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TABLE OF CONTENTS

| | <i>Page</i> |
|---|-------------|
| EDITORIAL COMMENT | |
| IMAGINATION AND LIFE— <i>The Daffodils</i> <i>G. H. Durrant</i> | 1 |
| SOME MEDIEVAL FRENCH ATTITUDES TO LOVE <i>P. Royle</i> | 10 |
| SOME NOTES ON THE COMIC SERIOUSNESS OF <i>Twelfth Night</i> <i>C. O. Gardner</i> | 24 |
| THE PROBLEM AND SIGNIFICANCE OF AGRIPPINA'S MURDER <i>S. J. Batomsky</i> | 32 |
| PARTY POLICIES IN CENTRAL AND EAST AFRICA <i>C. J. Juta</i> | 37 |
| 'MENTAL HEALTH' <i>B. Crowhurst Archer</i> | 43 |
| CORRESPONDENCE: <i>The English Examination Paper</i> <i>N. E. Nuttall</i> | 47 |
| THE PICTURE AS A SOURCE OF KNOWLEDGE <i>T. Cienski</i> | 48 |
| SOME MAXIMS FOR A MEGALOMANIAC <i>P. E. Matthews</i> | 63 |
| HORACE, <i>Odes</i> , I, 9: A TRANSLATION <i>B. H. Farrar</i> | 71 |
| THOUGHT <i>B. H. Farrar</i> | 72 |

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31 OCTOBER, 1962

EDITORIAL COMMENT

There is a considerable variety of subject-matter and styles in this number of *Theoria*, for articles poured in, together with a mere trickle—one letter—for the correspondence column. The movements of education departments are notoriously slow, but we hope that Mr Langman's challenge will shake out another trickle or two, until we have something more like a stream.

We particularly welcome an article on Wordsworth from Professor Durrant, now living in Canada; and we hope that he and other distinguished *émigrés* from our unhappy country will continue to cheer and enliven and fortify us by visiting, from time to time, the pages of *Theoria*.

THE EDITORS.

IMAGINATION AND LIFE—*THE* *DAFFODILS*

by G. H. DURRANT

FEW OF WORDSWORTH'S poems are so well known as 'I wandered lonely as a cloud'; it is included in many anthologies, and has been learned by heart by generations of school-children. It is difficult to take a fresh view of a poem whose cadences and phrases are almost as familiar as the Lord's Prayer. Yet for this very reason a close consideration of it may help towards a better understanding of Wordsworth's poetry, for it is the wide popularity and familiarity of such apparently innocent poems that lead the sophisticated to neglect Wordsworth, and to regard him as a poet for children or for a very special group of nature-lovers. If the poem records Wordsworth's love of flowers and the pleasure they gave him, and achieves nothing more, it may be dismissed as innocent, and child-like, but slightly ludicrous.

The objection which is often felt to this and similar poems was stated by Coleridge:

It is a well-known fact that bright colours in motion both make and leave the strongest impressions on the eye. Nothing is more likely too than that a vivid image or visual spectrum thus originated may become the link of association in recalling the feelings and images that had accompanied the original impression, but if we describe this in such lines as

They flash upon that inward eye
Which is the bliss of solitude !

in what words shall we describe the joy of retrospection when the images and virtues of a whole well-spent life pass before that conscience which is indeed the inward eye: which is indeed 'the bliss of solitude'? Assuredly we seem to sink most abruptly, not to say burlesquely and almost as in a medley, from this couplet to

And then my heart with pleasure fills,
And dances with the *daffodils*.¹

Coleridge's objection is, consciously or unconsciously, felt by many. If it is indeed the daffodils in themselves that awaken such an ecstasy the reader can only conclude that Wordsworth's experi-

ence was eccentric, and that to enter sympathetically into it involves, for most of us, some sacrifice of honesty and good sense.

The answer to Coleridge has been given, in general terms, by the philosopher Whitehead, who says of Wordsworth:

He always grasps the whole of nature as involved in the tonality of the particular instance. That is why he laughs with the daffodils, and finds in the primrose 'thoughts that do often lie too deep for tears'.²

The philosopher's hint has been insufficiently attended to; and no doubt it needs the confirmation of literary illustration. A closer look at the poem will help us to judge between Coleridge and Whitehead, for it will help us to decide whether, in this instance, the poetic interest is in the daffodils themselves, in the private life of the poet, or in what the poetry says about the world and about ourselves.

Wordsworth himself regarded this poem as a touchstone for the understanding of his work. In a letter to Lady Beaumont he remarks:

Having said so much upon a mere 14 lines, which Mrs Fermor did not approve, I cannot but add a word or two upon my satisfaction in finding that my mind has so much in common with hers, and that we participate so many of each other's pleasures. I collect this from her having singled out the two little Poems, the Daffodils, and the Rock crowned with snowdrops. I am sure that whoever is much pleased with either of these quiet and tender delineations must be fitted to walk through the recesses of my poetry with delight, and will there recognise, at every turn, something or other in which, and over which, it has that property and right which knowledge and love confer.³

That Wordsworth was not concerned with the poem as merely a tribute to the pleasure to be taken in flowers is made clear in a letter written a few months later to Francis Wragham:

You mention the Daffodils; you know Butler . . .; when I was in Town in Spring he happened to see the Volumes lying on Montague's mantelpiece and to glance his eye upon this very Poem of the Daffodils; 'aye', says he, 'a fine morsel this for the Reviewers.' When this was told me, for I was not present, I observed that there were two lines in that little poem which if thoroughly felt would annihilate nine tenths of the Reviews of the Kingdom, as they would find no Readers; the lines I alluded to, were those

They flash upon that inward eye,
Which is the bliss of Solitude.⁴

In 1807 Wordsworth included the poem in *Moods of my own Mind*, but two years later, in a letter to Coleridge written in May, 1809, he discusses his plan of classification, and suggests the inclusion of 'The Daffodils' amongst

poems relating to natural objects and their influence on the mind either as growing or in an advanced state, to begin with the simply human and conclude with the highly imaginative as the Tintern Abbey to be immediately preceded by the Cuckoo Poems, the Nutting, after having passed through all stages from objects as they affect the mere human being from properties with which they are endowed, and as they affect the mind by properties conferred; by the life found in them, or their life given.⁵

In 1815, Wordsworth placed the poem in *Poems of the Imagination*, and added the following note:

The subject of these Stanzas is rather an elementary feeling and simple impression (approaching to the nature of an ocular spectrum) upon the imaginative faculty, than an exertion of it. The one which follows is strictly a Reverie; and neither that, nor the next after it in succession, 'The Power of Music', would have been placed here except for the reason given in the foregoing note.⁶

The poem which immediately follows is 'The Reverie of Poor Susan', in which the song of the thrush prompts the imagination of Susan to a vision of her home in the country:

'Tis a note of enchantment; what ails her? She sees
A mountain ascending, a vision of trees;
Bright volumes of vapour through Lothbury glide,
And a river flows on through the vale of Cheapside.⁷

In 'Power of Music', a street musician momentarily transforms the lives of his listeners:

What an eager assembly! What an empire is this!
The weary have life, and the hungry have bliss;
The mourner is cheered, and the anxious have bliss;
And the guilt-burdened soul is no longer opprest.

As the Moon brightens round her the clouds of the night,
So He, where he stands, is a centre of light;
It gleams on the face, there, of dusky-browed Jack,
And the pale-visaged Baker's, with basket on back.⁸

It is interesting to note that in the last line of 'The Reverie of Poor Susan' Wordsworth says that 'the colours have all passed away from her eyes,' though the only colour involved in the vision is the 'green' of the pastures. But 'bright volumes of vapour' and 'the mist and the river' suggest radiance; and perhaps the 'colours' that have passed from Susan's eyes are the colours of the rainbow. If so, Wordsworth may, when he wrote the poem, have intended a reference to the prismatic effect of the mind. A similar notion may underlie the reference, in 'I wandered lonely as a cloud', to the daffodils as 'flashing' on the 'inward eye'. Brightness and radiance, in all the three poems in question, are the symbols of the bliss of vision. Even where the experience is musical, as in

'Power of Music', the musician is a 'centre of light' and 'gleams' on each face 'as the Moon brightens round her the clouds'.

What the three poems have in common, as suggested by Wordsworth's note, is that in each an apparently simple sensation or feeling has the power to irradiate the mind, either immediately or in memory, with a joyful and transforming light. Each shows the human mind acting, not as a mere mirror, reflecting impressions, but as a prism which breaks up the white light of an apparently simple impression into a spectrum which has both the vividness and the order of the rainbow. The imaginative faculty, when it performs this feat, is not being consciously exerted; it acts spontaneously, from its very nature, just as the prism cannot fail to create a rainbow from a beam of white light falling upon it in a favourable position. The imagination, in these poems, is shown in the act of creating from the white light of experience the 'ocular spectrum', the radiance and order which, when the daffodils 'flash upon (the) inward eye', flood the mind and cause the heart to 'dance'. The dance is the response of the heart to the ordered pattern created by the imagination, acting with spontaneous power when the conditions are appropriate and the necessary stimulus is provided.

The conditions described in the poem must now be more closely considered. The occasion which prompted the poem is described in Dorothy Wordsworth's *Journal*:

When we were in the woods beyond Gowbarrow Park we saw a few daffodils close to the water-side. We fancied that the lake had floated the seeds ashore, and that the little colony had so sprung up. But as we went along there were more and yet more; and at last, under the boughs of the trees, we saw that there was a long belt of them along the shore, about the breadth of a turn-pike road. I never saw daffodils so beautiful. They grew among the mossy stones about and about them; some rested their heads upon these stones, as on a pillow, for weariness; and the rest tossed and reeled and danced, and seemed as if they verily laughed with the wind, that blew upon them over the lake; they looked so gay, ever glancing, ever changing. There was here and there a little knot, and a few stragglers higher up; but they were so few as not to disturb the simplicity, unity, and life of that one busy highway.⁹

Dorothy's description is of course more than a merely factual account; it gives life to the scene by the use of metaphors of sleep, laughter, and dancing; and it gives some order and arrangement by treating the more isolated flowers as 'stragglers' from the main group. Dorothy notes 'the simplicity, unity and life of that one busy highway'.

We must suppose Dorothy's account to be truer to the immediate facts than Wordsworth's. She admits to having a companion, and she notes that some flowers have been blown down by the wind.

She also notes the 'stragglers'. These three points are all omitted from Wordsworth's account. The poet insists on his loneliness, ignores the stragglers, and suggests that all the flowers are joyfully dancing. We can decide whether this is sentimental falsification only if we consider what, in the poem itself, Wordsworth was essentially concerned with. It is clear from the start, however, that on this occasion there was no question of the 'laborious minuteness and fidelity in the representation of objects and their positions as they appeared to the poet himself', with which Coleridge tasked Wordsworth,¹⁰ nor of any 'biographical attention to probability'.¹¹ It seems that, whatever else the poem may offer, it cannot be accepted as biographically true, or even as a reliable account of the actual scene.

The first stanza, which introduces the daffodils, also introduces the poet, alone:

I wandered lonely as a cloud
That floats on high o'er vales and hills.

This, in its context, is more than an 'insertion of accidental circumstances'—to quote Coleridge's account of one of Wordsworth's characteristic defects.¹² The poet is 'lonely'; the daffodils are 'a crowd'. The poet 'wanders'; the daffodils are 'beside the lake, beneath the trees', and we know that daffodils grow in profusion only in favourable soil and light. They are not accidentally 'beside the lake, beneath the trees', as the narrator in the poem is accidentally there. The poet himself 'wanders' like a cloud which has no home, no destination, no clear shape. The suggestions of this stanza are closely linked with Wordsworth's view of man's identity, which is best realised through pious attachment to particular places and particular persons. The daffodils are triumphantly themselves, the product of their special place and time. It is the poignant sense of the difference between them and a human being, who is never quite at home in any place or at any time, that gives the poetic force to the stanza.

This suggestion of the daffodils as forming part of an order from which man is exiled is strengthened by what at first seems to be mere repetition:

When all at once I saw a crowd
A host of golden daffodils.

But the shift from 'crowd' to 'host' represents a movement of mind by which the daffodils are seen to be not merely a 'crowd' but a loose yet ordered array along the lake-side where they must grow. They are not an 'army'—for that would suggest the mechanical alignment of contemporary warfare; they are a 'host' like a Zulu impi or like the warrior angels in Milton, disciplined and ordered in spite of an appearance of looseness in their ranks.

A similar shift is seen in the last line of the stanza, where 'fluttering' is modified to 'dancing'. 'Fluttering' suggests aimless and undirected movement; it suggests also the individual life of

each flower, as though each was a creature like a butterfly. But 'dancing' corrects and amplifies this. Though each flower has its own life and movement, all are part of the dance, the pattern that responds to the breeze.

The essential poetic sense of the stanza, then, is the contrast between a human being, who feels himself rootless and aimless, and the paradisaical life of the flowers which are in joyful harmony with their environment, celebrating in their 'dance' the very life of the elements. The description of the daffodils as 'golden'—a word to which the context gives great force—crowns them with a brightness and glory fitting their status as symbols of a life undivided by self-consciousness from the outer world.

But there is yet another level of thought to be taken into account. Wordsworth tells us that the poem is about the 'imaginative faculty', and we are here shown that faculty at work. The poet 'wanders', is 'lonely', and is like a floating cloud. These are images of a drifting mind which has not yet been quickened to an imaginative response, and to that ordering of experience which the imagination achieves. So the daffodils, at first sight, are 'a crowd'. But the mind is already active, finding 'order and relation'; and 'crowd' is instantly superseded by 'host'—a word which substitutes the glory, brightness, and deliberate order of an army for the mere confusion of a crowd. A similar shift of the mind, leaping from mere association to imaginative awareness, may be seen in 'fluttering and dancing', where the mere fluttering is seen with a quick movement of mind to be part of an order, and to be a *dance*. Because in this poem Wordsworth takes as his starting-point a mood in which the imagination is quiescent, and shows it awakening, we are given not only an imaginative account of the daffodils, but also an account of the workings of the poet's mind. This account deals both with the imagination producing immediate joy, and with that 'spontaneous overflow of powerful feelings' which occurs when an emotion is 'recollected in tranquility', and a merely vacant or pensive mood is transformed into active perception and 'bliss'.

The daffodils are seen in the first stanza as the products of a particular soil in a particular place. In the second stanza the order and harmony of the lake-side are related to the greater order of the universe:

Continuous as the stars that shine
And twinkle on the milky way,
They stretched in never-ending line
Along the margin of a bay:
Ten thousand saw I at a glance,
Tossing their heads in sprightly dance.

The evocation of the stars in their courses adds far more to the poem than an illustrative simile. The flowers in fact cannot have looked very much like stars on the milky way, and we do not find it possible to imagine the resemblance very clearly. Of course we

are not intended to do so. We are invited instead to consider the focal order—the daffodils growing in a crescent along the lake—within the greater order of the universe. The poetic force of the stanza would of course be lost if the sense of difference were suspended whilst we contemplated the unity of the universe; and the polarity is insisted on in the last lines. The flowers, though a part of the universal order, are still themselves, each an individual life asserting itself joyfully; ‘tossing their heads’ and ‘sprightly dance’ suggest the unconscious courage of the fragile lives so gaily lived out under the trees and under the stars. Yet each flower is part of a ‘host’ of ‘ten thousand’ which stretches in ‘never-ending line’. The daffodils are not merely happily vegetating; they are joyously embattled in the wind. This is a point of crucial importance for the full appreciation of the poem.

The suggestion is further developed in the third stanza. The comparison between the dance of the waves and the dance of the flowers would be a mere awkwardness if it did not carry us forward to a further significance. What this is may be seen if we consider the part played by the wind in the poem. The response of the cloud to the wind is to drift aimlessly before it. But the flowers, blown by a wind strong enough to raise waves on the lake, are not merely at its mercy. They ‘dance’ in the breeze; and their sprightliness suggests a joyful response to the wind which they are outfacing. There is surely a relationship here between the poet’s previous mental state, when he wandered like a cloud, lonely, detached, and merely passive, and the mental state associated with the daffodils, which is that of an imagination awakened by the wind of Time, not merely to drift before it, but to dance in joyous celebration. Wordsworth’s own comment, given in a letter to Sir George Beaumont, lays emphasis on the ‘trouble and agitation, both of the flowers and the water’, which, he says, were ‘the whole object of the poem’.

‘Instances of what I mean,’ says your Friend, ‘are to be found in a poem on a Daisy’ (by the bye, it is on *the* Daisy, a mighty difference!) ‘and on Daffodils *reflected in the water!*’ . . . What shall we think of criticism or judgment founded upon, and exemplified by a Poem which must have been so inattentively perused? My language is precise; and therefore it would be false modesty to charge myself with blame.

Beneath the trees,
Ten thousand dancing *in the breeze*.
The *waves beside* them danced, but they
Outdid the *sparkling waves* in glee.

Can expression be more distinct? And let me ask your Friend how it is possible for flowers to be *reflected* in the water where there are *waves*? They may indeed in *still* water, but the whole object of my poem is the trouble or agitation, both of the flowers and the Water. I must needs respect

the understanding of every one honoured by your friendship, but sincerity compels me to say that my poems must be more nearly looked at before they can give rise to any remarks of much value, even from the strongest minds.¹³

The response of the daffodils in the poem is not to lie down in a defeated attitude of sleep—as some of them do in Dorothy's account of the scene—but to convert 'trouble and agitation' into a dance of delight. And here the comparison of the dance of the daffodils with that of the waves, which might appear awkward, is justified by the need to show that the daffodils, because they are more delicate, more subtly organized—a higher order of nature, in fact—than the waves, can for that very reason respond with greater complexity and harmony of movement to the pressures of the wind. This leads on naturally to a consideration, in the last stanza, of the special powers of response to experience possessed by the human mind, which is always capable of making use of its various powers—including the power of recollection—to convert an aimless drifting, or a 'vacant' or 'pensive' mood, into a moment of insight and joy.

The last stanza describes the transformation of this 'vacant or a pensive mood' into 'bliss'. Are we to suppose, with Coleridge, that it is the simple memory of the daffodils that produces this startling result? The poem as a whole is not about daffodils, except as the focal point of a much wider perception. It is about the complex life of nature, and man's sense of exile from that life. What Wordsworth invites us to remember with him, imprisoned in our solitudes, is the universal order of which we ourselves, the waves, the trees, the daffodils, and the stars, are all individual aspects. In imaginatively contemplating the order, we cease, for a moment of thought, to feel the burden of loneliness. In the last stanza the common human condition of weariness and solitude is simply brought to mind by the first lines:

For oft, when on my couch I lie
In vacant or in pensive mood.

It is to transform this condition that the daffodils

Flash upon that inward eye
Which is the bliss of solitude.

