

A STUDY OF INKATHA YESIZWE'S APPROACH TO  
THE YOUTH, WITH SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO THE  
MOVEMENT'S YOUTH BRIGADE

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## ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THE TEXT

Inkatha	-	Inkatha Yenkululeko Yesizwe
KLA	-	KwaZulu Legislative Assembly
ANC	-	African National Congress
PAC	-	Pan African Congress
SASO	-	South African Students Organisation
BPC	-	Black Peoples' Covention
COSAS	-	Council of South African Students
AZASO	-	Azanian Students' Organisation
NUSAS	-	National Union of South African Students
SRC	-	Students' Representative Council
FFP	-	Progressive Federal Party
NRP	-	New Republic Party
SAP	-	South African Police
ZP	-	KwaZulu Police
UDF	-	United Democratic Front

PREFACE

Chief Gatsha Buthelezi's mass movement, Inkatha Yesizwe, has a position of greater significance in the South African political spectrum than has been accorded it by either progressive forces opposed to the apartheid state, or by the state itself. It is of crucial importance that a far more rigorous analysis of Inkatha than has hitherto been the case, be attempted. Progressive groupings in South Africa would be making a grave mistake to simply dismiss Inkatha and Buthelezi as 'tribal politics'. Buthelezi is a charismatic leader, and has a broad popular appeal; Inkatha's membership - inflated as the figures may be - constitutes a significant sector of 'the people' that has been politicised and is being led in a specific direction. A failure to thoroughly understand the movement means a failure to come to grips with a significant political force in Natal/KwaZulu and in some areas of the Transvaal, and which is attempting to extend its sphere of influence throughout the country.

It is a movement that is well organised and is armed with a slick rhetoric, a sophisticated ideology, specific programmes of action, and - more recently - a para-military wing to implement these programmes. There are facets of Inkatha which have been neglected by researchers, such as the relationship between Inkatha and trade unions. Attempts are now being made to analyse the movement more rigorously. Gerry Maré, for example, has focused on the tension between Inkatha and the urban traders in KwaZulu<sup>1</sup>, and Roger Southall has discussed Inkatha's populist strategy of mobilisation.<sup>2</sup> Colleen McCaul's dissertation traces the movement's historical origins, its support base, its political strategies and its growing conservatism, and provides a sound overview of the movement as a whole.<sup>3</sup>

This dissertation is an attempt to provide some insight into the Inkatha Youth Brigade, which constitutes approximately half the movement's total membership. The first chapter examines the nature of Inkatha's populism. Drawing on theoretical pieces by Laclau and Poulantzes, Inkatha is analysed as a populist movement exhibiting many features of fascism. It is therefore characterised as exhibiting a conservative or reactionary populism. This chapter seemed necessary in terms of contextualising the movement's attitude and strategies towards the youth.

The second chapter examines the nature of the Youth Brigade, its structure, and the type of activities it has engaged in. It is argued that Inkatha's

hierarchical/.....

hierarchical structure and 'ageism' ensures that the Youth Brigade is kept under the control of the movement's leadership, and that tensions between Youth Brigade rank and file and Inkatha leadership are swiftly dealt with.

Chapters three and four examine two major areas where the movement has failed to assert its ideology and enforce its discipline on to the youth. The role played by Inkatha during the 1980 schools' boycott is discussed with specific reference to events during May and June 1980 in Kwamashu and Umlazi. In chapter four, the relationship between Inkatha and students at the University of Zululand is discussed. In both chapters the role played by the Youth Brigade is examined.

The final chapter deals briefly with the formation of the Youth Service Corps, a para-military sector of the movement. It is argued that the fundamental aim of this corps is to give substance to Buthelezi's threats against forces within extra-parliamentary groupings that are opposed to Inkatha.

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CHAPTER ONE

Inkatha Yenkululeko Yesizwe, meaning 'national cultural liberation movement', claims to have a paid up membership of 750 000 black South Africans. The colours and songs of the movement are those of the ANC, and its president is Chief Mangosuthu Gatsha Buthelezi, who has characterised himself as

" one whose birth and ancestry places me in a position of being custodian for the people of the ideals and statemanship of the early Zulu kings and early Zulu nobility. Their blood is my blood, and their flesh is my flesh, and my people were put together as a people by them. " <sup>1</sup>

(His great-grandfathers were King Ceteswayo and Chief Mnyamana Buthelezi, Prime Minister of the Zulu Kingdom.) King Dinizulu originally founded Inkatha in 1922, but it was disbanded shortly afterwards due to financial mismanagement, and current Inkatha leadership are adamant that the links between the 'old' and 'new' Inkatha are minimal :

" Zulu women, carrying waterpails on their heads, use a strip of soft blanket to soften the discomfort of the burden. That pad is an Inkatha. The pad symbolises the purpose of Inkatha KaZulu when King Solomon Ka Dinizulu founded it ... Today, Inkatha claims bigger designs. Its purpose is no longer to soften the burden, but to throw it off altogether. " <sup>2</sup>

And clearly, the leadership necessary to 'throw the burden off' will be provided by Buthelezi.

This chapter will attempt to asses Inkatha's particular brand of populism. Drawing from Poulantzas <sup>3</sup> and Laclau <sup>4</sup>, Inkatha will be analysed as a populist movement exhibiting many characteristics of fascism. This approach is used as a means of providing some insight into Inkatha's appeal to 'the people', and its political strategies.

Laclau argues that there has been a simplification of the analysis of fascism within Marxism, where fascism has been presented as the political expression of an increasingly reduced sector of interests. Fascism was reduced to the expression of a direct dictatorship of monopoly capital over the rest

of society. Not only were aspects such as the relative autonomy of the fascist state and the mass mobilisation which preceeded its coming to power undervalued, but the term 'fascist' was applied by marxists to all potentially authoritarian policies of monopoly capital, and more recently the term has been applied to regimes such as the Chilean Junta, or that of the Shah of Iran.<sup>5</sup> Fascism has become a popularly used adjective to describe repressive regimes in general, and it is not in this sense which it is being applied to Inkatha. Instead, by using Poulantzas and Laclau's interpretations of fascism some clues can be provided as to Inkatha's populism.

The coincidence of racial oppression and economic exploitation in South Africa has produced ideologies and movements from amongst the dominated classes which cut across class identification. Using Laclau's formulation of the people/power bloc contradiction, which is a non class contradiction where the 'people' are constituted by a range of classes, it becomes clear that this contradiction has an important determining role on the forms of existence of classes at the political and ideological level - in South Africa, it gives rise to non-class, popular-democratic ideological components, whilst the class contradiction gives rise to specifically class-oriented ideological components. Thus populism is characterised by its appeal to the people above class divisions, while at the same time this popular-democratic struggle only exists articulated with class projects. Nevertheless, the class character of the populist ideology will be given by its form and not its content - thus, for example, nationalist ideologies are not necessarily proletarian or bourgeois because the class nature of nationalism only derives from its articulation with other ideological elements. The specifically nationalist elements can be articulated within a range of ideological components, and it is therefore non-class elements which 'constitute the raw material on which class ideological practises operate.'<sup>6</sup>

If we accept fascism as a form of populism, then it may be possible to characterise Inkatha as a populist movement which manifests a number of features of fascism. At this stage it is necessary to draw a distinction between a fascist movement and a fascist state. This is an important distinction, since Laclau and Poulantzas concentrate their analyses of fascism on Nazi Germany and Mussolini's Italy. Do their analyses preclude the possibility of South Africa's Afrikaner Weerstand Beweging, for example, which presents an explicitly 'national socialism' ideology, from being characterised as a fascist movement? Similarly, is it a-historical to attempt to define Inkatha as a fascist movement?

Poulantzas' analysis focuses on two main aspects : firstly, the type of crisis from which fascism emerges and secondly, the form of the state whereby the crisis is resolved. He locates fascism in the imperialist stage of capitalism, and sees the rise and coming to power of fascism as corresponding to the deepening and sharpening of the internal contradictions between the dominated classes and class fractions. He argues that the beginning of the rise of fascism presupposes a significant number of working class defeats, and that behind every tactical and strategic error of the working class during this period lay the fundamental error of economism.

For Poulantzas, the petty-bourgeoisie plays a crucial role in the rise of fascism since it corresponds to an economic crisis and an acute ideological crisis for the petty-bourgeoisie - petty-bourgeois elements become dissociated from dominant bourgeois discourse and more and more ideological elements are taken from the working class ideology. Poulantzas maintains that fascism is basically an urban phenomenon ( which does not explain the existence of fascist movements in the predominantly rural agricultural economies of Rumania and Hungary, for example), and argues that the function of the fascist state was to establish and organise the hegemony of monopoly capital.

Laclau postulates that while the great merit of Poulantzas' book is that it reopens the theoretical debate on fascism he disagrees with many of its analyses. He argues that the condensation of contradictions which Poulantzas posits as comprising the crisis cannot be fully understood i.e. while the elements are presented in all their complexity, the unity in which these complexities are resolved is presupposed and not explained. Laclau's critique of Poulantzas is detailed and will not be covered here. Essentially it deals with class and popular-democratic interpellations (used in the Althusserian sense), and with Poulantzas' conception of the class nature of the petty-bourgeoisie.

Laclau, drawing from Poulantzas, then argues that fascism arose from a dual crisis:

- (1) a crisis of the power bloc, which was unable to absorb and neutralise its contradictions with the popular sectors through traditional channels;
- (2) a crisis of the working class, which was unable to hegemonize popular struggles and fuse popular-democratic ideology and its revolutionary class objectives into a coherent political and ideological practice.

Dealing with the first aspect of this dual crisis, he uses the concept of

'transformism' / .....



'transformism' to explain the political neutralisation of possible opposition from new social groups by co-optation of their representative political organisations into the power bloc. This transformism entered into crisis in Germany and Italy after the First World War, both because of the post-war economic crisis and as a consequence of a hegemonic crisis in the power bloc, which arose as a result of the particular forms which the transition to monopoly capitalism took in Germany and Italy.

" Monopoly capitalism ... found it impossible to assert its political hegemony within the power bloc - an indispensable condition for, the political and economic restructuring which capital accumulation required ... it was unable to base itself firmly on any apparatus within the power bloc itself, [thus] it could only achieve its aims by basing itself on a mass movement. " 8

This mass movement had to be presentable as an alternative to the system to prevent it from being absorbed into the ruling system, and the mobilisation had to proceed through interpellations which would prevent any identification between radical popular objectives and socialist objectives; both conditions were necessary to enable monopoly capital to carry out the required structural changes.

Nevertheless, Laclau points out that the fascist movements were not by any means an invention of monopoly capital. This is a crucial point because it does not presuppose an unbreakable link between a fascist movement and monopoly capital -fascism provided the sufficient condition for monopoly capital to make use of a mass mobilisation against the traditional system of power, but

" in every circumstance where monopoly capital was not forced to accept the fascist solution it preferred not to do so; in some cases it could impose its hegemony through solutions within the parliamentary system itself; ... in other cases it realised it through military dictatorships. " 9

Laclau states that Nazism constituted a power alternative by its own means, and that in Italy the industrial sectors thought, 'up to the very eve of the march on Rome', of a political solution in which the fascists would occupy only a subordinate position.

According to Laclau, fascism in Germany achieved a dual ideological transformation. Firstly, at the level of the people/power bloc contradiction, there occurred 'the unification of the ensemble of popular interpellations through a subject which eliminated the very possibility of the class struggle' i.e. the German petty-bourgeoisie which was experiencing the post-war crisis was interpellated as a race. Through this identification of popular traditions with racism, a dual aim was achieved: the radicalism necessary for a radical confrontation with the state was retained, whilst its socialist direction was obstructed. Secondly, the class struggle was denied and the expression of this ideological transformation was corporatism, which strictly separates 'people' and class, and tolerates no common area between the two.

The second aspect of the crisis from which Laclau argues that fascism emerged was the crisis of the working class. Laclau's thesis is that if fascism was possible it was because the working class, both in its reformist and its revolutionary sectors, had abandoned the arena of popular democratic struggle. Fascism he argues, was a crisis of maturity of the workers' movement. Before fascism, class reductionism and economism dominated the workers' movement, and the problem of popular democratic struggles was ignored. This crisis of the working class was not rooted

" in the working class' incapability of carrying

out a proletarian revolution in Italy or Germany,

but in its incapability of presenting itself to

the dominated classes as a whole as a hegemonic

popular alternative ... As a result, the popular

interpellations of the middle classes were absorbed

and neutralised ... by fascist political discourse,

The lack of articulation of popular interpellations

with socialist discourse left this flank increasingly

exposed to the ideological influence of fascism. " <sup>10</sup>

Can these two basic 'conditions of crisis' be applied to South Africa today? More specifically, are prevailing conditions necessary and sufficient to give rise to a fascist movement in KwaZulu? Clearly, one cannot simply 'apply' a theory as some sort of checklist and then see whether the theory fits the empirical data. A clear and thorough understanding of the specific social formation is necessary, and it is in this context that at this point that there is a brief discussion about the current crisis in South Africa. The South African state is facing a deep organic crisis. <sup>11</sup> Eric Olin Wright

has/.....

has argued that

" the systematic solutions to the dominant impediments at a given stage of capitalist development generate the new impediments which constrain the accumulation process in a subsequent stage. It is in this sense that the impediments to accumulation can be considered contradictions in accumulation rather than merely obstacles to accumulation. They are contradictions because the 'solutions' to a particular impediment become themselves impediments to accumulation. " 12

It is this argument that Saul and Gelb use when they argue that the solution to the crisis in South Africa in the 1940s became impediments to accumulation in the early 1960s. They outline three limits that emerged in the early 1960s: firstly, the consumer markets became saturated, as blacks continued to receive poverty wages; secondly, black unemployment escalated creating the political threat of a vast reserve army of labour; and thirdly, the job-colour bar resulted in a skills shortage.

In the 1970s, the boom period of the '60s gave way to a period of economic crisis. Foreign capital investment began to dry up - between 1976 and 1977, there was an outflow of R121 million. Unemployment of African workers reached 2,3 million by 1977, and the rate of unemployment was increasing. The shortages of technical workers accelerated. The state was forced to abandon or defer several major infrastructural investment programmes. Furthermore, no significant capital goods sector had developed because of South Africa's dependence on capital goods imported from the developed capitalist countries and financed through gold in particular, and exports of other primary commodities.

Thus by the mid-1970s the economy had reached severe barriers under the prevailing political and social conditions within the country. Change was urgently needed in the conditions of accumulation i.e. a complex restructuring of capital in all sectors was needed to render labour more productive. Because the state's role is to guarantee the conditions of extended reproduction, it is called upon to intervene to reorganise the conditions of production. And in the late-1970s the state was suffering a loss of legitimacy following the intensification of class struggles and the growing challenge to racial capitalism, which deepened the economic crisis into an organic crisis i.e. a multi levelled crisis, producing the need for a formative and not merely a defensive strategy.

called/.....

Called 'total strategy' by the government, the reform initiatives represent the increasing convergence of previously divergent interests, and has entailed profound state restructuring. This restructuring has had real content - the registration of African trade unions, concessions to the black middle class, the concern with the quality of life of South Africa's urban population, and the new Constitutional Dispensation. Yet the basic structures of apartheid remain firmly intact, thereby eliminating the possibility of the accommodation or neutralisation of manifestations of the people/power bloc contradiction, which can only intensify.

The 'independent' Bantustan strategy is an attempt to contain political struggles by focussing aspirations and discontents of the African population at a local level, rather than having them directed at the overall system of racial capitalism. The Bantustans are a form of tight control of the reserve army of labour and are a central means of enforcing influx control.

In 1976, the average income of a KwaZulu resident amounted to R359, of which only R72 was earned in KwaZulu itself. The tendency of the average KwaZulu family to rely on wage remittances of its migrant members is not only great, but increasing. The significant increase in the number of migrants according to the Buthelezi Commission Report, reflects

" the combined influences of the influx control laws that prevent the permanent resettlement of population, the growth in job opportunities beyond KwaZulu's borders and the growing relative underdevelopment or impoverishment of the rural areas. " <sup>13</sup>

According to an employment survey conducted in 1973, only thirteen percent of the KwaZulu labour force was engaged in non-agricultural activities within KwaZulu.<sup>14</sup> This thirteen percent constitutes the petty-bourgeoisie - the businessmen, civil servants, and teachers. It is from this group - particularly the civil servants - that the leadership of Inkatha is drawn. Despite a substantial injection of capital from the central state, employment generated by secondary industry is minimal. By 1981, for example, ten years after the inception of the 'Agency' programme, public and private investment of R182 million had created jobs for only some 6 200 people. Over the same period the average increase in the supply of labour was 30 000 people.<sup>15</sup> By 1975, the Bantu Investment Corporation, now the KwaZulu Development Corporation, had invested R1,67 million into the establishment of a small number of minor enterprises; total employment from this investment amounted to 400 persons.<sup>16</sup>

It is in this situation of increasing dependence on migrant labour, rural poverty, increasing unemployment and the frustration of political aspirations that Inkatha arose. At this point, before returning to the theoretical discussion of fascism, an investigation of what could be described as Inkatha's fascist characteristics is necessary.

Firstly, there is the movement's undoubted populist appeal. Schlemmer has described the movement as a 'remarkably heterogeneous organisation', consisting of subsistence farmers, workers, white collar employees, civil servants, professionals and businessmen.<sup>17</sup> A number of attitude surveys have been conducted in an attempt to assess urban support for Inkatha. Roger Southall quotes a 1977 survey of black political thought in Soweto, Durban and Pretoria, in which 43,8% of the interviewees nominated Buthelezi as the political leader they most admired, 40% of his admirers being non-Zulu. An attitude survey of trade union <sup>members</sup> in Durban in 1978 showed that 87% of the interviewees saw Buthelezi as their leader,<sup>18</sup> and in a survey conducted by the Star newspaper in 1981, among Africans interviewed in Johannesburg, Cape Town and Durban, 39% expressed support for Buthelezi's leadership.

In the rural areas, support for Inkatha is mobilised largely through the traditional chiefs. While this lends itself to some manipulation to gain support for the movement,<sup>19</sup> it is interesting to note that the massive rise in Inkatha membership over the period 1982 to 1983 was due to Buthelezi's handling of the proposed Ingwavume land deal, and was thus membership drawn largely from that area.

Corporativism is clearly manifested in the movement's ideology. Quite simply, Inkatha rejects the concept of class. When questioned by the writer on the fact that the movement's ideology is one which responds to apartheid, uniting people on the basis of their skin colour, and thus fails to grapple with the question of economic exploitation, Buthelezi's response was that he found that the question represented confused thinking.:

" For us it is a fact of life that Africans as Africans have got a role to play in the liberation of this country ... it is simply pure rhetoric in an argument which has never been won by anyone at any time that an African organisation cannot grapple with real economic exploitation. [which was not the question] ... It is an assertion to say that 'real' exploitation is economic exploita -

tion, and Inkatha does not specialise in being clever in this kind of dogmatics. " <sup>20</sup>

Dr. Oscar Dhlomo, Secretary-General of the movement, in response to the same question, told the writer that he had not heard this argument (as posed in the question before, but that Inkatha was grappling with the question of economic exploitation.

