

SECRET

13 JANUARY 1982

SUMMARY NOTES OF A MEETING BETWEEN SOUTH AFRICA
AND THE UNITED STATES : LONDON, 13-14 JANUARY 1982

Dr FOURIE said that South Africa had conveyed to the United States a list of points which could be discussed at the meetings. The Cabinet was meeting on 19 January 1982 and

PRESENT: South Africa : Dr B G Fourie
Mr D J Hough
Lieut-General J J Geldenhuys
Ambassador D B Sole
Mr J D Viall
Brig. C J van Tonder
Mr J A Eksteen
Mr D W Auret

Dr CROCKER indicated that the Contact Group was planning to meet in South Africa on 25 January 1982 and it was hoped that replies would have been received from all parties by then.

United States : Dr C Crocker
Mr N Platt
Mr R Frazure
Mr W Stadtler
Mr D McElhaney
Mr D Keogh
Mr A Keyes
Ms N Ely
Mr E G Lanpher

At the meeting of the Contact Group, the United States wanted first to hear from South Africa and obtain its views on Phase II. As far as the United States was concerned, the United States would be meeting with the Angolans in Paris on 15 and 16 January. The fact that such a meeting was taking place was a significant development. Apparently the Angolans had taken a decision to enter into serious discussions with the United States. The Savimbi visit to the United States had taken place from 28 November 1981 to 15 December 1981 under the auspices of Freedom House. He had met with people in the State Department. These meetings were viewed by the United States as being essential to strengthen the political legitimacy of UNITA and in order to achieve Cuban withdrawal from Angola. Savimbi's visit should be seen in that context. The United States had told Savimbi that UNITA had a central role to play in Angola and in any regional settlement. It was not for the United States to dictate the reconciliation process in Angola but the parties in the country would have to work this out. Savimbi had said that he too had an open mind in this regard and that he did not have any blueprint for the future. He was waiting for a signal from Luanda. His impression was that there was division within the MPLA about talking to him, but he felt that he had political and military momentum, also as regards the Cubans. The United States side was struck by Savimbi's statement that there could not be a military solution in Angola. Savimbi wanted a political solution and an obstacle to achieving that was the presence of Cubans in Angola. The United States had stated clearly to him that

SECRET

13 JANUARY 1982

Dr FOURIE said that South Africa had conveyed to the United States a list of points which could be discussed at the meetings. The Cabinet was meeting on 19 January 1982 and a response on Phase I could be expected following that meeting. It would be most useful if certain points regarding Phase I could be further talked about. It would also be appreciated if an indication could be given of where matters now stood and what the United States view was.

Dr CROCKER indicated that the United States was at present waiting to hear firstly from all parties on Phase I. The Contact Group was planning to meet in Bonn on 25 January 1981 and it was hoped that replies would have been received from all parties by that time. Phase II would not publicly and formally commence until Phase I had been completed. At the meeting of the Contact Group in Ottawa, the Group had looked at Phase II but no formal proposals had emerged. The United States wanted first of all to listen to South Africa and obtain its views on Phase II, which were crucial for that Phase. As far as Angola was concerned, the United States would be meeting with an MPLA delegation from that country in Paris on 15 and 16 January 1982. The fact that such a meeting was taking place was a significant development. Apparently the Angolans had taken a decision to enter into serious discussions with the United States. The Savimbi visit to the United States had taken place from 28 November 1981 to 15 December 1981 under the auspices of Freedom House. He had seen numerous people in the State Department. These meetings were viewed by the United States as being essential to strengthen the political legitimacy of UNITA and in order to achieve Cuban withdrawal from Angola. Savimbi's visit should be seen in that context. The United States had told Savimbi that UNITA had a central role to play in Angola and in any regional settlement. It was not for the United States to dictate the reconciliation process in Angola but the parties in the country would have to work this out. Savimbi had said that he too had an open mind in this regard and that he did not have any blueprint for the future. He was waiting for a signal from Luanda. His impression was that there was division within the MPLA about talking to him, but he felt that he had political and military momentum, also as regards the Cubans. The United States side was struck by Savimbi's statement that there could not be a military solution in Angola. Savimbi wanted a political solution and an obstacle to achieving that was the presence of Cubans in Angola. The United States had stated clearly to him that

/.....

it had to have communication with all parties in Angola, also the MPLA. Savimbi had been quick to encourage that development and had been pleased at the prospect of talks between the MPLA and the United States. He was seeking to firm-up his diplomatic support in Africa and the United States was prepared to help Savimbi achieve this. Savimbi was appreciative of South African support and was not apologetic about it. He indicated however that he was getting increased pressure from certain African countries to distance himself from South Africa, and he was clearly starting to feel on the defensive. His problems arose even when he travelled to countries such as Morocco, Gabon, Zaire and Senegal. It would be necessary to look at ways of building Savimbi's support.

