

2.2 RESETTLEMENT SITES

This chapter gives a guide, district by district, to all known resettlement sites in the Ciskei. The information comes largely from field trips in 1980-82, updated where possible. Some of the communities are rather fluid and altogether there are many gaps in the picture, for which we apologise. Ongoing field work is needed even just to keep track of what is happening.

First, to give the overall scale of population movement, we review immigration to the Ciskei in the decade 1970-80 on the basis of estimates drawn from the population censuses. Then follows a description of the districts of Mdantsane, Zwelitsha, Hewu, Victoria East, Keiskam-mahoek and Peddie.

2.2.1 Immigration to the Ciskei

Immigration into the Ciskei is summarised in Table 1 on the next page, according to magisterial district.

In addition to natural growth of the 1970 population, the Ciskei has increased by 161 283, or 26% of the current population. Assuming that immigration was evenly spread throughout the 1970s and that it did not disrupt the natural growth of the immigrant population, this implies that 142 350 people entered the Ciskei during the decade. The flow was fairly evenly divided between those going to proclaimed towns and to rural villages.

According to the table, a staggering 55 250 were resettled in Mdantsane during the 1970s alone. Even this figure may well be a little on the conservative side.

Towns in the Zwelitsha district received 14 273 immigrants. Most went to Dimbaza and Ilitha rather than to Zwelitsha itself.

The estimate for new arrivals to Sada (Hewu) in the 1970s is 3 385. Even ignoring the squatter settlement of Emadakeni on the edge of Sada, there is reason to believe that this is a gross

Table 1 AFRICAN IMMIGRATION TO THE CISKEI

Magisterial districts	African population		Annual growth rate	Net immigration	New arrivals as % of total population
	1970	1980			
Urban: Mdantsane	66 380	149 621	8,5	55 250	42
Zwelitsha	24 662	48 503	7,0	14 273	33
Hewu	10 671	17 825	5,3	3 385	22
SUBTOTAL	101 713	215 949	7,8	72 908	38
Rural: Mdantsane	18 975	29 122	4,4	3 747	15
Zwelitsha	68 402	118 495	5,7	25 438	24
Hewu	19 574	56 240	11,1	26 989	54
Victoria East	42 303	65 616	4,5	8 966	15
Keiskammahoek	26 800	38 280	3,6	2 777	8
Peddie	43 300	58 725	3,1	1 730	3
Middledrift	36 734	47 926	2,7	- 205	-
SUBTOTAL	256 088	404 335	4,9	69 442	19
TOTAL	357 801	630 353	5,83	142 350	26

underestimate. The current figure for Sada is probably more like double the table figure of 17 825.

There was considerable influx into the rural areas of Zwelitsha (25 438) and Hewu (26 989). In the latter, more than half the rural population is recent arrivals and their descendants. The numerous resettlement sites in both areas testify to this influx.

There was also positive net immigration into the rural parts of four other districts: Mdantsane (3 747), Victoria East (8 966), Keiskammahoek (2 777) and Peddie (1 730). Only Middledrift, which has no known resettlement camps, saw net emigration.

A warning about the above figures. Undercounting in the recent census may have been quite significant in some districts, especially in the closer settlements of Mdantsane, Zwelitsha and Hewu. Secondly, net immigration figures are not entirely appropriate indicators of the extent of population migration to, from and within the Ciskei. They will not include families who were resettled to the Ciskei but who left between the census dates, nor the migrant workers of resettled families who worked in other areas on the census day. Underestimation on this score may well come to something like 20 000. The figures will also underestimate the influx into specific districts from R S A to the extent that these districts are losing people to other Ciskeian districts. For example, there may very possibly have been internal Ciskeian migration from rural parts of Peddie, Keiskammahoek, Victoria East, Hewu and Middledrift towards Zwelitsha and Mdantsane. This urbanisation process inside the Ciskei has been greatly exaggerated recently, but is nevertheless occurring. It is impossible to put a realistic figure on the numbers involved.

Because of these shortcomings there are considerable discrepancies between the above

immigration figures and the population estimates for the various resettlement sites given below. Those resettlement figures themselves are only rough ones, based on newspaper reports, direct observation and hearsay. In some cases they are open to considerable error, but they were the best we could get.

2.2.2 Mdantsane district

MDANTSANE

Mdantsane is the massive dormitory township of East London. On the basis of census figures we estimate that 39 958, or 72% of the 55 250 new arrivals, were resettled from Duncan Village in East London during the 70s. The other 28% have a variety of backgrounds. Some came from rural parts of the Ciskei, some from small Eastern Cape towns, and others from the Western Cape. Only ex-farm people seem to be absent. Relocation to Mdantsane on a similar scale occurred in the 60s. During this period, people from the Western Cape were more predominant. A case study in Part 3 below discusses removals to Mdantsane in more detail.

POTSDAM

This settlement is on the left of the road from East London to King William's Town, just after Mdantsane.

Potsdam began in 1969 as a temporary transit camp for farm labourers evicted when the Development Trust purchased the white farmland where Mdantsane was later extended. It was initially a transit camp, and the Potsdam people were forced to sell their livestock and were told they would have no land to plough. The settlement was subsequently reinforced as farm labourers came from the Komgha area. By 1972 there were 992 residents, but Potsdam still kept the character of a transit camp. Only now, in 1982, is the permanence of the settlement being recognised. There are no government services except for a mobile clinic and a single primary school. 18 out of 19 children are below the third percentile (weight/age should be 83% above, is more than 95% below) - a sign of serious malnutrition.

The 1981 population was estimated at 5 000, which is 4 000 more than in 1972. Apparently 1 750 people came from Komgha, Kei Mouth and Moolplaats, east of East London, in 1976 (Charton, 1981, 72). We do not know where the others came from.

2.2.3 Zwelitsha district

This large district of the Ciskei contains the towns of Dimbaza, Zwelitsha and Ilitha, and also a substantial rural population of 118 495. There are many resettlement sites in the area - these are outlined below. At least one other is planned, at Chalumna. Net immigration for 1970-80 is 25 438, according to estimates based on the census, but this figure is probably on the conservative side. Proximity to the border industrial areas makes this district ideal for resettlement in the interests of labour supply.

The tremendous inflow into the area has, however, been far less an act of deliberate planning

for labour supply than the effect of people simply wanting to go there rather than elsewhere in the Ciskei, since most non-migrant jobs in the Ciskei are found in and around here. Many of the new sizeable resettlement sites in the area, and this includes Dimbaza, had small beginnings. They started with a few squatters being resettled or a few workers evicted from farms bought by the Trust. Then they expanded as families filtered in one by one. They had become redundant on farms and been evicted; or they had found life on white farms intolerable, 'chosen' the Ciskei because they had not been allowed to move anywhere else and had no other route to industrial employment except through a bantustan with its migrant or commuter labour markets. Similar considerations would have applied to the much smaller group of people from small towns in the Cape.

The pattern of migration to the Zwelitsha district shows clearly that resettlement in South Africa cannot be viewed simply as the organised uprooting of certain whole communities. The unco-ordinated seepage from white South Africa to the bantustans, which moves a large number of people, is due as much to the impact of the legal and State-enforced institutional environment in which africans find themselves as to planned removals such as Duncan Village to Mdantsane or Humansdorp to Elukhanyweni.

DIMBAZA

The site lies left of the road, about 15 km from King William's Town on the route to Alice and Fort Beaufort.

This resettlement camp, notorious in the 60s, is now the industrial heartland of the Ciskei. The first people came from towns west of the Eiselen Line as a result of the coloured labour preference policy. The influx increased in the 70s to between 8 000 and 9 000. A significant number are from towns throughout the Cape, and many came of their own free will. But just as many had rural backgrounds: some were evicted, others found farm conditions intolerable and left of their own accord. Conditions in Dimbaza are discussed in a case study in Part 3 below. The official population figure in 1978 was 14 562.

ZWELITSHA

This dormitory suburb of King William's Town lies slightly southwards. A right turnoff from the East London road as it leaves King William's Town, at the SABC building, leads to Zwelitsha.

It is now a fairly long-established township, with a present population of about 30 000. In the mid-seventies there was a brief wave of new arrivals, but since then the influx has dropped again. No more than 3 500 people, probably mostly from the other townships of King William's Town, could have entered in the last few years.

ILITHA

A turnoff right, signposted to Ilitha, leads to this site about 10 km out of King William's Town on the East London road, just before Berlin.

This place started in the mid-seventies. Charton (1981, 72) records 2 000 arrivals in 1974, and there has been a lot of expansion since then, both in numbers and in physical planning. The community includes people who had been squatting at places such as Frankfort near King William's Town. Now Ilitha is an established town of the Sada/Dimbaza type where people are buying plots.

PHAKAMISA

The turnoff to this site is the same as for Zwelitsha - a road to the right at the SABC as you leave King William's Town for East London. Instead of turning off this side road to Zwelitsha, you would continue along it for about 7 km. Just before a low bridge, there is a dirt road to the left leading to Phakamisa which is at the top of a hill. It is close to the Fort Murray turnoff.

People who were unable to get houses in Zwelitsha created a squatter area just outside it called Silvertown. This was flattened by a great storm in June 1979. The squatters were left homeless, but managed to attach themselves to Sebe's interest in his then rivalry with Chief Lent Maqoma who was Minister of the Interior. The people were given temporary wooden houses on released farm 135, which they still occupy. This is Phakamisa.

Phakamisa is now being surveyed, and will eventually comprise 1 460 sites. The Ciskei government is hoping to sell these to its civil servants as sites for building their own houses (DD, 10.06.81). If this scheme gets off the ground, the Phakamisa people will probably have to move again. The current population is estimated at 3 000.

NDEVANA

This site is next door to Phakamisa. It lies about half a kilometre further along the dirt road, a little further round the hill, and it overlooks the valley.

One can only presume that the Quail Commission was hallucinating when it wrote that Ndevana has flourished despite all the difficulties and beyond all expectations ... a small but important example of what people can create for themselves out of nothing if they are given a minimum of support by the authorities.

On the contrary, Ndevana offers a picture of mass misery and deprivation unsurpassed anywhere in the Ciskei. It started promisingly enough when Sebe brought out 23 landless families from Mgwali to form the nucleus of his tribal domain (1976). One headman and his most reliable councillors come from this pioneer group. Then Fetter Farm was purchased, and hundreds of evicted farm families began pouring in from Mt Coke, Komgha, Macleantown, and then 'farms all over'. When Sebe decided to save Farm D at Middeldrift, he sent the people on to Ndevana. People are still coming in to Ndevana because 'Chief Sebe said everyone should have a place'. That is all they get - a 'place' of one-eighth of a morgen, and the right to run their cattle on the commonage. The people were promised arable land, but at the time of our visit (June 1980) they had not yet received their allocations. Apparently some plots have since been made available.

A visitor to Ndevana sees nothing but endless tiny dwelling sites virtually back to back, with houses erected by the people themselves. There is no longer any grass or wood visible, the people have consumed it like a swarm of locusts. Water comes from two boreholes and there are a few taps (one per 500 dwellings). It is impossible to grow vegetables. Often there is no water to cook with. When the wind doesn't blow, there is no water at all, and the people have to walk to Ilitha, about 6 km away. People dig their own pit latrines, and there is high infant mortality from gastro-enteritis, measles and chicken-pox. Infant mortality is higher than the Ciskei average, which is about 200 per 1 000. Adults suffer from scabies and rheumatic fever.

Apart from the two headmen, there is no local authority, not even a tribal authority. People have to go to Zwelitsha to seek work at the crowded labour bureaux there. There were only three requisitions through the tribal authority in the first six months of 1980, and these took less than 100 people altogether. Many people have lost their pensions in the move. There

are four schools and a clinic, but no shops. Everything must be got from Zwelitsha (25c single fare) or King William's Town (40c). People are divided, so they say, by starvation:

You get so hungry you feel you must steal a chicken. There is always suspicion of people from other places of origin.

In 1979 the population of Ndevana was estimated at 40 000. (CLA, v 11 (1979), p 185)
A medical doctor today puts it at 90 000.

WELCOMWOOD

The site is 10 km from the Zwelitsha - Kidd's Beach road beyond Mt Coke.

The Welcomewood people were moved from the squatter town of Riemvasmaak near Upington in the North-Western Cape in 1973-74. Although classified as Ciskeians, they speak only Afrikaans and neither understand nor get along with the local people. Many worked in Upington and have no agricultural experience whatsoever. They have adequate garden plots, which they are unable to utilise. There is plenty of wood. There is a clinic and a school is projected, but there are no other facilities and they must go to Zwelitsha like everyone else.

A major ordeal the people had to survive, in addition to everything else, was a freak storm in 1975 which smashed most of the housing.

Out of the 215 who came from Upington, most of the men have returned. With other people arriving, the community now totals about 500.

TSWELE TSWELE

Tswele Tswele (formerly known as Qura) lies about halfway between Mt Coke and Kidd's Beach.

This new resettlement area was established in 1979. It has a mixture of rural and urban (mainly ex-Duncan Village) people. No facilities exist whatsoever and the cattle and people drink out of the same dam. It is still very green and pleasant and not unduly crowded, so people are not discontented. They look forward to the time when they will be allocated plots, for which they have been waiting about 18 months. The main danger is that people are still arriving in a steady trickle, and the place is such a long way from anywhere. It costs 95c single by bus to King William's Town and 74c to Mdantsane. The population in June 1980 was about 1 000. (See also Stop Press section in Part 4 below.)

KALKEN

All we know of this site is that it is released land near Qura. There are about 150 illegal squatters there, under constant threat of eviction by Ciskei authorities.

ATHILE

This site is somewhere west of Mt Coke. We have no information about it.

CHALUMNA

The route from King William's Town to this site starts as for Zwelitsha: taking the SABC turnoff on the right from the East London road as it leaves town. Then left at the first main crossroad, into a main road that almost immediately becomes a dual highway. Zwelitsha soon appears on the right of this road. About 27 km along, turn right down the Kidd's Beach turnoff, and the present squatter site at Chalumna is on the right hand side of the road less than 1 km along.

In the time of the Territorial Authority (i.e. before 1971), evicted farm people from the Macleantown district were settled here in tents. They suffered terribly in storms, and several died. (CLA, v 11 (1979), p 139)

Towards the end of 1981 a wave of people arrived, ironically wanting to get a stake in the Ciskei before 'independence'. They were off farms, according to a report in the Mercury (King William's Town), 12.11.81. In April 1982 this land was apparently still Trust land, due for consolidation soon into the Ciskei.

Minister Xaba for the Ciskei says this squatter area is where the Kwelerha-Mooiplaats-Newlands people are to go. The present squatters are to be cleared off first, he says in the same Mercury story, but he does not mention where.

There were a mass of people on the site in April 1982. They were trekking 3 km to get their water from a dam further down the road. There were no facilities whatever. Some families were trying to grow food, apparently without success.

We could not gauge the population in April 1982, but it was certainly in the thousands. In 1979 it had been estimated at 6 000. (DD, 18.06.79)

GOBITYOLO

This camp is situated 10 km outside King William's Town on the Komgha road. A turnoff on the left virtually opposite Peulton leads over a slight rise and down to the site.

The settlement began in 1978 west of Frankfort nearby, and was subsequently moved to its present site. Much of the land around Gobityolo is vacant, and it is believed to be earmarked for the Mgwali and Wartburg removals. The first group of families were farm people from that very district whose employers had sold their land to the CNDC. Another group of farm people from released land around Queenstown were trucked in the same year, 1978. They were ordered to sell all but three of their cattle. Since then, more evicted farm people have come in from the Cathcart, Queenstown, Stutterheim and Komgha districts.

