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

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PIETERMARITZBURG

As a tribute to Professor W. H. Gardner who edited *Theoria* in the early 1950's and who died in January 1969 only a year after his retirement as Head of the Department of English at this University, we are fortunate to be able to publish one of his lectures on G. M. Hopkins's poetry, delivered at Yale University during a visit to the United States. In this way we record our link with the scholar eminently active in establishing Hopkins as a poet of stature and a poet far ahead of his contemporaries. Professor Gardner's wholehearted absorption in English studies is reflected in this article which we value as an authoritative handling of a subject hitherto untouched by *Theoria*.

In this issue we also include articles on a variety of controversial topics: contemporary theatre, revolutionary theory, the origin of the Bantu-speaking peoples, and student revolt. Readers who find themselves provoked are invited to start further debates at 'postal-chess pace'.

THE EDITORS

GERARD MANLEY HOPKINS AND THE POETRY OF INSCAPE*

by W. H. GARDNER

In thanking Professor Martz for his kind words of welcome, I should like to say how deeply I appreciate the honour of being asked to speak on Hopkins in Yale University. When Professor Martz sent me the invitation I recalled the pride and pleasure I felt, in 1947, when I was told that my study of Hopkins was to be issued in America by the Yale University Press.

My own very special admiration for American scholarship and critical discernment — I mean to say, for the unusual insight shown by certain American critics in dealing with new and markedly original writing — dates from about the year 1935, when I was making a close study of all the reviews which greeted, or merely noted, the first edition of Hopkins's poems — the first collected edition brought out by Robert Bridges for the O.U.P. in 1918. While many, too many, of the English reviewers were virtually dismissing that slim volume of poems and fragments as 'a pious memorial to the Poet Laureate's dead friend', at least two American reviewers put their fingers quickly and precisely on Hopkins's main qualities. In the early 1920's they saw, more clearly even than Bridges, that Hopkins, working almost in isolation in the 1870's and '80's, had been driving at something which would not be clearly understood and appreciated until the 1930's and '40's. They saw the vital relation between the poet's character and religious beliefs on the one hand, and his fluid versatile personality, his passionate vision, his inner conflicts and technical virtuosity on the other: they saw, in short, the essential relation between his matter and his manner; his love of tradition, and his restless experimentation; his desire for certainty and stability, and his love of newness and change — as shown in his remarkable stylistic innovations.

I should like, therefore, to dedicate this unworthy address to the memory of the two critics I am speaking about — Edward Sapir, a Yale scholar, who wrote on Hopkins in *Poetry* (September 1921), and Samuel Putnam, whose review appeared in the *Chicago*

*A lecture delivered at Yale University in 1960. This article was prepared from Professor Gardner's handwritten text.

Post (May 1924). Some of their statements reached, at one stroke, a classic finality, and I shall proceed to quote a statement by each of them. First, Edward Sapir, a distinguished anthropological philologist, whose feeling for language gives him a certain affinity with Hopkins:

> We must beware (he says) of exaggerating the external difficulties; they yield with unexpected ease to the modicum of goodwill that Hopkins has a right to expect of us.

(They certainly yield most easily to a lover of language.) Speaking of Hopkins's Sprung and Counterpointed rhythms, Sapir says:

> There is no blind groping in this irregular movement. It is nicely adjusted to the constantly shifting speed of the verse. Hopkins's effects, with a few exceptions, are in the highest degree successful. Read with the ear, his verse flows with an entirely new vigour and lightness, while the stanzaic form gives it a powerful compactness and drive. It is doubtful if the freest verse of our day is more sensitive in its rhythmic pulsations than the Sprung verse of Hopkins.

To cap this, Samuel Putnam, another linguist, came out boldly with the following:

> Hopkins exhibits, more than any other poet with whom I am acquainted, the perfected mating of rapture and technical virtuosity — freedom achieved in restraint.

Having read those remarks in 1935, I felt that in trying to write a full-length study of Hopkins I had nothing more to do than elaborate the canonical texts, or aphorisms, of Sapir and Putnam.

Although Hopkins published little or nothing of importance in his own lifetime, and was content to remain unknown, if Christ, his Master-Critic, willed it so, his recent emergence into world-fame, and even a measure of popularity, might almost be described as one of the miracles of literary history. Hopkins aimed at making his poetry original before everything else. For him, poetry had to be *inscape* — nothing but *that*: the individual vision embodied in the inscape of speech, that is, in words fusing thought and feeling in a diamond-like density and brilliance, in a total complex of 'individually-distinctive beauty'. As he readily admitted, 'it is the vice of distinctiveness to become queer, and

(he adds) this vice I cannot have escaped'. True, he had not quite escaped it. Yet paradoxically he claimed that his poetry had certain features which made for popularity.

His contemporaries found his poems difficult, and asked him for 'cribs'. They demanded a logical clarification of the many poetic ideas which seemed to peep out, fitfully, from a bewildering mass of irregularities: 'veins of pure gold imbedded in masses of impenetrable quartz', as Coventry Patmore put it. It is no wonder that so many of the earliest reviewers sent up a pessimistic cry. To quote one of them: 'Hopkins is the most unpopular of poets, and seems destined to remain so'. Some of you will be saying 'Thank God for that': some because they do not like Hopkins; others because they despise popularity. But in the special and important sense in which Shakespeare is 'popular', Donne is 'popular' and Yeats is now 'popular', so too Hopkins is mildly popular. The Penguin edition of his poems, for example, has run into five impressions in just over six years.

Hopkins is now established as a poet of classic status because he is much in little. In his total nature he reconciled many opposites and conflicting tensions. He was a natural artist, who looked at the world with the fresh vision of the child and the primitive; he was also a precise scholar, who looked at his material and tools almost with the eye of a scientist. At the same time, paradoxically again, he often forged his own linguistic tools — spontaneously, like the first instinctive makers of language; that is to say, like the first makers of *poetry*, if we are to believe Shelley. Hence, Hopkins's poetry was at once 'naive et savante' (child-like and learnèd), to use the apt words of André Bremond. Of course, Hopkins's poetry is a good deal more than 'naive et savante'. It is at once sensual and ascetic. It can be mellifluous and harsh — tonal and atonal; yet more than most other poetry it always tends towards the condition of music. He could be cynical and sentimental; his thought is often basically conventional, yet freshly presented. As a religious poet, he could show a deep and unshakable faith in terms of disgust and disillusion which often look like downright disbelief; and so we could go on enumerating the paradoxes. It is because of this variety, ambivalence, mastery of the emotional paradox and intellectual dilemma, that he has proved so interesting and cathartic to the present age — an age which has relived the conditions, and recaptured the sensibility, of John Donne and George Herbert, from whom Hopkins obviously stems.

The best of Hopkins's early verses, written before 1876, proved that he could handle the traditional verse forms with considerable

skill. The finest example of his youthful mastery is that school poem called *A Vision of the Mermaids,* written at the age of 18. Here is a sample:

> Soon — as when Summer of his sister Spring
> Crushes and tears the rare enjewelling,
> And boasting 'I have fairer things than these'
> Plashes amidst the billowy apple-trees
> His lusty hands, in gusts of scented wind
> Swirling out bloom till all the air is blind . . .

and so it goes on — a combination of the sensuous Romantic imagery of Keats and the dynamic movement of Shelley's *West Wind.* Something had to happen to Hopkins to prevent him from becoming just another late Victorian follower of Tennyson and Swinburne. Something did happen. Following the traditional pattern of Christian sainthood, he had to die in order to live.

In 1866 — aged 22 — Hopkins was converted to Roman Catholicism; and he decided to renounce his earlier ambition to become a painter or poet in order to become a priest. On joining the Jesuit Order he burnt all his own copies of his poems, and resolved to write no more, as poetry was incompatible with his profession. For seven years he kept his vow, but during those seven years of training for the priesthood he served, occasionally, as a teacher of Rhetoric. In preparing his lecture notes he made a searching study of the whole European poetic tradition. He examined, in particular, the various modes of diction and rhythm to be found in Greek, Latin, Italian, French, Welsh, Old Norse and Middle English poetry. He was especially interested in what he later called the inscape of speech: by that he meant, primarily, the maximum musicality and expressiveness of poetic utterance, as these qualities are achieved by the use of phonal texture, sound pattern, or tone-colour (call it what you will), together with concentration and subtlety of meaning and the most expressive variety in movement or rhythm. He admired, and rightly, the rich phonal patterns produced in Old Welsh poetry by such devices as internal rhyme, half-rhyme or assonance, and alliteration; he admired the 'vowelling-on' and 'vowelling-off' of Greek choric poetry (a striking instance of this technique in Hopkins's own poetry is to be found in one of the later sonnets:

> This to hoard unheard,
> Heard unheeded, leaves me a lonely began).

He also studied all the masters of varied flexible rhythms — from Aeschylus and the Anglo-Saxon poets to Walt Whitman and Coventry Patmore. Furthermore, he was fascinated by 'word-play' in the Euphuistic and Shakespearean sense—the pun, the two-edged word, the subtle ambiguity and suggested overtone (for example, 'a virginal tongue told', where the verb carries the further implication of 'tolled'). Altogether, Hopkins must have spent far more time in studying poetic technique than his solemn vow to renounce poetry could have justified, and *that* was the important thing that was happening to him: he was beginning to experience the extreme tension of a divided loyalty.

The immediate result, as you know, was startling. Encouraged by his Jesuit Superior, he at last broke his seven-year silence by writing, as a great *tour de force,* the most idiosyncratic long ode in English — *The Wreck of the Deutschland.* In this poem of thirty-five 8-line stanzas he embodied, fully fledged, all his most daring linguistic and prosodic innovations. As he wrote to Canon Dixon: 'I had long had haunting my ear the echo of a new rhythm, which I now realized on paper'. Considered solely as a metrical mode, this 'new rhythm' was Sprung Rhythm, the basic principle of which is that one stressed syllable makes a foot, whether there be one, two, three or more unstressed syllables attached to it — or none at all. Stresses may stand together, as in common speech and in syncopated music:

> World's strand, sway of the sea;
> Lord of living and dead;

or again:

> Whether at once, as once at a crash Paul,

or:

> I did say yes
> O at lightning and lashed rod.

Here, Sprung Rhythm, the New Rhythm, is simply a matter of stress, slack and pause. But when we consider the total impact and impression made upon us by this 'new rhythm', by (a) the powerful rhetorical and dramatic stress rhythm; (b) the condensed, elliptical, often contorted syntax (sprung, syncopated syntax); (c) the

elaborate pattern of organically used internal rhyme, half-rhyme, assonance and alliteration; and (d) the many original compound words — when, as I say, we consider all these surprising features as they are fused by poetic passion into a homogeneous style, we realise that Hopkins's term 'a new rhythm' implies much more than it says. Actually it refers to a total complex of style — a fusion of thought, feeling, texture and movement which is virtually inimitable. In this poem the parts of speech often interchange functions; expressive archaisms and seemingly 'precious' words (like 'whorl' for 'ship's propeller', or rather for its shape and movement combined) — such words rub shoulders with the homeliest ejaculations and phrases. The word-order is sometimes Greek or German or Welsh rather than English — seems at first to do violence to the genius of the language; and yet even at a first reading the sporadic brilliant flashes of description and insight throw a first radiance, as of early dawn, upon the more obscure parts. While the reader's feelings are being worked on by all the resources of poetic technique, his intellect is at the same time continuously and rigorously engaged and challenged. Hopkins has thrown the whole of himself into this poem, and the reader must bring *his* whole being to the comprehension of it.

Let us pause here to consider one of the most powerful but obscure passages in the poem — stanzas 5 to 8. In stanza 5, Hopkins presents starlight and a storm at sea as symbols of those opposite natural phenomena which make us feel God's power — suggesting either his love or his just anger. God is under or behind all phenomena, though we cannot clearly understand how or why; we *sense* his presence:

> I kiss my hand
> To the stars, lovely-asunder
> Starlight, wafting him out of it; and
> Glow, glory in thunder;
> Kiss my hand to the dappled-with-damson west:
> Since tho' he is under the world's splendour and wonder,
> His mystery must be instressed, stressed;
> For I greet him the days I meet him, and bless when I understand.

The poet says we intuitively feel the presence of God in the world; we cannot rationalize this feeling. As he goes on to say in stanza 6, we must work the 'mystery', the incomprehensible certainty of God's reality and presence, into the total pattern of our life and consciousness: it must be 'instressed'.

Not out of his bliss
Springs the stress felt
Nor first from heaven (and few know this)
Swings the stroke dealt —
Stroke and a stress that stars and storms deliver,
That guilt is hushed by, hearts are flushed by and melt —
But it rides time like riding a river
(And here the faithful waver, the faithless fable and miss).

Only the sensitivity and insight born of our feeling for Christ's tenderness and suffering can elucidate the problem of disaster and pain, the meaning of the Wreck of the Deutschland.

It dates from day
Of his going in Galilee;
Warm-laid grave of a womb-life grey;
Manger, maiden's knee;
The dense and the driven Passion, and frightful sweat:
Thence the discharge of it, there its swelling to be,
Though felt before, though in high flood yet —
What none would have known of it, only the heart, being hard at bay, . . .

The inscaped physiological picture of incubation and childbirth·

'Warm-laid grave of a womb-life grey'

introduces the physical suffering of the crucifixion:

'The dense and the driven Passion, and frightful sweat'.

It is from such martyrdom, common to man in all ages, but supernaturally significant only in Christ, that we receive the electrical discharge of edifying grace which illuminates the mystery of man's probationary suffering in life. Our religious sense, our sense of the numinous, is awakened mainly by (a) beauty and (b) compassion — compassion which is inseparable perhaps from fear.

Now comes the hardest stanza of all:

. . . Though felt before, though in high flood yet —
What none would have known of it, only the heart, being hard at bay,

Is out with it! Oh,
We lash with the best or worst
Word last! How a lush-kept plush-capped sloe
Will, mouthed to flesh-burst,
Gush! — flush the man, the being with it, sour or sweet,
Brim, in a flash, full! — Hither then, last or first,
To hero of Calvary, Christ, 's feet —

Never ask if meaning it, wanting it, warned of it — men go.

Only the heart, 'hard at bay', faced with the inevitable suffering, tragedy, extinction in death — only the heart, not the head, can finally answer the question: 'Do you accept this order of things, this faith: Christ's sacrifice made because of your sin, and your *own* sacrifice, which must be made for Christ?'

'We lash with the best or worst
Word last!'

Some commentators take the 'best' and 'worst' words to be simply 'yes' and 'no'. But the rich, violent image of the ripe sloe bursting in the mouth (like the grape in Keats's *Ode on Melancholy*), suggests a more complex meaning. The Passion of Christ, considered as symbol of the suffering and renunciation enforced on man, is both sweet and bitter: so the cry wrung from the heart could be: 'How comforting! but oh, how painful and terrifying!' Or it could be: 'How painful and terrifying! but oh, how comforting to me who accepts and believes!' This interpretation is supported by the conclusion:

'Hither then, last or first,
To hero of Calvary, Christ, 's feet —
Never ask if meaning it, wanting it, warned of it — men go.'

You may call this a bullying Jesuitical form of propaganda; but the statement, if not a fact, is hard to disprove: man must carry this cross; he must submit to his fate, whether he believes in the Christian interpretation and dogmatization of the fate, and the promise, or not. (Note, by the way, in this stanza, the prevalence of words ending in '-sh': they are all words indicating speed, or richness and ripeness, or both of these ideas. Note, too, the remarkably effective tmesis of 'Brim, in a flash, full'.)

That image of the sloe, the fruit which is ambiguously either 'sour' or 'sweet' or both, is symbolic of most of Hopkins's own greatest poetry — especially the last 'terrible' sonnets. In the *Deutschland* God is said to be:

'Mighty a master, being a father and fond.'

He is addressed as:

'Father and fondler of heart thou hast wrung:
Hast thy dark descending and most art merciful then.'[1]

Many poems begin with the 'worst' word and end with the 'best'— for example, *Patience* has a bitter beginning:

'Patience, hard thing! the hard thing but to pray,
But bid for, Patience is!'

but it ends with a comparison between the rewards of the patient man and the honey stored in a honeycomb:

'He is patient. Patience fills
His crisp combs, and that comes those ways we know.'

Another sonnet begins:

'My own heart let me more have pity on; let
Me live to my sad self hereafter kind, . . . '

and the end is a comforting Claudian landscape with sunlit blue skies glimpsed between the darker mountains: God's grace, says the meditative, melancholy poet, cannot be *wrung* out of Him, cannot be commandeered at will. No, God's smile

' 's not wrung, see you; unforeseen times rather — as skies
Betweenpie mountains — lights a lovely mile'.

'*Betweenpie* mountains' — what a verb! Odd — disconcerting; but once we have seen that 'pie' is a back-formation from 'magpie' or 'pied', we cannot help responding to the freshness and precision of the compound. If we cannot dissociate 'pie' from food, then of course the poem is ruined for us.

