


NHLABAMKHOSI

(CLARION CALL)



ONE SOUTH AFRICA

ONE PEOPLE

EDITORIAL

The Institutional Life of South Africa

When we speak of democratic opposition in South Africa, we speak of opposition to the schizophrenia of our society which has destroyed the brotherhood of men. And when we speak of democratic opposition, we speak of opposition within institutions, both officially recognised and officially ignored. It is these institutions which divide men whose nature it is to be together. It is these institutions which should enshrine the fellowship of all South Africans and they must be made to do so. This, for us, is the end product of democratic opposition. Therefore for us the starting point for democratic opposition is the institutional life of South Africa.

Our people are not a broken people. They have to live, to learn, to love and die within the institutional life of the country where they find themselves. We have sympathy with people who have lost faith in the opposition which operates within the institutions of South Africa.

Whatever use we make of KwaZulu, as a base, everything we have done is geared towards the attainment of a sovereignty in which all blacks and indeed all the people of South Africa will participate, not just some people, as against all others.

KWAZULU

This Newsletter is issued by the Bureau of Communication: Department of the Chief Minister, Ulundi — 3838.

Its purpose is to express views on such topics of current affairs as appear to affect the KwaZulu Public and their interests. The views expressed by readers could be sent to:

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Although noms-de-plume are accepted, it is a requirement that full names and addresses be provided in confidence. As space is a premium, readers are advised to write as concisely as possible and to accept that their contributions might be shortened.

INKATHA'S STRATEGY OF SURVIVAL

A Comparative Assessment

When talking about Inkatha's strategy we need to look at both strategies which Inkatha needs to adopt for its own survival, and then at organisational strategies which Inkatha pursues in the struggle for liberation with the people of South Africa. For Inkatha, politics is the outcome of the interplay between these two levels of strategies and indeed many politically oriented Black Organisations in South Africa have over the years confused the one with the other. Let us then briefly examine the two sets of strategies as Inkatha perceives them:

The belief we uphold in Inkatha is that in order for a liberation movement to successfully pursue its programme of principles in the struggle, it must first ensure that it will in fact survive to be able to pursue that programme. After more than three hundred years of white oppression in South Africa we have learnt a lesson that the struggle for liberation will be long-drawn and arduous. Liberation movements who do not first maximise their capacity to survive in the struggle will therefore have been obliterated from the political scene by the time total liberation is ultimately won.

The strategy of survival is thus basic to Inkatha's overall plans for the total liberation of South Africa. At the Annual General Conference of the Inkatha Youth Brigade, the President, Chief Mangosuthu Gatsha Buthelezi (1980 : 8) reaffirmed this strategy when he quoted Chairman Mao Tse Tung as follows:

"The basic principle of war is to preserve oneself and destroy the enemy" ¹⁾ Elaborating on Mao's theory, Chief Buthelezi further declared: "When one goes to war, one knows that this means coming

face to face with death. But in spite of the fact no wise General will not make sure that his soldiers are safe and that they only die at that moment when there is nothing else left for them to do." ²⁾

How therefore does Inkatha seek to maximise its capacity to survive in the struggle for liberation in South Africa?

NO HIDDEN AGENDA

One aspect in Inkatha's primary strategy of survival is that of operating openly in broad daylight. It is not a secretive organisation evolving code languages, holding secret meetings or pursuing objectives which cannot be confirmed as correct at open Annual General Conferences.

We have come to realise that in South Africa the tendency to pursue secret objectives comes from the mistaken view that elementary and amateur precautions are sufficient to hide agendas from the Security Police. It is also in part a response to the idealisation of revolutionary tactics and strategies.

More importantly, and tragically so, secrecy in politics in South Africa is encouraged by those who find political failure and martyrdom preferable to political failure leading to obscurity.

After a wave of brutal oppressive action by the minority regime in the late 1950's and early 1960's, politics in South Africa when through a protracted period of dispondency and despair. For almost a decade up to the 1970's there was no organised black political activity of any significance. It was Inkatha's strategy pursuing open politics which opened up the political debate and

re-introduced dialogue. During this period, no black leader in South Africa did more for the struggle than Chief Buthelezi, the President of Inkatha. He fearlessly quoted banned and imprisoned leaders like Mr Nelson Mandela and Mr Robert Sobukwe in his speeches and openly discussed banned organisations like the African National Congress and the Pan Africanist Congress. ³⁾ At his very first meeting with the then Prime Minister of South Africa, Mr John Vorster, Chief Buthelezi raised the issue of Mr Mandela's release from Roben Island, when all other black leaders in South Africa found it still risky even to whisper the name of Mandela.

The fact that name like Oliver Tambo, Walter Sisulu, Govan Mbeki, Moses Mabhida, M.B. Yengwa, Dr W. Chonco and others are known to the young people of South Africa is chiefly due to Chief Buthelezi who never failed to mention these names during his numerous public addresses to members of the Youth Brigade of Inkatha, the majority of whom were not yet born when these leaders operated openly in South Africa. Chief Buthelezi braved vitriolic attacks by right wing white groups who accused Inkatha of collusion with the ANC ⁴⁾ and Chief Buthelezi personally as an agent of the communists.

In 1979 Chief Buthelezi travelled to London with senior members of Inkatha to meet the leadership of the ANC at their instance. At the meeting in London Inkatha's strategy of operating openly in South Africa again came to the fore when the ANC leaders tried to suggest that the meeting should be regarded as secret. Chief Buthelezi told the ANC leaders that Inkatha operated openly in South Africa and that an attempt to hide the fact that the meeting

did take place would invite the inevitable attention of the South African Security Police. Indeed when the Inkatha delegation returned to South Africa the Security Police and the media already knew that a meeting between the ANC and Inkatha had taken place in London. Subsequent press statements by the President of the ANC Mr Tambo, attempting to deny that the meeting took place were therefore of no avail.

In South Africa right wing white groups as well as some Cabinet Ministers called for Chief Buthelezi's detention but the Chief of Security, General Johan Coetzee commented:

"Some people think he (Buthelezi) should be thumb-screwed, but I don't think it's as simple as that." 5)

Inkatha's strategy of operating openly is further motivated by the belief that in South Africa, detention, death and the destruction of organisations follow incompetent secrecy. Organisations need to adopt public programmes before they can involve ordinary people and establish viable constituencies. This Inkatha has done and the strategy of not attempting the impossible is one reason why it is succeeding.

CONSTITUENCY POLITICS

Black people in South Africa come face to face with apartheid in their day to day living circumstances, and they can oppose apartheid more effectively in those circumstances than in abstract or symbolic politics. Workers form a constituency and they should be mobilised as such. Youth form a constituency; professional groups or traders may also form constituencies. The ideal of constituency politics is best served by having a multiplicity of cross-cutting constituencies, each of which has its own specific objectives, but all of which have a basic common goal. For Inkatha this basic common goal is the total liberation of black

people in South Africa. Consequently, in its constitution Inkatha provides for the affiliation of a variety of organisations viz: Trade Unions, Farmers' Associations, Chambers of Commerce, Teachers' Associations, Nurses' Associations, Education Inspectors' Associations, Church Organisations, Doctors' Associations, Lawyers' Associations and Social Workers' Associations. The majority of these associations are already affiliated to Inkatha. The underlying belief here is that an essential part of the liberation struggle in South Africa is to make it impossible for the South African government to implement any of its versions of apartheid. Each constituency at a particular point in time is in a position to become pragmatically effective in opposing any version of apartheid, provided it is properly organised and appropriately conscientised.