The people have residential plots of the standard size, but arable land is not yet allocated (May 1981). They are waiting for the survey to take place. Water comes from a borehole driven by an engine. Originally, people dug their own latrines, but new tin latrines were then provided. There was a clinic at nearby Peulton, and a primary school (there were complaints that pupils were turned away if they did not have uniforms). Many were adherents of the NGK mission church, we heard, and regular Sunday services were held in private houses.

The chief lives close by, but is generally ignored. The people defer to Mrs F Matiyase, a Ciskei MP who lives nearby in Frankfort, and to the appointed headman who runs the local store. (Prices in the store appeared quite fair for a country trading station.) There is also a village committee which seems popular and efficient.

The nearest labour bureau is in King William's Town, about 10 km away. (The bus fare is 40c

single - when an attempt was made to raise it, the Gobityolo and Peelton people staged a successful boycott.) There were complaints that the mines did not take enough people, and also at the low number of requisitions (only two in the first six months of 1980). Nevertheless, there were very few men about on a weekday - they were said to be at work in King William's Town.

All in all, Gobityolo seemed to be the best organised and most contented of the camps visited in the area. Nevertheless, one local accompanying the SPP group summed up the danger when he said, 'Ndevana used to look just like this!' An uncontrolled influx, as at Ndevana, would soon destroy the existing supply of wood and grass, and overburden the somewhat tricky water supply. In this respect it is worrying that arable plots have not yet been allocated and that there are plans to settle the 8 000 - strong Mgwali/Wartburg community hereabouts.

The population in 1981 was estimated at 500 families, say 3 000 people.

MADAKENI ('the muddy place')

This site is near Dimbaza. It was established at the same time as Dimbaza, but while the latter was developed, the former was ignored. People still live in mud houses and tents, and there is no water supply. There were 175 families, say 1 000 people, in December 1980. (Evening Post, 6.12.80)

BRAUNSCHWEIG

It lies about 12 km from King William's Town on the left of the road to Stutterheim, just before the Pirie Fish Hatchery turnoff.

DD of 10.03.81 has a story that these are farm labourers who left their employers through discontent, for example at restrictions on the number of cattle they were allowed to keep. This story is not totally far-fetched: many farm people are attracted to the camps inasmuch as there seems a prospect of getting their own land. Not all of Braunschweig will go to the resettled people - a good part of it has been set aside for a poultry farm. The population is estimated at 'over 100 families', say 600 people. Another visit in 1982 confirmed the people were still there, fairly scattered about.

FRANKFORT

About 25 km from King William's Town along the Komgha road, a left turnoff leads to Frankfort. The dirt road goes through this tiny old dorp. A couple of km further on, and there is the new resettlement site on the left of the road, and the construction camp and stores on the right.

The first tomato box houses are up, some zinc latrines, some sketchy roadways, a few taps fed from boreholes. 3 000 sites are planned, and the first grim truckloads arrived in late June 1982 with the first 26 families. They were the entire community of Alsatia Farm, east of Cathcart - the first of eight threatened areas in the 'White Corridor' to be cleared.

Alsatia was a true black spot, bought by a Mr Dlakadla in 1904. His two grandsons owned the farm when the South African authorities told them in December 1981 that they were to be bought out and everyone moved to the Ciskei. The price offered was R61 300 for the farm of

1 114,9 ha. The brothers accepted. Some of the community only heard of the move in May, and others said the first they knew of it was when the GG trucks arrived. All felt helpless:

there was nothing we could do. We told the people with the GG trucks that we didn't want to go, but they said we had to. We don't like it in Frankfort - this place is like a location. (Mercury, 1.07.82)

At Alsatia, the people could keep stock and had land to plough. Nobody wanted to go, but they did not see how to resist:

Mr Wotasi Dlakadla said the Dlakadla family and the community did not want to leave but were forced against their will. They had large fields and the farm was big enough for their stock. Although they were allowed to take their stock, grazing was limited at Frankfort. (DD, 14.07.82)

Frightened, the people climbed onto the trucks. Now at Frankfort, they must join the hordes of workseekers already in the area. They have lost their subsistence base and have no other source of income. People were compensated for their structures. After using up their bucket of mealie meal, the 'removal rations' for each family, what else could they live on but that money paid out to them? It is buying nothing but some survival time.

The 5 000 people at Mgwali and 3 000 at Wartburg are scheduled to join the Alsatia people here soon, perhaps by the end of 1982. Alsatia was the thin end of the wedge. If they are resettled, it will be the same story all over again: well established families will lose their security, such freedom as they could assert before, and perhaps their lives. For discussion about these threatened communities, see Section 2.6 below.

2.2.4 Hewu district

Hewu extends from the Katberg northwards to the Swart Kei River, roughly the northern third of the Ciskei. This area of about 102 000 ha always was rather sparse country and thinly populated. The land cannot bear heavy use because of the long cold winters which cut down the cycle of growth. Yet thousands of people have been resettled here since Sada began in 1964. The Ciskei authorities say there are almost 100 000 in Hewu now. (DD, 27.05.82) That total looks more realistic than the 74 000 of the 1980 census, but still may be rather low, taking into account Sada with its possible 40 000, and the 50 000 who came from Herschel and Glen Grey in 1976/77.

THE FOUR AREAS

1 The central core of the district is the 1913 reserve area of Zulukama. The people here have been waiting for generations for the day when they would inherit the 'white' farms roundabout, only to find these areas given to outsiders. This has made for friction. The people of Zangqokwe and Lower Didima in the 1913 area, for instance, have a running feud with the resettled community to the west at Phelandaba because 'these people from Herschel live on land that was meant to come to us'. The two sides impound each others' cattle and even have faction fights. We also heard that when the 'white' farms to the south were being bought out for consolidation into the Ciskei, people from the 1913 area quickly moved into that Zweledinga area, only to be pushed back by the police who told them they had to leave the land for the people resettled from Glen Grey. The locals feel bitter about resettlement around them, we were told.

2 The Shiloh mission area, under the Umziwoxolo tribal authority, is the other part of Old Hewu. Altogether the Old Hewu area has nearly 28 000 people living in its 21 locations. Until resettlement began in 1964, the main feature of the area was the Moravian mission. There was also the tiny dorp of Whittlesea, the administrative hub of Hewu. The very first removals took place within the Shiloh area itself as a small township outside Whittlesea was cleared and the people resettled at Sada on the old cattle post of Shiloh mission. Some local farm workers have also moved to Sada. Otherwise all those resettled in the Shiloh area are from elsewhere, mostly the Eastern Cape. Sada and its overflow Emadakeni hold up to 40 000 people, and the new Whittlesea North site, over the road from Sada, is designed for up to 10 000 houses, say 60 000 people. The labour bureau supplies almost all the jobs going, so the area amounts to being a rural dormitory for labour. The new Shiloh irrigation scheme and the four small CNDC factories at Sada, the office jobs in Whittlesea and the few recruiting white farmers roundabout - these offer very little. For as long as the development programme lasts, there are also jobs on building roads and houses. But basically, this is labour bureau country now. Apart from the Shiloh scheme, the land is for housing, not agriculture.

With the population unnaturally high and about to soar again, pollution will be a growing hazard as it is already in the Zwelitsha/Mdantsane region to the south. Hewu is notorious even now for lack of proper sanitation and health facilities. There is no hospital in the entire Hewu district: the case study on Sada in Part 3 below gives a rough idea of how bad the position is. Patients are referred to the Cecilia Makiwane Hospital in Mdantsane, 280 km away. The terrible fact is that Hewu with its 100 000 inhabitants, most of them malnourished, has only 22 clinics and not a single doctor, according to the Ciskei Minister of Health. (DD, 27.05.82) In 1980 the Republic finally agreed to pay the whole cost of a hospital at Poplar Grove, next door to the Whittlesea North site. The position is so critical now, that Ciskei has asked for R34m for medical facilities in Hewu by 28 April 1982, a request that was still being considered at the time of the DD report on 29.05.82. To plan further resettlement into this grossly overpopulated area seems the acme of cynicism, especially with the diseases of the deprived already rampant.

3 Zweledinga has recently been formed from at least six 'white' farms east of Shiloh which were bought out for the Ciskei during 1977/79. The main farms are Oxton, Pavet, Bushby Park, Price's Dale, Haytor and Bushman's Krantz, and the area is about 10 000 ha. This land and Ntabethemba to the north were ceded in part exchange for the Herschel and Glen Grey districts which were excised from the Ciskei and given to Transkei under the 1975 proposals.

Zweledinga ('The Promised Land') was where most of the Glen Grey people came in 1976/77. The Zweledinga Development Plan (ZDP) dated 1979 gives their number as 6 086 but that seems a little low. Oxton transit camp alone has about 1 200 houses, we could say 7 200 people. Smaller encampments are at Embekweni/Price's Dale, Yonda, Zweledinga/Pavet, Oxton Manor and Esibonile/Haytor. Some people have also seeped into the old mission village of Hackney. A total of 10 000 upwards seems more likely.

The basic plan seems to be for the Oxton people to be removed in 1982/83 to the new site at Whittlesea North, and all the other people to Price's Dale, Haytor, Yonda and Bushby Park. These are rural closer settlements with house plots of 50 x 40 m for land-right holders - those people whom the authorities pronounce as being 'traditional farmers'. These families will also get a land strip of $\frac{1}{4}$ ha under irrigation. Everyone else will get a 40 x 30 m house plot only. (ZDP) The new settlements are planned for 300 - 600 households each. An irrigation scheme is being started too, along the now-familiar lines of 'tribal farm' plus economic units for the chosen few. The Oxkraal River which wanders through central Hewu provides most of the water for this Zweledinga region, an unbelievable idea when you see the trickle it is.

4 Ntabethemba ('Mountain of Hope') is the area of c. 11 000 ha curving round the north-west side of the old 1913 reserve. It used to be bounded by the Swart Kei River, but recently other land on the far side has been added. The 17 or so farms of the area were bought out for the Ciskei in 1977/79, most of it set aside for the huge influx, upwards of 40 000, who came mainly from Herschel district in 1976/77.

This last region is subdivided into three resettlement areas, called after the three chiefs from Herschel. In the north-west is Malefane (Basoto tribal authority); in the north-east, Bebeza (Amavundle tribal authority); and south of them, Hinana (Amaqwati tribal authority). Further south again are the Tsorwana game park and the vast stock-fattening area of the Ciskei Livestock and Marketing Board (CLMB).

Tsorwana is being promoted as a tourist feature. The game is strictly guarded from hungry poachers roundabout. The CLMB cull stock - reports suggest that some animals are simply confiscated, while others are bought at a price set by the CLMB itself. We understand the CLMB are virtually the Ciskei agents of Vleissentraal who finally buy the animals after any fattening that is needed on the ranch. Better strains of cattle are also developed here.

The emphasis on profiteering from stock seems to come before attending to resettlement, to judge by this complaint in the Ciskei Assembly from Mr Myataza, MP for Hewu, who asked the Department of Agriculture and Forestry

to allow the board (CLMB) to occupy less farms than at present. About three quarters of released farms were occupied by the board, he said.

Released farms are those which have been taken over during consolidation.

Mr Myataza said if one were to go to Hewu, poorly grassed rural areas would be found adjacent to farms owned by the board which had ample grass covering. (DD, 18.05.82)

In the same debate, Chief Hebe added that most of the people at Zweledinga had not been allocated sites yet.

Another scheme that appears to have had priority over resettlement is the large irrigation project in the north, along with Glenbrock Dam. The South African Development Trust started the work here, which Pretoria will complete. (Government Gazette No 8204 of 14.05.82, p 15)

Several resettlement sites are being set up now. The largest will be Ntabethemba Town, just north of the 'Mountain of Hope'. A water supply is being planned, notably the 27 km Ntabethemba Canal plus a total of 893 ha under irrigation - if, Pretoria adds ominously, 'water can economically be provided from the Swart Kei River in the Ntabethemba area'. (Ibid) Even if the plan is carried out, it will do nothing like support the people of the area. They may be seen by officialdom as a reserve force for the labour bureaux. The area looks like a death trap to us. It is so congested, it cannot be made viable through farming. There are no local jobs to speak of. Even the labour bureau system, the last resort for people, seems useless: the nearest bureau at present is at Whittlesea which is too far away, and the dwindling number of contracts will mean very little income if another bureau is started in Ntabethemba. We heard that many people have quietly returned to Herschel. We met one family in Sada who had moved there after six months of near-starvation at Thornhill. How have the rest survived, and how do they plan to carry on? This is an important question to research.

RESETTLEMENT SITES

SADA

5 km out of Whittlesea, it has two entrances along the left of the Oxton road.

Sada is one of the older resettlement sites, dating back to 1964. About 32 000 people live here, and most of them have come here from the farms and small towns of the Eastern Cape.

Most workseekers rely on the labour bureau in Whittlesea because there are very few jobs locally. Approaching Sada from the Seymour/Oxton road junction, you pass the Shiloh irrigation scheme and the four CNDC factories on your left - all that the local development amounts to. The Shiloh scheme employs less than 200 people and has food plots for 278 families. (EPH, 5.05.82) The Sada factories employed just 580 people in 1980. They were designed to employ women on a labour-intensive basis while men went on contract work. Goods produced are of the 'cottage industry' type: 'ethnic' clothing, carpets, soft toys, uniforms. The Good Hope incentives for Sada will probably not help to boost local employment much because the place is so isolated. The nearest railhead is 42 km away at Queenstown.

For further detail on Sada, please see the case study in Part 3 below.

EMADAKENI

This sprawl of informal housing lies to the left of the Oxton road almost immediately after Sada as you drive towards Oxton and the Katberg. A car can reach the site by turning into the nearest Sada entry road and then veering right.

Emadakeni is really Sada's overflow. It began in the early 1970s and now holds perhaps 6 000 people. Again, it is a fairly local population. There is terrible destitution here, and no facilities whatever. Families carry all their water from the taps in Sada and dig their own pit latrines (April 1982).

More information is given in the Sada case study below.

WHITTLESEA NORTH

This huge new site is being rapidly developed straight across the Oxton road from Emadakeni, and a turnoff is bound to be built there soon. In April 1982 we reached the site from the other side: back to Whittlesea and out the other side towards Queenstown, there is a turnoff left almost at once into the Poplar Grove road. A couple of km along on the left, a rough track leads onto the site next to the signboard of the Whittlesea Special Organisation contracted for the job.

Already there is a vast housing grid being bulldozed across this land which used to be the Shiloh commonage. Roads and waterpipes are being laid for about $4\frac{1}{2}$ km to the Oxton road, and the site could spread into a square that size. Pretoria is funding this development with the Queenstown municipality as its agent. Up to 10 000 houses are to be built, possibly of varying quality. The first two dozen were the NE 51/9 type: water into the house, flush toilets, shower cubicle, water into kitchen, four rooms, internal doors, cement floor.

Who will live in these expensive houses, which cost R3 500 to build? Their rental presupposes urban incomes. The place is meant for 'the residents of Oxton, Silver City and Ciskeian residents of Ezibeleni', according to the Gazette of 14.05.82 (p 12). Anyone who has seen Oxton will know that those families lack money for food, let alone rental. If the 'Silver City' referred to means the Embekweni group next to Oxton, then the same applies to them. They cannot possibly be moving to these houses. We therefore assume that Whittlesea North will include areas of the cheap rural housing which costs R500 per unit, and perhaps a site-and-service scheme.

The Oxton people include some families who had tried to stay on this commonage before, when they moved there from Glen Grey in 1976/77. Despite their appeals and protests, they were pushed away to Oxton at the end of 1977 (but not with bulldozers, the magistrate at Whittlesea

assured the press) to make way for people from Mlungisi township at Queenstown. Now ironically they are to be forced back here, along with the Ezibeleni people who, originally from Mlungisi, were the group who should have displaced them in 1977.

