

GOVERNMENT CREATED POLITICAL BODIES

Bantustans

THE BANTUSTAN POLICY, perhaps sooner than has always been anticipated by its black opponents in South Africa and abroad, began to crystallise in 1974. In 1974 and 1975 certain developments can be singled out which had the profound effect of making the Bantustan policy sound more accomplished:—

there was more definite planning with the Transkei for the “independence” of that territory;

there were new developments regarding South Africa at the United Nations.

the South African Foreign Affairs Department developed a much more outgoing diplomatic African policy.

By and large these events have given rise to intense debate and speculation in South Africa about the course of events over the next few years. On the one hand protagonists of the Bantustan policy are capitalising on the “gains” and claim that with more time their policy will be seen to be working. On the other hand those who are opposed to the Bantustan policy argue that the so-called gains are gimmicks calculated to buy more time for the South African Government which is being overtaken by events in nearby countries.

The Transkei Independence Question

The announcement of independence plans for 1976 by the Transkei's Chief Matanzima had three immediate results. The first was the disturbance of the fraternity of Bantustan leaders whose agreed strategy

had been to reject independence until the Government was prepared to grant more land to the homelands and that no individual Bantustan leader would bargain alone with Pretoria without consulting the others. The disappointment of other homeland leaders was expressed in the statements by homeland leaders, first by Gatsha Buthelezi who expressed regret that the "Transkei brother's" decision to go it alone had broken the "Black Solidarity" forged in 1973 at the Umtata meeting of homeland leaders;¹ and second by Collins Ramusi's blunt accusation that the Transkei Chief Minister had "betrayed" his fellow homeland leaders. The importance of the Matanzima move to the South African Nationalist Party Government was underlined by Premier Vorster's public thanking of the Transkei Chief Minister for his "statesmanship".²

The second was the apparent sharp reaction that came from White opposition politicians who had apparently regarded the whole question of independence for Bantustans as a matter for the distant future. The main fear expressed by Whites was what independence for Bantustans would mean. The points raised by the United Party election candidate for Umzinto, George Bartlett in his campaign speech are probably most significant. He said, "Sovereign independence means seats in the United Nations for eight Bantu homelands. It means the freedom to make whatever alliances with whatever nations a Bantustan may choose. It means the bringing of our northern border to the back door of Durban. It means every African working at Amanzimtoti will be a foreigner with no allegiance to South Africa and no right to the products of the wealth generated by his labour in white areas, other than his wages".

He went on, "Don't believe the propaganda that these States will be peaceful to South Africa because they are economically dependant upon White South Africa—who would have thought 12 months ago that the Arab states would hold the whole Western world to ransom with their oil. How long would we last if black South Africa aided by some foreign State, denied us the black labour for our factories, cane fields, and gold mines—only serious trouble for the future of the White man can result from this policy".

The third was that of black opponents of the system expressed by SASO General Secretary, Mr. Tami Zani in a special interview. Mr. Zani felt that Matanzima was carrying the Bantustan policy across a political Rubicon, "certainly without remarkable gain for the black people as a whole, but only supplying South Africa with more diplomatic ammunition to cheat the world into accepting separate development and its multinational policy as a living fact to reckon with."

He supported the belief that the Government was attempting to transform the African population into inhabitants of underdeveloped "countries" thereby shattering any hopes they might have had of a more equitable share in the economy they had helped to develop. He

warned that the dangerous significance of these independence moves was that they nullified the efforts of the whole black struggle from 1910 up to date, where Blacks had been saying they were not consulted when the whites formed an alliance in government in 1910 and further went on to pass Acts allocating a certain percentage of land to the Blacks, dictating even the terms of use of that land. Today Blacks were ready to sign that, as ethnic groups, they were entitled to only certain portions of the unfairly allocated total percentage of land for Africans.

The South African Students' Organisation, and the Black People's Convention have always been known to be some of those organisations which unconditionally reject the Bantustan policy and the role that its black proponents play in society, which attitude has undoubtedly earned them very little popularity with Bantustan leaders.

South Africa and the United Nations

In view of the uncomfortable situation of the South African delegation at the United Nations over the years and the repeated jabs at the validity of the delegation's credentials to the world body, the South African Government decided to revise its strategy regarding the United Nations. The Government included in their United Nations delegation for 1974 three observers in the persons of the Transkei's Chief Kaizer Matanzima, Dr. M. B. Naidoo, a member of the Executive Committee of the South African Indian Council and Mr. D. R. Ulster, a tutor at a teacher training school.

The names of these people were announced in Parliament by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr. Hilgard Muller, on the 10th September 1974 in response to the United Party's Japie Basson, who said, amongst other things, that the "multinational character of South Africa should be soundly reflected at the United Nations and in all international forums where our country is officially represented".

He went on to relate his experience at the U.N. in 1973, that he was confronted by someone who charged that S.A. claimed to be a multinational state, yet one did not see the other South African nations that the Government always talked about. "For the sake of credibility, and also, of course, for the sake of good foreign policy, we believe that it has become imperative for us to present a multinational South African front where and whenever we appear on the international stage".³

The Minister continued and informed Parliament that the idea of including a Bantustan representative had come with Mr. M. C. Botha, Minister of Bantu Administration and Development; together with whom they went to discuss the matter with Matanzima, who then requested that he be the one to go the U.N.⁴ He also observed that this opportunity would be useful to Mr. Matanzima in view of the current independence negotiations for the Transkei.

“The development of a mixed commission for a U.N. delegation, and the subsequently announced plans for posting Blacks at overseas Diplomatic and Information missions is opening yet another page in ‘the task sheet’ for the Bantustans and their frontrunners, that of maintaining a full time ‘cooling system’ for the South African Government in the hot international diplomatic chamber”, remarked the Acting President of South African Students’ Organisation, Rev. Gwebele-ntlanzi Mposelwa.

Banning Powers Bestowed on Bantustans:

In the South African Parliament in Cape Town, the Department of Bantu Administration and Development introduced a bill which turned out to be very controversial and also remarkable in so far as the Bantustan development is concerned. Most of the 10 clauses of the Bill dealt with minor administrative matters. The most controversial of the lot were clauses one and ten which dealt with security matters. Clause 1 dealt specifically with the Transkei. It sought to empower the Transkei Legislative Assembly to take action, where necessary, against organisations presenting danger to public safety, public peace, order and good administration. Which means that a Bantustan Government could legislate for the prohibition of any organisation which it did not like i.e. it could be a political, social, cultural, religious or business organisation. The clause went on to provide that the Transkei Government could prohibit the membership of such an organisation, prohibit the furtherance of the objects of any such organisation and it may restrict or prohibit any African being an office bearer of any such organisation. It may further legislate for the restriction of any African to a particular place or area. These provisions also embody the prohibitions of the publication or dissemination of the contents of any speech, utterance, statement or writing by any African that the Bantustan Government so legislates against. This would apply not necessarily to a person who is a member of a prohibited organisation but to any individual who, in the opinion of the authorities, makes utterances which are against “good government”.

Clause 10 sought to arm the rest of other Bantustan Governments with the same prohibition powers as offered the Transkei by Clause 1. The Bantustans could do this in agreement with the Minister or Deputy Minister of Bantu Administration and Development only. The Minister claimed that he had been approached by certain Bantustan Governments with requests for such powers as have been described above. The reaction of the other Bantustans to the debate of this Bill will be dealt with under the discussion of the various Bantustans below. But it might be worth mentioning that as far as could be established, the Transkei and the Ciskei had spearheaded the request for the Security Bill.

This Bill went through all stages of Parliament with strong opposition from the non-government parties. The main opposition points were that such a law was not necessary because the country was under no emergency; that the Government was entitled to ask its legislature for powers of this kind for a limited period in times of war or national emergency. In the case of the Transkei there was in operation for almost 15 years Proclamation 400, which was introduced in 1960 as an emergency measure. Under this Proclamation, it was explained by the Progressive Party's Mrs. Suzman⁵, all meetings are unlawful unless they are authorised by the Bantu Commissioner, with the exception, of course, of church services, funerals, meetings of statutory bodies and bonafide sports organisations. There are powers to prohibit entry into any area and there are powers to prohibit departure from any area. Any chief authorised by the Minister can order any African to move with members of his household, with livestock and movable property from a place within the area of jurisdiction of such a chief to any other place specified by such chief, permanently or for a specified period. He can order the demolition of any hut or dwelling owned by such African without incurring liability for compensation. He can impose fines of up to R100, or four head of large stock or 20 head of small stock or up to three months' imprisonment. All these are powers which had already been given to the Transkei. The opposition feeling then was that extra powers given under this Second Bantu Laws Amendments Bill would lead to further erosion of the rule of law. It was felt that such powers would encourage Bantustan Governments to obliterate all forms of opposition and create enforced one party "States". This sort of argument held for both clauses 1 and 10 which empowered the Transkei especially and the other Bantustans as well with similar security measures.

The New South African Policy on Africa

The success of the African liberation movements in Portuguese African territories followed by the resultant military coup in Portugal itself gave rise to concern in South African defence and diplomatic circles. Beside the general diplomatic impetus launched by S.A. as a result of the African attitude at the United Nations, a special effort at opening a reasonably serious debate with Black Africa on the Southern African question was seen as a priority need.

In the course of these events, more and more countries became interested in South African internal politics and its attitude to the whole changing face of Southern African political geography. It is in this regard that people like the Bantustan leaders assumed the role of being roving diplomats from one country to another. In many cases it was observable that the trips of people like Gatsha Buthelezi and

Lennox Sebe to African and European countries whether they were arranged by the South African Dept. of Information or by the respective hosting Governments, did have a lot of influence on the international attitude towards South Africa. A typical case of this nature was the visit by the Kwa-Zulu Chief Buthelezi to Liberia by invitation from President Bill Tolbert (Jnr), for the latter to get first-hand information on the situation in South Africa. Chief Buthelezi, amongst other things, highlighted the plight of drop-out black students who had been expelled from S. African tribal universities. An example was made of the young Ndamse couple, who both had had to seek work for lack of opportunities to further their studies in South Africa.

These two were promptly offered scholarships and money for travel given to Buthelezi to facilitate matters for them to be able to join the Liberian University which was to open at the beginning of March.

Soon after Chief Buthelezi's return from Liberia, Premier John Vorster was reported to have visited Liberia; and his visit, claimed Mr. Gibson Thula, Buthelezi's key man on the Witwatersrand, had no connection with Buthelezi's own trip earlier on. The whole thing was supposed to be a sheer coincidence.

Another notable feature in 1974 and 1975 was the increased dialogue between the Bantustan leaders and the Central Government. In the meeting held it was also observable that there was an increasing number of demands by the Bantustan leaders for more rights for urban Blacks, release of political prisoners, scrapping of job reservation, influx control and bannings etc.

1975 so far has shown little reason for people to change their traditional attitude to Bantustans; although some observers do suggest that the S.A. Government is likely to honour some of their demands, so as to keep the Bantustan leaders within reach, for it has come to realise how much of an asset they can be in foreign relations.

Internally, within the ranks of the Bantustan leaders themselves, tensions have flared up between some individuals, whereas in some cases, relations have remained normal. The question of a federation of Bantustans has not been raised much lately, and it is believed that the unhappy exchanges between people like Chief Matanzima of the Transkei and Mr. Sebe of the Ciskei over amalgamation and disputed land might retard progress in the matter. On April 23rd, Chief Buthelezi was reported to have claimed that a Transkei Cabinet Minister and an Urban Representative Mr. Mdingi had visited parts of Kwa-Zulu in the South Coast in an attempt at getting these people to secede in favour of the Transkei. They are said to have been promised high posts in the Transkei if they agreed. Gatsha did not take kindly to this information. Matanzima denied any knowledge of this incident. The Bantu Administration and Development Minister, M. C. Botha, con-

firmed that Transkei had made representations for the inclusion of part of Kwa-Zulu on to the territory. The area concerned was near Harding and formed part of Kwa-Zulu. "However seeing that the area concerned forms part of a homeland, namely Kwa-Zulu, it is in the first place a matter between the Transkei and Kwa-Zulu", said Mr. Botha. This incident also augured deterioration of relations between the two neighbouring Bantustans. The Transkei Cabinet Minister concerned Chief Ndabankulu, Minister of Roads and Works, however admitted that he had visited the Harding area to sound opinion on the possibility of secession.

General Matters Relating to Bantustans on the Whole

In carrying out the Bantustan policy to its logical conclusion, the South African Government has been trying to identify each and every African in the country with one Bantustan or the other. While it has not been too difficult to relate African people in the rural villages to specific defined "homelands", it has been extremely difficult trying to convince people who have stayed in an urban township without any contacts in any rural settlement for all their lives, that in fact their homes are not in the urban area but in a particular Bantustan. In the light of the continued herding of people from White areas to Bantustans it might be interesting to note the domicile of the majority of the Africans in South Africa.

It has not been possible to acquire current figures of adult citizens of each Bantustan domiciled in and outside the Bantustan. However, the following population census results of 1970 which relate to place of enumeration were furnished by the Minister of Statistics in reply to a question in Parliament⁶:—

<i>Tribe</i>	INSIDE BANTUSTAN			OUTSIDE BANTUSTAN			
	<i>Male</i>	<i>Female</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>Male</i>	<i>Female</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>Ratio</i>
Bapedi	97 860	234 980	332 840	202 340	145 460	347 800	1:1
Bashoeshoe	3 120	5 720	8 840	265 400	296 220	561 620	1:63
Tsonga	20 600	61 880	82 480	107 700	86 240	193 940	1:2
Tswana	79360	127 360	206 720	252 520	24 520	497 940	1:2
Venda	21 680	74 900	96 580	41 380	22 400	63 780	1:0.6
Swazi	11 260	17 580	28 840	81 160	83 440	164 600	1:6
Zulu	283 000	527 140	810 140	483 400	423 000	609 400	1:1
Xhosa	289 440	579 700	869 140	543 920	355 560	899 480	1:1

Also furnished in the table given above are the ratios of people staying inside the Bantustans to those staying outside. The figures given above do not reflect the true picture of numbers of Africans domiciled inside and outside the rural Bantustans because there are huge urban townships accommodating thousands of people, which are

administered as part of whatever Bantustans occur nearest the townships. Below are given the estimated numbers of Africans living in some of the townships referred to above⁷:

	<i>Male Adult</i>	<i>Female Adult</i>	<i>Children under 18 years</i>
Zwelitsha	5313	5557	15625
Mdantsane	19148	23776	41911
Umlazi	43564	35280	66412
Ntuzuma	714	857	2086
KwaMashu	50691	40254	80000
Imbali	3191	3974	7748
Ezakheni	1956	2002	3958
Sundumbili	1541	1239	2908
Seshego	8608	7595	14429
Mabopane	7530	12950	40720
Ga-Rankua	16257	14157	33494
Temba	3560	3544	8402

The total adult population of the above townships forms 18.4% of the total number of Africans supposed to be living inside the Bantustans. It should be noted also that there are other townships of the same category as these, whose population statistics were not available. It is generally expected that more townships will be incorporated into Bantustans.