" We view economic exploitation not as a racial phenomenon but as a class phenomenon ... our starting point is that without people being organised and mobilised nothing will change. This organisation is a means to an end - total liberation from all forms of oppression. "

He was then asked, in the light of his assertion that Inkatha does not reject the notion of class struggle, what the movement envisages a future economic system to be like :

" Not necessarily capitalist. We must recognise both the benefits and disadvantages of capitalism. In South Africa capitalism is racial. We would wish to see some modifications to what is interpreted in South Africa as capitalism ... Inkatha's vision of liberation is many faceted. We do not isolate economic exploitation from the rest of the story. " <sup>21</sup> (emphasis added)

This euphamistic answer was given more substance by other Inkatha members. When questioned about the use of a class analysis and the role of the working class in a struggle for liberation, Mr. Sandile Makhanya told the writer that lawyers, teachers, businessmen, pupils and workers all belong to Inkatha and that

" they can all have their own organisations under the umbrella of Inkatha. If there is a problem at a coca-cola factory, for example, and the workers want better wages, they can come to Inkatha and we will gat all our members to boycott coca-cola. We did this over the issue of white bread, no white bread is sold in KwaZulu now. <sup>22</sup> Inkatha has a multi-strategy approach, and it is a strategy for survival. " <sup>23</sup>

Mr. Nkehli told the writer that

" Inkatha is a unifying phenomenon. It is based on African values and has developed the philosophy of

Ubuntu-Botho. Through this, Inkatha realises a common destiny. Inkatha has a sanctity input into the struggle. It is a dangerous road - we move between the apartheid regime and violence and chaos. It provides the opportunity of forming alliances, leading towards a National Convention... we believe in evolutionary change. " <sup>24</sup>

This 'multi-strategy' approach forms the essence of Inkatha rhetoric. In many of his speeches, Buthelezi argues that there is room for apartheid to be attacked from as many sides as possible - external, internal, through armed struggle, through trade unions, or simply through blacks uniting as a racially oppressed people. The multi-strategy approach is the justification for Inkatha's participation in the Bantustan structures, for its refusal to support a disinvestment campaign, and for its policy of 'constructive negotiation' rather than 'protest politics'. In a paper presented at Essex Country College by Herbert Villakazi (described by Buthelezi as 'one of our brilliant young academics in exile'), in which he quotes extensively from classical marxist texts to substantiate his thesis, he argues that from the standpoint of revolutionary politics, there is nothing 'inherently sinful' about a revolutionary operating from a reactionary, government created platform.

" What determines whether or not a particular individual should be indicted for operating from a certain platform is ... certain specific, ascertainable historical conditions, chief of which is the question of whether the revolutionary movement is on the 'straight path' or the 'zigzag path', and how that particular individual uses that particular platform. " <sup>25</sup>

He goes on to argue that the notion held by most 'radicals' that a system created by the oppressor for the purpose of keeping people oppressed can under no circumstances be used by the oppressed as a weapon against the oppressor 'is undialectical in the extreme'.

Secondly, this multi-strategy approach which is both revolutionary and reactionary is held together by the charismatic leadership of Chief Buthelezi, who makes reference to his Zulu ancestors at the same time as reminding people that he was a member of the ANC Youth League. He has thus successfully integrated the popular-democratic traditions of struggle in South Africa with the Zulu 'tribal' traditions, and maintains that Inkatha was built on the

same/.....

same principles as those of the 'founding fathers' of the ANC.

" Inkatha is the largest black organisation

this country has ever seen. It has taken

up the struggle where the ANC left it after

it was forced into an exiled position. The

traditions of our struggle for liberation runs

deep in the blood of the people. " 26

At the same time, an idolisation of Buthelezi as a leader has been established.

Buthelezi and Inkatha are indivisible. In an unattributable interview, the

writer was told that a few years ago, one could refer affectionately to

'Gatsha'; That is no longer allowed - it is now 'His Excellency', or the

'Honourable Chief Minister'. At the outset of the interview with Buthelezi,

the writer asked what he thought it was about his leadership of Inkatha that

seems to inspire either hero-worship or else vehement mistrust and

opposition. His response :

" You could also ask what it was about Jesus

Christ or Mahatma Gandhi. "

Every newspaper article or letter which questions Inkatha or Buthelezi's leader-

ship, or which Inkatha feels has misrepresented the movement's views, is

responded to swiftly, usually in the form of a letter which is signed by

Buthelezi. In a number of unattributable interviews, the writer was told that

criticisms within Inkatha of Buthelezi are simply not tolerated.

In the paper by Villakazi, it is argued that

" Only petty-bourgeois revolutionary phrase-mongers,

and young people completely innocent of the theory,

of Marx, Engels and Lenin, can deny the progressive

nature of Gatsha Buthelezi's work in contemporary

South Africa. It is actually the duty of revolu-

tionaries everywhere to help strengthen and sharpen

the revolutionary edge of his work ... from the

standpoint of Marxism, the basis of criticism should

not be that Buthelezi is working within a hateful

reactionary institution ... " 27 (his emphasis)

Inkatha members speak of Buthelezi's 'pragmatism' and 'realistic leadership',

and accept unquestioningly his assurances that the movement has by no means

used all components of its 'multi-faceted' approach against the apartheid

Government. He speaks on many platforms, and his speeches are translated,

reproduced and made widely available. His official title is on every speech :

President/.....



President of Inkatha, Chief Minister of KwaZulu and Chairman of the South African Black Alliance, and his speeches are generally full of powerful analogies and rousing phrases.

While it is a common mistake to personalise history, Buthelezi's influence and position in Inkatha and his insistence that KwaZulu will not accept 'independence', has led to a form of hero worship, where he is revered and beyond reproach. This idolisation cannot be underestimated.

Thirdly, there is the 'thuggery' of Inkatha. There are numerous examples of the use of violence against black opponents of the movement.<sup>28</sup> In a number of unattributable interviews, for example, the writer was told that Inkatha has taken a vow to kill Rev. Xundu, a political leader in Lamontville and member of the Joint Rent Action Committee in Durban. (An Inkatha member in casual conversation with the writer, said that Rev. Xundu had used the rent crisis in Lamontville in 1983 to gain political power.

" He's from the Transkei ... where was he before the rent crisis? He is maintaining this situation of unrest and crisis to further his own political ambitions. " )

Despite Inkatha's insistence on its non-violent approach, this has only applied to the question of armed struggle against the state. The recently formed para-military Youth Service Corps, discussed in more detail in Chapter Five of this paper, seems to be an institutionalisation of Inkatha's use of violence against political opponents. In addition, the actions of Inkatha during the 1980 schools boycott and at the University of Zululand, examined in some detail in this paper, reinforce the argument that Inkatha is more than prepared to use violence to further its aims.

Fourthly, great emphasis is placed on the youth of the movement. Since this is the main area of investigation of this paper, it is not necessary to go into this aspect in any detail here. The emphasis of the movement as a whole on discipline is translated in the Inkatha youth into a near fanatical loyalty to Buthelezi and the 'Zulu nation'.

Fifthly, Inkatha is vehemently anti-marxist. The writer was told by an Inkatha member that 'we do not accept the chaos advocated by marxism'. Buthelezi insists that Inkatha embodies the ideals of the ANC that was formed in 1912, and that the ANC has been taken over by communists. The decisive break with the ANC seems to have come after an Inkatha delegation met with ANC representatives, including Oliver Tambo, in London in 1980. In June 1980,

the ANC issued a statement condemning Buthezi for the role played by Inkatha in harrasing the children involved in the schools' boycott.<sup>29</sup> This, in conjunction with his distinct lack of enthusiastic support for the Free Mandela campaign in 1980, led the ANC to publically denounce Buthezi. Since then, Buthezi has made constant implicit and explicit attacks on the ANC. In 1980,

for example, he said that he must warn all political groupings 'inside and outside this country' that he would not stand by and watch as the suffering of his people was exploited for ideological ends.<sup>30</sup> In March 1983, following the discovery of arms caches in Uundi, Buthezi claimed that the ANC was attempting to assassinate him. He stated that the Uundi arms caches could lead to inter-ethnic conflict in South Africa, as the leadership of the ANC came from the Transkei, and asserted that the ANC wanted to provoke inter-ethnic conflict and thereby 'destroy the black liberation struggle in South Africa.'<sup>31</sup> Three days after this outburst, the Inkatha Central Committee issued a statement strongly condemning the 'growing evidence' of the intention of the ANC to 'eliminate by violent means the Inkatha movement, its physical base at Uundi and its leader, Chief Gatsha Buthezi.' The statement said that Inkatha would tell blacks in South Africa that the ANC and not the 'white racist regime', had become their oppressors.<sup>32</sup> The ANC categorically rejected the claims that it was trying to assassinate Buthezi.<sup>33</sup> The reason for the accusations made by Inkatha can be located in the denunciation of Buthezi by the ANC, which is likely to have had a detrimental effect on Buthezi's popularity and credibility, since part of Buthezi's popularity has been as a result of Inkatha portraying itself as the 'internal wing'.

Dr. Dhlomo explained the tension between the ANC and Inkatha as having four aspects: firstly, the fact that the two movements follow different strategies which frequently clash; secondly, the degree of access to the oppressed masses causes strain -

" Inkatha is an internal liberation movement in daily contact with the people; the ANC doesn't have this access. This causes tension because the ANC claims it is the sole authentic representative of black people in South Africa, but it is talking about people with whom it is not in touch... the ANC feels uncomfortable and jealous of a numerically powerful body like Inkatha. "

Thirdly, there is a lack of contact between the two. Dhlomo stated that when the ANC decides on a strategy, such as disinvestment, it does not consult with Inkatha. 'There is no planning and consolidation. Thus the ANC is bound to misinterpret Inkatha's political strategies.' Finally, Dhlomo asserted

that/.....

that the tension is one of 'political oneness', where the ANC thinks that it must be 'top dog'. Inkatha will not accept this, and 'the people of South Africa will have to choose their leaders in a free and fair election.'<sup>34</sup>

There are numerous further examples where Inkatha has attacked the ANC and accused it of engineering opposition to Inkatha. Buthelesi told the writer, for example, that he had evidence to prove that the ANC had sent funds to a South African independent trade union to be used for the express purpose of undermining Inkatha. Relations with progressive political groupings within the country are also tense.<sup>35</sup> Asked by the writer what Inkatha's position on the emergence of the UDF and National Forum (NF) was, Buthelesi said that

"Our view of the UDF and NF will be determined by the extent to which they meet the demands of liberation by co-operating with us and other organisations."<sup>36</sup>

Thus not only has Inkatha increasingly taken an anti-marxist stand, but it also expresses an unprecedented chauvinism in its approach to the liberation struggle, as a result of its fear of mass action that is not under its control and which therefore might achieve aims different to those of Inkatha. This attitude was reflected in a General Conference Resolution in 1981 which stated that "General Conference ... insists that leaders of other liberation movements and anti-apartheid groups must consult with our President before embarking on any action or programme which is expected to have mass nationwide support."

Sixthly, Inkatha 'preaches the gospel of development - for us, development equals liberation'.<sup>37</sup> In an interview published in Inlabamkhost, Mr. Nkehili stated that the aims of the Bureau for Community Development and Youth Affairs embodies 'the promotion of the development of the people based on self-help and self-reliance principles.' Implicit in the movement's corporatist approach is a fear of the development of a revolutionary class consciousness on the part of the organised working class. Its 'gospel of development', therefore, portrays workers' interests as synonymous with the attainment of economic benefits by stressing the need for conciliation and harmony between capital and labour, by denouncing the working class' political activities and the conscientisation of the working class. It therefore articulates working class ideological components in such a way as to neutralise their antagonistic potential, thereby ensuring that working class hegemony is not asserted within the movement.<sup>39</sup>

Development projects embarked upon by the KwaZulu administration, specifically in the rural areas, are part of the 'self-help' policy. The establishment of a literacy training project and the training of young Inkatha activists in basic rural development skills will have immediate benefits for communities in KwaZulu. In this sense, Inkatha is beginning to 'deliver the goods' in terms of its development programme, and will play a vital role in maintaining rural support for Inkatha.

The Buthelezi Commission Report, released in 1982, was subtitled 'The requirements for stability and development in KwaZulu/Natal.' The composition of the Commission, which represented a wide range of business interests, and the report itself reflect Inkatha's increasingly pro-capitalist economic ideology, and its accommodation of business interests. Pupils are encouraged to get 'as much education as possible' so that they can carry the struggle for liberation 'into the marketplace'; and Buthelezi stated in a speech in August 1977 that

" each occasion when a black man manages to be in a position to establish any business is an auspicious occasion, not only for himself or his family, but also for the entire community ... [striking] a blow for us in the liberation struggle now being waged by blacks. "

In addition to these traits outlined above, there is the stress laid by Inkatha on ethnicity. Whilst the movement insists that it is non-racial in approach and composition, it exhibits a notable predilection to find non-Zulu agitators behind any anti-Inkatha moves, and the movement's main support is drawn from areas where there are large concentrations of Zulu-speaking people. Constant reference is made by Inkatha to a Zulu heritage, Zulu tradition, and loyalty to a Zulu nation. It is interesting to note that the 1975 Inkatha constitution made specific reference to KwaZulu and Zulu people; this was amended in 1979 to read 'South Africa' and 'blacks'. There has thus been a conflation of Zulu speaking people and 'the people' as a whole. In interviews conducted by the writer, Inkatha members insisted that, although ethnicity had been abused by the South African state, there are real differences in cultural and historical terms. The use by Inkatha of the chiefs in KwaZulu reinforces this emphasis on 'tribalism', as do the numerous references made in speeches by Buthelezi to the time when 'the Zulu nation was independent'

At the outset of this chapter the question was posed as to whether it is possible to analyse Inkatha as a fascist movement. In terms of Laclau's two 'conditions of crisis', there is certainly a deep organic crisis in the South African social formation, and the power bloc is unable to neutralise or absorb manifestations of the people/power bloc contradiction. It is also clear that the reform initiatives of the state are a response to the impediments to capital accumulation, and thus far monopoly capital has lent its support to them. Nevertheless, it is not an impossibility that certain fractions of capital may increasingly turn to Buthelezi and Inkatha as a future political option, in a situation where black majority political representation will be a reality in a not too distant future. Monopoly capital must be able to ensure its continued hegemony within the power bloc, and Inkatha as an essentially petty-bourgeois movement, would undoubtedly serve the interests of monopoly capital. There is a well founded fear in industrial sectors that the civil war is going to escalate within the country, and that industrial unrest will increase. In Volume II of the Buthelezi Commission Report, it was stated that

" the region of KwaZulu/Natal is not likely to escape the effects of prevailing conditions in the Republic as a whole. We are particularly mindful of the fact that one Black political leader of moderate and co-operative inclinations with a wide base of legitimacy [Chief Buthelezi and Inkatha] should not have his position undermined by heightened radical mobilisation resulting from rising expectations without corresponding reform in national policies ... KwaZulu/Natal must be given the opportunity to acquire developed and decentralised powers, enabling constitutional and socio-political progress towards longer term stability to be negotiated within the region itself."<sup>40</sup>

Thus while monopoly capital may not use Inkatha to assert hegemony within the power bloc, it may well use the movement to maintain hegemony.

In terms of Laclau's second condition for the rise of fascism it is quite clear that the working class in South Africa has not abandoned the arena of popular-democratic struggle. Nevertheless, it must be recognised that the majority of workers in KwaZulu are migrants and thus more than likely unorganised. In a sense, this constitutes a flank of the working class that is susceptible to Inkatha's ideology. Two further factors must be taken into account :

firstly/.....

firstly, the relatively small proportion of South Africa's total black labour force that is organised; and secondly, the defeats that the working class has suffered in the last decade both on the factory floor and through direct state repression. Both these factors could account for working class support for Inkatha. and Buthelezi.

In conclusion, the use of a fascist theoretical framework to analyse Inkatha does go some way in explaining the contradictions of a movement which on the one hand refuses to accept Bantustan 'independence', is opposed to the apartheid government and is involved in attempts to reverse rural poverty, housing backlogs and the lack of educational and health facilities in KwaZulu, while on the other hand vehemently opposes progressive political groupings and trade unions, and uses violence against its opponents. This revolutionary/reactionary ideology and political practise is characteristic of fascist movements. In addition, the militarism of the movement, its emphasis on discipline and loyalty, its broad populist appeal and the idolisation of its leader also point to the fascist tendencies of Inkatha. Furthermore, it is interesting to note that Inkatha arose during a period of organic crisis.

Nevertheless, it is historically more accurate to characterise Inkatha's brand of populism as conservative or reactionary nationalism, exhibiting fascist characteristics. It is far beyond the scope of this paper to thoroughly investigate theories of facism, and because of this it is impossible to fully examine the possibility of Inkatha as a fascist movement. All that can be done at this stage is to point to fascist characteristics in an attempt to offer some insight into the movement. With specific reference to the youth, the attempt to examine Inkatha in the light of a fascist theoretical framework offers an explanation for Inkatha's approach to the youth, which will now be examined.

CHAPTER TWO

The Inkatha Youth Brigade was established in 1976. Constitutionally, it falls under the jurisdiction of Buthelezi, in his capacity as President of Inkatha. The definition of 'youth' is very broad : 'Those people who are accepted by the Youth population as Youth'. The role of the Youth Brigade as defined in its constitution is that it shall be the 'reserve of the movement and shall play the vanguard role of upholding and consolidating the gains of the movement.' Membership fees for those under eighteen years of age is 50c on joining and an annual subscription fee of 50c; for those over eighteen the joining fee is R3,00 and subscription fee R2,00. There is an Executive Committee of the Youth Brigade which comprises a Chairman, who also serves as Youth Brigade Secretary and is appointed by Buthelezi in consultation with the Central Committee; the Executive Secretary; the Treasurer, and five other officers who are elected at a General Conference of the Youth Brigade.

The role of the Youth Brigade Secretary, as defined in the constitution of the Brigade, is to supervise the activities of the Youth Brigade; formulate and execute plans for the activities of the youth of the movement, and

" (4) (c) shall act at all times in accordance with the directions of the President of the movement or of the Central Committee and in accordance with approved policy;

(d) shall carry out all duties of the movement as directed by the President of the movement. "1<sup>21</sup>

There is a National Youth Council, which comprises the members of the Executive Committee of the Youth Brigade, the Regional Youth Secretaries, and two members from each affiliated youth organisations. In addition to this tight structure, which effectively ensures that Buthelezi at all times controls the direction of the Brigade, the specific brief of the Women's Brigade is that it should play 'an instructive role' in the mobilisation of women and in the 'upbringing of the children towards the objectives of the movement.'

