TOWARDS

SOCIAL CHANGE

General Editor
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REPORT OF THE SOCIAL COMMISSION OF THE STUDY
PROJECT ON CHRISTIANITY IN APARTHEID SOCIETY

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INTRODUCTION

THE SIX SPRO-CAS commissions, established in mid-1969 under the sponsorship of the South African Council of Churches and the Christian Institute of Southern Africa, were asked to examine South African society in the light of Christian principles, as expressed in the Message to the People of South Africa; to formulate long-term goals for an acceptable social order; and to consider how change towards such a social order might be accomplished.

The commissions - economics, education, law, politics, society and the Church - have approached their triple mandate in different ways, but all have been deeply aware of the urgent need for radical reform and change in our society, and have given much thought to the means whereby this can be achieved.

The first Spro-cas report to be issued, *Education beyond Apartheid* (August 1971), made 49 recommendations for change which if implemented will not only transform our educational system, but also go some way towards achieving a new social order in South Africa. The findings and recommendations of the different commissions are obviously inter-related and should be read and considered in conjunction with each other.

A Special Project for Christian Action in Society (Spro-cas 2) will follow on from the work of the Spro-cas study commissions. The initial aims of Spro-cas 2 will be to implement those recommendations which are immediately practicable, and to prepare the ground for the eventual implementation of the long-term recommendations. This programme will also be sponsored by the South African Council of Churches and the Christian Institute and will involve the talents and energies of many individual South Africans in a number of specialist action groups. From

the Christian Church in our country there is emerging a sustained and focussed thrust for social transformation, in which Spro-cas 2 will play its part alongside a number of other undertakings.

As described in Chapter 1 of this report, the Social Commission faced problems in identifying its specific areas of study. The original intention was to create a very broad group drawn from as wide a range of societal activity as possible: writers, doctors, clergy, youth leaders, social workers and businessmen, as well as sociologists, anthropologists and social anthropologists from various universities. The first meetings were totally unstructured and open-ended. The intention was commendable and the results very interesting, even, at times, dramatic. Frustration arose, however, from the lack of clarity about the goals and function of the commission and because of the sheer range and variety of the issues that were considered and discussed. Miscegenation and censorship jostled for attention with ideologies and problems of power politics. After a year it had become clear that the field of study had to be rigorously defined in terms of basic societal forces and the whole question of social change. The areas finally chosen are reflected in the chapters of this report. The task of drafting and revising the material was entrusted to the social scientists whose names appear at the end of Chapter 1, which Mr Lawrence Schlemmer agreed to draft. It provides the context for the later chapters, and it was subsequently approved by the other members of the commission.

The sponsors of Spro-cas express their warm gratitude to those who participated in the early life of the Social Commission: Prof John Blacking, Dr A. Boraine, Mr André Brink, Mr W.A. de Klerk, Mr Paul Devitt, Mr C.O. Gardner, Mr C.L.S. Nyembezi, Prof J.V.O. Reid (who acted as chairman when it became imperative to give the commission some structure), the Rev L. Rakale and Mr E.A. Saloojee. Their contributions to the discussion and the working papers they prepared have added to the richness of the final report which is now presented.

Particular gratitude is expressed to Mrs Fatima Meer, who worked with the Commission very closely but felt unable to sign this report. Tribute is also expressed to the late Prof James Irving, head of the Department of Sociology at Rhodes University, who was a member of the commission until his untimely death.

In all, the Social Commission produced 48 working papers - more than any other commission - which were considered at its meetings in Johannesburg, Cape Town and Botha's Hill. Some of the earlier papers have been included in the four Occasional Publications issued by Spro-cas between November 1970 and April 1971 (*Anatomy of Apartheid; South Africa's Minorities; Directions of Change in South African Politics; Some Implications of Inequality*). They deal with topics ranging from culture and apartheid, the position of the Indian people and the English-speaking

whites, to malnutrition and poverty.

Several people outside the immediate membership of the commission also assisted its work by preparing papers for discussion or by making information available. They include Mr M.J. Ashley, Prof S.P. Cilliers, Rev Theo Kotze, Rev B.S. Rajuili, Prof N.J. Rhoodie, Rev R. Robertson, Mrs R. Selsick and Mr Clive Smith: their assistance is gratefully acknowledged.

Dealing as it does with a society that is in a constant state of flux, the report of the Social Commission must not be seen as an attempt to provide a definitive work, but rather as a contribution at a point in time to an on-going process of change. It is itself part of that process. That it contains much of permanent value few who are concerned for our society will deny.

Peter Randall
Director of Spro-cas

November, 1971

ABSTRACT

THE FIRST CHAPTER is a systematic analysis of the nature of apartheid society and the factors which underlie the injustice in that society. It suggests that this injustice should not be understood merely in terms of such obvious factors as prejudice and racism. The subsequent discussion of the white ruling group shows to what extent the motives and intentions behind political policies are more complex than is popularly suggested. In the same vein the concluding section of this chapter suggests that more than one course of change is possible. Chapter 1 thus sets out basic assumptions with regard to the nature of apartheid society and offers a context within which various strategies for change may be assessed. The chapter carries the broad agreement of the members of the Social Commission, who also decided that the remaining five chapters, by individual members of the commission, should be included in the report because they effectively amplify the major chapter.

The reality of discrimination in South Africa is often blurred by the myths and justifications which have evolved for separation and domination. Since the justifications appear plausible and are widely endorsed within the white ruling group, they are in themselves serious impediments to change. A thorough understanding of them is thus essential: Chapter 2 attempts to provide this, while the appendix raises the question of the sincerity underlying apartheid.

Taken together, Chapters 3 and 4 provide a comprehensive survey of the organisations and institutions within South African society. Chapter 3 discusses the relative potential of important organisations for bringing about change, while Chapter 4 indicates the extent to which white control in a network of institutions common to all groups constitutes a form of organisational violence. Specific recommendations follow. Chapter 5 considers and evaluates various methods of reducing the inter-group tensions which are inevitable in a society in which serious discrimination occurs. Its practical proposals are offered to churches and other groups.

Whereas Chapters 3, 4, and 5 deal with suggestions for change in specific areas of society, the final chapter takes a broad perspective of strategies for change in the apartheid society as a whole.

Chapter One

SOCIAL FORCES AND
SOCIAL CHANGE

Section One

Introduction

THE STUDY PROJECT on Christianity in Apartheid Society (Spro-cas) comprised six commissions each concerned with aspects of our national life. The Economics, Education, Political, Legal and Church commissions each had a distinct and clearly defined area of study, although these areas were closely inter-related and some overlap in the work of the various commissions was unavoidable.

With the Social Commission, however, the demarcation of a distinct field of study was more difficult. If the word 'social' is taken to be synonymous with the word 'societal', then the overlap with the work of the other commissions is total, since it embraces the spheres of law, education, politics, the economy, and religion. The only alternative meaning which can be given to the word 'social' in this context would have restricted the activity of the social commission to certain very specific and somewhat separated areas of concern, such as race prejudice, social stratification,   poverty and family life. Even if this had been the alternative chosen, however, extensive reference to factors in the fields of study of the other commissions would have been unavoidable.

At the outset, the Social Commission attempted to do justice to both these alternative approaches. A number of extremely valuable papers were prepared, some of which considered broad aspects of South African society, while others dealt with particular areas of interest *(1)*. However, it became apparent that the diverse range of material could not be combined effectively into a unified report, and as a consequence the Social Commission was reconstituted and most of the material which had been produced was very profitably used in a series of occasional publications.

The reconstituted Social Commission consisted entirely of social scientists and individuals with particularly relevant knowledge whose first difficult task was to delineate a field of interest for the Commission.

The choice made was to give the term 'social' its broadest and most inclusive meaning and to study aspects of South African society as a whole leading up to a detailed consideration of social change and strategies for change. It was considered that this approach would complement the work of the other commissions, particularly in the sense that it would provide an analytical framework within which the other commissions could be related to one another, and in the sense that a consideration of the potentialities of and strategies for social change would assist in assessing the recommendations of the other commissions.

Quite obviously, any attempt at a complete coverage of South African society in any depth would have been futile. Aspects of particular importance had to be selected for intensive study. The particular areas selected by the Commission were: culture in relation to ideologies and political policy, formal organisations in the structure of society, and lastly an assessment of strategies for change towards a more equitable and just ordering of the society.

The ensuing sections of this chapter are aimed at providing a broad summary outline of salient features of South African society as a background against which the more detailed contributions by particular authors can be assessed. Since efforts to achieve greater justice in a society at large should be based on a thorough understanding of that society, the aim has also been to explain the nature and causes of apartheid society.

Section Two

South African Society:
The Basic Patterns

South Africa, at the present time, is a form of 'race oligarchy', effective authority being vested in the hands of the white minority, the only group enjoying the parliamentary franchise in a racially mixed society. The ruling minority is sufficiently large in relation to the total society to enable all positions of authority in almost every institution to be staffed by whites. This group is also sufficiently large to allow for competition among whites for positions requiring skill and expertise, and therefore it has been able to maintain adequate standards of efficiency in the administration of the country. (In recent times, however, there have been signs of declining efficiency due to a shortage of skilled whites). The ruling white oligarchy, therefore, is in no sense a small elitist and unstable ruling clique. White rule in South Africa is more pragmatic and efficient than facile comparisons with totalitarian regimes would imply (2). In addition, it has equipped itself with efficient security services and the most effective modern means of military coercion available, and therefore is able to reinforce control by threat of force and punitive security measures (3). It is this coercive factor which has provided critics of South Africa with justification for regarding the actions of the white government as forms of violence.

Among the ranks of the whites there is an almost overwhelming concensus that the white group should retain exclusive or near exclusive control over the instruments of power and over the major resources of the country. The lack of voting power, and the lack of authority in the administration of the country and in the economy have obvious implications as regards the share of material privilege enjoyed by blacks.

As will be outlined presently, the general picture is of relative wealth and affluence among whites compared with widespread poverty and a relative absence of social amenities for blacks.

Theoretical Perspectives

South African society can be and is seen from a variety of different points of view. Simplistic arguments that the inequality is to be explained by inherent or pervasive differences in ability between the races are based on ignorance and myth and can be disregarded. Another view, the assertion that the patterns in society have as their major basis the racial discrimination that results from prejudice in the minds of whites as individuals, provides only limited insight. Reference to race prejudice does not explain the particular patterns of discrimination in the society. It also presupposes that white South Africans are more inclined to prejudiced behaviour than others of European stock; a possible factor which research has failed to support thus far *(4)*. Personality factors relating to prejudice may well determine the degree to which individual whites in inter-personal situations take advantage of the formal inequality between whites and blacks. In addition, the presence of race prejudice and negative racial stereotypes among whites has tended to make it possible for proponents of the *status quo* to justify the state of the society by drawing invidious comparisons between the races and cultures in South Africa. However, race prejudice, as a concept applicable to individual personalities, does not provide us with a full understanding of the persistence of certain fixed patterns of interaction between the races in South Africa *(5)*. For this understanding we need to look at the *collective interests and fears* of the whites rather than at their personalities.

Two points of view which embody fully the notion of interest are those which we may broadly term the 'pluralistic' view, and the view of South Africa as a situation of 'class conflict'. Explanations of current policies in South Africa which are basically accepting of the need for various forms of differentiation in the society, tend to make much of the cultural differences between the various ethnic groups, and of the right of different cultures to protection from influences which would weaken and disrupt essential features of such cultures *(6)*. This point of view has also been the theme of many speeches by Cabinet Ministers in the present government in introducing legislation aimed at the separation of the races in South Africa *(7)*. Cultural differences do exist in South Africa to a significant extent, since a large proportion of Africans still live according to tribal practices and values, even though they might move to and from the cities as migrant labourers.

A view of the society which is based on an appreciation of such cultural differences is one which asserts that the divisions and in-

equalities between groups in South Africa are rooted in differences in culture; a view which refers particularly to what is seen as a lower level of 'civilisation' and technological attainment in the culture of most blacks, and the need for whites to protect 'superior' Western Christian standards. South Africa is seen as composed of different 'nations' or 'peoples' at different levels of development; a pluralism which underlies the socio-economic and political divisions that constitute Apartheid. (Some of the rationalisations behind this view are examined in the Appendix).

Present government policies are aimed at maintaining and strengthening the existing divisions in society. The greatest possible degree of social, residential and political separation is sought. These policies are in a sense, like a self-fulfilling prophecy; the more they are applied, the more justification there is likely to be for applying them. However, the various segments of the plural society overlap in the economy, and in the sphere of basic public services and amenities. Seventy percent of the country's labour force is African, and the overwhelming dependence of the economy on black labour will remain a permanent feature in the society. Within the framework of government policies, this reality is accommodated by viewing the African workers as 'guest' labourers who are in the 'white' areas only to work (8); a form of 'export' from the 13% of South Africa's territory which is regarded as the 'homelands' of Africans in South Africa.

Thus the plural society viewpoint as propounded in South Africa by apologists for government policies, seeks not only to explain, but also to justify the separation of races in the country. This point of view, and the policy of Separate Development, have derived impetus from the powerful nationalism of the politically dominant Afrikaans-speaking white group. Moodie has shown how the justification for the policies of Separate Development have their roots in the ideologies which guided the Afrikaners' own struggle for identity and influence in the country (9).

This view of the society, however, is deceptively over-simple and one-sided. The theory of the plural society as expounded by its originator, Furnivall (10), is more illuminating. This theory was developed as a means of describing and understanding the patterns of colonial societies. It emphasises cultural differences and a more or less complete social separation of groups or races in the society. However, these divisions do not in themselves constitute a plural society. The theory also emphasises the basically exploitative nature of the colonial type of plural society. A socially distinct population group (often colonisers) maintains political domination over other distinct groups, in order to extract labour from the subject groups for the benefit of the economy which is owned by the dominant group. The control exercised by the dominant group is not geared to the common good of all groups in the society, but operates to

the advantage of the ruling group. Cultural and social separation is maintained in such a way as to discourage subject groups from coming to assume the right to share in the material privileges enjoyed by the dominant group. Control is essentially coercive, and the area of common interaction, the economy, assists in maintaining the tenuous unity which does exist by providing the subject peoples, or some of them, with the security of wage labour, albeit usually underpaid.

South Africa, essentially, is a society of this type. The aims of the dominant white group include permanent control over the major proportion of the territory, leaving only 13% of the land area for the Africans where development towards some form of independence is being allowed. The 'white' area (which is essentially a 'common' area) includes virtually all developed areas, cities and towns, embracing almost the whole economy of the country. The assumption appears to be that the African 'Homelands' will continue to sell labour in the 'white' areas even if they eventually become independent; an assumption that is justified by the fact that existing independent territories, the former High Commission Territories of Swaziland, Lesotho and Botswana, continue to send migrant labour to South Africa's mines and industries.

Continued social differentiation is encouraged by the provision of separate institutions for the black population groups outside of the economic sphere, and by prohibitions on race-mixing in organised public life, in marriage, and in residential settlement. As it applies to Africans, the policy is legitimated in the eyes of its supporters by the provision of the separate political institutions for the different tribal groups centred in and restricted to the relatively very small and largely under-developed native reserves which, as said before, are officially viewed as the only 'Homelands' for Africans.

In the plural society in South Africa, the non-Bantu speaking blacks, namely the Indians and the people of mixed blood, are also denied important privileges at the present time, such as parliamentary franchise, freedom in choice of dwelling area, and social and educational facilities equal to those of whites. Because of their relatively smaller numbers, and, in the case of the Coloureds, because of the fact that they share the culture of whites, these groups are simply segregated from whites rather than being subjected to a comprehensive plan for completely separate political and social development. The current policy of the Government as regards the political status of Coloureds is one which is termed 'parallel development'. This would appear to imply permanent minority status for the Coloured group within the overall society, without the justificatory designs of separate 'Homelands'. The position of the Indian community is essentially similar *(11)*.

Thus the basic pattern of South African society is that of a colonial

society which has become well-established and formalised in the laws of a sovereign state. We have stated that a fundamental theme in this type of society is the economic interest of the dominant white group. However, the pluralism in South Africa, as in other colonial societies, is very much reinforced by cultural and colour differences, and indeed, is usually understood in these terms rather than in economic terms by the members of the dominant group. It is important to note that the majority of whites in South Africa are probably not aware that they enjoy virtually the highest standard of living in the world by means of the systematic exploitation of black labour *(12)*. If the blacks were not there, whites would be performing the menial work, which would mean a vastly different way of life than that which they enjoy today.

A population steeped in the Western Christian moral tradition cannot freely acknowledge that its political system is based, to a large extent, on material interests. In evading the economic truth, whites make much of the other factors which divide South Africa's population. This is not to suggest that there is deliberate deception. Most white employers, for example, do not deliberately exploit blacks. Indeed many do as much as they can for blacks within the norms of the economic system. It is the system which is exploitative rather than the people in it.

The most powerful of these other factors are the apparent cultural difference which whites perceive as existing between themselves and the other races, and the well-nigh universal tendency to denigrate members of other races to some extent. Hence prejudice, negative stereotypes *of other races and cultures and an awareness of and pride in their own* culture are to a large extent the framework within which whites generally see the situation in South Africa. As we have pointed out earlier, however, these factors alone do not determine the basic patterns, however much they might contribute to them and strengthen them.

The notion of culture as justification for continuing economic inequality becomes clearer if we examine the relative positions of urban Africans and whites. As Wilson and Mafeje, and Pauw *(13)* have pointed out, urban African communities exhibit markedly similar characteristics to urban communities of equal socio-economic status in other countries, and are predominantly orientated to Western cultural patterns. There is evidence in all South African cities of widespread and pervasive cultural change towards the Western pattern among urban Africans. This is not to deny that these populations have styles of living which are different from those of whites, but the differences are to an ever-increasing extent differences in life-style which are associated with socio-economic status rather than with historical difference in culture. Similarly, whites regard their Western or their Western-Christian culture as something which distinguishes them from blacks in South Africa. For the English-speaking whites, and in-

creasingly for Afrikaans-speaking whites as well, that culture is, broadly, very much the urban middle-class culture which is typical of almost all technological societies today. Its distinguishing feature, in the South African situation, is the relative affluence, high consumption of consumer goods, and the well-developed leisure pursuits which affluence facilitates; in short, a 'culture' of relative abundance. The economic factor is the most significant divider in South African cities, not the diminishing differences between Western and African tribal culture.

The position of the Coloured community, which at no stage has had any culture other than that of whites, gives the lie to the rationalisations for inequality which refer to unbridgable cultural difference. Even as far as the Coloureds are concerned, justifications for the withholding of equal rights tend to refer to 'differences' between them and whites, usually differences according to standards of popular morality and differences in appearance. These differences are racial and economic in their origin, and do not derive from membership or former membership of a different kind of society, as is the case with *some* Africans in South Africa. Nonetheless, most whites appear to be insistent that Coloureds as well as Africans should be kept separated or segregated *(14)*.

This is not to suggest that the cultural factor in the sense of a historically derived cultural pattern is unimportant. Particularly among the Afrikaans-speaking whites there are many people who are very fundamentally motivated by a concern for the survival of Afrikaans traditional values and for the survival of the Afrikaner whites as a distinct group. This concern is most strongly felt amongst certain groups, mainly some academics, intellectuals, churchmen and other professionals; it does not appear to be a powerful motivating force among rank-and-file Afrikaners *(15)*. Furthermore, the survival of cultural identity does not necessarily depend on privilege and domination. Many minorities in the United States, for example, have maintained an exclusive identity without access to wealth or political power. The same can be said of Indians in South Africa. It would seem as if the drive to dominate stems from more than the desire to maintain privilege, even though these motives may be rationalised in terms of culture. Similarly, fears of what may happen to the cultural group if political power were lost appear to be fears of the reactions of the under-privileged if the latter were given an opportunity to 'retaliate', rather than fears of the loss of cultural identity *(16)*.

The plural society in South Africa is deeply divided; this fact few people will deny. However, the divisions at present are quite clearly as much reinforced by economic interest as by the fact of differences in ethnic and cultural identity. Even without racial divisions, but with a similar economy, wide disparities in material privilege would probably have existed.

A theoretical view of South Africa which corresponds fairly closely to the 'pluralist' viewpoint is that which sees the conflicts in our society in terms of a fundamental lack of common agreement on basic political issues among the various population groups - in short, a lack of the underlying concensus necessary to support a democratic form of government. Cilliers uses the expression 'a state without a nation' to describe the South African situation; a situation in which the power of the state is not legitimised by a common value-system shared by a majority of citizens who regard themselves as belonging to a single society. He argues that in a situation of this type, stability and order tend to be maintained by coercive means by the dominant group in the society; in the case of South Africa, by whites *(17)*.

This argument can also be used to justify rather than explain South African society if the lack of concensus is presented as resulting also from the incompatability of different cultures. In véry large measure, however, the lack of concensus in South African society is also due to lack of agreement as regards the distribution of wealth among the various ethnic groups. Thus, in the South African situation, democracy is not impractical primarily because of basic differences in historically derived cultural values - it is also impractical for the wealthy ruling group partly because it would imply a redistribution of wealth to some extent or another, and partly because of deeply rooted fears of loss of identity - a basically irrational factor which is not necessarily linked with any specific cultural identity. This factor will be dealt with more fully in due course.

The plural society model in the sense which Furnivall intended it fits South African society very well. It is a model of a type of society similar to most colonial societies, where political and economic dominance is maintained in the material interests of a ruling group which segregates itself from other socially and ethnically distinct groups in all spheres of activity except those which are necessary for continuation of economic activity and the administration of the country.

The important theme of the economic interests of the dominant group brings this aspect of the theory of the plural society very close to the theory of *class*. Another way in which South Africa can be seen is that of a situation of class-conflict where the lines of economic conflict are overlaid by racial divisions. A framework of analysis according to class appears to be most adequate in explaining the economic factor in the the plural society. By *class* in this context, we do not mean mere distinctions based on social prestige or social status. The term is not used in the popular sense, but is used to denote sharp distinctions in privilege and authority, and the possession of or exclusion from control over the economic resources of the country. Furthermore, we do not suggest that whites as a group are consciously aware of a common class identity. As

we will point out in due course, a variety of factors distracts the attention of whites away from their class identity. Whites constitute a 'class-in-itself' rather than a 'class-for-itself'.

The vast majority of Africans who reside in 'white' areas (constituting some 54% of the total African population at the time of the 1970 Population Census), as well as most Indians and Coloureds, are employed at unskilled levels in the economy. The whites constitute only some 20% of the total labour force, but the ownership of land and production is almost completely in their hands. Whites occupy virtually all executive, higher technical and supervisory positions in the economy and in the administration. Increasingly, blacks are coming to occupy skilled manual and routine white collar positions, although the proportion of Africans at these levels is still very small. The whites with poor education who occupy lower status positions are protected from competition from blacks by various 'job reservation' laws and by informal employment practices. The whites in working class positions, by virtue of their race and their unrealistically high wages in comparison with those of blacks, identify with the white middle and executive classes rather than with the black proleteriat. In fact, it is this relatively small group of whites whose occupational status overlaps with that of a considerable number of blacks who are most insistent upon the need for legislation to restrict the occupational advancement of blacks *(18)*.

Those blacks with advanced education are either employed in capacities below their educational attainments or else in positions in separate 'ethnic' organisations (like 'Bantu Education', 'Coloured Education', etc.) and are hence not in competition with whites for occupational or social status. Various studies show very little correlation between education and occupation, at levels below the Junior Certificate, among Africans *(19)*.

Due to the large reserve army of African labour in the African reserves, as well as to the fact that African trade unions, where they exist, have no legal bargaining rights, the disparity in income between skilled and unskilled labour is very large. In 1970 the ratio of skilled to unskilled wages in South African industry was almost 6 to 1, compared with a ratio of less than 1½ to 1 in the U.S.A. and in Canada *(20)*.

