

FIGHTING TALK

Registered at the G.P.O. as a Newspaper.

Vol. 15. No. 2.

Price: 5 cents (6d.)

MARCH, 1961



Crisis in Northern Rhodesia



A New National Convention for a New Constitution

PROF. Z. K. MATTHEWS

South Africa and the Commonwealth

SHARPEVILLE:

Extract from the Banned Book by
The Bishop of Johannesburg

Salisbury Island:

The Nationalist Apartheid University
For Indians

FIGHTING TALK

A monthly journal for Democrats in Southern Africa.

Vol. 15.

Number 2.

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Published by the
FIGHTING TALK COMMITTEE
P.O. Box 1355, Johannesburg

Price per copy: 5 cents (6d.)
Annual subscription 75 cents (7s.6d.)
Overseas subscription: 15s.

Registered at the G.P.O.

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OUR COVER PICTURE:

The personalities of Northern Rhodesia's Crisis: (left) Mr. H. Nkumbula, president of the African National Congress, (centre) Sir Roy Welensky, Federal Prime Minister, (right) Mr. Kenneth Kaunda, President of the United National Independence Party.

Next Month:
5 Years of BANTU EDUCATION
by Phyllis Ntantala.

A New National Convention

by PROF. Z. K. MATTHEWS

was prevented from attending the Convention by an important professional engagement—the defence of the Zulu Chief Dinizulu and some of his followers indicted on a charge of Treason arising out of the Zulu 'Rebellion' of 1906. I refer of course to W. P. Schreiner who will always be remembered for this as well as for his other good works for a greater South Africa.

The Ghost of Banquo

But although the Non-Whites were not represented at the National Convention, the Non-White apparition, like the ghost of Banquo, repeatedly made its appearance before the distinguished delegates.

The Convention nearly suffered shipwreck on the question of franchise rights for Non-Whites in the new State. This one-sided gathering eventually decided upon a constitution for South Africa in which the political rights of those not directly represented at the Convention were placed at the mercy of a White Parliament under so-called 'entrenched' clauses to be destroyed later as 'the dead hand of the past'.

The Non-White leaders of the day protested against this betrayal both in this country and by means of a deputation which went to the United Kingdom when the South Africa Act was being piloted through the British Parliament. Their protests were not heeded and on May 31, 1910 the Union of South Africa was launched on its doubtful career.

The subsequent history of the Union has amply demonstrated the unwisdom of a multi-racial society depending upon a constitution drawn up by one section of the population.

Side by side with the widening of rights and fundamental freedoms for the group which drew up the constitution has gone the whittling down of the meagre privileges of the Non-White groups until we have reached the position where the Whites without turning a hair talk about the Union Parliament as the exclusive monopoly of the White section of the population. All pretence to the contrary has been cast aside. In fact anyone who suggests the desirability of some form of direct representation for any section of the Non-Whites in the Union Parliament is regarded as an enemy of western civilisation and of the White man, who ought possibly to be charged for treason.

Either Fool or Knave

And what has been the result of this White monopoly of political power? Has it brought about better relations between White and Non-White? Has it stimulated peace and harmony between the

'The 1908 Convention was a White, not a South African Convention.'

'The future of South Africa depends on her response to the challenge for a genuine representative, all-in Convention to draw up a truly South African Constitution.'

None of the important problems of a multi-racial society, least of all problems relating to the political aspects of such a society, can ever be satisfactorily or permanently settled on a unilateral or a uniraical basis. This is the plain lesson of history, even of South African history.

The Union of South Africa was planned at a National Convention in which the four colonial governments which existed here prior to Union were represented.

Ever since the time of Sir George Grey it had been felt that no permanent peace could be established in Southern Africa while there existed a multiplicity of puny political entities — Boer Republics and British Colonies — all striving to maintain a precarious independent existence. Two so-called Wars of Independence between Boer and Briton were fought before it was finally decided that a National Convention should be summoned at which the possibility of unification might be discussed and a Constitution drawn up for a new State.

The idea of unification was a laudable one, but of course there are national conventions and national conventions.

The pre-Union National Convention had certain characteristics about it which made it neither national nor representative. Although it met to create a political structure for a united South Africa, the vast majority of the population — the Non-White population — was not accorded any share in its deliberations.

It might of course be argued that the Non-Whites of the Cape were indirectly represented in so far as the Cape delegates came from a territory whose members of Parliament were elected on the basis of a voters' roll open to both Black and White. This applied to a much lesser extent to the Non-Whites of Natal. But even this was representation by proxy. It does not affect the argument that the Convention of 1908 was a White, not a South African Convention.

It is interesting to recall, in passing, that one of the most influential Cape politicians of the day who might have made a significant contribution to the defence of Non-White rights

THE NATS AND THE COMMONWEALTH

by V. PILLAY

different racial groups represented in the country? Has it set our political structure on a sure and stable foundation? Anyone who answers these questions in the affirmative is either a fool or a knave.

The ever-mounting pile of discriminatory and restrictive legislation, the declaration of states of emergency and the sending of armies of occupation into supposedly happy Bantustans during peace time — these are not matters which are consistent with the utopia which in some quarters is supposed to exist in South Africa.

The Big Stick

It is suggested that the dissatisfaction with the status quo which gives rise to disquieting disturbances in different parts of the country from time to time is the work of a few "agitators" and "communists". We have reached a state of affairs in which these terms of abuse are applied to everyone who on any ground whatsoever is opposed to any government scheme. Honest differences of opinion about matters of public importance have become anathema to our rulers and the communist big-stick is wielded freely to silence all legitimate criticism. Although this line of attack does succeed in fooling some of the people some of the time, it will not fool all the people all of the time.

The Hunger of Millions

In spite of arrests and detentions, deportations and bannings, political vituperation and abuse and others forms of intimidation, the cry for a new National Convention to draw up a new constitution is being heard more frequently in different quarters, among groups with varying political views.

This cry is not a cheap political debating point but arises out of the hunger of millions of ordinary South Africans for a political structure in which they all have a stake and of which they can be justly proud.

Such a political structure can only emerge from a National Convention in which all sections of the population are directly represented, in which the delegates will be imbued not with the primitive idea of exclusive privileges for the group they represent, but with the spirit of what each group can contribute to the common welfare, of what each can give to, rather than get out of, our common fatherland.

Such a Convention could turn South Africa from being the embarrassment that it is wherever civilised people foregather into a country which can take the lead, as it ought to, among the independent states of Africa.

Whether South Africa becomes a Republic or not, whether she remains within the Commonwealth or gets out of it, the challenge of a genuine, representative, all-in Convention to draw up a truly South African constitution will remain, and the future of the country depends upon her response to that challenge.

The Non-Whites of South Africa are still prepared and ready to co-operate

The forthcoming conference of Commonwealth Premiers is likely to be dominated by the issue of South Africa's membership, this despite the reports from Whitehall that Mr. Macmillan has softened up the Afro-Asian Commonwealth members not to take a firm stand against South Africa.

But in almost every member country of the British Commonwealth there is growing awareness that despite all the rhetoric about Commonwealth "multi-racial inclusiveness", its "contribution to world peace and stability", and how it "enlarges the area of freedom", Commonwealth unity stands or falls on its attitude towards apartheid and the monopoly of white rule in South Africa.

The British Labour Party has now declared that South Africa's "behaviour has gravely endangered the reputation of the Commonwealth" and has called for the suspension of S. Africa's membership in the Commonwealth.

The British Liberal Party has expressed a similar policy. A widely representative conference held recently in London by the Anti-Apartheid Movement argued that "far from restraining the South African Government, S. Africa's membership of the Commonwealth has in fact restrained successive British Governments from taking a public stand at the U.N. against the oppression and injustice of Apartheid".

From Ghana to India

In Nigeria and Ghana, mass opinion has expressed itself forcefully and this has been reflected in the policies of their

with their White fellow-citizens in creating and building up a South Africa in which the legitimate rights of all sections of the population are adequately and effectively protected, on condition that they are given an effective share in that creative process. The question is whether the Whites of South Africa can rise to the occasion and refrain from spurning the hand of friendship while it remains outstretched, thus redeeming the time, for the days are evil. This is the opportunity which properly used can lead to a South Africa which can be the envy of all.

All over the continent of Africa constitution-making is in progress and in countries which cannot be said to be better prepared for the process than all the peoples of South Africa. The groups represented there are together on a basis of equality trying to hammer out political structures consonant with the spirit of freedom for all which is abroad in mid-twentieth century. Why should South Africa alone of all the States in Africa remain a kind of anachronistic stick-in-the-mud?

Governments. The demands of public opinion in these countries have been combined with a threat — "either South Africa is kicked out of the Commonwealth, or we get out".

It was Dr. Nkrumah's delegation to the Addis Ababa Conference of Independent African States that won acceptance of a resolution calling not only for a total embargo on South Africa (trade, air and post facilities) but also for Ghana and Nigeria to work for S. Africa's expulsion from the Commonwealth. This, as Mr. Oliver Tambo, explained recently in London, made it "impossible for me to believe that after such commitments, Ghana and Nigeria will retract and remain silent."

In India, it is no longer possible for M. Nehru to evade questions of Commonwealth relations and Sharpeville as well as the State of Emergency have made him abandon such plans as securing South Africa's agreement to a U.N. sponsored round-table discussion on the treatment of Indians in S. Africa. Nehru has come to the conclusion that it is "impossible to talk with the South African Government".

If there is any issue on which Indian public opinion is unanimous it is on South Africa and the Commonwealth. The possibility that Mr. Nehru may no longer adopt a wholly legalistic attitude to Commonwealth relations (i.e. non-interference in matters of domestic jurisdiction) is suggested by the invitation issued by the semi-official Indian Council on African Affairs, to Dr. Dadoo and Messrs. T. Makiwane and V. Make (from the S.A. United Front) to visit India before the Commonwealth Premiers' Conference and to meet Mr. Nehru, Mr. Menon and Dr. Prasad (the President), and to address members of the Indian Parliament. The Indian visit of the United Front delegation will bear very sharply on Mr. Nehru's role at the Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference.

Tory Lobby

Pressure from African and Asian countries apart, Britain needs also to weigh carefully the effects of close ties with South Africa.

