

SECRET

2

SUMMARY NOTES OF A MEETING BETWEEN A SOUTH AFRICAN AND A
UNITED STATES DELEGATION ON THE QUESTION OF SOUTH WEST
AFRICA/NAMIBIA : GENEVA, 13 FEBRUARY 1986

South African delegation

Mr R F Botha
Ambassador J H A Beukes
Mr A L Manley
Mr D W Auret
Mr A Jaquet
Mr D T de Wet

United States delegation

Dr C Crocker
Ambassador Herman Nickel
Mr P Ringdahl
Mr J Davidow
Mr R Cabelly
Ms Nancy Ely
Mr Ashley Wills

DR CROCKER noted that since the last meeting which had taken place in Cape Town in January 1986, there had been a series of developments relating to Angola. Dr Savimbi had paid a successful visit to Washington in which he had succeeded in achieving wide ranging exposure and had thus managed to take the high ground. On the American side his argument in favour of power sharing and possible reconciliation between the various parties in Angola, had received firm support. By the time he had left Washington there was no doubt that he had managed to put his case

seriously about what it meant in order that effective

SECRET

2

action which would bolster his position could be taken once across and it was the American impression that he had been well understood. Savimbi had done a fine job and there was little doubt that Savimbi was pleased with the visit as a whole. He had also left Washington with an indication that he would receive proper support. A further advantage of Dr Savimbi's visit had been that he had been exposed to the different voices which constituted the general support he has in the U.S. This should have given him a good indication of how the United States would proceed vis-a-vis Angola in the future. In this regard DR CROCKER said that the Administration was determined to achieve a resolution of broad support in Congress without detailing any specific action which will be taken to support Savimbi. This was important since it would give President Reagan flexibility to provide the kind of support which would help Dr Savimbi and which would be effective. It would also provide an umbrella for other supporting actions which might be contemplated. Moreover, it would give impetus to the greater consensus on how to proceed, which was at present emerging. Dr Savimbi understood that. Decisions in this regard had already been taken and the United States was going to provide support.

A further aspect which was discussed during the talks was the question of national reconciliation in Angola, which was high on the United States' list of priorities. This had specifically come to the fore in the discussion Dr Savimbi had had with Secretary of State Schultz. Security Council Resolution 435 and Cuban troop withdrawal (CTW) was of course also discussed and Dr Savimbi was told that the United States would continue its existing approach regarding Namibia and Angola. As far as national reconciliation was concerned Dr Savimbi was asked to think seriously about what it meant in order that effective

SECRET

3

action which would bolster his position could be taken once this matter became reality. His ideas would also be useful in terms of canvassing support for national reconciliation with other African states such as Gabon and Zaire.

MR BOTHA asked Dr Crocker what his view was on national reconciliation in Angola.

DR CROCKER said that he would not want to see Savimbi shoot from the hip on this issue. It was important that national reconciliation should not mean something which was purely ethnically based. It would not help for the MPLA simply to appoint a number of Ovimbundu to the government in Luanda and think that they had thereby achieved national reconciliation. There was more to it than that. He wanted to state clearly that national reconciliation in Angola could not be linked to a Namibian settlement. This objective should be pursued independently. DR CROCKER said that he thought that a strategy similar to that of March 1985 was probably the best way to proceed. The United States, however, needed to hear more concrete ideas from Dr Savimbi as to what that term (i.e. national reconciliation) might mean. Dr Savimbi promised that he would get back with more concrete ideas but there was no doubt that he had left Washington with bolstered morale and a sense of having been well received.

DR CROCKER said that while Dr Savimbi was in Washington a further round of discussions had taken place with the Angolans in the form of a meeting between Minister Rodrigues (Kito) and Frank Wisner. Kito had repeated that the Angolans attached great importance to the idea that South Africa should demonstrate its commitment to a Namibian settlement by agreeing to a date for the

implementation of SCR 435 on condition that agreement is reached on Cuban troop withdrawal. Kito's contention was that this would help convince the doubters in his own ranks. The Angolans realised that they had a military option which could be pursued but they clearly did not want to do so. An opening on the peace track would hopefully persuade the Angolans to pursue that option energetically and aggressively. From the American point of view it was thus important to get a date for implementation from South Africa but at the same time the United States was seeking to convince the Angolans that it would be a mighty struggle to achieve this. The Angolans certainly have no reason to assume that it would be easy to convince South Africa to do so. The Americans were convinced that this idea had some potential impact. South Africa could couch any such announcement in a way which would show that the South Africans were taking the initiative and this would give South African the high ground. There were indications that some of the United States' European partners, e.g. the British, had knowledge of the initiative but the Americans were doing all in their power to protect it.