Sometimes Hopkins puts the 'sweet' first and the 'sour' last, as in *The Windhover*; and more often we hear the 'sour' or bitter words all through, as in 'No worst, there is none' and 'I wake and feel the fell of dark, not day'; but to compensate for this 'lashing' with the worst word both first *and* last, we find later poems which reassert, at the end, a serene or passionate faith — as in *That Nature is a Heraclitean Fire and of the Comfort*

of the Resurrection and the splendid sonnet 'in honour of St Alphonsus Rodriguez'. The endings of both poems could be taken to symbolize Hopkins's own eventual triumph — certainly on the aesthetic plane, and perhaps also on the plane of theological 'merit':

> 'I am all at once what Christ is, | since he was what I am, and
> This Jack, joke, poor potsherd, | patch, matchwood, immortal
> diamond,
> Is immortal diamond.'

Very fittingly did the American Jesuit Fathers call their well-known book of Hopkins studies *Immortal Diamond.*[2] Hopkins, who died practically unknown in 1889, was certainly resurrected as a poet in 1918.

Hopkins's use of the word 'instressed' in stanza 5 of the *Deutschland* induces me to go back ten years in his life to point out, in the prose of his early Journal, his first use of the terms 'inscape' and 'instress'. As a young man, he observed natural phenomena with a loving and searching eye — a metaphysical eye. His jottings of 1866 describe colour, organic form, movement, growth and decay, in fact the intrinsic quality of any object which was capable of striking through the senses into the mind with a feeling of novelty and discovery. He describes trees, breaking waves, the ribbed glacier, and the distant hill whose contour is like a 'slow tune'; he eagerly describes the growth and disintegration of anything, from a cloud to a bluebell. But he is mainly interested in those aspects of a thing which make it distinctive and individual; like every true artist, and every true critic, he is interested in 'the relation between the parts of the thing to each other, and again of the parts to the whole'. He is always intent on examining that unified complex of characteristics which constitute (to quote Dr. W. A. M. Peters) 'the outward reflection of the inner nature of a thing' — its individual essence. Even his later theological prose is obsessed with this idea of individuation: what makes me *me,* I myself. He was always looking for the law or principle which gave to any object or grouping of objects its delicate and surprising uniqueness. Very often this sense of knowing a thing in its essence, its unique oneness, is for Hopkins the discovery of that fundamental beauty which is the active principle of all true being, the source of all true knowledge and delight — even of religious ecstasy; for, speaking of a bluebell, he says, 'I know the beauty of our Lord by it'.

As a name for that 'individually-distinctive' form made up of

various sense-data he coined the word *inscape,* or perhaps he took it over from some obscure earlier writer; and for that energy of being, that natural but ultimately supernatural stress of being which determines an inscape and keeps it in existence, he coined the name *instress.* (The origin of the idea is obviously Greek, mainly Platonic, but we won't go into that just now; you will recall Shelley's *Adonais*: 'the one Being's plastic stress sweeps through the dull sense world'.) But instress is not only the moulding, unifying force *in* the object; it connotes, also, that impulse *from* the object which actualizes the inscape in the mind of the beholder, or rather the perceiver, for inscape may be perceived by all or many of the senses at once. Instress is the sensation of inscape — a quasi-mystical illumination, a sudden perception of that deeper pattern, order, and unity which gives meaning to external forms. For instance we read in the Journal:

> 'I saw the inscape freshly, as if my eyes were still growing, though with a companion the eye and the ear are for the most part shut and instress cannot come'.

You see: perceiving inscape, receiving instress, is like being alone with God. Professor Martz, in his illuminating book *The Poetry of Meditation,*[3] says: 'the instress of a thing is manifested by its inscape'. In a sense this is true, I agree, but the point I am stressing here is that the instress or unifying force implies also an *out*stress: otherwise, how could instress be said to 'come' to the mind of the perceiver? The perceiver is brought into the unifying magnetic field, so to speak:

> 'His mystery must be instressed, stressed'.

'There lives the dearest freshness deep down things', Hopkins writes in *God's Grandeur,* and in the Journal he had written, ten years earlier:

> 'I thought how sadly the beauty of inscape was unknown and buried away from simple people and yet how near at hand it was if only they had eyes to see it and it could be called out everywhere again'.

In one of his Journal notes Hopkins speaks of the sky as being 'charged with simple instress'; and in another he says: 'All things therefore are charged with love, are charged with God, and if we know how to touch them give off sparks and take fire, yield

drops and flow, ring and tell of him'. We see therefore that instress can safely be equated with Divine Love — God's creative and sustaining Love and Power.

See how Hopkins puts all this in the octave of a sonnet:

God's Grandeur

The world is charged with the grandeur of God.
　　It will flame out, like shining from shook foil;
　　It gathers to a greatness, like the ooze of oil
Crushed. Why do men then now not reck his rod?
Generations have trod, have trod, have trod;
　　And all is seared with trade; bleared, smeared with toil;
　　And wears man's smudge and shares man's smell: the soil
Is bare now, nor can foot feel, being shod.

And for all this, nature is never spent;
　　There lives the dearest freshness deep down things;
And though the last lights off the black West went
　　Oh, morning, at the brown brink eastward, springs —
Because the Holy Ghost over the bent
　　World broods with warm breast and with ah! bright wings.

The bare foot feeling the ground is here a symbol of the soul of man discovering the instress and inscape in Nature. We are losing that power of discernment — but the grandeur of God is still there.

All this preoccupation with inscape has, therefore, a direct bearing on Hopkins the poet. In his Sprung and Counterpointed rhythms, and in his striving to bring into a unity, in his verse, the maximum of formal and phonal patterning and variety, he was consciously moulding the inscape of speech on the lines of the physical inscapes in external nature. This fact is proved by his giving the same coined name — an 'outride' — to both the outflying wisps of branch or twig on the contours of a tree, and the extra or hypermetric syllables in a verse-foot — syllables which are not counted in the formal scanning of a line.

Having evolved his own theory of inscape and instress, Hopkins was delighted to find that it corresponded, more than roughly, with the 'theory of knowledge' and the 'principle of individuation' which he found in the scholastic philosopher Duns Scotus, who was to become his favourite thinker — thereby supplanting, in this matter, the official philosopher of the Jesuit order, St. Thomas Aquinas. Scotus maintained that we achieve our knowledge of the Universal through the individual being. Individuality is embodied

in form, spirit, activity, and not merely, as Aquinas said, in quantified matter. (This individual Form was called Thisness, Haecceitas.) Hence, in one of his most Scotist sonnets *As kingfishers catch fire,* Hopkins follows Scotus in regarding the individual activity of a thing as the measure of its participation in the hierarchy of all being, at the summit of which scale is Christ — the perfection of physical beauty and the perfection of moral character. Let us look at this sonnet:

> As kingfishers catch fire, dragonflies draw flame;
> As tumbled over rim in roundy wells
> Stones ring; like each tucked string tells, each hung bell's
> Bow swung finds tongue to fling out broad its name;
> Each mortal thing does one thing and the same:
> Deals out that being indoors each one dwells;
> Selves — goes itself; *myself* it speaks and spells,
> Crying *What I do is me: for that I came.*
>
> I say more: the just man justices;
> Keeps grace: that keeps all his goings graces;
> Acts in God's eye what in God's eye he is —
> Christ. For Christ plays in ten thousand places,
> Lovely in limbs, and lovely in eyes not his
> To the Father through the features of men's faces.

Isn't this poem like Hopkins talking to us — in his own idiom, expressing his own inscape? Poetry, he said, should be 'current language heightened'. 'Design, pattern, or what I am in the habit of calling inscape is what I above all aim at in poetry'. Again he said: 'Poetry is speech employed to carry the inscape of speech for the inscape's sake — and therefore the inscape must be dwelt on'. 'Inscape', he said again, 'is the very soul of art'. (Aristotle said plot was the soul of tragedy — the pattern of events.)

See how Hopkins dwells on the inscape in the poem I have just quoted. The main reason for the initial strangeness of his style is the serious artistic purpose of 'inscaping' into a perfect unity (i) the inward fusion of thought and feeling, and (ii) the corresponding outward harmony of rhythm and sound-texture. Inscape, he declared, is the essential and only lasting thing — the species or individually-distinctive beauty of style.

'As kingfishers catch fire' — their flight is a flash of blue flame: 'dragonflies draw flame' — their gilded bodies and gossamer

wings draw a thread of flame through the air. Do they also 'draw' the flame of the kingfisher? The verb 'draw' is richly ambiguous. And now hear the very chiming of a stone dropped into a well, a stringed instrument plucked ('tucked'), and a great bell swinging and *telling* us of itself. It is all done by a wonderfully musical and delicate use of internal rhyme, assonance and alliteration:

> As tumbled over rim in roundy wells
> Stones ring; like each tucked string tells, each *hung* bell's
> Bow *swung* finds *tongue* to fling out broad its name;

To me that is exquisite: I know nothing else like it, except some passages in Greek, in Welsh poetry, and in Rilke.

See how well the lines are packed with sound and significant images. Then look at the bold original handling of grammar. Each thing 'selves' — a verb; it 'goes itself', just as a schoolboy says colloquially: 'Go it, Bill; show 'em what you can do!' The naive, childlike Hopkins; but a clever child!

'Each mortal thing does one thing and the same'. 'Mortal' suggests (i) 'each finite created thing' and (ii) 'every darned thing you can think of'; both ideas are 'inscaped' into the word 'mortal'. Current speech heightened, by means of a pregnant ambiguity.

Then, in the sestet, comes the inevitable exegesis on the moral, theological plane. As the stone or bell 'goes itself', because it was created for that purpose, so the just man, by a directed effort of the will, 'justices', produces an act of justice, deals out to others the grace God dealt out to him. Then, in the conclusion, we see how the inscape of each thing is like a window through which we look into the Divine source of all inscape — the all-embracing, all-instressing beauty and perfection of Christ, God. As one of those early American reviewers said, 'Hopkins was a 'natural Platonist': as all things in this world participate in the Platonic forms, so in Hopkins's Christian thinking, all things participate in the total being, the ultimate comprehensive Nature, of God.

Inscape, for Hopkins, implied not only concentration and intensity of utterance; it meant also the fixing, in language, of the specific and individual nature of the object as Hopkins himself saw it in one particular context. Take, for example, the opening stanza of *The Wreck of the Deutschland.* Hopkins has been shocked and 'instressed' by the foundering of a steamer on a sandbank in a storm with the loss of many lives. As a believer in God he cannot pretend that God knew nothing about it: he sees tragedy as a dreadful admonition: he is thinking of God's

infinite power in relation to man's petty subservience. Hence the strange compound adjective which opens the poem:

> Thou, mastering me
> God!

As soon as we reach the word 'God' we know exactly what aspect of God Hopkins is having strong feelings about. The alliteration shows which words must be stressed. We should note also that the alliteration in line 5 is not merely ornamental. It is strictly functional:

> Thou hast bound bones and veins in me, fastened me flesh.

By kinaesthetic images we are made to feel the binding and fastening. Alliterative 'b' changes to alliterative 'v'; and it so happens that 'v' is phonetically half way between 'b' and 'f'. It is the same in the next line, where the alliterated vowels mark the main stresses:

> And *a*fter it *a*lmost *u*nmade, what with dread,
> Thy doing: and dost thou touch me afresh?
> Over again I *f*eel thy *f*inger and *f*ind thee.

Note the seqence of ideas bound together by the alliterative 'f' 's: 'I *f*eel something touching me. God, it's a *f*inger. My God, I *f*ind it's God's finger'. Quite a little alliterative drama, isn't it?

No, you may say: that was not intended; it is just coincidental, accidental. Very well: listen to Hopkins on inscape:

> 'All the world is full of inscape, and chance left free to act falls into an order as well as purpose'.

But behind Hopkins's writing there was a controlling purpose, a directing concept.

To sum up, we may say that the most original and characteristic features of Hopkins's style were deliberately introduced to catch the immediate, significant personal impression; to fix in language, with the utmost precision, the inscape of the object as it instressed itself on the inscape of the poet. The compound epithet or noun, with or without hyphens, is the main instrument — for example, in the *Deutschland*:

The-last-breath penitent spirits . . .

and:

Now burn, new born to the world,
Double-naturèd name,
The heaven-flung, heart-fleshed, maiden-furled
Miracle-in-Mary-of-flame,

and in *Harry Ploughman*:

See his wind- lilylocks -laced,

and in *The Windhover:*

. . . the rolling level underneath him steady air, and striding
High there . . .

I conclude with a well-known line from *The Starlight Night*:

Ah well! it is all a purchase, all is a prize.

Edward Sapir and Samuel Putnam had, in learning many languages, put down a good deal of the purchase price, the charge for being able to read Hopkins with understanding and sensitivity. They won the prize early, but not without some hard work and clear thinking.

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REVOLUTIONARY AND CONSERVATIVE THINKING*

by D. G. GILLHAM

According to a manifesto issued by the students at the Sorbonne during the upheavals of last year, there is only one true revolutionary class left in European society now that the aims of socialists have been achieved either in part or in full in most advanced countries of the world. The class referred to is the class of students—not necessarily students in the undergraduate sense of the word, but in the sense: active members of the university and scholarly world. The workers of the world who were called upon, nearly a century ago, to unite so that they could insist on their rights have now obtained those rights in such good measure that they are united only in their determination to remain comfortably established as they are, and in order to resist any change in the control of societies that they exercise either directly or indirectly. In England, for instance, it would seem that the trades unions are a stumbling block to the government in power (whether the government be Labour or Conservative) in any effort to institute economic improvement, and we witness the peculiar position of the government pleading for reform (a reform that originates from academic thinking about economic matters—originates from the universities) while the mass of people who might benefit from the reform refuse to countenance it. Labour, it would appear, has become as obstinately conservative as the bourgeoisie of a hundred and fifty years ago, so that the students of France, because they are organized as a class, and because their calling allows them to remain critical of the government which rules over them and the society in which they live, are alone capable of demanding reform in the manner which we call revolutionary, and they stage their revolt, appropriately enough, in the city which saw the first revolution of the truly modern sort. The Latin quarter and the Place de Bastille lie within a mile or two of each other.

I should like to refer further to the manifesto of the students of the Sorbonne, filling in a bit, and giving my own understanding of their statement. Society presents to the reformer, so the students

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say, a blank and immovable wall of bureaucratic procedures that defy his efforts to be heard or be effective. The reformer is confronted, not by people who are opposed to him and arguments which are contrary to his own, but instead by institutions which are deaf to him and people who are indifferent to what he has to say. Society is a massive piece of machinery, the cogs and levers of which are procedures and rules, prejudices, stereotypes, customs, conventions, and habits. It is stupid—a great unwieldy bulk that is incapable of hearing criticism or of improving itself because it is a senseless automaton concerned only with running itself—a lumpish monster of bureaucratic procedures and ingrained habit that blunders along on its sightless way. If intelligence is to enter this situation, the students suggest, then it is no use trying to introduce it by intelligent means, because the monster has no brain to absorb it. If reform is to come, and reform is an attempt to apply intelligence—someone's intelligence—to the situation in which men find themselves, then it can come only through revolutionary action, which is destructive. Only if the monster is smashed is there any possibility of men being forced to look at their situation, listen to the voice of reason, reassess their needs, and institute an era which is rational and because it is rational, truly humane and liberal.

No doubt the students of Paris had a great deal more to say in the course of the weeks that they spent deliberating in the barricaded lecture halls of the Sorbonne—more than I have indicated in my outline, and no doubt they could present an argument better suited to meet the objections that immediately spring to mind on considering the case as I have put it. I have not done them justice, and I don't pretend to have done so, though I think I have caught something of the gist of what they said. One catches the gist because one feels a good deal of sympathy with what they say. Their frustration is akin to the frustration that all thoughtful people must feel who live in a society they cannot wholly approve of, and where they wish things were ordered in a better manner. The students, one feels, carried their reason to an extreme, but that reasoning was based on a real grievance: the recalcitrance of the established order of things; its inaccessibility; its inability to hear the pleas of the enlightened. It is a man of poor spirit who has not, at some time, wished to take the neck of the established order, if it conveniently had one, wring it and set things going on a footing acceptable to his own idea of right and justice.

I do not wish to examine any further the situation of the students at the Sorbonne or to argue any case for or against them. I do not know sufficient about their circumstances, or even about their

statements in detail, and my purpose is to place the sort of thinking exemplified in their manifesto rather than consider the particular case. Their situation is not a new one, nor are the arguments put forward original ones. It is interesting to note, however, that the insurrection was managed and carried out by young persons; by students in their early twenties and lecturers in their late twenties —interesting but not surprising. Young manhood and womanhood is the time (and should be the time) when ideas of the sort I have outlined are most attractive, not because the ideas have an element of crudity (ideas of age are even cruder) but because they manifest an idealism, an optimism, and a desire to be active and effective that is often absent at a later time of life. As a young man one is most free to be militantly idealistic; to be, if not a revolutionary, then most imbued with a reforming zeal; with the desire to alter, if necessary, everything on the face of the earth. One is, after all, creating one's own world at that time, and what could be more natural than the desire to create it better than it (rather dismally) is. There are, of course, two dangers in this desire: one being that one's conception of a better world may be a mistaken one, and the second being that one's zeal may incline one to be intolerant, for even the most liberal idealism may lose sight of the means for the sake of its end; may wish to force freedoms on people that they do not want, by the use of methods that are arbitrary and illiberal in the extreme. We need look no further than Africa to see that this is so, and looking at History we see that nearly all revolutions are started by men with the best of intentions and the most humane ideas, but are usually taken over by men whose humanity is lost in fanaticism.