Overall, the average *per capita* income of whites is over thirteen times higher than the average income of Africans *(21)*. In industry and construction respectively white earnings are 5.8 and 6.5 times higher than those of Africans, while in the mining industry white wages are nearly twenty times higher than those of Africans *(22)*. Over the past 50 years, between 1918 and 1968, the increase in African wages in industry did not keep pace with the rise in national income per head of population *(23)*. Between 1947 and 1967, in private industry, the actual gap in wage

levels between whites and blacks increased from R580 to R2,256 *(24)*. South Africa as a whole is by no means an affluent society, but the earnings of white executives in the private sector, after tax and taking into account the cost of living, would appear to be higher than those of their British and Australian counterparts, and almost as high as those of executives in the United States *(25)*. Some idea of the profitability of private enterprise in South Africa can be inferred from the fact that in 1969, of all American capital invested in South Africa, Australia and New Zealand, one fifth was invested in South Africa, but South Africa produced three-fifths of the total foreign earning from the three countries. The average annual return on American investment in manufacturing industry in South Africa in 1969 was 14.4% compared with worldwide return on American investment of 10.8% *(26)*.

The broad picture emerging, therefore, is of very large discrepancies between white and black incomes, a widening rather than narrowing of private investment and great affluence among the white managerial classes contrasting with relatively low wages among working class blacks, resulting in widespread poverty *(27)*.

In a rapidly expanding economy, such as that of South Africa, the potential normally exists for class cleavages to become modified or blurred by the process of occupational differentiation and by upward occupational mobility of members of the labouring classes. This is one way in which an ever-increasing proportion of a population can acquire higher status, enjoy material advances and an increased bargaining power leading to greater privilege. In South Africa these processes are discouraged by both official and unofficial practices. Firstly, the *per capita* public expenditure on education for White, Indian, Coloured and African children differs very widely and perpetuates the advantage enjoyed by whites *(28)*. Secondly, many instances exist where skilled occupations for which no whites are vailable are frequently 'fragmented' into two or more semi-skilled positions for blacks with the effect of making skilled labour available but at lower levels of occupational status *(29)*. In other areas, existing job reservation laws and Industrial Council agreements in terms of the Industrial Concilation Act restrict occupational mobility. In addition, the 'halo effect' *(30)* of such laws as well as 'traditional' employment practices, and fear among employers of the reactions of the public and of white staff, reduce opportunities for advancement among blacks. It is also official government economic policy to attempt to restrain growth to a point which will not overtax 'white labour resources' *(31)*.

At the present time, however, considerable shortages of white skilled labour exist and temporary official exemptions from job reservation laws and a slight relaxation of the informal social colour bar in places of employment allow more blacks to perform work formerly done by whites.

These occupational advances extend no further than skilled manual and routine non-manual work, however, and the chances of black coming to occupy positions of authority and high status in 'white' institutions are remote, as will be discussed presently. It is conceivable, however, that large cadres of black skilled workers in future years will enjoy increased bargaining power by virtue of their training and industrial skills, and this has certain long-term political implications.

What emerges at present, however, is a picture of a society in which divisions in power, bureaucratic authority, occupational status, social status and standard and style of living - all the factors which constitute or relate to class - correspond almost completely with differences in official ethnic-group membership. Fundamentally, South Africa is a society characterised by deep class cleavages and by a potential for bitter class conflict. It needs to be noted, additionally, that the 'classes' in South Africa, by virtue of their ethnic identity and the laws and social norms which make it virtually impossible for members of one ethnic group to become assimilated into another group, have a 'caste-like' character. This has been a fairly common feature of class in plural or colonial societies.

There are, of course, growing numbers of Africans, Coloureds and, particularly, Indians, who are affluent and whose class position, seen objectively, would be similar to that of most whites. The proportions of blacks in this category are very small at this stage, as figures on standards of living which we present later will suggest. These individuals are 'marginal' to the main groupings in the society in the sense that they have incomplete membership of both the privileged and the under-privileged groups. They are also denied access to the public amenities and facilities which whites of similar income can enjoy. A certain number of them, presumably because of their relative affluence, are conservative, and some even support the *status quo* in a broad sense (some even to the extent of co-operating willingly in the implementation of government policy), notwithstanding the fact that all of them plead for a relaxation of the social colour bar. However, a considerable proportion of these marginal groups, possibly in sharp reaction to the fact that they are denied the social rewards that their material and educational position would normally justify, have become radically opposed to the social, political and, in some cases, economic order in South Africa. The main point to be made here, however, is that the 'middle class' blacks are largely outside of the major class system, since they are neither members of the black 'proletariat' nor have they access to the political and economic power of whites (32).

To state that South Africa is a class society implies that the members of the classes in control in the society have fairly common interests

which contrast with those of the lower classes. Yet, on the face of it, there appears to be a sharp conflict of interests between white private enterprise and management on the one hand, and the white political bureaucracy on the other. Industrialists and other employers, faced with shortages of white skilled labour, wish to employ more blacks, particularly Africans, in more advanced positions in their enterprises. The government, on the other hand, not only discourages widespread occupational advancement, but limits industrial expansion in the recognised 'white' industrial centres, and in terms of the Physical Planning and Utilisation of Resources Act, encourages or forces expansion to take place in areas which border on African reserves. This policy tends to create uncertainty for industrialists and has limited industrial expansion to some extent *(33)*. The press in South Africa makes much of this conflict of interests, and criticisms of the government's restrictive economic and labour policies are published very regularly. There are very real differences in the approach of industrialists and that of the ruling political party to the maintenance of white supremacy. The basis of these differences will be dealt with in due course. However, the effect of government policies as *applied in practice* does not appear to conflict with some of the more fundamental aims of business.

The long-term aim of the government appears to be to maintain effective control over the black labour force. African trade unions are not legally recognised and any strike action is a punishable offence. In fact, a Cabinet Minister once expressed his party's aim of 'bleeding African Trade Unions to death' *(34)*. In terms of Section 10 of the Native Urban Areas Act, Africans have to serve one employer for 10 years or else remain in town for 15 years in order to qualify for residential rights in the city - a provision which, as Durand has pointed out, *(35)*, binds an African who wishes to remain in town to a single employer effectively. Additionally, in terms of the Bantu Labour Regulations of 1968, Africans from the Reserves may only enter into labour contracts through a government Labour Bureau and these contracts are valid only for one year. However, they may be renewed if the employer so wishes, and an African employee has to make sure he satisfies his employer sufficiently for the latter to deal with the red tape of renewing the employee's contract after the mandatory termination of employment. In the 'border industrial areas', where industrial growth is at present being encouraged by means of a number of incentives, the government has authorised lower minimum wage rates than those established for the cities *(36)*. These and other regulations have prompted Rex to state that South Africa has possibly developed one of the most perfect systems of labour control in the world, because 'they enable the employer to control a variety of forms of legitimate violence which he may use against his workers, but at the same time

do not require that he should buy the worker for life and be responsible for the worker for life' *(37)*. It should be stated here that this system of labour control has evolved rather than been consciously designed in all its aspects.

The advantages to businessmen of a cheap, docile, and well-controlled labour force are of great importance in understanding the relationship between the class interests of businessmen and the motives of the government. In practice, the government generally allows businessmen to advance black employees where the need is pressing, although this is often denied in public *(38)*. However, with its own supporters' attitudes and the long-term interests of white supremacy in mind, the government is determined to protect the white worker from competition from blacks *(39)*, to prevent non-whites and whites from working together in equal status positions, to prevent any white person from working under a non-white person and to prevent Africans from 'entering the top strata of labour .... for this would lead to labour equality and to integration in residential areas, social matters and political authority in Parliament' *(40)*. Thus the government appears to balance the short-term needs of businessmen against the long-term requirements of white control, which brings with it the perpetuation, for as long as possible, of the present advantages of a docile, tractable and relatively underpaid black labour force. As de Kiewiet has said: 'What abundance of grass and rain was to New Zealand mutton, what a plenty of cheap grazing land was to Australian wool, what the fertile prairie acres were to Canadian wheat, cheap native labour was to South African mining and industrial enterprise' *(41)*.

The conflict between government and business should be seen against the background of this broader area of underlying agreement, which is not necessarily openly recognised. There is one element of fundamental disagreement between private business and government policy which, although not central to our argument, deserves mention here. This is the trend towards fairly comprehensive control over private enterprise which legislation allows. Such control is particularly tight in the African homelands. This has often caused private businessmen, both English and Afrikaans, to warn against the danger of socialistic controls in South Africa. This 'socialism' does not, however, generally result in any of the benefits to workers typical of socialist systems, particularly for blacks. It is significant that in regard to the issue of trade union rights for Africans, the government and employers have not been in any conflict. Johnstone summarises the position thus, 'the relations between capitalist development, apartheid policies and the core structure of white supremacy are essentially collaborative and conflicts which do take place between them are only over the marginal distribution of class benefits and con-

straints; this is an expression ..... of the pragmatic nature of actual Apartheid in its pursuit of an economically powerful white supremacy' *(42)*.

Thus it is possible to demonstrate a correspondence of interests which underlies a host of differences between those in economic and those in political authority in the country. However, the less fundamental division of interest between the government and white business does effectively blur the conception of a shared class position in the society. As mentioned earlier, other divisions among the whites have had the same effect. Language group identity is one major division. Differences in social status or prestige among whites have the same effect. Whites, whose dominant conceptions of group identity are language, race and social prestige, are seldom aware of having very definite shared class interests which are in conflict with those of most blacks. The greatest problem in the application of the theory of class to South Africa lies not so much among the white-collar whites, but in the divisions among what, in terms of class theory, should be a potentially solidary working class. Class theory would argue that those who perform the same function in the processes of production should have common interests, tend to become aware of these common class interests, and act upon them. Yet, as we have already pointed out, that section of the white group who, in objective terms, can be regarded as working class, not only fail to identify with the black working class, but are more hostile towards blacks than anyone else *(43)*. The fact is that white workers and to some extent a significant proportion of Coloured and Indian workers as well, form an 'aristocracy' of labour, and that they share with the middle and managerial classes of whites, the surplus profits of African and unskilled Indian and Coloured labour. White workers have used their political power to press for protected employment, and a virtual monopoly of most skilled positions, and their political influence has enabled them to obtain tacit and open government support in their demands for very high wages *(44)*. Thus the racial divisions and the race-oligarchical political structure has, in a sense, divided the working class.

Furthermore, by the exclusion of Africans, and to some extent Asians and Coloureds as well, from the skilled trades and from semi-skilled positions, white members of the working class have acquired a 'scarcity value' which has further enhanced their economic privilege. Since these whites are important as voters, the government has done little to alter this situation, despite severe shortages of unskilled labour *(45)*.

What we have in South Africa, then, is a class situation in which the classes have caste-like characteristics by virtue of being legally circumscribed by population registration acts and by virtue of enforced social separation of the races, and in which the exploitation of the black

working class labour force is faciliated by legal restrictions on African labour organisation, and by the ways in which the movement and residential rights of Africans are controlled. In addition, the class divisions do not follow conventional lines - political factors have divided them along ethnic lines. If one wishes to distinguish very clearly between South African society and class situations of a more conventional type (i.e. earlier European societies), South African society should be seen as a plural society in which the 'segments' of the plural society (the different ethnic groups), while being socially distinctive and separate and having a vastly unequal share of material resources, are .....
'held locked together ..... not solely by the institution of government, but by a rapidly expanding economy and the exploitative labour system on which it depends' *(46)*.

The choice between these two alternatives would seem to be little more than arbitrary. Whichever is chosen, one point deserves to be reemphasised. In understanding the *patterns* in the society, the exploitation of labour and the nature of class interests cannot be overlooked. In understanding the motivations and perceptions of *people* in the society, however, race and ethnic differences are possibly more important. This is due to the fact that the economic inequalities and political policies which undergird these inequalities tend to be explained and justified, at the popular level, in terms of the very visible and obvious factors of colour and apparent cultural differences which coincide with economic inequality. For this reason classical theories of the 'class struggle' cannot be applied uncritically in the South African situation.

Despite the observations made about the relation between class and race, many readers might consider that too little emphasis has been placed on the element of racism in Apartheid society. We have stated that racism is a powerful factor which tends to reinforce class distinctions in South Africa. We have also acknowledged that, for the average individual in the country, black or white, the element of race appears to be overwhelmingly important. We have also asserted, however, that the concept of racism does not provide us with an adequate understanding of why South African society is patterned in the way it is, and this assertion might be questioned by those who consider that Apartheid society is particularly prominent in its injustice, precisely because of racial discrimination. It would also be understandable if such an assertion were to be questioned by black people, who know that the discrimination they suffer, and the constant assaults upon their dignity which they endure, are to be accounted for by the colour of their skins.

Yet, for the sake of clarity, and in order that those who work for greater justice should fully understand the forces which maintain the present stage of affairs, the fundamental importance of the class factor

must once again be emphasised. The major reason why colour discrimination is applied so systematically and consistently in our society is because such discrimination accords so closely with the requirements for maintaining the material and political privilege of whites. If we were to accept the concept of racialism in its own right as central to an understanding of our society, we would have to go further and ask why South African, or Rhodesian, whites are so particularly racialistic. It is precisely here that the racism thesis proves inadequate. We either have to accept that Southern African whites, for some peculiar psychological reason, are more prejudiced than is 'normal', or else accept that the racism accords with the self-interest of whites as a group. Since the former position is untenable *(47)*, we have found it more profitable to provide an explanation in terms of white class interests; interests which are, however, articulated in terms of race, and at the same time reinforced by race.

There is, however, one factor operative at the level of group psychology which in its own right deserves particular attention alongside that of class-based racism, and that is the factor of white *fear*. Some element of anxiety is probably always present among members of privileged groups in class societies. Status anxieties and a sense of threat from lower status groups are fairly typical. In South Africa this type of fear appears to be accompanied by an even more powerful fear, largely irrational in nature, arising out of the marked racial differences in the society. This fear is probably rooted in fairly typical basic anxieties relating to 'identity', and as such is a fairly common human phenomenon. In many South African whites, however, it seems to assume the form of an irrational, compelling fear of being 'swamped' - of utter annihilation - by the black groups which powerfully outnumber whites.

This anxiety is allayed to some extent by compulsive domination. Many whites feel 'safe' only when they are clearly on top - masters in complete control of black servant classes. Obviously, this behaviour, which accords with the social and economic patterns in our society, creates conditions of hostility and resentment among the objects of the domination. In this sense the irrational identity-fear creates a situation where there are rational grounds for fear. This reinforces the initial fear and a vicious cycle results. In addition, the complete domination over blacks must cause a sense of guilt among many whites. It is not unlikely that this guilt results in these whites automatically assuming that the blacks they dominate are hostile and antagonistic. This assumption has also influenced the attitudes of whites towards the blacks in independent Africa, and these attitudes have in turn been reinforced by the overt hostility of some black states. This process has probably coloured the attitudes of white Southern Africans to the black world

in general. The effect of visits by foreign black dignitaries on white attitudes to blacks in general is an essential topic for research into processes of change in South Africa.

The social segregation in our society makes blacks virtual strangers for most whites, and the stranger is generally more easily feared. Also, where a particular group identity is clearly perceived and highly valued by members of the group, as is the case among large numbers of Afrikaners, we can assume that anxieties over group identity and survival are far more prominent. This factor of fear is intertwined in the patterns in our society, and contributes to their rigidity and resistance to change.

On the issue of blacks being virtual strangers to most whites, we have observed that there is among whites almost complete ignorance of how blacks live. This genuine ignorance encourages a variety of social myths, inter alia that different standards apply to blacks, that they can live more cheaply than whites, do not feel hardship as acutely, and so on. These myths, even among groups of whites where pronounced racialism is not present, facilitate the continuation of the impersonal social system as it operates to protect white privilege at the cost of the material interests of blacks. Here racial stereotypes, myths and ignorance as it were *enable* the class system to operate with least resistance from otherwise humane and well-meaning whites.

The Origins of the Society in its Present Form

South Africa's colonial history is one in which pre-literate Bantu-speaking tribesmen were drawn into an agricultural economy controlled by well-organised settler farmers, and into an urban industrial economy controlled by white entrepreneurs and administrators. The lack of relevant technological experience on the part of the Bantu-speaking tribesmen, which facilitated control by the technologically advanced whites as well as the well-nigh universal phenomenon of race prejudice and discrimination, (a tendency which appears to be very well developed among Northern Europeans of the type that colonised South Africa) must be accorded due importance in understanding the different positions which Whites and Africans occupy in the society today. In the case of South Africa, race prejudice was strengthened by marked linguistic, pigmentary, and cultural differences between Africans and Whites. Race prejudice must also be considered a factor relating to the position of Indians and Coloureds. The difference in technological experience between the whites and the indigenous people also made domination by the whites appear to be 'natural', to some extent even in the eyes of the colonised. White settlers of both British and of Dutch, French and German stock obtained from Bantu-speaking tribes the best land, providing themselves with the initial economic advantage. The land was obtained partly by con-

quest, partly by land treaties (which whites took to imply ownership, whereas the tribal chiefs probably intended only granting usufruct) *(48)* and partly by the occupation of temporarily unoccupied land. Deprived of land, many tribesmen had no option but to work as serfs on white-owned land or as labourers in white-owned industry. The need to work for whites was given impetus by the requirement of having to pay poll taxes in cash. Hence ownership of land gained by whites in conquest or by other means must be seen as a very basic factor in the development of the present patterns in South African society *(49)*.

The present position of the Indian community can be traced to early economic relationships, since the majority of Indians arrived as indentured labourers to work on the sugar plantations in Natal. The 'passenger' Indians who arrived shortly after the indentured labourers and set themselves up as traders encountered a great deal of resistance to their economic development from whites. Various restrictions have been placed on their trading rights, and these handicaps have directly and indirectly affected the economic position of the entire community *(50)*. It is important to note that these restrictions long preceded the period of Afrikaner Nationalist rule. It was the English in Natal who laid the basis for the present Group Areas legislation which, in the words of a white estate agent, 'represents the economic emasculation of the Indians'.

The coloured community came into existence in South Africa carrying the double stigma of being partly descended from the conquered pre-literate Khoi and San peoples and from the slaves imported from the Dutch East Indies, as well as from white settlers. The initial status of the Coloured community at large was that of a slave community. The abolition of slavery changed master-slave relations between Whites and Coloureds into master-servant relations, a change which brought very little improvement into the social and economic status of the community. This initial handicap has left the majority of the Coloured people in a relatively powerless economic and social position vis a vis the whites ever since.

The basic social economic patterns in the society as it exists today had emerged by 1910 with the granting of independence. The effect of independence, as Marquard puts it, was to raise '..... the status of the European colonists to that of rulers while it left four fifths of the population in the condition of colonial subjects' *(51)*.

Subsequent economic and agricultural development has imbued the distinctions in power and economic status between the ethnic groups with all the connotations of class distinctions. As Rex puts it, the historical pattern has been the emergence of a class system '..... in which the classes are groups of varying histories and ethnic origins who enter the modern society with varying rights and degrees of right-

lessness according to the kind of conquest or unfreedom which was imposed on them in an earlier period. The history, the structure, the forms of social differentiation which South Africa presents are ..... the product of such conquest and unfreedom. In South Africa they combine in a unique way but do so in terms of the economic and social processes inherent in one of the few examples of a capitalist economic take-off which is to be found outside Europe and North America' *(52)*.

One effect of the various wars, skirmishes and conflicts over land between white settlers and indigenous peoples in the 18th and 19th centuries was to contribute to the hostility which exists between the groups, and also to strengthen the fear which many whites have of being swamped or annihilated by blacks, which we have referred to earlier. The tremendous importance in Afrikaner cultural life of the 'Day of the Covenant', which relates to the killing of the Trekker leader, Piet Retief, and his followers by the Zulus under Dingaan, is one indication of the lingering memory of open black-white hostilities and the threat to the Afrikaner group which these hostilities posed.

Patterns of Poverty

In dealing with class relations in South Africa, we have already drawn attention to the major economic inequalities between the races in South Africa. A somewhat more complete picture is provided by the following comparison of average monthly wages in the different sectors of the economy:

MONTHLY CASH AVERAGE EARNINGS BY RACIAL GROUPS *(53)*
LAST QUARTER OF 1970

	Monthly Earnings in Rands	Ratio of Earnings to those of Africans
Mining		
White	360.80	19.7
Coloured	75.20	4.1
Asian	98.90	5.4
African	18.30	1.0 *
Manufacturing		
White	307.20	5.9
Coloured	73.60	1.4
Asian	77.40	1.5
African	52.30	1.0

MONTHLY CASH AVERAGE EARNINGS BY RACIAL GROUPS
LAST QUARTER OF 1970

	Monthly Earnings in Rands	Ratio of Earnings to those of Africans
Construction		
White	325.30	6.5
Coloured	109.60	2.2
Asian	150.40	3.0
African	49.90	1.0
Electricity		
White	369.10	6.7
Coloured	76.70	1.4
African	53.30	1.0
Banks and Building Societies		
White	298.20	4.5
Coloured	80.40	1.2
Asian	106.80	1.6
African	66.90	1.0
Central Government		
White	282.10	6.3
Coloured	114.30	2.6
Asian	114.70	2.6
African	44.80	1.0
Provincial Administration		
White	224.30	6.2
Coloured	59.20	1.6
Asian	73.50	2.0
African	35.90	1.0
Local Authorities		
White	293.60	6.5
Coloured	85.90	1.9
Asian	60.20	1.3
African	45.00	1.0
S.A. Railways		
White	295.30	5.6
Coloured	70.60	1.4
Asian	53.80	1.0
African	52.30	1.0
Agriculture (1963/64)		
White - mostly owners, few employees	profits not known	·
Coloured	12.92	1.9 *
Asian	16.08	2.3 *
African	6.92	1.0 *

* Free accommodation and rations should be added to these figures.

In 1968 it was estimated that Africans, who formed 70% of the population, received 19.8% of South Africa's personal cash income, while the whites, who made up only 17.5% of the population, received about 74% of it. The average *per capita* income of Africans in 1967 was roughly R82 per annum compared to a white average of R1141 per annum *(54)*.

The implications of the low incomes of non-whites are obvious - a depth of poverty which is general and wide-spread, with all its attendant problems. Dr Neser of the National Nutritional Research Institute, writing in the South African Medical Journal, has stated that nearly 80% of the African children in a survey of African areas in Pretoria (a not atypical area) came from homes where the family income was too low to permit the purchase of adequate food supplies *(55)*. Potgieter states that 75-85% of African families in Pretoria have an income lower than the minimum needed for basic expenses, and concludes that at least 80% of African school-going children suffer from malnutrition or under-nutrition as a result *(56)*.

In one major African rural reserve, Leary and Lewis reported that 'at least 50% of all children born alive fail to reach their fifth birthday, and the majority of those who die do not reach their third birthday' *(57)*. At roughly 1960, the life expectancy of an African person was between 44 and 46 years, that of a Coloured person between 50 and 54 years, that of an Indian person between 58 and 60 years, and that of a white person between 65 and 72 years *(58)*.

Poverty is not the only cause of the malnutrition and disease which result in the patterns of mortality which we have just described, but it is the most important contributory factor. The compilers of the Lent Book of the Church of the Province in South Africa have estimated that 1,000,000 Coloured people, 375,000 Indian people and 9,000,000 African people in South Africa, a total of over 10,000,000 people (out of an estimated total of 18,000,000 at the time), live in serious poverty *(59)*. We have carefully considered these estimates and maintain that they are a fair reflection of the true position in South Africa *(60)*.

Professor van der Horst's analysis of progress and retrogression in South Africa suggests that gradual improvements in the circumstances of blacks have occurred over the years, as measured in terms of disease rates, life expectancy, and incomes (corrected for rises in the consumer price index). However, her figures and others also suggest that the trend has been for the relative economic position of Africans to deteriorate in comparison with that of whites *(61)*.