MR BOTHA said that he thought that the idea had been mentioned in broad outline in a letter President Botha had addressed to Mrs Thatcher.

DR CROCKER said that the tactics and timing relating to the realisation of the initiative were of extreme importance. President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev had discussed regional issues in Geneva. Angola had been on the agenda. There would be a meeting between Secretary of State Schultz and Foreign Minister Schevardnadze soon. He himself would be seeing his Soviet counterpart within a month. The United States would make the case that a

continuation of the military track in Angola would have consequences for overall U.S./Soviet relations. The Soviets would be told that they should use their influence in Luanda in a constructive manner if they were interested in the survival of the MPLA. Given Soviet propaganda tactics, it would be useful to have an indication from South Africa before his meeting with his Soviet counterpart.

MR BOTHA said that the South African Government would look MR BOTHA explained that Dr Crocker was aware that his idea had been to have President Botha make the announcement in his speech at the opening of Parliament on 31 January 1986. A draft had been submitted to him. And at that stage the feeling was that the inclusion of such an announcement would have a great impact. Subsequently, however, a formulation regarding Mr Mandela had also been submitted and the inclusion of both these items would have made the speech too long. He also wanted to say to Dr Crocker candidly that he believed there might have been opposition to the announcement from the internal parties in the Territory. The AG had wanted to brief the internal parties on the discussions in Cape Town and while it had been agreed that this could be done, the AG was instructed not to go into the question of such an announcement. There was no doubt that the internal parties did not like this idea. South Africa was having great difficulty with them. While they had overcome their own initial internal difficulties, he could not tell Dr Crocker today what the chances were of their accepting such an initiative. The South African Government was in favour of the announcement. He did not think that Dr Savimbi would be opposed to it. (NOTE: Dr Crocker interrupted and said that Dr Savimbi had not expressed opposition to the idea in Washington.) But the difficulties were with the internal

SECRET

6

parties. He asked whether Ambassador Nickel could not be authorised to talk to them. In any event the South African Government would have to consult with them on this matter.

DR CROCKER said that they could think about this possibility and added that there would clearly be benefit in giving the event some drama.

MR BOTHA said that the South African Government would look for an opportunity to proceed with this initiative.

DR CROCKER expressed the view that the initiative was in part a tool, since it would obviously increase the pressure on Luanda but it was also in part a gimmick. It did not do or call for more than was already South African Government policy.

MR BOTHA said that he had a suspicion that the internal parties had sent a message to President Botha in which they expressed their opposition to this idea. It seemed as if the internal parties would do anything in their power to avoid the implementation of SCR 435 and that they might be considering doing a deal with SWAPO. He had to say that the internal parties did not hold strong views on Cuban troop withdrawal. (At this point Mr Botha read a report on the announcement which appeared in Business Day on 13 January 1986 - see attached).

MR BOTHA asked what the Americans thought he could say with regard to the news report.

DR CROCKER indicated that he would stonewall completely on this point. (At this stage discussion of possible press comment took place and the attached press release was decided upon.)

SECRET

7

DR CROCKER continued and asked Mr Botha to let the United States have further thoughts on this matter. The United States accepted the formulation which South Africa had put forward as far as the initiative was concerned. He wanted to ask how Mr Botha saw the picture in Angola.

MR BOTHA indicated that he was of the opinion that unless something happened in Luanda and unless some of the key figures in the Central Committee or the Politbureau tire of the war and saw that the Soviet Union was not helping them, there was no hope for change.

DR CROCKER asked whether South Africa had any hard evidence in support of this contention.

MR BOTHA said that there were a number of whispers but he wanted to make it clear that unless that was the case he found it hard to believe that Dos Santos would be prepared to accept Cuban troop withdrawal. Something had to happen in Luanda and he was of the opinion that it might not be impossible for the Angolans to decide to talk to the Soviets in attempting to solve their dilemma. The Soviet Union was, in his view, the key.

DR CROCKER agreed that there could be no question in that regard.

