produced by Blacks and Browns. What South Africa requires desperately is a show written by South Africans for South Africans. An onslaught on racial kraaling and an acceptance of the broad humanitarianism of human relationships is an absolute necessity.

COLOUR — OR STANDARD?

The argument has often been advanced that aestheticism creates a criterion. That is that blacks can't play the part of whites and vice-versa, and that a Coloured fishing village (whatever that may be) must contain Coloured characters. Must Othello of necessity be a Moor? or Shylock a Jew? Can only Japanese play in the Mikado and must Hamlet be a Dane? It has been proved over and over again that an audience is sufficiently perceptive to disregard these considerations if the standard is sufficiently high. Men played the parts of women in Elizabethan Drama, and the audience were quite prepared to accept Ophelia and Juliet.

Attempts were also made to prove that the script of "Paljas" at no time mentioned the word "Coloured." The "Colouredism" is however implicit in the play itself. Certain expressions like "gal" "jöl" "doekoem" which apparent-

ly are the prerogative of a particular socio-economic group were tortured and bludgeoned into the play to add "masala and spice", and resultantly stood out like sore thumbs. There is no objection to the author's use of the WORD Coloured. Technically he cannot limp through a work using terms such as So-called Coloured and so-called White ad nauseam. The objection is not levelled against the use of the word, but at the concept of "Colouredism" as such with all its derogatory South African connotation.

A writer in South Africa cannot help using the artificial racial classifications in his description of human relationships, but the work as a whole must over-ride and supermount such considerations. Through the work the artificiality and injustice of such a status quo must be shown for what it is.

CASTE AND CULTURE

Fortunately Abrahams Bay is as fictitious and non-existent as Paljas himself. I failed to see how typically Cape this latter-day cowboy striding his piscatorial range, could become. The tiny digs at existing injustices and malpractices are so obscure and mild that I was reminded of Bully Bottom's "I will roar you as gently as any sucking dove. I will roar you as it were a nightingale." I do not consider that the play in itself merits any serious consideration.

Quite irrespective of the background or history of any piece of work, that which is valid at once becomes common property to all mankind. To quote, "Culture is human culture and as such belongs to the whole of man."

An absolute necessity therefore is the wholesale onslaught on and rejection of caste barriers by leading representatives of South African culture in the interpretation of their arts. This will open conditions which will enable all South Africans to contribute to the fuller development of world culture.

It demands a rejection of all-white or all-black castes as such, the rejection of plays exploiting and implementing certain racial characteristics and stereotypes, a situation whereby caste is eliminated from cast, otherwise we will continue to bastardize our art forms with the creation of racial yardsticks and criterions.

Lest I be misunderstood let me emphasise that I am not making a case for a carefully selected multi-racial cast. One white or black actor does not make a non-racial summer. I am merely stating that actors should be auditioned and selected purely on merit, otherwise we will continue to have shows of which Peter Quince says,

"All for your delight we are not here. That you should here repent you the actors are at hand."

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BOOKS

Africa's trade union story

"That the period 1945-1960, in which the struggle for Africa's independence reached its greatest heights, has also been the period of the most rapid growth of African trade unionism, and in which an unprecedented storm of strike battles has taken place, seems to have escaped the attention of a surprising number of writers on African affairs. Yet everywhere it has been the mass actions of the workers which have helped pave the way for the post-war upsurge of the national struggles and the growth of the national political parties and organisations."

This is the theme of a remarkable and inspiring book, "Africa — the Lion Awakes", by Jack Woddis, which forms the second part of a trilogy. For the non-trade union democrat, and even for the trade unionist, this book will be a revelation. The world, as represented by the major organs of the press, is one in which strikes cause disruption, and the real issues are hidden — when trade union actions are reported at all. The hats and hairstyles of Princess Margaret monopolise its columns while Radio South Africa, in its so-called news services quotes endlessly from the speeches of party hacks.

Jack Woddis gives the essence of the real Africa of this century. His book is copiously documented and his facts are presented with ability. He deals with people who have made, are now making history; people who are changing the face of a continent in ways not within the scope of a Rhodes, Smuts or Welensky. He relates the incredible wealth and abysmal poverty of Africa in the ten years between 1945 and 1954 with the huge, exported, profits. ". . . the Rhokana Corporation was able to pay out total dividends equal to fourteen times its original capital. Throughout the 1950's the Corporation's dividend had never been under 200 per cent; in 1957 it actually reached 350 per cent."