In this chapter it will be argued that the youth have been seen by Inkatha leadership as constituting a crucial sector of the population from which to draw membership and support. If Inkatha is to ensure its reproduction it must attract the youth to its ranks. Mr. <sup>MUSA</sup> Nomusa Zondi, Head of Youth Affairs,

told/.....

told the writer that

" young people today are receiving so much attention because 50% of KwaZulu's population is fifteen years old or younger. In a few years they will be in responsible positions. If they do not get attention now, they will be unable to take up these positions."<sup>2</sup> (emphasis added)

Most importantly, it must counter more radical political movements and ideologies since inherent in the chauvinism of Inkatha in its insistence that it must lead the struggle for liberation in the country; that it alone has the leadership, ideology and discipline to ensure the true path to freedom. Steve Biko spoke about Inkatha as being an organisation of 'oldies' :

" We oppose Gatsha. He dilutes the cause by operating on a government platform. Because of this I see the danger of division among blacks. But we hope to avoid a real split on the basis of the BPC's great appeal to the younger generation. Gatsha is supported by oldies, for good reason, since Gatsha protects the stability that the older persons need. But we are young. We do not look upon the solution to injustice as an expectation but a duty. Here lies the dilemma of the old : between duty and bread."<sup>3</sup> (emphasis added)

It is precisely this influence that Inkatha must counter, and in this particular instance Buthelezi did so by recalling the Zulu heritage. In a speech in 1978, he stated that there were black politicians who 'criticise us for not denying our Zulu heritage' and that

" No one ever pauses to think that we are more than any other so called 'Homeland area', have the best claim to independence and to want to regain our sovereign status which we lost after our conquest by Britain in 1879 ... It is pathetic that there are people who are black and educated such as the late Steve Biko and his acolytes were who mouth these threadbare clichés ... We will never abandon King Shaka's mission of building one big Nation here ... We can never abandon what remains of the unity he achieved in this

region/.....



region, in order to placate pseudo-podium revolutionaries that are being built up by our enemies not in the interests of the black struggle but in order to perpetuate white domination. "4

The attitude of chauvinism of Inkatha takes the form of ageism within the movement. . . Despite the Youth Brigade's stated aim of playing a 'vanguard role', it is quite clear that the direction of the movement as a whole emanates from a small group within Inkatha leadership. This is the case both for ideological positions, as well as for actions and programmes undertaken by the movement. An example of this was the establishment of the Youth Service Corps : Buthelezi proposed the idea to the Inkatha General Conference in June 1980, which subsequently adopted the idea as Inkatha policy; a few months later the Youth Brigade resolved to adopt the establishment of a Youth Service Corps, and expressed support for the programme. The programme was mentioned again at its 1981 conference. The programme itself was drawn up by Buthelezi, Dhlomo, and members of the Bureau for Community Development and Youth Affairs, and once this was done the structure and operation of the Youth Service Corps camps was outlined to the Youth Brigade conference in 1982 - five months after the programme actually got under way. The responsibility for the operation of the camps and for follow-up programmes remains with the Bureau.<sup>5</sup>

Implementation of Youth Brigade policy rests with a section of the Bureau, run by 'Professional Officers'. In addition, there is a full time National Organiser, whose task is to establish new branches and supervise the activities of the Youth Brigade as a whole. The Secretary of the Brigade is Arnold Musa Mkhise, who was appointed in October 1976, at which stage there were Youth Brigade branches in five schools, and membership of the Brigade totalled one thousand people. By 1981, according to Inkatha statistics, membership stood at 140 000 and by 1983 this figure had, according to Mr. Mafole (the National Organiser) reached some 401 000 'card carrying members'.<sup>6</sup> If these figures are correct, there was an increase of 400% in Brigade membership from 1976 to 1983, and there is an average of 500 members per branch. It would seem that these figures are somewhat inflated - the two branches the writer had contact with, for example, had no more than thirty to forty members. While these may be exceptions, they indicate that caution should be used when referring to membership statistics given by Inkatha. Nevertheless, whatever the precise figures, it seems that Youth Brigade members currently constitute one half of the total Inkatha membership. This in itself is of significance,

since/.....

since not only does it contradict de facto Biko's characterisation of the movement, but it also lends itself to a number of important questions. Firstly, what has attracted the youth to Inkatha's ranks? Secondly, is there any tension between the Youth Brigade rank and file and the Inkatha leadership? In other words, does the Youth Brigade accept without comment or question the direction given by Buthelezi? And thirdly, what is the relationship of the Youth Brigade to other youth groupings in the country?

This and subsequent chapters will attempt to answer these questions with reference to the activities in which the Youth Brigade has participated, as well as to the 'education for nationhood' programme in the schools, which is an integral part of the inculcation of Inkatha ideology in the youth. It will be argued that, far from being outdated, Biko's characterisation of the movement is supported by the 'ageism' and hierarchy within Inkatha, and that, far from playing a vanguard role, the Youth Brigade exists to carry out the directives of Inkatha leadership. In essence, Inkatha attempts to assert its ideology of a conservative, multi-strategy approach to the struggle for liberation over the youth, from whom it demands absolute loyalty.

In 1976, Inkatha resolved at its Annual General Conference to introduce the 'principles and philosophy' of the movement into KwaZulu schools, and in 1978 a circular was sent by Dhlomo to all schools, instructing them to set aside time for Youth Brigade activities. In June of that year, Dhlomo stated that his department would find out whether Youth Brigade branches had been formed in the schools, and those schools that had not done so would 'have to explain themselves convincingly to the department.' At the same time, he warned that those teachers who had refused to join Inkatha would not be allowed to continue teaching. In 1979, 'Inkatha' was introduced as a one hour per week compulsory subject at all levels of schooling, and teachers who did not comply with this regulation would be subject to disciplinary measures by the Department of Culture and Education. (Nevertheless, in the course of interviews conducted by the writer, it became clear that because of the acute shortage of teachers, those who refuse to adhere to the Inkatha syllabus are not necessarily disciplined. It was more than likely this fact which led Buthelezi to state in June 1980 that 'our teachers have failed to inculcate on our youth the right attitude to our struggle'. This comment was made during the 1980 schools' boycott.<sup>8</sup>)

The 'education for nationhood' programme was devised to fit in with the philosophy of Ubuntu-Botho, which was described by Mafole as a 'fusion of traditional African and Westminster models ... which incorporates all aspects of the

people/.....

people, including politics.<sup>9</sup> The syllabus has set content courses - 'Inkatha', History of Black Africa, African Culture, Modern Lifestyles, Environmental Studies, Religious Studies and practicals. The Inkatha section covers the history of the movement, organisational structure, the role of the 'leaders and the led', the role of the Youth Brigade, discipline and conduct of Inkatha members, and the importance of the constitution, Inkatha rallies, leadership and training. The Modern Lifestyles section deals with rural and urban life, economic development and the need for African business enterprise. Practical include singing, dancing and self-defence. In 1980, Buthelezi stated that

" The Inkatha syllabus was done by some of the best educationalists we have in Natal ... the subject is called Ubuntu-Botho. If you say Inkatha syllabus we do not object. It deals with all liberation movements - with the ANC, the PAC, with black leaders in the history of Southern Africa. It is not indoctrination in any sense. "<sup>10</sup>

Nevertheless, Inkatha is careful to point out that once the ANC and PAC had been banned, there existed a political vacuum :

" The political vacuum is ... explained to the people ... in the simplest possible terms and how that vacuum was filled : the emergence of Inkatha, how did it become the black voice, the expression of the aspirations of the people who were politically poor, and how they enrich themselves through Inkatha. "<sup>11</sup>

Given the fact that an education system is a crucial ideological apparatus through which the values and norms of the ruling class are transmitted and inculcated into the youth, it is not surprising that since the introduction of Ubuntu-Botho into the schools, there has been a dramatic rise in Youth Brigade membership. (Nevertheless, the education programme has not altogether succeeded in creating loyal supporters out of the pupils and students of KwaZulu. This will be examined in the following chapters.) Furthermore, the successful portrayal of Inkatha as the 'internal wing' of the liberation movement did much to enhance its credibility amongst black South Africans, and it is obvious that this was also an important factor in attracting the youth to its ranks.

It is Inkatha's aim to have a Youth Brigade branch in every KwaZulu school. To this end, apart from the mandatory teaching of 'Inkatha' and time allowed for Youth Brigade meetings and activities, Inkatha documents are sent to every

school/.....

school. In order to establish a branch, the National Organiser requests the district inspector to grant him time 'to talk about Inkatha to the pupils'

" If there is resistance from inspectors, then I ask a sympathetic teacher to get pupils to sign a petition and ask the headmaster to invite me to come and speak ... so I will always go to a school with a written invitation. " <sup>12</sup>

There must be a minimum of thirty members before a branch is formally constituted. It is then officially inaugurated, and members are permitted to wear the Inkatha uniform.

According to Mafole there are thirty three Youth Brigade branches in Soweto, and fifteen in the Southern Transvaal. <sup>13</sup> Inkatha has previously insisted on the existence of three Inkatha branches in the Western Cape. The writer was unable to find any evidence of these branches, however, and when questioned by the writer, a Professional Officer in the Youth Division admitted that there are

" no branches [in Cape Town as such]... there are problems with manning an office and travelling there ... but there are delegates who come from Cape Town to the annual conferences. " <sup>14</sup>

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One of the main issues with which Inkatha has had to deal with viz-á-viz the youth is the question of the armed struggle. According to Mr. Nkehli,

" The youth in Inkatha is calling for great change ... the youth is becoming more militant, and is frustrated about the narrowing of options. " <sup>15</sup>

When questioned by the writer on growing militancy within the youth, Buthelezi said that

" rising militancy is as evident in Inkatha's adult membership as it is in its Youth Brigade. " <sup>16</sup>

Nevertheless, a constant theme in Buthelezi's speeches, particularly when speaking to young people, is that the time is not yet ripe for armed struggle. At the Youth Brigade conference in 1979, for example, Buthelezi said that

" in certain quarters within our black community 'negotiation' and 'peaceful change', to which we in Inkatha are committed, have almost become

swear/.....

swear words ... even from a pragmatic point of view we cannot see how blacks can pull off violence with all the forces arrayed against them."<sup>17</sup>

Speaking at a Youth Leadership Training Course in 1978, Buthelezi told trainees that

" Even though Inkatha understands the impatience of the youth and the fact that others had no option but to choose the armed struggle, the Movement believes that constituency politics and the mobilisation of the people will bring about change ... I have a duty to warn you as our youth to be careful, and to make a distinction between real bravery and foolish bravado. We all admire and praise our brothers and sisters who have died in jail ... But we have to admit that we have achieved very little by their supreme sacrifices. "<sup>18</sup>

Buthelezi's response to the writer, when asked about the viability of a non-violent approach, was that Inkatha believes that there is 'too much glib talk' about the use of violence for political purposes in South Africa. He asserted that despite the ANC's commitment to a programme of violence for more than two decades, it has achieved less than Inkatha has in its non-violent commitments. It would seem that the Inkatha youth have been more or less convinced by the leadership that violence as a strategy against the government is not a strategy - for the moment. And this is a crucial point, for in many ways it is an approach used to mollify the youth. But it must be recognised that this non-violent approach applies only to the question of armed struggle; as will be outlined in following chapters, Inkatha uses violence against black opponents of the movement. It is also interesting to note that the recently established para-military Service Corps is for the youth of the movement, and is a further attempt by Inkatha to contain and channel the militancy of the youth in a direction which is of use to the movement.

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According to Nkehli, Inkatha is engaged in a programme of 'trust building', in which the youth plays a vital part.<sup>19</sup> At its Annual Conference in 1978, attended by some 800 delegates, the Youth Brigade resolved inter alia to 'open the lines of communication between black, coloured and indian youth'.<sup>20</sup>

This/.....

This resolution was supported by Buthelezi when he spoke at the Inkatha General Conference that year :

" I charge the youth with the task of assisting us in overcoming the divide and rule tactics of Pretoria ... the youth can play a vital role in achieving black unity ..."<sup>21</sup>

In its efforts to overcome the divide and rule tactics in terms of black-white relations, the Youth Brigade has made overtures to the Afrikaner Studente Bond (ASB), to a group of Stellenbosch students with whom it has formed the South African Youth Foundation (SAYF), and to the PFP Youth. The effort to make contact with the ASB was unsuccessful. The ASB Congress in 1981 was addressed by Mkhize, chairman of the Youth Brigade. According to Mafole, the Inkatha delegation members were treated as 'foreigners in their own land.' A number of the ASB delegates walked out during Mkhize's speech, and shortly afterwards the Congress voted against a motion calling for black participation in the President's Council.

The Youth Brigade met with more success in the establishment of the SAYF. Formed in August 1981, the aim of the foundation is to 'improve relations and co-operation between black and white youth, because the future of the country is in the hands of the young.'<sup>22</sup> The inaugural meeting was addressed by Dr.Koornhof, Minister of Co-operation and Development (whose department was at that time enjoying new found noteriety in the Western Cape over its handling of the Nyanga Bush 'squatter' crisis), Mr. Gibson Thula, Inkatha representative in Soweto, and Dr.Dhlomo. Projects undertaken by the foundation have included the appointment of white members to conduct winter school classes at the University of Zululand. The Foundation held a five day Leadership Seminar at the University of Stellenbosch in December 1981, which was attended by twenty four students from fifteen Universities in South Africa. The seminar was 'apolitical' and SAYF trustee Frans Roelofse told reporters that

" We believe the leadership seminar has made a definite contribution to the improvement of the quality of life in Southern Africa."<sup>23</sup>

(It is interesting to note that, a few months after this seminar, all NUSAS affilliated campuses were approached by the Stellenbosch SRC about the possibility of forming a 'national multi-racial cultural student organisation'. It is likely that the invitation, which was turned down by the NUSAS campuses, came from the Foundation.)

Connections have been made between the Youth Brigade and the PFP Youth,

corresponding/.....

corresponding to growing links between Inkatha and the PFP, especially over the issue of the President's Council and the referendum about the New Constitution. In 1981, for example, a joint statement was released by the leaders of the Youth Brigade, Labour Party Youth and the PFP Youth, accusing the National Party of jeopardising the future of all South Africans through its policy of racial discrimination.<sup>24</sup> The writer has not, however, researched this particular area any further.

The main thrust of these initiatives by the Youth Brigade is 'trust building', and the involvement of youth groups in joint projects. A University Exchange Programme has been initiated by the Bureau for Community Development and Youth Affairs, where West German students will live and work in rural areas in KwaZulu. It seems that the projects relate to, as Nkehli put it, 'overcoming rural poverty and backward education' in KwaZulu.<sup>25</sup> There is no indication as to the success or otherwise of these projects, and it seems as if most are in the formative stage.

The precise nature of activities undertaken by Youth Brigade branches is also unclear, and it seems to vary from branch to branch. Mafole told the writer that activities included literacy training projects, and creating 'centres' for the community. Members of the Civil Servants' Youth Brigade branch in Ulundi, formed in 1983, told the writer that they had participated in the Ndundulu Fire Disaster Relief Project, and were discussing the possibility of applying for a Welfare Organisation number in order to raise money to assist in future projects of a similar nature. The branch meets approximately once every month.<sup>26</sup> In 1983, members of the Mpumalanga, Vulindlela and Hlanganani branches held a six day camp, attended by 600 people. It was a 'work oriented' camp and the six days were spent cutting ~~Thatch~~ grass to be used in the restoration of Ondini, the site of King Cetswayo's residence.<sup>27</sup> The clearest indication of the nature of branch activities is contained in a proposed five year plan for the Youth Activation Programme, under the supervision of the Youth Division.<sup>28</sup> The plan outlines proposals for assisting youth 'to develop a sense of patriotism, discipline, responsibility and encourages the involvement of youth in the development of their country.' According to the proposal, the Youth Division of the Bureau exists

" to organise seminars, talent days, rallies, workshops and leadership training courses. . . It also serves in co-ordinating youth with other relevant youth organisations ... it advises youth groups and individuals on

matters affecting them and provides a consultation point for those seeking guidance."<sup>29</sup>

The proposals suggest that the Bureau concentrate on one of the five regions in KwaZulu each year, and that every year there is a theme. (1983 was declared the Year of King Ceteswayo by Inkatha.) The four phases envisaged by the proposals are: firstly, visiting local leaders (chiefs, izinduna, Inkatha leaders) and explaining the programme, 'identifying youth leaders', activating youth towards the establishment of Youth Brigade branches, clubs, and recreational societies, and assisting the youth in identifying their needs and interests. Phase two includes organising Youth Leadership workshops, 'activating youth in the lines of patriotism', and helping youth to decide on projects to be undertaken in their communities. The third phase consists of organising rallies in the region in which the Bureau is working, organising programmes for school vacations and supervising 'youth projects'. The final phase includes the organisation of 'talent days', Regional Parade days, helping youth leaders to make annual reports, and 'organising youth to be capable of running regional affairs on their own' and communicating with Inkatha Head Office and the Bureau. At the end of the proposal is:

" NB: This programme is based in training youth on para-military lines. "

While this outline gives a fairly clear idea of the types of activities branches participate in, it also begs a very obvious question : has the Youth Brigade in fact worked as well as Inkatha makes out? In the light of this proposed 'youth activation programme', it would seem not. Furthermore, the proposal reinforces the impression that the direction for the Youth Brigade comes from Inkatha leadership.

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There do seem to be some signs of strain between Inkatha leadership and the younger members of the movement. Masomi remarked, for example, that

" the attitude among the youth is that we are not positively aggressive enough to provoke a reaction from the powers that be ... they would say that we have been maintaining a low profile for far too long now."<sup>30</sup>

Buthelezi told the writer that

" Inkatha is responsive to the demands of the youth and youth in Inkatha is responsive to the demands of adults. There is in Inkatha



no formal clash between the Youth Brigade

and adult membership." 31

Nevertheless, Mafole asserted that

" the youth will push the movement to the left,

and the leadership will have to respond

favourably. " 32 (emphasis added)

Dhlomo agreed with this, remarking that

" the youth are pushing the leadership - we

accept the militancy of the youth as a nat-

ural fact... It is difficult to say how far

the leadership is willing to be pushed. " 33

Nevertheless, he did not foresee a situation arising where there was serious

tension between the Youth Brigade and Inkatha leadership, except on the question

of 'crossing the border'. (In 1978, however, three members of the Youth

Brigade were expelled by the Inkatha Central Committee for advocating a more

black consciousness oriented political line.) It is interesting to note the

differences in responses as outlined above, with Mafole emphatic that the

Youth Brigade will force the movement in a more radical political direction.

In the light of the hierarchy and tight control exercised by the leadership

over the Youth Brigade, however, this does not seem likely. Furthermore,

during the interview with Mafole, he dismissed the Freedom Charter as 'an

irrelevant document' and expressed the chauvinism of the movement's approach

to the struggle for liberation. In addition, relations between the Youth

Brigade and progressive student organisations such as COSAS and AZASO are

tense, to say the least. Buthelezi told the writer that

" AZASO and COSAS claim to serve the same objectives

as the Youth Brigade and differences between them

are primarily differences of strategy and tactics.

Inkatha youth talk less and do more... COSAS and

AZASO are both in their own way resuscitations of

the strategies and tactics of SASO with perhaps a

more overt linkage to the ANC's mission in exile...

AZASO and COSAS suffer from the same terrible

deficiency of not having a viable mass movement...

They are as a home base from which to operate. They are

therefore not rooted in the will of the people. " 34

As will be discussed in the following chapters, this attitude of Inkatha

to COSAS and AZASO has led to violent conflict between AZASO and the Youth

Brigade in particular.

This chapter has attempted to sketch the nature of the Youth Brigade. It is argued that essentially Inkatha is rigidly hierarchical and 'ageist', and that the movement attempts to assert its conservative ideology over the youth. It does this through direct intervention in the KwaZulu school syllabus, and by demanding that teachers give time to Youth Brigade activities, which on the whole seem to consist of rallies and camps. At the same time, however, concerted efforts are being made by Inkatha to actively involve the youth in community programmes, but again, the direction for this comes from the Inkatha leadership.

An aspect of the Youth Brigade that has only been briefly discussed is that of the militarism of the Brigade. Most of it is self-evident: the hierarchy of the movement, the emphasis on discipline, patriotism to a Zulu nation, loyalty to Inkatha, the wearing of uniforms. There is also the idolisation of Buthelezi as outlined in the first chapter, which is particularly marked in the youth of the movement. There is also the increasing emphasis on a para-military approach to the youth, the most overt manifestation of which has been the establishment of the Youth Service Corps.

Nevertheless, the movement has not been entirely successful in its attempt to convert all KwaZulu pupils and students to its cause. This is the subject of discussion for the following two chapters.

CHAPTER THREE

As has been outlined above, the youth has been isolated by Inkatha leadership as a crucial group from which to draw membership and support, and it is thus vital for the movement to counter the more radical and politicised tendencies that have emerged amongst the youth, particularly those in the urban areas. This chapter will therefore examine the role played by Inkatha in the 1980 schools' boycott in the context of attempts by Inkatha to assert its discipline over pupils in KwaMashu and Umlazi, the two KwaZulu towns that were affected by the boycott. It will be argued that Inkatha did everything within its power to undermine the boycott and to place the blame for it on various 'instigators' - anything but recognise the legitimacy of the pupils' protest. The participation of KwaZulu pupils in the schools' boycott signified a serious flaw in the 'education for nationhood' programme, and Inkatha's response to the boycott reflected the movement's fear of mass action outside its sphere of control.

Before discussing the boycott, there is a brief investigation of student activity in <sup>KwaZulu</sup> schools in the years immediately prior to 1980, which contextualises Inkatha's attitude towards and actions against the boycotting pupils in 1980.

