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THEORIA

A JOURNAL OF STUDIES



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LITERATURE.

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SHUTER & SHOOTER
PIETERMARITZBURG



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FOREWORD

The publication of this Journal springs from the conviction that a University Arts Faculty justifies its existence most fully, in our own country and epoch, if it seeks to promote an outlook of humane criticism in as many fields, and as many groups of people, as possible. It takes the view that it is necessary to maintain a certain degree of abstraction and distance from the immediate and concrete, in order that the latter may be adequately viewed and mastered. It also takes the view that further additions to the burden of detail with which Western-European Man has been loading himself for the past few centuries can only be justified if such detail is continuously fitted into a synoptic picture.

This Journal will try to build as many bridges as possible between the standpoint of general theory and the standpoints of scientific specialists, of workers on behalf of special causes and of the educated community generally. It will provide a forum for the discussion of the many problems involved in study, teaching and research, and will publish scientific and technical studies provided these are not exclusively directed to specialists. While its articles have, in this first instance, been written by members of Natal University College, it hopes in future to secure articles, both in English and Afrikaans, from all over South Africa.

B. NOTCUTT,
J. N. FINDLAY.

Durban and Pietermaritzburg,
June, 1947.

Notes On The Teaching Of Literature

University teachers of literature are nowadays much concerned to relate the study of literature to life, and to abandon the notorious "Hist. of Eng. Lit." treatment that did so much harm in the past. They are also anxious to see that the study of language is genuinely related to literary study, and that it does not become an end in itself, or merely a mechanical "grind". Several South African universities have already broadened and liberalised their English syllabuses in order to give more attention to the background of thought and social life; and to study language as it is used, and not only in its historical aspects.

These changes are in themselves excellent, and will do much to enliven the study of literature by making all who engage in it conscious of the part it plays in the life of society. So much is nowadays widely accepted, and the advocates of the older historical and philological methods have little to say for themselves. The barrenness of a study that is rooted in the sandy soil of Germanic Philology needs little demonstration. The discipline that such a study offers is usually the discipline of mechanical learning by rote; and it has no longer much power to stimulate original thought.

But we ought to recognise that the newer type of literary studies has also its dangers; and in particular that by attempting too much within a limited time we may fail to achieve the "discipline of letters" which should be one of our aims. Here the analogy of an Honours School of Literature, like the Cambridge English Tripos, may be misleading to us; for in such a school the students commonly give all their time for three years to the study of literature. Consequently they may give much attention to philosophical, religious, historical, social and other questions that are adjacent to the study of literature, and they can do this and still have some time left over for the direct study of imaginative writing. South African students,

except in their post-graduate courses, give only a comparatively small part of their time to literature, whilst on the other hand they may make a formal study of History, Philosophy, etc., as a part of their degree course. So the problem for us, at least in undergraduate courses, is not to find a way of including within the literature course all the circumjacent knowledge that our students need ; but to find a way of making connections between their study of history, philosophy, etc., and their study of literature. This can best be done by exchange of lectures between departments, by common discussions and seminars, and by helping students to group their courses well.

We might also pay more attention to seeing that courses in the various Arts departments have some sort of reference to each other, though this can only be done by reasonably frequent discussions between the departments concerned.

The danger is that unless we follow some such plan we may find ourselves saddled with the (necessarily amateurish) teaching of history, philosophy, politics, and religion during the time when we should be teaching students to *read*, and so attain the perception of the specific literary value which is after all the goal of our studies.

For if the study of literature has any right to exist as a separate branch of study, and not as a subsidiary (or "applied" branch) of history, psychology, philosophy, philology, etc., it can only be as an art whose aim is the attainment of a distinct kind of knowledge. We need to consider what distinct kind of knowledge it is that we pursue in our studies, and to set that as our chief aim.

This distinct knowledge that we seek in literature may be described in general terms as a complex but unified experience expressed in words, and of a kind that is recognised as being specially valuable to man. Though there is no reason to suppose that it is in any way mysterious, or that it contains any unknown ingredients, such an experience is difficult of achievement, both for the writer and for the reader. For every successfully written poem there are many failures ; and (though we often forget this) for every successful reading of a poem there are also a great many failures. The validity of literary studies lies in the stability of the poetic experience once it has been successfully evoked, and in the apparent general similarity between the responses of different skilled readers. We can experience the stability of the poetic response for ourselves ; the similarity of response in others can only be guessed at from the pointers and approximations of criticism, and from the general similarity

of make-up of most human beings. But this, though admittedly a defect of literary studies, is no greater a defect than many other recognised studies have to contend with. It is not a rash assumption to suppose that we may seek for some "objective" value in a poem that has been tested for many years by careful judges.

The task of our study, then, is to discover those successful patterns of symbols that we call "good poems", to live the experience of them as fully as we can, and to help others to the same experience. The justification of the study is to be found in the immediate enjoyments that it makes available; and further in the claim (which I cannot establish here) that these enjoyments open the way to further enjoyments, by acting as a stimulus or a guide to future experience.

This pursuit of an integrated experience of a special kind is the one point in which the arts of literature, painting, and music are distinct from the studies of history, politics, psychology, philosophy, etc., and if no such distinction existed there would be no point in continuing the study at all. We should do much better to divide the study of literature amongst the historians, psychologists, philosophers, and philologists. But such a division, even if it were achieved, would not make possible the full grasping of a work of literature; it would be described from many different angles, and we should be given many different cuts in cross-section through its complexity; but we should be no nearer the experience itself. However valuable such descriptions might be as psychology, history, or philosophy they would bear no closer a resemblance to the successful reading of the poem than does a police description of a woman to the experience of being in love with her. The danger of too much insistence on the integration of literary studies into the total body of knowledge then, is that it may lead to our neglecting the main tasks of reading and teaching to read, and that the chief end of literary studies may be lost in the pursuit of an apparatus. A knowledge of philology, of "background", of literary history, of bibliography or of poetic theory is valuable for literary studies only as apparatus, and there is no point in assembling the apparatus if we never learn to use it.

The art of reading a poem (or the arts of listening to music or looking at a picture) are not highly esteemed today because they are not systematic. Unlike the natural sciences, they have to begin from the beginning with each new student, and the advance made by one student cannot be handed on to the other. It is for this reason that no "progress" is made in the

arts, and we cannot claim to be any better off today than we were a hundred years ago. Indeed, it may well be that the art of reading efficiently has lost ground. In an age which values systematic advance so highly, the arts must necessarily be thought a waste of time. Moreover, these arts produce no visible results in the practical field,¹ and this alone is enough to make them seem a waste of time to many people. Consequently teachers of the arts are often anxious to pretend that they are really teaching something else; that they are really "scientists" of some kind; scientific biographers or bibliographers or philologists or psychologists. The "laboratory technique" is paraded for all to see, and bits of apparatus, models of larynxes, recording machines, graphs, intelligence tests, vocabulary tests, vowel charts, linguistic "laws", etc., are given a prominent place in the shop window. This tendency, which was once strongly established in Germany, seems now to have invaded America.

A less pretentious alternative to teaching the art of reading, and a more useful one, is the teaching of History, Sociology, or Politics through the study of literature. To some extent this is unavoidable for all teachers of literature, since the context in which a work is written partly determines its total meaning. Moreover, the study of a "period" in relation to its literature is the study of History with the flesh on its bones, and may be of great value in itself. Nobody would wish to exile such studies from the literature syllabuses.

But the danger at present seems to be that such studies may crowd out the direct practice of the art of reading, and when a book or poem is prescribed it is often chosen as a suitable illustration of a social problem or a religious crisis or a political trend. The reaction against aestheticism (itself a healthy reaction) has gone so far that we are inclined to forget that a poem, play or novel has its own end to fulfil, besides being a useful piece of social criticism, or an interesting political symptom.

I suggest that, along with the study of literature in its political, social and religious setting, we should practise the reading of books, poems, and plays quite isolated from any external historical context. It is, after all, the aim of poets to achieve

¹Whilst we greatly value the techniques (scientific and political) through which we hope ultimately to increase human enjoyment, we distrust the arts which aim at an immediate and direct increase of enjoyment. Our Puritan past and our almost superstitious respect for "machinery" seem to account for this.

some independence of their immediate environment, and to write a work that can stand by itself. Some have succeeded to an astonishing degree, so that many poems of Blake, Shakespeare, and Hopkins (to name only three poets) can be comprehended without any knowledge of their authors, or of the time and circumstances in which they were written.¹ But they cannot be comprehended except as the result "of watchful good sense, of fine and luminous distinction, and of complete self-possession"; qualities that may or may not be found in the "literary-historical" scholar. It is in the training of these qualities that we should seek for the discipline of letters; not in a training that can be provided more satisfactorily through the study of history or of science.

For, after all, without the special gift of literary understanding, without the power to achieve, from a set of printed symbols, a unified and rich poetic experience, all our ancillary knowledge is so much dead wood. We can pile it as high as we like, and it will never light a fire. But experience has shown, I think, that this special skill can be developed by patient teaching, by reading and by discussion of actual poems, to a degree that has not in the past been thought possible. We should not allow the admitted necessity of relating literature to its historical background, and the admitted necessity of studying literature in its social implications, to obscure the even greater need for a direct approach to books.

My conclusions are that we should have more small tutorial classes, that we should read through texts with students and help them to achieve as complete a reading as they are capable of, and that we should test in examinations not so much knowledge of the apparatus of criticism, as the critical ability of a student when faced with passages that he has not previously met. Such teaching and such examinations would train teachers and critics of literature who would be able to read for themselves before claiming to instruct others.

G. H. DURRANT.

¹I know this is a heresy. But the appeal is to experience. Does one's reading of Blake's *The Sick Rose* really benefit at all from knowledge about Blake and his time? And cannot Lawrence's *The Snake* be read effectively without knowledge of his theories? (There are of course many works where historical criticism is indispensable; that is not denied.)

The Social Function Of Witchcraft

INTRODUCTION

My objective is to show that witchcraft is something more than meaningless superstition. I can do so most effectively by restricting myself to a single Bantu tribe, the Lobedu of the far N.E. Transvaal. For in this way I shall be able to analyse some of its relations to the ideas and values of the society and perhaps also to achieve my aim of making some sense of an institution which, owing to its associations among ourselves, seems to be utterly devoid of sense.

Among the Lobedu, just as of course among other Bantu people, witches and sorcerers, so far from playing the role of unreason, make a rational contribution to the fulfilment of men's needs and purposes. This is almost immediately evident when we remember that witchcraft and sorcery are explanations of evil in the universe. They enable men to account for their failures and frustrations. Moreover, since the evil operates only through the medium of human beings, it can also be brought under human control. The parts assigned to these characters, the witches and sorcerers, presupposes a just world, ordered and coherent, in which the evil is not merely outlawed but can be overcome by man-made techniques. In the result men feel secure and the moral order is upheld.

I cannot undertake the task of demonstrating the validity of the underlying conceptions and presuppositions, because the whole setting is entirely different from anything with which we are familiar. I have to limit myself to a small segment of the circle circumscribing the magical background against which witchcraft assumes meaning. But I shall have failed in my purpose if I fashion the witch to a shape that cannot be articulated with ordinary human needs such as we ourselves have.

THE CHARACTERISTICS OF WITCHES AND SORCERERS

Let us at the outset see how the Lobedu phrase the roles of those arch-enemies of society, the witches and sorcerers. They picture witchcraft as criminality incarnate, an intrinsically evil influence in the universe which can manifest itself only through a human being ; it is independent of all the other supernaturals, but it is not a capricious power ; and it is thought to be set into motion only by malice, hatred and similar motives and generally only against some specific individual.

The phraseology used indicates that the Lobedu make a major distinction between witchcraft proper, which is the wickedness, sometimes without overt rhyme or reason, of the night-witch, and sorcery, which is the destructive technique of the day-witch ; witchcraft implies personal relationships with the supernatural, sorcery means manipulation of magic which is not supernatural by Lobedu conceptions. An elaborate moral grading of magic indicates, however, that many other distinctions are drawn. At the one extreme good magic or medicine—the two conceptions are identical—safeguards the moral order and is approved ; for it is the application in the public interest of the properties of matter, as when the queen, transformer of the clouds, makes rain or the doctors heal disease. At the other extreme, evil magic or sorcery is bad and frowned upon. Between these extremes there are several grades of magic (or rather uses of magic since magical power in itself is generally neutral) some within the law but ethically disapproved and some about which opinions differ. Often enough the victim places an interpretation upon his misfortunes which differs from that of his fellows : he may try to incriminate a sorcerer, but they will tell you that he is merely blaming others to escape a sense of his own inadequacy or incompetence. Perhaps I shall be able to turn later to some of these complications in the moral scheme. At the moment my point is that it is essential to understand that sorcery which falls into the category of magic is entirely different from witchcraft proper. Sorcery is neither wonderful nor above ordinary matter-of-fact physical laws ; but witchcraft involves supercausation, is mysterious and transcends the operation of natural cause and effect.

The night-witch is accordingly a sinister character. He belongs to an unholy fraternity, whose members meet at night to deliberate upon their deeds of darkness. For these deeds are always mysterious in the sense that no one knows how they are done, and they are physically impossible by natural means. The

idea is that he disposes of the powers of darkness rather than that he does his evil work by night. The night-witch uses no medium of destruction such as poison; he himself has inborn powers to ride through the air, prowling over villages like night bombers over our cities, but invisible, infiltrating unobserved into the defences and insinuating himself through the smallest crevices. He uses no spells or incantations; nor indeed does he employ medicines or send his soul on these miraculous excursions. But he has familiars who have various functions: he may send them out as vampires or leave them at his home in his own image as an alibi. No one, however, knows precisely what his methods are except that they are all supernatural.

It is his mystical presence which paralyses you when you wake in a sweat after a terrifying nightmare. He maliciously excises parts of your body in order to insert sand or millet, which accounts for the excruciating pains familiar to anyone who has experienced foreign matter impinging upon exposed tissues. When unaccountably your bones ache or you feel tired as on the morning after the night before, you know that it is a night-witch who has set you to hoe all night in his garden. Nowadays, in the more sophisticated culture-contact situation, you ascribe lassitude for which no ostensible reason exists to such new devices of night-witches as causing you in your sleep to cycle aimlessly up hill and down dale.

Night-witches, like the succubi of mediæval times, are almost invariably women, not men, but the rationalization incriminating the gentler sex is rather different. According to popular opinion as reflected, e.g., in Dr. Wier's disquisition in 1563 on the credulity and fragility of the female sex, mediæval women were considered to be peculiarly susceptible to evil influences owing to their mental and moral infirmities. The Lobedu have a much higher estimate of women's nature and role, for women are the supreme rulers, the high priests, the great go-betweens in quarrels, the final adjudicators in questions of inheritance and succession and, as may be suspected in a society that does not rely on force or coercion, the guarantors of the effectiveness of all the major sanctions. Nevertheless, the Lobedu seem to have succumbed to the masculine illusion that what is feminine is often inexplicable, instinct with inscrutability. With such credentials Lobedu women both become psychological substitutes on whom people tend to project their failures and frustrations and are believed to be endowed with inscrutable powers such as the night-witch disposes of.

The province of the night-witch is not limited to destruction by disease and death. Among other things, barrenness, marked differences in the productivity of adjoining fields, the wind that breaks the growing crops, are attributed to witchcraft of this brand. And rather more sinister is the power to enslave souls and to send familiars and vampires upon nefarious errands. The addition of the familiar to the scheme permits of its further elaboration; but I have to content myself by saying that the relationship between witch and familiar is not invoked as an explanation of frigidity in women as is the case among some Xhosa tribes. Lobedu familiars are often obnoxious animals such as polecats and hyenas, though the most fearful of them all is the *kbidudwane*, a human being killed in such a way that when he is buried only his shadow is interred, the real personality being imprisoned in a large earthen pot by day and dispatched by its mistress upon sinister missions by night. Quite unlike the *khipago*, a conception borrowed, as the name indicates, from the European spook, which is comparatively harmless and can easily be laid by appeasing his complaint or pouring medicine on his grave, this fearful familiar of the witch causes one to faint, waste away and die, and nothing will avail except discovery of and a direct attack upon the witch.

There is a great deal more to the witch than this, for the analysis of wickedness is taken far back and is closely articulated with conscious as well as subconscious, hidden, human motivations. The night-witch, e.g., is born not made; but, since criminality is by Lobedu conceptions a product of both nature and nurture, the potentialities with which the witch is born unfold apace as she imbibes the evil secretions in her mother's milk. Moreover she must learn how to put her power into practice. This learning process begins on the second or third day after birth when mother-witch flings infant-witchling up against the wall to which it will cling like a bat and so learn its first lesson in flying.

The sorcerer by Lobedu conceptions is an entirely different character. He is usually a man whose machinations involve the use of medicines and incantations, ordinary natural techniques "of the day" as they phrase it, not the inscrutable and supernatural devices "of the night". Sorcery operates by natural laws. It is not the nature of its power that is evil, but only its perverted application. Its essence is the criminal use of the potency of medicines, which can be and usually are in the service of legitimate ends. The sorcerer's techniques are simply those of lawful medical practice; but they are lawful means put to

unlawful ends. Spells are not essential, since the destructive potency is usually inherent in the poisons used, not in the sorcerer himself. For the sorcerer is not evil incarnate: he belongs to no criminal gang, does not inherit either his knowledge or his sinful propensities, and has no power to tame and teach familiars. The Lobedu have in mind a normal human being, a man even of good character and generous instincts, who owing to some temporary aberration succumbs to the temptation of injuring an enemy by using some poison—an extract of the ordinary properties of material things, which he may acquire from another. Unlike the night-witch who might send a hyena to take up its abode in your body and eat your food, the sorcerer's method is to cause you to eat some indissoluble toxic substance which clings to your œsophagus and from there poisons your whole system. There is no known antidote to the internal hyena, except of course the long-range attack upon the unknown witch; but the foreign substance introduced by the sorcerer can be removed by means of an emetic.

A favourite technique of the sorcerer is to challenge enemies by pitting the potency of his poisons against the drugs they use to protect themselves. This conception of medicines warring against one another, like our toxins and anti-toxins, is the reason why everyone must be inoculated with anti-sorcery serum, just as we guard ourselves in anticipation by vaccination. It is also obvious that such techniques as placing poisoned thorns in your path, or pointing a medicated forefinger are used by sorcerers not night-witches. It suffices to ground an imputation of sorcery when a man menaces you with the words *u do bona* (you will see) and evil subsequently befalls you.

THE MORAL GRADING OF MAGIC

Since sorcery is simply lawful means put to unlawful ends, the same techniques may be moral and approved in one context but immoral and outlawed in another. And a study of these different contexts casts considerable light upon a number of underlying conceptions. Take, e.g., the technique of challenging or in Lobedu phraseology "trying" others with medicines. The medicines are called *malgo* and the technique *bu lega*, and *bu lega* is sorcery and illegal except when employed by doctors against one another. It is legal in this context not merely because the trial of strength has social value and the quacks are discredited, but also for a much subtler reason. Lobedu society is fundamentally co-operative and frowns upon all forms of rivalry. Even when the good things of life, the prizes, or the

means for achieving desired ends such as land, are, objectively considered, limited, the scarcity is rephrased in such a manner that rivalries are avoided. It is as if everything for which people might compete is made to fall into the category of free commodities, or rather, since psychological principles are involved, objective facts are reinterpreted in a way that shifts the problem to a subjective setting in which the scarcity no longer appears as a significant factor. The population, e.g., presses hard upon the natural resources but the periodical threat of starvation, even the scarcity of relishes, is attributed not to the limited resources, but to some shortcoming in men such as indolence; and the virtue of rephrasing the difficulty in this way is that rivalries for the scarce things are obviated while the merit of, say, industry is stressed. This is naturally only part of the explanation, for the functioning of the culture relies on co-operativeness: aggressiveness and the measurement of one's achievement against that of another are never rewarded, the social structure places barriers between potential competitors and, among a multitude of other cultural arrangements tending in the same direction, the whole educational system—the absence of any comparison of the attainments of children, the insistence upon sharing (even the head of a locust, as the Lobedu say), the team work and mutuality that are given a high cultural rating, the disapproval of any form of personal display—all this inculcates values that are incompatible with competitiveness.

Now when one doctor tries another with *malego*, the intention to injure does not constitute sorcery. I have said that the Lobedu themselves rationalize what appears to be an inconsistency by saying that this licence, that is allowed doctors, is a guarantee of the effectiveness of their medicines, since if they cannot immunize themselves against the poisons of others, they are little use as guardians of the public health. But partly also *legaing* is the projection of rivalries into the magical world since it is disallowed in ordinary life. There cannot be competition for clients or their custom, for any rivalry on the economic level is simply inconceivable. Nevertheless, the implications of scarcity of clients are inescapable. The attention is, however, diverted from the objective situation of a limited clientele to the warring of medicines in the magical world, and this vicarious outlet for, instead of complete repression of, competition is condoned not merely because it is to the public benefit but also because it is compartmentalized, as completely segregated from the conception of rivalry as heroic deeds in war involving the killing of the enemy are among us segregated from foul murder in peace.

Many other uses of the power which we call magic are moral and hence medicinal, or immoral and hence sorcery according as the motive is approved or not. Some of them, curiously enough in a co-operative society, are concessions to the impulse of revenge; some are methods of frustrating an enemy by making his objective invisible; and there are today also techniques to secure the favour of others, like love-magic or medicine to attract trade customers but these are introductions from other tribes, incompatible with the Lobedu pattern, and hence always reprehensible. The power is in itself neutral; it is the objective which makes it moral or immoral. That, of course, is not the whole story; the handling of human motivations is much subtler; but I must content myself with this over-simplification, which at all events is a sufficient approximation to Lobedu conceptions to enable us to take our analysis a little further.

One type of vengeance magic is *madabi* which is the use of powers—really certain properties of matter—to transmute the thing to which it is applied, e.g., *madabi* will enable you to turn pieces of the skin of an animal into the animal itself. A deserted husband may legitimately so manipulate *madabi* as to frighten his erring wife into running back to him, for instance, by causing monkeys to appear whenever his unfaithful spouse cooks or draws water for her new-found lover. Among us mice rather than monkeys might occasion misgivings in a conscience-stricken wife. But the use of *madabi* for purely personal ends is sorcery and hence criminal, as when a man takes revenge upon a girl, whom he has seduced and who subsequently jilts him, by changing her sex whenever the child is about to be born, and thereby endangering her life. In the first instance *madabi* functions as a moral sanction and its psychological effect reflects the effective internalization of a sense of guilt which nothing will remove except repentance and restitution; in the second, it conceptualizes a sense of frustration seeking an outlet in unlawful revenge. Like other vengeance or rather justice magic, *madabi* continues to act unless and until the person who dispenses it reverses its power. To apply *madabi* is *bu dabeka*; to arrest or reverse its action is *bu dabekulla*; and this reversal has been very neatly linked up with conceptions of fair play and the ultimate triumph of justice. Let me illustrate from the technique called *mutsikela*, the most dreaded form of vengeance magic which, even when lawfully used, is considered to be so drastic that preliminary public warning of its being put into operation is necessary.

Mutsikela, or working on the grave of a victim killed by

sorcery or witchcraft, is lawful if directed against the criminal murderer, even though its effects are so deadly that it destroys not merely the criminal but also his relatives; for either they are accomplices or the homicidal propensity is inherent in them and has been nurtured in the same home. While medicine to reanimate the spirit of the deceased victim is being poured down a hole in the grave, the most diabolical spell known to the Lobedu—it is *ex tempore* but follows a familiar pattern—is uttered sending the spirit on its mission of stern justice. Spirit and medicine are instructed to search for and strike down the homicidal witch, the phraseology I heard on one occasion being, “to cause them to follow you to the grave; and we say not one of them but the whole brood of culprits”. There are, however, dangers in using this method of restituting a wrong. It is perfectly legal in untainted hands, though its morality is doubted. It must be preceded by the public warning, *bu ebela*, which consists in a warning shouted out from some vantage point, within earshot of the suspected witch, that, unless he desists and makes amends, retaliatory action will be taken. One must remember that in the Lobedu pattern of justice, the repressive sanctions, such as penalties, fines, punishments, indeed any measure involving physical coercion, are practically unknown; all wrongs fall under the restitutive sanction and the procedure given the highest cultural rating is *bu khumelwa*, mutual reconciliation. The criminal, even if he has murdered your son, is wherever possible converted into a kinsman: he gives his daughter and so becomes a son-in-law who has many obligations to you and in return receives beer, the bond *par excellence* of brotherhood, from you.

Mutsikela, like all justice magic, searches for the evildoer and passes judgment upon him; but if the culprit has made suitable restitution and you neglect to recall the forces you have set into operation, or if the witch who has caused the death himself *tsikela's* for you in an attempt to disarm suspicion against him, the omniscient medicine will seek the culprit in vain and returning will strike down the guilty sender. And so the engineer of evil is hoist with his own petard; the criminal use of this kind of magic not merely constitutes sorcery of the worst brand but also rebounds upon the criminal. It is, however, more than suspected that the cleverest sorcerers and witches have methods of confusing these medicines, though in the last resort the greatest magicians, the specialists whose function it is to protect the society against witchcraft and sorcery, are superior and the operation of their medicines cannot be circumvented.

ANTI-WITCHCRAFT DEFENCES

As *mutsikela* indicates, the Lobedu have effective anti-witchcraft defences. Of course a victim may always consult the divinatory dice, those specially prepared bones that take the place of our stethoscopes and X-rays in diagnosis. No one believes, as we naively imagine, that bones are in themselves endowed with perspicacity; but properties and powers can be imparted to them by subjecting them to certain treatments. I am not concerned to explain how such a conception can be justified, except to say that at the level of observation, technology, and scientific verification of these people it is impossible to demonstrate its invalidity. Now, if the bones have identified the witch, it is open to the victim to accuse him and risk the legal proceedings that follow. But resort to law is not altogether satisfactory: it tends to harden animosities in this case whereas appeasement is the accepted function of law; the court is liable to dismiss the accusation as based on idle gossip, or to procrastinate in the hope that the parties will forget their grievances in letting off steam again and again as the case drags on; and there is the danger that the attempt to invoke legal sanctions against a witch will spur him to greater activity against you. It depends entirely upon a man's estimate of the total situation whether he will rely mainly on legal justice or other means to deal with harm caused by the witch or sorcerer; but in any case anticipatory protective measures are always taken. The type of defence is determined by the kind of attack that is feared. A few examples will suffice to indicate the general principles of anti-witchcraft defences.

Protection against the parachutists that ride through the air, the night-flying witches not unnaturally takes the form of camouflaging the village or other objective of the enemy. Hence the *diphaba*, medicine encircling the village or placed at strategic points, such as the gates. This medicine masks the village, making it appear like an expanse of water so that the witch is deluded and concludes that he has come to the wrong place. Logically enough, the camouflaging effect is obtained by using the properties of products of the ocean, such as whale-oil and sea sand. Medicated pegs around the village block the passage of poisoned shafts hurled by sorcerers. So-called witch-doctors of various kinds, for some establish contact with the forces involved through the diagnostic bones, some through their own innate powers and some others through the medium of ancestral spirits, are the detectors and predictors. They divine

the nature and direction of the attack, smell out the quislings and send back with interest the death and destruction. Vengeance-magic with its preliminary warning to the enemy is nothing else than the legitimate reprisal.

The usual defences are unavailing against the witch within the village, since he probably knows the disposition and nature of the precautions taken. There are, therefore, methods of dealing with fifth-columnists. Traitors within the gates may be expelled but a much more favoured solution than physical coercion, which is always regarded as objectionable, is to *fera* the witch. *Fering* consists in surreptitiously introducing into his system, through his food or beer, a drug which calms the irritation impelling him to bewitch. It stops that itching of the fingers which constrains him to commit crimes and causes him to forget his frustrations and to seek compensation in day-dreaming or loquacity instead of in action. He may become gossipy and guileless. An examination of the ingredients of the medicine used throws a good deal of light upon the conceptions that they are handling in this case, but the thought-pattern can hardly be explained here and I must content myself by saying that the objective is to convert the compulsion to do evil into conduct that is aimless and harmless.

THE INCIDENCE AND FUNCTION OF WITCHCRAFT

I have so far confined myself to description and have mentioned a few of the Lobedu rationalizations. But it is necessary to pursue the analysis very much further in order to understand the real role of witchcraft and sorcery and to show to what needs in human nature the institution is a response. I need hardly reiterate that witches and sorcerers are considered to be the embodiment of malignant forces ever on the alert to enter into unholy matrimony with the criminal impulses of the human heart. Witchcraft particularly is the essence of evil, vicious and inscrutable, that whirls through the universe and seeks asylum in sinful souls in which the germs of wickedness lie ready to be quickened into life. Sorcery is not transmitted in the germ-plasm: a child can never be guilty of sorcery, but the kind of precocity in him which enables him to circumvent an adult or the accepted code is a sure sign of incipient witchcraft. Both vices are, however, identified with the malice and jealousies that motivate anti-social conduct. Both of them occur only where you find stresses and strains in life, where, in other words, there are tensions, actual or potential, between people. Hence it is relatives and neighbours, but never strangers, who use witchcraft or sorcery against one another.