MR BOTHA thought that perhaps the Angolans would recognise the folly of continuing their intimate relationship with the Soviet Union. It was a fact that the Soviets were not popular in Africa, since they had not contributed anything to arrest the retrogression in the continent. The United States was in an extremely strong position since it

demonstrably played an important role in many African countries. He wanted to inform Dr Crocker that he had seen the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and that the UNHCR would soon be sending a team to South Africa to look into the problem in regard to refugees. The press and the media would be present during the visit and this would no doubt serve to highlight the problems he was talking about. The position in the African countries was terrible and the United States had an advantage which the Soviets did not. The U.S. could play a very important role in this regard.

DR CROCKER explained that the United States was seeking points to exert pressure on Luanda and was basically working in four arenas.

- the negotiations around SCR 435 and Cuban troop withdrawal
- the military situation, through hints out of Washington of aid to Savimbi
- by seeking options which might facilitate national reconciliation in Angola, but without linking it to a settlement in Namibia
- the U.S./Soviet front.

These were all ways in which pressure could be brought to bear on the MPLA. A decision by South Africa to proceed with the proposed initiative would give the United States a basis to further increase the pressure.

MR BOTHA asked Dr Crocker whether he was satisfied that the United States had done enough to convince those African leaders who supported Savimbi to go to Luanda and to tell the MPLA what it should be doing and to convince the African leaders that they could play a constructive role.

SECRET

9

DR CROCKER indicated that the United States was talking to the Africans on this question. In this regard Francophone countries were very important and were sending the United States messages that they only required an indication from Luanda that there was a possibility that this might happen and they would then jump in the pond. He added that Brazzaville would in future also become progressively more important in terms of exerting leverage on the MPLA. It should not be forgotten that during years of exile and during the liberation struggle the MPLA had operated from Brazzaville.

MR BOTHA enquired whether Dr Crocker had heard rumours that President Dos Santos had, during a visit to Kinshasa, indicated to President Mobutu that he would talk to Savimbi, but that he had retracted this once he returned to Luanda.

DR CROCKER said that they had heard such a story in 1985. The American analysis was that movement at this stage would bear fruit since there was some fluidity and perhaps even flexibility in Luanda. The covert approach which the U.S. favoured in regard to aid to Savimbi had been decided upon because it was not the business of the opposition to know that the United States was doing.

MR BOTHA expressed the view that SWAPO was in a much weaker position allround at this stage than in the past. He wanted to mention that the Commander of Sector 10 in SWA/Namibia had regular discussions with the Commander of the 5th military region in Angola. Such matters were important and we should take measures now which could make best use of the weakened SWAPO position.

DR CROCKER agreed and said that he thought that it should be done sooner rather than later.

MR BOTHA noted that he was concerned that the Soviet Union was contemplating increasing their role in Africa. This should be prevented.

DR CROCKER said that the US shared this concern and steps should be taken sooner rather than later to prevent this. Savimbi had said that time was not on our side. The decision by the Soviets to supply Angola with some US\$2 billion of arms had already been taken in 1983. It should always be borne in mind that the Soviets operated in terms of middle to long-term strategies. There was every reason to believe that this arms supply would continue. Gorbachev had to prove himself.

MR BOTHA asked whether Eastern European countries such as Romania, Yugoslavia, Hungary and East Germany were in a position to assess the intentions of the Soviet Union in Africa.

DR CROCKER asked what South Africa was hearing. There could be no doubt about Soviet intentions. In his opinion "we gave the Soviet Union Angola in 1975".

MR BOTHA said that if peace could be achieved in Angola it would have a positive effect on the whole of Southern Africa. The so-called liberation movements and organisations such as the ANC would be denied existence and would dry up.

DR CROCKER said that he would get a mandate in Washington to talk to the Soviet Union about South African concerns and would keep South Africa posted in this regard.

SECRET

11

years ago today the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 385 which was intended to provide a definitive programme for the independence of South West Africa. Those who know the history of this matter know that MR BOTHA enquired whether the Americans could not make concessions to the Soviets on an issue such as Star Wars in exchange for Soviet movement in Africa.

DR CROCKER said that it was U.S. policy to make clear to the Soviet Union that the United States could bankrupt them on arms development technology. The Soviets had to know that arms control was a function of broader policy relationships and not the other way round. This would be told to them in no uncertain terms.

agreed to a satisfactory timetable for Cuban withdrawal. The people of South West Africa have waited long enough for independence. In a serious attempt to facilitate a resolution of this difficult problem I propose that 1 October 1986 be set as the date for implementation of the international settlement plan, provided a firm and satisfactory agreement can be reached two months before that date on the withdrawal of the Cubans.