In 1980 only thirty six of KwaZulu's two thousand schools were affected by the boycott, and these were mainly schools in KwaMashu, which is a large township near Durban. Nevertheless, this relatively low participation cannot be attributed to a KwaZulu - and thereby Inkatha - education, since the 1976 nationwide unrest did not affect Natal schools at all. This earned the praise of the regional director of Bantu Education in Natal, who commended the co-operation of teachers, parents, school boards and pupils in Natal 'during the riots'.<sup>1</sup> It was a widely held belief in Natal that it was due to Inkatha's influence that Natal escaped large scale civil disturbances in 1976/77, and that residents in the townships of KwaMashu and Umlazi were reluctant to damage or destroy buildings and facilities that belonged to and were administered by them. This was also the official opinion: Mr. S. Bourquin, chief director of the Port Natal Bantu Affairs Administration Board, presented in the press as 'a man who knows the Zulu people intimately', stated that it was his

" firm belief that Inkatha has had a restraining influence on the Zulu people during the past year of unrest in our country. " <sup>2</sup>

Inkatha itself took credit for the relative peace in Natal. Addressing the

Inkatha/.....

Inkatha Youth Brigade at Mahlabatini in July 1977, Buthelezi said that he would be

" failing in my duty if I did not take this opportunity to thank the youth for managing to maintain a balance, despite the political traumas of 1976 and 1977. I am proud of your commitment to the struggle for liberation ... the fact that you did not resort to acts of arson ... does not mean that you did not identify with our brothers and sisters in the struggle ... I know just what kind of pressures you were subjected to in attempts to persuade you to indulge in acts of violence ... I know how some fire-eaters amongst our loquacious self-acclaimed revolutionaries denigrate you. " <sup>3</sup>

It would thus seem that there was, in fact, an increase in the level of political consciousness of pupils in KwaMashu and Umlazi in the period from 1976 to 1980, because it is quite clear that Inkatha failed not only to successfully assert its 'restraining influence' over the schoolchildren in 1980, but that the attitude of supposed reluctance towards destruction of buildings and property changed radically. It is difficult to attribute this more radical political consciousness to any one particular factor, although an important influence was the arrival in 1977 of pupils from Soweto, sent by their parents to KwaZulu schools following the 1976 uprising. In addition, the formation of COSAS in 1979, the emergence of progressive community based organisations and the launching of the 'Free Mandela' campaign in 1980 are other possible contributory factors.

From mid-1977 there were a number of incidents where students protested against various school regulations. In August of that year, for example, two schools - one at Empangeni and the other in Inanda - were closed after teachers walked out in protest against pupil unrest. The pupils were forced to apply for readmission.<sup>4</sup> In June 1978, pupils protested at at least three KwaZulu schools, which culminated in the death of one teacher and severe injury to a second at St. Augustine's school near Nqutu.<sup>5</sup> Shortly thereafter, Soweto pupils at a nearby high school were assaulted and threatened with death by KwaZulu pupils. This vicious turn of events can be traced to a single factor - the insistence by the KwaZulu administration that all the unrest taking place in the schools, minor as it was, was the work of 'troublemakers' from other areas, and that the pupils' grievances were not valid in themselves. Rumours were sweeping the Natal schools to the effect that the province was going to be 'set alight' by Soweto pupils. The principal of one of the affected schools/.....

schools stated that the protest had started following a letter sent to the pupils by the SSRC, and Buthelezi told reporters that he

" was aware that people from Kingwilliams Town and Soweto are actively working in KwaZulu schools.

I am also aware that they are denigrating me to the students, whom they are trying to incite to violence." <sup>6</sup>

The fact that when the principal made the accusation against the SSRC it had been banned for over ten months and that most of its members were either on trial for sedition or in exile, seems to have escaped him; similarly when Buthelezi commented to reporters on the supposed presence of BPC members in the 'trouble spot'schools, the BPC had already been banned in the October 1977 state crack-down.

The tirade against Soweto pupils and the BPC reached its height in mid-1978. In May of that year, Dr. Oscar Dhlomo announced in the KLA that any teachers who remained outside the ambit of Inkatha would be suspect and might not be

" entrusted with the future of our children ... we do need teachers but certainly not the type who seemingly do not appreciate the fact that the nation is involved in a liberation struggle... those teachers, who are known to the department, who refuse to join Inkatha and who ridicule it and its leaders in front of their pupils will not be entrusted to continue teaching." <sup>7</sup>

The motivation for this statement was reflected in a speech by Mr.W. Sabelo, KLA member for Umlazi, who told the house that students and pupils at four unregistered private schools in African towns near Durban were planning to create disturbances on June 16. He stated that many of the students were from Soweto and that the teachers were members of SASO and the BPC.

Dr. Dhlomo then announced that a 'riot deposit' would have to be paid by the parents of all pupils at KwaZulu schools.

" We have heard Soweto pupils want to see unrest in Natal on the anniversary of June 16 ... if children know their parents have paid this, they will be less likely to take part in violence." <sup>9</sup>

In addition, there were constant appeals to the Inkatha Youth Brigade to oppose the 'destructive activities' that could lead to student disturbances in Natal.

It must be realised that these statements and accusations were being made against a background of constant assurances by the KwaZulu administration that Soweto students were welcome in KwaZulu schools. This points to a trend which is clearly discernible in Inkatha's overall strategy - while on the one hand the movement expressed ideals of non-violence and extended a warm welcome to Soweto students, on the other hand it consistently accused Soweto students of engineering the unrest in the schools and exhorted the Youth Brigade to oppose this. It should therefore have come as no surprise when KwaZulu students attacked pupils from Soweto in the incident mentioned above. There are numerous other examples of a similar nature, some of which will be mentioned in this paper, which substantiate the argument that, far from advancing an ideal of non-violence, Inkatha has -albeit subtly - actively encouraged the use of violence to further its own ends.

From the incidents in the schools in 1977/78 it is possible to discern Inkatha's approach to school unrest. Firstly, there is the movement's implacable refusal to accord any legitimacy to the pupils' grievances, and secondly, Inkatha's insistence on placing the blame for the unrest on 'agitators' - in the examples outlined above, on pupils from Soweto and members of SASO and the BPC. Some of the more obvious inconsistencies in these accusations have been pointed to above, and in a column in The Voice it was in a tone of incredulity that the columnist remarked on Buthelezi's assertion that Transvaal students were in Natal specifically to incite violence on June 16 1978:

"Can you really imagine this happening? Not when

the might of the Zulus in the Transvaal is con-

tinually being put on display. How could they

possibly lose control in Natal - their traditional

stronghold. Students are not that stupid to

engage in a suicidal exercise ..."

He argued further that the demands being articulated by the pupils in Natal were completely dissimilar from the demands of the pupils of Soweto in 1976/77.

A further incident of unrest, this time culminating in a violent confrontation between pupils and riot police which resulted in a 16 year old pupil being shot dead and four others seriously injured, illustrates the third dimension in Inkatha's approach to school unrest. In February 1979, pupils at the Kwamakhuta High School near Amamzitortl boycotted classes, and the police were called in by school officials. Following the violent confrontation with the police, Dr. Dhlomo ordered the closure of the school and announced that pupils would have to apply for readmission. This tried and tested tactic is well

known as a means of isolating and refusing admission to 'troublemakers', and as has been seen had already been used by KwaZulu on at least two previous occasions. What is important about this particular incident, however, was the reaction of the KwaZulu administration to the destruction of school property. Dhlomo made it quite clear that his department would not tolerate 'lawlessness and vandalism', and had no sympathy whatsoever with

" These children who are roaming the streets and destroying government property ... Destroying school property and engaging in disgraceful behaviour is not the way to register dissatisfaction ... nobody but the enemies of progress will benefit from this unruly behaviour. " <sup>11</sup>

The inference here is quite clear : buildings and facilities are 'untouchables'. Those who go against this are enemies of the struggle for liberation, and Inkatha would treat these people as such.

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KwaMashu pupils joined in the nationwide schools' boycott on 30 April 1980. Initially pupils from Mzuvele High boycotted, in sympathy with the 'coloured' and 'indian' protests against unequal education. <sup>12</sup> By the following day five schools in the township were participating in the boycott. During the first two days of the boycott in KwaMashu, pupils were teargassed by riot police who attempted to disperse the pupils as they marched from school to school. <sup>13</sup> On the third day of the boycott vehicles were stoned and windows smashed at some schools, and the situation in the township was described as 'very tense'. The following day approximately twenty two students were arrested and an unknown number injured when a squad of riot police broke up a protest meeting being held by students in the sports stadium. <sup>14</sup> By mid-May the boycott had spread to all KwaMashu schools, as well as to schools in Umlazi, and at a meeting of approximately 1 000 parents on May 12, a Parents Committee was formed. The parents condemned Bantu Education and expressed their support for the boycotting pupils. At the meeting the main grievances of the pupils were described as the lack of qualified teachers, overcrowded conditions, poor sporting and other facilities, and the enforcement of the rule that pupils had to wear school uniforms. <sup>15</sup> It could thus be surmised that there was substantial support in the township for the boycott.

It is not the intention of this chapter to detail the organisation of the boycotting pupils, or to give a precise chronology of events during the boycott.

Rather/.....

Rather, it is in the context of a total boycott of schools in KwaMashu and Umlazi and violent confrontation between the pupils and police that Inkatha's response during this period must be examined. It seems clear that - initially at least - the KwaZulu administration seemed confident that it could prevent the boycott from spreading and persuade the pupils to return to school. As it became obvious that KwaZulu and Inkatha had lost control of the situation, so their attitude and response grew more hostile, their accusations more vitriolic, and finally a situation of open conflict between Inkatha and the boycotting pupils arose.

In early May Buthelezi identified Inkatha with the grievances of 'coloured' school boycotters, but urged black pupils to discipline themselves and stay at school. Speaking in the KLA, Buthelezi said that

" that kind of indiscipline is exactly what will allow us to fall into the hands of 'trigger happy' types who will use us as cannon fodder. "

Nevertheless, he remained confident that, because of the discipline which Inkatha maintains, people who were trying to use the current situation in South Africa to 'ignite similar unrest in KwaZulu' would not succeed.

" No organisation in South Africa has the machinery which Inkatha has to inculcate discipline and patriotism. " <sup>16</sup>

By mid-May this complacent attitude changed somewhat when Buthelezi threatened to adjourn the KLA so that Inkatha could deal with people who were 'organising and agitating' among school children in KwaMashu. He asserted that the unrest in the township was being orchestrated by certain people in Reservoir Hills <sup>17</sup>, the University of Durban-Westville, and the Medical School. He said that he wished to warn these

" pundits that if they are trying to throw down the gauntlet to Inkatha we will pick it up. " <sup>18</sup>

It is interesting to note that these pronouncements were made on the same day that the Parents' Committee was formed.

Speaking during the debate in the KLA on the boycott, Buthelezi warned that

" Behind the facade of politeness and courtesy which the Zulu possesses there is such anger that does not exist in any other group in South Africa. They [~~elitist~~ groups trying to manipulate the children] must not try to provoke us ... "

Referring to an incident the previous week when pupils destroyed property at the John Dube High School, which had been funded by a loan to the KwaZulu administration

from/.....



from the Urban Foundation, he said that he 'choked with anger' when he thought of the sacrifices that the ordinary black men and women contribute to the education of their children. Speaking to a resolution on the boycott, Dr. Dhlomo said that

" We are not prepared to be led by children. We do not believe that children have the intellect to devise strategies under which the black man is to be liberated ... Our foolish children, who are being used by instigators, are breaking down the very structures which their parents have sweated to put up. "

Speaking in the same debate, Dr. Madide, the Minister for the Interior and Health, issued a warning to those 'responsible' for the disturbances, and said that those people should know that Inkatha had seen through their smokescreen. He said that Inkatha would 'come and get them'.

But the highlight of the debate was not the threat of violence against the instigators. It came when Mr. S. Sithebe, a member of the KLA, named three black Xhosa speaking lawyers - Mr. G. Mxenge, Mr. J. Poswa, and Mr. L. Skweyiya - as being amongst those responsible for orchestrating the boycott in KwaMashu. At the same time, Buthelezi also said that 'foreign representatives' were responsible for engineering the boycott.<sup>19</sup>

Despite the ensuing furore over the accusations, which included denials of any involvement by all the foreign embassies and incredulity that such accusations could have been made<sup>20</sup>, the KLA refused to withdraw the allegations. In a statement released by the Democratic Lawyers Association and thirty one Durban based lawyers, the accusations made in the KLA were labelled as 'purile, scurrilous, unwarranted and irresponsible'.

" We accept the denials by the lawyers who were specifically singled out, and we deplore the fact that these attacks were made from the apparent safety of a forum created for the purpose of dividing African people along ethnic and tribal lines ... It is no time for a sterile exercise in tribalism and for a searching for scapegoats by people who are in no position to provide the solution. We deplore the accusations that certain members of the legal profession deliberately incite

schoolchildren'.....

schoolchildren to commit offences so as to benefit financially from defending children. " 21

The day after these allegations were made, KLA and other Inkatha members helped

distribute some 15 000 pamphlets in Kwamashu, Umlazi and Clermont. The pamphlets

called on pupils to stop the boycott. 22 The boycott continued, however, and

hundreds of riot police patrolled the streets of Kwamashu. On 14 May, the

Kwazulu administration announced that it would expel all pupils who were not

back in class by the beginning of the following week, and Inkatha announced

that it would be holding a rally in Kwamashu on Sunday 18 May. All parents

and pupils were invited to the rally to discuss the boycott. 23

On the Saturday preceding the rally, riot police were called in after Kwazulu

officials had failed to disperse a meeting of approximately eight hundred

pupils, who had gathered in the township cinema to discuss the boycott and

the rally. 24 The rally itself was a showpiece of Inkatha planning. Held

in the Kwamashu sports stadium, an estimated 10 000 people attended, and were

told by Buthelezi that

" Every black child who perseveres through school

into high school has before him a chance of

leading a liberation battle in the market place

and in the factories ..

Evil political forces think that they can attack

Inkatha by mobilising children. There is a

total onslaught against Inkatha .. Inkatha knows

who the political riff-raff are who try to throw

down the gauntlet to the movement .. We will

drive them out of our midst and if they are not

careful they might find that they run risks, one

of which may be having their skulls cracked as

none of us can predict what form the anger they

raise takes ... " 25 (emphasis added)

In the course of the day, a Kwamashu minister, Rev. W. B. Mbambo, was severely

injured after being attacked by a two hundred man strong impi for allegedly

being one of those behind the school boycott; a Kwamashu councillor, Mrs. A. Mguni,

ran the gauntlet of a crowd of angry Inkatha Women's Brigade members who

claimed that she too was behind the boycott; and riot squad police intervened

when an Inkatha impi, armed with knobkerries, spears and knives marched out of

the stadium towards a group of about five hundred pupils who had been meeting

in a nearby hall. 26 The pupils at this meeting had earlier elected two

representatives to go and talk to Buthelezi in the stadium, but had refused to

enter the stadium for fear of being attacked, and were thus escorted by police to the entrance of the stadium. There, however, they were told by the Minister of Justice, Mr. C. J. Mchethwa that it was contrary to Zulu custom for youngsters to approach their elders in such a way, and they were refused a meeting.<sup>27</sup> In a separate incident on the same day, police opened fire into a group of approximately three hundred pupils, killing one scholar, and severely wounding another. Three policemen were injured.<sup>28</sup>

In a speech made some two years later in Kwamashu, Buthelezi stated that no violence was ever used by anyone against school children during the 1980 boycott. He said that it was a 'malicious fabrication' that Zulu Impis had marched on students, and that 'that blatant lie' was picked up by a certain newspaper in Durban.<sup>29</sup> Nevertheless, pupils involved in the boycott maintained that they had been attacked by an impi, and it seems highly unlikely that a reputable commercial newspaper would concoct a front page story on the riot squad intervening in the attack.

The day after the rally, Umhlati residents attacked a truckload of pupils from Kwamashu who were in the township to talk to pupils about organising a protest meeting over the shooting of the two youths the previous day. Several students were injured in the attack. Thus, once again, there are documented instances where violence has been directly provoked - indeed encouraged - by Inkatha. It is no mere coincidence that, during and following a massive Inkatha rally where Dhlomo called the boycotters 'the real enemy', and Buthelezi talked explicitly about the 'total onslaught' against Inkatha, that Inkatha impis and supporters were directly involved in assaulting 'enemies' who had been identified - some of them by name - by the movement.

By 28 May, despite threats of expulsion, attendance in the schools was still very low. At Mzuvele High School, for example, where the boycott had started, only three hundred out of a total of one thousand three hundred were present; and at Isibonela, only two hundred pupils out of nine hundred and forty were attending classes.<sup>30</sup> The following day there were reports in the newspapers stating that eleven schoolchildren had been 'persuaded' to go to Uundi, after being approached by Inkatha supporters while holding a meeting in Kwamashu. The pupils were being held at the Inkatha offices in Uundi, and were due to appear before the KLA.<sup>31</sup> That evening, it was reported that the children had been handed over to police to be 'spoken to'.<sup>32</sup> On 8 June, a Durban Judge ordered urgent service of documents on Buthelezi and three members of Inkatha after a Kwamashu school boy and two other Kwamashu residents sought an urgent court order preventing the respondents from

assaulting or threatening to assault them, or inciting others to assault them. <sup>33</sup>

The three applicants in the case were Themba Mbatha, a scholar at Mzuvele High; Mr.B.S.Ngobese, a member of the KwaMashu Civic and Ratepayers Association; and Ms.S.Kubheka, a typist and resident in KwaMashu. The respondents were Buthelezi; Mr.G.E.Bengu, Inkatha regional chairman for KwaMashu and KwaMashu's representative in the KLA; Rev.C.H.Mngadi, Inkatha regional secretary in KwaMashu; and Mr.S.S.Logungolo-Mtolo, chairman of the KwaMashu Council and an Inkatha member. A fairly detailed discussion of the case presented by the applicants is worthwhile, for not only was it the first time that Inkatha's activities had been challenged in Court, but it also brought to light the violent role Inkatha had been playing in KwaMashu.

In his affidavit to the Court, Mbatha stated that on the night of 28 May, he was asleep at his home when he was woken up and ordered to accompany a group of about ten men armed with sticks, sjamboks and knobkieries. These men threatened to assault his mother when she asked them when Mbatha would be released, and the family was under the impression that the men were plainclothes policemen. The men also demanded that Mbatha's sister accompany them, and they were taken to the garage of Mr.Bengu, where they were told they would be interrogated. They were then handcuffed and put into a combi, under guard, and driven to the 'C section' offices in KwaMashu, where they were taken into the hall and marched onto the stage. It was at this point that Mbatha noticed the other applicants, who had also been detained.

" All the while I was terrified and apprehensive that some harm was to be inflicted on us, more especially as it seemed that the mob was aggressive and kept making remarks to the effect that they were going to teach us (i.e.my companions and I) the lesson of our lives." <sup>34</sup>

During the course of the evening, groups of men kept entering and leaving the hall and a number of children were 'frog marched' in, under guard. At one stage Rev.Mngadi and Councillor Mkhize came into the hall, and according to Mbatha appeared to be in charge. Mbatha was refused permission to talk to Mngadi.

At approximately four o'clock in the morning, the children were loaded into a combi, some of them still handcuffed, and were under the impression that they were being taken to the Veralum police station, where they would be detained.

They/.....

They were then told that they were being taken to Ulundi. They arrived in Ulundi shortly before eight o'clock and were taken to the Inkatha offices, and then to the KLA where they were made to sit in the public gallery immediately behind Buthelezi.

" A meeting was in progress and members of the KLA were all present. I then saw Councillor Mkhize speak to the congregated Assembly. He stated that the inciters to the riot had been apprehended. Upon hearing this the Assembly burst out in shouts. I and my companions feared for our lives thinking that we were going to be summarily dealt with by members of the Assembly." <sup>35</sup>

Following further comments by Mkhize and Buthelezi, the Chief Minister announced that the pupils would be handed over to the KwaZulu police. Later that afternoon they were taken back to KwaMashu, but when they arrived they were taken to an Inkatha meeting, and not to their homes. At this stage they were still under guard.

