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Again we are glad to welcome articles by writers from other countries besides support by academics of our own university. Readers will also take note of contributions which feature work of the South African poets, N. P. van Wyk Louw and H. W. D. Manson, who died during the past year.

THE EDITORS.

TWO ASPECTS OF JANE AUSTEN'S DEVELOPMENT*

by D. W. HARDING

Examining the development of Jane Austen as a novelist, so far as uncertainties of chronology allow, has of course an interest in itself, but it gains its chief critical justification if it leads to a more discriminating enjoyment of the special qualities of each novel as the independent work of art it is. The various aspects of her development are interrelated but I have time in this lecture only to discuss — and in a rather fragmentary way — two of them: the handling of dialogue and the nature of the comedy.

Sense and Sensibility, the first novel to be published, is also the least skilful in dialogue, the furthest certainly from the modern conception of what dialogue should be and should do. It is especially the style of the interchanges between the two sisters that seems stilted and unnatural. A sample occurs early on when they discuss Edward Ferrars: Marianne has lamented that Edward has no taste for drawing:

'No taste for drawing', replied Elinor; 'why should you think so? He does not draw himself, indeed, but he has great pleasure in seeing the performances of other people, and I assure you he is by no means deficient in natural taste, though he has not had opportunity of improving it. Had he ever been in the way of learning, I think he would have drawn very well. He distrusts his own judgment in such matters so much, that he is always unwilling to give his opinion on any picture; but he has an innate propriety and simplicity of taste, which in general 'direct' him perfectly right.'

This is early in the novel; later when Marianne is convalescent and making contrite avowals of her past folly she is given even longer and more stilted speeches than this, and when the two sisters and their mother are discussing Willoughby's conduct Elinor provides the lengthy summing up, running to well over a page and a half of text with only two brief interjections from Marianne. It forms a sermon, directed both to Marianne and to her mother, and at the end 'Elinor, satisfied that each felt their own error, wished to avoid any survey of the past that might weaken her sister's spirits' — so she just adds a final five lines of damnatory

* A lecture delivered at the University of Natal, Pietermaritzburg on 31 July, 1970. Professor Harding has recently retired from the University of London.

comment on Willoughby. This might seem a special case but the same prosy approach to conversation occurs again shortly afterwards when Edward tells Elinor about Lucy's insistence on maintaining her engagement to him:

'I thought it my duty,' said he, 'independent of my feelings, to give her the option of continuing the engagement or not, when I was renounced by my mother, and stood to all appearance without a friend in the world to assist me. In such a situation as that, where there seemed nothing to tempt the avarice of any living creature, how could I suppose, when she so earnestly, so warmly insisted on sharing my fate, whatever it might be, that anything but the most disinterested affection was her inducement? And even now, I cannot comprehend on what motive she acted, or what fancied advantage it could be to her, to be fettered to a man for whom she had not the smallest regard, and who had only two thousand pounds in the world. She could not foresee that Colonel Brandon would give me a living'.

This kind of dialogue, though used clumsily and excessively in *Sense and Sensibility*, is of course not to be judged as a poor attempt at conversation. It is a convention: it permits considered, continuous utterance in what is modified monologue rather than conversation as we know it. In spite of being quite unnatural it has some advantages over ordinary conversation where — unless you're a bore — you don't usually develop your view fully and continuously or insert all the qualifications and provisos, all the safeguards against exaggeration, all the precautions against misunderstanding. You expect these minor modifications of the initial statement to come in the form of progressive corrections as you talk; otherwise it would be more like the holdings forth of the conventional committee meeting. No one would want to bring the pretentious tedium of committees into real life, but yet there are frustrating moments in ordinary talk when more carefully thought out or developed exposition of a point of view would be welcome. This is what Jane Austen gains when she makes Elinor and Marianne exchange little oral essays — though she gains it at a heavy cost.

For some rather special purposes she retains the convention to the end of her work, for instance when Anne Elliot explains to Wentworth her fully considered opinion about her earlier submission to Lady Russell's unfortunate advice. In fact much of the interchange between the reunited lovers in *Persuasion* takes this form. But it differs in effect completely from the prosy speeches of Elinor and Marianne. Why is this? The length of unbroken utterance is not less. The difference lies in the length and structure of the sentences and

the pressure of personal feeling they suggest. With Edward Ferrars's long speech about Lucy's clinging to the engagement we can contrast Captain Wentworth's account of his unhappy realisation that he was perhaps committed to Louisa Musgrove:

'I found,' said he, 'that I was considered by Harville an engaged man! That neither Harville nor his wife entertained a doubt of our mutual attachment. I was startled and shocked. To a degree I could contradict this instantly; but when I began to reflect that others might have felt the same — her own family, nay, perhaps herself, I was no longer at my own disposal. I was hers in honour if she wished it. I had been unguarded. I had not thought seriously on this subject before. I had not considered that my excessive intimacy must have its danger of ill consequences in many ways; and that I had no right to be trying whether I could attach myself to either of the girls, at the risk of raising even an unpleasant report, were there no other ill effects. I had been grossly wrong and must abide the consequences.'

Even if something is allowed for the difference between the characters the greater spring and vigour of this speech compared with the prosiness of Edward's seems to mark an increase of skill. The difference lies not only in the overall shortness of Captain Wentworth's sentences (9 sentences in 148 words, against Edward's 4 sentences in 145 words), with their consequently simpler structure, but also in their varying length and changing rhythm.

* * *

Much of an author's advance must go on by his observing which features of his early work seem to wear well when he looks back at it, developing those and avoiding a repetition of the less satisfactory. Nothing as prosy as Elinor and Marianne at their worst occurs in later novels, and we find, as we should expect, that *Sense and Sensibility* also contains a much more successful kind of dialogue which is soon carried further. Many of the comedy speeches have liveliness and conversational briskness, for instance the exchanges about Colonel Brandon's age and the discussion of his personality among the two sisters and Willoughby. We begin to find something of the quality of stage dialogue, stilted perhaps but polished. Willoughby says to Elinor:

'In defence of your protégé you can even be saucy.'
'My protégé, as you call him, is a sensible man; and sense will always have attractions for me. Yes, Marianne, even in a man between thirty and forty. He has seen a great deal of the world; has been abroad; has read, and has a thinking mind. I have found

him capable of giving me much information on various subjects, and he has always answered my inquiries with the readiness of good breeding and good nature.'

'That is to say,' cried Marianne contemptuously, 'he has told you that in the East Indies the climate is hot, and the mosquitoes are troublesome.'

'He would have told me so, I doubt not, had I made any such inquiries, but they happened to be points on which I had been previously informed.'

'Perhaps,' said Willoughby, 'his observations may have extended to the existence of nabobs, gold mohrs, and palanquins.'

'I may venture to say that *his* observations have stretched much farther than *your* candour. But why should you dislike him?'

'I do not dislike him. I consider him, on the contrary, as a very respectable man, who has everybody's good word and nobody's notice; who has more money than he can spend, more time than he knows how to employ, and two new coats every year.'

Sharpened and brightened and pruned of sentences like 'I have found him capable of giving me much information on various subjects . . .', this style of dialogue is developed in parts of *Pride and Prejudice* into the crisp exchanges that suggest the influence of the eighteenth century theatre:

'You are very cruel,' said her sister; 'you will not let me smile, and are provoking me to it every moment.'

'How hard it is in some cases to be believed!'

'And how impossible in others!'

Much of the dialogue between Elizabeth and Lady Catherine in the shrubbery has this quality. At other points Jane Austen achieves much greater naturalness, though with equal immediacy and sense of real interchange, each speaker directly responding to what the other has just said. Some of the serious discussion between Jane and Elizabeth Bennet has this quality, and the difference between their dialogue and that of Elinor and Marianne, even in equally serious passages, shows an astonishing advance. Elizabeth has told her sister of Darcy's first proposal and of her refusal of him, and Jane among her other feelings is grieved for the unhappiness Darcy must have suffered:

'His being so sure of succeeding, was wrong,' said she; 'and certainly ought not to have appeared; but consider how much it must increase his disappointment.'

'Indeed', replied Elizabeth, 'I am heartily sorry for him; but he has other feelings which will probably soon drive away his

regard for me. You do not blame me, however, for refusing him?'

'Blame you! Oh, no.'

'But you blame me for having spoken so warmly of Wickham.'

'No — I do not know that you were wrong in saying what you did.'

'But you *will* know it, when I have told you what happened the very next day.'

* * *

Much more nearly full control of the resources of dialogue as an element of the novelist's technique can be seen in the fine episode of Mr Bennet's conversation with Elizabeth after she has accepted Mr Darcy. It keeps the main focus on Mr Bennet by giving him by far the greater proportion of the direct speech, Elizabeth's speech in the main being described rather than reported. After his opening words of astonishment and anxiety, we get a brief description of Elizabeth's unspoken thought ('How earnestly did she then wish that her former opinions had been more reasonable . . .'). A short interchange of direct speech between them follows, with something of the crispness of stage dialogue, including:

'Have you any other objection,' said Elizabeth, 'than your belief of my indifference?'

'None at all. We all know him to be a proud, unpleasant sort of man; but this would be nothing if you really liked him.'

'I do, I do like him,' she replied with tears in her eyes . . .

But these fairly rapid exchanges are soon succeeded by the moving speech from Mr Bennet which employs the convention of long, carefully considered utterance that allows important views and feelings to be fully expressed. It ends with a side-glance at his own situation when he says, 'My child, let me not have the grief of seeing you unable to respect your partner in life.'

Elizabeth's reply is described and summarized, not reported, for what she had to say is already familiar to the readers: '. . . at length, by repeated assurances that Mr Darcy was really the object of her choice, by explaining the gradual change which her estimation of him had undergone . . . she did conquer her father's incredulity, and reconcile him to the match.' We then get direct speech again from Mr Bennet, followed by a description, still more drastically compressed, of Elizabeth's revelation to her father: 'To complete the favourable impression, she then told him what Mr Darcy had voluntarily done for Lydia. He heard her with astonishment.' The focus is kept sharply on Mr Bennet's reaction, and he now has another

long speech, this time for comedy purposes in the display of the amusing, if less admirable, aspects of his character. This is followed by his teasing her a little about Mr Collins's letter, but we already know about this, so what he says is, at this point only, summarily described. Finally, with the effect of a stage exit line, he is once more given direct speech: 'If any young men come for Mary or Kitty, send them in, for I am quite at leisure.'

Mr Bennet remains in his library but the effect of an exit is gained by his sending Elizabeth out as he speaks — and us with her. We follow her, in ordinary narrative describing the rest of the evening until she tells her mother of the engagement, when again long passages of direct speech are used to convey Mrs Bennet's exclamatory reaction, alternating with the briefest indirect indication of Elizabeth's replies. And in the remaining seventeen lines of that chapter a full twenty-four hours is compressed, ending in three lines of characteristic direct speech from Mr Bennet. The whole chapter is worth looking at for the remarkable skill with which it compresses some parts of the time it covers and extends others without letting these differences of the time scale seem obtrusive. (It was a difficult chapter from this point of view, to judge by the use of printer's rules to separate sections.)

* * *

The development of the dialogue includes several interacting factors, among them the length of unbroken speeches, the length and complexity of the sentences that make them up, the varying proportions of direct and summarized speech and the distribution of the two kinds of report among the characters, together with the proportion of dialogue to narrative and the sort of relation between them. To illustrate this last point, consider the call that Anne and Lady Russell make on the Musgroves when the children are home for Christmas and the Harville children are there too, adding to what Mrs Musgrove calls 'a little quiet cheerfulness' and what Anne thinks of as a domestic hurricane. There is no dialogue. The pandemonium is described 'and Mr Musgrove made a point of paying his respects to Lady Russell, and sat down close to her for ten minutes, talking with a very raised voice, but, from the clamour of the children on his knees, generally in vain. It was a fine family piece.' The whole description, more than a page long, has no direct speech; then at the end comes one quoted remark: 'I hope I shall remember, in future,' said Lady Russell, as soon as they were reseated in the carriage, 'not to call at Uppercross in the Christmas holidays'. Then narrative is resumed for more than a page, this one sentence of direct speech being given its admirable emphasis by isolation. At the same time

too the narrative had been effectively punctuated by the speech, in a way that, for instance, some of the early chapters of *Sense and Sensibility* are not, especially those describing the resettlement of the Dashwoods in Devonshire, where the almost unbroken descriptive narrative seems plodding by Jane Austen's later standards.

The energy conveyed by the direct speech in *Persuasion* is equally remarkable in the indirect. Wentworth's account, near the end of the book, of his unintentional constancy to Anne and the gradual revival of his love is given in oblique speech of supreme skill in its command of short sentences and cumulative effect, sentences with very few subordinate clauses but most resourcefully varied in length and rhythmical structure:

She had not mistaken him. Jealousy of Mr Elliot had been the retarding weight, the doubt, the torment. That had begun to operate in the very hour of first meeting her in Bath; that had returned, after a short suspension, to ruin the concert; and that had influenced him in everything he had said and done, or omitted to say and do, in the last four-and-twenty hours. It had been gradually yielding to the better hopes which her looks, or words, or actions occasionally encouraged; it had been vanquished at last by those sentiments and those tones which had reached him while she talked with Captain Harville; and under the irresistible governance of which he had seized a sheet of paper, and poured out his feelings.

Of what he had then written, nothing was to be retracted or qualified. He persisted in having loved none but her. She had never been supplanted. He never even believed himself to see her equal. Thus much indeed he was obliged to acknowledge — that he had been constant unconsciously, nay unintentionally; that he had meant to forget her, and believed it to be done. He had imagined himself indifferent, when he had only been angry; and he had been unjust to her merits, because he had been a sufferer from them.

So it goes on for a couple of pages with extraordinary variety and energy. We have the unusual good fortune of being able to compare these passages with the earlier version of them in the cancelled chapter. The revision makes them much longer and much less a generalized summary, with much more attention to the complexity and contradictions of Wentworth's attitude towards Anne. Because this elaboration very much extends the oblique report, Jane Austen changes what had been indirect speech into direct, in the passage beginning 'I found,' said he, 'that I was considered by Harville an engaged man!' The revision offers not a summarized description,

but an active evocation of a state of mind conveyed with the energy and urgency characteristic of the speaker.

It is hardly necessary to say that much more attention could profitably be given to her increasing technical command of dialogue. There are, for instance, such things as the use of long, scarcely interrupted speeches from the caricature figures, in which they display themselves without benefit of conversational feed-back, and the special devices of speech notation, almost jottings, used with Miss Bates and with the strawberry gatherers led by Mrs Elton. Her great development in the control of dialogue secured much more than a craftsman's triumph. It was that; but it also allowed facets of character to be displayed more tellingly, states of mind to be put more convincingly, and comedy effects to be achieved more swiftly and without being laboured.

* * *

Jane Austen's novels are very serious discussions of moral taste, standards of behaviour and the conflicts faced by individual people in a complex society, a society highly civilized in some directions but insensitive and clumsy in others, especially in underestimating the importance of personal relationships in comparison with material considerations and social status. But she wrote in the convention of comedy. The relation between the serious concerns and the comedy treatment is one of the aspects of her work that most changed as her practice advanced.

In *Sense and Sensibility* the comedy is to a great extent tangential. True, we can say that the release of Edward Ferrars from his engagement through Lucy's characteristic exploitation of Robert Ferrars's characteristic vanity, provides comedy integral with the action, even if the action here seems rather sketchily arranged to bring about the dénouement. But the story of Marianne and Willoughby is almost outside the convention of comedy; comedy touches it at several points, mainly through the character of Mrs Jennings, but it never penetrates what remains a lamentable history; and although there is comedy in the fact that Elinor makes the marriage of sensibility and romance while Marianne enters on a marriage of prudent, prosperous stability, still that is rather sober comedy, if not sad.

In this novel much of the comedy comes in set pieces. The most contrived and unsatisfactory is Mrs Jennings's half overhearing what she takes to be a proposal of marriage from Colonel Brandon to Elinor when in reality he is asking Elinor to convey to Edward his offer of a living. The scene is rather awkward and laboured and it does nothing much for the story as a whole. A far better set piece

is Mrs Jennings's description of the splendid uproar at the Middletons when Lucy's secret engagement is revealed and she and her sister are ejected. Funny in itself, it is also crucial to the action and full of confirmatory exhibition of character.