Inkatha thus believes that constituency politics rallies people together and we have to face the fact that this is the only way oppressed people in South Africa will be mobilised. Hordes acting in unison only when fuelled by anger are not acting in unison in the true sense of the word and their action cannot be one in which Black South Africa gathers accumulative power. The brand of constituency politics that Inkatha pursues in South Africa also enables different constituencies to maximise their capacity to sanction and curb the activities of counter-revolutionary elements in their midst, without calling in so-called external instigators who will only attract the attention of the ever-vigilant Security Police.

Constituency politics also serves to increase the cost to the state in case it attempts to act against a liberation movement by way of either banning it or banning its leaders. The secret of a banning order is the assumption that there is one person who is the moving spirit behind a movement; and that if that person is banned then the movement would fizzle out. Inkatha strives to ensure through consti-

tuency politics that if the state should act against its leaders then the masses themselves would see to the propagation of the ideals of the movement even when the leaders have been removed. Further, the numerical strength of a liberation movement keeps the state guessing as to what would happen if its leaders were banned. Nobody for instance can accurately foretell what would happen in South Africa if Chief Buthelezi were to be imprisoned or banned. 6)

A bitter critic of Inkatha was once prompted to write:

"Inkatha today constitutes a Black phalanx which, because of the diversity and solidarity of its support, poses a more organised threat to establishment of South Africa than the ANC did in the early sixties." 7)

BLACK UNITY

The pursuit of constituency politics leads Inkatha to the acceptance of the responsibility for working towards black unity. Because Inkatha is people-oriented and it does not have hidden ideological agendas, and aspires to serve black South Africa as a whole, it welcomes divergent views and respects the right of everyone to present his views to the masses and to attempt to establish a movement with aims and objectives in support of his views. This is the very stuff of which democracy is made, and Inkatha does not begrudge anybody the right to be part of a democratic search for the best and most effective amongst alternative solutions. Chief Buthelezi himself once declared:

"We are a host of freedom fighters each using the means at his disposal for the destruction of apartheid." 8)

Inkatha has attempted to unify Black South Africa both formally and informally. The Black Unity Front in 1977 was the first attempt by Inkatha to bring Blacks of different political persuasions

together. The South African Black Alliance which was established in 1978, is another tangible attempt which Inkatha has made to establish Black Unity. While this alliance was originally formed between Inkatha, Inyandza, the Indian Reform Party and the Coloured Labour Party, it will accept any movement which works within the broad objectives of democratic opposition to apartheid.

Beyond these attempts to establish links through informal means. Prior to Steve Biko's death, Inkatha was engaged in discussions with both the external mission of the ANC and the Black Consciousness Movement in South Africa, to establish a united front, but such fronts have not evolved and to date the South African Black Alliance is the only successful attempt to do anything in this direction. No other movement has achieved greater success than Inkatha in unifying the people of South Africa. Inkatha does not believe that "holier-than-thou" political attitudes are beneficial for South African politics and has therefore at all times attempted to keep alive contacts with a wide range of organisations and leaders.

Leaders in so-called independent homelands are just as important as any others when it comes to forming a united front. Inkatha believes that it is fundamentally undemocratic and unrealistic to exclude any black constituencies from participating in black unity, if we are serious about black liberation in South Africa. We believe that even those so-called homelands which opted for altogether unacceptable Pretoria-type independence, have constituencies of millions of black South Africans who cannot be jettisoned by the democratic process. Moves are now afoot to draw these constituencies and their leadership back to the struggle for liberation in South Africa.

Every black South African, be he in jail, exiled or banned, is a rightful heir to the struggle for liberation in South Africa.

Many critics of Inkatha both in South Africa and abroad sometimes misunderstand and misinterpret Inkatha's strategy of black unity. For instance, Inkatha's eagerness to co-operate with any organisation whose main goal is black liberation in South Africa, is sometimes interpreted as a sign of weakness. The fact is that when Inkatha calls for this co-operation among black liberation movements in South Africa, it does so from a position of immense strength. It is the largest black liberation movement in the history of South Africa, and it has a unique capacity to mobilise people on a scale never witnessed before in South Africa. Therefore there can never be any political solution in South Africa — now or in the future — which can exclude Inkatha.



However, Chief Buthelezi, in spite of the tremendous power he wields through Inkatha, has always lamented the fact that continued white domination in South Africa thrives on black disunity. It is only for that reason that Inkatha today is a foremost protagonist of black unity in South Africa.

The other misconception is that when Inkatha speaks in support of alliances with movements like the external mission of the ANC, it is attempting to gain credibility by using the ANC. Nothing could be

further from the truth. The truth of the matter is that it is in fact the ANC that would benefit from any political alliance with Inkatha for the simple reason that Inkatha is in total contact with the oppressed masses in South Africa on a day to day basis. This therefore means that a movement like the ANC whose leaders have been out of the country for more than 20 years, cannot hope to effectively influence the political situation in South Africa without co-operating with influential and powerful internal movements like Inkatha.

NON-VIOLENCE

In the very nature of the South African situation, one cannot achieve open democratic opposition leading to pragmatic actions

uniting people in a broad multi-strategy front, unless the ideals on non-violence are espoused. There is a particular kind of political dishonesty at work in South Africa at times. People who claim to be non-violent neither work actively for the emergences of non-violent opposition, nor have the courage to espouse violence in any effective way. One is thinking here of most of the Black Consciousness movements that emerged during the 1970's.

Inkatha's strategy of pursuing non-violence in South Africa is pragmatic for the following reasons:

- a. No single liberation movement in the history of South Africa ever adopted the strategy of violence while it operated inside the country. The ANC itself which now espouses violence as an instrument of change operated in South Africa as a non-violent movement for 48 years from 1912 to 1960. It only opted for violence when it was banned in 1960 and some of its leaders were sent abroad to establish an ANC mission in exile.
- b. For logistic reasons, an armed struggle in South Africa is not feasible for the foreseeable future. To be effective such a struggle would require a secure base near the borders of South Africa from which it could be launched. At the moment not a single country in Southern Africa is prepared to allow its territory to be used as a base for attacks against South Africa. While neighbouring African States need to be commended for giving our exiled liberation movements shelter as well as diplomatic and moral support, not a single one of these countries would like to incur the wrath of the South African Defence Force by allowing guerillas to establish military bases to attack South Africa from their territories. The barbaric raids at Amatola in Mozambique and Maseru in Lesotho are grim reminders of the brutality of the South African Defence Force when there is suspicion, no matter how unjustified, that neighbouring countries have bases from which guerillas can launch attacks on South Africa.

The fact that some countries in former colonial Africa like Mozambique, Angola and Zimbabwe were partly liberated through the armed struggle, has tended to obscure the fact that there are many other countries in former colonial Africa

that were liberated through non-violent means. In fact, comparatively speaking, the continent of Africa has witnessed very few wars of liberation in its history.