" The meeting then progressed and we were all made to give our names and addresses and the schools which we attended. Various members at this meeting spoke out accusing us of being agitators ... thereafter each speaker who took the floor stated that we were chasing children out of schools. Threats were then made that our houses would be burnt down and that we would be taken and beaten to death. " <sup>36</sup>

They were finally released just before midnight.

Mbatha then went on to state that since their release, they had been reliably informed that on 1 June an Inkatha meeting at Umzuvele resolved to round up the children behind the boycott and take them to the police. This meeting was chaired by the fourth respondent. Mbatha also drew the Court's attention to the fact that there had been violent incidents in KwaMashu where houses had been attacked, and that Inkatha vigilantes were roaming the streets of KwaMashu at night and attacking people.

" My family as well as my close associates and intimate friends are living in fear of our lives and realise that the police are impotent to act in the present situation more especially in that we suspect that the Inkatha movement exercises tremendous influence in police channels ... " <sup>37</sup>

Mbatha stated that he believed that Inkatha was intent on stamping out 'all forms of opposition and other democratic forms of expression where these are in opposition to the Inkatha movement', and that the movement was determined to cause him grievous bodily harm - 'even if this means disposing of us permanently.'

Mr. Ngobese testified that he had been the chairman of the Local Residents Association of 'G' Section, KwaMashu, for seventeen years, but that in 1980 following an announcement by the Ward Councillor that only Inkatha members could be elected as a Resident chairman, decided not to stand for re-election. Following this, he was threatened with violence by Rev. Mngadi, and on 3 June that year his house was extensively damaged by a group of armed men. He stated that Inkatha was intent on using violence against those prominent members of the public who were opposed to the movement :

" As I am regarded as a prominent member of the public in KwaMashu and am not a member of the Inkatha movement I fear and verily believe that members of this movement will assault and injure me. " 38

Sinbongile Kubheka described attacks on her family by Inkatha members, pointed out that she was not a student and that, far from being an instigator of the boycott, believed that the boycott emanated from the students themselves, who were dissatisfied with the educational system. She stated that she feared that

" members of Inkatha will further incite one another against myself and other young people as well as the other applicants herein, who have already been accused of being instigators of the boycott ... At present members of Inkatha, including some of the respondents herein have formed vigilante groups which are patrolling the streets in KwaMashu ... these people conduct themselves as though they are the law unto themselves." 39

Kubheka can not be accused of exaggeration in this regard; in addition to the evidence of assaults and attacks on homes of anti-Inkatha people, contained in the various affidavits, a week before the appeal was brought before the Supreme Court, and two days before the alleged attack on Mr. Bengu's home<sup>40</sup>, Buthelezi himself called for the creation of black vigilants groups to 'protect buildings', and said that these vigilantes should 'shoot to kill' if they found anybody/.....

what emerged from the affidavits submitted to the Court, was that a situation of open conflict had developed between Inkatha and Kwamashu residents opposed to the movement, and that this conflict had extended beyond the boycotting pupils to include parents and sympathisers. Mr. S. Baqwa, for example, told the Court that on 4 June he was woken by a neighbour at approximately eleven o'clock at night. The neighbour told him that he had been approached by certain students who wanted sleeping accommodation as they could not sleep at their homes for fear of being assaulted by Inkatha members. He was apprehensive, since he felt that, should he give shelter to the pupils, he would also be assaulted. The following day, Mr. Baqwa was one of a group of concerned residents who approached the Kwamashu police and spoke to the Station Commander to appeal to him to exert more pressure on the perpetrators of the violence in an attempt to put a stop to their actions. That evening, on his way home, Mr. Baqwa was set upon by a group of Inkatha men armed with knobkerries and assegais. He said that he believed that the attack had occurred because

" I have allied myself with efforts to afford protection to individuals threatened by Inkatha." 42

A Durban attorney, Aubrey Nyembezi, who was also amongst those who approached the police, told reporters that

" The violence has reached epidemic proportions. There are crowds of people hunting in vigilance groups. Several children are sleeping out in the veld because they are scared they will be caught at their homes and beaten up." 43

Bengu, the Kwamashu Inkatha chairman, responded by blaming ANC inspired youths and adults for attacks on the homes of Inkatha members. He said that Inkatha supporters were providing protection for pupils who wanted to attend school without being intimidated, and he stressed that this was at the wish of parents of children in Kwamashu.

After hearing the affidavits of the respondents, Mr. Justice Howard granted an interim interdict in favour of the applicants. 44

In his Presidential address to the Inkatha General Conference in June 1980, Buthelezi summed up Inkatha's view of the schools' boycott when he stated that " those who are committed to improving black education

must necessarily work hand in hand with those who are persuing other liberation objectives. While we must not despise our own black people as unfit to be caught up in our struggle, those who destroy school buildings defile their parents and their elders with their dirty hands. In our pernicious system, our buildings in which we learn - inadequate as they are - are a labour of love by the people. I can see no good coming of the disrespect which is shown to that labour when there is wanton destruction. There is something spiritually sick about the way in which school protests have been conducted ... " <sup>45</sup>

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This chapter has attempted to illustrate, with reference to events in May/June 1980 in KwaMashu and Umlazi, Inkatha's approach to the youth who fail to accept the movement's political strategies or submit themselves to the movement's discipline. It is quite clear that Inkatha played an exceedingly destructive role during the boycott. The strategy the movement used in attempting to break the boycott was threefold. Firstly, it attempted to alienate the boycotting pupils from their parents and broader community by accusing them of wantonly destroying facilities that their parents had 'sweated' to provide. Secondly, it undermined the legitimacy of the pupils' protests by accusing 'manipulators' and 'agitators' of engineering the boycott, and thirdly, it used outright violence against the boycotters and sympathisers in an attempt to intimidate them. In terms of the second part of the strategy, it is interesting to note who the 'agitators' were presented as : in addition to the three lawyers, foreign representatives, various KwaMashu residents and 'ANC inspired' youths and adults, Buthelezi alleged that an 'identified white man' had been paying KwaMashu schoolchildren R10 a day each for continuing the boycott, but refused to elaborate on who the man was; he accused the Sunday Times of playing a divisive and unconstructive role in black politics; and he said that the police (both SAP and Special Branch) were guilty of tacitly supporting children, who were 'causing chaos in KwaMashu', by refusing to act against them. <sup>46</sup> The majority of these accusations were made in the KLA, thus protecting the speakers from any prosecution for libel.

The movement displayed little - if any - sympathy for the pupils, or understanding of the reasons for the boycott. Instead, the boycott was taken as a political attack on Inkatha, inspired by anti-Inkatha supporters, which



included Xhosa speaking people (thus attempting to categorise the conflict as a 'tribal' one), and ANC inspired agitators (thus attempting to discredit the ANC in favour of Inkatha).

Nevertheless, in his presidential speech to the movement in June 1980, Buthelezi made what seems to be an acknowledgement that, in the light of the continuing boycotts, the education for nationhood programme had not achieved what Inkatha had hoped it would :

" It is quite clear to me that our teachers have failed to inculcate in our youth the right attitude to our struggle. They have failed to elicit from the youth that sense of commitment which adds to our total strength in unity ...

Every school inspector must become increasingly involved in bringing the message of Inkatha to the people ... school inspectors should forge links in the chains which bind pupils, teachers, parents and authority into a task force for liberation.

Our communities must produce more viable parent/teacher associations. Our branches have failed to tackle this most important aspect of liberation ...

In the matter of education we are failing. " <sup>47</sup> (emphasis added)

The role of formally constituted Youth Brigade branches in the schools remains unclear. At its annual conference in Ulundi in September 1980, the Youth Brigade condemned the 'recent spate of boycotts' in KwaZulu schools, and called upon members to stand together in the event of any further boycotts. <sup>48</sup>

Nevertheless, it is a telling fact that at the height of the boycott, it was one hundred percent effective. The question as to where Youth Brigade members were at this time remains unanswered; to say that they stayed away from school because they were intimidated by other pupils seems to be an answer that is far too glib. Some ten thousand people attended the Inkatha rally that was held in KwaMashu in the May, and while not all of these people were from KwaMashu, it is clear that there was a significant amount of support for the movement in the township. Furthermore, Inkatha maintains that the Youth Brigade branches are well organised and disciplined; in this context the boycotting pupils would have been extremely foolish to attempt to intimidate Youth Brigade members and thereby incur the full wrath of the movement. Conversely, Youth Brigade members, with that amount of support behind them, should not have been scared of staying at school. It seems likely, therefore, that Youth Brigade members participated in and supported - or at least sympathised - with the boycott, and that this came as a shock to Inkatha leadership.

The main incidents of violence were perpetrated by ordinary Inkatha members, not school members and the violence against the boycotters only manifested itself once it became clear that the boycott was succeeding. It may be that Youth Brigade members were the first pupils to return to the schools - in the light of threats of expulsion and the reaction of the Inkatha leadership to the boycott, this seems very likely. Nevertheless, it does seem as if, at the height of the boycott, the discipline and loyalty of Youth Brigade members wavered. It was this fact, and the failure of Inkatha to break the boycott - which was still in force in August 1980 - that prompted the formation of the para-military Youth Service Corps, a development which will be expanded on in Chapter Five.

## CHAPTER FOUR

The University of Zululand, popularly referred to as Ngoye, has a long history of conflict and confrontation with Inkatha and the KwaZulu administration. There is no doubt that this has been a thorn in Inkatha's flesh, for the students at Ngoye constitute a vital group from which future civil servants and professionals can be drawn into the movement. A useful analogy to this situation would be if students at the Universities of Pretoria or Stellenbosch consistently protested against, condemned and challenged the National Party and the Broederbond. Overwhelming support from Ngoye students for Inkatha and Buthelezi's leadership would undoubtedly be a strength to the movement and an important arena where Inkatha strategy could be discussed and improved on. Buthelezi, speaking at Ngoye in May 1976, recognised this - albeit somewhat euphemistically - when he stated that

" Democratic opposition has of necessity to challenge an existing way of life, an existing direction in social, economic and political developments with a demand for a better way of life and a new social direction. It is quite clear that where a nation controls its own university education, its universities should spearhead the various developments mentioned here, and do a major job in the orientation of university graduates for their role in the development of themselves and their people. " 1

In addition, an 'Inkatha campus' could play an important ideological role in the national student movement as a whole, giving an Inkatha 'line' and input and thereby potentially influencing students from other campuses as part of the attempt to attract support for Inkatha among youth all over the country.

The failure of Inkatha to win support at Ngoye is indicative of its failure to attract the more politicised youth in general and to have a restraining influence on more radical political groupings. This failure occurred as much with SASO supporters in 1975 and 1976 as with AZASO supporters today. The criticisms the students make against Inkatha are many, but the one in particular which evokes nothing short of fury in Inkatha leadership circles is the accusation that Buthelezi is working within the system and has sold out on the black peoples' aspirations for freedom and liberation in South Africa.

An examination of relations between Inkatha and Ngoye students over the last seven years shows the ways in which Inkatha has tried to win support at Ngoye, and the students' responses to these initiatives, and illustrates Inkatha's strategy toward  
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the youth. Most importantly, the position that the students now hold vis-a-vis Inkatha encapsulates in large part the criticisms which are voiced in general against the movement, Buthelezi and the KwaZulu administration. Their refusal to accept Inkatha as the legitimate liberation movement in South Africa, or at least as the movement representing the interests of the Zulu speaking people, is a stand which not only defies Inkatha in its own territory, but which also refuses to accept tribalism and hierarchical organisation. This 'dissension in the ranks' has caused extreme anger in Inkatha, and the events at Ngoye campus in October 1983 illustrate very clearly the lengths to which Inkatha is prepared to go in its attempt to establish political hegemony on the campus.

This chapter will thus be an investigation of relations between Inkatha and the Ngoye student body since 1976. It is not an exhaustive study, but attempts to describe various events over the years which illustrate the nature of these relations. The main focus of the chapter will be the events leading up to the violence in October 1983, since they highlight in many ways the fascist nature of Inkatha as described in Chapter 1, as well as the growing split between Inkatha and progressive political organisations in South Africa. Furthermore, it shows the interplay of a branch of the Youth Brigade with groups which are antagonistic to Inkatha.

In May 1976, students demonstrated against Buthelezi receiving an honorary doctorate at the graduation ceremony, and his car was stoned as it arrived on campus. In

response, the KwaZulu administration decided to ban students from Ngoye from taking up teaching posts in KwaZulu unless they apologised for staging the demonstration. In supporting the decision, Mr. S.Z. Chonco, KLA member for Msinga, referred to the demonstrations as part of the world wide communist strategy to denigrate Buthelezi.<sup>2</sup> The ban was still in force on October, and former Ngoye students were dismissed

from KwaZulu schools, despite an apology to the Central Committee from some students, as well as an apology on behalf of the parents of Ngoye students. The KwaZulu administration stated that the ban would remain in force until the students, a student body, apologised to the Executive Council for their behaviour at the graduation ceremony.<sup>3</sup> Near the end of the year, Mr. G.L. Steyn, secretary of the Department of Education and Training in KwaZulu, announced that all teachers under the KwaZulu administration would be 'advised' to join Inkatha. In May the following year the 4000 member Natal African Teachers Union (NATU) decided to affiliate to Inkatha.<sup>4</sup> In this way, not only were student teachers and practising teachers

severely punished for the demonstration against Buthelezi - which was essentially a student demonstration - but Inkatha also ensured that teachers would, formally

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at least, be Inkatha members and supporters, thus minimizing the possibility of anti-Inkatha input to KwaZulu schools.

This exercise in power on the part of Inkatha had a definite effect on Ngoye students. The university was reopened early in 1977, after being closed for six months following extensive damage to university buildings during student action during the nationwide revolt in 1976. Immediately after the banning of SASO and the BPC in October 1977, students voted by 464 to 5 votes (the total number of votes representing about one third of the student body) to dissolve the SRC. The students accused SRC members of lacking credibility and diplomacy, and cited as reasons for their decision inter alia an incident, spearheaded by SRC members, when a group of students confronted Mr. D. Madide, KwaZulu Minister of Interior and Health, during which Mr. Madide was 'annoyed and embarrassed'; an attempt to disrupt a Chaka Day celebration; the confiscation by SRC members of Inkatha publications; and 'foolish radicalism' shown by the SRC executive and a number of other members.<sup>5</sup> This decision must be seen in the context both of the effect of the KwaZulu administration's refusal to employ Ngoye graduates as teachers, as well as the disruption caused by the closure of the university and the banning and repression of all the Black Consciousness organisations in October 1977. It was also at this time that Buthelezi was accusing SASO and BPC members of 'inciting students to violence' in KwaZulu schools, as mentioned in the previous chapter. SASO members had played an important leadership role on the campus, and I would argue that it was in this political vacuum that more conservative students at Ngoye asserted themselves. There is no indication that the dissolution of the SRC was headed by Inkatha members, and there is also no evidence of a Youth Brigade branch on the campus, although further research may show otherwise.

Nevertheless, despite this conservative move on campus, the university failed to become a model campus of harmony and good relations between students and the administration. In January 1978, Dr. Nkabinde - described by students as an 'Inkatha man' - was appointed as the new rector of the university. This followed moves on the part of the University Council and the KwaZulu administration to bring the university under the control of KwaZulu. In June of that year, the university was closed by the rector, and students were obliged to apply for readmission. At least 17 students, including seven SRC members, were refused readmission. The closure of the university came after a series of student grievances, and students claimed that all those refused readmission had been victimised either because of their prominence in student affairs or else because of personal grievances held by the administration against them.

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The first main student grievance came about in April, when several pregnant students, two of whom were married, were expelled from the university. In response, students organised a one day boycott of classes, stating that it was unfair discrimination to expell the women, all of whom were clearly pregnant when they registered at the university at the beginning of the year. The university authorities agreed to negotiate with the students, and the matter was defered to the next Council meeting, which was to be held in June. At the end of May, however, the university again began expelling pregnant women.

A student body meeting was called to discuss this and other grievances, including the semester system of exams and the poor standard of teaching in the Science Faculty. The meeting was banned by the rector on the grounds that it would be contravening the Riotous Assemblies Act. Approximately 400 students then resolved not to attend classes until the rector agreed to meet them and discuss their grievances. Nkabinde's response was to close the university, and he called in a squad of riot police to enforce this.<sup>6</sup> One of the new regulations on the re-admittance form was that

" expectant/pregnant ladies will under no circumstances be readmitted. In the event of a lady student becoming pregnant after readmission, she will have to leave the university immediately. "

While this confrontation between the University administration and the students does not seem to be the manifestation of hostility between the students and Inkatha, it must be seen in the context of the university administration co-operating with the police. This co-operation had the support, albeit tacit, of the KwaZulu administration, since the University Council has a large contingent of Inkatha supporters. Similarly Nkabinde's refusal to discuss the students' grievances. Furthermore, the student activity in the first half of 1978 was taking place against a background of a major power struggle within Inkatha itself, which resulted in the expulsion of Dr.S.M.Bengu from the position of Secretary-General of Inkatha. Dr.Bengu was appointed Director of the Student Advisory Service at the university in 1977, a key post in student - administration relations. On 2 June, 1978, he announced that he was resigning from his post at the university, since the university administration was making it impossible for him to help students, and had debarred him from meetings with the SRC and university administration. In an interview with the Sunday Tribune 2 days later, Dr.Bengu said that he had refused to be a spy for the rector, and stated that at the heart of his resignation was his refusal to hand to the authorities the names of students who had signed a science students' memorandum listing grievances about the university.<sup>7</sup>

It is clear that the reasons for his resignation went much deeper than his

differences with Nkabinde over dealing with student grievances. Bengu was expelled

from Inkatha by the Central Committee in October 1978, and left the country

shortly afterwards to work for the Geneva based Lutheran World Federation. The

reasons given for his expulsion were that he had been 'demanding action, for

organising demonstrations by the youth and for expressing support for the BPC.' 8

Three members of the Youth Brigade were expelled at the same time for wanting

to push Inkatha into what Buthelezi described as 'spectacular mass action and

senseless violence'. During the 1979 Inkatha General Conference, the decision

of the Central Committee to expel Bengu was endorsed, and

" the malicious and venomous denigration campaign by Dr.

Bengu...directed at the President of Inkatha and Inkatha "

was condemned. Furthermore, the conference resolved that

" a vigilant eye be kept on all remnants of supporters,

sympathisers and followers of the deposed Dr.S.M.Bengu

and his propagation of violent action. " 9

1979 seems to have been a particularly quiet year on the campus, with no major

incidents. But the conflict between Inkatha and the students flared up again

in 1980, again around the graduation ceremony and, most importantly, over the

issue of Buthelezi's chancellorship of the university. It is interesting to note

that Dr.Bengu was named by Buthelezi as the main instigator of the unrest that

occurred on the campus in 1980. The events at Ngoye during this period must be

seen in the context of the schools boycott during that year, and in particular

the role Inkatha played in attempting to break the boycott in Kwamashu and

Imlazi, as outlined in the previous chapter.

In mid-May, a student body meeting adopted a resolution calling on Buthelezi to

restrain Inkatha supporters from attending the graduation ceremony in their

uniforms, and requested both the university and Buthelezi to not allow 'traditional

warriors armed with sticks' to be allowed on to the campus. In essence, 10

their call was a request to Buthelezi to not turn the graduation ceremony into an

Inkatha rally.