DECEPTIVE WORDS

He deals with the democratic game of rulers who start changing the rules when the game begins to go against them: ". . . Tory peer, Lord Milverton, asserted that 'the greatest enemy of democracy is universal suffrage when it is applied to a people who have not yet the judgment and the knowledge and the education to use it for their own protection and for their own national interests.'" And, "In Africa today, 'thunders Mr. Richard Goold-Adams, 'a universal franchise implies dictatorship, not de-

mocracy.'" Of course the persons quoted are quite serious, although not rational or sensible, and most careless about the meaning of words, which they often turn to mean the opposite of what they used to. In the Republic we are richly provided with the language of unthink. There are the defenders of 'law and order' who refuse to prosecute assassins, detain people without trial but commend 'the rule of law', and smugly assert their respect for the sub judice rule while their henchmen indulge in kidnapping.

African trade unions have grown despite all attempts to hamper or hinder them and they have really run the gamut of obstacles. They have been banned outright. They have been compelled to "register", although British trade unions need not. "In Britain . . . trade unions are entirely free to decide for themselves whether or not they wish to register as a 'society' within the meaning of the law. There is no compulsion on them to do so, nor is there any action taken against them by the government if they decide not to register." Registration has been refused, or delayed, or granted only under certain harsh conditions.

Various "labour advisers" have been foisted on the unions, for example a certain W. S. Mare who wrote in a pamphlet: "Employers are usually not nearly so bad as some people would like to pretend they are." Company unions have been formed. Officials have been jailed, with or without charges, the innocent as well as the guilty; others have simply disappeared and years later been found to be living in exile. In Kenya "Makhan Singh (General Secretary, East African Trade Union Congress) was arrested and sentenced to three months imprisonment on a charge of perjury. After serving eight weeks, he was acquitted by the Supreme Court—only to be immediately re-arrested under a Restriction Order prepared by the governor. Under this order he was banished to a remote village, Lokitaung, without trial and without right of appeal. He is apparently still there."

UNIONS PAY OFF

Despite all injustice and repression, contempt for law, disorder provoked by the rulers, the movement grew. Woddis shows what a rich and exciting history it has and how, again and again, men of good sense, courage and ability have come from the ranks of the working people to lead their fellows. They made solid gains. They improved working conditions and raised wages. In 1949 wages were almost exactly the same on the Witwatersrand gold mines and the Northern Rhodesian copper mines. Six years later they had both increased, but

the organised copper miners were receiving 93.4 d while the unorganised African gold miners were getting 60d.

Throughout Africa the persecution of all fighters for political advancement and the destruction of political parties increased the importance of trade unions. They shouldered exceptional and unusual burdens and today many of the leading figures in the new African states, presidents, prime ministers and cabinet ministers, are men who served their apprenticeship in the trade unions. The study of the variety and inventiveness of anti-trade union activity by governments and employers in Africa is sufficiently educational to justify this excellent book.

The granting of political independence by the imperialist countries, while attempting to keep economic and military control of former colonies is described as "Going in order to Stay". It does not always succeed for long. "In the case of Nigeria, military co-operation and the provision of mutual staging facilities for the two countries were made conditions for independence. (No one seriously expects Nigeria to press for the use of such staging facilities in Britain under this 'mutual' agreement!)" In January 1962 Nigeria scrapped this agreement.

AID AND STRINGS

The final section compares and contrasts the aid given by the colonialists and the socialist countries. No wonder there is wailing and shuddering when China enters into diplomatic relations with newly independent African states, for China has granted loans without interest.

"The West . . . has lost its monopoly of capital equipment in the world market, just as it has in the fields of credit, trade and the training of technicians . . . Significantly, after the Soviet Union had given credits to Afghanistan at two per cent, the United States granted a loan at three per cent — previously, in 1954, it had charged four-and-a-half per cent." Sekou Toure, President of Guinea, said: "We refuse to accept the popular idea of African countries coming like little naked beggars before the rich capitalists . . . Soviet loans are different, they are offered in a spirit of co-operation and mutual trust."