This 'inward eye' is clearly not, as Coleridge suggests, merely the Memory. It is the Imagination which is here awakened by the remembrance of the daffodils—and it is a vision of the universal order of which the daffodils are a part that causes the poet's heart to fill with pleasure and to dance with the flowers. It is this that justifies the apparent hyperbole, for in the course of the poem we are shown how the human condition may be transformed from a 'lonely' wandering to a solitude made alive and joyful through the power of contemplation. The awakened imagination makes all the difference between mere loneliness and a blissful *solitude*.

Though the poem cannot be adequately read if we suppose it to be simply about daffodils, it would be wrong to say that the

daffodils are symbols. They are experienced as 'real objects', intensely 'there' in their own right, as if independent of the perceiving mind. This extraordinarily 'real' character of the daffodils, by which they seem to have an independent existence outside the poem and outside the poet's mind, gives to the poem, more than anything else, its truly Wordsworthian quality—that vivid lucidity in which objects are seen without fanciful 'colouring', bright and clear in the light of day.

A detail which does not appear in Dorothy's account—the waves on the lake—gives to the wind itself the reality of weather rather than of a poetic breeze that has been introduced merely to set the flowers dancing. The exact placing of the daffodils 'beside the lake, beneath the trees' serves further to give them definition, and the life seen in them makes them seem even more intensely real.

We gain a strong sense of the actuality and immediacy of the daffodils, so that it is natural, when we think casually of the poem, to give it in our minds the title 'Daffodils'. And of course this is an essential part of the poem's success. In the dialogue between nature and the perceiving mind, both voices must be heard. The polarity between subject and object must be sustained if the true wonder of the commerce between the mind and the world that we 'half create and half perceive' is to be communicated. This polarity between the 'real' world and the subjective mind is too often lost in romantic poetry. The pervasive, ever-present sense of nature as external, objective and real distinguishes Wordsworth's poetry from that of most of his imitators, and gives to the ordering and harmonising tendencies of his mind something of a heroic quality. It is easy to unify what has no unity or order of its own; but Wordsworth's great achievement was to harmonise without falsifying, at any point, his strong sense of what was actually *there*. This he does with such success in this poem that at times we forget that it is a poem 'of the Imagination' and we are tempted to look on it as a fragment of autobiography or as a brilliant 'flower-piece'.

NOTES

- ¹ S. T. Coleridge, *Biographia Literaria*, ed. J. Shawcross, Oxford, 1907. Vol. II, pp. 109-110.
- ² A. N. Whitehead, *Science and the Modern World*, New York, 1925, p. 117.
- ³ *Letters of William and Dorothy Wordsworth*, ed. E. de Selincourt, Oxford, 1935-39, *The Middle Years*, Vol. I, p. 130.
- ⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 149.
- ⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 308.
- ⁶ *Poetical Works*, ed. E. de Selincourt and H. Darbishire, Oxford, 1941-49, Vol. II, note on p. 507.
- ⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 217.
- ⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 218.
- ⁹ *Journals of Dorothy Wordsworth*, ed. E. de Selincourt, Oxford, 2 volumes, 1941. Entry for April, 15th.
- ¹⁰ *Op. cit.*
- ¹¹ *Op. cit.*
- ¹² *Op. cit.*
- ¹³ *Letters of William and Dorothy Wordsworth* ed. E. de Selincourt, Oxford, 1935-39, *The Middle Years*, Vol. I, p. 170.

SOME MEDIEVAL FRENCH ATTITUDES TO LOVE

by P. ROYLE

BROADLY SPEAKING, there were, in France in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, four clearly distinguishable attitudes to love. According to the first, which is that of the official Christian Church, love was sinful; according to the second, it was awe-inspiring and tragic; according to the third, which is that of the courtly lovers, it was ennobling; and according to the fourth, which is that of the *bourgeois*, it was ridiculous. Of these four attitudes, the first, being that of the Catholic Church, could be said to be Roman; the second was Celtic, and, more specifically, Breton; the third was of Provençal origin; and only the fourth, according to which love—or, at least the love of a man for a woman—was a fitting subject for mirth and derision, was genuinely French (it will be remembered that not until the late fifteenth century were Brittany and Provence finally incorporated into France). It is to this fourth attitude, therefore, that the adjective *gaulois* has been reserved.¹

What distinguishes the first and second attitudes from the third and fourth is that, whereas the latter sprang from a concern with the practical consequences of love (according to the third attitude it made noble, according to the fourth it made ridiculous), the former were rooted in a deep, metaphysical awareness of supernatural powers. To the Christian schoolmen, for whom even passionate love of one's wife was sinful, love was the work of Satan exploiting that human concupiscence which was the sign and the consequence of the Fall; to the Celtic imagination which produced the tragic story of Tristan and Iseut, love was the work of Fate. Admittedly the courtly lovers also ascribed their love to an extramundane source, namely the god Amour; but this was a mere convention, arising in part from a conscious, and often malicious, analogy with Christianity, and was never taken literally.

One thing, however, all four attitudes had in common: to all four love was madness, *folie*. To the schoolmen the lover was mad because, unless he repented, he could not escape eternal damnation, and because love, by definition, meant a capitulation to the dark, enslaving forces of unreason; to the Celts the lover was mad in the sense that he was visibly transported into a different, mysterious, and terrifying realm; to the courtly lovers love was a sort of secular

folly of the cross, a wholly admirable folly, but, insofar as it demanded great heroism, patience, and self-sacrifice, folly nevertheless; and to the *bourgeois* it was madness because it reversed or upset what they held to be the natural relationship between men and women. The last attitude will be seen to be that of Ovid, and the last but one that of his misinterpreters.

According to the Christian Church, then, love was sinful. The Christian Middle Ages are probably the most rationalistic epoch in the history of man, both in the sense that their epistemology was a rationalist one (to this day it is an article of Catholic dogma that a knowledge of God can be acquired through reason alone), and in the more existential sense that the passions were held to be evil. Their philosophy seems to us dialectically futile and practically pernicious. But it can and should be defended: for into an age when Europe consisted of warring barbarians some such philosophy alone was capable of introducing peace, order, and civilization. When the horse is wild, the efforts to ride it will necessarily entail cruelty. D. H. Lawrence is not the diet for cannibals.

But there were several reasons why love should have been regarded in the Middle Ages as sinful. First of all, a rationalistic age is an age dominated by its men; and, as the earliest lyric poetry in the French language shows, love was an emotion experienced first by women. When this fact is taken in conjunction with the fact that marriages were prearranged business deals, it will be obvious why husbands should fear love and regard it as evil: women, in their demand for a satisfactory emotional life, were already disrupting the divine social order. If, of course, it so happened that her *husband* became the object of a woman's love, this, despite Christian dogma, would be regarded as right and proper; and if he were capable of returning this love, which was rarely the case, their relationship would then be a deeply feudal one akin to the love that united Roland and Charlemagne. The husband would protect the wife, and her love and devotion would be seen as his just reward. And we should never forget that the feudal system, having grown as it had out of the need of the weak for the protection of the strong, engendered a manly, homo-erotic love, the depth and intensity of which had never been equalled.

I have spoken of the husband protecting his wife. From whom, or what, then, did she need protection? As our medieval forefathers saw it, women needed protection, together with the whole of Christendom, from barbarians, pagans, and Saracens, the very legions of the Devil. Men were called upon to protect their women-folk from the Devil. And the Middle Ages were an exceptionally embattled period, with the Saracens in Spain and Sicily at the very gates of Christendom. Now, imagine a medieval warrior returning to his wife and finding that she has been unfaithful to him. When he demands an explanation, she informs him that she has fallen in love. Would this 'love' not seem the very work of the Devil,

designed to strike despair into the hearts of his adversaries? And would this not be especially the case in France, *douce France*, the country which immortalized its sense of mission in the phrase *gesta Dei per Francos* (God performs His heroic feats through the French)? Writes Conon de Béthune, a lordly *trouvère* of the late twelfth and early thirteenth centuries:

‘God is besieged in His holy heritage. Now we shall see how He will be succoured by those He rescued from the gloomy prison when He was put on the cross the Turks now hold. Be sure that those who do not go will be dishonoured, unless they have the excuse of poverty or age or sickness; those who are healthy and young and rich cannot stay behind without shame.

‘All the clergy and the old men who continue here in charity and good works will have their share in this crusade, and all the ladies who live chastely and keep faith with those who go. And if by evil counsel they fall into sin, they will do so with cowards and worthless men, for all the brave will have gone on this journey.’²

The contempt for women which we find in the literature of medieval France, although it was no doubt confirmed and intensified by her equation with Eve, was certainly more than theoretical; and it is noteworthy that the story of Troilus and Cressida, that epic tale of female perfidy, originated, the work of Benoît de Sainte-Maure, in the land of the *chansons de geste*.³

This attitude to love, as can be imagined, produced no great work of literature in the *langue d’oil*; and insofar as it was propagated by schoolmen, it is not at all surprising, as they generally wrote in Latin. It did, however, leave its mark on literature in the form of the palinodes with which so many authors ended their literary lives.

The second attitude, however, although not of French origin, and basically un-French, found expression in some of the best literature of the French Middle Ages. Let me briefly relate the story of Tristan and Iseut, as pieced together from the fragments of Béroul and Thomas, and foreign translations.

Tristan, the heroic nephew of King Mark of Cornwall, sails to Ireland to bring back the beautiful Iseut as his uncle’s bride. On the way back both he and Iseut accidentally drink a love potion concocted by the bride’s mother for her to take on her wedding day. The effect is instantaneous, and they fall irrevocably in love.⁴ Iseut nevertheless marries Mark, but continues to see her lover secretly. They are betrayed and taken into custody, but Tristan escapes on his way to the stake and effects the release of the humiliated Iseut. After a spell in the forest of Morois, Iseut returns to her husband,⁵ who is now convinced of her innocence, and Tristan, after further adventures and betrayals, makes his way to Brittany. There he marries another Iseut, but cannot forget his beloved. He falls ill and sends for her, who alone can cure him, and, so that he might know the sooner whether she is coming or not, arranges for a white sail to be hoisted if she is, and a black one if she is not. His wife,

in a fit of jealousy, announces the approach of a boat with a black sail, and Tristan dies, at the very moment of Iseut's landing. Grief-stricken, Iseut dies also.

I have said that to the Celtic imagination that produced this story love was the work of Fate. I now wish to examine this concept of Fate more closely. First, it is a pagan conception: Fate, in the sense that even God or the gods are subject to it (as in Greek and Norse mythology) is superior to God. And secondly, it is awful: for death is the ultimate fate of us all, not Heaven, as for the Christian, but the terrible unknown. But the fact that God, Who is supremely free, is subject to Fate, suggests the paradox that fatality is not wholly incompatible with freedom. What are the moral consequences of this belief? Insofar as one is free, one must obey the laws of the deity; but the moment one comes under the direct sway of Fate, divine laws become supremely irrelevant. Now, just as death is fated, so is love. One can neither make oneself love nor prevent oneself from loving. Love is magic, transcending the sphere of responsibility and divine law; and because it is disruptive, and, above all, because it is linked with death as the doing of Fate, it can be seen only as baleful; and, indeed, it seems to have been regarded by the Celts as a trap set by Fate to lure men more rapidly to their graves, a delicious bait thrown into the stream of life, yet in which was concealed a deadly hook. To draw an analogy with Christianity, whereas *caritas*, which is a gift of God and which yet mysteriously fails to annul freedom, gives a promise of Heaven, love, which is equally a gift, if that is the word, but in this case of Fate, contains a threat of death. The difference between the Christian conception and the pagan one is simply that, with its doctrine of predestination, Christianity has reconciled God with Fate.

I have said enough, I think, to show wherein lies the tragedy of Tristan. The Tristan story is tragic because the hero loves both Mark, the wise, good Mark, and Mark's wife. But his love for Mark, although sincere, is a normal human affection reinforced by duty; whereas his love for Iseut is supernatural. Even so, imagine the predicament of Tristan. He is bound to Mark by the three holiest ties of medieval Europe: kinship, fealty (he is Mark's vassal), and the natural love which is the due of such a bountiful, God-fearing king. Yet he can do no other than deceive and wrong him. Inevitably the love he feels for Iseut requires him to transgress the moral law, and the lovers are led into falsehood and deceit. From the Christian point of view their behaviour is evil, and is seen to be so, during the months of hardship and privation in the forest of Morois, by the lovers themselves; yet to the poetic heart their conflict is seen to be a noble one, and their decision to live apart if need be, to go back to the world, is, in the light of the potion, heroic.⁶ The attitude of the authors is therefore understandably ambivalent, oscillating between frank admiration of Tristan's exploits and the love from which they spring, coupled with

the vehement hatred of the lovers' betrayers, and a good Christian disapproval of their sin.

Let me now relate the story of *Les Deus Amanz*, the lay of the Two Lovers, by Marie de France.

Once upon a time there lived in Normandy two young lovers. Unfortunately, the girl's father, the king of Pistres, was very possessive, and, to make sure no one should take his daughter from him, decreed that he would give her in marriage only to the suitor who carried her in his arms, without a single halt, to the very top of the nearby mountain. Several suitors presented themselves, but all of them failed to fulfil the requirement. The lovers, seeing the hopelessness of the task, were forced to keep their love secret, and met clandestinely. This began, however, to weigh heavily upon them, and the young squire urged his lady to elope. This she would not do, as she did not wish to cause her father grief, and advised her lover instead to go to Salerno, where she had an aunt who was practised in the science of medicine and who would give him a strengthening potion which would enable him to climb the mountain with ease. He took her advice, returned with the potion, which he was to take when his strength began to fail, and asked the King for his daughter's hand in marriage. A day was arranged for the squire's ordeal, and the King invited all who would to come and witness the spectacle. On the fateful day his daughter, who, to lighten her lover's task, had been fasting, appeared in nothing but her smock; the squire took her in his arms and, handing her the potion, began the ascent. He was soon half-way up the mountain but already his strength was failing. Despite his lady's entreaties he disdained to take the potion, and battled on to the summit; in vain, alas! for no sooner had he reached it than he fell down dead. His beloved, failing to revive him, threw the potion to the ground and lay down next to him to die. The king and his company, finding them there, lamented loudly, and, after three days, buried them there. The hill is known to this day as the Mountain of the Two Lovers, and the country round about, under the effects of the potion, has become a garden full of beneficent herbs.

Why does the story end tragically? This question is answered specifically in the original:

'Mes jo creim que poi (ne) li vaille,
Kar n'ot en lui point de mesure.'

(But I fear it won't do him any good, for there was in him no *measure*.)

Démésure, lack of moderation, the tragic, often noble *hamartia* of French medieval heroes—it is this which brought about the lovers' downfall, as it also caused the death of Roland. Fate could be cheated by *mesure*, reasonableness, just as grace, gift of God though it was, could be achieved through reason and its subordination of the flesh. If you were a shrewd fish, you could enjoy the bait

without swallowing the hook; but the lover of the lay is anything but shrewd, and so goes the way of all flesh, taking with him his beloved, as Roland, ignoring until it is too late the sensible suggestion that he should blow his horn, involves his valiant rearguard in his own destruction.

And so from this lay emerges the admirable lesson that reason must hold the emotions in check if their fruit is to be enjoyed. Fire consumes and destroys when uncontrolled; it is life-giving when harnessed. This is wisdom indeed, allowing as it does both reason and passion their place in the sun, but leaving it to reason itself to determine just what the place of each of them shall be. A rational environment in which love is felt to be both mysterious and good (for, whatever the Bretons may have felt about it, to Marie, in whom signs of *courtoisie* are clearly evident, love is good) will normally produce insights such as this. It will, if other conditions are favourable, often produce great art; for what is most art if not emotion made available through the imposition of a rational form? The French Middle Ages did, of course, produce great art; but they did not produce great literature. Nevertheless, the work of Marie de France is very good indeed, and ranks, to my mind, among the best artistic products of the age.

Now, whereas the works of Bérout, Thomas, and Marie de France represent, in modified form, the swansong of a society which seems to have left it to others to commit its creations to paper, the courtly poets are the harbingers of a new age. Of the novel nature of the love they sing much has been written, and I intend to say correspondingly little. Everyone has heard of it, and everyone who has read C. S. Lewis's *The Allegory of Love* knows that its characteristics were Humility, Courtesy, Adultery, and the Religion of Love. But the point I wish to make is this: that love, if experienced at all (and in medieval France it was a rare emotion), can be experienced in two ways: it can possess or it can be possessed. What distinguishes the love of a highly civilized man from that of a less civilized man is that the former possesses, whereas the latter is possessed by, his love. And this is one of the capital differences between the love of Tristan and Iseult and that of the courtly lovers. The love of the servant of Amour for his lady, where it was genuine, was the sexual instinct raised to the level of personality. It could be experienced only by highly self-conscious persons, people who were aware of others as unique individuals, capable of imaginative sympathy. The child is not yet a person, and the people of the Middle Ages were infinitely childlike. But the child, as it becomes ever more conscious, matures: and this is what happened in medieval Provence. Christianity, with its cult of female virginity and its habit of critical introspection, personalized the women of Europe; and in Provence, owing to a fortuitous combination of circumstances, the women personalized some of the men. If ontogeny is the recapitulation of phylogeny, it looks as if here we have an example of the converse: girls mature earlier than boys.⁷

This does not, of course, prove anything about the superiority or inferiority of women. Virginity was forced on one class of women, just as prostitution was virtually forced on another, by the dominant males, who liked to feel they were initiating their brides into the secrets of sex. But it does, after all, speak well for women that they turned this code to such advantage. For the courtly code, in a modified form, is, let us make no mistake about it, fundamental to civilization as we understand it today: for it presupposes and demands integrity, which is a way of saying that it erects seemingly impassable barriers and yet provides the means of breaking them down. The history of courtly love is essentially the story of *Lysistrata*. Only on the civilized man will a lady bestow her favours. The barriers she erects are impervious to brute force, that vicious, aggressive dealer of death, and can be broken down only by its opposite. Even table manners become important, as they are seen as part of the process of civilizing, of forcing into consciousness. The more conscious a person is of others as persons, the more acute is his awareness of his own uniqueness and claim to unique consideration. This creates the tension from which the higher forms of civilization spring. It is a tragic tension, but one which brings inestimable privileges. It is the basis of the attraction-repulsion principle which underlies the intercourse of civilized human beings. The person who is capable of imaginative sympathy with others wishes to know, love, and cherish the whole human world; but at the same time his awareness of his own uniqueness, his own integrity, makes it impossible for him to be other than chaste. The promiscuous person is either a shallow individual or a callous one. The civilized human being, on the contrary, does not wish to consummate his love until he has proved to himself, and is sure that his lady recognizes, his personhood: hence the romantic trappings of courtly love, the adventures, the jousts, the tournaments, those formal testimonials to the homage paid by womanly virtue to manly vice—and to woman's success in domesticating it and putting it to the service of that personal love which is the source of human life. And hence, too, the increasingly important role allotted to the minstrel, the *jongleur*. For it was not always possible or desirable for a lady to be present at the exploits of her admirers; but it was highly desirable that she should get to hear of them.

