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SASH

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The Black Sash magazine

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ESTHER LEVITAN

ESTHER LEVITAN, our well-loved and staunch member of many years standing, was detained by the Security Police on 5th January 1982. She has since been re-detained under Section 6 of the Terrorism Act, which provides for indefinite detention without charge or trial.

She was our accurate and dependable Secretary until her husband's death forced her to take a job.

The Black Sash is appalled by her arbitrary incarceration, as it is by the effective disappearance of all those detained and banned.

And no one knows why.

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Sane Nationalists?

IN NOVEMBER the Prime Minister informed the Transvaal Congress of the National Party that 'no sane Nationalist' would endanger White self-determination.

This, of course, begs the obvious question: Are Nationalism and sanity compatible? South Africa, over the past thirty years, has become increasingly aberrant.

Paranoid secrecy is not compatible with complete sanity. In this issue there is an edited version of a paper by Professor William Gutteridge. Professor Gutteridge sounds like a moderate academic, certainly not 'anti South African', who is deeply concerned about our future. However, under the Defence Act **SASH** was not allowed to publish his definition of the 'operational area' or his approximate estimate of the number of men serving on the border. The authorities refuse to allow the adult men and women who voted them into power to know how many of their sons are endangering their lives, and where.

Another sign of psychological disturbance is the Government's constant self-justification and transference of blame. It is the spiteful media which have made our country a universal outcast and not the Government's actions. Squatters were not at Nyanga because they wanted to earn a living in the Western Cape, but because agitators put them up to it. The majority of Indians did not vote in the elections for the SA Indian Council because they saw through the whole charade, but because they were intimidated.

Of course such reasoning is patently tragi-comic. But the very tragedy lies in the fact that the Government does not see its absurdity. And it is here that its behaviour verges on the psychotic. A neurotic is at least very conscious that he is ill. A psychotic does not know that he is irrational and sees nothing wrong with his behaviour and beliefs.

Recently Pik Botha said that in South Africa one is innocent until proved guilty by the courts. Such a statement denotes a divorce from reality and a refusal to acknowledge facts in view of the almost weekly detentions by the Security Police of people held without charge or trial, and in view of the special provisions of the Internal Security Act, the Sabotage Act and the Terrorism Act, all of which cast an onus on the accused to prove his innocence.

Insanity in the body politic leads to a perversion of individual humanity. Eighteen years of detention without charge or trial have bludgeoned the general public's natural reactions of horror into apathy. The recent formation of a support group by the parents of some of the detainees is a courageous, outstandingly healthy reaction to the cancerous, tentacle-like growth of the absolute power wielded by the police, and the Security Police in particular. If only this sort of sanity could be restored to our body politic, and to our people, so that our old men could once again realise their dreams and our young men be legally permitted their visions, there would be hope for South Africa.

ON STANDING

STANDING in silent protest, holding a placard and wearing a black sash, has been this organisation's way of expressing dissent for the past nearly 27 years.

For all of that period I have been one of those who have stood, in rain or sunshine, heat or cold, night or day, deriving personal satisfaction from the knowledge that my poster has expressed a viewpoint I endorse, and feeling grateful for the opportunity to join my colleagues in the unceasing battle of the Black Sash for justice and fair dealing for all in our country.

I have had my share of public abuse and of public support, of tomatoes or eggs or approbation. But never before have I experienced such an almost tangible wave of anger and hatred surging towards me from passing motorists as on the morning I shared a stand with SHEENA DUNCAN

against the re-imposition of a banning order on WINNIE MANDELA.

Taking it in turns we held posters saying, 'WINNIE MANDELA and Hundreds More Banned or Detained' and 'Justice Is Dead!' It is hard to know what it was that so infuriated the public. Was it the name of 'Mandela?' or was it the unpalatable truth about justice? or was it simply the evidence that there are still people who dare defy Government Policy or question the morality of its actions?

It is, of course, not surprising that those who support a Government that can perpetrate institutionalised violence against its citizens should in turn have scant regard for the rights or the dignity of those who dissent, and should express their disregard in so violent and unedifying a fashion. Such behaviour does no credit to the society which engenders it

JOYCE HARRIS

Our National Motto: “Don't Quote Me”

WILF NUSSEY

WHEN the Nationalists bring their second republic into being the backroom broeders should redesign the South African coat of arms to replace the motto 'Unity is Strength' — a weird one, anyway, for a party which believes separation is strength.

In its stead, below a shield of Whites dexter, Blacks sinister and bureaucrats rampant, should be that ubiquitous South African comment on everything: 'Don't Quote Me'.

So widely used is it now in every niche and strata of South African society that it can take its place beside our other national buzzwords like sunshine, rugby, voetsek and boerewors.

Situation: A reporter doing a spot opinion poll in a city street asks: 'Madam, do you believe that better living conditions for servants should be enforced by law?'

'Oh no, I can't say anything about that, I might wind up in detention'.

Or, 'Ma'am, what do you think of the miniskirt?'

'Ar, it's very nice if you got long legs, y'know, but please don't quote me 'cause my husband's a company director'.

Or, 'Should schools have tuck shops?'

'Ooh you can't quote me on that, the school won't like it'.

Controversial

Situation: You want information from a government department on a subject of immediate public interest, like the critical nurse shortage, squatter removals, police pay or a certain party at the Mint, and if it is even faintly controversial, the response is likely to be:

'I am afraid I cannot comment on that, you will have to speak to the Director-General/Minister/Whoever'.

Or, 'I do not talk to the Press', or 'We are not allowed to talk to the Press'.

Or, if you know the man well enough, 'Look, I'll explain what's happening but for God's sake don't quote me or I'll be sacked'.

Some top rankers, once reached, dodge behind thick hedgerows of red tape. Ask the Transvaal Education Department about teachers' salaries, or the Prisons Department about conditions inside, and the reaction is almost invariably: 'Please submit your questions in writing'. (Answers take up to three weeks, and then say little or nothing).

Cabinet Ministers, too, have their boltholes, the favourite being 'It is not in the public interest to disclose . . .' — this even in Parliament, the nation's major forum, which has a greater right and

privilege to know than any other institution or individual.

The best ministerial example of the 'don't quote me — no comment' syndrome in recent years is that of the Minister of Police, Mr Louis le Grange.

Secrecy

Of all public service departments none is more concerned with serving the public than the police. They should be part and parcel of the public, its first and continuous contact with the State, its guardians, its helper in all things from giving the time of day to fending off terrorism.

Conversely the public must be concerned about the welfare of the police as members of the community. Their well-being is the guarantee of the public's security. Therefore police pay is very much the concern of the public, who pay it.

But Mr le Grange deems it otherwise. Last year he announced that he could not allow the issue of police salaries to be discussed publicly. His logic is strange: it was not pleasant, he said, for policemen to hear in public that they had rotten salaries and bad working conditions.

So strongly does Mr le Grange believe this that when a Cape Town reporter revealed police pay details earlier this year, the police summoned him before a magistrate to reveal his sources.

Gilbert and Sullivan would have loved it but the Attorney-General, sensibly, did not and quashed the case.

Disease

Mr le Grange's attitude reflects a yen for secrecy which has permeated the bureaucracy like some insidious disease since the National Party came to power in 1948. Confronted by powerful criticism of many of its actions, the Government decided to avoid this by the simple expedient of hiding them.

The result is the present all-pervasive timidity, indecision and 'we know what's good for you' arrogance which would not be tolerated by the public of any normal democratic society like Britain's, America's or Australia's.

But here the 'don't quote me/no comment/not in the public interest' response has been current for so long and is so commonplace that it is taken for granted as the norm and is creeping well outside officialdom into commerce and industry.

Consider the many aspects of life which the public is denied details of and prevented from questioning freely: the Defence Force (where official secrecy hides much more than it needs to),

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Helen Suzman Talks

to JANET SAHLI

Janet: Can you sum up your general impressions of this last Parliamentary session?

Helen: It was very disappointing. Although I was never optimistic that we were going to see much in the way of reform — I knew PW and Co. had been scared out of their wits by the support gained by the HNP in the April general election — nevertheless I always retain a sort of sneaking anticipation that something good will happen — even after 28 years! In the event, nothing whatsoever was forthcoming, with one exception in labour relations legislation. For the rest the government's behaviour — especially Koornhof's — over the Nyanga issue was utterly appalling.

Janet: You've anticipated my next question. The PFP has been strong in its condemnation of the government's handling of Nyanga. You yourself have said that the government must come to terms with the urban problem. How would you have handled the whole Nyanga question?

Helen: Well, you see Nyanga is the outcome of the government's hopelessly unrealistic policy of believing that it can stem urbanisation by influx control and failing to provide accommodation. This is particularly so in the Western Cape, where the 'Coloured' labour preference policy prevails.

The government has got to accept the fact that people are coming to the cities to look for work — there is none in the homelands — and adapt housing standards to the existing critical shortage by site-and-service schemes, core-housing etc.

Janet: Could you elaborate on your previous point about labour relations?

Helen: What it did was to remove three major deficiencies in the big Industrial Conciliations Amendment Act of 1979. Firstly, all workers can now join a registered trade union, including migrant workers. It is now a right, not something granted by a permit. Secondly, the Minister's permission does not have to be sought in order to form a multiracial trade union. Thirdly, sex discrimination has been removed from Wage Board determinations.

I don't belittle the changes, but if they are not accompanied by avenues for political expression the dangers are that industry will become a battlefield for political rights, as well as for the normal worker demands for better employment conditions.

Janet: Much time is spent in Parliament in what I feel to be wrangling, wasting time on points of order, such as the fuss about Mr Eglin's alleged visitor who disturbed one session. Isn't this a classic case of fiddling while Rome burns?

Helen: You must realise that these are dramatic incidents played up by the media. Most of Parliamentary discussion is routine and often boring.



● Helen at Nyanga with Tjaan van der Merwe (left) and Roger Hulley (right), PFP MPs.

These are colourful diversions and don't take up an enormous amount of time.

Janet: What are the implications of the Bill on private schools?

Helen: That's two-sided. On the one side it allows provincial administrations to subsidise private schools that take Black pupils. That, of course, is a good thing. On the other side is a Catch 22 provision. It enables the Minister to declare a private 'White' school Black if it admits any Black pupils at all. The repercussions of this could be pretty frightful in that 'White' schools are located in White group areas, and they could then, of course, be closed down.

Janet: To move away from the Parliamentary session, you have said that big business must bring more pressure to bear on the government. How do you envisage this being done?

Helen: Well, South Africa must be one of the few countries in the world where the men who provide the greater part of the revenue which flows into State coffers have so little influence over policies.

Here, unlike the US for instance, the government seems to ignore big business. The only lobby which functions efficiently is the farmers' lobby.

I only hope that at the second conference of captains of industry and the Prime Minister in Cape Town in November these tycoons will emerge from their cocoons and speak up in no uncertain terms.

It's high time that these people used their influence to tell the Prime Minister that they are disappointed at his failure to follow through on the Carlton Conference.

Marshalling free enterprise to solve problems means more than providing housing and services for urban Blacks on the shoulders of businessmen who have already paid heavy taxes precisely to provide for these. It also means releasing business from all the restrictions on the hiring of labour, such as the Planning Act, and from the operation of laws that prevent the vertical and horizontal mobility of labour.

Janet: What do you think of the granting of independence to the Ciskei?

Helen: A disaster — unmitigated. I mean — this independence is phony. Two-thirds of the people live outside of the Ciskei. Over 75 percent of the Ciskei's income comes from the earnings of migrants in the RSA and from grants from the central government in the RSA.

It means in effect that 2,1 million people will be deprived of their South African citizenship on December 4th. That means that all hope of participation in the political processes of the country in which they earn their living — ie the RSA — will disappear forthwith.

GROUP AREAS

KATHI JORDI AND ELEANOR ANDERSON

IT IS WELL that the Voortrekkers were a sturdy lot, for the roads named after them are usually long and need a good bit of trekking on before you get to where you want to be. Such at all events is Voortrekker Road in Vereeniging (meaning union, society, association, combination) which led us two Black Sash women to the south edge of the town where the Indians are being moved to a new, and nearby shopping area, comprising about fifty shops in a not especially impressive complex. Some South Africans reach for the tooth and the nail when change is mentioned, but the Indians are a sturdy lot too and have accepted the move with resignation, some indeed, the owners of very old shops, with satisfaction. The whole city block is to be demolished and the new development is to take in the adjoining park which borders Railway Street. White people are to be dislodged, too, the shopkeeper we are talking to informs us, and we look at each other carefully and nobody says 'Hah!'