Merely to say that we have here the projection of conflicts that in a non-aggressive social environment are driven underground because they are not permitted to find expression in open dissension, is not enough. Some kinds of tension are rather differently canalized; they are given other avenues of vicarious expression. There are, e.g., relatives such as the father's sister towards whom, according to the behaviour patterns of the Lobedu, onerous obligations and an extreme delicacy of conduct are enjoined; they are easily aggrieved and readily nurse grievances; and they may have concealed complaints, repressed and subconscious wants. A father's sister's subconscious grievance is actually conceptualized as *mabava*, which may cause illness in the family of her brother's home. And when he calls her, as he may, to remove the cause, she often uses the phraseology (in the conciliation rite she performs): "if I have been aggrieved and am harbouring ill-will in my heart, I am quite unaware of it . . ." The interesting point is not merely this conception of hidden frustrations, but also that *mabava* is in quite a different category from witchcraft or sorcery. The position is that the father's sister's displeasure or frustrations cannot be projected as witchcraft or sorcery; and the technique of handling tensions of this kind is entirely different.

It is, however, not merely the incidence of witchcraft and sorcery as between persons, i.e., the types of personal tensions involved, that raises numerous interesting problems; there is a different problem in attempting to explain why these evils are invoked for only a limited range of situations. Why, e.g., can you never ascribe the cracking of your pot in the process of burning to these destructive forces, while you do so when the crops in your garden, also the fruits of your labour, unaccountably fail? Why, when you are caught out telling lies, cannot you incriminate a witch maliciously intent upon discrediting you? After all the Lobedu have a technique, *bu nielela*, which can quite legitimately be used to cause a thief who has escaped detection to repeat his thieving so that he may be caught red-handed. A criminal may be made the victim of an obsessive compulsion to relapse into crime so that he will once more be tried for an offence for which he has, say, been let off with a light sentence in our European courts; for as the Lobedu see things, our justice causes criminals to multiply and witches to become more aggressive and the clemency we exercise to reform the offender presents itself as a challenge to which they respond by magically constraining him to crime. *Hu nielela* is never anti-social and hence can never fall in the category of sorcery;

and while it will take me too far afield into Lobedu cultural arrangements, orientations of values and conceptual categories to demonstrate the good sense and coherence of these apparent incongruities, I can say, generally, that when the total situation considered against the background of the knowledge and control of nature available demands an explanation in terms of lack of skill, incompetence or other inadequacy, a man is not permitted to attribute his misfortune or failure to sorcery or witchcraft. Moreover the fundamental presupposition, that the social order is dominated by moral forces, must not be invalidated by the interpretation of causes that a man invokes to account for his shortcomings.

Leaving on one side these difficult questions, let us for a moment revert to the incidence as between persons of witchcraft and sorcery. A statistical analysis reveals that some relatives never bewitch one another, even though their relationship is subject to the severest conflicts. A brother can, for instance, never impute witchcraft or sorcery to his cattle-linked sister, that is, the sister through whose marriage he obtains the cattle for his own marriage. She is the builder of his home and can intervene in it; indeed, he can never divorce the wife obtained with his sister's cattle unless she consents; and in the last resort she may give refuge to that wife if he drives her away and so can prevent the annulment of the marriage and cause the wife to bear children by anyone she likes: the children will still be his and she may still require one of the daughters to marry her son (or if she has none, a supposititious son) so as to become her daughter-in-law who will care for her in her old age. The situation is obviously one that is pregnant with potential stresses and strains. Yet, as I have seen, the ill-conceived idea of a brother to impute witchcraft or sorcery to this sister is ridiculed as a mental aberration or treated as a psychopathic compensatory adjustment. The Lobedu rationalization is usually that brother and sister know one another's medicines and hence cannot harm one another in this way, but underlying this rationalization is the realization that to admit the possibility of witchcraft between these two relatives would endanger the whole social structure, the delicately-balanced edifice built upon the *lobola* exchanges.

On the other hand the most prolific source of witchcraft and sorcery is the conflict of co-wives. They become entangled (if I may use the metaphor of the eternal triangles of our monogamy) in the polygons of jealousy that arise in polygamy. The specific cause of the frustration that is projected may be neglect

or favouritism of the husband, status of one wife relative to the other co-wives, indeed any kind of differential treatment or attempt by the husband to benefit the house of one wife at the expense of another. Sexual jealousies do not, however, take a prominent place, since the structure of the family is such that the husband-wife relationship is primarily the link holding together two larger groups, the intermarrying lineages whose interlocking rights and duties constitute the basis of social solidarity as well as of the political organization. A very considerable portion of the total cultural energy goes to devices for ensuring the smooth running of these crucial institutions; and the solutions for difficulties that are ranked highest are always compromise, give and take, conciliation. Dissension and open conflict between co-wives is severely frowned upon, while agreement even in the humblest home receives royal recognition, which means a great deal since the queen is divine and only rarely accessible to ordinary mortals. The consequence is that co-wives can express their resentments only indirectly in some substitute activity. This is, of course, good soil for the growth of grievances for which witchcraft and sorcery provide a very natural vicarious outlet—hence the high incidence among co-wives of vicarious fights in the world of fantasy.

It would serve no good purpose to analyse the various conflict situations in which imputations of witchcraft and sorcery arise. They are quite unintelligible in our setting since the different ways in which men account for their failures and frustrations are always relative to the functioning and values of their society. But a few facets of these situations can be dealt with fairly generally. The first is the psychological function of witchcraft and sorcery. They enable men to believe that their failures are due not to any fault of their own, but to the machinations of others; and it is very necessary, in a world in which the technology is inadequate for the satisfaction of the complex culturally created needs, that men should be able to compensate for their inadequacy and continue to feel that they are masters of their own fate. Moreover, witchcraft and sorcery provide avenues of vicarious achievement to those who, because of their aggressive temperaments or disharmonious conditioning, find it impossible or extremely irksome to conform to the pattern of co-operativeness and reciprocity.

Another point worth mentioning is that witchcraft and sorcery do not operate automatically, as a number of other forces do; they must always be set into motion by a specific individual; and consequently there must be some theory incriminating

such an individual. Part of the theory is that there are people with innate perverse impulses, and since the values and institutional arrangements of the society reflect an ultimate and universal sanity, they are abnormal and can have intimate relations with the supernormal. Their techniques therefore override ordinary physical laws. But it is impossible to impute witchcraft or sorcery to certain individuals, since they cannot have the necessary evil motivations, or a logical inconsistency would be involved: the society has found it useful to convert the misfortune suffered into a social sanction. There is, in other words, a good deal more in witchcraft and sorcery than meets the eye, and they can be shown to be intelligent responses to man's fundamental needs in the context of the society in which they are found.

J. D. KRIGE.



Some Reflections On Migratory Labour In South Africa

Few studies provide greater scope or wider interest than an investigation of the break-down of the traditional pattern of Bantu tribal life since its coming into contact with European society and Western values. A process of adaptation and adjustment has been taking place ever since. This process has many features all of which are in some way inter-related. The present article confines itself to one aspect of one of these features, namely, to the modifications which are taking place within the system of migratory labour that has been and remains the main source of labour for the mines and secondary industry.

The system of migratory labour in South Africa has certain important features which distinguish it from overseas migratory labour, particularly in the United States and in Britain, where the main studies in this field have been made. In the first place labour in those countries is usually migrant because of seasonal variations in the demand for labour. The families from the East End of London which go down to the hop-fields of Kent during the picking season provide a typical example, as do the waiters, acrobats, actors and others who make Brighton or Blackpool a holiday resort for the masses. Similarly, in South Africa workers move to Durban or Cape Town for their respective seasons, while sheep-shearers move from farm to farm in the Free State and the Eastern Cape. In these cases, the movement of labour is designed to meet the needs of the employer, needs that are intermittent and frequently limited.

In South Africa, such cases, though important in their own way, are none the less exceptions to the general rule. The demand for labour of the Witwatersrand gold mines is, however, not subject to seasonal variations. Nor as a rule is the labour demand seasonal in industry or commerce, or among private householders for domestic service. The explanation for the fact that many of the workers employed are migrant must, therefore, be sought elsewhere.

The second point is this. In most countries, migrant labour is supplementary to the main body of labour. The labour may in some cases be casual in its work habits, but it is nevertheless relatively stable in its domicile, and in most cases lives close to its place of employment. In South Africa, as far as the Africans, who constitute the main body of workers, are concerned, the boot is on the other foot. The distance between the place of work and the place regarded as "home" may frequently be as much as a thousand miles, except in Natal where the reserves are at lesser distances. Spells of work in urban employment alternate with spells as peasant farmers in a tribal subsistence economy. As was stated by the Native Mine Wages Commission¹: "South African economy rests upon a migrant labour supply".

This situation has developed for a number of reasons. South Africa's industrial revolution was initiated and rapidly accelerated by the expansion of mining and railway building during the latter half of the nineteenth century, these being later supplemented by the growth of secondary industry during and since the war of 1914-18 and especially during World War II.

This industrial expansion took place in a country in which the tribalised Bantu were for the most part living under a pastoral subsistence economy in reserves, into which they had been confined by European expansion. The bulk of the remainder were living on European farms as labour-tenants under the semi-serfdom of the labour tenancy system. In the reserves, the system of husbandry was little modified, the only significant change being the introduction of the steel plough. As a result of the importance placed on cattle and a generally primitive technique of farming, soil denudation and deterioration have occurred on a wide scale, so much so that desert conditions have been created in some areas.² The reserves cannot provide even a bare subsistence for the vast majority, and for some their holdings are to all intents and purposes useless as a source of income.

In the early days of this development, the supply of labour from the reserves fell short of the labour requirements of the mines and other employers. The reaction that might have been expected did not, however, occur. The price of African labour did not rise, so that there was no resultant reduction in the demand for labour, and equally there was no increase in the supply of labour forthcoming.

¹U.G. 21-44.

²Report of Native Economic Commission, 1930-32.

This may sound as if we make our economic laws as we go along, but it is probably true under the conditions which then existed that an increase in the price of labour might actually have had the effect of reducing the supply of labour. The danger was a very real one. The men leaving the reserves in search of work were for the most part the young unmarried men. They were anxious, among other things, to see the white man's world. Money had to be raised to pay the taxes of a Government, which realised the effect a money tax would have in promoting the flow of work-seekers among a people to whom money was extraneous. A relatively short spell of work would also suffice to meet the additional desires raised by the sight of knives, beads, blankets and other goods which traders and cities suggested. Some of these could at one time be acquired in exchange for the products of the hunt or their fields, but as these declined, so the incentive to move out increased and older men began to join the stream.¹

Nevertheless, the African did not as a rule intend to break with his family, his tribe and the land. The labour was migrant, not because the labour demands of employers varied, but because the African came out to supplement the income from his land, and the number which came out for this reason varied with the seasons and the richness of the harvests. It was a minimum during and immediately after the harvest, thereafter increasing until it checked when the rains came and ploughing became necessary and possible, and rising again to its peak just prior to the harvest. Similarly, a bad harvest stimulated a greater movement from the reserves, while a year of "full belly" tended to inhibit it. Higher wages could, in such circumstances, reduce the labour supply, because they could and did mean that Africans need only come out to work for wages less frequently and for shorter periods.

In recent years, and greatly stimulated by the expansion of industry during World War II, the demand for African labour has increased and has probably become stabilised on a higher level. Simultaneously, another process has been taking place: the number of Africans coming out of the reserves in search for work has increased, and the extent to which this labour is migratory has been reduced.

It is this latter aspect which is frequently overlooked and yet is so vitally important. The extent to which migratoriness is being reduced is shown by a large number of examples. Some

¹With much more dangerous effects on family life, tribal structure and reserve economy.

very interesting figures have emerged from an analysis made of 10,000 Africans presenting themselves at the offices of the Witwatersrand Native Labour Association, as submitted by the Director of Native Labour to the Native Economic Commission in 1931, and to the Native Mine Wages Commission in 1943.¹ In each case, 10,000 Natives were taken as a sample of the total number registered for employment in the mines.

The results showed that in the 1931 sample the Africans had spent on an average 10.88 months at work and 8.1 months away, whereas in 1943, the figures were 13.6 months at work for 7.6 months away. Thus the proportion of time spent at work had risen from 57.4% in 1931 to 64.1% in 1943, a very significant rise for the comparatively short period of 12 years.

Further details submitted also contain points of interest. While 36% of the British South African Natives² still stay in the reserves for 12 months and more between spells of work, 81% of those registered during 1943 had been on the mines before, and of these 20.7% had returned to work after not more than three months away, i.e., "no more than a holiday visit" to the reserves.³

Similar results emerge from a large number of related studies at present being made by the Department of Economics, Natal University College. Figures from the Durban Housing Survey show that only a small proportion of Durban workers returned to the reserves for ploughing purposes during 1943. Only 19% had done so, and less than 7% had been away for two months or less.⁴ The survey now being conducted at the Dunlop Rubber Factory shows that the African employees average 22 months at work for every two months away. A sample survey of the 1,056 workers employed in July, 1946, showed that 83% had unbroken service records; of these 57% had been at the factory for more than 15 months and 24% for more than 27 months.

These and many other figures are indicative of the fact that of the rising numbers of Africans drifting towards urban employment, an increasingly large proportion is stabilising into a permanent industrial labour force. This group look to urban employment not as a supplementary, but as the main and in many cases as the sole source of its income. Strong evidence for the correctness of this view is to be found in the

¹See Appendix I of U.G., 21-44.

²*i.e.*, Natives from the Protectorates.

³Section 209 of U.G., 21-44.

⁴These figures were not published, but have been extracted from the returns of the Housing Survey.

increasing numbers who are endeavouring to settle permanently with their families in the towns. The percentage of African females in Durban has risen from 6% in 1911 to 22% in 1936 and 28% in 1943-44.¹ It is also indicated by the changes taking place in the age composition of the population, and by the proportional decline in the number of working age. Those under 14 years have increased from 6.8% in 1921 to 13.5% in 1936, while those over 50 have increased from 2.2% to 5.8% during the same period.² These figures are particularly notable when we see that the total African population of Durban has increased from 64,000 in 1936 to 109,000 in 1946.³

Nor is it any longer really true to say that high urban rates of pay tend to reduce the supply of labour available. If this were the case, the spells of work of Dunlop African employees would probably be shorter than the average for Durban or on the mines. Actually the reverse is very much the case. The Dunlop workers are on the average away for only 8% of their working lives, as compared with an average of 18% for the same workers when employed elsewhere prior to employment at Dunlop's, and an average in 1943 of 36% for workers on the mines. As conditions are, it is thus possibly true that the present wage policy of the mines may actually represent a barrier to any increase in their supply of labour, as Africans are increasingly looking for the higher rates of pay which can be earned in such industrial concerns as Dunlop's, where earnings range between £10 and £12 per month.

Important conclusions regarding policy follow. It is clearly no longer—if it ever was—a matter of choice between a deliberately migrant and a deliberately urbanising Native labour policy. An abrupt transition would be economically and socially very complicated and dangerously disruptive. What should, however, be noted and made the basis of policy is the fact that within the broad drift towards urban employment, an increasingly stable urbanised group is emerging despite the barriers raised by inadequate housing, the Native Urban Areas Act, discriminating industrial legislation, and the inertia of established ideas and ways of life among the Africans.

South African incomes are low because productivity is low—and casual labour and migratory labourers loom large as the roots of this state of affairs. It is time that the question were

¹Table 6 in the memorandum of evidence prepared for the Native Laws Commission by the Department of Economics, N.U.C.

²Do. Table 7.

³Do. Table 3.

analysed, not on a basis of for or against migratory labour,¹ but in terms of the reality of the situation. This article has only touched on the many questions involved; policy-makers should examine all the facts.

G. E. STENT.

¹*E.g.*, as in the memo submitted by the Gold Producers Committee of the Chamber of Mines to the Native Laws Commission.



Die Aandeel Van Die Opvoedkundige Sielkunde In Die Opleiding Van Onderwysers

Sedert veertig jaar speel die Opvoedkundige Sielkunde 'n vername rol in die opleiding van onderwysers. Die doel van die Opvoedkundige Sielkunde, en gevolglik ook die inhoud en die metodes, is egter van tyd tot tyd gewysig namate daar veranderings gekom het in die opvoedkunde (nuwe doelstelling) en in die sielkunde (nuwe navorsingsgebiede, nuwe teorieë, nuwe metodes).

Die taak wat ek my hier gestel het, is om na te gaan wat ons teenswoordig met 'n opleiding in die Opvoedkundige Sielkunde behoort te bereik, en hoe die doelstelling tegelyk ook die inhoud en die metode van die opleiding bepaal.

Om die doel te bepaal, moet ons uitgaan aan die een kant van die beeld wat die moderne sielkunde ons van die persoonlikheidsontwikkeling gee, en aan die ander kant van die rol wat die onderwyser in die persoonlikheidsontwikkeling van die leerling behoort te speel.

Die moderne sielkunde (karakterologie, personologie, Gestaltsielkunde, kliniese sielkunde) stel drie feite op die voorgrond: eerstens, dat die persoonlikheid altyd en orals afhang van groter gehele (die familie, die skool, die beroepswêreld, die kultuurgroep met sy karakteristieke waardes en waardehouinge, die fisiese en materiële omgewing) en tot 'n groot mate deur daardie gehele bepaal word; tweedens, dat tenspyte van hierdie afhanklikheid elke individu tog eenmalig is en in staat om sy eie stempel op daardie groter gehele af te druk; derdens dat die persoonlikheid self as 'n geheel groei, sodat die intellektuele ontwikkeling byvoorbeeld altyd gesien moet word in sy afhanklikheid van oorerwing en omgewing (wat al lankal gedoen word) sowel as in verhouding tot die gevoelens en strewings (iets wat baie psigoloë nog nie voldoende in

aanmerking neem nie). In die beklemtoning van die eerste feit word psigoloë veral deur sosioloë en antropoloë ondersteun, ten opsigte van die tweede deur filosowe; die derde feit kan net deur die sielkundige beoordeel word, omdat die psigoloog (veral die karakteroloog) die enigste is wat hom met hierdie probleem besig hou.

As ons hierdie drie feite op die ontwikkeling van leerlinge in die skool toepas, dan beteken hulle: in die eerste plek, dat die persoonlikheid van elke leerling gevorm word deur baie invloede wat van buitekant die skool kom—en daardie buiteskoolse invloede kan dikwels die sterkste wees—; ten tweede, dat wat die skool ook al vir alle kinders beoog, die enkele leerling altyd sy eenmalige individualiteit besit, wat ons nie mag verontagsaam nie sonder om gevaar te loop dat die leerling hom ter selfbeskerming teen die invloed van die skool afsluit of dat sy individualiteit verkrag of selfs doodgesmoor word; en derdens, dat die aanwring van kennis en van vaardighede die hele persoonlikheid van die leerling beïnvloed, en daarmee ook sy gesindhede teenoor die waardes en waardehoudinge van die samelewing waarvan hy 'n lid is.

Die rol wat die onderwyser in hierdie persoonlikheidsvorming speel, word daardeur bepaal dat die samelewing hom daarvoor verantwoordelik hou om kennis mee te deel, om vaardighede te laat aanleer, om toe te sien dat die waardes (veral morele) van die samelewing gerespekteer word, en dat die belange van die sosiale groep sowel as die potensialiteite van individue tot hulle reg kom. Ons kan selfs persoonlikheidsvorming en opvoeding gelykstel, mits ons onthou dat die persoonlikheid nie in 'n lugleë ruimte nie, maar as 'n integrale deel van die samelewing groei en funksioneer. Dit is dan wel waar dat die onderwyser nie die enigste persoon is wat persoonlikhede vorm nie, want opvoeding is, soos 'n sosiale antropoloog dit uitgedruk het, „die wisselwerking tussen die lede van opeenvolgende generasies” en dus 'n proses waarin almal betrokke is. Maar in hierdie proses neem die onderwyser tog 'n besondere plek in. Hy is meer as mense in enige ander beroep met die deel van die bevolking in aanraking wat opvoeding die meeste nodig het en nog opvoedbaar is (kinders en adolessente), en afgesien van die verantwoordelikheid wat elke mens vir sy medemens het, het hy die spesiale opdrag van die samelewing om opvoeder te wees.

As ons verwag dat die onderwyser persoonlikhede moet vorm, dan moet ons seker maak dat hy ook bekwaam is om dit te doen. Dit behoort derhalwe die doel van die opleiding in

die Opvoedkundige Sielkunde te wees om onderwysers in staat te stel om die individuele persoonlikhede van kinders te leer verstaan, sodat hulle beter in die opvoedingsproses sal kan ingryp. Hierdie doelstelling moet dan die inhoud van die Opvoedkundige Sielkunde sowel as die metode in die opleiding van onderwysers bepaal.

Ten opsigte van die inhoud beteken dit dat die bloot didaktiese probleme, wat vroeër so 'n belangrike plek in die Opvoedkundige Sielkunde ingeneem het dat Eksperimentele Didaktiek 'n doeltreffender naam vir die vak was, 'n ondergeskikte plek moet inneem of dat hulle selfs daaruit verwyder moet word en onder die Onderwysmetodiek val.

Bloot didaktiese probleme is byvoorbeeld die volgende: Is dit beter om leerlinge eers drukskrif te laat leer voordat hulle leer om aanmekaar te skryf, en indien dit wel so is, wanneer moet die oorgang van drukskrif na aanmeekaarskrif plaasvind? Wat is die beste metode van memorisering van poësie, van prosa, van onsamehangende feite? Wat is die waarde van visuele hulpmiddels in verskillende vakke? Watter uitwerking het vermoeidheid (of beligting, of vogtigheid ens.), op die leerproses van leerlinge? Hoe lank moet 'n les duur vir verskillende vakke en vir leerlinge van verskillende ouderdomme as ons die beste resultate wil bereik?

Daar is 'n geweldige aantal sulke probleme, en daar ontstaan gedurig nuwes. Hulle is belangrik vir die onderwyser, en hulle word opgelos deur eksperimentering en met verwysing na sielkundige feite en beginsels. Waar dit in die opleiding van onderwysers nie moontlik is om hierdie probleme onder die Metodiek te behandel nie, is dit nodig om hulle onder die Opvoedkundige Sielkunde te laat val. Ons moet dan net oppas dat hulle nie dit verdring wat die hoofsaak behoort te wees in die Opvoedkundige Sielkunde: die studie van die persoonlikheid.

Hierby moet uitgegaan word van die besondere probleme in die skool, en moet die kennis diensbaar gemaak word aan die doeleindes van 'n onderwys wat nie meer blote didaktiek is nie, maar egte opvoeding geword het.

Nie net die leek nie, maar ook die vakman (soos blyk uit baie publikasies in die Opvoedkundige Sielkunde) reken dat die onderwyser veral 'n deeglike kennis van die sielkunde van die kind en die adolessent nodig het. Ons begin derhalwe ook hier met die bespreking van die kind se persoonlikheid. Dit is egter noodsaaklik om ook op die sielkunde van die onderwyser self in te gaan, omdat die onderwyser sonder hierdie

kennis nie net sy leerlinge nie reg kan verstaan nie, maar ook persoonlik 'n mislukking van sy beroep maak.

As ons eis dat die onderwyser insig moet hê in die persoonlikhede van individuele leerlinge, dan dink ons gewoonlik in die eerste plek aan kinders wat op een of ander wyse afwyk van wat ons as normaal beskou: aan die verstandelik sub-normales, die gedragsafwykende of „moeilike” kinders, kinders met liggaamlike gebreke ens.

Die noodsaaklikheid om sulke kinders te verstaan, word al lankal besef, maar gewoonlik word net verwag dat die onderwyser genoeg kennis sal hê om hulle te erken, sodat hy hulle na 'n spesialis kan verwys: na die psigoloog, die sosiale werker, die psigiater, of die geneeskundige. Ervaring het egter al geleer dat dit nie voldoende is nie. Die oorgang van sub- of abnormaliteit na normaliteit is geleidelik. Daar is baie kinders wie se gedrag nie van so 'n aard is dat dit verwysing na 'n spesialis regverdig nie, ofskoon daar wel spesiale opvoedkundige maatreëls nodig is. Daar is byvoorbeeld al die leerlinge wat te slim is om in spesiale klasse geplaas te word, maar te dom om in die gewone klasse maklik te vorder. Dit is die onderwyser wat hierdie kinders moet verstaan, want hy is verantwoordelik vir die opvoedkundige program wat vir hulle opgestel word. Verder is daar die modelleerling, wat goeie skoolstudiese vordering maak en in alle opsigte die onderwyser probeer tevrede stel, nie omdat hy in sy skoolwerk belangstel of selfstandig is nie, maar juis omdat hy veels te afhanklik is van die goed- of afkeuring van die onderwyser om ooit die moed te hê om opstandig te wees; hy is in groter gevaar as die stoute, rebelse kind om later 'n mislukking van sy lewe te maak. As die onderwyser so 'n modelleerling nie verstaan nie—en hy doen dit dikwels nie, omdat so 'n leerling nie lastig is nie—dan sal hy die onselfstandigheid ook nie teenwerk nie. Uiteindelik is daar nog die besonder slim leerlinge wat juis deur hulle slimheid van die norm „afwyk”. Hulle het dikwels hulle eie probleme, omdat die onderwyser hulle spesifieke behoefte aan meer ingewikkelde en meer gevorderde werk as wat deur die meerderheid van die leerlinge behartig kan word, nie erken nie. Hulle stel dan soms hulle surplus aan verstand en hulle oorskot aan vitaliteit in die diens van katekwaad. Hulle kan so „moeilik” word dat hulle na 'n psigoloog verwys moet word. Die meeste van hulle kan egter net deur die onderwyser gehelp word, omdat hulle nie simptome toon wat verwysing na die psigoloog sou regverdig nie.

Psigologiese spesialiste en kinderleidingklinieke is in elke

onderwysstelsel nodig. Vir hulle sal daar altyd nog meer as genoeg werk wees wanneer onderwysers geleer het om die groot meerderheid van leerlinge wat gewoonlik as „moeilik” bestempel word, te verstaan. Trouens, een van die belangrikste take van kliniese psigoloë en kinderleidingklinieke kan nooit van hulle weggeëem word nie: die taak om die algemene publiek, insluitende onderwysers, op sielkundige gebied voor te lig, en om verbeterde metodes van kliniese ondersoek en dieper insigte te verskaf.

Kennis van die persoonlikheid beteken nie net kennis van die afwykende persoonlikheid nie. Vir die opvoedkundige is dit besonder belangrik omsypsiologiese kennis ook te gebruik om leerlinge te verstaan wat nie deur sub- of bo- of abnormaliteit opval nie. Ook die ander leerlinge het hulle besondere probleme, en die onderwyser moet hulle ken, sodat hy kan help wanneer dit nodig is.

Dit klink miskien asof die studieveld so ingedeel moet word dat ons na mekaar, en sonder betrekking tot mekaar, verskillende kategorieë van kinders (subnormales, delinkwente en „moeilike” kinders, modelleerlinge, „normale” kinders, slim kinders ens.) moet bestudeer. In werklikheid beteken dit egter dat ons ’n begripstelsel en ’n persoonlikheidsteorie moet hê wat ons in staat stel om kinders te verstaan wat baie sterk van mekaar verskil, en wat geldigheid het ook buite die gebied van die kindersielkunde. Sonder so ’n begripstelsel is die gevaar groot dat die onderwyser die kind sien as iemand wat hy moet klassifiseer in sekere rubrieke, maar nie as ’n individuele kind nie, en dat hy leerlinge wat nie in die klassifikasie, wat hy leer ken het, inpas nie, nooit sal verstaan nie. Dit is hier nie die plek om die besonderhede van so ’n begripstelsel aan te dui nie.

Dat dit teenswoordig toenemend noodsaakliker word om as onderwyser ’n deeglike kennis te hê van die faktore wat die persoonlikheid beïnvloed, blyk ook uit die feit dat daar binnekort ’n stelsel van kumulatiewe verslagkaarte vir alle leerlinge in alle Suid-Afrikaanse skole ingevoer sal word. Die doel van hierdie kaarte sal wees om die onderwyser in staat te stel om beter beroepkundige en opvoedkundige leiding te kan gee. Om van so ’n stelsel ’n sukses te maak, eis ’n aansienlike mate van sielkundige opleiding van onderwysers. Die ervaring in ander lande het al getoon dat waar hierdie opleiding ontbreek, die kumulatiewe verslagkaarte maklik ’n administratiewe ballas in plaas van ’n opvoedkundige hulpmiddel word.

Tot dusver het ons die sielkunde van die leerling genoem; ons kom nou tot die psigologie van die onderwyser.

Die onderwyser moet weet dat hy deur sy blote teenwoordigheid al invloed op sy leerlinge het. Hy word 'n moontlike voorwerp van identifikasie en idealisering, of miskien van verafskuwing—'n skrikbeeld van hoe 'n leerling nie wil wees nie. Of hy geïdealiseer of verafsku word, het soms min met sy werklike eienskappe te doen, maar sonder 'n kennis van hierdie moontlike verhoudings tussen leerlinge en onderwyser kan die onderwyser leerlinge nie altyd verstaan nie, en sal die opvoeding van die kind soms nie doeltreffend wees nie.

Die belangrikste feit in die sielkunde van die onderwyser is egter dat hy bewus of onbewus as die verteenwoordiger van die samelewing optree. Dit gebeur dikwels dat hy nie onderskei tussen homself as ampsdraer en homself as persoon nie. Een van die gevolge hiervan is dat hy sy eie rol oorskat, en dat hy met 'n aanspraak op alwetendheid en gesag optree wat hom betweterig en diktatoriaal maak. Dit is 'n soort beroepsiekte van die onderwyser. Dit is nadelig vir homself as persoon omdat dit sy verhouding tot sy familie en sy vriende vergif. Maar buitendien belemmer dit ook sy werk. Hy sal geneig wees om elke skolastiese vertraging en elke oortreding teen die sedelike eise van die samelewing as 'n persoonlike aanval op homself of as 'n minagting van sy persoon te beskou. Hy sal dan miskien kwaad word, of selfs straf toedien, maar hy sal nooit in staat wees om 'n kind raad en hulp te gee nie, want om raad te kan gee, moet die onderwyser juis die objektiewe waardes en eise sien as iets wat heeltemal onafhanklik van sy eie persoon bestaan en wat die kind moet leer respekteer met of sonder die onderwyser.