There has been noted pressure on Blacks to apply for citizenship certificates of Bantustans. Increasingly it is becoming difficult for people to acquire houses in Bantustan townships for occupation or even lodgers' permits, without the required citizenship certificates. In spite of this pressure there has been no remarkably fast rate of applications for the certificates. The numbers of certificates of citizenship which had been issued by September 1974, to "citizens" of some Bantustans are given below:—

Kwa-Zulu	316724
Venda	42402
Bophutha-Tswana	33608
Gazankulu	50756
Basotho Qwaqwa	32447
Lebowa	155919
Ciskei	36519

The general observation with respect to most people talked to is that the reason for the apparent reluctance to apply for the certificates is that people fear to be committed to one Bantustan or the other, lest it restricts their scope of economic livelihood.

The South African Government, mostly through the Bantustan leaders and officers of agencies like the Bantu Investment Corporation, and the Xhosa Development Corporation has embarked on an intensified campaign to interest South African and foreign businesses in investing in the Bantustans.

The Minister of Bantu Administration and Development reported in Parliament, August, 1974, on how many firms, South African and foreign had established undertakings in each Bantustan:—

	<i>S.A.</i>	<i>Foreign</i>
Bophutha-Tswana	54	3
Kwa-Zulu	17	3
Lebowa	8	1
Basotho Qwaqwa	1	—
Gazankulu	3	1
Venda	2	1
Swazi	1	—
Transkei	22	2
Ciskei	8	—

The total number of Africans that were employed by all these firms in all the Bantustans were given as follows:

South African Firms	—	11249
Foreign Firms	—	2195.

The total financial commitments of white entrepreneurs with whom contractual agreements had been concluded by August, 1974 in regard to the establishment of industries on an agency basis at particular growth points in the Bantustans were as follows⁸:—

Babelegi	(Bophutha-Tswana)	—	R18,265,000
Isithebe	(Kwa-Zulu)	—	890,000
Seshego	(Lebowa)	—	2,180,000
Letaba	(Gazankulu)	—	290,000
Butterworth	(Transkei)	—	8,803,000
Witziesshoek	(Basotho Qwaqwa)	—	86,000
Umtata	(Transkei)	—	574,000

Expenditure figures given in August 1974 as well as by Government agencies at growth points in Bantustans were as follows:—

<i>Government</i>	<i>Industrial Townships</i>	<i>Water Schemes</i>	<i>Electricity Supplies</i>	<i>Housing for Whites</i>	<i>Transport Subsidization</i>
S.A. Bantu Trust	nil	Babelegi R83,023 Isithebe R108,373 Butterworth	Isithebe R3,927,33	nil	R1,396
Transkei	nil	R1,688,463	nil	nil	nil
Bophutha-Tswana	R1,923,525	R196,932	R44,826	nil	nil
Basotho Qwa-Qwa	R221,730	R55,170	R292,256	nil	nil

Bantu Investment Corporation:

Babelegi	R547,615	R75,292	R17,631	nil	nil
Witziesshoek	nil	nil	R3,800	R40,000	nil
Isithebe	R2,800,247	R112,451	R629,381	nil	nil
Seshego	R78,345	R107	nil	nil	nil

The Bantu Investment Corporation has operations in all the four growth points tabulated above.

Xhosa Development Corporation:

Butterworth	R1,139,992	R213,023	R169,710	R656,822	nil
Umtata	R213,934	R50,147	R21,050	R3,209,811	nil

The Xhosa Development Corporation has operations in all the four growth points tabulated above.

Industrial Development Corporation

nil	nil	nil	Babelegi R1,065,700 Isithebe R865,200	nil
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The following amounts had been spent on each growth point on the erection of factories for leasing to entrepreneurs:—

Babelegi.....	R9,573,397
Witziesshoek.....	54,420
Isithebe.....	1,576,817
Seshego.....	500,463
Letaba.....	557,049
Butterworth.....	4,136,737
Umtata.....	419,036

Agencies like the Bantu Investment Corporation and the Xhosa Development Corporation mainly go on to use whatever factories have been erected for lease by Africans. This, they do supposedly with the intention of letting Africans take them over when the time is ripe.

The number of persons employed by the Corporations, agents established with assistance of Corporations and African loans in all the Bantustans were given as follows:—

Whites.....	508
Coloureds.....	67
Africans.....	15,345

White agencies mainly led by the Bantu Investment Corporation and the Xhosa Development Corporation in partnership with the Bantustan Governments or alone, have embarked on a big production drive to exploit the Bantustan natural resources to the full, in an attempt to raise the hopes for the chance of viability of the territories. According to the figures furnished by the Minister of Bantu Administration and Development on the 18th of October, 1974 in reply to a question in Parliament, Bophutha-Tswana had had the highest value of production. Its total of R36,615,000

has been supported substantially by the mineral production which stands at R25,770,000. The Transkei comes closely second at R36,192,000, with its main production from pastoral and crop farming, which totals R29,492,000.

Below we give the total value of crop, pastoral, industrial, and mineral production for 1973 in each Bantustan, as were given by the Minister in 1974¹⁰:—

GROSS VALUE

Crop Production		Pastoral Production	
	R		R
Transkei.....	13,890,000	Transkei.....	15,602,000
Ciskei.....	1,565,000	Ciskei.....	1,931,000
Kwa-Zulu.....	11,180,000	Kwa-Zulu.....	9,153,000
Basotho-Qwaqwa.....	58,000	Basotho-Qwaqwa.....	90,000
Lebowa.....	7,007,000	Lebowa.....	2,707,000
Venda.....	961,000	Venda.....	744,000
Swazi.....	669,000	Gazankulu.....	909,000
South Ndebele.....	155,000	Swazi	737,000
Bophutha Tswana.....	2,428,000	South Ndebele.....	64,000
Gazankulu.....	985,000	Bophutha Tswana.....	3,020,000

Industrial Production		Mineral Production	
	R		R
Transkei.....	6,663,000	Transkei.....	37,000
Ciskei.....	625,000	Ciskei.....	nil
Kwa-Zulu.....	4,612,000	Kwa-Zulu.....	385,000
Basotho-Qwaqwa.....	121,000	Basotho-Qwaqwa.....	nil
Bophutha-Tswana.....	5,397,000	Bophutha-Tswana.....	25,770,000
Lebowa.....	1,870,000	Lebowa.....	7,517,000
Venda.....	370,000	Venda.....	166,000
Gazankulu.....	541,000	Gazankulu.....	57,000
Swazi.....	129,000	Swazi... ..	nil

The royalties for industrial and mineral production are paid to the South African Government, because these activities are not controlled by the homelands governments. This, therefore, means that in actual fact Bantustans like Bophutha-Tswana which have high mineral production figures, have this money in figures only.

Kwa-Zulu

Land Consolidation

In 1974 the Kwa-Zulu consolidation plan remained difficult to finalise and to put into effect. The giant puzzle released in the 1974 consolidation proposals involved an attempt at putting together 205 pieces of Zululand into six large areas.¹¹ The government proposals envisaged transforming 157 "Black spots" (presently in white areas) and 48

“traditionally” Zulu areas into five major pieces and one smaller portion of homeland, totalling up to 3,364,000 hectares of land. White Natal was to be cut to lie thinly along the coast. It had been estimated that the value of land involved in the massive exchange programme could be as much as R300 million. Kwa-Zulu’s Chief Buthelezi made a strong demand for control of the Zululand coastline and territorial waters. The Chief is reported to have said that his Government had emphasised that even if the Republican Government gave Kwa-Zulu all the land promised under the 1936 Land Act, the land would not be adequate to make Kwa-Zulu a country which could stand on its own.¹²

The Transvaal leader of the Nationalist Party, Dr. Connie Mulder also Minister of Information, had made a hope-dashing statement early in the year to the effect that consolidation of Kwa-Zulu into a single territory was “practically unattainable.”¹³ He said the consolidation of the Bantustan into a single unit would be “an ideal” but that the most that could be hoped for was the gradual creation of a smaller number of units.

Controversy about what kind of consolidation plan would be an acceptable proposal continued in 1974. The Nationalist M.P. for Klip River, Mr. Val Volker, said he was totally opposed to the Kwa-Zulu consolidation proposals for the Helpmekaar area, the Upper Tugela and the Drakensberg locations. He said the proposals were not logical and he would fight them with all the means at his disposal.¹⁴ Bishop Alpheus Zulu, Anglican Bishop of Zululand, talking on Kwa-Zulu said that he was unable “to talk of a Zulu homeland that did not include Durban”.¹⁵ He said that the average man in the Zulu Bantustan had his future so bound up with that of the white man in Durban that the latter could not advance much without the former’s participation. In his statement the Bishop referred to the system of Separate Development as a sad process...by which white people determine where and how black people shall live, in utter disregard of the fact that these human beings cannot be manipulated with impunity.

The consolidation of Kwa-Zulu has always been a thorny problem. In 1973 the Deputy Minister for Bantu Development had said that consolidation would take twelve years. This statement, viewed with the background of Dr. Connie Mulder’s declaration of the complete consolidation of Kwa-Zulu as “practically unattainable”, does create a feeling of confusion in the minds of concerned people.

Asked to comment on the long term consolidation plan of the homeland, the Secretary General of the South African Students’ Organisation, Mr. Tami Zani, said that the whole policy of Bantustans was formulated by the South African Government as a result of the 1960 disturbances, that Dr. Verwoerd introduced the scheme in response to

concern expressed in such speeches as was made by the Acting Cabinet Chairman Sauer (the then Minister of Lands who acted as Cabinet Chairman during Verwoerd's absence after the assassination attempt by Pratt) who urgently called for something to be done about the situation, a change in the Native Policy, which would give the Native a hope for the future. Mr. Zani referred to the Bantustan policy as a brilliant and well-calculated stop-gap in this regard. Hence the consolidation programme itself was meant to take a very long time, to buy enough time for the Government to work out a stronger and more comfortably powerful position from which it could declare a no-compromise attitude.

Twelve farms on the southern bank of the Umfolozi River near Ulundi were reported incorporated into Kwa-Zulu early in 1975.¹⁶ Mr. J. C. C. Botha, Nat M.P. for Eshowe reporting the move, announced also that the Bantu Trust lands of Strangersrest and Koningdaal will in turn become white areas. This would then change the Kwa-Zulu border from the Umfolozi River in the Ulundi area to the proposed Vryheid/Richards Bay Road. It was reported that two farms in the Mkize area, Ipiwa and Bacha, would probably be incorporated into Kwa-Zulu. It was also proposed to include the Makatini flats and Jozini Dam into Kwa-Zulu at a later stage, although Sordwana would remain white.

Constitutional Development

In 1974-5 the heads of departments in the Kwa-Zulu Government retained the status of Councillor, pending general elections. The Zulu Government had been resisting general elections until such time that all Kwa-Zulu citizens had acquired citizenship certificates. The Zulu administration is reported to have accused the South African Government of delaying the processing of the certificates. They insisted on using the certificates in the registration of voters, instead of pass books which had been used in other homelands. They charge that using reference books will be accepting the pass laws.

The 1973 manoeuvres by the former Chairman of the Kwa-Zulu Legislative Assembly, Chief Charles Hlengwa, to set up an opposition Umkonto ka Shaka Party appeared more or less quiet in the past year. This seems to have given Chief Gatsha Buthelezi enough time to work out what kind of political structures he wants to see develop in Kwa-Zulu. The Johannesburg supporters of the Zulu monarch, Goodwill Zwelitini, who are also followers of the Buthelezi administration started a movement which Chief Buthelezi wants to promote as a mass organisation for Kwa-Zulu. A few individuals staying in Soweto came together sometime in 1972, to organise some kind of entertainment and good reception for King Zwelitini when he visited the Witwatersrand. This group later formed themselves into a standing committee for the

reception of Kwa-Zulu dignatories. According to information received from a key member of the committee, Gatsha Buthelezi suggested that they call it Inkatha ka Zulu, a name signifying Zulu Union; a name which had been used by King Solomon in the 1920's for an association whose aim was to promote Zulu economic development and cultural advancement. Chief Gatsha wanted this name revived, and that Inkatha ka Zulu must be made a mass organisation for the Zulu people all over South Africa. Observers believe that this organisation may be made into a governing party of Kwa-Zulu, and probably succeed as the only party that everybody belongs to.

In Kwa-Zulu there is yet another organisation called UBhoko. This organisation comprises the key people in leadership roles of all aspects of life, from all over Natal. They meet regularly to discuss current affairs, and can make recommendations to the Kwa-Zulu Government on what direction to take in solution of problems.

Business and Finance

Chief Gatsha Buthelezi of Kwa-Zulu announced that his government would present a budget of R64,5 million for the financial year 1974. He explained that the bulk of the money would come from the South African Government and that Kwa-Zulu had raised R14 million from its own sources. In a breakdown of the estimates, Chief Buthelezi said a total of R6,72 million had been raised from general tax, an increase of R1,47 million over 1973.¹⁷

Prospects of investments in Kwa-Zulu by outside companies improved in 1974. Chief Buthelezi continued to call on industrialists, foreign and local, to invest in the territory. The Metro Cash and Carry in association with B.I.C. moved into Kwa-Zulu in a deal that could have far reaching implications for all Bantustans. Metro would also undertake the training of Africans in all aspects of wholesaling, through its Afmark School of Business.¹⁸

Gatsha Buthelezi said that he had accepted a 50% partnership for Kwa-Zulu in a sales company to be formed by one of the largest manufacturers in the world of commodities like lanterns and heaters. He was also offered directorship in Chalwyn Kwa-Zulu Sales. The company had so far invested R340,000. Chalwyn (Kwa-Zulu) Pty. Ltd. was the first company to bear the name of the territory and would eventually become a R1 million manufacturing business, and would employ about 5,000 people. It was thought likely that the company would make R250,000 a year in profits. The sales company would make approximately R100,000 a year which would mean R50,000 a year for Kwa-Zulu.