In *Pride and Prejudice*, again, the central story of Elizabeth and Darcy is serious and *could* easily have had an unhappy outcome. After Darcy's first proposal Miss Bingley might have got him on the rebound and Elizabeth might have learned the truth about his merits compared with Wickham's only when Wickham had involved the family in disaster. Nor does the sense of comedy arise simply from the happy ending; the same changing relations between Darcy and Elizabeth as they learnt to know themselves and each other might have been handled simply as serious, perhaps rather didactic, romance. In fact if we consider only their relations to one another we find very little at all comic, other perhaps than their embarrassment on meeting unexpectedly at Pemberley; in the early scenes they are fencing with each other or very angry, and in their meeting at the inn when news of Lydia's elopement has arrived we have Elizabeth's intense distress and the moving scene of her having to confide in him, believing that this ends all possibility of his love for her; while we see, at least with the hindsight given by rereading, his real considerateness and his deep involvement with her. The comedy of their story arises partly from Elizabeth's liveliness of outlook and manner, but mainly from the reactions of the people around them, Lady Catherine, Mr Bennet and Mrs Bennet in their different ways, and, towards the end, in the scenes at Pemberley, very largely from Mrs Gardiner. Her role is vital: it helps to define the comic view of the changing relation between the two lovers. She has not been enlightened about Elizabeth's changed views of Wickham and Darcy (nor about his proposal), and she therefore represents the prejudice Elizabeth had harboured in the early chapters, with the result that, while the housekeeper's eulogies of Darcy have a more and more convincing ring to the new Elizabeth, she is dogged by her old self in the form of Mrs Gardiner's sceptical reinterpretation of what the housekeeper says. When Darcy arrives and immediately behaves so well we get the comedy situation of the total inconsistency between Elizabeth's old view of him, still current with the Gardiners, and his actual behaviour which confirms Elizabeth's new judgment. His further politeness and the call on his sister at Pemberley elaborate the comic situation of the revolution required in the Gardiners' appraisal of him, and their gradual realization that some quite unexpected relation exists between him and Elizabeth. The comedy is summed up in the description of Elizabeth and the tactful Mrs Gardiner returning home after the call:

Mrs Gardiner and Elizabeth talked of all that had occurred, during their visit, as they returned, except what had particularly interested them both. The looks and behaviour of everybody they had seen were discussed, except that of the person who had mostly engaged their attention. They talked of his sister, his friends, his house, his fruit, of everything but himself; yet Elizabeth was longing to know what Mrs Gardiner thought of him, and Mrs Gardiner would have been highly gratified by her niece's beginning the subject.

There is of course very much more comedy material in *Pride and Prejudice*; including set pieces such as Mr Collins's proposal, Sir William Lucas's call to announce Charlotte's engagement, Lady Catherine's parties; the whole novel has the sparkle that Jane Austen felt afterwards she may have overdone, maintaining it with too little contrast. The caricature figures, like Mr Collins and Lady Catherine, are closely associated with the theme of Elizabeth and Darcy's love, but in the main that central theme is surrounded and touched by comedy rather than being worked out as comedy in itself. At least this seems so in comparison with the very fully integrated comedy of *Emma*.

It is in *Emma* that the comedy arises most directly out of the main structure of the novel, or rather out of the whole structure, since of all the novels *Emma* is the one in which the subplots are so closely knit with the main story that nothing could be spared without wrecking the pattern. And the whole pattern is comic in conception, even apart from the characters who evoke various kinds of laughter, amused or indignant. This close structuring is one of the features that makes *Emma* so superb as a piece of craftsmanship. It is worth while noticing the importance of Harriet Smith in the total structure. A fairly minor figure, she nevertheless holds together all those blunders by Emma which create the plot; first about Mr Elton, then about Frank Churchill's feelings, which allows her to encourage Harriet to hope, as she believes, for *his* love, this mistake concealing her even greater blunder of confirming Harriet's hope of winning Mr Knightley. Harriet links episodes of a story which, once outlined, is bound to be comedy: the heroine who arrives late at the discovery that she is in love with the man, of whose love for her she is ignorant, and who spends her time prior to that discovery in misguided efforts to manage other people's love affairs, one of which, she suddenly realizes, may deprive her of the man she finds she wants herself.

In comparison with *Emma* both *Mansfield Park* which preceded it and *Persuasion* which followed have their comedy attached to the

main theme, imported through characterization and incident rather than inevitably emerging from it.

* * *

In the main Jane Austen's comedy is a matter of character (often caricature) and of tone. Her control of the comic tone is probably the most characteristic quality of her writing, her ability to introduce it without losing sight of the serious aspects of the situation she creates. This comes out in her letters too. As an example, her account to Cassandra of an accident to the naval son of one of their friends will serve. (It has further interest as a real life instance of the distress of a family like the Musgroves and the to-ings and fro-ings between their house and Lyme after Louisa's accident.) She writes:

Earle Harwood has been again giving uneasiness to his family, and talk to the neighbourhood; — in the present instance however he is only unfortunate and not in fault. — About ten days ago, in cocking a pistol in the guard-room at Marcou, he accidentally shot himself through the thigh. Two young Scotch Surgeons in the Island were polite enough to propose taking off the Thigh at once, but to that he would not consent; and accordingly in his wounded state was put on board a Cutter and conveyed to Haslar Hospital at Gosport; where the bullet was extracted, and where he is now I hope in a fair way of doing well. — The surgeon of the Hospital wrote to the family on the occasion, and John Harwood went down to him immediately, attended by James [the eldest Austen son], whose object in going was to be the means of bringing back the earliest Intelligence to Mr and Mrs Harwood, whose anxious sufferings, particularly those of the latter, have of course been dreadful . . . *One* most material comfort however they have; the assurance of it's being really an accidental wound, which is not only positively declared by Earle himself, but is likewise testified by particular direction of the bullet. Such a wound could not have been received in a duel.

Her genuine concern for the family, and her strong feeling (like Elinor Dashwood's) about duelling, are beyond question, but the eagerness of the two young surgeons to take such a lucky chance of practising their skill can't be neglected. Four days later, writing to Martha Lloyd, she reports worse news of 'poor Earle's unfortunate accident':

. . . he does not seem to be going on very well; the two or three last posts have brought rather less and less favourable accounts of him . . . John Harwood is gone to Gosport again today. —

We have two families of friends that are now in a most anxious state; for tho' by a note from Catherine this morning there seems now to be a revival of hope at Manydown, it's continuance may be broken too reasonably doubted. — Mr Heathcote however who has broken the small bone of his leg, is so good as to be doing very well. It would be really too much to have three people to care for! —

This is the characteristic manner, the sudden step to one side, which, without denying the seriousness of the incident, alters the perspective.

In the novels it becomes a very important technique, used at times with great boldness. In *Sense and Sensibility* Jane Austen created an intense climax with the scene in the crowded party where Willoughby's faithlessness is made unmistakable. In this and the following scene of Marianne's high-wrought hysteria we are certainly asked to believe in the strength of true feeling that lay beneath her earlier exaggerated romanticism; it is in fact the destruction of the lighthearted girl that she was and the beginning of a new character. Elinor, already saddened by the loss of her hopes in Edward Ferrars, now has this new distress. The episode is as remote as it can be from comedy, and Jane Austen wants to get back into the comedy register. She does it through the clumsiness of Mrs Jennings's goodnatured compassion after dinner:

'Poor soul!' cried Mrs Jennings, as soon as she was gone, 'how it grieves me to see her! And I declare if she has not gone away without finishing her wine! And the dried cherries too! Lord! nothing seems to do her any good . . .'

And this is capped by Mrs Jennings's production of the Constantia wine that used to be so good for her husband's cholicky gout. With Elinor's proposal to drink it herself rather than disturb Marianne, Jane Austen modulates the simple laughter of the passage to a tone which combines comic detachment with a reminder of the sadness of each sister's situation:

Mrs Jennings, though regretting that she had not been five minutes earlier, was satisfied with the compromise; and Elinor, as she swallowed the chief of it, reflected that, though its good effects on a cholicky gout were, at present, of little importance to her, its healing powers on a disappointed heart might be as reasonably tried on herself as on her sister.

In this passage Jane Austen makes use of a figure whom she has established as comic to bring the narrative back into the mode of

comedy. In *Pride and Prejudice* she achieves a subtler blending of tones; in the scene where Mr Bennet advises Elizabeth not to marry Darcy the tone shifts from the very serious to the comic by way of the shifting aspects of Mr Bennet's character. As soon as his deep anxiety is relieved he reverts to his cool tone of disengaged banter.

And this slightly bantering disengagement is the tone that Jane Austen manages with great skill when she speaks in narrative as the author. She could command it even as early as *Sense and Sensibility*, for instance when Edward Ferrars arrives at Barton, free at last from his lamentable engagement to Lucy:

. . . and to what purpose that freedom would be employed was easily predetermined by all; — for after experiencing the blessings of *one* imprudent engagement, contracted without his mother's consent, as he had already done for more than four years, nothing less could be expected of him in the failure of *that*, than the immediate contraction of another. His errand at Barton, in fact, was a simple one. It was only to ask Elinor to marry him; — and considering that he was not altogether inexperienced in such a question, it might be strange that he should feel so uncomfortable in the present case as he really did, so much in need of encouragement and fresh air.

With the greater maturity of *Emma* she brings subtler shades into her tone at the rather similar point, when Emma is assured of Mr Knightley's love. The complication here is that Emma appears suddenly to have changed her mind about letting him speak to her — she thought he was going to confide in her about his love for Harriet. Explaining her apparent volte-face would have meant revealing the secret of Harriet's foolish hopes and this her bad conscience about Harriet completely forbade. Earlier in the novel we have heard Emma say to Jane Fairfax, who has revealed her own plans about her marriage 'Thank you, thank you. — This is just what I wanted to be assured of. — Oh! if you knew how much I love every thing that is decided and open!' But there has been a different tone when Emma supposes that Harriet's unfortunate love for Mr Elton 'had been an offering to conjugal unreserve' after his marriage. And now, faced with this same conflict between openness and discreet loyalty to Harriet, Emma is made to choose discretion and leave her own change of attitude unexplained, and Jane Austen as narrator adds her own rather wry reflection:

The change had perhaps been somewhat sudden; — her proposal of taking another turn, her renewing the conversation which she had just put an end to, might be a little extraordinary! —

She felt its inconsistency; but Mr Knightley was so obliging as to put up with it, and seek no farther explanation.

Seldom, very seldom, does complete truth belong to any human disclosure; seldom can it happen that something is not a little disguised, or a little mistaken; but where, as in this case, though the conduct is mistaken, the feelings are not, it may not be very material. — Mr Knightley could not impute to Emma a more relenting heart than she possessed, or a heart more disposed to accept of his.

The whole passage is in the tone of comedy, the tone of amused detachment, but the mingling tones of seriousness, and of an essentially good-natured inspection of decent people coping with the curious problems their circumstances produce, create subtle and mature harmonics of feeling.

* * *

While this subtlety is one aspect of her more practised work another is the extraordinary boldness with which she can unite what might have been clashing tones. Here the account of Louisa Musgrove's accident on the Cobb is supreme. Having got her particular set of characters assembled Jane Austen had, one may say, only to make them behave according to the probabilities, and a mixture of the comic and the distressed resulted inevitably. Severely concussed, Louisa appears to be dead:

Captain Wentworth, who had caught her up, knelt with her in his arms, looking on her with a face as pallid as her own, in an agony of silence. 'She is dead! she is dead!' screamed Mary, catching hold of her husband, and contributing with his own horror to make him immovable; and in another moment, Henrietta, sinking under the conviction, lost her senses too, and would have fallen on the steps, but for Captain Benwick and Anne, who caught and supported her between them.

Jane Austen leaves them for a moment frozen into immobility by their various characteristic reactions, and then —

'Is there no one to help me?' were the first words which burst from Captain Wentworth, in a tone of despair, and as if all his own strength were gone.

When Captain Benwick has hurried off to find a surgeon Louisa is till unconscious, Henrietta in a faint and Mary hysterical: She then turns to what we may call the survivors:

... it could scarcely be said which of the three, who were completely rational, was suffering most, Captain Wentworth, Anne, or Charles, who really a very affectionate brother, hung over Louisa with sobs of grief, and could only turn his eyes from one sister, to see the other in a state as insensible, or to witness the hysterical agitations of his wife, calling on him for help which he could not give.

Jane Austen deliberately got her comic effect at this point by choosing, out of the three survivors, to picture the state of Charles Musgrove in detail. And yet of course she does nothing at all to belittle the seriousness of the accident or the terrified distress of the whole party. And, if we have any doubt about the *deliberate* introduction of the comic note into the account of disaster, we get, half a page later, the workmen gathering around 'to be useful if wanted, at any rate, to enjoy the sight of a dead young lady, nay, two dead young ladies, for it proved twice as fine as the first report.' (For such a deliberate mingling of tones it may be worth while to compare *The Winter's Tale*; the clown's account of the shipwreck and the death of Antigonus.)

By the time she wrote *Persuasion* Jane Austen had impressive control of a wide range of tones. On the one hand, of course, there is the grave, almost autumnal resignation of Anne's outlook in the earlier part of the novel, culminating in the last hour at Uppercross after the Musgroves have all gone to Lyme and she waits there alone for Lady Russell to fetch her. But in the mode of comedy, or within the gamut of amusement, *Persuasion* includes a remarkable variety of notes. The satire directed against Sir Walter and Elizabeth is severe and unsoftened with any kindness, and although Elizabeth's growing anxiety at not getting married is recorded it is plainly accepted as the natural outcome of her being the objectionable person she is. In contrast is the goodnatured, affectionate amusement we are invited to feel about Admiral Croft, and the rather more superior but still kindly view we are given of the Musgroves. The very detached and rational attitude Jane Austen adopts to Mrs Musgrove's large fat sighings over the dead son 'who had been very little cared for at any time by his family, though quite as much as he deserved' has a degree of astringency that has upset some readers, and certainly Jane Austen invites us to share some contempt for the limitations of the Musgroves; but it is a most scrupulously contained contempt, and their real merits as a family — compared for instance with Sir Walter, Elizabeth and Mary Elliot — are never lost to sight. In dealing with the heroine herself, Jane Austen produces, towards the end, her very characteristic tone of goodhumoured banter even

about things she takes most seriously. Just before Mr William Elliot's villainy has been revealed Anne is made to recognize his attractiveness but to feel that her love for Wentworth, even if it were not returned, would prevent her ever marrying someone else:

... be the conclusion of the present suspense good or bad, her affection would be his for ever. Their union, she believed, could not divide her more from other men, than their final separation. Prettier musings of high-wrought love and eternal constancy, could never have passed along the streets of Bath, than Anne was sporting with from Camden-place to Westgate-buildings. It was almost enough to spread perfume and purification all the way.

And finally in *Persuasion* there is a note of sheer joy that Jane Austen only rarely produces. Usually her happy resolutions of the heroine's anxiety are mixed with other feelings. In *Persuasion*, after Anne has received Wentworth's note telling her of his love, we get a beautifully mingled scene of comedy around Anne's overwhelming emotions amongst the party at the inn and her anxiety to get an encouraging message to Wentworth, and then the episode of her being escorted homeward by Charles Musgrove and of course being overtaken by Wentworth. Charles, anxious to get to the gunsmith, rather apologetically asks Wentworth if he would mind taking his place as escort for Anne: 'There could not be an objection. There could be only a most proper alacrity, a most obliging compliance for public view; and smiles reined in and spirits dancing in private rapture.' And even when, as usual, Anne is given the time for reflection that Jane Austen found so important to mental health the complete commitment to happiness is phrased with an unusual boldness:

At last Anne was at home again, and happier than any one in that house could have conceived. All the surprise and suspense, and every other painful part of the morning dissipated by this conversation, she re-entered the house so happy as to be obliged to find an alloy in some momentary apprehensions of its being impossible to last. An interval of meditation, serious and grateful, was the best corrective of every thing dangerous in such high-wrought felicity; and she went to her room, and grew steadfast and fearless in the thankfulness of her enjoyment.

Rather than any single line of development in comedy, what is most striking about Jane Austen's work is the range of her manner and the variety of her comic method, adjusted always to the particular task she had in hand in each novel.