There could also be other resettlement direct from Mlungisi. That township is losing some areas to 'coloured' families, and africans are being moved out. Costly rentals at Whittlesea North suggest this site might be designed for at least some of the Queenstown labour force, just as Mdantsane is a dormitory for East London workers. If so, the argument would be the same: it is worth the transport cost to have a de-unionised work force, which is what a bantustan-based force amounts to.

In March 1982, the Dept of Co-operation and Development said two other communities were to be resettled here: the 'badly situated' groups from Lesseyton and Goshen in the northern end of the 'White Corridor'. There is some detail on them in Section 2.6 below.

Ciskei's Minister of the Interior also said 1 000 families needed homes in the Whittlesea area (DD, 13.05.82, p 9), which could just refer to the terrible backlog at Sada.

Shops will be put up. Pretoria is also committed to paying for a hospital in the area. Water is to come from Waterdown Dam which already supplies Sada.

OXTON MANOR

Continuing along the Oxton road in the direction of Katberg, Oxton Manor is signposted on the left about 8 km after Emadakeni. Quite a few people are squatting here - some from Glen Grey, others from recently consolidated farms in the area. This was the farm shown to busloads of Glen Grey people to entice them in. Each busload assumed the place would be theirs alone.

HAYTOR/ESIBONILE

A left turnoff between Emadakeni and Oxton Manor leads to this permanent resettlement site in Zweledinga. We heard there is a school there, which betokens a community already in the place, but have no other information.

EMBEKWENI/PRICE'S DALE

A little further than Oxton Manor along the road towards Katberg, on the right-hand side. This desperately poor group came from Glen Grey in 1976/77. About 130 meagre houses are scattered about on the very stony ground here. The main building here is the clinic.

OXTON

Continuing towards Katberg, the road to Oxton goes off to the right immediately after Embekweni. It is signposted. You can see the mass of zinc dwellings from the Katberg road - about 3 km off.

This is the biggest Glen Grey resettlement area, now proclaimed a transit camp. At the very least it holds 7 000 people, and some estimates go as high as 10 000.

The houses are small, many of them one-room zinc. Gardening is minimal, with the place so congested, the ground stony and watering impossible. People buy food from Whittlesea and Queenstown. Buses run there but they are expensive - R1,50 single to Queenstown (1981). Some workseekers do walk over to Whittlesea c 15 km away. Sometimes huge buses call here and round about to pick up workers for the fruit farms in Du Toit's Kloof.

The main school is Funda secondary, on the right as you enter Oxton. It has 600 pupils. There are also two primary schools. Children also attend neighbouring schools - at Engotini, the Moravian station a few km away on the Sada road, for example.

Most people here seem short of everything including food, fuel, water. A regular stream of wood carriers walk that long road to the camp, bringing the wood from nearly 10 km away. Many families had brought stock but most died, and there are none now. The grass and bush has all gone from a wide radius round Oxton. The residents say Whittlesea North will be better in many ways, but it is not the choice of those who cannot afford township expenses. Oxton camp is due to be cleared in 1982/83.

YONDA

Further along the Katberg road from the Oxton turnoff, a few km along on the right, is Yonda. This is one of the permanent sites for Glen Grey people. At present there are about 60 brick-and-iron houses looking very small and laid out in rows. The bricks are of local clay fired in little kilns on the spot. This area, now virtually desert, used to be waving grass on Bold Point farm. Like all the crowded settlements arising here, this one has its flock of goats which quickly strip the ground cover and even eat cactuses down. The need for fuel also strips the countryside. Like Oxton, this area shows the devastation of heavy settlement here. The right stocking rate for Hewu is just one goat or sheep per morgen, and the present one is 23 per morgen. People cannot possibly subsist here. Once denuded, the land gets worse as the rain runs off instead of sinking in, removing the thin precious layer of topsoil in the process, which then clogs the dams and furrows. A dam can silt up in just a few years.

We have no information from within Yonda, and last saw it in April 1982.

BUSHBY PARK

Just about a km further along towards Katberg, on the right, is Bushby Park farm, rather bare ground even now where one of the four Zweledinga resettlement sites will be developed. (1982) The delay in permanent resettlement is very hard on people. Chief Hebe, the local MP, told the Ciskei Legislative Assembly that most of the families who arrived in Zweledinga from Glen Grey five years ago have still not got permanent sites. (DD, 18.05.82) Some people have managed to make other arrangements: for example, quite a few moved unobtrusively into the old mission village of Hackney which you can see from the road at Bushby Park. It is a good few km off the road to the right, in among the hill slopes on the far side of the valley.

ZWELEDINGA

This transit camp is another couple of km further along the Katberg road on the left, with its prominent clinic building. There were about 500 houses here in 1981, and 3 of the 6 taps worked. It is probably the bleakest, iciest site in Hewu. Even Oxton people bless themselves for not being here. From the start in about 1977 it has been a receiving area for Glen Grey people who passed through to other parts of the whole Zweledinga district as permanent sites were allotted.

The last campful of families are waiting now, and expect to leave in 1982/83. Please see section 2.6 below for some further detail.

SPRING GROVE

This and the following sites listed are in the Ntabethemba area to the north. We give them in the order they would appear on a clockwise route starting from and returning to the Poplar Grove crossroads. To reach that junction from Whittlesea, take the Poplar Grove turnoff left as you leave the village in the direction of Queenstown. You soon pass the Whittlesea North site on the left. The crossroads lie about 10 km along this road. Travelling to this point from Zweledinga transit camp, you go back towards Oxton on the Katberg road. It is not necessary to go all the way to Embekweni for the Oxton turnoff there, because soon after Yonda (now on your left) a slow left fork leads straight to Oxton some 5 km away. The road to Poplar Grove is the natural continuation of this angled road which runs across the front of the Oxton settlement, with Funda school on the right, and on another 9 km to the crossroads.

Coming from Whittlesea, go straight through the crossroads. (Coming from Oxton, turn left.) Continue past the Lower Didima village on the right after 8 km and the Donnybrook slow turnoff left after another km, you follow the road round left for another 9 km to the Ruitjies turnoff left. (Both those left turnoffs take you into the CLMB and Tsorwana land.) Continue past the Ruitjies turnoff, and the road seems to be leading straight into the 'Mountain of Hope' which suddenly rises in front. 2 km along on the left is Spring Grove.

As in all the other Ntabethemba sites, most of the people here come from Herschel. They all arrived between about July 1976 and March 1977 and first went to Thornhill and Loudon, the two receiving farms in the north. We have no information from within Spring Grove but understand this site was started in 1978/79. We heard that quite a number of people have also come to it from the Republic, especially from 'white' farms where land was consolidated or the farmer got rid of the old and ill. They have come particularly from the Eastern Cape farms - Tarkastad area, Steynsburg, Hofmeyr and Aliwal North.

TENTERGATE

This site lies about 10 km further along on the left of the road. The road will have veered to the left of the mountain about 3 km after Spring Grove, and after another 5 km passes the left turnoff to Tarkastad. Tentergate lies just a little beyond that turnoff point.

This is a very much bigger settlement than Spring Grove. In fact, it stretches so far from the road that it seems to have spread onto the next farm, Sunnyside - or else, that is an adjoining site. The Sunnyside development is quite recent, from about 1980. No information from within. Apparently these people here are Basutos who had moved to Herschel and then come on to Thornhill in the great exodus. Six long buildings on the right of the road appear to be schools. We heard the site has just one borehole on the river, and there is a dam 2 km further on, on the right of the road.

TENTERGATE No 2

So-called by a local man, this very much larger settlement is about 4 km further on, on the left. It stretches along the road for about 5 km, and goes quite a long way back from the road. 12 long school buildings line the roadside. Most of the houses throughout the area, as here, are of mud brick, with rows and rows of zinc latrines, like a logo of resettlement. No local

information, and we regret not being able to gauge the populations of these sites. Again, we heard the people here were 'from the Free State', referring to the Sotho element in the Herschel group. There are two main groups of houses (April 1982), perhaps 700 in the bigger one. Tarkastad is about 10 km west of here as the crow flies. The Vulindlela bus service is the main form of transport for this and other sites in the area. Both the Tentergate sites started in 1979, weird isolated dormitories.

ROCKLANDS

Another 8 km brings you to the left turnoff to Waverley station. The site starts in that left fork. Roads were being laid out in April 1982, and it looked like another very big site. Presumably this place is meant for people from Thornhill.

MITFORD

8 km further on along the through road is Mitford on the left and its small dam on the right. This settlement was perhaps the first given to the Herschel people after they came to Thornhill nearby. The house sites are on the hillside and below there are some plots which a white farmer said were 4 morgen each (we could not check). Fences have been repaired recently (April 1982) to keep livestock in camps. This is a biggish settlement and it looks better off than the Tentergate sites down the road. No information from within.

THORNHILL

This vast notorious site starts 6 km beyond Mitford on the right of the road which curves in a slow semicircle to the right around a hill. The Thornhill shacks are strewn around the shallow slopes, a shock to see. These non-dwellings look as if they are at the end of the world, on land like the back of the moon. There is nothing there, no grass, nothing. For 6 km further as you drive, the houses just keep on coming. It's a cold tract, dusty and exposed, with wind devils going around the day we were there.

This place and the neighbouring farm Loudon have been the transit camp for the Herschel influx of 1976/77. At first there were about 40 000 people here. They streamed in, expecting the houses, infrastructure and grazing they had been promised. They found nothing except a few tents for the firstcomers, and that was in the bitter cold of July 1976. The grass soon disappeared. As the crowd grew and in the heat of summer six months later there was typhoid, enteritis, measles as well as the general starvation.

Even Pretoria and Zwelitsha were shocked at their own underestimate of the move. Some food was trucked in and plans were made to improve the clinic service, as they belatedly tried to contain the situation. But the main government response seemed to be to keep it all secret. Dr Seidler, the one and only doctor at the site who was doing a superhuman job there, began telling the press how many people she was seeing daily, that babies were dying at a rate of 10 a day as far as she knew, that the foodpiles had been left stacked for weeks next to the starving people for lack of anyone to distribute them. She was speedily removed. The Flying Angels, a medical crisis service, were refused when they offered to immunise the whole area within 24 hours. The only link allowed with outsiders was a soup kitchen run by a small group of local women.

A lot of families have gone now (1982) - some quietly back to Herschel, some to Sada, the new Ntabethemba sites or elsewhere. The place is patchy now. Some of the mud brick homes are obviously vacant, looking slightly more derelict than the ones that are lived in. A purely

subjective sense we had of the place being vacant, not to say haunted, with hardly anyone to be seen and the total silence. What DO these people do? What do they eat? Where can they get jobs? Fieldworkers should find out how people suffered here, and how they coped. We regret giving such a meagre account of this place, which must be one of the worst cases of resettlement ever.

There is to be some development here on a low level. There are a couple of school buildings. The planners just envisage trying to reshape the remaining community so that they draw together to one or more focal points where they would have any shops or other facilities. As for housing, it is to be geared to 'what people can afford' - which probably means site-and-service. Services will be minimal.

NTABETHEMBA TOWN

We have no route to this site, still to be started. It is planned for the Bulhoek area a few km further along the road after Thornhill on the right-hand side. It might be a little way off the road: on the map it lies a bit north of the Mountain of Hope and west of Tentergate. It will probably have road links to the west and east, to the main tar road as it loops north via Tentergate and back through Bulhoek. (It carries on to the Poplar Grove crossroads again.)

The scheme will be on the lines of Whittlesea North although probably not quite so vast, and probably with poorer housing. These are the two sites designated as 'new towns' for Hewu. The Republic has promised R25,9 million for Hewu, especially for carrying out resettlement projects. R10 million was to be for this northern region, and a lot of that will be for this town, the large dam being made nearby and the canal scheme.

PHELANDABA

We do not know where this site is, but heard from the Lower Didima people in the 1913 reserve that Herschel people have been resettled there. It sounds as if they are in the Ntabethemba Town area. No further information.

2.2.5 Victoria East district

Although the table at the beginning of this section shows net immigration of 8 966 into this district, there is only one known resettlement camp. A possible explanation, which has not been corroborated beyond hearsay, is that the chiefs in the area have allowed people from 'white' farms in adjacent districts to settle here, on some of the numerous farms in the district which have been bought up for incorporation into the Ciskei. Squatters may also have settled on them. We should add, though, that in general the Ciskei does not permit the occupation of previously white-owned farms by either squatters or subsistence farmers. The idea is to hand the farms over to african commercial farmers.

GLENMORE

Glenmore is at Committee's Drift on the Fish River, on the eastern (Ciskei) side. From

Grahamstown take the East London road, 2 km along take the Fort Beaufort turnoff to the left, then 6 km or so at the top of the Ecca Pass take the dirt road turning off to the right marked for Committees Drift. After 13 drifts and about 15 km you reach the Fish River bridge, and the side road to Glenmore turns off left on the far side. From Alice, Dimbaza or Peddie, go first to Breakfast Vlei and then Committees Drift.

A case study of this well-known resettlement camp appears below in Part 3. Most of the families are ex-squatters from Coega and Klipfontein, but a few come from farms in other districts south-west of the Ciskei. The population in December 1981 was 4 200. The whole community are under threat of removal. See also Section 2.6 below.

2.2.6 Keiskammahoek district

There is only one resettlement camp in this isolated rural district. For obvious reasons hardly any other people have migrated to the area. There is some internal resettlement due to betterment planning and more recently in the interests of the Keiskammahoek irrigation scheme.

ELUKHANYWENI (The Place of Light)

On the road from Middledrift, about 3 km before Keiskammahoek, a turnoff to the left leads to the site. It leaves the main road just about on the ridge overlooking Keiskammahoek valley.

This camp of some 3 000 people from 'badly situated' african reserves near Humansdorp is discussed in Part 3. The level of violence during the move has no parallel in the history of recent removals to the Ciskei.

2.2.7 Peddie district

Peddie is a rural area in the south-eastern part of the Ciskei. During the past three years the district has suffered long spells of drought. Together with overpopulation and over-stocking this has resulted in depleting natural resources, with soil erosion a characteristic feature. These conditions have made it difficult for many people to eke their subsistence from the soil.

Like most other rural areas in South Africa, Peddie exports labour on a large scale to the mines, industrial areas and agricultural farmlands of the Western Cape and Orange Free State. The majority of families in the district thus survive on their meagre agricultural production and on remittances from migrant labourers.

During the past 10 - 15 years there has been an influx of people into the district (and if the census figures can be believed, an efflux as well). Most came from 'white' farms in the Eastern Cape where they had either become redundant labour, been evicted or had found conditions unbearable. Others were victims of the insecurity of tenure which blacks experience in the urban areas, and therefore found it necessary to build their own homes in the rural areas. Not a single location has been unaffected by these events.

Many, however, have suffered discrimination in their new places of settlement. The critical shortage of land has meant that, in many areas, residential rights have not been accompanied by the right to a field or to rear stock.

The incorporation of 'white' farms has also proved disruptive. Many of these now stand vacant and unused, awaiting transfer for who knows how long, to african commercial farmers. In the mean time no-one may cultivate them, not even the ex-farm labourers.

Peddie has four resettlement spots which differ widely.

KAMMASKRAAL

This, the most recent resettlement camp in the Ciskei, contains two separate communities. The one group was evicted from a 'white' farm near Alexandria where they had worked until the farm changed hands. They were then trucked here to this site south of Peddie. (From the Grahamstown/Peddie road take the dirt road signposted Fish River Mouth, about 10 km from Fish River bridge or from Peddie. Another 15 km down this road (keeping right at a V-fork on the way) there is a large, well established village spreading along a hill to the left and right of the road. An unmarked turnoff left here leads to Kammaskraal after 3 km. From the coast road, turn inland on the road from Old Woman's River mouth. At the village after about 12 km, take the Kammaskraal turn to the right.)

We have encountered several farm evictions that took place under similar circumstances, where the new owner brought his labour in from outside, presumably another of his farms. It seems that the process of labour rationalisation on farms is often triggered by changes in management.