It was natural that this development should take an ostensibly unchristian turn. For Christian sex, as has been intimated, was a paltry thing, conceived in terms of species and procreation, and Christian marriage was a business deal. And this brings out very well the distinction, which is crucial, between formality and conventionality. Courtly love was formal to a high degree; but it was anything but conventional. Of course, in a Christian age, an attempt was made to reconcile it with Christianity (in fact, many clerics considered themselves better courtly lovers than the less

lettered knights); but whilst not wholly rejecting Christianity (hence the palinodes), it was definitely hostile to it, as will be seen from the following passage from that delightful *chante-fable*, *Aucassin et Nicolette*. Aucassin, on being told by his father that had he taken Nicolette to his bed he would have forfeited Paradise, replies:

'In Paradise what have I to do? I care not to enter, but only to have Nicolette, my very sweet friend, whom I love so dearly well. For into Paradise go none but such people as I will tell you of. There go those aged priests, and those old cripples, and the maimed, who all day long and all night cough before the altars, and in the crypts beneath the churches; those who go in worn old mantles and old tattered habits; who are naked, and barefoot, and full of sores; who are dying of hunger and of thirst, of cold and of wretchedness. Such as these enter in Paradise, and with them have I nought to do. But in Hell will I go. For to Hell go the fair clerks and the fair knights who are slain in the tourney and the great wars, and the stout archer and the loyal man. With them will I go. And there go the fair and courteous ladies, who have friends, two or three, together with their wedded lords. And there pass the gold and the silver, the ermine and all rich furs, harpers and minstrels, and the happy of the world. With these will I go, so only that I have Nicolette, my very sweet friend, by my side.'⁸

The rule of secrecy in the courtly code is an interesting one, as it is largely responsible, if not indeed for the actual delimitation of the public and private worlds which we take so much for granted, yet for the sacrosanctity attaching to each of them.⁹ Some things are done in public, others are done in private (and yet others are simply *not done*). One of the reasons for this secrecy was no doubt a practical one: why antagonize the husband unnecessarily? Then, also, the Middle Ages, like most ages, were a period of scandal-mongering; and what lover could bear his love to be hawked around the streets and defiled by gossip when it was seen to be such an exquisite, delicate flower? Numerous are the complaints of the *trouvères* against the evil slanderers, often, it must be admitted, fictitious, who plagued their existence. Yet I believe there was an even deeper reason, born of a profound intuition, for this consecration of the private world and attendant refinement of the public. A personalized human being *cannot* make love in public; for the public world in a civilized society is the realm of consciousness, of deliberate purpose, of political activity—and, it must be added, of a necessary hypocrisy; and love is, after all, however civilized its forms may be, a passion which can express itself uninhibitedly only away from the public gaze, in the privacy of the forest or the bedchamber. It is there that we find refreshment in the forgetting of our civilized manners and allowing ourselves to be possessed by

our love. For to possess one's love constantly is to destroy it; and to be possessed by it in public is a negation of the consciousness from which it derives its superiority.

Naturally, the birth of courtly love cannot be 'explained': it partakes of the mystery of life itself. But why it should have made its first appearance in Provence is a legitimate question. Several explanations have been offered, and there is no doubt much to be said for all of them. But I should like to put forward another, of a somewhat Hegelian flavour. In the eleventh and twelfth centuries Provençal Catholicism was severely threatened from within. The Catharist heresy had groups of adherents scattered far and wide over the European continent, but it was in Provence, and more particularly in the Albigeois, that its strength was greatest (hence the alternative designation of Albigensianism). Now, Catharism could hardly be said to be a heretical form of Christianity; it was rather a different religion. Its main tenet was that this world was the kingdom of Satan, being regarded by some as a form of Purgatory for fallen angels and by others as Hell (the latter, logically enough, believed in metempsychosis, as those who did not attain salvation would have to undergo another spell of earthly torment). As has been said, this faith was yet another form of Manichaeic dualism; but however this may be, in its attitude to sex Catharism was a *reductio ad absurdum* of the teaching of the official Catholic Church. Not only was love evil, but all forms of sexual activity, inside or outside marriage, were to be condemned; Satan and the flesh were synonymous. The need to propagate the species could no longer be considered the justification of matrimony, as to bear children was to assist in the prolongation of the reign of Satan. To such lengths was this aberration carried that believers were forbidden to consume meat, cheese, eggs, and milk, on the grounds that all these foods were the product of sexual generation (fish was allowed, as it was believed that fish did not reproduce in this way). The life-loving Celts equated love with death, and therefore regarded it as terrible; the life-hating Catharists, like official Catholicism, had no conception of love, and, like Catholicism, equating sex with life, regarded it as evil.

The Catharist attitude to sex was, as I have said, a *reductio ad absurdum* of the views of the Catholic Church. But *because* it was this it had to be combated vigorously. Catholic sex bore roughly the same relation to Catharist sex as capitalism bears to monopoly capitalism. Monopoly capitalism, the logical conclusion of any economic system resting on genuinely free enterprise, has to be checked for fear it leads, as Marx predicted, to the overthrow of the whole capitalist system. And, of course, it *has* been checked, and capitalism continues to go its way, happily shouldering its internal contradictions. And similarly Catharism was checked, allowing Catholicism to muddle along with its 'paradoxes'. But the interesting point is this: that just as 'the little men', in their resistance to the growing power of the big corporations, were forced

temporarily to don the unwonted mantle of leaders of 'progressive' opinion, so the Church, in its efforts to squash Catharism, was forced to stress the less negative side of its sexology; and just as the little men were outflanked by the socialists, so the Church found itself assailed from the opposite direction by the adherents of the courtly code. Does this analogy not help to explain the ambivalent attitude of the courtly lovers to Christianity? Just as socialists (as opposed to communists) seek, while maintaining 'capitalist' as a dirty word in their vocabulary, to work towards their goal within the framework of the capitalist economy, so the courtly lovers, whilst fundamentally antagonistic to Christianity and outwardly rejecting it, never really did so, as is testified by the celerity with which they recanted when they felt their end was in sight. The courtly tradition has, however, by working as a leaven, succeeded in transforming Christianity from within, in much the same way as socialism is gradually humanizing the most unrepentant of capitalist societies. But this did not happen before it had been temporarily smashed, together with its Catharist converse, in the bloody crusade against the Albigensians.

My account of the Provençal origin of courtly love is, therefore, this: that it was in Provence that the Church concentrated its attack on Catharism, and that the nature of the arguments it was forced to use in its propaganda liberated forces that were elsewhere still suppressed.¹⁰

The courtly code, although in the thirteenth century it was adopted by some of the wealthier *bourgeois*, was first of all an aristocratic affair. Whereas Christian grace made the virtuous virtuous, thereby ensuring them a place in Heaven, courtly love, with its promise of earthly felicity, ennobled the noble—in both the moral and the class sense of the term. Why, it might be asked, should commoners have been considered, in general, as being beyond redemption? If we look at the attitude to women of the *bourgeois*, as reflected in the *fabliaux* and the second part of the *Roman de la Rose*, from which I quote, the reason will become clear.

'And if he is the sort who does not want to be true to his mistress, and yet does not wish to lose her, but wants to attach himself to another, should he wish to give his new friend a kerchief or shawl, a hat, a ring, a clasp, a belt, or a jewel of any kind, let him take care that the first one does not know them, for she would be grieved to the heart to see her wearing them; nothing would console her for it. And let him take care never to get the new one to meet him in the same place where the other used to come to him and where she is in the habit of coming; for if she should come and find her rival there, nothing in the whole world would set that to rights! For no old bristly boar is so fierce, when the dogs are worrying him, nor is the lioness so cruel, so desperate, or so deadly when the hunter attacks her at the

moment when she is feeding her cubs, nor is a snake so much to be feared when you tread on its tail and it doesn't consider it a joke, as is a woman when she finds a new mistress with her lover. She throws out fire and flame in all directions, ready to put both life and soul in peril.

'And if she hasn't actually any real proof of what is going on between them, but still becomes suspicious of it, because she knows or thinks herself forsaken, however it may be, whether she really knows anything, or just suspects, let him never budge from a position of complete denial even of what she knows to be true, and let him not hesitate to swear it. Let him hasten to make love to her on the spot, then he will put a stop to her reproaches.

'And if she worries and attacks him until he has to admit it, perhaps because it can't be denied, he must then, if he can, try to compel her to believe that he did it against his will, because the other woman had got him in her clutches and was persecuting him so that he simply could not get away from her without going to bed with her, and that it had never happened except this once.

'Then let him take his oath, and swear and promise that it will never happen again; he will be so true to her that if she ever hears a word of such a thing he gives her full leave to kill or injure him, for he would see that other woman drowned, the shameless baggage, before he would go anywhere where she could put him in such a position again; if she should send for him, he will never go to her, nor will he allow her to come, as far as he can help it, to any place where she can get hold of him. Then let him take the other tightly in his arms and kiss, flatter, and caress her, and beg her to forgive him for this injury, since it will never be repeated for he is truly sorry, ready to perform any penance she can lay upon him, once she has forgiven him. Then let him set about love's work if he wants her forgiveness.'¹¹

This passage is highly amusing and (no doubt) crammed full of brilliantly just observations; but it shows that Jean de Meung, to put it mildly, has a low view of women. Is it not decreed by nature and confirmed by the Bible that man should be superior to woman and should assert his authority over her? Is not courtly love, therefore, dangerous, fatuous nonsense? Love is a sin, as it upsets the natural relationship between man and woman, and Nature, Physic, must be our guide. It is interesting to see the common ground that existed in such matters between the Church, which held human nature to be corrupt, and the *bourgeois*, to whom human nature was human nature, to whom monasticism was consequently repugnant, and for whom Nature eventually came overtly to replace God. This combination of Christian puritanism and *bourgeois* male egotism is directly responsible for the sexual ethic to be en-

countered in many Catholic countries to-day, an ethic which declares it to be right and wholesome for men to have sexual experience before marriage, on the grounds that to abstain would be ridiculous and unmanly (did not Andreas Capellanus, the clerical author of *De Arte Honeste Amandi*, declare, whilst affirming that love was not for nuns, that Jesus could not really have expected his clerics to remain celibate?¹²), and which yet lays down an intolerable pattern of sexual behaviour on its women; an ethic, in other words, which demands the division of women into the pure and the venal.¹³

Where the male sexual appetite is regarded as virtually uncontrollable, marriage will naturally be seen as an institution designed primarily for the convenience of women. The male has never assumed his paternal duties with the alacrity shown by women in the espousal of motherhood; and this was certainly the case in medieval France. Men, according to the current opinion, were trapped into marriage by scheming females, who, once secure, committed infidelities behind their backs. They, of course, could be unfaithful to their wives; that was their natural prerogative. But should their wives be unfaithful to them—that was intolerable and had to be prevented at all costs, even if it meant belabouring them with cudgels; for there was no one more ridiculous than the cuckold, the man lured into matrimony only to be given another's offspring to rear. The feminine jealousy of which Jean de Meung writes was the sexual jealousy of the lover; the jealous husband was jealous first and foremost of his reputation.

Whereas, therefore, for clerical celibates women were seductresses, tempting men into sin and thereby placing their heavenly salvation in jeopardy, for the more earthy *bourgeois*, they were cunning propagators of the species, who inveigled them into constancy and thereby ruined their lives on earth. Their antagonism would only be intensified by the Church's teaching that these were, in fact, the ends of marriage: the propagation of the species and the prevention of fornication. On either the clerical or the *bourgeois* view women could only be considered unpleasant, and any one who was foolish enough to fall in love with one was worthy only of ridicule. And if, by some logical freak, the two views were combined, as they so often were,¹⁴ cudgelling must have seemed too good for them.

Whence, it might be asked, did this attitude spring? But this would be the wrong question. The question is rather: why was it that some men, notably of the aristocratic class, did *not* feel like this? For the medieval *bourgeois* attitude to women is the natural attitude of morally immature societies: strength is respected and weakness despised. It is simply that the aristocracy began to be personalized before the *bourgeoisie*. No doubt, ladies of leisure had more time for introspection, and more time for the cultivation of those civilized arts which were necessary to win the respect of their men-folk. In an age when leisure was the mark of the highest

class of society, it is understandable that *bourgeois* men should not have respected either their mistresses or their wives. For women of their own class were required, under pain of a beating, to work, and to work hard, for their keep (unless they belonged to the wealthier *bourgeoisie*); and manual work was contemptible. Moreover, this work could easily have had a brutalizing effect. Their aristocratic counterparts, on the other hand, could devote themselves to making themselves attractive, and thereby fan the flames of that revolt against the Church which was the necessary midwife at the birth of the courtly code. For the medieval Church was opposed to finery of apparel in much the same way as are the Plymouth Brethren to this day; and the admiration aroused in a knight by a lady's comeliness would at the same time lead him to reject at least that particular shibboleth in the Christian inventory of prohibitions.

It will perhaps be remarked that I have not examined any literary text at all closely. This is because scarcely any are worth it. Many may be read with pleasure, even delight; but few are worthy of intensive study. Medieval France, so rich in magnificent architecture, produced neither a Dante nor a Chaucer. In an age of vertical aspirations, which expressed themselves in the gothic spires of soaring cathedrals, literature, which depends for its existence on an immediate awareness of, a direct interest in, earthly life, could not flourish. The search for the good alone does not produce great literature; and neither, as is amply illustrated by the French eighteenth century, does the search for the true. Furthermore, it is difficult to imagine great literature without great literary aspirations; and to medieval France, with her belief, shared by the whole of Christendom, in the proximity of the end of the world, such aspirations must have seemed vain.

Three of the attitudes to love which I have discussed did, however, after a long period of gestation, bring forth a considerable literary progeny. The second attitude, albeit deepened and subtilized, is essentially the attitude which underlies *Phèdre*. The third, in its profoundest Christian form, is that of Corneille. And the fourth is that of Rabelais. In addition, we have in *Les Liaisons Dangereuses* a combination of the third and fourth attitudes: Valmont also serves the god of Love, but with the cynical and reprehensible purpose of hurting and degrading the women he ensnares.

One last point. The second attitude to love was taken over by German romanticism. In Novalis the parallelism Love-Night-Death, in a Christianized form, was carried to its logical conclusion in an execration of the sun which is reminiscent of the medieval *aubes*, those songs in which the lovers complain of the dawn because it will bring their separation. And in Wagner's *Tristan und Isolde* this *amor fati*, for into such it has been transformed, finds its triumphant expression in the *Liebestod*.

NOTES

- ¹ This is not, of course, to say that this is the only truly French attitude. One must suppose, however, that, before the importation of the courtly code, it was the attitude not merely of the *bourgeois* but of all classes of society.
- ² Translation by Brian Woledge, *Penguin Book of French Verse*, Vol. 1.
- ³ The story is, admittedly, a fairly minor episode in the *Roman de Troie*, and Benoit himself claims to have taken the whole history from a Latin translation of the *Iliad* of Dares the Phrygian. It has, however, certain profoundly original qualities which make it far more significant than its length would lead one to suppose.
- ⁴ In the Bérout version their love is not irremediable, as the potion was designed to lose its effect at the end of three years.
- ⁵ In the Bérout version this development is explained by the wearing off of the effect of the potion. Their continued relationship thus becomes a voluntary one.
- ⁶ Even in the Bérout version their decision is by no means devoid of nobility; for although the effect of the potion has worn off, they still love each other deeply.
- ⁷ A frankly ontogenetic approach to the Middle Ages can be very illuminating. If we view our medieval forebears as children, much that must otherwise appear strange in their lives will become comprehensible: the peculiar blend of profound tenderness and horrifying cruelty, the habit of regarding outsiders as strange objects and weaving fantasies around them, the naïve attachment, compounded of love and fear, to Mother Church, with its often concomitant hatred of monks and priests, the ambivalent attitude to power, the childish reverence for erudition and the clerical delight in displaying it in disputations which resemble nothing more than the debates of precocious schoolboys. This childishness, it must be said, is far from being contemptible. For adult human beings, however backward they may be, are *not* children, and become children only through a voluntary submission to their superiors. This is brought about by a genuinely humble acknowledgement of their own inadequacy (too much self-reliance, as shown in *Les Deus Amanz*, brings disaster) and an admirable desire to learn, to grow and develop. Their superiors themselves, of course, are only relatively superior, and whilst they are fathers to their flocks, they are children to their God.
- ⁸ Translation by Eugene Mason.
- ⁹ The ancient world seems to have had no conception of the beauty of domestic life, which was for it indeed *privata*, deprived. *Vide* Hannah Arendt: *The Human Condition*.
- ¹⁰ I have not included the Catharist attitude to love under a separate heading for two reasons: (a) it was, as has been said, the Catholic attitude reduced to absurdity; and (b) it was, strictly speaking, not an attitude to love at all, but an attitude to sex.
- ¹¹ Translation by Brian Woledge, *Penguin Book of French Verse*, Vol. 1.
- ¹² Quoted by C. S. Lewis in *The Allegory of Love*.
- ¹³ This ethic is very well illustrated (and condemned) in the novels of Mauriac.
- ¹⁴ This confusion was no doubt facilitated by the *bourgeois* origins of so many of the clergy—and especially of the *goliards*, that association of clerics *manqués* and emancipated monks considered to be responsible for many of the *fabliaux*.

SOME NOTES ON THE COMIC SERIOUSNESS OF *TWELFTH NIGHT*

by C. O. GARDNER

I

TWELFTH NIGHT is a play that needs to be continually insisted upon, continually interpreted and reinterpreted. Its delicate truthfulness, its apparently fanciful ways of enforcing central perceptions about human life, spring from just that sort of gaily serious imaginativeness that the Mr Gradgrinds of literary criticism (and there are always many of them) are apt to scorn or to forget about. And in an age which devotes so much of its time to matters sociological and political, it seems especially valuable to delve a little into this play which is set in Illyria, a mythical dukedom which seems never to have heard of what we call sociology and politics.

Illyria is a land that the alert heart knows well, and in Illyria Shakespeare shows the heart's deepest needs being recognised and in the end fulfilled. Presiding over everything in the play is what Perdita in *The Winter's Tale* calls 'great creating Nature'. What falls comically prey to Nature's impulses—to her way of plotting, and to the sensitivity and honesty and satire found in her disciples—is a variety of charming yet significant vanities, a rich collection of emptinesses and part-emptinesses. For 'Nature abhors a vacuum'.