1. IMMEDIATE
2. TELNR5675

COPY NO OF

Ten years ago today the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 385 which was intended to provide a definitive programme for the independence of South West Africa. Those who know the history of this matter know that the fact that the territory has not yet attained independence cannot be laid at South Africa's door. The last remaining obstacle to the implementation of the international settlement plan is the continuing threat posed to South West Africa and to our region by the presence of the Cubans in Angola. Despite the progress which has been made in bilateral discussions since October 1984 when Angola agreed in principle to the withdrawal of the Cubans in conjunction with the implementation of the settlement plan, the Angolan Government has yet to agree to a satisfactory timetable for Cuban withdrawal. The people of South West Africa have waited long enough for independence. In a serious attempt to facilitate a resolution of this difficult problem I propose that 1 October 1986 be set as the date for ^{COMMENCEMENT OF} implementation of the international settlement plan, provided a firm and satisfactory agreement can be reached two months before that date on the withdrawal of the Cubans.

IT WAS LEARNT THAT CROCKER LEFT WASHINGTON ON TUESDAY NIGHT WITH AN UNUSUALLY LARGE DELEGATION.

"THE TALKS ARE GOING TO COVER JUST ABOUT EVERYTHING" A DIPLOMAT SAID.

HE ADDED THAT ANGOLA AND SWA WOULD BE AT THE TOP OF THE AGENDA.

UN RESOLUTION 435 HAS FOR MANY YEARS BEEN ONE OF THE MOST CONTENTIOUS ISSUES IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY WITH VIRTUALLY THE WHOLE WORLD RANGED AGAINST SA FOR NOT IMPLEMENTING IT AND WITHDRAWING FROM SWA.

ANOTHER PRESSING TOPIC WAS UNDERSTOOD TO BE BOTSWANA.

US OFFICIALS ARE DEEPLY WORRIED ABOUT SA POTENTIAL STRIKES AGAINST THE ANC IN THAT COUNTRY.

THE TALKS COME AS THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION EMBARKS UNDER PRESSURE FROM CONGRESSIONAL CONSERVATIVES ON A POLICY OF PSYCHOLOGICAL PRESSURE ON THE ANGOLAN GOVERNMENT TO SEND THE CUBANS HOME.

THE POLICY HAS ENTAILED PUBLICLY WELCOMING UNITA'S JONAS SAVIMBI AND PROVIDING HIM WITH SOME MILITARY

1. IMMEDIATE
2. TELNR5075
3. 19860213/0900
4. KAAPSTAD
5. GENEVA (SAFDEL)
6. ROETE: P VERMEULEN

COPY NO OF

EN CLAIR

1. GELIEWE DRINGEND VOLGENDE AAN DW AURET TE BESORG.
2. TELGESPREK TUSSEN MNR AURET EN VERMEULEN VERWYS.
3. TEKS VAN VANDAG SE BUSINESS DAY VOORBLADBERIG DEUR

SIMON BARBER SOOS VOLG:
PIK CONFERS WITH CROCKER IN GENEVA

BOTHA READY FOR DEAL ON SWA

WASHINGTON - SA IS PREPARED TO NAME A DATE FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 435 TO HELP THE US PRESSURE ANGOLA OVER CUBAN TROOP WITHDRAWALS, DIPLOMATIC SOURCES SAY.

THE RESOLUTION RELATES TO UN-SUPERVISED ELECTIONS IN SOUTH WEST AFRICA.

THIS OFFER WAS LIKELY TO BE MADE DURING FOREIGN MINISTER PIK BOTHA'S TALKS WITH DR CHESTER CROCKER IN GENEVA. THEY MET YESTERDAY.

STATE DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN ROBERT BRUCE DECLINED TO ELABORATE ON THE PURPOSE OF THE MEETING BEYOND SAYING IT WOULD DEAL WITH REGIONAL AND BILATERAL ISSUES.

IT WAS LEARNT THAT CROCKER LEFT WASHINGTON ON TUESDAY NIGHT WITH AN UNUSUALLY LARGE DELEGATION.

"THE TALKS ARE GOING TO COVER JUST ABOUT EVERYTHING" A DIPLOMAT SAID.