Dr FOURIE enquired in what way Savimbi was feeling embarrassed.

Dr CROCKER said that pressure from various countries was putting Savimbi in a difficult position. This was true particularly in the context of South Africa's military operations in southern Angola. Savimbi was being tied to this and he was accused of being part of South Africa's buffer strategy in that part of the world. He was attempting to regain lost support from African countries by stating that SWAPO was a legitimate liberation movement. The United States sincerely hoped that more could be done to take account of Savimbi's political position in Africa. The United States made a sharp distinction between Savimbi and other political parties in Angola. The United States had told Savimbi that other groups had wanted to visit the United States. He was very concerned about this but was told that since he was considered in a special way, other groups would not be received in Washington. It was the United States point of view that they would be condemning Savimbi if any of the other groups were treated the same. It would be appreciated if South Africa could indicate its views on this matter. The United States hoped that South Africa shared its view and would contain its enthusiasm for other Angolan opposition groups. As far as the United States talks with the Angolans in Paris were concerned, South Africa would be briefed as soon as there had been a chance to assess them.

Dr FOURIE explained that traditionally the FNLA had received its main support from Zaire, from President Mobutu. Mobutu had not been anti-Savimbi, but had preferred to back the FNLA. South Africa had no contact with other opposition groups in Angola and supported the United States position. As far as Savimbi was concerned, it would be interesting to learn whether the loosening of relations with South Africa was seen in

/.....

terms of practical politics. If this was so, then South Africa could discuss this with Savimbi.

Dr CROCKER said that the problem had two dimensions, i.e. what was actually happening and the public perception.

Dr FOURIE enquired whether Savimbi was more concerned about the latter.

Dr CROCKER said that Savimbi was concerned about the linkage with South Africa regarding its fight against SWAPO.

Dr FOURIE referred to the information received from the United States regarding Savimbi's visit. It was noted that Savimbi held the view that SWAPO would break with the Soviet Union if it came to power in South West Africa. South African Intelligence Agencies strongly differed with this point of view.

Dr CROCKER said that Savimbi might be using this argument to boost his own image. It would not serve mutual United States/South African interests if the clock were to be turned back to 1975. It was important that Savimbi and the MPLA not be treated on an equal basis. Holden Roberto's movement was a disaster. If there was to be movement by the MPLA, all efforts should be concentrated on Savimbi.

Dr FOURIE recalled that the strategy in 1975 had been dictated by the so-called Frontline States. Their objective was that no-one should be in control of Angola at independence. In the event the strategy did not work. South Africa followed the advice of the Frontline States but was by no means wedded to that strategy.

Dr CROCKER quoted from General Haig's letter to the Minister of 9 January 1982. Genl. Haig had indicated that it was crucial that both South Africa and the United States recall what it was trying to do and not get bogged down in detail. Progress had been made. The United States and South Africa had shared interests in the region. The United States strongly felt that it and South Africa must collectively control events. There was no doubt that change was coming but the United States and South Africa must control that change. The shared objective in southern Africa was that Soviet influence should be reduced. There would have to be change in both South West Africa and Angola, but since South West Africa was on the international agenda one would