Commenting on investments Chief Gatsha said, "Build your factories in Kwa-Zulu, then you will be helping us to help ourselves, and

we assure you that your investment will be safe". Chalwyn's products would bear the stamp—*made in Kwa-Zulu*.¹⁹

GENERAL ISSUES:

The Buthelezi—Dladla Quarrel

Unity in the Kwa-Zulu Cabinet was badly threatened in 1974, when the Chief Executive Councillor Gatsha Buthelezi and the Executive Councillor for Community Affairs, Barney Dladla clashed openly in Kwa-Zulu. It was hinted at by a Durban newspaper, *Ilanga*, that it had developed over matters of community development and the role the Bantu Investment Corporation should play in Kwa-Zulu.²⁰

The issue came into the open when the two men clashed in the Assembly in May 1974, during the debate on a letter criticising Gatsha and lauding the role played by Dladla in Kwa-Zulu politics.²¹ Mr. Dladla had been mediator between Durban striking workers and the employers, a role which won him a lot of support from the people. It was therefore seen as a heavy blow for Barney Dladla when it was suggested that it must be the Urban Representative of Kwa-Zulu, Solomon Ngobese, and not Barney Dladla who was to negotiate on behalf of workers. Explaining this move, which offended Mr. Dladla, the Chairman of Inkatha KaZulu in the Witwatersrand, Dr. S. H. Nyembezi said that the action could be justified logically in that Mr. Dladla was a high executive in the Kwa-Zulu administration, and that lesser figures should be the ones that get involved with the heat and dust of worker politics, and that it would be ill-fitting for Kwa-Zulu to allow a Cabinet Minister's dignity to be placed at stake.

Later when the Assembly was asked to raise hands to show its loyalty to its Chief Councillor, Buthelezi, Barney Dladla did likewise, when each Cabinet Minister was asked to "unequivocally and categorically" state his allegiance. Mr. Dladla merely said that he dissociated himself from the contents of the controversial letter, which he described as false:²² The letter is the one that sparked off the trouble by criticising Chief Buthelezi. However, three days later, Mr. Dladla did ultimately pledge his loyalty and support for the Chief. It is believed that he must have been under heavy pressure from the rest of the Cabinet.

Soon after these incidents, Barney Dladla was removed from the portfolio of Community Affairs to that of Justice. He is said to have regarded his transfer as demotion intended to incapacitate his dealings with the workers. He believed that Buthelezi together with the Trade Union Council of S.A. (TUCSA) were waging a campaign against him to resign. Emphasising his intention of continued activity with black trade unions, he said "*Tucsa* does not want black trade unions to stand on their own. They want them to be affiliated to *Tucsa*".²³

Buthlezi, however, denied that he was trying to force Dladla to resign. He claimed that the decision to transfer Dladla was a compromise to promote Zulu political unity; and that Dladla was being ungrateful, because a special session could have dismissed him from office completely.

Subsequent to an anonymous letter received from Amatikhulu, threatening his life should he go to the Kwa-Zulu capital of Nongoma, in pursuit of his duties, Mr. Dladla decided to keep the Justice Department, but work from Escourt, his home-town, and not at Nongoma. This move brought criticism to Barney Dladla from people who felt that he could never run a department like the Justice Department away from where it was happening. Mr. Dladla was at the time operating from Escourt without a clerk, stationery or furniture. His attempt at procuring his furniture from Nongoma was spoilt when Chief Gatsha discovered a truck loaded with the goods about to pull off, apparently directed by some officer per Dladla's instructions. The Chief ordered that the lorry be off-loaded.²⁴

Among the main points of conflict between Mr. Dladla and his Chief Executive Councillor, featured the following:—

- that Chief Buthelezi was allowing the Bantu Investment Corporation to gain a stranglehold over Kwa-Zulu economy.
- that the Chief was becoming a pawn in the hands of the all white TUCSA leaders whose organisation was bent on gaining black membership in order to be allowed into the International Labour Organisation (ILO)
- the Chief had objected to Kwa-Zulu having anything to do with black caucuses and trade unions, and had “watered down” a memorandum which Dladla had drafted to Pretoria on the subject. Buthelezi was alleged later to be wanting to dissociate himself from African trade unions so that he could attract investors to his Bantustan.

Dladla claimed that Gatsha supported the BIC so much because the Investment Corporation was building him a house worth R76,000.²⁵

On the 28th August, 1974 Mr. Barney Dladla was stripped of his position as Kwa-Zulu Councillor of Justice. Commenting on the whole episode, the *Daily News* editor said that it was unfortunate that a sharp personality clash should have occurred so early in the development of Kwa-Zulu. He went on to point out that the bitter difference between Chief Gatsha Buthelezi and Mr. Barney Dladla seemed to be on rivalry rather than principle.²⁶

Banning Powers

Kwa-Zulu is one of those Bantustans which rejected the Second Bantu Laws Amendment Bill which was introduced in Parliament

providing Bantustan Governments with powers to ban persons and their organisations in their territories. Chief Buthelezi said that the Zulu Government had not requested powers to ban people, and that presumably these powers would only be used by those governments which had requested them. He said that the Minister had created the impression that all Bantustan leaders had asked for these powers to ban. "We do not want this power", said Chief Buthelezi.²⁷

However, it was revealed in Parliament by Progressive Party member for Houghton, Mrs. Helen Suzman, that there was another arbitrary power exercised in a limited area in Kwa-Zulu in terms of Proclamation 103 of 1973. She said that this power was in force in the Msinga area, where "some lawless characters were apparently living at the time". She also added of course that the powers given by this Proclamation had in fact not been used.

Transkei

Land Claims and Consolidation

The Transkei insisted in its call to the South African Government to zone black all the Transkei major towns. This would enable the Africans to trade competitively with Whites. The zoning of these towns as black, however, was not seen as the complete answer for the population needs of the Transkei hence the persistent claim for more land. Claiming of more land would inevitably lead to consolidation of some areas to the Transkei. The 1936 Bantu Trust and Land Act had laid down boundaries of land belonging to different tribes. It was on the strength of that Act that Bantustans were claiming their land. Towns like Butterworth, Umtata, Idutywa, Umzimkhulu and Engcobo were to be zoned black. As soon as they had been unconditionally transferred, people living there would take Transkei citizenship. This would curb "dual allegiances" to the Transkei and the South African Government.

Ncambedlana and Norwood, suburbs of Umtata were taken out by the Transkei Township Board which budgetted R3 million to pave roads and install services towards their improvement. These suburbs, being the only better shelter for Africans in Umtata, were so overcrowded that a temporary township was to be built to ease the pressure on them.

In its land claims, the Transkei went to the extent of demanding some Ciskei land like Herschel. Negotiations are already under way to have Herschel repossessed from the Ciskei. Glen Grey was also another

target for the Transkei. At the time of printing the Ciskei had promised to cede Glen Grey and Herschel to the Transkei on condition that it was given some other land in return.

There was a great controversy on whether Port St. Johns should be handed over to the Transkei or not. Matanzima claimed that the area where Port St. Johns was situated had been geographically and historically part of the Transkei. The South African Government on the other hand was reluctant to hand over the Port to the Transkei, apparently for security reasons.²⁸

The main aim for consolidation and land claims by the Transkei Government was to strengthen its power economically, socially and politically so that it could be internationally recognised as an independent State and ultimately as a member of the United Nations. However, the South African Government was only prepared to hand over a number of little spots of land in Matatiele, Indwe and Elliot.

Speaking on the granting of land to the homelands, the Honourable Minister of Economic Affairs said that "90%" of the total surface of South Africa occupied by Bantustans was adequate because actually the land they occupied was not properly made use of. Granting of more land to the homelands would be dangerous to the economy of South Africa. He warned that land that could have been used by white agriculturists to produce food that would be imported by the homelands to feed the Bantustan citizens, was lying waste in the homelands.

Natal Mercury reported that the Transkei showed that it was setting eyes on Port Shepstone, a white area in the Natal Coast. This conclusion had been arrived at after an analysis of the posters which had been exhibited at the congress of Matanzima's party which showed Port Shepstone as one of the towns in Natal earmarked by the Transkei.

Finance

To be economically self-sufficient the Transkei would have to depend on outside countries for some years. Large sums of money would have to be acquired from outside to give the Transkei "the push it needed"²⁹ Overseas companies, it was hoped, would invest in the Transkei as soon as it was independent. It would strengthen economic as well as socio-political ties.

A large United States based petroleum company donated television equipment worth R10,000 to the Transkei. This was an encouragement to other foreign investors which the Transkei was keen to invite. Chief Kaizer Matanzima announced that the Transkei was prepared to go beyond the terms even of South Africa to attract foreign investors to the Transkei.³⁰ It was later revealed that this television equipment would be used mainly by the Department of Agriculture to educate people in

The Xhosa Development Corporation on the 7th June, 1974, completed its biggest individual industrial deal in the Transkei with the signing of a R10 million project with Pep chain stores group. The firm was to establish a large blanket and clothing manufacturing complex at Butterworth, where more than one million blankets would be manufactured a year. This complex would provide jobs for 6,000 people. Some would be housed in the township which was being built by the Corporation.

The overall budget tabled by the Chief Minister and the Minister of Finance of the Transkei was R68 million. Of this amount, the South African Government would provide R50 million.

The Cabinet Salaries were increased, a factor that raised the total expenditure even further. The new salary figures were given as follows³¹:—

	<i>Salary</i>	<i>Personal Allowance</i>
Chief Minister	R14,000	R1,200
6 Chief Ministers	6,500	900
Other Legislative Assembly members and 65 chiefs	3,000	8

Independence

The Transkei is the only homeland which has been actively involving itself in attempts to become fully independent. This move came as a surprise not only to other homeland leaders but also to the public, especially because all the homelands had unanimously agreed not to accept independence until their land claims had been met far beyond the 1936 Land Act concessions. Seemingly Matanzima's view was that people were anxious to have a free State of their own, without the consolidation issue being thrashed. He said that since the South African Government was not prepared to meet any further demand on land, Transkeians had no option but to make the best use of the little that they had.³² Independence would mean that the Republic would sever its ties with the Transkei except where the former was invited. Matanzima was reported to have said, "We are becoming impatient with the constitutional development here. After nine years of self-government we are almost at the same level as other homelands."³³

Already pre-independence preparations were being made by the Transkei which hoped to acquire its independence by 1976. Matanzima believed that by the end of 1975 the following would have been achieved:—

- (a) Administrative personnel would be ready to take over.
- (b) The Legislative Assembly would complete its pre-independence report for the Central Government.

- (c) Pre-independence general elections would be called in 1975.
- (d) All South African Police Stations would have black police officers to take over all commands.
- (e) Port St. Johns would have become part of the Transkei and compensation for dispossessed Whites would be expected to be paid by the South African Government.³⁴

As preparations for the feasibility of 'Uhuru Day', the South African Government and the Transkei leaders decided to set up a committee of experts to examine the legal, constitutional, financial, administrative and other matters connected with independence. This committee comprised the following:—

1. Mr. I. R. Onselen.....The Secretary for Bantu Administration and Development, who chaired the meeting.
2. Mr. G. J. Grobler.....The Director of Homeland Affairs of the Department of Bantu Administration and Development, as alternative chairman.
3. Mr. K. A. Faire.
4. Mr. V. R. Zietsman
5. Professor J. H. Opperman (nominated by the Transkei)
6. Dr. R. Du Plooy
7. Mr. S. A. Visagie
8. Mr. H. R. Myburgh³⁵

Condemning the committee's white composition the Transkei Democratic Party said that it was likely that the committee would be biased because all its officials were government servants.³¹ Interviewed in Umtata, the Democratic dissident leader Mr. H. B. Ncokazi condemned the idea of independence for the Transkei. He said that Transkei Africans had as much right to the general wealth of the Republic of South Africa as anyone else in South Africa, no matter what the colour of his skin was. He said he regarded the Transkei independence move as a plot to dump the Transkeians who had contributed to the building of South Africa.

Mr. Ncokazi also expressed doubts that Chief Matanzima was more interested in Transkei independence than John Voster, who wanted to prove his Bantustan policy a success. He went on to attack the official Democratic opposition party under Mr. Knowledge Guzana, and branded it a confused group of people for participating in the Transkei Legislative Assembly Constitutional Recess Committee, which drafted proposals for an independent Transkei Constitution.

Amalgamation

As reported in earlier issues of *Black Review*, the standpoint of Chief Kaizer Matanzima has always been that the Transkei and Ciskei should amalgamate to form one Xhosa superstate. This line of thought was pursued in 1974 and 1975. Matanzima warned the Ciskei Blacks that unless they amalgamate before independence there would be constant land disputes. He had planned approaching the Ciskei formally to discuss forming a superstate. What the Transkei was after was the formation of a State from the consolidation of the Transkei and the area known as the Border. This would mean having a single Xhosa State. However, Chief Matanzima stated, "I want to say categorically that the Transkei has nothing to lose or gain by association with their kinsmen except that we are anxious that there be just one national unit."³⁷ His main wish in amalgamation was apparently to incorporate the 150,000 emigrant Tembus in Glen Grey. If the Ciskei did not agree on amalgamation, there would be a final parting of the roads which would never meet again.

The Chief Minister of the Ciskei did not pick up the debate on amalgamation very enthusiastically. As far as the Ciskei leaders saw the issue, amalgamation was a matter for the future and all negotiations regarding the issue would have to be handled delicately and responsibly between the two governments. It was felt also that the Transkei was dictating the terms in an improper way. The Ciskei Justice Minister said that they did not want to dance to the Transkei music.