Obviously in any society, a more educated and skilled group is bound to receive greater financial reward than a less-skilled section of the population. In South Africa, however, it is the *extent* of material inequality that is of concern, not the mere fact of unequal income *(62)*.

Of equal concern, in this regard, is the fact that the differences in educational attainments of whites and blacks are being perpetuated by official educational policies. The report of the Spro-cas Education Commission provides a very full documentation of inequalities in the provision of education for different groups *(63)*. One index of the inequality which exists in this field is the amount spent by the government and provincial authorities on education for the different groups. Excluding capital works and university education, the unit costs per pupil in 1968/9 were:

Whites	R228,00	*(64)*
Indian	R 70,00	*(64)*
Coloured	R 73,00	*(65)*
African	R 14,50	*(64)*

Thus, a white child has fifteen times as much spent on his or her education as an African child. Furthermore, the pupil-teacher ratio in African schools is 60-1 compared with the 21-1 ratio in white schools *(66)*. One of the problems to which this inequality contributes is the high drop-out rate in non-white schools. Among Africans, for every 1000 pupils entering school, only 7 reached matriculation class in 1967 *(67)*. Education for whites is free and compulsory, which is not the case with other groups.

The conclusion which these figures suggest is that official government policies are not aimed at *reducing the differences* in skills between whites and blacks, and this, in turn, suggests that progress towards greater economic equality will be seriously retarded. (In fairness, it should be mentioned here that the Minister of the Interior, Mr Theo Gerdener, recently pledged that the income-gap would be reduced).

Even when educational standards of white and black employees are equal, however, there are significant differences in the salaries which members of the various groups command. The following are the minimum and maximum salaries of male school-teachers with comparable qualifications (Matric. plus 4 years training): *(68)*

White	R3360 - 5100
Coloured and Indian	R2010 - 3480
African	R1260 - 2610

The same distinctions occur in the salaries of medical practitioners employed in provincial hospitals, in the salaries of University teachers, and in salaries throughout the civil service. Impressionistic evidence of the salaries paid in private enterprise suggests that the position outside of the public sector is not better.

These economic and educational inequalities lie at the very basis of South African society as it is presently structured. Another fundamental inequality concerns the right to ownership of property. Africans are completely prohibited from owning any property in the 86% of South Africa's territory outside of the underdeveloped reserves. This prohibition has recently been extended to the possession of property on leasehold as well as freehold *(69)*. Indians and Coloureds may only own property in their own official group areas, which, with one exception (that of the Grey Street area in Durban), are situated well outside central business districts and other areas where property values are very high. Hence, members of these two groups are generally legally prevented from owning property in areas where the return on capital investment is likely to be highest.

Group Areas legislation has meant that many thousands of families have had to be removed to group areas appropriate to their ethnic identity. In this process of relocation, despite Ministerial reassurances at the time of the passing of the Group Areas Act *(70)*, Indians and Coloureds have been far more drastically affected than have whites. Up to the end of September, 1968, the following number of families had become disqualified to remain in their homes: *(71)*

White families	-	656
Coloured families	-	58,999
Indian families	-	35,172

Disqualification in terms of the Group Areas Act tends to cause grievous economic losses to the families involved *(72)* and black families have had to bear the brunt of these losses.

Territorial segregation and separation in South Africa has been accompanied by numerous restrictions and laws which have had the effect

of segregating virtually all public amenities and recreational and entertainment facilities (73). In non-white group areas, public facilities are almost inevitably less adequate than those in white areas. In South Africa the dictum 'separate but equal' is virtually nowhere applicable, except perhaps in the buildings and equipment in the separate black universities established for the different ethnic groups.

In the foregoing descriptions we have outlined only a few of the fundamental inequalities which exist between the races in South Africa. A complete description of the patterns of formal discrimination in South Africa would fill volumes. Discrimination affects housing, family life, transport, health, social services, public safety, insurance and social security - in short, virtually every area of life. Since fuller documentations of these inequalities are freely available (74), we will limit ourselves to the few examples of basic inequalities which have been presented.

The all-pervading patterns of inequality and discrimination in South Africa are supported and reinforced by myriad laws and regulations. Recently, Mr Fred van Wyk, Director of the South African Institute of Race Relations, in an analysis of statutory discrimination, drew attention to the fact that since 1909 some 200 laws had been passed which seek to regulate relations between the races or which are applicable to specific racial groups (75). The number of these laws has progressively multiplied over the years. Thus from 1909 to 1948, 49 such laws were passed in 38 years. From 1948 to 1960, 53 laws in 12 years. From 1961 to 1971, *98 laws in 10 years.* van Wyk drew attention to the large number of amending acts, designed to close loopholes and tighten the provisions of the basic Acts. Furthermore, a feature of many of these laws was to grant ever-increasing powers to individual Ministers with a corresponding weakening of the rights of the courts - hence undermining the 'rule of law'. An important aspect of statutory discrimination in South Africa is the system of security laws with their frightening provisions for detentions without trial, house arrest, bannings, deportations and other punitive measures against individuals which allow no recourse to the courts.

In order to understand South African society today, it is essential to understand the effects of the laws discussed above. In the first place, reform movements have their activities severely circumscribed by the ever-present threats posed by security laws and the large number of police informers who are a result of these laws. The various security measures have severely weakened black leadership and for many years a climate of fear has prevailed which has undermined attempts to mobilise under-privileged black peoples.

The social divisions between ethnic groups which many of the laws foster, also have important effects. It is safe to say that a vast majority of blacks have no contact with whites whatsoever, outside of the formal hierarchical relations in places of employment and in contacts with white police and officials. This tends to create a considerable social 'distance' between whites and blacks. Among many blacks, this seems to have the effect of discouraging comparisons of their own circumstances with those of whites. The whites are remote beings whose position is seen as being 'unassailable'. Among many whites, on the other hand, the rigid social separation creates the impression that blacks live in another society, in another and largely unknown 'world'. As Professor Reid says when writing about poverty and malnutrition among blacks, apartheid creates the impression that blacks live in a world where different standards apply. This cuts the blacks off from a good deal of sympathy from whites who would be very distressed if similar conditions prevailed in their own communities *(76)*. The absence of any cross-cutting social ties between communities keeps whites relatively ignorant of conditions among black communities. Lack of social contact other than master-servant contact and contact in the workplace also perpetuates the 'stigma' of colour in the eyes of most whites. For most whites the notion of any informal contact with blacks, in an atmosphere of equality, is strange and disquieting.

A further feature of South African laws and regulations is that they emphasise racial and tribal divisions among South African blacks in myriad different ways. Job reservation determinations and the facility of asking for more determinations in terms of the Industrial Conciliation Act give Indians and Coloureds a great deal of protection from labour competition from Africans. Hence any sense of a shared position of being discriminated against, of being exploited, is undermined. Furthermore, as in many authoritarian societies, or in societies characterised by vast social and economic inequality, patterns of interaction are self-reinforcing. The wealth, education and confidence of the average white tend to give him an advantage in any interaction with blacks, which in turn makes the blacks feel inferior, producing among the latter, low morale, a lack of self-confidence, dispiritedness and apathy. Thus the psychology of an oppressed group is functional for the maintenance of the system *(77)*.

Hence we see that laws in South Africa, in making existing social norms and practices more rigid and authoritative, have made discrimination, inequality, status distinctions and distinctions in privilege so utterly pervasive that these characteristics have penetrated deep into the consciousness of both blacks and whites. If any one factor is to be singled

out as accounting for the surface calm and lack of open conflict in South Africa, it is the rigidity and pervasiveness of inequality in the society. In a macabre sense, therefore, the authorities in South Africa are right when they maintain that the myriad laws and regulations are there to preserve 'harmonious' and 'peaceful' relations between the groups in the country.

Section Three

The White Ruling Group

IN A SOCIETY where racial, linguistic and cultural differences coincide with differences in privilege and economic status, the more privileged classes are provided with opportunities to justify and rationalise inequality, *consciously and unconsciously,* in ways which are very effective. The types of justifications which are likely to be resorted to most readily are those which accord with important aspects of the culture of the privileged groups. These justifications are often ideologies for domination and are essential to an understanding of South Africa.

The characteristics of the white ruling group which are relevant to the system of inequality in South Africa can best be understood in the light of:

(a) the past economic and nationalistically based conflicts between the Afrikaans and English-speaking whites;

(b) existing cultural and socio-economic differences between these two groups;

(c) in contrast to the two above-named factors, the material social and political privilege which the two groups share.

It is very probable that the English-speaking and Afrikaans-speaking groups would have been locked in intense conflict and competition with one another today, were it not for what they perceive as the greater common 'threat' to the position of both groups posed by the blacks in South Africa. The history of Afrikaner-English relations, and especially the rise of Afrikaner Nationalism in the 1920's and 1930's would certainly suggest this.

At the time of Union, the Afrikaans-speaking whites constituted in many respects a rurally based group with a rural, pioneer-orientated culture. The struggle against British imperialism and the shared experience of the Great Trek had resulted in considerable in-group feeling and Afrikaner patriotism in the areas outside the Western Cape Province. The English-speaking groups were almost totally urban-orientated, and, outside the pioneer settler areas of Natal and the Eastern Cape, without the binding forces of shared group feeling.

The political settlement after the Anglo-Boer War, at the time of Union, for a variety of reasons was marked by a considerable amount of accommodation of Afrikaans interests. The conquered group emerged from the settlement with the franchise and with those Afrikaans-speaking leaders who were prepared for rapprochement with the English, in a powerful position (Botha, Smuts, etc.).

These advantages did not prevent the Afrikaans group from remaining in a highly disadvantageous economic position vis-a-vis the English for several decades. Some Afrikaners, following the pattern which had been established in the Western Cape, became wholly or partly assimilated, into the English-speaking urban culture. This process occurred with a section of the Afrikaans leaders - i.e. those in the South African Party - and these people came to symbolise, for the English group, English-Afrikaans unity. For many of the more traditional and fundamentalist Afrikaans leaders, the actions of Afrikaners who sought English-Afrikaans unity symbolised betrayal. Cultural assimilation was often accompanied by upward mobility in the economic institutions of the English-speaking community, while the mass of rank-and-file Afrikaners remained relatively impoverished. There was, however, a small elite of Afrikaans professionals (teachers and ministers of religion) who remained very closely identified with the mass of ordinary Afrikaners.

Very broadly speaking, in the twenties and thirties, two groups emerged among the whites; an economically prosperous group, composed mainly of English-speaking whites but including a proportion of Afrikaners who shared their way of life, led by a group of politicians whose numbers included many Afrikaners committed to English-Afrikaans unity, and who, for historical reasons, retained the support of many Afrikaners outside this broad group. On the other hand, there existed a powerful group of Afrikaners who were nationalistically motivated. This nationalism was reinforced by the inferior economic position which the majority of Afrikaners occupied. For these reasons the Afrikaner nationalist leaders distanced themselves from the English and Afrikaans-speaking leaders of the first group. They drew upon the patriotic inspiration provided by the well-established national patriotic intellectual tradition which started with the deliberate efforts to found Afrikaans as a separate language. The nationalist Afrikaners, by and large, tended to view themselves as a 'people' (volk) in a heterogenous and, to some extent, alien community. The leaders of the South African Party, on the other hand, tended to perceive a single white nation marked by linguistic and economic divisions. These two themes are relevant to ideology among whites today, as we shall point out later.

The period up to 1948 saw the steady political consolidation and economic improvement of the Afrikaans nationalist group. This process

was accomplished by close collaboration between the Dutch Reformed Churches, the education profession, Afrikaans cultural and semi-secret organisations like the Broederbond, economic organisations like the Reddingsdaadbond, agricultural organisations, factions in the trade union movement, and of course, the Nationalist Party. Steadily more and more Afrikaners were persuaded to return to the bosom of the 'volk' and in 1948 a sufficient number had been recruited as Nationalist supporters to win an electoral victory for the Nationalist and Afrikaner parties in coalition, albeit with a minority of total white votes, made possible by the system of loading rural seats. This minority grew to a slight majority in the sixties, by which time Afrikaans nationalist organisations operating in the economic sphere had facilitated the emergence of a rapidly growing Afrikaans nationalist entrepreneurial class.

Today, the English-speaking and non-nationalist Afrikaner group still has economic ascendancy and its leadership is closely tied to private white business. The Afrikaner nationalist group, despite considerable advances in the entrepreneurial sphere, has its extra-parliamentary power base primarily in the civil service and in government-affiliated educational, scientific, industrial and cultural organisations. Afrikaans cultural organisations, and the semi-secret politico-cultural body, the Broederbond (composed of most of the 'traditional' inner elite of the nationalist group), still appear to have a powerful influence on the public leadership of the Afrikaans nationalist group.

Hence we have two clearly distinct white elites. The majority of people in both elites are in *broad* agreement that the white man shall maintain his position of political domination over the major resources of the country. A minority group among the English-speaking elite favour a gradual assimilation of individuals from the black group into the ruling class (a view represented by Progressive Party policy) but even this orientation, for most of its adherants, is probably seen as a policy which is compatible with continued white control.

The shared aim of maintaining white domination has probably tended to defuse historical, economic and ideological rivalries between the Nationalist Afrikaners and other whites to some extent, but strong differences remain, and this is one factor which tends to make the South African oligarchical system somewhat less rigid (actually and potentially) than is the case in the neighbouring white-ruled state of Rhodesia.

At this stage, however, only a minority among Afrikaner nationalist leaders espouse the cause of 'Afrikanerisation' of the white group, or a position of total dominance for the Afrikaans language, although a strong contingent probably favour a relative strengthening of the position of the Afrikaans language in the white society.

The (shared) aim of maintaining white domination should not draw

attention away from the fact that an incisive difference exists between Nationalist Afrikaners and other white leaders in regard to the *means and methods* of maintaining domination. The difference lies in the *extent* to which separation of the races is seen as being necessary, and the extent to which this ideal of separation has become conceptualised and justified as an ideology.

South African history provides us with numerous examples of laws and policies providing for the separation of races which have been applied by British administrators and by English-speaking politicians. One outstanding example is provided by the various local and provincial laws passed in Natal to prevent the so-called 'penetration' of 'white' areas by Indians in the early twenties, laws which culminated in the Asiatic Land Tenure and Indian Representation Act of 1946 and subsequently in the Group Areas Act. Then we also have the examples of British administrators like d'Urban and Shepstone pursuing policies aimed at the separate settlement of African communities.

There is little to suggest that the English-speaking and non-nationalist Afrikaner group, had they remained in power after 1948, would not have imposed strict residential segregation, where they considered it necessary. After all, Rhodesia, under similar conditions, seems to be moving in this direction.

The Nationalist Afrikaner leaders, however, have formulated an ideology which extends far beyond the need for mere segregation in response to specific pressures. 'Apartheid', more recently 'separate development', and even more recently, 'multi-national development', are progressive stages in a single policy which provides for complete separation, consistently applied, in all spheres of activity - even in areas where the affected white communities have not shown that they have considered it necessary (for example, bus segregation in Cape Town and Durban, mixed audience acts, the Extention of Universities Act, etc. etc.).

This is where one can possibly draw a distinction between Anglo-Saxon pragmatism and Afrikaner Nationalist idealism. While both appear to be equally unconcerned with the real needs and sentiments of black South Africans, policies in terms of the tradition of the former group would simply be responses to specific conflicts, and, in moving from precedent, a pattern would emerge over time. In the latter, the pattern is conceived in advance, as a total blueprint, and imposed with far less regard to the empirical conditions affecting policy implementation than would be the case with policies of a more pragmatic kind. The Tomlinson Commission and its findings are the outstanding examples of an attempt to produce a complete blueprint for policies regarding Africans.

This distinction is seen in the present differences between the policies of the National Party and the major opposition party, the United Party.

National Party policy has developed from a blueprint providing for complete territorial separation of the races, on a highly unequal basis, to one which, in addition, emphasises the separate economic, political and cultural development of the various linguistic and ethnic groups in the South African community (multi-national development), also on a highly unequal basis.

The United Party policy, on the other hand, in the eyes of Afrikaner Nationalist idealists, is hardly a policy at all. In providing for some separation, some segregation, some integration, some token black representation along lines of 'race federation', it is a compromise between the perceived need to maintain white domination, and the reality of economic and administrative interdependence between races. As such, this policy is fairly typical of conservative policies, which seldom are based on 'total solutions'. To a non-pragmatic idealist, however, the policy appears as somewhat of a patchwork affair - a criticism frequently levelled against the policy in the Nationalist press.

There are undoubtedly many reasons for the differences in political thinking between the two white groups. Some of these can possibly be understood in the light of the cultural roots of the two groups in Britain and Europe. The role of the 'idea' in politics has been far less potent in British history than in European history (78). Of more immediate importance, however, is the phenomenon of Afrikaner Nationalism itself. As we have mentioned earlier, the architects of separate development, in their attempts to provide a rationale and justification for continued white control, have drawn on their own experiences of existing as a people (volk) within a broader context - that of the nation as constitutionally defined.

Afrikaner Nationalism has had a very strong religious basis, particularly since the early thirties. Moodie describes this nationalism as a 'civil religion' (79), very definitely a 'Christian National' ideology. He points out how the institutionalisation of this ideology as a popular political 'thrust' was able to mobilise Afrikanerdom in the teeth of considerable opposition from not only English influences but also from the earlier type of evangelical Calvinism of the Dutch Reformed Churches and the more liberal and rational nationalism propounded by General Hertzog and his followers (80). The strongly emotive religious factor in the Afrikaner nationalist political movement has imbued its adherents with a singular determination and all-pervading sense of purpose. It is probably quite true to say that many Afrikaner leaders saw themselves (and some still see themselves) as having a divine role in the shaping of South Africa's political destiny.

Some projection of this ideology onto the various black groups is undoubtedly involved in Nationalist race policies; the policy of Apartheid

is, in part, the formal definition of the various black sub-cultural groups as peoples (volkere) who, willy nilly, should co-exist with others in South Africa in a way which would cause them to acquire conceptions of themselves as separate peoples, with all the attendant characteristics of group-belongingness, patriotism, a common language, a shared concept of their history and future destiny as a people, etc. etc. (These are some of the criteria which some Afrikaner leaders use to define the Afrikaner people). The 1948 Christian National Education Manifesto makes quite clear that state educational policy should aim not only at Christianising blacks, but imbuing them with an awareness of their own group identity *(81)*.

Policies aimed at race separation, the division and consequent weakening of the political power of the black population in South Africa, the curtailment of black influence in the organisations and institutions of the dominant (white) group, acquired, by virtue of the ideology of Afrikaner nationalism, a great deal of respectability in the eyes of many Afrikaner leaders. It became a policy which could be pursued with virtuous zeal, on the grounds that the end justified the means. This policy has gradually evolved to include the aim of eventual independence for the separate African peoples whose 'homelands' are in the 14% of South African territory set aside as African reserve areas in the thirties. Instead of being seen for what they are - 'rural ghettoes' - these areas have been redefined as under-developed, semi-autonomous, and potentially independent states, and very respectable internationally endorsed terminology is employed in describing the administration of the areas and the preparations for self-rule. This is *not* to suggest that all Afrikaner Nationalists who helped formulate this policy or who presently support it are cynical and moved by ulterior motives. We will return to this point presently, however.

In this way, a very adequate justification - a legitimating charter - has been created for laying down policies aimed at permanently removing all rights of Africans in virtually all developed urban and other 'white' areas. Even the fact that more than half of the African community presently resides outside the 'homelands', and the fact that the 'white' economy is overwhelmingly dependent on black labour can be argued away. The relatively limited phenomenon of migrant labour in Europe is used to full effect in these arguments, and the African labour in the border areas and in white areas is argued to be a form of 'export' by these areas. Hence, black labour becomes a 'commodity', and the exporting of a 'commodity' in the form of migrant labour can reach very substantial proportions without stirring the conscience of the policy-maker *(82)*.

Quite apart from the obvious and massive injustice involved, one reality which this policy does not adequately take account of is the fact

that a sophisticated economy requires more than temporarily resident migrant 'labour units' for 70% and more of its manpower requirements. With developing technology, as the need for skills rises, increasingly the economy will require adequately motivated, well rewarded, more skilled and experienced workers with a healthy morale. The White, Coloured and Indian groups, even with immigration, cannot possibly supply the country's requirements for skilled and experienced semi-skilled labour without limiting economic growth and particularly the expansion of secondary industry (an expansion which appears vital in view of the limited life of the country's largest single source of foreign exchange - the gold mines).

Another reality which the policy does not take account of is the virtual impossibility of 'homeland' development occurring at a rate which will allow these areas to support more than double the population which they fail to support adequately at the present time. This is a double unreality in the sense that if it were possible to accomplish development of this order, 'white' South Africa would be deprived of more than two-thirds of its labour force, and the traditional white South African way of life, which is a culture of privilege and affluence, would crumble *(83)*. White opposition policies, whatever their own moral demerits, face these realities.

This is not to suggest that 'separate development' is theoretically impossible or necessarily unjust. If the policy were limited to certain 'homelands' possessing the potential for adequate development and if the population expected to live in these territories were limited to the existing *de facto* residents in the areas, many important objections would fall away. However, the policy, as formulated, embraces all Africans in the country.

Obviously not all Nationalist Afrikaner thinkers are deceived by these justifications and rationalisations of present policy. One is therefore faced with the perplexing task of attempting to understand the motives of leading Afrikaner Nationalists, both inside and outside of the political party. To avoid the danger of over-simplifying issues, we should attempt to distinguish between various factions among leaders of Afrikaans Nationalism.

Ideological divisions in the non-nationalist group of whites are fairly clearly defined, and this group can be seen to be divided into conservatives (the majority), more progressively oriented people who generally believe that political privileges should be extended to well-educated and financially advanced blacks (Progressive Party supporters), a small proportion of liberals, and an even smaller group of radicals. Divisions among Afrikaans Nationalists are more difficult to discern. Afrikaans Nationalism has provided other grounds for political party affiliation than orientations in regard to the race/class issue in South Africa, and hence

we find today that the National Party itself contains a fair spread of opinions in this regard among people who, for reasons of language-group identity, remain affiliated to the single party. The arch-conservative nationalists in the *Herstigte Nasionale Party* are an exception, but since this is a very small group with an uncertain future, we can disregard this party for present purposes. In any case, attitudes typical of H.N.P. leaders can be found in the National Party. The following types of Afrikaans Nationalist *leaders* can be identified.

There appears to be a small group of intellectuals, churchmen and professionals, who support the plural state system as a solution to South Africa's problems, and who would like to see separate development carried through to its logical conclusion, with great sacrifices from whites of land, resources, urban development and labour - in effect a type of partition. As Moodie points out *(84)*, this group is composed of people who are generally very sincere. They believe that separate development could be an ethical solution to South Africa's complex problems.

Then there appear to be those (also a small group of intellectuals, churchmen and professionals) who seem to favour the fullest possible implementation of the policy, realising and anticipating, however, that at some stage in the future concessions will have to be made in regard to the Coloureds, Indians and the urban African population. Both the above groups would appear to represent rather small minorities.

A very much larger group of Nationalist Afrikaans leaders appear to favour the fullest possible development of the homelands, including the granting of independence, but realise that 'white' South Africa's labour needs will have to be accommodated by various deliberate arrangements, like border industrial development, mass weekly or less-frequent migration of workers to and from the reserves, facilitated by high-speed transportation, and/or by allowing large numbers of Africans to remain in white areas without political rights on a temporary basis. This is justified on the grounds that these Africans will have political rights in distant 'homelands', but these rights will have no direct bearing on the very basic issue of wages or on working and living conditions in the 'white' areas. The political views of this type of thinker might be sincere in regard to 'homeland' development and independence, but these views as they apply to urban Africans, can only be regarded as rationalisations and attempts at justification.