If youth is the time of life that wishes to see things altered, then age, it is commonly held, is the time that would like to see things remain very much as they are; is the exponent of conservatism. That may be so, though I do not think these popular generalizations bear very close examination—their definitions are too vague. In the case of this particular generalization there are too many different kinds of conservatism for it to mean very much. There is, as I have indicated, a great difference between the revolutionary who shows zeal and the revolutionary who shows fanaticism: the zealot wishes people to share his ideals and tries to convince them to freely accept his view, while the fanatic is determined that people shall accept the good he offers, at the point of a gun if necessary. There is also a difference between a responsible conservatism and an irresponsible one—as great a difference as between the zealot and the fanatic, for while a zeal to change what exists and a responsible love of what exists seem to me to spring

from the same impulse (to be not incompatible, and to be beneficial in their operation), a fanatical desire to impose change goes together with an unimaginative and bigoted determination to have things as they are. These last two go together because they both spring from a selfish impulse, they pay no regard to the needs or wishes of other persons, and they do often exist side by side in the same mind, incredible though it may seem that they should do so. As we draw a distinction among revolutionaries between the zealot and the fanatic, then, it is necessary to draw one amongst the conservatives—we might call them appreciators and bigots because the one category, having come to what seems to them a just appreciation of what exists, sees what is good in itself and wishes to retain it, while persons in the other category, finding that the present state of affairs suits them very well, are determined to maintain the *status quo* so that they can continue to exploit their circumstances.

I should like, now, to go more deeply into the mentality that underlies the opposed doctrines of revolution and conservation, and the study is made an easy one by the existence of a controversy in print that was published at the time of the French Revolution, the case for the Revolution being stated by Tom Paine, and the conservative case against it by Edmund Burke. The works concerned are Burke's *Reflections on the French Revolution,* published in 1790, and Paine's *Rights of Man,* published in 1791. They were read with great interest at that time, and may be read with equal interest now because the issues that are confronted are issues that confront men now, whether they live in Paris and are members of the Sorbonne or live in South Africa and are members of the University of Natal. The circumstances are not the same, of course, but that is an advantage because one can take a more dispassionate view of the arguments put forward, and so approach one's own situation with a mind enlightened by the exercise in objectivity.

Two or three months after the taking of the Bastille in 1789, Burke wrote a commentary on the Revolution, and in the following year it was expanded and published as *Reflections on the French Revolution.* It was expected that Burke's pamphlet (or book) would endorse the Revolution, for a number of reasons: firstly, he was a Whig, a member of the liberal party of the time; secondly, as a member of Parliament he had spoken up for the American colonists, prior to their revolution and the Independence, gained in 1783; thirdly, he had spoken up for the Catholics in Ireland; fourthly, he had attempted to curb the King's corruption of the

English Parliament; fifthly, he was opposed to slavery. In short, he appeared to be a most thoroughgoing 'agitator', and it came as a surprise to many when Burke, instead of speaking out in favour of the Revolution in France, proved most disdainful of it and attacked it sharply. No one, apparently, was more surprised than Thomas Paine, who undertook to write an answer to Burke, which appeared in 1791 under the title *The Rights of Man*. Briefly, the careers of the two men are as follows: Burke, the son of a lawyer, was a university man, a member of Parliament, the holder of a largish estate (although he was always short of money), a member (in short) of the 'establishment', though by no means an aristocrat. Paine, on the other hand, started life as a stay-maker and a petty customs official, was self-educated and not always scrupulously honest in money matters. He emigrated to America, where he employed his journalistic gifts on behalf of the colonists in revolt. He became well known as a propagandist for liberty and equality; so well known that he was elected as deputy to the French National Assembly, and when he was forced to fly from England not long after the publication of *The Rights of Man*, it was to France he went in order to take his seat in that parliament.

At the time of which we are speaking, then, the course of the French Revolution was still incomplete, the French King was still on his throne, and events in France still in a state of flux. As a commentary on events in France the two works we are to discuss are not of great interest. Both Burke and Paine are too close to what took place, are too much among the trees to be able to see the wood, and they are both frankly prejudiced, Burke having too little sympathy for the Revolution and Paine too much. In addition, both men are using the events as an excuse to discuss the principles of revolution in order to influence thinking at home (in order to influence thinking about the state of England), so events in France are at the periphery of their attention, while possible future events in England are their real concern. As Burke's work is antecedent to Paine's we will make a summary of his criticism of the French Revolution first, though, in the time at our disposal, the summary will, I am afraid, have to be a very superficial one indeed.

The first point to touch on is that, though no one was more aware than Burke that there were matters that demanded reform in England, no one was more determined to set about rectification in a conservative way—in a way, that is, that would not destroy what was valuable. He is certainly not prepared to approve any change made for the sake of a mere principle, that is, for the sake

of an -ism, and not even for the sake of liberalism, because, for Burke, practical consequences are a better guide to the judgment of political acts than all the principles in the world. Liberty, he says, is a fine principle, and something to be striven for, but so is government a fine principle, and if the acquisition of liberty results in a chaotic ordering of civil affairs then no good, on balance, has been gained. Thus the Burke who had approved the freedom gained in America and who could advocate self-rule for Ireland deplored the effects of democracy in France and could argue against the full extension of the franchise in England (though in favour of some reform). He sums up his wary attitude towards France:

> I should . . . suspend my congratulations on the new liberty of France until I was informed how it had been combined with government; with public force; with the discipline and obedience of armies; with the collection of an effective and well-distributed revenue; with morality and religion; with solidity and property; with civil and social manners. All these (in their way) are good things too; and without them Liberty is not a benefit whilst it lasts, and is not likely to continue long. The effect of liberty to individuals, is, that they may do what they please: we ought to see what it will please them to do, before we risk congratulations, which may be soon turned into complaints.[1]

The revolutionary claims the right to alter the state of government and to alter the social and economic pattern of his country, basing the right upon two ideas: firstly, on the idea that sovereignty stems from the people, and that they may, therefore, determine the form of their government, and secondly, on the idea that the revolutionary has a better knowledge of how the state should be run than the present governors. Most revolutionaries, of course, entertain these two ideas simultaneously. Burke denies the right of the people to alter their constitution at will, and he denies that any man, or set of men, however wise or numerous, can possess the wisdom that entitles them to prescribe wholesale renovations of the fabric of government or society. On Burke's view, rights are an outcome of civil life, they flow from the fact of being governed, and they have no other basis. Changing the form of a government against the will of those who govern (to limit the powers of a King, for instance, or to alter the structure of a parliament) is an achievement of force, not an achievement of right. Burke does not exclude the possibility of a government

reforming itself in a constitutional manner, and affirms that 'A state without some means of change is without the means of its conservation'. But, for reasons that we will go on shortly to examine, even those persons in power at the moment, if they are wise, will effect their changes with caution and within the limits of what the constitution allows. Changes beyond that allowance, whether they stem from the people or the government, are an infringement of rights; are, in the latter case, a revolution from above, and so a matter of force, not entitlement. The point at issue here is the location of the source of human rights. It was being claimed that these rights *inhered* in the will of the people, and Burke asserts that rights are an acquisition of the people, vested in, and guaranteed by, the control exercised over the people by the government and by the constitution, and it is by the continuance and permanency of government that rights continue to be effective. There is, he states, no other source of rights and to say that they stem from the people is to talk in terms of non-existent abstractions. Rights are, briefly, an outcome of our institutions and not their basis; we do not possess rights 'naturally' but receive them as an inheritance, and the advantages of looking on them as an inheritance, Burke says, are numerous. Firstly, as he puts it:

> the idea of inheritance furnishes a sure principle of conservation, and a sure principle of transmission; without at all excluding a principle of improvement. It leaves acquisition free; but it secures what it acquires.[2]

Men are able to point precisely at what their rights are, and know exactly what is theirs to defend. In addition, an inherited constitution has acquired, during long years of trial and error, its own built-in checks, with a balance of power between conflicting interests. In a balanced constitution no single party or interest can exert its will in defiance of other interests, but must convince opposing elements of its wisdom, so that government becomes a matter of reason, not of force.

Opposed to the advantages of an established inherited constitution are the disadvantages of a raw, untested constitution in which arbitrary power has full sway, such as that which Burke sees as now set up in France. The disadvantages are numerous. Firstly, the power, which is unchecked, is placed in the hands of men without experience of government. Secondly, government will be that of theoreticians, interested in the establishment of principles and theories, instead of in seeing to the practical wants of the people they govern. Thirdly, the leaders are forced to bow to the

most ignorant of their followers as it is by pandering to them that they must hope to remain in power. Fourthly, the followers must 'become subservient to the worst designs of their leaders' because in such designs the apparent interests of the ruling group are seen to lie.

Such evils would be tempered by submission to the tried procedures of a long-established constitution with its built-in checks, but these, alas, have been abandoned by the French; their Assembly, says Burke,

> . . . since the destruction of the orders, has no fundamental law, no strict convention, no respected usage to restrain it. Instead of finding themselves obliged to conform to a fixed constitution, they have a power to make a constitution which shall conform to their designs. Nothing in heaven or upon earth can serve as a control on them.[3]

This is one of the chief hall-marks of revolutionary governments: they can brook no opposition, and they make it their business to ensure that no effective opposition to their will shall arise. A government with an -ism to uphold cannot afford to be tolerant, and even so high-sounding a principle as that of the rights of man is, for Burke, a dangerous ground on which to construct a constitution. The science of government is, for him, a practical one, dealing with practical needs and not theoretical, though he assumes that the governor will be better if he is a man of good faith and of high principles. Constitutions are a growth, the outcome of time and of a process of trial and error. The revolutionary believes in his ability to construct a constitution on the grounds of the -ism he happens to believe in, and this belief is a second hall-mark of the revolutionary. He is directed by abstract ideas and not by the real needs of the community he lives in—indeed, Burke explains, the high principles and superior concerns of the revolutionary make him incapable of the 'tedious, moderate, but practical resistance' which brings about improvement of lasting value. The third hall-mark of Burke's revolutionary in power is that he busies himself remedying names, not vices. They give new names to old things in the hope of remedying them, but all the old evils live on in a new guise, and, in reality, revolutionary government changes forms and fashion without changing the substance. There, then, are three of the chief characteristics of the revolutionary according to Burke: his inability to brook opposition, his reliance on abstract theory and his concern with outward form rather than real needs, and, of course, these are of particular

interest in South Africa, where revolution and subversion are much discussed topics.

The conservative governor differs from the revolutionary because he sees that rights and wisdom lie, not in the -ism but in institutions. Burke puts it:

> We are afraid to put men to live and trade each on his own private stock of reason; because we suspect that the stock in each man is small, and that the individuals would do better to avail themselves of the general bank and capital of nations and of ages.[4]

Burke argues that no man or set of men are wise enough or omniscient enough to say what the best future course for a nation is, or to say what sweeping constitutional changes are necessary. The happier consequences of past trials are embodied in our constitution, and we abandon the principles and precedents contained in our constitution at our peril, taking a chance on our own wisdom instead of that which has been accumulated. Wisdom does not lie in the fabrication of principle, but in taking the methods and customs available to us and turning them to good practical use.

Paine's work is written as a direct answer to Burke's, though it is sometimes difficult to believe that Paine could have expended much care in reading his opponent. He misunderstands him and spends much of his space vilifying him to little purpose. Here are some of the points he makes in answer:

'I am contending', says Paine:

> for the rights of the living and against their being willed away and contracted for by the manuscript assumed authority of the dead; and Mr. Burke is contending for the authority of the dead over the rights and freedom of the living.[5]

Governors, says Paine, cannot tyrannize beyond the grave by prescribing for future generations and every age must be free to act for itself in all cases. Burke might make a number of replies in answer to this. Firstly, that the word right has more than one sense and that Paine confuses them. If Paine means that the nation has always the ability to choose for itself, then he might, with reservations, agree, but in exercising this ability the nation would be depriving itself of its real rights, which are the inherited ones. Secondly, that all laws are made for a fixed period or for all time, and to make them on any other basis would be absurd. Thirdly,

that any generation is bound by the example of its predecessors whether it likes it or not, because it lacks the ability to do anything original. Even the direction taken by a revolution is determined by what is being revolted against. Fourthly, in society man has no rights but by being a member of a community and subscribing to the conventions and institutions established in that society. To alienate oneself from these is to alienate oneself from one's rights, which can only return with the re-establishment of conventions. Fifthly, the term generations, used in conjunction with rights, is inaccurate. Society, for this purpose, is a continuum, and not a number of historical segments. Sixthly, in choosing between the fixed tyranny of institutions and the wilful tyranny of upstart individuals, the former is infinitely preferable.

A second argument used by Paine reads as follows: It concerns the origins of government:

> . . . *Individuals themselves*, each in his own personal and sovereign right, *entered into a compact with each other* to produce a Government: and this is the only mode in which Governments have a right to arise and the only principle on which they have a right to exist.[6]

Furthermore, Governments 'continue to derive their force from the consent of the living'. To this, Burke might reply that the compact idea is too much of an over-simplification, that government is an outcome of growth, not decision, and furthermore that a constitution is too complex a thing for any individual to see how to renew it in any great degree. The compact claimed by Paine is merely an implicit one and the consent of the living is inevitable.

To go on to the next argument: there is a difference, says Paine, between the French Government, which is laying down its constitution, and any established form of government: He says:

> The present National Assembly of France is, strictly speaking, the *personal social compact*. The members of it are the delegates of the nation in its original character; future assemblies will be the delegates of the nation in its *organized* character.[7]

Burke would argue the absurdity of assuming that man could become Adam again, taking a fresh start in his political life. Political life is an accretion, not a creation, and the modes of political life, even revolutionary modes, date back to historical

precedent and the experience of mankind. There is very little that is new under the political sun.

In judging between Burke and Paine one comes to the conclusion that if one of the two men is right it is Burke who is so. He certainly gets the better of the argument, partly because he is more intelligent in himself, is the better reasoner, but also because he tries to take more into account, and looks at things more realistically. He has a less romantic view of man's capacities, looks for built-in checks to keep us straight, is more moderate and humane. I feel more sympathy for him, and, it would seem, I have been pleading the conservative case in putting him forward, but then one must remember that Burke was no bigot—not a die-hard conservative hanging on to things because it suited his purse or his position, but a disinterested, intelligent, and passionate observer, defending what appeared valuable to him but unafraid to denounce abuses when he saw them, and to speak his mind at all times. His convictions are of the conservative variety, but he was a wonderful reformer also, patiently and untiringly working for what was just, through the institutions and mechanisms society placed at his disposal. His views were liberal in the extreme, but they were not those of a stereotyped liberal, and he placed too high a value on order, decorum, continuity and flexibility to embrace a revolutionary cause. It seems to me that there united in him both the zeal of the true revolutionary and the capacity for reverence of the true conservative.

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PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF STUDENT REVOLT*

by E. F. O'DOHERTY

The phenomenon of student unrest is so widespread and so uniform in its detailed manifestations wherever it occurs, that it is legitimate to assume that research will reveal recurrent common causal factors, and similar explanations for the phenomenon wherever it occurs. Among the common causal factors one can list historical, economic, pedagogic and social contributory factors. Its true importance lies in the perception by its leaders that the most far-reaching revolution in history can be brought about not by tackling political and social institutions, but by destroying the cultural institutions of a society.

In order to survive, a culture uses institutions both formal and informal through which it processes its young members, in order that on the one hand it can assimilate them, and on the other that they can identify with the culture. In this way the culture preserves and perpetuates itself. The true importance of student unrest is seen to lie in the declaration of some of its leaders, that so far from identifying with the culture which wishes to assimilate the student, the aim is to change the culture itself at its roots by changing its formal, formative institutions. This is explicit, although perhaps expressed in other terms, in the work for example of Cohn-Bendit. In student language generally it is expressed not in cultural/anthropological terms as above, but in ideological terms. This is not to say that it is a bad thing. The foregoing paragraph is descriptive merely, and not evaluative.

There is a natural history common to student unrest wherever it occurs. It begins with the selection of a relatively trivial but concrete grievance, around which can cluster, and which itself can epitomize, and symbolize, the otherwise inarticulate and objective unrest, aggression and fear, precipitating guilt-feelings, whose causes we hope to trace in this paper.

First let me remind you of the territorial seagull, who knows exactly what to do if another seagull approaches his territory. He rises, and circles his own perimeter, and the invader reads the signal, and goes away. He also knows exactly what to do if the

*A lecture delivered at the University of Natal, Pietermaritzburg, 1969.

invader is actually within his territory. He rises, dive-bombs him, and sends him away. But he has no genetically coded response built in if the invader merely squats on his periphery. He now behaves neurotically, simply because he must do something. He beats his own beak on a rock until the blood flows.