A recent exchange of strong words between the Chief Ministers of the Transkei and the Ciskei proved that the controversy between the two homelands was widening the gap between them. Matanzima released a statement which stopped short of calling the Ciskei leader a liar. He accused the Ciskei of being an appendage of Pretoria which he proudly affirmed that the Transkei was not.³⁸

The Transkei can be said to have failed in its attempts to bring about amalgamation with the Ciskei. This was revealed by Matanzima after the meeting of the homeland's constitutional recess committee. Commenting on the amalgamation question in an interview, the Democratic dissident leader Mr. H. B. Ncokazi said he did not believe that Matanzima was ever interested in amalgamation with the Ciskei, "judging from the clumsy way in which he handled the issue". He said the Chief Minister must have been reluctantly responding to pressure from his party, which was, by and large, interested in amalgamation. Mr. Ncokazi said that his own party, true to its policy of uniting all black people to fight apartheid jointly, had seen the amalgamation of the two homelands as a step towards the realisation of the dream of black unity.

Africanization of Civil Service

Chief Kaizer Matanzima assured many Whites living in the Transkei that they were welcome to stay in the homeland as long as they desired until they voluntarily requested to leave. He was referring to white civil servants and teachers, saying that although the Transkei wished to replace Whites with Transkei citizens, his government would strive to retain the service of those Whites who could not as yet get replacements. However many white posts were given to Blacks. For instance the Secretary for Education in the Transkei, Mr. Heystek, had his post taken by Mr. Kakana.

Whites were assured of safety and equal treatment should the Transkei be independent. As long as they remained citizens of the Transkei, they would not be expelled from the homeland. Mr. M. C. Botha warned these Whites that they should not turn to the Republic for help should things get hot for them after independence. Mr. T. E. Tshunungwa warned white people that although his generation was negotiating with Whites peacefully, "we don't know what our sons will do".³⁹ Chief George Matanzima opening the 58th congress of the all-white Transkei Territories Civic Association thanked the Transkei Whites for the mental, spiritual, and material leadership offered to Blacks by them. He encouraged those Whites who had their roots in the Transkei and who regarded it as their home and fatherland not to leave but to remain in the territory and become citizens of the Transkei.⁴⁰ On the other hand Mr. Botha said that it was against the Government's policy for Whites to continue to exercise land ownership there.⁴¹

In his consultation with Mr. Sonny Leon, leader of Labour Party, Chief Matanzima assured Mr. Leon that Coloureds would be granted full citizenship in the homeland as soon as independence was gained. Coloureds were part and parcel of the Transkei, he said, and they should be allowed to remain there and enjoy all the privileges of people who live in these homelands.

Some Whites feared for their safety in the Transkei should it become independent. Mr. Lundenann, a Transkei delegate to Mr. Botha said, "I doubt if ever in history there were people as harassed and uncertain as the Whites here are." His delegation pleaded for those Whites who wanted to leave the Transkei but were unable to do so, due to circumstances beyond their control. The Transkei Civil Association was responsible for the formation of the delegation.⁴²

There would be no Bill of Rights to guarantee security of tenure for Whites who remained in the Transkei. However they would not be discriminated against when the homeland became independent.

Transkei—Second Bantu Laws Amendment Bill

After Chief Matanzima had received the draft from the Minister of Bantu Administration and Development and later read that their reactions as homeland leaders had been taken as in favour of the Bill, he commented:—

“We did not ask for the banning powers. We only asked for the same security powers as the Republican Government has.”⁴³

The security powers held by the South African Government involved powers to ban but the Transkei emphasised that it did not want those powers but only security powers. Commenting on this statement which she labelled an ambiguous statement, Mrs. H. Suzman said that apparently Chief Matanzima did not realize that the security powers that the Government had in the Republic certainly included powers to ban.⁴⁴ Mrs. Suzman went further to relate that early in 1974 Chief George Matanzima, the Minister of Justice in the Transkei had introduced a motion calling for the Transkei Government to consider the possibilities of approaching the South African Government to amend the Transkei Constitution Act of 1963 so that the necessary powers to maintain law and order could be secured by the Transkei. After long deliberation on the issue the motion was passed without being voted against. Opposing the motion in the debate the opposition party led by Mr. K. Guzana said that what ought to be discussed was the introduction of a Bill of Rights which would protect the rights of all individuals against powers of the State, rather than the security powers.

The Transkei would, despite Proclamation 400 in the territory, be the first homeland to be given all the banning and security powers. Powers given to the Transkei under this 1960 Proclamation included banishment, banning, and restriction of all kinds. This Second Bantu Laws Amendment Bill would give even more weight to the already functioning Proclamation 400 in the Transkei.

Bophutha-Tswana

Land Claims and Consolidation.

Reporting to his Cabinet on the summit meeting held between Mr. Vorster and other homeland leaders Chief Mangope, the Chief Minister of Bophutha-Tswana, said that he was not happy to be told that homeland boundaries would still be decided by the South African Government within the limits of the 1936 Land Act. He added that times had changed and populations had increased tremendously since 1936. He

therefore resorted to telling his people that if they made better use of the little land that they had, perhaps they would have a stronger case for more land.⁴⁵ The argument laid by the Government was that the homelands wanted more land yet they could not even prove their agricultural skills in the adequate use of the land that they had.

The Bophutha-Tswana Government submitted a new draft consolidation proposal to the South African Government. Mafeking was offered to the Tswana people as the capital of their future independent homeland.⁴⁶ Mr. Raubenheimer, the Deputy Minister of Bantu Administration and Development announced that the Vryburg—Kimberley road would be the border line between Bophutha-Tswana and the neighbouring white areas.⁴⁷

An issue which led to some confrontation between the Tswana and Lebowa Governments was the claim by the Lebowa Government of some Tswana areas. This claim was vehemently rejected by the Bophutha-Tswana consolidation commission. Mr. D. P. Kgotleng declared that Bophutha-Tswana refuses and rejects Lebowa's claim that Ga-Rankua, Mabopane and Winterveld areas should be declared international* urban areas.⁴⁸ Towards the settlement of the consolidation problems about 2000 Tswana tribesmen at Mayeni near Taung in the Northern Cape were to be moved to a new area because they were living on former tribal trust land. The Mayen tribesmen refused to move from their land saying that they would only be physically lifted from their homes. The argument put by the Mayen people was that the new land which they were to occupy before 18th March, 1975, was a semi-desert compared to fertile Mayen.

Whites who had been told to vacate their farms for settlement by Blacks told the Government that they were not prepared to leave their farms.

Apparently the land occupied by the Tswanas is insufficient because Chief Mangope adopted a new strategy of influx control to secure land and jobs for Tswanas only. *Drum* magazine of 8th May, 1975 reported that late in 1974 Chief Mangope lent out Bophutha-Tswana vehicles to Pretoria to move out South-Sothos from Thaba-Nchu in the Free State. Thaba-Nchu falls under Bophutha-Tswana.⁴⁹ Chief Mangope said that the non-Tswana in Thaba-Nchu and other parts of Bophutha-Tswana, were depriving people in Thaba-Nchu and Tswanas of land and employment. This move surprised people because prior to his election Chief L. Mangope had stated in his party manifesto that he wanted citizenship rights for all living in Bophutha-Tswana irrespectively of origin,⁵⁰ to be secured early last year. *Drum* reported that Chief Mangope had been applauded for relieving the plight of 20 000 non-Tswana squatters at Winterveld, north of Pretoria. He had declared

*International: the different Bantustans are referred to as nations.

that his Government had inherited that distressing situation from the Department of Bantu Administration and Development. He had emphasised that the Bophutha-Tswana Government rejected the principle of the removal of people in large numbers.⁵¹

Chief Mangope threatened to apply the influx control near Pretoria. For this Chief Mangope was attacked by opposition parties which said that he was doing to these people what the South African Government was doing to African people as a whole. Chief Maseloane reiterated that Bophutha-Tswana should accept those who were ethnically not Tswanas as citizens and use their taxes to finance further houses and schools in the areas.⁵²

Chieftainess Esther Kekana of the Hammanskraal amaNdebele substantiated the suggestion that Chief Mangope was discriminating against non-Tswanas. *Drum* of 22nd January, 1975 reported that the points which proved Chief Mangope as a discriminator as Chieftainess Kekana said were:

(i) A circular from the Bophutha-Tswana Department of Education explicitly stated that Tswana would be the medium of instruction in all schools.

(ii) In 1971 some Ndebele people applied for trading rights for a restaurant at Babalegi near Hammanskraal. They never got a reply and the restaurant was later given to a Tswana, Mr. Sebokedi.

(iii) In 1972 the Ndebele of Majaneng were refused residential permits by the superintendent of Temba Township in Hammanskraal and were later expelled from the area.

(iv) Mr. Simon Makgohloa a Pedi born in Hammanskraal was expelled from the area.⁵³

Finances

A loan of R15 million for housing and resettlement in Bophutha-Tswana was approved by the Western Transvaal Bantu Administration Board.

The Bophutha-Tswana Development fund was launched. This was one of the major points with which the rebels accused Mangope. The purpose of the fund was to facilitate development in the homeland.

To encourage vocational and the technical training for young people of Bophutha-Tswana, the Rustenburg Platignum mines donated R1,200,000 to the Bophutha-Tswana Government.

A three pronged farming project, estimated to cost R1,000,000, was launched by BIC. The money would be broken down for use as follows:

Fish hatchery and angling scheme	R300,000
Fresh milk production scheme.....	R350,000
Irrigation farming project.....	R280,000

The Premier Milling Group was to establish a R5 million milling complex at Thaba Nchu. This would create jobs for 300 Tswanas. This project would be established by Premier Milling group in conjunction with BIC.

In an article headlined "Mangope tells of big budget" the *Rand Daily Mail* reporter showed that Bophutha-Tswana was taking a giant stride towards placing itself on a financial par with Botswana.⁵⁴ The Bophutha-Tswana Government read its Appropriation Bill to give itself an annual revenue of nearly R50 million. This Bill showed that government salaries had risen.

Salaries

Cabinet Ministers from R5,000 to R10,000 per annum

Chief Minister from R6,200 to R12,000 per annum

The Department of Health and Social Welfare had a budget of R13,500,000. R11,500,000 had been allocated to the Department of Works.

The source of income of Bophutha-Tswana was:

Directly from Bophutha-Tswana sources	R8,000,000
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S.A. Governments' consolidated Revenue Funds	R13,000,000
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S.A. Government in terms of Bantu Constitutional Act 1971	R23,500,000
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Total Budget	R44,500,000 ⁵⁵
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A new Bill was passed whereby 4,000 non-Tswanas in the Bophutha-Tswana village of Morelette, were made to pay special taxes of 25 cents on each head of cattle they owned.

Mangope's Power Struggle and Formation of Bophutha-Tswana Democratic Party

Immediately after he was re-elected, the Chief Minister of Bophutha-Tswana Chief L. Mangope dropped two of his former ministers, Chief S. G. Ntuana who was Minister of Agriculture and Mr. D. P. Kgotleng former Minister of Works and replaced them with Chief T. V. Mahapan as the Minister of Justice and Mr. T. Molathloa as Minister of Agriculture. He also shifted Chief H. R. T. Maseloane, number two man in the Cabinet and Deputy Leader of Chief Mangope's Bophutha-Tswana National Party, to the junior Department of Works.

A conflict started between Chief L. Mangope and Chief Maseloane. Chief Mangope had threatened to expel Chief Maseloane from the Bophutha-Tswana National Party. The expulsion of Maseloane would have meant that the party would have been divided into two factions.

It was also speculated that Maseloane would form his own party—the third in Bophutha-Tswana.⁵⁶

The rebel faction led by Chief Maseloane accused Chief Mangope of using police to intimidate his political opponents. They alleged that Mangope interfered with the affairs of Chiefs, particularly in the Madikwe region under Chief Maseloane.⁵⁷

The squabble reached its peak when members of the Tswana Legislative Assembly pressed for investigation into a letter claimed to have been written by Mangope asking for the right to expel Maseloane. The opposition parties had drafted a motion calling for the expulsion of Mangope from Parliament. The mover of the motion was the Chieftainess Esther Kekane who said that the people had no longer any confidence in Mangope. However through the Commissioner-General's influence, the opposition was persuaded to amend the motion so that it only called for the resignation of Mangope in his position as a Chief Minister. However the lull that followed the Commissioner's call turned out to be the lull before a big storm.

Chief Mangope tried to introduce English as a medium of instruction in private schools, opening them for all pupils irrespective of their tribal origin. He was opposed in Parliament because it was felt that the new proposition was contrary to the policy of separate development. Chief Mangope's main opposer, Chief Maseloane, felt that Tswanas should have their exclusive schools, hence encouraging a sense of self reliance within the Tswanas.

Another storm burst out over the newly-formed Bophutha-Tswana Development Fund. The purpose of the fund was to facilitate the development in the homeland but it was "made out and entered into" by Chief Mangope in his private capacity and eight trustees. The opposition argument against this fund was that Chief Mangope's control of the trustees would make him a most powerful man even if he were not the Chief Minister.

Despite the strong opposition confronting him, Chief Mangope pressed harder for the exclusion of the "rebel" Ministers from the Bophutha-Tswana National Party. He also demanded that Chief Maseloane, who was Chairman of the Madikwe Regional Authority, should surrender that position. However Chief Maseloane refused to do so.⁵⁸

Chief Mangope resigned his leadership of the Bophutha-Tswana National Party and formed a new party called the Democratic Party. Chief Maseloane and the others who remained with the party argued that as Chief Mangope no longer belonged to the ruling party, he had to resign as the Chief Minister. Supporting this call the Seoposengwe Party also demanded the resignation of Chief Mangope as Chief

Minister and also called for general elections. However, Chief Mangope with the support of the majority of the members of the Tswana Legislative Assembly was able to continue as Chief Minister of Bophutha-Tswana and the leader of the newly formed Democratic Party.

The opposition party made another attempt to win votes in favour of a general election. It claimed that the ruling party was avoiding general elections for fear of being ousted. Voting on the general election, the opposition party was defeated by the Bophutha-Tswana National Party by 41 votes to 21.⁵⁹

Chief Mangope was assured of the powers of expelling the unwanted Cabinet Ministers by the Prime Minister.⁶⁰ He tried to amend his homeland constitution so that he had secure powers to dismiss members of his Cabinet without having to ask for permission from the State President.⁶¹

In the *Government Gazette* of the 4th of April, 1975, Chief Mangope secured the long desired powers of axing the two "rebel" ministers after Bophutha-Tswana's constitution had been amended by the State President's proclamation. Later on Mr. S. S. Modube, the Chief Minister's private Secretary, issued Chief H. Maseloane, Minister of Works and Chief J. Toto, Minister of Agriculture, with letters of expulsion from the Government. They were to vacate their positions within 14 days.⁶²

Because of the exclusion of the two "rebel" ministers, new Cabinet Ministers were appointed by the Chief Minister. The new men were Chief V. Suping appointed as the Minister of Agriculture and Chief B. Motsatsi as Minister of Works. Mr. N. T. Matsike was also sworn into Parliament as Minister of the Interior.