consequently have to start there. If Namibia could be handled creatively, it would provide leverage on Angola and in other areas. No-one had the levers necessary to reverse the events of 1975/76 or to reverse the philosophy then established. The United States had no interest whatsoever in seeing a red flag flying in Windhoek. No one should be in any doubt about the United States position in that regard. It was important that the United States and South Africa join their assets to prevent such a situation from arising. The United States optimism that it could be prevented was based on South Africa's position on the ground following an election, the results of Phase I, the constitutional principles and United States/South African goals in Angola. All these factors were cause for hope that a red flag would not fly in Windhoek. However, if there were to be no change in Angola, then there was a great likelihood that a red flag would fly in Windhoek. It was important thus to achieve the removal of Cubans from Angola and establish national reconciliation in that country. The United States commitment in the area was growing and at least three allies in the Five recognized the new realities. This was also true of any economic assistance which might be planned for the future - in this regard the Angola side of the agenda and the determination of the United States should be stressed. The United States wanted to lift one Soviet piece off the board but it did not expect South Africa to go ahead if this could not be done. The United States had made it very clear to all parties that the Angola side of the equation existed and that it had to be resolved. United States intelligence confirmed that everyone understood this, although they might not like it. To provide confidence, the United States had looked at the future on the basis of the constitutional principles. Although the goal had not yet been reached, enormous progress had been made over the past year. As one looked at phase II there was a desire to press through urgently and to arrive at a date. Some responses from certain parties had been received. The United States had to make absolutely clear that a special relationship existed between it and South Africa. This was recognized by the Contact Group and by the Africans. But the United States remained a broker and it had to be put in a position where it could strengthen 435. The United States had to maintain its broker role. Impartiality was a very broad concept and the Africans had talked only very broadly about it. They did not know South African thinking on this score. The Africans saw Phase I in terms of substantial concessions on their side. To the Africans, impartiality meant further concessions to South Africa. As far as UNTAG was concerned, there was a long history of negotiations and the Contact Group and the Africans thought they knew the South African position. If one were to deal effectively with impartiality and UNTAG, and bridge the gap which existed, South Africa and the United States would have to think together on this. There was no doubt that a substantial gap existed. It would be helpful if South Africa could identify for the United States thing substantial from South Africa.

Dr PLATT said that the Africans would want a firm commitment the relationship between UNTAG and impartiality. How must the questions of UNTAG, impartiality and the internal parties be dealt with? What are South Africa's priorities regarding impartiality and how could the United States sell this?

General was concerned, the United States agreed that it was softer than in the past, but nevertheless understood. Dr FOURIE thought that it was ironic that the Frontline States saw Phase I as concessions to South Africa. There was a strong feeling in South West Africa that the issues in Phase I were crucial for Phase II. Impartiality was exceedingly important. Some things which the United States saw as important, were an embarrassment to others. As far as the new Secretary General's statement was concerned, some saw it as softer than those made by Waldheim. But he touched on two very sensitive issues, i.e. praising SWAPO and condemning South Africa. This raised questions of his objectivity re impartiality. The parties in South West Africa had a long history of denial regarding seeing the Secretary-General and UN sponsored scholarships. The South African approach was that the people of South West Africa wanted visible impartiality. Thus the question of SWAPO'S status as "sole and authentic" representative was of primary importance. If the permanent observer status of SWAPO at the United Nations continued, it would be difficult to convince the people of the Territory of the impartiality of the United Nations. As far as the Commissioner for Namibia was concerned, it would be better if the post were not filled. As far as the question of how South Africa linked UNTAG and impartiality, there was the perception that if UNTAG came to the Territory in a special manner, it would be interpreted as SWAPO allies entering the Territory. With their flags and symbols, UNTAG would be seen as a discriminatory factor which was being re-introduced. The position of South Africa had changed since 1978. When it came to these matters, it was not clear whether the United States was ready to discuss them. UNTAG would certainly have to be discussed. One would also have to look at the question of the inclusion of persons from countries who openly supported SWAPO. It would be impossible to argue that such persons could be impartial. Other countries would be much easier to accept. South Africa did not want to scrap Security Council Resolution 435, but wanted to make it more effective. This could possibly be done by aligning UNTAG's functions with its numbers.

Dr CROCKER suggested that perhaps impartiality could be further discussed since the United States wanted to address South Africa's concerns on this matter. There had been some discussions in the Contact Group on this point. The United States had gone out of its way to treat all parties on an equal basis. As far as the United Nations was concerned, the Five had limited influence. The way in which this could be done was to turn the Africans and the Frontline States around, but in order to achieve this, they would want something substantial from South Africa.

Dr PLATT said that the Africans would want a firm commitment to an implementation date. The United States agreed that the post of Commissioner for Namibia should be kept vacant and that this could be achieved if a date for implementation was obtained. As far as the statement by the Secretary General was concerned, the United States agreed that it was softer than in the past, but nevertheless understood South Africa's concerns. Phase II should be started by both sides making their views known on this matter and making it clear to the Secretary General that a new Phase required a new style.