Another type of view, which appears to be characteristic of a fairly substantial group of leaders, is that the development of the 'homelands' and their eventual independence should be regarded essentially as justification for continued domination and a way of countering criticism. This type of view does not favour large expenditure on 'homeland' development, nor the granting of *full* independence if it seems likely to prove embar-

rassing. The latter view tends to be cynical, involves very little self-deception and is obviously very largely expedient. This view *and* the previous viewpoint mentioned appear to be typical of nationalist leaders involved in the National Party structure itself, and it is probably somewhere between these two positions that the real dimensions of the official policy of separate development are to be found.

Lastly, there is a not insubstantial group of very conservative Nationalists who would appear to oppose any substantial expenditure on the development of separate facilities as well as the granting of too much autonomy to 'homeland' political institutions. Here the emphasis is almost completely on separation and control, rather than on development.

In attempting to assess the relative strength and influence of these factions one has to take account of the preferences among the grass roots supporters of the National Party. On the basis of available evidence from social surveys and opinion polls, *(85)* it would appear as if rank and file supporters generally favour separation but do not favour sacrifices on the part of whites and heavy taxation in order to implement separate development. This gives the less 'verligte' (enlightened) and less progressive nationalist leaders an immediate advantage. The fervour with which the National Party machine has fought the small right wing breakaway faction - the H.N.P. - lends support to the contention that the leadership fears that it has moved ahead of the larger mass of its supporters. Rank-and-file white South Africans, who for decades have been encouraged to maintain a hostility toward the blacks, are not likely to be enthusiastic supporters of 'separate freedoms' if this means any sacrifice from them, and especially when government-appointed African politicians like Chief Kaiser Matanzima and Chief Gatsha Buthelezi have already made statements suggesting that they will eventually do everything they can to prevent whites deriving all the advantages of separate development and none of the disadvantages.

Party political policies are never autonomous and free-floating political forces. Even dictators are answerable to their publics; how much more so the National Party intellectuals. The very structure of privilege that the policy is, in part, designed to protect makes its implementation in any real and significant sense impossible. Yet, on the other hand, well advertised policies have a certain momentum, if only because the policy-makers have to protect their credibility. Hence, we have seen certain aspects of the policy which are probably not very popular being put into effect in the creation of territorial authorities and legislative assemblies in the 'homelands' and in the establishment of the representative council for Coloureds, and will see more of these developments in the future. These are legally powerless bodies in relation to the real issues in the society, but their very impotence has an important political significance;

amidst myriad security laws these bodies enjoy some freedom to organise blacks. However, the main point is that none of these developments, at this stage, affects the material self-interest of whites, and for this reason they are tolerated by grass-roots National Party supporters who are not necessarily sympathetic to such developments.

Ideology and its rationalisations should never be taken too seriously without studying the way they interact with the values of the mass of people who are in a position to support, circumscribe or oppose the ideologies; in South Africa these people are the white voters and members of certain powerful lobbies. The following paragraphs present a *broad and very general* overview of the interests of white voters in South Africa.

Rank-and-file whites, English and Afrikaans-speaking, are very probably interested first and foremost in their pockets and standard of living. There is evidence to suggest that urban Afrikaners may be even more materialistic than their English-speaking fellow whites *(86)*. Several investigations have suggested *(87)* that whites, both English and Afrikaans, probably put material interests above other interests in considering race policies; and material privilege in South Africa means white supremacy over a subservient class of blacks, whose labour is utilised and exploited as effectively as possible. The idea of 'separate freedoms' is likely to remain little more than a justification for domination, if only because white grass-roots interests will see to it that it remains so (unless of course, pressure from the blacks themselves influences the application of the policy significantly). In addition, it needs to be mentioned here that, in general, there appears to be a strong correlation between support for 'Apartheid' and hostility towards Africans *(88)*. It seems fair to assume, therefore that the majority of people who vote for the government's policy of separate development are not people who would look favourably on sacrifices from whites in the cause of African development.

There is a very basic congruence between the interests of private enterprise and popular white self-interest. As the figures in Section II show, businessmen benefit enormously from a docile, subservient class of blacks; but they also wish to exploit South Africa's labour in the most effective ways. As we mentioned previously, the interests of white capital are not likely to be served best by a situation in which migrant labourers travel exceptionally long distances to work or reside in compounds, and they will certainly not be best served if the migrant labourers are subject to the influences of unpredictable political organisation in separate independent states, since there obviously will be a possibility of effective labour protest being organised within the 'homelands'.

Already business efficiency has been undermined by ideology to some extent - there is mounting inflation and major Afrikaans business organisations like the *Handelsinstituut,* not to mention the non-Afrikaans cham-

bers of industry and commerce, are calling for a more efficient use of black labour *(89)*. The present government has already experienced losses at the polls, possibly partly because of bread and butter issues; the last thing the government can risk is a recession. It seems that the government must compromise on the labour issue and allow more technical education for African workers and their utilisation in more skilled positions, as is already occuring *(90)*. Added to this there is evidence that white attitudes towards job reservation are changing - therefore the businessmen have a large proportion of the urban public with them *(91)*. The compromises that are being made by the government are by 'exemption', but everyone knows that the exemptions are permanent, short of an economic recession occurring.

Previously the Nationalist government would have been able to draw on the loyalty of Afrikaans Nationalists to provide a certain freedom to implement unpopular policies. However, urban white South Africa, outside of certain cities like Pretoria and Bloemfontein, appears to be becoming somewhat of a 'melting pot', with a dilution of Afrikaner nationalist sentiment apparently taking place. Recent surveys provide confirmation that the rank-and-file urban Afrikaner is becoming less and less concerned with his traditional identity and with fervent in-group loyalties *(92)*.

These developments will probably have the effect of strengthening the relative position of the cynical and expedient faction within the National Party, inasmuch as they suggest that a dynamic implementation of separate development, as desired by Nationalist idealists, is impossible. As the experienced commentator Stanley Uys argued recently, the enlightened 'verligte' Nationalists are less influential now than many thought they would be *(93)*. It seems that they will have to be content with the trappings of 'separate freedoms' without the substance. The irony of the problems faced by more enlightened National Party leaders is that their idealism is probably more compatible with the political thinking of some opposition party supporters than with the thinking among rank-and-file National Party voters. An outspoken and active Bantustan leader who is willing to work actively for the real development of all 'his people' has more sympathy from white liberals and radicals than he gets from the ordinary supporters of the party that created his role in the first place. The Christian National idealism which gave rise to the policy of separate development is likely to founder on the rocks of white racialism and material self-interest, for it is these latter motivations, *ultimately*, which are central in the politics of white domination in South Africa.

Thus, leaving aside the possibility of influences from the outside world and the possibility that blacks themselves will force the pace of separate development, it seems that white majority interests are likely

to remain largely directed at maintaining white domination and material inequality.

At this stage, despite much talk of change in the press, it would seem that South Africa, in essence, will tend to remain a rigid class society, with the class divisions reinforced by race. The dominant thrust in white oligarchical leadership is likely to continue to be the maintenance of white domination in much the same basic form as it has existed in the past. Separate development *as planned by the government,* apart from the possibility of token gestures of independence for the 'homelands', seems likely to remain little more than a justification for white domination in those areas where South Africa's problems are most critical - the cities, towns and other developed areas of the country.

Section Four

South Africa:
Change and Justice

THE FOREGOING analysis of the social forces operating in South Africa may create the impression that we feel confident that all the major factors impinging on the possibilities of change have been identified. We fully acknowledge, however, that new combinations of forces in future years may give rise to factors, at present latent, which will create significant new possibilities for change. This dimension of the unpredictable cannot be analysed, and hence the ensuing discussion is based on the situation as we understand it at present.

Taking a very long view of the South African situation, it is possible to speculate on the types of basic changes which are likely to occur. Excluding the possible effects of influences from abroad, one of two types, or a combination of the two types of change, are almost certain to occur in the *long run*. This issue is also dealt with in the paper by Lawrence Schlemmer elsewhere in this report, but the issue bears brief mention here. One type of change which is likely to occur would involve a gradual weakening of the colour-bar and the slow movement of 'selected' blacks upwards into the privileged white stratum of society. This process could take place by a gradual extension of effective franchise rights, or by the breaking down of the economic colour-bar. The 'seeds' of this type of change already exist in the political sphere in South Africa in the form of the policy of the Progressive Party (the policy of a qualified franchise for all South Africans). While there is no prospect of the Progressive Party gaining power in the near future further indication of the potential viability of this type of change is the current pressure from certain Afrikaans academics for an acceptance by whites of the Coloured

group as equal citizens *(94)*. When one considers the logic behind this pressure, it seems clear that this type of thinking has implications for some urban Africans and for Indians as well. Broadly speaking, this type of change would be fairly similar to the 'evolutionary' changes which have occurred in older class societies; a process which has generally resulted in the extent of inequality being reduced for the population at large and in class divisions becoming blurred by the upward mobility of individual members of the lower classes.

The other type of change, in a sense a polar opposite of the first type if one considers the processes involved, is that which is likely to result from conflict or confrontation between the underprivileged and the privileged classes leading either to a fairly radical reorganisation of the society, or leading to a much more accelerated extension of rights to the majority of blacks. Because of the divisions of South African society on ethnic lines, such confrontation or conflict is likely to occur between organised race or ethnic groups. Here again, the 'seeds' of this type of change can also be found in institutionalised political life in South Africa. The principle of separate political organisations for different ethnic groups, which is central in the doctrine of separate development, is one indication of the potential for this type of change. Aspects of the race policy of the United Party where provision is made for separate electoral rolls for the different groups combined with highly unequal representation, possibly also could carry the 'seeds' of this broad type of change.

Recent comments by a prominent Nationalist and subsequent comments in the Nationalist press on the possibility of a 'super-parliament' as a way of securing dialogue between the different ethnic groups in South Africa is perhaps yet another portent of possible future events in South Africa *(95)*. Dialogue at this level could very easily lead to confrontation provided black participants had some form of bargaining power - a power which the overwhelmingly black labour-force could, theoretically, provide.

Very broadly, the suggestion is that people in a disadvantaged position in a society can improve their position, (i) by shaking off their identity and moving upwards as individuals (which is, of course, difficult if the identity is partly based on visible colour differences) or, (ii) by consolidating their identity, their cohesion, and morale and attempting to secure improvement for the group as a whole.

This discussion is not to suggest that any current policies of either the government or the opposition will inevitably lead to one or the other type of development outlined above. It is simply suggested that the different policies, if applied, can have the effect of structuring the type or pattern of conflict and change which is likely to emerge in any case as a result of more basic problems in the society (like the perpetuation of inequality, injustice, etc.).

Obviously, several combinations of the two types of change outlined are also theoretically possible. It is not necessary to spell these out, since several hypothetical possibilities are fairly obvious.

One important point needs to be made. Change along the lines of the first type (i.e. 'evolutionary' change involving the gradual assimilation of certain blacks into the white group) is more likely to enable the majority of whites to retain a position of relatively high material privilege in South Africa of the future. This type of change will have the effect of undermining the actual or potential political solidarity of blacks as a 'class', since it will lead many black 'leaders' to identify with the privileged stratum into which they will have moved or would hope to move. Just as the wealthier groups in Britain, Western Europe, Brazil, etc. of 50 years ago, tend still to be among the wealthier groups in these societies, so could South African whites retain their relative privilege with fairly limited, if significant, sacrifices.

The second course of change holds out the possibility of far greater sacrifices from whites in the long run, because of the intensity of conflict implicit in confrontation between class groups which, because they would be defined by race identity, are likely to develop a spirit of group consciousness and purpose very readily. In fact, black consciousness or black awareness, although not as yet a strong popular movement, is very definitely developing in South Africa. This course of action carries with it the probability of mass action on the part of blacks, possibly involving large scale strikes, disturbances in the townships etc. This would obviously lead to a sharpening of world criticism and hostility, and possibly to a crisis in business confidence as well. In such a situation of 'instability', sweeping concessions to blacks are likely to become necessary in the long run.

These are the broad theoretical possibilities for change which the present structure of South Africa and the nature of its political organisation suggest. What will actually occur is impossible to predict. It is necessary, however, to expand on the hypothetical themes by considering a few concrete trends and issues which relate to change in South Africa.

It is conceivable that those whites (presently mainly English-speaking) who favour a policy of gradual concession, taking the form of a qualified franchise for Indians, Coloureds and Africans, will be strengthened by disillusioned Afrikaans Nationalists of a more liberal persuasion. Also their numbers are likely to be strengthened as more and more whites move into the ranks of the more confident upper-middle classes (those supporting this type of policy tend to be more affluent and well educated, and hence economically secure from black competition (96). This is likely to be a very gradual and long term process, however, and racialism seems likely to be the dominant and popular white orientation for at least years to come.

The possibility of a substantial proportion of whites acceding to even the gradual introduction of steps towards a universal franchise for the mass of non-whites appears to be a rather remote political possibility in South Africa. Pleas for direct moves towards a democracy based on the common society model are little other than cries from a political wilderness.

As might be inferred from the foregoing general discussion of change, a progression towards a democracy based on the extension of voting rights to more and more individual blacks over a period of time is not necessarily the only form of change which will satisfy the requirements of justice based on Christian values. The fundamental requirements of justice are more basic than gradual developments towards a universal franchise, since it is theoretically possible for inequality to be maintained despite this as we will point out in the following paragraphs. Primarily the requirements of justice are that African, Indian and Coloured people in South Africa have influence and power which is effective in regard to all matters of policy affecting their interests. This implies that blacks should have an effective influence in the determination of wages, living conditions, social benefits and facilities and all other matters relating to either their material, social or psychological circumstances.

If all adults were to be given the privilege to vote in the next general election, the results of such an election would not necessarily secure for blacks the type of influence outlined above. It is just conceivable that the manipulation of voters' sentiments by shrewd politicians acting directly or inadvertantly in the interests of whites could so divide the black community into opposing blocs, based on false conceptions of voter interests (tribal blocs, racial blocs, status blocs, etc.) that, say, white business interests for example, retain an influence out of all proportion to the number of people in the managerial classes in South Africa. This type of imbalance in power has occurred in numerous democracies, and it could occur in South Africa as well, particularly with a gradual extension of voting rights. The franchise which Coloured males enjoyed in past years did not answer their real needs. Coloured males in large numbers voted for political parties whose primary concern was with the interests of whites. It can be argued, however, that Coloured male voters constituted a small minority on the electoral roll, and this is an important point to consider. On the other hand it is also important to consider that the Coloured voters at large did not utilise that opportunity to the full to gain for themselves improved opportunities in the society. The point we wish to stress here is that *effective political organisation and the articulation of group interests* must be present before the franchise can be used to full effect. Effective power can precede the vote, if it is

backed, say, by effective organisation of labour, or by other forms of group organisation.

This is *not* to deny the probable effectiveness of a universal franchise if it were possible to achieve this in the foreseeable future. We consider it essential to draw attention to alternative possibilities for change which might be *more easily realised* than those possibilities which depend on a universal franchise. Hence the ensuing papers by Lawrence Schlemmer and Douwes Dekker on strategies for change do not neglect a discussion on voting rights on any grounds of principle, but simply because popular white attitudes to the vote for blacks are so completely intransigent that a universal franchise is not likely to be achieved *without blacks gaining effective influence beforehand.* Some form of effective franchise for blacks will undoubtably follow on effective group organisation by blacks. But until the latter is achieved, calls for a universal franchise are likely to remain futile.

In view of the unlikelihood of the majority of whites making concessions without considerable pressure being brought to bear upon them, and considering that the proportion of whites which is likely to press for fundamental change is never likely to be very large or very powerful, it would seem that pressure from blacks themselves offers the only real hope for incisive change in the foreseeable future. If such pressure is to be constructive then a great deal more political mobilisation needs to occur among rank-and-file blacks than has occurred hitherto. In this regard it should be considered that the most effective types of pressures will be those that can be backed by the threat of popular action among blacks in areas which are most likely to move whites to make concessions; one of these, for example, is the area of labour relations. This type of political mobilisation requires leadership; yet leadership among blacks which is likely to be politically effective tends to be soon removed by official action in terms of security laws. One avenue for providing some of the necessary leadership without risk of immediate action by security forces, is in the institutions which have been created in terms of the policy of separate development itself.

The continued existence of these institutions is to a large extent guaranteed by the government's need to maintain some credibility, locally and overseas. Furthermore, the very powerlessness of these institutions at present affords them some safety in South Africa's hazardous political climate. As long as they last, and at this stage it seems that even a changed white government could not dismantle them without offering more effective alternatives (97), they have the potential for acquiring functions never intended by those politicians responsible for their establishment. These institutions could become the centres of communication for effective popular movements. These avenues are by no means the only avenues for

constructive strategic action aimed at achieving justice, but they present important opportunities and they are readily 'available'.

As certain black student leaders have recently pointed out, action within the framework of separate 'ethnic' institutions, carries with it the ever-present danger of encouraging sectional loyalties which will further divide the dark-skinned community. This danger can, however, be avoided to a very large extent if black leaders are frequently reminded of the danger and if the political activity of these leaders is aimed at making blacks aware of their real interests and at facilitating effective organisation rather than at the arousing of group sentiments.

This is not to suggest that possible changes in white attitudes could have no significance at all. Changes in the white community which would make it even marginally easier for blacks to organise and gain confidence and bargaining strength could be very significant indeed.

It seems inevitable in a situation where racialism in a highly manipulative class society blocks changes towards greater equality, that opposition to the race oligarchy is likely to take the form of counterracialism - action organised within and on behalf of the less-privileged racial groups. This, broadly speaking, was the trend which emerged in certain of the black resistance movements before their suppression in the sixties, and it is likely to become even more clearly apparent in years to come. In South Africa, race group identity and race discrimination are more readily perceived and felt than the underlying economic groupings and interests, among both whites and blacks. The racialism of whites, the policies of the present government, and the terms in which these policies are justified, represent a constant encouragement of counterracialism. At this stage it is impossible to say whether the major lines of race-conflict will be drawn between whites and all blacks collectively, or primarily between Whites and Africans with other groups in a marginal position. Trends in both directions can be discerned.

Whatever the case, it would seem as if the quest for equality will be carried out under the banner of race. Although secure predictions cannot be made, it seems not unlikely that the resolution of this conflict will take the form of some type of bargaining or confrontation between institutions representing racial interests *(98)*.

In the course of these possible events, it would be unfortunate if those South Africans who espouse the ideals of basic human dignity and of the liberation of the human spirit were to lose sight of the fact that freedom will not necessarily be realised with the removal of the colourbar. Whites do not have a monopoly on the manipulation and exploitation of people. Power and greed know no colour-bar. South Africa could have an all-black Cabinet, but there might nonetheless be very sharp contrasts between affluent 'integrated' suburbs and very influential 'integrated'

boardrooms on the one hand, and grinding poverty among peasants and soul-destroying dullness and hardship among the urban poor on the other. Blame for the ills that beset South Africa cannot be laid at the door of the Afrikaner, or the English-speaking whites, or the wealthy business-man. Human alienation, in its essence, is found everywhere, in West and East, and in the first, second and third worlds. The task at hand is to understand the basic nature of our society and to work not only for the end of 'Apartheid' but to go yet further and explore the possibilities of a future South Africa which could afford everyone as creative and fulfilling a life as possible.

At its roots, the structure of our society, like that of so many others, is shaped by the very basic values which people are taught in their formative years, directly and indirectly. Deeply imbued competitiveness, the acceptance of social conventions as absolute authority, the need to find a sense of worth in acquired goods, status, power, and in unquestioning patriotic identification with a group which excludes others, are but some of the values which contribute to a society which cannot but be mani-pulative and to some extent exploitative. In contrast, the development of expressive artistic and creative abilities, an openness to the rewards of warm and empathic contact with others, an acceptance of different points of view and ways of living, and the notion that human beings are free to change and recreate their social life, are seldom encouraged in our type of society.

In this sense South Africa's problems are not unique. They are the problems which most other societies have as well, but they are writ very large and are therefore very compelling. For those working for greater justice in South Africa the enormous inequality between the races is the issue which should have first priority. But this inequality should be seen as an aggravated symptom of a deeper malaise, and strategies for con-structive change should take this into account.

FOOTNOTES

1. Details of the work and composition of the Social Commission in its earlier form are given in the Introduction to this report.
2. This is fully analysed in a recent work by Heribert Adam, *Modernising Racial Domination, the Dynamics of South African Politics,* University of California Press 1971.
3. Bannings, detention without trial, etc. imposed by the Minister of Justice in terms of the Suppression of Communism Act and the Terrorism Act.
4. T.F. Pettigrew, 'Personality and Socio-cultural Factors in Intergroup Attitudes', *Conflict Resolution,* Vol. II, No. 1, March 1958.
5. One can think of specific examples of the failure of race prejudice adequately to explain patterns of discrimination in South Africa. For

example, at one stage impoverished rural Afrikaans migrants were subjected to the same type of pressure that drove Africans into urban areas. One can also draw attention to the fact that blacks are allowed to advance occupationally in some situations but not in others, an apparent inconsistency which can only be explained with reference to the economic and political structure and not in terms of race pre- judice. The race prejudice thesis also has the weakness that it accepts the actors' definition of the situation, and hence provides an explanation based on popular sentiment.

6. See for example: N.J. Rhoodie, *Apartheid and Racial Partnership in Southern Africa,* Academica, Pretoria/Cape Town, 1969. This book gives an excellent account of the reasoning (or rationalisations) behind the legislation relating to Separate Development. See particularly p. 61, 62, 63, 64, 72, 77. See also L. Schlemmer, *Social Change and Political Policy in South Africa,* South African Institute of Race Relations, Johannesburg, 1970, p. 3 and footnote 2. See also Denis Worrall, 'The Plural State System as a Direction of Change', in Peter Randall (Ed): *Directions of Change in South African Politics,* Spro-cas, Johannesburg, 1971.

7. A good example being Minister de Wet Nel's exposition of the aims of the Promotion of Bantu Self Government Bill of 1959.

8. For a fuller discussion of these points see L. Schlemmer, 'City or Tribal Homeland: A Study of Patterns of Identification among Africans in Durban', Paper read at the Second Congress of Sociologists of Southern Africa, Lourenco Marques, June 1971, Institute for Social Research, Durban.

9. T. Dunbar Moodie, *Power, Apartheid and the Afrikaner Civil Religion,* unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 1971, Chapter II.

10. J.S. Furnivall, *Colonial Policy and Practice,* Cambridge University Press, 1948, pp. 303-312. See also M.G. Smith, *The Plural Society in the British West Indies,* University of California Press, 1965. Smith, however, does not deal with the institutions of the economy as 'common' areas in the plural society. He sees the political control exercised by the colonial government as the unifying factor in a society where all institutions exist separately among the various groups.

11. For an excellent summary of the laws mentioned in the preceding three paragraphs, see M. Horrell, *Legislation and Race Relations,* SAIRR, Johannesburg, 1971.

12. See Heribert Adam, *op. cit.* pp. 6, 7, 30, 31.

13. B.A. Pauw, *The second generation,* Oxford University Press, Cape Town 1963, particularly p. 194, and Monica Wilson and Archie Mafeje, *Langa,* Oxford University Press, Cape Town, 1965, p. 172.

14. See Henry Lever, 'Ethnic Preference of White Residents in Johannesburg' *Sociology and Social Research,* Vol. 52, No. 2, January, 1968, pp. 157-173.

15. J.E. Pieterse (Ed.): *Jeug en Kultuur,* Voortrekkerpers, Johannesburg, 1967. This study shows that the majority of young adult Afrikaners tend to see themselves primarily as white South Africans rather than as 'Afrikaners'.

16. For an amplification of these points see the chapter by van Zyl Slabbert in this report.

17. S.P. Cilliers, *A Sociological Perspective on the South African Situation,* South African Institute of Race Relations, Topical Talks series, No.

26, Johannesburg, 1971.