The students' 'manifest grievance' has to be read as a language, which may be the only language the students know through which to say the latent and all too real grievances which sometimes bother them. Furthermore, the behaviour of students in revolt is also a language, and must be read in the same way in which we read the tantrums and negativism of children and the strikes and violence of workers. For child, worker and student alike, the language of demonstration, be it tantrums, pickets or sit-ins, may be telling us something which the child, worker or student may not even know he is saying, and may not be able to say in any other language. Perhaps the greatest task that we as psychologists and counsellors have to tackle at this time is the task of learning the student-revolt language of behaviour.

In the nineteenth century and early twentieth the instinctual needs of students and indeed of young people generally, living at an intellectual level, were taken care of by society, through the provision of sublimatory processes which in the main clustered around artistic activities, leisure interests, and competitive sport. It would seem that the sublimatory effect of the processes hitherto provided has diminished to the point of failure. Thus it would seem that our young people, being more honest than their forebears, are no longer willing to handle their deepest instinctive needs through play-activities of physical endeavour, and because they are still not able to face real issues realistically, mainly through lack of power, decision-making and responsibility for the consequences, they have taken instead a very clever via media, viz., confrontation with real problems, together with refusal of responsibility both for destruction of that which is, and for the provision of an alternative.[1]

It should always be borne in mind that while description and evaluation of events are different and distinct processes, they are nevertheless so inextricably linked that the very language we use to describe is often heard by the hearer as evaluative. Thus most of the accounts of student power, student unrest, student revolt, 'describe' these phenomena in emotionally-charged ways which either over-value both the students and their actions, or under-value them to the point of adverse verdict.

Anxious men under stress behave like our seagull. We should remember the Luddites in the nineteenth century. These were men

in whom anxieties, rational or irrational had reached such intolerable intensities that they erupted in violence. The Luddites thought 'the machine' was their enemy, therefore they destroyed 'the machine'. Students think of the university institutions as a machine, and as neo-Luddites they decide to break the machine. Very few are prepared like the Nanterre group, literally to work for the destruction of the machine. They settle for replacement of the worn-out parts. In this they are inconsistent, and serve only to give a new lease of life to the creaking machinery. The Cohn-Bendit Luddites are at once more consistent and more irrational (but perhaps more successful). What are the causes of the anxieties of students? In the student's mind they are everything that is crystallised in such phrases as 'the establishment', 'Bourgeois society', 'authoritarian structures', etc., etc. In truth it may very well be that the following is at least a partial synopsis of the true student anxiety sources:

1. Students in the past on entering university, found themselves standing at the outside edge of achieved knowledge, and on the frontiers of new discovery. The contemporary student by contrast, finds himself one of an unexciting caravan in the long slow haul across a desert of academic aridity.
2. Instead of the excitement of discovery (which would engage his emotions) the student experiences the apathy of the treadmill.
3. In the past, students entering tertiary levels of formation expected to be, and were, culturally at home at these levels. It is probably true now that a very large number of those entering tertiary levels are 'culturally-displaced people'.
4. In terms of the 'principle of viscosity' of group dynamics, the more difficult, or the more privileged it is to become a member of a group, the more one will identify with the group. Membership becomes a prestige factor one is loath to relinquish. Conversely, the easier it is to become a member, the less valuable will membership be. When tertiary level education was a rare privilege, it was highly valued. This is not to say that it should still be a rare privilege. It is only to say that we have not yet been able to devise ways of evaluation and identification appropriate to the more democratic accessibility of tertiary levels. Easy access to tertiary levels of education has greatly increased the number of culturally-displaced persons.

Cultural displacement is at least as real as political or geographical displacement. Among the politically-displaced, research shows a very high incidence of neuroticism, and some specific emotional disorders. 'Those who became political refugees before the age of 25 years were likely if they showed behaviour disturb-

ances to become a-social or anti-social, leading to criminality or sexual promiscuity.'[2] It may be that cultural displacement as we see it in our universities may have the same consequences as political displacement. The unassimilated, whether by cultural or political displacement, is likely to behave either by taking refuge in negativistic and solitary behaviour, or by turning on the society which has not assimilated him.

5. It seems clear that the professional knowledge of a great many students, perhaps the majority, outstrips their cultural development. It has long been acknowledged that their professional knowledge vastly outstrips their philosophical and/or their theological formation. The present proposition is more radical still, in as much as it may mean that many professionally qualified graduates are not viable as persons in their own culture. This may be the true meaning of the conscious and deliberate rejection of their culture by so many, which they express in the form of a revolt against middle-aged, middle-class bourgeois values. (It may very well be that the latter is a valuable thing to do. The point here is simply that no matter what the culture may be, the culturally displaced by reason of professional knowledge outstripping cultural development, will reject it. Such people could perhaps be labelled, not intellectuals, but intellectual savages.)

6. A great many, nobody knows for sure how many, of our gifted young students, are often ahead of their teachers in ability and achievement. Margaret Mead has made this point in another way: nobody in the older generations knows the whole answer to any of the questions the younger generations are now asking. And this is the first time this has happened in history. The answers may in fact have been wrong in the past, but at least the wise man (parent, guru, priest, philosopher or poet) gave it, very often in the full subjective conviction that it was right. Now, the wise man, like Socrates, knows that he doesn't know. Must he also drink the hemlock? In brief, the young have outstripped both parents and teachers to a degree hitherto unknown.

7. It might be contended that cultures differ from one another primarily by reason of the value-systems they operate. Sometimes a given culture may operate two different or unrelated value-systems, but may come to identify the two systems in a single continuum (e.g. political and religious values, political-social, economic-political, religious-academic, etc.). When this happens, the rejection of one of these value-systems necessitates a rejection of both, except in the case of very sophisticated and mature people.

The application to student unrest is somewhat as follows: All value-systems in our type of culture have got themselves

identified with middle-class bourgeois values, not, of course the 'eternal' values (which are not the prerogative of the bourgeoisie) but such ephemeral values as respectability, conformity, success, security, complacency. The values of the young are freedom, independence, non-conformity, risk, uniqueness, even poverty and the 'pseudo-asceticism' of which Anna Freud speaks. This set of differences is probably what we mean when we refer to the 'generation-gap', just as in another type of culture all value-systems may become identified with the values of socio-political authoritarianism. By contrast with all this, attempts by sociologists to create theories of the structure, nature, purpose and function of society, while prescinding from all values (cf. Wertfreiheit of Weber) have succeeded only in producing a 'no-value' value-system. It is intriguing to note that a 'no-value' value-system in which power and authority are identified, took shape ironically in the mind of Laski at LSE between the two wars. Perhaps most universities ever since have taught a Laski no-value theory of society, and are now reaping the whirlwind, in as much as students have begun to believe them. It is we who have taught the students that there is no moral aspect to authority, that authority relationships are governed only by power, the clash of force. Students who have been taught to think this way, by a natural and inevitable process conclude that if they have enough physical power at their disposal, e.g. sheer weight of numbers to occupy university buildings, that they will no longer be obliged to accept an authority over them. Having enough power to counteract an opposing power is thus easily confused with having a right to reject moral authority over one. The connection between power and authority through culture amounting to at times an identification of the two is, I believe, the source of much confusion in society generally.

The seagull attacked the wrong target and drew his own blood. In much the same way, the student under anxiety-producing stress, more often than not appears to attack the wrong targets, and this for two reasons: first he does not know the right ones, and secondly, even if he succeeded in destroying the ones he attacks, it would only be to replace them by similar ones. In other words, to attack president, professors, governing bodies of tertiary level institutes, is to attack the wrong targets, simply because the individuals holding these roles are the instruments of culture, whereas the true target is the very culture itself and its values, and secondly, if these personified targets are destroyed, they will simply be replaced, and if the students join them, even to the point of controlling them, they will find in a very short time that they

have simply joined the establishment. They are more likely however, like the seagull, to draw their own blood and effect nothing. It is surprising to see how students mistake the target. It could be argued that their best way of changing the university they despise would be not by tackling its organs of administration, but by tackling the dreary humour, low intellectual output, the waste of time in Societies, the physical conditions of life, the indolence, apathy, lack of intellectual excitement and lack of creativity, which characterise the lives of so many students.

The Real Problems:

There is some general agreement on the real problems which students, universities and society as such ought to be tackling.

1. The overtaking of the teaching resources:

The enormous expansion in sheer numbers at tertiary levels of education: a 400% increase in France in the thirty years 1939-1969; in Britain more than 20 new universities in a decade. It is possible that not enough attention has been paid to the quality of the intake in this enormous expansion of sheer numbers. It is quite certain that machinery (at administrative, organizational and teaching levels) which may not have even been adequate for the smaller numbers of thirty years ago, is certainly not capable of functioning successfully in present conditions of vast expansion.

2. The overtaking of the students' resources:

The growth in quality and in sheer quantity of the content of university courses has not been controlled in relation to students' ability, and often has not functional significances for the student. Three or four years is too short a time for the sheer amount of material that has now to be packed into an undergraduate degree course. Courses have grown in range and depth over the years, based on the logic that anything can be added but nothing can be dropped. Examination standards have risen to a frightful level and while it is true that some anxiety and tension in students is perfectly good and healthy, it would appear that the burthen has become too great and has moved into the pathological area. Even in Oxford, where if anywhere conditions might be considered ideal because of the one-to-one teacher/student convention, the suicide rate is eleven times that of the non-university co-age group, and 15% of all students need psychiatric help, compared to perhaps 2½% of the same age-group in the general population.

Dr. Miller of London, who studied these matters, stresses the uncertainties, conflicts and anxieties of students as contributory causal factors. It is important in the context of examinations and

the value of degrees to stress that, at current market price, a Ph.D. has a capital value of £100,000. What this means in practice is that the difference between a lower second and an upper second in the British Universities' award system may mean a difference over average life-span of £40,000–£50-000. (It may be helpful in order to understand this to remember that in general a second class honours, grade 1, is the minimum base on which to proceed to a master's degree by research, and *a fortiori* therefore to doctoral work).

3. There is considerable evidence that the cultural saturation of the student's home environment plays a most important part in determining his academic achievement levels. Thus drop-out rate at primary or secondary school level correlates inversely with the educational attainment and aspiration levels of the parents. The lower the educational attainment and aspiration level of the parents, the higher the drop-out rate. If we combine this psychological fact with the cultural displacement and quantitative expansion, the following conclusion may be drawn:

Students of tertiary levels of education who in their home background have had no tradition of learning, no experience of beauty, no clear goals or academic levels of aspiration (and therefore neither self-critical feed-back nor critical feed-back from the environment), no understanding of adulthood nor consequential true evaluation of liberty, will inevitably find themselves in an ambivalent love-hate relationship in which, predictably because of the love-hate factor, the love-object must be destroyed.

Arising out of the last sentence, psychological aspects of student unrest can now be looked at at a deeper level. The beginnings of university in the Western Europe of our epoch were at Bologna and Padua. These were students' universities in which the students invited teachers to teach what they, the students, wanted. Later, as for instance at Paris, Oxford and Cambridge, instead of universities of students one finds the concept changing into a university of masters and students, later still into universities of fellows (*universitas sociorum*) until finally it becomes *universitas studiorum,* e.g. Cologne, Ratisbon, etc.

Somewhere along the line, university becomes the 'tender mother', the *Alma Mater.* It is possible that she is now seen not as the tender mother, but as the over-protective, over-restrictive, over-demanding, rejecting and hostile mother. She precipitates guilt-feelings which can only be avoided by either rigid conformity or anti-social behaviour. The validity of this dynamic image is borne out by clear observation. The hostility of students is often met by unreasoning hostility on the part of the authorities. This clash

itself precipitates high levels of anxiety. A group of students experiencing simultaneously hostility and anxiety will seek a way of expressing their feelings. Instead of seeing student behaviour in the following logical sequence: perceived purpose—elected means—behavioural implementation—assembly to carry through the programme of behavioural implementation, one should read it instead in the following logic: intolerable anxiety and hostility levels—group formation—conceptualization of unrest—symbolization in a concrete grievance—throughout this process projections (e.g. stereotypes on to authority figures) and internalizations (of sanctions) leading to a re-activation of unresolved oedipal problems followed by joint aggressive behaviour. This is particularly clear in the parricide demands for the overthrow of the president (cf. Dr. Adams, LSE).

It should not be thought that an attempt to indicate some psychological aspects of student unrest is an adequate explanation of the whole phenomenon. On the contrary, it is only an attempt to account for the residual dimensions of the problem when political, social, economic and academic factors have already been taken into account.

The task before us is:

1. to identify genuine and remediable grievances,
2. to identify the students who are concerned with real problems, and their solution,
3. to identify the emotional factors motivating this group, and distinguish them from the emotions of the camp-followers,
4. to identify the motivations of both groups,
5. to identify the goals of both groups.

This done, it becomes possible to maximise communication between the administration, the teaching body, and the students, in a productive way. Merely to maximise communication without these preliminaries often leads to simple capitulation of the administration and teachers to force. This, I think, is the difference between the concepts of student unrest and student power.

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THE CIRCLE AND ITS TANGENT

by R. H. LEE

Almost every critic or reviewer who has written on Tom Stoppard's *Rosencrantz and Guildenstern are Dead*[1] has paid tribute to the dramatist's "brilliant idea" in linking his play about two supporting actors with the play in which they act their parts. But once they have shown that they understand that a "brilliant" and even audacious idea is involved, they stop without doing justice either to the full brilliance of the idea, or to the detail in which it is worked out. In this article I want, first, to explain what I think the idea is, and how the structure and intention of the play should be seen; and, secondly, to analyse some parts of the play to show that the dramatist embodies this idea in the substance as well as the structure of the play.

When Rosencrantz and Guildenstern first meet the Player on the way to Elsinore, this exchange takes place:

Rosencrantz: What is your line?
Player: Tragedy, sir. Deaths and disclosures, universal and particular, denouements both unexpected and inexorable, transvestite melodrama on all levels including the suggestive. We transport you into a world of intrigue and illusion . . . clowns, if you like, murderers—we can do you ghosts and battles, on the skirmish level, heroes, villains, tormented lovers—set pieces in the poetic vein; we can do you rapiers or rape or both, by all means, faithless wives and ravished virgins—flagrante delicto at a price, but that comes under realism for which there are special terms. Getting warm, am I?[2]

It has already been established that one of the primary verbal modes of the play is punning, and so we are not surprised to find that "line" can mean "special interest or concern" or "the long narrow mark linking two or more points". The Player thus performs tragedies as his special interest or concern, and his specialisation as a form of drama is also described as a line.

Tragedy as a literary form *is* predominantly linear, and this fact suggests to me that a helpful way of looking at the structure of the play is to see it as a circle with a tangent to it. The circle is the world of Rosencrantz and Guildenstern as people, and the tangent is the world of *Hamlet,* and Hamlet, play and character. The tangent touches the circle in the lives of Rosencrantz and Guildenstern, at the very point where we see them as *people* (expressed, in dramatic terms, by their being characters in *Rosencrantz and Guildenstern are Dead*) and at the same time as characters in *Hamlet*. Their confusion arises from the intermittent and, to them, inexplicable movements from one kind of world to another.

The diagram of the circle and its tangent is helpful also in suggesting the nature of the two worlds touching each other. We have already discussed the pun on the 'line' of tragedy linking *Hamlet* with the tangent. In the action and image of spinning coins, and in the plain allusions to *Waiting for Godot,* we see the nature of the other world—the circular, repetitive experience of Beckettian comedy. In his play, Stoppard provides us with the point of contact of seventeenth and twentieth century views of the world, as these are crystallised in the drama of each century. Let us look at each separately.

The understanding of and response to tragedy as a literary form depends upon the acceptance of the idea of causality: that certain events will have have certain consequences which, in turn, become the causes of certain events which have their own consequences. One could go further and say that belief in tragedy also involves acceptance of the belief that the whole linked chain of events has a purpose, and is therefore theoretically explicable by someone in possession of all the necessary information. The two central elements of tragedy are indicated in the terms "inevitability" and "understanding"; or to quote Northrop Frye:

> . . . . . tragedy shows itself to be primarily a vision of the supremacy of the event or 'mythos'. The response to tragedy is 'this must be', or, perhaps more accurately, 'this *does* happen': the event is primary, the explanation of it, secondary and variable.[3]

In our own lives, the possibility of seeing clearly the full course of the linked chain of events, and understanding its inevitable end, is limited. It is limited by our individual participation in the event which colours our view of them, and by physical death, which cuts off our participation in the sequence at the moment it reaches its conclusion, and the moment *before* we can understand it. The

fact and prospect of death also complicates and confuses our necessary emotional acceptance that this *is* where the whole tragic sequence is leading. We are thus in our own lives partially unable and partially unwilling to contemplate the straight line of tragedy to death.