Dr CROCKER said that the credibility of that approach was dependent on the credibility of movement forward.

Mr PLATT said that it would not be possible to convince people on the question of impartiality if they could not be convinced that there was movement.

Dr FOURIE asked whether these matters could not be kept off the agenda.

Mr PLATT thought that it could be kept off the agenda only if there was movement.

Dr CROCKER said that this year the Five had thought to plead with the Africans to keep these matters off the agenda. But in the context of Operation Protea and other similar operations, it was decided to let the Africans have their silly little debate. As far as point seven of the agenda was concerned, the United States would try its best.

Dr FOURIE asked what about the question of bursaries and other practical assistance.

Dr CROCKER said that the United States could do a fair amount if there was movement. Once South Africa's commitment to a date was obtained, the United Nations could be told to clean up its act - the time had come to be realistic.

Dr FOURIE said that on Phase II, it would be difficult to do things step by step. One would have to get a package since one thing would lead to another. Various assurances would have to be obtained - not in a few days - and it would require hard work.

African group to make concessions on the leverage which they had, if they could not see concessions on the African side. /.....

Dr CROCKER thought that ways should be found which would not require the mustering of too many votes.

Dr CROCKER said that the United States shared South Africa's view about a package in the near future. Once that was achieved, the Five could go to the United Nations and get things straight.

Dr FOURIE said that impartiality was crucial and therefore UNTAG became crucial.

Dr CROCKER asked what the most important points were in the list of 10.

Dr FOURIE pointed out that items 1 - 6 plus 8 were totally incompatible with impartiality. One should try to get a commitment from the United Nations that they would not treat SWAPO as something special. The United Nations should not be seen as an ally of SWAPO.

Dr CROCKER said that the United States had a practical problem. It was one thing to get the Secretariat in line, but quite another to try to control the votes, or speeches or resolutions of the membership.

Dr FOURIE said that that was exactly why he was looking for a way to keep the matter off the agenda.

Mr PLATT said that once a date for implementation had been agreed upon, one could develop a consensus. But it would be easier if the whole thing was approached as a package and not if it were done step by step.

Dr FOURIE said that it would be important to tie the package together before moving into Phase III.

Mr PLATT said that the size and deployment of UNTAG was part of the package.

Dr FOURIE said in summary that the United States recognized the validity of South Africa's concerns and would work to eliminate them. This could only be achieved if a package could be put together.

Mr FRAZURE said that there was agreement on a package. But there would also have to be agreement on the content of items on the list. It would not be possible to expect the African group to make concessions on the leverage which they had, if they could not see concessions on the South African side.

Dr CROCKER thought that ways should be found which would not require the mustering of too many votes.

/.....

Dr FOURIE said that there never had been agreement on border
Dr FOURIE said that this could be done by extending advan-
tages and privileges also to other parties.

been intended as an element to monitor the South African
forces, for which not many persons would be needed. Secondly
Mr PLATT said that the implication was that movement on
impartiality would occur at the end of the sequence, i.e.
after agreement on UNTAG etc.

out by civilians. The easiest way to detect hostile acts
would be to attach monitors to South African units. As far
Dr FOURIE stated that South Africa recognized that the various
matters could not be resolved point by point, but that a
package should be developed. It had to be recognized, however,
that there could not be movement to a following phase until
that which had gone before was put into practice.

the original plan were designed, it was envisaged that both
South African and SWAPO bases, in Angola and Zambia, would be
Dr CROCKER agreed and said that people would have to perform
on what they had agreed upon. The timing of implementation
was crucial.

Dr CROCKER enquired whether, during the DMS discussions, it
was agreed that 5 battalions should be deployed in the North.

Dr FOURIE said that what was important was that the impar-
tiality had to be settled in advance. This was important
since one would have to look at the effect it could have on
the outcome of the election.

Dr FOURIE said that the argument was that if there was peace,
Dr CROCKER asked for South Africa's views on UNTAG. Thus there
was also agreement that UNTAG would be scaled down by keeping
one battalion in reserve in its country of origin, having

Dr FOURIE said that his delegation had very tight instruc-
tions regarding UNTAG. There had been a change in the South
African position following certain events in the past. Its
basic approach was that UNTAG should do no more than be in a
position after the election to certify that it had been free
and fair. South Africa felt that this task could be equally
well performed by persons in civilian clothes. /The United
States delegation was given a brief history of discussions
regarding UNTAG/. South Africa had thus indicated to Judge
Clark that a figure of 1000 was possible with maximum deploy-
ment in the north of the Territory and not in populated areas.
Other matters which would have to be discussed were the
question of UNTAG uniforms and the countries of origin of
its members.