Bophutha-Tswana—Second Bantu Laws Amendment Bill

At the second reading of the Second Bantu Laws Amendment Bill, Mr. M. C. Botha had told the House of Assembly that all the respective homelands had been consulted about the Bill and according to their reactions they had agreed on its implementation. Analysing different views deduced from press statements released by most Chief Ministers, Mrs. H. Suzman tried to show that most homeland leaders were opposed to the Bill.

Chief Lucas Mangope of Bophutha-Tswana was apparently against the Bill. Speaking on the banning powers, he was reported to have said: "We did not ask for them but the Bill was sent to my Cabinet for comment. We had no option but to let it go through, I think it should be discussed extensively by all the homeland leaders".⁶³

Basotho Qwaqwa

Elections

Indications of change in political outlook came to Basotho Qwaqwa in May 1975, with the dramatic change of Government following the landslide success of the Dikwankwentla Party, an opposition party led by a commoner.

The State President had proclaimed in the *Government Gazette* that since Basotho Qwaqwa had attained self-rule, elections would take place in March 1975. By the end of 1974 the Department of Community Affairs had begun compiling information to explain voting procedures to Basotho citizens. Sixty members would be appointed, forty of whom would be designated chiefs and headmen elected by two tribal authorities.⁶⁴

In March 1975 more than half a million Basotho flocked to the polls to elect the twenty members of the reconstituted Qwaqwa Legislative Assembly. Parties to which they belonged were Basotho United Party, Basotho National Party, Basotho Union Party, and Dikwankwetla Party. People living in towns and cities outside the homeland voted at the Bantu Affairs Commissioners' offices, while those living within the district of Qwaqwa at Witzieshoek voted at the appointed polling stations.

There were two likely contenders for the position of Chief Minister, Mr. Hamilton Mota a half brother to Chief Mota and Mr. K. Tshona a teacher, both leading government officials. The contest was evident because of the fact that Chief Mota had his leadership challenged on the basis of three significant factors. Firstly, the constitution makes provision that a Chief Minister can be any person and not necessarily of royal descent. Secondly, a rise in political awareness had been caused by the formation of opposition political parties. The third factor was the opposition from within his own cabinet.⁶⁵

The general feeling was that Chief Mota's Government, in the leadership of about 1½ million Basotho, was very shaky. Interviewed by the *Rand Daily Mail*, Chief Mota said he was aware of the great opposition that he was facing and was "leaving it to the members of the Legislative Assembly to choose whoever they wanted."⁶⁶

Mr. Kenneth Mopeli, 44 year old leader of the Dikwankwetla Party, was elected Chief Minister when the Legislative Assembly opened in May 1975. He defeated Chief Mota by 42 votes to 13 and six papers were spoilt. The *Rand Daily Mail* regarded Chief Mota's defeat as

“a clear sign of the waning power of traditional chiefs in African society”.⁶⁷

Chief Mota is the third traditional Chief to be ousted by a commoner in South Africa's homelands. This, the *Mail* added, “shows growing disenchantment of the rank and file African with the conservative traditionalists.”⁶⁸

In his maiden speech, the newly elected Chief Minister of Basotho Qwaqwa Mr. Kenneth Mopeli warned the South African Government that if his demands were not met, he would clash with Pretoria. The issues which could lead to confrontation Mr. Mopeli said, were firstly the demands for more land for Basotho.

The second issue would be the freedom of movement and work opportunities for Blacks. Mr. Mopeli said that Basotho should be allowed to work and stay in any place they desired. Thirdly, the Africanisation of jobs in the homelands. He said his government was extending a hand of friendship to Whites, which they should accept. He added that Whites should come and teach Basotho and as soon as Basotho were ready to take over the jobs the Whites should go.

Supporting his call for freedom of movement and work opportunities, Mr. Mopeli mentioned that the 1970 census had revealed that about 98% of the Basotho people lived outside their homeland. Mr. Mopeli went further to announce that his government was prepared to renew negotiations, despite the Prime Minister's announcement that the land consolidation question had come to the last round.⁶⁹

Commenting on Mr. Mopeli's speech, the *Rand Daily Mail's* editor said that “if the Nationalist dream of Africans returning to their homelands ever comes true, it would mean that tiny poverty-stricken spots would have a population in excess of 2,700 per square mile”.⁷⁰

Mr. K. Mopeli said in an interview with Mr. Vorster that the future of Qwaqwa was bleak if the homeland was not given more land. He added that 98% of Qwaqwa citizens lived outside the homeland and only 128,000 lived in it. The Chief Minister is reported to have suggested that since 300,000 Qwaqwa citizens lived in Mount Fletcher, Matatiele and Qumbu, it might have been meaningful to establish the homeland within those areas.⁷¹

Land Claims and Consolidation

Basotho Qwaqwa comprises 61,000 hectares of land. It is the smallest homeland in South Africa. The Government had agreed to give Basotho Qwaqwa more than 30,000 hectares in the Free State, in accordance with the 1936 Land Act. This meant that many white farmers would have their farms incorporated into Basotho Qwaqwa.

However, the affected farmers voted unanimously against the hand-over of the farms to the Witzieshoek homeland.

Campaigning for election the Dikwankwetla Party had declared that should it come to power, it would demand more land for Basotho people. Towns like Villiers, Bethlehem, and Harrismith, would have to be added to Qwaqwa which was already overpopulated. The leader of the party, Mr. K. T. Mopeli, had added that Harrismith, Vrede, Frankfort, Kroonstad, Heilbron, Bethlehem, Winburg, Kerstell, Fouriesburg, Senekal, Ficksburg, and all those towns bordering Lesotho would have to be added to the Witzieshoek homeland.⁷²

In his first House of Assembly speech, Mr. Mopeli the newly elected Chief Minister referring to his call for land said that his government was committed to the promises he had made to the electorate prior to the elections.

Amalgamation

Unlike other Bantustans which were considering possibilities of merging with each other, there has been no such speculation on the part of Basotho Qwaqwa. The only idea of merger, linking the territory with independent Lesotho, had been rejected by Chief Wessels Mota in a statement in the *Rand Daily Mail* of the 29th November, 1974.

The idea had been reported in the same paper as having come from the Commissioner General for Basotho Qwaqwa, Mr. N. C. van R. Sadie. The report mentioned that he had suggested that Qwaqwa be incorporated into Lesotho because Basotho from both areas shared the same culture and language. Rejecting the idea, Chief Mota said Lesotho was not economically viable, not politically stable and that the rate of unemployment was very high. This made Lesotho economically highly dependent on outside help.

Chief Mota had always been unfavourably disposed to any kind of merger with other territories. The *Star* of the 19th of July, 1973 quoted him as saying on homeland federation, "The basis of our society is chieftainship, and a federation of the kind suggested would destroy or at least weaken the system."

The new Chief Minister of Basotho Qwaqwa, Mr. K. Mopeli, said in an interview before a "get together" with Mr. Vorster that he favoured as a long term ideal, a federation of homelands to give Africans unity and better bargaining powers.⁷³

Finances

The Qwaqwa cabinet rejected Pretoria's proposed salary scales for members of the Legislative Assembly in Qwaqwa. It decided to appoint a commission which would make recommendations.

Salaries scales laid down by Pretoria were:

Chief Minister.....	R10,200 per annum
Cabinet Ministers.....	R8,100 per annum
Chairman of Legislative Assembly.....	R3,600 per annum
Deputy Chairman & Leader of the Opposition...	R3,300 per annum

Ordinary members of the Assembly would receive a sessional allowance of R8 per day. Mr. K. Mopeli, the Chief Minister said that he was not satisfied with the salary scales prescribed by the Government, especially because there was no pension allowance for the service rendered by members of Parliament.⁷⁴

The Cabinet has also refused to occupy temporary four-roomed houses built by the Vaal Triangle Bantu Administration Board at Phutha-Dichaba, Qwaqwa's capital. A member of the Qwaqwa Assembly, Mr. C. M. Koe was quoted by the *Rand Daily Mail* of May 28 as saying "We live like kings and we should not be expected to step down to the level of the jacks. We want as much comfort as possible."

Basotho Qwaqwa's Reaction to the Bantu Law's Amendment Bill

Chief Wessels Mota of Qwaqwa maintained a quiet attitude towards the Bill. He neither replied to Mr. M. C. Botha on the draft Bill sent to his government nor released any public statement of his opinion on the new Bill. Consequently, Mr. Botha took this silence as a passive positive stand, hence his utterance that all the homelands had agreed on the Bill.⁷⁵

Lebowa

Land Claims and Consolidation

The Lebowa Land Commission set up in September, 1973 compiled evidence for the Lebowa Land claims. Should the final draft of Lebowa Land Consolidation be passed, Bushbuckridge would be one of the most controversial areas where there would be a mass removal of people. This area was earmarked for Shangaan people of Gazankulu and already there were signs of bitterness and ill-feelings between Lebowa and Gazankulu over the land consolidation of these respective homelands. Mr. M. C. Botha, Minister of Bantu Administration and Development had given the area to Gazankulu, thus evoking some dissatisfaction among the people of Lebowa who then demanded that the Land Commission must mediate otherwise "they would take the law

into their own hands by driving Shangaans over the border to Ngungunyane".⁷⁶

The Lebowa Land Commission had been told that more than 200,000 hectares would have to be vacated by 130,000 Lebowa citizens to make room for resettlement of other northern homelands and South Ndebele homelands. It seemed evident that the people of Lebowa were facing vast problems of having to move from their areas of birth and inheritance, to some new and unfamiliar parts of the country. Speaking on this problem, Lebowa's Minister of the Interior, Mr. Collins Ramusi, added that the people were not prepared to move from their land because after all they needed more land than that in which they lived. Because of these recurring land disputes between Gazankulu and Lebowa the Lebowa Land Commission called a meeting to be held to settle these problems. Chief Phatudi felt that not until the land disputes had been solved and the land been consolidated would Lebowa regard herself as an entity and ready to be independent.

The bulk of the claims made by Lebowa were:—

- One third of the Transvaal should be ceded to the homeland. This included towns like Cullinan, Nelspruit, Lydenburg, Groblersdal, Warmbaths, Pietersburg and a section of the Kruger National Park.
- Areas within other homelands like Bophutha-Tswana, Swazi, Ndebele and Shangaan homelands had their land claimed by Lebowa.
- Zebediela estates (13700 hectares) which were then occupied by Ndebele people were other targets.
- The R8,5 million worth of farms north of Vivo in Northern Transvaal should be included in Lebowa.

In reaction to these massive claims the South African Government reiterated that Lebowa would get its quota in terms of the 1936 Land Act.⁷⁷ The *Star's* editor said that these claims of one third of Transvaal were so massive that Lebowa might not get a tenth of the total area. He added that these claims serve to dramatise "just how vast is the gap between expectation and reality in the homelands".⁷⁸

Since these claims had been sharply rejected by Mr. M. C. Botha, another meeting was organised between the Government and Lebowa officials. The meeting which was said to have been exceptionally cordial resulted in no dramatic changes from both parties. It was after this meeting that Collins Ramusi said that actually Johannesburg belongs to Lebowa but because of goodwill they have not claimed it and other lands so that other people could have a place to live in.

Commenting on the claims by the Lebowa Government, Mr. M. C. Botha said that after all it did not fall within any homeland govern-

ment's authority to appoint committees "to say what land should belong to them".⁷⁹ In other words it seemed that the South African Government had jurisdiction over this topic.

Amalgamation

With such acute land problems it is not surprising that Lebowa would want amalgamation with other homelands. The general feeling was that through amalgamation would come settlement and burial of land disputes. The main Transvaal homelands involved in these talks on amalgamation were Lebowa and Gazankulu. It was expected that Vendaland would also be called to the amalgamation discussions.

In the private talks held between Professor Ntsanwisi, the Chief Minister of Gazankulu accompanied by his Minister of the Interior, Mr. Mageza and Mr. C. Ramusi, Lebowa's Minister of the Interior accompanying Dr. Cedric Phatudi, the Chief Minister, Chief Mphephu of Vendaland was excluded.

Yet should there have been any talks on amalgamation, Vendaland was bound to come in. The main idea behind these secret talks was to agree on amalgamation between these three homelands to curb the costly constant clashes over land.

In December, 1974, Gazankulu and Lebowa held "exploratory" talks at Mogobaskloof which might lead to a federation or union of the neighbouring northern homelands. These talks could lead to a merger between 5-6 million people at present occupying a land mass of 3½ million hectares. Vendaland did not attend this meeting which was believed to be a further rejection of independence which as yet was a concept. Speculation was rife that the central Government would thwart this move because when the possibility of amalgamating Kwa-Zulu and the Transkei was mooted in 1972 the Government stepped in and warned that its assent and co-operation would be necessary.

Satisfied with the meeting Professor Ntsanwisi said they were "meeting in order to hammer out all the pinpricks which stood in the way" of what he said was a mutual agreement leading towards a solution for amalgamation.⁸⁰ Ditching tribalism was the main force behind the idea of amalgamation.

After all these promising efforts, the dream of a "Federation of the Great North between Lebowa and Gazankulu"⁸¹ crumbled after these two homelands failed to reach agreement over some disputed land in the Eastern Transvaal.

Africanization of the Civil Service

The Lebowa's Public Service Commission, whose duty was to probe into job situations and the relationship between black and white personnel, was appointed by the Lebowa Legislative Assembly after

alleged mishandling of black personnel by whites. However, the Department of Bantu Administration and Development warned that the Land Commission would have to interview white personnel because they were not employees of the Lebowa Government but that of the Central Government.

If Lebowa land claims succeeded, it would mean that many Whites would fall under Lebowa. Some white farmers showed interest in becoming Lebowa citizens rather than lose their farms. Many of these affected white farmers live in the Trichardsdal area.

The Lebowa Government opened arms to those Whites who wanted to be Lebowa citizens and guaranteed the safety of their property in a Bill of Rights. One of the Whites who accepted Lebowa citizenship was Mr. Gordon McNeil who said "if we can't keep our farms under a white government let's go to a black government. I don't care a damn if its a black government as long as we can keep the farm".⁸²

On the other hand Pretoria expressed disapproval of this inclusion of Whites under Lebowa. Mr. M. C. Botha said that the Central Government was not in favour of this trend but would not interfere.