There is strong feeling in informed Conservative circles that Britain's relations with black Africa and Britain's performance in the power struggle for influence on the African continent have been handicapped by the repeated British vote for South Africa at the United Nations. At a time when flexibility on African issues is vital, the Commonwealth connection between Britain and South Africa has frozen British moves.

The influential Bow Group in the Conservative Party does not go so far as to

call for a suspension of S. Africa's membership from the Commonwealth, but it has been lobbying for a British approach to the Union Government to secure some new understanding that would in effect free British policy from the inhibiting effects of what is termed by these circles "Commonwealth loyalty". This was the pressure of opinion inside the Conservative Party which forced Mr. Macmillan to warn the South African Parliament that Britain would "mind her own business" only so long as South Africa's policies did not affect that business, and that there were "aspects" of apartheid it was "impossible" for Britain to support.

Testing the Phrases

That Commonwealth countries' relations with South Africa have become the pivot of the whole future of the Commonwealth is due to popular anti-South African feeling in almost all the Commonwealth countries, this notwithstanding the huge advertising expenditure of the Union's State Information Department abroad.

Apartheid is understood for what it is and countless millions are now putting to the test the fine phrases about freedom and democracy in the Commonwealth, by persisting in asking that awkward question — "What about South Africa?"

More than this — there has grown an overwhelming movement of solidarity of peoples abroad with the struggle for human rights in South Africa, and no Government, can safely ignore it.

The British Government is caught in an agonising dilemma. It would like to keep the Commonwealth intact, but as long as Britain harbours South Africa, she blackens her own reputation and undermines Commonwealth amity.

Stalling for Time

One possible, albeit temporary, escape from this dilemma is now being worked on in the back rooms of the Commonwealth Relations Office. At a press conference in London, Dr. Y. Dadoo revealed a British plan to argue (should the Afro-Asian members object to the seating of a Republic of S. Africa) that since South Africa would become a republic only some two months after the meeting of the Commonwealth Premiers, the decision on the admission of a republican S. Africa could be postponed to the next Commonwealth conference. In this way it is hoped to win time and create a climate where political decisions more conducive to Britain's plans could be taken.

Another plan is to crowd the agenda of the Commonwealth Conference (especially with an awe-inspiring item, likely to take up two days of discussion, on a "Commonwealth Disarmament Scheme") so as to force a postponement of the decision on S. Africa.

However, it is almost certain that these plans will not succeed. The United Front is interviewing all the Commonwealth Premiers (with the exception of Australia and New Zealand) before

the conference. Delegations have been sent to Asia and Africa. In London, the Anti-Apartheid Movement, supported by the Labour, Liberal and Communist Parties, the trade unions, Church, student and co-operative organisations, has decided on activities during the conference which will make it extremely difficult for the Prime Ministers to ignore the issue.

Dr. Verwoerd has been met on arrival in Britain by mass demonstrations against his racial policies.

There is little doubt that for the mass of the South African people membership of the Commonwealth has little meaning.

British rule in colonial Africa has been a rule of oppression and the Government of Mr. Macmillan, like every other British Government, has tried to hold on to the remains of the Empire in a Commonwealth system of economic and political relationships which sustain British trade, and provide a privileged and protected area for the operations of British investments.

In practice, there exist little in the nature of direct and close links between say, Pakistan and Australia, let alone South Africa and any of the Afro-Asian members, despite their membership of the same Commonwealth.

The New Zealand Prime Minister has explained that "New Zealand's membership of the Commonwealth still means largely its relationship with Britain . . . "We have little contact with Pakistan or Ghana, S. Africa or the West Indies".

This makes it easier to understand why members of the Commonwealth like Ghana and India are still members of an institution which has tolerated South African racialism for so long.

In fact, the Commonwealth is a British institution reflecting the new form of her imperial relations with her former colonies and the dictates of British interests, economic and political, make it difficult for the Macmillan Government to turn Dr. Verwoerd out, unless South African policies can be seen to interfere with the pursuit of British interests elsewhere.

The present public campaign around the Commonwealth Conference of Premiers reflects British revulsion at her association with South Africa's racialism. It is no longer easy for the average British working man to accept Britain's bad record at the United Nations and her close company with France (running a bloody war in Algeria), Portugal and Spain.

British public opinion on the issues of colonialism and racialism has advanced to the point that it is no longer possible for the British settlers in Central and East Africa to count on the support of "our people at home" for their policies. British voices are now loudly demanding the republic of Dr. Verwoerd to be thrown out of the Commonwealth.

Chipping the Rock

Till now European South Africa has stood firm as a rock behind the system of apartheid, and even Sharpeville,

The Cape Coloured Political Front

New moves on the Cape Coloured front:

- ★ The Transvaal Coloured Convention at the end of 1960 which formed a new federal body of 26 organisations, with a policy of democratic rights for ALL citizens.
 - ★ Twenty-odd Coloured personalities met in Cape Town to formulate an anti apartheid programme, and to confer with African leaders.
- Next moves:
- ★ A Transvaal Coloured conference during March.
 - ★ An all-Coloured Convention in Cape Town during June.

One of the consequences of the State of Emergency, proclaimed at the end of March last year, was to turn the political spotlight sharply on the Cape Coloured People. 'God's Step Children', they had once been called; and the old stereotype of the happy half-caste, disowned by both parties to his parentage and yet so well accommodated to his social position, had long survived.

But suddenly, among some of the most influential sections of the ruling class, by whom he had always been embraced in the triple appellation of 'Coolie, Kaffer and Hotnot', came the realisation that his culture, his religion, his language, his way of life was that of the white man. And for this he must be rewarded. It was a sudden and a strange volte face, but it was real and it was clear; and it manifested itself in many ways. For it was discussed among all groups of the Nationalist hierarchy and it led to the appointment of two Commissions of Enquiry: one of them at Cabinet level.

From 'Hotnot' to Ally

The explanation, of course, is simple. Faced by the bold onslaughts of a militia though it chipped the rock badly, could not split it.

But South Africa's steady isolation in a continent in revolution and in a world that condemns racialism out of hand is chipping away at that rock all the time. The government of South Africa has found shelter and protection in the Commonwealth and the Nationalists do not relish being pushed out alone into the cold wind of world condemnation to face the blast completely without friends or succour.

The efforts among the peoples of the Commonwealth countries to have South Africa expelled from the shelter of the Commonwealth are part of the move for her complete isolation as a political leper and pariah; part of the growing trade boycott against South Africa; part of a total repudiation of the Nationalist Government and White supremacy systems, and a joining hands with the African people of the continent in the winning of true democracy.

COLOURED PEOPLE AT THE CROSSROADS

By A Special Correspondent

tant, black nationalism in the March demonstrations (so erroneously, if revealingly, called 'disturbances' in the Herrenvolk language), it was not surprising that the Afrikaner section of the ruling class should look for allies in the ignominious attempt to assure the continuation of its hegemony.

Driven to desperation and despair by an African leadership and movement which, for all its other shortcomings, certainly showed a remarkable propensity for evoking fear in the hearts of their opponents, many layers of the Afrikaner Herrenvolk were not slow to turn for support to those, previously despised as "Hotnots", now graciously to be called "the natural allies of the white man".

And the response was not slow in showing itself. For amongst the Cape Coloured people there has always been the section which prides itself on the percentage of "white blood" that flows in its veins and has lived in the vain hope that the definition of "white" will, in addition to "association" and "appearance" make some provision to include them in its orbit. Among this conservative section the offer for assistance came as a further, and almost Heaven-sent opportunity to prove themselves once again loyal to the white Herrenvolk and to establish their claim to some benevolent consideration by word and deed. And, in the most treacherous way, they called upon the Coloured people to refuse support to the African people and to take their place with the oppressors.

Edgar Deane and Syd B. Lotter, both holding down jobs amongst organised Coloured workers because of trade union apartheid, were amongst those who made this call upon the Coloured people and it is not without significance that their chickens have come home to roost. For Deane, at least, is finding that the people's memories are not really as short as he thought they might be, and he is being replaced at the first opportunity as the Coloured people's candidate in the Ward VI elections for the Cape Town City Council.

But this was certainly not the only reaction among the Coloured people. The Coloured Peoples' Congress lost no time in a valiant attempt to rally the Coloured people in support, but they were hampered by several factors. The demonstrations were sudden and unexpected, they certainly took the Coloured people by surprise and hampered organisation; the declaration of the State of Emergency and the sudden detention of the leaders prevented the effectiveness of the call to the Coloured people from being tested; there is among the Coloured people no real tradition of practical support for the African people, apart from isolated groups; and, most important, large sectors of the politically conscious Coloured people were either

deterred from support or confused in their attitude by the role of the Anti-C.A.D.

Anti-C.A.D. Confusion

Perhaps it is necessary to state that the Anti-C.A.D. has a quite definite policy on these matters. It stands firmly and uncompromisingly for full democratic rights for all and votes for everybody, and it regards as fundamental for the achievement of its political objectives that people should in no way operate the machinery devised by the Herrenvolk governments for their oppression.

It is thus opposed to any special department of state for any group, e.g. the Bantu Affairs Department and the Coloured Affairs Department, and to any special Parliamentary representatives for such groups. Its policy is one of non-collaboration and its propagates the weapon of the boycott against all institutions which are devised to keep Non-Whites subservient and inferior and against all persons who work these institutions.

In other words, it does not believe in working "from within" under any circumstances and regards as traitors and quislings all who serve or assist those who serve on Location Advisory Boards and Coloured Councils whether appointed, nominated or elected. The Anti-C.A.D. refuses to accept the theory that everything depends on the candidate and that one should try to get one's own people on to these "dummy" Boards and Councils and into Parliament. This has always been a sharp point of difference between itself and some other sections of the general liberatory movement.

Not, of course, the only point of disagreement. Its declarations have made quite plain, for example, that it stands for a non-racial democracy in South Africa, and it is accordingly violently opposed to any form of nationalism, whether white, black or coloured.

And so, almost inevitably, it comes into conflict with any of the demonstrations of African Nationalism whether in South Africa or in any other part of Africa.