Dr CROCKER said that it might be useful to talk specifically
on the functional side. The UN plan and the Report of the
Secretary General set out the functions as (a) monitoring
the restriction to base of the South African forces and
their withdrawal, (b) border surveillance, (c) infiltration
prevention, (d) monitoring of violent acts, (e) demobiliza-
tion of the citizen and other forces, (f) monitoring the
election, and (g) assisting civilian duties. All sides in
the negotiations perceived that South Africa had accepted this.
What was the South African position in that regard?

/.....

Dr FOURIE said that there never had been agreement on border surveillance. This was a particularly sore point since UNTAG had never been envisaged as a peace-keeping force. It had been intended as an element to monitor the South African forces, for which not many persons would be needed. Secondly they would be required to assist the civilian component and, since South Africa did not want to deny the Special Representative that assistance, the task could be carried out by civilians. The easiest way to detect hostile acts would be to attach monitors to South African units. As far as the control of violence was concerned, this was clearly a task for the police.

Genl. GELDENHUYS said that when UNTAG functions according to the original plan were designed, it was envisaged that both South African and SWAPO bases, in Angola and Zambia, would be monitored. This position had subsequently been changed.

Dr CROCKER enquired whether, during the DMZ discussions, it was agreed that 5 battalions should be deployed in the North.

Genl GELDENHUYS responded affirmatively.

Dr FOURIE said that the argument was that if there was peace, there would be no need for so many UNTAG members. Thus there was also agreement that UNTAG would be scaled down by keeping one battalion in reserve in its country of origin, having 20 per cent on leave etc.

Dr CROCKER said that South Africa was however now saying that it would only accept a number which was substantially less than the original number mentioned. The United States would require assistance from South Africa to bridge the gap which now existed between the figures of 7500 and 1000.

Dr FOURIE said that South Africa would be only too willing to help. The way to do it might be to say that UNTAG was not a peace-keeping force. The figure of 7500 was not cleared with South Africa beforehand.

Dr CROCKER observed that the Minister had given the go-ahead for the DMZ in 1980 with 7500 UNTAG troops intact.

Dr FOURIE noted that it had been done on the basis of what had been explained to South Africa.

Dr CROCKER said that it seemed that South Africa's highest concern was to reduce the psychological effect of such a high number of military personnel and not the security aspect.

/.....

Dr FOURIE said that was correct.

Dr CROCKER said that UN professionals insisted on a number of 7500. While South Africa's primary interest was psychological, that of the UN was military.

Dr FOURIE said that South Africa insisted that UNTAG was not a peace-keeping force. Genl. Philip had agreed with this point of view.

Dr CROCKER noted that the Africans would also have a psychological interest which would have to be borne in mind.

GENL. GELDENHUYS said that the question of monitoring of SWAPO bases should perhaps be reconsidered. If one had monitor teams on both sides of the border, one would have immediate knowledge of any problems.

Dr CROCKER said that this had not been explored with the Africans but he understood the logic.

Dr FOURIE said that as far as composition was concerned, there was not a change in South Africa's acceptance in principle of certain countries. However, there had been some significant changes in some African countries and South Africa would not be able to accept them now. Ghana was a case in point. As far as the DMZ was concerned, South Africa had accepted it in principle provided it could be made effective. South Africa did not think this was possible. The option mentioned by Genl. Geldenhuys, if accepted, would cause the DMZ to fall away.

Dr CROCKER said he did not think that the DMZ could work on the basis of 1000 UNTAG military personnel or with monitoring on both sides.

Dr FOURIE stated that the area was too big to be effectively covered. If monitoring on both sides could be established, it could help.

Mr PLATT observed that the UN record in this regard was not encouraging.

Dr CROCKER said that one had to look at the psychology of the negotiations. If the United States and the Five had to tell the Africans that (a) the numbers would come down;

/.....

(b) the DMZ was out and (c) SWAPO should be monitored, they would have an extremely difficult time selling it.