And therein lies the great satisfaction and arguable moral value of dramatic tragedy. The tragic play compels us to see a tragic sequence, and, because we are not involved in it, and because the dramatist can give us all the information for understanding, we cannot flinch from the inevitable end—death. This is what Aristotle means in his theory of the cathartic value of tragedy—it enables us to contemplate through art a vision of life too horrifying to contemplate at first hand. In fact, artistic death is the only death most of us *can* contemplate—as the Player argues to Rosencrantz and Guildenstern, when they object that stage deaths are unbelievable:

> *Guildenstern:* Actors! The mechanics of cheap melodrama! That isn't *death*! You scream and choke and sink to your knees, but it doesn't bring death home to anyone—it doesn't catch them unawares and start the whisper in their skulls that says—"One day you are going to die". You die so many times; how can you expect them to believe in your death!
>
> *Player:* On the contrary, it's the only kind they do believe. They're conditioned to it. I had an actor once who was condemned to hang for stealing a sheep—or a lamb, I forget which—so I got permission to have him hanged in the middle of a play—had to change the plot a bit but I thought it would be effective, you know—and you wouldn't believe it, he just *wasn't* convincing! It was impossible to suspend one's disbelief—and what with the audience jeering and throwing peanuts, the whole thing was a *disaster*!—he did nothing but cry all the time—right out of character—just stood there and cried . . . Never again . . . Audiences know what to expect, and that is all that they are prepared to believe in.[4]

A tragic drama, then, focusses our attention on and, as Aristotle's theory suggests, helps us to come to terms with what is assumed by the dramatist to be the situation in real life. Whether this theory actually describes the effect, desired and actual, of tragedy is hotly disputed, and modern critics tend not to accept these wide

claims. Frye, for instance, narrows them considerably, but still indicates belief in the "line" of tragedy when he writes:

> The machinery of fate (in tragedy) is administered by a set of remote invisible gods, whose freedom and pleasure are ironic because they exclude man, and who intervene in human affairs chiefly to safeguard their own prerogatives. They demand sacrifices, punish presumption, and enforce obedience to natural and moral law as an end in itself. Here we are not trying to describe, for instance, the gods in Greek tragedy: we are trying to isolate the sense of human remoteness and futility in relation to the divine order which is only one element among others in most tragic visions of life, though an essential one in all.[5]

Stoppard's "brilliant idea" consists essentially in using the actual tragic play *Hamlet* (to which we already attach feelings of "human remoteness and futility") as an image of "the machinery of fate" in the lives of Rosencrantz and Guildenstern themselves. A tragedy becomes the vehicle for a sense of tragedy in another play. Rosencrantz and Guildenstern are caught up in it "without possibility of reprieve or hope of explanation". (Act III)

The Player and the tragedians (we notice that though they are usually called the Players, Stoppard chooses to focus upon their playing of tragedy alone) are given many opportunities of describing this view of life. The central example, perhaps, is this:

Player: There's a design at work in all art—surely you know that? Events must play themselves out to aesthetic, moral and logical conclusion.

Guildenstern: And what's that, in this case?

Player: It never varies—we aim at the point where everyone who is marked for death dies.

Guildenstern: Marked?

Player: Between "just deserts" and "tragic irony" we are given quite a lot of scope for our particular talent. Generally speaking, things have gone about as far as they can possibly go when things have got about as bad as they reasonably get. (He switches on a smile.)

Guildenstern: Who decides?

Player (switching off his smile): Decides? It is *written. (He turns away.* GUIL. *grabs him and spins him back violently.) (Unflustered)* Now if you're going to be subtle, we'll miss

each other in the dark. I'm referring to oral tradition. So to speak.
(GUIL. *releases him.*)
We're tragedians, you see. We follow directions—there is no *choice* involved. The bad end unhappily, the good unluckily. That is what tragedy means.
(*Calling.*)
Positions!
(*The* TRAGEDIANS *have taken up positions for the continuation of the mime: which in this case means a love scene, sexual and passionate, between the* QUEEN *and the* POISONER/KING.)

Player: Go![6]

Death is the goal of the design of all tragic art, and the actor can manoeuvre only in the determining of the kind of death, and the moral attitude to death. Once we have established those, we can begin. Wittily, as he explains this theory, the tragedians take their places *and begin.* This is the world into which Rosencrantz and Guildenstern are dragged initially by the messenger, uncomprehending of its causes or consequences, barely understanding the minute parts they have to play, and thus carried along to their deaths. There is a small growth of self-awareness, expressed in their attitude to being on the boat in Act III. Though they disbelieve in their destination, they do realise that they are being carried somewhere:

Guildenstern: Where we went wrong was getting on a boat. We can move, of course, change direction, rattle about, but our movement is contained within a larger one that carries us along as inexorably as the wind and current . . .

Rosencrantz: They had it in for us, didn't they? Right from the beginning. Who'd have thought that we were so important?

Guildenstern: But why? Was it all for this? Who are we that so much should converge on our little deaths? (*In anguish to the* PLAYERS.) Who are *we*?[7]

They do develop slightly, moving away from the world they begin in, into the Hamlet world. Their original world is caught at once for us, in the play, in the action and image of spinning coins, and especially in the remarkable run of heads with which the play has opened. Around this phenomenon, which the simpler and more satisfied Rosencrantz finds simply "luck", Guildenstern nervously erects certain pertinent philosophical dilemmas. For our purpose,

the most important is that it suggests a world in which all causality is absent, and presents us with the notion that the sequence of eighty-five heads is both amazing and expected:

> *Guildenstern:* It must be indicative of something, besides the redistribution of wealth. (*He muses.*) List of possible explanations. One: I'm willing it. Inside where nothing shows, I am the essence of a man spinning double-headed coins, and betting against himself in private atonement for an unremembered past. (*He spins a coin at* ROS.)
>
> *Rosencrantz:* Heads.
>
> *Guildenstern:* Two: time has stopped dead, and the single experience of one coin being spun once has been repeated ninety times . . . (*He flips a coin, looks at it, tosses it to* ROS.) On the whole, doubtful. Three: divine intervention that is to say, a good turn from above concerning him, cf. children of Israel, or retribution from above concerning me, cf. Lot's wife. Four: a spectacular vindication of the principle that each individual coin spun individually (*he spins one*) is as likely to come down heads as tails and therefore should cause no surprise each individual time it does.[8]

The final explanation is statistically accurate, and presents us with a world of total unreliability—an amazing combination of phenomena simply cannot be made to yield either a sequence or a precedent. The eighty-sixth spin is totally undetermined by the previous eighty-five. Facts remain isolated, refuse to form chains, and explanations remain forever "possible", the nature of circumstances determining the run being beyond our comprehension.

Guildenstern himself specifically draws the comparison between the two kinds of world:

> *Guildenstern:* The equanimity of your average tosser of coins depends upon a low, or rather a tendency, or let us say a probability, or at any rate a mathematically calculable chance, which ensures that he will not upset himself by losing too much nor upset his opponent by winning too often. This made for a kind of harmony and a kind of confidence. It related the fortuitous and the ordained into a reassuring union which we recognized as nature. The sun came up about as often as it went down, in the long run, and a coin showed heads about as often as it showed tails. Then a messenger arrived. We had been sent for. Nothing else happened. Ninety-two coins spun

> consecutively have come down ninety-two consecutive times . . . and for the last three minutes on the wind of a windless day I have heard the sound of drums and flute. . . . .[9]

The messenger summons them from the endless cycle of fortuitous, repetitive facts, to a world which proceeds in an ordained linear, sequential manner to a pre-determined goal. The use of *Waiting* for Godot is balanced by the use of *Hamlet,* and in the play the seventeenth century world view (focussed in its drama) touches the absurd universe (focussed in *its* drama). The Rosencrantz and Guildenstern exits from *Hamlet* become "entrances somewhere else", "which is a kind of integrity"; but I think Stoppard goes beyond this, to suggest that there is no end to the futile round of the absurd universe, unless we seize again on tragedy. Guildenstern says in the play: "We need Hamlet for our release",[10] and we feel that Stoppard is obliquely telling us that modern drama needs some infusion of the attitudes behind *Hamlet* for its release from being forever waiting for Godot.

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DÜRER AND LEONARDO: A COMPARATIVE STUDY

by D. VAN MAELSAEKE

Every age must explain the enigma of Leonardo da Vinci's universal genius in the light of its own contradictions. Leonardo is the intriguing kaleidoscope of Western civilization varying for every age which holds it to the light.

In spite of the critical approach to Leonardo's artistic and scientific activities in our century by scholars as eminent as Croce, Garin and Chastel, we still remain fascinated by the strange paradoxes of a genius who managed to reconcile such contradictory worlds as beauty and truth. We feel irresistibly attracted to an artist who with the same aloofness drew the head of Christ[1] and that of Caesar Borgia[2] and who on account of his insight into the organic unity of the universe, was able to transform John the Baptist[3] into a vine-crowned Dionysos[4] as the personification of the perpetual metamorphosis of everything in the cosmos. We cannot but pause with scrutinizing astonishment before the man who saw the very contradictions of human existence summed up in the enigma of the Eternal Feminine: from the horror of Medusa's snake-enwoven head[5] to the strange mixture of motherly tenderness and smiling superiority of mind of his Madonnas, and from the sensuality of the Leda as the symbol of fertility beside her swan-like lover[6] to the sphinx-like charm of the Mona Lisa[7]. The neither rejecting nor inviting smile of the Mona Lisa is indeed characteristic of the impassivity with which Leonardo saw both a creative and destructive force at work in a universe governed by Necessity.

Living in an age in which an alarmingly unlimited belief in progress is accompanied by a not less alarming return to a new barbarism under the guise of civilization, we are more than ever intrigued by Leonardo, whose belief in the infinite possibilities of man as the transformer of the world is counterbalanced by his still stronger belief in human impotence and the certainty of human defeat in the struggle against the inexorable elements of nature.

Leonardo's influence in Germany may be traced back as far as Albert Dürer's life-time (1471–1528). Indeed Dürer's nudes and physiognomical studies as well as his portraits and studies of animals and plants reveal a Leonardesque interest in the diversity

of natural phenomena while his engravings, woodcuts and drawings were the channels through which motifs of the Italian Renaissance, including those of Leonardo's work, spread all over Europe. Moreover, Dürer was the first theorist of Renaissance art outside Italy; he did for the northern Renaissance what Alberti and Leonardo did for Italy; he assimilated the leading ideas of Renaissance aesthetics to a genuine northern sensibility in his unfinished treatise on painting ('Die Speis des Malerknaben'), his treatise on the art of measurement ('Unterweisung der Messung') and last but not least his treatise on human proportions ('Proportionslehre'). The German Romanticists Tieck and Wackenroder must be held responsible for the distortion of Dürer's personality as that of the meek and pious artist who never forgot 'that an artist is nothing but a workman of God'.[8]

Dürer is the first artist outside Italy who deliberately exchanged a medieval humility for a deeply humanistic self-reliance. Dürer is not by chance the artist to whom we owe the first independent self-portrait in the history of Western art. Indeed, the portrait Dürer drew of himself as a boy at the age of thirteen (Albertina, Vienna) already betrays in the wide eyes full of passionate and touching inquiry that rare degree of self-confidence that will enable the artist to evolve a better understanding of the world through self-knowledge. Dürer's second self-portrait (1493), now in the Louvre, represents the artist in the dainty dress of a well-bred youth who holds in his hands a thistle as the symbol of good luck in love. The crimson cap with short, narrow strings, the embroidered shirt and the blue-grey cloak with yellow laces set off the almost feminine grace of the face, the features of which express something of the happy fatalism that Dürer summarizes in the inscription of the picture: 'My affairs go as decreed above' ('Myn Sach dy gat als es oben stat').

A deliberately virile self-consciousness is the undertone of the magnificent self-portrait (1498) now in the Prado museum. Dürer represents himself in the guise of the typical Renaissance 'gentiluomo', sumptuously dressed in a modish white and black costume hemmed with gold. The self-assured young artist stands in front of an open window through which an Alpine landscape is seen as a direct reference to Dürer's first trip to Italy (1494–95). This self-portrait is characteristic of the young Dürer who had freed himself of the austere moral conventions of the North through the full enjoyment of life in Mediterranean regions where he had become extremely sensitive to the seductions of pagan beauty. It stands for the self-reliance of the young artist who had already painted some very evocative Alpine landscapes in watercolour and

gouache, while his engravings and woodcuts ('Apocalypse') were spreading his fame from Germany to Italy, France and Russia. The Prado self-portrait is, as Panofsky puts it, a challenge: it claims for the painter in particular and the artist in general the status of the 'liberal man' which had been granted in Renaissance Italy but which was still a wish-dream in the North. Finally the Prado self-portrait announces the artist of the second trip to Venice (1505–7) whose pictures like the 'Feast of the Rose Garlands' (Narodni Gallery, Prague) and the 'Virgin with the Siskin' (German Museum, Berlin) were unanimously admired for their monumentality of composition or their refinement of colour by personalities so various as the Venetian Doge Loredano, the Patriarch Antonio Suriano and Giovanni Bellini, the leader of the Venetian school.

For Dürer, as for Goethe, the trip to Italy was mainly a self-discovery; it enabled him to reconcile in a well-balanced personality a genuine Northern sensibility with a classical striving for perfection and absolute beauty. However, during his stay in art-loving circles in Italy Dürer, like Goethe, became deeply aware of the discrepancy between the free development of the artistic personality in the South and the philistine hatred of originality in a still strongly medievalized North: 'How shall I long for the sun in the cold; here I am a gentleman, at home I am a parasite' (Wie wird mich nach der Sonnen frieren; hier bin ich ein gentiluomo, daheim bin ich ein Schmarotzer')[9].

Dürer's sense of the triumph and tragedy of artistic originality deepened his self-consciousness that culminates in the serenity of the Munich self-portrait (Alte Pinakothek, Munich). It represents Dürer as a mature, bearded man with long hair falling to the shoulders. The impressiveness of this portrait mainly depends on an explicitly Leonardesque treatment of chiaroscuro. The figure of the artist emerges from the high forehead over the sensuous lips to the hand resting on the fur collar of the dark coat.

We cannot agree with Panofsky that Dürer deliberately styled himself into the likeness of the Saviour and that this portrait must be interpreted in the light of mystical identification of the artist with God. From Dürer's letters and diaries we may infer that Dürer was neither pious nor humble enough to justify an interpretation of his artistic conceptions in the framework of the 'Imitatio Christi'. As a true Renaissance man, Dürer indulged in a worldliness and a craving for fame never to be satisfied. In his letter to Willibald Pirkheimer written during his second stay in Venice, he proudly expatiates on his success in Venetian circles: 'There are so many nice fellows among the Italians who seek my company

more and more every day—so that it warm's one's heart—wise scholars, good lute-players, pipers, connoisseurs of painting, and many noble minds, true models of virtue, and they show me much honour and friendship.'[10] Dürer's outlook on the world is as paradoxical as Leonardo's and in the same letter the admiration of his work by the most prominent Venetians is counterbalanced by the superiority of mind with which he notes the interdependence of greatness and envy: 'There are also amongst them some of the most false, lying thievish rascals, the like of which I should not have believed lived on earth. If one did not know them, one would think them the nicest men the earth could show. For my part, I cannot help laughing at them whenever they talk to me. They know that their knavery is no secret but they do not care. . . . Many of them are my enemies and they copy my work in the churches and wherever they find it; and then they revile it and say that was not in the antique manner and therefore no good.'[11]

Finally Dürer stresses the fact that Giovanni Bellini, the head of the Venetian school and the master of world-famous painters like Giorgione and Titian, highly appreciated his work: 'Giovanni Bellini has highly praised me before many nobles. He wanted to have something of mine, and he himself came to me and asked me to paint him something . . . he is very old, but still the best in painting.'[12]

The Munich self-portrait, which is almost certainly wrongly dated (1500) since it represents a much older man than the Prado self-portrait of 1498, may well, as Wölfflin asserts, have been painted during or shortly after Dürer's second stay in Venice. It shows us Dürer so engrossed in his dignity as an artist that it irresistibly calls to our mind Leonardo da Vinci's praise of the painter as the true 'uomo universale' who wants to be at once a creator, a scientific observer and a contemplative thinker.