Al is 'n onderwyser miskien nie geneig om sy eie rol in die skool te oorskat nie, gebeur dit tog maklik dat hy die rol van skoolonderwys in die lewe van die kind nie in die regte perspektief kan sien nie. Hy vergeet om na al die buiteskoolse invloede te kyk wat op die leerling inwerk. Ons ken almal die onderwyser wat geen egte respek vir die beroepswaardes van 'n oudleerling het nie, omdat hy te goed onthou hoe swak hy in die skoolwerk was.

Wat die onderwyser nodig het, is selfkennis. Hy moet nie net tussen sy amp en sy persoon kan onderskei nie, maar hy behoort ook sy persoonlike simpatieë en antipatieë, sy ideale en wense, sy bekwaamhede en tekortkominge goed te ken. Anders sal hy in die beoordeling van 'n kind te veel klem lê op dinge wat vir hom persoonlik belangrik is sonder dat hulle objektief en vir almal waardevol is. Ons kry byvoorbeeld die onderwyser wat kinders in die eerste plek volgens die netjies-

heid van hulle handskrif beoordeel, of wat in 'n opstel elke aanduiding van persoonlike gevoel afkeur, omdat hy self gevoelsku is of sulke gevoelens nie kan hê nie.

Ten opsigte van die metode van opleiding in die Opvoedkundige Sielkunde moet ons daarvan uitgaan dat die onderwyser in sy beroep nie daarop uit is om die Opvoedkundige Sielkunde as 'n wetenskap, d.w.s. as 'n geheel van samehangende feite en hipoteses waarop verder gebou kan word, te bevorder nie, maar dat hy in konkrete gevalle mense moet verstaan, sodat hy hulle beter kan opvoed. Hoe kan hy leer om dit te doen?

Daar is twee dinge waarop gelet moet word: daar moet klem gelê word op beginsels, en die aspirant-onderwyser moet oefening hê in die ontleding van individuele gevalle onder die omstandighede waaronder hy dit later as onderwyser ook sal moet doen. Albei is nodig om oordraging van leer in die opleidingsituasie op die latere beroepsituasie te bevorder.

Die klem op beginsels—en „teorie”—is belangrik, omdat sielkundige tegnieke in die hand van 'n persoon wat nie gewillig of in staat is om sy interpretasie van individuele gevalle in die lig van algemeen erkende teoretiese insigte te sien nie, dit op vooroordele en intuïsie van onkontroleerbare waarde sal baseer.

Klem op oefening in die beoordeling van leerlinge onder min of meer dieselfde omstandighede as wat later in die beroep aangetref word, is nodig, omdat die aspirant-onderwyser die vertrouwe moet hê dat hy die tegniek wat hy leer gebruik, later ook sal kan toepas.

Dit beteken dat kinders nie in 'n laboratorium en met hulp van ingewikkelde en tydrowende toetse of indrukwekkende toestelle bestudeer moet word nie, maar in die skole en met behulp van tegniese middels wat daar maklik aangewend kan word. Daar is nogal baie wat in enige skool gedoen kan word: intelligensie- en skolastiese toetse afneem; kinders in verskillende situasies in die skool en op die skoolgronde (sport, speelyd) dophou; opstelle en tekenings van leerlinge nie net as skolastiese prestasies nie, maar veral ook as uitdrukking van die kind se persoonlikheid te bestudeer; oefening in die sistematiese korrelering van al die gegewens wat die onderwyser op sulke en soortgelyke maniere oor leerlinge verkry.

Hoe waardevol 'n Eksperimentele Skool ook al mag wees, is dit vir die opleiding in die Opvoedkundige Sielkunde miskien nog nie eens 'n nadeel as 'n universiteit nie oor so 'n skool beskik nie, as die dosent net daarin slaag om met die bestaande skole—so veel verskillendes as moontlik—reëlins te tref dat

die studente toegelaat word om kinders te toets en deeglik te bestudeer. Die studente kry daardeur die gevoel dat hulle nie in 'n kunsmatige laboratorium-omgewing werk nie, en die onderwysers wat al jarelank in die skooldiens is, sien dikwels hulle eie leerlinge in 'n nuwe lig as die resultate van ondersoek met hulle bespreek word. Plaaslike ondervinding toon dat skoolhoofde en onderwysers gewoonlik graag van die geleentheid gebruik maak om leerlinge deur aspirant-onderwysers te laat toets, en dat beide die studente en die skool daarby baat.

Die invloed wat op so 'n manier van die universiteit op die skool en die onderwysers uitgeoefen word, kan nie maklik oorskakel word nie. Die beste opleiding op universiteit kan die aspirant-onderwysers tog net help om hulle beroep met 'n sekere mate van kennis en met bepaalde verwagtinge tegemoet te gaan. Eers as hulle vir 'n tyd self verantwoordelike onderwysers was, sal die meeste probleme, ook die van die Opvoedkundige Sielkunde, vir hulle werklik aktueel word. Dit is dan wanneer hulle die raad van 'n opvoedkundige sielkundige nodig het. Myns insiens maak die dosent die grootste sukses van sy werk wat daarin slaag om sy studente te laat insien dat die kursus in Opvoedkundige Sielkunde op universiteit nooit klaar afgesluit kan word nie, en wat die vertrouwe van die studente wen sodat hulle later in hulle beroep nie aarsel om vir raad na hom toe te kom nie.

W. H. O. SCHMIDT.



Food And The Social Insects

“ Then, I said, let us begin and create a state ; and yet the true creator is necessity ; who is the mother of our invention. True, he replied. Now the first and greatest of necessities is food, which is the condition of life and existence. Certainly.”

Plato, *Republic* II.

It is generally accepted that the terrestrial forms of life from which all the inhabitants of the earth's surface at the present day are descended commenced the invasion of the land at the time of the Carboniferous or the geological period just preceding it, that is about 300 million years ago. This was certainly not a single or sudden event, and how many unsuccessful attempts were made during ages of geological time to cross the threshold between water and land we are unable even to guess.

By the time that the coal measures had slowly begun to form out of the vast, steamy, and tropical forests of this age, the bases for the invasion of the land had been firmly established and the train of evolutionary conquest which was to culminate in the most completely terrestrialized of all animals, the mammals, had begun.

Our distance in the geological time scale from those far-off events is rather apt to blur the distinction between the two great lines of animal development which were destined to achieve a complete mastery of the dry land, the small-brained and small-sized invertebrates and the large-brained and bulkier vertebrates. Though we now consider even the most highly developed invertebrates, such as the hyperactive and extraordinarily versatile insects, to have lagged behind in the evolutionary race, the decisive superiority of the vertebrates and their final mastery of the terrestrial environment would probably not have appeared so inevitable to an extra-terrestrial observer of the Carboniferous scene.

Both the vertebrates and invertebrates commenced the great adventure of land-living at about the same time in geological history, but the invertebrates appear to have made a slightly more promising start. They were represented by a numerous

and fairly diverse band consisting of generalised types of insects, spiders, scorpions, centipedes, millipedes, some land snails and possibly some of the soft-bodied land worms which have left no fossil traces of their existence.

The invertebrates even at that far-off time had produced a number of giant forms, and some of the insects and millipedes of the Carboniferous period were larger than any that have appeared in the earth's history since that promising dawn of invertebrate life. In the air too they held an advantage, and many millions of years before the vertebrates had produced a single type capable of flight immense dragonflies with a wing-spread of 25 or 30 inches flapped clumsily between the avenues of giant mosses and tree-like ferns which formed the Carboniferous forests. To balance this galaxy the vertebrates could only muster a number of primitive and clumsy footed amphibia, the Stegocephalians, a class of animals which must have possessed very limited physical and mental abilities, and were just capable of dragging themselves sluggishly along the ground.

The advance of the small-brained invertebrates has been parallel to, but always separate from, the vertebrates. That they were unable to evolve the large brains, and as a general consequence, the higher intelligence of the back-boned animals, has been primarily due to reasons which appear to have very little to do with intelligence. The main handicap of the invertebrates has been their breathing organs which, as a means of respiration in general, have been weighed in the balance and found wanting; the majority of them, and their most highly developed members, are contained in a group or phylum, the Arthropoda, which all possess jointed limbs well designed for various kinds of active movement and an external skeleton or armour of chitin; most of the terrestrial representatives breathe by means of tracheæ or short simple tubes which carry oxygen directly to various parts of the body. Such a system while mechanically adequate up to a point for an animal of small bulk is quite unsuited for those large-bodied ones which are mainly found among the vertebrates; as a result the arthropods have not been able to increase their body size beyond a certain limit. Other terrestrial invertebrates, such as many worms and snails, are in even worse case, with still cruder methods of respiration, while some minute forms have no breathing organs at all.

The limiting of body size in the terrestrial invertebrates has again limited the size of the brain and the number of neurones which it can contain; as a consequence the number of paths

and synapses by means of which impulses are able to pass through it are in their turn restricted. Thus the brains of even the most highly evolved invertebrates such as the bees and ants, though possessing considerable complexity of structure, are hopelessly small.

The two lines of terrestrial evolution which are evident in the zoological kingdom have reached their culminating point in two groups, or classes as they would be ranked by zoologists, each of which has emerged predominant from the larger phylum of which it forms a part; the small-brained insects from the Arthropod phylum, and the large-brained mammals from the vertebrate phylum. Both are characterised by two outstanding evolutionary achievements, the development of flight and the establishment of some form of social organisation, the former as an activity by means of which the living space of the group has been extended and more thoroughly mastered, the latter as a means of integrating the various members of the group so as to provide greater security and certainty of survival.

It is perhaps no accident that the highly socialised insects of the present day, such as termites, ants and bees, are also masters of flight. Apart from mere parachuting devices, only the bats and man himself, among the mammals, have achieved flight; in the case of the bats, as in birds and various extinct groups of flying reptiles, by the direct evolutionary development of certain organs and their appropriate muscles; in man indirectly by the application of his intelligence, itself the product of a long evolutionary process, to the mechanics of flight. In human history the organisation of men in societies, with the pooling of knowledge and experience resulting from such integrations, was a necessary prerequisite to the discovery of flight; in its turn this discovery has extended and completed man's biological environment, hitherto limited to the lands and waters, so as to embrace a third medium, the air.

The animals most completely adapted to a terrestrial existence are now the dominant life forms of our planet's surface, among the vertebrates the mammals with man as overlord and super-mammal, among the invertebrates the energetic, prolific and ubiquitous insects. These are however the rulers of the open lands, the plains, mountains and deserts, and there are still niches and corners of the dry land surface where their writ does not run; such habitats are caves and the great tracts of tropical rain forest, which at the present time are the least explored parts of the earth's surface.

Of all the ecological regions or biotypes into which the zoogeographers have divided the continental masses, the tropical rain forests existing today present the closest resemblances to the vast forests of primeval vegetation which covered great tracts of the earth's land surface during the Carboniferous period, especially in what is today the Northern Hemisphere.

These coal age forests were the birthplace of the terrestrial prototypes, in both the vertebrate and invertebrate lines of development; the tropical climate of that period caused the interiors of these forests to be perpetually warm and humid, with an atmosphere resembling that of a modern greenhouse; their exteriors presented a continual symphony of green, for there were no seasons then, without the falling leaves or autumn tints which herald the changes of the year in our temperate forests. There was a perpetual rain of microscopic spores from the Carboniferous trees to the ground which continued throughout the 70 million years of the period, so wasteful and abundant that some of the coal seams are made almost wholly of such spores. Mary Borden has given us this word picture of the palaeozoic landscape in *Jehovah's Day*: "through the green gloom of the long vaulted colonnades of naked tree trunks, slowly, languidly, as snowflakes do, a pale golden shower of spores floated ceaselessly down from the leafy roof to the ground".

In all these respects, uniform humidity, genial warmth and the exuberant growth of the lowlier forms of plant life, the modern tropical forests resemble those of the Carboniferous with their wealth and wastefulness; like the primeval forests too, they are carpeted with a layer of mould rich in organic matter, derived from generation after generation of trees which had lived and died, contributing with their bodies to the carpet of humid forest soil.

In the rich humus which is everywhere so characteristic of the forest floor a unique collection of small animals live their whole lives through without ever emerging into the open sunlight. This hidden or cryptic fauna is most highly developed and typical in the great ever-green rain forests that girdle the tropics, but it can also be studied in the South African temperate forests which are outliers or extensions of the tropic forests of central Africa. In Natal they are especially characteristic of the mist belt region along the upper slopes of the great Drakensberg range which skirts the Western and Northern boundaries of the province.

The dwellers of this cryptic habitat are isolated in their forest

islands where they are protected and sheltered by the leafy covering with its many ways of tempering the cold wind of the environment to the shorn lamb of the organism; theirs is a double habitat, or one habitat enclosed within another, since they are not only blanketed by the layer of organic debris which litters the forest floor, but also by the humid mantle existing in the forest itself, which moderates the excessive heat of the sun and prevents evaporation from the forest floor. It is not surprising that such genial conditions have not called out the spartan qualities required for existence in the open with its more structurally advanced and enterprising forms of life.

Far more exacting are the conditions which prevail in the open lands where the insects and vertebrates are predominant. In place of the enduring mildness of the forest with its half tones, mists, and twilight, the open lands abound in strong contrasts, burning heat alternating with bitter cold, flood with drought, and deep shadow with dazzling sunlight. In these open regions, swept by eternal winds and currents of air, and subject to the daily tides of convection rising from the sun-warmed earth, the atmosphere is in continual circulation and humidity is kept low; on the forest floor there is no such movement and the air stagnates.

The forest cryptic fauna is mainly a community of arthropods and 95 per cent. of it is made up of various branches of this great invertebrate phylum, the Arachnida (spiders, scorpions and mites), Myriopoda (centipedes and millipedes), a few flightless insects and some dry land Crustacea thus forming the bulk of the population. The most outstanding characteristic of this hidden community of animals is the small size of the inhabitants and the fact that most of the individuals are blind; the average size of the population taken as a whole is not more than a few millimetres in length of body, while about a third are only one millimetre or less. In the second place they have rather crude types of breathing organs without any of the regulating or controlling devices which are so characteristic of the more specialised insects and the vertebrates. This and the fact that they are in general thin skinned, so that they easily lose moisture from their bodies by evaporation, makes it impossible for them to live in an environment where such factors as humidity, temperature and light are liable to violent day-to-day or seasonal variations. Of these factors humidity is by far the most important and the forest cryptic animals live in a habitat where the atmosphere is continually near saturation point; when placed in dry air

they succumb in a few hours, so that for the cryptic fauna existence outside the forest means swift and certain death.

These minute and primitive animals have produced no new forms over vast periods of time ; they have not ventured forth, or made great progress, or effected startling changes. On the other hand their lives are secure and unadventurous to the point of monotony as long as the forests remain undisturbed by fire, excessive drought, or the destructive and usually short-sighted activities of man.

The majority of the inhabitants of this closed and protected habitat are vegetarians, eaters of living and decaying plant substances, fungi and spores ; their food supply is literally a perpetual manna from heaven, falling in a never-ceasing rain from the canopy of the forest—leaves, seeds, twigs, boughs and the giant trunks of fallen trees, whose lives have begun and ended in the forest.

Most of this woody substance is eaten at various stages of decomposition and it also provides food for innumerable fungi which in their turn are consumed by other groups of cryptic animals. In spite of all this abundance, however, little is wasted ; cohorts of gravediggers and undertakers are there to bury and consume in their turn, the corpses of the eaters ; the disposers of waste, the night soil and sewerage brigades, are highly developed ; the residue returns to the soil where it is further reduced to still finer particles by bacteria and microscopic organisms.

A substantial minority of small carnivorous predators, centipedes, spiders, mites and the like, are analogous to the larger carnivorous mammals of our nature reserves ; they also are well provided with an abundance of food in the small herbivores which form their natural prey ; since their nutriment is more concentrated they are able to feed at longer intervals than the browsing herbivores and, as in the open lands, the balance of accounts between the meat-eaters and the vegetarians is continually being adjusted so that the populations of the two groups tend to remain in equilibrium.

Apart from these broad resemblances the food conditions of the open lands are very different from those of the forest floor ; in such an environment the larger and more active populations cover an immensely greater area in their daily ranging for food ; they have a far greater choice of diet, especially of living green plant foods. On the other hand competition is far more stringent ; such calamities as fire,

flood and drought may bring about a drastic food shortage, while even in good years the supply of available food varies with the seasonal rhythm; at one time of the year there is abundance, at another scarcity. What has become so well known in newspaper headlines since the ending of the war as the "world food situation" has remained precarious for millions of years in the case of the chronically hungry insects, which represent the great majority of the animals of the open lands; for them recurring food shortages, with the total supply unable to meet demand, have always had to be reckoned with.

At some time in their history the more highly organised insects seem to have met this threat to their economic existence by the formation of social organisations. Herds, aggregations, and swarms are common forms of integration among both vertebrates and invertebrate animals, and seem to have defence for their main object; but mere gregariousness is not enough to provide the communal security which has been attained by the most advanced social insects like the ant, bee and termite. Whereas in these social orders the defence of the group has been achieved, one might almost say as a by-product of social integration, the real attainment has been a stabilisation of the colony by providing against the insecurity resulting from recurring food shortages; like man, the ants and bees have found a means of feeding ever larger populations of individuals and at the same time extending the living space of the community at the expense of other animals, more often those with solitary habits of life.

In all the most progressive insect societies, two methods or procedures have been used, division of labour and the storage of food for future use, the latter implying a form of instinctive or automatic prevision. The ants, and more especially the bees, have taken advantage of those foods, such as dried seeds, pollen and nectar, which are easily available and will keep their nutritive qualities for a considerable time. The same is true of human societies, especially those of the industrial West which would not have been possible without the excessive specialisation and grading of activities which is their hall-mark; the more complex groups in human societies have also made a larger use of non-perishable grain foods than any other form of nutriment.

In the social Hymenoptera and termites the division of labour has been physiologically determined and ineradicably fixed by the formation of permanent grades or castes or individuals designed for a single type of activity, for defence,

maintenance of the community, or reproduction. The cement which binds these different members of a social group is a kind of pleasure principle based on what Wheeler has aptly termed *trophallaxis*, or the mutual exchange of food between the adults and their larvae; many larvae produce a sweet secretion or saliva which is highly agreeable to their attendant nurses and the larvae are in their turn fed by the adults. But not only is there an exchange between adult and larvae but between adult and adult going about their daily occupations in the nest. Nor do these trophallactic relationships stop here, they expand like an ever-widening series of ripples so as to include other insects that have managed to get a foothold in the nest, predators, scavengers, guests and messmates, as well as a number of parasites, and these consist not only of unfamiliar and quite different orders of insects like flies and beetles, but even such distant relations as mites, spiders, millipedes, and crustacea. Finally, alien insects that live quite outside the community are drawn into feeding relationships with the society; certain insects, usually Aphids, are "milked" for their glandular excretions of honey dew, and in return receive care and protection from their keepers. If Freud had studied insect instead of human societies would he have interpreted this trophic relationship as a form of his all-pervading "libido" or eros? It certainly provides as important a key to the understanding of insect societies as does the libido in human ones.

Apart from their remarkable feats of structural engineering, many ants and termites practise a form of agriculture in the planting and reaping of grain and the cultivation of fungi; animal husbandry in the keeping of "cattle" with liquid glandular attractions, while the ants are colleagues of man in the discovery of much less admirable institutions such as slavery and organised war. In these highest forms of insect society, division of labour has led on to activities which are so strikingly similar to those of human societies that they have in all ages impressed natural philosophers, biologists and poets.

Shakespeare, in human terms and similes, has given a picture of the bustling social activity and interplay of specialist groups which goes on in the hive of the honey-bee.

"Others like soldiers armed in their stings,
 Make boot upon the summers velvet buds,
 Which pillage they with merry march bring home
 To the tent royal of their emperor
 Who, busied in his majesty, surveys
 The singing masons building roofs of gold

The civil citizens kneading up the honey
 The poor mechanic porters crowding in
 Their heavy burdens at his narrow gate
 The sad-ey'd justice, with his surly hum
 Delivering oer to executors pale
 The lazy yawning drone."

In some respects the totalitarian-physiological societies of the insects may with reason be considered to have bettered their democratic and economically determined human counterparts. They have not at any rate produced the million or so "super-fluous" spinsters which after each recurring world war are such menacing symptoms in Anglo-Saxon civilisation. The nursery school teachers and social welfare workers among the ants and bees, though physiologically condemned to a lifetime of monotonous drudgery, have at least a full outlet for their primitive parental instincts in being able to satisfy their ardent propensities for nursing the brood.

In the most highly organised and interesting social insects the whole trend of evolution is toward ever-increasing vegetarianism and matriarchy. In the solitary wasps the male is a nonentity, though in some cases he may hang around and try to guard the nest; but in the bees and ants, as Wheeler remarks, he has not even the status of a loafing policeman, and all the activities of the nest or hive are carried on by the widows, debutantes and spinsters of the community.

To return to the animal inhabitants of the forest floor, the food picture there is one of perpetual abundance; unlike the open lands where the amount available lags behind the consuming ability of the population, the supply is perennially ahead of demand. But while inexhaustible it is also, on account of the humid nature of the environment, perishable, and must be eaten on the spot; at various levels of decomposition it is consumed by different groups of feeders, but having passed any one stage, can no longer be used by the particular group of animals which eats it at that stage.

In all this diverse forest community, composed of 32 different orders of worms, mollusca and arthropods, we will look in vain for a social organisation, or even for the primitive beginnings of a society.

It is probable that for these animals the very abundance of food materials has proved a barrier to the formation of social behaviour and co-operative habits of life, since even if the food was of such a nature that it could be stored, there would be no incentive for storing it; the need therefore for various grades of

specialists entrusted with the duties of gathering, storing and later rationing food to the various participators in a co-operative society, does not exist in such an environment.

The seasonal fluctuations, the natural calamities of flood and drought, producing temporary or permanent shortages of food, and thus periods of social insecurity, must thus have been the main economic motives continually forcing both insects and men to organise themselves in societies characterised by a marked division of labour and the habit of storing food.

In this respect human societies are only now treading the trails blazed by the insects many millions of years ago, since the bees and ants were already highly organised socially in the Oligocene, 30 millions of years ago. The social wasps are descended from predatory ancestors though in the more advanced forms they show a trend to become, like the bees, entirely vegetarian; similarly, though the more primitive forms of ants are all decidedly carnivorous, the progressive societies among them show a tendency to resort more and more to a purely vegetable regimen as the only means of maintaining and developing large populations and efficient colonies.

The various successive stages in the historic development of human societies are likewise marked by an advance from a primitive and mainly flesh-eating to a largely vegetarian regime. Man has been unable to develop populous societies without becoming increasingly dependent on grains and other plant foods; compare for example the sparse communities of the carnivorous Esquimaux with the teeming populations of the vegetarian Hindus. The great riverine civilisations of the Euphrates, Yang-tze and Nile have likewise all been predominantly graminivorous and food-storing associations of men.

It is, however, possible that the techniques of modern industrial civilisation may have provided a check to this universal trend of societies towards vegetarianism in the discovery of canning and indefinitely preserving flesh-foods, possibly the most significant and fundamental of all social inventions. Paradoxically, this most recent of Man's technical triumphs may yet be regarded as a piece of dietary atavism, a reversal of his nutritional history, by returning him to the point from which he first started as a predominantly carnivorous mammal.

However this may be it is reasonable to suppose that, judging from the great differences in social organisation which prevail in forest communities on the one hand and such highly territorialized groups as both insects and Man on the other, that the prime motivating force in society-making has been the ele-

mentary urge of hunger. Despite the Freudian belief in the paramount importance of sex, food in living organisms is the first great necessity; the reproductive urge, powerful though it may be, and interwoven as it is in a million protean forms into the complex texture of both insect and human societies, is still the urge of the well-fed animal.

Societies have achieved the pre-eminent position which they hold, at the expense of solitary animals, mainly in virtue of their superior abilities for gathering, storing, and distributing food. Neither can there be much doubt that it has been the "Sturn und Drang" of lean times and food scarcities, rather than conditions of ease and plenty that has forced both the invertebrate insect primates and the vertebrate primate, Man, so widely different in their physical and mental capacities, along the same road to social security.

For those who take the long view of biological history there may, even in this dismal winter of our world discontents, be hope in the realisation that the mere possession of natural plenty does not, and probably cannot, lead to biological and social progress. The forest communities, although surrounded by material abundance, have like most other non-social animals, ended in an evolutionary cul-de-sac from which they cannot escape.

The only alternative open to those forms of life which have, for good or ill, set foot upon the road of social evolution is not to accept but to remake an environment which must otherwise result in a state of chronic scarcity and insecurity. Of all the animals that inhabit the earth's surface the only one with the physical, social and intellectual capacity for this task is Man.

R. F. LAWRENCE.



Oor Die Geardheid Van Leipoldt As Digter

(OOM GERT VERTEL E.A. GEDIGTE)

Die aanleiding tot hierdie studie is eerstens 'n belangstelling in die ingewikkelde persoonlikheid van die digter Leipoldt. Die klem val dus op die digter se lewensbeskouing soos dit in sy gedigte in „Oom Gert Vertel” tot uiting kom. Miskien opper iemand die beswaar dat gedigte net 'n verbygaande stemming van die digter verteenwoordig en daarom vir so 'n ondersoek ongeskik is. Dit is nogtans 'n feit dat in die daaglikse lewe die dinge en gedagtes wat jou boei en besig hou, hulle onwillekeurig in 'n gewone gesprek aan jou opdring. Hoeveel meer sal dit nie die geval met 'n emosionele mens of 'n digter wees nie?

Tweediens is dit 'n belangstelling in die betoog wat in Schiller se „Über naïve und sentimentalische Dichtung” voorkom, wat nog te weinig bekend is en tog baie kan prikkel tot nadenke.

Uit die aard van die saak sal eers net in hooftrekke uiteengesit moet word wat onder „naïewe” en „sentimentele” digkuns verstaan moet word. Daarna sal enkele gedigte in „Oom Gert Vertel” aan die hand van hierdie opvattinge getoets word.

Ten slotte sal daar 'n poging aangewend word om die gedigte te groepeer volgens die lewensbeskouing wat in hulle geopenbaar word.

Volgens Schiller kan alle digkuns in twee groot afdelings gerangskik word.

(a) Naïewe digkuns. „Daar is oomblikke in ons lewe wanneer ons aan die natuur, die menslike natuur in kinders, die gewoontes van die landelike bevolking, die oerwêreld, 'n soort liefde en roerende agting toebring. Hierdie soort liefde, agting en belangstelling kan onder twee voorwaardes plaasvind: (1) die voorwerp moet natuur wees of as sodanig deur ons beskou word; (2) die natuur moet in teenstelling met die kuns wees en dit beskaam. Dan is dit naïef. As bv. die natuur en die

naïewe nageboots word in 'n kunsmatige blom, word die onderhawige gevoel vernietig deur die ontdekking dat dit 'n nabootsing is. Daardeur word duidelik dat hierdie soort welgevalle aan die natuur nie esteties is nie maar moreel. Want dit word deur 'n idee veroorsaak en nie deur 'n blote betraging nie. Hoe kon 'n ou klip, die gekwetter van voëls, ens., anders op sigself aanspraak maak op ons liefde?

„Dit is die idee wat deur hulle daargestel word wat ons bemin. Ons bemin in hulle die stil skeppende lewe, die rustige werksaamheid uit hulle self, die innerlike noodwendigheid, die ewige eenheid met hulle self. Hulle is wat ons was en wat ons sal word. Ons was natuur soos hulle en die kultuur moet ons op die pad van die vernuf en die vryheid na die natuur terugbring. Hulle verpersoonlik ons verlore kindsheid, daarom vervul hulle ons met 'n soort weemoed. Tegelykertyd verpersoonlik hulle ons hoogste ideale volmaaktheid en wek in ons 'n verheewe ontroering.

„Hulle volmaaktheid is nie aan hulle eie verdienste toe te skryf nie. Daarom verskaf hulle aan ons die merkwaardige genot dat hulle ons voorbeelde is sonder om ons skaam te laat voel. Wat hulle eie karakter uitmaak, is iets wat in ons eie karakter tot volmaaktheid afwesig is. En wat hulle van ons onderskei, is wat in hulle tot goddelikheid ontbreek. Ons is vry, hulle is noodwendig, ons wissel, hulle bly dieselfde.

„Maar net as die twee met mekaar verbind word, spruit die goddelike of die ideaal voort, nl. as die wil die wet van die noodwendigheid vryelik volg, en as onder al die wisselinge van die fantasie die vernuf aan die reël vashou.

„Omdat hierdie belangstelling in die natuur op 'n denkbeeld gegrondves is, kan dit net in gemoedere te voorskyn kom wat vatbaar vir denkbeelde is, d.w.s. net in morele persone. Die meeste mense gee hierdie liefde net voor en volg die mode. Maar in elke mens is daar 'n sedelike aanleg, en daardeur sal daar altyd 'n soort uitwerking van hierdie gevoel bespeurbaar wees. Ten sterkste sal dit uiting vind in voorwerpe wat nader by ons staan en die onnatuur in onself sterker laat beseef, bv. in kinders en kinderlike volkere . . .”

Die naïewe wyse van gewaarwording kry ons veral by die ou Griekse en Romeinse digters. Daardie gevoel is nie net een wat hulle besit het nie, maar ook die wat hulle digkuns in ons verwek. Hulle getuig van die natuur en is die natuur self. Hulle digkuns is kinderlik, rein en natuurlik.