Buthelezi's response was to announce in the KLA that Dr.Bengu was responsible

for the disturbances at the University of Zululand, and also accused him of

being behind the 1976 unrest on the campus. To 'substantiate' his claim, Buthelezi

tabled what he termed an official ANC document detailing a meeting between

Bengu, and Nzo, Pule and Maharaj in Lusaka in March 1979, where he said that

Bengu had complained to the ANC about Buthelezi. Buthelezi then went on to

state that Bengu had met with the President of the Ngoye SRC, Reggie Hadebe, and

.....other/.....

other student activists in Esikaweni earlier in the week where he had encouraged the SRC to take action against Inkatha.<sup>11</sup>

Buthelezi launched into a tirade against Hadebe, who had previously been a member of Inkatha, describing him as a 'psychotic' and a person capable of assassination, and detailed a long list of what he termed 'aggression against Inkatha' perpetrated by the students at the university under the leadership of Hadebe. He said that all Inkatha supporters would be wearing their uniforms at the graduation ceremony, and made it clear that Inkatha would never allow itself

" to be bullied by children...Under no circumstances will we abdicate our responsibility as adults. " <sup>12</sup>

He then stated that he had been reliably informed that students at Ngoye were seen buying knives in preparation for the graduation ceremony, and that these weapons were going to be used against Inkatha members who attended the ceremony.

" We know that some of the students are a bunch of spoilt, silly kids like the SRC leader, Mr. Reggie Hadebe. He is taking instructions from his 'father', Dr. Sisbusiso Bengu. " <sup>13</sup>

On the day of the graduation ceremony, police were called in by the university authorities to disperse large groups of students who were assembling at the entrance gates. Warning shots were fired, teargas and police dogs were used, and fifteen students were arrested, shortly before Inkatha impis arrived 'in a massive show of force.'<sup>14</sup> This happened some three hours before the ceremony was due to begin.

During the graduation ceremony, students were surprised to see Hadebe go up to receive his degree and be capped by Buthelezi. As Hadebe left the hall, however, he was attacked by Inkatha supporters and severely beaten. Several other students were also assaulted by Inkatha members. In the violence that followed the ceremony, the student hall, a science laboratory, and the dining hall were burnt down, causing an estimated R50 000 damage. The following day the entire student body staged a sit in, and police were called in to break the meeting up. Hadebe expressed fears for his life, and told reporters that he was considering laying a charge of assault.<sup>15</sup> In the piece de resistance of the entire affair, Buthelezi announced that Hadebe might be prosecuted for allegedly ordering acts of violence on the campus the previous week, and said that Hadebe was directly responsible for the attack on Inkatha members on 19 May, where the car of a member of the Central Committee, Dr.S.Ngubane, was stoned. The irony of this statement, following the assault on Hadebe which was witnessed by dozens of students, staff members and at least two newspaper reporters, seems to have escaped

Buthelezi/.....



Buthelezi. He went on to praise Inkatha members and the traditional Zulu regiments' who had accompanied him to the campus to attend the graduation ceremony.

" This was as it should be, because it was in the first place a calculated insult for Mr.Hadebe to send me the kind of telegram he sent me, ordering me to tell Inkatha members not to wear their uniforms and ordering me to tell members of the Zulu regiments not to carry their shields and sticks. " 16

Dr.Bengu responded to the accusations made against him by denying having any role in the events at Ngoye.

" Chief Buthelezi's accusations against me must be seen as part of his mudslinging campaign which he started in 1978 soon after I had left the country."

Referring to Buthelezi's mention of a meeting between himself and ANC representatives in Lusaka, he said:

" I absolutely refute Chief Buthelezi's allegations. I know that all these false statements that Chief Buthelezi is making about me associating me with violence are meant to set the SAP on me ...  
Just because he is a chief, Buthelezi thinks he has a right to insult people left and right. As I said in 1978, I still call on the chief to reveal his sources of information. It is not enough for him to say that an 'official' inquiry into university troubles had come to the conclusion that Dr.Bengu had indeed been responsible for the ructions! What official inquiry was that? Was it a police inquiry? Was it the chief's official inquiry? " 17

In his presidential address to the Inkatha General Conference at Ulundi in June 1980, Buthelezi referred to the incident at Ngoye and stated that

" The time has come for us to be able to say that a university such as the University of Zululand will forfeit its right to exist if it does not serve the people...If I find a conflict between Inkatha's aims and objectives and our means of implementing those objectives on the one hand, and the activity encouraged or perhaps even tolerated by an institution such as the University of Zululand, even through a consortium of black lecturers manipulated by a clique of white academics, then I will question the authenticity

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of that university in our midst. I will have no hesitation in setting about the establishment of a true university of the people of KwaZulu if the current state of affairs continues. We are serious in our political commitment and we will not tolerate those who make a mockery of the mass response to the South African situation which is found in Inkatha. These are fighting words and I seek a mandate from this conference to back these words up with action if necessary. " (emphasis added) <sup>18</sup>

Three months later, a stinging attack was launched against Inkatha in the editorial of the August issue of the student magazine at Ngoye, Senzani. The editorial stated that

" This years' graduation ceremony was turned completely into an Inkatha rally ... Disregarding the students' resolution to observe graduation day as a strictly academic occasion, the Inkatha leadership, obstinate and dictatorial as it is, sent a large number of thugs armed with dangerous weapons ... Inkatha is not a liberation movement but a religious organisation. It is more a hero-worshipping body than it is ideologically orientated ... the organisation makes sure that this man Buthelezi is always in power, that he is listened to and that he is unopposed... " <sup>19</sup>

Protas Madlala, the editor of the magazine, was subsequently found guilty of misconduct in terms of a section of the university rules and was suspended for a year. The magazine was banned. <sup>20</sup>

At the same time the question of Buthelezi's chancellorship of the university became a major issue among the students. A petition calling for his removal as chancellor was submitted to the university administration. According to the SRC, the rector refused to have anything to do with the petition, and refused to act on it. The SRC said that the petition was drawn up following a meeting between the SRC, the Chairman on the University Council Dr. McCrystal, and three Council members in late May. The meeting was called by the SRC because of their objection to the presence of uniformed and armed members of Inkatha at the graduation ceremony, and explained to the Council members that Buthelezi was seen by students to be the core of the problem, and that they wanted him removed as chancellor.

Dr. McCrystal then suggested to the SRC that either Buthelezi should be removed

from/.....

from the position, or else that he should remain chancellor but not bring his 'warriors' onto the campus, and that student opinion on the matter could be tested through a referendum. The SRC then took these suggestions to a student body meeting :

" ...when we reported back to students they wanted nothing to do with Gatsha Buthelezi. We then drew up the petition and handed it to Professor Nkabinde. We told him that if Buthelezi was not removed, we would not take part in any further graduation ceremonies. " 21

When the details of the meeting in May were released, Dr. Madide, Minister of Interior and Health, accused Dr. McCrystal of 'betraying' Buthelezi:

" Could he [Dr. McCrystal] really be taken in by the vociferous cohorts of the president of the SRC? It is mind boggling that those who are claiming to be fighting against Bantustans, against Bantu Education, against Ethnic Universities, should gang up with the creators of these monsters to remove from a position of trust the one person who has constantly and consistently fought against the National Party. " 22

Dr. McCrystal was clearly taken aback by this vociferous attack, and repeatedly asserted his long association with Buthelezi, and his respect for the Chief Minister. Nevertheless, he stated, he was merely doing his duty as chairman of Council in listening to student grievances and attempting to find an acceptable solution. Four months later, Dr. McCrystal resigned from his position at the University, citing as his reason his acceptance of an appointment to the President's Council. All suggestions of Buthelezi resigning as chancellor were thus successfully thwarted.

It was in the period 1980 and 1981 that two events of significance to the organisation of students at Ngoye occurred. Firstly, the SRC was dissolved. It is unclear as to whether it was the students' rejection of the structure of the SRC, or ultimately the rector's action which led to its dissolution. What is clear is that students were unhappy with the constitution of the SRC and were loath to participate in it until a more satisfactory constitution was accepted by the University Council. According to students interviewed by the writer, Nkabinde has consistently refused to allow students access to the constitution to enable them to work out a new one. In an interview between the editor of the Inkatha magazine Inhlabamkhosi ( meaning Clarion Call) and Nkabinde, the rector was asked about the lack of an SRC at Ngoye. Nkabinde's reply was that

" The SRC is elected by students. The machinery for the elections of the SRC exists. There is a constitution. .

There/.....

There are well furnished offices and other

facilities. The decision to have an SRC or not

lies solely with the students themselves ...

students are actively encouraged by the University

authorities to elect an SRC in order to promote

and facilitate effective communication. " 23

He fails, however, to explain why students have not availed themselves of the

opportunity to elect an SRC, or why it was disbanded in the first place.

Secondly, AZASO was banned by the rector from operating on Nyoze campus. This

has meant that AZASO supporters have been forced to operate covertly. Both these

actions had an adverse affect on student organisation on the campus - as one,

student described it :

" 1981 and 82 were years of political confusion

on campus. "

In October 1981, several cars were stoned and a production of a play was disrupted

on the campus by a group of approximately 300 law students, who were protesting

their exam results. Apparently, 'Zulu warriors' who were in the play attacked

the students with spears. The police were called in, and fifteen students were

arrested. 24 Three days later, at a meeting of the student body, it was decided

to stage a sit-in boycott in protest against the arrest of the students. Despite

the lack of an SRC to play a leadership role, there was full support for the

boycott. On the day of the sit-in, camouflaged policemen with dogs were called

in to 'man the campus', and students stated that they would consider boycotting

exams the following week if the fifteen students were not released. 25 Nkabinde's

response to the boycott was to threaten that students who boycotted lectures

in future 'without valid reasons' would have their study loans or bursaries

withdrawn. In addition he warned students that state subsidies of boycotters

would also be withdrawn. 26 At a university where approximately 95% of the students

receive loans or bursaries, the possibility of this threat being carried out

placed the students in a very difficult situation. It does not seem, however,

that Nkabinde actually acted against any of the students by withdrawing financial

assistance.

The incidents outlined above give a clear indication of Inkatha's inability to

fully win the support of Nyoze students. At particular conjunctures, such as

the issue of Buthelez's chancellorship, it would seem that virtually the entire

student body was united and supported the stand of the SRC. When examining

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the events of 1983 at Ngoye, therefore, it is necessary to bear in mind this situation of constant tension, whether implicit or overt conflict, between Inkatha and the student body. I will argue that given this failure of Inkatha to win over the students - or at least a substantial majority of them - ultimately led to the body confrontation on the campus in October 1983, where Inkatha took a decision to show a massive display of force and to attempt to finally assert hegemony at Ngoye.

The student body at Ngoye is relatively small in comparison with the 'white' universities - in 1981 there were less than 2000 students, and this figure has dropped slightly. This is an important point to make, since a 'student body' meeting, referred to on a number of occasions by students interviewed by the writer, is thus a fairly easy meeting to organise. It is thus entirely feasible that, on a small campus where the majority of the students live on the campus, a meeting of the student body literally means a meeting of all students. This is crucial, because when members of the crisis committee, for example, refer to a mandate from the student body, it is a decision taken at a meeting attended by all students. The second factor which must be taken into account is that, precisely because it is a small campus, student activists are easily identifiable. It was no accident, therefore, that the brunt of the attack on students in October was taken out on students well known for their anti-Inkatha sentiments.

At the beginning of 1983, a number of students previously at Fort Hare and Turfloop universities registered at Ngoye, following the expulsion of many students from those universities in 1982. At this stage, between forty and fifty students were members of the Youth Brigade branch at Ngoye. According to students interviewed by the writer, the attitude amongst students to the Youth Brigade was that

" Anyone can join Inkatha if they want to. But the problem comes in when they want to use our campus for their propaganda. They are trying to make inroads and coerce students into Inkatha. At the beginning of the year, for example, they [the Youth Brigade] showed banned political films to ingratiate themselves with students. "

1983 of

a) the first formal meeting of/the Youth Brigade branch on campus, which was attended by a number of 'non-Inkatha' students,

" Youth Brigade members vowed to fight against the Xhosa and Sotho students, and claimed that they were polluting the university. Students at Ngoye reject the concept of race and we were thus very shocked by this attitude.

Inkatha/.....

Inkatha places so much stress on tribalism ... you must remember that it is the students from Natal itself that hate him [Buthelezi] the most. We students do not accept the structure of the KwaZulu government; we do not accept people who work hand in hand with Pretoria. " 27

From the beginning of the year, therefore, it seems as if there was already a lot of tension on the campus, a tension that seems to have been created by the Youth Brigade itself.

In April, Dr. Jordan Ngubane, a highly placed Inkatha member, gave a speech on the campus. According to students, Dr. Ngubane is himself a controversial figure, with a history of involvement in the ANC, then FOFASATU <sup>(sic)</sup> in the 1950s.

" When students questioned him after the speech, he was exposed ... he spoke very critically of the ANC in general and of Tambo and Mandela in particular ... He became very angry with the questions and left the campus very embarrassed ... we heard rumours afterwards that Buthelezi summoned the 'Inkatha lecturers' at Ngoye to Ulundi and asked them why they didn't rescue Ngubane from being embarrassed by the students and staff members' questions. " 28

In June, police were called to the campus when the students held a demonstration to protest against three members of the ANC. The students marched around the campus singing and chanting, a police car was set on fire, and some R50 000 damage was caused before the students dispersed. 29 A few weeks later, a successful boycott of a June 16 memorial meeting was staged by the students. When students had earlier approached the administration to request permission to organise a June 16 meeting, they were told that the Council of Campus Ministers had already arranged a service, to be presided over by Bishop Zulu, a well known Inkatha supporter. The students resented what they considered a hijacking of this day of memorial by Inkatha, and

" we registered our disapproval of Inkatha and the KwaZulu government by not attending. Only 10 people or so attended, and these were all staff members ... This proved the lack of support for Inkatha ... it was a completely peaceful boycott. "

In August, a seminar on black political thought was organised under the auspices of the university's Centre for Research and Documentation, which is under the

directorship/.....

directorship of Professor Villakaze, an Inkatha member. Speakers at the seminar included the Rev. Buti Thlagale of Equal Opportunity Scholarships, and Dr. Oscar Dhloomo. It seems as if initially only Inkatha supporters were invited to address the seminar, but after protest by students at this, Joe Paahla (then president of AZASO) and Archie Gumedie (a National president of the UDF) were invited to speak. According to an AZASO executive member,

" In the letter inviting Joe to speak no details were given - no information about what the aims of the conference were. AZASO was very unhappy about this 'empty letter', and decided not to participate... it could have been a set up. We could have been used ... Archie did not go either."

Students demonstrated against Dr. Dhloomo's presence on campus by boycotting his address, and over one hundred students disrupted the seminar by heckling, clapping hands and chanting slogans.<sup>30</sup>

The incidents outlined above illustrate the fact that, throughout the first half of the year, students successfully mobilised against Inkatha, and showed the lack of support for the movement at Ngoye. On 13 September, a meeting of all the male students on the campus was held to discuss the question of violence in the hostels. At the meeting, which was chaired by a member of the university administration, students called on the university to ban the Youth Brigade on campus. Their motivation for this request was that Inkatha's stress on tribalism was causing tension on the campus, which inevitably led to violence.

A few weeks after this meeting, rumours began to circulate that Buthelezi was to address a meeting on the campus to commemorate the centenary of King Ceteswayo's death.

" When we heard that Buthelezi was coming, we knew that everywhere he goes, his warriors go. The time when he was due to come was a week before exams ... On the previous three occasions when Inkatha members had spoken at meetings, students had clearly and peacefully shown that there was no support for Inkatha on campus. Buthelezi was going to come with his warriors at a crucial time in the exam period ... this would really affect students. We were not interested in meetings at this stage, but in simply learning for exams. Two weeks before he was due to speak, Zulu warriors went into Lamontville looking for Rev. Xunde, and they beat up people ...

we didn't want the same thing happening here. Then some people received threatening letters; Anonymous notices were posted up on the walls, warning us that people preventing Buthelezi from coming onto campus were challenging death. The majority of students do not support Buthelezi, and were therefore scared of being attacked ... "

In an effort to prevent Buthelezi from coming onto the campus, students approached the university administration and the AZASO executive for help. AZASO then approached the administration of the University of Natal and requested the Vice-Chancellor to attempt to dissuade Nkabinde from allowing the meeting to be held. According to AZASO, Nkabinde's reply was that he was 'aware of the situation'.

In the interview published in Inhlabankhosi shortly before the Ceteswayo memorial rally was due to be held, Nkabinde was asked what he thought the cause was of the 'unfriendly reaction' students had had to visits by members of Inkatha and the KwaZulu government. Nkabinde's reply was that

" political conviction is the underlying cause. The students who believe that the resolution of the South African problem lies in the adoption of a militant move tend to oppose the more peaceable approach adumbrated by the Inkatha movement ... Fortunately, very few students participate in or show partiality to the demonstrations. " (emphasis added) <sup>31</sup>

It is clear that he failed to perceive the seriousness of the situation, and attempted to play down the hostility between the students and Inkatha.

during the week before the rally students were told by cleaners on the campus that the local headman had been contacted and told to tell the men in the surrounding areas to arm themselves and to go to the campus on Saturday morning, the day of the meeting. Students were searched by university security as they entered or left the campus, and according to a number of students, Nkabinde was warned by university security to leave the campus, as violence was inevitable.

At a meeting of all students on Friday 28 October, a Crisis Committee was elected and mandated to go immediately to Durban in an attempt to obtain a court order to prevent the meeting from going ahead. ( This attempt was unsuccessful, as their lawyers advised the Crisis Committee that they did not have substantial enough evidence to prove that there would be violence on the campus if Buthelezi addressed the meeting.) After the Crisis Committee had left for Durban, some

students/.....



students decided to march to the university gate and back again. It seems that at this stage there was a clash between students and Youth Brigade members. Nkabinde called the police in, who attempted to disperse the students with teargas and batons. According to one of the students who made statements to the South African Institute of Race Relations following the incident, the police fired teargas into the F block of the women's hostels.

"Then the police came to the men's hostels ... the

men students were calling them to divert them from the ladies ... Botha was giving orders to the police to go inside the hostels ... [they] broke windows and doors in C block and E block and put teargas inside the women's hostels ... the police then went to the men's hostels again, to New York and Moscow. [the names of two of the hostels.] They broke

into rooms and arrested about eight or ten students ... then they threatened that they would come back at 8p.m. and that we students must leave the campus ...

the police camped next to Bhekuzulu and cars patrolled the campus the whole night..."

Following the police warning, and terrified of further violence, a number of students left the campus that evening, but most had nowhere else to go to.

The precise chronological events on the Saturday are somewhat unclear as both the students and Inkatha give conflicting reports. Nevertheless, I would argue that it would seem as if the violence was, if not planned by Inkatha, then at least anticipated. It is clear that Inkatha was not prepared to brook any interference with their rally. From late on the Friday afternoon Inkatha supporters began arriving on the campus from as far afield as Ladysmith, and as one student pointed out, the Inkatha people were not searched for weapons when they entered the

university grounds.

Violence flared early on Saturday morning, and began while many students were either still asleep, washing or eating breakfast. The following are some of the comments made by students in interviews with the writer and in statements to the SAIRR :

" I woke up very early on Saturday morning, at about

5.30 a.m. There were already a number of buses on

the campus. Inkatha people were in groups chanting

slogans - 'We are angry, our hearts are full of blood',

and slogans like this. They moved first down to the

women's hostels, and then to the men's. This was at

about/.....

about 6 a.m. "

" The warriors moved to the female hostels... they were chanting 'we want the Xhosas and Sothos out' and called on Zulu students to join them ... stone throwing started ... most of the students ran into the hostels ... the warriors went into various hostels ... there were many warriors; they went into New York on to all the floors, stabbing and beating students. . They were egged on by Inkatha women and children. "

" The whole of New York, which is seven stories high, was a mess - windows were broken, doors broken down, books torn. "

" I could see what was happening - I know that the Inkatha people had a list of people that had disrupted Dhlomo's meeting. The doors were broken down of the rooms of political students..."

" It must have been well planned as Inkatha knew where they were heading. On the fourth floor were most of the active political students ... they also broke into rooms and looked at the stickers and posters students had in their rooms and damaged rooms with 'Free Mandela' stickers in them ..."

" The campus security did nothing - this went on for nearly an hour before the police intervened. And do you know, not one single Inkatha person was arrested. "

" Students had run into New York as it was the last block- I was left standing in the middle and ran away into the bushes - they followed us there ... afterwards many students were found badly stabbed, lying in the bushes. "

" I saw a body being thrown out of one of the floors of New York ..."