People also tend to ignore the fact that the political problems of South Africa are fundamentally different from those of either Mozambique, Angola and Zimbabwe before independence. Black people in these countries were faced with groups of white oppressors numbering hundreds of thousands, the majority of whom were settlers who could flee to their countries of origin after the liberation struggle.

In South Africa, however, we are faced with a determined tribe of white oppressors numbering almost 5 million, who no longer have another home to flee to and are therefore prepared to exterminate or be exterminated in defence of apartheid and white privilege. Moreover these white oppressors command the most lethal military machine and the most vibrant economy in the Southern hemisphere. ⁹⁾

Inkatha believes that it is an unwise strategy to allow the enemy to lure you into a position where you will be forced to fight him from a position of weakness. The white minority regime in South Africa has ensured through discriminatory laws, that black South Africans remain unarmed so that in case of an insurrection they can be overpowered with minimum effort. That is what Chief Buthelezi (1979 : 78) means when he declares:

"I do not believe that it would be responsible for me to undertake a course of action which pins its hopes on controlled mass violence and in the process turn my people into cannon fodder.

From my point of view, large scale violence as a planned strategy will not serve the interests of my people. Blind condemnation of non-violence means not taking cognisance

of the consequences of violence to millions of people." ¹⁰⁾

Inkatha is fully convinced that there are effective non-violent means of crippling the South African government besides the armed struggle. The soft underbelly of South Africa is its economy which depends almost entirely on black labour and black consumer power. Once black people are adequately mobilised in accordance with its strategy of constituency politics, Inkatha believes that it could force the South African government to capitulate by encouraging black people to withdraw their worker and consumer power. This cannot be achieved by simply scattering pamphlets on the streets at night, calling for a strike, as some liberation movements which are not in contact with the ordinary workers do. People need first to be organised and consulted if they are expected to support such a call. Chief Buthelezi underlined the growing importance of the power of black workers in South Africa when he asserted:

"We stand on the threshold of exercising our power in our places of employment and in the market place of South Africa. That is where the future drama of our liberation will ultimately unfold." ¹¹⁾

For all the above reasons Inkatha does not believe that the armed struggle is a viable strategy in South Africa at the present time. Nevertheless Inkatha does not condemn those liberation movements which have opted for the armed struggle. Neither does it attempt to oppose or undermine their strategy. Inkatha fully understands the reasons why many gallant sons and daughters of South Africa have had to sacrifice their lives in the armed struggle against apartheid. That is why it was possible for Chief Buthelezi to advise Inkatha Youth Brigade

members at their conference in 1979 as follows:

"Just as our policy is that of working for peaceful change, we have not stopped anyone who feels that he or she will serve the cause of Black liberation by skipping the country and joining the armed struggle." 12)

However, Inkatha does have some misgivings about the manner in which the ANC in particular pursues its strategy of violence in South Africa. We believe that for a movement like the ANC which has opted for a violent overthrow of the present government in South Africa, it is imperative that it must first win the confidence of the masses inside South Africa before it can even begin to mount an effective armed struggle. It is amazing, to say the least, that ANC strategists seem to have completely ignored this essential element of an effective armed struggle. On the contrary the ANC spend most of their time villifying and insulting Chief Buthelezi in their publications. 13) The negative attention that the ANC gives to Chief Buthelezi has led black people in South Africa to the conclusion that the priority in the ANC struggle is to attack Chief Buthelezi and Inkatha and not to overthrow the white minority regime in South Africa. Giving an account of the training they received during the war in Zimbabwe, a ZANU guerilla had the following to say:

"We were taught how to approach the masses and how to live with them and that we were the people's soldiers. We were taught that we had come from the people and that we had to go to the people, to stay with the people. The people were our source, shelter and security." 14)

It is thus clear that if the ANC is serious about mounting an effective armed struggle in South Africa, it still has a lot to learn about the tactics of winning the hearts and

minds of the masses who are expected to assist and give shelter to guerillas in the field. Surely this is not done by insulting and ridiculing influential leaders of the masses like Chief Buthelezi because in doing so they are actually insulting the masses themselves. One hopes that Inkatha will not reach a stage where it decides to incite the black population of South Africa against the ANC — something which Inkatha could effectively do if it chose to.

The other misgiving of Inkatha about the ANC's strategy of violence is that whenever acts of sabotage are carried out against the South African government the victims are in most cases black and not white people. Bombs which explode on railway lines in Soweto affect black and not white commuters. If it is not immediately revised, it is clear that this strategy of concentrating on black people as targets will further portray the ANC as a movement that is bent on venting its anger of oppressed fellow blacks and not on the enemy. In this regard the ZANU guerilla stated:

"After our political orientation everybody was able to understand the situation at home — the direction which had been followed by the Smith regime and the direction ZANU wanted to follow. Our political education taught us that when we went on to learn about guns we would know who were our enemies and who were our friends at home." 15)

PROTEST

Inkatha believes that it is essential to protest continuously at the inhumanity which characterises apartheid. Protests should be made at every opportunity and about everything that can capture the public's imagination. The process of protest consolidates political attitudes and symbolises the unity of all people.

Inkatha believes, however that no matter how important protest is,

we should not confuse protest with effective political action. Protest is valuable when it is part of a political action programme, but it is impotent on its own. For instance when Inkatha fought the decision of the South African Government to cede South African territory to Swaziland in 1982, protest was merely part of a comprehensive and properly planned action programme which included a campaign to enlist the support of the international community to oppose the land deal, a campaign to conscientise the people in the affected areas of Ingwavuma and KaNgwane, and a series of Supreme Court actions against the South African government. In its employment of protest as a strategy, Inkatha therefore differs from other liberation movements and organisations in South Africa which seem to believe that protest by and of itself can force the minority to reconsider its oppressive policies.

RADICALISM

Many critics of Inkatha classify it as a "moderate" or "conservative" movement and Black Consciousness groups in South Africa as "radical" or "progressive" movements. It is, however, not clear as to what criteria are applied in classifying a liberation movement as either moderate or radical. Within the context of South African politics there is no other liberation movement that has taken more radical actions than Inkatha in opposing the government of South Africa on a day to day basis; yet Inkatha is still mysteriously classified as a moderate or conservative movement. To Inkatha, a true radical risks everything for his people. So-called radicals who cast the world into the image of their own party will prove one day to be idealists. The true radical must be relevant to the interests of his people. For Inkatha the word "radical" has a positive connotation and Inkatha is undoubtedly committed to radicalism in South Africa. Inkatha's policies are

radical and its supporters are characterised by greater militancy of attitudes than supporters of other political organisations. The fact that this anger is led by pragmatism and a felt need to achieve, does not alter the nature of the radical support which Inkatha enjoys.

Chief Buthelezi is radically opposed to apartheid; he is radically opposed to oppression and he is presently the most outspoken radical in South Africa. At the level of newspaper comment, the nature of true radicalism is obscured by the propensity to report in sensational terms. The sensational is not necessarily radical. Inkatha's aims and objectives are radically different from those of the South African government. its Statement of Belief is radical in nature, and in no way conflicts with the Freedom Charter drawn up in Kliptown.

It might well be that one of Inkatha's strengths lies in its ability to ignore the need to appear heroic. The pursuit of political appearance at the expense of political achievement is so deeply mirrored in most political groups in South Africa. Theirs' is so very much the politics of imagery and symbolism. The clenched fist and the shouting of slogans without visible action programmes is all so very symbolic. Inkatha thus believes that true radicalism has within it an element of realism and pragmatism.