The other community at Kammaskraal were squatters, originally from 'white' farms, who congregated on tribal land in the Peddie district and moved to Kammaskraal under a promise of agricultural land. In fact the place is a transit camp, the people under threat of removal to Peddie where no agricultural land will be available. The people came in 1980 and in mid-1982 are still living in makeshift shelters incorporating their original tents.

Conditions in this closer settlement are discussed more fully in Part 3. The whole population, say 1 000 people, are under threat of removal. Now removed: see Stop Press in Part 4 below.

ZWELEDINGA

This settlement, not to be confused with the big Zweledinga area in Hewu, lies off the same Fish River Mouth road as Kammaskraal. From the Peddie side, you turn right just before Prudhoe, and the site is 1½ km along on the right. From the coast road, drive up to Prudhoe and then left.

The name Zweledinga means Promised Land. The site is sometimes called Mgababa after the holiday resort in Natal. It is a sprawling settlement with about 250 families who came from Alexandria, Port Alfred, and from the Peddie rural locations of Nyaniso, Runletts and Nobumba. When they arrived in 1978 they built corrugated-iron shacks but have since built mud houses with corrugated-iron roofs - although corrugated-iron shacks have not completely disappeared. The people who came from the Peddie rural locations had originally settled there from outside the district, mainly from Alexandria, Port Alfred and Albany. These were resettled by the Ciskei government and were promised land - a promise which has not been fulfilled. Another factor contributing to their resettlement on what was previously Heaton Trust Farm appears to have been the political self-interest of Chief H Z Njokweni who saw an opportunity to expand his constituency. Although their accommodation is better than that of other resettlement locations, the wet conditions (due to fountains) have given rise to reports of stiff joints and chest-related illnesses.

BELL

Where the road from Peddie joins the Port Alfred/East London coastal road, travel 5 km towards Port Alfred, and Bell is on your left.

Bell (also called Tuwa) has a resettlement area of families who migrated here from various farms in the Peddie district. About 70 families have settled here over the past five years. Some left the farms because they wanted to enjoy some freedom from what they saw as a form of slavery without any security. Some resented the farmers' demands that they should reduce their stock. Others left because of the uncertainty surrounding the buying out of the farmers by the SA Development Trust and the departure of their former masters. The new leaseholders did not want many people on their farms. Those who were evicted approached the magistrate at Peddie and he advised them to quit the farms as the owners/leaseholders had the right to evict them.

On arrival at Bell they were allowed by the titleholders to erect dwellings on their lands. Later a Mr Enkel, a shopkeeper and member of the Bell-Bodiam Village Management Board, surveyed the land and sold them plots at R4 and R8, depending on the size. The people have built houses on the plots. They are allowed to own stock but have no access to arable land. They have been integrated into the community and participate in community projects like the building of additional classrooms for the local school. Of significance is the fact that the community, previously not under the jurisdiction of any chief, have recently placed themselves under Chief H Z Njokweni. The immigrants maintained that he had assisted them when they were stranded, and because he was in the Ciskei cabinet he could help them. (Chief Njokweni was dismissed from the cabinet in January 1982.)

BINGQALA

Coming from Grahamstown, turn right 3 km before Peddie. 6 km down the side road, turn right on the road to Fallodon and stay on it for 10 km, then turn right again and stay on that road for another 4 km, and Bingqala is there on both sides of the road.

This is another area where people have resettled. About 25 families left farms for more or less the same reasons as the Bell immigrants. They joined about 15 families who had been living on the farm for many years. The Dept of Co-operation and Development provided them with ready-made one-roomed zinc houses. The people have also built their own houses, and they own stock. The arrival of the immigrants caused tension because they were wooed by Chief H Z Njokweni to accept him as the chief of the area whereas the old residents had always recognised Chief Matomela. By June 1981 relations had deteriorated to such an extent that a fight resulted in the death of six adults. Because the Njokweni supporters are in the majority, the area now falls under his control.

2.3 CATEGORIES OF RESETTLEMENT

In this chapter we look at the broad types of removal in the Eastern Cape. The migration patterns are discussed first. Then, using Gerry Maré's categories, we try to show which groups in the community are being moved, to what extent, and why.

There are huge gaps in our information. They should be quite evident and so, however incomplete the picture is here, we trust it will not be misleading.

2.3.1 Migration patterns

Only a small fraction of the african migration flows in the Cape region over the past decade have been directly due to organised GG removals. However, the position is quite different if we use the term resettlement in a wide sense to include not only GG removals but population movements which occur under the pressures created by the institutional and legal framework of the bantustan policy. Most of the people who migrate to the 'homelands' do so only because they are not allowed to go elsewhere.

Some information on the various categories of removals can be gained from population censuses. Table 1 below gives estimates of the extent and pattern of net Xhosa migration between regions of South Africa. It is clear that the only white areas with a net inflow of Xhosa people were the metropolitan regions around Port Elizabeth (10 395) and Cape Town (28 507). We may assume that these people came from all over, including the Ciskei and Transkei.

The large efflux from the East London metropolitan region is mainly due to the resettlement of people from Duncan Village to Mdantsane.

Although there are certain small towns, e.g. Grahamstown, that had a relative increase in their african population, on the whole the smaller towns of the Cape lost people (34 606). Exact figures are not available to show how many people went to this or that destination, but it seems reasonable to assume that a significant number went to the Cape Town and Port Elizabeth areas. Some definitely ended up in the bantustans.

Table 1 NET XHOSA MIGRATION, 1970 -1980

Area	Xhosa population		Net migration
	1970	1980	
East London	68 344	39 989	- 39 958
Port Elizabeth/Uitenhage metropole	201 427	275 841	10 395
Cape Town metropole	110 409	177 042	28 507
Eastern Cape towns	167 802	191 673	- 28 815
Central & Western Cape towns	69 630	84 723	- 5 791
Eastern Cape country	348 416	335 553	- 106 985
Central & Western Cape country	79 744	63 323	- 36 382
Rest of RSA	679 418	843 162	- 41 961
Transkei	1 857 784	2 492 077	49 919
Ciskei	356 718	628 421	141 898
Other bantustans	48 712	96 916	29 176
TOTAL	3 988 404	5 228 770	-

The efflux from the rural areas of the Eastern Cape was, to say the least, torrential. In the vast majority of rural districts the african population declined absolutely. This also holds for the rural areas of the Cape as a whole. Net Xhosa emigration totalled 143 367. Most of these people went either to the Ciskei or the Transkei.

There was also positive net Xhosa emigration from the other parts of 'white' South Africa (41 961). Since many of these emigrants came from Natal and OFS, we may assume that most of them from the non-Cape provinces of South Africa are now in either the Transkei, KwaZulu or Bophuthatswana.

The bantustans were of course the recipients of the Xhosa people who left 'white' South Africa. The Ciskei heads the list (141 898) since most organised resettlement was directed here. The Duncan Village - Mdantsane removal is especially significant in this regard. But so also is the conservatively estimated 32 000 people who fled to the Ciskei when the Herschel and Glen Grey districts were handed over to the Transkei as part of its independence bonus. The Transkei also received additional people. 81 919 came in from 'white' South Africa, though with the flight of the refugees from Herschel and Glen Grey the net immigration amounted to only 49 919. Some Xhosas went to other bantustans (29 176), especially Bophuthatswana and KwaZulu.

These movements are implied in the net migration pattern of Table 1, which we can trace to some extent from people's origins to their destinations. Table 2 below attempts to show these migration flows. It must be treated with the utmost circumspection because it is based on a great deal of guesswork, but at least it conveys some idea of the magnitude of the flows and it should be seen in that light.

For example, it shows that the efflux from the rural parts of the Cape to both the Ciskei and the Transkei was about 60 - 70 000 in each case, and from small towns of the Cape between 5 - 15 000. It also shows the possibility that roughly the same number of people from each of those bantustans, Ciskei and Transkei, managed to settle either permanently or temporarily in the metropolitan areas of Port Elizabeth and Cape Town.

Table 2 NET KHOSA MIGRATION BY ORIGIN AND DESTINATION

Origin	Positive net immigration regions				Total
	Ciskei	Transkei	Other bantustans	PE & CT	
Rural Cape	67 516	60 617	7 395	7 839	143 367
Urban Cape (small towns)	11 535	11 535	-	11 536	34 606
East London (Duncan Village)	39 958	-	-	-	39 958
Herschel and Glen Grey	32 000	-32 000	-	-	0
Rest of RSA	651	19 529	21 781	-	41 961
Bantustans/cities	-9 762	-9 762	-	19 524	0
TOTAL	141 898	49 919	29 176	38 899	259 892

Another word of caution about this table. Some kinds of migration flows do not show up in net migration tables of this kind. If at any stage between two census dates one person moves from region A to B and another person the other way, then the two moves cancel each other out and will thus be invisible in migration estimates based on data from the census. So, for example, the above tables show only a positive flow from the Ciskei to Cape Town, yet it is well known that removals from Cape Town to the Ciskei have occurred under influx control and coloured labour preference.

2.3.2 Farm removals

By far the greatest number of recent removals to the Ciskei have been from the white rural areas. This is clearly shown in Table 2 above (67 516). But it is also apparent from interviews. Names like Komgha and Cathcart crop up more frequently than Cape Town in conversations with resettled people.

In 1970, full-time farm workers and their families formed the bulk of the african population in the white rural areas. In what is now the Cape, squatters, tenants and freeholders in black spots have never rivalled this group for size. Hence the vast majority - probably between 75 and 85% - of recent removals from the rural areas to the Ciskei have involved ex-farm workers.

We have already discussed the underlying economic processes. A stage in agriculture has been reached where the mechanisation of production processes, the rationalisation of labour utilisation and the consolidation of farm units have all become strongly labour-saving in effect. Hence, despite sustained increases in output, employment, after a stabilising period in the early sixties, started to decline. In most of the Cape this trend was further exacerbated by the implementation of the Coloured Labour Preference policy from the mid-sixties onwards.

In a sector such as agriculture, a decreasing or even just a stagnant trend in employment, in combination with population growth, must inevitably generate a surplus population and therefore large-scale population migration.

In the Eastern Cape, much of this migration was induced by individual farmers evicting the families they no longer wanted on their land. The questionnaire surveys show that surprisingly few issues were normally precipitating all these evictions. An argument between the farmer and

one or other member of a labouring family was often the explanation given. Other common causes were the farmer complaining about a worker's 'laziness' or about the cattle he kept. Many resettled people explained that the farm was sold and the new owner brought his own staff along, presumably the 'surplus' from another operation. Many were also evicted, they said, when they could no longer work either through injury or old age.

But all these 'explanations' were mere triggering mechanisms. Underlying them is the over-supply of farm labour, a condition which enables farmers to dismiss with ease any 'cheeky' or 'lazy' worker, and especially as replacements would be available.

Exactly the same condition is ultimately responsible for the excessively harsh working circumstances and low wages on farms. Many farm labourers work a 12-hour day, and average farm wages in the Eastern Cape were estimated at R40 per month including rations in 1976 (Quail, 1980, p 78). Little wonder then that many people left farms not through eviction but of their own free will. These economic refugees often use expressions such as 'the cruelty of the farmer' or 'the oppression by the boers' to describe life under their erstwhile employers.

Whether evicted or not, africans off white farms have no legal option to go anywhere else but to the bantustans. It is this restriction which gives the urbanisation process (which occurs in all industrialising countries) such a perverted twist in South Africa, turning it into forced relocation. In fact the stream of ex-farm workers to the Ciskei is a quintessential example of the State's strategy of relocating the surplus population in the bantustans as far as possible. It also depicts the fact that most of the unemployed in South Africa come directly from the agricultural sector.

Of those farm families who have been resettled in the Ciskei, a fortunate few managed to get into townships such as Dimbaza and Mdantsane. But most went to squatter camps like Ndevana and the Muddy Places on the edge of townships where services are rudimentary or nonexistent and conditions appalling. From here in turn, the adults who manage to find jobs migrate on contract to towns and also back to farms again in 'white' South Africa.

2.3.3 Squatter & tenant removals

The word 'squatter' is used here to refer to an african living on someone else's property with the consent of the owner. For present purposes we are just discussing squatters on farms.

Unlike labour tenancy, squatting has been fairly common in the Cape. Eastern Cape squatters were excluded from the provisions of the Natives Land Act of 1913 which had been designed to root out squatting. These squatters also evaded the provisions of Chap IV of the Native Trust and Land Act of 1936. In 1943 the Pike Commission found that there were 16 534 african squatters in the white areas of the Cathcart, Stutterheim, Komgha and East London districts alone.

Some squatters constituted a kind of subsistence peasantry. These were the ones who worked the farms of white landowners who preferred 'kaffir-farming' to other forms of agriculture. Other, more proletarianised, squatters merely rented residential stands on white farms and worked elsewhere. The circumstances of the latter group varied greatly. On some farms they amounted to only a few families. The rental for them may have been nominal, and for some even a mere kinship tie to a settled farm worker may have been enough to gain the consent of the farmer. On other farms, especially those within commuting distance of a significant source of employment, squatters settled more densely and rentals consequently became more of a factor. Certain crown lands were also occupied by squatter communities.

The National Party, along with organised agriculture, has always been hostile to all forms of squatting. The 1954 Amendment to the Native Trust and Land Act enabled the State to put into effect Chap IV of this Act relating to the occupation of land by squatters. This chapter makes

it compulsory for certain squatters to be registered - only those who had occupied the land ever since 1936. Any squatting that commenced after 1936 was deemed illegal, and the people involved fell under threat of immediate eviction.

The Amendment threatened squatters in other ways too. It simplified the eviction procedure. It also required landowners to pay an annual licence fee for each registered squatter, and the fee increased with time. This measure was obviously made to discourage legal squatting as well.

The motivation behind these early moves against squatting varied according to the type of squatter. (Morris, 1977) The independent squatter peasantry was seen as a waste of labour tying workers to subsistence activities - and this at the very time when capitalist agriculture faced severe labour shortages. Because this type of squatting clashed with the labour needs of white farmers the organised representatives of agriculture called for its abolition. They saw clearly that the elimination of this independent peasantry which existed in the midst of modern agriculture would have the effect of pushing more people into wage labour on the white farms. The ample references to the idleness of the peasant squatters in the parliamentary debates of the time, suggest that the government shared this view.

In the case of the squatter proletariat, the State's antagonism was based primarily on political grounds. These squatters avoided both the urban and the bantustan systems of control, and those squatters on the periphery of cities in effect escaped the controls over the influx of africans into the urban areas. They posed a threat at least for the future because the chance of a phenomenal increase in these squatters was very real. The prospect of large african concentrations, uncontrolled, contradicted the strategy of containing the struggles in South Africa and this the State could not tolerate.

Although some squatters were removed shortly after the 1954 Amendment, the all-out assault on them happened only in the sixties. By then the agricultural labour shortage was a thing of the past. Farmers began to see squatter communities as a nuisance rather than a potential labour supply. Henceforth the political motives underlying the drive against squatting, and the spectre of an overwhelmingly black countryside - the so-called 'verswarting van die platteland', became the dominant considerations.

The application of Chap IV of the Native Trust and Land Act of 1936 during the sixties and into the seventies forced literally hundreds of thousands of squatters out of the white rural areas and into the bantustans. There is very little local information available, but it would seem that the Eastern Cape had its fair share of these evictions (see next section on black spot removals).

With the passing of the 1976 Prevention of Illegal Squatting Amendment Act, which outlawed all forms of squatting, the pace quickened once more. In a major anti-squatting drive, ECAB sent a growing number of labour inspectors round to enforce long-neglected regulations. They stepped up the pressure on farmers to register their workers at labour bureaux. Since this entailed a registration fee for each employee, including those who were economically inactive, the result was a spate of farmer-initiated squatter evictions. In places where whole squatter communities congregated, ECAB organised the removals themselves. The resettlement of the squatters from Klipfontein, Coega and Colchester at Glenmore belongs to this campaign. Their removal is considered in detail below in Part 3.