" There was just blood everywhere, broken windows, smashed

doors/.....

and daughters of a warrior nation and they had gone to the university to commemorate one of the greatest warriors in Zulu history, and the simple fact of the matter is that this violence so carefully plotted, so carefully orchestrated and so cunningly executed produced the inevitable counter-violence. "

He went on to accuse COSAS, SASO and various staff members at Ngoye of being behind the incident, saying that COSAS was formed as a front organisation for the ANC's 'mission in exile'. The speech, rather than being an explanation of the events at Ngoye, was full of threats :

" I must warn South Africa that if the kind of provocation continues which we experienced on Saturday, Inkatha youth will demonstrate their strength and their prowess ...

The peoples' anger is rising and the fervour with which we pursue our objectives will deepen. Nothing will stop us and those forces of disunity which are attempting to do the National Party's dirty work in disrupting our progress will be taught a lesson or two if the denigration of Inkatha continues ...

The abuse of me must now cease. Continuing to label me as a sell-out is going to have ugly repercussions ...

I welcome opposition because without it we do not think as sharply as we would otherwise have to do, and I particularly welcome opposition at a University where young people should be learning how to think for themselves and form their own opinions about politics and the state.

But ... opposition which is not honest and democratic is merely a divisive force which shames the nation ...

know just how powerful we are; we know that we can walk into the campus at the University of Zululand any day of the week there to do whatever we wanted to do. " (emphasis added) <sup>32</sup>

Far from being an explanation of events and a sincere regret about the violence, Buthelezi's speech was a justification of the violence, and very clearly, a warning that it will occur again. Despite Buthelezi's assertion that there is no genuine opposition to him from students on the campus, students interviewed by the writer as well as those who made statements to the SAIRR put Inkatha support at Ngoye at between five and thirteen percent of the student body; all students who were interviewed said that no more than forty people were formal members of the Youth Brigade branch on the campus, a number which has now dropped to about twenty. One student said that

" Those Youth Brigade members must know that if they dare

set foot on the campus again, they will be killed. I don't believe that they will come back, because they know how the students feel about what happened. "

As a result of the events at Ngoye, the university was closed and exams postponed until January 1984. Subsequent newspaper reports have stated that, following a meeting in Ulundi, exams will be written in January with SAP and ZP members present.

The violence at Ngoye was strongly condemned by many people and organisations. In an unusual step, AZAPO joined with organisations such as AZASO and the UDF in protesting Inkatha's role in the violence. In addition, some three hundred staff members at the university called on Buthelezi to resign as chancellor. (This out of a total of five hundred staff members)<sup>33</sup> Buthelezi refused to resign, stating that he would not accept being humiliated when the whole thing was political and had been orchestrated. In addition, he called AZASO 'a band of uncouth, lying, receiving scum of South African youth.'

What is particularly interesting, however, is the 'unofficial' response of Inkatha.

An Inkatha member, who wished to remain anonymous, said that the incident had 'split Inkatha'. There is little doubt that many Inkatha members were deeply shocked by the violence. In an interview with Mr. N.Mafole, the National Organiser of the Youth Brigade, who was present at Ngoye on Saturday 29th, he stated that

" The situation got out of hand. We were unable to control the Inkatha youth."

Mr. N.Nkehli, director of the Bureau for Community Development and Youth Affairs, said that the violence at Ngoye

" symbolises a move amongst the youth towards militancy... there were over 1 000 Youth Brigade members there, and we were unable to control them."

While these comments could be seen as an abdication of responsibility on the part of the Youth leadership, I would argue that they also demonstrate a sudden recognition that violence such as was displayed at Ngoye could have disastrous consequences for Inkatha. The movement is going to be hard put to explain the incident to the Commission of Inquiry in the light of the evidence that students are presenting. It is clear that students did their utmost to prevent the rally from being held, and for Buthelezi to suggest that the violence was plotted by the students seems to be ludicrous in the extreme. It would therefore seem that although the majority of Inkatha members interviewed by the writer accepted the official explanation of the incident at Ngoye, there is very deep concern at what the violence on the part

of/.....

of the Youth Brigade signifies. Nevertheless, a Professional Officer in the Youth Division summed up the general Inkatha sentiment when he told the writer that he was 'proud of what happened at Ngoye'.

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This chapter has attempted to describe the violence at the University of Zululand in October 1983 by contextualising it in relations between the Ngoye student body and Inkatha since approximately 1976. It is clear that Inkatha has consistently failed to win the support of the students, and in the light of students' attitudes following the violence in October, it seems likely that - if anything - the incident had an immensely politicising effect on students, who are extremely angry with Inkatha and refer to the incident as the 'Ngoye massacre'. One of the recommendations from the meeting<sup>in Ulundi</sup> between some parents and students and the KwaZulu administration in December is that students be admitted to Ngoye on a racial basis - students to be given first preference would be those from KwaZulu, Kangwane and Natal. This is clearly an attempt to exclude the (possibly) more politicised students from 'bush' universities such as Fort Hare and Turfloop, who are characterised as troublemakers by Ulundi.

The Youth Brigade branch at Ngoye is small, and support for Inkatha on the campus seems to be limited. This is interesting, since the lack of support or disinterest in the movement prevails despite five years of 'education for nationhood' in the schools, which means that KwaZulu matriculants at least would have had significant 'Inkatha input' while still at school. In order to reinforce their numbers at the rally in October, hundreds of Inkatha supporters were brought onto the campus from other areas, and given Inkatha's loose definition of 'youth', many of these people were adults.

As with the chapter on the role Inkatha played during the 1980 schools' boycott, this chapter has been a description of the type of strategies used by the movement to alternatively attempt to attract and then 'deal with' youth who have refused to accept Inkatha. As during the schools' boycott, the strategies employed have ranged from attempts to undermine student organisation against the movement by accusing agitators of engineering anti-Inkatha sentiment, to using the University administration in attempts to bring the students 'in line', to appealing to students on an academic level through, for example, the seminar organised by the Centre for Research and Documentation, to outright violence on an unprecedented level this year.

" You see, what we have found this year, is the

convergence/.....

convergence of two trends in the Inkatha Youth Brigade.

Firstly, young people were sent from Inkatha to North America to receive 'leadership training' after 1980. They have now returned to the country, bringing with them a new sophisticated theoretical input ... ,

Secondly, the first para-military troops graduated early this year [the Youth Service Corps] ...

These two trends have contributed to a new approach of the youth in Inkatha, of increased militancy ... "

and it seems, of a growing split between Inkatha and progressive groupings in South Africa.

providing us with the protective mechanisms which development is also necessary from the point of disruption of our programmes ... a para-military " We will not brook Black divisive forces and the

to as the YSC). Speaking about the resolution, Buthelezi said that as its Commander - in - Chief, an Inkatha Youth Service Corps (hereafter referred approaches to the activities of Inkatha, and to establish, with Chief Buthelezi The General Conference therefore resolved to immediately introduce para-military

military lines. " 2 must necessarily develop even further along para- and disciplined approach to reconciliation, Inkatha " If black South Africa is to retain an effective

which Buthelezi made his recommendation, it was stated that Central Committee Special Report to the Inkatha General Conference in 1980, are not doing a good enough job of controlling black South Africans. In a It would seem that in Inkatha's terms, the SAP, riot police and security branch

order in the light of emerging anarchy. " 1 form the basis for such groups which will provide blacks .. the traditional Zulu regiments can and the black communities in South Africa by other " violence that is being unleashed against Inkatha

mean trained groups of Inkatha youths who needed to defend themselves from In response, Buthelezi said that he had used the word 'impi' figuratively to immediately sparked off rumours that Inkatha was about to establish its own army. uniformed and armed Inkatha members at the 1980 graduation ceremony, and boycott in Kwamashu, and the protest of students at Ngoye over the presence of This recommendation from Buthelezi came in the wake of the continuing schools'

to Inkatha and black South Africa. " ( Chief Buthelezi, June 1980) out for the protection of that which is so sacred impi in every Inkatha region which can be called need to create well disciplined and regimented of peace sits easily on the spear. I think we We need to tone up our muscles so that the dove midst of chaos which other people try to create. We need to be able to conduct meetings in the fashion. We need to be able to control riots. schooled in the employment of anger in an orderly training camps where branches and regions are " I think it is time for Inkatha to establish

CHAPTER FIVE

safeguard those things we erect in the nation's interest. " <sup>3</sup>

At its conference in August 1980, The Youth Brigade resolved to set up a youth corps on a countrywide basis. At this conference, however, the emphasis of the YSC was not so much on its para-military aspect, but on the contribution of a years' service by young matriculants and graduates in order to involve black youth 'more productively in community projects'.<sup>4</sup> Nevertheless, the actual structure and functioning of the YSC remained unclear. In November 1980, Buthelezi addressed the National Executive Committee of the Youth Brigade, and dealt at some length with the need for 'realism' and the fact that 'the days of protest politics are over', and the need for Inkatha to mobilise its youth in order for it 'to play its historical role by embarking on a Youth Service Corps'.

" We need to conceive of a Youth Corps in bold terms... I can envisage a camp in our rolling countryside where 10 000 youth will be mustered, drilling, learning, teaching and being taught, disciplining themselves to become fashioned steel for the struggle. I can see the need for a boldness with that level of achievement. Nobody else in this country could conceivably talk about establishing a youth camp ... I can do so because of Inkatha ...

At this stage a great deal of planning is going to be put into youth activity and the establishment of a Service Corps. The Secretary-General and others are involved in this planning and when the time comes for them to be taking their first steps you here today should have already prepared the ground for the first success.

When I myself and the Secretary-General and other people begin on a practical implementation of plans, those of you who display leadership qualities; those of you who display dedication and those of you who value discipline and the ability to serve will be singled out ... and you will find yourselves with a real man-size job of work to do ...

I can in my mind's eye see a whole football field with athletically uniformed and disciplined Service Corps units, displaying their marching,

exercising/.....



exercising and acrobatic skills ... I can see Inkatha youth selected for specialised training receiving

honours at universities around the world. I can see

units of the Youth Service Corps constructing dams,

building bridges, salvaging drought stricken soil,

introducing forms of life-saving technology, building

schools, conducting literacy training classes ...

I can imagine the great jamborees of the future where

vast throngs of our youth demonstrate their unity of

purpose in massive gatherings and demonstrations of

power." (emphasis added) <sup>5</sup>

It is worth quoting this extract in full because not only does it illustrate the

hierarchical and ageist nature of Inkatha, but it also shows how in a space of

five months Inkatha leadership had attempted to put a more acceptable face onto

the establishment of the YSC. In this rhetorical 'I have a dream' speech, the

purpose of the YSC is fundamentally different to that which Buthelezi gave at

the General Conference. Instead, it is now presented as a programme to establish

units of young people who would be sent into the communities as Inkatha activists

after a year's training in basic rural development skills. Their envisaged

contribution would be in helping to 'build the nation', fitting in with the

movement's approach of 'development equals liberation';

This chapter is an attempt to describe and examine the YSC programme, the camps

that have been set up to train the youth participating in the programme, and the

types of activities that the Amabutho <sup>6</sup> have been involved in. It must be

emphasised that this chapter contains only very general comments about the YSC,

since it is a very new programme (implemented in 1982), and that it is an aspect

of Inkatha about which a great deal more research needs to be done.

The first camp was established at Emandleni-Matleni, which means 'in the place of

power'. In the key note address to the 1982 Youth Brigade conference, Buthelezi

outlined what trainees could expect at the camp. <sup>7</sup> Under the heading of

discipline, he said that the camp was para-military in nature, and that military

standards of discipline would be maintained. Preference would be given to

applicants who had passed standard six, and there would always be room for

matriculants and graduates who wished to 'devote a year of their lives to Black

Development'.

He stated that the training schemes were based on brigade structures which were  
formed into companies belonging to a regiment for a particular area; and he  
emphasised that while every effort would be made to accommodate every trainee by

giving him or her training in his or her special field of interest, it was an express condition of the camp that trainees could and would be drafted into any sphere of activity where there was the greatest need. Buthelezi then went on to describe the 'activity of the camp' :

" During the year all trainees will receive generalised training to prepare them to play a more important role in Black society ... For those dying for the 'armed struggle' this kind of conditioning is good even for that if that option is ever forced on us one day. ... The camp exists to meet the demands of the Commander in Chief [i.e. Buthelezi] and the trainees enter the camp on the understanding that their training and their employment during the year at the camp will involve them in a wide range of activity from manual labour to skilled work, as well as other roles. These will be experienced both inside the camp and anywhere in South Africa, where the Commander in Chief may from time to time decide ... " (emphasis added)

Finally, Buthelezi stated that selected trainees could be given the opportunity of furthering their formal education elsewhere in South Africa or abroad. Such formal study would be undertaken on the understanding that for each year of study, the candidate would be required to work for Inkatha.

At the beginning of 1982, the first group of trainees entered the Emandleni-Matleng camp. According to the Bureau for Community Development and Youth Affairs, there were 300 trainees from six areas in Natal, Kwazulu and the Transvaal. In an interview by the writer with Mr. Nomusa Zondi, the head of the Youth Affairs division, the YSC programme was described as a 'social reconstruction programme' :

" Modern society has disrupted everything - there is no one but ourselves to start sorting things out. Emandleni-Matleng has been set up to provide a base where young people can be trained in practical skills, in health, agriculture, housing and so on. In twelve months, they gain a measure of ability to attend to these problems. The young people go back to their communities with these skills, they become activists in the communities ... They hold workshops [while in the camp] to understand and work out approaches to the community they work in. They learn basic skills in all fields, and then

concentrate/.....

concentrate on one special skill at the end of the year. This kind of instruction does not produce carpenters, for example, but produces people who can put their shoulder behind all facets of the community ... the training is built on principles of self-help and self reliance, which does not mean that projects initiated by the Youth Service Corps won't get help from the KDC, for example. YSC members get R100 monthly from the Bureau while they are working for us. " 8

Two 'graduates' from the camp, who are now involved in a literacy project, outlined their experiences during the year at Emandleni-Matleng in an interview with the writer :

YSC members: We learnt the basics of agriculture, motor mechanics, building, community health and recreation ... Then you specialise in one. People are trained in the specialist field according to their talents.

Interviewer: What were your main activities on a day to day basis?

YSC : We spent most of the time working and doing physical training. We had to get up at four every morning, girls and boys alike, to go running ... We lived in tents and used sleeping bags the whole year.

Interviewer: Why is there this emphasis on physical training?

YSC : It is to enable us to withstand any situation, or be prepared for any situation. We were sent to Ingwavume during the crisis there ... We spoke to the communities about the land deal, about what His Excellency the Chief Minister and Inkatha was doing about Ingwavume ... We were severely harassed by security branch while we were there ... We learnt to speak to the community, to withstand the enormous pressure of certain situations.

Interviewer: What other activities did you participate in?

YSC : Song workshops; the history of and development of Inkatha; leadership training.

Interviewer: Do you feel that you gained anything in terms of personal development?

YSC : We learnt self-discipline, we learnt how to work hard ...

we/.....

we learnt hoeing and planting, how to drive a tractor and so on ... our field of special interest is agriculture ... We had to do guard duty alone at night. I was terribly frightened, but learnt to overcome my fears. I feel that I have developed a lifelong commitment to Inkatha.<sup>9</sup>

The administration of the camp falls under the Youth Affairs division. According to Mr. Sandile Makhanya, a Professional Officer in this division, there are two main thrusts of the Youth Action Programme, of which the YSC is an important part. Firstly, the youth camps, and secondly, the implementation of Youth Brigade policy. The programme is designed to inculcate 'patriotism, culture and loyalty - to a Zulu nation'. When questioned by the writer on the emphasis of Inkatha on the wearing of uniforms and the para-military approach to the youth, he said that the uniform ensures equality, and it

" symbolises unity and loyalty to the President ... our youth is getting out of hand. The youth need to be united and disciplined, otherwise they could be used by other people for their own ends." <sup>10</sup>

Drawing from these and other interviews conducted by the writer, it would therefore seem that the YSC programme has essentially three aims. Firstly, on an ideological level, it provides Inkatha with the opportunity to inculcate members of the Youth Brigade with a strong sense of loyalty and duty towards the 'Zulu nation' - and thereby Buthelezi and Inkatha. Secondly, it provides Inkatha with the means of substantiating Buthelezi's constant threats that Inkatha will 'pick up the gauntlet' thrown down by its enemies, imagined or otherwise. And thirdly, the 'social reconstruction' aspect - the training in rudimentary rural development skills - is part of the recognition by Inkatha that in order to retain and attract support, it needs to become more involved in 'bread and butter' issues in the communities.

It seems as if the initial phase of the YSC programme has gone some way in fulfilling these aims. Many of the Amabutho have been placed in various KwaZulu administration departments and, according to Buthelezi, he is receiving 'good reports' on their work. Addressing the KLA on the Youth Action Programme, Buthelezi stated that the Amabutho from the camp have been formed into three groups. The Hlanganani Amabutho were involved in 1983 in a water development project, and have made 'a notable impact on this community'. In addition, this group organised two regional Youth Groups in their area, which resulted in 'youth being activated to become involved in community development work'.

The Dlangezwa/Nselini Amabutho, which experienced difficulty in being placed in employment after leaving the camp, worked at Ndundulu in 1983 to relieve victims of the fire disaster there. The Ndundulu Fire Disaster Relief Project was planned and implemented with this group, and

" their dedication to their work has shown that the Emandleni-Matleng Camp succeeded in getting them imbued with patriotism. "

The Transvaal Amabutho has set up a 'women produce co-operative' in the Vaal region, and is also developing a glassmaking project as a source of income. It is also involved in preparing for the inauguration of a multi-purpose co-operative to be called Eyethu Intuthuko/Yarona Tshwelopele, meaning 'development is ours'.<sup>11</sup>

A second permanent camp at Amatigulu is under construction. It can now accommodate five hundred students, and according to Mr. Nkehli, director of the Bureau, in five years' time it will accommodate 3 000 people. It is interesting to note that the first camp to be held at Amatigulu for a week in December 1983 was for young people who would be university students in 1984. This has particular significance in terms of the situation at Ngoye, and the unpopularity of Inkatha on the other 'bush' campuses, and it may be the beginning of a new strategy to ensure a university intake every year of committed Youth Brigade activists.

There is no doubt that the kind of activities that the 1983 Amabutho have participated in are constructive, and the potential contribution to various communities of people with rural development skills is enormous. But the programme has experienced 'teething problems' in that YSC members do not receive any formal qualification, and thus have difficulty in finding jobs - they certainly cannot all be accommodated in the Ulundi bureaucracy, which is what Buthelezi suggested at the 'graduation' ceremony in 1983. The Bureau will thus be faced with the problem of being unable to find employment for YSC graduates, while still wanting to keep tight control over the activities that they become involved in. Furthermore the Youth Brigade resolution in 1980 referred to 'matriculants and graduates' who would become YSC members; by 1982, however, this had changed :

" There are many youth who will not be fortunate enough to remain at school or go to university after they have completed their schooling. They will be victims of apartheid in circumstances beyond their control ... For them, we must have

a special place. This place is the Emandleni-Matleng  
Camp development. "12

It would therefore seem as if the YSC programme is being presented by Buthelezi as an alternative to formal schooling, in an attempt to solve the unemployment problem and at the same time attract unemployed youths to Inkatha.

People opposed to Inkatha are very distrustful of the YSC because of the stress on it as - in Buthelezi's words - a para-military taskforce.<sup>13</sup> The YSC exists to carry out the directions of the Commander-in-Chief, and given the role the newly formed corps played in Ingwavume (following which Inkatha membership is said by the movement to have gone up by 350 000 ), there is clearly the possibility of corps members being used in situations where Inkatha finds it necessary to enforce its presence, or else to 'maintain order'. If a situation similar to the 1980 schools' boycott rose again, for example, there is no doubt that the YSC would be called in to keep the pupils at school. At this stage the YSC is relatively small and no new trainees were taken in to Emandleni-Matleng in 1983. The reason for this seems to be that more work needed to be done on the camp itself. The programme will get under way again in 1984.