Indeed Dürer shares Leonardo's belief in the divine character of the painter's creative mind. Like Leonardo, he likens the creative idea in the artist's mind to the pattern in God's mind when he created the world. He attributes to the painter 'a creating power like God's ('ein Schaffen gleichförmig dem eines Gottes'): 'For a good painter is inwardly full of images, and were it possible for him to live for ever he would always have from his inward ideas something new to pour forth by the work of his hand.' ('Denn ein guter Maler ist inwendig voller Figuren und wenn es möglich wäre, das er ewiglich lebte, so hätte er aus den inneren Ideen allzeit etwas Neues durch die Werke auszugiessen.')[13]

Dürer's oil paintings and watercolours, his engravings and woodcuts as well as the baffling number of his drawings illustrate the

similarity of his approach to art to that of Leonardo, who in his *Trattato della Pittura* does justice to the artist as the master of both reality and imagination:

> 'If the painter wishes to see beauties which will make him fall in love with them, he is a lord capable of creating them, and if he wishes to see monstrous things that frighten, or those that are grotesque and laughable, or those that arouse real compassion, he is their Lord and their creator. If he wishes valleys, he makes them also; if he wishes from the high crests of mountains to disclose a great countryside and if, after that, he wishes to see the horizon of the sea, he is their lord, and so, too, if he wishes to see high mountains from deep valleys or from high mountains to see low valleys and sea-shores. Indeed, whatever exists in the universe through essence, presence, or imagination, he has it first in his mind and then in his hands. . . .'
> (. . . . 'in effetto ciò ch'è nell'universo per essenzia, presenzia o imaginazione, esso lo ha prima nella mente, e poi nelle mani.')[14]

However, whatever the artist invents through the creative originality of his mind must, as Leonardo puts it, have an exact foundation and justification in nature: 'Although human subtlety makes a variety of inventions answering by different means to the same end, it will never devise an invention more beautiful, more simple and more direct than does nature, because in her inventions nothing is lacking, and nothing is superfluous . . .' ('Ancorachè lo ingenio umano faccia inventioni varie, rispondendo con vari strumenti a un medesimo fine, mai esso troverà inventione più bella, nè più facile nè più brieve della natura, perchè nelle sue inventioni nulla manca e nulla è superfluo.')[15]

Dürer agrees with Leonardo that nature and art are not necessarily contradictory worlds and that art in which nature no longer holds sway as a free creative force ceases to be art.

Dürer shares Leonardo do Vinci's belief in nature as the exemplary artist who creates according to unalterable organic laws and he sees the main proof of an artist's genius in the ability to mould rules of art after the laws underlying the growth and decline of all organisms in nature. Art is enigmatically hidden in nature and only the artist who has a keen eye is able to select an immense treasure of beauty and truth in the inexhaustible diversity of natural phenomena: 'Depart not from nature according to your fancy, imagining to find aught better by yourself; else you would be led

astray. For verily art is embedded in nature; he who can extract it, has it.' ('Geh nicht von der Natur ab in deinem Gutdünken, dass du wolltest meinen, das Bessere aus dir selbst zu finden, denn du würdest verführt. Denn wahrhaftig steckt die Kunst in der Natur. Wer sie heraus kann reissen, der hat sie.')[16]

Dürer's nudes and other human studies as well as his studies of animals, plants and trees clearly illustrate the affinity of his artistic conceptions with those of Leonardo, who in his *Trattato della Pittura* deliberately emphasizes that the artist's creative inventiveness combined with the scientific observation of natural phenomena transforms the painter's mind into 'a second nature': 'Necessity compels the mind of the painter to transform itself into the very mind of nature, to become an interpreter between nature and art.' (Necessità costringe la mente del pittore a trasmutarsi nella propria mente di natura, e a farsi interprete infra essa natura e l'arte.')[17] The interpretation of nature by the artist as a mediator between the worlds of beauty and truth is a characteristic of the development of painting from Giotto to Cézanne as the alienation from nature characterizes modern art since Picasso.

Dürer shares Leonardo's belief in the organic evolution of European art: 'For the arts decline easily and they are reborn with much labour and after a long time'. ('Denn gar leichtiglich verlieren sich die Künste, aber schwerlich und durch lange Zeit werden sie wieder erfunden.')[18] Dürer recognizes that European art rose to a first highpoint in Ancient Greece and Rome and he agrees with both Alberti and Leonardo that art declined with the fall of the Roman Empire and that the decay became still greater during the ages of barbarism; on the other hand he praises the revival of art through a new return to nature during the Italian Renaissance ('Wiedererwachsung'). Like Leonardo, Dürer believes the rise and decline of painting to depend upon a belief in nature as the only authoritative teacher. Indeed, Leonardo's enthusiastic faith in nature makes him even disapprove of those who want to imitate the Ancients who were themselves 'disciples of nature': 'Since natural things exist in such great abundance, we wish and we ought to resort to nature rather than to those masters who have learned from her.' ('. . . essendo le cose naturali in tanta larga abbondanza, piu tosto si deve ricorrere ad essa natura che ai maestri che da quella hanno imparato.')[19] According to Leonardo the art of painting continually declines and deteriorates when artists neglect the 'interpretation' of nature in favour of the imitation of work already done.

Leonardo praises Giotto (1266–1337) because he deliberately broke away from the rigid conventionality of conservative Gothic

and Byzantine artists in order to return to nature as the only authoritative teacher:

> 'After these came Giotto, the Florentine, who—not content with imitating the works of Cimabue, his master—being born in the mountains and in a solitude inhabited by goats and such beasts, and being guided by nature to his art, began by drawing on the rocks the movements of the goats of which he was the keeper. And thus he began to draw all the animals which were to be found in the country, and in such wise that after much study he excelled not only all the masters of his time but all those of many bygone ages.'[20]

Indeed, Giotto whose frescoes Leonardo must have admired in the Bardi and Peruzzi chapels (Santa Croce) in Florence, humanized art in much the same way as Francis of Assisi humanized religion by his reaction against the rigour of dogmatic Christianity. After Giotto art, as Leonardo remarks, declined again and although Giotto's pupils, the so-called Giotteschi—Daddi, Giottino, Taddeo Gaddi and Maso di Banco, were not lacking in technical ability and charm, they mostly only imitated what Giotto had realized through his audacity to master a new grasp of the visual world.

Whereas Giotto represents in Leonardo's survey of the organic development of painting in Italy the first stage of the rediscovery of nature in the Renaissance, Masaccio (1401–28) stands for the second triumph of naturalism, comparable only with Brunelleschi's achievements in architecture and Donatello's mastery of sculpture. Leonardo undoubtedly studied Masaccio's frescoes in the Brancacci Chapel of Santa Maria del Carbine in Florence. He must have admired the way in which Masaccio had reconciled creative imagination and spatial realism in the light of the discovery of mathematical perspective by Brunelleschi.

Masaccio's frescoes which served as a real school of art, are indeed remarkable for their splendid treatment of the nude, their realistic representation of the relationship between the physical world and the world of human emotions, and their dramatic narrative power. Leonardo could not but discover his immediate predecessor in an artist like Masaccio, who in a limited period of artistic creativity 'showed by the perfection of his work how those who took as their standard anything other than nature, the supreme guide of all masters, were wearying themselves in vain.' ('mostrò con opera perfetta come quegli che pigliavano per altore altro che la natura, maestra dei maestri, s'affaticavano in vano.')[21]

Leonardo himself achieved what Giotto and Masaccio had begun. In our age of photography we are perhaps not strongly

enough impressed by Vasari's description of Leonardo's enigmatic 'Mona Lisa' (Louvre, Paris) as a supreme example of how art can 'imitate' nature: 'The eyes possess that moist lustre which is constantly seen in life . . . To look closely at her throat you might imagine that the pulse was beating. Indeed, we may say that this was painted in a manner to cause the boldest artists to despair.'[22]

Dürer himself had no creative predecessors like Giotto and Masaccio. However, soon after his apprenticeship in Wolgemut's studio he could make himself familiar with the revival of German painting through a return to nature in the works of artists like Pleydenwurff, Schongauer, Herlin and, last but not least, Conrad Witz.

Pleydenwurff was the major Nurnberg painter before Wolgemut and Dürer, who had introduced the realism of Flemish painters as Van der Weyden and Bouts into German art, while Dürer could find his immediate predecessor in Conrad Witz, the greatest Swiss painter before Holbein, whose major works he may have seen in Basle during his German tour. Dürer must have admired the naturalistic exactness with which Witz integrated landscape into the variety of events in the human world, so that the landscape in the background of Witz' only signed and dated work, 'Christ walking on the Water' (Geneva), could be recognized as an almost photographic view of the shore of the Lake of Geneva.

Dürer himself achieved what Pleydenwurff, Herlin, Schongauer and Witz had begun. His versatility as an artist was duly recognized by his great contemporary, the humanist Erasmus, in his dialogue 'De recta Latini Graecique sermonis pronuntiatione':

> 'Light, shade, splendour, eminences, depressions; and, though derived from the position of one single thing, more than one aspect offers itself to the eye of the beholder. He observes accurately proportions and harmonies. Nay, he even depicts that which cannot be depicted: fire, rays of light, thunder, lightning, the spots on a wall, all the sensations and emotions in fine, the whole mind of man as it reflects itself in the behaviour of the body, and almost the voice itself.'[23]

Dürer agrees with Leonardo that the supremacy of painting among the other arts is founded upon the fact that the painter, more than any other artist, serves the eye as the most accurate, the most reliable and the noblest of the human senses: 'The sight is the noblest sense of man. A thing you behold is easier of belief than that you hear.' ('Das Auge ist der alleredelste Sinn

des Menschen. Ein jegliches Ding das du siehst, is dir glaublicher denn das was du hörst.')[24]

According to Leonardo, the nobility of the sense of sight is three times greater than that of the other three senses since he thinks it preferable to lose the senses of hearing, smell and touch rather than the sense of sight. Like Plato, Leonardo praises the eye as the mediator between the visible and the intelligible world and consequently as the master of both art and science: 'Now do you not see that the eye embraces the beauty of the whole world? It has given birth to architecture, and to perspective, and to the divine art of painting'.[25]

Dürer was the first artist outside Italy who recognized that artistic creativity is not a mere mechanical process and that art without theoretical foundations (Kunst) is only a mixture of imagination (Gewalt) and blindly accepted practice (Brauch). Dürer's scorn for those who ignore the scientific foundation of painting on mathematical perspective and on all-embracing study of nature echoes in an unambiguous way Leonardo's precept that artistic practice ought always to be built on sound theory. Leonardo indeed compares the artists who rely upon mere practice and who neglect the study of nature to 'pilots who board a ship without rudder or compass and who are never certain where they are going.' ('. . . nocchieri ch'entra in navilio sanza timone o bussola, che mai ha certezza dove si vada.')[26]

Leonardo is the supreme example of an artist to whom perfect beauty and perfect truth are one: 'Great love is born of great knowledge of the thing that is loved, and if you do not know it, you can love it little or not at all.' ('Il grande amore nasce dalla gran cognizione della cosa che si ama, e se tu non la conoscerai, poco o nulla la potrai amare.')[27] Dürer does not equal Leonardo in the universality of his scientific interests but like Leonardo he indulges in a search for knowledge never to be satisfied: 'Nature has implanted in us the desire of knowing all things, thereby to discern the truth of all things.' ('Es ist uns von Natur eingegossen, dass wir gern viel wüssten dadurch zu bekennen eine rechte Wahrheit aller Ding.')[28]

From Dürer's own drawings we can infer that before 1505 he had gained access to copies of Leonardo's drawings through intermediaries, Giacobbe de Barbari and Lorenzo di Credi. However, direct contact with Alberti's and Leonardo da Vinci's aesthetic and scientific theories was one of the main experiments of Dürer's second trip to Venice in 1505–06. We know from Dürer's own testimony that this trip to Italy included an extremely important excursion to Bologna, where he must have had direct instructions

about Alberti's and Leonardo da Vinci's artistic precepts from Luca Pacioli, the famous mathematician whose work on the 'Golden Section' ('De Divina Proportione') was illustrated by Leonardo himself.

Soon after his return from Italy to Nürnberg Dürer set up a plan for a didactic treatise on painting 'Die Speis des Malerknaben'. From Dürer's notes we can infer that he intended to discuss the problems that had mainly occupied Leonardo in his *Trattato della Pittura.* Besides educational, artistic and moral precepts Dürer wanted mainly to deal with the study of human proportions, the proportions of the horse and the proportions in architecture. The treatise would, however, also have included a theory of perspective as well as a study of colours. 'Die Speis des Malerknaben' remained a fragment since Dürer from 1513 till his death mainly concentrated his attention on his famous 'Proportionslehre'. This treatise was only to be published together with a Latin translation by Camerarius after Dürer's death and was to lay the foundations of scientific anthropometry through French, Italian, Spanish, English and Dutch translations.[29]

Dürer's outlook on art is primarily, though not exclusively anthropocentric. Like Leonardo, Dürer took a special delight in depicting the variety of human types representing the different classes of society. His drawings not only deal with the love and courtship of the higher classes for he drew soldiers and riders with the same skill as peasants, musicians, dancers and fools. Like his Italian contemporaries, he was interested in the physical characteristics and customs of all human races, as may be inferred from his drawings of Orientals, Indians, Gypsies and Negroes (Dürer's magnificent silverpoint drawing of the negress Catherine, now in the Uffizi, Florence).

Dürer's nudes are characteristic of a Renaissance outlook on the world, according to which the physically perfect man represents the measure of all beauty: 'Above all it is agreeable to see a beautiful human figure' ('Vor allen Dingen is es lieblich zu sehen ein schönes menschliches Bild.')[30] Dürer was the first northern artist who expressed his sensitiveness to the pagan seductions of Renaissance Italy in an impressive series of nudes. His taste for the sensual treatment of the nude must have defied the puritanical moral conventions of his fellow-citizens. His nudes no longer represent abject sinners characteristic of a typical medieval outlook on life as shown in the works of Flemish painters—Van Eyck, Van der Goes, Van der Weyden and Bouts. The sturdy nudes brimming with exuberant sensuality, as Dürer drew them for his engraving 'The Four Sorceresses' (Staatliche Museen, Berlin), are a northern

counterpart of a classical group of 'Three Graces', remodelled after the realistic nudes of the 'Women's Bath' (Kunsthalle, Bremen). Another engraving known as 'The Doctor's Dream' shows us the caricature of the scholar who forgets to live and who in his dream is tempted by the sensuality of a young Venus of splendid proportions. Finally the engraving known as the 'Sea-monster' (Albertina, Vienna), which according to Bartsch represents the rape of Mamyone by Triton, shows us a seductive young woman displaying her beauty in a pose 'all'antica'.

Dürer alternately uses mythological, historical and biblical settings as safeguards for his nudes. He not only copies mythological engravings by Mantegna ('The Battle of the Seagods' and 'Bacchanal with Silenus'); he also restudies Mantegnesque figures in the light of his personal observations; the young woman represented in the less famous engraving known as 'The Small Fortune' illustrates the way in which Dürer remodelled a muse of Mantegna's 'Parnassus' after a Nürnberg model. Dürer recurs to a subject from Roman history in order to illustrate his studies of the male and female body in movement, as may be inferred from his pendrawing known as 'The Rape of the Sabine Women', a copy by Dürer of a lost drawing of Pollaiuolo. Finally the biblical theme of the 'Fall of Man' (Albertina, Vienna) serves Dürer as a welcome pretext for achieving for the Renaissance in northern European countries what Masaccio realized in his 'Adam and Eve' in the Brancacci Chapel in Florence: the glorification of the nude by a demonstration of the nobility of the physically perfect male and female body. Dürer's studies of the nude go hand in hand with his studies of human proportions. Besides Leonardo da Vinci, no artist has devoted so much energy to the study of the proportions of the human body as Dürer.

After the Venetian painter and engraver Giacobbe de Barbari showed Dürer a male and female nude constructed by geometrical methods during his first stay at Venice (1494–95), Dürer set out on a lifelong search for the secret of beauty in human proportions. From Dürer's own testimony we know that after his first trip to Italy he started studying Vitruvius, who in his treatise on art summarized the results of the search for significant mathematical relationships between the parts of the human body in a classical canon that had already been accepted by Polyclitus. Indeed, before his second trip to Italy Dürer's studies of human proportions were mainly based on accepted classical models as the 'Apollo of Belvedere' and the 'Medici Venus', which Dürer had got to know through Italian intermediaries like Mantegna and Ghirlandajo. Dürer's many pendrawings of 'Apollos' and 'Adams' as well as of

'Venuses' and 'Eves' culminate in the famous engraving of the 'Fall of Man'; they account for the fact that originally Dürer was looking for absolute beauty as it had already manifested itself in the ideal proportions of classical Greek sculpture: 'I would regard him as the greatest master who could show me how to make the most beautiful figure.' ('Welcher mir mit Wahrheit kann anzeigen, wie das hübscheste Bild zu machen sei, den will ich für den grössten Meister halten.')[31]

During his second trip to Italy (1505–07), which led to a direct contact with Leonardo's philosophy of art, Dürer soon gave up his belief in absolute beauty. As a result of his providential encounter with Leonardo's studies of human proportions Dürer no longer tried to fix one single canon of beauty to apply to all human figures. He agrees with Leonardo that absolute beauty is not to be found in the human world. We do not even know what beauty is. Beauty is hidden in the immense variety of human figures. Beauty is so abundantly, though enigmatically, spread over the whole of mankind that even the best artist is hardly able to grasp it: 'Although we cannot regard any human being as absolutely beautiful, we find in living creatures such an abundance of beauty that none of us can recreate it in his work.' ('Obgleich wohl wir nicht sagen können von der grössten Schönheit einer leiblichen Kreatur, so finden wir doch in den sichtbaren Kreaturen eine solch übermässige Schönheit unserm Verstand also dass solche unser keiner kann vollkommen in sein Werk bringen.')[32]

Dürer agrees with Leonardo that the artist should not try to embellish nature by idealizing the proportions of the human body. Dürer's splendid preparatory drawings of the male and female nude for the Prado 'Adam and Eve' sufficiently illustrate the way in which under Leonardo's influence the geometrical schematization of the human body gave way to scientific anthropometry. Dürer's splendid nudes show how the contact with Leonardo's studies of human proportions strengthened Dürer's innate sense of the organic structure of the human body. Like Leonardo, Dürer had indeed a keen eye for the rhythm of the whole body with various parts contributing to the general movement although he was honest enough to recognize that for the scientific aspects of anatomical studies he had to rely upon the findings of Italian predecessors and contemporaries like Pollaiuolo and Leonardo.