Dr FOURIE said that bearing in mind the South African position on numbers and if the United States thought that the DMZ had merit, the matter could possibly be further discussed.

Dr CROCKER said that the United States wanted South Africa's views on the DMZ - many persons involved in the negotiations thought that it still existed. South Africa should not report that the United States wanted the DMZ.

Dr FOURIE said that he would not formally take it up but would look at it again and discuss it further.

Dr CROCKER asked whether there were any further points regarding composition and United States participation.

Dr FOURIE said that South Africa just wanted to stress that some countries were no longer acceptable. South Africa would like some kind of clarity from the United States before it approached the Secretary General. We wanted to remove all pitfalls in this regard.

Dr CROCKER said that the United States approach was to try to put everything together before going to the United Nations.

MR PLATT said that the problems which one encountered at the UN were well known. The United States would have to work out some arrangement with the Five, then deal with the Secretariat and other countries which were involved.

Dr CROCKER asked what South Africa's difficulties were with other countries apart from Ghana.

Dr FOURIE said that some countries were more acceptable but South Africa would come back to the United States on that. Nigeria had offered themselves but because of the position which they took, they were not acceptable.

Dr CROCKER said that for the plan to work, there had to be some kind of balance, and some Africans in the composition.

Dr FOURIE said that South Africa realized that geographic distribution would have to be taken into account.

Dr CROCKER said that the question was whether the Five would
Dr CROCKER referred to the military deployment plan. The
had its own view, but all were prepared to look at Namibian
economic development.

Dr FOURIE repeated South Africa's point of view that UNTAG
should not have too great numbers and that it should be
deployed in sparsely populated areas. It was realized that
one had to operate on a give-and-take basis.

Dr CROCKER said that "sparsely populated areas" could mean
away from Windhoek and Owambo. was how one expressed it.

Dr FOURIE said that the deployment also depended on numbers.

Mr HOUGH suggested that one came back to this.

GENL. GELDENHUYS said that the concern about UNTAG numbers
came from the political leaders in the Territory who were
convinced that the election would be won through intimidation
and emotion. They did not want UNTAG to come to South West
Africa in a show of strength.

Dr CROCKER observed that some rationale to bridge the gap
had to be found. South Africa had to give some answers.

Dr FOURIE referred to the Status of Forces Agreement which was
almost ready, with the exception of one or two minor problems.

Dr CROCKER said that as far as the "non-document" on South
West Africa was concerned, the Frontline States had not yet
said anything about it. The document was alive and well.
It had been discussed in Ottawa and would be further dis-
cussed in Bonn. The Five did not see the document as a
precondition.

Dr CROCKER said that the Five would be meeting in Bonn during
Dr FOURIE referred to a possible meeting with Mr Kosie
Pretorius. If such a meeting were to become knowledge in
South West Africa, the other parties would be infuriated.
There was also the question of Ruacana.

Dr CROCKER said that the latter sounded more like something
for bilateral discussions. What was the position with the
Fund?

South Africa knew that the United States did not want
a conditional reply but perhaps a reply with a private under-
standing could be formulated. After preliminary discussions
Dr FOURIE said that the Fund was becoming more real to South
Africa. This was a matter which should be discussed. As
had been stated previously, South Africa would be prepared to
participate in such a Fund. Frontline States were preventing
SWAPO from responding individually. The United States

/.....

14.
Dr CROCKER said that the question was whether the Five would want to contribute to Namibian development. Each country had its own view, but all were prepared to look at Namibian economic development.

Dr FOURIE pointed out that South Africa linked the Fund to underwriting constitutional principles.

Dr CROCKER said that the United States understood the logic of the statement. The question was how one expressed it.

Dr FOURIE said that a formulation could be discussed.

14 JANUARY 1982

Dr FOURIE said that it might be useful to start with the position on impartiality.

Dr CROCKER enquired when South Africa's response to Phase I might be expected.

Dr FOURIE thought it might be during the next week. Certain matters which had so far been raised might facilitate a reply. He would report back to the Government and suggest a response. The Government would then have to make its decision. When was the Contact Group meeting?

Dr CROCKER said that the Five would be meeting in Bonn during the last week of January. South Africa's response would assist the United States in establishing its credibility with its allies. This was imperative. What sort of reply could be expected?