It has been known for years that this was to become a 'White' area, though nobody could make plans because the new complex is just being completed. If our Government has a fault it is this apparent unwillingness to tell people likely to be affected just how they are to be affected. So often questions over the siting of a highway, the spending of money on a clinic, further investment in a business are met with the official response, 'We haven't decided yet' and this can be inconvenient and expensive.

The Indians seem to feel this too. They speak with courtesy to the sombre-faced officials who come in their GG cars to tell everybody what to do, but it is exasperating to have been promised a large shop and given a small one, or vice versa, or to be allotted a very obscure site when the one you had before was on a corner.

One trader is lucky to be moving from one big shop to another and is pleased that the African bus rank is to be moved near him, as most of his customers are Africans. But he shares the general

apprehension about rents. These are to start quite low but will soon be doubled and may escalate so rapidly that only heaven will know the price. Subletting is not allowed, nor does there appear to be space for expansion.

'Will the new complex accommodate everyone who has to move?'

'We really can't say', comes the official reply.

'Is everyone to be moved?'

'We haven't decided yet'.

With these uncertainties in mind, and also cheered by recentish talk of reform in the land, one well-to-do trader has made enquiries of estate agents with properties to let in 'White' areas. They said they'd let him know if anything turned up. These things take time — a long, long time. Another shop owner is distressed because he'll have to move twice, once almost immediately, and a second time when permanent accommodation is available for him.

'Please may I not stay put a little longer and then have just one move?' 'No'.

'But why?' 'The answer is no'.

'You realise I shall have to pay about R3 000 for carpeting in the temporary place?' 'So?' replies officialdom.

We buy a coke and two bananas each for lunch and ask the cafe owner how's business in the new place. Surprised at our interest he says things are not too bad, after all people do need to eat and drink. We tell him we came along from Johannesburg to wish him well. His surprise becomes astonishment.

'You did? Well . . . er . . . thank you'. He stares at us again. 'Well, I never!' He calls to someone at the back and his wife joins us. 'These two ladies have come to wish us good luck', he tells her.

'Some of the people just moved have had a terrible time', she tells us, gesturing at a little jeweller's shop across the street. 'Bue we hope things will improve. Allah has always watched over us and now we shall need his protection more than ever'.

STRATEGY FOR SURVIVAL

WILLIAM GUTTERIDGE ©

Professor Gutteridge, Professor of International Studies at the University of Aston in Birmingham, specialises in the military and security aspects of Southern African developments. What follows is an edited version of his paper.

THE POST-ELECTION AGENDA

THE COLLAPSE of the Portuguese Empire in Mozambique and Angola in the 1970s and the emergence last year of an independent Zimbabwe brought international Black Africa to the frontiers of the Republic. These events combined with internal Black aspirations, violently symbolised by the Soweto riots of 1976, brought home to South Africa's White leadership the need for a new strategy. The so-called 'total strategy' which has emerged rests on the twin pillars of maintaining security by conventional military means, and of social and political reform underpinned by rapid economic development.

The common-sense military view that a country cannot be defended unless most of the population are on its side has prevailed. In the process, the political emphasis has shifted perceptibly from White supremacy to White survival and identity.

The object of this study is to examine, as Mr P W Botha begins what at his age of 66 is likely to be a final five-year term as Prime Minister, the prospects for avoiding an ultimate escalation of a conflict which is already in progress at a number of levels internally and to an extent externally. The probability that the Parliament elected on 29 April is the last exclusively White South African Parliament, whatever the developments in the course of it, is also a factor to be taken into account. Whatever the intermediate steps, proof of success can only lie in the enactment of measures which are overtly recognised by the bulk of the population as meeting Black aspirations. If this were to happen, in due course the international pressures against South Africa would be defused. Failure would mean an escalation of violence and presumably a revolution. At present it seems unlikely that a final concession of power by the White minority would precede such a deterioration.

To a considerable extent the South African Government is now hung on its own rhetoric. For years its anti-terrorist and other legislation has tended to equate what many would crudely term 'the Red menace' with 'the Black menace' (Swart gevaar in Afrikaans). Internal dissidence and subversion has been regarded as inevitably and closely linked with direct Soviet intervention. The

labelling of the opponents of the regime generically as 'communists' has not only made the creed seem attractive, it has masked the genuine nationalist — even the Black-consciousness — content, in the anti-apartheid protest. The blanket condemnation by the Prime Minister in at least one major election speech of 'Communism, Marxism and Radicalism' could not do other than continue to compound the confusion.

The failure to distinguish between African socialism, or Marxism, and close practical dedication to Moscow's cause distorted judgments in South Africa on Robert Mugabe's accession to power in Zimbabwe in March 1980 and still seriously affects relations between the two countries. The same probable misperception is an important inhibition on a Namibian settlement. South Africa fears the impact of a Swapo-dominated government in Windhoek, providing another chance for Soviet interference in her affairs. The euphoria generated in South Africa by the prospect of conservative governments in power in Washington and London simultaneously is another indication of the undue tendency there to see external relations primarily as a response to the Soviet threat. Sir David Scott, until 1979 British Ambassador to the Republic of South Africa, in his recently published reminiscences sums up this aspect in a single sentence: '**Communists did not invent discrimination, they merely capitalised on it.**' In the same book he confirms the view, comprehension of which still seems to elude South Africans, that the manoeuvrings of successive British Foreign Secretaries, including Dr David Owen, on the subject of the UN plan for Namibia and of South Africa generally have been designed primarily to avert mandatory sanctions against the Republic. The failure to date to implement the generally agreed proposition of independence for Namibia, accepted in principle by Mr Vorster in 1975, is an albatross round Mr P W Botha's neck which he will have to remove before he ventures far along the road to reform in the Republic.

NAMIBIA: SOUTH AFRICA'S FRONT-LINE?

Though the UN Security Council Resolution 435 of 1978 has been described in some quarters as

a dead-letter, it is likely that any settlement of the Namibian question in the near future will be based on a modified version of it. Essentially this resolution providing for a UN-supervised election aimed originally at independence for the territory by the end of 1981. The abruptly abortive Geneva Conference in January 1981 more or less terminated that prospect for the time being.

Earlier difficulties over the UN plan related to the proposed Demilitarised Zone (DMZ) in northern Namibia, the size and composition of the UN Transitional Assistance Group (UNTAG) and in particular the number and location of South African and Swapo bases. The least of the problems seemed to lie directly in reaching agreement on practical arrangements between the designated UNTAG commander and the South African military

ter the territory, partly, **but only partly**, depends on the urgency of the need from a number of points of view to end the war.

Though the South African Defence Force (SADF), along with the newly designated South West African Territorial Force, has probably about 20 000 men in the border areas, the guerilla war with Swapo has never remotely approached the scale of the operations in Zimbabwe or even earlier in Mozambique. The position at the moment seems to be that, on the Swapo side, there are around Lubango, south of Benguela in Angola, 6 000 or 7 000 young men from Namibia or with Ovambo tribal affiliations either in training or in waiting for it. This reservoir is supplemented by recruits and what are regarded as refugees from Namibia whose flow is somewhat spasmodic.

'We Blacks do not quite grasp what this general election is about. We do not know what Whites are really voting for.' — Chief Gatsha Buthelezi.

authorities. A first-hand view of the terrain is sufficient to bring home the virtual impossibility of effective control by a UN force of only 7 500 men, not all of them to be deployed in the DMZ.

Whatever the technicalities, however, it is clear that the essential problem is one of mistrust and fear: fear on the part of South Africa, as has been indicated, of a Soviet-influenced government in Namibia, and mistrust on the part of Swapo that the Republic will effectively implement any agreement which is reached, short of their own preference essentially for a direct transfer of power to them. Thus, in spite of all the manoeuvrings, and the establishment of an internal political administration under a directly appointed South African Administrator-General in 1977, the central issue is still what it was when the Western contact group — USA, Canada, Britain, West Germany and France — was established in that year.

The capacity to apply pressures on Swapo, which in the last resort would be deprived of its bases and supply lines, is considerable. The major missing link is South Africa's political will to run the risk of genuine independence for Namibia and thus end the war. The question is whether in the aftermath of the election, P W Botha's Government feels that it can reach a firm decision. In this calculation not only military factors but military advice, and even pressure, will play an important part.

Namibia: the military aspect

The guerilla or 'border' war in what is now termed the operational area in northern Namibia, has now become what seems a permanent feature of the South African scene. Today a political settlement in Namibia, with independence resolving the long-standing dispute between the UN and South Africa over the Republic's claim to adminis-

For the time being, however, the operational Swapo guerilla forces amount to no more than about 2 000 men located some 50 km inside Angola in the area north of the Cunene River opposite Ovamboland. They too, especially since the South African 'Operation Smokeshell' in July 1980, have scattered and are generally in small defended localities.

The South Africans for their part claim, probably accurately, that the direct operation of guerilla parties has in the last six or eight months been progressively confined to a relatively narrow strip from the Etosha Pan northwards through to the frontier but embracing Oshakati and Ondangwa. In the past there have been incidents further south in the farming and mining areas down to Otavi and beyond. Lately these have recurred on a small scale around Tsumeb. The South African attribute their relative and perhaps temporary success at least in part to their 'hearts and minds' community action programme, whereby medical aid, education and village development are a primary role of the armed forces. **It is, judging by experience in other places, likely that these civil aid programmes, while having some beneficial practical results, make little political impact.**

The admittedly sharp rise in land-mine casualties in recent months and the precautions which consequently have to be taken, including sweeping the roads even in the main administrative area each morning, suggests a high level of guerrilla infiltration of central Ovamboland. This impression is reinforced by the fact that incidents still take place within a few hundred yards of the military airfield and base at Ondangwa and close to the perimeter fences at Oshakati. On the other hand, guerrillas killed in action or captured are reported to be getting younger and to be less experienced.

There has been some success by the authorities in creating what may be conveniently termed

ethnic battalions. Ovambo, Bushman and Kavango men have been recruited into special units and are involved in operations. These with a small number, as yet, of non-Whites from the Republic validate the claim now made that 28 per cent of the operational force is non-White and that racial integration is taking place in some circumstances; 38 per cent of the forces of all races serving in the border area are now drawn from Namibia.

What could have been an important development in social, as well as military, terms has been somewhat vitiated by an ill-advised attempt at the end of 1980 to introduce compulsory military service in Namibia, to coincide with the designation of the South West African Territorial Force. The introduction of compulsory military service seemed to ignore not only the lessons of colonial experience, especially in French-speaking Africa where pressures for full franchise quickly arose, but obvious sensitivities of minorities. It is understood that the provisions will be dropped or substantially modified by the end of the year.

The relatively small population base of Swapo — about a million in all on either side of the frontier — and apparent military success, encourage in some quarters an illusion that such a war can

therefore, could not afford to break the political connection is regarded, in many quarters in the territory, as not only irksome but a distortion of the truth.

Though there is a substantial White element in Namibia, who regard themselves as being in a position analogous to Protestant Unionists in Ulster, there is also, among some longstanding White residents with a real stake in the commercial viability of the country, a conviction that South Africa has at one and the same time underdeveloped and, to a degree, exploited it. They are generally critical of the failure of South Africa, whatever the legal rights and wrongs of her administration of South West, properly to honour her assumed responsibilities as a colonial power. A greater commitment to economic development could have helped, they argue, to offset the political reluctance to devolve power. They are not disposed to accept the excuse that, throughout the 1950s and early 1960s, while the price of gold remained static and costs of extraction rose, the South African economy was not strong enough to help.