THE CONCEPT OF LEGITIMACY

by R. W. SMITH

One of the prerequisites of stability in a political system, and one of the most widespread phenomena of political life, is the voluntary acceptance of political decisions that are legitimate, that is, in conformity with the values and beliefs of the society. Any political system that rests entirely and exclusively on force is a possibility for the short run only. As Rousseau pointed out, no ruler can maintain his position, and no political system its stability, until 'force has been transformed into right and obedience into duty'.¹ When a person believes a political order to be legitimate, he tries to live up to its rules as a matter of moral obligation. 'Power graced with the quality of right evokes man's responsive sense of duty.'² In a legitimate political system, the decisions of the governors are 'accepted and obeyed because they are felt to be justified' by standards common to 'both those who command and those who obey'.³

In view of the crucial importance of the concept of legitimacy⁴ for the study of comparative politics, I propose to re-examine Max Weber's classic analysis of the concept in an attempt to show where his treatment of it can be clarified and extended. In the first part of this paper, I shall briefly present Weber's own analysis. In the second part I shall discuss the recent criticisms and clarifications made by David Easton and Talcott Parsons. I shall conclude with a consideration of some problems neglected or ignored by Weber, but closely related to the over-all problem of legitimacy.

1

Weber's Theory of Legitimacy

The motives for maintaining a system of authority may be material or ideal, or some combination of the two. That is to say, authority rests on self-interest and/or a sense of legitimacy.⁵ No system of authority, however, will voluntarily limit its appeal to material advantage as a basis for guaranteeing its continuance. Every such system will attempt to establish and cultivate belief in its legitimacy. 'But according to the kind of legitimacy which is claimed, the type of obedience, the kind of administrative staff developed to guarantee it, and the mode of exercising authority, will all differ fundamentally. Equally fundamental is the variation in effect.'⁶ Weber thus believes it useful to classify the types of authority according to the kind of claim to legitimacy typically made by each.

There are, Weber says, three pure types of legitimate authority.

The validity of their claims to legitimacy may be based on:⁷

1. Rational grounds — resting on a belief in the ‘legality’ of patterns of normative rules and the right of those elevated to authority under such rules to issue commands (legal authority);
2. Traditional grounds — resting on an established belief in the sanctity of immemorial traditions and the legitimacy of the status of those exercising authority under them (traditional authority); or finally,
3. Charismatic grounds — resting on devotion to the specific and exceptional sanctity, heroism or exemplary character of an individual person, and of the normative patterns or order revealed or ordained by him (charismatic authority).

Rational — Legal Authority.

Rational-legal authority is the modern Western form of authority, in which obedience is owed to the legally established impersonal order. To a large extent the structure of authority is bureaucratic. There is, in principle, a separation of private status from public status: the person of authority is an official bound by rules — beyond his delineated sphere of authority, he is treated as a private individual with no more authority than anyone else. His personal property is separate from that of the office; indeed, the position or office is regarded as a combination of rights and duties existing apart from the individual exercising them. Admission to a particular office requires long periods of study and technical skill, but, in principle, a bureaucratic career is open to anyone qualified for a position. There is a normal career pattern of promotion, ending with retirement. Remuneration is in the form of money, and is paid from the central treasury. In Weber’s opinion, bureaucracy is more rational than any other type of organization: it requires precision, stability, discipline, and reliability.

Some of the consequences of rational-legal authority are a tendency toward equal opportunity, increased impersonalism, and a promotion of education. Bureaucratic administration also tends, in Weber’s view, to promote large scale industry, transportation, mass communication and a money economy.

*Traditional Authority*⁹

In a traditional authority structure, obedience is owed to the *person* of the chief who occupies the traditionally sanctioned position of authority. The obligation of obedience is not based on the impersonal order, but is a matter of personal loyalty within the area of accustomed obligations. The commands of the chief are legitimate in either of two ways: by accordance with tradition or by the chief’s

free personal choice. This latter sphere of traditional prerogative rests primarily on the fact that obligations on the basis of personal loyalty have an unspecified character. But nothing new, in theory, can be deliberately created by legislation — what is actually new is thus claimed to have always been in force but only recently to have become known. The chief's administrative staff lacks almost all of the characteristics of the bureaucratic staff. It does not consist primarily of officials, but of personal retainers, many of whom are members of the family or favorites. In place of an office, there is a status, with no clear-cut distinction between the sphere of authority and private capacity. There are seldom any delineated powers. Technical training is not usually required as a qualification for serving the chief. Payment is not in the form of salaries, but by appropriation of fiefs or benefices. Often the costs of administration are met from means which are not distinguishable from personal property.

The effect of traditional authority is to discourage education and rational calculation. Various aspects of traditionalism combine to greatly hamper economic development: arbitrariness of the chief, substantive regulation of economic activity, and modes of financing administration.

*Charismatic Authority*¹⁰

In the beginning charismatic authority is highly unstructured, being identified not with a society, but with an individual. The charismatic leader is set apart from ordinary men by what is regarded as exceptional, if not supernatural, qualities. His charisma is dependent on its recognition by members of society, but he always regards those who ignore or deny his powers as delinquent in moral duty. But if proof of his qualifications fails, if he is for long unsuccessful, it is likely that his charismatic authority will disappear. The charismatic leader is a revolutionary, setting his personal legitimacy against that of the institutionalized order. He preaches, creates, or demands personal trust in him and his revelation. If he is successful, there will result a radical alteration of attitudes, a new orientation towards the world.

The administrative staff is chosen in terms of their own charismatic qualities; they are not officials, but disciples. 'There is no such thing as "appointment" or "dismissal", no career, no promotion. There is only a "call" at the instance of the leader on the basis of charismatic qualifications of those he summons.' There is no hierarchy — the leader may intervene at any moment. There are no rules of a formal kind; rather there is the pattern of 'It is written . . . , but I say unto you . . .'. There is no definite sphere of authority and competence; no salary or benefice. The disciples tend to live in a

communistic relationship with their leader. They ignore the economic order, living from gifts or booty. 'What is despised . . . is the traditional or rational everyday economizing, the attainment of a regular income by continuous economic activity devoted to this end.'

Charismatic authority is thus outside the realm of the everyday, the routine and the profane. In this respect it is sharply opposed to both rational and traditional authority. Bureaucratic authority is bound to analysable rules, while traditional authority is bound to precedents thought to have existed in the past. Charismatic authority, however, is foreign to all rules. The only basis of legitimacy for it is personal charisma. This lasts as long as it is able to inspire belief and trust.

Charismatic authority, however, is by its very nature unstable; it exists only as an originating, revolutionary process. It is typical of prophetic religious movements or of expansive political movements in their early stages. As soon as the position of authority becomes established, or if it gets control over large masses of people, charisma gives way to the forces of everyday routine. There are two forces that then drive toward the 'routinization' (institutionalization) of charismatic authority: the problem of succession and the desire on the part of the administrative staff for a more regular mode of existence and material benefits. Depending on how these two problems are solved, charismatic authority will be transformed into traditional or rational authority, or a combination of both. To illustrate how this is so: If the new leader is chosen on the basis of lots or oracles, his legitimacy is dependent on the technique of selection, which involves a form of legalization. If the leader is chosen, like the Dalai Lama, on the basis of certain qualities which mean he is the reincarnation of the original leader, then there is a bias in favor of traditionalism. Similar examples could be given for the administrative staff. But for the most part, a combination of the two types of authority is likely to result.

Theory of Social Change

Max Weber viewed the pattern of rational-legal authority as a distinctive achievement or characteristic of the modern institutional order. He viewed the progression of history as a trend toward the 'de-mystification' of the world; a progression from the traditional with its primitive religions, crude technologies, and functional diffuseness toward a period of general rationality and science, with highly specified functional roles, discipline, and legal impersonalism. But this process was not automatic, nor was there any certainty that the legal-rational order could maintain itself. Let us look more closely

at the three types of authority structures in relationship to social change.

Weber saw that social change depends to a high degree on the stability of the structure of authority. But no form of authority is safe from the challenge of charismatic authority, nor indeed from its own inherent tendencies toward change.¹¹ Change is in two directions or tends to be: from the traditional to the rational, and from the rational to the traditional. If charismatic authority successfully challenges traditional authority, this may produce only a new traditionalism, or it may, on the other hand, lead to rational authority. But even if the charismatic is routinized into a rational-legal pattern, there is still a precarious possibility that this new pattern will break down and return to the traditional. This can happen through an inherent tendency of the rational-legal structure or through the intermediate influence of a charismatic movement. The segregation of roles and the impersonalism on which the rational-legal structure depends are hard to maintain. These requirements of the authority pattern rest on an artificial division of the human personality, and can only be maintained by discipline. Or the official may become so bound up with bureaucratic rules that he treats them as a source of traditional authority. Though Weber does not mention what conditions favor the rise of charismatic movements, there is no reason to suppose that they would not arise under a rational-legal structure of authority and, in fact, we know they do (Hitler, DeGaulle). A successful challenge of rational authority by the charismatic, however, might well return the authority structure to a new form of traditionalism.

II

*The Easton Critique*¹²

David Easton maintains that Weber's classification of the types of legitimacy has serious limitations for purposes of understanding political change. By change is meant, in this context, transformations in the bases of legitimacy of the authority structure. Easton argues that Weber views change largely from the point of view of the holders of authority — the chief and his administrative staff — and the various symbols connected with their roles. The subjects of authority, on the other hand, 'play a very shadowy part' in the processes of change. This emphasis springs from Weber's 'typical overemphasis on the influence of great men in history'.

In the second place, Weber approaches the problem from a formal level, despite his concern for the motivations of the actor. He offers only a 'gross description of principles of legitimacy and the various types of authority structures to which they correspond'. Even if we assume with Weber that all the factors of the social environment

contribute to the rise of a new basis for legitimacy, that charismatic leaders appear and their charisma is later routinized, still we have nothing but a formally correct analysis. We are still left with the problem of how changes occur, how it is that they have a certain impact.

What is needed, Easton suggests, is a behavioural approach to the problem of legitimacy. The way the members of society view the authorities, their structure, influence, and mode of exercising power, will 'significantly reflect the degree to which these members are ready to give or withdraw support'. This behavioural analysis will, he thinks, help to describe the way in which change actually occurs. Such an analysis escapes from both an overemphasis on the holders of authority and from the problems of a formal, non-explanatory analysis. By concentrating on the perceptions or images of the members of the society, we can develop an 'index' to compare the image of the authorities with the ideal conception of the authorities. Up to a certain point, a discrepancy between perceptions and expectations may be tolerable, but if the gap stretches beyond a certain point, then a change may occur. The change in authorities may not actually take place since the members may lack the means to accomplish the task. Or the authorities may succeed in narrowing the distance between images: by manipulation, new policies, more adequate dissemination of information, or by modifying the expectations.

The 'discrepancy index', Easton realizes, has its limitations, but it does provide a clue to the stability or instability of authority. The index brings together a variety of factors—technology, economy, culture social structure—that contribute to change or stability in a political system. By concentrating on the 'discrepancy index', Easton argues, 'we have a method for synthesizing and isolating the potential effects of these multiple factors upon changes within a political system'.

Easton is correct, I think, in his criticism of Weber's approach, and in his belief that behaviourism can usefully supplement Weber's analysis. Easton does, however, make a questionable assumption that mars his own analysis: he speaks of a change of 'authorities' as if this were a change in the 'structure of authority' or a new type of legitimacy. In most rational-legal systems, a change in authorities is a procedural matter, and is not a change in structure. Even in a traditional system a change of persons in positions of authority does not necessarily mean a change in the basis of authority. While it is useful to measure the desire for change of authorities, the issue relevant to Weber's analysis is the desire for change in the basis of authority.

The Parsons Critique

By far the most important studies of Max Weber's sociology have

been made by Talcott Parsons.¹³ It is, therefore, of particular interest to note some of the clarifications that Parsons makes with respect to Weber's analysis of legitimacy. To begin with, Parsons raises a question about the pure types of authority. Granted that the classification is not empirical, but an ideal type, is it a properly constructed ideal type? More specifically, how far do the different variables belong to a particular type of authority? Is functional specificity of roles, for example, necessarily related only to the rational-legal; is diffuseness a necessary characteristic of the other two types? One of the basic necessities of theoretical and empirical study of authority, then, is to make a fundamental re-examination of the components of Weber's ideal types.

Next Parsons notes that Weber treats the organization of authority as *analytically* autonomous from the rest of the social system.¹⁵ In other words, Weber failed to systematically employ the concept of a generalized social system. In Parsons' view, however, a generalized account of the principal variables of social relationships is logically prior to the treatment of such specialized structures as those of authority.¹⁶ Although Parsons does not bring out the point, it is this difficulty which causes Weber to treat incorrectly changes in the *organization* of authority as a change in legitimacy. If a bureaucrat comes to regard legal rules as a kind of traditional authority, this does not mean that from society's viewpoint the whole structure of authority is legitimate in terms of the traditional. This brings us to the next point that Parsons makes, which is related to this problem, but goes beyond it to a fundamental clarification of Weber's whole analysis.

The base line of Weber's analysis, Parsons says, is the concept of traditional authority.¹⁷ In this authority pattern, the limits to authority are not clearly defined, there is little differentiation between the political position and a generally superior status, and there is no formally defined administrative structure. Weber's two other types of authority deviate in two directions from the traditional pattern. The rational-legal is the consequence of a process of differentiation of political from non-political functions in the social system. Authority is then no longer that of a diffuse superior status, but a positively delineated function embodied in the concept of *office*. The charismatic deviates from the traditional, not by further structural differentiation, but by questioning the legitimacy of the institutionalized order.

At this point, it is well to recall that Weber thought that he was dealing with legitimation — that is, approval in terms of general values. But Parsons concludes that 'Weber's classification is not one of types of legitimation in terms of different types of values, but on

the one hand, of level of differentiation of the social system with reference to political function, and on the other, of stability of institutionalization of the value system in this respect. Variations which are a function of types of values, then, would be expected to be analytically independent of Weber's classification and could be applied to any of his three types'.¹⁸ Weber, in other words, had not done what he thought he had: he mistook one aspect of authority (role status) for another (legitimacy) and went outside the concept of authority to questions of stability of a value system.

Parsons, furthermore, points out that a pattern of authority is broader than legitimacy, which is only one of the four elements. A pattern of authority is defined by: (1) legitimation in terms of the general values of the society, (2) status in the system of roles, that is, degree of functional differentiation, (3) the type of situation in which authority is expected to be exercised, and (4) the sanctions available, and the counter-sanctions which can be brought to bear by others.¹⁹

III

Some Neglected Problems

In this section I wish to deal briefly with some problems that are related to legitimacy, but which were to a large extent ignored or neglected by Weber in his own analysis of legitimacy.

Weber's typology of the modes of legitimacy seems incomplete in important respects. It does not help us to see, for example, the qualitative differences between, say, a stable democracy and a stable monarchy: both might very well contain substantially the same blend of traditional, legal, and charismatic justification of the political order, and yet the very form of government would introduce qualitative differences in the way the members oriented themselves toward the political world.²⁰ For where a high degree of participation is allowed, an active (masculine) relationship to society develops; where it is not permitted, more passive (feminine) relationships come into existence.²¹ In other words, by spreading responsibility for the system, democracy turns the participants into creators of legitimacy; by confining responsibility to the rulers, monarchy turns the subject into a consumer of legitimacy.²² Monarchical man accepts his society and accepts it as a given; democratic man comes to understand his political world — what it means, how it is created and how it is maintained. Consequently, monarchical legitimacy is more fragile than democratic legitimacy. Less subject to change, it nevertheless shatters more easily.

Moreover, Weber seems not to have exhausted the types of answers which can be given as to why a particular order is justified, that is, legitimate. I shall, in fact, suggest that there are at least two other

possible bases of legitimacy. Before doing that, however, it is necessary to consider a suggestion along these lines made by Robert Dahl.²³ Dahl argues that the authority of the technical expert is a separate type of authority, 'not necessarily grounded on an appeal to legality, and ordinarily . . . neither traditional nor charismatic'. If this is true, then not only has Weber made a serious omission, but, more importantly, the technical expert possesses some claim to authority and rulership. Technological society becomes possible not in a scientific but in an ethical sense as well. The difficulty with Dahl's argument, however, is that he equates obedience with authority. But as Weber points out, in any situation involving obedience, the motive for compliance may be related (in a pure case) to a consideration of *either* authority or interest.²⁴ Why, then, do we in fact generally follow the advice of the technical expert — the physician, the engineer, the broker? Because it is morally right to do so, or because we believe that it is in our interest to do so? In truth, the technical expert *as expert* does not possess any authority: he only appears to because Dahl confuses interest with authority. To say this does not mean that technological society is undesirable, but it does mean that any influence the technical experts might have in their capacity as experts will rest on utility rather than on authority.