II

Orsino, the duke, thinks he loves Olivia, and takes delight in describing his feeling for this woman (whom he seems hardly to know) to Cesario, his servant, who is in fact a woman disguised as a man. Olivia thinks she will never love anybody; then suddenly she proves vulnerable, and professes love for Cesario.

The unnatural involution of Orsino's emotions expresses itself from the first in a peculiarly over-sweet yet not unmusical poetry:

If music be the food of love, play on;
Give me excess of it, that surfeiting
The appetite may sicken, and so die. (I, i, 11.I—3)

Clearly Orsino is less than mature: he is pompous and lusciously self-indulgent. Yet his imagination is not contemptible; Nature and time may be able to save him from himself. In Olivia, who

is at the beginning of the play mourning her brother's death, we find the same symptoms; we are told of her:

The element itself, till seven years' heat,
Shall not behold her face at ample view;
But like a cloistress she will veiled walk,
And water once a day her chamber round
With eye-offending brine. (I, i, 11.26-30)

In sharp contrast to all this is the entry of Viola (the person who later disguises herself as Cesario) in scene ii:

Viola: What country, friends, is this?

Captain: This is Illyria, lady.

Viola: And what should I do in Illyria?

My brother he is in Elysium.

Perchance he is not drown'd. What think you sailors?
(I, ii, 11. 1-5)

Here there is a healthy directness and a natural and lively sensitivity.

Viola is at the centre of the play: she is indeed Nature's child and darling (to use Wordsworth's words). She disguises herself because she wishes to lie low until she knows what her fortunes are to be in the country in which she has landed after a shipwreck (and we are not called upon to doubt the necessity for, or indeed the inevitability of, her subterfuge). As Cesario, and Orsino's go-between, she is able to look closely at Orsino and Olivia; and she throws herself with good-humoured satirical intent into the musicalities of imaginary love and imaginary coldness:

Viola: . . . I will on with my speech in your praise, and then show you the heart of my message.

Olivia: Come to what is important in 't: I forgive you the praise.

Viola: Alas! I took great pains to study it, and 'tis poetical.
(I, v)

But Viola becomes startlingly involved in this unreal relationship. Her lively spirit breaks down the barriers that Olivia has raised against nature; astonished and embarrassed, she has to endure being proposed to. But, more important, she herself—intuitively discerning human value lurking beneath romantic vapours—finds that she is in love with Orsino.

The situation, looked at superficially, may seem to be too incredible to be anything more than farcical: a woman is loved by another woman and is in love with a man who does not know that she is a woman. Yet—and without any ventures into the abnormal—Shakespeare has made it convincing, and important. Viola herself is alive and lovable in every word. And Orsino and Olivia are made foolish and yet not unworthy of respect in a way which admirably illuminates their essentially youthful immaturities (Illyria is a poetic kingdom where subtle tendencies of the heart and soul are enacted with great clarity). The relationship between Viola and Orsino is perfectly done. Orsino's inability to recognize the femininity of the servant he feels a great affection for indicates

the magnitude of the blindness that his sentimentalities have brought upon him. (Again, the palpability of Orsino's mistake is wholly Illyrian.) And it is all, at one level, funny (the incongruities are piquant), and at another level, because of Viola's profound and delicate sensibility, sad and deadly serious.

III

In order to show a little more precisely what I mean, I am going to look carefully at a very important scene, Act II, scene iv. (It is with no little diffidence that I present an analysis of such a well-known passage in such a well-known play; yet, strangely, Shakespeare seems not always to have received the minute critical attention he deserves.)

Orsino enters, and makes a typical demand:

Give me some music. Now good morrow, friends:
 Now good Cesario, but that piece of song,
 That old and antique song we heard last night;
 Methought it did relieve my passion much,
 More than light airs and recollected terms
 Of these most brisk and giddy-paced times:
 Come; but one verse.

Only when music is playing does he feel sufficiently at ease to welcome his friends. He then asks—almost as if he were a child pleading ('Come; but one verse')—for a sentimental song to relieve (but really to titillate) his 'passion'. His delight in the *oldness* of the song, in its utter lack of modern sprightliness, and the sophisticated 'dying fall' of his cadences seem to symbolize the unreality that Orsino is constantly seeking.

A servant tells him that the song had been sung by the court fool. But Orsino is unaware of the comic significance of this fact:

Seek him out, and play the tune the while.

He then draws the disguised Viola aside:

Come hither, boy: if ever thou shalt love,
 In the sweet pangs of it remember me;

and immediately he is caught up in a web of fine dramatic ironies. He does not realise how inevitable it is that Cesario should in her loving remember him, or how much more real her 'sweet pangs' are than his own. He blunders on, and complacently and patronisingly tells her about love:

For such as I am all true lovers are:
 Unstaid and skittish in all motions else
 Save in the constant image of the creature
 That is belov'd.

Yet the loving (and ultimately beloved) person before his eyes he

cannot see clearly: he is obsessed by notions and fantasies. He asks dreamily:

How dost thou like this tune?

Viola: It gives a very echo to the seat
Where Love is thron'd.

The passionate energy and sincerity of Viola's reply breaks sharply upon us. In a few words she creates an image of love more powerful than any of Orsino's. Even he is impressed, though in a condescending way:

Thou dost speak masterly.
My life upon 't, young though thou art, thine eye
Hath stay'd upon some favour that it loves;
Hath it not, boy?

And again he is caught, ridiculously. Viola resorts to punning:

Viola: A little, by your favour.
Orsino: What kind of woman is 't?
Viola: Of your complexion.
Orsino: She is not worth thee then. What years, i' faith?
Viola: About your years, my lord.
Orsino: Too old, by heaven . . .

At one level we are aware that Orsino is not only calling Viola a boy but calling himself an old woman. More deeply we must realize that Viola is almost desperate. Her verbal play is not mere light-heartedness: she is finding a secret channel for her intense feelings; *her* passion really does need relieving. Orsino of course knows nothing of this; he moves on confidently to a piece of elegantly-turned worldly wisdom (unaware that he is contradicting what he has said earlier):

Let still the woman take
An elder than herself, so wears she to him,
So sways she level in her husband's heart:
For boy, however we do praise ourselves,
Our fancies are more giddy and unfirm,
More longing, wavering, sooner lost and worn,
Than women's are.

Viola: I think it well, my lord.

How far beneath Orsino's surface ripples are the depths from which that reply comes! But the duke, once at work on his pet subject, is not to be stopped:

Then let thy love be younger than thyself,
Or thy affection cannot hold the bent:
For women are as roses, whose fair flower
Being once display'd, doth fall that very hour.

This closing couplet is not unimpressive; it contains a real feeling. Yet there is something decorative about it: the duke is seeing women from the outside, and he rejoices self-consciously in what

he takes to be the roundedness of his perceptions. His vision is put to shame by Viola's reply:

And so they are: alas, that they are so;
To die, even when they to perfection grow !

Viola knows by experience the concrete truth of Orsino's generality: she makes his image vivid, personal, almost intolerably alive.

Feste, the clown (who is wise), comes in, sings his song, commends Orsino to 'the melancholy god' and laughs tolerantly at him, and then departs.

Orsino, swollen again with his diet of music, breaks out into a grandiloquent protestation:

Once more, Cesario,
Get thee to yond same sovereign cruelty:
Tell her, my love, more noble than the world,
Prizes not quantity of dirty lands;
The parts that Fortune hath bestow'd upon her,
Tell her I hold as giddily as Fortune;
But 'tis that miracle and queen of gems
That nature pranks her in, attracts my soul.

How noble and soulful and poetical Orsino is—in his own eyes. It is amusing that he should see 'nature' as playing some part in his feelings. Respectfully and tenderly—but with most serious intent—Viola slips in an awkward question:

Viola: But if she cannot love you, sir?

Orsino: I cannot be so answer'd.

Viola: Sooth, but you must.

Say that some lady, as perhaps there is,
Hath for your love as great a pang of heart
As you have for Olivia: you cannot love her;
You tell her so; must she not then be answer'd?

Viola's delicately pointed rhetoric is the flower of an intelligence that is rooted in experience of the heart's truths. In his somewhat blustering reply Orsino is at his most ludicrous and his most impertinent:

There is no woman's sides
Can bide the beating of so strong a passion
As love doth give my heart; no woman's heart
So big, to hold so much; they lack retention . . .

It is marvellous (and a fine insight of Shakespeare's) that a man should speak so grandly and know so little. For of course Orsino is as wrong as he could be. The archetypal situation that he is an unwitting participant in is one in which a vain man given to confident theorizing is loved by a woman who has matured before him and who is only too sensitively aware that he may waste himself or foolishly commit himself before he can learn to realize what she has to offer him.

Orsino rambles on:

Make no compare
Between that love a woman can bear me
And that I owe Olivia.

Viola: Ay, but I know—

Orsino: What dost thou know?

Viola: Too well what love women to men may owe.

Viola's tentativeness, her quiet womanly boldness, are beautifully held in the rhythm. Then she moves on to her most daring confession and self-revelation:

My father had a daughter lov'd a man,
As it might be, perhaps, were I a woman,
I should your lordship.

Orsino: And what 's her history?

Viola: A blank, my lord. She never told her love,
But let concealment like a worm i' the bud
Feed on her damask cheek: she pin'd in thought,
And with a green and yellow melancholy,
She sat like Patience on a monument,
Smiling at grief. Was not this love indeed?

In her vital fragility she sees herself as a rose: she is still exploring the realities of the simile that Orsino had tossed off casually and conventionally. It is natural—and moving—that her young blood should fear the worm and should shun 'a green and yellow melancholy' (Orsino in his vanity is, as Feste knows, a prince of melancholy). Viola is unable to unmask herself: she can become herself only when Orsino recognizes her for what she is. For of course she could never indelicately expose herself as poor Olivia does.

The scene closes with an orotund pronouncement from Orsino, who has learned nothing. Viola's situation is almost tragic. Yet Shakespeare has pictured it in such a way that we are at every moment aware of the comic ironies which surround it.

IV

Olivia on the whole echoes Orsino. Yet she is less laughable than the duke (it was gentlemanly and right of Shakespeare to be kinder to his noble lady than to his noble knight). And when she begins to be responsive—though it is, alas, to a person whom we know to be a woman—she is even to some small extent an echo of Viola; she betrays her feelings, but her feelings are not utterly different from those of the person to whom she is speaking:

Cesario, by the roses of the spring,
By maidenhood, honour, truth, and every thing,
I love thee so, that, maugre all thy pride,
Nor wit nor reason can my passion hide.

(III, i, 11.154-157)

The emotion in this is considerably deeper than what we have had from Orsino. Viola—although she is compelled into an irony which springs from her deeper knowledge—answers seriously:

By innocence I swear, and by my youth,
I have one heart, one bosom, and one truth,
And that no woman has; nor never none
Shall mistress be of it, save I alone. (III, i, 11.162-165)

V

It is hardly necessary to elaborate upon the way in which the passages of 'lower' comedy (extremely funny for their own sake) are relevant to the 'high comedy' situation. Malvolio, the pompous and self-loving puritan, and Sir Andrew Aguecheek, too empty-headed to suffer any real feeling, provide telling commentaries upon Orsino and Olivia. And Sir Toby Belch (though his loquacious drunkenness may link him to Sir Andrew and Orsino), Maria and Feste the clown, the people who bring Malvolio and Aguecheek their proper comic retributions, are admirable representatives, in their different ways, of great creating Nature. Consider for example the healthy and natural (and profoundly *English*) exuberance of Sir Toby's exclamations as he and two others, hidden in a box-tree, observe Malvolio's self-indulgent fantasies:

Malvolio: Having been three months married to her, sitting in my state—

Sir Toby: O! for a stone-bow, to hit him in the eye!

Malvolio: Calling my officers about me, in my branched velvet gown; having come from a day-bed, where I have left Olivia sleeping—

Sir Toby: Fire and brimstone!

Fabian: O, peace! peace!

Malvolio: And then to have the humour of state: and after a demure travel of regard, telling them I know my place, as I would they should do theirs, to ask for my kinsman Toby—

Sir Toby: Bolts and shackles!

Fabian: O, peace, peace, peace! now, now.

Malvolio: Seven of my people, with an obedient start, make out for him. I frown the while, and perchance wind up my watch, or play with my—some rich jewel. Toby approaches; curtsies there to me—

Sir Toby: Shall this fellow live? (II, v)

VI

The complexities of the relationship between Orsino, Viola and Olivia are generously resolved by the appearance of Viola's identical twin brother Sebastian. The latter comes innocently in and is within a few moments insulted by Sir Andrew and proposed to by Olivia. His gay and willing acceptance of the astonishing mistake that he is involved in embodies excellently that acquiescence in what is obviously lively and good which the whole play, in its various themes, points to. And it is Sebastian who says of the happy denouement:

But Nature to her bias drew in that.

In *Twelfth Night*, Nature is a genial and kindly mother, a good-humoured and tolerant corrector. Time, as Feste knows, is her assistant:

. . . and thus the whirligig of time brings in his revenges.

The forces of nature—both dampening and refreshing—bear down upon man's ridiculous inflations:

But when I came alas to wive,
 With hey ho, the wind and the rain,
 By swaggering could I never thrive,
 For the rain it raineth every day.

THE PROBLEM AND SIGNIFICANCE OF AGRIPPINA'S MURDER

by S. J. BATOMSKY

THE SCENE, Baiae on the bay of Naples, a quiet, peaceful night with the waters of the bay calm. The time, late March of 59 A.D. Nero, princeps of Rome, had just escorted his mother, Agrippina, to the imperial galley, a sumptuously decked-out vessel. With a fond embrace, perhaps too fond, he left her, and the ship put out for Bauli, a few miles away, with Agrippina and her maid, Acerronia Pollia, resting in the deck cabin. After being out of favour with her son, she had been invited to attend with him the festival of Minerva at Baiae. Suspicious, but pleased at the chance of regaining her influence, she had accepted, and a mansion at Bauli had been placed at her disposal. Now after dinner with her son, she was on her way home.

Then it happened. Confusion overtook the boat as the trap that had been set was sprung. The roof of the cabin, heavily weighted with lead, fell in. Another of Agrippina's attendants, Creperius Gallus, was killed instantly. The galley itself did not sink, but listed over. Agrippina and her maid were not killed: projecting beams had saved them, and they slid into the sea in the general turmoil. Acerronia cried out for help, shouting 'I am Agrippina'. Forthwith she was despatched with oars and boat-hooks. Agrippina herself, with greater caution, managed to swim away, even though she had injured her shoulder. She was picked up by some fishing vessels and taken to her own villa.

Realizing that her only chance was to feign ignorance, she sent word to Nero that she had by divine mercy escaped a serious accident. Nero at once summoned his two chief advisors, Seneca and Burrus, and they held a hurried conference. No plan was forthcoming, till Anicetus, the freedman commander of the fleet, who had actually built the boat, took over the whole direction of the crime. Agrippina's messenger was accused of attempting to assassinate the Emperor; and Anicetus with two of his men hastened to Agrippina's house, broke into it, and murdered her. The pretext, as it was later announced to the Senate, was that Agrippina, jealous of imperial power, had instigated a plot against Nero.

Such were the events of that night in March, to summarize briefly Tacitus' account of them.¹ The question now arises: who

was the actual instigator of Agrippina's death? The suspects can be narrowed down to a few—either Nero alone, or Nero in conjunction with Seneca and Burrus. The action certainly came from Anicetus, but who stood behind him?

Turning away from Tacitus for the moment, let us look at the History of Cassius Dio, as epitomized by Xiphilinus. He leaves out any reference to Seneca and Burrus being summoned when the messenger arrived from Agrippina, or to Anicetus taking upon himself the direction of the affair, and says simply:

'Upon hearing this Nero could no longer restrain himself, but punished the messenger as if he had come to assassinate him, and at once sent Anicetus with the sailors against his mother; for he would not trust the praetorians to slay her.'²

However, Dio does link Seneca with the plot from the beginning.

'He was incited likewise by Seneca (or so many trustworthy men have stated), whether from a desire to hush the complaint against his own name, or from his willingness to lead Nero on to a career of unholy bloodguiltiness . . . But they shrank from doing the deed openly . . . One day they saw in the theatre a ship that automatically parted asunder . . . and they at once caused another to be built like it.'³

Yet here, with his well-known dislike for Seneca, Dio is a doubtful authority, and it is worth checking his account against the other sources. Suetonius, for instance, makes no mention of Seneca and Burrus at all in his account of Agrippina's murder. He writes:

'He (Nero) determined to have her life . . . He devised a collapsible boat to destroy her life by shipwreck, or by the falling in of its cabin . . . On learning that everything had gone wrong, . . . driven by desperation, he secretly had a dagger thrown down beside her freedman, and then ordered that the freedman be seized and bound, on the charge of being hired to kill the Emperor, and that his mother be put to death.'⁴

Neither Suetonius nor Dio give us as detailed a picture of the events of the night of the shipwreck as Tacitus does; but when we turn to his account, we are faced with certain tantalizing difficulties. To quote Tacitus' account, then, of what occurred after the shipwreck: The news of her escape had just come to Nero and

'half dead with terror he protested that at any moment she would be here, hot for vengeance . . . What counter resource was at his own disposal? Unless there was hope in Seneca and Burrus! He had them summoned immediately; whether to test their feeling, or as cognizant already of the secret, is questionable.'⁵

The difficulty lies in the text of the passage. The passage

quoted above is from the Loeb translation of Jackson (1937), and the words 'Unless there was hope . . . is questionable' correspond to the Latin text adopted by him which reads as follows:

'Nisi quid Seneca et Burrus; quos statim acciverat, *incertum experiens* an et ante gnaros.'

Jackson is here following the conjectures of Wölfflin (1867) and Halm (1883). The relevant text in Fisher's Oxford Edition (1906) reads:

'Nisi quid Seneca et Burrus; quos *expergens* statim acciverat, *incertum* an et ante gnaros.'

'Unless Seneca and Burrus (could devise something). He *awoke them* and summoned them immediately. It is uncertain whether they were already aware (of the plot).'

The Medicean manuscript itself reads 'expergens quos', and Fisher follows Pfitzner in transposing the words. Furneaux (1891) also follows Pfitzner (1885), commenting:

'This reading has the merit of making no further change in the Medicean text than the transposition of the two latter words; the omission of a verb being explained, as in the preceding sentence, as rhetorically suited to the character of the passage.'⁵

Nipperdey (1852) reads 'incertum an aperiens'—'It is uncertain whether he was disclosing the plot.' A more modern editor, Fuchs (1949), keeps to the MS 'expergens quos', but marks it as an insoluble crux. Finally, Woodcock in his edition of book XIV (1939) adopts the reading:

'Nisi quid Burrus et Seneca *expedirent*; quos statim acciverat.'

'Unless Seneca and Burrus could *devise* something. He summoned them immediately.'