The Namib desert is undoubtedly rich in minerals which European and North American firms are anxious to exploit once political stability has been

The major missing link is SA's political will to run the risk of genuine independence for Namibia and thus end the war.

be won by other than political means. Military opinion in South Africa is divided between this, apparently minority, view and those who realistically would prefer, if they have to, to defend South Africa on the line of the Orange River to the south. This latter calculation takes into account the probable attrition of White morale by the indefinite continuance of military service, the cost of the war, **now running at R700 000 a day** and the relative ease with which southern Namibia could be kept under surveillance because of its desert and semi-arid landscape. **There is little doubt that contingency planning already takes account of such a possibility which would, whatever happened to the government in Windhoek, not bring a hostile border too dangerously near to the Republic's industrial heartland, which is, of course, much closer to Mozambique.**

Namibia: economic and political factors

Pending a political settlement the economy of Namibia is stagnant. In the face of uncertainty about the outcome, and probably of fear of the consequences of a Swapo victory for Nujoma in a UN-supervised election, there has actually been some disinvestment by South African interests and certainly over a period of years transfer of profits to the Republic. The claim that Namibia is financially dependent on South Africa and,

achieved. At least one French mining company interested in uranium has shown itself willing even to anticipate a settlement. Already nearly 50 per cent of the country's revenue comes from De Beers Consolidated Diamond Mines of South West Africa, the headquarters of which has tactfully been moved from South Africa to Windhoek. Another chunk of income comes from Rossing Uranium Limited, an associate of the British mining company Rio Tinto Zinc (RTZ), which produces from the moon landscape of the desert, 19 per cent of the world's current uranium needs, and is a principal source of supply for British Nuclear Fuels and the Atomic Energy Authority.

An independent government of Namibia would be able to maximise the benefits from mineral extraction and ensure that the whole population, rather than the employees of particular companies, benefited. Rossing Uranium employs people of all races, and its provision of medical services and housing is something of a model.

In these circumstances, where the proportion of resources known, and as yet undiscovered, to population is so high that all Namibians could be relatively rich, the prospect of economic sanctions applied by the UN against South Africa to achieve the country's freedom is all the more frustrating. This applies also to the particular campaign to cancel the uranium contracts, which, even if it

were felt necessary for them to be renegotiated, would probably be vital for the effectiveness of any legitimate Namibian government.

The obstacles to a settlement, certainly one based on UN Resolution 435, are the official commitment of the UN to Swapo, South Africa's corresponding fear of a Marxist Moscow-oriented regime and the pressures for an internal settlement — what has been termed creeping UDI. On 1 April 1981 South West Africa — Namibia became, as far as the machinery of government is concerned, an independent state with Pretoria holding a veto. Nominally the administration of the Defence Act was transferred on that date to the South African appointed Administrator-General, while the Government Service Act was amended so as to establish a South West African police force. At the same time the railways remained fully under South African control and it was reported that Namib and Caprivi Airways had both been denied, by the National Transport Commission in Pretoria, licences to operate scheduled services in the northern part of Namibia. Services to South Africa are in any case restricted in order to safeguard the privileged rights of South African Airways.

Such administrative provisions illustrate very well the ambivalence which has created increasing tensions even in so far as a so-called, and probably as a result progressively futile, internal settlement is concerned.

During the past three years the legal framework of 'petty' apartheid has been demolished. But this has not been accompanied by the dramatic expansion of opportunities for Blacks and 'Coloureds' for even by effective implementation of the repeal of discriminatory legislation. The swimming pool and even the public library in Windhoek remain segregated. Black leaders can now dine with Whites in the Moringa room of the Kalahari Sands Hotel, but the training college for non-White teachers is grossly overcrowded, while White trainees have a palatial underused campus on the outskirts of the town and a virtual one-to-one tutor to student ratio. Higher professional education is dependent on the securing of places, for example at medical school in South Africa, and no attempt has been made to provide national university or polytechnic facilities. Rates of pay may have been equalised but the opportunities to qualify for higher level posts are negligible.

Surprisingly, it is by no means only non-White leaders who attribute this failure to implement reform to the continuance of the South African connection especially via the bureaucracy. White businessmen and professionals, even some of those of South African origin, but with a genuine, if self-interested, dedication to a new Namibia, resent the starving of investment by the transfer of funds to the Republic and see the old colonial-style administration of mediocre middle-rank White civil servants as the main retarding factor.

The process of retardation results from a combination of incompetent inertia with political con-

servatism. The three-tiered system of administration recently introduced in Namibia has not only generated a numerically top-heavy and expensive bureaucracy for the size of the country's population, but it has features which are uncomfortably reminiscent of the Republic's homeland policy — education, for example, is administered by 11 different, essentially ethnic, authorities. In short, whatever the prospects for an internationally agreed settlement of the Namibian question, the internal administration has not, for a variety of reasons, succeeded in consolidating its political support.

The prospects for a Namibian settlement

UN Resolution 435, while currently described in some quarters as a deadletter, is at the same time treated by the five-nation Western Contact Group as the only basis for negotiation. Swapo, and its key supporters, regard it officially as non-negotiable while at the same time privately showing some willingness to accept modifications or provisos.

Practical acceptance of the plan is now dependent on safeguards and on the clear demonstration that South Africa will honour the agreement reached. The safeguards will be essentially constitutional and aimed not only at the White minority. Though a constitutional conference before an election seems to have been decisively rejected on the grounds that the conditions for effective chairmanship, for example, which applied over Zimbabwe, do not exist, an entrenched bill of rights, guarantees for private property and the preservation of multi-party democracy, including White parliamentary representation with regular elections, seem to be essential conditions — so do undertakings from a Namibian government not to harbour groups hostile to neighbouring states such as the ANC and Unita. There might even be requirements about the new Namibia's international affiliations — the UN (obviously), the OAU and the Commonwealth are mentioned as desirable. Attempts are also being made to influence a future Namibian government against the CMEA — once known as the Lomé Convention. A principal obstacle to Swapo's acceptance will be the status of the former British territory, now South African, of Walvis Bay which is, in fact, a tiny enclave halfway up the long Atlantic coast of Namibia.

On the evidence of a recent visit, it is not only historical precedent which suggests that something more than paper guarantees will be required. The question may be whether members of the Western Contact Group, especially perhaps Britain and West Germany, plus one or two African states, including Nigeria, will be willing to commit themselves to providing a presence. The offer of technical assistance and even the provision of places for higher education overseas, along with investments and development aid, could be a critical element in any package agreement. It might not

be too farfetched to suppose that, at any rate initially, international status for Walvis Bay could provide at one and the same time a base for an international military presence to guarantee the demilitarisation of the frontier area, support for constitutional guarantees and a channel for assistance to meet the challenge of the probably inevitable exodus of uncommitted Afrikaners.

Prime Minister P W Botha not only needs to be able to weather the immediate political consequences amongst his own National Party's right wing of an independent Namibia, probably under Swapo domination, but to make a virtue of necessity by somehow creating a climate conducive to the Republic's own reform. **Without an early resolution of the Namibian question, whether economic sanctions are eventually applied or not, the illusion that there is a military security solution to essentially political problems will stand increasingly in the way of his testing the feasibility of constructive peaceful change.**

CHANGE IN THE REPUBLIC: THE MILITARY DIMENSION

On 30 January 1981 the Republic of South Africa launched its first direct commando assault on the ANC headquarters at Matola, near Maputo, Mozambique. That attack apparently marked a new phase in the South African approach to defence against subversion and guerrilla attack. It could in the official view of the Republic be justified on the military grounds that the Silverton bank raid and the surprisingly successful attack on the Sasol-II oil-from-coal refinery as well as less spectacular activities in 1980 appeared to have links with the exile movement in Mozambique.

Other factors may, however, have determined the timing of such a raid which was in itself not obviously helpful in promoting the longer-term policies of internal reform and improved inter-state

tween South Africa and Mozambique are strong and not diminishing, and there was a risk that even the raid in question might have disrupted important communication and electric power links. More generally there were the possible repercussions on political attitudes at a time when the so-called front-line states, even Angola, seemed increasingly anxious to establish some sort of peaceful co-existence with South Africa, at least for the time being.

Developments in Zimbabwe and the apparently 'liberalising' tendencies of the South African Prime Minister and some other members of his government have, however, served to focus attention on what seems to be a more general shift over the last two or three years in South Africa's defence policy. There has even been the suggestion that in the aftermath of the Muldergate affair the commanders of the armed forces have to all intents and purposes seized power in the fields of foreign policy and defence and are profoundly influencing domestic developments on the basis of a new concept of security. To emphasise the role of military personnel in this way is probably to underestimate the importance of Mr Botha's 12 years as Minister of Defence before he became Prime Minister. His experience at the policy-making level in this field is, therefore, exceptionally for a politician, far greater than that of any of the generals who are now supposed to be so influential. The significance of his initial retention, as Prime Minister, of the defence portfolio should not be missed.

During Mr Botha's period of office as Defence Minister the defence forces of the Republic of South Africa were rapidly built up. **By 1977-78 defence expenditure amounted to at least 19 per cent of government spending and 5,1 per cent of GNP.**

The Republic of South Africa is the only country in Africa south of the Mediterranean littoral which

It would be very surprising if the possibility of an ultimate defence of the 'laager' of SA were not being urgently considered.

relations in Southern Africa. The apparent shift to the right and at least covert growth of sympathy for the Republic's position in some Western countries could be regarded as making the decision easier. It could also be regarded, happening as it did within three days of the announcement of a forthcoming election, as a gesture underlining the continuing determination of the National government and party to defend by every means the South African 'laager', while at the same time strengthening the political base for internal reform.

In the terms of a wider and longer-term concept of South African security, trans-border military expeditions, especially into Mozambique, are likely to prove counterproductive. The economic ties be-

has a military potential comparable to that of a medium-sized power in Europe or North America. Though Nigeria has in a sense a larger military establishment, its strength lies more in standing manpower than in the sophistication and versatility of its equipment and training.

In one sense at least geography is very much militarily on the side of South Africa because she is at the tip of a large continent and any attempted invasion would have to be mounted at a considerable distance through ports and airfields with, at present, limited facilities. The prospect of a major insurrection would probably be a precondition of any attempt from outside at direct military confrontation.

Successive Defence White Papers in 1977, 1978 and 1979 have demonstrated that planning is being based on the 'worst case', in which the Republic would be subjected to a violent assault from inside and outside at the same time. Some years ago Mr P W Botha, as Defence Minister, announced the intention to build a new army base at Phalaborwa in the north-eastern Transvaal, 50 km from the Mozambique border and a new air base, now complete, with underground hangers at Hoedspruit 40 km further south on the edge of the Kruger National Park — an indication of the potential threat to the industrial heartland of the Rand which would be posed by an invasion from that direction. At the same time a new combat training school was proposed for Sishen in the north of Cape Province not far from the Namibian and Botswana borders.

In terms of territorial defence as conventionally conceived the Republic of South Africa certainly means business. Confidence in her ability to handle a violent situation over an indefinite period is, however, less than total. The weaknesses are perceived to be the growing burden of defence expenditure; the probable difficulty in renewing and repairing sophisticated equipment, some of which still has to be imported; fuel supplies, especially diesel oil, even though temporarily secured by stockpiling; and, perhaps, surprisingly, the continued morale of White conscripts. Service on the northern Namibian border has not in the long run much more appeal for South Africans than Vietnam had for Americans.

There are also manpower problems of a different nature. To quote the 1979 Defence White Paper 'although the Permanent Force cadres of the Army . . . are manned to 80 per cent a real shortage exists in the leader element . . . and amongst the ranks of instructors.' In short, the armed forces are not immune from the problems consequent upon trying to run a large country with a substantial population on the basis of limited White manpower. These factors, along with the geographical and other disadvantages of distant frontiers, have, as already indicated, even caused some influential military opinion to think in terms of the abandonment of Namibia, when the Orange River would be a more easily defensible frontier.

The logic of what the 1977 Defence White Paper called a 'total national strategy' for defence is, therefore, clear. At that time General Magnus Malan, Chief of the Defence Force, referred to 'a national reorientation aimed at survival, while at the same time ensuring the continued advancement of the well being of all South Africans'.