And included among its arch-enemies are not only local leaders of African politics, but what it also so blithely calls the Nkrumahs, the Nassers, the Bandas, the Nyereres and so on.

All these, to the Anti-C.A.D., are merely the tools of Imperialism, the representatives of a quisling class which has betrayed or is betraying the people into a horse-deal with their white masters. And its attitude to the P.A.C., therefore, needs no elaboration. And, equally, it goes without saying that it stands apart and isolated from every other section of the people, harshly cri-

tical of everything and everybody and yet constantly appealing for "the unity of the oppressed".

African demonstrations against the pass laws or for a living wage are always characterised as criminal "adventurism", and its only response to the P.A.C. campaign was to issue a three-pronged resolution which condemned police brutality, mourned the dead and castigated the leadership. For the rest, it scorned with its customary venom even those of its supporters and others who in the circumstances felt themselves constrained to assist and relieve the unfortunate victims who were besieged, encircled and starved in the locations by the brutal police action.

Something Wrong

Despite the suave indifference of the Anti-C.A.D., or, perhaps, because of it, the Coloured people have certainly not followed its line that nothing has happened in the country. If the events since March have done anything at all they have certainly shown large sections of Coloured people that there is something wrong with the leadership that has been so influential among them for so long.

And there have not been wanting those among them who have pointed to the fact that the Coloured teachers who have played so prominent a part in the past have not succeeded in carrying the struggle to the stage demanded by the situation in which we find ourselves. Perhaps they are not far wrong in laying the charge that, while Deane, Golding, Lotter and the rest who issued the notorious call to the Coloured people were rightly and roundly condemned, no lead was given to the people, even if only to call upon them not to scab on the African workers.

The result has been a fairly wide-scale reassessment of the position among the Coloured people, even if not yet a realignment of forces.

One may leave aside those who find the solution in co-operation with the Nationalist government and its Coloured Affairs Department and serve on or support the Union of Coloured Affairs; those who have banded themselves into the Kleurlingvolksbond for the same purpose and all those to whom *Die Banier* — official organ of the Nationalist Party among the Coloured people — is their mouthpiece.

And similarly one may leave aside those groups who, while against apartheid, are prepared to make the best of it and to enjoy such fruits as it has to offer.

There remains a large and important section of the South African people who are looking for direction and dynamic leadership. It would be a mistake to underestimate the difficulties and the problems. But of one thing there is no doubt: the Coloured people are at the cross-roads — who is to point the way?

One Year Since Sharpeville: March 21, 1960-61

Till the morning of March 21, 1960 many of us had never heard of Sharpeville, and to those of us who had it was no more than another urban location with the usual load of hardship and poverty and pass-law prosecutions. By evening its name was pulsing through cables and radio sets everywhere.

Running for our trains we might have tucked the evening papers under our arms without noticing the headlines and the news-stand posters. But, riding home from work, when we opened our newspapers in railway compartments, we realised that something had happened that morning in the dusty streets bordering the Sharpeville police station, something which had irrevocably changed things.

And it was not only we who felt this change; even Paul Sauer knew that "the old book of South African history (had) closed . . ."

Perhaps, at first, we were unable to define this change. We felt horror and disgust. Those who, when the stench of cordite had cleared, found among the seventy corpses a father, a wife, a son, felt a terrible void. And the torn flesh and splintered bones of 180 evidenced the ravages of Sten gun bullets. From the headlines and the horrifying pictures we turned to the reports, brushing aside the public relations handouts and piecing together what there were of the facts. Then came the day of mourning, the stay-at-home, the march on Cape Town, and the State of Emergency.

Naturally they tried to hide what they had done — Bishop Reeves' book proves that. **THE CROWD WAS RUSHING THE FENCE**; but more than seventy per cent of the victims were shot in the back. **THEY FIRED**

IN SELF DEFENCE; and killed a woman 150 yards away, and blew off John Mailane's head as he distributed invoices for his firm on his bicycle. **THEY WERE TRYING TO DISPERSE THE CROWD**; and as it dispersed, continued shooting for 45 seconds, firing 705 rounds, several Sten gunners firing two complete magazines, one continuing to fire seven rounds from a third and two then changing to revolvers from which they each fired a further six rounds. Oh yes, **AND THE CROWD WAS ARMED**; as evidence of this they produced two coloured umbrellas and a bicycle pump, in working order.

Neither the Nationalist Party nor the police had any regrets. Dr. Verwoerd thought that **THE POLICE HAD DONE A GOOD JOB**. They had killed eight women and ten children.

But we had a national day of mourning; and in Cape Town students picketed Adderley Street and Parliament, while inside the Government and "opposition" planned the banning of the ANC and PAC; and 50,000 people gathered at Langa to mourn their dead.

But they were shaken by the nationwide support for the day of mourning, and they announced the suspension of the pass-laws. So Chief Luthuli burnt his, and in the streets of Johannesburg and elsewhere many others did the same.

And then they came with dawn arrests and were countered by the great march from Langa to Cape Town. Remembering the peaceful column of 30,000 marchers who for two hours brought Cape Town to a stand-still, one thinks of Lt. Col. Pienaar's evidence to the Sharpeville enquiry: "The Native mentality does not allow them

to gather for a peaceful demonstration. For them to gather means violence."

The authorities promised concessions and the marchers returned home. Then, with them safely out of the city, they followed fast upon their falsehoods with the State of Emergency, and military cordons, and further arrests — 1,900 political leaders and 18,000 "vagrants." And in their homes and in the streets people were beaten by the police. Dr. Jordan was struck in the face by a teenage policeman as he came out of the Rondebosch Post Office after sending a telegram, and a baby was shot dead at the Nyanga gate when its mother tried to take it for medical attention. From whose gathering did violence grow?

As the Saracens moved from door to door in Langa and Nyanga and the people were driven to work with sjamboks, the stay-at-home crumbled.

But the Emergency dragged on, and buses were hired to transport families to visit parents or children in country gaols. And there were hunger strikes and interrogations and incitement trials and refugees in the Protectorates. Then, after five months, the Emergency ended.

All this flooded through our lives after Sharpeville. The Bishop's Sharpeville book was banned because its pictures and its text demonstrate the story of indefensible slaughter. Like the Commandant who, when asked whether he had learned any useful lesson from the evidence in Sharpeville, replied: "Well, we may get better equipment."

The Sharpeville shooting — March 1960 — one year ago this month — was the moment when the sorrow of a nation turned to anger.

A. WANNENBURG.

From the Book by the Bishop of Johannesburg banned by the Nationalist Government

SHOOTING AT SHARPEVILLE

by AMBROSE REEVES

If the authorities had admitted that a ghastly mistake had been made at Sharpeville and indicated that they intended taking steps to prevent a recurrence, the probability is that, once I had called for a judicial enquiry, I should have hesitated to make any further comment. But in point of fact the authorities adopted an entirely contrary attitude.

Since the events at Sharpeville, they have been at pains both to justify the action that was taken and to commend the conduct of the police.

More recently, they have gone so far as to make it plain that, if similar circumstances should occur in the future, the police will not hesitate to shoot again.

Perhaps there is some significance in

the fact that, in statements which have been made by members of the Government, the incident at Cato Manor in which nine policemen lost their lives has more than once been linked with the events at Sharpeville.

While it is true that there were certain parallels in the background to Cato Manor and Sharpeville — as, for example, the economic position of the inhabitants — the incidents were dissimilar in so many respects that it is dishonest to suggest that they were identical.

As I have already made clear, neither the continuous police raids nor the harrying of the inhabitants by the authori-

ties can ever be held to have justified the Cato Manor crowd in causing the death of nine policemen in the execution of their duty.

It might be much more honest and just to compare the happenings at Sharpeville not with those at Cato Manor, but with what happened at Windhoek on December 10, 1959. Although at Windhoek it was the threatened removal of the Location to another site which precipitated the demonstration, the circumstances were in some respects strikingly similar. In both cases those present declared that the demonstration was a non-violent expression of disapproval. In both cases the police were present in large numbers. In Windhoek it is claimed that the crowd did not hear

From Turfloop to Salisbury Island

the order to disperse. At Sharpeville many of those injured denied that any order was ever given to disperse: if it was given, they did not hear it. In Windhoek many alleged that they went to the Police Station because they were curious to see why such a large body of police had come into the Location. Some of the injured at Sharpeville declared that they had gone because they wanted to see the Saracens. As one injured woman told me, with a wry smile, "I had never seen a Saracen. But I was shot before I saw one."

Why, finally, do we attach such special importance to the shooting at Sharpeville?

In the atmosphere of charge and counter-charge which followed Sharpeville, many people have forgotten what is the abiding tragedy, the loss to hundreds of children of parents and the hope of education and financial support for the future. Many of the injured suffered severe injuries which will not only cause them much suffering during the remainder of their lives, but will also shorten their expectancy of life. Others lost limbs. It should be realised that an African who is maimed in this way finds it extremely difficult to obtain sheltered employment for the future. The loss of a leg to an African labourer often means no employment and slow starvation for his remaining days. Such is the fate of the children of Constance and Ethel Maisilo. Two fine women, whose husbands were brothers who ran a taxi service in Sharpeville. Twenty children have lost their fathers and these two households have lost a combined income of £80 a month. John Khota lost his right arm, shattered by machine gun fire. John was a painter by trade and at the age of 70 was a vigorous and well-preserved man earning £35 a month. His injury has lost him his livelihood. Today, he is at a loss to know how he will fend for the future. John Marobi has lost a leg. He was a passer-by in a nearby street. Another young African lad who worked in a bookellers is sterile, while Benedict Griffiths, whose father serves with the South African Police, only has the use of his limbs by the grace of the medical staff at Baragwanath Hospital, who were indefatigable in their attempt to save him. Joshua Mutha, a bus driver with a large family and earning £8 a week, lies in Baragwanath Hospital with a broken femur which will not heal. So 216 families and over 500 children are paying the dreadful price of forty seconds of uncontrolled firing at Sharpeville. The toll of irresponsibility finds its expression in amputations, severe abdominal wounds, arthritic conditions, the loss of mobility and cohesion in limbs, wives left widows, and children fatherless.