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The original elitism proposed for the YSC, as a group of educated young people especially chosen for membership and training because of their commitment to Inkatha, seems to have fallen away. Nevertheless, the existence of well trained and disciplined units with absolute loyalty to Buthelezi is a development of immense significance in South Africa as a whole. Despite the tendency for the Ulundi bureaucrats to play down the para-military aspect of the corps, its structure, the training received by members and the terminology used give the distinct impression that the essential aim of the YSC remains that outlined by Buthelezi at the 1980 General Conference.

The development of the YSC represents an explicit move within Inkatha towards militarism, and could also be an attempt to pacify the youth in their impatience with Inkatha's position on the armed struggle. This chapter has attempted to describe the form that this move has taken, and I would argue in conclusion that the significance of the programme lies in the fact that the YSC could be used against progressive groupings in the country. The violence used by Inkatha against the students at Ngoye this year and against UDF supporters at a UDF meeting in Hammersdale in November, serve as indicators to suggest that this is the case. Buthelezi's conviction that there is a 'total onslaught' against Inkatha could easily lead to the use of violence by the YSC against those who are named by Inkatha as enemies.

### CONCLUSION

The aims of this project were essentially threefold. Firstly, an attempt has been made to apply a more rigorous definition to the nature of Inkatha's populism, and to isolate and briefly examine what could be categorised as fascist characteristics of the movement. It was argued that it is historically more accurate to characterise Inkatha's populism as a conservative or reactionary nationalism, while it was recognised that more research needs to be done into this.

It was in this context that the second aim was situated: to discuss the nature of the Youth Brigade. A descriptive account was made of the structure, function and some of the activities of the Youth Brigade, and what role it plays within Inkatha as a whole. An attempt was made to highlight the hierarchical nature of the movement and the 'ageism' displayed towards the youth.

Thirdly, an attempt was made to examine the interaction between Inkatha, the Youth Brigade and youth who refuse to accept Inkatha's ideology. Out of this discussion arose a brief examination of the Youth Service Corps, the establishment of which was given impetus by the events in 1980.

This threefold aim was an attempt to work towards a greater understanding of Inkatha's approach to the youth. In conclusion, I would argue that the essential task Inkatha sets itself with regard to the youth is to contain the militancy - existing or potential - of the youth, and to assert its conservative ideology. It is in the execution of this task that the militarism, discipline, unity, patriotism and loyalty demanded of the youth come in.

In the light of the role played by the Youth Brigade at Ngoye in October 1983, I would argue that, far from the youth pushing the leadership to the left, it is finally beginning to assert its role as defined for it in the Inkatha Constitution, and for which it has been trained, ideologically, politically and practically. While maintaining a facade of negotiation and co-operation in order to curry favour with white liberals and conservative groupings, it will continue to use violence against political opponents. It is no coincidence that Mkhize visited Malawi a few years ago in order to study the Young Pioneers more closely. Mafole, Buthelezi et al should not express surprise over the violence at Ngoye, or lament that the youth 'got out of hand' - it is simply carrying out its role as vanguard of a movement that specialises in finding opponents, conspiracies and a 'total onslaught' behind every anti-Inkatha sentiment that is expressed.

FOOTNOTESPREFACE

1. Maré, G. 'Class formation in the South African reserve areas : Inkatha', presented at Wits conference on the History of Opposition in South Africa, 1978.
2. Southall, R. 'Buthelezi, Inkatha and the politics of compromise', in African Affairs 80, October 1981
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CHAPTER ONE

1. Speech by Chief Buthelezi, presented at the University of Natal, Durban, 7.2.1979
2. 'Inkatha : Centrepoint of the gathering storm', in Frontline, December 1979
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9. p120, op cit
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18. quoted p11, C.McCaul op cit
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20. Interview with Gatsha Buthelezi, Chief Minister of KwaZulu and President of Inkatha , by the writer, 18.11.1983
21. Interview with Dr. Oscar Dhlomo, KwaZulu Minister for Education and Secretary-General of Inkatha, by the writer, 18.11.1983
22. Nevertheless, the price of white bread was not reduced.
23. Interview with Mr. Sandile Makhanya, Professional Officer in the Youth Division, by the writer, 17.11.1983
24. Interview with Mr. Nqobizizwe Nkehli, Director of KwaZulu Bureau for Community Development and Youth Affairs, by the writer, 17.11.1983
25. p66, Villakazi, H. 'South Africa Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow', presented at Essex Country College, New Jersey, undated. This paper is extremely interesting in its use of marxist texts and Mandela's No Easy Walk To Freedom, to justify Buthelezi's political position. It seems to have been drawn up primarily as a response to accusations that Buthelezi had 'sold out' on black political aspirations in South Africa. Buthelezi quoted extensively from it in a speech presented at Stanger in September 1978.
26. p27, 'The President says it this way', in Inkatha, 6th Ordinary General Conference, June 1980
27. p73 op cit
28. see for example, Brewer, J. 'The Modern Janus : Inkatha's role in black liberation', in The Societies of Southern Africa in the 19th and 20th Centuries, Volume 12, Collected Seminar Papers No.28, University of London, 1981
29. 'ANC slams Buthelezi', Sunday Post 29.6.1980
30. p25, \*The President says it this way', op cit
31. Rand Daily Mail 25.3.1983  
Sowetan 35.3.1983
32. Rand Daily Mail 28.3.1983
33. Star 30.3.1983
34. Interview with Dhlomo by the writer, op cit
35. see for example pp37-55, Coleman, K. , paper on Inkatha, unpublished, 1980; Hayes, G. 'Inkatha : an analysis', paper presented to the Southern African Studies Seminar, University of Natal, 1979
36. Interview with Buthelezi by the writer, op cit

37. Interview with Nkehli by the writer, op cit
38. p16, Inhlabamkhosi , Volume 1, Number 3, October 1983
39. For a discussion on Inkatha's attitude towards the working class, see pp57-61, C. McCaul, op cit
40. p116, Buthelezi Commission Report, op cit. The Buthelezi Commission was composed of inter alia representatives from the Federated and Associated Chambers of Commerce; nominees of Harry Oppenheimer and Dr. Anton Rupert; representatives of banking and finance, Natal based secondary industry and the Afrikaner Handelsinstituut, as well as from the NRP and PFP.

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## CHAPTER TWO

1. p15, 'The Youth Brigade' in the Constitution of the National Cultural Liberation Movement or Inkatha, Inkatha booklet, undated
2. Interview with Mr. Nomusa Zondi, Head of KwaZulu Youth Affairs Division, by the writer, 17.11.1983
3. Reproduced pp12-13 in African Affairs, Number 2, January 1978
4. Speech by Buthelezi at Stanger, Natal 25.9.1978
5. The Youth Service Corps will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Five.
6. Interview with Mr. N. Mafole, National Organiser for the Youth Brigade, by the writer, 16.11.1983
7. 'Teachers get new warning', Rand Daily Mail 12.5.1978
8. p17, 'Presidential Address' in Inkatha, 6th Ordinary General Conference, June 1980
9. Interview by the writer, op cit
10. Interview with Chief Buthelezi by Joe Thloloe, Post 17.3.1980
11. David Masomi, Regional Organiser for Inkatha in Natal, Interviewed by C. McCaul, 10.3.1983
12. Interview by the writer, op cit
13. Ibid
14. Interview with S. Makhanya, op cit
15. Interview with N. Nkehli, op cit
16. Interview by the writer, op cit
17. Speech by Buthelezi to the Youth Brigade, 2nd Ordinary Conference, Ulundi, 24.3.1979
18. Speech by Buthelezi to Youth Leadership Training Course, Mahlabatini, 27.6.1978
19. Interview by the writer, op cit
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21. p15, 'Presidential Address' in Inkatha, 4th Ordinary General Conference, July 1978
22. 'Inkatha youth in merger with whites', Star 25.8.1981
23. 'Verwoerd and Motea build some bridges', Sunday Times 13.12.1981
24. 'Inkatha National Organiser in custody', Daily News 17.8.1981
25. Interview by the writer, op cit
26. Interview with members of the Civil Servants' Youth Brigade branch by the writer, 17.11.1983
27. Report on the Bureau for Community Development and Youth Affairs to the KLA, 4th Sitting, 1st Session, 15.11.1983
28. 'Proposed Five Year Plan for Running Youth Activation Programmes : Youth Action Section : Prepared by S.H.Makhanya' November 1983
29. ibid
30. Interview with David Masomi, op cit
31. Interview by the writer, op cit
32. Interview by the writer, op cit
33. Interview by the writer, op cit
34. Interview by the writer, op cit

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1. Schools swop as KwaZulu takes over', Sunday Tribune 2.1.1977
2. 'Natal fever or good relations?', Daily News 24.8.1977
3. p15, "The Black Struggle" in Inkatha Vol.2, No.7, August 1979
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5. 'Future of Soweto's students in the balance', Voice 20.5.1978
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7. 'Teachers get new warning', Rand Daily Mail 12.5.1977
8. Ibid
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10. "'Phil's Voice" : Too incredible to believe', Voice 6.5.1978
11. ' Toti school lawlessness condemned', Daily News 3.3.1979
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'Tear-gas as stones fly', Daily News 1.5.1980
13. 'Police use teargas at KwaMashu school', Rand Daily Mail 1.5.1980
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15. 'Parents back black boycott', Daily News 12.5.1980
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17. This is an 'indian' Durban suburb

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19. 'Chief lashes at 'imbeciles' - 'manipulators' blamed for trouble',  
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26. 'Inkatha to the rescue after impi beats priest', Daily News 19.5.1980  
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27. 'Man shot dead as pupils stone vehicle', Daily News 19.5.1980
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31. 'Inkatha persuades pupils to face Assembly', Daily News 29.5.1980
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33. 'Pupils' action against Inkatha', Rand Daily Mail 9.6.1980
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39. paragraphs 46 & 47, pp 10-11, op cit
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- 1. 'Shoot to kill, urges Buthelezi', Daily News 2.6.1980
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- 3. 'Violence flares in KwaMashu', Sunday Tribune 8.6.1980
- 4. 'Township tense - Buthelezi', Rand Daily Mail 14.6.1980
- 5. p16, 'Presidential Address' in Inkatha, Sixth Ordinary General Conference'  
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- 6. Daily News 9.5.1980
- 7. p17, 'Presidential Address', op cit
- 8. 'Youth Service Group to be set up', Natal Mercury 15.9.1980

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3. 'Students are sorry - but ban stays', World 24.10.1976
4. 'Teachers' Union joins Inkatha', Sunday Tribune 15.5.1977
5. '464-5 votes dissolves Zulu SRC', Natal Mercury 29.10.1977
6. 'Come off it, Professor', Sunday Tribune 25.6.1978
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11. 'Zululand University disturbances : Buthelezi blames Bengu', Daily News 21.5.80
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'Students are playing with fire, says Buthelezi', Daily News 22.5.1980
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14. 'Students held - then Inkatha force moves in', Sunday Tribune 25.5.1980  
'Shots fired at Varsity', Sunday Times 25.5.1980
15. 'Big sit-in at Zulu varsity - Arsonists hit after graduation ceremony',  
Star 26.5.1980
16. 'Hadebe may be prosecuted over violence, says Buthelezi', Daily News 27.5.80
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19. Editorial in Senzani, August 1980
20. 'Student suspended after writing letter to Mercury', Natal Mercury 18.11.80
21. 'Why Gatsha wasn't axed as Chancellor', Sunday Post 1.9.1980
22. 'Buthelezi betrayed in varsity talks', Star 29.8.1980
23. p26, Inhlabamkhosi Vol.1, No.3, October 1983
24. 'Spears drive off student rioters', Star 23.10.1981
25. 'Ngoye campus in new turmoil', Daily News 27.10.1981
26. 'The rector's warning : threat to take away students' burasaries', Natal Mercury 12.11.1981
27. This quote is from an unattributable interview with a member of the Crisis Committee. In the rest of this chapter, unless otherwise stated, the quotes used are from students interviewed by the writer, who do not wish to be named. (See list of references for further information concerning the interviews).
28. This is not unlikely. Stories abound of people, including Alan Paton and

the editor of the Sunday Tribune, being summoned to Ulundi to apologise or account to Buthelezi for something that they have said or done in connection with Inkatha.

29. Star 10.6.1983
30. Rand Daily Mail 13.8.1983
31. p25, op cit
32. Statement to Members of the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly on the events of the 29th October at the University of Zululand by the Chief Minister, Monday 31st October 1983
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2. 'Now it's Gatsha's army', Sunday Express 27.7.1980
3. Ibid
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7. National Conference of the Youth Brigade . Theme: Youth Responsibility in South Africa in the context of the Prime Minister's guidelines and implications of African Exclusion in the emerging political dispensation. Keynote Speech by Chief Buthelezi, Saturday 21 August 1982, Ondini.
8. interview by the writer, 17.11.1983
9. interview by the writer, 18.11.1983
10. interview by the writer, 17.11.1983
11. Report by the Chief Minister on the Bureau for Community Development and Youth Affairs to the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly, Fourth KLA sitting, First session
12. Keynote speech to Youth Brigade conference, 1982, op cit
13. This opinion was gleaned from interviews conducted by the writer in the period 5-9 September, 1983. (see reference list for interviewees)

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C. NEWSPAPERS

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Natal Mercury	Rand Daily Mail	Sunday Express	
Natal Witness	The Sowetan	Sunday Times	

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                   No.4 July 1978  
                   No.7 July 1979  
                   Volume 2 No.7 August 1979  
                   No.8 August 1979  
                   No.9 August 1979  
                   Fourth Ordinary General Conference June 1978  
                   Sixth Ordinary General Conference June 1979
2. INHLABAMKHOSI (Clarion Call) Volume 1 No.3 October 1983

E. INTERVIEWS

1. Mr.N.Mafole, National Organiser of the Youth Brigade
2. Mr.N.Zondi, Head of Youth Affairs, Bureau of Community Development and Youth
3. Mr.N.Nkehli, Director of Bureau for Community Development and Youth Affairs
4. Dr.O.D.Dhlomo, KwaZulu Minister for Culture and Education and Secretary-  
                   General of Inkatha
- . Chief Gatsha Buthelezi, Chief Minister of KwaZulu and President of Inkatha
- . Members of the Civil Servants' Youth Brigade branch, Ulundi. (approximately  
   twenty five members interviewed in a group)
- . Mr.S.Makhanya, Professional Officer, Youth Division
- . Members of the Literacy training project under Mrs.J.Maysom. (approximately  
   twenty six members interviewed in a group)
- . Two Youth Service Corps Members who are part of the Literacy Training project
- . Two members of the Ngoye Crisis Committee (unattributable)
- . Two AZASO members, students at University of Natal Medical School (unattributable)
- . Three students from Ngoye (unattributable)
- . Reverend Xundu, Anglican Minister in Lamontville and member of JORAC
- . Mr.I.Nkise, former community councillor for Hambanati, presently on executive  
   of UDF, Natal North Coast
- . Mr.A.Gumedi, National President of the UDF
- . Mr.I.Donald, from Association for Rural Advancement, Pietermaritzburg
- . Mr.L.Tsenoli, Member of DIAKONIA, Durban
- . Four unattributable interviews

SPEECHES BY BUTHELEZI

- . Stanger, Natal 25.9.1978
- . Umlazi, KwaZulu 23.7.1980
- . Soweto, Johannesburg 13.4.1980



4. Ulundi, KwaZulu 13.3.1980
  5. Ondini, KwaZulu 10.10.1981
  6. Aachen, West Germany 25.9.1981
  7. Nobamba, KwaZulu 29.8.1981
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  9. Durban 3.12.1981
  10. KLA 19.11.1982
  11. Soweto 17.10.1982
  12. Johannesburg 15.10.1982
  13. Ondini 9.10.1982
  14. Melmoth, KwaZulu 29.9.1982
  15. KwaMashu 17.4.1982
  16. Ondini 21.7.1982
  17. Edendale, Natal 4.12.1982
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A NOTE ON METHODOLOGY

The nature of this paper is such that much reliance was placed on information from interviews, newspaper reports and speeches. This does present some problems in terms of accuracy. Nevertheless, I would argue that this paper does reflect the prevailing attitude towards the youth in Inkatha.

The interviews were, on the whole, conducted in an atmosphere conducive to conversation, and many of the most interesting comments were made to the writer during informal gatherings. In addition, several interviews which are unattributable were conducted by the writer. The reasons given for the interviewees not wishing to be identified were generally fear of reprisal. Some of the interviews were recorded on tape and then transcribed by the writer; where this was not possible, notes were taken during the interview, and then written up in full afterwards. Two of the interviews were with large groups of people (interviews number 6 and 8 in the bibliography), and while this presented some difficulty for note taking, they were immensely interesting and valuable since interviewees spoke to each other as well as to the interviewer.

The dissertation as a whole has taken on a different form to that originally envisaged by the writer. In order for a thorough study to be done of the Youth Brigade, it would be necessary for an in-depth study to be made of a number of branches. This was not possible for this dissertation, since research time available to the writer coincided with school and university vacations. Nevertheless, it is hoped that this project has pointed to trends within and characteristics of the Youth Brigade, and of Inkatha's attitude towards youth in general.

It would seem that there are a number of areas which need to be researched. In addition to those mentioned in the text, the precise nature of Inkatha's brand of populism needs to be rigorously examined.

Finally, I would argue that the scope of this paper was too broad, which has meant that in places questions were left unanswered, or were not posed at all. The chapter on the schools' boycott, for example, could have been far longer and more analytical. As it stands, it focussed on a very specific time period during the boycott, and made no reference to the boycott of 'coloured' and 'indian' schools in the greater Durban area, for example, or to the boycott in any other areas. This was perhaps necessary in order to contextualise the boycott in KwaMashu and Umlazi. This paper should therefore be viewed as general comments on Inkatha's Youth Brigade, with the hope that further research will be done in this area.

# Waiver over KwaZulu bursary pledge by students

ACADEMICS in Natal have expressed strong misgivings about the effect the KwaZulu bursary pledge will have on academic freedom.

Students were summoned to Ulundi to sign a pledge not to criticise Inkatha, the KwaZulu Government or Chief Gatsha Buthelezi — or else forfeit financial assistance to further their studies.

They also had to promise: "I shall never in word or deed, directly or indirectly, vilify, denigrate or in any manner speak in contempt of the Inkatha Liberation Movement or its leadership at various levels in public or in private."

Professor P. Booysse, vice-principal of Natal University, saw this as an infringement of academic freedom.

"I do not believe that

Daily News  
Reporter

one should in any way prescribe to students or staff at a university what to think by using financial or any other mechanism to force particular attitudes on them," he said.

The secretary of the Joint Academic Staff Association, Mr David Schuster, saw freedom of thought as a basic human right.

"What has happened to individual rights as a human being? Must one just sign them away when one becomes a student?"

Professor Lawrence Schlemmer, part-time director of the Inkatha Institute, said: "This sort of pledge is fairly common as an extension of the civil service norms. However, in many coun-

tries these come into conflict with other norms, such as academic freedom.

"I am aware of the complexities, but do not like restriction on thought and this pledge does produce a serious problem for universities."

Chief Gatsha Buthelezi told the students called to Ulundi that he had "no intention of creating automata or decoys. Our aim is to help produce young people who can think for themselves.

"We accept the principles underlying academic freedom," he said.

"But we cannot help to produce intellectually dishonest people who, while they find it acceptable to use money from 'sell-outs,' continue to denigrate us either tacitly or openly."

DAILY NEWS 16.1.1984

The introduction of a 'pledge' to Inkatha by Ngoye students is a development that has occurred since the writing of this dissertation. It does, however have bearing on Chapter Four of this paper, and the above newspaper article has therefore been included as a late addendum.