The assumptions behind this pattern of strategic thinking are that Black leaders in the homelands are as vulnerable to terrorism as Whites and that economic sanctions, which are no longer ruled out as impracticable, would force the affected countries of southern Africa to make common cause. A region with a population of 40 million people and huge natural resources and reserves

of labour would, it is argued, be capable of survival against almost any threat. Its protagonists feel that Namibia has demonstrated the possibilities of legally eliminating race discrimination and of a joint multiracial defence; they see recent moves in the Republic as being in the same direction. It is doubtful, however, whether they have yet explicitly identified fully the implications of such a concept for the future control and composition of the armed forces of the area.

Over the last two years, non-White recruitment to the SADF has taken place in the Republic and there are already convincing reports of successful integration and of the possibility of Blacks exercising authority over Whites. 'But how even so', said Chief Buthelezi, Chief Minister of KwaZulu, in a conversation on this topic, 'can I recommend my people, who would make good soldiers, to join a force over which we have no political control?' This is a view paralleled by the attitude of the 'Coloured' leadership towards conscription.

In adopting a new kind of 'Fortress' strategy, the South African attitude to the West is ambivalent. On the one hand, the emphasis of policy is being switched from Europe and America to the local region where the drive for self-sufficiency will be stepped up; on the other hand, it is clearly expected that a successful consolidation of Southern African power would rally Western support against Soviet and other incursions in the area, which would be in any case for geographical reasons militarily much more vulnerable than a 'laager' based on the Republic alone.

A great deal depends on the projected and feasible level of guerrilla activities primarily by the ANC. The Sasol-II attack demonstrated one type of possibility which would be enhanced by the acquisition of new weapons, especially portable rocket launchers with guidance or homing devices. There have, however, been recent changes in the direction of the ANC's military operation into the hands of younger, more militant and aggressive leaders. Longstanding key figures like Joe Slovo appear to have been displaced by the new generation stemming from the Soweto violence of 1976. They may put the emphasis on intimidating potential Black collaborators, not only in the police and army but more generally. This could be seen as their response to the official 'total strategy' aimed at winning African acquiescence in or support for White reformist measures and would seem to suggest that the 'ethnic' battalions are seen as a serious threat to Black nationalist aspirations.

Internally a greater threat may well stem from the activities of Black trades unions who are increasingly effective in mobilising protest: the response of the South African authorities in particular to disciplined non-violence, if it becomes an established method of civil resistance in the next year or two, could be crucial and, in those circumstances, inflexible police methods would be particularly counterproductive. Externally the equipment of guerrillas with new generations of port-

able, precision-guided missiles is likely to make strategic industrial and other targets difficult to defend by normal methods. More seriously still, as a result of South African incursions, Mozambique may resort increasingly to Soviet assistance. There is thus little alternative for South Africa to a 'total strategy' which is aimed optimistically at releasing the external pressures by achieving real internal stability. Attempts to destabilise the apparently hostile governments of neighbouring states by, for example, backing Unita in Angola or anti-government guerrilla forces in Mozambique, are more likely to consolidate their authority by making them turn to external powers for military assistance, whereas economic circumstances are increasingly likely to cause them to seek a peaceful *modus vivendi* with the Republic.

This is an example of the way in which obsessions with an aspect of the Soviet threat may distort judgements and divert attention from the economic and political realities and trends which may actually be to the advantage of the Republic in terms of peace and stability.

INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE: THE THREAT OF SANCTIONS

Though sabotage may well, for the time being, become a regular feature of South African life, it is unlikely on its own to pose a crippling direct threat to the economy. Withdrawal of labour or protests in places of work, if well co-ordinated, clearly have a greater potential. Economic sanctions, however, in the South African context might conceivably have a serious impact. To be effective they would need to be more or less universally agreed and backed by enforcement measures. In terms of the implementation of sanctions, South Africa's relatively isolated geographical position could now work to her disadvantage. Satellite surveillance has reduced the scale of dependence on a naval presence for the enforcement of a blockade, and though neighbouring countries are frequently forced to rely on South Africa for communications and even grain supply, their willingness, at least nominally, to support sanctions is no longer in doubt.

The approval and implementation of any UN resolutions on sanctions now depends on the cooperation of major Western countries, notably the USA, Britain, France and West Germany. France, under President Mitterand's guidance, may be in the process of shifting her position, but on the face of it neither the USA nor Britain is likely to allow a resolution to take effect.

The question arises, however, whether in the long run the repeated resistance by the West to popular Third World pressures exploited by the Soviet bloc will not itself work counter to the achievement or maintenance of stability in South Africa. The probable effect of sanctions on the Black work force in South Africa, on the inhabitants of the 'homelands' and of neighbouring in-

dependent states is not in serious dispute. If they really worked then unemployment within the geographical limits of the Republic would sharply rise, while outside those boundaries there would be food shortages and the export of Zambian copper and Zimbabwean chrome would be disrupted. Chief Buthelezi, while refusing 'independent' status for Kwa-Zulu and supporting specific pressures especially by Western economic interest against South Africa, opposes 'blanket' sanctions and disinvestment on the grounds that the welfare of his people would be the first to suffer. Increasingly neighbouring Black states like Zambia and Zimbabwe openly recognise the potentially destructive effect of sanctions on their own economies, while endorsing the principle. This may well be in the expectation that because of the veto, they will both avoid the consequences of sanctions and, at the same time, be seen to be sustaining pressures against 'apartheid', even if those pressures are relieved by the action of one or more Western countries.

In the short term the consequences for themselves of the full observation of agreed sanctions by NATO countries would probably not be great, particularly if there had been some stockpiling of essential mineral raw materials. Apart from the scarce commodities like vanadium, titanium and platinum which are required in relatively small quantities, the essentials to industrial survival are chrome and manganese. In both cases Southern Africa is a principal supplier and for chrome the West is almost wholly dependent on South Africa and Zimbabwe, though West German interests are now involved in developing chromite mining in the Soviet Union. Correspondingly the loss of shipping and naval facilities in South Africa is much more putative than real except in the event of war. Some Western countries, notably Britain, have large investments in South Africa and there would be job losses, in the event of effective sanctions, arising from the presumed closing of South African markets.

The related questions of access to raw materials and market raise the fundamental issue of the essential interest of the West in South Africa. The initial euphoria about the prospect of a Reagan administration in the USA on top of a Conservative government in Britain was beginning to wear thin by the time of the South African election. The realisation that in the end they are both likely to want to get off the horns of a dilemma which could damage their immediate economic prospects was dawning. **Looked at from the standpoint of stark Western self-interest — which is perhaps the most realistic way, even for South Africa, to look at the situation — the Republic in its present form is not indispensable to the West.** In the end too, though this often seems to White South Africans cynical, they are beginning to appreciate that the particular form of government or social system which South Africa chooses or manages to evolve will be judged largely by the extent to which it endangers stability in the region. The West's interest lies not

so much in idealist objectives but simply in avoiding disruptive chaos.

In general the impact of economic sanctions on the South African socio-political system would be less practical and financial and more in terms of political attitudes and morale. While Black resistance would certainly be encouraged, the 'laager' mentality of hard-core White opinion would be reinforced by the determination to resist and survive. It is certainly arguable in the light of historical precedent that even if sanctions did not prove, because of elaborate evasions, an international farce, they would be, for too long a period, counter-productive in terms of inducing radical reform.

THE POLITICAL WILL TO REFORM

The result of South Africa's election on 29 April 1981 was in hard factual terms predictable. Objectively and in his own terms P W Botha's political judgement in calling the election was proved right. Any further delay accompanied by more speculation about the character of intended reform would inevitably have hardened the resistance. Though the HNP popular vote increased from 34 000 in 1977 to 192 000, they failed to get a foothold in

viction that, in terms of White self-interest and survival, radical change is essential. Recent visits to South Africa have reinforced the impression that this could be achieved quickly enough only by a strong lead from the top of the Afrikaner hierarchy. **But that leadership is inhibited by the fear, characteristic especially of Afrikanerdom, that a change of stance would be interpreted as weakness and a betrayal of the national heritage.** In these terms P W Botha had no alternative to holding an election, even though his eventual overwhelming majority of 131 seats out of 166 in Parliament was less than that which he inherited from Mr Vorster in 1978. Mr P W Botha, Dr Koornhof and others, including senior defence force officers who recognise reform as essential for the survival of White identity, have clearly not yet reached any firm conclusions about the scale and range of change which will be necessary and prove feasible. More significantly they have not yet, as the election campaign demonstrated, succeeded in securing an easy acceptance of what they have already done across the White electorate.

Though P W Botha called the election to obtain a mandate for reform, most of the campaign, espe-

Underpaid, undereducated White public servants already have a record of obstruction to reform at the point where government administration and the man-in-the-street come face-to-face.

Parliament which, as Mrs Helen Suzman, the veteran PFP MP, predicted, could have provided a critical rallying point for right-wing militancy.

The growth of the PFP's parliamentary membership from 17 to 26 may not be quite the set-back for the Prime Minister which conventionally it might seem. That and the decline of the New Republic Party (NRP), symbolises the emergence — especially among the young Whites to whom Dr Frederick van Zyl Slabbert, the PFP leader particularly appeals — of fundamental dissatisfaction with the government's approach to the political and social status of the Black population seen in terms of White survival. It remains to be seen whether this undoubted success at the polls will increasingly attract young Afrikaners with genuinely **verligte** leanings. It is they, rather than the current generation of National Party politicians, even the Prime Minister and his small group of 'reformist' colleagues in the Cabinet, who will, in the end, determine whether a **rapprochement**, acceptable to their Black opposite numbers, is feasible.

There is no doubt, however, that in the face of political tensions within the White community it is going to be difficult for the 'reformist' momentum, slow as it is, to be kept up. For that momentum depends first not on legislation, which in theory at least could be imposed, but on a widespread con-

cially in Afrikaner-dominated or marginal constituencies, was taken up with reassuring the voters that change was not as fundamental as it might seem. The question is whether the new government will have the nerve to repeal laws which would imply the death of 'apartheid' and thus resist the charge that only cosmetic change to 'petty' regulations is allowable.

The real trends in policy in South Africa today are unusually difficult to interpret. Measures introduced by P W Botha's government, and tentatively proposed for the future are capable of contrary interpretations — they can be seen either as a projection of historical evolution or an attempt to reverse it. Right-wing Whites fear an eradication of their established social order, while the best for which P W Botha can possibly hope is the acquiescence of the majority of the population of all races who appear at least to be committed to a non-violent solution, even though there is, at present, little other common ground between them.

The majority in South Africa does, however, already recognise that change of some kind is bound to come, but the acceptance in non-White quarters of the genuineness of White intentions was undoubtedly not assisted by the recent election campaign. While Dr van Zyl Slabbert, PFP leader of the official opposition, incurred criticism by asserting

that there was no reason why there should not be a Black Prime Minister in a federal South Africa, provided that one race did not dominate the rest, government supporters were asking why Blacks should have social facilities comparable to those for Whites.

It was not surprising that in a speech at Ver-eeniging, the Prime Minister should refer to the dangerous effect of 'damaging campaigns', but **he put the blame on the White opposition for their outspoken criticisms of the government rather than on his own party for further alienating the non-White communities.** Though it is difficult to calculate the actual effect, it can be assumed that abuse from the hustings will not be forgotten and will take a long time to live down.

Unfortunately the installation of the Reagan administration in the USA seemed to suggest to many White politicians that there was more than electoral advantage to be gained from adopting an uncompromising stance. The notion of the Republic as a bulwark against communism, approved by the West, was reinforced. The point was missed that after some initial encouragement to South Africa, the United States, even more than Britain under a Conservative government, would put its own **realpolitik** and economic interests first. In these circumstances the willingness to listen to the American equivalent of the siren voices of the small 'unrepresentative clique of back-room Tory figures in Britain' who, not only according to Sir David Scott, have continually misled White politicians in Southern Africa about the support in Conservative

In this context the enhanced determination and efficiency of the exiled African National Congress, backed by members of the South African Communist Party, cannot be a matter for surprise. Recent events, including attacks on railway-lines, police stations, an electricity sub-station and a defence force recruiting office probably indicate that a positive decision has been taken to escalate urban guerrilla activity, even though some incidents have been specifically associated with the Republic's twentieth-anniversary celebrations. The object of these operations is evidently to disrupt and keep up pressure on the population while apparently not running the risk of the kind of counterproductive alienation which might be the result of large-scale indiscriminate killings.