The demonstrations at Windhoek and Sharpeville were both dispersed by the use of firearms with a consequent kill-

With the setting up of the Indian 'university' at Salisbury Island, Durban, the Government's structural scheme for higher education for Non-Whites is complete. Ethnic 'tribal' colleges for Africans have been established in Ngola, Turfloop and Fort Hare, and at Bellville for the Coloured people.

The reaction of the Indian people to the Salisbury Island college has been sharp, clear, unequivocal and uncompromising. It is reflected in the following resolution adopted at a conference held in Durban on the 17th December, 1960:

"This conference called by the Indian people of Natal and attended by representatives of all communities from all parts of the Province . . . condemns the whole concept of tribal universities, and resolves upon a policy of total non-co-operation with an institu-

tion designed to carry into effect the Nationalist Party policy of indoctrination for servitude."

Not without cause is the Government's scheme for tribal universities characterised as 'indoctrination for servitude'. The Statement on Christian National Education produced in 1948 by the F.A.K. (Federation of Afrikaans Cultural Societies) carries this clause:

M. D. NAIDOO
on
The 'TRIBAL'
UNIVERSITY FOR INDIANS

"The spirit of all teaching must be Christian-Nationalist; in no subject may anti-Christian or non-Christian or anti-nationalist or non-nationalist propaganda be made."

Stated simply, this means that the content of all teaching must be Christian-Nationalist propaganda. It is a notorious fact that the majority of leading Nationalists are members of the F.A.K.

Christian National Education has been approved by all the Afrikaans Teachers' Unions. Mr. De Wet Nel, when Minister of Education, Arts and Science, announced that the Government meant to introduce C.N.E. in all schools.

The Bantu Education Act has taken the education of African students out of the hands of the educational authorities and has placed it under the control of the Department of Bantu Administration and Development with Mr. De Wet Nel as Minister in Charge. And Christian Nationalist principles are now being implemented, with disastrous results to the standards of education.

The Salisbury Island College fits neatly into this picture. All Indian university students in South Africa may now be admitted to study at this college only. Students already registered at other institutions will be allowed to complete their declared courses of study at such institutions.

The Salisbury Island college offers courses in the Arts, Commerce and Science (Natural Science) faculties. This college has been established in spite of the Holloway Commission's 1956 report and recommendation that Non-European students should be concentrated at the University of Natal, Durban, and at Fort Hare, except in the cases of those choosing courses of study for which only the open universities offer facilities.

In 1957, an inter-departmental committee was appointed 'to work out the details of the financial implications of the provision of separate university education facilities.' In spite of the recommendations or the Holloway Commission, this committee is reported to have worked on the basis of the present

ing of some of the crowd and the wounding of many others. Such a show of force, it is claimed, was necessary for the restoration of law and order. Certainly order has been restored, but it is dubious if, at a time when the normal processes of law were suspended under the South African Emergency Regulations, anyone could claim that the rule of law had been restored.

And it is even questionable how far the mounting use of force, the arrest of most of the responsible African, Indian and Coloured political leaders, and the dislocation of commerce and industry by the calling up of a number of regiments can be termed the restoration of order. The probability is that such a use of force will ensure that no further demonstrations will take place in the near future.

But it would be a great mistake to equate such a calm with a restoration of order in South African society. Beneath the outward calm, there is a growing resentment — not only of the Government, but of the dominant white group as a whole — and a firm resolve on the part of many Africans to carry on the struggle as and when it becomes possible for them to do so.

Many people will be inclined to dismiss the events at Sharpeville as just another incident in the long and growing series of disturbances that have marked the attempt to put the theory of apartheid into practice. Their only desire will be to get back to normal as soon as possible. Superficially, this may easily be achieved; but underneath the external calm, dangerous fires will continue to smoulder, fires that can never be extinguished by a show of force, however invincible that force may appear to be.

History, I believe, will recognise that Sharpeville marked a watershed in South African affairs. Life can never be quite the same again for any racial group in the Union, because of what happened on that Monday at Sharpeville.

(Continued on page 16)

Northern Rhodesia

Crisis Calendar

Start of the trouble: Seven years ago Britain pushed Federation through in the face of the African opposition of three countries—Northern Rhodesia, Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. At the same time Britain transferred a considerable part of her power into the hands of the White minority government, entrusting it with the running of the Federal Constitution.

Then began the tight rope dancing of the Colonial Office to balance African claims to self-government and White minority resistance. The Monckton Commission raised African hopes in Northern Rhodesia that Africans would get a clear majority in the Legislative Council.

When the London talks on the new Northern Rhodesian constitution opened Sir Roy Welensky led the last ditch stand of the White minority by boycotting the talks. The new constitution gave neither group what it wanted.

A complicated electoral system of three voters' rolls lowers African voting qualifications, raises the number of voters to just over 70,000 but balances power as between the African majority, the White minority and the Colonial Office.

Africans charged Britain with selling them down the river. Welensky roared that he would resist the new constitution 'with all the means at my command.' He tried to provoke trouble and frighten the British government into retreat by calling up the army.

Five of Welensky's ministers in the Northern Rhodesian government resigned.

Welensky threatened even open sedition: to dissolve Parliament and declare the Federation independent. Imagine the reaction if the Africans tried that!

South Africa's Eric Louw tried to cash in. The time had come, he told the South African Parliament, when South Africa, the Portuguese Territories and Rhodesia might have to stand together to maintain 'western civilisation' in Africa.

Next speech by Welensky was a steep climb down.

He would negotiate further, he said. In Britain, probably while he is there for the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' talks.

The army units have been ordered to stand down because 'the danger of African unrest is past.' There never was any — only bluster and bravado from Welensky to force Britain to delay the new plan and talk again.

The Conflict Remains

Britain now has a chance to delay — but blowing down her neck she feels the hot breath of Federation Africans, Kenya further north and at the starting post for independence, the whole continent.

New constitution formulae? Even more complicated voting systems? The irreconcilable cannot be reconciled. 70,000 Whites in Northern Rhodesia refuse to surrender their monopoly of government: 2½ million Africans demand government based on the principle of 'one man one vote.'

This 'crisis' is over: the conflict remains.

Federation's

The Beginning

by L. B.

There can be little doubt that what we are witnessing in the Central African Federation is the beginning of its end. One way or another, the Federation is going to burst asunder, as it was doomed from the very day of its foundation in 1953.

Its formation was forced through in the teeth of opposition from the majority of its people, especially of the overwhelming majorities of Africans in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland.

It has foundered along from one crisis to another — from the Nyasaland State of Emergency to the State of Emergency in the Rhodesias — from one constitutional "settlement" to another — from the 1958 London agreement to last month's London Conference. But nothing has served to hold this structure stable against the tide of internal opposition and of internal struggle which is now poised to destroy Federation and the purposes for which it was established.

POLICEMAN OF CENTRAL AFRICA

Federation was the answer of imperialism to the stirrings of the African people.

Strong demands for political advance towards liberation were growing in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. The British government could try to contain those demands by force; but what force? British forces were already heavily committed in Malaya, Kenya and Cyprus. In Northern Rhodesia there were only some 70,000 Whites, most of them emigré miners from South Africa, who had not yet made the territory their settled home; in Nyasaland, only some 9,000 Whites in an African population of two million.

If there was to be a base for imperialism to resist African liberation, it could only be by way of Federation of these two territories with Southern Rhodesia, with—at that time—over 100,000 White settlers, and strong mining-financial corporations able to dominate and control the destiny of all three countries. Federation was to be the gendarme of imperialism and white settler interests in the whole area.

Or so it was planned. The vision has had to be tempered with reality.

"We know" the delegates of the Nyasaland African Congress told Mr. Griffiths in 1951, "what the European settlers under the leadership of Southern Rhodesia want . . . To forestall the development of Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia as black states, and to impose on them the Southern Rhodesian policy of white supremacy."

Despite all the talk of partnership, this has been the reality of the Federation. It is still the reality of the constitutional struggles which have been going

on in the recent London Conference. It is the real issue which is behind all Sir Roy Welensky's present talk of "responsible government" and his rejection of the proposals for extending the vote to Africans on the basis of the scheme put forward by Britain's Colonial Secretary, Ian Macleod.

A long and consistent struggle against Federation is approaching its climax in both Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. It is growing up too in Southern Rhodesia.

In that struggle, the Federation and its white political leaders have tried to act as the policemen of imperialism. They have used force, states of emergency, rule by decree, imprisonment of political leaders of the Africans, outlawing of African national organisations. All to no avail.

FORCE — AND FRANCHISE

The single stark issue which faced the Belgians in the Congo has faced the British government in the Federation. Is it to hold Federation together by naked and open armed force, against the wishes of the people?

To attempt to do so in the world today is a dangerous course, one which might well end in greater disaster for imperialism, in the break-away of other, newly independent members of the Commonwealth, in loss of prestige and influence in Africa and Asia, in war and the prospect of revolution in the territory itself. But if not by force, by what means?

Basically, this has been the problem of the British government for some time. The Devlin Commission, appointed after the widespread struggles in Nyasaland last year, suggested that imperialism cut its losses, and permit Nyasaland to break away from the Federation, if it cannot be persuaded to stay in.

This year, Mr. Macleod has tried another tack — a revised Northern Rhodesian franchise, which will give the Africans increased political power, and the Whites decreased, but which will still keep Northern Rhodesia firmly within the Federation. If the idea could be sold to either Africans or Whites, it would perhaps give a further lease of life to the shaky edifice of Federation.

In fact it has satisfied nobody.

Both African leaders at the Conference, Mr. Kenneth Kaunda and Mr. Harry Nkumbula wanted much more; they wanted a straight 'one-man-one-vote' constitution, which would have ensured an African majority.

Short Innings

ing of the End

ERNSTEIN

All European leaders at the Conference wanted much less; they wanted a constitution from which it would be impossible for an African majority to emerge.

What the African leaders are going to do is, at the time of writing, not clear.

For a while Sir Roy Welensky, with the backing of the whole Northern Rhodesian Government, turned this into an academic issue by denouncing the proposals and provoking a crisis.

CALLING OUT THE TROOPS

Sir Roy Welensky said he would fall back on the use of force. Troops were called up for active service, not to meet any threat of disturbance, but in the hope of provoking it.