(b) Sentimentele digkuns. Met die ontwikkeling van die kultuur, kuns en gekunsteldheid verwyder die mens hom van

die eenvoud, waarheid en noodwendigheid van die natuur, ofskoon hy deur 'n morele drang altyd na haar teruggedwing word. Hy soek na die verlore natuur waarvan hy deur die vryheid van sy fantasie en verstand afgedwaal het.

Soos ons gesien het, het die verhouding teenoor die natuur verander. Dit is veral die moderne sentimentele digters wat die indruk bepeins wat die dinge op hulle maak; dit is denk-beelde met betrekking tot die werklikheid. En hulle hou hulle deurgaans met twee gewaarwordinge onledig, nl. die van die werklikheid en die van die ideaal. Die wyse van gewaarwording by die sentimentele digter kan plaasvind op 'n satiriese of op 'n elegiese manier.

Satiries is 'n digter as hy tot onderwerp die verwydering van die natuur en die teenstrydigheid tussen werklikheid en ideaal het, waarby die klem op die werklikheid val. Dit kan sowel ernstig met emosie, as ook skertsend met blymoedigheid geskied, namate die digter in die sfeer van óf die wil óf die verstand vertoef. In die eerste geval het ons die bestrawwende of patetiese satire, in die tweede die skertsende, opgewekte satire.

As die digter die natuur teenoor die kuns en die ideaal teenoor die werklikheid stel sodat die voorstelling van eersgenoemde oorweeg en veral 'n gevoel van welgevalle verwek, is dit elegiese digkuns.

As die natuur wat verlore gegaan het, of die ideaal wat onbereikbaar is, betreur word, het ons die eintlike elegie. Die ideaal en die natuur kan ook 'n onderwerp van vreugde wees omdat dit as werklikheid voorgestel word. Dan het ons die idille.

Ons sal ons miskien afvra hoekom die idille en die nuwe digkuns dan verskil, want in al twee kry ons die uitbeelding van die natuur. Maar Schiller wys in 'n voetnoot daarop dat, al word in die idille die onbedorwe natuur of die ideaaltoestand voor ons onthul, die digter tog in sy hart die natuur en die ideaal teenoor die kuns en die werklikheid stel. Dit sal in sy manier van uitbeelding tot uiting kom, wat ons aan die beperkinge van die werklikheid en die gekunsteldheid van die kultuur sal herinner. Want die digter as 'n kind van sy eeu kan hom nie aan die invloed van sy tyd onttrek nie.

Watter soort digter is Leipoldt nou? Ons sal ons bepaal by 'n paar voorbeelde wat maklik uitgebrei kan word.

Oorlogsgedigte. In hierdie gedigte is daar 'n gloeiende ontevredenheid met die werklikheid. Al word soms die teenorgestelde ideaal van vryheid en reg nie genoem nie, spruit die ontevredenheid uit die afwesigheid van vryheid en reg. Die gedigte is dus pateties-satiries.

Natuurgedigte. Ons vind hier oor die algemeen 'n elegiese gevoel wat die botoon voer. Die digter bepeins die indruk wat die natuur op hom maak. Die onderwerp staan in verband met 'n idee. Dit is volmaaktheid waarna die digter verlang, bv. die prille jeug met sy nabyheid aan die natuur toe al die varings maters vir hom gewees het, soos „In die Boesmanland”. Of dit is 'n volmaaktheid wat miskien glad nie bestaan in die werklikheid nie, maar wat as sodanig beskou word, soos die van „die Verkleurmannetjie”, wat in 'n gelukkige staat van onafhanklikheid lewe en altyd jonk bly.

Daar is 'n paar idilliese gedigte soos, bv. „Oktobermaand”, waarin 'n harmonie tussen werklikheid en ideaal bestaan, alhoewel ons voel dat daardie tweestryd tussen ideaal en werklikheid in die siel van die digter nie heeltemaal uitgewis is nie, bv. waar dit in die oorbekende reëls uitkom :

„Wat gee ek om die winter ?
 Wat praat jy nou van Mei ?
 Wat skeel dit as ons later
 Weer donker dae kry ?”

Dieselfde geld ook van „Lenteliedjie”, waarin die sentimentele geaardheid in 'n paar vragies gesien kan word en wat getuig van 'n onuitgesproke vergelyking met 'n ander toestand.

„Kan jy beter kry ?”
 of :
 „Sal ons ooit ons blommetjies
 Vir iets anders ruil ?”

'n Skone idille is „Die Soutpan”, waarin die teenstelling „So arm die wêreld hier, en tog so mooi”, nie net as 'n stilistiese kontras beskou moet word nie, maar sy ontstaan te danke het aan die sentimentele geaardheid van die digter wat hom ook die volgende beeld veroorloof :

„Stil, as 'n oumens amper oor sy reis
 En met die dood se skadu op sy gesig”.

Ander Gedigte. In die gedigte wat tot onderwerp die mens of menslike toestande het, kry ons 'n sterk satiriese trek. Daar is 'n ontevredenheid met die werklikheid wat aansluit by die oorlogsgedigte. In „Ou Booï se Pondok” is die gedagtes oor die maatskaplike toestande wat deur die digter se gemoed gaan, so onaangenaam dat naderhand selfs die koffie wat hy drink 'n bitter smaak kry, veroorsaak deur sy pateties-satiriese gevoel. Die ou Jood in „Mordegai” daarenteen word skertsend-satiries uitgebeeld. „Aan my ou Vriend” is elegies. Dit is 'n gevoel

van welgevallige bewondering van die ou grysaard wat volgehou het en nog volhou, net soos „Die ou Meul”. Hoe anders is die lewe van die digter!

„Eksel self sou baie graag my beste gee,
As ek eenmaal soos jy getroos terug kan kyk”.
(Aan my ou Vriend)

Slampampierliedjies. Hier kry ons hoofsaaklik satiriese gedigte. Veral deur middel van die vraagteken kom daardie gevoel van onwetenskap sterk uit wat 'n gevolg is van die kultuurmens se vervreemding ten opsigte van die natuur.

„Boomsingertjie, ek wonder,
„Ken jy ook my geheim?” (I)
„Is jou lofsang maar 'n kriekie-klaaglied,
En jou deuntjie, kriekie, maar 'n kreun?” (XII)

Die werklikheid as 'n tekort teenoor die ideaal as die hoogste realiteit, kry ons in „Die Einde”; en sy ontevredenheid met die heersende toestande blyk bv. uit:

„Dingaan, die Zoeloe, was 'n duiwel,
Maar hy is lankal dood, en nou
Het ons geen mens wat ons kan teister
En tog sit ons nog in die rou!” (XVII)

'n Pragtige idille is „Ek sing van die wind wat te keer gaan” (VIII). Dat dit 'n idille is en geen naïewe kunstwerk nie, kom uit in die reël: „Maar nooit nie, nee nooit nie, van geld”. Die teenstelling: ideaal—werklikheid is aanwesig in die hart van die digter. Idillies is ook „Klim op, klim op met die slingerpad (XVIII).

Ek dink hierdie paar voorbeelde toon genoegsaam aan dat Leipoldt 'n sentimentele digter is, dat hy nie in ooreenstemming met die natuur voel nie, maar die natuur gewaarword, dat hy nie natuur is nie, maar daarna soek. Dit sluit geensins uit dat daar naïewe reëls in sy verse voorkom nie. Op hom is van toepassing wat Schiller omtrent die sentimentele digter skryf: as die mens in die kring van die kultuur getree het en as hy onder die invloed van die kuns gekom het, is die sinnelike harmonie in hom opgehef en kan hy alleen as 'n morele eenheid aan homself uiting gee, d.w.s. hy strew na eenheid. Die ooreenstemming tussen sy gewaarwordinge en sy denke wat in die naïewe toestand werklik plaasvind, bestaan net ideël. Dit is nie meer in hom nie, maar buitekant hom as 'n gedagte wat eers verwesenlik moet word, dus nie meer as 'n lewensfeit nie.

Die bittere stryd om vryheid was verby en alles was oënskynlik verlore. Manne wat hul plig gedoen het, die Johnnies en Bennies en Japies, het met duisende vrouens en kinders hul lewens op die altaar van die vaderland gelê.

„Hier struikel die kind wat te vroeg was gebore ;
 Hier sterwe die oumens, te swak vir die stryd ;
 Hier kom 'n gekerm en gekreun in jou ore ;
 Hier tel jy met angs elke tik van die tyd ;
 Want elke sekond' van die smart laat sy spore
 Gedruk op jou hart, deur 'n offer gewyd”.

(In die Konsentrasiekamp)

Daardie wreedheid wat dit vrouens en kinders, swakkes en oues van dae, laat ontgeld het, word fel deur die digter aan die kaak gestel. Iemand wat brutale vyandelike geweldadighede nie self aan sy lyf gevoel het nie, kan nie ten volle die gloeiende verontwaardiging peil wat uit „Aan 'n Seepkissie”, „Die ou Blikkie” en „'n Nuwe Liedjie op 'n Ou Deuntjie” spreek nie.

„Vergewe ? Vergeet ? Is dit maklik vergewe ?
 Die smarte, die angs, het so baie gepla !
 Die yster het gloeiend 'n merk vir die eeue
 Gebrand op ons volk, en die wond is te na,
 Te na aan ons hart en te diep in ons lewe—
 Geduld, O Geduld, wat so baie kan drai !”

(In die Konsentrasiekamp)

'n Gevoel van absolute neerslagtigheid oormecster die digter. Wat beteken daardie mense wat nog oor volk en heldemoed sing ? Hulle is self slegter as die vee. Hy soek verligting by die silte see. Dit sal nou sy nuwe vaderland wees.

„Ek wil vergeet en uithou, ja,
 Ek kan nog jare ly,
 Solank die branders tot my sing,
 Die skulpe praat met my”.

(My nuwe Vaderland)

Leipoldt aanvaar die lewe met sy mokerhoue. Hy sal probeer om te vergeet, al gaan dit swaar, solank as hy maar net troos uit die natuur kan puur.

Die vrede het gekom en die kerk van smart moes tot die droesem geleedig word. Die Afrikaners het wel hier en daar lawaaiierige Bondskongresse gehou, maar hulle durf niks en kon niks doen nie. En daar het die kerkhoue met die slagoffers gelê.

„Waarom het Hy die boom gesnoei, die tak
So afgekap tot aan die stam ?”

(Vrede-aand)

Die gedagte egter aan die heldemoed van die Afrikaanse
Vrou, die beste wat ons nasie het, laat Leipoldt nuwe moed skep.
Die gees wat die vroue in die oorlog besiel het, lewe nog.

„Dit lewe nog om ons te lei, en maak
Die swaar, swaar vrede plig ; die harde taak,
Wat voor ons lê, die lewe wat ons wag,
Ons donker pad, so helder as die nag”.

(Vrede-aand)

In „Amsterdam” hoor ons dat moed en volharding nie vol-
doende is om ’n nasie te word nie. Holland het elke duim van
sy land duur gekoop uit bloed en sweet. Ons het ook ons bloed
gepleng vir ons land, maar :

„’n Nasie word
Nie somaar as die koring groot :
Dit moet deur werk, deur vlyt, deur smart,
Deur lewe ook word voortgestoot”.

„Woltemade se Spook” vra dieselfde :

Ek het my plig gedoen ; en jy,
Jy wat so sedig droom en gaap—
Wat het ons land van jou gekry ?
Het jy gewerk of net geslaap ?”

En verder :

„Neem die werk as trouwing ;
Neem jou land as vrou ;
Die toekoms as jou babetjie :
Dis genoeg vir jou !”

(Slampamperliedjie IV)

In hierdie gedigte wat min of meer in regstreekse verband
met die volksgebeure staan, kry ons ’n brandende gevoel van
smart en verontwaardiging. Hulle bestempel Leipoldt as ’n
ware volksdigter, want hy het die volksmart meesterlik vertolk.
Verder is daar ’n toon van kragdadige lewensaanvaarding
waarneembaar, en eindelik kry ons die belangrike reëls wat
reeds uit „My Nuwe Vaderland” aangehaal is, om te wys hoe
die digter troos in die omgang met die natuur vind.

Die oorlog is ’n maatskaplike verskynsel en ons het in die
vaderlandse gedigte al die een en ander kenmerk van Leipoldt
se houding teenoor die medemens as lid van die nasie nagespoor ;

dit is hier eintlik net by wyse van aanvulling dat nog iets gesê kan word. „Ou Booi”, met wie Leipoldt gemeensaam omgaan, en met wie hy oor belangwekkende menslike probleme gesels, verpersoonlik m.i. net Leipoldt se ander-ek. Dit is dus ’n dramatiese manier om aan persoonlike gevoelens uiting te gee en nie noodwendig ’n samespraak wat werklik plaasgevind het nie. ’n Paar aanhalinge sal laat uitkom waaroor dit in die gedig gaan.

„Het ons toe, soos nou, oor alles
Wat belangrik is, gelag?”

„Wat is van jou pa geworde?
As hy reus was, is hy nog;
As hy dwergie was—soos ons nou—
Ja, dan was hy maar ’n bog.
Hy was Boesman, skelm deugniet—
Ja, maar mens, dit was hy tog!”

Die kleurling word vanuit ’n suiwer menslike standpunt beskou. Verder is daar ’n sterk ontevredenheid met die huidige maatskaplike en menslike toestande, alhoewel erken word dat die lewe vroeër ook in baie opsigte tekortkomings gehad het.

„Tog—daar is ’n toekoms altyd:
Waar vandag is opgestaan,
Daar op Golgotha, die Kruise,
Sal die mense môre staan
Rond die heiligdom van helde,
Wat alleen is voorgegaan”.

Let hier op die keuse van die beelde. Daar is nie sprake van die Kruis nie, maar van die Kruise, nie van die Verlosser nie, maar van helde. In elk geval spreek daaruit ’n opwekkende gedagte.

Ontevredenheid met die mense laat ook bittere gedagtes in Slampamperliedjie II ontstaan.

„Hier is die dorp, waar ons nou lewe,
So ver nie van die veld,
Daar’s baie uitgedroog en dom,
Daar’s baie bleek, verdor en krom:
Jy is daarop gesteld!”

Tog is Leipoldt geen misantroop nie. Waarteen hy uitvaar, is die tekortkominge van die maatskappy wat sy morele gevoel kwes. Dit word duidelik uit die volgende:

Daar is geen mens so aaklig goed,
 Daar is geen vent so vals en swart,
 Of in sy bors klop daar nog deur
 'n Brokkie van 'n mensehart”.

(Slampamperliedjie III)

En selfs die ou Jood met al sy inhaligheid het hy terwille van een goeie daadjie liefgekry, immers Mordechai het hom lekkers gegee toe hy nog 'n kind was.

Ten slotte is daar aan almal in „Die Einde” 'n besielende boodskap :

„Moed, mense, hou moed !
 Die kwaad sal verander in goed,
 Die morelig kom uit die duister”.

Om ons beskouing af te rond, net nog 'n woord betreffende die digter en sy werk teenoor die medemens. Die versies wat hy skryf, word aan niemand opgedra nie, want hy is soos Goethe se sanger :

Ich singe wie der Vogel singt,
 Der in den Zweigen wohnt.
 Das Lied das aus der Kehle dringt,
 Ist Lohn, der reichlich lohnet”.

„En ek, soos 'n windswaal, maak my versies
 Nie maar vir jou—nee, glad nie ; want ek weet,
 Jy hou mos nie van versies, jy wat trots is,
 Omdat jy dink jy het die wysheid beet”.

(Slampamperliedjie VI)

Die mense wat niks daarvan verstaan nie, wat altyd op die nuttige uit is, is nog nie „gespeen” nie. (Slampamperliedjie XI).

Opsommenderwyse kan ek dus sê :

Leipoldt het geen hoë opinie van die gewone mense nie, al ag hy die „reuse” en helde onder hulle hoog. Hy staan simpatiek teenoor ander rasse en beoordeel hulle in die eerste plek volgens hulle menslikheid. Leipoldt wend hom nie van die maatskappy af nie. Sy stem klink helder op soos hy moed probeer inboesem. Hy dig vir homself, vir sy eie plesier. In die *Inleiding* tot „Oom Gert Vertel e.a. Gedigte” vertel professor Smith dan ook hoe hy toevallig die gedigte by sy vriend ontdek en hom oorreed het om hulle te publiseer.

Die intieme omgang met die natuur soos dit geblyk het in die aanhaling uit „My Nuwe Vaderland”, kan volgens Schiller verklaar word uit die feit dat by die moderne, die sentimentele

mens, die natuur verdwyn. Ons probeer daardie bevrediging in die fisiese wêreld te verkry wat ons in die morele nie kan vind nie.

Daar is by Leipoldt 'n gevoel van uitbundige of stille natuurvreugde soos in „Ek Sing van die Wind”; „Klim op, klim op met die slingerpad”; „Oktobermaand”; „Lenteliedjie”; of „Die Soutpan” en „Die Doringboom”, waarin die digter hom amper vereenschwig met die natuur en daarmee in harmonie is.

Dan is daar 'n gevoel van verlange na die nuwe, onveranderlike geluksaligheid wat in die natuur bestaan en wat voorkom in gedigte soos: „In die Boesmanland”, „Die Verkleurmannetjie”, „Die See het Juwele” (XIX), „Op my Ou Karoo”, „Gistraand in die Maanlig daarbuite” (XV). Die ouderdom wat die kinderlike staat benader, sal ook daardie nuwe gevoel gaande kan maak, soos in „Aan My Ou Vriend”.

Ten slotte word die natuur as middel gebruik om daardeur 'n gevoel van weemoed oor die kortstondigheid van die bestaan te uiter, m.a.w. dit is die besef van die beperkinge wat ons bestaan omsluit. Dit, meen ek, tref ons aan in gedigte soos „Die Sterretjie”; „Krulkop-Klonkie” (V); „Klossies, jul bewe en bibber” (XIII); „Die Maanlig Meer” (XVI); „Die See is Wild” (XX). Hiertoë reken ek ook 'n gevoel van onmag om tot die wese van die natuur deur te dring, waaruit 'n gevoel van bewondering voortvloei, soos in „Boomsingertjie” (I); „Sekretarisvoël” (X); „Kriekie” (XII).

(Apart staan „'n Skoenlapper” (LXI), waarin 'n poging aangewend word om innerlike harmonie te verwerf deur berusting.)

Ons sien dus dat Leipoldt deurdronge is van die natuurbekoring en dat dit vir hom een van die maniere is waarop hy volmaaktheid nastreef, al word dit nie uitdruklik gesê nie, en al kom dit net in die nuwe strekking van sy strewes aan die lig, soos in die verlange na die verlore natuur en die poging om die natuurraaisel te deurgrond. Die natuur is dus vir hom 'n skone werklikheid met vaak 'n groot vraagteken in die agtergrond.

Eindelik nog 'n woordjie oor Leipoldt en die doodsgedagte.

Om dood te wees, sê Lessing, is niks vreeswekkends nie; en vir soverre sterwe net die oorgang tot doodwees is, is daar ook in die sterwe niks vreeswekkends nie. Net as jy só of só sterwe, in hierdie toestand, as gevolg van die een of ander se wil, onder skande en marteling, kan dit vreeswekkend wees en word dit ook sodanig. En verder: daar is baie maniere

om te sterwe, maar net een dood. Die Grieke en Romeine het in hulle taal twee woorde gehad vir dood: een vir die toestand en een vir die oorgang tot daardie toestand. Lessing bewys in sy verhandeling: „Wie die Alten den Tod gebildet“, dat die Grieke die dood (toestand) nie onder die beeld van 'n geraamte voorstel nie, maar as 'n tweelingbroer van die slaap. Vir ons is die dood 'n geraamte, alhoewel die Christelike leer ons verseker dat die dood vir die vromes alles behalwe 'n straf is. Sou dit nie beter wees om soos in die Skrif van 'n doodsendel te praat nie? Net 'n wanbegrepe godsdiens kan ons van die skone verwyder, en dit is 'n bewys van die ware godsdiens wat ons reg begryp het, as dit ons altyd na die skone terugbring.

Maar Lessing maak nie gewag van die feit dat die toestand van doodwees vir 'n denker soos Sokrates sekerlik geen verskrikking is nie, maar dat in elke lewende wese die instink van soortbehoud, lewensbehoud, een van die sterkste instinkte is.

Dit lyk asof Leipoldt in „Op die Kerkhof” nie aan die sterwe dink nie, maar aan die toestand van doodwees wat tog glad nie verskrikkend kan wees nie. Ons kry die teenstrydige gedagtes van verwording aan die een, en 'n vae geloof aan 'n lewe in die Paradys aan die ander kant. Die tweede gedig wat met die dood te doen het, „Op 'n Leiklip”, is 'n elegie na aanleiding van sy getroue ou hond se dood. 'n Dier is volgens die gangbare Christelike opvatting 'n ding of slagding. Is dit sonde, vra Leipoldt, as hy in sy hond meer siel sien as bv. in outa Kees? En 'n siel kan tog nie in niks verdwyn nie! Nogtans is die grondtoon van die gedig sy twyfel of die dood werklik rus, 'n slaap of 'n droom is, die twyfel wat ons ook in 'n paar reëls in „Ou Booi se Pondok” en „Japie” aantref.

„Sal jy alles weet of niks nie,
as jy lyk is in 'n vis?”

Japie het gesneuwel.

„As 'n mens maar kan weet waar hy eindlik sal bly,
Wie het dan vir die toekoms gevaar?”

Wat 'n mens in hierdie twee gedigte tref, is dat Leipoldt hom bekommer oor die toestand van doodwees en nie oor die sterwe nie, dat die Christelike godsdiens nie sy twyfel sus nie en dat hy aan die moontlikheid van 'n siel in 'n dier dink.

The Life Of John Dunn, The White Zulu Chief

Less than seven decades ago the power of the Zulus, a proud and aggressive nation of warriors, who since the time of Chaka had carried terror into the hearts of their enemies, was temporarily checked. For many years the well-watered and fertile land of the Zulus had been coveted not only by the Voortrekkers but also by the British. While Zulu Imperialism had been halted at Blood River, Voortrekker and British Imperialism conflicted in their expansionist aims: the pastoral Boers of the South African Republic, ever seeking new grazing lands, sought by means of concessions and grants to infiltrate into Zulu country, while, on the other hand, the Natal Government and Theophilus Shepstone, in particular, regarded the land lying North of the Tugela as an outlet for its own congested Natives and for future European settlement. The subjugation and subsequent annexation of Zululand would accomplish these objectives, and simultaneously remove the potential danger of a Zulu invasion into the virile, but small Garden Colony.¹

Looming large during the troubled period preceding the Zulu War of 1879 were the figures of Theophilus Shepstone and Cetewayo—and standing next to Cetewayo was John Dunn, one-time influential friend and chief advisor to the Zulu King, but later his implacable foe. Ever ready to further his own advancement, John Dunn exerted a restraining influence on the treacherous Cetewayo. John Dunn, shrewd and ambitious “had much to do—probably more than was generally known—with relations and events in connection with Zululand, Natal, Transvaal, Swaziland and other territories”² during those momentous years which saw the annexation of the Transvaal and the final fall of the Zulu Nation.

¹Hattersley: *Later Annals of Natal*—Chapters III and IV.

²*Natal Mercury*: 6th August, 1895.

Although no official record exists of the date of birth of John Dunn—he himself does not mention it or his birthplace in his autobiography¹—his birthplace has been presumed to be Port Elizabeth, and natal date 1833. Molyneux, who campaigned with John Dunn during the Zulu War, states that “John Dunn was the son of a Scotchman who had settled at Port Elizabeth in the Cape Colony. Being of an adventurous frame of mind he had come to Natal about 1850.”² The *Natal Mercury*³ believed that John Dunn was born at Port Elizabeth, where his father was a practising doctor; that he went to a school conducted by the late Mr. John Paterson and that he migrated to Durban at the age of 17. An authority on Zulu history, Bryant,⁴ declares that John Dunn was the son of Robert Dunn, a Durban pioneer who had migrated to Durban from Port Elizabeth in earlier times, and that about the year 1838, had annexed for himself a farm upon which the Durban suburb Sea View now stands. This latter fact is corroborated by John Dunn himself, who refers to elephants coming within a few yards of his father’s place at Sea View near Clairmont and that Durban at that time “was nothing but a wilderness of sand heaps with a few straggling huts called houses”.⁵ That Robert Dunn was resident and trading in Durban in 1838 was established by a Major Charters,⁶ who, on landing stores from the ship *Helen*, occupied Maynard’s store which belonged to Robert Dunn. In his autobiography John Dunn stated that when he was 14 his father died, and that three years later he lost his mother. After the death of his parents he took to the wandering life, “having always been fond of my gun and a solitary life”.

In 1853 John Dunn decided to leave civilisation “for the haunts of large game in Zululand”. The decision was made after an unfortunate incident. During that year he engaged himself and his wagon to a proprietor of a Durban newspaper for a trading trip to the Transvaal. On their return he claimed payment for completion of his contract, but was informed that he had no claim on the money as he was not of age; and that according to Roman-Dutch Law no contract existed between him and the owner of the newspaper. In disgust he started off

¹John Dunn, *Cetewayo and the Three Generals*: edited by Moodie (1886).

²Molyneux: *Campaign in South Africa and Egypt*, p. 125.

³6th August, 1895.

⁴Bryant: *Olden Times in Zululand and Natal*, p. 127.

⁵*Ibid.*, p. 2.

⁶Bird: *Annals of Natal*, p. 431. Also Bryant, p. 566.

for Zululand, where he wandered about, till he met a Captain Walmsley who persuaded him to return to Natal and take office under him as an interpreter.¹ At Nonoti he resided with the Agent Walmsley till the year 1856.

In the same year great events were taking place in Zululand. Across the Tugela, in the turbulent country of the Zulus, the two rival factions of Umbulazi and Cetewayo, sons of King Panda and rivals to the throne, were drawn up to decide the issue by force of arms. Umbulazi, with a force estimated at 7,000 and with his back to the swollen Tugela, was numerically no match for the superior forces of the wily Cetewayo, whose followers numbered approximately 20,000. Realising his plight Umbulazi appealed to Walmsley for help, but this was officially refused. But "a gentleman who acts we believe as Interpreter at the Agent's residence, and as a sort of Lieutenant to Mr. Walmsley, volunteered to cross the river with a small bodyguard to endeavour to negotiate terms of peace between the belligerent parties".² Negotiations having failed, Dunn sided with Umbulazi, to whose assistance he came with a small force of Native Police and other kraal Natives. The fortunes of battle went against Umbulazi despite the valour of Dunn, who acquitted himself so valiantly that he earned the admiration even of his enemies.³ Disastrous to Umbulazi, who was killed, this Battle of 'Ndongakusuka,⁴ fought on 2nd December, 1856, proved to be the turning-point in the life of the future White Zulu Chief. This battle, memorable in that the fortunes of the Zulu nation were now in the hands of Cetewayo, a man "treacherous in negotiation and ruthless in the removal of all obstacles to his supremacy",⁵ was also memorable as being the occasion of the first public appearance of John Dunn.⁶

Indeed, Dunn was to come more and more in the public eye after this battle, as Cetewayo, flushed with victory, attacked English traders and drove off their cattle. A great deal of the blame and calumny fell on Dunn as "all accounts concur in confirming the belief that not an article of property or a hair on the head of an Englishman would have been touched, but for the Dunn affair".⁷ From the *Natal Mercury's* inference, it would appear that, if Dunn had not aided Umbulazi, Cetewayo

¹*Natal Mercury* : 11th December, 1856.

²*Ibid.*

³Fynney : *The Rise and Fall of the Zulu Nation*, p. 25.

⁴Gibson : *The Story of the Zulus*, p. 121.

⁵Hattersley : *ibid.*, p. 124.

⁶Haggard : *Cetewayo and his White Neighbours*, p. 7.

⁷*Natal Mercury* : 11th December, 1856.

would not have attacked the traders. It would thus appear that Cetewayo, in an attempt to revenge himself against Dunn, sought vengeance against other traders in the belief that they too had sided with his rival. This inference is by no means so reasonable; rather must the cause for the unprovoked attacks be sought in Cetewayo's hatred towards the Natal Government for allowing troops to support Umbulazi.

Dunn, on his own initiative, volunteered to recover the thousand head of cattle stolen by Cetewayo. This mission he successfully accomplished. On his second visit to Cetewayo, he was persuaded by the Zulu despot to remain in Zululand as his friend and advisor. A promise of a grant of land and wives seemingly decided the issue.¹ He succeeded in obtaining a tract of uninhabited land between the Tugela and Amatikulu Rivers. Ambitious to become a chief in his own right, he received permission from Cetewayo and the Natal Government to settle Natal Natives in that area. In this manner he set up an independent tribe, which acknowledged him as its Chief.

"My position had now become one of some consequence in the country, and I was looked on as being second to Cetewayo in authority—the poor old King Panda holding only a nominal position," wrote Dunn in an outburst of egotism. But it would appear that he overrated his popularity and influence with the Zulus, although he lived many years amongst them and took so many of their women to wife.² Legend has it that they numbered forty-seven, bearing him over one hundred children. Thus he lived in Zululand "where he established himself upon the model of King Solomon, the Wise."³ In due course he became Cetewayo's link with the Natal Government, supervisor of the passage of Amatongo labour through Zululand, and purveyor of firearms to the Zulu Nation at large.⁴

Panda's death in 1872 paved the way for the coronation of Cetewayo as King of the Amazulu by Theophilus Shepstone, and opened the way for Cetewayo to take stronger action against the Boer Republic of the Transvaal, whom he accused of violating his territory. The time was seemingly ripe for allowing his warriors to "wash their spears", even against the advice of Dunn and the protestations of the Natal Government. Anxiously the British Government watched the bloody regime of the new ruler, and with anxiety did they fear the military

¹Dunn's Autobiography: *ibid.*, p. 18.