The anniversary celebrations and the events surrounding them neatly but alarmingly sum up the dilemma into which White South Africa has got itself. The obvious attempt to foster White morale overrode any attempt to understand the potential reaction of other communities. The apparent failure to appreciate that the mass of the population feel that there is little to celebrate and possibly nothing worth defending clearly demonstrates the gulf which exists. The reported ritual burning of the national flag by demonstrators and the indignant reactions to the act as a form of sacrilege symbolised the divide.

More significant in some senses, however, were other incidents at the end of May and the beginning of June 1981 whether they were directly related or not to the Republic's national celebrations.

The US, even more than Britain under a Conservative government, would put its own realpolitik and economic interests first.

circles for their policies, was in evidence. **The danger of encouraging the preservation of a society which even its leaders want to reform cannot easily be overemphasised.**

Though it would be an exaggeration to suggest that the election campaign not only exacerbated Black-White relations, but revived the old Anglo-Boer tensions, the credit for avoiding that lies essentially with the PFP for, primarily through its leadership, building a bridge between the two White communities. Moreover, the election has done nothing to diminish the gradually increasing militancy of the post-Soweto generation of young Blacks, with whom progressively for the sake of ultimate survival their Indian and 'Coloured' opposite numbers feel bound to identify. In spite of a new willingness of ministers, from the Prime Minister downwards, to listen to Black community leaders over the telephone or face-to-face the government seems as yet remarkably insensitive to their problems.

The heavy-handed response to student demonstrations on the campus of the University of the Witwatersrand and the removal of Mr Allister Sparks, the editor of the *Raid Daily Mail*, confirmed the continuing official disinclination to allow the dialogue and debate, which as Bishop Tutu said in an interview on BBC TV, is the only way forward. Coming on top of the banning of five Black journalists earlier in the year and the closure of two Black newspapers, whatever the exact circumstances of the termination of Mr Sparks's appointment, it is bound to appear sinister in terms of relatively peaceful evolution in South Africa.

Whatever the precise details, there is no sign of an attempt to prepare the White electorate for what in the interests of survival will almost certainly have to come — a dialogue, whether in the form of a national convention or not, about the future of South Africa involving all races, including probably exiled or imprisoned leaders like Nelson Mandela. **Indeed a decision on the part of the government**

to release him and others might be seen as a gesture of confidence rather than capitulation: but it seems to have been ruled out.

THE NEXT FIVE YEARS

There are a number of reasons why detailed speculation about the legal and constitutional steps to be taken during the life of the newly-elected White Parliament is likely to be futile. The main one is that the government itself seems set on exploration to find out what is feasible rather than on following a blueprint. It is probable that changes in the law covering the daily lives of the different races will prove practically, but not symbolically, more important than the constitutional framework. It is just as likely that the approach of the bureaucracy, especially the police, towards the implementation of the changes will prove a major difficulty. **Underpaid, undereducated White public servants already have a record of obstruction to reform** at the point where government administration and the man-in-the-street come face-to-face.

In a number of areas the Botha government has already modified the position of its predecessors. Its motivation has been primarily the development of a much larger non-White bourgeoisie with a stake in the country. It has certainly softened the labour laws and facilitated the rise of black trades unions, partly to allow for the necessary increase in the country's skilled and semi-skilled labour.

The general effect has been what the right wing verkramptes obviously predicted. **The belief that by creating a middle class and extending trades could be met to the point where support for the ANC, (PAC) and the Black consciousness movement would be eroded, has been predictably proved wrong.** A strengthened Black middle class and an entrenched and unionised labour force will demand more political rights and a more radical approach to segregation.

It seems unlikely that however fast the country moves in spreading real prosperity through the population and towards, for example, equal pay for all races, the steam will be sufficiently taken out of the situation in this way. It might, if in the process the Group Areas Act were to be repealed or seriously modified and fully integrated educational opportunities were to be provided, but these are precisely the areas in which, according to authoritative sources, the government is most reluctant to move for fear of the White back-lash. The question too of the homelands and their implications for any common South African nationality or citizenship is also critical, though a form of dual citizenship might just work.

At present too much is being made in some quarters of the President's Council of Whites, 'Coloureds' and Indians, with one Chinese — but no Blacks who are still officially regarded as having political rights in their homelands. **But, like most proposals issuing from the South African government today, it should be seen as a part of a process rather than an end in itself.** It does, however, appear that P W Botha is prepared, if neces-

sary, to use a referendum of the White community to implement what he sees as his mandate for reform, using the probable support of the opposition to offset National Party dissidence. He might have to run the risk of splitting his party in the process and it seems unlikely that he will do this. If so his options are very restricted and the 'total strategy' unrealisable.

However, whether through the President's Council or otherwise, one or more of the confederal or consociational proposals for the future government of South Africa will probably be officially tested towards the end of this Parliament's life. The core of any new proposal, consonant with the wider concept of a 'constellation of states', is likely to be a tiered system of government. This would attempt to recognise racial and community autonomy, whether on a geographical basis or otherwise, and any power sharing would only be in the top tier where the representation would not necessarily be proportionate to population size.

Conclusion

The detailed elaboration of the formal changes in the South African socio-political system which may be attainable or desirable in the next few years is unnecessary at this stage. For them to be effective they will need to facilitate and reflect changing attitudes simultaneously. On the face of it the odds are against P W Botha's government bringing about successful reform to the extent that White opinion accepts measures which actually satisfy enough Blacks. But there is no final solution — no prescription from outside which could work — other than an unlikely total concession by one side or the other. In the peculiar situation of South Africa where the Whites have so much more strength than they have elsewhere, while, because of economic dynamics, they need more non-Whites to work alongside them, there is just a chance that the response on the part of the Black majority to reforming intentions may become positive.

On South Africa's prosperity and avoidance of chaos may depend the stability and livelihood of states to the north. Powerful international forces would welcome peaceful co-existence not only within South Africa but between the Republic and neighbouring states — not least because they would thereby be freed from diplomatic and even economic embarrassment.

Mr Botha's government has already introduced some changes: he now has authority, if he really needed that, to introduced more. He has to judge the pace of change. There is no question of an immediate radical stroke formally eliminating 'apartheid', but it is essential to press on as quickly as possible with some of the measures which have been hinted at. An obvious economic and social parity of treatment, even if legal separation remained, would, if it is not a contradiction in terms in South Africa, be a basis. The world outside must sustain credible pressures, economic and otherwise, which the political leadership can at least fall back upon in order to justify their in-

ternal actions. **Letting South Africa off the hook of sports boycotts or the EEC code of practice on wages may not in fact prove a friendly act.** Any signs of increased sensitivity and of the appreciation of the ultimate advantages of sharing power need to be encouraged. The welcome given in Pretoria initially to the Reagan administration provides the Conservative government in Washington — and in London — with a powerful opportunity for leverage, and therefore with a special responsibility to sustain pressures on the Republic's leadership.

But, in general, the world outside can do little but wait and refrain from military intervention. There is, however, no doubt that the continuance

of racial tension and discrimination in South Africa provides the Soviet Union with a unique opportunity, not only for maintaining her credibility with Black Africa, but for embarrassing the West. This opportunity, if it continues, could well extend beyond the diplomatic field to the whole question of access, especially to mineral raw materials. The responsibility for initiatives lies clearly with the existing government of South Africa. It has to isolate the genuine internal causes of discontent and redress them fast enough to avoid a final flare-up. The success of P W Botha in laying at least the foundations of a new and generally acceptable order by 1985 is fervently to be hoped for. The chances are objectively not good.

Love Your Neighbour?

PIETER DIRK UYS ©

SO IT didn't take that long for the Ugly Sister to throw off her sweet Cinderella facade. Barely four days after the Nationalist win in our snakes-and-ladders election, reality raised its arrogant head.

I suppose it was all too un-South African to be true — all the honest promise of reform. Maybe we ourselves are the ones to blame, like school-children, believing what our leaders say and feeling relieved at the promise of reform and a safer future.

We do pride ourselves in being a Christian nation with the Commandments at our fingertips — to love our neighbours and hold out the hand of compassion and care.

Somehow, with all the promise of change and the need for careful consideration of the past few weeks, one was lulled into believing that once P W Botha had his mandate he would rid himself of not only the irritating Right-wing extremist supporters of a 'Kaffirlose Vaderland', but would get rid of those passengers who have been clinging to his bandwagon for the ride and the thrill of being a little boss.

The Jimmy Krugers, the Lapa Munniks, the Arrie Paulus brigade and then, of course, the perpetuators of the obscenity of the laws of the Group Areas Act and the other little gems in our political heritage necklace.

And so it came to pass that, in keeping with what one expects of a Christian nation — the title with which we have endowed ourselves, while not having passed the audition — on Sunday morning two young and very confident policemen collared a young Black man who was watering a suburban garden and demanded his passbook.

The pass proved to be relatively up-to-date but further inquiry showed the man was in fact resident on the property — without permission.

'He can't stay here', the Dienaars said, 'We'll give you a warning and then we will come and raid you and it'll be a R500 fine for you. And for him? Well, he's not allowed to stay here. Let him stay in Soweto, there's lots of room there for him'.

The Black man watched and listened and if he had a tail should have wagged it, for the conversation was not about a person, but an animal. An animal who needed a collar and a licence and a permit — and firm instructions a la Woodhouse to 'walkies' and 'sit' and 'stay!' 'Stay' being the operative command — 'in your own area' (which this White suburb was not)!

It was getting on for winter. It was damp. Where would he find a place to stay?

'Listen, he hasn't got a permit to work here as a garden boy. You should get him a permit from Bantu Administration, although they won't give it to you, I can tell you now. He's already registered where he works — he can't be registered in two places'.

Suddenly their smiles faded and the interview was over.

'R500 hey, we're making a note of your name and address'.

They did and left — leaving the echo of P W Botha's voice repeating for the umpteenth time:

'The Afrikaner knows from his march through poverty and his determination to stand up and be himself how there was one attempt after the other to prevent him getting his freedom and therefore there isn't a nation in Africa better equipped to understand what is going on in the hearts of people who want to be free . . .' (Rustenburg, 1981).

I looked at the impassive Black face of the young man next to me, struggling through his poverty and trying to stand up and be himself, despite one attempt after the other to prevent him from getting his freedom — a face devoid of the

trappings of pretence, a face set in anger and humiliation.

Of course, the choices were only mine on this day in the life of White South Africa. He had no choice: he had to get out and find a home elsewhere or end up in jail or worse.

I could, of course, refuse to pay that R500 fine and demand to be jailed in the glare of the public interest. (If all the Whites confronted with That Fine refused to pay it on humanitarian grounds could the prisons in South Africa, already overfull, accommodate 20 000 housewives and careermen from the upper echelons of our society?)

But our nasionale unitate has never been that virile, so maybe let's pay and be damned — forget the conscience and donate to the starving kids somewhere, get the brochure and see what it looks like down in Australia, try to get the money out and

the kids away before they have to fight on a border to protect the dreams of men dead or defiled.

The string of mini-events that led to the conclusion that our Sunday was not only the day of God but of Demons was nothing that earth-shattering. It was just another incident among hundreds and thousands involving the lives of people and their families that we White overlords accept as the norm.

But at least there is one screen we can't hide behind. One day, when we have to pay, probably in kind, for the inhumanity of our Christian society; when we have to stand alone against all mankind, accused of the first degree emotional murder of millions, we cannot say, as has been said by others not so long ago:

'We didn't know . . . we really had no idea what was going on . . . we're not to blame . . .'

● Acknowledgements to Sunday Express



PATTI PRICE

WHEN PATTI PRICE died in 1980 a Port Elizabeth newspaper suggested that a boathouse should be named after her, to commemorate the wonderful work she had done for the National Service



Rescue Institute of South Africa.

Happily, on July 18 1981 a new boathouse was opened and named 'Patti Price'. The event took place at Simons-town and a plaque in her honour was unveiled by Mrs J Ferris, wife of Commodore Ferris of the South African Navy.

Patti was an outstanding member of the Sash and members of the False Bay Branch who had been invited to be present were proud and deeply moved by this wonderful tribute to our dear and never-to-be-forgotten Patti Price.