Having rejected the notion of technical authority, one can argue that Weber is correct in viewing the authority of the bureaucrat as an example of legal authority. Weber is mistaken, however, when he fuses the *rational* and the *legal* forms of legitimacy into a single category. For the rational (if perhaps false) demands made upon us by Plato, Marx, the Social Darwinists and others are devoid of any appeal to legality: their claims stem not from any formally correct procedure, but rather from a belief that they have pierced reality in such a way that they have a knowledge of the whole. Significantly, Weber had himself, at one time, separated the rational and the legal, treating them as different grounds for ascribing legitimacy to a political order.²⁵ A political order could be justified by 'virtue of a rational belief in its absolute value, thus lending it the validity of an absolute commitment'; or it might be justified 'because it has been established in a manner which is recognized to be *legal*'. The former lays a claim to knowledge; the latter claims only that it is 'formally correct' and 'imposed by accepted procedure'. Why, then, does Weber later abandon the distinction between the rational and the legal, actually defining the former in terms of the latter? He does so in part because of the example he chose to illustrate the rational form of legitimacy — a belief in natural law. Moreover, the ultimate commitment that is involved in the rational form is also found in the traditional, charismatic, and, to some extent, the legal. And finally,

each type of legitimacy is itself a form of rationality.²⁶ Nevertheless, it seems necessary to preserve the distinction between the rational and the legal: the claim to a rational insight into reality, nature, or history cannot be reduced to a pattern of law. Indeed, from Plato forward, the man of knowledge has been antinomian in many ways, striving to base the world on truth, rather than on law. This is especially the case, unfortunately, with the totalitarian regime, but it is also true of the Stoics, for whom natural law would dictate a radical restructuring of the world, and for Thoreau, the gentle revolutionary, who believed that what is right must necessarily take precedence over what is lawful. Indeed, there seems to be an inherent incompatibility between the rational and the constitutional order: each tends to reject the other as a foreign substance in the body politic. Like the charismatic, the rational is at war with the *status quo*. Yet, unlike the demands of the charismatic figure, rational knowledge is not personal, does not adhere to individuals, and can be *argued* in rational terms. To say that rational knowledge can be discussed, of course, does not mean that it somehow is rendered benign: escaping ‘crimes of passion’, the rational order may nevertheless slip into ‘crimes of logic’.²⁷

Weber is at least partially aware of the rational type of legitimacy, if not of its effects. But he omits entirely the type of justification that Rousseau thought was fundamental in a democracy — that one has imposed the law on oneself through participation. What is crucial here, of course, is not the metaphor of the ‘social contract’ but the ideas which the metaphor seeks to express — participation, reciprocity, self-rule. In Weber’s schema, though, the citizen is always a subject under the guidance of the patriarch, the bureaucrat, the charismatic leader. In this sense, the forms of legitimacy that Weber presents us with are all elitist in nature: the political order is remote from the mass of men, standing outside and above them even as they consent to that order. That men could genuinely want to participate seems not to have occurred to Weber. Yet the issue today, in the university and elsewhere, has little to do with efficient and effective rule, but rather with self-rule. That is, the politics of the elite is being rejected in favour of the politics of participation, and with this a new form of legitimacy, unknown to Weber, is being asserted. What is involved, initially, is a change in *structures* so that greater participation can take place. With greater participation, changes in the *content* of many policies (which had previously been shaped by the few) begin to take place. Later on a change in *attitude* toward rules occurs: since the laws are no longer imposed on the society, as it were, from the outside, but are created by the members of the society, the laws no longer seem transcendent. This does not mean,

however, that rules lose their honoured status and enforceability: what is lost in transcendence is more than made up for by increased understanding and personal involvement.²⁸ And finally, the shift away from elitist forms of legitimacy seems to have important effects on the members of society as *persons* (and as political persons): charged with shaping their own lives, they tend to become freer within themselves and more responsible and understanding in their regard for others and for society as a whole.

One final point. Weber, *in practice*, limits his analysis of legitimacy to a discussion of political authority. Yet he knew that his typology could be applied to any form of organization, and he knew also that the underlying social structure has much to do with the more visible political structure. Why then does he restrict his analysis in this apparently arbitrary way? He does this, I think, because of his deep concern with the question of violence and its justification. And the essence of the political association, according to Weber, is its appeal to violence, and its claim to use violence legitimately.²⁹ Private organizations, on the other hand, are precluded, by the state, from using violence against their members. But to find the problem of legitimacy compelling only when it is related to violence is, inevitably, to ignore a number of important questions that the concept of legitimacy might otherwise suggest to us. What types of legitimacy, for example, are commonly found in private associations, and how do they affect the structure, function, and effectiveness of the association? Are private associations simply miniature political worlds, duplicating, on the level of authority, the same type of legitimacy that is characteristic of the particular political society? And if not, how does the discrepancy come about and what are its effects on the individual, the association, and the society? If legitimacy is, in part, a problem of socialization, what is the nature of the socialization process within private associations? What is at stake for Weber, though, is something far more compelling than the claims of social science. The problem of legitimacy is, for him, the problem of a meaningful world and one's relation to that world. One is driven, Weber says, by an 'inner compulsion to understand the world as a meaningful cosmos and to take up a position toward it'.³⁰ One, in other words, seeks meaning and salvation; but evil, injustice, and suffering continually drive one on to higher levels of rationalization of the world. At bottom, then, the problem of legitimacy is the problem of theodicy. And for Weber the prime temptation as well as the *prime evil* was violence.

IV

Conclusion

Where do we go from here? Do we devise a new theory of legiti-

macy along non-Weberian lines or do we take up Weber's theory and attempt to improve it? I suspect that we are better off doing the latter, and that is why I have attempted to show where and how Weber's theory might be clarified and extended. 'In science, each of us knows', Weber remarks, 'that what he has accomplished will be antiquated in ten, twenty, fifty years. That is the fate to which science is subjected; it is the very *meaning* of scientific work . . .'.³¹

Yet Weber's theory of legitimacy has stood up very well; no other conception of legitimacy before or since has had the depth, range, and utility that his possesses.³² Even those contemporary theorists who are sharply critical of Weber — C. J. Friedrich, for example — end up, whether they know it or not, essentially qualifying Weber rather than overthrowing him.³³ At the same time, others, like Leonard Binder, have demonstrated that, though Weber's approach may be limited in important respects, it is still possible to achieve impressive results with the theory even as it stands.³⁴ I suggest, however, that what we now need to do is to move beyond Weber, on the basis of Weber; building on his work, we can, in a sense, complete it.

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- ¹⁴ Parsons, 'Introduction', in Weber, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization*, p. 75.
- ¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 76.
- ¹⁶ *Ibid.*
- ¹⁷ Parsons, 'Authority, Legitimation, and Political Action', in Friedrich *op. cit.*, pp. 212-13.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 213.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 211.

²⁰ Cf. Robert A. Dahl, *Modern Political Analysis* (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1963), p. 30.

²¹ Tocqueville's remark in *Democracy in America*, Phillips Bradley, ed. (New York: Vintage, 1954), Vol. 1, p. 258, is interesting in this connection: 'On passing from a free country into one which is not free the traveler is struck by the change; in the former all is bustle and activity; in the latter everything seems calm and motionless. In the one, amelioration and progress are the topics of inquiry; in the other, it seems as if the community wished only to repose in the enjoyment of advantages already acquired.'

²² Cf. Jean Piaget, *The Moral Judgement of the Child*, trans. Marjorie Gabain (New York: Free Press, 1965).

²³ *Op. cit.*, p. 30.

²⁴ *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization*, pp. 124-27, 324-27.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 130-31.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 115-18.

²⁷ Albert Camus, *The Rebel: An Essay on Man in Revolt*, trans. Anthony Bower (New York: Vintage, 1956).

²⁸ See Piaget, *op. cit.*

²⁹ Weber, 'Religious Rejections of the World and Their Directions', in H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, ed., *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1958), p. 334.

³⁰ Weber, *The Sociology of Religion*, p. 117.

³¹ Weber, 'Science As A Vocation', in Gerth and Mills, *op. cit.*, p. 138.

³² See, for example, Dolf Sternberger, *op. cit.*; Guglielmo Ferrero, *The Principles of Power* (New York: Putnam, 1942); Carl Schmitt, *Legalität und Legitimität* (Munich: Duncker & Humblot, 1932).

³³ Carl Joachim Friedrich, *Man and His Government: An Empirical Theory of Politics* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1963), Ch. 13.

³⁴ Leonard Binder, *Iran: Political Development in a Changing Society* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1962), Ch. 2.

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THE CONVERSION OF CONSTANTINE AND THE ESTABLISHMENT

by E. H. BROOKES

In the year 312 the Emperor Constantine put the monogram of Christ on the shields of his soldiers. In the year 313 he ended for ever the persecution of Christians in the Roman Empire. In 325 he presided over the great Christian Council of Nicaea. In 328 he founded Constantinople, the new capital of the Roman Empire, Christian from the beginning. About 332 he began building Churches and encouraging the dissemination of the Scriptures. In 337 (on his death-bed) he was baptized as a Christian.

I see no reason why we cannot accept this conversion to Christianity as sincere, but, whether it was or not, it bound up Christianity with the Roman Empire. In the east this connection lasted until 1453. In the west it would be hard to set a date to it, for the Holy Roman Empire lasted in its fashion until 1806, and the Papacy is still with us and still in Rome. The conversion of Constantine is thus the classic example of the Establishment, and our view of it is bound to affect our attitude to the 'Establishment' to-day.

Those who regret the conversion of Constantine do so because they claim that as a result thousands of people crowded into the Christian Church, now suddenly made not only safe but fashionable, that the moral standards of the Church declined as a result, that many Christians became 'worldly', that the purity of the Gospel was contaminated.

It does not seem possible to refute these accusations, but are they decisive in the matter? Before we make up our minds we ought to consider the values of the Establishment and the dangers of persecution.

Those who deplore the falling back of individual Christians undervalue the raising of the whole level of Roman society after 313. If the world infiltrated into Christianity it is no less true that Christianity infiltrated into the world. In the first quarter of a century of the new Establishment, laws were passed mitigating many of the evils of slavery, condemned criminals were not to be forced to become gladiators, the condition of prisoners was materially improved, a peasant's plough-oxen could not be distrained for debt, the practice of branding prisoners on the face was stopped, children were given new protection. Does all this count for nothing? Is it only the sanctity of the individual that matters and not the raising of

the general tone of the community? And is there anything to show that individual sanctity ceased or even decreased as a result of the Establishment?

Persecution breeds heroes. It also ruins the lives of those who fail when the test comes. Even the heroes are often self-righteous and intolerant heroes. We find this to-day with persecuted radicals. The orthodoxy of the heterodox is peculiarly pitiless, yet they are heroes.

Persecution also induces obsession. The Christians of the persecuted centuries could think of little else but their Christianity. The persecution of the Covenanters in seventeenth-century Scotland inhibited literature, art, music and architecture. The persecution of radicals in the late twentieth century narrows unduly undoubtedly heroic lives. Even apart from the physical pain which it entails, persecution is not an unmixed blessing.

The conversion of King Ethelbert of Kent in the sixth century is, for some strange reason, never discussed with the same acrimony as that of Constantine in the fourth. Nor is the conversion of King Khama of Botswana in the nineteenth century. Indeed it would throw new light on the conversion of Constantine if we considered the position of a missionary in Africa or the Pacific Islands. He must take account of the local King. He needs his more or less benevolent neutrality if he is to do his work at all. If he converts the King why should this be worse than converting anyone else? Should that conversion mean the crowding of half-pagan followers into the Church, may it not also mean the cessation of the custom of murdering twins, the gradual decline of prosecutions for witchcraft, the raising of the general status of women and children? What missionary would not rejoice over this? Granted all the heroic blessings of persecution what missionary would deliberately choose perpetual persecution for his people?

The ideals of individual sanctity and corporate advancement short of sanctity are in discussions of this kind so often presented as mutually exclusive. Why not both? No Church has ever yet consisted exclusively of saints, not even a persecuted Church. There have always been those who followed what might be termed an Honours Course in faith and goodness, and those who were contented with a Pass Degree. The idea of a Church of Saints is irresistibly attractive, but it has never been thoroughly worked out. The children of the Covenanters in Scotland combined spirituous with spiritual occasions. Not all the Franciscans were worthy of St. Francis. Not all the Corinthians were worthy of St. Paul. From the dead-and-alive Anglicanism of the late eighteenth century emerged the pure Church of the Methodists. Less than a century later the Salvation Army was

formed by secession from a Methodism which had become largely hereditary and indubitably respectable.

The quest for the pure Church will always go on. It ought to go on. It brings renewal of life and faith. But no Church can ever be perfect. The very casting out of those who are not saints breeds an insufferable self-righteousness and self-satisfaction in those who are — or claim to be — saints.

Why can these considerations not be applied to the case of Constantine? Why can they not be applied to the secular revival of our day which condemns the Establishment root and branch with very little careful thought and much repetition of slogans? Yet dare we condemn the secular Francis of Assisi, John Wesleys and William Booths of our day? We need them. Often they are right in everything except tolerance and charity.

It seems that in human society generally, as in the Christian Church, there must be a perpetual tension between the prophetic and the priestly, the challenging radicals (secular or religious) and the good people — good, not bad — who find something very worth while in the Establishment. I do not speak here of hypocrites or mere formalists, but of those who find in the daily routine of devotion and duty properly carried out things infinitely worth while. In the early chapters of St. Luke the 'priestly' Simeon and Anna are not contrasted to their disadvantage with the prophetic John the Baptist. Perhaps the early Church needed both. Perhaps the secular twentieth century needs both.

When the western world could be described fairly as 'Christendom' there was certainly much wrong in it, as even a superficial student of the Middle Ages or of the seventeenth century must know. The urge for religion has not been destroyed by secularisation. Never have fewer young people attended Church. Rarely have more young people taken an interest in religious matters. But the complete destruction of the Establishment would set humanity back to a marked degree. Humanity may revolt, but it must have something to revolt from. The destruction of the Establishment must inevitably lead to the building up of a new Establishment. When the Tsar is forced out, Marx and Lenin are brought in.

Mixed up with religion as a part of the Establishment is a dubious foreign policy and a questionable economic structure. Surely these need investigation, analysis and attack. The argument for change in these fields are, in my judgment, overwhelming. Yet we must know what we are going to put in their place and not throw the whole of ordered society into the melting pot. If the radicals of the later twentieth century succeed in setting up their new Establishment, they must accept the fact that thousands will crowd into the new

community who do not really qualify as secular saints just as thousands crowded into Constantine's Church. Unless the new Establishment has the equivalent of Siberia available for all political heretics, it will have to put up with them. Radicals who repudiate wholesale the generation preceding their own must ask themselves what they will do if their sons repudiate them, perhaps in a reactionary direction.

If it is claimed that there is no intention of building a new Establishment, but only revolting against Establishment generally, is this not a policy of perpetual anarchy? In the secular field is this not, as the seventeenth-century poet put it, speaking of the religious field, to

Call fire and sword and desolation
 A godly thorough reformation,
 Which ever must be going on
 And still continue, never done,
 As if religion were intended
 For nothing else but to be mended.

The object of this brief study is not to plead for the *status quo*. The aims of radical reform are all intelligible and mostly right. May the reformers succeed in abolishing race distinctions and removing our immense disparities of income. It is simply a call to think as well as to shout, to produce original slogans instead of taking on some one else's epigrams, to consider what is to replace anything that is to be destroyed, and to preserve what is worth preserving even in the Establishment.

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MANSON'S CASSEROLE

by C. O. GARDNER

Potluck — which was performed in Pietermaritzburg in 1967, and is soon to be published by the University of Natal Press — is very different from the other plays of the late H. W. D. Manson. It does not attempt high poetic seriousness: indeed it is a light-hearted and loosely-constructed hotch-potch, mainly in prose. But at its denser and sharper moments it presents us with telling satire, fine fantasy, and some touches of beauty.