²Haggard: *ibid.*, p. 42.

³Moodie: Preface to Dunn's Autobiography.

⁴Haggard: *ibid.*, p. 7. See also Gibson, p. 121.

system which Cetewayo had inherited from his predecessors. A series of events, partly welcomed by Shepstone and wholly feared by the Home Government, culminated in the Ultimatum to the restless ruler of the Amazulu.

While relations between Cetewayo and the Natal Government deteriorated, Dunn marked a change in Cetewayo's manner towards him, which boded ill for his future. Prudently Dunn retired to his principal kraal at Emangete, but accompanied Cetewayo's Indunas to Fort Pearson to hear Bulwer's Ultimatum. Dunn kept the written ultimatum, and refused to deliver it to Cetewayo, apparently fearing for his life. Cetewayo's threat to "goble the English up" decided Dunn to quit the country with his followers.

At first he decided to remain neutral, but was persuaded by Chelmsford to take up arms against his former benefactor. Chelmsford's immediate object was the relief of the besieged Eshowe, and since Dunn was well acquainted with the country he was made head of the Intelligence Department.¹ At that time "John Dunn was a handsome powerful man of about forty years of age, a perfect rider and rifle-shot, and might have been taken for an English county gentleman".² During the march to Eshowe he and his scouts rendered sterling service, and at the Battle of Gingindhlovu he displayed remarkable coolness and bravery. After the relief of Eshowe he was attached to General Crealy's force. The Zulu Campaign of 1879, marked by the misfortunes at Ensandhlwana and the heroic stand at Rorke's Drift, culminated in the utter defeat of the Zulus at the Battle of Ulundi, which event marked the eclipse of Cetewayo and his subsequent capture.

Wolseley, after the eclipse of the Zulu power, put into effect his policy of dividing Zululand into thirteen dependencies, each one owing allegiance to an appointed Chieftain. For his valuable services to the British cause, Dunn was appointed the most important Chief, and in the instructions to the British Resident of Zululand (Osborn) it was stated that all the ex-King's brothers were to be under the eye of Chief Dunn.

John Dunn received the "Benjamin share of Zululand", his territory extending from the Umhlatuzi River to the Tugela, and from the shore of the Indian Ocean to the sources of the Umhlatuzi in the Babanango Mountains. Strong criticism marked this appointment, it being averred that Zululand was

¹*Natal Mercury*, 16th April, 1879.

²Molyneaux: *ibid.*, p. 125.

to be kept for the Zulus in general and John Dunn in particular.¹ Furthermore he was accused of having designs on the throne of Zululand itself. Despite these accusations, John Dunn's rule of his territory was superior to that of the other chiefs. He ruled his Dependency with the aid of three European magistrates, whose decisions were subject to appeal to himself as final judge. The functions of the magistrates, each in charge of a subdivision, were clearly defined: they were to try cases, to mark out the amount of grazing which was attached to each kraal, to take account of all the cattle in the district, and to collect tribute. Each Native paid a uniform tax of 5s. a year in kind for his hut and in addition each kraal paid to Chief Dunn a "present" of cattle.² Part of the tax was allocated for administrative purposes and for public works such as schools and roads. At "Mongat"³ Ludlow found a large brick building which was to serve as a Court House, and clustering round it were a collection of galvanised iron huts, used as offices and dwellings for Dunn's wives.

It would appear that Dunn kept his numerous wives at different kraals of which Mangete, Emoyeni and Ngoya were the most important. At the Emoyeni Mission Station an incomplete register shows that, although he married his many Native women in accordance with the Native custom, many of them were baptised, while all his children were brought up in the Christian Faith. That he was tolerant in matters of religion is evidenced by the fact that some of his wives were Roman Catholics, while others embraced the Anglican Church of which he was reputed to be a member. Furthermore, he saw to it that his children received some measure of schooling.⁴ Besides his Native wives he was married to a coloured woman, one Catherine Green. That he ruled patriarchally and demanded the utmost faithfulness from his numerous wives is evidenced by his hanging two unfaithful ones.

In the meantime Wolseley's Settlement was a failure; peace was not restored to the distracted country. Strife and blood were rife, while the Resident was powerless to enforce law and order, having no executive powers. Public opinion in England demanded the restoration of Cetewayo and, with the advent of a Liberal Government, it was decided to restore him to his

¹*Natal Mercury*, 9th September, 1879.

²Ludlow: Zululand and Cetewayo, p. 53.

³Mangete. (Mangete, Emangete and Dunn's Reserve refer to Reserve 7A.)

⁴Statement by surviving children. Also statement to writer by Father Carmichael who was a missionary stationed near Mangete between 1882 and 1884.

throne. This move was strongly resisted by many of the appointed chiefs, including Dunn, who was not anxious to be deprived of his powers, nor his reputed income of £15,000 a year and all the contingent profits and advantages of chieftainship.¹

As a preliminary to the restoration of the ex-King, John Dunn with other chiefs were deposed on orders from the Home Government, and his former territory became part of a large Native reserve under a British Resident Commissioner; this reserve was to serve as an asylum to which such Zulus, who did not wish to accept the rule of the restored King, could settle. And so in 1883 Cetewayo landed from the ship *Algerine* at the mouth of the Umlazi River, and, in order to reach his restored kingdom, now very reduced in territory, he was compelled to cross Dunsland, the former territory of his erstwhile friend, but now still his bitterest foe.

Although deposed, Dunn did not leave Zululand, but remained with his people in the Emangete district, over which he still had limited jurisdiction—a good friend and warmly liked by all who had made his acquaintance. His connections with Natal were by no means severed: he paid frequent visits to the county of his early childhood, and for many years was a member of the Durban Museum Committee.² Nor did his loyalty to the British Government diminish, for in the war against Dinizulu he again took up arms and accompanied Major McKean with two thousand of his own men to relieve the Lower Umfolozi Magistracy.³

And so he continued to reside amongst those people with whom he had chosen to live, until his death from dropsy and heart disease on 5th August, 1895.⁴ His remains lie buried in the delightful surroundings of Emoyeni, where some of his descendants are still inhabiting a portion of his former vast domain.

N. HURWITZ.

¹Haggard: *ibid.*, p. 56.

²*Natal Mercury*, 7th August, 1895.

³Gibson: *ibid.*, p. 314.

⁴*Natal Mercury*, 6th August, 1895.

A Super World

"Super" is a really insidious word, since it assumes completely wrong values. While it suggests something that is very desirable, it has the underlying implication that great size or some other exceptional quality is the reason for its excellence. The discriminating person is not misled by the golden face of a super-image, but looks to see whether the image has feet of clay. The ancient Romans lacked that discernment when they planned their super-monoculture farms, worked by slave labour, to produce colossal harvests, but that converted parts of North Africa into permanent desert, because they failed to realise the fundamental need in agriculture of maintaining soil tilth and fertility. Two thousand years later, there were people just as foolish, who repeated the error of the ancient Romans, and gave the United States its "Dust Bowl" and its super-floods. South Africa is now beginning to treat its soil conservation seriously. Dr. F. H. King tells how, by using good agricultural methods, Chinese peasants have maintained the fertility of their small holdings for 4,000 years.

A project is good or bad, not because it is big or small, but according to its suitability for the conditions under which it has to operate. On the subject of "Being the Right Size", J. B. S. Haldane has made several very interesting points. A mouse, due to its large surface area compared with its weight, can survive a fall from any height; but to maintain bodily warmth, its large surface area is a disadvantage, for it has to eat daily one quarter of its own weight in food, to keep warm in a normal climate, and it could not eat sufficient to survive in a climate such as that of Spitzbergen, where the smallest mammal is a fox.

One can visualise how surface area is affected by weight, if one considers a thousand toy blocks, each a one inch cube. Each has a surface area of 6 sq. inches, so for a thousand blocks, the total surface area is 6,000 sq. inches. Now, if the blocks are built up into one bigger cube, the new cube will have a 10 inch side, and its surface area will be 600 sq. inches. So, if one had an animal the same size as 1,000 mice, it would have only one-

tenth of their surface area, and so the heat it loses through its skin would be only one-tenth of that lost by the mice. This effect of size on surface area can be seen everywhere, even in common everyday things. Finely split firewood will burn away more quickly than a big block of wood, because there is a bigger surface exposed to the air. Small cakes will bake through more quickly than big ones. It is more wasteful to buy small potatoes than big ones, unless one is prepared to eat the skin, which, incidentally is particularly valuable dietetically.

J. B. S. Haldane has also pointed out that, with a human being, the ratio between the loads on one's bones due to one's own weight, and the strength of one's bones, varies as one's linear dimensions. Thus the story-book giant, of ten times the ordinary person's height, would have his bones ten times more highly stressed, so that an ordinary movement, such as that of standing up, would cause the giant's bones to fracture. A picture of such a superman, seated, may impress one, until one realises that he is seated because he is not strong enough to stand. We must realise then, that the super-things are not necessarily the most effective and desirable.

A super-film or a super-revue may mean that ridiculously large sums have been spent on spectacular effects, but the dramatic and human qualities may be second-rate, and false cultural values may have been set. Super-quality fruit may mean the side-tracking of a country's productivity, from something that should be included liberally in everyone's diet, to a luxury article, benefiting chiefly wealthy consumers and producers. Super-schools, with mass production methods, as part of a majestic bureaucratically controlled system, may tend to replace wisdom, and a love of culture, by an encyclopaedic knowledge.

By mass production, in super-factories, so many articles that have come to be regarded as necessities can be produced cheaply, for the benefit of the masses. This may be true so far as factory costs are concerned, but then for a big number of articles to be distributed to a big number of people, the costs and the profits mount up so alarmingly, that the benefits of mass production are largely lost. In any case the modern social and economic systems seem to be balanced so that too big a part of an individual's income is frittered away on the less essential things, the use of which has become *traditional*. The mass-produced motor car has become almost a necessity, but one wonders with how many the family car has kept down the production of true family wealth—children.

Another evil that has come with super-industries is what Sir Albert Howard, the noted agricultural authority, has termed "fragmentation", where more and more people specialise in finer and finer divisions of knowledge or of handicraft. Apart from the narrowing effects of this on the mind, it increases the cost of the article, for each consumer has to pay for the upkeep of more and more sectional groups, and each sectional group plans and clamours for its own standards of living to be raised above those of others, so intensifying the present-day avalanche of rising costs, that makes one despair. In the building, equipment and maintenance of one's own home, it is amazing to realise how many sectional interests have to be catered for, and one wonders if, in the course of time, it will become an offence to grow one's own vegetables and flowers, or even to cut one's own lawn.

Actually, the sphere of super-industry is not quite as all-pervading as one is apt to imagine. Of the factories in Britain in 1936, only one half per cent. had over a thousand workers, and only fourteen per cent. had over fifty workers. Also, it is well known that a small factory, with low overhead costs, can produce certain articles much more cheaply and efficiently than a big factory. In British agriculture in 1908 more than fifty per cent. of the farms were under fifty acres. Super-industries have a very valuable part to play in our modern life, but one should have quite definite ideas about their limitations, instead of thinking that more and more super-industries should be developed for the good of the individual. Bigger and better is not necessarily a sound slogan.

The generation and use of power, is one of the most fundamental developments of our age. Here, the relation between the nationally linked chain of super-power stations, and the small power station, is very interesting, in view of the modern development of heat and power (H. and P.) stations.

Most power stations consist of :—Steam boilers or generators, in which the heat from the fuel converts feed water into steam. The steam pressure may be anything from about 200 to 1,850 lb. per sq. inch. Then, usually, the steam passes to turbines, and the power developed by those drives electricity generators. From the turbines, the exhaust steam passes into condensers, in which cooling water condenses the steam. The condensed steam is then pumped back to the boilers, and then the cycle is repeated.

In a big modern power station, only about twenty per cent. of the heat in the coal reappears as electrical energy at the mains,

the remaining eighty per cent. being lost, chiefly in the water that cools the condensers. In the Heat and Power (H. and P.) stations, which have recently been developed, chiefly in Russia, the heat formerly wasted in the condenser cooling water, is distributed through the towns, and used for domestic heating, and for the heating of public buildings, baths, etc. Before being distributed, it is first slightly re-heated. The distribution mains (delivery and return) radiate to about seven miles from the central station. Also where steam is needed for industrial purposes, it is delivered from the central station, through a network of steam mains, instead of being generated in less efficient plant at each factory. In Russia there are a number of regional H. and P. stations, each of about 135,000 horse power in capacity, which form a national heat and power network. Computations show that the annual saving of coal in Russia, for 1934, due to the use of H. and P. stations, was about one million tons. Thus the reduced cost of heat and power to the consumer, is only part of the benefit, which also includes conservation of the country's natural resources, as part of a planned national economy.

For high-efficiency operation of H. and P. stations, it is necessary to have a big consumption of heat. In cold climates, such as that of Russia, this is easier to arrange than in countries having milder climates, such as that of South Africa. The factor of size now comes in. Though a mouse cannot survive in Spitzbergen, yet it flourishes in milder climates. Smaller H. and P. stations have very distinct possibilities in South Africa, if they can be planned to operate in conjunction with plants requiring heat for process work, e.g., canneries, condensed milk and dehydration factories, hospitals, laundries, and so on. If there is a reasonably big heat load, such smaller H. and P. stations would be able to supply electricity more cheaply than a big power station that has no heat load. These smaller H. and P. stations might also use part of their power for refrigeration. Consideration should be given to the use of such plants for the low temperature and communal locker refrigeration systems, that have proved so useful in the United States, in reducing wastage, due to gluts of perishables. Such smaller H. and P. plants should then be ideal for our farming centres, as well as for our smaller towns catering for the de-centralisation of industries.

It might be of interest to give a hospital as one example of the economy that would result from the use of H. and P. plant. Hospitals require about 7.5 lb. of steam per hour per bed, with the steam pressure at 100 lb. per sq. inch. If, instead of

generating the steam at this pressure, it were generated at, say, 250 lb. per sq. inch, and 120 deg. F. of superheat, it could drive a high-pressure steam turbine, exhausting the steam at 100 lb. per sq. inch, and this exhaust steam would be used for ordinary hospital work. In a hospital of 500 beds, the power available from the turbine would be about 100 horse power, and this would be obtained at a fuel cost of only about $3\frac{1}{2}$ d. per hour, in excess of that required for the hospital steam only. This additional power could be usefully applied for hospital refrigeration and air conditioning.

With our South African Bantu population of eight millions, chiefly rural dwellers at present, the ratio of our rural to our urban population is exceedingly high. The drift of Natives to the towns has already assumed large proportions, and it seems likely that the rate of drift will increase greatly with our increasing industrialisation. Discerning people must consider whether, in planning for the future, we want super-towns with super-slums, and super-T.B. clinics, and super-hospitals, and with super-rates and super-costs of living, for in South Africa these have been increasing with the increase in size of a town. Let us rather plan, where possible, for de-centralisation of our industries, and for more small or satellite towns, provided with H. and P. plant, if conditions are suitable.

In planning for such smaller towns, provision should be made for workers' gardens, to give them the benefit of some fresh grown food, the need for which was stressed by Dr. T. W. B. Osborn, in his address to the S.A. Association for Advancement of Science, on 3rd July, 1945. Such gardens would also provide a form of recreation natural to the Bantu, and would avoid the need for artificial amusements, which are unproductive culturally, and which are not part of their own social organisation. Louis Bromfield, in the *Readers' Digest* of May, 1944, has described the happiest man he had ever known, a French working man, whose home was a small holding, where he raised most of the food needed by his family. The wealthy city man can have the pleasures of a suburban home, but why not make those pleasures part of the normal life of as many as possible, at all grades of the economic scale, by the development of wisely planned small towns.

All our modern systems of political ideology, Capitalism, Totalitarianism, Communism, Socialism and Bureaucracy, are alike in their attitude that people must be treated in mass groups. They all lack the concept of the value of the individual, and of a common humanity, that is part of the spiritual heritage of

the West from Palestine. The concept of the value of the individual has been stressed by Sören Kierkegaard and by Martin Buber, also by Gandhi in his ideas on a simple life.

A happy nation is that made up of happy individuals, and the test of all social, economic and political planning should be whether or not it makes for happiness of the individual. Let us plan in South Africa, for those of all economic and racial groups, to have conditions where they can live happily together as individuals.

The mechanical age has brought us the possibilities of improved living conditions, with less strain and more opportunity for leisure, as well as more adequate supplies of good food, to build up healthy families. If we have not got these things, it may be soothing to look for a scapegoat, but in a democratic system scapegoats and red-herrings are synonymous, for the welfare of a country depends on the knowledge and judgment of each individual voter.

ERNEST REIM.



The Economist's Approach To The Social Sciences¹

We cannot have all we want. This may or may not be a good thing, but with a limited time on earth and inadequate resources at our disposal we are always being confronted with the need to make choices—between different goods and services, between present satisfactions and future satisfactions, between work and leisure, between energy to produce and energy to enjoy the fruit of our labour, between what to retain and what to sacrifice, between spending £2½ millions a year on going to the cinema in South Africa and spending the same amount on housing, or old-age pensions or anti-T.B. work.

One of the choices we have to make is between how much time we should spend on learning *how* to work and live and how much in *actually* working and living. This problem was not solved by one hopeful little socialist community whose menfolk spent their time discussing philosophy and left all the work to their womenfolk. For either or both reasons the experiment failed. Perhaps it was because, not being in S.A., they had no Native servants!

Admittedly we cannot plan an education and training for ideal beings blessed with an unlimited time on earth. And so the impatience with too prolonged education which is felt by the business world is understandable. In any case and at all times we have to make a compromise between the desirable and the possible.

The study of these choices is the playground of the economist, and it is a not unfair simplification to define economics as the study of human behaviour in relation to the conflict between the very many desirable goods and the scarce resources, and the study of how man can make the most productive use of his resources in time, effort and goods.

¹Part of an Address given to the United Council of Social Agencies, Durban, March, 1947.

There are, of course, several factors—biological, physiological, psychological, political, and others—which determine economic life and human conduct. For instance, it is a physiological requirement that a hungry man shall eat. If he cannot obtain food in the normal way he may be faced with the question of whether to steal or not. For various reasons, he may decide not to do so. He may think it wrong to steal, alternatively he may be prepared to steal, but be scared of being found out. Or perhaps he may have weighed the risks and decided that discovery and punishment outweigh the temporary appeasement of hunger.

Because so many factors may condition human behaviour, the economist realises that any remedy for a social ill—indeed, even the preliminary diagnosis of the disease—must be based on a careful examination of the full background of considerations, not only economic, but also political, ethical, sentimental and other. One result is that however watertight a so-called economic solution appears to be, it may not always be politically wise or socially just, or even humanly acceptable. Alternatively, a political solution may be economically impossible. The truth is that we cannot hope to build a brave new world by studying only one aspect of human life, and, furthermore, that our remedies and even our palliatives must often be based on expedience and improvisation.

Naturally enough, zealous humanitarians are impatient for quick results, for it does not require a high intellectual capacity or specialised research to see that there is a good deal wrong with the world, and even with our own little corner of it. It is, therefore, not surprising that the suggestion is frequently made that we should abandon or postpone the abstruse intellectual problems involved, make a list of our obvious failings and our known resources, and get on with the urgently needed improvements.

No doubt a good deal could be put right without further scientific knowledge, but, as we have already noted, the problems involved are complex and difficult, and we must know more about them. Hence the importance of Social and Economic Research.

Research may be defined as diligent investigation to discover something, and its goal is generally an imposing collection of facts and figures of varying attractiveness. But a mass of facts and figures may have little or no value. By itself it is no more likely to be useful knowledge than is a heap of stones necessarily a house. To be really useful, research must be organised,

purposeful and scientific, so that its results may lend themselves to proper handling and interpretation.

It is, of course, tempting to interpret human values in the field of social studies in direct, simple and intelligible terms, yet this is not always possible. It may sometimes be necessary to abandon the direct and easy paths for more tortuous routes and to become temporarily immersed in mysterious methods, symbols and computations, finally to emerge with a conclusion couched in apparently unintelligible jargon which must then be translated if possible into ordinary simple language.

This slow and patient research into facts is today becoming more and more complicated and technical, and more and more the function of experts in investigation and analysis. As a result, useful research depends primarily upon trained and enthusiastic research workers, who are not afraid to dig out hard facts, however much they may hurt, and to face the naked truth, however great the resulting shock.

The need for social and economic research can hardly be over-emphasised. An enormous amount of time and energy is devoted to the mechanical sciences, to the study of how the wheels of machines go round, but relatively very little time is spent on analysing how the community's wheels go round. A greater proportion of our scarce time and resources might well be devoted to the study of man himself, for competent government, skilled business and harmonious social relations depend not only on good intentions, but also on sound methods and policy based on fundamental facts collected and sifted by organised and skilled research.

Admittedly, it is one of the primary functions of a university to engage in such fundamental research. Unfortunately, however, members of a university staff, after their normal teaching, examining and various routine duties, have but little time and energy left to devote to research, which after all is a very exacting occupation. Yet this question of time is not the only difficulty. There is the problem of finance, involving as it does the painful and often disheartening search for funds to start and maintain social research.

Some economic research, however, has been rescued and put on its feet by the business community of Natal, while a small beginning in civics research has been made possible by the Durban Civic Association.

Perhaps, the National Council of Women and similar organisations would be only too glad to embrace the opportunity to encourage scientific research into housing, food, marketing

problems, the increase in the divorce-rate, the employment of women, old-age pensions, etc.

Another aspect of research is that it not only supplies an addition to knowledge as a necessary preliminary to wise policy, but that it is also an essential part of the education of a community.

Here in South Africa, our European civilisation has largely been founded on and nourished by chance fortune; our virgin resources have been taken by storm, instead of being gently wooed. We have been obsessed and possessed by the lure of speedy opulence. It is thus not surprising that the spirit of public service and disinterested research has not so far been seriously overworked—even in the universities themselves.

But it is also here, in South Africa, that a mere handful of Europeans today stand at one of the important cross-roads of race, colour and ideology; it is here that European civilisation may well have to stand its first world trial and much of the spotlight of world opinion will fall on Natal and Durban. In no other country is it, therefore, more necessary to take stock and to collect and present facts scientifically and impartially. And the first step in this process is for us to learn much more about ourselves.

How can we plan for the future, when we do not know what exists in the present; when we cannot assess the wealth—or poverty—of our resources, human and material?

Our health programmes, public finances, housing, social security, education, and many other activities and institutions depend on the wise utilisation of our human and natural resources, and this depends on collecting and interpreting an enormous number and variety of facts, all of which must first be collected and interpreted. How much do we really know about our own Province of Natal—its peoples, its fears and its hopes?

The Tennessee Valley Authority, as long ago as 1937, was not only employing 5,000 full-time experts, but was also drawing on the resources and staff of Government departments, several universities and various research institutions. This large body of investigators was examining land use, industrial possibilities, transport and, indeed, the entire potentialities of a region in which human and natural resources had not previously been rationally utilised and in some cases had been wasted.

But here in Natal, we have as yet no such galaxy of experts. All we have is a tiny handful of staff and students forsaking the traditional cloisters for the highways and byways of the Pro-

vince in an attempt to study life and labour in Natal, noting, for example, the trials and tribulations of the butcher, the baker and the lip-stick maker, and other key industries.

In the Natal Regional Survey we are collecting and collating existing data, and attempting to fit together seemingly unrelated fragments of a giant jigsaw puzzle into a comprehensive picture of the economic and social structure of our Province. But when it will be finished I dare not say, for research is a long-term business, in which patience is not only a virtue but a necessity. Certain fundamental facts are, however, slowly being collected, and we have already collected a good deal of information bearing on the size and growth of Natal's population, its racial, age and sex structure, housing conditions, family occupations, incomes, the degree and extent of poverty, food supplies, water resources, public health statistics, and so forth.

The welfare of Natal depends on our natural and human resources, and on the skill with which these resources are developed. It is the economist's, and generally the social scientist's, job to investigate these and to make them known to the policy-makers.

Finally, economics is what interests the economist. And the economist, if he is a good economist, is interested in everything.

RAYMOND BURROWS.



Die Digter

Ernst van Heerden¹

Ernst van Heerden se eerste bundel „Weerloose Uur” (1942) word gekenmerk deur ’n sekere verbete opstandigheid, ’n poging tot die bou van ’n staalharde pantser om die weke kern van die hart. Maar ondanks Marsmanniaanse kragbeelde is hierdie opstandigheid op baie plekke nog stroef en geforseerd. Die bekoring van die meeste gedigte lê hoofsaaklik in die onderdele; die treffende metafoor, maar veral die treffende slot. In „Fusillade” en in ’n geringer mate in „Ek, die onbekende Soldaat” het hy egter emosioneel en tegnies iets bereik wat nie sommer as onryp jeugwerk bestempel kan word nie.

In „Verklaarde Nag” is die gedigte oor die algemeen beter versorg en sorgvuldiger opgebou. Hulle bekoring lê eerder in die totaaleffek. Hulle is teerder en mensliker, ’n suiwerder en meer organiese uiting van die hele persoonlikheid. Waar „Weerloose Uur” hoofsaaklik handel oor die liefde en oor ’n mode-godsdiensstryd wat nie orals oortuigend is nie, bring die tweede bundel ’n aanmerklike verbreding van motieweveld en ’n verdieping van lewensgevoel.

’n Eienskap wat die digter in „Weerloose Uur” in ’n mate agter die skokkende krag van die grootse gebaar kon verberg, tree hier duideliker na vore; ’n eienskap wat ek die neiging tot dandyïsme wil noem. Maar dan moet ons hier verstaan ’n dandyïsme soos ons dit ook by Couperus vind. Dit mag nie met blote dekadente oorverfyning verwar word nie. Dit is eerder (om met Rispens te praat) ’n poging om elke pynlike aanraking met die alledaagse, die platvloerse te vermy. Dit is die stel van die self teenoor die gewone, ’n bepaalde geesteshouding wat min of meer neerkom op ’n soort geestelike trots gepaard met ’n sekere geestelike vermoedigheid (vgl. Richtingen en Figuren in de Nederlandsche Letterkunde na 1880, blss. 140-1).

¹Veral na aanleiding van „Verklaarde Nag”; Nasionale Pers Bpk., Kaapstad, 1946.

Die gevaar van die dandyïsme is natuurlik dat dit wel bloedloos en oorverfynd kan word soos soms by Housman, 'n digter vir wie van Heerden 'n sterk voorliefde gehad het. Dat hy hierdie gevaar ingesien het, blyk uit die feit dat hy in „Verklaarde Nag” probeer om aansluiting te soek by dié digters wat die werklikheid probeer deurdring: Hoornik—vgl. „agter glas” herinnerend aan „Geboorte” en „kruis, anker en hart” („Mattheus”)—en verder Eliot, Auden, MacNiece, Achterberg (vgl. sy voorliefde vir die Latyns-Griekse woord: sentrifugaal, somnambulisties, monotone, matematies).

Uit hoofde van daardie dandyistiese neiging het hy egter nie tot die nugtere werklikheidsaanvaarding van Hoornik gekom nie. Ek kan my bv. nie voorstel dat Van Heerden so iets sou skryf nie:

Achter de gracht in d'armoewijken,
 Staat bij de scherven van een glas
 een kind, dat amper op durft kijken
 na 't duister dat vol ruzie was ;
 het ruikt de lucht van bier en asch
 en ziet zijn moeder 't wasgoed strijken.

Die Latyns-Griekse woord wat deur Auden so meesterlik aangewend is, klink by Van Heerden nie ewe oortuigend nie. Vgl. bv.:

. . . Die hortende slag en klap vereffen tot die lang gesoem
 wat ritmies

en somnambulisties ruis (bls. 54.)
 met Auden se

Into this neutral air
 Where blind skyscrapers use
 Their full height to proclaim
 The strength of Collective Man,
 Each language pours its vain
 Competitive excuse :
 But who can live for long
 In an Euphoric dream ;
 Out of the mirror they stare,
 Imperialism's face
 And the international wrong . . .

(Another Time, bls. 113.)

Tog het Van Heerden op ander plekke onteenseglik bewys dat hy hierdie soort woord besonder goed kan hanteer :

. . . die strakke lyne van onwrikbaarheid
sluit matematieks juis
weer in hulself. (bls. 61.)

en

Die donker houtklop van die denne-sparre
is die monotone maatslag vir die wêreldlied. (bls. 42.)

Hier is „matematieks” en „monotone” musikaal en semanties onvervangbaar. Tog hou sulke woorde die gevaar in dat hulle, veral in die poësie, so maklik kan sondig teen die gees van Afrikaans. In hoeverre is sy dandyïsme (die poging om nie gewoon te wees nie) die oorsaak van Van Heerden se gebruik van hierdie woorde?