Altogether we estimate that between 10 and 15 000 squatters were resettled in the Ciskei during the seventies, and this is by no means the end of the road. The Dias Divisional Council which covers the Port Elizabeth/Grahamstown area has kept reminding farmers that they can be fined, jailed or both for harbouring squatters. In collaboration with the administration board, it also launched a plan baldly termed Prevent which was to see to the establishment of resettlement camps and above all to stop the growth of the african population in the white farm areas around Port Elizabeth. The first phase was to declare the region falling under the board a prescribed area, to avoid further influx. The second phase was to house those already in the area. (Evening Post, 8.07.78) Squatter evictions since then from farms at Alexandria and elsewhere have pushed hundreds of families onto the roadside or into the Ciskei.

2.3.4 Black spot & 'homeland consolidation' removals

These two categories are treated together because it has not always been possible to establish whether the communities under threat of removal hold land in freehold (black spots) or on communal tenure (in which case it would be 'homeland consolidation'). Some areas (Mgwali, Wartburg) are definitely in the first group, others (Mooiplaats) in the second. In the context of the Ciskei, at any rate, both categories are being moved for the same reason: they are 'awkwardly situated Bantu areas'.

Why this is such a crime is not entirely clear. It has been suggested that this type of relocation has more ideological overtones than any other category of removal:

The chess-board appearance of interspersed white and black land is in contradiction to some aspects of the policy of Separate Development and it is important for the credibility of the policy both for the white electorate and the blacks committed to the Bantustans that an attempt at creating consolidated land units is seen to be made. (Baldwin, p 225)

The recent doubts expressed within official circles, mainly in response to increasing costs, seems to support the view that a cosmetic ideology was being served. But perhaps one should also not ignore some other motivations. A consolidated territory is definitely preferable from the administrative, political and economic points of view.

The attitude of capitalist agriculture to consolidation has been somewhat ambiguous. In the past, black spots were definitely convenient and important labour pools for the farms in the area. Nowadays, however, the settled farm population provides an ample supply of regular labour. Black spots now seem to be quite unimportant even as sources of casual labour, because the bulk of this is also drawn from among the settled farm population. The labour bureaux system enables those farmers who still need occasionally to recruit from elsewhere to do so quite effectively in the bantustans. The occupants of black spots, certainly in the Eastern Cape, have thus become surplus to the labour needs of the surrounding capitalist economies.

While this is often enough of a qualification for an african to be resettled to a black area, in itself it cannot explain why the State changes the boundaries of these black areas. However, it is important to note that the redundancy of a community normally serves to stop any opposition from local employers when it comes to removal. In fact, farmers close to black spots these days usually call for their excision. Uppermost in their minds are the inconveniences such as petty theft, generated by having a black spot nearby with its extra people in the area. White agriculture benefits as a whole when this contact is reduced - which is what happens when bantustans and therefore also the surrounding white areas are consolidated. The South African Agricultural Union accepts this fully. It even goes so far as to recommend the creation of buffer zones.

On the other hand, some white farmers vociferously oppose consolidation when they have to give up their own land, when their farms are incorporated into a bantustan in exchange for black spots being excised. It is for this simple reason rather than any concern for labour supplies that certain elements within agriculture, notably the Natal Agricultural Union, still fight consolidation.

Subsistence agriculture occurs in all 'badly situated' black areas, but its contribution to family income varies considerably. Some communities are virtually self-sufficient in terms of food production and might even grow some cash crops. Migrant remittances then become strictly supplementary. In other areas, and especially where landowners sublet on a large scale, the level of agriculture is hopelessly inadequate. Then outside employment is vital, whether on nearby farms or in distant cities. These places in effect are really squatter settlements. Other conditions in these various areas also range very widely, in quality of

housing and so on.

Two well-known instances of this type of removal have sent people to the Ciskei. In 1973 Riemvasmaak, a black spot near Kakamas in the Northern Cape, was cleared and 46 of the families were moved to Welcomewood, near King William's Town. The 215 people involved were labelled Ciskeian Xhosa although they had lived on the other side of the country and could not even speak Xhosa - their language was Afrikaans. Then between 1977 and 1978 about 4 000 Tsitsikama people from their isolated reserves west of Humansdorp were forced off their land, some even at gun point, and resettled at Elukhanyweni near Keiskammahoek. Now, in June 1982, a third black spot removal has been cleared, Alsatia in the so-called 'White Corridor' between Ciskei and Transkei, and the 26 families (200 people) trucked to Frankfort near King William's Town. (For details of Riemvasmaak and Alsatia removals see Section 2.2.3 above. The Humansdorp removal is discussed in a case study below in Part 3.)

There may also have been other black spot removals in the Cape over the past two decades. In response to a question from Mr L F Wood, the Minister of Bantu Administration and Development listed 36 black spots (see Section 2.7 for names) in the Eastern Cape districts of Elliot, Cathcart, Indwe, Komgha, Maclear, Stutterheim and Wodehouse. (Hansard 1969, v 25, p 325) He did not give the numbers involved. Then again in 1980 the Minister of Co-operation and Development replied with a similar list to a question from Mr H E J van Rensburg. From this it seems that over 30 black spots, mainly from the East London/Queenstown corridor - the 'White Corridor' - were cleared between 1970 and 1979, and 6 013 people removed. (Hansard PQ 537, 22.04.80) Unfortunately we know nothing more. It would seem, though, that most of these places were squatter settlements on either public or private white-owned land rather than actual black spots, and so we think that only a small percentage of these people from the white rural areas, about 4 000 in all, were moved from 'badly situated' black areas.

The process of Ciskei consolidation has not yet run its full course. A number of black areas in the 'White Corridor' containing almost 40 000 people are currently under threat of removal. They are discussed more fully in Section 2.6 below.

2.3.5 Urban removals

The State policy of urban relocation was officially introduced in the late 1960s in terms of a General Circular (No 27 of 1967) issued by the then Department of Bantu Administration and Development. Before local municipalities (and later, administration boards) in white urban areas were allowed to embark on new housing schemes for african township residents, they were required to have the permission of the department. As Smit and Booyesen note:

The Department had to be satisfied that

- (1) such new developments (particularly family housing) were imperative and that
 - (2) it was not possible to provide such accommodation in an adjacent black homeland.
- (1977, 10)

The emphasis on the construction of african housing was now to be in the bantustans. The policy has been that where towns are situated in the vicinity of a bantustan, its african workers must be resettled in that bantustan with their families, and where this is not possible, the families should be housed in the bantustans and the workers accommodated in hostels in the white towns. Thus, in terms of the urban relocation policy, urban townships have been and are being disestablished, with their residents being relocated to towns in the bantustans established and developed so as to allow for this relocation. Urban relocation has also taken the form of the incorporation of townships into bantustans through the redrawing of the bantustan border.

It would appear that urban relocation has taken place to every bantustan. The relocation has been primarily to what the Riekert Commission refers to as 'fully fledged' towns situated near the bantustan borders. Based on the size of the respective bantustan urban populations, it seems that KwaZulu, Bophuthatswana, Ciskei and Lebowa, in that order, have been the recipients of the greatest number of people under the policy. By 1970, 19,4% of the de facto Ciskeian population lived in urban areas in the Ciskei.

The policy has necessitated the large-scale provision of housing in the bantustans (mainly in the 'fully fledged' towns), such that 9 735 houses were erected annually in the bantustans during the 1971-77 period. Prior to 1970, the South African Bantu Trust (SABT, now Development Trust) was solely responsible for the establishment, financing and development of bantustan towns. Since 1970, the bantustan authorities and the development corporations have increasingly become involved. From 1959/60 to 1969/70, the SADT's real expenditure on these towns amounted to R120 million. All three - the SADT, bantustan governments and corporations - spent a total of no less than R550 million from 1970/71 to 1979/80. The figure for the Ciskei alone from 1972/73 to 1979/80 amounted to R66,01 million. Most of this is for housing and associated services such as water supply, roads, drainage.

Baldwin (1975, p 216) estimates that 327 000 people were moved owing to the policy of urban relocation from 1960 to 1970, while Smit and Booysen (1977, p 20) give a figure of 171 259 for the 1968-75 period. Most urban relocation to the Ciskei has occurred from East London to Mdantsane, with the removals beginning in early 1964. By 1977, 82 000 former East London residents were living in Mdantsane. This drawn-out removal is still continuing and likely to go on for some time. (See Part 3 below for a case study of Mdantsane.)

In 1975, Baldwin wrote that the policy

can be seen in operation throughout the whole of Natal, the Cape east of the 'Eiselen Line', some parts of the Free State (including Bloemfontein, Bethlehem and Harrismith), the Northern Cape and Western Transvaal and most of the Eastern Transvaal. (1975, p 222)

The largest scale of urban relocation has taken place from Pretoria and the Durban-Pietermaritzburg area. In 1977, the Durban township of KwaMashu was incorporated into KwaZulu, with the township population at the time being about 180 000.

Urban relocation has also involved the removal of small town locations close to a bantustan. Again most of these moves have occurred in the Transvaal and Natal. In the Eastern Cape the Mlungisi township at Queenstown was partially deproclaimed in the mid-seventies and some residents forced to go to eZibeleni about 10 km away in the Glen Grey district, now ceded to the Transkei. Other parts of Mlungisi may also be cleared, and removals from one section have been reported. Another Mlungisi township at Stutterheim was scheduled for removal to the Ciskei at Frankfort, but this plan has now been scrapped. Some of these communities may be spared. The apparent abandonment of the long-standing plan to move Grahamstown's Fingo Village - and along with it the idea of developing a border city for 200 000 people at Glenmore (Committee's Drift) - might well have been a signal reversal in the policy of small town removals.

In the context of the Eastern Cape it is also necessary to note that a significant percentage of the efflux from small towns did not take the form of GG-type removals. There have been other forms of pressure. One was the stagnant economic opportunities. Housing facilities have been poor and limited, as a consequence of deliberate State policy. In many small towns these matters were often enough for a family to decide to move elsewhere. A good number of the people we met at Dimbaza had moved for reasons of indirect pressure. There were also those, comparatively few, families who were evicted from small towns for some or other offence such as failing to pay rent. In all these cases, though, it is the control that the State exercises over where people have to go, whether evicted or not, that makes them part of the relocation process.

According to the estimates contained in Table 1 of Section 2.3.1 above, 28 815 people left

the small towns of the Eastern Cape. Although we do not know for certain, it seems quite reasonable to assume that a good proportion of these went to the metropolitan centres, either permanently (Section 10 rights are to some extent transferable between towns within an administration board area) or as migrants. Nevertheless, many were forced into the Ciskei or Transkei - not only the victims of GG removals, but others trapped in State-controlled circumstances.

Why did the South African State introduce the urban relocation policy? It must be seen largely as a response to the State's historical inability to provide adequate housing in the townships, in both quantitative and qualitative terms. This has resulted in what has been referred to as the urban housing problem. The policy represents the third major attempt by the State to solve the urban housing problem. In the final analysis, the housing problem essentially involves an inadequate reproduction of labour-power (i.e. reproduction of the working class), an inadequacy which has the potential of manifesting itself in the form of working-class struggle.

The first major attempt at a solution was the 1923 Natives (Urban Areas) Act. As a result of the dynamics of capital accumulation in the late 19th century and early 20th century, large-scale migration to the urban areas occurred. This created an african housing problem in these areas (manifested in the form of squatter camps, for example), to such a degree that the 1923 Act was passed. By allowing for the implementation of some form of influx control, the State attempted through the Act to limit the rate of african urbanisation and thereby save municipalities from having to build so many houses. The Act did not give municipalities the machinery for any systematic control over african influx, however. From 1921 to 1936 the urban african population nearly doubled. Municipalities had the direct responsibility for providing adequate housing and services for the existing urban african population.

The urban housing problem was not alleviated in the decades after the Act. Africans continued coming into town on a permanent basis from the reserves and white farms. The 1940s saw great political instability in the urban areas, partly because of the nation-wide housing problem. The squatter movement during the 1940s, the manifestation of a relatively inadequate reproduction of labour-power, posed a threat to the reproduction of South African capitalism. This is partly what lay behind the early apartheid State legislation, the second major attempt to solve the urban housing problem.

In terms of the Native Laws Amendment Act (1952) and other legislation passed during the early 1950s, the influx control system was tightened up by the establishment of district (rural) and local (urban) labour bureaux. The State also tried providing for more housing through site-and-service schemes, encouraging municipalities to extend their monopoly of beer/liquor sales in the townships (the profits of which would be used for housing), training africans as skilled artisans for housing construction (who could be paid less than whites), etc. (See De Villiers, 1979.) These ideas were implemented in most major urban centres in the early and mid-fifties. Yet the urban housing problem continued throughout the fifties, which partly explains the intensification of the african working-class struggle during this period.

It is in the above context that one must explain the State policy of urban relocation, the third major attempt by the State to solve (in its viewpoint and that of capital) the urban housing problem. The first two efforts had been to reduce the problem, limiting struggles in the urban area. The third is actually to move the problem physically away, and the new policy is closely connected with bantustan strategy. Aware of past failures, the State is, in essence, merely locating the problem in the bantustans, with future working-class struggles arising from it being directed instead towards the bantustan 'States'.

The policy is also a form of influx control, with influx from the rural areas of the bantustans being increasingly located in and around the 'fully fledged' towns, as is the case with the squatter camps around the KwaZulu towns of KwaMashu and Umlazi, and in the squatter areas (e.g. Winterveld) near the Bophuthatswana towns of Ga-Rankuwa, Mabopane and Temba.

Whether this third attempt succeeds in solving the problem is of course another matter

altogether. In fact urban removal, more than any other type, reveals the limitations of bantustan strategy and the attempt to shift as many people as possible into those black areas. Not only is the bantustan mechanism of political control at its weakest in urban townships, but urban communities are very suspicious of 'homeland' leadership. It is said, for instance, that Sebe and his men have an almost pathological fear of entering Mdantsane.

The urban relocation process also affects squatting (in the usual sense of the word) within or immediately next to the boundaries of urban areas. This aspect is part of influx control removals too. We did not study this phenomenon in any detail because it is being covered by another SPP group, but would like to make a few remarks about it here.

Urban squatting communities exist throughout South Africa. They contain thousands of people. The squatter population of Port Elizabeth alone is said to be in the region of 70 000. There are many in East London too, and in small towns throughout the Eastern Cape.

A good many of these urban squatters have urban residence rights. The only reason why they are squatting is the acute housing crisis. But there are also many who are in the urban areas illegally, pushed there by the depressed economic conditions in the white rural areas and bantustans, and by the desire of contract workers to have their families with them, and other factors.

The recent history of the Cape Town squatter communities clearly shows the intense antagonism of the State towards urban squatters. The demolitions of Modderdam, Unibel and Werkgenot; the harassments, raids and arrests at Crossroads; the deportations from Nyanga Bush - these are only some of the elements in the State's arsenal against them. (See Volume 3, Section 3.3 of the SPP reports.)

Squatters in the Eastern Cape have endured similar experiences. In early 1979 about 1 000 squatters from Duncan Village were required to accept 'repatriation' to the Chalumna area in the Ciskei countryside. The events that preceded their 'acceptance' included all the usual features: raids, arrests, the burning of shacks. Many apparently had the necessary Section 10 qualification to be in Duncan Village.