The whole question of what reading to adopt is not merely a verbal quibble, but is important to the true picture of the events of that night. One cannot simply accept without investigation Henderson's statement in his standard work on Nero, even though it may very possibly be true. He writes:

'He roused Seneca and Burrus in hot haste from their sleep, and called them in fierce impatience to him. They had known nothing of the childish plot—how could statesmen have approved its incredible folly?—and now listened to Nero's outburst of fear and rage in silent dismay.'⁶

Momigliano, writing in the Cambridge Ancient History on Nero seems merely to avoid the entire issue.⁷

If the reading of Woodcock is adopted, it seems not unlikely that Seneca and Burrus were involved in the plot from its beginning. They seem to have been awake, and Nero seems to have expected help from them.

The readings of Jackson, Halm and Wölfflin are neutral, although the 'experiens' does tend to leave the impression that Seneca and Burrus were not privy to the attempt. The same can be said for Nipperdey's 'aperiens'.

However, the reading 'expergens' of the MS, the Oxford text, Furneaux, Pfitzner and Fuchs seems most definitely to imply ignorance on the part of Seneca and Burrus. They can hardly be expected to have gone quietly to sleep after plotting the murder without awaiting news of the outcome of the scheme. Seneca and Burrus on the one hand, and Nero on the other, certainly would have been pleased with Agrippina's being pushed out of the way; but it seems surprising that men of the character of Seneca and Burrus would have adopted a scheme so easily capable of being bungled. As Furneaux says:

'Men of that age and experience would hardly have caught at the suggestion of the freedman, to get up a sham shipwreck on a calm night in the day of Baiae.'⁸

Henderson has already been quoted on the subject. What seems even more surprising is that, once having agreed on the plot, they had no alternative plan in the event of its failing. What happened was that Seneca asked Burrus if the Praetorian Guard would help in the business, and Burrus replied that they would not harm Germanicus's daughter. That was the sole help they gave to Nero.

It was left to Anicetus to suggest the way out of the difficulty; and: 'The words (of Anicetus) brought forth from Nero a declaration that that day presented him with an empire, and that he had a freedman to thank for so great a boon.'⁹

If, then, we adopt the hypothesis that Seneca and Burrus were not in the plot, and that Nero alone planned the murder, we may ask what the significance of this is.

The beginning of Nero's reign is usually regarded as a period of good government, following the tradition of attributing this to a statement of Trajan's reported by Aurelius Victor.¹⁰ This statement, however, speaks of a 'quinquennium', or five year period, but there seems to be no definite break till the death of Burrus in 62 A.D. Syme actually takes the quinquennium as extending up to this time.¹¹ Because of this difficulty, the traditional view of the quinquennium was challenged by Anderson, who sought to connect it with Nero's building programme in the last five years of his rule.¹² Lepper has answered Anderson's arguments, and put the case for keeping to the traditional view.¹³

But the problem of finding a well-defined break in 59 A.D., after five years, remains. Might not, then, the murder of Agrippina serve in some way to point to a change in Nero? Up till then he had relied heavily on Seneca and Burrus, and it was certainly in no small way due to their influence that Rome and the provinces had been well governed. Now, however, Nero had ventured on a daring action, possibly on his own, and in his hour of need Seneca

and Burrus had failed him. Though Seneca later wrote the speech delivered to the Senate on Agrippina's death, Nero had found that he could stand without them. Their influence would thus have been struck a tremendous blow.

'Nero no longer had confidence in his counsellors for ultimate emergencies. It was not the great First Counsellor who had been prompt and relentless in the hour of need, but a freedman. Nero constantly remembered thereafter, and was constantly reminded thereafter by his entourage, that it was not Seneca who had served him best, or indeed at all, in his hour of frenzied fear, but one of themselves, namely Anicetus.'¹⁴

The murder of Agrippina can thus be seen to have had wide repercussions if one adopts the theory of Nero working at first without the knowledge of Seneca and Burrus. But it must still remain one of those tantalizing questions that a crux in a text poses for us.

NOTES

- ¹ Tacitus. *Annals XIV* 4-8.
- ² Dio. *History LXII* 13 iv (Loeb Translation).
- ³ Ibid. *LXII* 12 i, ii.
- ⁴ Suetonius. *Nero* 34 ii, iii (Loeb).
- ⁵ Tacitus. *Annals XIV* 7 i, 11 (Loeb).
- ⁶ Henderson, B. W. *The Life and Principate of the Emperor Nero*. Methuen, London, 1903, p. 121.
- ⁷ Momigliano, A. 'Nero' in *Cambridge Ancient History*, Cambridge, 1934, p. 716.
- ⁸ Furneaux, H. *The Annals of Tacitus*, Vol. II. Oxford, 1892. P. 64 n.
- ⁹ Tacitus. *Annals XIV* 7 vi (Loeb).
- ¹⁰ Aurelius Victor. *Liber de Caesaribus* 5 i-iv.
- ¹¹ Syme, R. *Tacitus*. Oxford, 1958. P. 262.
- ¹² Anderson, J. G. C. 'Trajan on the Quinquennium Neronis.' *Journal of Roman Studies* I, 1911, 173.
- ¹³ Lepper, F. A. 'Some Reflections on the Quinquennium Neronis.' *Journal of Roman Studies* XLVII, 1957, 95.
- ¹⁴ Alexander, W. H. *The Tacitean 'Non Liqueat' on Seneca*. University of California Publications in Classical Philology, Berkeley, 1952, p. 314.

PARTY POLICIES IN CENTRAL AND EAST AFRICA

by C. J. JUTA

NATIONALISM may be expressed in a variety of ways but probably the easiest way of understanding it is to analyse the principles and policies of nationalist parties. Unlike cultural and other organisations formed by nationally-minded groups, which may be considered either as pressure groups or manifestations of nationalism, political parties do not hide their lights behind bushels. A political party has to make an impact on the masses who cannot be expected to support cultural societies and organisations, but who may confidently be expected to accept or reject a party policy. The simpler the manner in which that policy is expressed, the more easily will it be understood. A political party's policy may therefore be expected to reflect the baser and more fundamental instincts and desires of the electorate.

A brief analysis of the Nationalist Party's policy in the Republic will illustrate the point. Like almost all other parties it stands for the development of the 'national autonomy and independence'; it will help to realise the 'national aspirations and convictions of the people of South Africa'; it urges the promotion of the country's 'economic independence and the expansion of her trade relations in all directions'; and so on.¹ The party also has certain ideas about the separation of the different races of people living in the Republic. To put all this in a nutshell the catchword 'Apartheid' was coined, and it electrified the world. It means all things to all men. To the man in the street the party's policy is 'Apartheid' and to that word he applies a meaning of his own choice. No catchword has ever been more effective, not even Mr Churchill's famous wartime V-sign.

ONE-MAN-ONE-VOTE.

No such catchword has yet been coined in either East or Central Africa except perhaps 'Uhuru' or 'Kwacha'—or 'One-man-one-vote', which is a slogan, not a catchword. Both are effective, particularly 'Uhuru'—or 'Kwacha', which means the same thing—but when 'Freedom' has been attained its effect as a vote-catcher will disappear, unless it is applied in another context. Common to the policies of most of the African parties, however, is the slogan 'One-man-one-vote', but it has never been extended to 'One-man-

one-vote-one-value', and it has been said, perhaps with justification, that in places it could degenerate into 'One-man-one-vote-one election'.

This demand for 'One-man-one-vote' has been written into the manifestoes of the African National Congress of Northern Rhodesia, originally led by Mr Harry Nkumbula who is now the leader of UNIP's strongest rival, the African Nationalist Party; the United National Independence Party of Northern Rhodesia led by Mr Kenneth Kaunda; the Nyasaland Malawi Congress Party of Dr Hastings Banda; the now practically defunct Congress Liberation Party of Nyasaland led by Mr T. D. T. Banda; Mr Joshua Nkomo's Southern Rhodesian National Democratic Party, now banned and replaced by the Zambesi African People's Union; Mr Jomo Kenyatta's Kenya African National Union; Mr Nyerere's Tanganyika African National Union; as well as practically every other political party which is mainly supported by Africans.

None of the following 'White' parties has accepted the slogan; Sir Roy Welensky's United Federal Party in the Federation, Mr Winston Field's Federal Dominion Party, Sir John Moffat's Central African Party which operates (or operated) in the Federation, Mr John Gaunt's Rhodesian Reform Party, the Dominion Party of Southern Rhodesia led by Mr W. J. Harper, or the two Kenyan parties, the Kenya Coalition and the New Kenya Party led by Sir F. Cavendish-Bentinck and Sir Michael Blundell respectively.

Never having been allowed to vote it is natural that Africans should demand universal adult suffrage, but without being facetious one questions whether the demand by politicians for 'One-man-one-vote' is based on the desire to help their fellow men, or to climb on to the band-wagon quickly. In the political vacuums that exist in most African states the stakes are high and those who are able to fill the high positions are not easily removed. None of Dr Nkrumah's C.P.P., Dr Banda's Malawi Congress Party, Mr Kenyatta's KANU, Mr Nyerere's TANU, or Mr Kaunda's UNIP will meet with or allow substantial opposition in the near future. At a recent symposium in Nyasaland, Mr Orton Chirwa, Parliamentary Secretary to the Nyasaland Minister of Justice, stated that unity was Africa's strength and that it could only be consolidated under a one-party government. It was foolish to talk about multi-party systems. They all wanted the same thing in Africa and they should get it through one-party rule.²

AFRICAN UNITY AND PAN-AFRICANISM.

Not unnaturally another common aspect of policy is that the unity of the African people should be attained. The magnitude of the task should not be underestimated, but that does not detract from the virtue of this ideal.

It will be recalled that Dr Malan worked to weld together the Afrikaners into a political unit, all his life, and even then he was only partially successful. It has taken the Broederbond—

and the Reddingsdaadbond—many years to find the financial support necessary for the task, and it required and still constantly requires the unremitting efforts of the hierarchy of Afrikaner leadership to prevent factions and individuals splitting off. Another contributory factor which assisted Dr Malan but which is missing elsewhere in Africa is that the Afrikaner 'volk' is a homogeneous group bound together by language, tradition and religion, relatively well educated, and, compared with African society, wealthy. These centripetal forces do not exist in African society, although it is not denied that the urge for unity is there. The primary centrifugal forces will probably be tribalism, political inertia, poverty and ethnic differences like language, customs and the like.

It seems as if enormous efforts are being made to build up political and ideologically-inspired blocs before the different nations have been fully crystallised and established. Breathtaking vistas of Pan-African movements; Casablanca, Brazzaville and Accra 'groups' of states; Afro-Asian groups in the United Nations; huge federal groupings, and the like, are the order of the day. Would it not be more desirable if all this energy and money which is being spent on an international scale were to be canalised into national necessities like housing, health, administration, education, transport, communications, employment and industrialisation? It would make more sense if the passion for establishing universities were devoted to establishing more primary schools and health clinics; if the money voted to be used to beam high-powered radio broadcasts were used to provide a more useful local service; if the money used to provide Buicks, Cadillacs, Landrovers and party printing presses were to be canalised into agricultural and hydro-electric schemes, and if the workers were provided with better pensions and compensation rather than encouraged to foster unnecessary strikes and trade union activities.

ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND POLITICAL ADVANCEMENT.

While most manifestoes and party principles play up the political aspects some paragraphs are devoted to social and economic considerations. In Northern Rhodesia the African National Congress wants the abolition of tribalism, the promotion of education and the political, economic and social advancement of the Africans; UNIP demands full political and fundamental human rights; Malawi pledges itself to promote the political, social and economic emancipation of the people; the N.D.P. will 'fight relentlessly' to promote the political, educational, social and economic emancipation of the people; KANU promises education for all for seven years; so does KADU; so does TANU.

EDUCATION.

All African parties are interested in education and even in Nyasaland a university has been mooted. Africa will bristle with institutions of higher learning long before the bread-and-butter

problems are solved. One hopes that British and American philanthropy will go on financing them.

LAND RIGHTS.

The questions of land rights and resettlement loom large in party programmes. Denied the right to own land, forced to work on the farms of 'settlers', driven to live in 'locations' and shanty towns, Africans are now demanding their rights to the land.

The African National Congress demands the enlargement of African land rights and privileges; UNIP requires the full liberation of Northern Rhodesia from undemocratic, imperial and colonial rule; Malawi demands the same; N.D.P. is pledged to promote the social and economic emancipation of the people; KANU demands resettlement under a land reform programme and promises to abolish the squatter system.

FEDERATION OF RHODESIA AND NYASALAND.

As may be expected the African parties in the Federation are all pledged to destroy it. Malawi and UNIP have been fiercely antagonistic to Sir Roy Welensky's dreams of a united Central Africa. In its place another concept has been put forward, that of a mighty federation in East Africa comprised of Tanganyika, Uganda, Kenya, Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia. If Mr Nyerere's dream is realised the largest state in Africa will have been born, Southern Rhodesia will be isolated, the political centre of gravity will move from west to east and the present order will disappear; but personal differences among the leaders might delay the establishment of this empire.

COMMONWEALTH.

Little has been made by the African parties of the issue of membership of the Commonwealth. KANU states its policy as follows:

'KANU has no intention of taking Kenya out of the Commonwealth. That association was founded on certain principles worthwhile for all humanity, and was in the right direction towards a world oneness.'³

Foreign military bases, and that, today, means British Army bases, will not be tolerated in Kenya.

Mr Kenneth Kaunda's policy is reported in the *Sunday Times* (5/8/62) as follows:

'The leader of the United National Independence Party, Mr Kenneth Kaunda, said today he would take Northern Rhodesia out of the Commonwealth, after his party came to power, if the British Government continued to impose federation.'

The 'White' parties are quite definite about *their* intentions. The U.F.P. would build a Commonwealth bastion in Central Africa; the Federal Dominion Party would institute constitutional reforms in the Federation which would result in Dominion status

for that country; the Central African Party would build a united nation of 'all our people' under the Crown, and Mr W. J. Harper's Dominion Party in Southern Rhodesia pledges its loyalty to the Queen and the British Commonwealth. In Kenya the New Kenya Party's first principle is 'loyalty to Kenya and to the concept of Commonwealth', and the Kenya Coalition's constitution will 'ensure the continuance of allegiance to the Crown and the Commonwealth.'

LABOUR.

The parties are not effusive about their relations with labour movements or trade unions. Malawi will work with and in the interests of the Trade Union Movement and other kindred organisations whose aims and objects are in harmony with its constitution. KANU's policy is stated as follows:

'In its plans for the speedy economic reconstruction of Kenya, KANU argues strongly against private enterprise, describing it as "a doctrine which made paupers out of workers, driving them to live in crowded slums."

'It argues in favour of a system where "private and public sectors share in the economic field with a more limited form of planning extending over both. Planning in this context means that the interests of the community have to be placed before anything else".'⁴

EUROPEAN AND AFRICAN ASPIRATIONS.

All parties pay lip service to democracy but the different approaches by the African and White parties are marked. Like some African literature the African parties reflect in their statements a pugnacity which is absent from those of the White parties. They reveal force, power, vigour and vitality; they are on the offensive; they demand all rights and their demands are irresistible. They will no longer be put off.

KANU's manifesto abounds in such phrases as 'speedy economic reconstruction', 'means of production, distribution and exchange', 'crash programmes of Africanisation'. UNIP would 'mobilise world opinion', 'accelerate the liberation of Northern Rhodesia', and 'fight for secession NOW'. Malawi offers to 'serve as a vigorous conscious political vanguard for removing all forms of oppression', 'to work relentlessly, and to promote Pan-Africanism'. The N.D.P. echoes these words without change; in fact the policies of Malawi and the N.D.P. are almost identical.

The White parties reflect the back-to-the-wall attitude of most of the Whites in East and Central Africa. They demand bills of rights, they cling to the Commonwealth, they speak of keeping the government in 'civilised hands', they harp on 'British traditions of justice, freedom and loyalty to the Crown'. There is much talk of 'partnership' and 'co-operation', and the 'fundamental rights of the individual'. Suddenly the principle of 'government by

consent' seems to have become important; large-scale European immigration is demanded, and 'land titles should be safeguarded'. All sorts of constitutional devices are incorporated into the constitutions to protect minorities.

The European is on the defensive; he is withdrawing from Africa; his manifestoes reflect his last-ditch political defence.

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‘ MENTAL HEALTH ’

by B. CROWHURST ARCHER

MR THEO GERDENER, the Administrator of Natal, in a recent address to the Nursing Staff of Addington Hospital, stressed the importance of the psychological element in health and disease. But until the training of doctors and nurses has received considerable reinforcement in this direction, they will lack the balanced vision and sensibility which, as a profession, they owe to their patients.

An American Committee on Medical Education reported as long ago as 1945 that the understanding of human relationships and feelings, and the way they both affect and are affected by physical health and disease, is indispensable to the properly trained doctor and nurse. The Committee's subsequent cautionary note displays a realism not untinged with irony: after recommending an increase in the proportion of time to be devoted to psychological medicine, the report adds 'but the committee does not favour increasing the number of hours given to psychiatry to a percentage equalling or approximating to the incidence of psychiatric problems in practice, which might bring them up to as much as 60 per cent of the entire curriculum.'

Never in the history of mankind has the physician been called upon to treat so many patients with psychiatric disorders. This is not due to the biological deterioration of our species, as some would have us believe, but is the result of radical economic, social and cultural changes that have followed the industrial revolution of the last century. These changes have been accelerated by two World Wars and the disintegration of many European states, and by the general decline in the old value systems.

True, modern civilisation is rapidly eradicating the slur of the slums and the ravages of disease, but at the same time it has given rise to stress reactions of a psychological nature for which no physical cause can be found—a veritable pandemic of neurotic and psychosomatic disorder.

It should be realised that in the more culturally and economically developed countries there is an insanity rate of something like two per cent amongst people of these countries, and a rate of neurosis—defined at the level of partially disabling illness—of about ten per cent. Treatment and preventive medicine are no longer the affair of numerous specialists working in isolation. The Public Health Services exist to prevent and modify illness and must assume responsibility for the total welfare of their patients. If the inci-

dence of physical disease reached the same proportion as many of our social ills with mental and emotional causes (alcoholism, delinquency, suicide, and even divorce), not to mention classical mental disease, an epidemic state would be declared and strong measures would be taken to combat it.

In 1957 Professor Rumke, Director of the Department of Psychiatry, of the University of Utrecht, the Netherlands, visited this country. He said that psychology and sociology appeared to be well represented by 'chairs' at our Universities, but not psychiatry. He had gained the impression that while medicine, surgery, and the other specialities were on par with those of any other country in the world, the outlook of the general public on mental illness was at least thirty or forty years behind that of the rest of the Western world. He also made the penetrating observation that a reasonable number of jokes about every profession was natural; there were, however, far too many jokes about psychiatry in this country, which suggested that the present public attitude towards this particular branch of medicine was puerile, if not unhealthy. The suffering of mental illness far exceeds that of cancer, yet, while the popular comedian or the cartoonist would not dare to ridicule a case of cancer, he would not hesitate to caricature cruelly the victim of mental illness in a way that savours of the Dark Ages.