18.   See Opinion Poll conducted by Market Research Africa (Pty) Ltd.,
      Daily News, Durban, 10/4/70, p. 7. Historically, de Kiewiet shows
      this dating back to the diamond and gold fields of the 19th century.
      C.W. de Kiewiet: *A Short History of South Africa: Social and Economic*,
      O.U.P., Cape Town, 1941.
19.   Inter alia, two unpublished studies undertaken by the Institute for
      Social Research, University of Natal, Durban.
20.   This inference is drawn from the figures given by Professor Sheila
      van der Horst, *Progress and Retrogression in South Africa: A Personal
      View*, South African Institute of Race Relations, Johannesburg, 1971,
      p. 16.
21.   *Financial Mail*, 18th April, 1969, p. 169, reporting on research conducted
      by Market Research Africa (Pty.) Ltd.,
22.   Department of Statistics, News Sheets, summarised in *Race Relations
      News* Vol. 33, July 1971, p. 2.
23.   van der Horst, *op cit.* p. 13.
24.   W.H. Hutt, *The Economics of the Colour Bar*, 1964, p. 181, and figures
      prepared by the Trade Union Council of South Africa. See also Muriel
      Horrell, *A Survey of Race Relations*, Johannesburg, 1970, p. 80.
25.   Pienaar and Associates, *Stats.* December 1970, p. 1255. It would appear
      that the salaries of senior financial executives in South Africa, after
      correcting for tax and c.o.l., are even higher than those in the U.S.A.
26.   See *Financial Mail*, 18/6/71, pp. 996-1000, and Dudley Horner, *United
      States Corporate Investment and Social Change in South Africa*, memo-
      randum, S.A. Institute of Race Relations, Johannesburg 1971, p. 1-2.

27.   It would appear that over 50% of Coloured families in the Cape, roughly
      60% of Indians in Durban, and nearly 70% of Africans in many urban
      areas live below the secondary poverty datum line. *Sources: Cape Argus*
      12/8/70, 20/3/71, *Rand Daily Mail*, 14/5/71, figures prepared by the
      Johannesburg Municipal Non-European Affairs Department, the Institute
      for Social Research and Department of Economics, University of Natal.
      See also Sheila van der Horst, *op. cit*, pp. 7 and 8.
28.   Sheila van der Horst, *op. cit*, p. 27. Detailed figures are presented later
      in this report.
29.   *Ibid*, p. 10.
30.   Robert Kraft, 'Labour: South Africa's Challenge of the Seventies',
      Optima, Vol. 20, 1970, p. 4, 'The real power of Job Reservation ..... is
      that it hangs over most employers as a threat ..... The authority of
      this legal instrument far outweighs the very limited number of actual
      reservations'.
31.   See for example, report on statement by the Minister of Planning in
      Parliament, *Sunday Tribune*, (Finance) 21/2/71.
32.   See also the remarks of Adam *(op. cit*, pp. 9, 109), which are relevant
      to the observations made in this paragraph. See also the discussion in
      the paper by Whisson (Chapter 3 of this report).
33.   For a very full discussion and substantiation of these points see Robert
      Kraft, *op. cit.*
34.   Margaret Ballinger, *From Union to Apartheid*, 1969, p. 313.
35.   J.J. Durand, *Swartman - Stad en Toekoms*, Tafelberg, 1970, pp. 44-46,
      60, 61. This author points out that labour turnover among Africans in
      Port Elizabeth is lower than among other groups, both in Port Elizabeth
      and elsewhere.

36. T.U.C.S.A., *The Industrial Development of the Border Areas of South Africa*, Johannesburg, 1966, pp. 8, 41.

37. John Rex, 'The Plural Society: The South African Case', *Race*, Volume XII, No. 4, 1971, p. 405.

38. See Kraft, *Op. cit*, p. 5 and p. 10.

39. *Ibid*, p. 4 and 5.

40. Quoted from a report on a speech in Parliament by the Minister of Bantu Administration and Development, in Muriel Horrell, *A Survey of Race Relations*, 1970, South African Institute of Race Relations, Johannesburg, p. 100.

41. de Kiewiet, *op. cit*, pp. 107-8.

42. Frederick A. Johnstone, 'White Prosperity and White Supremacy in South Africa Today', *African Affairs*, Vol. 69, April, 1970, p. 139.

43. See, for example, certain results of the opinion poll by Market and Opinion Surveys Pty. (Ltd), *Dagbreek*, 29/3/'70.

44. Even in certain of the African 'homelands', white Miners' Unions have until recently used their influence to protect white miners from competition from Africans.

45. For a discussion see K. Gottschalk, 'Race and Economics in South Africa', *Sash*, Vol. 15, June 1971.

46. John Rex, *Op. cit*. p. 412.

47. Two articles in the February 1971 issue of *New Nation* are particularly relevant in support of the view that white South Africans are not 'abnormally' prejudiced: 'Student Outlook at Stellenbosch' (Vosloo and Laver) and 'How Prejudiced are White South Africans' (Orpen).

48. In the tribal land tenure system there is no individual ownership of land. Land belongs to the tribe and the chief can grant *use* of land only.

49. See Rex, *op. cit*, p. 406.

50. See Fatima Meer: 'The Indian Community' in *South Africa's Minorities*, Johannesburg, 1971, (Spro-cas Publication 2).

51. L. Marquard, *South Africa's Colonial Policy*, South African Institute of Race Relations, p. 6.

52. John Rex, *op. cit*, p. 412.

53. Sources: Department of Statistics News Sheets and Agricultural Census No. 38 of 1963/64.

54. Heribert Adam, *op. cit*, pp. 7, 99, based on the National Readership Survey of 1967/8, conducted by Market Research Africa (Pty) Ltd.

55. M.L. Neser: 'Can we eradicate malnutrition in South Africa', *S.A. Medical Journal*, Vol. 39, 1965, p. 1148.

56. J.F. Potgieter, 'Inkomste en Voedingspeil', *South African Medical Journal*, Vol. 39, 1965, p. 1151.

57. P.M. Learly and J.E.S. Lewis, 'Some Observations on the State of Nutrition of Infants and Toddlers in Sekhukuniland', *South African Medical Journal*, Vol. 39, 1965, p. 1156.

58. See van der Horst, *op. cit*, p. 22-23.

59. *Who is my Neighbour*, Lent book of the Church of the Province in South Africa, 1971, p. 10. (The compilers use the secondary poverty datum line. Possibly their estimate of the number of blacks below this line is rather too high, but since the S.P.D.L. is the minimum income required for survival in the short-run only, and an income above the P.D.L. is required to maintain human standards in the long-run, these figures are a fair estimate of real poverty).

60. We refer readers to additional material presented by Professor H.L. Watts

and Professor John Reid in Peter Randall (Ed.), *Some Implications of Inequality*, Johannesburg, 1971.(Spro-cas Publication 4).

61.   See Sheila van der Horst, *op. cit*, pp. 7-8 and *Race Relations News*, Vol. 33, July 1971, p. 2.
62.   *Financial Mail* 18th April, 1969, p. 169, reporting on Research conducted by Market Research.
63.   See, *Education Beyond Apartheid*, Report of the Education Commission, Johannesburg, 1971, Chapter 5. (Spro-cas Publication 5).
64.   van der Horst, *op. cit*, p. 27.
65.   Professor Hansi Pollak, *Education for Progress*, South African Institute of Race Relations, 1971, p. 14.
66.   *Education beyond Apartheid*, *op. cit.* 1971, p. 25.
67.   Muriel Horrell, *Bantu Education to 1968*, South African Institute of Race Relations, Johannesburg, p. 55.
68.   *Education beyond Apartheid, op. cit.* p. 29.
69.   Muriel Horrell, *A Survey of Race Relations in South Africa - 1968*, South African Institute of Race Relations, 1968, p. 167.
70.   In a speech, Minister the Honourable T.E. Donges said that the application of the law would be 'based on justice' and that 'the object is achieved without recourse to discrimination between the various races', Hansard, Vol. 18, 7452.
71.   Muriel Horrell, *Survey of Race Relations*, 1969, p. 166.
72.   See L. Schlemmer, 'The Resettlement of Indians in Durban, and Some Economic, Social and Cultural effects on the Indian Community', in *The Indian South African*, South African Institute of Race Relations, 1966.
73.   For an enumeration of such restrictions see Muriel Horrell, *Legislation and Race Relations*, South African Institute of Race Relations, 1971.
74.   Readers are referred to: Peter Randall (Ed.), *Some Implications of Inequality*, Spro-cas No. 4, 1971; Franz Auerbach, *South Africa: A Fundamentally Unjust Society?*, South African Institute of Race Relations, 1970; Sheila van der Horst, *Progress and Retrogression in South Africa a Personal Appraisal*, South African Institute of Race Relations, 1971; Leo Marquard, *The Peoples and Policies of South Africa*, Oxford University Press, 1969, and *Who is my Neighbour*, the Lent Book of the Church of the Province in South Africa, 1971.
75.   For a full account of Mr van Wyk's address see *Race Relations News*, June, 1971, p. 5. For a complete description of all relevant laws see Muriel Horrell, *Legislation and Race Relations*, Institute of Race Relations, 1971.
76.   J.V.O. Reid: 'Malnutrition', in *Some Implications of Inequality*, 1971.
77.   See also L. Schlemmer: 'Factors Underlying Apartheid', in Peter Randall (Ed.); *Anatomy of Apartheid*, 1970, as well as the reference to the work of Heribert Adam: *Sud Afrika: Soziologie einer Rassengesellschaft*, Suhrkamp, 1969.
78.   See also Bill de Klerk, 'The Afrikaners', and Colin Gardner, 'The English-Speaking Whites' in Peter Randall (Ed.): *South Africa's Minorities*, Spro-cas, 1971.
79.   Cf. Moodie, *op. cit.* p. 4.
80.   *Ibid*, p. 351.
81.   See discussion of Christian National Education, Report of the Education Commission, *Education Beyond Apartheid*, Spro-cas, p. 86.
82.   A Cabinet Minister has stated that 'we now give judicial recognisance

of our expressed policy of *building our economy on migrant labour'*, *Financial Mail*, 19 July, 1968, p. 198.

83. For a summary of evidence on these issues see, inter alia, Robert Kraft, *op. cit.* L. Schlemmer, *Social Change and Political Policy in South Africa*, South African Institute of Race Relations, 1970, and the forthcoming Report of the Spro-cas Economics Commission.

84. Moodie, *op. cit.* p. 351.

85. For a discussion of these findings, see L. Schlemmer: *Social Change and Political Policy in South Africa:* 1970, *op. cit.*

86. L. Schlemmer: *Prestige of Occupations: A Critical Assessment* (forthcoming). A study based on a nation-wide sample of urban whites suggests that Afrikaans-speaking whites consistently assign greater importance to material values than English-speakers.

87. William Hudson, G.F. Jacobs and S. Biesheuvel, *Anatomy of South Africa*, Purnell & Sons, 1966, Chapter 4. *'What the People Say'*, *Natal Mercury*, 30 June 1969 and Public Opinion Poll conducted by Market Research Africa, reported inter alia in *Daily News*, 10 April, 1970. These studies have shown that, in general, a majority of whites disapprove of any more being spent in developing the homelands, particularly if it means any strain on the white taxpayer.

88. For a demonstration of the relationship between anti-African prejudice and hostility towards blacks and support for pro-Apartheid ideology, see H. Lever and O.J.M. Wagner, 'Urbanisation and the Afrikaner', *Race*, Vol. II, No. 2, 1969, pp. 183-188.

89. See summary of some trends in *Race Relations News*, Vol. 33, No. 5, May, 1971, pp. 4-5.

90. Robert Kraft, 'Labour: South Africa's Challenge of the 70's', *Optima*, March 1971, p. 5.

91. A nation-wide opinion poll suggests that roughly 84% of English-speaking whites and roughly 54% of Afrikaners approve of Africans being allowed to do more highly-skilled work than they are allowed to do at present. Market Research Africa, 'Public Opinion Survey', *Daily News*, 10 April, 1970.

92. For a discussion of the findings of recent opinion polls and other studies, see L. Schlemmer, 'Future Political Implications of Present Trends' in Peter Randall (Ed.): *Directions of Change in South African Politics*, 1971, p. 16. (Spro-cas Publication 3).

93. See *Sunday Times*, 21 February, 1971, p. 17.

94. For a full account of this issue see *Press Digest*, Nos. 31 and 32, 5 August 1971, and 12 August, 1971.

95. For an account of this issue see *Press Digest*, No. 29, 22 July, 1971.

96. Robert Molteno: 'The South African Election', in *South African Outlook*, July 1970.

97. For one indication of this, see Chief Kaiser Matanzima's stinging comments on the United Party policy as reported in the press, *Daily News*, 24 August, 1971.

98. See amplification in the concluding sections of Slabbert's chapter in this report.

QUALIFYING COMMENT BY PROF. N.J.J. OLIVIER

*Professor N.J.J. Olivier wants to state particularly that he believes
that evolution of the South African race relations problem has to be seen
in terms other than the conventional class approach, and that factors
such as a desire by the whites to maintain political control, at least in
respect of their own group, racial prejudice, colour consciousness, cul-
tural and other differences, in addition to the maintenance of a materially
privileged position, and also other factors, are major determinants in the
existence of the present pattern of race relations and race discrimination,
and of possible change in this pattern. He also feels that the policy of
separate development, as far as the economic and constitutional develop-
ment of the African homelands is concerned, has great potential in effect-
ing fundamental changes in the present pattern and does not share com-
pletely the doubts expressed in this Report on the implementation of this
policy. In general he wishes to state that he believes - despite the many
signs to the contrary - that attitudes are changing rapidly and that peace-
ful development to a more just society is possible, and even probable.*

SIGNATORIES TO THE REPORT OF THE SOCIAL COMMISSION

THE FOLLOWING MEMBERS of the Social Commission have signed the first chapter of the report to indicate their general agreement, whilst not necessarily endorsing every statement made in it. They signed in their personal capacities and not on behalf of any institution.

M. Gatsha Buthelezi	Chief Executive Officer of the Zululand Territorial Authority
L. Douwes Dekker	Assistant General Secretary, Industrial Council for the Clothing Industry
W.D. Hammond-Tooke	Professor and Head of the Department of Social Anthropology, University of the Witwatersrand
Anne Hope	education and training consultant
Bennie A. Khoapa	Secretary for African Work, South African National Council of YMCA's
H. Lever	Professor of Sociology, University of the Witwatersrand
N.J.J. Olivier	Professor in the Department of Bantu Law and Administration, University of Stellenbosch
James Polley	at present engaged in preparing a Ph.D dissertation in the Sociology of Religion
David Poynton	Director, Department of Education, Church of the Province of South Africa
Lawrence Schlemmer	Senior Research Fellow, Institute for Social Research, University of Natal
F. van Zyl Slabbert	Senior Lecturer, Department of Sociology, University of Stellenbosch
H.W. van der Merwe	Director, Abe Bailey Institute of Interracial Studies, University of Cape Town
H.L. Watts	Director, Institute for Social Research, University of Natal
M.G. Whisson	Senior Lecturer, School of African Studies, University of Cape Town

Chapter Two

CULTURAL AND ETHNIC POLITICS

f. van zyl slabbert

AN IDEOLOGY makes the world appear simpler than it is. It gives its adherents an interpretation of reality which 'makes sense'. It can also motivate them to act in a particular way and so help to create a feeling of solidarity between them. The significant thing about an ideology is that it attempts to 'explain' the real world and it consequently claims some sort of factual authority for its statements and assumptions. This authority is arrived at through the one-sided emphasis of a set of facts which then become the only 'harsh reality' in terms of which one should act.

While not inevitable, people usually explain or justify their actions in ideological terms. This is especially so in politics and that is why it is extremely important to find out what a political ideology says, what factual support it claims and for which purposes it is used. Apartheid is a political ideology, i.e. a belief system which gives an evaluative interpretation of South Africa in such a way that a desired state of affairs is presented as if it were largely a simple matter of fact. Its supporters claim that it is based on the 'hard realities' of the South African way of life and that is why it is obviously correct.

Before giving an analysis of apartheid one point should be made clear. A political ideology is but one element in the political machinery available to those who govern. An ideology is never the only reason why a particular government is in power, especially if it attains power through an electoral process in which it has to compete with other parties for votes. Voters who elect a government do so for a number of reasons: some because they simply favour the *status quo*; others because of real material advantages;

still others through force of traditions; and a few, perhaps, because they firmly believe in the ideology professed by those who govern them. Conversely, those who govern cannot simply implement the wishes of all the individuals and interest groups who support them. Some groups are more important than others at different periods. It is, however, when those who govern try to account for what they have done and why, that a political ideology begins to take shape. This ideology may be more or less coherent, more or less plausible, and the number of people who support it can vary from circumstance to circumstance and in their own strategic importance. Whatever the case may be, a government without an ideology is rather like an unclothed person - not always very attractive to look at. To analyse apartheid as an ideology is, in a sense, to strip a garment from South Africa that covers some important vital statistics.

THE MAIN COMPONENTS OF THE IDEOLOGY

The apartheid ideology has three major components related to three major areas of legislative and administrative activity. They can be labelled: A. separation, B. separate development and C. homeland development *(1)*, and although they are closely interwoven in practice, their logical explication and ideological synthesis is much more problematical and in some instances contradictory.

A. Separation

This component concerns the separation between white and black in as many spheres of contact as possible. Some of this separation is 'traditional', but most of it flows from legal and administrative compulsion. Familiar laws in this area concern separate amenities, mixed marriages, 'immorality', job reservation etc. It is in this area where most of the more blatant and sensational racial discrimination occurs. The function of the ideology is to explain why, for example, whites and non-whites cannot attend the same cinemas and why a white man cannot ask a black man to join him for dinner at an hotel. It is obvious that eloquent phrases like multi-nationalism, *veelvolkigheid* and group identities cannot reasonably be used to justify or explain these occurrences. Here are straightforward incidents of white and non-white persons, irrespective of their group or ethnic affiliation, receiving differential privilege simply because of skin colour. It is also in this area where proponents for apartheid can become most apologetic and vulnerable, and concede the harsh side of apartheid or 'petty apartheid', sometimes promising that when 'real apartheid' has been given a chance to develop much of this separation for the sake of separation will disappear.

But why is all this necessary now? This question brings the ideology

into play. Separation, it is argued, is necessary because it helps to maintain order and avoid friction *(2)* between the races. Why will there be disorder and friction if there is no separation? Because white and non-whites both have long histories of prejudice and antagonism towards one another which will flare up if they mix too freely with one another.

Another important reason given is that without separation the white man cannot survive, because with miscegenation his offspring will become coloured, *or* with free movement of non-whites into all areas the 'Western way of life' cannot be maintained. (The negative side of the survival argument is the *swart gevaar* scare used so effectively at election time).

Surprisingly enough the ideological arguments in this component of apartheid mostly focus on the *individual.* The law does not say that a *Xhosa* shall not use the facilities of an *Afrikaans* hotel but simply that a *non-white* person shall not use the facilities of a *white* hotel. In the separation component of apartheid as an ideology the ethnic group membership of the individual is strictly speaking irrelevant. ``'

B. Separate Development

The component of separate development in the ideology is intended to stress that the primary objective of the policy is not to keep the whites in a position of superiority or privilege, or necessarily to keep white and non-white apart, but to assist the various non-white groups to develop, albeit along 'separate lines', to political maturity, with satisfaction of their material needs and fuller enjoyment of the fruits of the industrialised society. Relevant legislative measures are, for example, those pertaining to Coloured Affairs, Indian Affairs, Development Corporations, Homeland Areas and separate educational departments.

The ideology has to explain why all this development in separation is necessary, which it does with the familiar barrage of apartheid jargon: multi-nationalism, cultural diversity, ethno-national collectivity etc.

Reduced to its barest essentials, the ideological argument runs: in South Africa you have the Zulus, Xhosas, Afrikaners, etc. Each of these terms represents distinct collective cultural identities, or separate 'ethno-national' collectivities each with a particular set of values, needs and way of life. Therefore a political and/or geographical situation must be manipulated so that each 'ethno-national unit' can live out its own aspirations. It is a matter of historical convenience that the English and Afrikaners show a great deal of 'cultural homogeneity' and can therefore be regarded as the 'white ethno-national unit'. As such they are the dominant *(3)* ethno-national unit occupying 87% of the land and all its resources and by means of which they can live out their own distinctive way of life. There are of course two minority groups, the Coloureds and Indians, also living mainly on this 87% of the land, but they are special

cases which will receive proper attention once the major problem is settled. The 'major problem' is the development of the ethno-national areas of black tribes so that they can live out their collective identities in 'their own areas'. By historical convenience it so happens that these areas are located in the remaining 13% of the country.

Apologists for separate development can, and do, present this argument with a remarkable degree of logical sophistication. The basic assumptions are linked in the following ways:

(a) The concept nation refers to a culturally homogeneous entity.

(b) A culturally homogeneous entity has a collective identity which is reflected in values, needs and way of life.

(c) The concepts Tswanas, Zulus, Xhosas, Indians, etc. are synonymous with collective identity.

(d) Therefore in South Africa you have, in principle, different nations.

(e) Different nations have different aspirations.

(f) Therefore different nations cannot co-exist within one institutional framework.

(g) In order to avoid a conflict of aspirations, different institutional frameworks have to be created in which different nations can live out their aspirations.

In this component of the apartheid ideology, in distinction to the separation component, all the arguments focus on the *group* and not the *individual*. (Even to the extent that the prime minister can say that '.... the National Party has never said that it is its policy to deny the human dignity of other nation groups'. *(Die Burger* 6/9/71). The point that is argued is, of course, that South Africa has a cultural problem and not a racial one.

C. *Homeland Development*

This component of the ideology falls quite comfortably within the rationale of separate development, from which it is distinguished by two additional factors.

The first is geographical: within the 13% of the land that 'belongs' to them the different tribes have their own homelands, which provide a geographical basis for the political and constitutional development of all the black people of South Africa. Within these areas they are supposed to realise their national and political aspirations. No such area exists for the Coloured and Indian people and they will have to develop separately in a different way than the African ethnic groups. This point is important, because, in terms of the ideology, the absence of a consolidated geo-

graphical area does not invalidate the idea of separate development - it only makes its implementation more difficult. On the other hand separate homeland development falls within the idea of separate development and is more concrete because there are these different tribal areas. Some Afrikaner Nationalists are toying with the idea of creating a 'coloured homeland' somewhere, but at present the policy for Coloureds and Indians is 'parallel development' - a variant of separate development. The position can be presented schematically:

Separate Development:

> *(a)   Homeland Development*
>
> (Africans with geographical units)
>
> *(b)   Parallel Development*
>
> (Coloureds and Indians with no geographical unit)

The second factor distinguishing homeland development from separate development in general is the position of the urban African which an intricate network of legislation makes unique. Because of the geographical basis of the 'homeland policy' those urban blacks who are not migrant workers or foreigners are defined into being 'permanently absent citizens' of the homelands. If one asks, for example, why the urban African cannot own property in urban areas and why high schools for Africans are preferably built in the rural areas and not the urban areas, the ideological answer is that the urban black man is a 'temporary' visitor selling his labour, and his full potential as a citizen can only be realised in his own homeland. There his 'true identity' can be preserved.

THE INADEQUACIES OF APARTHEID

When an attempt is made to relate these components of apartheid logically, certain contradictions become apparent as will be shown presently. Despite this, however, these components are intimately related in practice; for example, the 'separate development' of different groups seems more practical because there is separation between the races. Similarly 'homeland development' cannot practically be brought about to the extent that it is without separation or separate development. It is not self-evident, however, why racial separation should be related to cultural diversity: if we do not have a multi-racial problem but a 'multi-national' one, why is enforced separation of the races necessary at all?