It is here that the recent events in the Congo point the lesson. Belgium decided, when the demands of African liberation could no longer be suppressed, to provoke such internal conflict and disorder that armed force could be employed to set up open terroristic regimes. Welensky appears to be moving to the same 'solution'.

Where Belgium had to find African puppets — Tshombe, Mobutu, Ileo — to man the guns, Welensky relies purely and simply on the White population, who — we are told — are responding almost unanimously. Welensky, like Tshombe, speaks of 'Independence' — meaning, in this case freedom to dominate the African majority by open force without the restraining hand of Britain.

And yet the position is not parallel to the Congo's. In the Congo, unification in a single Congo state is the essential for national progress. In the Federation, dismemberment, and the splitting off of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland from Southern Rhodesia is an essential, if the peoples of those territories are to gain control of their national economies, and wrest economic power from the hands of the British South Africa Company, and the Oppenheimer empire.

Reaction aims to dismember the Congo; the African awakening seeks to dismember the Federation.

Nor can Welensky rely on foreign imperial support from Britain, as Tshombe has relied on Belgian arms, advisers and finances. British finance may be at his disposal, but not British troops or government diplomatic support.

Welensky in the last analysis is going to be forced back either on his own resources, which are too weak to successfully throw off the challenge of African nationalism, or on the support of the Union of South Africa.

But here another aspect emerges. The White settlers of the Federation are not all admirers or supporters of the Union of South Africa. 100,000 Whites, almost half the White population of Southern Rhodesia have emigrated there in the last ten years, mainly to get away from the South African government, the Nationalist government. Their motives have not all been uniform; some dislike the South African government because of its anti-British and republican policies; others because they fear that the South African government is making bloody revolution inevitable in South Africa. Whatever their reasons, they will not easily or lightly allow South Africa to become the real power behind Welensky's throne, as Belgium has behind Tshombe's.

Welensky faces the crisis thus in a position of weakness, without singleness of purpose in the White ranks, with the opposition of Britain's government, and armed only with much bluster and a fairly well-equipped army.

THE KEY: AFRICAN UNITY

On the other side, on the side of African nationalism, there is a solid majority against Federation and against the Welensky government. There are political parties better organised, more powerful than any in the Congo at the time of its crisis.

But there is here — as in the Congo — one factor which might well tip the balance in favour of the White settlers. **Are the African leaders united? Will they act together? Will they be able to work out a single united policy, which allows no division in the ranks of their people? This is the key question for today.**

Thus far from neither Mr. Kaunda nor Mr. Nkumbula is there any answer. United, their opposition, backed solidly by the people of Nyasaland, must certainly bring the Federation to an end in the very near future. But divided, warring on each other, scrambling for personal prestige or for leadership? That way can lie another tragedy of the calibre of the Congo's.

The battle is not yet over, nor its outcome decided. Only one thing is certain. **Federation cannot survive for long.** It has had a short innings. So short, that a new glossy volume titled "The Vision Splendid — The Future of the Central African Federation" is still among the latest arrivals in the bookshop windows, while the newspaper posters outside proclaim not the vision but the reality — "Crisis looms in Federation", "Troops called out in CAF." — and more sinisterly, in the Afrikaans posters: "Talk of open rebellion in Federation."

A short innings, but now its time has passed. The sweep of African liberation has caught up with this empire-building scheme of imperialism, and will shortly roll it into the dust of history.

THE PARTIES

United National Independence Party: Led by Mr. Kenneth Kaunda. Totally against Federation; stands for one man one vote constitution. Most powerful party in Northern Rhodesia, has recently campaigned to win the support of Northern Rhodesia's powerful chiefs.

★

African National Congress; Led by Mr. Harry Nkumbula. Its main platforms are also the end of the Federation and a democratic constitution based on one man one vote.

★

United Federal Party: Governing party with 46 seats in the Federal Parliament. Policy: to keep federal government for all time in the hands of 'civilised responsible people' — that is WHITES. Is prepared to concede only a token representation of Africans in Parliament. Northern Rhodesia's UFP leader is Mr. John Roberts who has condemned the latest constitutional talks as that 'headlong and senseless rush to hand Northern Rhodesia over to a black nationalist majority incapable of ruling.'

★

Dominion Party: Extreme right wing party with a policy of 'Southern Rhodesia first'. Is opposed to Welensky as 'too liberal!' Baasskap policies are close neighbours of Verwoerd's.

★

Central Africa Party: Looks to the Macleod constitutional plan described by the C.A.P.'s leader Sir John Moffat as 'ingenious' as a chance to hold the balance between the Africans and right-wing UFP and Dominion Party. Sir John Moffat applauded the Macleod constitution as the best that could be produced 'in view of the irreconcilable attitudes of the African and European nationalist parties.' But the United National Independence Party issued a warning to its branches not to be misled by Sir John Moffat 'and his henchmen.' 'True liberal Europeans' said the statement 'have joined the United National Independence Party.'

Votes for Africans

FRANCHISE FACTS

by NANCY DICK

Less than a generation ago there was not a single African member of an Executive or Legislative Council in the Central and East African territories. Today, the Africans' goal of effective African majorities in both governing bodies, and universal adult franchise, is within sight. Only in Southern Rhodesia is this doubtful.

What a contrast to trends in South Africa! The Cape Franchise and Ballot Act was introduced as long ago as 1892 to check the increasing influence of African voters. They were alleged to hold the balance in 5 out of 35 seats on the Legislative Assembly. Today, there are no representatives of Africans in the governing bodies and no African voters.

British Government — Settlers — Africans

In territories under the British Colonial Office, there is always the possibility of the combination of British Government + Africans vs. Settlers, as an alternative to British Government + Settlers vs. Africans.

In 1923 the British Government stated that:—

'Primarily Kenya is an African territory, and His Majesty's Government think it is necessary definitely to record their considered opinion that the interests of the African natives must be paramount, and that if, and when those interests and the interests of the immigrant races should conflict, the former should prevail.'

The Government had in mind a conflict between African and Indian interests, and although excuses have been proffered about the African's 'political immaturity' etc., to postpone the day of their advance, nevertheless African interests are at long last becoming paramount over all others.

THE PATTERN

The pattern of constitutional advance to self-government is unfolding. In the Legislative Council it is from official majority + nominated unofficial minority, through official majority + elected unofficial minority, to official minority + unofficial elected majority. Finally the Executive is responsible to the elected members of the Legislative Council and the Governor's powers are withdrawn altogether.

The six Central and East African territories are all near the top rung of the ladder. The present stages reached by some of them are as in the following table:—

	Leg. Co.	Franchise
Uganda	African majority.	Elections of all representative members on a common roll planned for 1961. 6 Eur., 6 Asia: 18 African.
Kenya	Unofficial rep. majority over Government members.	Some elected on separate communal roll: some by Leg. Co. sitting as an electoral college: 18 Eur., 12 Asian & Arab: 18 African.
Tanganyika	70 out of 71 seats won by T.A.N.U. The last stage of constitutional development before self government.	Common roll for all races: age, residence, literacy or property qualifications.
N. Rhodesia (before the new White Paper).	6 ex. officio, 2 nominated (including 2 African Ministers) & 26 elected members.	Common roll with property or income qualification; recognised chiefs may vote, Ministers of religion. Special temporary roll with lower qualifications. Wives of the above may vote on a simple literacy test, age & residential qualifications.

Nyasaland adopted Aug. 1960.	5 Govt. members 28 elected members.	Common roll for all races with age, residence and either income & literacy, tax payment qualification. Pensioners, those holding prescribed posts, master farmers.
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In Southern Rhodesia all members of the Governing bodies are white. The franchise is by means of a common roll, but the qualifications are so designed that Africans are mostly excluded. In 1954 there were 441 registered African voters as against 48,000 European.

It is appropriate here to quote the words of emancipation and encouragement by Nyerere, Chief Minister, on the results of the Tanganyikan elections in August last years:

"The people of Tanganyika accepted our leadership, and immediately began to think of themselves not as Europeans, Indians or Africans, or even as Wasukuma, Wamasai, or Wamanyamwezi, but as Tanganyikans. It is that unity that has made it possible to reach this stage peacefully."

THE MONCKTON REPORT

The African political parties in the Central African Territories have set their faces resolutely against Federation.

Their rejection of Federation before the Monckton Commission was appointed was based on certain criticisms, and the Commission's recommendations should be measured by the extent to which these criticisms have been met. On balance the Africans have certainly carried more weight than the settlers.

1. The Labour Party and the African political parties boycotted the Commission because the terms of reference did not include the right to secede. But the Commission did discuss this matter and recommended that territories be given the right to secede after a further trial period or after the granting of self-government.
2. The Commission rejected the possibility of holding the Federation together by force and stated that it could only continue "if it can enlist the willing support of its inhabitants." Since the majority of Africans in the Northern Territories, even the moderates, expressed opposition to Federation (as admitted by the Commission) it is obvious that vast concessions would have to be made in order to win their support.
3. The Commission met the fear that Federation is holding back the constitutional advance of the Territories by recommending that Northern Rhodesia get immediately the same constitution as that agreed to by Nyasaland at the Conference in August, 1960. This gives an African majority in the Legislative Council and an unofficial majority in the Executive.
4. The 1957 Federal Constitution provided for the election of 44 out of 59 seats by Whites (and therefore White members), 8 Africans elected by Whites as well as Afri-

cans (therefore 'stooges'), three more Whites with special knowledge of African affairs and only 4 Africans genuinely representing Africans. Moreover, the African electorate numbered 2,000 as against 90,000 others..

The Commission recommended a Federal Assembly of 60, 10 Africans from each territory, 17 Whites from Southern Rhodesia, 3 from Nyasaland and 10 from Northern Rhodesia, and a franchise similar to the new Nyasaland one.

13 out of the 25 members of the Commission tabled reservations on the question of Federal franchise, while the minority report rejected it altogether.