Inkatha And the Youth:

Another fallacy that is being deliberately propagated by Inkatha's critics is that Inkatha is rapidly losing the support of young people and that the majority of its support comes from older people and migrant workers:

"In Soweto Inkatha is supported by the older people and the hostel Zulus." 16)

This ignores the fact that out of a paid-up membership of 750 000, the Youth Brigade constitutes 44% of that total, i.e. 330 000 Youth



Chief Gatsha Buthelezi with Youth

Brigade members. 17) This makes the Youth Brigade of Inkatha the largest youth movement in the history of South Africa. The false claim that Inkatha is only supported by hostel Zulus ignores the findings of numerous past scientific surveys all of which have consistently revealed that Chief Buthelezi is the predominant leader in urban areas, that his support in these areas is 40% non-Zulu and that his general support in these areas clearly transcends ethnic or tribal boundaries.

CONCLUSION

Experience in the liberation struggles of Africa has taught us that the international community and interested groups can sometimes be terribly misguided in assessing the political significance of liberation movements that do not enjoy international recognition. In Zimbabwe Mr Joshua Nkomo's movement, ZAPU, was for many years flattered by the international community and the OAU into believing that it

enjoyed the following of the majority in Zimbabwe. For many years Mr Robert Mugabe's party, ZANU, which enjoyed real majority support in Zimbabwe was ignored by the international community and shunned by most African leaders simply because Nkomo's ZAPU had already claimed to be the sole and authentic voice of the people of Zimbabwe. However, when the people of Zimbabwe themselves handed down their judgement in the independence elections, Mr Mugabe's ZANU was the sole and authentic voice of the people of Zimbabwe. South African exiled movements like the ANC who are allowed by the international community to claim that they alone represent the black majority in South Africa should have learnt a lesson in the history of the struggle for Zimbabwe.

The investment/disinvestment question in South Africa is a case in point : Political differences between ANC and Inkatha are many, and investment/disinvestment in South Africa is one of them. ANC is one of the well known lobbyist against investment in South Africa. In this article **Inhlabamkhosi** attempts to assess this investment/disinvestment difference.

Twenty one years ago, before ANC was benned, on 26 June 1959, the leadership of the African National Congress (ANC), at what was to be its last commemorative meeting of South Africa Freedom Day, called on the international community, both singly and collectively, to take every measure to isolate Pretoria Regime. The meeting called for the severing of all relationships — political, diplomatic, cultural, economic and military — by the Governments and organizations of the world.

On economic boycott against South Africa, the late Chief Albert John Luthuli, President of the ANC made the point that: "the economic boycott of South Africa will entail undoubted hardship for the Africans. We do not doubt that . . ." The ANC Mission in exile pursued this economic boycott against South Africa. ANC as it claims to be the vanguard political organization in South Africa, together with its allies submitted its arguments to the International Non-Governmental Organization Conference for Sanctions against South Africa held in Geneva from 30 June to 3 July 1980. Since ANC Mission in exile has an observer status in the United Nations, the Non-Governmental Organizations Sub-Committee on Racism, -Racial Discrimination, **Apartheid** and Decolonization, in co-operation with the United nations Special Committee against Apartheid, adopted, during this conference, a resolution "calling upon all Member States to impose separate and collective sanctions against South Africa. More importantly, the international community came to appreciate that apartheid and racism in South Africa cannot be considered a "local" affair; that the implications of race rule and terror practised by Pretoria had

international ramifications precisely because the South African economy had over the decades of its development as a capitalist formation become the repository of vast amounts of foreign investment from transnational corporations; that the political representatives of capitalist countries constituted collectively the main stumbling block to the call for economic sanctions".

The transnational corporations provide economic support to Pretoria regime in two principal ways:

- (i) **Direct investment:** This is done primarily by way of financing the activities of their own branches, subsidiaries and associated companies in which they hold either a majority or minority of the share capital.
- (ii) **Indirect investment:** This takes the form mainly of short term credit facilities to South African private and public economic institutions and to the South African para-statal such as ESCOM, ISCOR, ARMSCOR, SOEKOR, SASOL & FOSKOR, all of which are Government controlled. The other form that indirect investment takes is through the granting of loans and the provision of export credit guarantees to the South African financial and industrial institutions. Two-thirds of the direct investment emanates from the European Economic Community (EEC) countries, with nearly 50 per cent from the United Kingdom, and one-quarter is from the United States of America. The United States and the United Kingdom have been increased their economic stake in South

Africa at a rapid rate, concentrating their impact on such strategic sectors of the economy as engineering, chemicals, mining, machinery and petroleum-related products.

A recent survey by the South African Financial Mail (September 1978) revealed the extent of international penetration of the South African economy by TNCs. On the other hand, without the massive injection of foreign investment from the early days of the discovery of gold and diamonds in South Africa the South African economy would not have been able to advance and develop into a fully fledged capitalist formation with all the characteristics of an imperialist power in its own right.

The ANC Mission in exile argues that racism and apartheid is more than just a system of national oppression of the black workers and peoples. At the heart of the policy of denying the black majority any political and economic rights and the policy of migrant labour, police brutality, repression, torture and murder witnessed at the time of Sharpville, Soweto and in the Cape, lie the real objectives of the system of race rule and repression. ANC states that "these funds have stimulated industrialization without any improvements in the economic, political, social and cultural lives of the black people. on the contrary, the more developed the economy has become, the greater has been the degree of oppression and exploitation imposed on the people and the bigger has become the gap in the living standards, incomes and power between the white minority and the black majority. Since the Second World War the real income of the black workers has decreased and the spectre of nearly two million unemployed now stalks the lives of the black workers, to be dumped in the barren wastelands going by the name of "homelands" and independent States".

Further, ANC states that industrialization and investments in the

apartheid economy have contributed enormously to the building up of the racist armed forces and the repressive State apparatus for the defence of white minority auto-cracy. The weapons they produce are used to shoot down black workers and to kill children in cold blood.

This call by the ANC Mission in exile is indicative of the fact that it is not involved in constituency politics and it does not heed the voice of the Black South Africa in the country. This is indeed a very serious misassessment of the South African situation when they established the disinvestment lobby. Every Black South African would agree with selective sanctions if they could be made to work in the short term and achieve real political gains. People inside the country do not want rhetorical politics and political programmes which are exercises in ideological marbles while the people starve.

On this disinvestment question, the President of Inkatha, Chief M.G. Buthelezi makes the point that:

“Every Black leader in the country knows that the vast majority of Black South Africans who are deeply aware of how unemployment, hunger and ill-health ravage their fellow human beings, would never advocate any line of action which has most disastrous effects amongst Blacks”.

The question of disinvestment is associated with quasi-socialist thinking. In this association, multinational corporations and the free enterprise system form related targets. The realities of the South African situation are simply that the industrial base on which economic expansion depends is already inadequate to cater for the needs of a population which is expanding at something like the rate of three per cent per annum. There will be no sound government in a liberated South Africa if programmes of political and social

reforms are held to ransom by economic under-development.