The Bill of Rights was prepared to safeguard the interest of white citizens who were prepared to give up their South African citizenship and live in Lebowa. It safeguards the freedom of religion, assembly, speech and freedom of lawful dissent and protest.

The Commission on public service recommended that white workers be phased out of the civil service because they were occupying positions that belonged to Africans. The report also recommended that the Lebowa Government Africanise the Government district offices as soon as possible because Blacks were ready and prepared to take over the positions which had been occupied by Whites. A motion to this effect was drawn up and unanimously accepted. All untrained Whites would be removed from the civil service and replaced by Blacks and seconded Whites should be understudied by Blacks so that the Africanization process could go on smoothly.

The Lebowa Government adopted the same attitude towards Indians and Coloureds as with Whites. Those who wished to be subjects of the Bapedi Government were welcome to do so.

It was only in December, 1974 that the Bill of Rights was included in the new draft constitution.

Early in 1975, the Lebowa Government tabled the Lebowa Constitution Act in which Lebowa was declared a self-governing territory within the Republic of South Africa. This Constitution Act included the Lebowa Human Rights and Freedom Constitution Act of 1975. This Human Rights and Freedom Act was based on the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights, said Mr. Collins Ramusi,

Lebowa Minister of Interior when interviewed by *Drum*. Mr. Ramusi went further to say that Lebowa did not want to practise discrimination, neither did it want to be puppets of Pretoria.⁸³

Investments and Finance

So far all the homelands except the Ciskei and the Transkei are industrially "guided" by the Bantu Investment Corporation but the Lebowa Government demanded that this body be replaced by the Lebowa Industrial Corporation.

To this demand Vorster assured Lebowa that a special development body for Lebowa would be set up "as soon as possible". Addressing a meeting at Lebowa, Mr. C. Ramusi encouraged people to take initiative in putting up national projects rather than waiting for industrialists from outside, hence the idea of the Lebowa Industrial Corporation.

A milling plant with an initial capital of R250,000 was started. More than 25 Lebowa Government members registered themselves for the project and said they would contribute R1000 each. The public was invited to buy shares. This milling plant would provide 300 shops with more than 2 million bags of mealie meal per month worth more than R250,000.

Presenting his budget speech, Mr. C. Ramusi, Minister of the Interior and Economic Affairs said that about 4,929 Lebowa people were unemployed mainly because of the influx control which was causing hunger and poverty among citizens. His budget for Lebowa amounted to R5,779,000 which would be mainly distributed as follows:

	R
Salaries and Wages	466,600
Post and Telegraphs	41,000
Printing and Stationery	69,000
Pensions	4,571,500
Child Welfare	13,000
Resettlement into Lebowa	1,000
Clinical Services	84,000
Training and employment in handicrafts	17,000
Training in industrial work	11,000
Miscellaneous expenses	320,000

The Government would pay for the land that had been occupied by Blacks which had been declared white. Compensation would be paid to the owners. The Government had to pay R8,5 million for the 30 farms near Vivo in the Transvaal. Estate agents alleged that the high price of R250,000 for each farm would artificially raise land prices in the district.

From Dr. Phatudi's call to white industrialists to "please come to the homelands"⁸⁴ it can be concluded that Lebowa is in need of indus-

trialists. He assured white industrialists that they would have no problems with migratory labour because he was aware that Whites feared expulsion because some African States had expelled investors.

In November 1974, the Lebowa Government asked the South African Government to allow it to establish its own Department of Economic Affairs and Health. South African officials would come only as advisors.

The Lebowa Government negotiated for a share of taxes paid by Africans to the central Government. These taxes included income tax, sales tax, general tax, paid by industrialists who invested in the homelands. Lebowa would be able to collect R5 million from her own direct taxation. These taxes included poll tax, education tax, and tribal levy.⁸⁵

R34,945,000 would be budgetted for 1975-76 which would be used thus:

For land planning and conservation	2,3%
For the population resettlement	7,3%
For the development of human needs	35%
For creation of employment	10,8%
For social services	21,5%
For general administration	13%
For infrastructural development	9,5%

To increase manpower with technical knowhow and to be able to assist in building up of the economy into a viable one, trade schools are being built at Lebowa.

Independence

Lebowa plans not to accept independence until all their land claims are met and their territory put together. In line with other Bantustans Lebowa rejects independence, regarding it as a cornerstone of the Governments race policy.⁸⁶

Lebowa's Reaction to the Second Bantu Laws Amendments Bill

Apparently Chief Cedric Phatudi was opposed to the giving of such banning powers to the homelands. He declared publicly that Lebowa had never asked for these banning powers because it had no need for them in Lebowa.⁸⁷

Vendaland

Land Claims and Consolidation

In Vendaland, as has been the case in other Bantustans, the thorny question of land consolidation has given rise to dissatisfaction among the communities concerned. *The Star* of 30th October 1973 had reported that farmers in the Soekmekaar district of Northern Transvaal had been prejudiced by the planned consolidation. About 60 farms were to be bought for consolidation in Vendaland. The Deputy Minister of Bantu Development Mr. Reubenheimer had said that these farms would be bought at market value plus 20% displacement compensation.

It was reported that the consolidation proposals would affect more than 4000 families who would be moved from Sinthumele and Kutama, west of Louis Tritchard.⁸⁸ A Bantu Administration spokesman said that it was not yet known how much it would cost to resettle the families because the Department had still to negotiate the terms with the white farmers on the transfer of their farms. The land would be transferred to the Vendaland administration as soon as the business transactions between individual farmers and the Department of Bantu Administration were concluded.

Independence

Contrary to the other homelands stance, Chief Mphephu's Venda National Party announced that independence would be its top priority. It would not negotiate independence with Pretoria on the basis of the land consolidation plans. Not until Vendaland attained its independence would it consider South African federation or a federation between Black States in South Africa.

Revealing his party's attitude towards Whites, a member of the Venda Independent Party said "it is time the central Government granted the Vendas complete independence as they no longer need Whites". Chief Tshikonelo added that Vendaland had long been a baby but had now outgrown that stage. Vendas could stand on their own and govern themselves.⁸⁹

Venda Politics

In the no confidence debate launched in 1973 against Chief Mphephu, opposition parties expressed their wish to have Mphephu's election declared null and void. Mr. Mutsila, VIP and Mr. Mudau had planned to ask the courts to consider the following accusations against Mphephu:

Corruption and bribery were the order of the day during Mphephu's election.

R70 suits were ordered by Mphephu for parliamentarians before the election of Chief Mphephu. They had been taken on a three-day trip to a game reserve immediately before the general elections. During that trip they had been told to vote for Mphephu, and also warned not to tell anyone until after the election in which Chief Mphephu gained 42-18 victory.⁹⁰

Until early in 1974 Chief Mphephu did not believe in political parties but he was later reported to have formed his own political party, the Venda National Party. Explaining his decision Mr. Mphephu confidently said that his party would gain 25 of the 27 seats in the Legislative Assembly. His party would be tradition-orientated and particularly concerned with the preservation of the powers and functions of the chiefs. Its policy, he declared, was that the Venda system of government by chiefs should not be tampered with.⁹¹

In March, 5 members of the ruling VNP, i.e. Venda National Party joined the opposition Venda Independence Party. Four of the defectors were chiefs and the fifth a headman. The Venda Independence Party already had the support of three chiefs and two headmen. This was a serious threat to Mphephu's government. Eight more members supporting Mphephu joined the Venda Independence Party. Newspaper cuttings were used to canvas people to join the Venda Independence Party. These cuttings presented chiefs as the uneducated lot and therefore the Venda Independence Party's aim was to destroy chieftainship and under its leadership there would be no room for uneducated chiefs.⁹²

It came as no surprise that Chief Mphephu abruptly closed the Venda Legislative Assembly until 1975. It is believed that he did this to avoid further defection by chiefs. When the assembly was later recalled, many chiefs and headmen crossed the floor to the Venda Independence Party. It was obvious that the Venda Independence Party had the majority membership. On the other hand the Venda Independence Party was experiencing a struggle for leadership which was likely to divide the party, and thus weaken it. The men involved were Mr. Baldwin Mudau, a Soweto based sociologist and Chief F. M. Ronovha, a middle-ranking chief living in Vendaland.⁹³

They were both clamouring for the position of Chief Minister. According to Venda constitution, only a Chief could become a Chief Minister.

Vendaland—Second Bantu Laws Amendment Bill

When the draft Bill was sent to the Venda Government, they said that they had no comment. This was interpreted as an approval of the Bill.

Mr Baldwin Mudau, leader of the opposition in Venda said that the new powers would be used to silence individuals in the Opposition.⁹⁴ This statement reflected the general feeling of the homelands opposition parties towards the new Bill.

Gazankulu

Independence

On the issue of accepting independence, Ntsanwisi, the Gazankulu Chief Minister showed himself to be rejecting it in agreement with other homeland leaders—with the exception of Matanzima who, according to him, sold out his birth-right as a South African.⁹⁵ He was adamant on the fact that his Bantustan would not apply for independence until their land demands —far in excess of the 1936 Land Act—were met. Clarifying the position, Prof. Ntsanwisi said that he believed that by accepting Bantustan independence, “we would lose our claims to South Africa’s wealth and would be abandoning our claims to an economy that we helped to build up.”⁹⁶

Investments and Finance

The first silk producing industry in South Africa was established at the Shangaan homeland, Gazankulu.⁹⁷ This was done as a joint venture by the Gazankulu Government and the Bantu Investment Corporation. Professor Ntsanwisi confirmed that a pilot silk project would be launched on the Marweni irrigation scheme which his Government and the Bantu Investment Corporation were to set up on a 50-50 basis. In the Ritavi district near Tzaneen it would involve 500 ha of land of which 200 ha would be developed initially. Apart from the silk project, crops such as cotton, wheat, vegetables and ground nuts would be grown. The annual income would then be R100,000. In 1975 the Bantu Investment Corporation was reported to be ready to spend R154,000. The mulberries imported from Japan in August, 1974 were expected to produce a return of R110 per kilo.

Gazankulu’s Reaction to the Second Bantu Laws Amendment Bill

Professor Hudson Ntsanwisi, the Chief Minister of Ganzankulu said:—

We did not ask for those powers. I don’t think we shall have need of them. There is no subversion in Ganzankulu.

This was said after Mr. M. C. Botha had claimed that all homeland governments had agreed on the implementation of the Bill.

Ciskei

Internal Politics

During 1974 and 1975, this Eastern Cape Bantustan saw a lot of dramatic political strifes and upheavals. Soon after the 1973 election victory of Mr. Lennox Sebe and his supporters, he mobilised his ad hoc group into a political party called the Ciskei National Independence Party (CNIP). The loser, former Chief Minister, Chief Justice Mabandla also organised his side to form the Ciskei National Party (CNP), as the Opposition to the CNIP.

The ruling National Independence Party adopted a conservative pro-Government policy following and executing the South African Government's Separate Development policy without reservation, whereas the Opposition National Party developed a policy of non-racialism, purporting to be striving for full citizenship rights for Blacks in South Africa as a whole. This policy won the opposition considerable support from Ciskeian intellectuals.

1974 saw a process of weeding out by the Sebe administration, of all "undesirable elements" from jobs in and around the major centres of the Ciskei. Referring to one such case, the banishment of a CNP man, Mr. Louis Mtshizana, the Leader of the CNP Chief Justice Mabandla said, "This act marks the culmination of a trend that has been going on since the Sebe team of Cabinet Ministers took charge of the affairs of the Ciskei". He said there had been dismissals and transfers, at very short notice, among all grades of school inspectors, teachers and civil servants; and there were dismissals in township Councils as well. "To cause further hardship and suffering on older persons, the Ciskei Cabinet had decreed that 'non-Ciskeians' shall not be eligible for business, land ownership and residential rights, employment and health services in the Ciskei".

The above statement by Chief Mabandla led to an investigation which was conducted in view of the allegations made. Below we give a picture of what was gathered from interviews with Ciskeians.

The Banishment of Mtshizana

In October 1974, Mr. Louis L. Mtshizana, a Mdantsane attorney who was an outspoken executive member of the opposition Ciskei National Party was banished unexpectedly. He had been banned in 1962 under the Suppression of Communism Act of 1950, and was later jailed on Robben Island for some four and half years. When he came out of prison, he joined Bantustan politics in the Ciskei and became quite popular as a lawyer. It was out of this background that pandemonium arose when Mr. Mtshizana was declared undesirable at

Mdantsane, where he had just rebuilt his flourishing law practice. He was banished to Herschel, rural district in the hinterland along the Lesotho border, under a section of the Bantu Administration Act of 1927, administered under the hand of the State President, Mr. J. J. Fouche and the Minister of Bantu Administration, Mr. M. C. Botha.

Statements of condemnation were shot from all over the Eastern Cape. The Transkei Administration reacted sharply because Mr. Mtshizana had originated from the Transkei. A statement from Chief Matanzima said that Mr. Mtshizana was a son of the Transkei and his banishment from the magisterial district of Mdantsane to the Magisterial district of Herschel would cause misunderstanding between the Transkei and the Ciskei Governments. He said that the Ciskei Government had instigated the action against Mr. Mtshizana. "Our shock stems from the fact that the Republican Government had to do the dirty work of another Government. They should have left it for the Ciskei Government to do," he said.⁹⁸

The Eastern Cape representative in the Coloured Persons Representative Council (CRC), Mr. Peter Mopp, said banishment without trial was symbolic of a sick society, and all South Africans should hang their heads in shame for allowing this to happen. "The finger of suspicion points heavily in the direction of certain supporters of Separate Development in Mdantsane as being responsible for the wheels being set in motion which led to Louis Mtshizana's banishment", said Mr. Mopp. He said it was only the one who was morally bankrupt who would banish an opponent, or cause him to be banished. He added, "if Mr. Sebe and his Cabinet did have something to do with this, then South Africa had better sit up and take note how some black politicians are imitating their white masters. If they had no hand in the banishment of their citizen, they should in no uncertain terms tell the Republican Government not to interfere in their internal affairs, and call upon the State President and the Minister of Bantu Administration and Development to revoke the banishment order".⁹⁹

The leader of the Transkei Reformist Democratic Party, Mr. H. B. Ncokazi, said "The banning and deportation of Mr. Mtshizana because of his political convictions is a drastic act of callous authoritarianism that is starkly reminiscent of Nazi Germany. Brutal treatment by ruthless administrators against this son of Africa will haunt us for many years to come, and like many other past iniquities that have been perpetrated against us, will never be forgotten".¹⁰⁰

It was reported that Ciskei Cabinet Ministers asked to comment on the matter, would not comment. The Minister of Justice Mr. B. D. Myataza, said "I am not prepared to comment". The Minister of Interior, Mr. L. F. Siyo, said, "We do not know what shape this matter

is going to take, and we cannot comment at this stage". The Chief Minister, Mr. Sebe, who was reported to be on holiday in the Wilderness, said it was difficult for him to comment because he had not got all the facts. He said the best man to comment would be the Acting Chief Minister, Interior Minister, Mr. Siyo.