HE ADDED THAT ANGOLA AND SWA WOULD BE AT THE TOP OF THE AGENDA.

UN RESOLUTION 435 HAS FOR MANY YEARS BEEN ONE OF THE MOST CONTENTIOUS ISSUES IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY WITH VIRTUALLY THE WHOLE WORLD RANGED AGAINST SA FOR NOT IMPLEMENTING IT AND WITHDRAWING FROM SWA.

ANOTHER PRESSING TOPIC WAS UNDERSTOOD TO BE BOTSWANA.

US OFFICIALS ARE DEEPLY WORRIED ABOUT SA POTENTIAL STRIKES AGAINST THE ANC IN THAT COUNTRY.

THE TALKS COME AS THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION EMBARKS UNDER PRESSURE FROM CONGRESSIONAL CONSERVATIVES ON A POLICY OF PSYCHOLOGICAL PRESSURE ON THE ANGOLAN GOVERNMENT TO SEND THE CUBANS HOME.

THE POLICY HAS ENTAILED PUBLICLY WELCOMING UNITA'S JONAS SAVIMBI AND PROVIDING HIM WITH SOME MILITARY

AID.

BILATERAL TALKS

STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS SAY THE ADMINISTRATION HAS BEGUN BILATERAL TALKS WITH THE SOVIET UNION ON AN ANGOLAN SETTLEMENT.

BY SETTING A SPECIFIC DATE FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF THE UN RESOLUTION, WHILE STILL MAKING IT CONDITIONAL ON A CUBAN WITHDRAWAL AGREEMENT, SA WAS PROBABLY HOPING TO ADD TO THE PRESSURE ON LUANDA, DIPLOMATIC SOURCES SAID.

"WE'RE IN A HURRY. WE WANT TO DEMONSTRATE OUR WILLINGNESS TO BE FLEXIBLE," AN SA OFFICIAL SAID.

CROCKER HAS MADE IT CLEAR IN RECENT WEEKS THAT, WHILE BOTH SA AND ANGOLA HAVE BEEN DRAGGING THEIR FEET ON THE SPECIFICS OF THE US SPONSORED CUBAN WITHDRAWAL/SWA INDEPENDENCE PLAN, LUANDA SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN PUTTING UP MORE AND BIGGER OBSTACLES.

SA'S FOREIGN DEBT CRISIS AND RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN ANGOLA ARE BELIEVED TO BE THE MAJOR PURPOSES OF THE WEEK LONG VISIT TO EUROPE BY BOTHA, WRITER ANTHONY JOHNSON.

IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT BOTHA WILL BE SPENDING MOST OF HIS TIME IN SWITZERLAND SEEING OFFICIALS ABOUT THE DEBT STANDSTILL.

THE SWISS GOVERNMENT SAYS BOTHA WILL BE MEETING HIS SWISS COUNTERPART PIERRE AUBERT IN BERNE.

THERE HAS ALSO BEEN SPECULATION THAT BOTHA WILL SEE FRITZ LEUTWILLER, THE SWISS MEDIATOR BETWEEN SA AND WESTERN BANKERS.

THE POSSIBLE RELEASE OF ANC LEADER NELSON MANDELA IS ALSO LIKELY TO BE RAISED IN BOTHA'S TALKS WITH CROCKER.

A SPOKESMAN FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS SAID THAT BOTHA WAS ABROAD TO DISCUSS GOVERNMENT'S REFORM PROGRAMME AND MATTERS RELATING TO SOUTHERN AFRICA.

HE SAID THE TRIP HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH THE RELEASE EARLIER THIS WEEK OF SOVIET DISSIDENT ANATOLY SHCHARANSKY.

A DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS SPOKESMAN CONFIRMED LAST NIGHT THAT BOTHA HAD ALREADY MET CROCKER IN GENEVA YETERDAY.

AT THE MEETING WERE THE SOUTH AFRICAN AMBASSADOR TO THE US HERBERT BEUKES AND SENIOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OFFICIALS OF BOTH COUNTRIES.

ENDS

In response to enquiries regarding speculative media reports on the content of the discussions between the United States and South Africa in Geneva relating to South West Africa/Namibia and the possibility of an announcement for the implementation of U.N. Security Council Resolution 435, Mr R F Botha said that he was not aware of any such decision by the South African Government on this issue.

Geneva

13 February 1986