Lily Herbstein

ZIMBABWE'S WHITE LIBERALS PRAISED

WHITE LIBERALS who opposed the Rhodesian Front Government of Mr Ian Smith were given unusual praise in Salisbury yesterday by a member of the Zimbabwe Government.

The Deputy Minister of Lands, Mr Moven Mahachi, told a National Unifying Force lunch: 'The role you played to oppose the regime which we were also fighting against was very important.

'You may not have realised it but we who were in the hot front know very well what you were doing and what you intended to achieve.

'Although we used to regard liberals as people trying to apply brakes on a fast moving revolution, that was not the case here.

'Our revolution was a people's revolution so powerful that no force could hold it. Hence we sympathised with your stand'.

Mr Mahachi's unexpected tribute was unusual in that in most African countries White liberals were barely tolerated by nationalist movements.

In Rhodesia, however, members of the opposition White parties, the Centre Party and the Rhodesia Party that joined forces later to form the National Unifying Party, maintained, wherever possible, strong links with the main nationalist parties.

Mr Mahachi told the NUF members: 'You criticised the previous regime for its racial policies and its brutal behaviour. You tried to persuade them to see reason and the need for change. That action you took was marginal in a way but very important to some of us'.

— Cape Times, 15/1/81

FANTASMANIA

GRETA LOCKEY

AFTER the Great Earthquake which devastated Fantasia, I decided to visit it to see for myself some part of the stricken land; and there, one day, poking in a pile of rubble, I stumbled on a smashed writing-desk, one drawer being jammed intact. With the help of a big stone, I loosened the drawer. It was filled with papers among which I found the following manuscript, not uninteresting as it records something of the country's story.

It begins:

My land is called Fantasia. It is rich in oil. Our climate is healthy. We have vast mountains and fertile valleys. The people belong to tribes, basically differentiated by the characteristic size of the foot. The Little-foot tribe to which I belong is numerically small, the Big-foot much larger. There are other tribes also, the Medium-foot, the Odd-foot etc.; I shall not mention them all.

Big-footers are countrymen by taste. However, since they form the labour force of Fantasia they do come to the cities where they enjoy a comfortable living, amenities being freely available to them. The men live in large hotels where they are protected from the temptations of 'the bright lights'. The special terms offered by these hotels ensure that they keep up their physical strength and also preserve their virtue.

The wives too, apart from the men, can lock themselves away in their small safe quarters elsewhere, without fear of molestation. Safety-guards regularly check that no unauthorised visitors have got in. The strictest regard for the morals of these workers is a feature of our government.

By day these women provide domestic help in the homes of the Little-foot ladies whose gratitude for their services often takes a generous form, such as allowing one woman one tea-bag every two days and at Christmas rewarding them with cast-off shoes. It is to be regretted that these shoes seldom fit their smiling recipients but the spirit of giving is what matters in the 'season of goodwill to all men' and this is absolutely spontaneous. Indeed the employers are often glad to get rid of their discarded footwear in such a satisfactory way.

We Little-footers have our residences in and around the cities where of course the money is. For that reason members of the other tribes like to come in and one can but admire their initiative in the matter of building for themselves, often making splendid and thrifty use of the most un-

likely materials to which wealthier builders have not given a second thought.

Though the size of foot varies from tribe to tribe, our human qualities are the same. We walk upright; laugh and weep for the same causes. We love children, mourn the dead, honour the family unit, worship as we believe. The Big-footers used to observe a constricting moral code, now practically outmoded, the example set by us to their younger members making itself felt so that their standards are altering to reach up to ours.

Big-footers are unable to grasp the value of money. They prefer to have a lot of children: a laughable miscalculation. However, as with the ethical code, the young appear to be adopting our views, realising that a large family is a drag and that that which a man must aim at all his life is to get rich. Big-footers also used to hold the outdated idea of keeping grannies and grandpas in the family, an idea which we know is quite impossible.

Certain other qualities divide us. Big-footers can stand more, owing to the larger area each man's foot covers, and this is convenient. They stand a lot. Only a few tend to lose their sense of balance. This unfortunately would seem to be a growing weakness, possibly due to their increasing taste for packaged food which until now has been the preserve of the Little-feet and which is entirely unsuitable for them.

They are slow movers, and laugh heartily at our mincing steps. In their simplicity they think we are illmannered because we move fast. They also complain that we 'lay down the law', as our idiom has it, not comprehending that we are in the position to do this because we are always right and that there is no need to consult with them over anything.

On the other hand it is not unusual to hear Little-footers at parties merrily recounting to friends and lovers funny incidents from Big-foot life, as for example the story of the woman who was accused of hanging about a hospital to pick up men, when she was in fact trying to get news of her sick child.

But no country is without its trivial disagreements and the pronouncement of our governors that conditions in Fantasia are the best in the world is believed and stoutly maintained by a big majority of the people, that is to say, Little-footers.

Lest at this point there should appear to be some discrepancy in my statements, I must explain to my reader that only Little-footers have the privilege of speaking out: and we well know that this is a privilege, not a right.

We are ruled by a king. We have no queen, but the king has a large and close-knit family of sons and daughters; close-knit that is, with the exception of his youngest daughter, Cassandra. While the others are intellectuals, Cassandra is a stupid woman who, in the teeth of common sense argues that the values of the heart are as important as those of the head.

With the help of selected courtiers, the Royal Family rules, respecting the traditions of their land as their Little-foot fathers and grandfathers shaped them. Cassandra alone wanted change, despite her family's mockery and the anger of her father.

Yet beneath this almost universal calm, there is unrest. Some blame it on the nonsensical concept which has swept the new world that men, so far from doing their accepted duty in their state of life, should live in constant rebellion against it.

The king has pondered long and earnestly. He has become convinced that the root of the trouble lies in the fact that the tribes are jumbled together, higgledy-piggledy throughout the land. He knows that by divine ruling certain benefits were meant for certain tribes only and to allow every man to share them is to fly in the face of providence. He is a deeply religious man.

Notices such as 'Little-foot Reserve, entry permit required' and 'Footprints must not exceed regulation size' have been put up outside parks, playgrounds etc. insisting on separateness and requesting people to take their recreation apart these are ignored. Friendly jingles, 'There is no fear Of Big-foot here', and 'T'is surely meet That Little-feet Should stay elite' displayed on hoardings have been defaced.

Foreign visitors, whose impolite disregard for our feelings has hurt the good king deeply, ridicule the notices. In reply he often cites instances of malpractice in other states, thus proving conclusively that there are none in Fantasmania.

At last the King like Archimedes had his inspiration. He called his council. 'I have resolved to put an end to this intermixing. I shall chop the land into pieces. Into each piece I shall put one tribe. We shall each follow our own path of life. The path of one is not the path of another and none shall trespass where he should not be. Our paths lie apart: our paths **must** lie apart. The path of the Little-footers must be safeguarded for the Little-footers . . .' but here Cassandra interrupted. 'But, Pa, Your Majesty, don't all paths lead to heaven?'

To say the councillors were shocked is to understate the situation: they were stunned. Then in chorus they burst forth. 'Silence! In the interest of Public Security, be quiet !'

Unswerving from the path, the King pressed on. 'We know from the Bible that God chose a people and divided the land. In this land, the duty devolves on me. We must no more tread upon each other's toes. None shall crowd the Little-footers from their path of life'.

Cassandra seemed unable to adjust her views: she was a person of fixed ideas. 'But, she cried', what have paths to do with it? All feet walk the same. If you have feet, you want shoes; it's as simple as that.

'A person wants everything the same as everyone else. Big-foot babies come the same way as ours do'. (The men stirred uneasily). 'You don't have to be born with little feet to want to drive a car or have pretty curtains or eat in smart places'.

By this time the others had had enough. 'Disgusting! Subversive!' they yelled and pulled her down in her seat. One put his hand over her mouth (which she gleefully bit), and the furious king threatened to shut her up in her room for no one knew how many days, while the rest of the council chanted: 'Law Norder! Law Norder! They pronounced it this way because it was a phrase they were required to shout so often that the pernicky pronunciation of the words separately had been banned.

So the Royal Plan was launched. It was decided, and in this the King had the support of the agricultural sector, to give to the Big-foot tribe all the mountain tops; to the Little-foot, the valleys. This was undeniably fair as there were many Big-feet and many mountain tops. Fantasmania justly prides herself on her sense of fair-play.

By putting men where there was no work, they would find it; rock would, by their initiative, turn to fertile soil. Self-help was a virtue which must be encouraged in others. 'Let them build character before houses', the King continued. 'In due course hospitals and schools will grow. In time some small businesses may arise'.

In his compassion the King forbade the Big-feet to take pets up on to the heights because of the altitude. His imagination knew no bounds. 'Let troughs be placed to supply water', he pronounced.

In all these measures he had, with the exception of his dissident daughter, the enthusiastic support of his councillors. The security-wardens also did their part in implementing the Royal Plan, aided by their gentle dogs who needed but a word to bring a malefactor down.

The King permitted no weakness in administration, restraining at once any who showed even a suspicion of non-co-operation. His faith in the Plan was so strong that one might almost say he was no more a man but a conviction.

At first there was little opposition. Cassandra had a small party who clung to the old ideas and could not see how muddling it was to have the tribes intermixing.

Then, inarticulate at first, the Big-footers suddenly became vocal in their reaction to the Plan. There were comments such as, 'Never mind the troughs; what about the water?' Some, with unintentional pathos cried, 'Give us light in our darkness!'

But as I have said, they were countrymen at heart and those in the country were for the most part employed in cutting down the trees (for fuel), hunting the game (for food), queuing in the small hours at bus stops (for work or shopping: we have a remarkable transport service), and lining up at the foetid streams or it might be at the stand-pipe, to get drinking water. These activities did not leave much time for evaluating ideas.

Nevertheless as the months have passed, opposition to the King and his council has inexplicably grown. Some demon of discontent possesses the Big-feet.

Issues which in the past have been unquestioned have become rallying points for malcontents. Take for instance the case of eating places. Up till now the Big-feet have been happy in the towns to eat their offal at midday in the blazing sun, sitting on the pavement, their feet in the gutter. Now suddenly there has arisen a demand for restaurants.

Another development is that their once simple trust in unfulfilled promises has given place to suspicion. They fail to recognise the selflessness of those into whose hands arrangements have been entrusted.

Cassandra's party, has become openly argumentative. The Royal Plan is proving costly. Money melts; no one knows where it goes. Hosts of clerks have been engaged, skilled in drawing up regulations meant not only to deal with every foreseeable difficulty but also to take it impossible for anyone else to deal with it. Offices have been furnished with desks, typewriters, computers, telephones, microphones, listening devices, speed-trapping devices, concealed cameras, radar and trays marked In, Out and Pending. The Pending Trays are made to special measurements.

In no time, seven comma five million ordinances had been printed, apart from those already on the statute book; and still, though every eventuality had been anticipated, they have proved inadequate to cope with the twists and turns of human affairs. No man was entitled to a house on a mountain top until he had established five years' residence there without a house. Intricacies such as this call for superhuman sagacity in the handling.

Illusions of grandeur have begun to permeate other tribes. Controversy is fierce and wide-spread so that polite society has itself spontaneously evolved a rule: certain issues have been tacitly declared **Unacceptable Subjects For Discussion At Parties**. This has silenced those who are unable to see that topics even faintly political are unsuited to gatherings the prime purpose of which is 'to eat, drink and be merry'.

Those who insist on dragging up undesirable issues in conversation have found themselves persona non grata even among old friends. This has led to a growing number of so-called protest meetings, which the King has had to forbid for they

encourage an independence of thought which must **not**, in the public interest, be encouraged.

Even in this, the King has shown his liberality. Regulation 9z90x sub sec Y permits meetings provided no person speaks, Inversely, one may, unmet, talk to oneself. No demagogue could ask for more; there are always people who love to make a political football of any trumpery question.

On a lighter note let me mention one small — one might say negligible — group of Little-feet which pursues, with total concentration, the interest which fully satisfies it: that of balloon flying.