It is now generally agreed that the problem of mental illness can only be satisfactorily resolved by integrating psychiatry into the 'general medicine' curriculum and combining it into a multi-disciplined mental health service. It is true that the provision of a satisfactory mental health service for South Africa presents certain difficulties on account of the size of the country and the uneven distribution of its multi-racial population. But with the introduction of the successful methods of physical treatment, and the recently proved economic and therapeutic advantages of 'early treatment centres', the problem is not as great as it would at first appear.

With the rapid advances in psychiatric medicine and a study of their application to the needs of the community overseas, it is now possible to discern the direction in which our own mental health services are likely to develop. But attempts to impose these patterns rigidly on other countries with different traditions and cultures and at different stages of social development might well lead to disappointment and even failure. Before attempting to plan a mental health service for the Republic of South Africa, one should consider the general state of medical care throughout the country, the nature of the work of the general practitioner in both urban and rural areas, the mental health resources at present available in the community, whether the mental disorders in any particular culture are secondary to physical disease or caused by socio-economic stresses, and whether the emphasis in treatment should be sociological, psychotherapeutic or by means of drugs. The first essential of a mental health service is that it should be realistic. Three groups have to be convinced that it is workable

and that it will benefit them personally—the medical and nursing staffs of the present psychiatric service, the government administrators, and the general public.

The initial appeal must be made to the doctors, because without their support the scheme can never get started. As the doctors and their staffs are overworked under the present system, they must be convinced that their work will be made easier and more rewarding by the adoption of the plan. Administrators are more likely to approve a plan that is already in operation or can be started without involving them in any great financial outlay or political responsibility. Finally, the plan should be self-advertising and flexible, and should be so framed that once the first step has been taken a public demand is created for the next.

Good medicine needs good management. The delay in the development of a satisfactory mental health service in this country is largely due to the present administrative difficulties. It is bad enough when a patient suffers from two diseases which fall under the jurisdiction of two separate government departments, but it is even worse when a single illness falls under two separate authorities, the Central Government and the Provincial Administration. This is the fate of psychiatry. Speaking generally, the major psychoses are the responsibility of the Central Government and the psychoneuroses are partially cared for by the Provincial Authorities. This artificial separation has left that large middle group, the 'borderline cases', almost uncared for, and in any circumstances, from the purely medical point of view, this artificial separation and dual control is clinically dangerous. How then in this period of transition should we attempt to bring psychiatry under a common authority with a single purpose?

It is anticipated that the mental hospital of the future in South Africa will be defined by function more than structure. Its curative sections consisting of short- and medium-stay early-treatment units will be in or near the general hospitals, where most of the outpatient work will be done. The early-treatment centres will be run on similar lines to those of the Antwerp and Worthing experiments, which provide a small number of beds, a day-patient system (which is a compromise between an inpatient and an outpatient service) and full facilities for domiciliary treatment. It has been shown abroad that this district mental hospital system has so reduced the number of admissions to the neighbouring mental hospitals that some writers contend that no further mental hospitals should be built until these experiments have been worked out. It is of interest and a source of great satisfaction that a pilot scheme of this kind has now been started in Durban and the first reports are most encouraging.

The first priority in any mental health service is not only to provide for good guidance, diagnosis and treatment but also good training facilities for general practitioners, intending specialists and auxiliary workers. Increased psychiatric outpatient facilities

and early treatment centres must be provided at our general hospitals and patients encouraged to obtain expert advice about their emotional and mental disturbances at the earliest possible moment, as in any other illness. These facilities will do much to rid the public mind of the age-old 'stigma and shame' that have for so long been associated with disturbances of the higher functions of the nervous system and will ensure, by early diagnosis, less protracted treatment and a greater chance of cure.

CORRESPONDENCE

THE ENGLISH EXAMINATION PAPERS

The Editors, *Theoria*,
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P.O. Box 375,
PIETERMARITZBURG.

Sirs,

You hope that many readers will join lustily in the battles begun in the Correspondence Column of *Theoria* 18.

While I agree generally with Mr Langman's criticism of the examination paper in question and am not disposed to do battle lustily in defence of the Board's examiners in English, there are two points I would like to make:

1. In Question 2 (c) the reference is presumably to the second line of the sonnet which runs, or staggers:

. . . 'For as you were when first your eye
I eyed . . .'

Whether this line is flawless or not (and I find it excruciating —aye, aye, aye, sir) is indeed, as Mr Langman says, a matter of opinion. But may not a teacher, justifiably, point out to his class that even Shakespeare is not the god of foolish idolatry that so many are taught to worship; that, like Homer, he nods sometimes, though rarely; and that 'would he had blotted a thousand' may be hyperbole but does apply to at least two lines in the canon: this, and the regrettable

'More than our brother is our chastity'
in *Measure for Measure*?

2. I am surprised that Mr Langman has not criticised the examiners' own use of the vile phrases, 'the above passage' in Question 1 (c) and 'the above sonnet' in Question 2 (c), when they could so much more simply, and correctly, have referred to *this* passage and *this* sonnet.

Yours faithfully,

NEVILLE NUTTALL,
Natal Training College.

THE PICTURE AS A SOURCE OF KNOWLEDGE

by T. CIENSKI

I. INTRODUCTION.

The conception of a picture as an act of knowledge appeared relatively late in the history of art.¹

Though the solution of the artistic problem in this intellectual sense has been started several times in philosophy, this approach for a long time remained foreign to the history and theory of art. For this the most likely reason seems to be the long persistence of the view according to which aesthetic facts are essentially anti-intellectual and of the attitude that, aesthetically, judgments are fundamentally harmful.

The aesthetic enjoyment was considered as dominating exclusively the artistic experience. Expressive of this expansion of aesthetics in art studies were the views of T. Lipps, estimating those studies as an integral part of aesthetics only. Thus the point of view which predominated in the theory of art was not intellectual but hedonistic.²

In such a situation the position of Hettner, who regarded the artistic phenomenon as an act of thought, may be called a real novelty.³ He found followers in the first half of the twentieth century, and among them mainly F. Burger.⁴ Burger called the painting a mode of representation of human knowledge. He sought in the picture a 'general law of phenomena', which would be revealed mainly in the form of the painting, particularly in its expression—thus 'the pictorial form is a judgment'. This judgment, which had to be a formative principle of the painting, he held to act generally outside the consciousness of the painter, revealing pictorial solutions corresponding to several philosophical problems of his time. From this point of view Burger analyses some periods of the history of painting. The importance of this position lies firstly in the complete break with the attitude expressed by the slogan 'art for art's sake' and the search for absolute beauty in an object of art, and secondly, in the associated break with the isolationist and autonomic attitude represented by several extremists of the school of Woelfflinian formalism. The emphasis on the picture's expressing judgments, although without a completely adequate investigation of the foundations for such an approach, was a

step forward in the intellectual interpretation of pictures. This position is appropriate then, as a starting point for this summary, in which it is intended to touch shortly on the intellectual content of a picture and its practical application in the history of art.

II. THE INTELLECTUAL DATA OF THE PICTURE.

The picture, like every object of art, functions as an intermediary between the spectator and the artist. There is then a complex of three elements, the artist, the painting and the spectator, connected by two functions, firstly, the creative function of the artist, leading to the picture as a point of arrival, and secondly, the largely recreative function of the observer, arising from the picture, as its starting point. The acknowledgement of this complex reveals that the role of the painting resembles another intermediary role—that of a sign. Thus for the better understanding of how a picture conveys knowledge, it is convenient to treat the picture as a sign.⁵

In order to do this, without any deep plunge into the theory of signs, it is necessary to introduce several elementary semantic notions. The representing sign is a physical object, used to initiate, in whoever perceives it, a concrete thought concerning another object. The aspect or form of the object of a representation has to be understood as a compact complex of visual perceptions—which means a certain complex of sensations and associated representations, existing permanently as a construction in spite of possible changes in its several elements without changing the concerned objectal type. A similarity of aspects often occurs between the two corresponding objects—the sign and its referent.

This similarity provides a natural qualification for the first to be a sign of the second: it is then 'a sign indicating by similarity of form,' a particular sign among other kinds of signs.

Regarding a picture as a sign of this kind, at least as far as non-abstract painting is concerned, one may say in general that the objects indicated by the painting are those objects whose forms are similar to the corresponding forms in the picture. It is precisely the right understanding of the representing elements which makes possible the transition from these to the 'outside' ones in the real or imaginary world of things. Abstract paintings are obviously not included in this account: they will resemble as function a different kind of sign. Thus the above interpretation of a picture as a sign may be carried further by saying that the perceiver's attention is finally directed to the objects indicated in the picture, as to its referents. Confronting such a sign one is authorised by virtue of its forms to ascribe to its referents all the judgments assigned in the form.

One may say that such a sign expresses all such judgments, so-called 'represented judgments', in which all the properties given by the forms are attributed to their referents.

Accordingly one may say about the picture by Domenico Ghirlandaio depicting an old man clasping a child to his breast,

that it expresses the judgments in which goodness and mildness are ascribed to the elder of the two designated persons—that it expresses them in virtue of the given forms. These ‘represented judgments’ based directly on the same data given in the perception of a picture, as in the above case—the judgments attributing mildness and goodness to the old man—constitute the direct intellectual data.⁶ They provide the origin and source for other judgments generated from them by means of reasoning, which extend the interpretation of the picture far beyond the objects represented. All of those judgments together constitute the indirect intellectual data of the picture. And by means of them eventually with the addition of yet other data penetration is achieved into the most fundamental problems in the history of art.

Thus, for instance, in the painting by Adrian van Ostade of country folk in front of a country house, the direct intellectual data are figures in their Sunday clothes, with bright and laughing faces, sitting, drinking and smoking on benches at tables, and with a house providing the background. One may conclude from the above the first indirect, intellectual data, that it is a holiday and that the participants possess considerable wealth. Further one could draw the conclusion—another indirect judgment, not without help of other ones from outside of the picture—that the growth of wealth in the Netherlands in the eighteenth century was not limited to the townsman only.

III. THE KNOWLEDGE GIVEN BY THE PICTURE.

Its General Character: The larger or smaller set of communications that can be obtained from a picture comprises the knowledge given by the picture. This knowledge, in the widest sense, embraces all the data of the picture, those based directly on its representation, viz. the direct data of the picture—and the indirect ones as well. This meaning of ‘knowledge’, which possibly does not seem to conform to its usual one, may be considered odd but seems to be rather useful, as all those data may provide communications—that is they all may constitute a source of knowledge.

But although the intellectual data of a picture, as explained above, occur in every experience of it, yet the majority of the indirect judgments complemented by other ‘extra-picture’ judgments are formulated and made explicit, particularly in the history and theory of art. Accordingly, a look into the various kinds of this knowledge also seems to be advisable for the better understanding of the scope of those lines of reasoning used in the problems of the history of art.

An exaggerated moderation in this sphere will hinder the investigator from making judgments concerning indirect intellectual data; from this a certain scepticism enters into the history of art as, for instance, in the case of M. Deri, who admitted valuation, but denied an understanding of historically distant paintings.⁷ The opposite of this case of ‘too little’ is a case of ‘too much’:

an excessive zeal may easily result in conclusions being drawn which, being too far removed from their starting point, have quite lost their contact with the painting. And thus there occur cases of a methodical 'pansymbolism', exaggerating the historical 'transparency' of the picture.

In particular the Viennese art historians formed that stream in the history of art which linked development in art with changes in the spiritual evolution of the culture. Some of them had to defend themselves against that kind of accusation in spite of its successful exploration, especially in early Christian, medieval and 'manieristic' art.⁸

It seems advisable, in dealing with disputes and differences such as these, to determine the worth of the professed knowledge in the history of art from a general methodological point of view.

Its value may depend on its formal conditions and its content and subject. As regards the first, this knowledge may be considered to be of a more or less probable character only, if the respective communications are based on the picture exclusively. In that case, the conclusion is a result of reasoning, starting from premisses given in the picture's direct intellectual data, i.e. a result of explanation, which does not lead to indubitable conclusions. Accordingly, the truth of the consequences does not imply the truth of their reasons, provided other judgments from other pictures or from outside of them help to determine the final conclusion categorically; thus, for instance, the pictures of the Silesian school of painting in the early fifteenth century are distinguished by the bright, even striking, colour-tone, which may be an artistic feature of this style, as well as an effect of the relative darkness of their painting studios in the Guild Houses at Painters Street in Wroclaw.⁹ Both possibilities are to be considered, till the difficulty of the choice of one of them is resolved on the basis of written sources.

Similarly, in the case of the portrait of Henry VIII by Holbein Junior, indirect knowledge, based on the interpretation of the expression of the king's face, informs one about the presumptive energy and violence of the model.

But only historical knowledge from outside of the picture could confirm this supposition based on the picture itself.

Those remarks may seem to be superfluous truisms; nevertheless, they are emphasized here for the better realisation of the informative value of the picture.

As regards the content of that knowledge in relation to the variability of the above-mentioned value, another kind of distinction is made in the practice of studies in the history of art—by asking whether the subject of an art-historical solution can provide critical and systematic answers to three special questions.

The maximalists not being satisfied by the answers to the questions 'What is represented?' and 'How is it represented?' require also an answer to the question 'Why is it represented?'—understood just in such a pictorial way.¹⁰

In particular the group of art historians who consider '*Kunstgeschichte als Geistesgeschichte*' demand this, expecting from the answer more than ever before from the history of art. The minimalists, on the other hand, denounce such investigations either as being too hazardous or as reaching too far into the irrational factors in the history of art—hence depriving them of any scientifically informative value.¹¹

Whatever may be the scientific look 'through the picture' by means of knowledge from the picture, it should be carried out within the above-mentioned methodological limits.

Classification of the Knowledge given in the Picture: One may regard some characteristics of this knowledge as principles of its classification. This classification, distinguishing some of its kinds as undertaken above, is not intended to reproduce the actual course of the intellectual activity in the artistic experience of a painting, in which it may occur in a more or less compact manner.

The first principle of classification may be found in the process by which this knowledge is obtained, i.e. the 'processual' principle. And here the process occurs on two levels (or in two phases), yielding the two kinds of knowledge described above.

The first is the most immediate one, which somehow occurs by itself, without any special effort on the part of the viewer, based directly on the sense perception data—those judgments being the direct intellectual data of the picture.

The second, which issues from a process of reasoning sometimes not fully conscious, provides indirect knowledge, which is all knowledge from the picture not obtained in the first process.

For instance, in the cartoon of Michelangelo, 'The Battle of Cascine', there could be stated as direct intellectual data—a troop of soldiers, part dressing themselves hurriedly, part still bathing on a steep river-bank. In finding that the reason of their hurry must be an alarm blown on the trumpet by a soldier, a fact belonging to the indirect intellectual data is noticed. The knowledge drawn from historical sources informs us about a battle near Cascine, where the Florentines were involved in an ambush—but remained victorious. That confirms and justifies the indirect reasoning in the intellectual interpretation of the cartoon.

The second principle of classification may be the attitude to the object of the knowledge given by the picture—i.e. objectival. Let us remember the scheme of an object of art as a complex of three elements—its executor, the object itself and the viewer, linked by both the creative activity of the author and the receptive activity of the viewer. In this scheme the painting could be regarded, firstly, as a manufactured thing—a piece of canvas in a frame, covered with layers of colour. For instance, in the altar of Ghent, the work of John and Hubert van Eyck, it has been found that the oil colours were applied as early as the first quarter of the fifteenth century. Here the object of knowledge is the painting as a material thing; whereas in the previously cited example of knowledge from

the cartoon of Michelangelo, its object was this cartoon as a sign, i.e. the same intermediary element of the above-mentioned scheme but treated semantically.

Further, the painting of Brouwer might communicate the artist's interest in the life of the country—this knowledge concerns the artist himself.

Finally, both the pictures of Michelangelo and Brouwer satisfy completely different kinds of artistic sensitivity in the viewer—thus they provide different kinds of knowledge concerning the artistic demand of the spectator of their own times—the last element of the scheme.

The third principle of classification may be a genetic one, starting from the picture as a sign, from its form or its subject.¹²

The Knowledge obtained from the Subject: Without going deeper into the meaning of the 'subject' of a picture, we shall use the notion here in the sense of a real life situation represented in the picture as a sign, as of something given in the picture, though extracted or derived from the picture's 'outside'.

The extraction of knowledge from the subject of a picture in this sense is more or less easy and fluctuates within considerable limits. Thus in some cases it may be obtained at first glance, for instance, in looking at a Netherlands 'still life'. But in other cases it may be progressively more difficult. It may sometimes be dependent upon the possession of other extra-pictorial knowledge—it could be stated in such a case that the gnostic value of the picture is in part gnostically conditioned.

So in the picture of Gericault called 'The Raft of Meduse' one may be impressed by the expressive features of desperate and dying figures—although knowing scarcely anything about the peculiar scene given in the picture. But the information provided from the 'outside' of the painting, explaining the subject as representing a moment in the tragic peregrination of travellers rescued from a sunken ship 'Meduse', allows a better understanding of the particular life situation represented in the picture—that is a better understanding of its subject.

Cases such as this occur particularly in pictures expressing in their subjects a fraction of a larger life situation which develops in time and space, sometimes with an historical or literary content. Only one moment or one place in such a development may be represented in the picture.

The subject of this kind of picture has its own history, which, from the point of view of the picture, may be called 'the pre-history of the picture'. The knowledge of this 'pre-history' could lead to a better understanding of the picture. In other words, it could be useful to obtain a better knowledge of the subject.¹³ The knowledge issued from the picture's subject matter, especially in historic art, afterwards provides a lot of information about the reality of things, for instance about the iconography—and about other things.¹⁴

Finally, in certain cases just the differences in the knowledge drawn from the subjects of two or more pictures accomplishing practically the same purpose could help to solve the problems linked with their origins.

For instance in the case of the previously mentioned cartoon of Michelangelo, the knowledge drawn from the subject, when verified by the sources, allows one to explain the origin of the cartoon as a glorification of the Florentine victory. But this kind of glorification is quite different in its subject from that of the portrait of the well-known Sicnese general, Guidoriccio Fogliani, by Simone Martini. This picture is, primarily, a personal glorification: thus there are two similar artistic acts aiming at similar purposes, but differently expressed in their subjects, corresponding viz. to two different historical mentalities, as the very origin and the background of both pictures.