And foreign capital is not all that important. If it can be had, without sacrificing a speck of independence, well and good. If there are strings attached it can be dispensed with. After the 1917 revolution Soviet Russia had, for all practical purposes, to do without foreign capital. Today, in one of its backward territories, Armenia, which could be compared to one of the less advanced African states, we have this position: "Formerly there was not a single college in the entire territory of Armenia. Today it has eleven higher educational institutions, and three times as many col-

Lions . . . Continued

lege students per 10,000 inhabitants as France, eight times as many as Turkey and thirty times as many as Iran."

Of course, investing money in Africa is profitable. American investments yield an annual profit of over thirty per cent. In 1959 the U.S. had 2,000 million dollars in Africa.

That 29 African countries are now independent; that others are soon to become independent; that shattering blows are being struck against colonialism — these are all due to the organisation of the working people of Africa. In telling of these struggles, the defeats and victories, Jack Woddis has produced a book which will remain essential reading until all Africa is free.

A.L.

Africa — The Lion Awakes, by Jack Woddis. Lawrence and Wishart. 301 pages.

SALAZAR'S WHITEWASH —

It is doubtful whether even the South African Information Office, in its desperate search for straws of apologia, would have the audacity to produce as self-righteous and distorting a view of this country's history and government as the National Secretary of Information (SNI) does of Portugal's.

With apparent sublime unconcern for and ignorance of the savage crushing of the Angolan people by Salazar and his soldiers this Review informs us that the Portuguese are "one of the most Christian peoples of all time." Were it not for their opening up of the sea routes, Matias pompously suggests, the world may never have had "the notion of the Human Family".

This incredible arrogance, surpasses itself in a section dealing with the structure of the Portuguese State, in which we read that Salazar and his state are the repositories of liberty par excellence. In the sort of philosophic terms borrowed from South Africa's "expert", Professor Murray, we are told that "only authority knows how to administer and defend" liberty and that "formal liberty" leads to the "destruction of real liberties" which in turn end in "the tyranny of the majority."

Perhaps it is futile to react with anger at this arrant claptrap for it is the language of the weak and the vulnerable whose present positions of power and military strength are temporary — and they know it. For example, in the same way that the Nationalist Government, ad nauseum, explains away all opposition as being the work of 'agitators', Soviet fishing vessels and misunderstanding of its pure motives, so Matias relies on "Die Vaderland's" report that the Angolan opposition fighters "were supplied with

weapons by Soviet ships apparently fishing in Whale Bay." And he finds it difficult to conclude "whether the world is a comedy or a tragedy" — his only explanation for the fact that 73 countries on the United Nations voted for the Afro-Asian motion condemning Portuguese action in Angola. Here is the supreme logic — all the rest of the world is crazy, except the governments of Spain and South Africa, Portugal's only supporters on UNO.

At most this make believe advertising material can provide a few bankrupt foreign officers with an example of verbal arrogance to add to their worn-out anti-communist propaganda. On the other hand it is this type of publication that awakens one to the unyielding viciousness of madmen like Salazar, Franco and Verwoerd.

Sadie Forman.

Portugal — An Informative Review, No. 2. Issued by the National Secretary of Information — Lisbon. March/April 1961.

THE BACKGROUND TO TERROR

Both Algeria, at Africa's head, and South Africa at her foot, are an anachronism in the 1960's. White supremacy is the driving force of reaction in both countries and just as the days of white South Africa are numbered in an assertive Africa, so Gerald Mansell tries to indicate, as politely and gently as possible, the perverted dream of a French Algeria, "L'algerie Francaise" is a mirage.

This booklet is well-documented and informative. Mansell has explored the background of both Moslem and European communities; he has analysed French policy in Algeria and the growth of nationalism factually and knowledgeably. His exposition bears the stamp of academic rather than political training, and where it gains in objectivity and a full description of contemporary Algeria, it loses in its lack of indication of any solution to the "tragedy". Nor is Mr. Mansell's assessment of what constitutes the tragedy of Algeria the same as that of the mass of the Algerian people as represented, for example, by the F.L.N.

In his ability to understand the many facets of the struggle he also finds himself sympathising, not only with the aspirations of the Moslem majority, but above all with the European Algerians, "who can hardly any longer be termed settlers," but who have for the past 100 years spread their roots over Algerian soil. His sympathy for the plight of the White Algerian is nonetheless tempered by a criticism of their race relations.