In hierdie bundel (hoewel in mindere mate as in „Weerlose Uur”) is daar nog ’n hinderlike surplus adjektiewe. Dit gee wel ’n sekere swier en elegansie aan die verse, maar dit wek die indruk van vaagheid waar presiesheid vereis word. Prinsipiël het ek nie beswaar teen vaagheid as die digter dit bewus bedoel nie. Shelley het soms daarin geslaag om ’n mooi atmosferiese effek te skep wat tegelyk musikaal en evokatief is waar te bewuste konsentrasie op presiesheid beslis ’n verlies sou gewees het :

And like a dying lady, lean and pale,
Who totters forth, wrapped in gauzy veil,
Out of her chamber, led by the insane
And feeble wanderings of her fading brain,
The moon arose up in the murky East,
A white and shapeless mass—

Hoewel daar by Van Heerden dieselfde neiging te bespeur is, vervaag die betekenis van sy verse somtyds juis terwyl hy probeer om sy bedoeling skerper te stel. Sy voorliefde vir koppelwoorde en oortollige adjektiewe verrai partykeer (soos by C. M. van den Heever) ’n onmag om die presiese woord vir die besondere emosie te vind (vgl. veral blss. 23 en 24). Die digter het sy gees nog nie gedwing tot volledige verantwoordings van elke woord nie. Daarom parodieer hy soms (onbewus) sy eie werk met die telkens terugkerende „wapperende wimpels” wat so ylend deur „Weerlose Uur” gewaai het. Tog is daar in ’n klompie verse wat ’n skerp en primêre emosie probeer verwoord, ’n suinigheid en direktheid wat onmiddellik ontroer. („Gebed van die Soldaat”, „Na die Front”). Hy vaar dus baie beter wanneer hy sy gevoelens objektiveer, wanneer hy nie bewus na vergeesteliking soek nie, maar die dinge self laat spreek.

Hierdie vaagheid hang ook saam met, en spruit miskien juis voort uit die neiging tot dandyïsme. Dit kom my voor asof die digter se ervaring van die primêre lewensdinge nie onmiddellik en direk is nie, maar asof hy met die dinge kennis maak via ander dinge: lektuur, musiek e.d. Dis die resultaat van 'n onuitgesproke, miskien ook onerkende vrees vir die nugtere werklikheid van die naakte lewe. Dit bring in sommige verse iets gekunstelds mee en laat 'n indruk van onwesenlikheid agter. Daaruit is miskien ook Van Heerden se keuse van motiewe te verklaar. Hy het 'n taamlike sterk voorliefde vir literêre en kulturele motiewe. Vgl. „Symphonie Pathétique”, „Prelude à l'après-midi d'un faune”, „Clair de lune”, „Wagner”, en titels wat herinner aan Hoornik en Greshoff („Fabrieksgeheime”).

Die bepaalde onwesenlikheid van sommige verse word deur die digter self (miskien onbewus) gekarakteriseer in die treffende gedig „Overture”. „Houtswaard” en „doek-kasteel” is sleutelwoorde tot die bundel. Hulle wek assosiasies met die onwerklike wêreld van die teater waar gepoog word om 'n illusie van werklikheid te skep. Die digter het ook die lewe en die wêreld as illusie aanvaar, maar hierdie gevoel van illusie word nog nie sterk en duidelik verwoord nie. Dit vind sy uiting in stemmingsverse wat uiters selde 'n gekonsentreerde indruk op ons agterlaat. (Vgl. blysk. 24, 34, 51, 55, 62.) Die imposante façade van die „doek-kasteel” is nog nie afgestroop om vir ons die illusie as illusie te toon nie.

Dit is gevaarlik om 'n digter iets voor te skryf en ek wil dit ook nie graag doen nie. Maar ek dink tog dat dit Van Heerden tot groter konsentrasie sal dwing as hy 'n paar epiese stukke aanpak. Dit sal hom dwing tot meer onmiddellike visuele waarneming; dit sal sy vers verskerp en 'n groter draagkrag gee. Dit sal ook die geleentheid vir meer bewuste ontwikkeling en strakker komposisie meebring. Want ongelukkig is baie van sy verse wesenlik nog te staties, omdat hulle slegs verbygaande stemmings van die oomblik is en nog nie opgehef is tot die plan van tydeloosheid nie. Die epiese element in die Bybelsonnette is te swak beleef. Ondanks die beskrywings mis hulle vir my genoegsame konkreetheid wat hulle tot visioene kon maak. Selfs in die beskrywende gedigte („Ses Bolandse Verse” wat na aan die epiese is) is daar nie genoeg gang en ontwikkeling nie. Maar tog is hulle (met uitsondering van „Kers in die Wind”) van die beste verse in die bundel, miskien juis omdat die digter gebonde was deur die objektiewe werklikheid van sy konkrete gegewe. Origenes bevat hierdie groep

verse nog te veel reminisensies aan W. E. G. en N. P. van Wyk Louw hoewel daar natuurlik geen sprake van navolging is nie.

Die digter beskik oor 'n goeie woordeskat en die meeste van sy verse is tegnies goed versorg. Maar hy bly te veel gebonde aan metriese oorwegings. In plaas van te streef na die juiste ritme in die besondere verband, streef hy soms na metriese presiesheid wat die ritme skaad. Sy vers neem uiters selde 'n vaart wat deur die knelling van die metrum breek. Daarom is daar so min verskeidenheid in sy ritmes, en daarom is dit ook dat sy poësie, ondanks Marsmanniaanse kragbeelde, so selde die indruk van 'n bedwonge elementêre krag op ons agterlaat.

Ek glo dat die invloed van Marsman en N. P. van Wyk Louw wat vir die jong Afrikaanse digter haas onvermydelik is, nie vir Van Heerden orals ewe heilsaam was nie. Na aard en aanleg staan hy vir my nader aan W. E. G. Louw, C. M. van der Heever en Totius. En ek sien uit na die dag wanneer sy persoonlikheid hom tenvolle sal openbaar in 'n teerder vers wat 'n meer organiese uiting van sy ware talent sal wees.

Die snelle, onverwagte slot wat so 'n markante kenmerk van sy eerste bundel is, vind ons in „Verklaarde Nag” verhewig en meer gekonsentreerd terug. Hoeveel sy vers aan lenigheid gewen het sedert „Weerlose Uur”, word bewys deur sy groter beheersing van die rymlose vers wat nie kan staatmaak op die rym om die idee van geslotenheid te wek nie. Ook is daar deur die gebruik van simbole 'n groter konsentrasie verkry. (Vgl. „Ouverture” en „Die digter”.) 'n Mooi suggestiwiteit word bereik in „Nag van die Eensames” waar die kontras tussen man en vrou psigologies en poëties fyn uitgewerk is. „Die Bruid” is die besgeslaagde van die twee dele. Wat veral besonder tref, is hoe die ritme eers amper gelykweg loop, maar gaandeweg groter swewing en versnelling kry in

die nag dra so moeisaam die vreemde gewig
van wat aardeswaar is en dan weer lig.

Daarna loop dit op tot 'n mooi klimaks om uiteindelik tot sagte rus te sink in die vrede van voleindiging. Hier bewys Van Heerden dat hy die berymde koeplet knap kan hanteer. Tot dusver is dit dan ook sy beste vorm. (Vgl. „Ballade van die Selfmoordenaar”, „Gebed van die Soldaat”, „Na die Front”, „Die Horlosie”, en „Die gevangene”.) Hier vind ons 'n suinigheid van woorde en helderheid van siening wat die verse tot poësie maak.

Waar daar in die eerste bundel te veel opstand was, is daar in „Verklaarde Nag” te veel lydsaamheid. Is „Weerlose Uur”

die dagbreek se verwagting en „Verklaarde Nag” die skemer se gelatenheid? Ek hoop nie so nie, want gelatenheid is op hierdie stadium darem te negatief. Wat ons nog moet kry is óf volle lewensaanvaarding, d.w.s. ’n meer positiewe, daadwerklike ingryp op die lewe en ’n omskepping van lewe en wêreld tot eie gestalte, óf ’n verbete berusting in die onvermydelike maar met ’n verborge kern van verset gloeiend in die stil kring van diepste menslikheid.

Miskien is dit nie bloot toevallig dat die titel van hierdie bundel my herinner aan Arnold Schönberg se snaarsekstet „Verklärte Nacht” nie. Soos Schönberg se werk in daardie tydperk van sy lewe (omstreeks 1900), is „Verklaarde Nag” nog te gebonde aan ’n tydsidoom en aan die werk van voorgangers en tydgenote. Al het Van Heerden in hierdie bundel ’n paar verse gelewer wat ’n positiewe bydrae tot ons poësie is, sal die tyd nog moet bewys of „Verklaarde Nag” (soos ek hoop en verwag) die ouverture tot ’n nuwe ontwikkeling sal blyk.

P. DU P. GROBLER.



Goethe

No other German poetical work has attracted the German people and all students of German thought and literature so much as Goethe's *Faust*, nor has any other German drama been interpreted so diligently and frequently. One reason is that it is written in a language which for vigour, vividness, and evocative power is equalled only in Shakespeare and Dante; the main reason, however, is that Goethe projects into *Faust* all the desires, hopes, and aspirations as well as all the anxiety man has experienced since the days of the Renaissance.

Goethe was attracted by the figure of Faust, an alchemist, astrologer, and magician, who lived at the beginning of the sixteenth century, because he saw in him his own conflict between a striving for the infinite and the limitations of human nature. The young Goethe identified himself so closely with Faust's passionate personality that he was unable to reflect calmly on the ultimate fate of Faust. To let Faust end in eternal damnation—as had happened in all other Faust stories—was impossible for Goethe; to find a reasonable justification for Faust's life seemed equally impossible. The result was that the *Urfaust* of 1774 remained a fragment. Sixteen years later, when Goethe published his collected works, he tried to complete the *Urfaust*. Still he could not decide what the outcome of Faust's life was to be. In the collected works *Faust* again appeared as a fragment. In 1797 Goethe conceived the idea of *Faust* as we know it today, for under the influence of his journey to Italy and his friendship with Schiller he had resolved his own conflict between the striving for the infinite and the limitations of this world. He is now able to see the passionate urge of Faust in what he deems to be the true perspective and plans the Faust drama with the redemption of Faust; but the last scenes were not written before 1831, a few months before Goethe's death.

In its final form *Faust* consists of two parts. These are preceded by the Dedication, the Prelude on the Stage, and the

Prologue in Heaven. Of these the Prologue in Heaven is the most important, because there the Faust theme is displayed: the Lord and Mephisto make a bet, the stake being the soul of Faust. God grants Mephistopheles permission to tempt Faust throughout his life, because he is sure that Mephistopheles will not succeed in stifling Faust's striving towards the infinite. Mephistopheles is convinced that he will be able to distract Faust.

In the first part we see Faust disillusioned about the results of his studies, because they do not give him any insight into nature and life. When even magic has failed to reveal the secrets of nature, Faust is on the verge of suicide. Then Mephistopheles offers Faust his services and it comes to a second compact: Faust promises his soul to Mephistopheles if he can make him so contented that his striving towards the infinite is stifled.

Mephistopheles first tries to drown Faust's urge in a sensuous and voluptuous life. Drinking with students and conjuring tricks do not entice Faust. As Faust is already too old for sexual passion he has to be rejuvenated in the witches' kitchen. The rejuvenated Faust's desire falls on Gretchen, the innocent girl, and soon develops into real love. But Faust's love can bring no happiness to her. Gretchen causes the death of her mother and her brother, and in desperation she kills her own child, of which Faust is the father.

Faust, who is unaware of all this, is taken by Mephistopheles into a more intense and baser kind of voluptuousness. He partakes in the Walpurgis Night, the annual gathering of the demons and the witches. Into this enjoyment there breaks the memory of Gretchen. Faust leaves the arms of a beautiful witch, and returns to Gretchen, but too late. He finds her in prison the night before her execution. His desire to help her is in vain, because her frightful experiences have robbed her of her sanity, so that she does not recognise him any longer. In all her insanity she is sane enough to realise that liberation with the help of the devil would mean eternal damnation. She accepts her fate, and thus is saved, as a voice from above assures us. But Faust himself still has a long way to go. Part I ends with the imperative "Hither to me!" with which Mephistopheles claims Faust.

The experience with Gretchen is so painful for Faust that only a bath in "Lethe's drowsy spray" can make him forget. Faust is still seeking higher forms of life. He has been through the little world, he now seeks the greater one.

Mephistopheles leads him to the court of the emperor, in the hope that activity and prestige in society and government might quieten Faust's urge. He gives him all the power he needs to win the favour of the emperor, and even helps him to conjure up the Helena and Paris of Greek legend. Dissatisfied in the world of power and prestige for its own sake Faust seeks Beauty. Attracted by Helena he tries to seize her, but the spirits dissolve in vapour.

Mephistopheles takes the unconscious Faust back into his old study, which is now occupied by Faust's former famulus, who has become a famous professor, and in a test tube produces the homunculus, the artificial manikin. Homunculus can read Faust's thoughts, and suggests that Faust should be taken to the Classical Walpurgis Night, which is an invention of Goethe and a parallel to the German Walpurgis Night in Part I.

Faust searches for Helena and finds her. Helena, the symbol of beauty, becomes the wife of the medieval German knight, in which role Faust appears in the third act. The child of their marriage is Euphorion, who symbolises the synthesis of the ancient Greek and the modern elements. But this child is unfit for life, just as the symbolised synthesis is a vain attempt; he is always losing the safe ground under his feet, tries to fly, and ultimately perishes in flames. Helena leaves Faust, who is left with only her veil. This dissolves into a cloud, which carries Faust all over the country. Faust has possessed Helena, *i.e.*, he has experienced a life of beauty, but still his urge remains.

From beauty Faust turns to creative achievement. While flying over the country he conceives the grand idea of reclaiming land on the coast of the sea, not for himself, not to revel in a feeling of power, but to create, *i.e.*, to add something to the sum total of values of this world, which so far he has merely exploited or in disillusionment avoided. He formulates his new aim in the words: "The deed is everything".

Faust is almost a hundred years old when we find him on the fertile ground he has reclaimed from the sea. Still he is not without desires. The small house of an old couple is in his way. He wants to construct an observation tower, and it must be on the plot of land they occupy. Mephistopheles, Faust's obedient servant, destroys both the house and the occupants by fire. This shakes Faust, and the four grey women, Want, Guilt, Necessity, and Care, with whom he has had nothing to do since his compact with Mephistopheles, come to visit Faust again. Only Care gains power over Faust, who now—contrary to Faust at the beginning of the drama—wants to be freed from

the bonds of Magic, but accepts Care even as he is accepting the limitations of human life.

Care blinds Faust, and yet he forms a new plan. He wants to construct a canal to drain the swamps. He orders Mephistopheles to start the work while already two grave-diggers are beginning on Faust's grave. Faust mistakes the noise of the shovels for the commencement of the work on the canal. He has visions of standing "on free soil among a people free". He now speaks the words for which Mephistopheles has waited so long :

" In proud forefeeling of such lofty bliss
I now enjoy the highest Moment—this ! "

and then dies.

Mephistopheles wins his bet with Faust, but he loses that with the Lord. For the terms of the bet with the Lord were that Mephistopheles should have Faust's soul, if he succeeded, not in making him contented in this world, but in stifling his striving towards the infinite. Faust becomes contented, but not before he has seen in a grand vision of the future the possibility of satisfying in this world, instead of stifling it, his striving towards the infinite.

The aim of this article is, however, not to give the " story " in Goethe's *Faust*, nor is it to convey to the reader an impression of the evocative power of Goethe's verse. An article on *Faust* would in any case be only a poor substitute for the actual reading of the drama. The aim here is exclusively to show in what way Goethe's *Faust* serves as a point of focus in which all the dominant strands of feeling of Western European man since the Middle Ages unite : the orientation of the Middle Ages towards the transcendental, supernatural world, the feeling of autonomy of Renaissance man, the constricted ambitions of the Rationalists, the passionate striving of the " Irrationalists " towards the infinite, the final turning away from the transcendental world and the conviction that, the view into that other world being barred, we must seek our salvation in this.

In the Middle Ages the authority of the church was unrestricted. In the structure of medieval society the church and the clergy occupied first place. Philosophy was the handmaid of theology. There was no need for the natural sciences, because nature was accepted as the creation of God, subject at all-times to the wise decisions of the Creator Himself. What today are problems of the scientists were in the Middle Ages the legitimate concern of the theologians. The first primitive

attempts of the alchemists to find out the nature of chemical substances were called *negromantia*, the black art, the art of the devil. The inquisitive mind that ventured too far in probing what was felt to be the secret of God was looked upon as an usurper of the rights of the church and had to be prepared to suffer for it. We have an example of this in the historic Faust, who was not even granted the peace of the grave, but for centuries was depicted as a warning example of the fate that overcomes those who trespass beyond the sphere of God-willed human limitations.

There was no encouragement either for the individual to feel himself to be different from other people. The individual was the representative of a group and nothing beyond that. All his claims for respect were based on the prestige of his group, all his chances in life were determined by the opportunities that were allotted to the estate—the clergymen, the knights, the artisans, the burghers, etc. The different groups wore different clothes, different hair styles, and had different seats in church. On the one hand this meant that the freedom of the individual was enormously restricted. He could never think for himself and was encased by conventions. On the other hand it gave a great feeling of security to the people, for in medieval society even the beggar had his God-willed place as one on whom others were to practise the Christian virtue of mercy. As long as the doctrine of the church was accepted there was no conflict possible between the individual's aspirations and his pre-ordained destiny. There was also no cause for anxiety about the ultimate meaning of life, for the decision about this was left to the authority of the church, which taught that a good Christian life earned its reward in eternal salvation and that even the sinner could be redeemed if he repented.

In Goethe's *Faust* Gretchen represents the medieval order, as is evident for instance when she asks Faust:

“How is 't with thy religion, pray?”

and asserts:

“We must believe thereon.”

Her salvation, unlike that of Faust, is a salvation in the Christian sense:

“Judgment of God! myself to thee I give!
 . . . Thine am I, Father! rescue me!
 Ye angels, holy cohorts, guard me,
 Camp around, and from evil ward me!”

Gretchen lays her fate in the hand of God and a voice from above assures us:

“She is saved!”

The Renaissance brought the great programme of the liberation of man, mainly from the authority of the church :

“ Released from ice are brook and river
 By the quickening glance of the gracious Spring ; . . .
 Out of the hollow, gloomy gate,
 The motley throngs come forth elate :
 Each will the joy of the sunshine hoard,
 To honour the Day of the Risen Lord !
 They feel, themselves, their resurrection :
 From the low, dark rooms, scarce habitable ;
 From the bonds of Work, from Trade’s restriction ;
 From the pressing weight of roof and gable ;
 From the narrow, crushing streets and alleys ;
 From the churches’ solemn and reverend night,
 All come forth to the cheerful light.”

Faust says this on Easter morning, but his words do not refer only to the joys of actual spring and Eastertime. They have a symbolic meaning also and express the feeling of Renaissance man, who experienced the liberation from all bonds as his own resurrection. Goethe, of course, is neither the first nor the last to use the analogy of spring to characterise the Renaissance.

The Renaissance is traditionally said to have received its last strong impetus from the Eastern Roman philosophers, who escaped from the Turks to Italy in 1453. They brought with them the knowledge of ancient Greek philosophy and of the original works of Greek philosophers. This suddenly gave a far more comprehensive view of Greek philosophy, which up to then had been represented in the medieval libraries only by Aristotle. All over Europe learned men felt an irresistible impulse to master the ancient languages in order to be able to understand the thoughts of the Greeks and the Romans. It is, therefore, not altogether wrong to take Renaissance to mean the rebirth of the classical studies. But Renaissance is much more than this. The classical studies led to a rediscovery of the Greek conception of man and life, and confirmed what some people at the end of the medieval period had dimly suspected, viz., that the conception of man and the meaning of life as given by the church was neither the only nor the most desirable one. Renaissance, then, implies the rebirth of an old ideal of humanity. From the newly gained knowledge of the ancient ideal the Renaissance personalities evolved their own. They now felt that they had a right to their individuality and they strove to develop all their potentialities—good as well as bad—to the

full. The Renaissance individuals had a strong feeling of their own power. They accept responsibility for their own lives and are more concerned about the fullness and intensity of their own existence than about the hereafter. Man tries to settle in this world, and to give up yearning for a transcendental, supernatural existence. God is gradually denuded of all His attributes and the world itself claims the legitimate inheritance of these. But it is not easy for man to confine himself to this world, for now he becomes aware of how his innate desire for the infinite conflicts with his inborn limitations.

The attitude towards nature also changes. The Renaissance period is the time of discoveries and inventions, which are made possible only by the fact that nature is now looked upon as something which, at least to a certain extent, can be conceived in mathematical terms.

Faust's famulus, who produces Homunculus, the artificial manikin, states it in these words :

“ The mystery which for Man in nature lies
We dare to test by Knowledge led ”.

Once the discovery has been made that there are predictable laws governing nature, it is only a small step towards the attempt to master nature.

The Baccalaureus, the able student of Professor Wagner in Goethe's *Faust*, expresses this :

“ This is Youth's noblest calling and most fit !
The world was not ere I created it ;
The sun I drew from out the orient sea ;
The moon began her changeful course with me ;
The day put on his shining robes to greet me ”.

In Germany, however, the Renaissance loses much of its effectiveness by being dissolved into two streams, viz., Humanism and Reformation, and the real implications of the Renaissance are lost sight of.

Humanism, which receives its name from the Italian “ uomo universale ”, meaning a personality that develops all its potentialities to the full, remains confined in Germany only to the study of the old languages, the development of the techniques of text criticism, the purifying of Latin from medieval Germanisms, and the development of a new Ciceronian style. It is as if the German humanists were not yet able to face the real issues—the autonomy of man, the rejection of a transcendental,

supernatural world, the realisation of the immanent values of life—and are, therefore, distracting themselves by painstaking devotion to philological tasks.

The Reformation is a step towards recognition of the autonomy of man, for Luther makes the individual's own conscience the arbiter in all moral decisions. But in two respects the Reformation puts limitations on man's autonomy: a transcendental world is still recognised, and though the authority of the church itself is shattered, the authority of the Bible is reinstated. The emphasis on the individual's own conscience leads to the increasing autonomy of the individual and paves the way for the rejection of the transcendental, supernatural world. The fact that Luther tries to save the authority of the Bible leads to two entirely different developments: the respect for the word of the *Bible* is the foundation for a new orthodox church, the respect for the Bible *word* eventually results in an overemphasis on the value of words and concepts. It leads to Protestant orthodoxy and to Rationalist philosophy and poetry.

It is not before the eighteenth century that the Germans really experience Renaissance with all its implications. Before that they are culturally impotent as a result of religious quarrels, which are the aftermath of the Reformation and political intrigue. The seventeenth century brings the Thirty Years War, which begins as a religious war and ends in the complete destruction of the German nation. The end of the war finds the people starved, poor, hopeless, and uneducated. The religious problems have lost their appeal, the cultural and intellectual life is at a standstill. The courts, the only islands of culture and ordered life, are midget imitations of the French court of Louis Quatorze, and even Frederick the Great, founder of Prussian power in the eighteenth century, speaks French better than German.

Goethe's *Faust* is a product of the eighteenth century, and not, like the historic Faust, of the sixteenth. In the eighteenth century the burghers recover from the aftermath of war, and they begin to realise how far behind Germany is in comparison with the other nations. Under the influence of France, the Rationalist movement arises. They want to master life with their *ratio*, their intellect. The rationalists receive their training in mathematics and transfer the methods employed there to philosophy. The question of methods as such becomes acute: clarity, precision, distinctness, regularity, conformity to laws, which lead to great advances in mathematics and physics, become the ideal for all thinking.

Another name for the rationalists is *Aufklärer*. This name too leads to a better understanding of their aspirations. They want to "enlighten" the people so that they become aware of and do away with their prejudices.

The rationalists cannot come to terms with the world of emotions, because the latter prove to be a hindrance to straight thinking. Instead of trying to understand them, they disregard or depreciate them. Everything that eludes the grip of their concepts is for them simply non-existent or not worth considering. Wagner in Goethe's *Faust* formulates it as follows :

" One soon fatigues, on woods and fields to look,
Nor would I beg the bird his wings to spare us :
How otherwise the mental raptures bear us
From page to page, from book to book !
Then winter nights take loveliness untold,
As warmer life in every limb had crowned you ;
And when your hands unroll some parchment rare and old,
All heaven descends, and opens bright around you ! "

At the same time the fact that some features of reality are

comprehensible in concepts gives the rationalists the optimism, which is so characteristic of their era. It is again Wagner who gives expression to this :

" Pardon ! a great delight is granted
When, in the spirit of the ages planted,
We mark how, ere our time, a sage has thought,
And then, how far his work, and grandly, we have brought."

The rationalists feel that one can add experience to experience and information to information, and in that way gain all the insight desired. That is why Faust—in his own rationalistic phase—studies :

" Philosophy,
And jurisprudence, Medicine,—
And even, alas ! Theology,—
From end to end, with labor keen. "

and this also explains Wagner's desire :

" Much do I know—but to know all is my ambition "

The rationalists, like the Renaissance individuals, rely on themselves instead of on outside authority, and thus are also concerned with the emancipation of man. But the rationalists lack the vigour and the vitality of the great Renaissance

personalities. They are sensitive but not sensuous. They have a deep-rooted distrust of the body and its needs. So Goethe shows Wagner as unproductive in body and in mind.

The German rationalists do not oppose the churches as institutions any longer; in any case, they lack the vigour for such an undertaking. Theology, now both catholic and protestant, is nevertheless their main battlefield. What they attempt is to substitute for religion by divine inspiration natural religion or religion based on reason. As they are prepared to believe only what they can comprehend, they set into motion their whole machinery of thought to prove God's existence and the soul's immortality. Ethics becomes the core of their theology, virtue their principal concern. The rationalists believe in an ordered civilisation and see in the moral teachings of Christianity a convenient means of safeguarding the interests of the individual in society.

Rationalism, then, continues the corrosion of the medieval view of the world. The replacement of Christian belief by rational concepts is carried further, though not yet to its logical conclusion, which would entail the demand for the abolition of the Christian church altogether. The prestige of the sciences, especially mathematics and physics, overshadows that of philosophy.

The rationalists also try to settle in this world and to shut out as much as possible any glimpse into another, i.e. a transcendental life. This becomes evident too in their often repeated assertion that the justification of virtue lies in the happiness it assures to the individual. They do not experience any conflict between their aspirations and their restricted faculties, because they do not really look beyond their immediate boundaries. They aspire only to what they can achieve, and as a group they never come to the point where their thinking lets them down. Rationalism reaches its climax in about 1740, but some decades before and some after it is an influential movement in Germany.

In *Faust* Goethe shows us three possible types of rationalists. Wagner is the very ordinary rationalist with his mediocre talents, who never really questions the basic principles of his existence. He is in a sense just as encased as the medieval man, except that his blind belief in the *ratio* replaces medieval convention. Mephistopheles is also a rationalist, and by no means the devil in the Christian meaning. Unlike Wagner he is only too ready to reflect upon his own and other people's beliefs and convictions. He sees quite clearly the insufficiency and pretentiousness of the claim to master the world with

human reason. But the fact that he realises the shortcomings of rationalism does not mean that he can rid himself of it. He comes to the conclusion that all attitudes towards life are inadequate, and that one erroneous view of life is as good as any other. Thus he remains true to his nature :

“ I am the Spirit that Denies ! ”

The young Faust represents yet another type of rationalist. He too had believed that reason was the highest faculty of man, and that man could solve the problems of his life by clear thinking. Faust nearly despairs when he realises that all his hopes are in vain. He shares with Mephisto the contempt for a Wagnerian mode of life, but unlike Mephistopheles he sets out to master life in spite of the fact that it is inaccessible to the *ratio*.

Around the year 1770 opposition against the rationalistic approach to life becomes strong. *Sturm und Drang*, i.e. storm and stress, is the name of the counter movement in the history of literature. This name reflects one of the chief characteristics of the movement, the enormous vigour and the passionate urge of its representatives. Faust grows into *Sturm und Drang* when he says :

“ My bosom, of its thirst for knowledge sated,
 Shall not, henceforth, from any pang be wrested,
 And all of life for all mankind created
 Shall be within mine inmost being tested :
 The highest, lowest forms my soul shall borrow,
 Shall heap upon itself their bliss and sorrow ;
 And thus, my own sole self to all their selves expanded
 I too at last, shall with them all be stranded ! ”

The *Sturm und Drang* personalities feel even more strongly than the rationalists the desire for autonomy, but this is all they have in common with the rationalists. To reduce it to a formula, one can even say that they invert all the values of rationalism. The *ratio*, i.e. reason or intellect, is now ridiculed :

“ You'll ne'er attain it, save you know the feeling,
 Save from the soul it rises clear,
 Serene in primal strength, compelling
 The hearts and minds of all who hear.
 You sit forever gluing, patching ;
 You cook the scraps from other's fare ;
 And from your heap of ashes hatching
 A starveling flame, ye blow it bare ! ”

With these words Faust puts Wagner in his place. The *Sturm und Drang* poets feel that intellect is only part of man, while emotion and passion involve the whole of man, and therefore are a securer basis for his venture into life. Because of this conviction the *Sturm und Drang* personalities have also been called "Irrationalists". Faust expresses the new ideal :

"Wherefore, from Magic I seek assistance,
That many a secret perchance I reach
Through spirit-power and spirit-speech,
And thus the bitter task forego
Of saying the things I do not know,—
That I may detect the inmost force
Which binds the world, and guides its course ;
Its germs, productive powers explore,
And rummage in empty words no more !"

Sturm und Drang gives up the fruitless discussion of theological problems. They emancipate themselves from the last remnants of Christian belief. They are not concerned about the merits of religion by divine inspiration as against natural religion. Ethics, which with the rationalists had still remained based on an outside authority, though only for the sake of convenience, is now entirely a concern of the individual himself. Very much as in the case of the great Renaissance personalities in Italy the criteria for good and bad are not seen in a doctrine at all. Good is that which helps the individual to expand, irrespective of its effect on others.

Mephistopheles introduces himself :

"I am
Part of that Power, not understood,
Which always wills the Bad, and always works the Good."

and the Lord justifies Mephistopheles' existence with the words :

"Man's active nature, flagging, seeks too soon the level ;
Unqualified repose he learns to crave ;
Whence willingly, the comrade him I gave,
Who works, excites, and must create as Devil."