The Knowledge obtained from the Form: The second element of the picture as a sign—the form, that is the aspects of objects represented in the picture and given in its subject—is also a source of information, thus of a new kind of knowledge.

A certain subject matter can be reproduced artistically in different kinds and its form may merely determine the acknowledged of the relevant representation as being a picture.

In the majority of pictures the forms, however freely constructed, seem to follow certain rules—which determine the organisation of its elements on the picture surface and assign the relation of aspects in the picture to the extrapictorial aspects of the respective objects. They may be called the picture's form principles. As determining the aspects of a pictorial representation, they may be built again by the spectator in his receptive activity, according to the previously mentioned scheme of an artistic experience as a complex of three elements, linked by two activities. The process of this reconstruction—at least as far as its intellectual part is concerned—leads to a conclusion, in which is stated an application of a concrete formal principle, which is drawn from judgments constituting the direct and indirect data of the picture and from other particular judgments as well. In these are included the results of comparisons of forms in the picture with the aspects of corresponding objects in an imaginary or existing reality. The variety of results obtained from such statements and conclusions could be considered on the one hand as a measure of the variety of formal principles applied in the pictures, and on the other hand of the variety of painters' attitudes towards the reality expressed in those principles. These conclusions are not in practice obtained separately, being closely connected to the other elements of the artistic experience, so they normally occur simultaneously with the perception of the picture.

The variety of these formal principles may begin with naturalistic ones, which tend theoretically to exclude any selection of details by the artist in order to obtain a precise likeness of aspects—and

end on the opposite side with those which, prescribing modifications affecting seriously the similarity of aspects of both realities (the pictorial 'internal' and the objectival 'external' ones), exceed the limits wherein the corresponding pictures could be considered as a sign indicating by similarity of forms.

The relating of those forms to the reality of things is of basic importance for both—for the reconstruction of the picture's formal principle and also for the resulting knowledge. This knowledge is more easily obtainable according as the picture's forms are closer to the forms of their referents in reality, than to imaginary and unreal ones. An increase of the painter's subjective intervention and activity in the representation may make more difficult the effective mutual confrontation of the picture's forms and those of reality. This fact was expressed in the conferring of the name 'activism' upon a subjective, unrealistic, introverted manner of painting, contrasting it with the more passive manner of representation of the extroverted, realistic painter.¹⁵

Extreme activism involves a complete break with reality, bringing about—as has already been said—the picture's becoming a different kind of sign, and the quality of the knowledge which issues from the form changes too. It becomes absolutely unrelated, emancipated and, in accordance with the above-mentioned regularity, more difficult to obtain, but intensified.

The knowledge which issues from a picture's form seems then to be essential to it. Thus it is understandable that parallel to a formal stream in art itself (strongly accentuating the forms in the picture) there developed a similar stream in art history culminating in Woelfflin's formalism, with a previous isolationist and autonomic tendency.

Nevertheless the opposite tendency, limiting the analysis of a painting to subject matter only, did not fail to develop in art history too. Its main representative was Muther whose history of painting is mainly a history of subject matter revealed in paintings.¹⁶

IV. RELATIONS AMONG THE VARIOUS 'COMMUNICATIONS' AND CORRESPONDING KNOWLEDGE GIVEN BY A PICTURE.

In accordance with the different kinds of knowledge examined in the above classification, the picture is to be regarded as a source of various sorts of knowledge concerning all parts of the picture as a sign, rather than of a uniform knowledge, a source of fragments of knowledge whose relations may be important in the final intellectual interpretation of the picture as a whole. If all those relations are limited to objects of knowledge concerning the elements of the picture only, they may be called *internal relations*. These internal relations might be examined mainly from the point of view of the concordance of the related kinds of knowledge, that is from the point of view of their 'quality', or they may be examined from the point of view of their role and importance in the picture,

depending mostly on the number of communications obtained, that is from the point of view of their 'quantity'.

Relations of 'Quality'. One may state in advance that, depending on the conformity of the communications given by the various parts of the picture—that is depending on the analogy among communications obtained from its various elements—it may correspondingly be granted various grades of 'consequence' or 'convergence'.

In this connection the form and subject matter may be examined separately. One may instance the frescoes of the inner walls of the church tower in St Savin (Poitu), dating from about 1060, which represent scenes of the life of Jesus. The ground is mostly of one colour, hence abstract, and embellished with several trees rather resembling chandeliers. Human figures are schematically depicted, and the surfaces bounded by the outlines are filled with bright colours. Modelling is almost entirely absent; the figures are scarcely linked with objective reality, and are represented un-individually, un-temporally and un-spatially. The whole presentation is sustained symbolically, and represents, in a consequently idealistic manner, human types rather than real figures.

In contrast to this example, certain late Gothic altar paintings from the beginning of the sixteenth century show simultaneously both naturalistic and idealistic elements; so that they inform us in a different way about the attitude to reality demonstrated in the picture's forms. In art theory such pictures are considered as formally 'cleaved'.

From the intellectual point of view, in conformity with the conception of the principle of the pictures' form, they could be described as following two or more such principles. Thus the formal consequence of a picture could be defined as a full artistic application of one single formal principle solely determining the forms in the picture and thus providing synonymous information provided from that source.

The above-mentioned distinction of different degrees of 'consequence' or 'convergence' of the communications obtained from various elements of the picture may be applied not only to the form, as we have just seen, but also to a considerable extent to the subject matter. Thus the paintings of Poitiers described above provide an instance not only of convergence of form, but also of subject matter. This assertion may be justified by the order of presentation where every part and detail is subordinate to the main motive of the represented life-situation; that is the events from the life of Jesus.

In this way it is possible to assert a unity in the representation of the subject, as well as a unity in the forms as stated above—and accordingly a unity in the corresponding knowledge. Such a unity is not present in the many 'Townmen Madonnas' of the late fifteenth century, where the details of an interior, strongly accentuated, draw the spectator's attention and distract from the main motive of the

subject, the representation of the Queen of Heaven, who, unlike the Christ in the pictures previously described, no longer dominates the scene.

Historical data from outside a picture may sometimes account for and clarify a certain 'lack of consequence' as for example in many paintings of the late fifteenth century. The growing Gothic realism may explain why it seems to happen so regularly there. The newly appearing factors, like realism in the instance quoted above, do not operate equally over the whole picture, so that there occurs what might be called the 'asynchronisation of changes', because the changes do not involve the whole picture simultaneously, as new forms are used to represent old subjects or new subjects are represented in old forms.

From this it may be concluded that the intellectual data as well as other data may express a certain historical situation, affecting the uniformity of the knowledge concerned.

Relations of Quantity: A different disturbance in the relations among the judgments based on a picture occurs, when the number of judgments arising from one particular element of the picture—i.e. either from the subject or from the form—considerably exceeds the number based on the other element. In these cases there is a lack of balance between the two kinds of knowledge. Predominance of knowledge from the subject matter occurs most often in didactic and moralising art, where the importance of that which is represented prevails over the manner of its representation. This happens for instance in the Hogarth picture which represents the effects of a family quarrel, such as departing guests, and chairs lying on the floor. Its moral, rather than its formal value, seems to be the real task of the picture. In this case the lack of balance between the two kinds of knowledge is still moderate. But in other cases the knowledge from the form may be considerably under-valued where the form value is decreased, and even reduced to nothing more than making recognisable the type of the object depicted. As an example could be instanced a Silesian 'Veraicon' of 1410, where a row of instruments of torture above the neckerchief of St Veronica are intended to act didactically and constructively on the spectator. This then constitutes the main part of the knowledge given by the picture; the form is not used as a method of education—hence unimportant.¹⁷

When the knowledge given by the form exceeds that given by the subject matter, the balance is disturbed in the opposite direction. An instance of this may be found in Goya's portrait of King Charles IV of Spain, which subject does not provide more knowledge of the model than many other portraits of the time. But by considering the expression on the King's face and the faces of his family one may find out far more about the personality of those figures, represented by Goya with severe and eloquent criticism, than is given in portraits by other painters, which have the same subject matter as Goya's but a far less expressive and thus less dominating form.

Other Internal Relations: Relations between the knowledge of a picture as a sign and a picture as a material manufactured thing, that is, its technique, its material and manner of execution, may constitute another type of the internal relations of pictures.

In striking cases of such regularities, which are based on links existing between the technique employed and its artistic effects, the knowledge of the technique enables one to predict the kind of knowledge which will be obtained from the form and even from the subject matter, and the contrary happens too, especially strongly in some schools of painting. For instance, the use of the impressionistic technique makes an impressionistic artistic result almost certain; and a very detailed naturalistic Netherlands painting of the fifteenth century is painted very probably in combined oil tempera technique, as particularly suited to give a meticulously complicated amount of detail.¹⁸

With regard to the *picture's external intellectual relations* it means that in relations between the knowledge from a picture as a sign and the knowledge from the outside of the picture is to be found a new type of knowledge—the discovering knowledge. The question is of the temporal priority of one of the two kinds of knowledge, knowledge expressed in the picture or by words—thus of their relative discovering value. Thus the knowledge conveyed by the picture may be merely a repetition of some other knowledge previously expressed extrapictorially, or it may not be identical with this. An increase of previous knowledge may be evidenced in different elements of the picture. For instance the paintings of the Quattrocento, by the introduction of new perspectival constructions and by an anatomically correct and exact reproduction of the human body, presented a completely new knowledge, overcoming the results of the time by the sciences of perspective and topographical anatomy.

Even those pictures which cannot be considered as signs representing by similarity of form, may evidence such a discovering function; for instance, some expressionistic paintings of the early twentieth century supply data concerning the structure of dream visions, while various futuristic paintings provide novelties concerning the functioning of visual memory. In both these cases the increases constitute an enrichment of psychological knowledge rather than of objective knowledge of the reality of things.

A similar discovering function may in some instances be attributed to judgments obtained from the picture's subject matter. The portrait of King John II of France, from the second half of the fourteenth century, is a source of information on the one hand concerning the King himself, and on the other hand concerning new secular interests, seen in this first portrait of a feudal heir. Similarly, the subjects of most of Daumier's drawings, showing the life of the French bourgeoisie of the nineteenth century, provide a better knowledge of that way of life than any other source of the time.

But yet another kind of discovery is possible in paintings—when the painter artistically draws the viewer's attention, particularly in an intensified way, to parts or details of the reality depicted. Certainly those details were previously seen—but not sufficiently distinguished from their environment. This process may even be regarded as the artistic enlarging of the viewer's apperception-field, and so in this sense it may be considered as a pictorial discovery of the object, and as communicating new knowledge concerning it. Thus Oscar Wilde was right when he said that Manet discovered the fogs of the Seine in his well-known landscape with this river.

V. THE KNOWLEDGE BASED ON THE FORM AND SUBJECT, THE *Weltanschauung*-KNOWLEDGE.

Finally, all elements of a picture have to be considered in order to obtain a knowledge expressing a certain attitude towards the environment—the so-called '*Weltanschauung*-Knowledge' given in the picture.

As was previously mentioned, the formal principle of a picture expresses this attitude—and can be reconstructed by the spectator. As the majority of the pictures are formally constructed on bases of a concrete formal principle, then, consequently, in a majority of these, such an attitude is clearly to be stated, even in those pictures whose principle seems to be the most passive one—that is, prescribing the most pedantic imitation of aspects of reality in the picture's forms—the naturalistic principle.

To put in words this knowledge a passage must be made from a certain meaningful expression of the colour spots in the picture to its verbal expression in the sentences relating jointly in their subject, the *Weltanschauung*, which is just an attitude to reality in its epistemological even ontological sense.

From the theoretical point of view this knowledge is founded on the system of represented judgments, as presenting pictorially the painter's opinion of how the things of the external reality seem to him to be. Theoretically it could be expressed by words in 'psychological sentences'. Thus in these judgments the occurrence of those visual sensations constituting the picture's direct intellectual data is stated. In proportion to the painter's sincerity they are true. This determines the artistic character of his work. Many of those above-mentioned judgments are assisted by other 'existence judgments' stating (according to the painter's opinion) 'what exists'.¹⁹

On the same complex of represented judgments which provides the basis of the *Weltanschauung*-knowledge, is founded the formal principle of the picture, which can in that way be linked with a corresponding *Weltanschauung*-knowledge.

But this correspondence is another large problem. Here we may emphasize only the exceptional position of this particular

knowledge among other kinds of knowledge to be drawn from pictures.

First, in contrast to the other types, this knowledge is based on all the elements of a painting as a sign—the subject matter of a painting, and also its form. Thus it is clear that certain subjects are better suited than any others to express an attitude through certain specific forms. So, for example, Rembrandt's 'Interior of a Slaughter-House' is less fitted to express an idealistic attitude than is a Raphael Madonna. This needs no explanation.

Secondly, this kind of knowledge depends on what we previously called the 'quality' of the knowledge of the form and subject matter. It seems obvious that 'cleaved' pictures—constructed in conformity to two or more form-principles, could not express one attitude on *Weltanschauung* in so far as a *Weltanschauung* is founded on one single principle of form included in a formal principle and dominating the whole picture (in its function as a sign).

Thirdly, this kind of knowledge is the most universal and general of all the kinds. The explanation of a pictorially expressed attitude towards the environment—i.e. of the *Weltanschauung* as previously described—was one of the principal tasks of the Vienna School in the history of art—independently of the work of other authors quoted in the Introduction—and continues to awake the greatest interest.²⁰ It was available also for the explanation of emotions representative of the time; as was shown in the works of Pinder.²¹ Hence the position of those who deny all value to such solutions in history and art history would seem to be obsolete.²²

VI. CONCLUSIONS.

To sum up shortly what has been said about the knowledge derived from a picture:

The picture may be considered as a suitable medium for expressing and communicating, with or without the awareness of the artist, judgments which may be reconstructed by the viewer.

To regard a painting in this way is to disagree with all those who consider that the painting as an act is purely emotional and capable of presenting emotions only. What is more, it even seems possible to express some statements made in the theory of art in terms of the judgments drawn from pictures—as was demonstrated in the case of the 'Consequence' of judgments.²³

But this pictorial expression of knowledge has specific properties. In the first place, the painter usually expresses far more than he consciously realizes: he usually expresses all the factors of his time, which have acted on him and through him on the picture.

Secondly, the ways of obtaining this knowledge determine in principle its general rather hypothetical character. But this nevertheless does not prevent the obtaining of results stated as certainties in the history of art.

Such knowledge does not in any way affect the emotional value

of this 'language of pictures'—feelings being always the main object of pictorial expression.

A possible line of investigation arising from the above conclusions would be the comparison of the possibilities of the two 'languages', the pictorial and the verbal; secondly, the inquiry into the relations existing between the emotional and the intellectual value of the picture (as above); lastly, the deepening of the semantic interpretation of the picture as a special kind of sign including all the above-mentioned properties.

But this task goes beyond the questions discussed here.

QUOTATIONS

- ¹ The references and quotations are based on the European continental bibliography where the questions involved were eventually the most discussed. See E. Panovsky: *Three Decades of Art History in the United States—Impressions of a Transplanted European*, printed in *Meaning in Visual Arts*, New York, 1954-1955.
- ² Th. Lipps: *Asthetik* 1903-6.
- ³ H. Hettner: *Studien zur Geschichte der Renaissance* (Studies in the History of the Renaissance) 1879.
- ⁴ Several art historians dealing with painting as an expression of *Weltanschauung*, like A. Riegl, Nohl, W. Drost, have been interested in it, but possibly none of them have done it with such an emphasis as F. Burger, H. H. Schmitz, J. Beth in *Die Deutsche Malerei vom ausgehenden Mittelalter bis zum Ende der Renaissance*, Berlin, 1913 (German Painting from the Late Middle Ages to the End of the Renaissance Period), and F. Burger in: *Cezanne and Hodler*.
- ⁵ The development in the semantic investigation of the Polish logicians was responsible possibly for one of the first interpretations of the picture as a sign in works of M. Wallis in *Przegląd Filozoficzny Warszawa—1932-36*. The emphasis there was put on the functions involved in the understanding of a picture by the viewer rather than on the corresponding conditions given in the picture.
- ⁶ The word 'intellectual' is taken here in its broadest meaning as concerned directly with the representation or the judgment as opposed to the emotions and the will.
- ⁷ M. Deri *Die Malerei des XIX. Jahrhunderts*, Berlin, 1919, page 318, *Naturalismus, Idealismus, Expressionismus*, Leipzig, 1919.
- ⁸ The work of M. Dworak, *Kunstgeschichte als Geistesgeschichte*, Wien 1924 (Art History as Spiritual History) gave the name to the whole stream.
- ⁹ T. Dobrowolski, *Slaskie malarstwo scienne i sztalugowe do poczatku XV W.* Page 96 (Silesian Painting to the Beginning of the XV Century).
- ¹⁰ As regards the streams in the history of art dealing with solutions as answers to the above-mentioned questions see W. Passarge. *Die Philosophie der Kunstgeschichte*, Berlin, 1930 (The Philosophy of Art History), page 91-92.
- ¹¹ On the irrationalist opposition in the history of art see R. Weigert: *Die Heutigen Aufgaben der Kunstgeschichte* (The actual tasks of the history of art), Berlin, 1938, pages 10-14.
- ¹² We do not mean by that distinction to oppose in principle the form to the subject matter in a picture, both being intimately linked, as every subject can be presented only in a concrete form.
- ¹³ The notion of the picture's 'pre-history' is due to R. Ingarden *O budowie o brazu Cracow*, 1948. (The Construction of the Picture.)
- ¹⁴ The maximalists exploit these possibilities of understanding better the links of the picture with its corresponding historic momentum on which it may depend. Thus the subject-matter, although for them less important than

- the form, is sometimes also taken into account as in the case of W. Drost, see E. Passarge: *Die Philosophie der Kunstgeschichte*, pages 48-50.
- ^{1.6} A. Snyder: *Der Expressionismus in Kultur und Malerei*, Berlin, pages 56-57. (Expressionism in Culture and in Painting.)
- ^{1.8} R. Muther: *Geschichte der Malerei im XIX Jahrhundert*. Wien, 1909. (History of Painting in the XIX Century.)
- ^{1.7} 'Veraikon' is the name for representations of the neckerchief of St Veronica with the impression of the face of Christ, according to the legendary tradition.
- ^{1.8} M. Doerner: *The Materials of the Artist and Their Use in Painting*. New York, 1934.
- ^{1.9} Thus a distinction of only an epistemologically, or also ontologically, defined position in the pictorial *Weltanschauung* would be possible. These 'existence judgments' and the corresponding beliefs, are sometimes verbally expressed by the artist, e.g. Manet says: 'I do what I see. What exists and not what does not exist.' (Quoted from R. Müller-Freienfels, *Die Psychologie der Kunst*, Berlin, 1923, Vol. II, page 210.) (The Psychology of Art.)
- ^{2.0} It was classically accomplished in Dworak's *Idealismus und Realismus in der Gotischen Skulptur und Malerei*, 1918 (Idealism and Realism in the Gothic Sculpture and Painting), but to-day this tendency is still in force. See E. Panowsky: *Et in Arcadia Ego in Meaning in the Visual Arts*, New York, 1955, and his interpretation by N. Weitz: *The Philosophy of the Arts*, 1950, pages 147-148. See also the controversy between I. Hospers and Professor Green in I. Hospers: *Meaning and Truth in the Arts*, New York, 1947, pages 159-161.
- ^{2.1} In the explanation of the mystic art of the XIV Century in W. Pinder: *Die Deutsche Plastik vom ausgehenden Mittelalter bis zum Ende der Renaissance*, Potsdam, 1937. (German Sculpture from the End of the Middle Ages till the End of the Renaissance.)
- ^{2.2} Obsolete though yet existing. See P. Francastel, *Art et Histoire: Dimension et Mesure des Civilisations*, where the author opposes such opinions as M. Bloch expresses in *La Société féodale et la formation des liens de dépendance*, Paris, 1939, in *Annales Economies, Sociétés, Civilisations*, mars-avril, 1961, page 297 seq.
- ^{2.3} The latest tendencies in modern aesthetics are for the rejection of the traditional dualism in the analysis of a picture between emotional and rationalistic expression: see I. Claude Piguet, *De l'Esthétique à la Métaphysique*, La Haye, 1959 (From Aesthetics to Metaphysics). The above statements do not contradict these tendencies. Page 77. See also on this S. Ossowski: *U Podstaw Estetyki*, Warszawa, 1938 (The Bases of Aesthetics).