THE MINORITY REPORT

The minority report, by Chirwa of Nyasaland and Habanyama rejected Federation absolutely; asked for a Referendum based on universal adult suffrage to test their contention that Africans don't want it at all; demanded a Constitution for Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia similar to that for Tanganyika; demanded a two-thirds majority of Africans in the Southern Rhodesian parliament; and in respect of the Federal franchise commented that "Parity" might have been acceptable to the Africans in 1953 but it is too late now in view of the fact that Africans in the neighbouring territories have achieved self-government."

The minority report was prepared to concede a reserved minimum number of seats for minorities, elected on a common roll, as a temporary measure.

Interestingly enough, it insists on franchise rights for African women the same as for men. In the new Nyasaland Constitution, the vote has not been given automatically to women, but is left for the Working Party to consider. In Uganda, in 1958, elections by secret ballot were tried out, 'with great success', 20% of the African women taking part. Not so long ago a reason given for the continuance of indirect representation of Africans by Whites was that 'the

ballot-box is a method entirely foreign to native ideas and quite unsuited for their use!'

The Macleod plan, published as a White Paper, sets out the latest proposals for the Northern Rhodesian franchise and is the crux of the present Northern Rhodesian crisis.

The plan provides for an estimated 45 elected members in the present 22-member Legislative Council.

One-third would be elected by voters from an upper roll (predominantly European), one-third from a lower roll (chiefly African) and the remaining third would be elected from a "national roll" of both the upper and lower rolls combined.

THE CABINET

The Executive Council, or Cabinet, would consist of three or four officials and six unofficial members, of whom at least two would be Africans.

CRISES AND CONCESSIONS

In their struggle for self-government, the Africans have faced from Britain the same tactics as we know so well here — states of emergency, detentions, deportations, imprisonment, bannings, shooting.

But in between the crises the British Government has been prepared to discuss and to make concessions.

African nationalism and Indian nationalism have become powerful enough forces to compel recognition; opposition to colonialism grows daily; the emergence of Socialist states has altered the balance of power held so long by imperialist countries.

None of these factors were in existence in 1910 when Great Britain, by assenting to Union, finally handed over the government of Indians, Africans and Coloureds to Europeans without providing for their political representation. 1960 in East and Central Africa is not 1910 in the Union.

Letter to the Editor

The Editor,
Fighting Talk.
Sir,

Rhodesian politics are certainly peculiar, but Mr. Robin Farquharson's version of The Central African Examiner's policy under its new management and editorship is even more peculiar — it smacks of the malicious. He writes (Fighting Talk, February 1961) that The Examiner 'generally takes the view that some day, and with every care being taken not to go too far, it may perhaps be desirable for some small concessions to be made to Africans'.

In fact, as those of your readers who also see The Central African Examiner will know, we have consistently pressed for the immediate and radical extension of the franchise to Africans and for the immediate abolition of all other forms of unfair racial discrimination. We have stressed that the franchise is the key to political and racial peace and co-operation in the Rhodesias and Nyasaland, and that the African movements are right in posing universal adult franchise as their aim. We have, as an independent journal of opinion, consistently exposed, analysed and condemned the repressive side of government in the Rhodesias and Nyasaland; we have also given due weight to its positive achievements.

At the same time, we have tried to extend our understanding to the fears and legitimate interests of the white minorities, and have recognised, as have

other liberals and African Nationalist leaders, that universal adult franchise cannot be achieved overnight and that the process of transition must be a phased one which takes into account the realities of the present situation.

It is for being so bold that we have suffered many withdrawals of advertising, though relatively few of subscriptions, which have increased on balance and this month, for the first time in the paper's history, passed the 2,000 mark.

JACK HALPERN,

Editor.

Central African Examiner,
Salisbury.

Robin Farquharson writes: The Examiner is doing a difficult job with courage: I still feel that more stress on radical immediacy and less on cautious qualification would better achieve its aim.

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SOUTH AFRICA'S POWER STRUCTURE

Dr. Abdurahman's presidential address at the A.P.O. Conference of 1923 contained a prophetic passage. He warned white people throughout the Continent that their repressive policies would 'awaken the nationality of colour'.

Starting in Egypt, a movement to throw off the foreign yoke would sweep through Africa. "There will then arise the cry 'Africa for Africans' . . . Then, just as the past witnessed a great scramble by Europeans for land in Africa, so the future will see a great white scuttle out of Africa'.

In a long article reviewing the address, S. P. Bunting in *The International* agreed with the forecast, but took the doctor severely to task for having said that the greatest enemy of the Coloured and African peoples in the industrial world was organised white labour.

Class and Colour

Having in mind the great Rand strike of 1922, Abdurahman said that "the greatest exploiters of coloured labour on the Rand are the white workers, and their 'solidarity' has resulted in our being kept down at unskilled work".

This, retorted Bunting, was false. True enough, the division between white and black in the Union roughly seemed to coincide with the real division between economic classes, between exploiter and exploited.

Race was not itself, however, the base of exploitation, said Bunting. "It is the capitalists, not the trade unionists, that draw the profits and the dividends; it is they that are the exploiters, the real slave drivers."

The dispute of those days continues with unabated vigour and even greater venom. What is the relation between class and colour? What is the position of the white worker, socialist or liberal in the social system? Is the struggle one of black and brown people against all the whites?

The debate carries on because the issues involved have not been settled. The 'contradictions' remain as they were in the 1920's. There has been no shift in power relations since then.

A Single Society

Bunting's class theory finds an echo in the pamphlets of the Socialist Workers League and the Workers Democratic League. Both claim that only the division between capitalists and workers is meaningful. Racial and national divisions are said to be of secondary and on the whole comparatively minor importance.

Those who hold this view denounce the Congress Alliance. They say that it

In the first article in this series (December 1960 issue) Dr. Simons set out six basic propositions:

- 1 South Africans of all types form a single, indivisible society. No one group can isolate itself from the rest now or in the future.
- 2 Ours is a multi-racial and multi-national as well as a class society. These categories are not inventions of the ruling class, but real entities.
- 3 No one national community can dominate the rest. Afrikaners cannot rule without the English; Africans cannot free themselves through their own, isolated efforts.
- 4 The disfranchised people require maximum unity among themselves and with as large a section of whites as can be detached from the white supremacists.
- 5 Unity can take the form of single, non-racial organisations or co-operation between racial organisations. Differences of opinion on the respective merits of each are legitimate and should not be treated as acts of betrayal.
- 6 PAC was not justified in setting itself up as a wholly African organisation in complete isolation from the rest of the population..

glosses over class antagonisms, holds back the working class, and serves the interests of the capitalists, African, European, Indian and Coloured, that dominate the Congresses.

Abdurahman's point of view has something in common with the approach of the PAC and the NEUM. They deny that white people can or will renounce their privileges. Individuals may join in the movement for national liberation, but not any group or organisation.

Liberals and communists are accused of misleading the national movement and diverting it from its historic mission of overthrowing white supremacy. PAC is even more exclusive. It claims that the struggle is one of African Nationalism vs. The Rest.

The Anti-Apartheid Front

The Congress Alliance has a programme but no theory. Nationalists, liberals, communists, socialists and the adherents of Eastern and Western religions, even when in one kraal, have difficulty in reaching agreement about

themselves and their ultimate aims. They combine in practice, in active struggle, but not on theory.

All sections of the anti-apartheid front agree however on one principle. They reject apartheid in any form.

They do not accept the notion of 'separate development' any more than they tolerate the mass of discriminating laws and customs which make up the fabric of white baasskap.

The positive side to this rejection is an insistence that all South Africans belong to a single society and must come to terms with one another as members of an indivisible State.

In opposition to apartheid slogans such as 'Bantustans' and 'ethnic autonomy', the anti-apartheid front demands equality of rights and status for all persons of all racial and national groups within the South African Republic.

The single society exists. It is not just a concept or vision for the future. It is real, and people who recognise and accept the reality have a base for common action. But what is the character of the common society and how is it to be reshaped? It is in answering these questions that profound disagreements arise on the anti-apartheid front.

Determinants of Status

What seems to be needed is a theory of the way in which power is held and maintained. What is the ruling class and how does it remain in power?

By power I mean the capacity to make decisions and impose them on other people. There are different kinds of power. Parents exercise authority over children, employers over workers, priests over parishioners.

We are concerned with political power, which is the kind of authority that belongs to the State and that governments possess. The distribution of political power is determined by the structure of society.

Persons of high status have more power than persons of low status. In our case, status is determined by one or more of three criteria: colour (race), language (nationality) and property (class).

In society race is a means of classifying people into unequal social classes or ranks. Sociologically considered, race describes a group of people who are regarded and treated as a separate biological entity with a common ancestry and who are assigned a higher or lower status in relation to other similar groups.

Any group could form a 'race' if so treated. It is common usage to describe the relation between Afrikaans- and

English-speaking whites as constituting the 'race problem'. But the description is incorrect and would be justified only if one group had a higher status than the other.

South African legislation distinguishes two main 'races', 'white' and 'non-white' in the enforcement of marriage and sex rules. It recognises a varying number of subsidiary 'races' for other purposes, such as residential segregation, job reservation, education, and administration.

Sociologically speaking, we should distinguish three 'races': white, coloured (including Asians) and black. There is a tendency to relegate the 'coloured race' to the same status as the 'black race', but the differences between them are appreciable. For one thing, the 'coloured' are accepted as permanent inhabitants of the 'white' areas.

Nationality constitutes the second detriment of status. The word describes a group of people with a feeling of oneness derived from a common language, tradition and culture who desire equality with or dominance over other similar groups, either in a single multinational state or in separate nation-states. Afrikaners form such a nationality.

English-speaking whites are more difficult to classify because of their affiliations with Afrikaners on the one hand and their country of origin on the other hand. They possess, however, a wide range of separate associations and institutions, their own literature, and national symbols that distinguish them from Afrikaners. They are in process of acquiring the feeling of oneness, largely in response to pressures from Afrikaner nationalism.

Africans are still undergoing a transition from tribalism, and are divided into language communities. But they also are developing a definite national consciousness. It is most evident in the educated classes and urban population, and constitutes the driving force in their political organisations. African nationalism is an actual, though as yet largely embryonic phenomenon.