Dr FOURIE said that that was a difficult question. The United States would want an indication that we now moved into Phase II. South Africa knew that the United States did not want a conditional reply but perhaps a reply with a private understanding could be formulated. After preliminary discussions he would call Dr Crocker.

Dr CROCKER said that the Frontline States were preventing SWAPO from responding individually. The United States

Dr CROCKER said that the United States saw the following looked forward to a consolidated reply from South Africa, which would include the view of the internal parties.

1. Agreement on package
2. Announcement of date for implementation.

Dr FOURIE said that South Africa might then need a little more time. South Africa appreciated the need to move according to schedule, but there should not be too much pressure on dates. He was not sure that we could get through Phase II by March.

Dr FOURIE stated that the announcement of a date for imple-
Dr CROCKER said that regarding Phase I, it might be useful to summarize where we were. The United States would provide its allies with the most precise answers. As far as impartiality was concerned, it made sense to group measures into a package. More could be done if the United States had a process to point to and a commitment to a date.

mentation of Security Council Resolution 435 would be con-
ingent upon the package being implemented. As far as the
Dr FOURIE said that a commitment to a date would be dependent on acceptance of a package and a move to start implementation of such a package at the start of Phase III.

Dr FOURIE said that the list was conclusive but that the actions
Dr CROCKER said that timing was important. If South Africa committed itself to a date for implementation on day X in future, the Five would then go to the Africans and say "let's get moving through concrete action at the UN". That could take a month, which time would fall in the period 1 April to 31 December 1982.

Dr FOURIE said that they were all important.
Dr FOURIE said that he could not foresee movement by South Africa until the package had been implemented.

Mr McLEHANEY noted that there were certain grey areas, e.g. in
Dr CROCKER agreed but did not think the Five could go to the UN without a commitment to a date. But the United States also agreed that the package could be implemented only when UNTAG arrived.

Mr PLATT said that what was required was a precise sequence. In order for the UN to vote funds for UNTAG, there would have to be both Security Council and General Assembly approval. That would have to be phased into the schedule.

Dr CROCKER said that there was a long history of discussions on UNTAG. Each of the Frontline States and the United
Dr FOURIE said that the United States and the Five would have to succeed in getting positive and not negative action. It was understood that existing resolutions could not be rescinded but the answer was to extend privileges and opportunities also to other parties. That would have to be dovetailed into the process.

GENL. GELDENHUYS stated that in Security Council Resolution 435, one of the functions of UNTAG was to monitor the Security Force bases. The reason for this had b/.....at

Dr CROCKER said that the United States saw the following steps in the process:

1. Agreement on package
2. Announcement of date for implementation.
(This would be start of Phase III).
3. Security Council resolution
4. General Assembly resolution.
5. Implementation starts.

Dr FOURIE stated that the announcement of a date for implementation could be made only if the package had by then been formalized and satisfactorily implemented.

Dr CROCKER said it occurred to him that the package would have been agreed on and it could be implemented. Implementation of Security Council Resolution 435 would be contingent upon the package being implemented. As far as the list on impartiality was concerned - was this a conclusive list?

Dr FOURIE said that the list was conclusive but that the actions of the Secretary General had to be included.

Dr CROCKER asked which of the 10 points on the list were the salient ones.

Dr FOURIE said that they were all important.

Mr McELHANEY noted that there were certain grey areas, e.g. in the field of scholarships, at which one would have to look more closely.

Dr CROCKER referred to UNTAG.

Dr FOURIE said that that too had to be included in the package.

Dr CROCKER said that there was a long history of discussions on UNTAG. Each of the Frontline States and the United States allies had an army of diplomatic historians. This fact would have to be borne in mind in any review of UNTAG. The United States would like to hear from South Africa which functions remained intact.

GENL. GELDENHUYS stated that in Security Council Resolution 435, one of the functions of UNTAG was to monitor the Security Force bases. The reason for this had been that

SWAPO was concerned that the SADF would in an improper manner influence the elections. SWAPO thus wanted the troops to be monitored so that they would not interfere.

Mr PLATT thought that it would be important to look at UNTAG's functions as set out in UN document S/12827, para 21. In the South African conception of UNTAG's functions, did these remain valid?

Dr FOURIE said that the monitoring function was the only one that remained valid. It was not possible for UNTAG to prevent infiltration. It could only perform its monitoring function if it were attached to SADF units and SWAPO personnel. South Africa had indicated that it could provide logistical support.