"The great mass of Europeans are city dwellers and include a substantial middle class — schoolmasters, university professors, lawyers, civil servants, technicians, industrialists and businessmen. Few of them normally have personal contacts with Moslems except as domes-

tic servants, messengers, market-stall holders and the like."

He might well be writing about South Africa in this vein, and just as the essential validity of his attitude would crumble here so it does in the Algerian context. Normal natural personal relationships between the members of different national groups do not develop as a result of the efforts of so many individuals, but are the consequence of the economic, social and political organisation of that society.

Mansell retails (and favours) De Gaulle's North African Federation plan which has been consistently rejected by Ferhat Abbas and the F.L.N. and he writes as if the high-sounding reforms De Gaulle promised the Algerian people have been successfully carried out. "General de Gaulle asked who else but France could carry out this task. France was ready to do it and had the necessary means . . ."

Current events belie this wishful thinking, and it emerges clearly that a strong antipathy to the military fascist Secret Army Organisation in France and Algeria is not enough. While the majority of the French in France itself are apathetic and disinterested in what they regard as their North African "colon", the end of this wasteful and inhuman battle can only be hastened by the definite ejection of the right extremists and an uncompromising acceptance of the rightful demands of the Algerian people.

Despite Mansell's reservations, 'Tragedy in Algeria' is well worth reading and is particularly recommended for its presentation of the background to Algeria's crisis.

Tragedy in Algeria. By Gerald Mansell. Published by Oxford University Press.

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E.E.C. — AND THE THREAT TO AFRICA

The integration of Africa into the European Economic Community (the Common Market) is rapidly moving apace. Last November, the Foreign Ministers of the EEC countries — France, W. Germany, Italy, Holland, Belgium and Luxembourg — met in Brussels and agreed on proposals to renew the Common Market's "association" with a number of African states which until recently were the colonies of France, Belgium and Italy. In December, representatives of sixteen African states met French and Common Market officials in Paris and broadly agreed to the proposals. For 12 of them, at least, the old system of "association" in the Common Market will continue unchanged. For the others, a new system is being worked out.

It now seems likely that by the end of 1962, the West European Governments working collectively in the Common Market will inaugurate their grand design for what they term "Eurafrika" and by firm treaty commitments bind a major part of the African economy to that of Western Europe.

The decision of Britain to apply for membership to the EEC now makes possible an even larger involvement of Africa in the Common Market. Britain has already indicated her intention to associate her African colonies and certain Commonwealth countries with the preferential tariff and trade system of the Common Market. According to the

By V. PILLAY

PART I.

statement of the British Government of October 10, and addressed to the EEC Council of Ministers, Britain would like British Africa to be given the opportunity of being "associated with the Common Market on the same terms as those which in future will be available to the presently associated territories of the EEC member countries".

The Dangers

If this British desire is fulfilled then virtually the whole of Africa would be-

come firmly entrenched in the web of Western Europe's trade, investment and finance. More than this, as this article attempts to show, the "association" of Africa would constitute a particularly successful European bid to collectively dominate and direct the African economy in the interests of European capital, to hold unchanged the exploitative systems of trade and investment developed in the era of open colonial rule and hence to make impossible all those economic transformations necessary to give substance to the newly-won independence of the African people.

THE COMMON MARKET'S STRUCTURE

The EEC is considerably more than a customs union or common market. For, apart from the removal of tariff and other barriers on the trade between the six member countries and the creation of a unified tariff system in respect of the EEC's trade with the outside world, the Rome Treaty of 1957 provides for the gradual harmonisation of policies of the members concerned in the whole field of economic, financial and social policy. All restrictions on the movement of labour and capital between the six countries are to be removed and a common managed agricultural market in which a single system of prices will rule is to be created. The Rome Treaty sets up a number of common institutions and a Court of Justice. The European Commission possesses far-reaching supra-national powers to administer the economic union of the six countries.

Only the First Stage

The economic union is only the first stage in the process of European unification. Already the steps towards creating a political union are being taken. In June last, the heads of state of the six countries decided to give "form and figure to the will for political unification which is already contained in the treaties founding the Community" and appointed a group of experts to formulate firm proposals.