Dürer's study of the variety of human features also reveals in an unambiguous way a close affinity with that of Leonardo, which covers the whole range of appearance from romantic beauty to faces bestialized by vice and disease. Neither Leonardo nor Dürer were exclusively interested in the beautiful and they agree that

the ugly, the phantastic and the monstrous also have a legitimate place in art. Beauty and ugliness are equally worthy of artistic interpretation and Leonardo stresses the fact that beauty and ugliness become more effective through one another as it is the extremities of all things which impart to them grace or lack of grace ('le bellezze con le bruttezze paiono più potenti l'una per l'altra'). In their physiognomical studies the similarity of Leonardo's and Dürer's paradoxical approach to reality becomes once more obvious. Beauty and ugliness in the human world correspond to the rise and decline of all things in nature. Like Leonardo, Dürer knew man to be a variable of fearsome instability. With a strange impassivity Dürer notes physical tokens of decay as the effect of the relentless approach of death upon the human frame. Dürer's allegorical picture of 'Avarice' (Albertina, Vienna) representing an ugly old woman irresistibly calls to our mind Helen of Troy's complaint before her mirror when she saw the wrinkles which old age had made in her face and addressed Time as the envious destroyer of all beauty: 'O Time, thou that consumest all things! O envious age, thou destroyest all things and devour all things with the hard teeth of the years, little by little in slow death!'[33] Both Leonardo's and Dürer's caricatures and grotesques not only express the artist's love of eccentricities; they are necessarily complementary to his untiring search for beauty.

Dürer's interest in abnormal human features can possibly be traced back to his first stay in Venice (1494–95) when probably through Barbari's role as an artistic mediator he became acquainted with copies of Leonardo's caricatures and grotesques. During his second stay in Venice (1505–07) Dürer made this contrast between beauty and ugliness the main theme of his well-known 'Opus quinque dierum' (Thyssen Collection, Lugano) representing Christ among the doctors in the temple. Dürer's picture certainly depends on a lost cartoon by Leonardo which, according to a special demand by Isabella d'Este, had to represent Christ at the age of twelve debating in the temple. The isolated figure of the young Christ as the embodiment of beauty among the Pharisees who are represented as ghastly old men, corresponds to the contrast between attractive youth and repulsive old age which is one of the favourite themes of Leonardo's profiles and grotesques. However, the representation of repulsive old age is counterbalanced by that of the dignity of old age in Leonardo's drawing of an old man (Windsor Castle) and in Dürer's magnificent life study for the Lisbon St. Jerome. Dürer's affinity with Leonardo is also evident in his magnificent portraits. Dürer shares Leonardo's preference for a realistic interpretation of man: 'The more closely your work abides

by life in its form, so much the better will it appear.' ('Ich halt dafür, je genauer und gleicher ein Bild dem Menschen ähnlich gemacht würde, je besser dasselbe Werk sei.')[34]

Dürer agrees with Leonardo that true beauty can only be synonymous with the individual and the characteristic. In his portraits he repeatedly emphasizes vitality more than grace and by doing so proves that he prefers to depict strongly marked lineaments indicating vigour and originality rather than ideal beauty. Dürer knew what 'decoro' was, that appropriateness which Leonardo believed to be the final test of the painter's ability to represent the close correspondence beween facial expression and the character of the sitter. Dürer painted many portraits. Besides his self-portraits, that enable us to follow his inner development as a man and as an artist, he immortalized the likenesses of his father, his mother, his wife and his teacher Wolgemut. There is a Leonardesque grace in his portrait of a young and charming 'Venetian Woman' (Kunsthistorisches Museum, Vienna) and an impressive picturesque simpliciy in his 'Portrait of a German Woman from Venice' (Dahlem Museum, Berlin). A strange mixture of aristocratic dignity and a cautious sensibility characterizes Dürer's superb portrait of 'Jacob Fugger the Rich' (Alte Pinakothek, Munich), while we cannot but praise the powerful vitality of his portraits of 'Oswolt Krell') (Alte Pinakothek, Munich) and the sturdy Nurnberger 'Jerome Holzschuher' (Dahlem Museum, Berlin). Dürer transfers a Leonardesque insight into the psychology of a Macchiavellian prince to his portrait of 'Maximilian of Austria' (Kunsthistorisches Museum, Vienna) while he immortalizes his sympathy with contemporary Humanism in his engraved portraits of Pirckheimer, C. Celtes and Melanchthon.

Dürer's approach to art is, however, far from being only anthropocentric. Like Leonardo, Dürer knew a lasting enthusiasm for the world of animals, as may be inferred from his large-scale watercolours of the giant seacrab, the lobster, the young hare and the little owl. (Albertina, Vienna.) Dürer shares Leonardo's artistic and scientific interest in the study of the proportions of the horse. Leonardo's studies of the ideal proportions of the horse, which are praised by his contemporaries Lomazzo and Vasari, are immortalized in the magnificent silverpoint drawings and other preparatory sketches for the famous Sforza monument in Milan. Dürer must have had access to these drawings as early as 1503 as may be inferred from his drawing known as the 'Small Horse'. This drawing of a majestically pacing horse, the Leonardesque character of which can hardly be denied, was followed by his remarkable studies in equine proportions (now respectively in

Venice and Cologne) and was to anticipate the magnificent representation of the horse in Dürer's world-famous engraving 'Knight, Death and Devil' (Staatliche Museen, Berlin). Not only Wölfflin but also Panofsky stresses the fact that Dürer in this engraving rivals the plastic and rhythmical beauty of Leonardo's artistic conception of the horse for the Sforza monument. The knight himself, however, seems to refer to Dürer's familiarity with Verrocchio's rider of the Colleoni statue in Venice. Dürer's interest in the animal kingdom is as paradoxical as his view of the human world. Indeed, beauty and ugliness in the human world are counterbalanced by beauty and ugliness in the world of animals. The boar-headed monster in the engraving 'Knight, Death and Devil' shows that like Leonardo Dürer knew 'how to make an imaginary animal appear natural'.[35]

Dürer's versatility as a pictorial artist does not limit itself to the artistic representation of man and the world of animals. There is something of Leonardo's delicacy of perception and accuracy of observation in Dürer's studies of trees, plants and flowers. Dürer beheld with a clear-sighted affection and an almost Leonardesque understanding of the vegetable world an individual tree as well as a small tuft of grass. Dürer's well-known watercolours representing a bunch of violets, a peony or a columbine are as exquisitely and lavishly drawn as Leonardo's Star of Bethlehem, his anemones and irises. Moreover, Dürer knew how to integrate a landscape into the variety of human events. Dürer achieved what Conrad Witz had begun in the representation of naturalistic landscapes. He freed mountains, valleys, woods and seas from the rigidity of conventions which had characterized the artificial scenic landscapes of the Romanesque artists. The landscape-backgrounds of the 'Apocalypse' (British Museum, London) are indeed far from the visionary landscapes of Dürer's congenial contemporary Grünewald and still farther away from the romantic dream-world peopled with dread mythical beings, of painters like Altdorfer, Huber and Baldung Grien.

Like Leonardo, Dürer invested his landscapes with a new vitalizing force. His earlier landscapes like the 'Alpine Landscape', the 'Pass in the Alps', the 'Dosso di Trento' and the 'House on an Island in the Pond' already express the artist's pleasure of the world seen in the light of a mood. They combine a plastic delineation of form with a typical Venetian thrill of colours. Dürer's later landscape-backgrounds of mountains, valleys and seas as we know them from his 'Adoration of the Magi' (Uffizi, Florence) and the 'Madonna with the Iris' (National Gallery, London) reflect their inspiration by a Leonardesque feeling of unity within the cosmos.

Dürer's visualisation of landscape is as paradoxical as his representation of man and the animals. The polarity of beauty and ugliness in the human world and the world of animals is counterbalanced by the dialectical interdependence of the creative and destructive forces of nature in landscape. In the 'Apocalypse' landscapes of a smiling serenity alternate with eruptive volcanoes, terrific showers of fire and surging waves. Like Leonardo, Dürer knew the organic interdependence of creation and destruction in the cosmos. However, its speaks for the strange discrepancy in Dürer's personality that in spite of his assimilation of the pagan spirit of Ancient Greece and Renaissance Italy, religious fervour finally got the upper hand over artistic independence. Due to his conversion from a humanistic view of life to an unambiguous Lutheran belief the artistic preoccupation with beauty became restrained by an almost Neo-Gothic search for divine Truth.

Dürer did not go as far as Leonardo, whose insight into human impotence and insignificance got gradually the upper hand of a humanistic belief in man as the measure of all things. It is noteworthy that the fundamental difference between Leonardo's and Dürer's development is nowhere better illustrated than in their visualisation of the Deluge. Both Leonardo and Dürer were influenced by apocalyptic writings and prophecies foretelling the destruction of the world by a new Deluge. Dürer made his magnificent drawing of the 'Deluge' (Albertina, Vienna) at a time when the Peasants' War overpowered Germany like a flood that in the eyes of pious people seemed to sweep away all the wicked follies of mankind. Dürer shared the general panic that affected all classes of society. His extraordinarily beautiful drawing of the flood is a pictorial sketch of an apocalyptic vision that haunted him like a nightmare. The drawing is accompanied by a text in which Dürer describes the vision:

> 'In the year 1525 on the night between the Wednesday and Thursday after Whitsun I dreamed that I saw four great columns of water descending from heaven. The first fell most furiously, with a dreadful noise, about four miles away from me, and flooded all the countryside. I was so terrified by it that I woke. Then the others fell. They were very great. Sometimes they fell far off, sometimes near. And they descended from such a height that they seemed to fall slowly. The falls were accompanied by so much wind and flying spray that when I awakened my whole body still shook with fear. It was long before I regained my equanimity. On rising in the morning I painted what I had seen. May God mend all.'[36]

We cannot but admire the simplicity with which Dürer in this drawing managed to visualise a natural catastrophe. We see an apocalyptic landscape over which columns of water descend from the sky like pillars. Man and all other living beings have been swept away by the remorseless malignity of the water. However, the text accompanying the drawing reveals Dürer's fear for his own safety and his pious belief in the fact that God may mend all.

A comparison with Leonardo's famous drawings of the 'Deluge', now in Windsor Castle, illustrates the sharp contrast between Dürer's and Leonardo's development as artists. Leonardo used the myth of the end of the world through a deluge only as a welcome motif for the illustration of his cosmic insight into the interdependence of creation and destruction in the universe. Unlike Dürer, Leonardo glories in the triumph of natural forces over human impotence. The prognostication of a new Deluge corresponds to his profound belief that the destructive elements of nature could at any moment annihilate the arrogant human beings, who dare to maintain that man is the mode and measure of all things. Leonardo's drawings of the 'Deluge' are also accompanied by a marginal text in which he dwells with a morbid pleasure on every detail of a cataclysmic destruction:

> 'Darkness, wind, tempest at sea, deluge of water, woods on fire, rain, thunderbolts from the sky, earthquakes and destruction of mountains, levelling of cities.
> Whirlwinds which carry water and branches of trees and man through the air.
> Branches torn away by the wind crashing together at the meetings of the winds, with people on top of them.
> Trees broken off, laden with people.
> Ships broken in pieces dashed upon the rocks.
> Hail, thunderbolts, whirlwinds.'[37]

No traces of fear are to be found in Leonardo's description of the 'Deluge'. We are struck by the strange impassivity with which Leonardo witnesses the interdependence of creation and destruction in a cosmos governed by divine Necessity. Dürer would certainly have shrunk back before the audacity of Leonardo, who like Goethe looked with dispassionate eyes into the abyss of continuous change and who found in the correlation of evolution and dissolution the final reconciliation of beauty and truth.

> 'O marvellous Necessity, thou with supreme reason constrainest all effects to be the direct result of their causes, and by a

supreme and irrevocable law every natural action obeys thee by the shortest possible process.'
('O mirabile necessità, tu con somma ragione constrigni tutti li effetti a participare delle for cause, e con somma e inrevocabile legge ogni azione naturale colla brevissima operazione a te obbedisce.')[38]

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THE END OF THE GRANITESIDE SITE MUSEUM

by L. D. S. GLASS

There are probably many readers of this Journal who, during the last ten years, will have visited the Graniteside Site Museum. This unique archaeological display was situated some four miles south of the centre of Salisbury. The principal attraction was the actual excavation of a medieval burial ground, along with a cast of one of the skeletons in its burial position, and, to broaden the picture, related items of anthropological and archaeological interest.

First discovered in 1958 by the activity of a bulldozer, the driver of which had the wit to tell the National Museum of the pots scooped up, the area was duly excavated. As this proceeded, it was decided to leave the grave goods 'in situ' and to erect a building over a selected area. Thus came into existence one of the most interesting museum displays one could imagine: here one could walk around the six pits, divided by the unexcavated balks, and look down upon the graves, with their pottery and stone cairns, very much as they were placed some 700 years ago.

But, alas, Graniteside, as the years passed, fell within the Light Industry Area of the city, and it had to give way to 'progress'. Not that this was inevitable; one has a niggling suspicion that, had the people of Rhodesia shown more interest, neither the museum nor the civic authorities would have agreed to its destruction. However, during 1969 something of an emergency operation took place. Graniteside Site Museum had to go as soon as possible. Mrs. E. Goodall, of the National Museum, was in charge of the obsequies with the assistance of the museum staff and, occasionally, escorted parties of school children thoroughly enjoying the holiday lark.

When the burial ground was first discovered late in the 1950s it was the hope of incurable romanticists that the graves would assist in the solution of the Zimbabwe 'mystery'. These people, still mentally in the era of the Victorian antiquarians who interested themselves in Rhodesian ruins, continue to invoke King Solomon, the Queen of Sheba, Sabaeans, Phoenicians and what have you. One such was Colonel H. L. Boultbee, who was, at the time of the discovery, Curator of the Queen Victoria Museum in Salisbury. Writing in 1960[1] he stated that the graveyard at Graniteside represented burials far removed from African methods of burial. The

occupants of the graves would have been 'brown-skinned and intelligent' and of the same race that built at Zimbabwe, Inyanga and Mapungubwe ages ago. The earliest building at Zimbabwe, he believed, dated from about 950 B.C. when King Solomon's great fleet sailed south, manned by Phoenician sailors. For 2,000 years after that time the inhabitants prospered through the sale of gold and possibly interbred with the Mediterranean traders. Then, at the end of the eleventh century, came Negroid invaders from the north; the carnage was great at the hand of these 'savages' and Zimbabwe, *et al,* ceased to exist.

This, of course, is a fairy tale. We have known since 1905 and been convinced since 1929 that Zimbabwe was of medieval origin and built by the ancestors of the present Rhodesian Africans. It is, in fact, extremely unlikely that there was any stone building at Zimbabwe before 1200 A.D.[2] The people living at Graniteside at that time certainly did not build in stone, and if they had any contact with Zimbabwe it would, presumably, have been for the purpose of trade. The truth about Graniteside, as well as Zimbabwe and elsewhere, is less exotic than Boultbee and others would have it; but not the less exciting. To most of us the knowledge that the Southern African ruins were the work of the indigenes of the continent is a source of pride.

What, then, are the facts that we can glean from Graniteside? To anthropologists in Southern Africa the discovery of a graveyard is usually a matter of importance. This is because we do not know very much about the Iron Age peoples who lived here. Archaeology and oral tradition, quite securely now, give the endless stone structures to people of Bantu origin. But were sites such as Graniteside, devoid of stone building, occupied by Bantu or by the people variously called Bush-Boskopoid, Khoisan or Hottentot? Thus there is always the chance that the discovery of skeletal remains in a burial ground might assist in answering the all-important question—Who?

At Graniteside a great many graves were found, sometimes as many as four or five being located in a twelve-foot square. In depth the burials ranged from four feet to a maximum of seven feet.[3] These were shaft graves; the shape of the vertical shaft was usually oval and, frequently, the wall of the shaft could be seen by a change in the soil texture or by a difference in the colour of the soil. The floors of three graves I probed could easily be detected when the softer grave earth was scraped away and the hard, undisturbed granitic earth reached: they were convex, oval in shape, and about 3ft. 10ins. long and 1ft. 10ins. wide.