More recently, the squatters in Soweto, Port Elizabeth, had their shacks demolished for three weeks in mid-1982 by armed ECAB officials. (See also Section 2.6.7 below on the Soweto raids.) This harassment is in a long line of bouts against squatters in the PE area where families have been pushed from pillar to post, judging by press reports. For example, ECAB moved the squatter families from Veeplaas to Kleinskool in September 1978 to clear an area at Veeplaas for housing development. (EPH, 28.09.78) Many of these families were coloured, and the Coloured Management Committee decided to negotiate with the Board to get them to stop any more of these removals. Bethelsdorp Extension 21 was planned, to rehouse all local coloured squatters by the middle of 1981 (and we do not know, but suspect this has not happened). After this Bethelsdorp site, the next major coloured rehousing scheme for squatters was to be in Kleinskool, which was due for reproclamation from an african to a coloured group area. (EPH, 11.09.79) Yet Kleinskool is now the site for african squatter settlement, according to the ECAB plan for about 2 000 housing units there in a place to be called KwaDwesi. Many moves seem to have been pointless, even in official terms.

Meanwhile squatting families have tried to stabilise themselves where they could. They can invoke the law to some extent (which makes a change): Section 10 people should not be disrupted until ECAB have found another place for them. This point was clearly upheld in the Jijana case in 1980/81. The case is worth outlining here to show what poor choices the squatters have, and also how a court victory for those with Section 10 rights can mean disaster for the other families who will then be booted out of the area:

Mr Jijana allowed families to settle on his 4 ha property at Veeplaas, and people streamed in. They included those with Section 10 rights, who said they would rather live in an illegal squatter village than in the legal slums roundabout. More than 200 shacks had gone up by

the end of May 1980. (EPH, 30.05.80) A court order allowed ECAB to clear squatters and shacks from the site after 28 June, but also said the Board had to accommodate those with Section 10 rights. In the three months following, ECAB arrested nearly 300 squatters. They were those without Section rights, and contract workers moving into the camp to be with their families. The 'illegals' would be fined and pushed off to a bantustan, we assume. Then on 15 October in another raid, ECAB arrested another 150 families who had come in afterwards to use the sites previously occupied by 134 'legal' families whom the Board had moved to serviced sites in Kleinskool. (Evening Post, 16.10.80) Households were obviously pouring in as fast or faster than they were being removed. The camp was by no means pleasant to live in. It had no toilets supplied, an inadequate water supply, and it was very congested. Nevertheless, it drew in people because as Mr Velile Dweba said at the time of the case in May, they had nowhere else to go. (The squatters did not oppose ECAB's application formally. Some said they were 'illegally' in the area and would have nowhere to live if forced to move. Like those who replaced them on Mr Jijana's site, they were living as unobtrusively as possible.)

Two later developments in the Jijana story are that ECAB got an interdict from the PE Supreme Court preventing Mr Jijana from taking any more squatters on to his property (EPH, 29.10.80); and that about 200 families were allowed to stay there till ECAB found other accommodation for them, and that meanwhile the Board had 'improved services to the area'. (EPH, 11.02.81)

This means a reprieve for some of the squatters, but many more have been moved out. Any reversals seem to be rare. The brickfields squatter community seem to have won through after a very steady and united stand. They are close to the KwaDwesi site and at first ECAB insisted these families should stop entrenching themselves in the brickfields area. They were making fairly solid houses for themselves out of the broken bricks and had also built a school which they were then told to demolish. Publicity over this put ECAB in a very glaring light, and now it seems that the community have the right to stay for at least five years, or even permanently. The KwaDwesi site will not overlap them but basic services might be extended to them. (EPH, 22.07.82)

Few squatter communities can make these stands because so many 'illegal' families are involved. There seems to be a lull in the PE area now - following the incident in June 1982 when four people were shot in the context of squatter raids in Soweto. (See Section 2.6.7 below.) It looks as if ECAB will wait till the three new township sites are ready - KwaDwesi, Kwa Magxaki, and Motherwell - and then, perhaps in 1983, go on an all-out binge of moving Section 10 families to these places while deporting all the others to Ciskei or Transkei. Even the Section 10 squatters may not be safe by then, if they have no work and the Orderly Movement Bill allows for their removal from the area. This Bill could become law in the next parliamentary session.

The victimisation and relocation of urban squatters, and their struggle against the State, has a long history in South Africa. It is bound to continue. On the one hand, the State cannot afford to tolerate uncontrolled urban squatting and is continually shaping new instruments to deal with it - e.g. the Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act, the Admission of Persons to the Republic Regulations Act, and now the Orderly Movement and Settlement of Black Persons Bill. On the other hand, the forces that push so many people into erecting their shacks on any open urban property, whether they have urban residence rights or not, will if anything strengthen in future.

2.3.6 Influx control removals

This category of relocation has already been implied in the urban removals section above. It has to do with the removal of african people from what are now referred to as prescribed areas, i.e. urban areas in 'white' South Africa where influx control legislation is applicable.

Most of the removals concern africans who are illegally in prescribed areas. Briefly, to reside in an urban area lawfully an african requires one of the following Section 10 qualifications:

- (a) continuous residence since birth in the area
- (b) either a continuous 10-year period in one job or a continuous 15-year period of lawful residence in the area
- (c) being a dependant of those with (a) or (b) qualifications although you lack those qualifications yourself, provided your entry into the area was permitted by a labour officer
- (d) being authorised by a labour officer.

One common category of illegals is the dependants of (a) and (b) qualifiers who do not have these qualifications themselves and who have not received permission to enter the prescribed area - in other words, those who value family life but are denied the Section 10 (1) (c) right. The crucial variable here is whether people have suitable housing available. As we all know, this is in extremely short supply.

Another important group is the workers and workseekers without (a) and (b) qualifications who were unable to obtain a Section 10 (1) (d). For this, people need approved accommodation and employment. Housing is difficult, but workseeking even more so because it is government policy to pitch outsiders to the back of the jobs queue. On top of that, there are the procedures which contract workers must follow to get jobs in the urban areas - these procedures hamstringing all outsiders seeking work. It is very important to note that Section 10 (1) (d) is not a legal right. It is a permit to remain in an urban area which may be granted or refused by the labour officer. People registered in terms of Section 10 (1) (d) have no rights and no security, and are only legally in town while that permit for a particular contract lasts.

The rest of the illegals are the families of illegal workers, outsiders who try their luck in the urban informal sector, and others who come in to draw on urban services such as health and education.

There is enormous infringement of influx control, as indicated in Dr Koornhof's admission that 42% of the Greater Cape Town african population are illegal residents (see Vol 3 of the SPP reports). Cape Town may be exceptional, but urban squatting is obviously widespread and there are many more illegals besides who live in the proclaimed townships with the permanent residents. This suggests that the oft-quoted 10% figure for metropolitan areas as a whole may well be an underestimate.

Influx control has operated in South Africa throughout this century in one form or another, as is reflected in the Natives (Urban Areas) Act of 1923. The Stallard Commission report (1922), which more or less formed the basis of the 1923 Act, recommended that an african

should only be allowed to enter the urban areas, which are essentially the white man's creation, when he is willing to enter and minister to the needs (i.e. perform labour) of the white man, and depart therefrom when he ceases. (Quoted in Desmond, 1971, p 23)

The general aim of influx control legislation is to limit the sheer size of the african population in urban areas. However, the rationale underlying this general aim and thus the resultant function of such legislation has not remained static throughout this century. We can see its changing role, for example, during the apartheid era since the National Party victory in 1948.

The early 1950s saw a tightening up of influx control, reflected in the Native Laws Amendment Act of 1952. As M C Botha, Minister of the then Department of Bantu Administration and Development, said in 1970, among

the most striking successes we as a National Party have on our record books, I mention the tightening-up of influx control.... (Quoted in Baldwin, 1975, p 225)

We must see this in turn in terms of how South African capitalism developed during the 1930s and 1940s.

The 1930-1950 period was a time of rapid capital accumulation for urban-based manufacturing capital, with its gross value of output increasing by 140% between 1933 and 1939, and by 141% between 1939 and 1946. (Humphrey, 1977, pp 33-34) The boom in manufacturing and mining capital had a very bad effect on farm labour. The white farmers were losing their labour tenants and squatters because they could not compete with the higher wages offered by the manufacturers. Farm workers were leaving the land to find work in town.

Morris (1977) has given a wealth of empirical information, in the form of statements by the *South African Agricultural Union and its provincial representatives*, to indicate the crisis for agricultural capital. At the 1944 OFS Agricultural Union congress, for example,

delegates from all parts of the province complained that it was impossible to maintain adequate labour forces on their farms. . . . The drift to the towns would have to be stopped in some way. (*Farmers Weekly*, 23.08.44, quoted in Morris, 1977, p 9)

During the 1940s the South African Agricultural Union exerted huge pressure on the State for it to intensify labour controls. The Union called for the division of the african working class into two sections, one restricted to working for manufacturing and mining capital, and the other only for agricultural capital, with State-controlled labour bureaux preventing the latter work-force from migrating to the white urban areas. (See Morris, 1977, and Greenberg, 1980.)

This produced the new influx controls of the 1950s. These new measures were, however, also meant to solve what the State and capital saw as a problem of urban crisis and instability.

This other problem started with the large-scale african migration to the towns during the 1930s and 1940s, when people came not only from white-owned farms but also from the african reserves. Agricultural productivity in the reserves had declined steadily during the first half of this century as a result of the penetration of capitalist social relations of production in South Africa. (See Wolpe, 1972, and Simkins, 1981.) Naturally people started streaming into town from the reserve areas. The influx control system could not cope in the form it took in the days of the United Party and earlier, when there was little control over african movement from the white farms and the reserves. Between 1921 and 1936, the urban african population increased by 94%, with the male/female ratio decreasing from 5:1 in 1936 to 10:3 in 1946, reflecting an increase in family migration. (De Villiers, 1979)

The enormous migration resulted in mass unemployment in the urban areas. It also meant the municipalities could not provide adequate houses, either in number or quality. Both these factors helped to intensify the working-class struggle by africans in town during the 1940s. Thus, while the new, tighter, influx control system was introduced to solve the labour shortage for agricultural capital, it also tried to limit the scale of the urban african working-class struggle.

It was only after 1948 that legislation was passed, and State institutions formed, to solve these two problems. Under the Native Laws Amendment Act of 1952, labour bureaux were set up in 'white' South Africa. They were of two kinds - local (urban) and district (rural) - and they operated under the control of a central State labour bureau. Rural residents now had to have permission from the district labour bureau before they could leave the rural area, while one of the functions of the local labour bureau was to remove illegal urban residents. (The endorsing out of illegals employed in town meant reducing the unemployment rate amongst the legal residents.)

Legal urban residents were defined in terms of Section 10 of the 1945 Urban Areas Act. Up until 1952, though, Section 10 was applied only in areas where the local municipality asked for it. Then the 1952 Act made it automatically applicable to all urban areas, referred to as proclaimed areas. Movement between proclaimed areas was prohibited unless it meant moving

from an area of labour surplus to one of labour demand.

As things stood, it would not have been possible to implement the newly tightened-up form of influx control, because

owing to the absence of portraits, fingerprints and thirdly, of fixed identity numbers and durable identity documents it has thus far not been possible to determine the movements and still less the identity of our Natives.

(Morris, 1977, p 42, quoting a government official)

The Native Abolition of Passes and Co-ordination of Documents Act was passed in 1952 to counter these difficulties by facilitating the registration and identification of africans. The two 1952 Acts were applied to women only in the early 1960s, according to Wilson (1972, p 223), although they were used earlier in certain urban areas.

By 1957 there were 234 local and 278 district labour bureaux, the respective figures for 1971 being 418 and 379 which indicates how strongly the system went on growing. During 1953/54, over 54 000 'illegal' africans were removed to white farms to become labourers. (Morris, 1977, p 43) By the late 1950s the farm labour shortage had more or less been solved, especially given the increasing mechanisation and the transition to full-time wage labourers in white agriculture.

Then during the 1960s and 1970s the role of influx control legislation began to change. To quote Maré:

It has been said that if the apartheid period up to the end of the 1950s can be broadly characterised as that of allocation of labour, then the 1960s and 1970s are the decades of relocation of labour. (1978, p 37)

With this came the new emphasis on removals to the bantustans. As Maré notes, the people relocated have been the unemployed. The laws have been important throughout the period for enabling agricultural capital to keep up an adequate labour supply, but whereas urban removals during the 1950s were directed towards the white-owned farms where labour was needed, the 'target area' in the 1960s and 1970s has been the bantustans where employment opportunities are exceedingly limited. With the farm labour shortage pretty well solved in the 1950s, the main function of influx control legislation since then has been to limit the scale of unemployment in white urban areas and hence the intensity of the urban african working-class struggle. In this regard, J B Vorster stated in 1970, when he was Prime Minister:

The greatest danger confronting South Africa is not so much the threat from outside the borders, serious though they may be, but mass unemployment...

(Quoted in Legassick, 1974, p 28)

We must see the changing role of influx control legislation in the context of the dynamics of capital accumulation during the last 20 years.

The period since the early 1960s has been characterised by the increasing penetration of productive monopoly capital into the South African social formation. This affects the policy of relocation because the monopoly sector is more capital-intensive than the competitive sector. The absolute number of employed people may increase; but, relative to the rise in constant capital (primarily, the means of production), the growing capital-intensity in production implies that the number of employed is decreasing. In other words, the more you use machines (increasing capital intensity), the less your relative use of manpower. The following statistics help to make the point. From 1955 to 1970, african employment in the private manufacturing sector grew from 433 056 to 864 300. (Wolpe, 1972, p 443) African unemployment, on the other hand, rose in South Africa from 1,24 million in 1960 to 1,6 million in 1970, and again to 2,3 million in 1977, according to Simkins. (Maré, 1980, p 21)

It seems clear then that influx control legislation now attempts to locate african unemployment in the bantustans rather than the white urban areas. It does this mainly by preventing the

unemployed from moving into the white urban areas. But since many thousands enter these areas illegally, influx control also requires that these people be sent back to the bantustans. From 1960 to 1970 it is estimated that 400 000 people were thus removed. (Baldwin, 1975, p 216)

The key function of influx control at present is to confine the unemployed to the bantustans as far as possible. Yet it still also serves to limit the size of the urban african population, whether employed or not. The State therefore makes it almost impossible for contract workers, even those with steady jobs, to get permanent urban residence rights. If these restrictions were relaxed, there would be an immediate threat of the african population doubling in some metropolitan centres. For this reason the migrant labour system, whatever its narrow economic functions, is still encouraged to the full.

This role of influx control, of limiting urban african numbers, is of course connected with its other function of limiting unemployment in town. Effective control over urban unemployment would be impossible if the permanent urban population increased so much that most jobs were filled by local people. In other words, limited urban unemployment presupposes a migrant component in the work force sufficiently large to absorb any unemployment that might arise.

In the past two decades, influx control legislation has been continually toughened and tightened. With the 1964 Bantu Laws Amendment Act, women and children residing with their male Section 10 qualifier had to prove that their original entry into the urban area had been lawful. Before, they merely had to prove that they ordinarily resided with him. (Wilson, 1972, p 161) The same Act widened the definition of an 'idle' person (as set out in the 1945 Urban Areas Act), so that Section 10 qualifiers could be endorsed out of town after becoming unemployed. The 1978 Bantu Laws Amendment Act widened the definition still further by including qualifiers involved in the informal sector. We should add, though, that not many people have been affected by the 'idle and undesirable' clause of the Act - during 1978, for example, only 284 people were declared idle and 11 undesirable in the main urban centres. Yet the fact remains that the tool is there for wholesale use if the authorities so wish.

The 1968 Black Labour Regulations resulted in the establishment of tribal labour bureaux in the bantustans. Africans there were, and still are, required to register as workseekers at these bureaux, and must find work through the bureaux before leaving the bantustan areas. This is a further attempt at entrenching the migrant labour system.