The situation which we find as the curtain goes up is both ludicrous and intriguing: four men and two women, perched at the top of a giant tree, have just managed to escape the flood which appears to have engulfed the rest of the world. Before long, a seventh character arrives — in a punt. He climbs on to the tree, and then, with rather irritable aplomb, begins to explain to the other characters both who he is and what the meaning is of the dilemma in which they find themselves:

- Parson:* Now perhaps you'll explain yourself.
Newcomer: Certainly. (*He settles himself comfortably.*)
S. African: Who are you?
Newcomer: I'm the Playwright.
Intellectual: The Playwright? What d'you mean?
Playwright: (*grappishly*): What I said. Don't be ridiculous. For God's sake . . . (*He consults the exercise book he was writing in*)
You're supposed to be the Intellectual, aren't you?
Use your head then. I'm the Playwright.
Negro: What d'you mean?
Playwright: Well, for heaven's sake! Can't you see this whole damned thing's ridiculous?
Parson: Ridiculous?
Playwright: Of course it's ridiculous. You're all in a play!
(*To the Intellectual*) What's the purpose of a play?
Intellectual: To amuse and instruct.
Playwright: To amuse alone. That and that only. Get in touch with your time. Well for God's sake don't all look so bemused.
Just look at this set-up. (*He waves his arm over the scene.*)
Can't you see it's all phoney? It's a *play*! You're all in a play!

S. African: A play?
Playwright: A funny play. A comedy.

It is impossible for us not to be puzzled and gripped by the situation and to feel a certain partly incredulous sympathy for the bewildered Intellectual, Parson, South African and Negro (and the two girls, who are dumbfounded). At the same time we are of course detached and can respond to the implications of the Playwright's remarks. And almost everything he says points to the radical un-seriousness of most contemporary drama: ridiculousness is taken for granted; being 'in a play' is tantamount to being quite separated and different from ordinary human life as we know it; a dramatist *amuses*, pretends (he has no truck with an instructive 'criticism of life'). In fact bogusness is of the essence:

Can't you see it's all phoney? It's a *play*!

A *play*, then, Manson implies, does not nowadays express and call forth the free, responsible, responsive, patterned movement of the imagination; instead it is frivolity, evasion, an empty joke. There is a hint, too, in the indignation of the characters at being treated as ciphers, that much modern drama is founded solidly upon the abasement of human dignity. But these points are made lightly. Indeed the humorous absurdity of the situation represents both Manson's mimicking of the sort of fare that is so often dished up to contemporary 'intellectual' audiences, and his own mocking refusal to be impressed.

The Playwright elaborates:

. . . The purpose of a modern play is to amuse — to play about with ideas — like this one for instance — this tree. It's all symbolic, can't you see? You're all that's left of England. And those things you see, the rubber duck —

Parson: It's plastic —
Playwright: Plastic duck then, the plastic flowers. The enema you thought was something's guts — just rubber. Marvellously symbolic. The end of it all. On a tree. It's all quite marvellously symbolic. And I'm going to make it funny too.

2nd Young Girl: Funny? I'm hungry . . .

Playwright: Yes, of course, of course, you must have laughs, but there must be something else besides that . . .

Intellectual: Of course . . .

Playwright: Well, what?

- Intellectual:* Ideas I suppose.
- Playwright:* Exactly! Ah, but you've got to be careful. If you don't have ideas these days you're out, aren't you?
- Intellectual:* Well of course . . .
- Playwright:* And if you do?
- Intellectual:* Well I mean it *is* entertainment nowadays, isn't it? People *like* to think.
- Playwright:* Do they? Don't be pathetic. Do you?
- Intellectual:* Well, yes, I think I do.
- Playwright:* Do you? Or do you like to *feel* you're thinking? Consider.
- Intellectual:* (*with a wry grin*) Hm. I think I see your point. But *feeling* you're thinking is pleasant — and entertaining.
- Playwright:* Exactly. It's entertaining. Why?
- Intellectual:* It makes you feel good.
- Playwright:* Well, so do laughs. But this is subtler, isn't it?
- Intellectual:* Of course, laughs just make you feel good whereas feeling you're thinking makes you think you *are* good — and intelligent to boot.
- Playwright:* And everyone likes to feel they're intelligent, and everyone will pay you for making them think so. It's simple flattery really . . .
- Playwright:* . . . Well here we are, see, seven on a tree. And that's O.K. Don't worry: it's symbolic. Seven always is.
Trees always are.
And there's water all round you — deep water —
That's symbolic too.
- Intellectual:* The set's pretty dreary.
- Playwright:* What d'you mean?
- Intellectual:* Drab. Dreary. No colour. Nothing to see.
- Playwright:* That's not dreary. It's ominous, threatening. It's significant. Don't worry about the set.
- Negro:* But we're all just stuck here.
- Intellectual:* It's boring — static.
- S. African:* No one comes and no one goes.
- Playwright:* Exactly. That's important. Can't you see? There's a hideous finality about it all. And it's cheap too. Only one set, you see — no scene changes.
(*Excitedly*) I tell you I've got something here. It's archetypal! And none of you are really characters

at all. You come from nowhere, belong to no one. You're just here! That's important!

These passages constitute a direct and challenging criticism of most recent *avant garde* drama, particularly the 'theatre of the absurd'. It is so fatally *easy*, Manson suggests, to devise situations that are melodramatic, improbable and yet apparently brimful of 'archetypal' significance. Plays written in this spirit are not the expression of an artist's vision, the fruit of years of patient and often painful thought and imaginative effort; they are essentially casual and modish performances, clichés, superficial tricks. Despair has become a game, 'hideous finality' a gimmick, symbolism a vacuous and routine technique. How different from the phantasmagoric scenes in *King Lear*, where the nightmare, the madness and the profound paradoxes, astonishing as they are, are set firmly in the context of human reality and are played out by people whom we have grown to know and love.

And none of you are really characters at all. You come from nowhere, belong to no one. You're just here!

Manson believed, unfashionably, that as long as human nature lasts, *character* is bound to be important in art: dispensing with richness of personality, motivation and setting is simple impoverishment. Coherent and meaningful action — Aristotle's organic unity and 'beginning, middle and end' — are important too.

No one comes and no one goes.

The shaft is obviously aimed at the works of Beckett, notably the celebrated *Waiting for Godot*. The suggestion is that, however superficially intriguing or symbolic the *Godot* situation may seem to be, Beckett is not seriously exploring reality, not committed to the attempt to discover truth: he is 'playing about with ideas.' And the audiences respond because they like to *feel* they are thinking. They are in fact sitting back and gazing narcissistically and complacently at what they tell themselves is their philosophical-psychological-social dilemma. (For, in the interests of truth and reality, we have to ask ourselves: are most people of today really reduced to the level of mental and emotional tramps? Have human life and human endeavour really become a mere static, passive, meaningless waiting for an unknown and unknowable person or event?)

There may be a little more substance and validity in some aspects of *Waiting for Godot* than *Pothuck* implies, and Manson himself might have been prepared to accept this; but he seems to me to have been right to see the play as above all something to be satirized and

debunked. As a serious artist in the traditional sense, a man devoted to both the discovery and the creation of meaning — meaning that will confirm and enrich and extend man's deepest knowledge of himself and of life — Manson was inevitably hostile to writing that acquiesces, at times almost gaily, in meaninglessness. An awareness of the absence of meaning, a pained sense of ambiguity, the experience of despair — in themselves these things may be essential elements of serious dramatic writing, as indeed Manson's own plays show. But as counters in a macabre game, as medicinal doses administered in order to shock and to titillate the public's senses, as *ideas* divorced from properly created protagonists, as inert data to be submitted to passively, brokenly, laughably, these things are destructive; the 'art' that purveys them is 'non-art' or 'anti-art' in a far more devastating sense than the creators of those terms meant to suggest.

With the justifiable malice of the satirist, Manson goes further: he advances the view that the 'theatre of the absurd' and most of the contemporary 'drama of ideas' are, like almost all easy art, designed to flatter the audience and to make money. Audiences enjoy the illusion that they are facing up to the ultimate issues of life. The fact that 'absurd' plays lack most of the *texture* which artists have in the past used as a means of conveying life's complexity makes such plays the very reverse of challenging: they are fundamentally rather restful — mock-stimulating simplifications for tired or immature minds. And how convenient that these plays require cheap sets and costumes!

It might be objected that Manson was wrong to attack Beckett and his contemporaries, that such writers are authentic spokesmen of their time. As I have already said, I don't believe this to be so: human life today is nowhere (or almost nowhere) reduced to the elements that most modern plays picture. But besides, in so far as many people do in fact begin to see themselves and their world in 'absurd' terms, Manson was attacking these people *through* the playwrights whom they have rashly chosen as their guides and representatives.

The passages that I have quoted and examined provide the basis for *Potluck*. The plot, such as it is, grows from the 'agonizing dilemma' of the six bewildered 'archetypes'. The playwright points out to his forlorn victims that as they are in a modern play they will have to be amusing, and that, as there is no food, whenever they feel hungry they will have to eat the person who has been least successful in providing entertainment. Most of the varied humour and satire in the play — which is often but not always on a deliberately light or music-hall level — flows from the players' frantic (but sometimes

unsuccessful) attempts to be funny or the Playwright's interjections, and from the central absurdity of the situation.

I am not going to attempt a systematic analysis or even a summary of the play as a whole. A good deal of the amusement is too knock-about to call for analysis, and the plot is too relaxedly rambling and inconsequential to need an exact summary. Instead I shall single out a few of those passages where Manson allows his imagination to work rather more fully. I shall also, by way of conclusion, say a little about the denouement.

The white South African — as one would expect — is the occasion for some political satire. It is made quite clear that he is by no means a supporter of the present South African regime: when the Playwright insists that the actors are going to have to jest for their lives, the South African replies:

I'm damned if I'll make myself a bloody light-weight
for you . . .
You're a bully. Why do you think I came to this
country?
To get away from bastards like you!

He is no Nationalist, then; nor is he a racist, as his dealings with the Negro make clear. But he does believe that he has a right to exist, and he is not prepared to be liquidated by the doctrinaire and unsubtle political notions of reformers-from-a-distance. His attitude and his valid sense of his own dignity are very neatly brought out when he refuses to play the Playwright's game and thus becomes the first candidate for immolation.

Intellectual: . . . That prig's not playing the game.

S. African: I'm not going to either.

I'll be as dull and heavy and prosy as I can. What's my score now?

Playwright: Nil.

S. African: Good.

Intellectual: I suppose you think you're tough, don't you?
Or independent? You're just out of step, that's all — and selfish . . .

Parson: He's obviously going to be the first one eaten — we've all worked that out.

Intellectual: Good thing too.

1st. Young Girl: Why?

Intellectual: He's a racist.

2nd. Young Girl: He's a bloody South African, isn't he?

1st. Young Girl: Are you a racist?

S. African: Yes. I wouldn't eat a bloody Englishman —
And certainly not old Darkie there —

Negro: Steady, white man! I think you almost got yourself a point then.

S. African: I'll shut my mouth then.

Playwright: You'll all get really hungry in time, I promise you.

Intellectual: No doubt. And when we do we'll have to eat him.
But not before. We have our principles, don't we, Padre?

Manson insists that 'principles' may often show not respect but contempt for human life, and that beneath supposedly humanitarian views and sentiments there may well lurk a desire for conformity and a nasty sadism.

Finally they prepare to kill the South African. It is the Negro who holds the knife ('Bloody black savage! Get *on* with it!' mutters the Intellectual who thinks of himself as an anti-racialist). The Playwright has the lights switched off, but in the darkness the victim jumps off the tree and either sinks or splashes away; all attempts to hook him out are unsuccessful.

1st Young Girl: It's such a waste!

2nd Young Girl: He was such a lovely, fleshy young man!

The light comedy of these remarks is followed by a remarkable line which clinches this little satirical sequence:

Intellectual: (*bitterly*) Christ! That's typical, isn't it?
Cowardly swine! That's what's wrong with all of them!

1st. Young Girl: (*a bit confused*): Who?

Intellectual: Bloody South Africans! Why don't they let people eat them!

Manson's criticism of abstract and complacent 'principle' is fundamentally the same as his criticism of the theatre of the absurd: both are inhumanly blind to the actual lineaments of human reality.

Considerably later in the play, we find four characters left: the Intellectual, the Parson and the two girls. (They have all shown how unracialist they are by eating the Negro!) After a very long session — with elaborate displays of humour and calculated half-humour — the score is added up, and the Playwright (who himself, of course, remains detached and immune) prepares to announce the name of the loser and therefore the next victim. At this the Parson, the Christian man of principle — admittedly weak and somewhat crazed with hunger — bursts out into noisy and inappropriate snatches of the psalms:

- Parson:* (*semi-delirious . . .*) 'The Lord is my light and my salvation
Whom shall I fear?'
- Intellectual:* Only the scorer.
- Parson:* 'I will magnify thee, O Lord, for thou hast set me up!'
- Playwright:* (*ignoring the Parson's victory psalms*) Here are the results.
- Parson:* 'I will always give thanks unto the Lord,
His praise shall ever be in my mouth —'
- Intellectual:* (*to the Parson*) Shut up! (*To the Playwright*) Tell us.
- Playwright:* The loser is —
- Parson:* (*now so crazed and certain of victory that he is beside himself*) 'Save me, O God: for the waters are come in, even to my soul.
I stick in a deep mine, where no ground is.
I am come into deep waters so that the floods run over me.'
- Intellectual:* Shut up!
- Playwright:* (*pointing to the 2nd Young Girl*) The loser is — you!
- Parson:* (*bellowing insanely*) 'O give thanks unto the Lord, for he is gracious . . .
. . . My knees are weak through fasting:
My flesh is dried up through want of fatness . . .'

It is a lurid and memorable piece of social criticism. The Parson demonstrates, of course, another kind of unreality: not only is he unaware of the suffering of the victim; he is incapable of seeing what a mockery he makes of Holy Writ and of his own pretensions. The conclusion of the passage is almost predictable; certainly it has a sharp poetic justice:

- Parson:* (*in a complete frenzy of triumph*) When the wicked,
even mine enemies and my foes,
Came upon me to eat up my flesh, they stumbled
and fell.'
(*He gives a quaint half-croak in mid-quotation and falls — fortunately between two branches, where he hangs grotesquely.*)
- 1st Young Girl:* (*looking up mildly surprised*) What's the matter with him?
- Intellectual:* (*lightly*) He stumbled and fell!
(*Suddenly his attitude changes, he looks at the fallen*

figure of the Parson intently for a few seconds and then goes over to it. He feels his heart and then, standing up, says in a reverend tone:) He's edible!

Shortly after this episode the three survivors launch suddenly into a stretch of remarkably evocative poetry. They believe that the water has begun to go down, and delightedly imagine England emerging from the sea:

- Intellectual:* (*staring like a visionary over the water*)
 Slowly the water will pale and recede,
 And the old, old hills will rear up like Leviathans,
 Shining and wet-backed in the brilliant sun.
 At first our world will be only islands . . .
- 2nd Young Girl:* Then green bays will swing their bow-loop inland . . .
- 1st Young Girl:* Ridges will thrust their craggy faces deep into the sea.
 Muddy banks that barely stood against the restless sea
 Will year by year grow up as high as Beachy Head
 And frown down on a wrinkled sea . . .
- 2nd Young Girl:* And everywhere the new, wet hills
 All shiny with a thousand rivulets, will hump up high,
 Crack open in cliffs and clefts . . .
- 1st Young Girl:* Long deep creeks and fathomless fiords
 Will penetrate and probe new continents . . .
- Intellectual:* Strange new rivers will spring from the snow
 Of mountains we have yet to know
 And roar and erode away romantic chasms.
 A million lakes and inland seas will inter-thread
 Our Empire of islands . . .
- 2nd Young Girl:* Longer than any meandering Mississippi,
 Wider than Niger and Amazon combined,
 A new and ever-rolling river
 Will churn its brown into the blue
 Of some unsettled sea.
- Intellectual:* And some new man, some giant Magellan,
 Sprung from our ancestral loins,
 Will one day thread his perilous way
 Down what were Derbyshire dales,
 Or nose his cautious ship round Snowdon
 And see the boundless ocean stretch away
 Where busy Manchester once lay.
 His keel may crunch the pinnacles of York's proud
 Minister

And still plough on unharmed,
 Though under water all her great bronze bells may
 boom
 A solemn grumble at her desecration . . .