Bad on the other hand is everything that restricts or obstructs the individual. In this sense it would have been "bad" if Faust had married Gretchen.

The fact that the *Sturm und Drang* poets renounce Christianity and refuse to accept a supernatural, transcendental world does

not mean, however, that they have no religion or that they do not believe in God. They accept Spinoza's conception of God : there is no God outside the world or outside man. God manifests himself in the world of which the individual is a part. God and the universe are two aspects of the same entity. This is called pantheism, and one can say that the *Sturm und Drang* poets have not a natural religion, but rather a religion of nature, nature conceived as "the garment of life, which the deity wears" (der Gottheit lebendiges Kleid). Faust answers Gretchen's question concerning his faith with this confession :

" My darling, who shall dare
' I believe in God ! ' to say ?

.
Who dare express Him ?
And who profess Him,
Saying : I believe in Him !
Who, feeling, seeing,
Deny His being,
Saying : I believe Him not !
The All-enfolding,
The All-upholding,
Folds and upholds He not
Thee, me, Himself ?
Arches not there the sky above us ?
Lies not beneath us, firm, the earth ?
And rise not, on us shining,
Friendly the everlasting stars ?
Look I not, eye to eye, on thee,
And feel'st not, thronging
To head and heart, the force,
Still weaving its eternal secret,
Invisible, visible, round thy life ?
Vast as it is, fill with that force thy heart,
And when thou in the feeling wholly blessed art,
Call it, then, what thou wilt,—
Call it Bliss ! Heart ! Love ! God !
I have no name to give it !
Feeling is all in all :
The name is sound and smoke,
Obscuring Heaven's clear glow."

Man need have no anxiety about the immortality of the soul, for he is part of nature, and nature only another aspect of God, so that his future is safe. Faust says :

“ The There my scruples naught increases.
 When thou hast dashed this world to pieces,
 The other, then, its place may fill.
 Here, on this earth, my pleasures have their sources,
 Yon sun beholds my sorrows in his courses ;
 And when from these my life itself divorces
 Let happen all that can or will.”

Faust has a long way to go still before he realises the full significance of his defiant challenge.

While the rationalists were optimistic about the function of civilisation, the *Sturm und Drang* poets share Rousseau's pessimistic evaluation. They take up his view that the solution to all problems of modern man lies in a return to nature. A new conception of nature also influences their attitude towards the natural sciences. There is a growing suspicion that even in its own domain the mathematical method does not come anywhere near the real problems of nature :

“ Ye instruments, forsooth, but jeer at me
 With wheel and cog, and shapes uncouth of wonder ;
 I found the portal, you the keys should be ;
 Your wards are deftly wrought, but drive no bolts
 asunder !
 Mysterious even in open day,
 Nature retains her veil, despite our clamors :
 That which she doth not willingly display
 Cannot be wrenched from her with levers, screws and
 hammers.”

In philosophy more than anywhere else the whole apparatus of rational thinking is done away with. Concepts are regarded as abbreviations of the real world, as empty shells deprived of life. Reasoning is replaced by intuition.

The *Sturm und Drang* period lasts little longer than one decade. Its function in the development of modern thought, however, is so important that the German Classical period, which follows immediately after it, would have been impossible without it.

What *Sturm und Drang* achieves with respect to the three main spheres of thought in modern times, viz. philosophy, science, and Christian faith, is : a new philosophy takes the place not only of the natural sciences but also of the Christian beliefs. *Sturm und Drang* searches for a new experience of God, which makes it possible for the individual to dispense with

Christian beliefs and at the same time justifies man's feeling that life in this world is worth while, provided only that his passionate urges are not obstructed.

In Goethe's drama Faust himself is a representative of *Sturm und Drang*. But *Sturm und Drang* in itself does not suffice. Faust knows this only too well :

“ Ah ! every deed of ours, no less than every sorrow,
 Impedes the onward march of life.
 Some alien substance more and more is cleaving
 To all the mind conceives of grand and fair ;
 When this world's Good is won by our achieving,
 The Better, then, is named a cheat and snare.
 The fine emotions, whence our life we mould,
 Lie in the earthly tumult dumb and cold.

.

Care at the bottom of the heart is lurking :
 Her secret pangs in silence working,
 She restless, rocks herself, disturbing joy and rest :
 In newer mask her face is ever drest,
 By turns as house and land, as wife and child, presented,—
 As water, fire, as poison, steel ;
 We dread the blows we never feel,
 And what we never lose is yet by us lamented ! ”

Faust accepts it as the lot of man never to be contented. He wagers his soul that Mephistopheles will never succeed in really changing his lot on earth. This is the condition of the compact :

“ When thus I hail the Moment flying :
 ‘ Ah, still delay—thou art so fair ! ’
 Then bind me in thy bonds undying,
 My final ruin then declare !
 Then let the death-bell chime the token,
 Then art thou from thy service free !
 The clock may stop, the hand be broken,
 Then Time be finished unto me ! ”

Faust says this as a *Sturm und Drang* personality : the Here and Now must stimulate the passions without holding man in their bondage. Faust has nothing to lose by the terms of his compact with Mephistopheles, for at that stage of his development life is not worth living the moment the striving towards the infinite

is curbed, and Faust knows that he will not "seek unqualified repose".

Sturm und Drang is followed by the *Classical period*. This period can best be understood as a synthesis of the one-sided rationalism and the equally one-sided *Sturm und Drang*. In this new combination the two no longer exclude each other, but modify each other's tendencies and thus serve as mutual correctives.

Out of rationalism itself there develop personalities like Kant, the philosopher, and Lessing, the poet, who master all the concepts and methods of rationalism to such an extent that they begin to see their limitations. Kant, for instance, clearly defines the legitimate domain of the intellect and thus by implication paves the way for Irrationalism.

In the *Sturm und Drang* movement those, who as poets and as men, do not outgrow the Storm and Stress emotions, fritter away their lives as well as their creative capacities. Goethe, who is one of the leaders of Irrationalism and writes a number of characteristic *Sturm und Drang* works, outgrows it in the natural process of maturing. He still retains the vigour and the passion as well as the *Weltanschauung* of *Sturm und Drang*, but at the same time he learns to appreciate the value of law and order and accepts the fact that there is a legitimate domain for the *ratio*.

Faust also achieves a synthesis in his life. In his *Sturm und Drang* mood he had exclaimed :

"Two souls, alas ! reside within my breast,
And each withdraws from, and repels, its brother.
One with tenacious organs holds in love
And clinging lust the world in its embraces ;
The other strongly sweeps, this dust above,
Into the high ancestral spaces "

With Mephistopheles as a guide Faust traverses the little world (in the enjoyment of the baser passions) and the greater (experiencing fame, beauty, and creative achievement). In doing this he changes himself. He does not give up his striving towards the infinite, nor does he in the end look impatiently and with contempt on the claims of this world. This becomes evident when the hundred-year-old Faust gives the account of his life to Care, who has once more got hold of Faust, although he had managed to avoid her ever since he had made the compact with Mephistopheles :

' I only through the world have flown :
 Each appetite I seized as by the hair ;
 What not sufficed me, forth I let it fare,
 And what escaped me, I let go.
 I've only craved, accomplished my delight,
 Then wished a second time, and thus with might
 Stormed through my life : at first 't was grand, completely,
 But now it moves most wisely and discreetly.
 The sphere of Earth is known enough to me ;
 The view beyond is barred immutably :
 A fool, who there his blinking eyes directeth,
 And o'er his clouds of peers a place expecteth !
 Firm let him stand, and look around him well ".

This seems like resignation, but in reality is fulfilment, as Faust goes on to explain :

" This World means something to the Capable.
 Why needs he through Eternity to wend ?
 He here acquires what he can apprehend.
 Thus let him wander down his earthly day ;
 When spirits haunt, go quietly his way ;
 In marching onwards, bliss and torment find,
 Though, every moment, with unsated mind ! "

What Faust realises is that life and this world are not stationary, but are themselves in a continuous process of developing. Therefore he is now able to understand what the Spirit of the Earth had said :

" In the tides of Life, in Action's storm,
 A fluctuant wave,
 A shuttle free,
 Birth and the Grave,
 An eternal sea,
 A weaving, flowing
 Life, all-glowing ".

Faust unites in a higher synthesis resignation and fulfilment, the futile Moment and Eternity. This enables him to state :

" The last result of wisdom stamps it true :
 He only earns his freedom and existence,
 Who daily conquers them anew ".

He satisfies his striving towards the infinite in the creative deed, and can now claim :

" The traces cannot of mine earthly being
 In aeons perish, they are there !—"

This, then, is how Goethe depicts the dilemma of modern man and the solution he offers in his *Faust*. If one approaches Hölderlin and Rilke, or the representatives of modern existentialism for a solution of the same problems, he will receive an answer which may be different from that of Goethe, but bears clear traces of Goethe's influence.

¹Many of the ideas expressed here are familiar to students of Professor H. A. Korff, Germanistisches Institut, Leipzig. The quotations of *Faust* are taken from the translation of Bayard Taylor.



Philosophy and History¹

I am going to speak to you this evening on the relations of Philosophy and History. This entails saying at the beginning what I understand by the two important human activities of philosophising and history-writing. History-writing I may define, in a rough, preliminary manner, as the ideal reconstruction of past happenings out of their many traces left in the present, and also as a critical evaluation of this reconstructed picture. The definition of philosophising is more controversial, but for my purposes I shall describe it as an attempt of human beings to stand aside from their various activities, theoretical, emotional and practical, to achieve clearness as to what they are really doing when they engage in them, and also to ask whether such activities might not be conducted in a more satisfactory manner. In ordinary moods we "carry on" in various ways, without asking how or why we are doing so, whereas in philosophical moods we try to formulate the principles we unwittingly follow, and to make quite sure that they are the best ones. Many people have, of course, no taste for philosophical activity: they feel that it merely introduces an element of hesitation and slowness into actions that are better performed unexamined. I shan't, however, attempt to justify the philosophic activity this evening: suffice it to say that a certain number of people find life intolerable without it, and that it certainly rids us of large number of gross errors and confusions, even if it does sometimes open up vistas and ways of talking, in which a large number of further confusions are possible.

What bearing has this philosophic on this historicising activity? Obviously it will be the philosopher's business, first of all, to give us a thorough analysis of the different types of historicising activity, to lay bare the many peculiarities and problems of such an activity which don't reveal themselves to superficial examination. And in the second place we may regard it as the philosopher's task to make recommendations in regard

¹A lecture given to the Historical Association, Pietermaritzburg, in August, 1946.

to the improvement of history-writing, in regard to the removal of distorted or questionable elements, and also in regard to the *deepening* of the whole treatment of history. Now it is in this last regard that philosophic activity has impinged most definitely on historical activity. Philosophers have tried to teach historians how to write history in a manner which discovers a deeper significance, more order and pattern in the sequence of historical events, than the ordinary historian ever dreams of looking for. And some historians have accepted the recommendations of philosophers, and have rewritten history on the lines indicated. The latest very distinguished essay in this direction is Professor Toynbee's *Study of History*. For reasons I shall develop later I shall, however, maintain that all this deepening of history has led to much more confusion than illumination, and that history is one of the fields in which a certain wise superficiality is the only genuinely philosophic attitude. The real contribution of philosophy to history, I shall try to show, lies merely in sharpening and refining our ordinary historical techniques and methods.

Leaving these general points, we may emphasise certain peculiarities of history-writing as a human activity which seem so obvious that we readily fail to notice them. The first is the essential *inaccessibility* of the subject-matter of history. It is part of what we mean by calling the past "past" that it lies beyond the reach of direct observation, that we can only reconstruct it, re-create it, refer to it, never confront it face to face. We know of it *through* various signs and relics which have persisted into the present, and we may manage to form a very vivid *picture* of it by interpreting those signs in the light of present experiences, but the past itself can't be resuscitated, to verify or refute the stories that we choose to weave about it. All this is worth saying because it places history in quite a different category from the observational sciences, and almost makes it metaphysical by comparison with them, and also because ever so many people tend to think of history as some stable deposit, which grows from century to century, and which hangs somewhere suspended in everlasting records, to which we have only to refer to settle this or that doubt or question. "Refer to the pages of history", we are told, as if there were some authentic record to refer to, instead of the yellowing parchments, the decaying monuments, the garbled accounts, out of which each age has to construct its own fragmentary and inconstant picture of things gone and forgotten, a picture coloured throughout by its own interests and prepossessions. The point might be put in the form that

there is a sense in which the real past doesn't matter to us, since it is essentially beyond our reach, whereas the only past that matters is the one we build up in the present by the application of historical techniques and methods. But I find myself loth to talk in this manner, as it suggests that we may give ourselves licence in constructing our picture of the past. If it is undoubtedly correct to say that it is *we* who build up and elaborate our own historical picture, it is also correct to say that the rules for such a construction are always rigorous and impersonal, not subjective and arbitrary. Our aim in writing history, as in other intellectual constructions, is to make a smoothly fitting system in which there will be as little looseness, as few discrepancies, and as few unfilled gaps as possible: history is in fact the prototype of all jigsaw puzzles.

But this whole question of historical smoothness or coherence brings me to the second obvious peculiarity of history-writing: that it is essentially a study of *individual* happenings and states and groupings, and that it is in no sense a generalising science like physics or psychology or sociology, which profess to discover *laws* of change which hold everywhere and always. This truth is sometimes contraverted in modern times, and it is held to be the task of the historian to discover laws of historical change, quite as much as it is the task of other scientists to discover laws. It is, of course, a matter of choice what precise meaning we give to the term "history": we can certainly *make* it mean the study of the laws of change of human institutions. But it seems more proper to call such a study "sociology" or "social philosophy", and to reserve the name "history" for a study connected with the past and the past alone, however much we may try to illuminate that past by noting how it exemplifies laws of social change, if such are discoverable.

If history, then, is a study of unique individual happenings and groupings, which occurred in the past, how is its smooth construction to proceed? How shall we find out what fits in with what, and what must be dismissed as not fitting in with other pieces of knowledge, and how new pieces are to be supplied to fill in the gaps in our information? Now if we had a body of well-founded laws about the behaviour of human beings, whether as individuals or in the mass, the whole process of historical interpolation would be readily understandable. Our laws would be such as to enable us to fill in the missing pieces, reject unsuitable pieces, and discover the right connections between pieces actually given. But in fact there are no such certain laws in sociology or psychology, or only the

merest adumbrations of them, and it is from history that we must largely derive them, rather than use them to construct history. How do we in practice solve this problem? The practising historian would probably answer: "From our general acquaintance with human nature plus our special intimacy with the atmosphere of a period." This answer contains the somewhat mysterious recipe of historical method. For the historian comes to *feel* what is likely or unlikely to have happened to certain individuals in certain historical situations, or how one thing led to another, not by any process of applying ready-made generalisations to the available material, but by a kind of intuitive understanding of those individuals and that period which has grown out of long intimacy with innumerable historical details. This place of intuitive understanding in historical reconstruction has been greatly stressed by the German school of the students of the *Geisteswissenschaften* or humanistic disciplines, of which the most distinguished is Dilthey. Dilthey emphasised the peculiar *felt coherence* which governs our construction of the historical picture; a man steeped in the sources of Reformation history suddenly finds that his data assemble themselves into significant patterns, and are not made up out of loose and disconnected fragments. He suddenly feels how and why a man like Luther reacted to the various influences of his youth and manhood, why he made the stand he did, why this provoked further historical resistances, and so on. And he doesn't know all this by applying the comparatively paltry generalisations of psychologists and sociologists to his rich historical material, nor yet by projecting his own modern attitudes into men of a different age. He reaches his picture by a kind of logic which isn't the logic of the generalising sciences, which might be called the "logic of understanding" or the "logic of the individual situation". I feel, however, that too great a stress on the intuitive understanding involved in history-writing will lead to various kinds of dangerous escapism and mysticism: it did in fact so lead in the work of the German thinkers referred to. For these were mainly concerned to save an island of intuitive spirituality from what they regarded as the devastating inroads of scientific method, and they sought that island in the realm of culture and history, which seemed so stable in the nineteenth century. Now I should maintain that methods of intuitive understanding have to be made part of scientific method, and subjected to its tests, exactly like other methods of discovery. Historians have always known (what psychologists are laboriously re-

discovering today) that the human organism is a vastly sensitive instrument, capable of reacting in an extremely delicate, and at the same time integrated, fashion to a vast number of distinct influences and suggestions. And just as the modern psychologist prefers the interview as a means of assessing personality to any armoury of tests, so the historian has always preferred to react intuitively to a vast mass of historical material, rather than to approach it with ready-made laws and assumptions. But, in the last resort the value of such intuitive methods must lie in their confirmation by subsequently discovered data, and ultimately in their capacity to reformulate such data in principles which must be general even if they do not have the rigid universality of physical laws.

We may now briefly stress a third important character of history as a science: that it is always selective, and that it operates throughout with the conception of the historically "important" or "significant". Now this notion of the important is one that varies vastly from one type of history-writing to another: there is a type of history to which it means the vulgarly large and influential. The history of the school-books, with its stress on the lives and fortunes of the great, is dominated by *this* standard of importance. There is another type of history whose standard of importance might be called relative: it may be interested in an aspect of human activity as precious as architecture or as trivial as hairdressing, and it accords importance to anything that represents a *large change* or a *marked style* in such an activity. From this point of view the introduction of the powdered wig was an extremely important event in the history of hairdressing, however unimportant it might be from other points of view. But history in the highest sense always depends on some more or less *comprehensive evaluation* of the various aspects of human activity from the point of view of their ultimate worthwhileness as parts of the human enterprise. The intelligent historian sees human activity in numerous facets or aspects, some of which deserve to occupy a large place in the canvas and others a small place, but he tries to see all of them distinctly and he tries to keep all of them in view. And whatever happening or phase or state or achievement is dealt with is always seen in one or more of these facets, and seen in its proper proportion in it. Some such evaluation must govern every treatment of history: in its absence we should have a colourless narration which wouldn't be worth while studying or knowing. Again this doesn't necessarily mean that the historian must take courses in the philosophy of value,

though he might conceivably do so with profit. To a large extent the competent value-theorist may be sent to delve his material out of the evaluations implicit in the work of the best history-writers.

Having given relief to a few of the philosophically interesting peculiarities of historical activity, we may now consider some of the profounder recommendations which philosophers have given to historians. And here I might discuss the way in which philosophers might set historians aright by criticising their interpolations and evaluations: I shall, however, concentrate on a field in which the influence of philosophers has been, on the whole, a bad one. I refer to the attempts of philosophers to discern a more or less orderly pattern in history which makes historical detail intelligible and enables us to forecast the future. These philosophical pictures have of course an ancestry in the various mythical pictures of providence and world-history which have dominated various types of culture. But in their philosophical form they have been ready to lay claim to the impersonal objectivity of science, and have, in consequence, wielded a much larger influence over millions of modern people than the myths of the past. I have no time to deal with a large number of these vivid historicist panoramas: I shall content myself by saying something about the historicist philosophy of Hegel, who here, as elsewhere, is responsible for corrupting human reason at its sources, and also about two other systems of the same sort with which I am familiar, those of Marx and Spengler. I shall not deal with a writer like Toynbee, who is much more highly spoken of than other historicist philosophers, because I have as yet not got round to studying him.¹

Hegel may be said (*in our own language and not in his*) to have been a philosopher who put an *abstract ideal* behind the whole of history, as well as behind all other things, and who endowed this abstract ideal with a certain *dynamic efficacy*, while history became the process by means of which it translated itself into concrete actuality. This abstract ideal is that of self-conscious Spirit, which becomes thoroughly aware of itself in the highest reaches of Art, Religion and Philosophy. But Hegel doesn't believe that such self-conscious spirituality can exist at the beginning of things: it must gradually realise itself through a long and laborious process, in which many resistances are overcome and many inadequate manifestations transcended. The function of the material world is to serve as a difficult resistance to Spirit; it is there to call forth the

¹In this latter part of my paper I have derived much light from Karl Popper's *Open Society and Its Enemies*.

spiritual energies by means of which it is tamed and subjugated and transformed. In proportion as Spirit overcomes the material environment, it makes out of it an external world of its own, the world of human society and culture. World history then consists in a series of incarnations of Spirit in various forms of social and political life, in each of which some aspects of the ultimate ideal are expressed, while others are suppressed or latent. The Orientals, according to Hegel, only realised that *One* was free, and consequently lived under absolute despotic sovereignties. The Greeks realised that *Some* were free, and consequently built up a high culture on a basis of slave-labour. The modern Germanic communities have, however, arrived at the realisation that *All* are free, a consciousness which underlies such movements as the Reformation and the French Revolution, which latter movement Hegel admired greatly in his liberal youth before he became a Prussian official philosopher. According to Hegel the incarnation of Spirit is always in a series of *nations*, in each of which it brings to complete expression a stage or phase of itself before passing on to some higher manifestation. And Hegel also supposes that the development of Spirit through various national incarnations always proceeds *dialectically*: it oscillates like an argument from one extreme position to its opposite, and then gathers both together into a "higher unity". And he holds that this dialectical development of the World-Spirit resembles the traditional Providence in that it uses the finite passions and purposes of individuals in the service of ends of which they know nothing. This use of the individual person by the World-Spirit is called by Hegel the *Cunning of Reason*. It has its crowning expression in the case of the "world-historical individual", a man like Caesar or Napoleon, who effects the change from one manifestation of Spirit to another, while having no other aim beyond his own glory or security, which he often pursues in a highly immoral or amoral manner.

Let us turn rapidly from this winning theodicy to the somewhat different historicist system of Karl Marx. Here the moving agency behind history isn't an abstract ideal in process of realising itself, but the concrete network of productive relations which arise whenever men co-operate with other men to wring a livelihood from a reluctant nature. Marx supposes the original organisation of production to have been communal, but that, as methods of production improved, there ensued an irresistible division of human beings into classes, some doing the harder and less attractive work, while others lived on their labours,

and exercised functions of supervision and military protection. Marx distinguished various types of primitive class-systems, the Asiatic type, the Classical type and the Feudal type, but wrote little about them, as he wasn't greatly interested in the revolutions of the past. But he held that it was inevitable that, at a slightly more elaborate stage in production, more and more power should pass into the hands of merchants, traders and money-makers generally. In Western Europe this began with the Free Towns, continued in the Reformation and Renaissance, and was consummated in the French Revolution. We then entered upon the monstrous regiment of shopkeepers, a period of large-scale mechanical production, increasing competition, limitless profit-seeking, and ever-increasing exploitation and misery of the labouring classes, which must in the end provoke a revolution, in which the workers seize the instruments of production and bring about a new type of communal and classless society. An important element in Marx's view is the doctrine that all the ideal and cultural aspects of a civilisation are, in a *covert* manner, reflections of its productive basis. Thus freedom of thought, protestantism, romantic individualism, Darwinian evolutionism and so forth are characteristic products of a bourgeois system of production: none of them could flourish either under feudalism or communism. This doctrine has led to the limitless relativism as well as to the intellectual and moral shiftiness of modern Russian Marxism; it is, of course, merely an inversion of Hegel's Cunning of Reason. Hegel taught that rational ideas and ideals might cunningly operate through material circumstances and human passions, whereas Marx taught that material circumstances and human passions might cunningly mask themselves in rational ideas and ideals. In both systems the individual moves with the historical tide in directions that he may not understand or approve of.

From Marx I pass to the infinitely cruder historicist system of Oswald Spengler. Here there is no longer either an ideal or an economic factor behind world-history, but something intensely vague called the inner soul of a culture, which arises inexplicably, reveals itself in a peculiar art, mathematics, science, philosophy, religion, ethics and so forth, all intimately connected with each other, runs through a series of stages which Spengler compares to Spring, Summer, Autumn and Winter, and finally withers and dies "with the same superb aimlessness as the flowers of the field". Spengler studies the life-cycle of six such cultures, the Egyptian, the Indian, the Chinese, the Classical, the Arabian-Byzantine and the Western European. Each has a "rural-

intuitive spring" in which literature assumes epic and heroic forms, and philosophy is mystical or scholastic. This is followed by an "urban and critical summer", exemplified in our own Reformation and Renaissance. After this comes an autumnal period, in which all is civilised and polite, and reason achieves its highest honours and triumphs: this obviously corresponds to our eighteenth century. After such a period follows the long complicated winter, of life in vast cities, democratic political forms, limitless money-making, boundless individualism, cosmopolitanism and "emancipationism", when science and philosophy become increasingly intricate and trivial. At this stage the disintegrating culture goes back to the primitive, yields its sick soul to the control of the "strong man". As South Africans, we may be interested in Spengler both because he saw in Cecil Rhodes the first of these harbingers of decline, and also because several Nationalist politicians, including General Hertzog, were profoundly influenced by him.

I have simply presented you with *three* totally different historicist systems because the difference of the pattern which each so confidently detects in history might cause you to doubt whether any such pattern is genuinely to be found in it. I should not, of course, wish to deny that each of the historicist philosophies mentioned (and many others of the same kind) have directed our attention to factors which explain *certain* historical trends, and throw light on the actual course of historical events. The Hegelian theory of historical development is valuable in so far as *some* changes in history are certainly to be explained by the logical development of ideas and ideals, by the simple perception, for instance, that one thing follows from another, or that what is sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander too. It is extremely fashionable in our anti-rational age to deny that rational and ideal factors make any important difference to historical trends, but I should unhesitatingly label this as a very silly and dangerous fashion. Plainly also the Marxist theory of historical development directs our attention to factors of immeasurable importance in history: there is obviously no province of human life, however exalted, in which the economic factor is not influential, and there are undoubtedly some vaguely foreseeable trends in economic and class development. Even the Spenglerian theory cannot be denominated worthless: cultures do seem to bloom, grow tired, ossify and die with a certain regularity, and there is certainly a vague correlation between the various expressions of the same culture, such as Spengler, for instance, detects between Gothic architecture and the infini-

tesimal calculus. But though such historicist theories have made us take note of factors important in historical explanation, they do not leave us with the impression that their authors have done their best to ensure that every historical fact has been thoroughly explained, and explained in the only satisfactory manner. One cannot help feeling that they have all failed to give sufficient attention to the possibility of *accidents* in history, a possibility greatly stressed by Russell in his early criticisms of Marx, even if he does use such dubious examples as one connecting the colonisation of America with Henry VIII's fortuitous meeting with Ann Boleyn.¹ There must obviously be many situations in which historical forces are in a fine balance and some very small happening, not foreseeable from any general knowledge of historical trends, may cause the whole development to proceed in one direction rather than another. The breakfast of an influential person may in some instances determine the course of history, even if in other cases the line of development is fixed by so many factors that we can practically say that it will be followed "anyhow". And if a key person is also intelligent and good, it is reasonable to think and profitable to remember that he may at times have an inconceivably large influence on the course of history.

Apart from all these considerations, I cannot help feeling that historicist ways of thinking are not only unfounded but also profoundly dangerous. The historicist philosophers have not been the first fortune-tellers who have actually made their own predictions come true. Their weightily phrased predictions, backed with a vast apparatus of pseudo-scientific talk and demonstration, are quite sufficient to damp human resource and ingenuity, and make us sit supinely waiting for certain inevitable consummations, or even lead us to hurry them on since no other outcome seems possible. The advent of Hitler was undoubtedly one of the worst events in human history, and it was also undoubtedly helped on by the historicist philosophers. Hegel provided the notion of the world-historical individual, under which Hitler was readily subsumed. Spengler provided the notion of the inevitable collapse of democracy and its supersession by strong-man government, which prepared the German mind for Fascism. Marx provided the notion that it was impossible to reform society in a piecemeal fashion, as the German Social Democrats were endeavouring to do, and so led

¹Through the break between England and Rome, and the consequent indifference of the English to the Pope's division of newly discovered territories between Spain and Portugal.

many Germans to believe that things must get worse before they could get better, and that it was only by way of Fascism and its evils that their social ideals could ultimately be realised. And the Marxist doctrine of the inevitability of social revolution caused the non-Marxists to forestall them with a revolution in an opposite direction. At present a crude historicism is convincing everyone of the inevitability of war between the democratic powers and Russia, a belief which may very well lead to its own fulfilment and put an end to human civilisation. As we are not ourselves committed to historicism, we do not believe that this will necessarily happen; provided only that intelligent forces can set bounds to the influence of historicist philosophies, this awful consummation may yet be avoided. We have, however, said enough to indicate the intimacy of the relationship between philosophy and history.

J. N. FINDLAY.



Some Relations Between Psychology and Literature

The purpose of this essay is to sketch the development of the concept of personality in Western Europe from the thirteenth century to the present day. I am not mainly concerned with asking what men were really like at various epochs, but rather with trying to find out their ideas about personality, and in particular with analysing the relation between theory and practice, comparing the concepts of psychological theory with the individual human beings described in poetry, novel and drama.

To reduce this vast theme to manageable proportions, and to avoid getting lost in a maze of detail, I have worked out the influence of a few great organising concepts, such as the soul, natural law, evolution and culture. The literary examples are drawn mainly from English. This is not because English literature is more expressive of the European spirit than Italian, French or German, but because I know it better. There is already too much name-dropping in this essay, without the attempt to give an illusion of completeness by a false display of learning.

THE MIDDLE AGES

The mediaeval literature of Europe contains little description of personality. Story-tellers are concerned mainly with action, and actions are described for their intrinsic interest, not for the light they throw on the agents. The chief individual differences which they recognised were those arising from occupational status, as might be expected from a feudal society in which a man's main secular business was to fill his station in life. The most vivid character sketches in mediaeval literature are in the Prologue to Chaucer's *Canterbury Tales*; and it is noteworthy that most of the characters have no names, but are described in terms of their occupations.