Then with the introduction of the Black Affairs Administration Act of 1971, 22 Administration Board areas were established in 'white' South Africa, with the boards becoming responsible for the administration and control of the african population.* Influx control no longer came under the white local authorities in the prescribed areas but was implemented by the administration boards under direct control of the then Department of Bantu Administration and Development (now Department of Co-operation and Development). A Section 10 qualifier could work in any prescribed area within the administration board area he had residence rights in. This is still the case, and now the 1980 Black Labour Regulations allow qualifiers to work in other board areas too. Both the 1971 Act and the 1980 Regulations thus allow qualifiers greater employment mobility. (Hindson, 1980) They represent an attempt at decreasing the unemployment rate amongst Section 10 qualifiers.

The ever-tougher line against 'illegals' is very clear to see in the instruments of control. While the 1968 Regulations are geared towards limiting illegal influx into the urban areas, the introduction of the R500 fine (in the late 1970s) on employers of 'illegals' in town obviously attempts to endorse out those people who have slipped illegally into the urban areas. This very aggressive response to illegal townspeople may still grow far more severe. The draft Orderly Movement Bill now under review by the select committee (1982) proposes raising the fine on employers from R500 to R5 000, and also fining any householder up to R500 for accommodating an 'illegal'.

* In 1979 these Administration Board areas were consolidated into 14 areas.

We have not been able to gauge how many people were endorsed out, as a result of influx control infringements, from prescribed areas to the Ciskei or Transkei during the 1970s. Census data are clearly of no use because these removals would probably be just about cancelled out by illegal entry at any particular time. It is well known, however, that tens of thousands are involved. For example, the aid centres alone throughout the country sent something like 50 000 africans to the bantustans during each of the years 1975 - 1977. (Riekert, 1979, p 55) Aid centres hide the story of pass law offences, incidentally. Before the aid centre in Port Elizabeth started in 1973, the local Commissioner's court averaged 17 000 convictions a year in pass law and other cases. Then the rate dropped dramatically - the total for all cases in January - June 1980, for instance, was a mere 1 575. The difficult life of an illegal migrant is crudely implied in an official circular to aid centre workers which refers to 'the most cunning unregistered worker or layabout who even uses a forged reference book to put a spoke into officials' wheels.' (EPH, 28.02.81)

2.3.7 Coloured labour preference removals

In 1955 Dr W W M Eiselen, then Secretary of Native Affairs, outlined the policy whereby coloured labour was to be given preference over african labour in the Western Cape, i.e. the region west of the line running from the eastern border of the Knysna magisterial district up to Hopetown in the north. He also stated that the policy would be implemented in the following stages:

- | | |
|--|--|
| (1) removal of foreign africans | (4) reduction in the number of african families |
| (2) freeze on number of african families | (5) replacement of african migrants by
coloureds. |
| (3) restricted influx of migrant workers | |

The ultimate aim was to remove all africans from the Western Cape.

It is quite clear that the Coloured Labour Preference policy was entirely consistent with influx control and the bantustan strategy generally. The presence of a large coloured working class in the Western Cape gave some feasibility to the goal of excluding africans - if not entirely, then at least to a significant extent - from the area. The policy may also have been developed as a kind of quid pro quo for taking away all coloured representation in parliament. It could have been an attempt to accommodate them economically, if not politically.

Eiselen's policy guidelines lay dormant for some years. The first tentative steps towards implementing the policy came in 1962 with the establishment of a variety of committees to encourage the use of coloured labour. The Eiselen Line was also shortly afterwards moved further eastwards to include districts such as Henley, Graaff-Reinet, Middelburg and Colesberg.

But it was only in 1965-68 that the State embarked on the policy very seriously. An amendment to the Black Labour Regulations empowered labour officers to withhold african labour from employers unless coloured labour was unavailable. The same amendment also enabled labour officers to ensure that permanent african labour was given preference in turn over contract labour when the use of african labour was unavoidable. These new Regulations were extended to all categories of employment including agriculture. Another measure froze the african component of the labour force. Finally the Physical Planning and Utilisation of Resources Act of 1967 severely curtailed african employment in any extensions to factories. These restrictions in the labour market were accompanied by a freeze on the provision of family housing for africans in the Cape Peninsula. The Coloured Labour Preference zone was extended eastwards yet again to the so-called Kat-Fish Line. It now included all Cape districts west of the Ciskei.

A spate of removals immediately followed the introduction of these measures. Not only were large numbers of individuals endorsed out of the Western Cape, but whole communities from small Cape towns such as Middelburg, Burgersdorp, Colesberg, Cookhouse, Cradock and

Molteno were uprooted. The resettlement sites of Sada and Dimbaza owe their very existence to these removals. Many people also went to Mdantsane.

During the seventies the Colour Labour Preference policy passed through several subtle changes. At the beginning of the decade whole communities were being moved. Africans were cleared out then from Hofmeyr and Noupoot. Now it would seem that, barring action against squatter communities, this side of the policy has been abandoned. It also seems that the attempt to reduce the african population by 5% per annum has been shelved. This part of the scheme aimed ultimately at removing all africans from the region, but giving it up did not mean at all that the policy in its entirety had been scrapped. On the contrary, some aspects of the policy have been enforced with ever greater enthusiasm in the area west of the 1963 Eiselen Line, and particularly those relating to the allocation of labour and provision of housing. The effect of these changes is that recently people have been forced out of the area through intensified economic pressures rather than crude GG removals.

The efflux from rural areas is fairly apparent from census material. We have already mentioned that employment of africans in Cape agriculture declined in the years 1972 - 75 whereas that of coloureds increased, and that this must at least in part be due to coloured labour preference. A glance at rural population growth rates for coloureds and africans reveals a similar pattern. In virtually all rural districts the african population either decreased at a faster rate than the coloured one or, where there was positive population growth, increased at a slower rate. Furthermore, the divergence in population growth rates was more and more pronounced the further westward the district. Altogether these observations suggest that the Coloured Labour Preference policy definitely accelerated the depopulation of the rural parts of the Western and Central Cape.

It is more difficult to gauge the urban areas in the Western and Central Cape region. An adequate set of employment figures for both africans and coloureds in all the urban areas is not available. The figures cited earlier suggest that coloured labour preference may well have adversely affected the employment opportunities for africans, but not to anything approximating the extent planned by the State. We can get a somewhat fuller picture from the population trends. In the urban areas of the interior parts of the Central and Western Cape, the growth of the coloured population was on the whole only marginally higher than the african population's, and both rates were below the average national growth rates for each group. This seems to imply that coloured emigration and the consequent limitations to the coloured labour force were such as to prevent an effective implementation of colour labour preference. Thus, although the policy may have made a small contribution to the efflux of africans from these areas, the main reason for this was simply the stagnation of the economies concerned. On the other hand, in coastal towns the coloured population grew fairly rapidly through the seventies (e.g. George 3,8; Knysna 6,0; Mossel Bay 3,5), no doubt primarily in response to the decentralisation incentives for employers of coloured labour, whereas the african population either decreased or hardly increased at all. In these urban areas the Coloured Labour Preference policy must have had a significant impact. The same holds for the Cape Town metropolitan area: its african population has increased quite rapidly, but there is general agreement that it could have absorbed many more people were it not for the discrimination against africans in matters of employment and housing.

This discrimination and the stringency of influx control generally has had two other main consequences:

Firstly, an exceptionally large number of people have been forced to enter Cape Town illegally, and as a result the area has been subjected to a mass of expulsions under the pass laws. The recent removal of the Nyanga Bush squatters is just the tip of an iceberg. The removals are continually going on, with new people always ready to replace the ejected ones. Often the same person goes through the process several times.

Secondly, the fact that migrant workers here stand at the end of the job queue to a far greater extent than elsewhere means that fluctuations in Cape Town's economic conditions strongly

influence the number of migrants in the area .

Both these migration flows are clearly of an oscillating type and hence do not show up in census figures . All we know is that many thousands have been involved .

Unfortunately it is impossible to say how many people have been resettled in the Ciskei or Transkei from the Western and Central Cape through the Coloured Labour Preference policy , because one cannot distinguish between the effects of this policy and other political and economic pressures .*

We do not know where people went on leaving a particular area , or for that matter where those entering an area came from . It is known that some of the recent settlers in Mdantsane are from the Western Cape . We also came across some recent arrivals from the Western Cape in Dimbaza and Sada . But obviously people must have gone to other places as well .

The Coloured Labour Preference policy does not seem to have such a clear role in the Eastern Cape . No detailed information is available , but in 1971 the policy was somewhat relaxed in this region and in 1978 Port Elizabeth was altogether excluded from its provisions . This could suggest that it never really got off the ground in the Eastern Cape , presumably because of the relatively small coloured population here .

2.3.8 Political removals

The largest group of political refugees in the Ciskei - whom one can say were removed by pressures arising from State action - were those flooding out of Herschel and Glen Grey in 1976/77 . Estimates vary on their numbers . The official total was 32 000 , but this figure is probably too low . Chief Malefane put it at 32 000 in mid-January 1977 , with another 8 000 still on the way from Herschel . Two months later, two Ciskei ministers (Depts of Health and the Interior) talked of 43 000 at the Thornhill site alone , with small groups still arriving daily . The Secretary for Agriculture in the Ciskei, Mr Gary Godden, put the figure at 50 000 including 10 000 extra people from 'white' South Africa . This is very close to the 51 429 which the local magistrate gave as the influx from Glen Grey, Herschel, Aliwal North, Burgersdorp and Noupoot (in response to a church enquiry in 1980 recorded in the minutes of the Border Council of Churches) .

This was certainly a large proportion of the Herschel and Glen Grey populations . The Ciskei Secretary for the Interior gave this telling information in June 1977 (Charton, 1980, p 165): that of the Ciskeian registered voters in Herschel prior to 1976, 25% were registered in the Ciskei after resettlement there up to 14 June 1977 (12 067 out of 49 019 voters); and of those in Glen Grey, 18% to the same date (15 432 out of 86 188 voters) .

The political pressures evidently came from both sides, Transkei and Ciskei . Both Herschel and Glen Grey had voted overwhelmingly against joining the Transkei - the Glen Grey vote in the 1971 referendum, for instance, was 37 842 to 6 634 in favour of staying in the Ciskei . When these districts were ceded to the Transkei anyway as part of the deal before it 'went independent' in October 1976, the people who had somewhat rashly registered their disapproval knew they had to get out . Matanzima's local men in fact told people to go, according to some of the SPP questionnaires . The Herschel groups were led by Chiefs Hinana, Bebeza and Malefane, whom George Matanzima, in true Chicago style, had taken for a ride with his bodyguards and threatened with firearms .

* At best we can mention our estimate that 42 173 people left the small towns and countryside of the Western and Central Cape during the 1970s, while 28 507 entered the Cape Town metropolitan area .

The refugees were also lured by Sebe. Chief Mabandla and others implied that he did so at least partly to get extra support for his political party, the CNIP (Ciskei National Independence Party). Sebe himself argued that Mr Mkrola coming from Herschel was his supporter and had the three chiefs Hinana, Bebeza and Malefane in his pocket, which meant four extra votes for the CNIP. It was a significant help in the close contests before Ciskei became a one-party State. Added to this, the extra thousands of people enabled Sebe to argue the need for another chief in Zweledinga. On the basis of now having 33 chiefs in the Ciskei, and that there had to be two-thirds that number of elected members of the Assembly, two more members were added. (Ciskei Debates, v 9 (1977), pp 327-8)

Sebe could count on support from the newcomers. They were firmly guided by their refugee leadership whose political consciousness was limited to blind loyalty to the Ciskei regime, supplemented by the conviction that the Matanzima brothers would never forgive them. But he did also draw them with promises of what Chief Mabandla called 'milk and honey'. Busloads from the two districts were driven around the still prosperous white farms in Hewu to show these people how much better these parts of the northern Ciskei looked than Herschel and Glen Grey. Each touring group was led to believe they would inherit a whole farm themselves.

The appalling lack of preparation which greeted the refugees was followed by a rapid deterioration in their condition as more and more people arrived and any compensation money ran out. Even Sebe was moved to clear his image by protest at conditions at Thornhill farm:

It is a big joke to think that over 40 000 people can be accommodated on 8 000 hectares of land. (DD, 22.01.77)

The overcrowding included the presence of 40 000 head of small stock in the early days. From the first it had been a disaster area, when the first 2 000 arrived in the bitter cold of July 1976. All people had were tents and later on some zinc huts, or the shelters they contrived for themselves out of bushes and mud and bits of plastic. Even with the passing months, no basic needs were being catered for. There was 'no food' and people were starving. Water was critically short: most supplies had to be carted in tankers from Whittlesea about 20 km away, and in January Sebe expressed his hope of getting 200 tankers to improve the daily supply. Measles and typhoid added to the crisis. There was no sanitation. These horrific conditions made a deathtrap of Thornhill and also the receiving farms in Zweledinga. (At Bushby Park, a farmhouse and cowshed were said to house more than 50 families.) The pain and permanent damage inflicted by the move on thousands of families can only be hinted at in the few press and Ciskei Assembly statements. Interviews in the area would record a lot more, although obviously such experiences lie far beyond words.

Atrocious though it all was, it did not result in any change of political direction. The refugees had committed themselves too deeply to their course of action. They were totally without other alternatives. They could only continue in trusting the promises of the Ciskei authorities.

Paradoxically the fact that the removal was such a disaster brought some slight benefit later inasmuch as it forced the Pretoria government to take some action. Some houses have been built, more development is planned, and attempts are being made to irrigate the Ntabethemba (Thornhill) and Zweledinga areas to some extent. (See Sections 2.2.4 and 2.6.5.) But these areas will never amount to the promised land which the refugees had hoped to find. In all probability they will never even equal the land they left.

As well as the mass political removal, a good many individuals have been sent to the Ciskei on account of their unacceptable political leanings. Pretoria has banned ex-Robben Island prisoners and their families here since the mid-sixties. Sada, Dimbaza and Ilinge appear to have been the chief destinations, as far as we have heard. (Ilinge, of course, now 'belongs' to Transkei with the rest of Glen Grey district.) The numbers cannot be estimated beyond saying that some hundreds of households have been banished to the Ciskei. They are not limited to main points like Sada but are also present in tiny rural villages.

By contrast, some domestic opponents of the Sebe regime have fled the Ciskei. (Again, we

hold that political refugees definitely have a place in an account of forced removals.) Prominent among these are former members of the opposition CNP such as Mr L Mtoba, Chief P Mpangele, and Dr H Kakaza who escaped from hospital while being held under R252. Each of these men fled to the Transkei after repeated and prolonged spells of detention. Numberless others have simply packed their bags quietly and left for the urban areas of the Republic.

2.3.9 Betterment removals

Betterment schemes date back to 1936 in spirit, to the creation of the SA Trust. They really got going with the Tomlinson Commission of 1956 which suggested, among other things, means whereby bantustan agriculture could be made more viable. These schemes entail people being moved only very short distances, but betterment has probably removed more people in more places with greater social consequences and provoking more resistance than any other category of forced removal in South Africa. (See Yawitch, 1982.)

The idea behind betterment schemes is simply that unplanned land use lowers the agricultural productivity of an area, and that scattered homesteads should be replaced by closer settlement villages surrounded by rigidly demarcated arable and pastoral zones. Calculations are made of the optimum carrying capacity of the land, and ideally excess people and cattle should be removed leaving the rest of the people as prosperous peasants. The Tomlinson Commission also advised the creation of industrial employment opportunities for the evicted people in the bantustans.