A delegation from the Opposition which was led by the leader, Chief Mabandla went to see the Chief Minister and two of his senior Ministers, to discuss the Mtshizana issue.¹⁰¹ In this meeting Mr. Sebe told Chief Mabandla that the action against Mr. Mtshizana had been "necessitated by some serious evidence", and because of the confidential nature of the evidence, he could not divulge it.¹⁰² Nevertheless he assured the Chief and his delegation that an extraordinary session of the Ciskei Legislative Assembly to discuss the political situation in the territory would be considered.

Chief Mabandla said after the meeting, "Many a man has suffered as a result of confidential information when the 'accused' was not given the opportunity to put his case across. The banishment of Mtshizana has sharply brought into focus the progressively deteriorating political situation in the Ciskei. It is unfortunate that the highly esteemed authority of the State President had had to be dragged into the political mud of the Ciskei and it is clear that Mr. Mtshizana is not deemed to have committed any act detrimental to the security of the State, hence he has not been chastised in terms of the anti-communism or anti-terrorism Acts, but under an almost obsolete section of the Bantu Administration Act of 1927, which, in those days, was designed to keep the 'Native' in his place," he added. He said it seemed the only "crime committed by Mr. Mtshizana and others who had tasted similar treatment was that they did not procure membership cards of the ruling Ciskei National Independence Party of Mr. Sebe, or that they criticised the Ciskei Cabinet and the policy of dividing the people of South Africa in terms of ethnic affiliation or natural pigmentation of their skins. "If there can be such deportation now, one wonders what lies in store for the Ciskei when the Bantu Laws Amendment Bill becomes law," the Chief concluded, referring to the Security Bill which was proposed for Bantustans. The Ciskei position vis-a-vis this Bill will be discussed in a special section below.

Other Reported Cases

Mr. Popo, a prosecutor in the Mdantsane Magistrate's Court was leading the case against some members of the ruling party who had allegedly assaulted commuters during a bus strike in the township. The commuters were opposing an increase in bus fares which they felt was unfair. The Ciskei Government, apparently requested by the White bus Company, told people to discontinue the strike. It was gathered from

random interviews that supporters of the ruling party then began to assault people that continued to boycott the buses, on the grounds that they were not loyal to the Ciskei Chief Minister who had appealed against the boycott. It is reported that some of the accused people did not turn up in court on a day they were supposed to appear, (apparently they were away on a CNIP trip to Cape Town) whereupon the prosecutor Mr. Popo issued warrants of arrest. It appears that the Ciskei administration did not take kindly to the action of the prosecutor, and for that reason he had to be removed from the scene.

The second instance was that of Mr. Masiza, a Judicial Officer at Mdantsane where he was handling an assault case in which members of the CNIP were accused. Before the case had been concluded, Mr. Masiza was transferred to Keiskammahoek, allegedly for having revealed confidential court information to some unauthorised persons. It is reported that Mr. Masiza appealed for a commission of inquiry to be set up to investigate the allegation against him but that request was rejected by the administration. He therefore refused to go to Keiskammahoek, and is reported to have gone to the Transkei.

Mr. Ngxamngxa, who was a teacher by profession, had been working as a Director of Culture in the Ministry of Education and Culture when he was removed without reason to be seconded to a secondary school in Middledrift as an assistant teacher. He had worked with that school for only about a month when he was dismissed from the Civil Service without reasons being offered. It is believed that he had been declared undesirable because he had allegedly attended a commemoration service of the Sharpeville shooting called Heroes' day (March 21st) organised jointly by the South African Students' Organisation and the Black People's Convention. Secondly he is said to have attended a funeral of a man who had suddenly died on Robben Island in March 1975 a few months before his release was due. The funeral was conducted at Dimbaza, a resettlement township outside King William's Town.

Mr. Bobo Mpafana, an ex-political prisoner who had been jailed for alleged participation in banned Pan Africanist Congress activities, was working at a reform school called Bekruipkop near King William's Town as a teacher. He was also dismissed for no particular reason.

The following people, all teachers, mostly head-masters, with long services in their respective schools were suddenly transferred to other districts at short notices:—

Mr. Tyalimpi transferred from Lady Frere to Herschel (subsequently left for the Transkei in protest).

Mr. Xoseka, transferred from Queenstown to Herschel.

Mr. Mpondo, transferred from Zwelitsha (the Capital township) to Lady Frere.

Mr. Faba, transferred from Mgwali (Stutterheim) to Rabula (Keiskamahoe).

Mr. Mangcu, transferred from Lady Frere to Zwelitsha.

According to Ciskeian regulations, "Any teacher on the teaching establishment may, whenever the public interest to the Department's interest so demands be transferred from the school or office where he is employed..."

There are a number of people who had been in the Ciskei administration of the Civil Service, who are reported to have left the service for unhappy reasons. Cases of two senior personnel who apparently had to leave for the Transkei Civil Service were mentioned. They were Mr. Martins, employed in the Staff section of the Interior Department, and Mr. Dlakavu employed in the training division for Government clerks. It was also alleged that a certain Mr. Manyakanyaka, an agricultural officer in the Debe-Nek area had been without pay since January 1975, allegedly for having attended a rally of the Ciskei National Party at Debe-Nek. According to sources close to Mr. Manyakanyaka, a letter was written to him to the effect that he had been suspended from the pay-roll because he was taking an active part in politics. According to Ciskeian Civil Service regulations, employees may not actively participate in politics of the Ciskei.

The Election Trial

"The election in the Zwelitsha electoral division, in which Mr. Sebe and others were elected into the Ciskei Legislative Assembly was declared void in the Grahamstown Supreme Court today". This statement which was broadcast as the first item on the seven o'clock news release of Radio South Africa, on Friday June 6, 1975, marked the highlight of the day in the Ciskei, when the Opposition Party won a moral battle against the ruling Party over the validity of the 1973 election result, in one of the two disputed electoral divisions.

There were 9 divisions in the Ciskei, in which the election was conducted, namely, Zwelitsha, Mdantsane, Middledrift, Keiskammahoe, Victoria East, Herschel, Glen Grey, Hewu and Peddie. The CNIP won most of the seats with a huge majority. The two divisions which the opposition CNP felt particularly unhappy about were Zwelitsha and Victoria East. Both divisions, the biggest in the Ciskei, were entitled to four seats each in the Assembly.

The Zwelitsha Division

Early in 1975, complaints were put before the Grahamstown Supreme Court by the Ciskei Opposition Party, in a bid to be accorded another

opportunity to win the four seats for this division, which were won by the ruling CNIP by an average majority of 15%. The complaints were brought with allegations against the CNIP candidates who won the election, amongst whom was the Ciskei Chief Minister Lennox Sebe; and some white electoral and returning officers.

It was claimed that the agents of the successful candidates, or the candidates themselves, had in their campaign, used intimidatory language to pressurize the voters in their favour and as a result the outcome of the election concerned should be regarded as irregular.

It was further claimed that the polling and the returning officers, who were all white judicial officers had, in the marking of the ballot papers to assist illiterate voters, allowed unauthorised persons who were attached to the CNIP to participate, thereby indicating favour for that particular party. It was alleged that the counting of the ballot papers had been done in an irregular fashion in that agents of CNIP candidates were assisting in the counting, and that some votes which had been cast for the CNP were rejected.

The hearing was conducted by Mr. Justice de Wet and two assessors. The judgement which was given in three sections on June 6, 1975, declared the election results null and void.

The first section, given by Mr. Justice de Wet dealt with the respondent CNIP candidates, the Chief Minister Sebe and Messrs. Nqezo, Nkontso and Sam, all four of whom had become members of the Legislative Assembly.

In his judgement, Mr. Justice de Wet declared that the responding candidates were not responsible for the undue pressurising influence to which the voters were allegedly subjected. This meant that even though the election had been declared void, for other reasons, to be explained presently, the said candidates were not to blame, and were therefore free to contest again in the event of another election in the Zwelitsha electoral division.

The electoral officers involved, Messrs. W. Odendaal, D. Crossman and D. J. Mulder were found guilty. It was the direct result of this judgement that the election was declared invalid. Because the four accused members of the Legislative Assembly had been cleared of complaints laid against them by the opposition complainants, it was ordered by the Supreme Court that the complainants should pay half the court expenses incurred as a result of that aspect of the trial while the defendants remaining to pay the other half.

The electoral officers concerned were ordered to pay all the costs accruing from their aspect of the trial, including those of counsel for both sides.

The immediate result of the judgement in this case was that the Ciskei Chief Minister was removed from the Assembly which meant that the Ciskei would be without a Chief Minister, because that position could only be held by a member of the Assembly according to the Ciskei constitution.

An air of uncertainty prevailed in the Ciskei for a while when speculation went on as to who would succeed Mr. Sebe. According to a section of Proclamation R187 of 1972, which brought about the establishment of the Ciskei Legislative Assembly to supercede the Ciskei Territorial Authority, "whenever the office of the Chief Minister becomes vacant or the Chief Minister is absent or unable to act and no Minister has been nominated, the Cabinet shall designate one of their number to act as Chief Minister until the vacancy is filled or until the Chief Minister is able to resume office."¹⁰³

Speculation was centred on two men as likely successors of Mr. Sebe—the Minister of the Interior, Mr. L. F. Siyo, who had acted as Chief Minister on several occasions in Mr. Sebe's absence, and the Minister of Education Mr. S. Burns-Ncamashe, who had much better educational qualifications.

There were reports that lobbying had already started at Mdantsane and Zwelitsha on the night of the Supreme Court decision. Contrary to all speculation, a relatively junior Minister in the Cabinet, Mr. J. Mkrola, was appointed to hold the fort.

The general feeling of people talked to about Mr. Mkrola's appointment was that he was certainly not the most capable man to succeed Mr. Sebe. Suggestions were that he had been appointed to allow Mr. Sebe to make a come-back at by-election time, which was expected before November 1975. Any of the more capable men would probably have tried to entrench themselves in the position at the expense of Mr. Sebe. Mr. Mkrola could never succeed in building himself up for power in the Ciskei because he represented the Herschel constituency, which was presently being ceded to the Transkei which meant that he would be out of the picture very shortly.

The Victoria East Division

Almost immediately after judgement in the Zwelitsha division dispute was passed, hearing commenced on similar complaints laid by members of the CNP against successfully elected CNIP members of the Assembly representing Victoria East.

The ruling party enjoyed a bigger success in this constituency, having won by a 55% majority in 1973. At the time of printing, the State was still leading evidence. Respondents in this case were Messrs. L. Maqoma, A. Lamani, S. Burns-Ncamashe, W. S. Ximiya, together with electoral officers Messrs. Odendaal, Basson, Barnard and Kemp. The

complainants were Messrs. M. Mabandla (brother to CNP leader), R. S. Matakane, M. Mbatane, W. Zantsi, L. Zantsi and O. Bokwe.

Whatever the verdict would be in this case, Messrs. S. Burns-Ncamashe (Minister of Education) and L. Maqoma would not be affected because they had since become Chiefs of some clans in the area. That status accorded them free right to the Legislative Assembly.

The Mdantsane Bus Strike

For the first time in the history of Mdantsane Township, African commuters called a halt to regular transport operations when a bus boycott was started on the early morning of December 2nd 1974. The people were protesting against bus fare increases which were not acceptable.

An investigation into the background of the strike revealed that in fact the proposed fare increases had been talked about between the bus company and the Mdantsane Council, a caretaker body created to look into the affairs of the township.

When the matter came before the court of the Road Transportation Board, where the Border Passenger Transport Company was supposed to motivate for fare increases, the people of Mdantsane had not been perfectly briefed to attend the Board where they could have opposed the bus company proposal, and show cause why the increases would not be acceptable. The majority of the people talked to put the blame on the Council for not having informed the community properly of the intentions of the bus company, and of what lawful steps they could have taken to stop the increases.

Ordinarily the Mdantsane commuters had to take buses operating a feeding system transporting them to a central terminus in the township, where they would get buses to the City. Regular passengers, like most workers, could buy weekly tickets at somewhat reduced fees. There had been long standing discontentment on the operation of the weekly tickets. The main point of dissent was that the tickets would expire at the end of the week, regardless of whether one had used one's ticket for all the week or not.

It happened in some cases that people either got free lifts from friends into the city, or that they had days off work, which meant that they would not use their tickets for which they had already paid. The feeling was that it was unfair therefore to have to buy another ticket for the following week even though one had an unused ticket from the previous week. One East London factory worker obviously incensed over this issue said, "Something *can* be done about this, I am sure it can be improved".

Some people were also expressing a feeling that the bus company was rather bullying in its operation and said that the community was never

consulted even when it was going to bring about a difference in the amount of money paid for daily travelling to the city.

Previously people could board buses from their respective sections of the township, directly to East London. When the new system of feeding into a central terminus was introduced in 1972, more money was involved and it also introduced the inconvenience of queueing twice for buses every morning.

Thus people responded favourably when the word got around in the 80,000 plus worker township that "Azikhwelwa" from the 1st of December. (Azikhwelwa is a Xhosa expression for "they are not to be boarded") Since December 1st fell on a Sunday, the boycott actually took effect on Monday 2nd.

Thousands of workers gathered at the central terminus from before dawn. Some had come in the feeding system buses from their respective section to the terminus merely to confirm if it was true that 'Azikhwelwa'.