Because of the close practical links between the various components

of the ideology it helps a great deal to identify the level of ideological justification being presented for apartheid. Within one argument a proponent can present justifications for separation and/or separate development and/or homeland development, and the quality of his appeal is substantially different depending on the level at which he is talking. Some of the ideological justifications for each of the components of apartheid have already been referred to. A closer look highlights some of the major inadequacies of apartheid as an ideology.

'Separation is necessary because it prevents friction'

It is argued that in the absence of separation, friction or conflict is inevitable because of the strong feelings of prejudice, ignorance and the racial stereotypes that members of the different race groups have towards one another. If, however, prejudice, ignorance or stereotypes are sources of potential friction or conflict then it would seem unwise to reinforce these through legislative measures. The basic question directed at all separation measures of apartheid is: What contribution does a particular measure make towards diminishing race prejudice or ignorance? If it makes none then it can only contribute towards eventual friction or conflict. The potential for conflict between the different race groups is very real and threatening. The question is not whether there will be conflict or no conflict, but rather what the intensity of the friction or conflict will be. Is localised structured conflict in limited sectors of our social life not more manageable than, and preferable to, a situation of polarised unstructured large scale conflict? Is the perhaps painful adjustment process in a work situation where attempts are made not to discriminate in terms of salary, authority and facilities (a situation of localised interpersonal conflict) not more controllable and in the long run more educative than one that polarises antagonisms and reinforces stereotypes throughout society? Can legislative measures not be used as effectively to combat prejudice and ignorance as to promote it?

If the answers to some of these questions are in the affirmative then the ideological justification for apartheid's separation component is not very convincing. By saying this one is in effect asking: What is the real reason for the separation between white and black? What does this separation mean for white and black respectively? What is the price to be paid for the absence of friction promised by separation? Would it not be more realistic and honest to admit that a number of legislative measures have been inherited and created which patently structure privileges to the advantage of the whites, rather than piously to justify them on the grounds that they prevent conflict? In the last analysis it becomes a choice between the type of conflict that will arise when a more equitable sharing of these privileges is brought about, and the type of conflict that could

arise when it is attempted to withold these privileges indefinitely. A more disturbing question is, of course, whether we still have this option.

'Separation between white and black is necessary for the white man to survive'

There are two types of 'survival' implied in this justification, biological and cultural.

(a)   Biological survival is often given as the justification for the Mixed Marriages Act and the Immorality Act. The fear of miscegenation is strong and irrational in white politics in South Africa. In all societies the sexual act is usually performed by consenting partners: where consent is lacking the law in some form or other intervenes. However, in relation to sexual/racial separation in South Africa it is thought that somehow (for to spell out the technicalities involved simply overwhelms the imagination) there exists a danger that the white race might disappear genetically if there were no laws to prohibit sexual intercourse between members of different race groups. While it is easy to ridicule the idea of a massive non-white sexual assault on the white man, the argument becomes somewhat more sophisticated when the idea of 'cultural survival' is linked to it.

(b)   The problem of the cultural survival of the 'white group' is riddled with ambiguities and confusion. The separation laws of apartheid imply that the whites, as members of a race group, have a particular contribution to make to political, economic and social development in South Africa and that this contribution is directly related to their cultural values. These values are often collectively referred to as 'white culture', 'Western Civilisation', 'Christianity in South Africa' etc. Separation laws ('unfortunately') are necessary to protect this unique cultural contribution, for without them the white man's culture would disappear.

This argument with its apparently strong logical (and emotive) appeal, covers a host of unexamined and questionable premises. However, if it is accepted as a valid justification for separation then peaceful or evolutionary change in South Africa becomes impossible. Separation structures privileges in favour of the whites: if these privileges are desired by blacks and their denial is a pre-condition for white presence in and contribution to South Africa, then the white man will have to go before the black man can have them. To know whether this argument is substantiated by facts however, one would have to know what is meant by terms such as 'White culture'. 'Western Civilisation' etc., within the South African context.

This would require a long and independent analysis but if, inter alia, these terms imply that the majority of white families should be able to employ poorly paid non-white domestic servants to do the household chores and help to socialise the children; that white children should go to better schools and universities than black children; that the white entrepreneur should have exclusive rights to obtain property and invest capital in the most profitable industrial sites and have a sufficient supply of unskilled or semi-skilled non-white labour that cannot effectively organise itself; that only whites should have freedom of access to the best facilities and institutions for their pleasure, education and careers - then the whole argument of 'cultural survival' becomes a tautology. Because then separation is not a pre-condition for the survival of 'white culture', but lies at the very heart of the culture itself. Ironically, this is about the only intellectually defensible meaning that the term 'white culture' can have as distinct from, say, Afrikaner, Jewish or German, culture. For 'white culture' does not simply demand separation for its survival, it *is* separation in everyday operation.

It is possible, however, to argue differently. One can identify a particular cultural value of a particular group, for example, the Afrikaners, and ask how this value is effectively protected by separation. The onus is on those who claim this to be the case to demonstrate it, for it is not self-evident. Part of this demonstration will most definitely entail a convincing spelling out of the defining cultural characteristics of, say, the Afrikaners vis-a-vis the English. This draws attention to the whole question of *'collective identity' which is the basis of the cultural diversity justification* for apartheid.

'Separate Development is necessary because of Cultural Diversity in South Africa' or 'because we have a multi-national situation in South Africa, Separate Development is necessary'.

At the heart of this argument lies a particular conception of what constitutes an 'ethnic group' or 'a nation'. The problems involved apply to both concepts so that only one need to be referred to for illustrative purposes. The basic issue is: How can one identify an Afrikaner, Xhosa, Jew or Zulu? The question presupposes, of course, that some 'collective identity' is shared by people referred to as Afrikaners, Xhosas etc. and that this 'collective identity' becomes the defining characteristic of an ethnic group.

The conventional social scientific way of describing an ethnic group used to be in terms of its kinship structures, associational patterns, language, economic processes and forms of political organisation. From this description 'a way of life' was deduced which was seen as typical

of any member belonging to that ethnic community. This type of definition is usually called an *objective* one in the sense that irrespective of the wishes, wants or awareness of a number of people displaying common social characteristics they are *defined* as belonging to a particular social category. This type of conception of an ethnic group has proved to be inadequate because it is possible for a number of persons to have common objective characteristics without being aware of this or without these characteristics being responsible for them acting as a distinctive group. At most these common characteristics can help to identify a number of people who could develop a particular type of ethnic awareness. The additional defining characteristic is then a *process of identification with cultural goals or values on the part of members of a group*. These group values can be concerned with preserving certain religious, language or kinship traditions or a combination of these. The point is that the members of an *ethnic group must not only be defined by others as such but must be aware of their own identification with definable cultural group goals or values*.

Obviously the existence of such ethnic groups in any society determines the degree of cultural diversity or homogeneity to be found and in this sense South Africa undoubtedly displays a great deal of cultural diversity. However, when the existence of such cultural diversity becomes the prime justification for enforcing a policy of separate development a host of almost impossible situations arise.

For one, it is impossible officially or legally to determine or hold constant: (a) the degree of ethnic identification or awareness of people in a society, and (b) the content of ethnic group goals pursued by them. This is another way of saying that it is impossible to legislate people into an unchanging ethnic awareness.

An Afrikaans-speaking person need not necessarily be an 'Afrikaner' if this requires a conscious striving to maintain definable group values. It is, moreover, not self-evident what the group goals of the 'Afrikaner' are. There may be a number of groups amongst Afrikaans-speaking people who regard themselves as 'true Afrikaners' and who mutually define each other out of the fold. This need not be surprising as it happens with any number of people having common 'objective' characteristics and from amongst who ethnic groups develop that try to draw membership boundaries in terms of commitment to common goals and values.

It does become embarrassing, however, when ethnic group membership becomes the basis for political administration as is implied in the separate development component of the apartheid ideology. In the case of the 'Afrikaners' as an ethnic group, contradictions reveal themselves. No particular institutional, economic or political privileges are legally reserved for them as members of the white ethnic group vis-a-vis other

white ethnic groups. In fact the objective social characteristic of 'whiteness' appears to be sufficient grounds for the apartheid ideologies to presume the existence of a common 'white cultural identity'. But surely such a position implies the absence of cultural diversity amongst white South Africans. If it does not, then why is the principle of cultural diversity in the separate development component not operative for whites in the same way as for non-whites? Why should a 'Xhosa identity' be preserved in a different fashion than an Afrikaner, or English, or Jewish, or Portugese 'identity'. What are the common elements in the 'white cultural identity' which make it possible for whites to share political, social and economic institutions without necessarily losing awareness of white ethnic differences, whereas it appears that this cannot in any way be possible with non-white ethnic groups? Is the principle of cultural diversity as applied in separate development a sophisticated justification for instituting a policy of divide-and-rule amongst non-whites?

A second major problem is that when 'cultural diversity' is used in this fashion as a basis for political dispensation, *ethnic* group membership is reified as the only important basis for group formation in a modernising society. Such a position must inevitably come into conflict with the major processes of change that occur during industrialisation or modernisation. These processes, such as urbanisation, differentiation of labour, proliferation of organisations and specialisation in education and training, create many possibilities for group formation based on common interests that do not necessarily touch on ethnic group interests. In fact ethnic membership is often subordinate to other interests. Thus an Afrikaner businessman does not associate with or employ only Afrikaners. He does not live in only Afrikaans residential areas, nor belong to purely Afrikaans sports clubs, voluntary associations etc. His involvement in the differentiated structure of an industrialised society is manifested in his multiple group membership where a diversity of interests and needs is satisfied. Once again, in terms of the separate development component of the apartheid ideology, this is not allowed for the non-white. As far as possible a Xhosa-speaking man is compelled to live in a Xhosa residential area; to attend a Xhosa educational institution; to make use of 'Xhosa opportunities' for occupational mobility; to exercise his political rights in a Xhosa homeland. But, of course, more than half of the Xhosa-speaking people do not actually live in the Xhosa homeland. In fact a great many of them live in highly industrialised urban settings where they are exposed to the same pressures for multiple group membership as any other person in similar circumstances. Is it not possible that the non-whites in urban areas can also become members of groups where ethnic membership becomes subordinate to other important and different group interests? Why presume a more inflexible ethnic awareness on their part?

If one can talk about a 'white culture' based on structured privileges, why can one not consider a 'black culture' based on structured deprivation?

'Homeland Development is necessary to preserve the identity of the ethnic groups in South Africa'

Speaking at the Republic festival in Guguletu, Cape Town, the Minister of Bantu Administration and Development, Mr M.C. Botha, said: 'During the past 10 years South Africa has become much more aware of its different nations *(volke)*. Every person lives within the context of such a nation *(volksverband)*. And even if many Xhosas work in Cape Town, they still remain members of the Xhosa nation. The governments (sic) of the Xhosa do everything within their power to strengthen the ties amongst the Xhosa and every Xhosa should do everything within his power to maintain contact. Although the festival focusses attention on South Africa, it also reminds us that everyone belongs to some or other nation. Every nation has its own character, language, traditions and history. That is why every nation also has its own future' *(4)*.

The following statement by the Prime Minister is also reported *(5)*. 'The National Party's position of multi-nationhood *(veelvolkigheid)* is the only one that can preserve white identity. And what the white man demands for himself he is also prepared to grant to any other nation *(volksgroep)* in South Africa: maintenance of its own identity'.

These two statements highlight an important paradox in the apartheid ideology. Note the distinction that is drawn between 'a Xhosa nation' and 'a white nation'. In the former a *volk* has a strong ethnic basis based on common 'character, language, traditions and history'; in the latter *volk* has a racial basis, namely 'whiteness'. The ethnic principle therefore does not operate for the whites. The reason given is that traditionally the whites have occupied the same territory whereas the Xhosas, Zulus, Tswanas etc., have their own historical areas of occupation. These areas are the homelands where the different black ethnic groups can develop to their full potential.

Most of the queries and arguments mentioned with regard to separate development in general apply to this view. However, additional questions arise: Is it possible for citizens of the homelands to develop to their full potential if roughly half of them do not live there? To what extent can political independence or sovereignty have any significance when the homelands are not geographically consolidated? For example, 2,135,448 Zulus live on 29 pieces of homeland; 610,528 Tswanas on nineteen; 100,181 Lebowas on three; 2,206,691 Transkeians and Ciskeians on nineteen (two Transkeian and 17 Ciskeian); 144,060 Basotho Ka Borwas on one; 251,235 Vendas on three; 112,020 Swazis on three; 392,910 Machanganas on four *(6)*. Why does racial discrimination still obtain in remain

the homelands and for how long? For example, how many Xhosa municipalities are there in the Transkei? Can a Xhosa minister go into any hotel or restaurant in the Transkei? How many Xhosa members are there on the Xhosa Development Corporation?

Great attention has recently been given by the main white political parties to the *de facto* existence of future independent homelands and to the need to accept them as such. This should not confuse one into thinking that the homeland policy is 'working' according to its ideological tenets. To what extent can one reasonably expect that the homeland policy is helping to preserve the 'identity' of the different black ethnic groups when there are more Africans than whites in South Africa's 'white' urban areas? Of South Africa's more than 15 million Africans, more than eight million live outside the homelands - of these 4,410,429 live in urban areas and 3,650,344 live in rural areas (7). Is it not rather that the Africans outside the homelands are making a substantial contribution towards preserving 'white identity' as discussed earlier on?

SOME CONSEQUENCES OF THE APARTHEID IDEOLOGY

A political ideology is a belief system which interprets a state of affairs and formulates goals for its adherents. The justifications used in the ideology then serve to 'explain' why certain policies have to be implemented. These justifications can have a purely religious nature based on principles of dogma, or they may simply be related to explicit value preferences. Sometimes, however, as was pointed out above, they purport to be generalisations or predictions about conditions in society. Thus we found justifications such as: because of friction separation is necessary; because of cultural diversity separate development is necessary etc. The preceding analysis has tried to point out some of the inadequacies in these justifications. The most important general criticism was not that these justifications have no relation whatsoever to conditions in South Africa, but that they select and emphasise certain aspects to the exclusion of others to such an extent that they become the only justification for certain policies.

Very much the same type of analysis could be done with regard to other ideological interpretations of South Africa, for example the common society ideal; a Marxist or Socialist interpretation: the Progressive or United Party 'plan for South Africa' etc. However, the apartheid ideology is the dominant one and is used by those who wield power. It is an operative ideology in the sense that events are structured and manipulated and justified in terms of its ideals. Irrespective of whether these ideals are realised or realisable one can try to see the consequences that result from attempts to apply apartheid.

One of the most striking and important consequences is the pervasive

awareness of *racial* differences in virtually all spheres of societal acti-
vity. Despite attempts on the part of the present government to bring
about pluralistic institutions, for example homeland areas, legislative
assemblies for blacks, representative councils, differential education
departments etc., the *de facto* situation, in terms of effective control
over the decisions and distribution of facilities, draws all the different
population groups into common political, economic and social structures.
Relative to the rewards offered in these structures 'whiteness' becomes
synonymous with privilege and 'non-whiteness' with deprivation. On
both sides of this basic division these are still groups with varying
degrees of ethnic awareness, but in terms of actual participation in the
institutional framework of South Africa, this is largely irrelevant. A
Xhosa does not generally stand a better chance than a Zulu of getting
to the top and an Afrikaner stands just as good a chance as an English-
man of getting there. This is basically so because Xhosas and Zulus are
black and Afrikaners and English are white. No matter how proponents
of apartheid may execute intellectual somersaults to deny this fact,
racialism is built into the implementation of their policy.

From the above follows a second important consequence. This is that
race or racialism cannot be ignored or wished away in politics or future
political development in South Africa. All opposition parties - white as
well as black - and other bodies opposed to apartheid will have to take
race and racialism very seriously indeed. This is so because structures
have been created that will increasingly operate on a racial basis. Con-
ceding that the present government will be in power for the foreseeable
future, institutional structures like the homeland authorities and the
Coloured Persons Representative Council will be given increasingly
symbolic or formal recognition, and will in terms of the consequence
mentioned above serve as platforms for mobilising support and loyalties
in terms of racial awareness and not primarily ethnic awareness. This
means that group politics as opposed to individual political participation
will increasingly become more significant in South Africa. The most im-
portant groups will be those in the homeland areas, different urban African
groups, and the Coloureds and Asians vis-a-vis the 'white group'. Multi-
racial interaction may still be functional on a social or friendship level
but as a basis for effective political bargaining it stands a very slim
chance indeed. It may well be that ethnic awareness within the non-white
groups may be differentially operative for some time to come, but all of
them have the common characteristic of standing on the deprived side
when competing for rewards and facilities vis-a-vis the white group, and
their demands are basically the same no matter where they are in the
social structure, i.e. more opportunities, more property, more education,
more power. Before they can compete with one another for these rewards

they have to compete with the whites. The platforms for articulating these demands are created by those who implement apartheid as an ideology. Although these platforms may not have effective power, they do provide some political and bureaucratic sophistication as well as a greater degree of freedom and legality for protesting against deprivation. These platforms also set the stage for a long and no doubt acrimonious process of collective bargaining on the future of South Africa. It seems that the whites have kept race in the centre of South African politics for too long. Now the proponents of apartheid have finally created the setting in which the blacks will respond to that challenge.

FOOTNOTES:

1. I am indebted to Prof. N.J.J. Olivier for these distinctions although my particular use of them is my own responsibility.
2. D. de Villiers: *The Case for South Africa,* Tom Stacey Ltd. 1970, p. 85.
3. N.J. Rhoodie: *Apartheid and Partnership,* Academica, Pretoria, 1966, p. 125.
4. *Die Burger* 1/6/71.
5. *Die Burger* 8/9/71.
6. Statistics provided by the Minister of Statistics in the Assembly and reported in *The Argus* 25/9/71.
7. Ibid.

Chapter Three

SOCIAL ORGANISATIONS
AND CHANGE

m.g. whisson

A MODEL of the inter-relations between the various institutions which make up a total social system is given in the diagram below *(1)*. In theory the number of institutions and the number of individuals playing roles within them could be multiplied until some approximation could be reached to a live society. But such is the complexity of the modern state that it would be impossible to construct an approximation to South Africa, and even if such were possible, the model would still be inadequate to explain behaviour or even to describe a society which has intimate links with the rest of the world of a personal, structural, positive or negative sort. The purpose of the model is to supply us with a number of hints as to the areas within institutions and within the society as a whole that we may search for indications of change, or of tensions whose solution must result in some sort of change.

General value system - expressed in religion, myth and ideology

Specific Institution

Charter

Norms Role

Ego

Norms Role

Charter

Specific Institution

Function

Function

Role conflicts

Action

Action

Material environment - including man as a biological element

In the ideal static system, there is consistency within the system of values, from which each institution in the society draws its specific justification and purpose. Even if the myths and rules which form the basis of, for example, the family are not wholly consistent with those which form the basis of the school, they do not positively conflict and it is possible for an individual to operate in both institutions without feeling an ideological conflict. Each institution is thus related at one level to all other institutions by virtue of their drawing from and contributing to a system of consistent values.

Each institution has a measure of autonomy, having its own charter or idealised statement of its ultimate goals and rationale for its continued existence, its own norms or behavioural rules, its own combination of roles, its own peculiar demands upon the material resources available to the society, and its own activities directed at achieving the goals set out in the charter.

Institutions are linked with each other not only through their involvement in a common system of values, but also through their personnel who play a number of roles in different institutions, and through the demands which they make upon the material resources available to the community. In the ideal static society there are either no role conflicts, or else there are institutional means whereby conflicts are resolved in a consistent manner, i.e. that the norms for the individual playing certain roles are modified in a manner accepted and understood within the society. Further, the individual is not pressed, either by the norms of the roles that he plays, or by the acceptable compromises that he makes as a result of his multiple roles, to behave in a manner inconsistent with the general values of the society.

Finally, in the static system, the consumption of natural resources is either so slow that no significant difference is made to the availability of the resources, or nature replenishes that which is consumed.

Unless all the above conditions are fulfilled, a society must undergo a process of social change. It is probable that such conditions have never existed in any society for more than a very short period of time, but in a society such as South Africa today, virtually none of the variables are stable. Changes are taking place in the general system of values - if indeed such a system can be said to exist at all - in the roles and combinations of roles being played by individuals, and in the availability of natural resources to the various institutions in existence. Further, new institutions are being developed which will play their own part in the process of change.

It is pertinent therefore to enquire of each of the major institutions within South Africa how it contributes to and derives from a common system of values, what role conflicts are created for those who participate

in it and in other institutions (e.g. the civil service and the Anglican church), and what impact it is having on the material base of the country. Where conflicts are implicit or experienced by the actors, there is scope for resolution in the direction of the defined goals. The goals in this instance may be summarised as a society ruled by christian principles of justice; freedom of opportunity and association; the freely expressed consent of the majority to the government in office; and a greater measure of economic equality than prevails at present.

THE FORMAL STRUCTURE

(a) *Parliament and the Government*

In a sense, all other institutions in South Africa are subordinate to the authority of parliament in that laws are made applicable to all people and all institutions, as well as specifically to certain groups and institutions. It is within the power of parliament to amend the constitution and to invalidate any decision made by the judiciary through retrospective legislation, to suspend all civil rights through a declaration of emergency and to by-pass the courts in order to deal with those whom it considers to be its enemies. But while this is the case, the government through its control of parliament, does not in fact exercise absolute power, and in some areas its control is weaker than in others. A part of the value system general to most of the electorate includes the concession of certain freedoms by the state to the individual and to other institutions. To justify the removal or the reduction of such freedoms it is necessary to demonstrate or allege convincingly some greater evil that might follow if the freedoms were not limited.

While it is important to appreciate the scope available to those who would attempt to alter the social structure of South Africa through various other means, it is vital to recognise the power of parliament and those to whom parliament has delegated power. Peaceful change of the kind sought by Spro-cas can only be achieved through the control of the supreme instrument of power. Other citadels of influence and secondary power may be seen as tactical goals, points from which an assault can be launched with some hopes of success, or as institutions linked to parliament by the means indicated in the model (ideologically, through personal links and role conflicts and through material interests or competition).

Although the government, the executive arm of parliament, is supreme, and has demonstrated its willingness to reject traditional checks upon its power when dealing with its enemies (e.g. the Terrorism Act) and with matters of policy to which its attaches great importance (e.g. the delegation of power to the Minister to organise the constitutional development of the Bantustans without reference to parliament for approval), the very breadth of its power involves it in dealings with other institutions

which possess some autonomy and which are in a position to influence it.

(b)   Political Parties

The most direct influence on parliament is exercised by the political parties, roughly in proportion to their representation in it, but with a disproportionate bonus of power to the largest party if it has an over-all majority. Party-policy makers are not necessarily ranked in the same hierarchy as formal office-holders in parliament and in the government, and when the party in power is representative of sectional interests e.g. white Afrikaners, then there is always the possibility of conflict between the interests of the section and the interests of the government which may need more than the support (or acquiescence) of its principle supporter in order to survive. Conflicts of interest between the rank and file of the party and the local party officials on the one hand, and the leadership in parliament and in the cabinet are a crucial area for study by the political scientists. At present there seem to be at least three mutually incompatible concepts being balanced by the leadership of the party, each having its own considerable body of support from within the party and from a large section of the electorate outside the National Party. There is the ideological section, pressing for 'separate development' along the broad lines laid down by Verwoerd, involving a series of virtually autonomous states on a theoretically ethnic basis. There is the pragmatic section which demands that the ideological programme be subordinate to the economic interests of the country as a whole and to their own interests in particular. There is the traditionalist section, represented to some extent by the H.N.P. but with a large following in the National Party, which still appears to dream of isolation and 'baaskap', as suspicious of the development of independent states around or within South Africa as it is of other 'modern' developments like high-rise apartments, big business and 'permissiveness'. Since one of the most urgent demands of the white electorate is for strong and stable government, division and uncertainty within the dominant political party is a serious handicap at election time.