Black South Africans struggle not only for political liberation in the country, but they also struggle for liberation from poverty, want and disease, which will not be achieved by an idealistic redistribution of wealth. Equality of opportunity is an essential mechanism for redistributing wealth in South Africa, but Blacks want opportunities and continuing industrial development and economic expansion are essential for the aims of liberation. Those who are involved in constituency politics, like Inkatha, have to deal with the realities of day to day human misery. Chief Buthelezi moves amongst the people, organise the people and weld them into disciplined groups. He is dependent on following lines of thought which accord with the people's attitudes, and he cannot indulge in theoretical politics however much he may be applauded abroad.

Not a year goes by when mass meetings of tens of thousands, or Inkatha conferences drawing delegates from all over the country applaud Chief Buthelezi boldly and with enthusiasm for his stand on the question of investment/disinvestment. Inkatha rejects entirely the view that the lobbyists for disinvestment are acting on a mandate from the people of South Africa. Their action is motivated by ideological and sectarian interests. Black South Africans engaged in the internal struggle are frequently insulted by Western Governments who share platforms with South African exiles but who expect to consult with internal leadership in secret meeting through back-doors.

Blacks in rural areas in their millions know that they have at best a precarious chance of maintaining anything like a minimum level of subsistence. The areas relegated for Black occupation by apartheid South Africa are ludicrously inadequate to support the many millions of people who are expected somehow or other to

eke out a living in them. Many millions of Blacks are entirely dependent on cash wages. Around every major city in South Africa there are vast areas of squatters and shanty towns which are characterised by the most terrible poverty because of the very high rate of unemployment in Black society. These Black ghettos are neighbouring areas to affluent White suburban industrial areas.

Inkatha argues quite pragmatically that Blacks in South Africa have no social security systems and the lack of money means starvation and death. It is patently absurd to believe that these people would side with those who argue for disinvestment and the concomitant diminishment of job opportunities in the country. The Black population of South Africa is expanding exponentially at the rate of something like 3 per cent per annum and the existing industrial base is not large enough to provide work opportunities for the present generations of Blacks and for the foreseeable future. Blacks in South Africa can anticipate the continuation of a chronic shortage of work opportunities. Any impairment of the process of industrial and commercial expansion in the country will spell disaster to millions of people and in the end many millions more.

Black public opinion is totally opposed to disinvestment as a strategy. When Black South Africa first sent the ANC's Mission into exile, the Western World did not respond to our needs and by and large Black South Africans in exile have received greater support from the socialist bloc than from the Western industrial world.

When **Inkatha** observes the behaviour of people in squatter areas which are beyond the normal administrative machinery of South African society, because squatter areas are outside the jurisdiction of normal public administration, one sees a very natural tendency towards free enterprise.

These communities do not band themselves together under any kind of socialistic norms. Surveys have indicated that the oppressed people of South Africa need to be led by a leader who knows their needs, who suffers with them, who attends to their daily problems. **Inkatha** which is the largest political organisation in South Africa, led by its President, Chief Buthelezi, has proved to be the only organisation in the country that is relevant to the programmes of the suffering masses.

Inkatha has on many occasions in South Africa warned industrialists of the irresponsibility in practices and in codes of conduct as far as employees are concerned seriously prejudice the free enterprise system itself. **Inkatha** believes that industrialists in the West should play a two-fold role. On the one hand they should exert substantial influences on their Own governments to take a very much more definite stand in the Black struggle for liberation and become actively involved in supporting the kind of developments in Black society which foster the interests of freedom and democracy and economic development. The other aspect of the role of Western industrialists is that of identifying with Black groups in South Africa which are involved in the forefront of the struggle in such a way that broad Western industrial interest are furthered and the free enterprise system is underlined.

Chief Buthelezi is a Black South African leader, and **Inkatha** of which he is a President has a mass membership which has already passed the 750 000 mark and is climbing steadily. By the very nature of the South African demographic facts a membership this large must necessarily be dominated numerically by workers and peasants. **Inkatha** as a movement has members across the length and breadth of the country and it is as representative of people in urban areas as it is of people in rural areas. So, whenever he speaks of Black South

African, he speaks within the framework of Black public opinion. The recent George Meany Human Rights Award that was given to Chief Buthelezi by FLO-CIO is indicative of **Inkatha's** political relevance in the country.

Unlike in Western countries where there is Marxism, communism, socialism, etc, Black South Africa is not ideological. It is not ideological in the sense of consciously creating a bastion against interests, and it is not ideological in the sense of consciously working to uphold or reject capitalism and the free enterprise system. Generations of experience and years and decades of personalised experience in people's lives have led them to understand that hunger is placated by food, shelter comes from a house, care comes from a hospital and that security comes from work. Mass support in South Africa is withheld and afforded to strategies and tactics which the people face. It is this which distinguishes the relevant from the irrelevant.

It is in the depth of Black South

African suffering in the souls of Black South African which makes the Black South African leaders search for moral pragmatism. Leaders of Black South Africa are aware that their followers are poverty-stricken and that poverty cannot be alleviated by ideologists. The magnitude of suffering in South Africa, especially in Black Society is such that one would never dare to branch out into purely ideological politics.

The oppressed peasant eking out an existence from a dusty bowl in a parched land has no luxury of options or ideology. Leaders of mass organisations, such as **Inkatha** Movement, thought it wise and relevant to engage themselves in moral pragmatism and realities which face the poverty-stricken Black of South Africa. Leaders of mass movements have come to the realisation that mass support require a strategy and need to employ tactics which are durable. No ideological straight-jacket of whatever origin can be a salvation, at present, of our Black Sufferings in South Africa.

CHIEF BUTHELEZI'S ALTERNATIVES AND CHALLENGE

Black political Developments have been curbed by an ever growing and already more than formidable body of repressive legislation. Whites came to recognise that the disenfranchisement of Blacks would lead to political ferment and ultimately to the destabilisation of South Africa. They have therefore determined to make a final separation of Black and White politics by creating so-called independent states in South Africa in which Whites have no political rights but over which they will be political masters. In return for excluding direct White political involvement in these states, so-called, Blacks would have to agree to relinquish all political rights in the rest of South Africa.

The challenge Chief Buthelezi faced when he was approached to serve in what was then the Territorial Authority was the challenge of not only putting an end to the erosion of Black political rights but to initiate a process of restoring to Blacks full citizenship and the democratic right to participate in the government of their country.

Thus, the challenge he faced has had only one outcome. He has to meet the challenge without arms. The practical challenge boils down to his exercising whatever ability is needed to mobilise the masses and to create constituencies in every walk of South African life. This was the challenge he had already elected to face when he

was called upon by the people to lead them through the new dangers which were presented by the emergence of homeland politics and the creation of homeland administrative machinery. If he had not played the role he had played in the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly, and in the KwaZulu Territorial Authority, he would not have had a share in the great and historical Zulu rejection of separatist politics. Had he declined this form of challenge, KwaZulu would have been manipulated into independence.

Whatever his own personal fate takes him, he is comforted by the fact that the great apartheid dream will never materialise because KwaZulu will not opt for the kind of "independence" Pretoria offers. He can make no greater contribution to South Africa than this: To avoid a race war which would surely result from trapping many millions of underprivileged "aliens" in the so-called White areas where they would be amongst the few million Whites. Democratic procedures in the area where one is born, works and dies, is the only alternative to the use of violence, to revenge, enforced poverty and political deprivation.