It is known that the proposals likely to be adopted by the governments concerned, will involve obligations on each member country to co-ordinate their foreign and military policies, each pledging the other mutual support in

the event of war; the establishment of a common parliamentary assembly and ultimately the framing of a "European Constitution" which would become the basic instrument for the political institutions of the EEC and for the law and government of each of the member countries.

Ahead of Schedule

The progress towards creating the economic union has been particularly rapid. The reduction in internal tariffs and the creation of a common external tariff are ahead of schedule by almost 4 years. The first regulations for the free movement of labour have been issued. In May 1960, the EEC countries unconditionally freed capital movements for direct investments and dealings on each other's stock exchange and for the placing of capital issues on each other's capital market. It is now confidently predicted that the common market in trade will be fully realised by 1966.

The rapid progress towards creating the economic union is matched by the overall economic growth of the six countries concerned. In 1959, industrial production in the EEC area rose by 7 per cent and a further 13 per cent in 1960. Nowhere else in the capitalist world has such a rate of industrial advance been achieved in these years. Furthermore, trade within the EEC has expanded at a rate far higher than the growth in world trade or the trade of the U.S., Britain or any other Western country.

West Germany

Within the EEC the country which has most benefitted from the new tariff

arrangements is West Germany. This country is now not only absolutely ahead in most categories of economic power in the EEC but has in general experienced the fastest rates of economic expansion in the capitalist world.

This absolute economic dominance of West Germany is paralleled by the immense growth in the concentration of industry and finance in the EEC region. The great combines and monopolies of West Germany, France, Holland, Belgium and Italy have become increasingly interlocked: trusts, consortia and other combinations now characterise the structure of industries concerned with finance, banking and investment, chemicals and synthetics, motor cars and electrical goods, iron and steel, energy and indeed of all the other main branches of economic activity.

Monopoly

The EEC, with its tariff and other unifying provisions, is very much the offspring of these concentrations of economic power in continental Western Europe; the monopolies now possess a vaster and considerably more profitable market, almost the size of the United States, capable of being exploited with less interference from outside.

Further, much of the political rapprochement of France and West Germany finds its source in the interlocking of the combines and cartels in these countries. The political figures that surround Adenauer and de Gaulle are representatives of these combines; far more than even in Britain, the leading industrialists and financiers of France and Western Ger-

many are in the governments of these countries.

France's almost continuous colonial wars since 1946 had by the early 1950's seriously undermined French prestige and influence in Europe as indeed in the rest of the world. Other countries, mainly the United States, were engaged in steadily ousting French influence in the Middle East and South East Asia. In Africa, a powerful movement of national liberation had taken root.

'Sick Man of Europe'

Within France, the colonial crisis reflected itself in a profound political instability and a prolonged economic crisis. The "sick man of Europe", as France was now freely called, faced the prospect of becoming a "metropolitan" country without colonies — a prospect which not only intensified the domestic crisis but provided the opportunity for the rebirth of a number of fascist and neo-fascist groups and ideas. The widespread disillusionment caused by the defeats in Indo-China became the breeding ground for the propagation of thoroughly anti-democratic solutions to the domestic crisis. It also gave birth to the campaign for European unity under French leadership for re-establishing Western Europe as the "centre of the world", and more important for collectively holding back the advance of the colonial revolution in Africa.

The French colonialists quickly adopted the banner of "European unity". In their new thinking, French influence in Africa—now the main centre of French colonialism — could best be maintained if the African colonies could be bound to a vaster, more viable and resourceful framework of trade and investment than that provided by France alone.

"Collective Colonialism"

For them, the creation of 'Little Europe' (i.e. the EEC) — was to serve purposes well beyond the immediate French interest of containing West German expansion or of re-establishing French prestige in continental Europe. It became an instrument to mobilise the combined investment resources of Europe of the Six for the exploitation of the riches of the Sahara and of French-speaking Africa and for tying these colonial territories more firmly to the economy of France and the EEC so that irrespective of the constitutional changes that may come in the future, the economic dependence of African on Western Europe's needs and decisions would be assured. As early as 1950, Robert Schuman, then France's Foreign Minister and the principal architect of the European Coal and Steel Community (the forerunner of the EEC) coined the term "collective European colonialism" to describe this new thinking in French ruling circles.