In practice, though, betterment has amounted to little more than the culling of cattle, the consolidation of homesteads and a re-allocation of a reduced arable land area among the people. Both the available grazing and - more important - the unused land area were expanded at the expense of the arable component. On the whole the surplus population successfully resisted the attempts of the SA Trust to move them off the land altogether. Certainly no jobs were created for them, nor did a viable class of peasants emerge. De Wet (1980) in a study of a betterment scheme in the Keiskammahoek district concludes that the condition of most people deteriorated as a result of betterment and that

in real terms the betterment scheme has drastically reduced the amount of land available for cultivation (however poor it may previously have been). By implication this has rendered the people even more dependent on migrant labour than they may have been before. (p 12)

The programme as conceived by Tomlinson may have had some justification, but since a main point of the plan - i.e. significant industrial development in the area - was never taken seriously, it has made betterment as nightmarishly illogical as a Kafka novel. To most of the people concerned it represents a totally inexplicable, oppressive bit of intervention by officialdom which has disrupted their life and left them materially poorer.

Unfortunately no figures are available for those moved in the Ciskei by 'the Trust', as it is known. But it would seem that most of the rural areas have been 'bettered'.

The irrigation schemes being developed by the Ciskeian authorities are rather like betterment schemes in their effect on people and land allocation. Whatever the agricultural virtues, they do involve moving people off land and a loss of land for some people. For example, the Tyefu irrigation scheme set up by LTA is divided into three parts:

- (a) the misleadingly named tribal farms, which are in fact farmed by LTA 'to meet the costs of competent management and to generate profits to be used for community development farms'
- (b) 4 ha 'commercial farms' allocated to men 'selected through the traditional channels', which in this case means the Sebe government
- (c) $\frac{1}{4}$ ha 'food plots' going to the people who were expelled from their land to make way for

the whole scheme in the first place .

There is an arithmetical discrepancy in the only figures available to us (DD, 12.12.80), but it seems clear that over half the land has gone to LTA, and that 198 'food plots' - presumably representing the number of displaced families - have been allocated. Further extensions to the scheme will entail moving the whole Glenmore community. A similar set of circumstances surrounds the Keiskamma irrigation scheme, only it would seem that in that case the displaced people didn't even get $\frac{1}{4}$ ha irrigated plots.

2.4 TRANSKEI RESETTLEMENT

2.4.1 Introduction

As the SPP has carried out no fieldwork in the Transkei, we are unable to make a definitive statement on relocation in that area. Early in the project, the Eastern Cape group decided to concentrate on the Ciskei, as there had been a large number of forced removals to that area, while the Transkeian authorities have, with a couple of well publicised exceptions, refused to accept people moved en masse. They have had less success with the thousands of people endorsed out of the urban areas and sent 'home' to the territory every year. This short section on relocation and the Transkei is intended only to point out certain trends, to emphasise the need for further research and to highlight the close relationship between South Africa and its progeny.

2.4.2 Resettlement camps

Ilinge was one of the three notorious camps - the others were Sada and Dimbaza - exposed in the 1960s for their lack of facilities and appalling conditions. It lies in a bleak valley in the Glen Grey district, 18 km east of Queenstown, and when Cosmas Desmond visited it in May 1969, he estimated that there were 1 000 houses there. Ten years later there were about double that number, and the camp is still expanding.

There are four types of housing at Ilinge. The majority of the houses are the original one-room brick units with an extra tin room added to the back. There are also newer standard 'location' type houses, two rows of attached rooms for workers at Ilinge's handicraft factory, and a few large multi-roomed houses belonging to shop owners and officials.

In 1973 the population of the settlement was estimated at about 12 000 people. (SAIRR Survey 1973, p 166) Most of them had been evicted from 1962 onwards from farms or endorsed out of urban areas such as Uitenhage, Colesberg, Cradock, Cathcart, Molteno, Queenstown, James-town, and from the Western Cape, particularly Cape Town. Many men returned to the jobs they had held before, but this time as migrant workers, leaving their families in Ilinge. Some 40 former political prisoners, mainly members of the banned ANC from Port Elizabeth, had

been virtually exiled to Ilinge, according to reports in 1969.

Problems then were much the same as they are now - lack of fuel, no land for ploughing or grazing, extreme cold in winter and heat in summer, with the biggest problem being the lack of employment. One young man interviewed recently had managed to find work on the Keiskammahoek dam site. He was lucky, as there are already thousands of unemployed people in the Keiskammahoek area. About 300 handicapped people are employed in making handicrafts such as mats in a factory at Ilinge itself.

There are six schools at Ilinge, and a clinic which was built in 1968 and costs 20c a visit. There is a post office, a police station, a couple of shops (including a bottle store) and three churches. The busfare to Queenstown was 70c each way in 1980.

When the Herschel and Glen Grey districts, formerly part of the Ciskei, were included in the Transkei in 1975, some Ilinge residents moved to camps in the Ciskei's Whittlesea area such as Zweledinga and Oxtan (see Section 2.2.4 above).

Similar to Ilinge, but smaller, is the settlement of Oranjefontein on the outskirts of Herschel village. This consists of about 104 tin huts occupied by people moved from white farms in the OFS and NE Cape in the late 1960s. All of these houses have tin latrines. Residents draw water from a tank in Herschel. Apparently they applied in the late 1970s to be given arable land but were told there was none available.

2.4.3 Urban relocation

At one stage the South African government planned to abolish the Queenstown location, Mlungisi, and move the people a few kilometres to the newly built eZibeleni, from where they would commute to Queenstown. eZibeleni lies just within Glen Grey, though, and when that district was ceded to Transkei it became obvious that a community largely defined as Ciskeian could not be forced to go there. The plan was therefore abandoned. Some people from Mlungisi who had already been moved to eZibeleni elected to stay. The place has become an industrial growth point, and people hope for jobs there. But people could freely choose to return to Mlungisi, and some have done so.

A large number of Transkeians live in East London's Duncan Village (described in more detail in Sections 2.6.3 and 3.2 below), the residents of which are gradually being moved to Mdantsane, in the Ciskei. However, the Transkei government wants the african population of Duncan Village to remain outside the Ciskei, because this residential area also serves a considerable number of Transkeian migrants. Transkeians there have been removed to Mdantsane along with Ciskeians as one area of Duncan Village after another is cleared.

According to the Daily Dispatch (4.03.82), in March 1982 Transkeian authorities expressed 'extreme displeasure' to the South African government through diplomatic channels when Transkeians were arrested for illegal residence in Duncan Village. The Transkeian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr Mtutuzeli Lujabe, said that while Transkei could not interfere in South Africa's internal affairs, if it decided to 'disestablish a place ... we have to look after the interests of our nationals. We object most strongly to our nationals being forced to live in another state either by compulsion or by implication, and we will take the strongest possible action if this is to happen'. (*Ibid*) Former MP and TNIP activist Mr J J Matotie is resident in Duncan Village, and is fighting its demolition. Backing for the Transkeian stand has also come from the East London city council. However, Koornhof and Morrison made it clear in 1982 that Duncan Village would not be given a reprieve.

2.4.4 Influx control

As has been mentioned, thousands of people are endorsed out of the urban areas every year and sent to the Transkei. They arrive in ones and twos and are either absorbed into tribal villages or, desperate for work, make their way back to the urban areas. In the late 1970s the South African authorities began to demolish the large squatter camps - Modderdam, Unibel and Werkgenot - on the outskirts of Cape Town, and tried to endorse out the inhabitants to 'their homelands'. Few went. In October 1977 the press reported Transkei's refusal to accept the squatters, and in January 1978, when South African officials claimed that there had been consultation on the issue, the Transkeian ambassador, Prof M Njisane, denied that any agreement had been reached.

Next in line for demolition was Crossroads, where in 1979 the Transkei authorities again blocked attempts to 'repatriate' squatter families saying that although they were given a list of 3 000 families, only 20% of them were found to have any links with the Transkei. (DD, 2.11.79) The year before, the South African government had planned to move Crossroads people to Bridge Farm in the Bolotwa-Gwatyu area where the South African Bantu (now Development) Trust had bought 20 farms for future consolidation into Transkei. The farms were to be handed over six months later, one full of relocated squatters. Kaiser Matanzima, who had been given a farm in the area by the South African government, was enraged, and demanded a meeting with the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr Pik Botha. An agreement was reached that Transkei would be consulted over land later to be transferred to the territory.

Meanwhile, back in the Western Cape, after a prolonged campaign to save the Crossroads community, a final position was reached which actually intensified influx control but which in the short term meant that most of the Crossroads people would remain, not without complications, in Cape Town. (See SPP v 3.) Plans for mass relocation were therefore no longer needed for this group.

2.4.5 The Nyanga Bush deportations

Between August and December 1981, the South African authorities used Section 40 (5) of the Admission of Persons to the Republic Regulation Act 59 of 1972 to deport to the Transkei thousands of people arrested at the Nyanga Bush camp near Crossroads. (See SPP v 3 for details.) While Transkeian authorities protested and claimed no part in the deportations, they were powerless to refuse to accept the people.

Mr Colin Eglin, PFP member of parliament for Sea Point, said the dumping of Transkeians who had squatted at Nyanga was in conflict with the Status of Transkei Act which gave Transkeians the right to enter South Africa. (Star, 25.08.81) A large part of the protest which followed the maltreatment and deportation of the squatters centred around numbers of children left in Cape Town when their parents were deported. Responding to a parliamentary question (PQ 25, of 7.10.81), the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr Botha, said that 10 deported mothers had left children in Cape Town and that they, together with 40 others whose children might have been left, were to be transported from Umtata to Cape Town at State expense. He went on to say:

After all the arrangements had been made and the bus was ready to leave, spokesmen of the crowd assembled there, claiming to speak for the women also, (and) rejected the use of the bus. The crowd thereupon demanded that the whole group of five hundred who had been removed from Cape Town and were still in Umtata should be taken back

forthwith. When the South African officials explained that they did not have the authority to comply with those demands, they were mobbed and prevented from leaving the premises until the arrival of the Transkeian police. Regretfully the attempt to assist the women concerned had therefore to be abandoned.

South Africa contributed R35 000 towards the cost of feeding people removed to Umtata who had not gone to 'their places of residence' (mainly because few of them had lived in the Transkei previously). The aid was administered by the Transkeian government. The outraged people who were forced for a while to draw on this aid said that it debilitated them, and as soon as possible they tried making their own arrangements. These included all possible efforts to return to Cape Town, in response to which armed roadblocks manned all the main routes they could take and stayed there round the clock with their submachine guns for a few weeks. This strong blockade certainly kept back the tide at the time. The Transkei was officially only prepared to accept those whom the chiefs said had homes in their areas. If it was not clear that they were Transkeians, the people were dumped in the Ciskei.

In terms of government strategies for forced removals, deportations could become crucial. Now that Ciskei is 'independent', Xhosa-speaking people may be deported, without notice and without being processed by the courts, from white South Africa to either Ciskei or Transkei. One could be deported at any time, and for any reason - for participating in labour or community organisations, or for resisting a removal scheme, or on being retrenched.

2.4.6 Land consolidation & black spots

A dispute over the acquisition of more land for the Transkei was supposedly the main reason for the territory breaking off diplomatic relations with South Africa in 1978. Chief Matanzima said in 1976 that 'We want to be free but will continue to press for land to be transferred to Transkei from South Africa'. (To the Point, 21.04.78) According to the Daily Dispatch (9.03.77), the Transkei claimed Elliot, Maclear, Kokstad, Harding, various farms in the Cedarville area, Matatiele, Mount Currie and parts of Port Shepstone. Transkei has also proposed amalgamation with Ciskei to form 'one Xhosa nation' but Chief Sebe has consistently refused to participate in the debate.

Removal of black spots and 'badly situated areas' has not been a major issue for Transkei. At the beginning of 1982 there were eight black spots under threat of removal in the 'White Corridor' between Transkei and Ciskei, but, as is explained elsewhere in this report, these are due to go, or have gone, to the Ciskei.

2.4.7 Betterment planning *

Although the Transkeian authorities have resisted mass removals of the sort so common in the Ciskei, and have waxed indignant over issues such as Duncan Village and the Western Cape squatters, they have had no qualms about implementing forced removals within their own territory.

* This section is heavily indebted to an article by Prof M C O'Connell, 'Resettlement and development in Transkei', Africa Insight, v 1, 1, 1981.

The type of internal relocation which perhaps affects most people in the Transkei is betterment planning. Betterment is a general term for agricultural development in the territory. We have touched on the subject in Section 2.3.9 above, but to repeat: the programme is designed to arrest and reverse the destruction of natural resources, improve agricultural production, and raise the standard of living in the rural areas. It is said that betterment will reduce the rate of labour migration and that it will allow a man to feed his family and earn an income through agricultural production. However, the forced resettlement which forms an integral part of betterment schemes - the consolidation of scattered homesteads into small, compact villages surrounded by clearly defined grazing and arable land - and the accompanying loss of privacy and distortion of kinship and neighbourhood relationships, has led to determined resistance. In 1971 residents of the Pepene area of Brooksnek formed an association called the Anti-Soil Conservation Scheme Section of Brooksnek which, in the same year, threatened to kill officials or local residents who supported the government's betterment scheme. From then on, agricultural officers operating in the area were accompanied by escorts of armed South African police. At Jozana, in the Herschel district, where betterment planning began in the early 1960s, people cut the fences as soon as they were erected, saying that once the land was fenced it was not theirs. Eventually police were sent to guard the fences, and one man was allegedly shot by them when the people attacked the police. In another area, people burnt the house of a headman who refused to oppose the betterment schemes.

A study by Transkei anthropologist Prof M C O'Connell of a betterment scheme at Nzongisa, near Mount Ayliff, indicated that the disruption of pre-betterment social relationships had led to a marked increase in crimes such as rape and burglary, and in the incidence of adultery. The study also showed that although betterment was intended to reduce migrancy, during the 19 years between the time that Nzongisa was resettled and the study was done in 1979 migration had increased steadily: between May and June of 1977 over half of all men between the ages of 18 and 65 were absent from Nzongisa. Said Prof O'Connell:

It is not just the increase in migration and the corresponding drop in agricultural production that force one to rethink betterment. It is also the general discontent, decline in morality, and other social problems which indicate a decline in the quality of life - both in the economic and in the spiritual sense.... Betterment might conceivably work if it is implemented only with the peoples' consent. Forcing betterment on Nzongisa has caused resentment.... The people of Nzongisa, like people everywhere, should have a right to choose their own life-style.

2.4.8 Infrastructural relocation

People have been dispossessed of their land and forced to move elsewhere to make way for projects including a tea plantation in Pondoland, an irrigation project near Qamata and a couple of other schemes, one of them near Kaiser Matanzima's farm. Most of the schemes have failed, causing even deeper resentment.

2.4.9 Squatter demolitions

On July 12, 1978 the Daily Dispatch reported that 40 shanties were demolished on the outskirts of Umtata, and that no alternative accommodation had been provided. 'The squatters were given notice to move out two weeks ago', Umtata's town clerk, Mr J Sacke, told the press.

'At that stage there were 28 shacks built of everything from tin and cardboard to plastic bags . By yesterday there were 40 shacks .' He said that in 1967 there were 50 names on the waiting list for houses at Umtata's Ngangelizwe township . In 1978 there were 1 000 , and the city faced a serious housing shortage . In Norwood , a suburb of Umtata , families were renting rooms at R10 to R15 per month .

2.4.10 Banishment & deportation

Tribal authorities control access to resources at the local level and therefore have total control over almost every aspect of people's lives , including the most important : access to land and its corollary , survival . The right to allocate and withdraw land defines security of tenure , and is a highly efficient means of maintaining real power over the people . A common punishment for those who dare to challenge the tribal authorities is another form of relocation - banishment . In terms of the territory's emergency regulations , the authorities have complete power to move anyone , anywhere , at any time . A whole location - Mpeki - was once moved because the residents were supporters of Chief Sabata Dalindyebo , King of the Thembus and a long-standing opponent of the Matanzimas and of the bantustan policy .

The authorities even have the power to deport their own citizens , as Mr Marcus Ngani , a reporter for the newspaper Post , discovered , when he was thrown out of the territory in 1980 . (Streek & Wickstead , 1981 , p 353)