The harshness of our South African situation has led many to abandon the hungry child or the weeping mother to seek training in the use of violence. Others have drummed up feelings of anger in protest politics which robs people of their nationality during spells of political frenzy. They whip up anger to dissipate Black political strength piecemeal. The struggle will be lost if we do no more than repeatedly try to use violence where it must fail. The growth of the country's repressive legislation was also made possible by the White held instruments of physical coercion.

The challenge he faced was therefore a double challenge. In the first place he had to face the challenge of reversing the consequences of colonial actions and

reversing the accumulated effects of White power exercised over seven decades. In the second place he faced the challenge of having to do so by non-violent means. Chief Buthelezi leads a people who are bordering on despair. He leads in a sub-continent where Blacks have had to employ violence to break the bondage of subservience and poverty. He faces a White Government which holds out little hope for a negotiated settlement. The pressures on him build up and the tension grows.

It is decent and it is political compassion to do what one can do to ease the lot of the poor. It is politically important to counter the ravages of poverty in the morale of an oppressed people. It is as easy as it is irresponsible to rock people between hopelessness and despair to violence and back. People want to be led to achieve. They want to progress and they want to be assisted to do something about their terrible situation. People want to be helped to fight for improvement, no matter how bad their state is. It is not true that Blacks would rather starve or die than support foreign investment, which results in jobs for them. Give us the jobs first and then we will struggle for improvements in the cry. Compassion in the pursuit of political goals keeps alive the soul of a nation.

First Bullet

Put bluntly, you must be sure you are going to win a war before you fire your first bullet. Again, quite bluntly, Whites do not heed warnings that Black opinion may turn to more widespread support of violence. The majority of Blacks reject violence but they do so because their instincts tell them that the external mission of the ANC will not come home. They will not march into Pretoria and take over the Government. Violence cannot be considered as an alternative to the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly because there is now and will be for the foresee-

able future only tokenism in the armed struggle which, while it serves a purpose, cannot be relied on along to bring about change in South Africa.

No Black person or organization has yet rejected **Inkatha** on the merits of its aims and objectives, or its policies. It is not rejected by Whites, nor by Coloureds or Indians. There are vociferous objections to its policy of constructive engagement in the Legislative Assembly but the overwhelming opinion by Blacks that this constructive engagement must continue is demonstrated by the fact that **Inkatha** is the largest Black political organisation this country has ever seen. Since from its inception every year **Inkatha** has grown. It is of crucial importance to the whole of South Africa that ordinary people were mobilised politically. We need above most other things to realise that disaster threatens on two fronts. One is the question already dealt with; alternatives to violence which necessitates mobilising people. The other has already been touched on poverty and the rocking backwards and forwards between despair and flashes of irrational violence.

Need for Mobilisation

Whether we are seeking ways and means of overcoming poverty, we need to mobilise people. We need to mobilise people so that they involve in self-help approaches. There must be a partnership between people and the Government after liberation if we are to tackle development meaningfully. The mobilisation of people into working and disciplined constituencies is not an exercise in idealism. Mobilisation takes place only when you deal with vested interests and organise action around practical and local issues. To achieve this best for the people, we need to be involved in mobilising people. That is good and that is an investment being made for the whole of South Africa. Sad as it is there are those

who have undone what little can be done by excusing themselves with mournful laments against apartheid. The fight against poverty, want and disease will continue into the future long past the point when we can see political victory or the forces of democracy.

Two Options

There are two views of the struggle for liberation in this country. The one we can perhaps call the Machel/Mugabe option. In this option people see the

possibility of employing violence to break down the ability of the South African Government to govern and forcing the South African Government then to a Lancaster House type bargaining situation. This option we all agree is a last resort option. Even ANC's external mission would not defend the employment of violence as a first alternative. Their justification for violence is argued on the grounds that nothing else will help. This is where we disagree. If there is nothing else to do and there is all that is left to do, we cannot be blamed if that is what

we do. While there is something that can be done it is irresponsible in the extreme to indulge in violence. It is irresponsible because in our country full-scale violence will be nothing other than the death throes of a society which will never be resurrected again. Violence in South Africa in proportion to the violence that was necessary to topple the Smith Regime will have to be so much greater that we are entitled to fear its destructiveness and to redouble every effort to seek alternatives.

Inkatha is a phenomenal political success and is in fact unprecedented not only in South Africa but in Africa. It has shown a political solidarity under a banner of clearly defined principles and ideals.

"I WILL SERVE THE NATION TO THE LAST DROP OF MY BLOOD . . ."

Chief Buthelezi

Our stand quite clearly is for a unitary state and universal adult franchise. We are, however, prepared to think of alternatives, provided it leaves us in the end with one South Africa and with equality before the law and the constitution, said Prince M.G. Buthelezi, the President of Inkatha when delivering the presidential address in June at Ondini National Conference of Inkatha in the presence of ± 10 thousand delegates from the four Provinces of South Africa.



(Courtesy of Zululand Observer)

**PRINCE DR M.G. BUTHELEZI
PRESIDENT OF INKATHA**

Inkatha is the heir to the power of Black South Africa. It is tragic that we are expected to bear the brunt of the fight now that the final constitutional crisis has settled upon us. It is tragic that the African National Congress Mission in exile has abandoned democratic internal opposition in favour of the kind of bandstand politics in which we observe them to excel in international forums.

It is tragic that the labour Party and the Black consciousness Movement have also by default left us to shoulder the burden. It is tragic that some of our brothers and sisters from a small minority of Black African opinion have deviated from the struggle to give a semblance of Black acceptance to apartheid as they opted for so-called independence.

These are the tragedies which have made us heirs to political power and are forcing on us a leadership role which we would so gladly have shared with so many others. Inkatha's approach has always been and remains even now, one of a multi-strategy approach in which a diversity of strategies and tactics mounted from a wide range of political bases is the ideal.

There is no easy victory and the first commitment that is expected from you is a commitment to follow the road to its bitter end wherever it may lead and through

whatever dark valleys it may meander. A total commitment at this point in time is expected from you to the ideals of a single destiny. Pretoria knows, and we know, the whole of South Africa knows that it is an impossible dilemma to recognise Pretoria and thereby giving de facto recognition to the so-called independent homelands, amidst typical wild Western protests that apartheid is abhorrent.

In this powerful address, the President of Inkatha said, "I ask you to reiterate the mandate you have given me so many times before to continue to reject independence of the kind Pretoria is offering us as we have done in the past." The big tent vibrated with that BIG YES. No matter how much our misguided brothers in so-called independent homelands blow their bugles, the hard facts of the matter are that the vast majority of their people reject their quasi independence as much as we do.

Attending one of Chief Buthelezi's mass rallies is to undergo an emotional experience, said one of the listeners during the Conference, when Chief Buthelezi said, "Pause, just one minute, hold your breath even, and hear what I say." The tent was full to its capacity but one could hear a pin dropping, and he said, "If Black South Africa rejects the tricameral arrangement, it must not do so negatively. As we step out to annihilate the tricameral arrangement, we must do so with a banner before us spelling out alternatives. We in Inkatha and KwaZulu as KwaZulu should take a further decisive step along the road we enunciated when we established the Buthelezi Commission."