The demand for strong stable government from the white electorate and the divisions within the National Party might be seen as an opportunity for the United Party to gain support and even power, although it too has its divisions and rarely projects an image of strength of purpose to compare with even the divided National Party.

A political party is *par excellence* an institution whose purpose is to achieve or hold political power. In order to do this its links with other institutions must be very close at the ideological level in that it must be felt by the electorate to express in its charter and policies their own values and aspirations. Charismatic leadership may mould an electorate

to some extent so that it will support the person of a leader whom it trusts despite some divergence between his goals for society and its goals. Shrewd political leadership may further gain the tacit support of the electorate for policies which do not reflect mass aspirations by the organisation of a 'packet' of policies which, as a packet is more attractive than the alternative packets being offered by other parties. This latter situation is what actually occurs in party politics and forms the basis for the often uneasy alliances of interest within parties which are thus held together by the necessity for compromise if victory is to be gained.

The foregoing suggests a number of alternative propositions if the goal of control of parliament is to be achieved, which goal is the *sine qua non* for fundamental change outside of violent revolution.

1. A political party must be formed to attempt to persuade the electorate to support a programme of change, *or*/and

2. An existing political party must have its direction altered towards a programme of change, in the context of a packet of policies which will express the values and aspirations of the electorate, *or*/and

3. A charismatic leader within a new or existing party must capture the imagination and support of the electorate for a policy of change, *or*/and

4. By the education, conversion or coercion of the electorate a climate of opinion (values, aspirations and fears) must be created within which the policies of all the parties will be compelled to change in the desired direction if they are to gain support.

Ultimately, the fourth alternative is the crucial one, as changes in the programmes of the existing parties, however well they may be organised, can only succeed if they either command the support of the electorate or the party in power is prepared to deny the electorate its constitutional rights until it has forced through its programme. Such a denial of rights would appear to be a means unacceptable to the attainment of the Sprocas goals, even if it became a possibility.

The rest of this paper will consider the position of other institutions and unstructured groups in relation to their influence on the electorate and the political parties and hence their potential for change within the whole society.

(c)   The Public Service

The government itself is by far the largest employer in South Africa, and if the various statutory bodies, state sponsored industries and educational institutions which depend for their existence upon its support

are added, it exercises considerable economic control over a significant proportion of the electorate. Where the authority of the state is fairly direct, discriminatory wages are paid and there is a strong tendency to favour whites over non-whites (electorate over non-electorate) regardless of individual merit. As this is known and understood within the public service, there is an immense pressure of self-interest upon the employees as *individuals* to support the party which can be relied upon to maintain discrimination to the advantage of the electorate employees. Such pressure is presumably strongest among those sections of the white state employees who are least confident of their ability to compete on an equal basis with members of the non-electorate.

However, the tendency among the upper echelons of the public service can and should be documented rather than argued. A study of 'elites' in South Africa [2] has shown that an overwhelming majority of respondents from the Civil Service support the National Party, which at that time was most determined to maintain discriminatory salary and wage scales in the public service. It has been argued that the reason for the predominance of Afrikaners and Nationalists in the upper echelons of the public service and the military (including the police force) is that Afrikaners of ability were denied equal opportunities in the private sphere due to English prejudice until perhaps twenty years ago and so tended to make their careers in the public service where there was less discrimination and less demand for posts from the English sector. It is also to be expected that the government in power, other things being equal, will favour for promotion men who will carry out its policies from conviction rather than from a sense of duty alone. Over the past two decades this would have worked to the advantage of the Afrikaner Nationalist.

A further problem arises in the consideration of the public service as an institution for the promotion of change. Recruitment to the middle and upper ranks of the service from the universities is likely to be rare in the case of people with liberal Christian views, as the policies that must be carried out by such officers in the public service are unlikely to appeal to such people.

The size of the public service and hence its influence on the economy as a whole and wage scales in particular, the determination of the National Party to maintain discriminatory scales for as long as it is in office, and the apparent acceptance in government of the primacy of political over economic considerations in the management of its affairs all serve to create and maintain a large body of conservative electoral support for *apartheid*. Ideological commitment, self-interest of the individual employees in their capacity as voters and traditional 'impartiality' make the public service a powerful institution unlikely to promote change in the direction of Spro-cas goals.

(d) The Judiciary

One aspect of the public service which merits special mention is the judiciary. Although appointed by the state, the judiciary has a traditionally independent position. Historically one role of the courts in the changing South African scene has been to set limits on the arbitrary exercise of power by the executive, at least until the powers of the state have been legally and unambiguously defined. The majority of the 'elite' in the judiciary who responded to questions about political affiliation expressed preference for the National Party but it would be very difficult to prove that their ideological commitment has affected their legal judgements. Indeed, the erosion of the citizen's right to appeal to the courts in political matters would suggest that the state has not found the courts to be a reliable ally in its battle with its political opponents. However, the judiciary cannot be seen as an institution promoting, or liable to promote, change in South Africa. In this it differs in its constitutional relationship to parliament from the position of the American Supreme Court. Its value to the liberal Christian must be seen in terms of what it is and the part that it can and should play in a just society. Any erosion of respect for the courts, however justified it might appear to be in the short term due to the legal diminution of their powers, is in the long run an erosion of an institution vital to the smooth running of a just society.

(e) Occupational Groupings

Occupational groupings form a series of institutions which interlock closely with the dominant political institutions. Where, as in most cases, the occupational organisations are white dominated each member of the group is also a member or potential member of the electorate. The organisations also make a major contribution to the general body of values within South African society as a whole and thus indirectly contribute to the dominant values within the political structures. Finally, as indicated by the model, they compete with each other and the state for the material resources of the country, both those which they need in order to operate, and those which they produce for use and profit. It is within the occupational groupings, dominated as many tend to be by economic considerations, that some observers have perceived the greatest potential for peaceful change in a liberal direction. As has been argued in the peculiar case of the public service however, the self-interest of the voters, even when interpreted strictly in economic terms, does not necessarily drive them in the direction of liberalising the economy. The threat of competition from abler non-voters, even the rational calculation of the relative advantage to be gained from a larger slice of a smaller cake as against a smaller slice of a larger cake, may lead groupings of employees in particular to support apartheid.

On the whole, organisations of employers - commercial and industrial organisations, the Chamber of Mines - tend as institutions to support a measure of economic liberalisation, but this does not imply political liberalisation, which carries with it the danger of instability and a loss of business confidence. The interests of many of the economic institutions are better met by exceptions being made in their own individual cases than by fundamental changes of policy, except where such changes affect business confidence. Situations of this sort involve a maze of contradictions, some of which can be resolved by corruption. Thus the interests of a business in the Western Cape might be best served by a permit from the minister to import, train and employ a certain number of Africans, rather than general permission being granted to Africans to live in the Western Cape (which would involve high infrastructure costs) and to work for competitors of the business. In such a case a fairly precise cash value can be placed upon the acquisition of a permit and an economic calculation made concerning the sum available for corruption. Increases in the productivity of non-voters, and increases in their purchasing power will obviously benefit the economy as a whole, but the benefit to individual businesses is more difficult to calculate.

The interests of the organisations of employers are best served by a shift in priorities from the emphasis on the political to a greater emphasis on the economic, rather than by a radical change in the direction of the ship of state. The United Party draws a considerable amount of support from this section of society. The more efficient exploitation of the resources of South Africa, including the labour of the non-voters, would be of economic advantage to all, although it might not lead to smaller disparities between the real incomes of voters and non-voters than is currently the case.

Agriculture forms a particularly important section of the economy in social and political terms, despite its diminishing proportional contribution to the national income. Farming is subsidised by the state in various ways and techniques have been developed to shield the farmers from the brutal winds of free economic competition e.g. through the produce marketing boards. Further, the farmers have a degree of electoral power out of all proportion to their numbers due to the distribution of parliamentary seats and the dependence of ancilliary businesses in the rural areas upon the prosperity of the farmers. Due to their relative isolation and their intimate association with the least educated and socially unemancipated section of the non-voting population, their Afrikaner traditions and their South African Calvinism, they tend to be politically conservative and in favour of apartheid. They are also a section of the electorate for which there is intense competition between the United and National Parties at election time, each competing with the other in its offers of

more efficient protection. Whilst the farmers, like the industrialists, may find that the emphasis on the economic rather than on the political or ideological a reason for shifting allegiance from the National to the United Party, their influence on both parties tends to be conservative. In time their political signifiance will presumably decline with their numbers and their contribution to the national income, but for the foreseeable future they appear destined to remain a powerful conservative force within the electorate.

By compelling the segregation of the Trade Unions on a black/non-black basis, and by encouraging the division on a voter/non-voter basis, the government has given the members of the white dominated Trade Unions the same sort of vested interest in opposition to radical change as is found in the public service. The most effective weapon that any union can wield in its attempt to extract better wages and conditions for its members is the spectre of a labour shortage in its field. By the systematic restriction of membership of skilled artisan occupations and unions to non-blacks a shortage of such artisans is virtually assured, and their bargaining power duly enhanced. While there are some trade unionists who recognise that in the long run the workers will gain most advantage from operating in a larger and more open economy, and some who maintain an ideological commitment to the interests of the whole of the working class, regardless of its racial classification, their views are inconsistent with the short term interests of their generally dominant white membership. In their role as consumers, members of the trade unions may well feel the need for economics to be given priority over politics in the running of the state, but in their role as unionists they gain considerable advantage from the maintenance of the *status quo.*

The white universities alone among the occupational groupings may have vested interest in a considerable degree of liberalisation, and even they are divided on lines of ideology and language. Restrictions on who and what may be taught, censorship through the Publications Control Board and through the banning of certain authors under the Suppression of Communism Act and the problems of dealing with the international community of scholars as a result of general abhorrence of white South African 'internal policies' are irksome, particularly in the social sciences. Apartheid tends to inhibit the free flow of ideas both within South Africa and between South African scholars and their foreign counterparts. But even within the universities there are strong interests supporting the *status quo.* The universities are financed very largely by the state, and extensively from business interests. While they have virtual autonomy over the disposition of such funds once they are received, the universities are subject to considerable pressure to do nothing that will run strongly counter to the interests of their backers. There is also considerable pro-

tection for the lazy academic who may be shielded from the demands of international standards and competition by an easy appeal to loyalty and language. The universities will always be in a state of tension between individual self-interest, academic dedication and corporate self-interest; between the pursuit of truth, service to the community and service to the state. Such conflicts may be contained, as they have been in the past, by rituals of defiance against state encroachments on 'academic freedom' and by a division of responsibility within the various institutions whereby the university administration and council maintain their institution in harmony with the demands of their financial backers while the academics dissociate themselves privately from the internationally or academically unacceptable activities of their employer.

At a different level - that of their function in providing information to their students in particular but also to the community at large - the universities play some part in the formation of public opinion and in indicating the possible courses of technological and social development. As institutions promoting change in a consistent direction, however, their role is limited. It is generally possible to find, within the universities, pundits to support almost any view of society and almost any policy for the solution of any social or technical problem. Because of this it is possible for the politicians, the controllers of the mass media and the public at large to select whatever argument is most consistent with their own interests or, if none are available, to dismiss the academics as being generally impractical and living in the clouds. This is not to deny the impact made by the universities and by individual academics on other institutions and on the electorate at large, particularly when a man revered in his field argues a case ideologically at odds with the general ethos of his university.

The various structured groups based on occupation are, for the most part, controlled by whites. While within and between them there are a number of clashes of interests concerning the advantage to be gained for their members through a shift in governmental priority from the ideological or political to the economic, and by attempts to liberalise the economy and the permitted measure of academic and social freedom, there is little within their structures, ideologies or formally defined goals which would lead one to expect them to be significant promoters of social change, *ceteris paribus*. The differences that exist between them would appear to be related primarily to the extent to which they are dedicated to the pursuit of economic goals and the extent to which they are dependent on, or related to, international or foreign institutions. A radical shift in their attitudes and activities would therefore appear to depend upon their evaluation of their economic situation and their possibly related international position.

(f) The Churches

Churches, as institutions, would appear to be particularly closely related to the general value system, since their charters for existence relate to the expression and advancement of moral values within the community at large. But while this is true to some extent and the role conflict created in some members of some churches may be intense as a result of differences between religious ideals and normal behaviour expectations, the churches have developed many institutional features which make them comparable in most respects with the occupational groupings already discussed, and in particular similar to the universities.

The overwhelming majority of South Africans who have affiliation to some organised religious group (as distinct from those followers of traditional African religions which tend to be integrated into other institutions such as the family and the larger kin and territorial groupings) are Christian, Moslem or Jewish. The Moslems and the Jews tend to use their institutions of worship for welfare activities, as well as for more narrowly defined 'religious' activities. The mosque and the synagogue, together with the religious teaching of the young, serve to support the cultural identity and moral values of the minority groups. As such they tend to be institutions withdrawing from the other activities of their members where those activities involve outsiders. Much stress is laid on endogamy among the faithful, failing which marriage should involve the conversion of the partner. In these respects they are similar to the Dutch Reformed *Churches but, except when they are being attacked as institutions or on* an ethnic religious basis, neither the Moslem nor the Jewish religious institutions comment upon or contribute much to debates on politico-moral issues in the country as a whole. Individuals from both communities are deeply involved in tackling and speaking out on moral issues with an urgency often related to their religious commitment, but the specific institutions take little or no part. There even appears to be some fear in some of the religious authorities that identification of their ethnic-religious group with some particular political philosophy will lead to persecution of the group as a whole. The Moslems are also overwhelmingly non-voters and fear that they can expect less protection from influential groups and individuals if their leaders cross the authorities. The ineffectiveness of protest following the death of an Imam in police custody, compared with the apparent effectiveness of protest following the arrest of a white Christian dean underlined for many the greater danger of protest for the non-voting Moslems than is the case for the voter-led Christians. For these reasons, the minority religious groupings cannot be expected to be directly involved in the processes of secular change, although the ideals inculcated into their members tend to promote activism in the individuals. The strength generated through adherence to the cultural

minority groups probably creates greater internal conflicts for the members who must also live in the context of South African values, than is the case with the majority group Christians.

The Christian churches in South Africa may be divided into three broad groups - the Reformed churches, overwhelmingly Afrikaans in language and culture, but with significant support from small English speaking evangelical and Calvinistic groups, and also affiliations with separate Reformed churches divided on the basis of racial classification and language; the churches of the South African Council, including the Roman Catholic church, overwhelmingly white English-speaking in their leadership but for the most part theoretically integrated and having a majority of non-voters as members; and the African Independent churches which have almost purely African membership and leadership, generally very few congregations under one leader, and number thousands of separate churches.

To the outsider the Reformed churches give the impression of being highly centralised and authoritarian, as well as being 'the National Party at prayer'. While there is undoubtedly a strong *conscience collectif*, and the majority of both clergy and laity would agree with the political statements of the leaders, the structure of the churches, with a strong emphasis on the autonomy of the individual congregations, permits considerable differences to exist within the churches. On some major politico-moral issues, such as migrant labour, the largest church (N.G.K.) has frankly admitted the moral dilemma and the evil which stems from the system, but has been unwilling to propose or to accept the political solution to the problem. A not inconsiderable section of the leadership of the churches has been struggling with such problems for many years - separate altars which led to the establishment of separate churches on the basis of racial classification and language, was initially allowed 'as a concession to prejudice and weakness' and was confirmed by the Synod of 1857 'as a result of the weakness of some'. *(3)*. Those who have been prepared to press the moral issues stemming from the 'traditional way of life' have been in a minority however, and have been met not only by the intransigence of the vast majority of white members and the fatalistic acceptance by many of the members of the Mission and Bantu churches, but by a formidable theological rationale from the dominant conservatives based largely on the analogy between the development of the Jews as the 'chosen people' as described in the penteteuch and the history of the Afrikaner in South Africa. To the outsider who is searching for hopeful signs of change, optimists within the Reformed churches point to the moral ferment within their churches and to minorities struggling to overcome the traditional prejudices within the churches. The pessimists suggest that despite the long tradition of respect for the dominee which pervades

Afrikanerdom, the main effect of a moral revolution within the Reformed churches would be a weakening of their influence on the Afrikaner masses - in short that the prejudices within the mass of Afrikaners are not subject to religious influence, even from their own churches. The truth may well lie between the two extreme positions and the Reformed churches must be considered as potential vehicles for change in South Africa, if not as independent institutions, then through the influence that they may have upon their members and through their presentation of moral dilemmas in a dramatic form.

The churches of the South African Council and the majority of the English language churches are fairly unequivocal in their condemnation of certain elements in the *status quo* and their leadership is overwhelmingly Progressive or liberal in its political outlook. A smaller proportion of the religious elite claims to support the United Party than is found in any of the other elite groups (4). With generally more authoritarian structures in theory than the Reformed churches, the 'English' churches appear to have resolved their moral dilemma at a lower level than the Reformed churches. Where the major area of crisis in the Reformed churches would appear to lie with the dominees who suffer serious moral doubts about the South African system but do not share them with their congregations for fear of alienating support, the English clergy and leadership is unequivocally progressive in its statements whilst the mass of its white congregations listen patiently and ignore practically. The multi-racial character of the English churches and the rapidly developing sensitivity among the non-voters who form the majority of their membership ensures that paternalism and hypocrisy will be exposed and rejected on all occasions where there is much contact between the different groups. Ferment and a challenging of traditional structures within the English churches is a certain feature for the foreseeable future, although how far this will lead to a change of attitude among the conservative white members and how far to a drifting away from the 'political' churches cannot be predicted. As vehicles for the conversion of the voters, the English churches are obviously of great importance, but in hauling the congregations up the gradient of self-denial, there is always the possibility that the lead engines will become detached from the trucks, or that the cargo of voters will have leaked away before significant change can be achieved. By continually facing their members and the country at large with the moral issues, and by finding programmes for change without arousing fears in the voters, the churches can and do make a small but important contribution to progressive change.

The African churches form an important and growing element in the religious structure of South Africa, although none of the members are voters. Whilst the vast majority appear to be very small scale in their

operations and led by men whose charisma often outruns their administrative skill, they can be expected to become better organised and more articulate in the course of time. Associations of church leaders or of churches, such as those of Inter–Denominational African Ministers Association of S.A. and the African Independent Churches Association, capable of organising (with some assistance at first) theological colleges and other joint activities, may well develop structures commanding the respect of the two groups of white-led churches. Membership of them will then provide a legitimate and equal status alternative to membership of the white-led churches. The threat of widespread secession from the white-led churches to the African independent churches, which would involve a dramatic fall in numbers, elimination of the greatest fields for potential growth in the churches and the loss of international confidence in the English churches would underline the moral and political dilemmas already facing those churches. The growth and maturing organisation of the independent churches could provide the greatest challenge to the English churches and to the Reformed mission and Bantu churches that they have hitherto faced. Within the churches, and within the country as a whole insofar as it is affected by the views and challenges of the churches, the development of the independent churches has a high potential for change. The extent to which such churches generate an exclusive black nationalism as a counter to the exclusive white nationalism that currently dominates South Africa will depend very largely on the reaction of the white-led churches and the readiness of individual white Christians to establish relations with their members on the basis of equality.

The churches as institutions have tended to be influenced as much by the general values among the voters as they have made contributions to the values of the voters. Nevertheless, both through their contribution to the values and the idiom of the myths which dominate the voters, and through the moral conflicts that they create in their members who have to compromise the roles of Christian and voter, they form an important group of institutions available and potentially available for change.

(g)   The Press

Like the churches, the press in South Africa is divided between the two European language groups, with a number of newspapers, mainly weeklies, catering primarily for the non-voters. Also, while the bulk of the readership of the English language press is doubtless United Party in its orientation, the Progressive/Liberals heavily outnumber the United Party supporters among the 'Radio and Press elite' (5).

The role of the press in the formation of public opinion is not a simple one, although few South Africans have the luxury of being able to choose their morning or evening paper unless they are bilingual. The Afrikaans

language press, together with the radio, gives fairly consistent support to the National Party, the press reflecting, perhaps even exaggerating, the breadth of opinion which co-exists within the Afrikaners' political instrument. The vigour with which political differences within the National Party are revealed in the news columns and fought in the editorials is somewhat deceptive however as the generally unmentioned boundaries are clearly defined. The struggles are based on the assumptions that all participants are supporters of the party and preferably Afrikaners. Despite the differences between the northern and the southern Nationalists, neither would consider the possibility of finding a more congenial political home in one of the other political parties. The most interesting and revealing comparisons for understanding the disputations found within the Afrikaans press would probably be in one-party states, where the idea of leaving the party is impossible, instead of merely unthinkable. As long as the loyalty of the Afrikaans press to the National Party remains unquestionable (and the presence of party leaders on the boards of the Afrikaanse Pers and the Nasionale Pers would seem to ensure this) its potential for the promotion of social change must remain limited, although not unimportant. The role of the Afrikaans press and the radio as the main means of communication between the National Party leadership and their main body of supporters is a crucial one and not a wholly inflexible instrument for sounding out the possibilities for change and for promoting those which can be sold to both the leadership of the party and the readership of the newspapers. Unlike the editors of the English newspapers, the Afrikaans editors include significant political figures in their own right within the informal structures of the party, hence their pronouncements tend to carry considerable weight.

The Afrikaans and the English press carry on a running battle, one purpose of which is to convince the Afrikaners that the differences between them and the English are insurmountable and hence the 'English' United Party is unthinkable as a political home for loyal Afrikaners. The English press is depicted as dishonest, disloyal and subversive of good morals if not of public order, although the attacks upon it are rarely pursued with the dedication that the wilder charges might warrant if they were true. The English press is, in fact, for the most part fairly cautious, knowing that error on its side will be treated far more seriously by the government than error made by the Afrikaans press. The illusion is created of a courageous and outspoken English press, willing to fight for the underdog regardless of the consequences. The reality may be judged from the very few occasions when newspapers have been forced to defend themselves in court, or, in the case of the larger papers, been forced to close down as a result of forthright criticism of the government. Just as the Afrikaans press is outspoken within the framework acceptable to Afrikaner-

dom, so the English press maintains itself within the framework accept-
able to a government which would like to project an image of reason-
ableness.

The English press is more closely associated with business interests
than with ideological interests compared with the Afrikaans press, although
running a newspaper is rarely the most profitable means of investing
capital and managerial skill. The commercial interests involved, in
addition to the political risks, discourage the editors from being too
adventurous. Nevertheless, both by their continued opposition to any
tendency of the government to drift to the right, and by their drawing
attention to the consequences of and alternatives to the policies of the
state, the English press performs a vital function in South Africa and
one which could be a factor in the promotion of change.

The press, through its reflection of and contribution to, moral and
political attitudes, and through its presentation of information, is and
will be an important institution for change in South Africa, despite the
limitations within which it works.

The newspapers and journals catering for the non-voters are probably
even less free than the press catering primarily for the voters. Neverthe-
less, by the regular accounts of the injustices which have been visited
upon the non-voters and by the inevitable suggestion of group identities
among the non-voters even if based on nothing more than a unity of
suffering, has contributed to the growing sense of anger and alienation
among the non-voters. The emergence of articulate and outspoken political
leaders through the consultative machinery for non-voters which the
government has created has provided the 'non-white press' with public
figures eager and able to express opinions on current events and to mould
attitudes among the non-voters. One of the goals of such leaders is the
'politicisation' of their people, and the press contributes much towards
this goal. As such it could become a growing factor in the process of
change within the non-voter communities and ultimately within the society
as a whole.

*(h)   Voluntary associations, including cultural organisations and
         service clubs*

Cultural organisations tend to be exclusive and conservative by their
nature, developing and protecting that which is most highly valued within
the group. At the level of the country as a whole, such organisations may
perform some political function, or membership of them confirm some
political advantage upon individuals, while at the local level and in small
groups, the effect tends to be largely a-political. The most powerful of
the cultural associations, certainly by repute, is the Afrikaner Broeder-
bond, which is a secret society dedicated to the cultural and political

interests of the Afrikaners. Since it shares largely common goals with the National Party, the two organisations tend to have close links. The dedication of such an organisation to the interests of a section of the population makes it an institution of considerable significance for the promotion of change for as long as its section does not possess supreme power, and an institution retarding change and opposed to change in the *status quo* once its section has achieved power. No other similar insituation exists within the non-Afrikaner sections of the population.