Apart from fulfilling the requirements of his earthly status, man's main concern was the salvation of his soul in the life to

come. From this point of view the important terms in which to describe a personality were moral terms. In accounts of the seven deadly sins, or in a drama of personifications such as *Everyman*, mediæval literature found its substitute for the individual personalities of our plays and novels.

The Middle Ages did, however, develop one secular idea of immense importance for the future of personality—that of romantic sexual love. The idea that one man and one woman belonged particularly to one another by reason of some unique affinity in their natures seems to have originated in eleventh-century Provence, and to have spread swiftly all over western Europe. It obviously involves the idea of personality, that everybody has some unique quality, some mode of self-expression which distinguishes him from everyone else, and is the meaning of his existence. Romantic love originally belonged not to marriage but to adultery. Marriage was involved in the whole system of status which left little room for self-expression. The wife must obey her husband, but the lover could choose to obey his mistress. The famous love-stories of the middle ages—Tristan and Iseult, Lancelot and Guinevere, Heloise and Abelard, Paolo and Francesca—are all stories of forbidden love, the assertion of personality against the order of society. Although mediæval romance asserts the existence of personality, there is on the whole little success in describing it. The lover claims uniqueness for his lady, but cannot communicate it. We remember Iseult or Francesca for what they did and suffered, and not (like Shakespeare's Beatrice or Rosalind) for what they were.

Mediæval theories of personality were mainly determined by the needs of theology. From the thirteenth century onwards theology drew heavily on Aristotle, whose works became available in Latin translations from the Arabic. In the *De Anima* the soul is described as having three parts: the vegetative or nutritive soul, responsible for the unconscious and automatic processes of the body—principally nutrition, growth and generation (the vegetative soul corresponds to what we call the autonomic nervous system); the sensitive soul, which included sensation, perception, memory, judgment, appetite and desire (this is "the mind" as it has been known to psychology since the time of Locke); and the intellectual soul, whose functions were reason and will—reason in general, independent of experience, and pure free will, apart from the prod of competing desires.

To Aristotle the soul was the form of which body was the material, so that there could be no soul without its body. This

at any rate is the obvious interpretation of most of the relevant passages in Aristotle's treatise, and the view of his great Arabian interpreter Averroes, whose writings exercised a strong influence on the schoolmen of the twelfth century. But Christian doctrine needed an immortal soul, independent of the mortal body. In the works of St. Thomas Aquinas the immortal soul corresponded to the intellectual soul of Aristotle; it was created by God shortly before the birth of a child (about the sixth month of pregnancy), and was thenceforth immortal, spending a brief but momentous span in the company of a mortal body, and thence passing on to heaven, hell, purgatory or limbo, according to deserts. Aquinas could find one passage in Aristotle (*De Anima* III, 5) which provided support for the doctrine of an immortal soul. The vegetative and sensitive souls were transmitted by the parents in the act of generation, were dependent on the mortal body, and died with it. Plants had only vegetative souls, animals had vegetative and sensitive, but the immortal intellectual soul belonged to man alone.

The meaning of these views for the theory of personality is not hard to see. They left room for the transmission of many human qualities through ordinary heredity; and in fact, as one would expect in a feudal society where status depended largely on birth, there was a strong belief in the inheritance of many qualities of personality—courage and delicacy of feeling, beauty of mind as well as of body. They believed that many valuable qualities depended on breeding, in men as well as in horses, hounds and falcons. But the qualities which mattered most in the long run, those determining the crucial issue of salvation or damnation, depended neither on heredity nor on environment, but on the soul specially created by God. Theological opinion was, of course, divided over predestination and free will. The followers of Augustine held that salvation depended entirely on the qualities which God chose to instil in the individual soul; souls were created bad or good, for hell or heaven, something like the problems in algebra books about drawing black and white balls out of a bag. Nothing that one did during life could have any influence on one's essential goodness or badness. The Pelagians held that man had a certain real free-will, and that the acts of his intellectual soul were of decisive importance. But neither theory left room for explanation of a person in terms of our familiar categories of heredity and environment. The theory of the intellectual soul kept fundamental goodness and badness out of the realm of natural explanation.

Apart from theological theories, there were two other explanations of personality traits familiar to the mediaeval world—the physiological theory of humours, derived from Greek medicine, and astrological explanations, which were popular in the late Roman Empire.

The theory of humours is something like our endocrinology, though it lacked experimental basis, and was almost entirely false. Moods and temperaments were determined by the preponderance of the humours—blood, phlegm, bile and black bile. According as he suffered from excess of one of these, a man was said to be of sanguine, phlegmatic, choleric or melancholy temperament. Phlegm, which in a healthy man predominated in the brain, was cold, blood was hot, hence we still speak of a cool head and a warm heart as desirable conditions. The theory of humours was generally believed, and expounded in standard textbooks; but it was really little more than a set of accepted metaphors for describing obvious traits. Anatomy was studied from books, not from corpses, and there were no attempts to prove the theories empirically.

Astrological theories were also popular, and official church opinion accepted them, though cautiously and with reservations. The church was suspicious, not so much because of the lack of empirical verification, as from a fear that any secular explanation of personality would undermine the basic theological requirement that man is responsible for his sin. Many qualities were supposed to be determined by the conjunction of the planets at the moment of birth. We retain traces of these beliefs in the adjectives jovial, saturnine, mercurial, lunatic, influential.

The middle ages lacked our idea of an order of nature, in which every event could be located in a framework of universal laws. God and the devil were constantly busy in the detailed and minor affairs of the world, aided by a host of angels and saints on one side, devils and witches on the other. In popular thought any evil desire or blasphemous idea could be attributed to the devil rather than to oneself, and the result of any chain of events might be interpreted in terms of a moral order. The speed with which a burn healed, the result of an ordeal by battle, expressed the judgment of God. A man whose motives and thoughts were constantly pushed in every direction by rival spirits could not be considered to have a well-defined personality of his own.

THE RENAISSANCE

In the Italian Renaissance of the fifteenth century there was a great growth of personality. The feudal order had broken down,

and careers were open to talents. The condottieri (military adventurers, mercenary leaders) could rise to any height of greatness by courage, leadership and ruthlessness. In economic life also the system of controls was breaking down, and was being replaced by a competitive capitalism, in which every opportunity was open to initiative and enterprise. The fifteenth century in Italy was the supreme age of individualism. Moral restraints as well as political and economic were thrown to the winds by the strong men who got on. Instead of the primarily moral approach to personality typical of mediaeval literature, we often find in Renaissance drama a deliberate suspension of moral judgment, an admiration of strength and cunning for their own sake, associated outside Italy with the name of Machiavelli. In the next century the model spread to other countries. Marlowe's plays are studies in this ruthless self-assertion—*Tamburlaine* in terms of military power, the *Jew of Malta* in terms of wealth, *Faust* in terms of knowledge. Shakespeare's *Edmund* and *Iago* show the horrified fascination that this type exercised over the rest of Europe.

Another typical Renaissance character is the man of honour, a secular version of the chivalrous knight; more discriminating in his aims than the condottiere, often ruthless and cruelly selfish, but willing to sacrifice every material gain, and even life, in the observance of an arbitrary and self-chosen standard of conduct. Shakespeare's *Hotspur*, *Henry V* and *Coriolanus* are examples of this ideal.

The typical man of the Renaissance, even if he was not a complete unbeliever, expressed all his values in the life of this world. The mediaeval drama of salvation, in which personality was evaluated in terms of its prospects of salvation, took a minor part in his thought. When the hope of heaven grew dim, aspiring spirits sought earthly fame as a substitute.

“ And Crispin Crispian shall ne'er go by
From this day to the ending of the world
But we in it shall be remembered.”

And the King of Navarre in *Loves Labours Lost*

“ Let fame, that all hunt after in their lives
Live registered upon our brazen tombs,
And then grace us in the disgrace of death;
When, spite of cormorant devouring time
The endeavour of this present breath may buy
That honour which shall bate his scythe's keen edge
And make us heirs of all eternity.”

The growth of Italian portrait painting was a response to the desire of patrons for personal fame. So strong was this desire that even in paintings of sacred subjects a portrait of the patron was sometimes irrelevantly introduced. Portraits were strongly individualised to record the personality of the subject, and were no longer the generic or idealised faces of the older religious painting. The men of the Italian Renaissance are the first of whom the world possesses a living likeness, because they were more self-conscious, more keenly interested in being themselves, than any before them.

The Italian humanists of the fifteenth century, by whose labours the ancient world was brought to life again, were not recluses or antiquarians. The recovery of ancient physical and biological knowledge, though important, was a secondary matter. Primarily they were concerned with finding models for a new way of life, with providing an alternative to the Catholic orthodoxy in which they no longer effectively believed. This they found mainly in the ancient historians, particularly Livy and Plutarch. In their works they found those heroic examples of civic virtue which were so notably lacking in Christian tradition. Scipio, Fabius, Aristides and Regulus formed patterns for the patriots of the new city-states or nation-states; Brutus, Timoleon and the Gracchi for the tyrannicides of Florence or Milan. Alcibiades, Aspasia, Antony and Cleopatra were models of enriched experience. So by a pious fiction they conceived the new civilisation as a restoration of the old, and spoke of the thousand years between as the middle ages.

The new-found interest in human character found its richest expression in the English comedy. The comedies produced a variety of strongly marked characters, in which the main interest lay in what they were, rather than in what they did. Some of them were stock characters from Terence and Plautus—the *miles gloriosus*, the miser, the spendthrift. Others, like Ben Jonson's *Alchemist*, were the result of keen satirical observation. The seventeenth-century character writers, working on the same lines as Ben Jonson, added a great range of sharply observed types—A Mere Complimental Man, The World's Wise Man, A She Precise Hypocrite. Yet in spite of the incomparably vivid language in which they are described, the method is somewhat crude, and adds nothing except a local setting to the technique of their model Theophrastus. The drawing of a character usually consisted in exploring the ramifications of a single trait, or a very simple combination of traits, such as boastfulness cum cowardice. They behave with a flat and simple-minded con-

sistency which makes them more like the seven deadly sins than like the men and women we know. Only in Shakespeare do we find a rounding of character, a sudden view from the other side, which makes conventional characters come alive. Pistol, a tedious Bobadil exposed once again, suddenly remembers that his wife at home has died of syphilis; Shylock, Barnadine, Caliban, Falstaff take on human qualities that make them too large for the conventional roles assigned to them in the plot. The richness and complexity of Shakespeare's characters were not appreciated until eighteenth-century sensibility had illuminated new aspects of human nature, and revealed to Coleridge and Schlegel what was invisible to Voltaire and Jonson.

Although the men of the Renaissance were deeply interested in human nature, they took little interest in explaining it, and did not add much to the theories current in the middle ages. Shakespeare uses the theory of humours derived from the four elements as a familiar metaphor rather than a serious explanation. "I am fire and air", cries Cleopatra just before her death, "My other elements I give to baser life." (See also the long "metaphysical" metaphor in sonnets 44 and 45.) Ben Jonson had an exact knowledge of the theory of humours, and explains it in the induction to *Every Man Out of his Humour*. But in his own work he explicitly gives a purely psychological meaning to the term, and drops the physiological explanation.

"It may by metaphor apply itself
 Unto the general disposition:
 As when some one peculiar quality
 Doth so possess a man, that it doth draw
 All his affects, his spirits and his powers
 In their confluxions all to run one way,
 This may be truly said to be a humour."

The use of the astrological idea was a little more serious. Many of the Italian humanists had cultivated astrology as a counterblast to Christian theology, and as having some classical authority. There is no evidence that Shakespeare exactly believed in astrology (cf. Sonnet 14 "Not from the stars do I my judgment pluck"), but he often used astrological metaphors to express the idea of divine power or destiny, the divinity that shapes our ends; for some reason he almost always avoids the obvious Christian expression, either because he did not believe it, or it was unfashionable, or because an unguarded expression might involve him in accusations of heresy. To express the

idea of man's helplessness, he is more inclined to say that "The stars above us govern our conditions" (*Lear* iv, 3), or

"That this huge stage presenteth nought but shows
Whereon the stars in secret influence comment" (*Sonnet* 15).

On the whole, however, Shakespeare, if he ever considered the matter, seems to have adopted the theological theory of the special creation of each soul. Certainly he treats essential goodness and badness as something belonging to the individual, regardless of heredity and environment. We are not offered a reason why Cordelia is good and Goneril is bad. Indeed, to do so would distort the whole meaning of the play, because it would no longer be a simple struggle between good and evil. Evil explained is never simply evil. It is a damaged gene, a tumour in the pituitary, a virus in the meninges, an over-protective mother, a sadistic schoolmaster, an unfortunate experience in the woodshed, a clash in mores, the log cabin that couldn't get to the White House. That is why the villain has disappeared from the serious modern novel, and survives only in the detective story underworld. Shakespeare is a good Elizabethan in regarding personality as something ultimate. He never makes the origin of a character a serious theme of his drama. Where reasons for a character are given, they are very crude. Edmund in *Lear* and Don John in *Much Ado* are bastards, and therefore villains. Richard III is a hunchback, therefore a villain. The men of the Renaissance did not want explanations of personality. They were delighted by their new-found moral and intellectual liberty, their freedom to enjoy "the huge army of the world's desires". They felt that any systematic explanation would be an encroachment on the freedom of the will which was their chief delight. The humanist Pico della Mirandola in his *De Hominis Dignitate* imagines God addressing Adam: "We give you no fixed place, no features of your own, nor any gift peculiar to yourself, in order that you may have whatever place, whatever features, whatever gifts you choose. On others we impose a definite nature within prescribed laws. You are bound by no limits, and will determine your nature by your own judgment. I have placed you in the middle of the world, in order that you may more easily look around at whatever is in it. We have made you neither heavenly nor earthly, neither mortal nor immortal, so that you may form your own image, as if the sculptor of yourself. You can degenerate to a brute, and, by the decision of your own mind, you can rise to divine heights."

There are passages in Shakespeare where astrological explanation is vigorously rejected in favour of free will.

“The fault, dear Brutus, is not in our stars
But in ourselves, that we are underlings.”

And Edmund in *Lear* :

This is the excellent foppery of the world, that when we are sick in fortune—often the surfeit of our own behaviour—we make guilty of our disasters the sun, the moon and the stars; as if we were villains by necessity, fools by heavenly compulsion, knaves, thieves and treachers by spherical predominance, drunkards, liars and adulterers by an enforced obedience of planetary influence; and all that we are evil in, by a divine thrusting on: an admirable evasion of whoremaster man, to lay his goatish disposition to the charge of a star.”

THE ORDER OF NATURE

The great metaphysical achievement of the seventeenth century was the concept of the order of nature. Galileo and Descartes elaborated the idea that all physical events fall under exact quantitative laws; and their faith was triumphantly confirmed by the discoveries of Newton. Thinkers were deeply disturbed by the problem of how to reconcile the existence and activity of mind with the laws of matter. Descartes proposed a solution by postulating independent worlds of mind and matter. Locke sought to give laws to the mind as Galileo had done to the outer world. The mind, as described by Locke, is the sensitive soul of St. Thomas. The intellectual soul was considered to be outside the realm of natural law, and was relegated to the theologians. Ideas came to the mind through the senses, and were associated with one another by proximity and similarity. As the laws of association determined the intellectual processes of mind, so motives were subject to the laws of pleasure and pain, the twin masters. This psychology, more exactly formulated by Hartley and Condillac, was so generally accepted that at the end of the eighteenth century Kant, while reasserting the autonomy of the will as a necessary condition of morality, was ready to admit that one could not identify any particular act as an expression of the intellectual soul.

The economists and political philosophers found the pleasure-pain psychology fairly adequate to their needs. The economists developed their theories in terms of an economic man, who was entirely rational and selfish. He bought in the cheapest market

and sold in the dearest, and always acted so as to bring the greatest profit to himself. The economists assumed the existence of a framework of social regulations which would make it impossible to profit by violence or fraud, and a large number of small producers competing sensibly within the regulations. They then proved that the material interest of all would be best served if every producer were left to pursue his own interest with a minimum of official interference. A universal law of nature ("the invisible hand") insured that rational self-interest served the public better than any state regulation. Charity and benevolence were also dangerous, since they weakened the independence and self-reliance of those whom they sought to help. Adam Smith says :

It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest. We address ourselves not to their humanity but to their self-love, and never talk to them of our own necessities, but of their advantages. Nobody but a beggar chuses to depend chiefly upon the benevolence of his fellow-citizens.

Economic theories acquired extraordinary prestige, because this was the only instance among the human studies of a system of quantitative laws comparable with those of physics.

Writers of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries achieved extraordinary skill in the analysis of ego motives. La Rochefoucauld, La Bruyere, Pope, Chesterfield and Swift showed a subtle insight in uncovering disguised selfishness, detecting the influence of competitive motives in every action, even when apparently spontaneous or disinterested. They made their observations mainly in the acutely class-conscious courts, high society and social climbers of the period, the finest possible field for studying the workings of the inferiority complex. In comparison with the economists, who studied the more practical ambitions of the bourgeoisie, they constantly demonstrate the vanity of human wishes, and the incompatibility of human hopes with human prospects ; but on the whole their analysis fitted in with the current hedonistic theories by stressing the element of calculated self-interest in every social activity. The elaborate analysis of hypocrisy so common in eighteenth-century writers shows a new realisation of the gap between the real man and the persona, but is inadequate because they lacked the concept of unconscious motives. Joseph Surface and Blifil could never really know themselves as well their as authors make them.

The laws of association remained one of the dominant psychological concepts of the eighteenth century. If academic psychologists had not been so dominated by Newtonian analogies, and the search for universal laws, they might have used the doctrine to explore the principles of symbolism, and opened the way to the extraordinary discoveries of Freud and Jung. As it was, in spite of constant reference to the laws of association, no one investigated them experimentally, and psychologists were content with allocating associations to such superficial categories as similarity, contrast, contiguity and causality. The doctrine had almost no influence on the literary description of the mind. It occupies a prominent place in only one novel of the time—*The Life and Opinions of Tristram Shandy*. The meanderings of the narrative, all its “rash jerks and hair-brained squirts”, correspond to a train of associations interpreted according to the doctrine of Locke. The novel was popular and widely imitated, but this feature of it did not strike the imagination of contemporaries, and the laws of association were allowed to remain dead generalities.

SENSIBILITY AND ROMANCE

During the latter half of the eighteenth century several ideas were developed which led to new concepts of personality.

(i) In opposition to the psychology of egoism we find the development of sensibility. The sentimentalists deliberately sought out situations which stimulated feelings of tenderness and pity. Rousseau's *Novelle Heloise* was the great textbook of the new movement. Mackenzie's *Man of Feeling* explicitly protests against the economist's theory of enlightened selfishness. Goldsmith's *Man in Black* is theoretically efficient and hard-hearted towards the poor, but invariably gives away everything he has, after a sermon against indiscriminate charity. In Sterne's *Sentimental Journey* almost every chapter ends with a half-concealed tear dripping on to the page.

(ii) The search for examples of qualities in human nature that could not be reduced to the laws of enlightened hedonism led the romantics to explore many byways in the hope of finding glimpses that would make them less forlorn. Knights of chivalry, Gaelic barbarians, boys and girls growing up on desert islands, peasants, tramps, children, savages, dogs, donkeys, skylarks—they explored every kind of character that was not dominated by the selfish ambition and envious competitiveness that were to them the worst disease of the modern world. “The age of chivalry is gone”, wrote Burke. “That of

sophisters, economists and calculators has succeeded; and the glory of Europe is extinguished for ever."

(iii) To the great Augustans (such as Addison, Pope, Hume and Voltaire) the order of nature, the rule of natural law, had been a source of inspiration and refreshment, a model for the proper peace and order of human society. To the romantics the laws of society embodied "the heavy and the weary weight of all this unintelligible world", identified with the hostile rigidities of economic theory, such as Malthus' law of population. The value of human life was to be found in its uniqueness, in the individual personality, the man who conformed to no pattern or rule, but expressed only himself. The man of the Renaissance also sought to intensify and enrich his experience, but mainly by projecting himself on to the outer world, impressing himself on society. The romantic, feeling society to be hostile and unsympathetic, expressed himself mainly through an intensified self-consciousness. Hence the vogue of spiritual autobiography, a new form in literature, except for specifically religious confessions. The model of the new form was Rousseau's *Confessions*. Wordsworth in the *Prelude*, Shelley, "in another's fate now wept his own", and Byron bore

With haughty scorn which mocked the smart
Through Europe to the Aetolian shore
The pageant of his bleeding heart.

Senancour's *Obermann*, Goethe's *Wilhelm Meister*, Goncharov's *Oblomov* repeated the theme of the sensitive soul who turns inward because the outer world is antipathetic. Romantic critics found in Hamlet a prototype for the introversion of the modern intellectual.

(iv) The sense of a profound conflict between the individual and society led the romantics to consider how personality is moulded by culture. And this led them to the study of childhood, which to them was the age of innocence, before the shades of the competitive prison-house descended. Rousseau, Wordsworth and Coleridge emphasised the profound and permanent influence of the earliest experiences on the adult personality, an idea which has become fundamental to modern psychology. By stressing the influence of natural surroundings rather than social relations, they were, in the view of the modern psychologist following a side-track. Coleridge held little Hartley up to the moonlight, and hoped that its beauty would have a permanent influence on him. To the modern psychologist he would have been better advised to cut down his opium

and give little Hartley a more consistent affection. Nevertheless, the basic idea was there, that the growth of personality is continuous, the child is father of the man.

In the later nineteenth century the novelists began to apply the idea, and for the first time in literature we begin to get keenly observed studies of children growing into adults. It is not apparent in Dickens, for whom character has the arbitrary God-given quality that we found in earlier writers. There is no relation between *Oliver Twist* and the workhouse in which he was reared. The presence of villains is also an indication that he was working with an older concept of the origins of personality. But Charlotte Bronte, Thackeray and George Eliot draw personalities in continuous development. They conceive the personality, in the same way as a modern psychologist, as developing in response to social pressures, particularly those of the parent figures. Jane Eyre in her early battles gains the strength which later enables her to stand up to Rochester and Miss Ingram. Arthur Pendennis and young George Osborne are brilliant studies in maternal over-protection. *The Mill on the Floss* is another study of continuous growth. The fact that famous authors (Dickens, Thackeray, Kingsley) now for the first time thought it worth while to write stories specially for children indicates the interest found in trying to enter and understand the world of children.

EVOLUTION AND PROGRESS

The concepts of evolution and progress are the great intellectual achievement of the nineteenth century. The beginnings are to be found in the eighteenth century, in the biology of Lamarck, and the millennial hopes of the *philosophes*. The idea of progress was not so much an intellectual discovery, as something forced on men's minds by the facts of scientific advance and technical mastery of the environment. The beginning of the idea can be seen in the Battle of the Ancients and Moderns, which occupied literary critics at the beginning of the eighteenth century, in which Fontenelle claimed superiority for the moderns on grounds of scientific discovery. The political philosophers of the French Revolution also believed enthusiastically in human perfectibility. But their simple-minded expectations show how slowly the idea of history and growth penetrated men's minds. They attributed man's evil state to the machinations of priests and kings, and supposed that once these were overthrown man could at once become good. In *The Revolt of Islam* and *Prometheus Unbound* the achievement of

virtue and happiness is pictured as a single act, after which humanity would have no history. The idea of growth is more adequately expressed in German thinkers, particularly Goethe and Hegel, who treat the history of ideas as a directed process of development. At the same time we can see the beginnings of dynamic concepts in the English economists, with their laws of increasing and diminishing returns. The two streams of thought fuse in Marx, in whom the concept of social evolution is fully developed. By the time Darwin's *Origin of Species* was published, the world was familiar with the idea, and ready to receive it. Spencer's philosophy proclaimed the unity of man and nature; and Haeckel's great generalisation, that the history of the individual repeats the history of the race, provided a fertile field for speculation. This concept powerfully reinforced that of continuity of development, whose origin we have seen in the romantic poets. From this time onwards man's original nature was defined by analogy with animal nature. The application of evolutionary ideas to human psychology was sketched out by William James, Lloyd Morgan and McDougall, and received a richer development in the work of Freud and Jung. Man's animal nature is not merely a beginning, from which the adult personality can cut itself adrift. The Freudian *id* (man's animal nature) is active throughout life, expressing its impulses through an endless variety of symbols in every human activity. Society, attempting to regulate human impulse to produce a tolerable harmony and order, suppresses this animal nature, and induces the conscious ego to deny its cruder impulses. But the ape and tiger do not die. They exact a cruel revenge in frustration, unhappiness and rationalised destructiveness. To Freud, man's spiritual aspirations are illusions, disguises which hide but do not abolish the animal reality. The Freudian theory of the unconscious is a description of the gulf that exists between man's conception of himself, and the realities of the animal nature to which he is bound. The analysis of unconscious mechanisms such as projection and reaction-formation shows that will and belief, which seem to be free decisions of the total personality, are really nothing but distorted images of unconscious desires. In his earlier writings Freud was inclined, like Rousseau and Shelley, to put the blame on society. Man's sin and unhappiness arose from the denial of his animal nature. Set this free, and all would be well. But the horrors of the first world war made him revise his estimate, and recognise an instinctive principle of destructiveness co-equal with the life-giving principle of lust. The function of society is regarded as the necessary repression of man's evil nature.

These ideas are reflected in much modern literature. The novels of D. H. Lawrence exemplify the earlier trustful phase of Freud's thought, in which man is to be reconciled to his original nature by revising the demands of society. The stories of Somerset Maugham are studies of the way in which unconscious impulses break through the social *persona* when some crisis evokes them. Aldous Huxley and James Joyce dwell with horrified fascination on the animality of the inner man. The technique of free association, the thoughts that flash upon the inward eye in vacant or in pensive mood, have opened a new world of mystery and terror. The idea that character, beliefs and attitudes are externally determined by social experience has been worked out in many novels. A favourite device is to picture a group of people subjected to the same testing experience, and then to show by throw-backs how their reactions are unconsciously determined by past experience (e.g. Gerald Bullett's *The Jury* and Richard Hughes' *In Hazard*). So far as I know, there is not a single instance of such a pattern of story-telling before the twentieth century.

MAN AND SOCIETY

We have seen the close connection between the growth of biology and that of sociology during the nineteenth century. While the former led to psychological interpretations in terms of individual experience, the latter led to the concept of culture. Men had, of course, known for thousands of years that habits and customs differ from one society to another. But it was only in the middle nineteenth century that they began effectively to understand how a man's beliefs and moral code are patterned by his place in society. The discovery of a close relation between interest and belief opened up new opportunities for sociology. Marx and Engels traced the influence of class status on beliefs, and used their analysis as a means of discrediting the capitalists. Pareto used the same device to discredit social democracy. Max Weber and Dilthey gave new scope and subtlety to the method in their studies of the ideological origins of religion, art and philosophy. The relativists recognised that the mechanisms through which interests influenced beliefs were unconscious; if all men are hypocrites, at any rate they deceive themselves as well as others. The cultural approach to some extent conflicted with the biological, by laying greater stress on the plasticity of human nature, and it is only in recent years that the two streams have joined in the German-American school of social psychologists (Fromm, Horney, Kardiner, etc.).

The influence of these doctrines on many minds has been a sense of oppression, a loss of freedom, a feeling of being tied up in a barrel. If all my beliefs are determined from without by causes unknown to me, what is there left that I can call myself? "In us is the feeling of freedom", says Dilthey, "yet in an outward view all is necessity." This sense of impoverishment, of being explained away, is an undertone in dos Passos' trilogy *U.S.A.*, where the different groups of characters go their way blindly and separately, without seeing their part in the general action, thinking thoughts that have no meaning for one another. It is the mood of many novels and plays dealing with an arbitrary group of unrelated characters thrown together by some trivial association of time or place (e.g., Kaufman and Ferber's *Dinner at Eight*, Elmer Rice's *Street Scene*, Vicki Baum's *Grand Hotel*, Graham Greene's *It's a Battlefield*). The problem of the relation between man's subjection to natural law and his moral freedom, which exercised the minds of Malebranche and Leibniz in the seventeenth century, was at that time an academic theological question, and the failure of their solutions did not matter. In the twentieth century the question has become of central importance. The vast and menacing examples of Germany and the Soviet Union show the degree to which the human personality can be consciously manipulated by tyrannical power. And it is plain that the scope of such control may become far greater still. Reflexology and endocrinology are new and threatening sciences (Greek endings with the little passing hell that signifies some faith's about to die). The nightmare Utopias of Aldous Huxley, E. M. Forster and Rex Warner express the burden of this thought on men's minds. The new philosophy of existentialism appears to be a reaction to this threat of social determinism. The characters in existentialist novels (Sartre, Camus) indulge in arbitrary and meaningless acts, as if to defy explanation in terms of any theory, and so to assert, even in this feeble gesture, the reality of man's freedom.

Others return to the mediaeval conception of an intellectual soul, and reassert an ultimate moral autonomy in spite of science: some in terms of Christianity (C. S. Lewis, T. S. Eliot, Toynbee and Reinhold Niebuhr), others in terms of mysticism (Maugham, Huxley, Heard). One feels that the Christians, and equally the mystics, have demonstrated the need for religious experience more effectively than the reality of it. In *Time Must Have a Stop* and *The Razor's Edge* and *Perelandra*, and even in the *Four Quartets*, the reader feels that there is a lapse from lived ex-

perience into abstract exposition. The sentimentalists of the eighteenth century changed men's minds, not by expounding theories, but by a direct presentation of new experience as in the *Sentimental Journey* or *The Leech-Gatherer*. The revival of religion will not initiate a new phase in the growth of the personality of Western man until it has passed from *Erklärung* to *Erlebnis*, from contemplation to enjoyment.

B. NORCUTT.