We regard no force for liberation as our enemy, our enemies are those who oppress all Blacks, but we in this country have to face the fact that the External Mission's prime objective is to establish themselves as a future Government in this country. They will attempt to prolong the struggle for

as long as it is necessary to do so. They are ideological puritans along Marxist lines. Ideological considerations are very secondary and pragmatism comes first. The struggle as we wage it inside the country is for an open just society and the equality of opportunity that we will find in it. The people here where the real battle is fought wage a struggle to establish a new South Africa in which there is the greatest prospect of not only banishing political oppression but also of banishing poverty, want and disease. The hard realities of the South African situation dictate that we have a political victory that does not destroy the economic base in the country.

Not only will violence be escalated across our borders but the ANC's mission in exile's attempt to foster turbulence in the country is going to be used yet again by the Government to justify political brutality inside the country. To these fountains of turbulence we

can see a compounding and contributory factor being shaped up by the prime actors of the 1976 violence scene who are now again embarking on exactly the same strategies and tactics which failed so dismally during that period.

After more than three hours, without any break, the President said, "I will serve the nation to the last drop of my blood . . ." and as a son of Africa dedicated to the liberation of African people, he said, "We will not promise people a Utopia. What we do now will place us in good stead even after liberation. We have seen through the experience of Africa that freedom does not turn any country overnight into an El Dorado. The new South Africa for which we struggle today can only mean much to us, if we emerge from oppression able to deal with poverty, destitution and the ignorance in which we as a people are trapped."

KWAZULU RECEIVES DROUGHT DONATION



Minister of Health and Welfare, the Hon. Dr D.R.B. Madide.

When accepting the donation for drought relief from Maizecor in Pretoria on 16 June 1983, the Honourable Minister of Health and Welfare, KwaZulu, Dr. D.R.B.

Madide said, "We thank the Almighty that in the last few days there has been some rains in most of the affected parts. Whilst we are very grateful indeed for this rain,

and whilst very considerable relief indeed will be experienced, it must nevertheless be emphasized that these rains will not make such difference to the damage that has already been done."

During the last planting season there was total crop failure. Our farmers reaped nothing. No mealies, no beans, no pumpkins no melons. All of you know that an estimated 70% of our population lives in the rural areas and eke out a precarious existence as peasant farmers. These farmers are at a subsistence level, which means they plant for the pot.

There have been many schemes in my area to encourage people to engage in enlightened farming methods. These schemes are promoted mainly by our Department of Agriculture and by our Bureau of Community Development. People have been encouraged among other things to grow vegetables and to keep poultry

both for its meat and for eggs. All these self-help schemes are in keeping with Inkatha's philosophy of self-help and self-reliance, he said.

Our approach to development has been one of attacking basic human needs such as starvation, ignorance and disease at grass-roots level. Our hospitals and clinics had begun to report a noticeable decline in the incidence of the more severe cases of malnutrition such as kwashiorkor and marasmus.

All of us feel that the drought has negated many years of patient health education, community development effort and self-help. Crop failure denuded grazing and livestock loss is driving our people almost to the brink of disaster.

This donation from Maizecor will therefore fulfil a really very sorely felt need. It will also be most immediately appreciated as mielies is our staple diet. The way your

company has responded to the clarion call for help will always be remembered as a sign of an affirmation of a broad South Africanism which recognizes everybody as a neighbour irrespective of superficial differences.

We have set aside a sum of R6 million to provide increased employment opportunities just to enable people to earn a little money to buy food. They work at community projects, he said.

Concluding his address, the Honourable Minister said, "We are also spending a lot of money to drill and equip boreholes so that there are permanent sources of clean potable water. Our Department of Agriculture is also procuring bales of hay and making them available to stock farmers to make up for the scarcity of grazing. In this respect the response of local White farmers has been most heartening.

ONE COMMON SOUTH AFRICAN NATIONALISM

We have to admit that the new mood of reform is the result of an interplay between moral and strategic considerations. Seen from a strategic point of view the mood of reform is inspired by acceptance of the fact that South Africa cannot afford a polarization of the races.

An African — Afrikaner relationship is a natural and real need, which would transform the peoples, nations and races of Southern Africa into a co-operating economic and political community.

Admittedly, polarization does exist and is exacerbated by the fact that the colour bar links up with class consciousness. It should be obvious to any observer that if a society is structured in such a way that the rightful aspirations of a specific group cannot be accommodated, conflict is bound to arise.

The fact of the matter is that Black and Brown South Africans have become a power group and a force to be reckoned with.

When one talks about change in South Africa one must remember that the ideology of apartheid has created a strong — albeit false — sense of security among many whites. Blacks could play a fundamental role in stimulating a better climate of understanding and creating a positive public opinion. Whites and Blacks should co-operate in the dismantling of stereotyped images.

The possibility of reform and the difficulty of reform arise from the existence of powerful forces determined to preserve the status quo more or less as it is on one hand, and of powerful forces determined to make fundamental changes in it through revolutionary

means if necessary.

There is black nationalism and Afrikaner nationalism. Black nationalism views Africans as indigenous and preponderant in numbers. On the other hand, we have Afrikaner nationalism which views Afrikaner as the only legitimate people to rule South Africa. This kind of sectionalism will never solve the problems of South Africa. Both black nationalism and Afrikaner nationalism as ethnic nationalisms are in paradigmatic crisis with regard to the South African society.

An exploratory meeting aimed at assessing prospects of continual meetings between the Inkatha Youth Brigade Executive and the Afrikaanse Studentebond (ASB) Executive was held on the 30th of June and 1st of July in Pretoria. This is due to the fact that Inkatha

believes in dialogue with the belief that South Africa belongs to Blacks and Whites of this country, even after liberation. However, this exercise has earned Inkatha the wrath of some black organizations and individuals. Inkatha Youth Brigade does this as a policy and hoping that the ASB will contribute through dialogue and otherwise towards change in South Africa.

Inkatha Youth Brigade approached ASB with open mind that there are non-negotiables, and that mutual trust and change will take an evolutionary process — not overnight. On the question of common nationalism for South Africa, a divergence of opinions loomed, and Inkatha Youth quickly presented ASB with copies of Inkatha's Statement of belief.

Ultimately, it was agreed that ASB would not abuse Inkatha or attempt to score mileage, and to launch a joint committee which will look at the possibilities of launching a joint product — orientated projects of a short and long term nature, such as establishing libraries in needy schools, winter school classes for matriculants in maths and science and bursaries to needy students.

It was realised that working in

joint groups instead of black versus white, would enhance better future understanding and mutual relations. Without understanding and mutual respect between blacks and whites of South Africa, reforms of any nature would be futile. In building our new South Africa, Africans and Afrikaners should first find each other in one common South Africa.

It must however, be clear that cultivating such a common South African nationalism is not an easy thing to tackle. However, one may suggest that in our process of reformation, we must liberate, first of all the concept of just constitution, which is the cornerstone of democracy, then constitutional nationalism becomes possible. There must be a constitution which will, inter alia, guarantee the rights of individuals and groups of all races. The present constitutional reforms under P.W. Botha's regime is devoid of such fundamental values.

Constitutional issues arise more properly when we come to consider the necessity of black representation leading to black presence in the process of making law.