For the West German monopolies, long barred from Africa, the association of Africa with the Common Market represented new opportunities for capital penetration and the winning of markets — and hence well worth the price of

participating collectively in the EEC's investment and trade plans in the African territories concerned.

Africa's Involvement

When the Rome Treaty and the appended Convention were negotiated there was no consultation between the negotiating conference and the territories that became associated with the Common Market.

The status of the French colonies was at the time determined by the Loi Cadre — this gave France full powers over the external relations, defence, trade and finances of the colonies concerned. Hence the decision to link these territories to the Common Market was a decision of France alone. Belgium brought in the Congo and Ruanda Urundi and the U.N. trust territory of Somalia was similarly associated on the decision of Italy (then administering the Trust).

The Rome Treaty distinguished between two groups of associated territories. The first concerned those colonies which constitutionally were regarded as being part of France (the so-called 'overseas departments'). And the second group comprised all those territories with which France, Belgium, Netherlands and Italy "maintain special relations" i.e. colonies proper.

The first group were to a large extent treated under the treaty provisions applying to member states. The colonies concerned were:

	Population (000's)
Algeria (including the hinterland)	10,270
French Guiana	30
Guadelope	260
Martinique	267
Reunion	318

Profit is the Keynote

It is to be noted that those Treaty provisions concerned with the alignment of policies on social insurance, labour legislation, conditions of work, and trade union rights as well as social security, were excluded from immediate application to these territories. Rather, the Treaty sought to integrate the economies of the colonies in this group to that of France and the Six in Europe through the removal of tariffs, freedom of trade, and linking up each of their agricultural industries to the common price system to be applied among the Six and hence to Western Europe's import requirements. The Ministerial Council of the EEC has since directed the removal of restrictions on capital movements to and from these colonies. However, there is one sense in which this group of colonies is treated similarly to those in the second group. This relates to the scope of the EEC's Development Fund: this fund, though to be applied mainly to the second group, could be used to finance investment projects in France's overseas departments as well. The purpose of this important proviso is to bring the rich resources of the Sahara within the purview of the Fund's operations.

French Africa

The second group of colonies is clearly more important. It encompasses virtually the whole of French-speaking Africa and some of the richest and important colonial regions in the world. Of the 24 territories associated, eighteen with a total population of over 53 million are in Africa. If Algeria is included, well over half of the African land surface will have thus become associated with the Common Market.

Here again, the implementing Convention to the Rome Treaty excludes the application to this second group of all the measures concerned with social policy. Rather, the Convention attempts to seal off this vast region into an economic preserve for the EEC in three crucially important ways:

First, the Convention makes it obligatory on this group to lower its tariffs on the import of goods from the EEC countries to a level at least equal to that which this group maintains on imports from the metropolitan country concerned. Hence French Africa would lower its tariffs on W. German goods to the same level as applies to imports from France. On the other hand the European Six will abolish their tariff on imports emanating from this colonial group. This, in effect, enlarges to all the European Six the preferential tariff system that exists between France, Belgium, Holland, Italy and each of their colonies. Coupled with the enlargement of the preferential system is the mutual obligation on the Six and the colonies to remove quantitative restrictions (import licencing controls) over their trade with each other.

Secondly, the European Six will be accorded full equality and complete "rights of settlement" in the associated colonial region. Thus, nationals and business enterprises of any of the member states will now possess "rights" to move freely and establish themselves in any territory of this group. This provides complete freedom for the entry of West German or Italian capital to territories hitherto restricted to the exploitation of the metropolitan power directly concerned.

Thirdly, the Convention establishes a 5-year Development Fund out of which "investment projects in the associated areas will be financed". The Fund of \$581 million receives contributions from each of the Six. France and West Germany will contribute the preponderant proportion i.e. \$200 million each, but the projects for EEC investment will in the main be chosen by that European country which directly governs the colony in question. Of the total Fund of \$581 million, \$511 million was to be allotted for investment in the French colonial area. In July 1959 the Ministerial Council of the Six decided to apportion the Development Fund to "social projects" (i.e. schools, hospitals, etc.) and "economic investments" in the ratio of 25 per cent and 75 per cent. By June 1961, some \$193 million was disbursed in this way from the Fund.

TO BE CONTINUED.

FIGHTING TALK, MARCH, 1962