This is Manson at his most sensuous and almost at his most serious (not that the passage is without humour); it is as if he has grown tired of the prosaic looseness demanded by his theme. Such verse scarcely needs analysis: its power and precision cannot be missed. At some moments one is reminded fleetingly of Milton's superb evocation of the creation in Book VII of *Paradise Lost*. But has this passage any point in the play? Is it merely gratuitous?

The play, as I have said, is a hotchpotch or a pot-pourri; it has no grand pattern into which such a passage could fit organically and exactly. And yet the passage does possess, perhaps, a meaning beyond itself. In its description of a new, wet, washed, refreshed, beautiful England, it seems to be conjuring up a nation and a civilization freed from the tyranny of drab backdrops, dispirited joking, fashionable despair. Life, as it is pictured in this extract, is worth living; reality is worth observing and cherishing. The passage, then, can be thought of as standing as a sign of hope, an indication of life's value and of its creative challenge to heroic and aspiring spirits . . . There is no gloomy Godot to be waited for: *God*, we feel, could be here.

But Manson does not press these points upon us. His Playwright's only comment on the poetic *tour de force* is laconic and distinctly deflating:

Very nice, very pretty!
 Ten marks all round for blankish-sounding verse.

And immediately afterwards the three remaining characters try some gay fantasy. They meditate happily on those sturdy receptacles which will before long — they hope — enable them to enjoy more varied and interesting meals than they have had on the tree:

Ist Young Girl: Anchovy, pink ham, whole chickens — in tins.
Intellectual: We will stuff our bellies with olives,
 Escargots and roll mops — even steak and kidney
 pudding
 We'll find in tins —
 Tins which rot not or corrupt
 But keep their goodness, Playwright,
 Although they may not float.

1st Young Girl: Caviare we shall consume as if it were mere Marmite.

2nd Young Girl: And our children and our children's children
Shall never need to know
That Brussels sprouts existed.

Intellectual: All strength shall come from tins,
All manner of goodness from tins.
We shall raise up an image to the great tin God
From whom comes our deliverance and succour.

2nd Young Girl: We will raise a temple to him
And give thanks to his brother bottle.

1st Young Girl: For glory be to bottles too.

Intellectual: Beer bottles, wine bottles; the elegant green and
slender Riesling,
The homely, dark, black bottle of Bass.

2nd Young Girl: The translucent mysteries of syrup-packed peaches
and pears,
All preserved for us forever
In the sure transparency of glass.

The thought is a novel one, thoroughly poetic in its comic way shedding as it does a new and unexpected light on some of the objects of our everyday world. We are made to recognize the beauty, the utility and the absurdity of tins and bottles.

Their elation is short-lived, however. The Playwright points out that the water is going down so slowly that it will be some time before they are on dry land again: another killing will have to be made.

Clearly, if the human race is to survive, one of the girls must be sacrificed. After a good deal of comic or partly comic discussion of marriage, sex and babies, and a good deal of suavity and rivalry from the two women, Henry (the Intellectual) finally hits upon a *scientific* way of deciding which female shall survive. He gets out a piece of string.

Intellectual: It is a measuring string, remember.
Exactly divided in inches.

2nd Young Girl: That's right but —

Intellectual: Well, I know and you know
And every single man should know
That his true love must one day measure
By this sacred tape of pleasure
Exactly forty-twenty-forty.
(*The girls look down at their figures in despair.*)
The face that launched a thousand ships

Was nothing to those swelling hips
That just exactly measured forty,
And the lissom waist that taped —

1st Young Girl: Don't tell me!

Intellectual: Yes, exactly twenty.

2nd Young Girl: And her bust?

Intellectual: Surely, darling, you can guess.
How could it be a fraction less
Than forty?

1st Young Girl: } (together, groaning sorrowfully) Oh . . . Oh

2nd Young Girl: }

Intellectual: When Romeo first saw Juliet
He was pretty sure that this was it
And that she must very nearly be
Forty — twenty — forty.

1st Young Girl: And was she?

Intellectual: To the inch.

What else could make that great romance
So certainly a cinch?
Old Anthony was quite a boy
And Antony had many a toy
Who nearly, very nearly, measured
Forty — twenty — forty.
But when Cleopatra came along
His heart within him sang a song,
For with his practised eye he saw
That she was forty (maybe more!)
According to the inexorable law,
And twenty where she should be too,
With hips exactly forty.
What made Odysseus dare the song?
What made his heart so strongly long
For sweet Penelope?
Rest assured that many were sporty
Many had what it took in plenty
Many perhaps were *more* than forty
And some for sure were less than twenty
But only sweet Penelope
Was just exactly
Forty — twenty — forty!

1st Young Girl: (wailing) It isn't fair! We're half starved!

2nd Young Girl: We know we've got nothing, Henry —
Nothing in the right place . . .

1st Young Girl: Nothing of the right consistency in the right place . . . This is fun and nonsense, of course; but it is decidedly accomplished and entertaining. I quote it as an example of the variousness of Manson's imagination; it is interesting to see how easily he could work in such a mode — the mode of what we might call refined vaudeville. And perhaps it isn't merely fun and nonsense: lightly implicit within it are good-humoured digs both at those who would attempt to judge human life in scientific terms and at the ludicrous materialism of the contemporary sex cult.

This article has been more anthology than critique. I have made it so because I believe that comedy needs to be allowed to speak for itself and that it is apt to lose its sparkle when it is encumbered by a heavy weight of commentary. Besides, *Potluck* doesn't seem to me to require more explanatory analysis than I have offered.

I have, however, given little idea of the effect of the medley as a whole. The play is a succession of quick changes from one level of comedy to another, sudden shifts of mood, abrupt variations of pace and point. Manson makes little attempt to maintain consistency of character or a constancy in our sympathies — as the extracts I have quoted amply demonstrate. (Once or twice, in fact, in my experience, the reader or audience has a little difficulty in deciding exactly how some of the exchanges are to be taken.) And there are smiles, grins, laughs and guffaws of every kind; and many human vices, foibles, fads, fashions and stupidities get some sort of drubbing, sometimes a savage drubbing — the colour question, marriage, divorce, homosexuality, other modern dramatists (for a while the Playwright is called Mr. Halfpinter), one-upmanship. There are also some evocative and memorable 'punch lines' — for example, when the Intellectual and the Parson decide that they will outscore the two girls by playing with literary allusions:

It's culture that'll kill 'em;
or, when the Intellectual has finally made use of his measuring tape:
You shall be my mate, and *you* shall be our meat.

The denouement comes when Henry's affections suddenly change, and 'Mate', to her horror, finds herself labelled 'Meat.' She doesn't take to the idea of consumption as a substitute for consummation:

1st Young Girl: You're not going to eat *me!*
I'd rather jump and end it all in the cold, grey sea!
Intellectual: (*shocked*) What about the human race?
You wouldn't be so heartless!
2nd Young Girl: . . . So utterly irresponsible,

1st Young Girl: I would!

Intellectual: Come, you're overwrought, Consider your human duty.

2nd Young Girl: You couldn't be so antisocial! I don't believe you! You couldn't be!

1st Young Girl: (*doggedly*) If you try to eat me I'll jump. That's all I know. I'll jump off this tree! I'll drown myself so deep you'll *never* get me.

Intellectual: (*utterly shocked*) God! What depravity!

2nd Young Girl: What utter lack of social responsibility!

Intellectual: What heartless inhumanity!

1st Young Girl: I don't care! (*She stares at them defiantly.*) If you move I'll jump!

Intellectual: You wouldn't dare.

1st Young Girl: Try me and see.

Intellectual: (*moving slowly towards her while he speaks*) Now for goodness sake! Be reasonable . . .

This is a partial repetition of the satirical point which was made when the South African took up the same attitude; but the point is worth repeating — it is pungent and indeed quite profound. For it is surprising how often people describe their own selfishness in general, high-sounding, moralizing terms — how often they find, like Mr. Podsnap, that the intentions of Providence happen happily to coincide with their own.

Henry and his new Mate speak as persuasively as they can:

2nd Young Girl: This is really unbearable, Henry!

She doesn't even see the *principle* behind it!

She's utterly depraved. She probably always was!

I just can't bear to *see* anyone behave so badly!

Intellectual: (*edging towards the 1st Young Girl*) You are ashamed, aren't you? You're not *really* depraved. (*He takes out his penknife.*) You do see, don't you, that it's us against you, and we're the majority? It's quite democratic. It's perfectly civilized. Think of Humanity — the future happiness of all mankind. It isn't as if we *wanted* to eat you . . .

2nd Young Girl: There's nothing vindictive about it . . .

Intellectual: It's a mature responsible decision taken after due consideration . . .

The passage contains some pregnant suggestions.

The victim jumps. To everyone's astonishment the water is only

two feet deep. They all jump in and begin to munch merrily at the fish which are swarming around. Then they turn indignantly to the Playwright.

Intellectual: You knew all the time, didn't you?

Playwright: What?

Intellectual: That it was shallow. (*He takes a mouthful of fish.*)

Playwright: You should have guessed.

Intellectual: (*with his mouth full*) How d'you mean?

Playwright: Well, it's so symbolic, isn't it? I couldn't resist it. It's not deep at all.

Intellectual: (*sitting down comfortably in the water and lazily catching another fish*) Just shallow — true!

Playwright: And muddy.

Intellectual: (*appreciatively*) Jolly clever that — to make it muddy.

Playwright: Nothing to it really — part of my trade — in any case you have to make it muddy if nothing's deep or many people will see through to the bottom.

There, as an impressive climax, is Manson's final thrust at a great deal of contemporary drama. Such drama is *muddy* — gloomy, depraved, incoherent, lacking every sort of lucidity — so that the audience will not be able to recognize the absence of real depth. The statement is one that Manson, as a writer of complete seriousness and unflinching clarity, had a good right to make.

Henry — scorned now by his womenfolk — complains that the plot contains glaring inconsistencies:

Intellectual: You can't just change things like that when it suits you. It's immoral!

Playwright: No, it's absurd. Plays can be absurd, can't they?

His final complaint leads to the 'punch line' which brings down the curtain:

Intellectual: But the play! It's a swindle! A bloody fraud! (*Pointing to the audience*) How d'you think *they* feel about it?

Playwright: Well, they can't say there wasn't any meat in it, can they?

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THE DRAMATIC OPENING—A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF OTWAY AND HOFMANNSTHAL

by G. W. CROWHURST

By the dramatic opening I mean the actual beginning of a drama when the curtain rises and the spectator is first confronted with the play. This dramatic opening can contain the exposition, but it does not necessarily have to do so. Very often the exposition is distributed over several scenes or it may even take up the entire first act. The interesting factor of the dramatic opening is *how* the audience is introduced to the play. The means with which the dramatist creates the first impression of his drama reflects his dramatic technique. Important impulses or motifs can supply the audience with the tenor of the drama, for instance the opening scene of "Macbeth" where the lines of the witches impart the sinister impact of the tragedy is, as Sehart¹ points out, one of the greatest examples of a dramatic opening without exposition elements.

The comparison of the dramatic opening of *Das Gerettete Venedig* by Hugo von Hofmannsthal² with the opening scene of *Venice Preserv'd or Plot discover'd* by Thomas Otway³ reveals how much the dramatic approach can differ and how much the intention of the author is reflected.

Hofmannsthal wrote a modern version of Otway's drama in 1903 and this adaptation corresponds to his general attempt to bring to life the great European dramatic heritage in modern times. In the same way as his last drama *Der Turm* (The Tower) basically has very little in common with Calderón's *La vida es sueño* (Life, a dream), *Das Gerettete Venedig* is only indebted to Otway in the basic form of the plot.

Otway opens his drama with a prologue and thus offers a double beginning:

In these distracted times, when each man dreads
The bloody stratagems of busy heads . . .

This prologue forms a vague frame in which the political outlook of the author is expressed. The gibe at the end, especially,

Oh Poland, Poland! had it been thy lot,
T'have heard in time of this Venetian Plot,
Thou surely chosen hadst one King from thence,
And honour'd them as thou hast England since.

separates the prologue distinctly from the dramatic opening. The speaker of the prologue is not characterised in any way and is therefore not bound to any person in the drama. This makes the prologue

an autonomous frame (at the end its counterpart, the epilogue, takes up a similar attitude) which deliberately destroys the illusion of the drama by connecting it with the political events of Otway's time: references to the occurrences connected with the 'popish plot' (which took place in September 1678; the play was performed in February 1682) can be found in the first twenty-one lines. The last fifteen lines concentrate on Shaftesbury, the leader of the Whigs, whom the Tory writers of that time held responsible for the 'plot'. In this way the prologue prepares the audience for the political satire in the drama where it is carried by the figures of Renault and Antonio. Actual names are not mentioned *expressis verbis* but the allusion is obvious, although the satirical purpose is only occasionally perceptible within the drama. The political aspect was not as important to Otway as the drama of love and friendship.

Here Otway makes use of an old theatre tradition. The prologues in the plays before 1600 usually presented the audience with the background story to the plot. Marlowe used the plot extremely skilfully — comparing the prologue of 1 *Tamburlaine The Great* with that of *Doctor Faustus* or *The Jew of Malta* displays how differently Marlowe used it. After 1600 the prologue tradition in English drama dwindles. In the same way as the Elizabethan tragedy developed, relatively, from a rhetoric drama to an action drama, the dramatists tended to put the main emphasis on the first scene. Most probably the fundamentally neutral character of the prologue which tends to stand apart from the drama itself supported this development. For that reason it remained in use for comedies where it supports the artistic intention of the V-effect. Later the Caroline and Restoration drama developed a special liking for the prologue and here Otway and Dryden both favoured it for its 'Verfremdungseffekt'. This was sharply criticized in 'Spectator 34' by Addison who called the prologues of their plays 'distant performances by themselves, pieces entirely detached from the play, and no way essential to it.'

The actual opening scene of *Venice Preserv'd* reminds one faintly of *Othello* (Act I, Scenes 2-3) and also the opening words 'No more! I'll hear no more . . .' convey a similar impression to the Shakespearean 'Tush, never tell me . ..'. Otway's dramatic opening gives the impression of being a spontaneous continuation of a conversation that preceded. This 'before' is suggested very strongly in the retrospect 'No more'. The relationship of Jaffier and Priuli is made visible from the centre and the audience is immediately confronted with one of the main figures of the drama. The scene is determined by its dialogue character and has as such not much effect from a visual point of view. The long passages of speech are static

and destroy the dramatic intensity of the opening words. Their obvious aim is to inform the audience of the past history and the present situation of Jaffier, Priuli and Belvidera; at the same time the relationship between these persons is established. The presentation element is very strong in this scene. Jaffier and Priuli oppose each other as equal partners (which they are not) and Jaffier recapitulates how he saved Belvidera (1.27-46). He displays manly character traits and in contrast his greatest weakness becomes apparent:

My heart, that awes me, is too much my Master" (1.85)

With these words the persuasion-scene in the fourth act is prepared. Although Belvidera is the subject of this conversation, she remains a pale shadowy figure. The determining factor of this scene is report and information; there is no vivid theatrical scene or impression to detract from this.

Hofmannsthal begins his drama very differently. The subtitle of Otway's drama falls away, so do prologue and epilogue. As it is here especially that Otway points to the political scene of his day, these parts had become meaningless for the 20th century. Otway's dramatic opening, the conversation between Priuli and Jaffier, is turned into a report which Jaffier himself delivers later when he comes home. *Das Gerettete Venedig* opens with the distraint in Jaffier's house. This event is not shown on stage in Otway's drama but Pierre tells Jaffier all about it when they meet (act I, scene 2; 1.232-267):

I past this very moment by thy dores,
 And found them guarded by a Troup of Villains;
 The sons of public Rapine were destroying:
 They told me, by the sentence of the Law
 They had Commission to seize all they Fortune,
 Nay more, Priuli's cruel hand hath sign'd it.
 Here stood a Ruffian with a horrid face
 Lording it o're a pile of massy Plate,
 Tumbled into a heap for public sale;
 There was another making villainous jests
 At thy undoing; he had ta'ne possession
 Of all thy antient most domestick Ornaments,
 Hadst thou but seen, as I did, how at last
 Thy Beauteous Belvidera, like a Wretch
 That's doomed to Banishment, came weeping forth
 Shining through Tears, like April's Sun's in showers
 That labour to orecome the Cloud that loads 'em,
 Whilst two young Virgins, on whose Arms she lean'd,
 Kindly lookt up, and at her Grief grew sad,

As if they catch't the Sorrows that fell from her:
 Even the lewd Rabble that were gathered round
 To see the sight, stood mute when they beheld her;
 Govern'd their roaring throats and grumbled pity . . .