One must consider that everyone has duties to the community in which alone the free and full

development of his personality is possible. In the exercise of one's rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to such limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic society.

It should be clear that the alternative in South Africa is either to talk with the Government or to fight with the Government. Those who refuse to talk, but don't go to the bush either, are inconsistent, hypocritical and or cowardly. The dialogue between Inkatha Youth, Polstu, ASB and Die Maties also between Inkatha Think-Tank and the Nationalist Party top members (no longer existing) and the advent of the Buthelezi Commission is indeed an endeavour to seek that common South African patriotism and a just and equal opportunity society.

South Africa is a microcosm of the world's most challenging problems, her people should talk and act realistically. We must grapple with the realities of our country, not an emotive terminology and Utopian talks.

KWAZULU POTENTIAL MINING DEVELOPMENT

The following account provides a brief description of the geology of the KwaZulu area and reviews the economic mineral potential in relation to the major geological sub-divisions of the country.

It cannot be claimed that KwaZulu has untold mineral wealth easily available for immediate pickings. What it does have is a stable political climate and mining legislation favourable to the investor. In KwaZulu the additional outlay is slowly bearing fruit and it is probable that several new mines will come into operation in the near future. Coal exploration has been particularly successful in the

Nongoma — Hlabisa area.

Recent research by academic institutions and mining companies has led to a better understanding of structural and other controls of ore genesis in volcanosedimentary terrains which should lead to the discovery of base-metal sulphides in this environment. Granite intrusives into greenstones and associated metasediments may

well have generated deposits of tin, tungsten and molybdenum. Hydrothermal gold mineralisation is characteristic of similar geological setting and these seem to be real promise for small-scale gold-mining operations, in the Nkandla area.

The foregoing and many other types of mineral occurrences in the country provide a good basis for the growth of a healthy mining industry in KwaZulu.

Mineral Occurrences

There is a conspicuous abundance of mineral showings in the Tugela River valley and in the Nondweni area of Nquthu District that justifies a great deal more attention than has been given to these deposits in the past. In the environs of Nkandla, low-order pyrite-gold-uranium mineralisation occurs in polymictic conglomerate, known as Dickson's Reef, and in grit layers of the Nsuze Group. Dickson's Reef was worked at Vuleka Mine west of Nkandla, at Speedwell Mine south of Ntingwe and at the Gem Mine north-west of Nkandla. Gold fields of South Africa is currently exploring the area for gold mineralisation in the "reef" in the Nkandla area.

Kynite is found south of Nkandla in interlayered kaolinite-kyanite schist beds in ferruginous phyllite and quartz-sericite schist of the Nsuze Group. Kynite constitutes between 25 and 35% of the host rock and is contained in steeply dipping layers 20-50 metres wide.

The Mlalazi Complex east of Eshowe locally contains significant copper-nickel values but no oregrade sulphides have yet been located however, the search continues. Ultrabasic and syenite bodies in Mhlathuze River valley north-east of Nkandla respectively contain minor nickel and copper mineralisation.

At the Enterprise and Sisters mines near Nondweni in the Nquthu District, gold was recovered from quartz veins in basic volcanic units, at Dumisa Mine 35km west

of Scottburgh, Umzinto District. At Nongoma-Hlabisa area, the coal field extends from north-west of Nongoma in a southerly direction to south-west of Hlabisa. As a result of the structurally complex geology, the anthracite is distributed in 16 individual reserve blocks. Coal also occurs in the Emakwezini Formation to the east of the Mfolozi and Hluhluwe Game Reserves in an area stretching from south of the Mfolozi River northwards to a locality immediately south of the Hluhluwe River.

The coal horizons in the Newcastle-Dannhauser are associated with arenaceous sediments of the Vryheid Formation. In Ladysmith area, coal seams measuring up to one metre in thickness occur in the arenaceous sequence of the Vryheid Formation in an area from east of Ladysmith eastwards towards Pomeroy.

Fluorite is found in northerly striking quartz veins associated with the acid volcanic phase of the Lebombo Group. The fluorite is generally of a high quality, but because of the intimate intergrowth of quartz and fluorite, beneficiation is difficult.

Gypsum is found in Tertiary clays near Ngebevu north of Greytown. Small isolated lens-like deposits of kieselguhr occur under cover of calcareous and siliceous sands in the Mbazwana and Lake Sibayi areas.

The future outlook of KwaZulu in relation to potential mining development is considered to be good. Clearly the resources of anthracite

and bituminous coal are the best known and most immediately available for exploitation. The heavy mineral beach sands fall in a similar category and await recovery of the steel industry. There is the strong belief that the better understanding of volcano-sedimentary deposits in remobilised terrain will lead to the discovery of massive sulphide and other deposits and there is no doubt that the vast and widespread resources of construction materials will be brought into use in the near future.

At present uranium prices, the Denny Dalton gold-uranium reserves are not economically viable. If, as is generally predicted, the uranium price increases substantially this mine may once again come into production. The anticipated price increase will provide added incentives for deeper exploration which may well add substantially to proven reserves. The quarries south of Empangeni and east of Nkwaleni are the only producers of the good quality aggregate for road-base, paving and concrete-mix. A steadily growing market exists in the Empangeni — Richards Bay complex. In the Durban metropolitan area most of the existing quarries are rapidly being depleted and it is anticipated that within the next 10 years several new quarries will be developed within the adjoining areas of KwaZulu. These should be monitored properly otherwise this asset may easily be over-exploited.

STRICT KWAZULU POLICY TO PROTECT FORESTS

News from the KwaZulu Bureau of Natural Resources

By Mr. B. Marshal
Nature Conservationist Officer

KwaZulu is often described as a land of rolling hills and lush forests. In fact the indigenous forests of KwaZulu used to number well over 200. These ranged from small forests of a few hectares in mountain catchments to large forests such as the well known Manguzi, Malangeni and Gwalaweni forests in Maputaland.

However, a recent survey has shown that 80% of the indigenous forests proclaimed between 1942 and 1952 have been chopped out totally or so damaged that they will never recover. This disappearance is due to the increasing pressures for combustible wood and for agricultural land and even as you read this, the destruction of forest trees, some of which are hundreds of years old continues.

This is alarming since forests exercise considerable control over



patterns of climate and the water cycle. The destruction of forests leads to the drying up of once perennial springs. In the present drought situation this factor alone must give rise for concern. However forests are also a source of valuable products such as medicines and wild fruits and if developed as tourist attractions, they could ensure a source of income for the local people.

With these facts in mind the KwaZulu Government's Bureau of Natural Resources is forced to adopt a strict policy with regard to

forest protection. KwaZulu's Conservation Act makes provisions for the protection of almost all trees and plants. This means in effect that there are people daily violating KwaZulu's laws when they cut down trees for one purpose or another. This does not mean that it is the intention of the Bureau to prosecute all people found making use of indigenous trees. The primary aim of the Bureau of Natural Resources is to manage KwaZulu's fauna and flora in the best interests of the Nation. If individuals wantonly ignore the interests of the Nation as a whole, they should not expect leniency.

Recently some people have been charged in the law courts for destroying protected trees. This is unfortunate, but necessary if our beautiful and valuable forest are to be maintained for the use and enjoyment of future generations.