The body was placed in a contracted or foetal position, lying

on its side with the knees drawn up to the chin and the hands near to the face. There appeared to be no specific orientation of the body, nor was there a general rule as to which side it was lying on. Quite likely, the body was bound into the crouched position, so that it could then fit comfortably into a grave of the size just described. It seemed to me that economy of labour was called for, and the grave dug just large enough to accommodate a body so bound. The pyramidal nature of the pots in most graves would indicate that they could be stacked in that position only because the narrowness of the graves allowed this to be done without their falling over.

However, not all the graves were of this size and shape. Mrs. Goodall reported that some graves started as a rough oval with a diameter of about three feet, but widened at the bottom where the body was placed to about five feet. In some cases the shape at the bottom was a rough square with rounded edges.[3]

The grave goods were pots and these in large numbers. Simple graves had five or six pots, but the more amply provided had up to twenty-two placed around and above the body. And it is possible that one or two bowls may have been placed within reach of the hands. The pottery may be classed as Harari ware; the few pots and bowls found belonging to other cultures may merely be intrusions due to trade or inter-marriage.

In some cases a single pot in an inverted position was found near the top of the filled-in grave shaft. This may have been a visible indication of the presence of the grave.[3] A grave that I excavated in one of the balks had such an inverted pot: its rim lay eighteen inches below the surface and after a further thirteen inches the uppermost of the grave pots came into view.[4]

Some graves had an arrangement of heavy granite stones above the pots. When the surrounding soil was excavated this gave the impression of a cairn-like structure. Such heavy stones may have been placed as markers, as protection against animal scavengers, or to guard against the feared return of the spirits of the departed.[3]

Other finds in the graves were iron bangles and imported beads. At Graniteside one could usually be sure of finding a bangle beneath the array of pots—and if one, two. These bangles, either from the arms or the ankles of the body, were all that remained to show where the body had lain before it was leached away by the acid soil. In one grave a cluster of iron bangles was found, lying as they had been on the arm at the time of burial. As for the beads, fair quantities of small glass beads were found, most of them being green in colour; other colours were yellow, black, red and blue. In shape they were small oblates or cylindrical cane

beads. Sometimes wound beads were found, the size of large peas, green in colour and similar to beads found at Zimbabwe.[3] Often beads were found at the bottom of the grave, indicating bead-ware as bodily ornament; sometimes beads were found in the soil above and around the pots, showing that bead-ware had been placed with the grave goods. The quantity of beads found was never sufficient to suggest that bead mats had been used as covers for the pots. However, some form of cover may have been used: in some cases potsherds were found near whole pots and in two cases thin slabs of granite. These may have been used as lids.

In 1959 charcoal found in the graves was submitted to C14 testing. Yale University dated one sample as BP 670 ± 100; Groningen University, Holland, dated another at BP 800 ± 60.[3] Thus the graveyard could have been in use between 1099 and 1389 A.D.

One of the interesting features of the graveyard was the large termite hill lying to the south. Visitors to the Site Museum could hardly fail to notice this partially excavated mound close to the entrance. Local natives report that burial near and around ant-heaps was a common practice until recent years.

This termite heap revealed the skeletal remains of nine individuals, preserved, apparently, by the alkalinity produced by the prolonged activity of the termites. Of these, three were in fairly good condition, the rest poorly preserved.[3]

The remains were examined by Dr. R. Trevor-Jones, who showed that they, along with other skeletal remains found near Salisbury, were of 'a hybrid race with Bush-Boskop or Hottentot characteristics predominating'.[5] Frequently it has been found that skeletal remains from the high central plateau of Southern Africa are Bush-Boskopoid. A. Galloway studied skeletons from Mapungubwe and Bambandyanalo and pronounced them to be of non-Negroid Bush-Boskopoid type. And the cemetery at Graniteside compared closely with the general aspects of the type of burial at Mapungubwe and more particularly at Bambandyanalo.[3] The Ziwa people at Inyanga between 300 and 1000 A.D. were Bush-Boskopoid.[6] Robinson and Summers excavated burials at Leopard's Kopje sites near Bulawayo and found the remains to have 'Bush' features.[7]

Thus we see that skeletal remains from Salisbury, the Limpopo, Inyanga and Matabeleland are all of this non-Negroid type. This resulted in something of an anthropological puzzle, as in all cases the culture represented seemed to be Bantu (Negroid), yet the remains Hottentot. G. A. Garner insisted that the culture was Hottentot. He believed, with Galloway, that the Bambandyanalo

skeletons were those of a pre-Negro indigenous type, with which the Bantu-speaking Negro people never hybridized. 'To argue', he said, 'that although the skeletal material was Hottentot the culture was Bantu, is to disregard completely the combined evidence, both cultural and physical.'[8] He was convinced that the Bambandyanalo people had a primitive form of civilization which was purely Hottentot.

However, R. Mason rejects this, showing that there is negligible resemblance between the Mapungubwe culture and that of the Hottentots.[9] The more popular theory today is that the culture was a Bantu one, imposed on the pliant Hottentot by the forceful immigrants from the north. If one is to accept this argument one must believe that it is unlikely that there was much immigration of Bantu people south of the Zambezi before the end of the eleventh century A.D. From that time they started to arrive, though the indigenous Hottentot population was destined to remain in the majority for a few centuries. They accepted the Bantu, lived in peace with them, hybridized with them and embraced their culture. The few skeletal remains found are thus what one might expect to find, those of the people in the majority, not necessarily those of the predominating class. By the fourteenth century those Hottentots not absorbed, seeking survival, moved south towards the Cape.

There is yet another argument. One may say that the Bantu culture spread more rapidly than the Bantu themselves, and that the Hottentots assimilated it even before its originators arrived on the scene.[10] This is an attractive theory, especially in view of the fact that skeletal material from the Limpopo to Inyanga has proved to be Hottentot. It is attractive, too, because we know how cultures and ideas tend to diffuse, despite distance and apparent lack of contact. It may well be that Bantu ideas and Hottentot ideas so spread and intermingled up to the eleventh century and even later that it will be impossible to find a clear dividing line. The contracted burials we have been discussing may have been common to both Bantu and Hottentots. They have been found as far north as Northern Tanganyika.[11] They were carried out at Isamu Pati in the Southern Province of Zambia, and it appears that 'there are Negroid elements' in the skeletons recovered here.[12]

And so, alas, Graniteside did not, after all, solve the 'mystery' of Zimbabwe, nor that of the Zimbabwe satellites such as Dhlo-Dhlo, Khama and Nalateli. Nor was it likely to. Zimbabwe, as the centre of the great Rozwi Confederacy, never flourished before 1450, while the others date from the 1700s. By the former date there were probably hardly any pure Hottentots north, even, of the Vaal river. The land was free for the ever-growing Bantu

population; and when and if skeletal remains are found at Zimbabwe (a much needed discovery) they will, doubtless, prove to be Negroid.

Graniteside was just one of the burial sites found on the Rhodesian plateau from the Limpopo to the north-east. Like the others, the occupants were Bush-Boskopoid. They lived, clearly, in large numbers in the area, and their culture was influenced by Bantu ideas, if not by Bantu immigrants. They traded with the coast, or at any rate had trade contacts. They may have had links with pre-Bantu people at Inyanga, Zimbabwe and Bambandyanalo. They had a sound knowledge of pottery and were acquainted with the use of iron. They practised a type of burial common among the various peoples of Africa. And that is about all we can say of Graniteside.

Graniteside has served its purpose in providing another piece in the jig-saw puzzle of the Southern African Iron Age. The ten-year-old museum, once fondly looked upon as permanent, is now no more. By mid-May, 1969, the six neat pits, with their dividing balks, the pot burials and the cairns, were reduced to mounds of sand. The grave goods to be preserved were being packed away, to end up in Rhodesian museums; the rest were to be re-interred in the earth from which the quest for knowledge had so rudely wrenched them.

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THE VOICE OF THE BARD IN BLAKE'S SONGS OF EXPERIENCE

by. T. OLIVIER

In spite of the postal-chess pace at which it has been conducted, the argument concerning Blake's *My Pretty Rose-tree* has been a most stimulating exercise. One perspective provided by the temporal vista consequent upon this pace, is that of emphasis; and it seems that the checks and counterchecks of the discussion have not been so expressive of threat or attack as of exchange—each player losing some pieces while capturing others. Thus Professor Durrant, while lauding Miss Paterson's 'appeal for a less cerebral approach to poetry',[1] finds it necessary to gently endorse the ironic quality recognised by both Mr. Pechey and Mr. Thompson: 'But imaginative delight need not exclude irony . . .'[2] Perhaps it should be noticed that Miss Paterson's comment need not totally exclude irony: '. . . the two readings of this Song of Experience . . . assert a tortuous irony in a poem where I find *for the most part* deep compassion.'[3] Our response depends, surely, on where we lay the stress in our reading of this—or any—poem? '. . . Criticism ought to involve a response of the whole person—of senses, feelings, experience, as well as of the brain.'[4] Miss Paterson has evidently responded most strongly to Blake's 'sympathy for the predicament'[5] of the dramatic speaker, whereas Mr. Pechey finds his emphasis in the irony that punishes the speaker 'by the very code he sought refuge in'; in the irony that 'makes Blake's point—that conventional morality is both wicked and absurd, a tragic distorter of individual lives'.[6] Both readers have nevertheless responded with compassion.

But I do not wish to enter into the dispute so delicately resolved by Professor Durrant. My immediate concern is the bearing this compassionate response has on our reading of this and other Songs of Experience. We are surely all involved in the state of Experience—Blake's speaker certainly is—and if so, compassion, a suffering with, is the only response that will give meaning to the irony of the situation. And surely Blake's purpose in the *Songs of Experience* (the very title is ambiguous, a strongly ironic quality in the word 'songs' co-existing with the suggestion of a passionate appeal that these songs be made truly comparable with the lyrical songs of Innocence) is both to reveal the benighted state of man *and* to speak to him in that state—to emancipate[7] him?

Hear the voice of the Bard! . . .

Calling the lapsèd soul.

In *My Pretty Rose-tree* both the speaker and the Rose suffer, for both are baffled by the self-imposed limitation of man's experimental state; in this state they are bound to act as their natures dictate. The speaker does what he believes is both expected and right. For his nature it *is* right, although 'inevitable' is perhaps a better term—and we understand his bewilderment at the Rose-tree's thorny reaction. In terms of Professor Durrant's interpretation of the poem, this means that the free choice that binds the speaker to 'what he already has, and limits (him) to what he already is', is the frustrated gesture of one held in thrall by 'Starry Jealousy'. His 'capacity for taking delight . . . in Nature'[8] is strangled.

Can delight
Chained in night,
The virgins of youth and morning bear?

His very *capacity* for taking delight is restricted, his eyes dimmed by the night of Experience. Man has forged his own manacles, but that does not make them any easier to bear or to escape from. Being of his own making they are, in fact, the limit of his vision —so much a part of him that he can't see them as manacles. This is why he needs to listen to the voice of the Bard. Following the promptings of his own sense of what is right, the speaker in *My Pretty Rose-tree* has fallen on the thorns of his Rose-tree, whose vision is as dim as his own, and whose thorns are turned blindly out in self-defence. She *is* the circumscribed capacity for delight,[9] but by token of the personification that gives her the power to act, she has the power to judge, to choose; and hers is likewise a limited, benighted response, quite consistent with her nature. Ultimately, it is our compassion for each of the thus trapped beings of the poem that gives direction to our response. If the poem ends in a kind of 'comedy of the grotesque', if this is 'the kind of comic absurdity the Fool tries time and again to make the King realize',[10] then our response must be appropriately parallel, and we must weep tears of frustrated anger and incipient joy. It is a compassionate response because we too are trapped; our tears of frustrated anger are for the tragic situation we recognise, those of joy are for the Bardic revelation, that brings whatever modicum of hope is commensurate with our ability to respond to his voice.

If we turn to *A Poison Tree*, we find a similar condition, requiring a similar response if anything more is to be felt or gained than the exercise of a mere poetic justice. The nearness of thought in this poem to that in *My Pretty Rose-tree* is perhaps more immediately evident in the title Blake gave to the first draft of the poem: *Christian Forbearance*. The self-denying restraint implied in this suggests quite clearly the poem's kinship with that world of fetters and manacles that baffles the speaker in *My Pretty Rose-tree*.

> I was angry with my friend:
> I told my wrath, my wrath did end.
> I was angry with my foe:
> I told it not, my wrath did grow.

This is distinctly epigrammatic, and the simple moral which it contains should not be obscured by any 'intellectualising'; yet Blake chose to develop the thought into a more complex poem, and the guilt of the second couplet is deceptive. The speaker appears to be looking back at his fault from a state of Innocence. But to do this properly, and with the finality of an epigram, the couplets would need to be reversed—perhaps thus:

> I was angry with my foe:
> I told it not, my wrath did grow.
> I was angry with my friend:
> I told my wrath, my wrath did end.

In this form, of course, it is trite—as the moralising pose which it suggests is too easy and naive. The speaker's guilt is real enough and he thinks he recognises it; or perhaps he does recognise it. But he is unable to take the emancipating step from recognition to exorcism. The guilt he knows is paraded, from the ominous generative implications of 'grow', through the description of his perverted, loving cultivation of the tree:

> And I watered it in fears,
> Night and morning with my tears;
> And I sunnèd it with smiles,
> And with soft deceitful wiles.

—to the Satanic suggestion of

> Till it bore an apple bright.

The glitter of that last word confirms the treacherous aim of 'soft deceitful wiles'; the speaker is indeed playing a Satanic role,

luring his foe to the point of covetousness, making him share the guilt of the fall:

> And he knew that it was mine.

But it is a two-edged lure; we are invited to see the Satanic quality of the speaker and to believe in his repentance. This is aided by the fact that our attention is subtly drawn from the speaker's guilt to that of the foe, who is thus deftly endowed with evil motives of his own. The speaker's ruse succeeds, and we feel, at least in part, the justification of the final couplet:

> In the morning glad I see
> My foe outstretched beneath the tree.

But the horror of this scene helps us further to recognise the false coin of his repentance. The threefold emphasis on 'foe' in the poem has its due effect on the rationalising mind; we recognise the folly of the situation. In Experience, an enemy must be destroyed, and by the most natural means since it is the right, the inevitable course; and surely the worst kind of enmity is that which pretends to be friendly? Betrayal, treachery, are *the* natural weapons of enmity. The natural and right course of friendship is simply to confess our anger when it arises. What has happened to the foe is partly retribution for his own guilt in accepting and harbouring—in conniving at—the enmity; the satisfied triumph the speaker expresses has some echo in our own response.

I said that the guilt acknowledged in the second couplet of the first stanza is deceptive; so too is the naivety of the speaker's gladness. The whole gives an appearance of shamefaced Experience confessing its fault, by which means to win our sympathy. As such, it appeals to the reader in a way recognisably similar to the appeal of the speaker in *My Pretty Rose-tree.* Again Blake's speaker addresses us in a tone that suggests he has done his duty, the difference being that here he shows off his guilt. The speaker in *My Pretty Rose-tree* paraded his innocence and expressed his bewildered pain; our present speaker parades his sin and expresses the perversity of his gladness at the foe's suffering. Yet our response to both poems includes a recognition of the speaker's wrong—felt in a smugness, a complacency which is out of keeping with the humility of true Innocence. The virtue of the first is as misguided as the vice of the second. If there is any humility in his voice it is that of *The Human Abstract*:

And mutual fear brings peace,
Till the selfish loves increase;
Then Cruelty knits a snare,
And spreads his baits with care.

He sits down with holy fears,
And waters the ground with his tears;
Then Humility takes its root
Underneath his foot.

But to take sides in the oppositions set up in these two poems is to become involved in the folly of 'Dark disputes and artful teasing'.

Folly is an endless maze,
Tangled roots perplex her ways.

However the speaker acts, he is entangled in the thorns of Experience and must be pricked if he grasps at them. As Professor Durrant points out, it is wrong to 'give too much weight to "vice and virtue" in Blake's poetic vision'.[11] For the 'vice' and 'virtue' of man, as seen in these poems, are ambiguous qualities whose meaning and value depend entirely on the environing state of man's soul. In the condition of Experience, they are bedevilled qualities, easily confused, shifting, treacherous; alike for the speaker, his opposed emanation, and us. To respond to the poetry in such a way that we avoid the embroilment of the speaker—or better, that we have the benefit of such embroilment—it is required that we compassionately accept his guilt, and recognise the treacherous nature of his self-deception. That, essentially, we see the speaker struggling with his apparently simple words, and respond to the voice of the Bard calling through them to us

Prisoned on the watery shore.

Mtunzini,
Natal.

REFERENCES

[1] Theoria 30, p. 1.
[2] Theoria 30, p. 4.
[3] Theoria 28, p. 65.
[4] Theoria 30, p. 1.
[5] Theoria 28, p. 65.
[6] Theoria 27, p. 59.
[7] If I may adopt the term from Mr. Pechey's perceptive commentary on *The Tyger,* Theoria 26.

[8] Theoria 30, p. 4.
[9] Cf. Theoria 30, p. 4.
[10] Theoria 27, p. 59.
[11] Theoria 30, p. 4.