This scene opens Hofmannsthal's drama:

Belvidera steht links, an sie gedrückt die beiden Kinder. —
 Der Gerichtsvollzieher, hinter ihm die drei Gerichtsdiener,
 alle vier die Mützen auf dem Kopf, in der Mitte des Zimmers.

Vollzieher (die Vollmacht in der Hand)

Wohnt hier ein Messer Jaffier, ein Edelmann
 aus der Provinz Treviso, Untertan
 der Republik, doch ohne Würde, Amt
 oder Beruf, und dessen Ehefrau,
 gewesne Tochter des gebietenden
 Senators Priuli?

(p. 79)

(Belvidera stands to the left, pressed to her the two children.
 The bailiff, three court attendants behind him, all four with
 their caps on their heads, in the middle of the room.)

Bailiff (the warrant in his hand)

Does a Messer Jaffier live here, a nobleman from the province
 of Treviso, subject of the Republic, yet without dignity, duty or
 profession, and his wife, the one-time daughter of the ruling
 Senator Priuli?)

Indirectly Jaffier is introduced at once, characterised by the word 'subject' which is intensified by the official formula — without duty, dignity or profession. The superficial impersonal formulation becomes the motto for the character of Jaffier. The drama seems to start quite casually on the periphery of the plot and yet the situation anticipates the end of the drama. Figures and action reflect each other: the state, represented by the bailiff and his three assistants, takes over the property of a citizen, and as the state stands for the whole population, after a while an old hag, a prostitute and a young man appear together with other members of the rabble. Opposing them is the daughter of the Senator, the aristocrat. Figuratively the intrusion of the general public into the private sphere becomes obvious. And later Jaffier will hand his wife to the conspirators as a pledge of his trustworthiness as if she was a piece of property. With the dramatic opening the machinations of a government are shown which become more and more sinister during the course of the drama.

Venice as a locality plays no part in Otway's drama while Hofmannsthal's Venice is an atmospheric factor which influences the people. Person, speech, gesture, time and place unite in the situation.

Jaffier's dwelling is described in the stage directions and attains symbolic meaning: a down-and-out existence is portrayed in the apartment below street level. Otway gives very few unspecific stage directions and the city as such is immaterial.

Otway's Belvidera is described as a pitiful figure; Hofmannsthal uses strong contrasts — on the one side the aristocrat, very pale, and on the other side the malicious official and the coarse mob (the stage directions state expressly that the officials keep their hats on and that the old woman is very red in the face). Hofmannsthal's Belvidera is composed and proud:

Ruhig! siehst du nicht,/dass ich ganz still bin. (p. 80)
(Hush, don't you see that I'm absolutely still)

This opening scene does not bring much exposition but introduces directly two important elements of the plot: the character of Belvidera and the city-state of Venice. Indirectly Jaffier's later appearance is anticipated and Priuli's sternness has been documented. The dramatic opening is symptomatic of Hofmannsthal's dramatic technique: he usually chooses a dramatic situation which prepares the audience for the plot especially from a visual point of view. This scene also has a static character; it has, not the epic traits of the Otway scene, but the traits of a tableau. Like a prelude, the opening supplies many important motifs, for instance 'gewesne Tochter' (one-time daughter), 'Fragt euch selbst' (question yourself), 'gestern' (yesterday), 'Vorwärts! so wie immer' (Go ahead! as usual), 'Ich fürchte mich' (I'm frightened), 'Lakai' (lackey) and especially the use of the subjunctive which is going to characterise Jaffier so perfectly:

Gelt, Mutter, wär der Vater dagewesen,
der hätte sie geschlagen und verjagt?" (p. 82)

(If father had been here he would have beaten and chased them away, wouldn't he, mother?)

And Jaffier answers this question later with a typical 'I would' and still more if's, reflecting the incapability of this figure to perform any deed.

Hofmannsthal's theoretic statements reveal the fundamental difference between his drama and the original:

Der Unterschied von Geschehen und Handlung, hier liegt das Geheimnis des Dramas. (In den Nachfolgern sowie in den Vorgängern Shakespeares überwiegt das Geschehen, bei ihm ist alles Geschehen Handlung geworden.) Handlung . . .

ist symbolisches Geschehen. Es ist die notwendige nicht die zufällige Lebensäußerung der Figuren (daher ist es ganz gleichgültig, ob es unter das Schema des Tuns oder des Leidens falle . . .) Handlung ist ein Geschehen, das den Figuren nicht von aussen aufgedrängt wird, sie nicht intrigiert und zudeckt, sondern ihren Platz im Dasein und ihre Funktion im Dasein aus einer potentiellen zu einer aktuellen macht, wie für jede Figur im Schachbrett innerhalb des Spiels einmal der Moment kommt, wo sie durch den Platz, auf dem sie steht, und die Kräfte, die ihr zugeteilt sind, über ihr eigenes und über das Schicksal aller anderen Figuren im Feld entscheidet.⁴

(The difference between happening and action, here lies the secret to drama. (In the successors as well as in the predecessors of Shakespeare happening prevails, with him all happening has become action.) Action is symbolic happening. It is the necessary, not the accidental life-expression of a figure. (For that reason it is immaterial whether it falls under the category of doing or suffering . . .) Action is happening that is not forced on the figures from outside, that does not intrigue and cover them, but turns their position and their function in life from a potential into an actual one; similarly each figure in a chess-game gets a chance to decide its own fate and the fate of all the other figures in the field through the position in which it stands and through the power which has been assigned to it.)

Here lies the key to the changes which Hofmannsthal undertook. His aim was to convert all happening into action. For that reason nothing really happens in the Austrian drama. This is the fundamental change: all the occurrences which Otway puts on the stage, for instance Jaffier's oath, his betrayal, his and Pierre's death, Hofmannsthal puts behind the scenes and one is merely confronted with the fact as such or with the consequences. The dramatic opening reflects this clearly: the dialogue between Jaffier and Priuli, originally present on the stage, only comes to our notice when it is past. Jaffier, the narrator, gives the event its special character through the highly subjective way in which he relates it. Reality appears through the medium of a subjective and reflecting figure which characterises itself at the same time by the manner of its feeling. The disproportion of illusion and reality becomes an integral part of Hofmannsthal's drama while this element is not present in Otway's. The scene Jaffier — Priuli which opens *Venice Preserv'd* offers in *Das Gerettete Venedig* the key-situation in which potentially the elements of Jaffier's character are shown.

To display human nature Otway uses action — his figures are capable of actually doing something; with Hofmannsthal even the possibility of action is doubtful. He transforms a chain of actions in Otway's drama into a series of states.

As an incident the distraint is only important in Otway's drama insofar as it prepares the scene for Jaffier's conflict — love versus friendship. As a consequence of the distraint Jaffier takes part in the conspiracy. For that reason the seizure of his property appears only indirectly and is not mentioned again in the drama. The seizure as an outward event is important with Hofmannsthal as it presents a symbolic situation *per se*. The visible scene reflects the inner state of the figures and anticipates the end. It does not lose its effect in the further course of the drama, but overshadows it. From the start the action of the drama is present as a potential.

Eigentlich geschieht nichts. Es entschleiert sich etwas. Und nicht etwas, das einmal geschehen ist, sondern ein unabänderliches Verhältnis.⁵

(Actually nothing happens. Something unveils itself.

And not something that has taken place once, but rather an everlasting relation.)

The dramatic figure is first introduced indirectly, is reflected in its sphere. Before Jaffier actually appears, he has been shown from two perspectives: the opening words of the bailiff and the words of his child.

Otway's figures form the origin of the events. They are not only the bearers of the action, but also have an independent reality. His figures are types, characters with their own centre of gravity and rounded in themselves. Hofmannsthal's figures cannot be taken out of the context of the drama, they are not types. It is not the individual figure which determines the course of the drama as with Otway, but the 'configuration', i.e. the constellation of several persons. Every figure refers to another and Jaffier and Pierre, Aquilina and Belvidera have to be seen together. A unity achieved by contrasts is the characteristic of Hofmannsthal's dramas. The relatively simple contrast of strong and weak in Otway's drama turns into the polarity of action and thinking, spontaneity and reflection —

Variiertes Grundthema: das Ich als Sein und das Ich als Werden.⁶
(Varied fundamental theme: the ego as being and the ego as genesis.)

The changes which Hofmannsthal undertook with Otway's drama as they are reflected in the dramatic opening are best described in Hofmannsthal's own words which he wrote in his diary in 1895.

Although the observation refers to the difference between Shakespeare and Browning, it is also valid for the relationship between *Venice Preserv'd* and *Das Gerettete Venedig*:

Das Verhältnis der dramatis personae von Browning zu denen von Shakespeare ähnlich dem von radierten Figuren zu Figuren eines Gemäldes. An diesen ist jeder Punkt definiert, an jenen der Phantasie viel auszuführen überlassen. Die bei Shakespeare absolute Menschen, bei Browning mehr das Relative eine bestimmte Gebärde, die Durchkreuzung der Schicksalslinien, ein Abenteuer.⁷

(The relationship between the dramatis personae of Browning and those of Shakespeare is similar to that of etched figures as compared with figures on a painting. Here every point is defined, there a lot is left to the imagination. Shakespeare's people are absolute, Browning shows rather something relative, a certain gesture, the crossing of lines of fate, an adventure.)

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TWO POEMS By N. P. VAN WYK LOUW

TRANSLATED FROM THE AFRIKAANS

by J. V. CREWE

Both *Die Beiteltjie* and *Ballade van die Bose* have previously been translated into English, the former by Uys Krige and Jack Cope, and the latter (or parts of it) by Anthony Delius.* I am, to some extent, indebted to both these translations. My reasons for publishing these versions of the two poems are, first, that the time is opportune for a tribute to the memory of N. P. van Wyk Louw, who died earlier this year, and, second, that the English translations already referred to are flawed, and therefore alternative renderings need not necessarily be redundant. (I say this with due respect to the translators, and especially to Uys Krige, whose excellence as a translator is undeniable.) The translation of *Die Beiteltjie* is often awkward or un-idiomatic, and that of *Ballade van die Bose* is incomplete. These faults, at least, I have tried to rectify.

THE CHISEL

I take a tiny, tiny chisel,
I tap it and it rings;
I hone and I hone it
till the metal gleams and sings.

I place a pebble on a rock:
— now this you must admit;
a chisel that's a chisel should
break any stone you hit —

I strike it with the chisel-point,
which proves both tough and keen;
the pebble cleanly fractures through
as though along a seam:

then, underneath my fingertips
the grey rock cracks apart
and right beside my feet I feel
the soft earth tear athwart;

and dark the cleft runs through my land
down to the root below —
a chisel that's a chisel cuts
just like this, not so?

* Both appear in *The Penguin Book of South African Verse*.

Then, forming two bright golden cliffs,
 in two the planet shears
 and, boiling, over the abyss
 the flat, green ocean disappears

and through the day I see the night
 disclose itself afar
 as the fissure from my chisel-point
 moves outward through the stars.

(Die Beiteljtje)

BALLAD OF THE EVIL ONE.

Do you now know me?
 Have you looked in the mirror
 and known whom you see?

From the flaming city
 would you fly for your life?
 I'll fly with you,
 close at hand like a wife.

The many believe
 that they know me at sight,
 but I'm hidden in lustre —
 too close to the light;
 and when they'd give warning
 or utter wise words,
 the sound of my voice
 like an echo is heard;

and the swift ones flee —
 from whom? and where?
 I am not hideous
 nor am I fair;
 and wherever they flee
 they bear me too
 in the grey-white grooves
 their nerves run through.

I am within you,
 entwined and rank,
 like ancient roots

in a dark earth bank
and before the daybreak
can begin,
through both your eyes,
I stream in.

Do you now know whether
what God united
belongs together?

.

I am your being's
underground,
and I stay at your heel
like a faithful hound.

When God this earth,
this silver ball,
in joyful play
from his hand let fall,
I was the chaos,
it floated in
the formless void
bleak and grim.

When a still, primeval pool
— before the coming
of fish or net —
the first white cell
did beget,
I was the darkness
lurking beyond;
cold earth and rock
beneath the pond.

I was the shadow
in God's wake,
what he left behind him
I would take;
and now that you're growing
toward mastery,
the umbilical cord
that binds you is me.

I am your being's
underground,

and I stay at your heel
like a faithful hound.

Will knowledge come soon:
I am the soil
though you be the bloom?

.

Although you are bright
and tall and free,
don't imagine that you
can be rid of me,
or that you distract me
from my own grim bent:
I may be a hound
but I stick to the scent.

On every horizon
I stand and bark;
and when God's spirit,
surmounting the dark,
seeks a being more lovely
than *yours* can be,
then I'll be bright
and tall and free.

O where will you go
and on what good ship?
All the world is shoal
and rocks that rip;
from the flaming city
would you fly for your life?
I'll fly with you,
close at hand like a wife.

Do you now know me?
Have you looked in the mirror
and known whom you see?

(*Ballade van die Bose*)

AUDIO-VISUAL TEACHING A NEW APPROACH OR A COMPLEMENTARY METHOD?

by M. D. CHRISTENSEN

Audio-visual methods of language instruction have already attracted the lively interest of an enthusiastic minority of teachers. There are of course a great number of audio-lingual and audio-visual methods, but I intend to discuss the one with which I am most intimately acquainted, namely *Voix et Images de France*.

Audio-visual teaching as such is nothing new. It is a method as old as human society; it is the method by which the children of our earliest ancestors learned to speak, or rather to communicate, with one another. Objects were pointed out, sounds were uttered and imitated by the child. In the acquisition of the mother tongue this has not changed throughout the ages. Yet, in formal teaching, particularly that of languages, we may confidently say that it is a completely new approach. Whether this provides *the* answer or not to any given problem of language teaching is a difficult question to answer.

However, before assessing the value of audio-visual teaching techniques let us look at the *Voix et Images de France* method as such.

During the Second World War the Americans devised methods to teach their soldiers the rudiments of a foreign language in a short period of time. But with the end of the war came a considerable revival of interest in international understanding and with it grew the necessity of learning foreign languages. The sudden proliferation of International Conferences (especially in connection with the newly-formed United Nations), the new trends in trade, and the technical and cultural revolution resulting from the war, largely contributed to this need.

U.N.E.S.C.O., desirous to contribute to world peace, thought of doing this through the spreading of culture and teaching of languages. By means of the medium of a foreign language the elements of hygiene, domestic economy and new techniques could be taught to underdeveloped countries. But, looking at existing language teaching methods, almost entirely based on translation, grammar and bookwork, to the detriment of the spoken language, the urgent need for a new, entirely revolutionary method became evident. It was essential to possess a method capable of providing people rapidly with a good working knowledge of a modern language; that is, to provide

people in the shortest possible time, with the most useful vocabulary possible and the fundamental structures of the language.

The British were already in possession of a method called 'Basic English', which is not to be confused with elementary English, as the word 'basic' stands for 'British, American, scientific, international, commercial' English, which because of its limited number of words (approximately two thousand) and its simplified grammar could be taught in a relatively short period of time.

The French had no 'Basic French' at their disposal, and it was urgent for them to find such a method. For this purpose, the French Ministry of National Education formed in 1951 the *Commission de Recherche du Français Élémentaire*, appointing the eminent historian of the French language, Professor Georges Gougenheim, as its President. (In 1958 the Commission became the C.R.E.D.I.F. or *Centre de Recherche et d'Etude pour la Diffusion du Français* with l'Ecole Normale Supérieure de Saint-Cloud, at Saint-Cloud just outside Paris, as its headquarters because there was already an audio-visual centre in existence there.) Once the Commission was established, the most urgent question confronting it was what the contents of this new, revolutionary method should be.