The Coloured have resisted all attempts to inculcate in them a distinctive national consciousness. Highly diversified in both cultural and physical traits, they have close affiliations with each of the three nation-groups. In so far as they can be classified, one may regard them as being divided between the Afrikaner and English nationalities.

South African Indians, on the other hand, retain close ties with their countries of origin. They do not identify themselves culturally with other ethnic communities, and can hardly be said to have developed a national consciousness.

Class Divisions

Class is a subdivision distinguished from the rest of society by sameness of occupation, income, education and standard of living. There is also an awareness of having common interests which are distinct from those of other classes.

South African classes are fluid and

mobile. Persons move easily from one class to another within each racial or national group.

Colour and national consciousness tends to dominate class consciousness. Class divisions cut across racial lines. But there is more social contact and a greater identity of interests (whether real or assumed) between white employers and white workers than between white and coloured or black workers.

The rigidity of the racial divisions and the operation of national differences retard the growth of class consciousness in all communities. The barriers also set a limit on the development of class distinctions among Africans and Coloureds.

Whites use their monopoly of political power to protect themselves against competition. Job reservation and similar barriers compress the range of mobility in groups of inferior status. The floor of the White class system is approximately the level of the artisan. That tends to be the ceiling of the African class system, in which the highest point is that reached by members of the professions.

Some Africans and Coloureds have a higher class status than some whites. Their class position does not fit in with their racial status and violates the system of white supremacy. To correct such 'deviations', the dominant whites make increasing use of the law to restrict social mobility among Africans and Coloured.

The white worker's privileged position makes him a member of the dominant political class. He has a share of political power, but not of economic power. African and Coloured are excluded from both kinds of power.

Nationality and Class

The white worker achieved his present status through struggle against the capitalist class. During the struggle he acquired class consciousness. Some groups of workers began to think of inter-national and inter-racial co-operation. Class alignments began to cut across national and racial divisions, and threatened to undermine the solidarity of national communities.

Afrikaner political and cultural leaders reacted to this challenge in two ways. In the 1920's they formed an alliance with the white labour movement, then dominated by English-speaking workers. The partnership put Afrikaner nationalism in power and consolidated the white worker's position of privilege in the economy.

After the break up of the alliance, Afrikaner nationalists denounced the trade unions as 'foreign' institutions which preached class war and internationalism in violation of Afrikaner traditions. Systematic and large-scale propaganda persuaded Afrikaner wage earners that they would best serve their interests by linking up with the Afrikaner business men and intellectuals in a national front against British imperialism and African nationalism.

Steps were taken simultaneously to isolate the Afrikaner middle class from the English. Home language schools, unilingual universities, separate clubs, professional associations and cultural societies combine with separate churches to keep the two language groups apart.

This cultural isolation is as necessary as racial segregation to keep Afrikaner nationalism in a dominant political position.

There is hardly an English working class. The immigrants who brought trade unionism and socialism have disappeared and their place has not been taken by new immigrants. The descendants of the original stock have gone to universities and not into factories. English (and Jewish) South Africans are middle and upper class.

In contrast, Africans, Coloureds and Indians are overwhelmingly workers or worker-peasants. Their economic status does not necessarily make them class conscious. They cannot easily distinguish between national or racial oppression and class exploitation. Indeed, it is doubtful whether such a distinction exists.

For these reasons the working class movement has made little headway. Workers parties have not been able to isolate themselves from national movements and have tended to submerge their identity.

A working class consciousness cannot emerge without an independent, self-contained and autonomous workers party.

The weakness of the labour movement is the most serious flaw in the anti-apartheid front. Only a socialist consciousness can link together the workers who form the bulk of the population and direct them to the establishment of a democratic and equal non-racial society.

In the absence of a strong workers party political movements are bound to acquire an increasingly sectarian character and develop along national or racial lines.

Socialists of all shades of opinion should regard the creation of a powerful workers party as their main objective.

The Basis of Liberalism

Liberals will challenge this assertion. They claim that their policies would constitute the most favourable structure for a free and equal society.

It might seem that the major sections of the anti-apartheid front agree. The Freedom Charter and Ten Point Programme are really statements of principles for a freely competitive capitalist society.

Adequate attention has not been given to the social and economic roots of South African liberalism.

It is basically the ideological manifestation of English nationalism. This relationship can best be shown by examining some of the issues that divide English and Afrikaner nationalism.

English-speaking South Africans

adopt a liberal attitude to immigration, both of whites and Africans. Afrikaner nationalism disapproves of both. White immigrants are favoured by one and feared by the other because they are likely to strengthen the English and weaken the relative position of Afrikanerdom in the power structure. African immigrants strengthen the labour force and are desired by the industrial and commercial classes who are predominantly English-speaking.

Afrikaners could strengthen their culture group by drawing on their natural allies, the Coloureds. As is well known, a movement exists to win the Coloureds as allies of Afrikaner nationalism. But the main demand for the 'integration' of the Coloured in the white community comes from English-speaking liberals.

A relaxation of the ban on inter-marriage and other barriers that insulate whites from coloured would reduce the value of skin colour as a means of classifying people and reduce the strength of Afrikaners in relation to the rest of the population. If Coloureds were given political rights they might use them to support the English community.

Since the English form a minority of whites, they have less reason than Afrikaners to maintain rigid national and racial divisions. They cannot hope to gain political power on their own. They can only share power, either with Afrikaners or with Africans and Coloured.

The main parties that have represented the English (Unionists, South African Party, United Party) favoured the first alternative, which left intact the basis of white supremacy.

Today Progressive and Liberal Parties urge the adoption of the second course. The extension of franchise rights to Africans and Coloured would bring about a change in the social structure and open the possibility of defeating Afrikaner nationalism.

The comparative flexibility of the English can be explained also on economic grounds. Holding the key positions in mining, manufacturing, commerce and finance, and controlling the greater part of the national wealth, they prefer a laissez-faire economy which permits of the maximum employment and free circulation of human and natural resources in an open market.

Afrikaners, in contrast, show an acute awareness of their relatively weak position in the urban economy and look to the State to provide opportunities that are not readily available to them under free competition.

Their contrasting attitudes arise partly from their respective theories of apartheid and integration, but these in turn sustain an economic interpretation.

English industrialists dislike the prospect of facing competition from factories employing low-paid workers and receiving State aid in 'border' regions. Afrikaner business men, on the other hand, welcome an opportunity to start new enterprises under conditions more

favourable to them than those encountered in established industrial areas.

Liberalism, therefore, is not a merely sentimental appeal for harmony in race relations. It has a substantial material basis in the sectional interests of English nationalism.

But its appeal is too narrow for it to gain the support of the great mass of

the working people. The bulk of them would not gain much in material comforts and living standards under a competitive capitalism.

Liberalism cannot therefore provide an adequate substitute for a working class movement. But liberals have a significant place in the anti-apartheid front and should be welcomed as allies.

THE PAN-AFRICANISTS

'Looking for Allies is a slave-habit'

says "TERRA"

This contribution was received in reply to the first discussion article and Dr. Simons' Point 6 (see the set of propositions on page 12). FIGHTING TALK asked for contributions not to encourage mud-slinging but to initiate a sober, reasoned discussion on the problems of unity in the freedom movement. This article departs from the spirit in which we started the series and though we publish this contribution, future articles should avoid slander and recrimination and should probe the propositions on which the series is based.

Whilst it might be scholarly to discuss the significance of the Pan-Africanist movement in the struggles of the voteless, yet I regard such a discussion as unreasonable and unfair, at least at the present moment. There are bound to be unwarranted inroads into the basic ideology, policies and programmes of P.A.C. In the course of the discussions it might be necessary to correct errors or even deliberate distortions of facts. Now, as we speak, the more important leaders of P.A.C. are in prison and cannot effectively enlighten the African people whenever malicious propaganda is unleashed to the press.

However, P.A.C. built itself up so no man can destroy it. For the mental health of those who are keen let the discussions go on.

From a person who supports African nationalism and Pan-Africanism the article by Dr. H. J. Simons is bad in that it harbours a bias and has by design, I believe, left out the most important lessons of the March campaign and of the true significance of P.A.C. in the struggle to liberate the black masses in South Africa.

What particularly disturbs is the statement that "P.A.C. was not justified in setting itself up as a wholly African organisation . . ."

In other words, the writers alleges that P.A.C. had no right in severing relations with the A.N.C. in 1958. Before we can discuss this article it is proper to begin from 1958.

The individuals who left the A.N.C. and its brain-trust were faced with a highly organised bureaucracy that thwarted every genuine initiative from the Nationalist section of the A.N.C., the Africans in general were being taught to worship the activity of the women as the vanguard of the struggle; African nationalists were labelled racialists and

were denied effective platforms at national conferences. What chances therefore had they inside the Charterists' organisation? There was no alternative but to walk out.

With regard to the C.O.D. and its sister organisations it is enough to say they incite the A.N.C. against any organisation that supports nationalism.

The liberatory struggles in South Africa have been delayed unduly by a South African slave habit or tendency that waste time looking for friends or so-called allies.

The white minorities must know and the white supremacists must know that P.A.C. had its own programme and that programme had to be carried out. It is therefore unrealistic to say "P.A.C. was not justified in setting itself up as a wholly African organisation."

As far as the writer's report on reactions to P.A.C.'s effort, my answer is, THE DUTY OF A DOG IS TO BARK, so those papers did likewise. All those reactions are irrelevant to the membership of P.A.C. But as a bone over which enemies of African freedom may waste time they are lessons which serve a useful purpose.

Stolen March?

There is yet another bad indictment on P.A.C. "that it stole a march". I quote the nauseating lines, "P.A.C. deliberately set out to steal a march on the A.N.C. which had announced March 31st as the date for its own campaign." Here the writer has falsified the facts. P.A.C. used a tactic which has been rarely followed in South Africa, that of not making the enemy wiser beforehand and that of announcing its positive intentions to the general public a few days before action. Since the writer does not know the real facts about P.A.C., he would be

well advised to approach those who know whenever he wants to make such dogmatic statements. P.A.C. never deliberately set out to steal a march on the A.N.C. All it did was to carry out its own programme almost to its mathematical details.

If the writer was a reader of THE AFRICANIST he would know that his statement is far from the truth. If he attended the A.N.C. conference in Durban, he would know how the leaders were stamped into taking positive action.