SOME MAXIMS FOR A MEGALOMANIAC

by P. E. MATTHEWS

INTRODUCTION.

Maxim I. 'The role of a man of principle is the best of all parts to play, for the professional hypocrite enjoys remarkable advantages.' (Molière's *Don Juan*, 1665.)¹

This sarcastic aphorism by Don Juan forms part of a final and forceful declamation of a plan for his own salvation. Almost immediately afterwards Don Juan meets his ultimate fate, damnation, and is consumed in a blazing abyss. This sudden break in continuity between the brilliant formulation and the possible application of the plan provides the dramatic climax to the play. For a moment Molière creates the illusion that the farcical Don Juan is a tragic hero. This is an illusion of course, because it is ironical. In an earlier remark to his valet Sganarelle, Don Juan destroys his case before he has made it:

Sganarelle: What! You don't believe in anything, and yet you want to set yourself up as a man of principle!

Don Juan: And why not! There are plenty of others like me who ply the same trade and use the same mask to deceive the world.

This is subtle irony on the part of Molière. On the one hand Don Juan presents a penetrating analysis of hypocrisy and provides arguments to show that this is the normal mode of behaviour of a great number of people. On the other hand he cannot adopt this mode of deception himself because such a decision on his part would itself be a deception. In other words, Don Juan proves that hypocrisy regarded as self-deception is a contradiction in terms. The element that is lacking is faith in hypocrisy; the determined conviction that all modes of behaviour are deceptions. Don Juan remains the hero of the play precisely because he is not able to deceive himself. Or in the words of Bernard Shaw: 'Far from relapsing into hypocrisy, as Sganarelle feared, he has unexpectedly discovered a moral in his immorality.'²

Molière's implicit suggestion, therefore, seems to be that hypocrisy cannot be described as self-deception because a deliberate lie to oneself implies a knowledge of the intention and must fail. Now this idea plays an important part in the arguments advanced by Sartre in the development of his concept of bad faith (*mauvaise foi*).³ Of course there is a vast difference between Sartre's definitive

and comprehensive description and explanation of bad faith and Molière's ironical analysis of hypocrisy, but the points of comparison are such that Don Juan's speech is a remarkably succinct statement of some of the essential features of bad faith. In an attempt to illustrate this point all the maxims presented in this discussion are quotations from Molière, of whom it has been said that he never forgot that he was writing by invitation for the King and Court, so he put everything in terms of the common people.⁴ Certainly, the language of Don Juan is far removed from the complex Hegelian terminology of Sartre, although in contrast, one of the chief merits of Sartre is that he recognises the necessity for detailed concrete answers to abstract questions.⁵

In Sartre's psychology of choice the main function of bad faith is a means of escape from the responsibility of personal decision. In this respect hypocrisy is an example of bad faith, but it seems to be a special case, because not only is it a negative attitude which can lead to a loss of individual identity, it may also function in the opposite direction as an instrument of personal aggrandizement. This aspect of bad faith does not seem to have been considered by Sartre. The object of this discussion therefore is to focus attention on the possible relationship between bad faith and megalomania, which has been defined⁶ as the insanity of self-exaltation, the passion for big things, or the will to power.

ANALYSIS OF THE METHOD.

Maxim II. 'Hypocrisy alone is privileged. It stills the voice of criticism and enjoys a sovereign immunity.' (Molière's *Don Juan*.)¹

Sartre regards bad faith as a peculiar type of deception or dishonesty, a negative attitude which is turned inwards upon itself. It differs fundamentally from other types of deception such as a deliberate or cynical lie because in bad faith there is no duality, there is no distinction between the deceiver and the deceived. In this sense bad faith has a unitary structure: one is aware of, and at the same time conceals the facts from oneself. This form of deception cannot be regarded as a cynical lie to oneself because this, as noted previously, is a contradiction in terms; rather, it is a deception involving a capacity for formulating a concept which combines at the same time an idea and the negation of that idea. Sartre has given several examples of this paradoxical attitude of mind which he obviously regards as a fundamental psychological problem. For instance, one of these examples of bad faith is the censor in Freud's theory of psychoanalysis. In addition to this opinion of the super-ego Sartre regards this concept as an unsuccessful attempt to explain bad faith. 'The result has been', he says, that the 'proponents of the theory have hypostasized and reified bad faith; they have not escaped it.'³

How then does Sartre explain the paradox? The most important part of the answer, it seems, is that bad faith is a metastable

attitude, a frame of mind within which one can vacillate between fact and fiction. This operates in such a way that at the moment certain facts are apprehended, a preconceived meaning or conclusion can be attributed to them, and conversely, if a particular concept is faced with facts then all, or at least the inimical facts, 'play a transitive role in reasoning and are eliminated in the conclusion'.³ In other words, if the facts do not agree with the fiction then so much the worse for the facts. Sartre calls this metastable relationship the concept of transcendence-facticity.

Bad faith is a game of mirrors. There is no attempt to reconcile the two-faced concepts as would be the case in good faith. On the contrary the purpose of bad faith is to affirm their identity so that the one can be played off against the other. 'Here we have to deal' says Sartre 'with human reality as a being which is what it is not and which is not what it is.'³

If bad faith is in fact a metastable state then how can it become an autonomous and durable form of behaviour? To Sartre this is essentially a problem of belief. The object of a belief is beyond complete verification, there is always an element of uncertainty. It follows therefore that a belief which includes its own negation, a belief which wishes itself to be not quite convinced, must be possible. This is faith in bad faith. 'Bad faith does not hold the norms and criteria of truth as they are accepted by the critical thought of good faith. What it decides first, in fact, is the nature of truth.'³ And in this way bad faith can become a persistent or pathological attitude of mind or method of thought.

One of the consequences is that 'a peculiar type of evidence appears; non-persuasive evidence'. Bad faith apprehends evidence but it is resigned in advance not to be convinced by this evidence because it has already decided on its exact requirements. Bad faith therefore, 'stands forth in the firm resolution to count itself satisfied when it is barely persuaded, to force itself in decision to adhere to uncertain truths.'³ Bad faith is founded on the principle that non-persuasion is the structure of all convictions. For this reason it places itself beyond the realm of rational criticism and, in particular, its position is unassailable if it is identified completely with established conventions and traditional morality. After all, criticism of motives is an unforgivable sin. Sartre's concept of bad faith, therefore, leads to the same conclusion as Molière's about hypocrisy that 'it stills the voice of criticism and enjoys a sovereign immunity.'

APPLICATION OF THE METHOD.

Maxim III. 'Hypocrisy is an art, the practice of which always commands respect, and though people may see through it they dare say nothing against it.' (Molière's *Don Juan*).¹

Bad faith is the complete antithesis of scientific method. But in the fringe or adumbral region of science, current concepts are mainly speculative and are based on limited observation and

limited empirical data. It is of interest therefore to consider if bad faith could function effectively within this region as a means to an end, namely, the establishment of a personal scientific reputation. If this is so, then obviously megalomania can flourish more effectively within the less empirical disciplines.

Let us consider, briefly and hypothetically, the possible symptoms which would indicate the application of bad faith by an ambitious scientist. Undoubtedly the most important symptom would be a great and exclusive enthusiasm for a subject which is founded predominantly on *a priori* principles. Within this domain there would be ample scope for endless argument and speculation. In fact, a logical corollary would be an implicit conviction that all disputes are beyond reasonable resolution. This, it should be noted, is essentially a belief in 'non-persuasion', but is also compatible with the inductive approach of science because a knowledge of all the facts is impossible and, therefore, no inductive theory is absolutely convincing. This is an example of a two-faced concept which is inherent in scientific method and could be exploited in bad faith. In this instance the distorted view could be held that the method of investigation used by one person may lead another to a different result. It is essential therefore, that there should be a variety of opinions on the same subject.

A second symptom, during the period of training and study, may be a predilection for the works of an established authority. Remember the scornful words of Leonardo da Vinci, 'any one who in discussion relies upon authority uses not his understanding but his memory.'⁷ Indeed, this may become an ideal, because the megalomaniac will regard himself as a singular success if he can quote himself as the established authority.

With this end in view, he may attempt to formulate a doctrine of his own. This may be founded on limited observation, but more probably it will start from the tentative conclusions of some earlier worker who was not prepared to follow his discoveries into the realm of speculation. The original source may remain unacknowledged because there is no logical proof that the available data would lead necessarily to the broad generalisations which will form the basis of the new doctrine.

Consolidation of the doctrine may now proceed by the transformation of hypotheses into axioms. This could be achieved by the process of self-quotation, an earlier *a priori* principle is presented now and in subsequent publications as an established fact. This is a further example of a two-faced concept. Its strength in the face of criticism lies in the possible convertibility of, and confusion between, fact and supposition.

Serious criticism is thus limited to the charge of inconsistency of opinion, not of fact, and this is overcome either by retraction or by polemic on the question of definition. There may even be some advantage in a controversy of this kind with an antagonist of established scientific reputation, the objective being not to narrow

down the divergent opinions but to perpetuate them in the belief that an opinion for one is not so for another.

If a particular doctrine is under serious attack, another advantage of the *a priori* method is that an alternative hypothesis can be constructed with a view to strengthening the peripheral defences in all directions. The postulates may be *non sequitur*, but this is of no real concern because the essence of the marginal region in science is a flexibility of thought which will allow a rapid modification of views. This is known as the theory of multiple working hypotheses. The difference, however, between practice and precept in the case of the megalomaniac is that there will be reluctance on his part to resort to empirical methods or precise observation. The principle of verification is anathema to him.

This line of argument leads, first, to the conclusion that 'bad faith' may function effectively as a means to an end within the speculative, peripheral region of science and, secondly, it supports the view that the *a priori* method in this region is, in the words of Molière, 'an art the practice of which always commands respect, and though people may see through it they dare say nothing against it.'

RELATION TO OTHER INDIVIDUALS.

Maxim IV. 'I shall set up as a censor of the behaviour of others, condemn everyone, and hold a good opinion of no-one, myself alone excepted. Let anyone offend me in however slight a degree, I shall never forgive, but steadfastly nurse an implacable enmity. I shall constitute myself the avenger and servant of authority and use that convenient pretext as a means of harassing my enemies. I shall accuse them of impiety and find means to turn loose on them the officious zealots who will raise a public outcry against them without even knowing what it is about, overwhelm them with recriminations, and damn them roundly on their own private authority.' (Molière's *Don Juan*.)¹

A further advantage of the *a priori* method, in so far as it permits a plethora of postulates, could be to preclude the entry of other workers into a particular field of study. The greater the number of postulates the more limited is the possibility of original conclusions on new data. An historical example of this type of resistance has been described by Helmholtz.

Typical of the reaction when, in 1847, Helmholtz announced his theory of the conservation of energy (the first law of thermodynamics) was the remark from some of the older men: 'This has already been well known to us; what does this young medical man imagine when he thinks it necessary to explain so minutely all this to us.'⁸

The use of this criticism as a pejorative in both spoken and written polemic could be a most effective deterrent against an intruder. And the same pretext could be used to prevent the publication of new data. T. H. Huxley is reported to have said

two years before his death (1895) that, 'Authorities, disciples and schools are the curse of science; and do more to interfere with the work of the scientific spirit than all its enemies.'⁹

If intimidation is possible within a scientific *milieu*, then how much more effective it must be if it is exercised successfully by an irrational authority acting as a censor within the framework of established institutions and the accepted moral code. It must lead of course, to a narrow, prejudiced or dogmatic attitude. In an exaggerated and fantastic form, if the censor is allowed to act with the fervour of an obsessional neurotic, then the process must end with absolute regimentation and unmitigated authoritarian rule.

DEFENSIVE MECHANISM.

Maxim V. 'People may be aware of their (the hypocrites') machinations, they may even recognise them for what they are, but they are not held in less regard on that account. They (the hypocrites) bow their heads from time to time, heave an occasional sigh of mortification, roll their eyes to Heaven now and again, and that atones, in the eyes of the world, for anything they may do.' (Molière's *Don Juan*.)¹

The discovery of new data which conflict with an established scientific theory can never be regarded as a signal of defeat. It should lead to a realignment of theory and act as a stimulant to further research. But this need not be the case in the marginal or pseudo-scientific area where speculation is regarded as the *sine qua non* of progress. As noted before, where the documentation is limited and thus the restraint imposed by scientific method is minimal, the application of bad faith has a greater chance of success.

New evidence in the marginal area of science is usually insubstantial, fragmentary and seldom conclusive, so that it can play, if necessary, 'a transitive role in reasoning and be eliminated in the conclusion.'³

As a partial illustration of this type of attitude in a scientist of historical importance, consider the reaction by Lord Kelvin to Clark Maxwell's electro-magnetic theory. 'Kelvin found that he was unable to translate into a dynamical model the abstract equations of Maxwell's theory.'⁸ In 1884, Kelvin said, 'As long as I cannot make a mechanical model all the way through I cannot understand: and that is why I cannot get the electro-magnetic theory.'¹⁰ Maxwell's theory did not demand the construction of a mechanical model but Kelvin apparently makes this a necessary condition and, for this reason alone, he is sceptical of the validity of Maxwell's theory.

Another method in 'scientific' apologetic, which could be used in bad faith, is to place greater emphasis on the lack of evidence in contrast to the available evidence. This is consistent with a scientific approach, but the objective in bad faith is precisely the opposite, namely to increase the element of uncertainty.

So far the argument suggests that in bad faith the use of

scientific method is an empty and hollow ritual, the intention of which is to mislead an opponent and refute all possible criticism. The procedure is used as a defensive mechanism. Let us consider by analogy, as before, the possible application of this type of procedure by a megalomaniac who is masquerading as the custodian of traditional values and morality. In spite of the illusion of 'sovereign immunity' it is clear that the imposition of a super-morality cannot be achieved only by intimidation or physical force. To avoid an open conflict and to gain as wide an acceptance as possible of the 'ideal' standard of conduct, the censor should occasionally provide some manifestation of flexibility and mortification. The censor should enact a ritual of despair and demonstrate an apparent 'benign tolerance' of the lack of 'rational appreciation' on the part of the 'transgressor' and the 'unenlightened'.

As the real aim of the censor is the antithesis of the illusory paragon, it is more than probable that manifestations of 'atonement' on the part of the censor will appear unexpectedly and not necessarily in direct response to actual events. In addition the censor will undoubtedly use this ritual in anticipation of criticism, real or imaginary. As a result there may be sudden, perhaps inexplicable, changes of attitude or policy. The pathological equivalent is a paranoid.

CONCLUSION.

Maxim VI. 'Humbug binds together in close fellowship all those who practice it, and whoever attacks one brings down the whole pack upon him. Moreover, men whom one knows to be acting in good faith, men of integrity, are always taken in by the humbugs and blindly lend their support to men who only ape their virtues.' (Molière's *Don Juan*.)¹

This admirably lucid, though somewhat exaggerated, sarcastic and dogmatic comment by Molière indicates the conditions under which bad faith in the form of hypocrisy may function as an instrument of megalomania.

If the masquerade is successful and proceeds far enough then a remarkable inversion of situation must surely arise where the megalomaniac, as a caricature of traditional values and morality, will watch the madding crowd with feelings of astonishment, amusement and contempt.

A LAST WORD.

Beware, my friends, of the hypocrite.

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Note: References 8, 9 and 10 are cited in B. Barber, *Resistance by Scientists to Scientific Discovery*. (*Science*, vol. 134, September, 1961, pp. 596-602.)

HORACE, *ODES*, I, 9: A TRANSLATION

by B. H. F.

THIS TRANSLATION first appeared in *The Rhodian*, the magazine of Rhodes University, in 1925. It is reprinted here, with acknowledgements, because it may interest both my pupils and a wider (theoric?) public. A kindly tutor was its primary cause. I liked its metrical licences, then, and I find I like them still.

From *The Rhodian*, vol. 9, no. 1, June, 1925, p. 27:

HORACE. ODE IX. LIB. I

Thou see'st how clear with lofty snow enshrouded
Soracte stands, nor now their burden bear
The laden woods, how the keen thong
Of cold binds fast the flowing streams.

Thrust forth chill clime, logs high upon the hearth
With lavish hand set due, and more than wont
Ungrudging, Thaliarchus, mete
The four-year wine from Sabine jar.

Leave to the gods the rest: as soon as they
Have stilled the winds that on the yesty sea
Implacate strive, nor cypress-tree
Nor tossed is time-worn mountain-ash.

What of the morrow shun to ask, and count
Whate'er of days chance shall thee give, thy gain,
Nor void love's sweetness, nor do thou
A boy, the tuneful dance misprize,

While to thy sap-green youth crabbed white old age
Comes not. Now let the plain, the village sward
Be thy desire, and ere night fall
Soft whispers at the hour of tryst.

Now too from inmost nook, the laugh that gives
Delight, betrayer of the lurking maid,
And troth-pledge snatched away from arm.
Or finger, wanton to resist.

B.H.F.

Thought on the tragic accident at Jeppe Railway Station, 25th August, 1962: (when panicking people were crushed to death in a narrow entrance):

The land is wide, from shore to shore,
With free, fresh, air, and room for all;
Yet these must die, minds pent in fear,
And lives crushed out against a wall.

B.H.F.

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