No expense is spared to procure balloons which are of every size, shape and colour. Enormous crowds gather to watch the record-reaching flights of contestants. Moving pictures bring the excitement into almost every home.

Balloon flyers select schools for their offspring where prowess in the harmless sport counts for more than academic achievement. It follows naturally that the balloon flyers have dropped out completely from Fantasia's national affairs. All balloons are inflated by mouth and there is little space left in the mind for competing values.

The upshot of all this stir is that, while the contentment and wellbeing of the whole population of Fantasia is not for one moment in question, discontent is gathering momentum. Reasonable checking measures have failed to silence agitators who are persuading the Big-foot children that their schools are inferior to those of the Little-feet. The schools have always been separate and, needless to say, equal.

Slogans such as, NO MOUNTAIN TOPS FOR US; WANT THE VALLEYS, and BIG-FEET SAME AS LITTLE-FEET have been forced upon them with no justification and they have started marching. This of course is treason and some children had to be shot.

I interrupt my writing. A premonition of terror fills me. My desk lurches, rocks — I can not be mistaken. My dog has begun to howl. There is disturbance in the street. Something is very wrong. The radio . . . the words are slurred . . . the mirror is swinging wildly. An earth tremor, it must be, pray God not a bad one. I am putting my papers in the drawer: outdoors is safest. I . . .

Here the manuscript ends in a scrawl. The writer perished with thousands in that fearful confrontation of forces which split Fantasia and wiped out all their civilisation had achieved.

Food for Thought . . .

Child Health in the RSA

A. MOOSA

Professor Moosa is head of the Department of Paediatrics and Child Health at the University of Natal, Durban. This is taken from his inaugural lecture.

THERE ARE approximately 10 million children in South Africa today of whom 8 million are black. What then is the state of health of these children? One way of looking at this is to analyse the number of infants under 1 year of age who die out of every 1 000 that are born, ie the infantile mortality rates. It is generally accepted that this rate is a good index of the overall state of health and socio-economic development of the population to which it applies.

The official Department of Health infantile mortality rates for the different population groups are as follows:¹

White	20,1
Black	100,2
Coloured	104,0
Asian	34,7

But this varies from area to area; for instance in Germiston for 1976 the rates were (based on notifications and not registrations):

White	9,1
Black	179,7
Coloured	444,4

On the other hand in Cape Town the infantile mortality for 'Coloured' for 1977 was 25,9/1 000.²

But these figures only reflect deaths up to 1 year of age. Our experience at King Edward VIII Hospital, Durban, shows that about 80 percent of deaths in our children's wards occur in those under 2 years.³ Although most of these are in children under 1 year, about 1/5th occur in the age group 1-2 years. This is not reflected in the infantile mortality rate. A recent survey⁴ of deaths in hospitals in Natal and KwaZulu during the month of March revealed 670 child deaths of which 86 percent occurred in children up to 2 years.

The most vulnerable group therefore are the young children up to 5 years. Amongst the Blacks they constitute 16 percent of total population. Yet deaths amongst this age group constitute 55 percent of total mortality for Blacks, figures which are very similar to other African countries, eg Liberia 17 percent and 57 percent respectively. Amongst the Whites this group constitutes 11 percent of the population but only contributes 7 percent to the total mortality which resembles the situation in a developed country, eg Denmark 8 percent and 2,9 percent respectively. We in the Republic of South

I'm proud of it) of having a level of health and Africa therefore are in a unique situation (not that socio-economic development of one section of the population similar to that of a Third World country and of another section similar to that of a developed country. Yet, unlike some of the Third World countries, we are a rich country and it is within our means to eliminate this discrepancy.

Why then are so many of our children dying each year? We lose more than 8 000 children a year in the hospitals of Natal and KwaZulu alone and about 2 000 of these deaths occur in King Edward VIII Hospital.

The principal causes of admissions to the children's ward, King Edward VIII Hospital, Durban, are chest infection (21 percent), gastro-enteritis (13 percent), infectious illness especially measles (10 percent) and TB (7 percent), and these are the same conditions responsible for the majority of deaths occurring amongst our children. The tragedy is that these are to a large extent preventable.

Take measles for example — the annual death rate for measles in children under 5 years in the Republic of South Africa (1970-1974) for the different population groups, according to Dr M Klein, is as follows:

White	11
Coloured	451
Asian	54
African	2 035 (corrected for total population)

This gives a mortality rate for measles per million population of 4 for Whites, 225 for Coloureds, 89 for Asians and 128 for Africans. Compare this with the rate in USA of 0,25 — the difference is quite striking. Yet measles, like many of the other infections, is preventable.

You may well ask why chest infections lead to death in these children, when in most of our own children it is usually a minor non-fatal illness. The answer lies in the fact that the vast majority of those who die from these infections are malnourished. Of all admissions to our children's wards, 45 percent have one or other form of severe malnutrition — marasmus or kwashiorkor-or, to put it another way, of our 6 649 admissions in 1978, 2 775 were malnourished, and one quarter of these died.

This represent only the severe end of the spectrum. Children with mild malnutrition are not as a

70 percent of our Black population lives in rural areas. 80 percent of these people are mothers and children, the least vociferous and the most vulnerable section of our population.

rule admitted. Malnutrition depresses the immunity of the child and so not only is he more prone to infection but he is also more likely to suffer from it more severely. So we have a vicious circle set up in which malnutrition leads to recurrent infections which in turn cause more malnutrition, each infectious episode causing the child to slide more rapidly down the slope that eventually ends in death. Because of the high infantile mortality, the parents have more children as a safeguard against the future, thus further compromising the meagre family resources.

But what we see in hospital and on the death certificate is only the tip of the iceberg. A survey from Soweto in 1977 revealed that 45 percent of 10-12 year olds were undernourished,⁵ in Cape Town in 1978 40 percent of school entrants were malnourished⁶ and in Durban in Umlazi in 1977 60 percent of boys 3-4 years old were below expected height and 30 percent of boys 12 years of age were below expected weight⁷ and amongst Indian school children in Durban 50 percent were undernourished.⁸

What effect does all this have on these children?

There is now incontrovertible evidence that malnourished children do not achieve their full potential. Whether this is directly due to the malnutrition or to the poor socio-economic environment from which these children come, is not clearly established — and it probably does not matter anyway. The two factors are so intimately linked that to try and consider them separately is futile, but it does help to explain the high drop-out rate amongst black school children, and high incidence of social 'maladjustment', depending of course which social norms these children are judged against. These children literally need food for thought.

Why then is malnutrition still so prevalent in South Africa today? The answer lies in one word — POVERTY.

The survey from Soweto referred to above found that 30 percent of the households interviewed existed below the poverty datum line and, to quote a recent article in the Sunday Tribune (3/6/79), 'Estimates of numbers living below the subsistence level vary between one third and half of the working black population'.

I have painted a rather grim picture of child health in South Africa today but if you work as I do in a hospital such as King Edward VIII, Durban, then you will realise these are realities with which we are faced daily. For me these are real issues, the priority areas in terms of child health in the Republic of South Africa.

What then should be done? 'How are we going to break the vicious circle of malnutrition, infection,

and multiple reproduction? We can, of course, provide aid in the form of food to the starving masses as has been done in many developing countries, but this is doomed to failure as experience throughout the world has clearly shown: malnutrition is still as prevalent as before, despite all forms of aid. In fact this form of aid may be positively detrimental, as it may suppress possibilities for social change.

We may of course stem the tide of a rising population by distributing contraceptive devices freely, but how does one convince a mother to use these when experience has taught her that the best security for the future is to have as many children as possible, knowing that half of them may not survive beyond the 5th birthday. When Dr Williams, who first described the condition of kwashiorkor, was asked to comment on family planning she said: 'If we look after the quality of a population, the quantity will look after itself'.⁹ The best contraceptive is good nutrition.

We can immunise all the children to protect them against infectious diseases, but this is less effective in malnourished children, and how does one get to these children, most of whom reside in rural areas?

The one important way to break the circle is to eliminate malnutrition, ie poverty. Only then will all the other approaches discussed above have the desired effect.

The solution, therefore, is not a medical one. It is essentially, a political and socio-economic one. As Dr J de Beer pointed out, the health priorities in the Republic of South Africa are the provision of clean, constant water, constant adequate supply of food, adequate sanitation and adequate housing. In order to achieve this we need a complete re-orientation in the thinking of those who decide how our monies are to be spent. Instead of building bigger and better 'disease palaces' or what I like to describe as towering monuments to our failure, like the new Johannesburg General Hospital which cost R156 million to build and R50 million per annum to maintain, the money should be used to provide much needed basic health services in the rural areas. In so doing we will reach a much larger section of our population.

It must be remembered that 70 percent of our Black population lives in rural areas which are largely undeveloped and do not have the basic amenities for healthy existence. 80 percent of these people are mothers and children, the least vociferous and most vulnerable section of our population. To invest in their health is to invest in a healthy future. What we need is a proliferation of maternal and child health centres or primary health

care centres which must be accessible, acceptable and appropriate to the needs of the population. Israel, with a population of 3½ million, has approximately 850 of these centres throughout the country. In KwaZulu with a population of approximately 5 million we have only 100 and these are not necessarily adequately staffed. But these health care centres must be seen as part of an overall development plan for the rural areas — agricultural development, educational and technological development — which must be appropriate. I believe the University of Natal has a leading role to play in this regard. Recognising the constraints under which the University operates due to the laws of this country, and recognising that the community it serves is unfortunately not the one most in need, I nevertheless believe the University should seriously consider the establishment of a Rural Development Unit which will undertake research into and co-ordinate activities related to rural development in Natal and KwaZulu.

What rôle should the medical profession play?

For one I think we as a medical profession should realise that the health care of our children and, for that matter, of all people is not the sole prerogative of the medical profession — but that other disciplines are of equal, if not greater, importance in the provision of adequate health care for our children. We must realise that 'western style medical education is an antiquated model of testified incapability in solving health problems of the type existing in developing countries'. We must move away from the so-called western pyramid of élitism (which probably stems from the 13th century when Emperor Frederick II of the Holy Roman Empire decreed that no one should practise medicine without sitting an examination before the masters of the medical school at Salerno), and see the provision of health care as a broad front of health for all by all and, especially, free for all. This re-orientation process must start right at the beginning of the training of our doctors and indeed even before that. In the training of our doctors we must kill two birds with one stone — not literally speaking, of course, although this may be a way of solving the population explosion! Whilst training them in the art of diagnosis we must at the same time teach them about the importance of prevention and health education.

But it is not just the University that has a rôle to play. Each one of us has a contribution to make. We cannot simply sit on the sideline and watch our children die in their thousands each year from preventable causes. We must all get involved and do something about this. **What, you may well ask, can I do in this regard?** For a start, become aware of what the real priorities in child health in the Republic of South Africa are and, secondly, bring pressure to bear on the policy makers and planners to deal with the roots of the problems and not merely the symptoms. If we can convince our health minister that instead of spending 98 percent

of the health budget on curative services and the other 2 percent on preventive and promotive aspects, the reverse should take place until such time as we have overcome the major health problems in this country. After this about half of the budget should be spent on curative and the other half on other aspects of health. We would then have achieved an important victory in our struggle to provide health care for all our people in the Republic of South Africa. If I may quote the late John F Kennedy when he opened the World Food Congress in Washington in 1963:

So long as freedom from hunger is only half achieved, so long as two-thirds of the nations have food deficits, no citizen, no nation, can afford to be satisfied. We have the ability as members of the human race. We have the means, we have the capacity to eliminate hunger from the face of the earth in our lifetime — we need only the will.

Do we have the will?

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Points of View

I WONDER what the Blacks, who shiver in the middle of a dark night and who are hounded early in the morning, call the department, surely not co-operation and development. Perhaps callous and destructive would be nearer the truth'. Dr Alex Boraine (PFP, Pinelands). — The Star

DR KOORNHOF said it was his duty to ensure that as far as possible Blacks living in White South Africa retained their bonds with their own national states. He was a friend of the Black man, and urged the Opposition not to destroy that friendship.

Dr Koornhof has claimed that the evictions and demolitions would be carried out compassionately with due regard to the dignity of those being evicted. 'I am sure he means what he says. I am only a little puzzled — how can you evict and demolish compassionately? How can you do something that is fundamentally inhumane inhumanely?'