By about 5.45 in the morning, with the number swelling larger and larger and more buses arriving, people became more restive and some stoning of the buses started. This drove the buses away and commuters began to fill regular taxis to go to town.

The spirit of taxi operators and ordinary car owners was highly supportive. Most of them rallied to the aid of commuters, and usual taxi fares were reduced considerably by all, apparently to enable the commuters to endure the strike. This practice continued for the next six weeks.

The South African Railways faced unmanageable numbers of commuters and trains were always very much overloaded. This of course, resulted in the slowing down of the regular services which had never budgeted for such numbers.

From its early stages, the boycott was marked with violence. During the day, when most workers would have gone to work, the police would collect people seen around the terminus and have them beaten up or arrested or both. The same prevailed and took an added dimension in the evenings. Pirate taxis were threatened by the law.

One incident cited which highlighted the extent of violence surrounding the boycott was the death of a young Form II schoolboy of Hlokoma Secondary School in police cells on the night of Wednesday 4th of December 1974. The pupil's surname was reported as Gangala. Apparently he had been snatched by police that night in the township as part of the general campaign to discourage people from supporting the boycott.

The most interesting result of the strike was that bus fares were eventually reduced to the original fees, even though the people continued to boycott in spite of the reduction, on the grounds that the weekly tickets issue had not been settled.

By this time the bus company was feeling the pinch of running at a loss as a result of which it was indicating a desire to sell its buses and the route licence to a black company to serve the Mdantsane people. The Ciskei Government became interested, but they could not raise the necessary capital to buy the buses.

The Xhosa Development Corporation, a Government created agency operating most viable commercial undertakings in Xhosa-speaking Bantustans, stepped in and offered to take over the services and finish off the remaining period in the contract signed by the Border Passenger Transport Company, which was due to expire in June 1976.

There were reports that by June 1976, the transportation service would be split into two concerns running in co-operation with each other. The feeding services within the township would be run by a black company in which the Ciskei Government would also buy shares, while the Xhosa Development Corporation would operate the service between the township and the city.

To end the boycott the Ciskei Cabinet made appeals to supporters of the ruling party to use the buses and to dissociate themselves from the feelings of the rest of the commuters. This led to more violence in the township. Government supporters went around assaulting anyone who used taxis or got lifts from private cars. Some were actually hauled from inside the cars.

Court proceedings arising out of these practices then led to inconveniences suffered by court officers like the prosecutor Mr. Popo, and the magistrate Mr. Masiza (see section on Internal Politics above).

During 1974 and 1975, prominent businessmen in Mdantsane and Zwelitsha were busy bracing themselves to be financially ready to buy substantial shares in the new black bus company to operate in Mdantsane. One businessman in Mdantsane commented in an interview, "Perhaps we can say this has been the most important development brought about by the strike".

Land Consolidation

Rapid developments in the consolidation programme of the Ciskei homeland, took place in 1975 especially in the second quarter of the year.

Amongst the most remarkable developments was the cession to the Transkei of two Ciskei districts of Herschel and Glen Grey for several Eastern Cape towns and some 150,000 hectares of rich farmland and forest, which would consolidate the Ciskei into a single unit.¹⁰⁴ However,

despite these prospects of good land addition to the Ciskei, it was evident from the Chief Minister Mr. Sebe's statement reported in the *Natal Mercury* of 20th March, 1975, that this would not be the end of the homeland's claims for land.

According to the report, Mr. Sebe said that there were several areas in the Eastern Cape at present in white hands, which had cultural and historic ties with Blacks. "Some are the very cradle of our culture," he said. He mentioned that he had his eyes on the districts of Emgwali (Stutterheim), Mooiplaats (near East London) and Blinkwater (near Fort Beaufort).

The cession of the Glen Grey and Herschel areas to the Transkei raised controversy in the Ciskei, especially regarding the Glen Grey district. In 1972 the people living in the Glen Grey area had decided through a referendum, by an overwhelming majority, that they did not want to be part of the Transkei.¹⁰⁵ It was therefore alarming that the Government could decide to disregard the feeling of this community and hive the district off to the Transkei.

The Chief Minister Mr. Sebe, addressing a special session of the Legislative Assembly, summoned to recommend the cession of the said areas to the Transkei, made it clear that his Government had no intention of testing its decision with a referendum in Herschel and Glen Grey. Pointing to written resolutions before him from chiefs and tribal authorities in both districts, he said, "This is all the authority I need".¹⁰⁶

Other areas consolidated into the Ciskei were Peddie, Alice, Hamburg and Seymour districts. These plans were concluded against stiff opposition from white farmers in those areas. It will be noted that there had always been opposition from affected communities, whether white or black, in all cases where the homeland consolidation programme was effected.

Investments and Finances

The Ciskei shared the same opinion of politico-economic interdependence between the Republic and the homelands, with other homelands. The Chief Minister Mr. L. L. Sebe stamped this idea when he said that he could not think of a more disastrous self-delusion than the idea still lingering in the minds of some white South Africans, namely, to create homelands, give them independence and then push them out of their thoughts. The Ciskei economy, he said, was so closely inter-woven with that of South Africa as a whole that even after independence this economic inter-dependence would have to be maintained.¹⁰⁷ He likened the South African situation to one little boat in which Blacks and Whites were crowded together and which was being

tossed by wild and unpredictable waves on the ocean of history. He aversed that the homelands and the South African Government had only each other to rely upon in a life and death economical and political struggle to reach the safety of a distant port, otherwise they would perish together.

Addressing a group of journalists who had just completed a three day tour of Xhosa Development Corporation projects in the Transkei and Ciskei, the Ciskei Chief Minister Lennox Sebe urged white industrialists to seize the opportunity of investing in the Ciskei before it became too late. "Events in the United Nations, around Africa, and in countries surrounding us, emphasise the point that the 'haves' must help the 'have-nots'. Daily around us, the signal warning flashes. If this aid is not forth-coming, we will suffer. To white South African industrialists I say, help us so that we may help you tomorrow", Mr. Sebe said.¹⁰⁸

Sources of information revealed that the Xhosa Development Corporation was embarking on a mammoth agricultural development project which would not only provide employment for many Ciskeians, but eventually, result in the independent homeland exporting produce to the Republic. This project would create 15,479 jobs for Blacks and about 154 Whites from the communities of Stutterheim, Cathcart, Queenstown and surrounding areas. Salaries and wages would rise from 1975-79. Agriculture, it was said, was the only resource in the Ciskei, therefore proper utilisation of this was a fundamental requirement for a healthy economy.¹⁰⁹

Opening the Second Ciskeian Legislative Assembly in 1975 the Minister of Agriculture Mr. Hendrich Schoeman said that various agreements which had been entered into with white industrialists would draw an investment capital of more than R4 million to the Ciskei because they would create employment opportunities for about 1,350 Ciskeians. He praised the extension of services in the Ciskei which had doubled from R15,958,000 in 1973/74 to nearly R33 million.

The salaries of the Ciskei Cabinet ranged thus:—

<i>Position</i>	<i>Salary per month</i>	<i>Salary per annum</i>	<i>Entertainment</i>	<i>Subsistence allowance</i>
Chief Minister	R541-67	R6,500	R300,00p.a.	R225-00p.a.
Ministers	R500-00	R6,000	R200,00p.a.	R100-00p.a.

The estimates of expenditure defrayed from the Ciskei Revenue Fund during the years 1973-74, 1974-75 and 1975-76 were as follows:—

	1973/74	1974/75	1975/76
	R	R	R
1. Chief Minister & Finance	406 500	440 200	537 000
2. Interior	3327 500	3997 500	5684 000
3. Works	4339 700	5826 000	13494 000
4. Education	6260 300	7184 000	10872 000
5. Agriculture and Forestry	1352 800	2377 000	3263 000
6. Justice	271 200	317 300	387 000
	<hr/> 15958 000 <hr/>	<hr/> 20142 000 <hr/>	<hr/> 34237 000 <hr/>

Ciskei's Response to the Second Bantu Laws Amendment Bill

The Minister of Bantu Administration and Development, Mr. M. C. Botha, had sent to all the homeland leaders the draft document of the above mentioned Bill. This he said he did to get their opinions of the Bill.

The impression which the homeland leaders had given to the Nationalists, especially Mr. Botha was that they had consented to the Bill. In support of this statement Mr. van der Walt a Nationalist M.P. said, "The fact of the matter is that not one of these Bantu homeland authorities adopted a negative attitude while the official liason was taking place, i.e. when they were requested to comment on this particular Bill...Those who participated actively such as the Chief Minister of the Ciskei, said so explicitly."¹¹⁰ As is evidenced in Mr. van der Walt's statement, the Chief Minister of the Ciskei supported the Bill unreservedly. He said the proposals embodied in the Bill were "pre-cautionary powers needed by every developing nation in the world".¹¹¹

Amalgamation

The Ciskei decided against amalgamation because it felt that the time was still too early for such a step to be taken, and also that it wanted to develop on its own. The general feeling among Ciskeians was that the Transkei was bulldozing the amalgamation issue. Further information on the issue of amalgamation has been discussed under "Transkei".

The Prime Minister Mr. Vorster reported to the Assembly that the matter of amalgamation rested entirely in the hands of the two governments concerned but the Chief Ministers of the two homelands were requested by the Government to consult on this question. The Ciskei felt that amalgamation was inevitable in the long run.

Africanization

Even after the Ciskei acquired its independence, those Whites, Coloured and Indians who wanted to stay in the Ciskei would be allowed to do so as long as they contributed to the development of the territory.

Opening the Institute of Race Relations 45th Annual Conference, the Chief Minister of the Ciskei Mr. L. L. Sebe said that "peace, friendliness and co-operation" between the homelands and the people of South Africa should be ensured.¹¹²

Assuring Whites of their safety the Chief Minister Mr. L. L. Sebe said that "Whites who opt to stay in the Eastern Cape districts which are to become part of the Ciskei homelands under the Government consolidation proposals would be accepted with open arms."¹¹³ Mr. Sebe spelt out his policy stressing that "People who have know-how cannot be thrown away". "We regard Whites with know-how as a golden investment", he said. He warned also that those non-Africans who wished to remain in the Ciskei would have to pay allegiance to the homeland.¹¹⁴ The Ciskei motto with regard to other races was "We will not worry about colour".

The Ciskei hoped that those people with know-how would pass on some of their knowledge to its people, especially in the transformation of the Hamburg/Peddie region into a sub-tropical fruit producing region

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| ²³ <i>Natal Mercury</i> 4.8.74. | ⁴⁷ <i>Star</i> 30.4.74. |
| ²⁴ <i>Natal Mercury</i> 29.6.74. | ⁴⁸ <i>Drum</i> 8.5.75. |

- ⁴⁹*Ibid.*
- ⁵⁰*Ibid.*
- ⁵¹*Rand Daily Mail* 19.3.75.
- ⁵²*Drum* 22.1.75.
- ⁵³*Star* 24.5.74.
- ⁵⁴*Rand Daily Mail* 14.3.75.
- ⁵⁵*Ibid.*
- ⁵⁶*Rand Daily Mail* 12.3.74.
- ⁵⁷*Rand Daily Mail* 29.3.74.
- ⁵⁸*Sunday Times* 16.3.75.
- ⁵⁹*Rand Daily Mail* 17.3.75.
- ⁶⁰*Star* 21.3.75.
- ⁶¹*Rand Daily Mail* 9.4.75.
- ⁶²*Hansard* Vol. 12 Col. 5887.
- ⁶³*Rand Daily Mail* 3.12.74.
- ⁶⁴*Rand Daily Mail* 22.1.74.
- ⁶⁵*Ibid.*
- ⁶⁶*Rand Daily Mail* 20.5.75.
- ⁶⁷*Ibid.*
- ⁶⁸*Rand Daily Mail* 21.5.75.
- ⁶⁹*Star* 23.5.75.
- ⁷⁰*Ibid.*
- ⁷¹*Rand Daily Mail* 30.10.74.
- ⁷²*Star* 19.7.73.
- ⁷³*Star* 23.5.75.
- ⁷⁴*Daily Dispatch* 28.5.75.
- ⁷⁵*Rand Daily Mail* 28.5.75.
- ⁷⁶*Rand Daily Mail* 10.9.73.
- ⁷⁷*Star* 30.4.74.
- ⁷⁸*Ibid.*
- ⁷⁹*Star* 8.5.74.
- ⁸⁰*Rand Daily Mail* 28.11.74.
- ⁸¹*Rand Daily Mail* 19.2.74.
- ⁸²*Drum* 22.5.75.
- ⁸³*Rand Daily Mail* 25.1.74.
- ⁸⁴*Rand Daily Mail* 12.6.74.
- ⁸⁵*Rand Daily Mail* 1.1.45.
- ⁸⁶*Sunday Times* 24.11.74.
- ⁸⁷*Star* 30.10.73.
- ⁸⁸*Rand Daily Mail* 17.7.74.
- ⁸⁹*Sunday Tribune* 30.12.73.
- ⁹⁰*Rand Daily Mail* 30.1.74.
- ⁹¹*Rand Daily Mail* 18.3.74.
- ⁹²*Rand Daily Mail* 14.2.75.
- ⁹³*Hansard* Vol. 12 Col. 5887-8.
- ⁹⁴*Rand Daily Mail* 1.7.74.
- ⁹⁵*Ibid.*
- ⁹⁶*Sunday Times* 30.6.74.
- ⁹⁷*Hansard* Vol. 12 Col. 5887.
- ⁹⁸*Daily Dispatch* 18.10.74.
- ⁹⁹*Ibid.*
- ¹⁰⁰*Ibid.*
- ¹⁰¹*Daily Dispatch* 22.10.74.
- ¹⁰²*Ibid.*
- ¹⁰³*Daily Dispatch* 7.6.75.
- ¹⁰⁴*Natal Mercury* 20.3.75.
- ¹⁰⁵*Daily Dispatch* 2.4.75.
- ¹⁰⁶*Natal Mercury* 19.3.75.
- ¹⁰⁷*Daily Dispatch* 27.9.74.
- ¹⁰⁸*Herald* 4.10.75.
- ¹⁰⁹*Weekend Post* 12.4.75.
- ¹¹⁰*Hansard* Vol 12 Col. 5902.
- ¹¹¹*Ibid.*
- ¹¹²*Daily News* 17.1.75.
- ¹¹³*Weekend Post* 10-12.4.74.
- ¹¹⁴*Ibid.*