Mr PLATT enquired whether South Africa had set numbers to correspond with functions.

Dr FOURIE pointed out that South Africa had not given numbers, but as South Africa saw the picture, UNTAG could fulfil its monitoring function with far less, not more than a few hundred would be required.

Mr PLATT asked about logistics, whether it would be military or civilian.

Dr FOURIE said that UNTAG members could be attached to South African logistic elements providing logistical support to UNTAG. These would come out of the thousand.

Mr PLATT asked whether assuming the question of monitoring SWAPO bases in Angola and Zambia could be reopened, the persons who might then be deployed in Angola and Zambia were included in the figure of 1000.

Dr FOURIE responded that he did not think so but that he would have to clear this matter with the Government, since they would obviously not be deployed inside South West Africa/Namibia.

Mr PLATT said that if they were deployed across the border, the question of visibility in Namibia would not arise.

Dr CROCKER noted that the Five did not, of course, have any mandate to take this matter to Angola and Zambia.

/.....

Mr PLATT addressed the question of demobilization and the dismantling of the command structure.

Dr FOURIE pointed out that the SWA Command Structure was unified. As a result that specific UNTAG task would require only a small number of UNTAG personnel to be attached to such a unified command and at places where heavy equipment was handed in. UNTAG would basically only have to ensure that arms and ammunition were handed in at armouries and monitor those armouries.

GENL. GELDENHUYS briefly explained the command structure in South West Africa/Namibia. Commando's and the Citizen Forces were, in any case, already demobilized. Monitors would be required only at the few existing armouries.

Mr PLATT asked about the ethnic forces.

GENL. GELDENHUYS responded that this matter would have to be further discussed and added that another document, one similar to the Philip /Geldenhuis document, would have to be drawn up.

Mr PLATT raised the question of civilian support for UNTAG as paragraph 22 of document S/12827 stipulated.

Dr FOURIE said that as South Africa saw it, this referred to the question of logistics.

Dr CROCKER said that in other words the second function on the list thus lapsed and this would have to account for a lessening of the original number to 1000.

Mr McELHANEY noted that UNTAG's monitoring functions also related to its tasks envisaged in terms of the DMZ.

Dr FOURIE said that the only answer was to attach monitors to units. If necessary, the question of the DMZ would have to be taken up with South Africa again. (Note: The previous day Dr Fourie explained that South Africa had accepted the DMZ proposal in principle only. The area covered was too vast and the proposal did not make any sense numerically).

Dr CROCKER summarized the South African position on the DMZ as being that the DMZ was not totally out as it had accepted the proposal in principle, but that UNTAG numbers also related to the DMZ in Angola and Zambia.

Mr PLATT observed that one major concern was that there should be a force which could stand between the SADF and SWAPO.

Dr FOURIE stated that that had never been UNTAG's task.

Mr PLATT agreed but asked how one addressed this.

Dr FOURIE pointed out that the Police would have the responsibility of maintaining law and order.

Dr CROCKER said that to conclude the discussion on UNTAG, it would be helpful if South Africa could give the United States a non-paper on the functions and numbers of UNTAG. This would also help the United States in its talks with its allies and with specialists at the UN.

GENL. GELDENHUYS suggested that one would have to look at the possibility of monitoring SWAPO bases in Angola and Zambia. If this was to be done, there would be virtually no possibility of clashes. There would be a problem if Angola and Zambia refused.

Dr FOURIE indicated that South Africa's preferred situation was one where monitoring took place on both sides of the border.

Dr CROCKER said that the United States could not respond immediately to that suggestion.

Dr FOURIE said that South Africa would not tie it to its bottom-line.

GENL. GELDENHUYS said that South Africa should not be seen as going back on Security Council Resolution 435. In fact it was trying to get back to the original plan contained in Security Council Resolution 435.

Dr CROCKER stated that the United States was trying to change the strategic map of southern Africa. It was trying to get the Cubans out of Angola and it was not certain what effect the introduction of monitoring in Angola and Zambia at this stage would have.

/.....

GENL. GELDENHUYS pointed out that the argument in the past had been that Angola did not want UNTAG on its Territory since it did not want the presence of Cuban forces to become known.

Dr FOURIE reaffirmed that this point was not included in South Africa's bottom line. South Africa did not want to make things difficult for the United States and the United States could play this by ear.