— Bishop Tutu quoted in The Star

LOVE SPELLS FOOD

NEIL AND CREINA ALCOCK

KWAZULU is afraid of its children, with their unnerving stares, their shrugs and silences. And the big boys out of work with nothing to do — they frighten their own parents.

'But at the dam', Majozi told the meeting, 'they don't look dangerous'. Nobody can be dangerous going brrrmmm brrrmmm up a dam wall. The Executive gave a sigh of understanding. If dam-building could defuse dynamite, then the under-16's had better go on qualifying for famine relief. While the relief lasted.

That was the worry. How much longer would supplies of mealie meal be trundled in at our gate? Since July more than 153 tons of food had arrived at Mdukutshani — which sounds like a lot of food until you count the people. The first gift of four tons, piled up in our office, seemed enough to start a supermarket. Had we shared it out equally among the families on our shortlist, however, each food parcel would have contained something like this: 1 teabag, 2 spoons of jam, 3 biscuits, ½ kilo-gram of mealie meal . . .

The short list, of course, stretched into a long list, and each name added became a signal for battle. Most of the skirmishes seemed to take place at the office door.

'If she qualifies, why not me?' Plaintiffs and petitioners brought routine to a standstill.

One well-dressed stranger arrived in a taxi to negotiate supplies for his area. 'My people are in a bad way', he told us. 'If you'll send the food, I'll see it goes where it's needed'. On his suit the man wore an Inkatha badge. He said he was regional director of the Zulu Cultural Liberation Movement. If he were, the region had yet to hear about it. 'That old bastard', snorted Mhlongo. 'He'll steal anything. I know him well. Give him food and he'll sell it as fast as he gets hold of it'. In fact before any food arrived, the man was selling places on his list at 25 cents a time. Were his customers refunded when no supplies materialised?

We grew steel around our hearts, trying to block out the whines and quavers, threats and insults. Even those who received parcels were dissatisfied. Phumaphi Njokwe went to Tugela Ferry to report us to the authorities. 'She complains she is getting a small supply', wrote the social worker.

Of course there were genuine cases. There were pathetic people who deserved help. There were children eating one meal a day, and old folk whose stomachs rattled with the water they swallowed to

feel full. However, we almost lost sight of them behind the rising dusts of squabbles.

'Food just means trouble', Oscar Myeni said when he asked to be released from further food distribution. Philemon Khoza threw in his resignation too. 'In my area the people now claim it is government food', he said. 'They tell me government food is for everyone. I have no right to discriminate'

It is one thing to act Father Christmas, another to play the role of God. God might cope with the human wrangle jangle. Our men couldn't. There had to be an end of gifts, they agreed. Instead of food-for-nothing it would be food-for-work. Philemon Khoza went home feeling the tension of the past weeks lifting at last.

On September 30 he and his wife were sharing an evening cup of tea when the door of their hut was smashed open and two shots were fired. Khoza was hit in the neck and abdomen. He died in hospital. Until the unknown gunman is found, the reason for the attack will be a mystery. However, the district is convinced Khoza was killed simply because he was in charge of handing out food.

Stunned by the death of their colleague, our directors did not push the work-for-food projects. Although the schemes got off to a slow start, by November dams and furrows were under construction in many different areas, and 1 194 people were working for food.

At Mseleni 450 men and women were clearing a canal to lead water 15 kilometres to their homes. At Umhlumba 43 hopefuls were preparing a garden in case it ever rained. There were 36 women busy at Mdukutshani's fishponds. Nhlalakahle had 96 starting a dam. At Mthatheni . . .

Mthatheni! The directors sat up straight. There was no problem about Mthatheni. Or rather there were so many problems about that place that they were all agreed. No more meal. Mthatheni was out.

Mthatheni is ruled by ladies. — And there are some who say openly that if the Mthatheni experience is anything to go by, it is just as well the world is ruled by men. 'Big shots', said Mhlongo. 'They think they're big shots! etting others to make their gardens for them — and still getting meal!' 'That Saraphina came to the office this week', put in Majozi, 'to complain that we had not been paying her R2 every time she came to ask for seed or meal'. A babble of indignation rose from the room.

Mthatheni ladies hotly deny it, but they are better off than other areas. For a start, they live along the road, which means that those who want work have a chance to climb onto the farmers' lorries which fetch labour daily. Next, Mthatheni is right on the Tugela River, where the government has laid out irrigated gardens. Not everyone has a plot, however. Some families have six. Many have no land at all. Saraphina is one of the lucky ones with four. Last year she sat in on the barefoot university classes. This year she asked for help. There was no help for individuals she was told, only groups. And so the Mthatheni ladies group came into being with the lofty purpose, of 'helping people who struggle to get food and those who are in need. 'Which means that those of you who have more than one garden must share with those who have none', Neil explained, 'and if you work together, helping each other, the land can be prepared without paying for a tractor'. Mthatheni would get places with community spirit.

'We understand', said the ladies, and set to work hoeing the garden of the wealthiest among them. Next they dug over the plots of the committee members. Mthatheni was seething with controversy when our commission of inquiry was appointed. The findings were no surprise to anyone. Mthatheni's leading ladies had kept every centimetre of their multi-plots to themselves. All they had shared with their poorer sisters was the digging.

That is why another investigating committee sneaked off before sunrise to catch KwaDimbi un-awares. Something seemed to be wrong there too.

KwaDimbi people live at least two hours walk away from the nearest road, tucked into the corners of wooded valleys, perched on dizzy ridges. cManqomfini they call their high country. The land where the grass lark plays. Not many strangers come visiting — KwaDimbi is too far off the beaten track.

The first time we went to KwaDimbi we were specially invited, and induna Buthelezi was waiting to guide us over the flat rocks of the Dimbi stream up to a high waterfall. In its short plunge from the top of the mountain down, Dimbi's clear water makes many leaps, splashing through overhanging ferns, dropping past banks of puffball white haemanthus. Despite the vigour of its upper reaches, however, the stream has died long before it levels out on the valley floor.

'We have never seen our stream like this', Buthelezi gestured from a boulder at the edge of the waterfall. The echo of his words was tossed between the precipices, disturbing a flock of hadedahs. The birds flapped into the air and circled, bugling their annoyance. The cliffs took up the echoes of their cries too.

The technical business was not complicated. KwaDimbi's men had already been to examine the Nomoya dam. They had decided that if a wall could be thrown across the top of the waterfall, water could be stored for piping to gardens in the dry valley lower down. All they wanted to know

was where to position the wall. And later, when we were drinking beer in the scant shade of a euphorbia on the hillside, Buthelezi broached the subject of mealie meal. It would be a long time before they could expect productive gardens. Was there any chance of providing them with mealie meal in between?

KwaDimbi was registered as a new work-for-food scheme with 18 workers. Another 18 bags of meal.

Not 18, corrected the office staff soon afterwards. 114. KwaDimbi claimed there were 114 people working at the waterfall. Well of course we knew they were cheating. There wasn't room for all those people standing together on that narrow lip of rock. There was certainly no room for that many working. We decided to take KwaDimbi by surprise, making an unplanned call, coming from an unexpected direction, over the top of the mountain.

And the dam workers were certainly surprised to see us. Surprised, but pleased. Two frail grandmothers waved from the bank, where they were lifting rocks onto the heads of six tiny girls. The dam wall had been completed according to plan, a stone-and-earth structure notched into the banks. However KwaDimbi's engineers had decided that support walls for the banks were also necessary, and a gang of boys were shifting rock for building.

'Is it all right? Have we done the right thing?' asked Mrs Nvelase, KwaDimbi's very own Mrs Thatcher, a powerful organiser, pusher and prodder. While we made the correct sounds of admiration we did a quick count of those present. Only 20. Ha!

'Let me take you down', offered our hostess, and unsuspecting we left the waterfall, and began a slip-slide journey along the mountainside, following a newly-dug pipeline. (But we had never talked of a pipeline. That was to be surveyed later)! About a kilometre further on we skidded to a stop in a shower of gravel as we rounded a corner — and bumped into a second workparty. This one took a bit longer to count. There were more than 80.

'What do you think?' beamed induna Buthelezi. 'You must look at the dam'. Dam? We had seen the dam. But we followed him as he led the way through the bush, past more people at work with axes, clearing a track. And when we emerged at the bottom of the hill — there was a dam being shaped out of flint with buckets and basins.

Sorry KwaDimbi. You have left us ashamed. Especially as there is no more mealie meal. White sympathy ran out ahead of the work.

'Well we always warned the people this might happen', said Majozi. 'We all know Whites are quickly bored'. And he set off to visit 1 194 people to announce that from now on it will be work-for-nothing.

Love is a four letter word spelt FOOD, said a headline in The Star which arrived this week. No, it had nothing to do with drought relief. Gourmet chef Robert Carrier was in Johannesburg to open a R450 000 Food and Drink Fair.

Obituary

RUTH HAYMAN LAZAR

IT was with great sorrow that we heard of the death of Ruth Hayman. Ruth was one of the early members of the Black Sash and she willingly and generously gave us support and help on many different occasions.

An Attorney by profession, she worked selflessly and courageously and with compassion to give legal assistance to those many people of all races who were accused of political offences.

From the days of the Treason Trial in 1956 until she was served with a banning order and house arrested in 1966 she worked tirelessly to preserve the rule of law and to fight for justice in South Africa.

When the Black Sash in Johannesburg opened its Advice Office in 1962, Ruth gave advice and help on how to deal with the many problems with which Black people were faced. The cases which required legal action she handled herself and our cases with which she dealt were done Pro Deo.

After she was banned and house arrested, Ruth tried to carry on with her legal practice, but found it almost impossible. When she realised the detrimental effects on her family and on Mervyn, of the life they were now forced to live, she decided that they should emigrate to Britain.

Ruth had not been long in London when she noticed in the supermarkets that foreign immigrants were having language difficulties. She

decided to help them and on her own she started a class to teach these foreign women to speak English. This idea caught people's imagination and an organisation of neighbourhood schools was set up. Now there are nearly a hundred of these classes all over London.

Comparatively recently she assisted in forming the National Association for Teaching English as a Second Language.

During the last five years I have seen a great deal of Ruth in London. The last time I saw her was less than a month before her death. This year Ruth was most concerned about the unemployment in Britain. She wanted to do something to help so she asked me how to make a Hay Box. I made one for her and gave her the instructions on how to set about making them. She was about to start workshops where unemployed women could make these hay boxes not only to earn a little money but to help save fuel for cooking which costs a lot in Britain today. As well she wanted to make Black Rose Furniture Polish.

Ruth will always be remembered with affection and will be admired for her courage, her generous mind, her enthusiasm and above all for her kindness and compassion. She will be greatly missed not only by her family and the Black Sash but by many thousands of people in South Africa and London whom she helped in so many different ways.

JEAN SINCLAIR

● Continued from Page 2

Prisons, most of the activities of the police, Marx, our fuel resources, mental asylums, an array of banned organisations and people, homelands, anything the Government declares a 'key point' under the National Key Points Act . . .

Law barrier

The list goes on and on, piled up by some one hundred laws which specifically bar knowledge from the public and behind which the overnment can act with virtual impunity, responsible to nobody but itself.

The result is such a plethora of spokesmen on everything from dog licences to attacks on Angola that a visitor might think the country is run by them.

Fulsome

While Government reaction to questioners tends to be blunt (occasionally to the point of simply slamming down the phone), that of commerce and industry is usually suave, smooth-tongued and fulsome.

That does not necessarily mean, however, that it is informative.

A typical reply by an in-house public relations office to an embarrassing question would not be 'No comment' but a silky 'At the end of the day, at this point in time, the board is in a rethink situation and production is not expected to be affected'.

Sickness

It might be funny were it not a symptom of a sickness which makes hollow our frequent claims of democracy, most frequently from those who refuse to answer questions and hide behind laws.

Democracy thrives only in a climate of free and open debate. No government can claim to be of and for and by the people unless it can stand the bright light of public questions and give honest answers.

But when a people have lost the wit and will to ask questions, or simply could not care what the answers are anyway, they deserve the government they get.

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