"Warped Nationalism"

There is yet another distortion that P.A.C. levels two charges against the A.N.C. The A.N.C. has no destination, it is idiotic to say it is charged with having failed to reach its destination, but one thing that the A.N.C. has done is to deceive the African people by saying it is an African organisation whilst it is in fact a tool of other organisations; it deceived the Africans by saying it was going to divide the land equally amongst the workers and not amongst Africans; "deliberately the A.N.C. preached a warped form of nationalism christened "progressive nationalism" and not African nationalism. By introducing the worker theory as the unifying force, it deliberately avoided the use of the African and African nationalism in unifying the African people. That is the unfortunate situation in which multi-racial organisations find themselves. They concentrate on compromises to the exclusion of positive actions based on their ideologies. The A.N.C. in order to appear good to its white friends and minorities condescended even lower than the devil and used terms such as Non-Whites, Non-Europeans and I think one day it will use 'Bantu' to appease Afrikaner nationalism.

The March Campaign Lessons

One important lesson was that P.A.C. stole the initiative from the whites and since the days of the I.C.U. no African political organisation has so successfully outwitted the whites.

Another important thing is that P.A.C. has not only been recognised by the Africans but that the enemies of African nationalism feel the existence of an awakening national feeling which cannot be taken lightly. The P.A.C. campaign has spotlighted South Africa as never before in the history of the sub-continent. Only a fool can still hold to the myth of keeping the native in his place or of asking him to return to his "homeland" the South African Sierra Leone, termed Bantustans. It is now only a question of time before white supremacy is carried out on stretcher to the nearest hospital where it will breathe its last. It is important too to note that P.A.C. has at least won the ideological battle amongst Africans that really count.

Further, the campaign successfully placed white political organisations and the A.N.C. on the mirror of Pan-Africanism.

Further, the A.N.C. and its satellites were clearly exposed and a treacherous statement was made on the eve of the campaign by the secretary-general of the A.N.C. and it was acclaimed by all whites irrespective of their political affiliations:— For instance, the Secretary-General of the A.N.C. informed Mr. Sobukwe by letter that the A.N.C. would not support this campaign. Which campaign? To end the pass laws.

Let me say the more important of the resolutions passed at the 47th annual conference of the A.N.C. held in Durban on the 12th and 13th December, 1959, dealt with two main matters: the economic boycott and the pass laws. A major campaign against the pass laws which would have several culminating points was agreed upon. Arrangements would be made for deputations to wait upon local authorities and Bantu Affairs Commissioners throughout the country. P.A.C. decided to launch "decisive and final positive action" against the pass laws. The A.N.C. refused to support this campaign because the ANC worships the leadership of the whites more than African leadership. Their god-fathers would not stomach leadership by Africans. Why did the A.N.C. side-step the pass campaign on which they had decided in Conference in Durban? Who refused to co-operate in this campaign? Was it the veteran white-led A.N.C. or the amateur "irresponsible" and "naive" Africanists?

When the P.A.C. campaign became in fact a success the "White Chief" Lutuli became hysterical, and saw the disappearance of his coveted glory — so, he burned his dom-pass to give an excuse that at least the A.N.C. did something.

Let there be no mistake, the Africans no longer require the services of privileged "professional advisers and interpreters". They are now dedicated to the building up of the African personality and the realisation of the United States of Afrika, under the banner of African nationalism and led entirely by the Africans themselves.

"TERRA".

They said . . . in Rhodesia

'I would annexe the planets if I could, I often think of that. It makes me sad to see them so clear and yet so far.'

CECIL JOHN RHODES.

'Your Majesty, what I want to know from you is if people can be bought at any price . . .'

CHIEF LOBENGULA, in a letter to Queen Victoria.

'In rejecting Federation with Southern Rhodesia we are not choosing between heaven and hell. Northern Rhodesia is also hell, but the door of the Federation hell will be more tightly bolted than the door out of the present hell.'

An African speaker at a mass meeting in Ndola, on the Northern Rhodesian Copper Belt in 1953.

'I am satisfied that if all discrimination were removed the Africans to a very large extent would be the greatest sufferers.'

SIR ROY WELENSKY, Rhodesia Herald, March 17, 1959.

'Africans will be excused now if they believe the British Government runs from Salisbury.'

The AFRICAN MAIL, February 21, 1961.

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From Turfloop to Salisbury Island (Continued from page 7)

scheme of one Indian, one Coloured and three Bantu university colleges.

It estimated running costs for 1967, when the colleges may be expected to be fully occupied, as £71,186 per Bantu college and £73,894 per Indian or Coloured College.

Bearing in mind that the amount of money available will determine the extent of research carried out and the quality of tuition provided, it will be useful to compare the running expenses of some of the other universities during 1957:

Witwatersrand	£915,314
Cape Town	£713,667
Natal	£472,475
Rhodes	£211,727
Fort Hare	£90,562

The above comparison discloses two significant facts. First, the financial provision being made for the Non-White institutions is on such a niggardly scale that the facilities offered and the standard of tuition must inevitably be well below par.

Second, Fort Hare will spend less in 1967 than in 1957.

The take-over by the Government will therefore mean a reduction in the already restricted facilities and its necessary accompaniment, falling standards.

The above conclusion is borne out by reference to the Extension of University Education Act, 1959:

Section 12: There may be established at a university college such faculties and departments as may from time to time be prescribed after consultation with the Council.

Section 13 (4): The Minister may, after consultation with the Council, in his discretion limit the number of students who may be permitted to register for any course.

The Act refers to a university council but makes no reference to its authority or function. The council is to consist of not less than 8 members appointed by the Governor-General of whom at least 4 shall be appointed on the grounds of their special knowledge of or in connection with university affairs. Similarly, the Senate shall consist of such professors and lecturers as the Minister, after consultation with the council, may from time to time designate. As the appointments by the Governor-General are made on the advice of the Minister, it is clear that in these tribal universities, unlike in any other universities, the Minister will choose the members of the council and senate. And in respect of the council, half or more of the members may be persons who have had no experience whatsoever of a university!

Section 25 of the Act makes provision for two types of members of staff: those who hold state posts, and those who hold council posts.

Incumbents of state posts are to be civil servants in every sense of the word. The Minister appoints, promotes or discharges every holder of a state post. The power to appoint, promote or discharge persons employed in council posts is vested in the council, provided that

every appointment, promotion or discharge is first approved by the Minister.

A 'conscience clause' prohibiting discrimination or tests based on religious belief is normal in university constitutions. The Act, however, affords no such protection for members of the staff at the tribal colleges. On the other hand, there are detailed and elaborate provisions dealing with the possible misconduct!

In spite of the Minister's unprecedented powers of appointment and dismissal of staff members, such is the confidence displayed in the hand-picked men of the Minister by the Government, that there is to be no liberty of opinion and expression for professors and lecturers!

In so far as the students are concerned, the Minister has the right to refuse admittance 'if he considers it to be in the interests of the university college concerned to do so.' (Section 14). The Act further empowers the Minister to make regulations, inter alia, for the admission, control and discharge of students. Although these regulations have not yet been framed, regulations based on similar powers for Fort Hare offer a useful guide: The following may be regarded as samples:

No student or group of students may visit any other institution without the permission of the Rector and of the institutions concerned, and then only on such conditions as may be determined.

No student or group of students may no person or persons not under the jurisdiction of the university college, may be upon the College grounds as visitors, or visit any hostel or other building of the institution without the permission of the Rector or his duly authorised representative, and then only on such conditions as may be determined.

The above rules illustrate the status of the students and how far that status is from that of a student at any other university in the world.

In the course of a speech on "The Case in favour of Apartheid" Professor L. J. du Plessis said in London on the 14th October 1957:

"Control of new institutions by Government Departments is rendered necessary by the fact that the Government initially supplies all the funds and that a responsible authority is needed TO PREVENT UNDESIRABLE IDEOLOGICAL AND OTHER DEVELOPMENTS (my emphasis) such as have lately disturbed non-white educational institutions not directly controlled by the Government."

This speech was made at a symposium to which he had been invited by the Manchester Guardian. Professor du Plessis is a personal friend of Dr. Verwoerd and other Cabinet Ministers. He puts it negatively, but it is clear that he considers that the Government's purpose in the application of Apartheid in higher education is ideological and this he is attempting to justify.

There is overwhelming evidence that

the Government's aim is 'indoctrination for servitude' in so far as the education of the Non-White South Africans are concerned. In rejecting this type of education, it is natural that alternative ways of obtaining higher education should be explored.

THE WAY OUT:

Natal's University

Education Committee

As a result of the Conference held in Natal last December, a University Education Committee (Natal) has been set up one of whose tasks is to assist students in pursuing alternative courses of study for university degrees.

Students are being invited to enrol with the University of London as external students. They will first be required to do the General Certificate of Education at the advanced level in order to be admitted to the University of London. This will take 14 months. Thereafter, they will proceed to the B.A. or B.Sc. (Econ.) degrees.

The standards of the University of London are high, certainly higher than the University of South Africa degrees being offered by the Salisbury Island college. The London degrees are recognised not only in South Africa but also in most parts of Africa, and are considered more valuable than the University of South Africa degree. The cost of these external courses will also be lower.

The Committee plans to supplement the correspondence courses by a system of tutorials based on a panel of lecturers in Durban. In addition a central library is planned and suitable premises are available. Students will use the library as a reference library and will be expected to study there all day. Attached to the library will be a refectory run by the students.

Though this whole scheme originates in the Indian opposition to the Salisbury Island college, the alternative facilities will not be run on racial lines. They will be open to students of all groups and a number of non-Indian enrolments have already been received.

Steps will have to be taken to overcome problems posed by the Group Areas Act.

A large number of lecturers of the University of Natal and others have volunteered their services. There will be no problem in finding competent tuition. Funds are being raised both in South Africa and outside. Books are already collected to equip the library.

The Committee has undertaken a difficult and onerous task. It has not the resources of the Government. It is certain that the Government will use its powers to cripple and destroy its venture. But it is confident that if the students and parents remain steadfast it will be successful in its central aim.