In his *Système grammatical du français* Professor Gougenheim writes:

A language consists above all of a system of sounds emitted by the mouth and perceived by the ear.¹

Professor Gougenheim's research was therefore essentially into the spoken language. Laying the stress quite definitely on the oral aspect of language, his team set to work and tape recorded two hundred and seventy-five conversations on various topics with men, women and children from all walks of life. The taped material yielded 312,135 words — undoubtedly too small a figure for a full-scale investigation, but significant enough for the determination of a lexicological and grammatical basis for that which was to be called *le Français Fondamental*. Fundamental French (hereafter F.F.) was therefore going to be based on vocabulary frequently used, and on a careful study of the frequency of words. Thus, only words with a frequency of twenty-nine and over were included in the First Degree of F.F. (or F.F.1).

The result arrived at was some eight hundred words. For the Second Degree F.F. (or F.F.2) words with as low a frequency as twenty were included, the result being some thousand words.

Further research was carried out in schools of four different French provinces on the use of nouns for special subjects of interest such as parts of the body, clothing, habitation, town and transport, work and

entertainment, etc., etc. Again basing the investigations on frequency and availability of words, the number of words in F.F.1 rose to fifteen hundred, and in F.F.2 to three thousand. However, to F.F.2 they also incorporated a further piece of research work carried out in 1926/7 by G. van der Beke and contained in his *French Word Book*².

For the Commission, therefore, the F.F.1 vocabulary represented the material to be taught first. They considered that those who could use fifteen hundred words would be able to join in common topics of conversation. What they were concerned with was a basic 'active' vocabulary. The average person's 'active' vocabulary is between six to ten thousand words; for the less educated it could be as little as five hundred to one thousand words. In this connection it is perhaps significant that the *Grande Encyclopédie* has some ninety thousand entries, the *Petit Larousse* seventy-three thousand entries; yet Racine's entire work is made up of only twelve hundred different words.

From the detailed and careful study of word frequencies in spoken French, the following very interesting conclusions were drawn:

- (a) Grammatical words have the highest and most stable frequency and hence correspond to automatisms which are the very structure of language.
- (b) Irregular verbs have the second highest frequency.
- (c) Then come adjectives with *petit*, *grand* and *bon* ranking first.
- (d) And only then follow nouns with *heure*, *chose* and *temps* in the first place. Nouns have a low, unstable frequency and are used in special circumstances. Thus a schoolchild will use the word 'chalk' more frequently than a nurse, who in a similar way will use the word 'thermometer' more often.

The study of the grammar used in these taped conversations revealed a certain number of patterns which in turn revealed the limits of a basic French grammar. From these it became evident that it is essential to teach:

- (a) the most frequent irregular verbs first (e.g., *faire*, *dire*, *aller*, *voir*, *savoir*, *pouvoir*, *falloir*, *vouloir*, *venir*, *prendre*, etc.) and only then regular verbs;
- (b) interrogative forms with *est-ce que* (*est-ce que tu montes?*) and with the simple interrogative intonation in the voice (*tu montes?*), rather than the far less frequently used literary inversion (*montes-tu?*);
- (c) the *passé récent* with *venir de* (*il vient de monter*) or the *futur prochain* with *aller* (*il va monter*) rather than the less important tenses, such as the *passé simple* or the *passé antérieur*.

The new insight gained made it clear why certain aspects of traditional language teaching are open to criticism. Traditional teaching is based mainly on translation rather than on the active use of the spoken language. As already stated, translation is to be avoided *at all costs*. It imposes the memorization of long lists of concrete words which are sometimes rarely used and which may therefore never be needed again by the student. This approach tends to make one forget that a language is primarily a means of communication between human beings.

Furthermore, regular verbs are taught exhaustively before any attempt is made to introduce the student to the far more difficult but constantly used irregular verbs, which are the very backbone of the French language.

Professor Gougenheim therefore strongly recommends that the student of a foreign language be taught a vocabulary of which he will be able to make *immediate* use, and that although this vocabulary may be a limited one, it may still be used in a great number of concrete situations.

Having scientifically determined the fundamental matter to be taught, it now became necessary to work out a theory upon which to base the teaching of F.F.

An appreciable amount of thought and research went into the establishment of principles on which this new revolutionary method, which was to teach a language quickly and well, was to be based. Much of the credit goes to Professor Paul Rivenc and to Professor Petar Guberina, both associated with C.R.E.D.I.F. The following are the main guidelines:

The basic structures of a language (phrasing, psychological habits involving the use of phrases — in brief, mechanisms) are the most difficult to acquire because they are so different from patterns of thought in the mother tongue. Within such basic structures the meaning of a single word loses its importance because in any case it takes its meaning only in relation to the whole.

Secondly, we must remember that the study of a foreign language is a shock to the individual psyche, and this has to be taken in to account because in turn it produces a subconscious resistance which must gradually be overcome.

Thirdly, all sorts of methods have been devised during the last ninety years to revolutionise modern language teaching. Thus, Berlitz introduced his direct method in the U.S.A. in 1880; Professor F. Closset advocated a mixed method, and Professor Delattre promoted an aural-oral approach. St.-Cloud lays its entire stress on the spoken language seeing that its primary function is not translation but communication. But to learn to speak means first and foremost

to learn to listen and to hear. This, of course, implies that the written language is to be taught at a later stage only. For the St.-Cloud team it is of primary importance to wean the student from the habits of his mother tongue, and this cannot be done if he is permitted to see the language in writing, because immediately and automatically he will react with pronunciation habits acquired in this mother tongue. Also, if the written word is used as a primary means of teaching a language, the actual listening and hearing process is undermined. But this being a vital process in the learning of a language, it should under no circumstance be minimised. This does not imply that reading and writing are completely banned from this method, which is striving to lead the student to a full knowledge of the language. All it means is that they are introduced at a moment when, having acquired a fair mastery of sounds, rhythms and intonation, the student will no longer be entirely under the influence of his mother tongue.

Let us remember that a student of a foreign language is partially deaf to certain sounds in this language, especially if these do not exist in his native tongue. By 'partially deaf' we mean that the subconscious resistance of a student to the acquisition of a new language often manifests itself in the form of bad hearing. E. T. Mueller states in his article 'Perception in Foreign Language Learning':

Unless we have mastered the speech habits of the foreign country we substitute in our hearing the sounds of our native tongue which are closest to the sound expressed by the foreigner. We make his sounds conform with the experience with which we are familiar³.

And he gives two examples which are worth mentioning. Take the word 'voiture'. No matter how often you repeat it, the Englishman will say 'voitioure', the Spaniard 'boiture', the Serbo-Croat 'voitire'. The other striking example illustrating his statement more perfectly is the following. The sound of a rooster crowing is for

the French	'cocorico'
the Spaniard and Italian	'quiquiriqui'
the Yugoslav	'kukuriku'
the British	'cock-a-doodle-doo'

Yet, does not a British rooster crow in the same way as a French one?

It becomes evident therefore that at the beginning it is essential to study a language intensively (at the rate of at least one hour per day); that intonation and rhythm, correct breathing and pauses are of capital importance, and that these have to be reproduced by the student with a maximum of fidelity.

Without language there is of course very limited communication between human beings. As language expresses the entire material and immaterial world in general and the way a people feel, think and act in particular, it cannot be divorced from a civilization. The relationship which exists between language and situation is therefore so intimate that it must be treated as a whole which can suffer no separation.

All this research led to the conclusion that the teaching techniques of the new method would have to be audio-visual, and based on LISTENING, REPEATING, UNDERSTANDING.

This was to be achieved with the help of two aids: sound and situation, that is, tape (as only a tape can reproduce a phonetic structure with perfection and without variation), and picture (i.e., slide or filmstrip), a situation explained by suggestion.

The master sound would of course have to be perfect and hence pre-recorded by a native French speaker. The teacher would then be required to play and replay the tape to the student as often as necessary. The student in his turn would have to reproduce this sound until such time as his pronunciation was perfect. Tape recorder and filmstrip are here used in a classroom situation and not in the laboratory, with numbers in the classroom not exceeding twelve students. We may be left wondering at this stage how applicable this would be in our sometimes overcrowded classrooms. However, it is obvious why twelve is advocated for optimum results. For the acquisition of the necessary automatisms, it would have been an easy matter for the St.- Cloud team to encourage the student's intensive use of the laboratory. As this would not have been a natural way of learning a language, however, the laboratory was assigned an auxiliary role as a place where the student can consolidate knowledge acquired in the classroom. Classroom and laboratory work must thus be carefully programmed so that one may complement the other.

If listening and repeating are the first prerequisites, then understanding is the next essential step. How is this to be achieved without translation? The projected picture (of a simple cartoon type) helps to solve the problem, because it makes possible the creation of a situation which illustrates the recorded sound given. 'Thus the eye helps assimilate the sound', says Professor Guberina. And the visual material must be conceived in such a way as to permit the student to become familiar with the surrounding culture of the foreign language. The gradual discovery of this world creates a kind of *dépaysement* which from the psychological point of view is most desirable, as it prevents even subconscious translation and gives the student the impression of being abroad. Consider, as a mere example, the difference which exists between an English and a French breakfast. The

pictures used for one language course will therefore not be of any use to the teaching of another language, and it is self-evident that the elaboration of such series of pictures requires much talent and above all a perfect knowledge of the customs of a country and of the gestures and attitudes of its people.

The use of audio-visual aids has not come from a fanatical devotion to technology, but from a philosophy based on solid physiological, psychological, linguistic and pedagogical foundations.

Significantly, the name given to this new audio-visual method by the Saint-Cloud team is *Voix et Images de France, Premier et Deuxième Degré*. It is of undeniable scientific value; it is the culmination of ten years of patient research bringing together linguists, philologists, phoneticians, neurologists, psychologists, physiologists, acousticians, artists, film producers, teachers and technicians.

Once the original aim of evolving a completely new teaching method had been achieved, C.R.E.D.I.F., realizing that traditional teachers would more than likely be unable to cope efficiently with this method, immediately extended its activities to the retraining of teachers. For this reason they set up for Frenchmen and foreigners alike *Stages de Spécialisation pour l'Enseignement du Français par les méthodes Audio-Visuelles* at Royan, Besonçon, Montpellier and Aix-en-Provence.

It is quite understandable that to ensure optimum results they allow only teachers trained by them to use *Voix et Images de France*, as well as the other methods evolved by them later on such as *Méthode Audio-Visuelle de Français*, *Bonjour Line* (a delightful method for children) and *En France avec Nicolas*. At Saint-Cloud itself they set up intensive one-year courses designed for those who would themselves be called upon later to train teachers. The object being a completely new approach to language teaching, it is perhaps not surprising that those who have been found least receptive to these new ideas and methods are those who have been engaged in teaching along traditional lines for many years.

The threefold training given (technical, theoretical and practical) is intensive, and lectures and practical work continue for some seven to eight hours a day, thus strongly stimulating the *stagiaire* or trainee, and steeping him in precisely that atmosphere which the promoters of *V.I.F.* advocate for all language teaching. The terms teacher and trainee as used here do not, of course, exclude the university lecturer entrusted with Special French.

The technical training consists of a very detailed introduction to the tape-recorder, microphone, loudspeaker and tape, to their actual mechanisms and to the principles on which their functioning is based, as well as to their suitability for the classroom or laboratory

situation. The *stagiaire* is also trained to use this equipment efficiently, to look after it, and to diagnose and remedy simple mechanical deficiencies, for much depends on his confidence in using these teaching aids.

Next of course is the question of the use of a tape-recorder as a teaching aid. The *V.I.F.* people use it extensively in the classroom and in the language laboratory. Indefatigably, imperturbably the tape-recorder repeats the sense group without any alteration either in intonation or rhythm. It replaces and saves valuable teacher energy, for a teacher is not always able to repeat five, six or seven times the same phrase without altering rhythm and intonation. And a change in rhythm and intonation can represent a change in meaning, which, particularly in early stages, leads to a great deal of confusion in the student's mind. Let us briefly recall what Professor Guberina said about this. At the beginning the student is half deaf, is guided by the speech habits of his mother tongue and has to be adapted to a new language. He strongly insists on the fact that intonation and rhythm should under no circumstances be sacrificed, the student no longer being confronted with one word, but with a sense group conveying one idea. The major break-through of this method is of course the teaching of ideas instead of merely words as is the case with the traditional method. The tape-recorder having become an indispensable teaching aid, what then is the role of the teacher? Does he become a glorified technician? No. He is an invaluable guide without whose help the student cannot progress as he cannot be his own judge. As for the projected images used, they are there to create the necessary situation and *dépaysement* mentioned above.

The theoretical training forms the major part of the *apprentissage*, with the greatest stress on language and phonetics and of course on the principles underlying all audio-visual language teaching.

Language is treated in depth and the trainee's studies range from the evolution of language in the child and adult, to memory and acquisition of foreign languages; to the distinction between the spoken, written and literary language; to grammar and syntax, and finally to the testing of others for their language knowledge, and the determination of their special strengths and weaknesses and the prescription of remedial teaching.

Phonetics too are taught in very great detail for obvious reasons, and complemented by much practical work in the not so easy art of corrective phonetics. In addition, the *stagiaires* themselves have to undergo corrective treatment, independently of whether Frenchmen or foreigners. In this connection Monique Léon's series of books on phonetics cannot be praised too highly as a piece of invaluable research work⁴.

The practical training is as thorough and intensive as the theoretical and technical. Experts are first watched at work, then they supervise the trainee's practice teaching, and finally, both the expert's and trainee's work are discussed at length.

What actually happens in a lesson taught by audio-visual methods? Is there anything new about it as conceived by *Voix et Images de France*? The first thing that would strike an observer is that the whole classroom situation reflects an entirely new and revolutionary concept of teaching. The students, at the most ten to twelve in number, are seated in a V-shape on either side of the classroom with the teacher at the closed end of the V having a slide projector and a tape-recorder in front of him. At the open end of the V is the screen. For months students and teacher will have neither books nor writing material. The classroom is in semi-darkness and the teacher projects slowly onto the screen ten to fifteen pictures which together create the situation to be explored during that particular lesson. The tape-recorder provides simultaneously the corresponding phrases. This part of the lesson is called the *présentation* and is an essential part thereof, during which, contrary to C. J. Walch's statement that 'the students remain passive'⁵, they are required to try, actively, intensely, to associate picture and sound. The next step of the lesson is called *exploitation* and is adequately described in Walch's article 'The C.R.E.D.I.F. Stage at Royan, 1967', with the exception that the students only proceed to the language laboratory for practice and consolidation when they have mastered every aspect of the lesson. A further step deals with the teaching of grammar patterns and is known as *mécanisme*. Thereafter follow phonetics drills where the teacher insists first and foremost on rhythm and intonation. The same thoroughness characterises the interior construction of one lesson as the whole approach to the question of evolving a new method and thereafter to the training of a new type of teacher. All parts of the lesson, as well as the introduction to writing and reading are well discussed in B. Mitchell's concise article, 'Audio-Visual Methods of teaching French'⁶. By the end of one lesson the student may have learnt only ten sentences, but they are of such a nature that they are of *immediate* value to him. Results are amazing. And, instead of being able to enumerate: chalk, blackboard, table, pencil, etc., he will actually be able to greet his fellow student in French, ask him simple questions thus establishing immediate contact and proving Professor Gougenheim's theory that language is first and foremost a means of communication between fellow human beings.

C.R.E.D.I.F. has not only given us an entirely new and revolutionary language teaching method, but also, thanks to their thorough

all-round training, a completely new type of teacher, an entirely new classroom situation and a new and refreshing attitude to the French language itself by putting it back into its rightful place which is that of a living language whose primary function is communication and not translation.

The *V.I.F.* method was designed for the specific aim of teaching French quickly to adult foreigners. It is not detrimental to the study of the written language and of literature which are studied in their rightful places, after the acquisition of the basis of the spoken language, as is only logical. Language study thus becomes a living thing to the student as he learns to speak French at a much accelerated pace and that with a near perfect accent, under the invaluable guidance of his teacher. So convincing have results proved to be that a pilot school has been set up in France at Marly-le-Roi where all subjects are now taught audio-visually⁷.

No modern language teaching method can, of course, provide all the answers, but *Voix et Images de France* is of undeniable scientific value, based on ten years patient research. In its search for a new, revolutionary method, C.R.E.D.I.F. far surpassed its original aim, thus making a lasting and most impressive contribution to modern language teaching.

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