The Freemasons, which might appear to be similar in certain respects to the Broederbond, have never performed a comparable political role although there is a widespread belief that masons assist each other in business and in other forms of individual advancement. The masonic organisations are overwhelmingly English in their orientation, although similar organisations exist within the coloured lower middle class whose main *raison d'etre* is their welfare functions for their members.

Religious congregations and the associations which are closely linked with them may perform a similar function of mutual assistance and the preservation of cultural traditions. This is particularly the case with congregations of ethnic or cultural minorities such as the Jews or the Greeks. Through their attempts to preserve that which is most valued in their traditional cultures and to assist their own members' advancement, they tend to cut themselves off as collectivities from involvement in political activities and are generally conservative.

Paradoxically, the same is largely true of some of the small leftist organisations that are found in both voter and non-voter circles. The groups are often dedicated to the purity of their own particular interpretation of socialism and encourage discussions of how events relate to their set of assumptions. They have gained a considerable following among school teachers employed by the Department of Coloured Affairs and their influence can be seen in the patterns of voting in the elections for the C.P.R.C. which they boycotted. But unlike the Broederbond, they have not formed an effective united organisation to advance their goals for their section of the population but, harassed by the police, have withdrawn from all involvement in active politics. Due to the extent of their support among the 'coloured elite' (6) they could develop rapidly into a significant political force if considerable changes occurred in the country as a whole. However, they appear unlikely to initiate change and are so fragmented that co-ordination for a common purpose is unlikely. Until a suitable opportunity occurs, their withdrawl from active participation in the political life of the non-voters tends to weaken leadership within the 'coloured' group and so retards what possibilities for change exist within the present system.

Cultural clubs and associations, by their promotion of sectional in-

terests, are unlikely institutions for the promotion of change.

The service clubs and welfare organisations are unlike the cultural associations as they, at least in theory, are designed for the benefit of non-members. Due in part to governmental pressure, there has been some tendency for separation on the basis of racial classification to occur, and there has always been a strong tendency among some sections of the population to assist members of their own section rather than to assist those people in greatest need. There has also been some debate concerning the real effects of service clubs and welfare organisations on the recipients of their charity and services. It has been argued that the giving of unreciprocated gifts is humiliating to the recipient and tends to develop a patronising attitude in the donor. Since, due to the unequal distribution of wealth within the country, the donors tend to be voters and the recipients non-voters, charitable activities reinforce the feelings of superiority and inferiority in the two groups respectively (7). Translated into political terms, such attitudes would militate against change by reinforcing conservative stereotypes.

However, if the welfare and charitable activities involve the donors in actually meeting the recipients, rather than working through a third party (a middle class social worker of either the donor or the recipient group) and if the donors are brought face to face with the realities of life for the needy, such contact can be salutary and powerful. There is always the possibility of the superficial and paternalistic analysis, but there is also the possibility that contact, even through charitable activities, will lead to a deeper analysis of the causes and consequences of cultural and economic deprivation and so to a readiness to work for change.

From the recipients' viewpoint, the paternalistic attitude or otherwise of the donor may be largely irrelevant. If a need can be satisfied, particularly if it is a need for some such constructive service as education, the recipient has gained some new strength or ability which he might otherwise not have gained. In communities, such as most of the non-voters form, assistance to survive, to be educated or to gain some technical skill may well provide individuals or groups with the capital and the will to demand their human rights and to assert true self-respect. Despite the small-scale of most charitable and welfare activities, such a contribution to the non-voters may be a significant stimulus for change.

Service clubs and welfare organisations, whilst not necessarily institutions geared to the promotion of change may well have as side effects the change of heart necessary in some voters as a precondition of peaceful change, whilst providing for the non-voter recipients the necessary resources for self-determined and self-generated change.

(j)   The formal structure of the non-voters

(i)   The Africans

Forming, as they do, the majority 'racial group' in South Africa, the Africans are the most crucial element in all the political calculations of the voters. The official policy of the National Party and the government, which may soon reach a stage where it is irreversible by any democratic action by the current voters, is the fragmentation of South Africa into a number of theoretically independent states each of which will be the national homeland of one of the various African quasi-ethnic groups, apart from the 'white' republic which will presumably include the 'coloured' and the 'Indian' groups together with a vast number of 'expatriates' from the independent mini-states. In some cases it is possible that the majority of the 'citizens' of some of the independent mini-states will be living outside their own state, whilst it is almost certain that the 'white' republic will have a majority of non-citizens as residents. The imposition of this programme of 'separate development' is alleged to be the only moral solution to the South African problem of the maintenance of group identities.

As steps towards the final goal are taken, political institutions and various other institutions which have significant parts to play in the process of change are emerging in the Bantustans. There is little evidence to suggest that the programme is acceptable to the majority of Africans, particularly to those who are resident in the 'white' areas and who, in many cases, have no national homeland to which they have any desire to go or with which they would like to be associated. However, it seems unlikely that there will be a major change of policy or government before the Bantustans and their government accepted leaders will be firmly entrenched. Under the circumstances of slowly growing autonomy in all but the fundamental matters of finance (the Bantustans will be too poor to be self-supporting for the foreseeable future) and security, the structural model breaks down as the values and aspirations of the different participants in the sub-system of the Bantustans are in fundamental conflict.

The government claims that in the long run the injustices currently done in the name of separate development will be justified by the greater good achieved through the solution of the 'race problem', and that as political maturity among the non-voters increases, so the policy will be accepted and seen for what it really is. It is also claimed that the 'sacrifices' which will be demanded of the voters will be justified by the end result of a secure and happy republic possessing a clear conscience.

The current conflict lies in all three levels of the structural model. The value of a benign white dominated social system giving fair, if not equal, shares to all, conflicts with the value or goal of an open non-racial

system and with the value or goal of a black dominated system. Partition on a federal basis or on a basis of independent states may be a legitimate compromise between the alternatives of black or white domination, but for it to be acceptable it would demand that the greater part of the land and resources be given to the majority group. Even then the compromise would be unacceptable to a large body of opinion which will settle only for one of the three alternatives to partition - the hard-line white and black nationalists and the ideological non-racialists.

At the level of conflicting roles, vivid illustrations have been provided by the confusion of roles when a black dignitary also happens to be a black South African. Exceptions to the general rule of racial caste taking precedence over social class can be made in the case of foreign visitors and diplomats, but in the case of South African citizens there is a serious problem of where the line must be drawn if embarrassment is not going to be acute. A black bishop of a white-led church may be exempt from petty bureaucratic harrassment, but what of a black archbishop of a black-led church? Care may be demanded in phrases addressed by white policemen to black paramount chiefs of evolving Bantustans, but what of the chairman of a large urban advisory committee, or a chief of a tribe within a Bantustan? The change of heart that would appear to be necessary for smooth relations to be established between the 'white' republic and its evolving 'black' Bantustans would appear to be little less than is required for the evolution of a just society in South Africa as a whole, particularly after the matter of land claims is settled to the mutual satisfaction of all parties.

One of the roles of the councils within the Bantustans will be to expose the conflicts which exist between the ideological goals of the government and the means which are acceptable to the white electorate for them to be achieved. The councils will be the mediators between their black electorate and the white government. As such they will have to achieve recognisable gains for their electorate or face being discredited and disobeyed, whilst dealing with the republican government unwilling to alienate its own electoral support. If the councils are successful in the eyes of their black electorate, then they will gain strength to make further demands from the white government. If they are unsuccessful they will lose all authority short of that sustained by naked force over their people, and the whole edifice of 'separate development' will be shown to be the farce which its critics claim it to be. Having created their vehicles for African self-expression, the government is faced with the choice of aiding and recognising them and so increasing their power to resist it, or with maintaining them impotent and discrediting itself. The councils and the administrative structures of the Bantustans are thus not only good training grounds for administrators, they are also institutions

of great significance for change through their direct relationship with the white government.

The rural Africans, both in and out of the Bantustans, would appear to be too impoverished in the former case and both too impoverished and too scattered in the latter to be able to organise effective institutions for the promotion of change, other than those which are related to the Bantustan councils or possibly the independent churches. In the towns however the picture is different. While it is very difficult for any politically orientated organisation to develop in the towns due to police infiltration and suppression, the sharing of common needs and goals and the existence of many small cross-cutting organisations such as churches and sports clubs, school committees and women's organisations combine to create fairly large scale networks of people. Given the stimulus of an important incident, such as a railway accident or an important funeral, largely unco-ordinated groups could well explode into riots. While such incidents can be contained individually, the cumulative effect upon the white electorate could be important. The Sharpeville incident provoked a marked decline in business confidence - a series of such incidents, particularly in a period of recession when they are more likely anyway, could force the electorate to greater effort in working out ways to protect themselves from fear of revolution by making meaningful concessions to the angry non-voters, as well as by improving their military and paramilitary security system. The development of political institutions in the Bantustans, regardless of the extent of their real power has indicated to all Africans that they have the right to organise politically. The limitation on the extent and effectiveness of such organisation will be tested empirically from time to time by demands and by explosions of frustration when the demands are rejected. Just as in America the plight of the blacks was not recognised nor attempts made to alleviate it until militant action was undertaken by the blacks themselves, so with South Africa. Under conditions of what is effectively a police state for the blacks, the development of their organisations must take place in public and within the given framework. Once the organisation is developed, once the people are informed of their rights, the negation of those rights and powers which they possess in the struggle for their rights, then the Africans can become effective contributors to the dialogue which will determine their immediate and ultimate future.

The institutions which are being established as the inevitable concomitants of Bantustan development - organisations of traders, the universities, councils of churches, etc. - will tend to orientate the Africans in those areas away from their former desire for acceptance in the white dominated organisations and towards structures similar in certain respects to those of the black power groups in the U.S.A. In those groups, there

is a strong body of opinion, encouraged by the black integrationists, that would argue that withdrawal into black organisational structures is merely a phase of development which will give the blacks experience of administration, the confidence which comes from internal leadership and independence from white paternalism and possibly greater financial backing for making more effective their demand for integration in due course. Where such a development is not potentially revolutionary in the United States as the blacks form a minority group, such a development has in it the seeds of revolutionary change in South Africa where integration and equality of opportunity would constitute and involve revolutionary change. This being the case, the formal structures which have been created for the Africans and which are being created by the Africans are important institutions available for the promotion of change. Unlike those discussed within the white society (section (a) - (h) inclusive) the change that will be generated in the African institutions will be revolutionary rather than evolutionary unless their demands are understood and met by the ruling whites.

(ii)   The minority non-voters

The same sort of argument as has been advanced for the Africans can be advanced for the people classed as Indian or Coloured, although there are some major differences. As minority groups for whom there appear to be no plans for homelands other than the 'group areas' established on the periphery of most of the urban areas in South Africa, and as groups whose cohesion is based more on external classification and common grievances than upon positive internal factors, they have found it more difficult to act in a co-ordinated way than have the Africans.

The imposition of 'ethnic' institutions - schools, universities, councils, urban management committees, reformed churches, etc. - by the government has, despite passionate opposition from some of the intellectuals, begun to forge a group consciousness and a political awareness. But where for the African there is really little hope of integration short of revolution, for the other minority groups there is always the possibility that in order to maintain itself in power against the rising African tide, the white group will permit or even seek integration with the minority groups, creating a non-black alliance against the Africans. Such an alliance appears to have developed to some extent in Rhodesia.

At present the 'Coloured' voters appear divided between rejection of all forms of minority group 'dummy institutions', acceptance of the Coloured Council and other institutions as means whereby the legitimate aspirations of the 'Coloured' people can be voiced and steps taken towards an integrated society, and 'Coloured Nationalists' who accept the idea of separate institutions for their people on the basis of different but equal

some day. While the second group appear to outnumber the third quite considerably, the size of the first group cannot be gauged very easily other than through calculations based on abstentions in the coloured election (8). With the development of separate institutions however, linked to the republican government through the virtually government nominated executive of the Coloured Council, the same conflict between the aspirations of the people and the willingness of the government to meet them as has been described for the Africans will emerge. To maintain some credibility, which is currently minimal, the Council must be granted some of its demands. As in the case of the Africans, accession to its demands will increase its power and its appetite for complete equality or for integration, refusal could lead to heightened frustration and communal unrest. The relatively small size of the community and its distribution through the country would make unrest more easily contained by the government, but the effects on business confidence and the demonstration effect on the Africans might well be significant. Wealth, education, urban experience and participation in urban networks make the 'Coloured' people a far more explosive group than the Africans at present, although their numbers make their explosions less productive of fundamental change.

The Indians are in a similar position to the 'Coloured' people, but whilst their average incomes, educational level and sub-group cohesion is probably greater than that of the larger minority group, and their experience of political action on a broad base goes back further, their current development of communal political institutions has not proceeded so far. The contribution that their institutions, both evolved and imposed can make to change are limited by size of the community being served, by its distribution through the country and the fatalism that religion inspires in some sections.

Unless the governmental crystal ball finally clears to reveal that the brown minorities are destined to be absorbed into a common non-black South African society, the institutions both evolved and imposed in the minority groups may well contribute towards change through becoming vehicles for the expression of group feeling, even violent frustration, and by their demonstration effect upon the Africans. With respect to the minority groups, the government may not be mounted upon a tiger as in the case of the Africans, but 'separate development' for them may be a very irritable ostrich.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT THUS FAR

The process of change in South Africa depends very largely upon control of the legislature and the government. Whilst there are many

minor conflicts and contradictions within the white dominated institutions within the country, these can be subordinated in nearly all cases to the common value of white domination over the destiny of the republic, whether it is to be fragmented, federated or centralised. Change in the direction of a common society, or even a just society organised on the basis of a number of independent or federated quasi-ethnic states would demand enormous concessions to be made by the voters which they are unlikely to grant unless threatened by revolutionary violence on a very large scale. (Cf. the needs of the African 'reserves' as calculated by the Tomlinson Commission and the financial allotments subsequently made to them). The changes in attitudes and values which would have to take place if such concessions were to be made in a good spirit are so great that they would permit the establishment of a common society to the greater economic advantage of all.

The Africans, through their developing institutions, both imposed and evolved, present the most stark lines of conflict of interest and values with the white dominated structure. The resolution of the conflicts will involve a revolutionary change of heart by the voters or a violent revolution stemming from a succession of incidents damaging to business confidence and the whites' sense of security.

THE INFORMAL STRUCTURE - 'THE ESTABLISHMENT' OF INTER-LOCKING ROLES AMONG THE ELITE; PRESSURE GROUPS AND PUBLIC OPINION

South Africa is culturally a plural society, and while the individual institutions are closely inter-related under the power and authority of the government, there are major divisions within the country which relate primarily to the sphere of values. For the most part, close inter-personal relationships exist within the cultural groups rather than between individuals of different cultural groups. There is a tendency towards endogamy, or at least disapproval by close kin of marriage between individuals of different cultural groups. There is a sense of competition and a sense of being threatened in various ways between the groups. Within the groups which form the electorate there may at times be a unity of interests, but there is little unity of spirit. The distinction between interests and spirit or ethos was recognised after Union when first the Afrikaner Smuts and then the Afrikaner Hertzog found themselves cut off from the spirit of Afrikanerdom which eventually found its true expression in the followers of Dr Malan. With the development of the police state in South Africa and the system of informers which is generally believed to exist, the tendency towards group exclusiveness has probably grown. The friendly man from a different cultural segment may be checking up

on you - his income may depend in part upon his success in finding enemies of the state. Withdrawal from close association is safer than intimacy which may go awry.

The cultural groups form both vertical structures and a system of horizontal stratification, each including a portion of the wealthy and the highly educated, each a portion of the destitute, yet seen together forming broad caste-like strata which recognise their position in the hierarchy even if they resent it as injust. To a considerable extent, peaceful change in South Africa depends upon the development of greater flexibility within these cultural groupings in the direction of the acceptance of the integrity and legitimate aspirations of the other groups. There can be no return to the universal acceptance of a caste-like society where each stratum knows its place and is happiest in it. The rest of this section of the paper will consider some of the salient features of the different cultural groupings in relation to their potentiality for change.

(a) The Afrikaners

Unity among the Afrikaners has always hung upon the opposition or persecution that the group has experienced quite as much as on the strong internal bonds of language and religion. Even religious unity has rested upon the paradox of protestantism - the obligation of each individual to establish a personal and unique relationship with God and to interpret the scriptures for himself, whilst at the same time identifying himself with the community of the redeemed.

Afrikanerdom today rests upon five institutional pillars - the party, the church, the farmers, the trade unions and the growing business sector. Between and within the leaders of these institutions there are close personal links based on common experiences, kinship, shared education, membership of the same social clubs etc. Despite the size of the country, the absolute size of this group is not large. Spread in fairly small groups over a wide area, with structures which bring the leaders of the small groups into fairly regular contact with each other - through the occupational associations, the party and the church - there is established an intimate and egalitarian network, within which there may be a strong *conscience collectif*. The strength of the group feeling is expressed in the lengths to which the various institutions are prepared to go to persuade members to remain within the fold, and by the virulence directed at those who leave it, make their fundamental disagreements public or seek alliances outside the fold to press their viewpoint. The experience of the leaders of the Christian Institute and of the Herstigte Nasionale Party is instructive in this regard.

The informal structure would appear to be fairly impervious to change. If outsiders attempt to press their views or to impose their wishes on

Afrikanerdom, the ideological exclusiveness of Calvinism which virtually excludes the possibility that the chosen might be mistaken rationalises a defensive unity. Since the essence of the unity is in the unity of spirit or ethos, found within each individual, even if collectively expressed, each person must be individually converted. A major change of heart among the leaders can be seen as a surrender by them to the evil world, and the leaders can be replaced. Change in the face of changing economic conditions can be resisted by appeals to the supremacy of ideals over material interests, even to the necessity of suffering and sacrifice to be rewarded by the ultimate triumph of the *volk* in this world or the next.

Afrikanerdom has changed, is changing and will change as a result of forces both within and outside its informal structure. The divisions within it create opportunities for liberal Christian Afrikaners, with sound credentials of birth, education, occupation and connections, to work towards the enlargement of their numbers within the traditional framework. Unfortunately the framework, being highly exclusive, comes into immediate conflict with the necessity for inter-group contact and understanding which is the goal of liberal Christianity. It is difficult for 'outsiders' to play any part in the internal struggles in Afrikanerdom, since to ally oneself with any faction might well be the kiss of death for it. Pressure from outside, particularly from outside the country, has to be weighed in terms of how far it drives Afrikanerdom into a closer defensive unity, and how far it counters the myth of growing acceptability and sympathy for apartheid.

Whilst change within the core of Afrikanerdom may be slow, erosion from that core may be steady as business and ideological interests make more individuals turn away from the dominant group. There is much evidence of this occurring at the university level, particularly in the social sciences, and also in the higher echelons of business. At other levels the drift away may be taking place less conspicuously, lack of commitment being shown by a reduction in religious observance and deviations from expected patterns of behaviour and association but not formally expressed in ways which would preclude an easy return to the fold.

The majority of voters are Afrikaners, and they dominate the administration, the military and the police force. As such their commitment to the traditional values of Afrikanerdom, which stand in opposition to the evolution of a just society, is of fundamental significance to the process of progressive change. It would appear that there is little prospect of change within the core group taking place sufficiently quickly to accommodate the rising demands of the non-voters, and little prospect of a sufficiently large number of Afrikaners deserting or rebelling within the *laager* to bring about radical change within their slowly evolving group.

(b) The 'English'

Although there is a large portion of the English-speaking white group which has close historical and cultural ties with Britain, it is also, to some extent a residual category, and as such has no strong focus of unity or identity other than in opposition to the Afrikaners among the broader group of the voters. Sentimentalists among the English like to expatiate on the values of democracy, pragmatism, tolerance, good humour, etc. of their fellows, often with the implication that these virtues are not shared with those of other tongues or hues. In the crucial areas of political opinions as expressed by voting patterns and evaluations of human worth as expressed in wages paid to employees of a different hue, the differences between the English and the Afrikaner - seen as generalised averages or collectivities - are very small. However, though the actual average differences may be small, the potential for change within the English speaking section is probably greater than within the Afrikaans speaking group, although the significance of change within the English speaking section is less as their numbers and political power are less.

There is no 'hard core' of English speaking culture and political values to compare with the core of Afrikanerdom, and there is similarly no network of close personal ties binding the English speakers into a fairly co-ordinated group on a national level. Relations between the Progressive Party and the United Party, from which it broke away, have been marked by some acrimony, but not by the passion and violence that marked the entry of the Herstigte Nasionale Party into the electoral arena. English speakers seem to be more widely and evenly spread across the South African white political spectrum, particularly among the elites (9). There is a smaller proportion of English speakers than Afrikaners in the public service, whose vested interests are more opposed to change than those of the commercial sector where the English speakers still tend to dominate. The English speakers are linked by easy communications to the broader English culture throughout the world, with its dynamic interplay of ideas, where the mono-lingual Afrikaner (a significant minority) is fed little that would make him question the values of the core group. Further, the English speakers, even those whose roots go back to the 1820 Settlers and beyond, have other places to which they can go if South Africa becomes uncongenial, places where they can be absorbed without difficulty. Their commitment, however deeply and sincerely felt, is not inescapable. The Afrikaner, lacking cultural ties with the English-speaking world from which he so proudly and courageously severed the final bonds in 1961, cannot say 'I would *rather* fight than switch' as the loyal English speaker might say - he may feel that he has no choice than to fight.

(c)   *The territorially based non-voters*

While the majority of residents of the Bantustans belong to what might
be termed a 'lumpen-peasantry', maintaining traditional ties with some
aspects of the tribal religious, communal and authority systems, together
with an identity based on language and ethnic grouping ('Xhosa' - what-
ever that means other than a linguistic category today - 'Zulu' etc.) all
are deeply affected by the system of circulating labour which takes a
large proportion of the adult men into the common economy, gives them
experience of the urban situation and returns them to the Bantustans to
transmit much of what they have learned to their fellows. This process
of education through experience, together with the slowly growing system
of formal education and the political education through parties and
elections is producing inevitable changes in rural African attitudes. Even
if the object of 'Bantu education' was to ensure 'that the Bantu child
remains a Bantu child', and the object of the territorial authorities was
to enable the 'Bantu' to develop along his own traditional lines, the
events must inevitably lead away from those goals. The 'traditional
Bantu' did not have elections and opposing political parties, and the
'traditional Bantu' were not literate. Even without the flood of ideas
and artifacts from the urban industrial economy, the establishment of
the two government sponsored institutions would be important factors
making for change within the Bantustan areas.

There is very little information on the process of politicisation of
the rural Africans in South Africa, but evidence from the rural 'coloured'
people and from elsewhere in Africa would suggest that involvement in
Kenya or Zambia, the 'bitter enders' leaving for Australia or England,
the majority making the best of things in the knowledge that they can
follow their less flexible brothers if they wish. Because of this, the
English are more likely to react to crises by seeking accommodation
with the aspirations of the non-voters - as they are also likely to be
more responsive to external pressures on the economy. There is there-
fore reason in the suspicion that is said to exist in the core of Afrikaner-
dom that the English are not to be wholly trusted, that only the Afrikaner
can be really relied upon to defend white privilege (or 'civilisation'
as the publicists prefer to call it).

The other minority groups among the voters - Jews (where not identified
with the 'English'), Greeks, Portugese, German, Dutch, French, Italian,
etc. are in a similar position to the English in that they have maintained
cultural and possibly other more personal ties to their countries of origin.
Like the English, their fairly short term economic interests are likely
to take precedence over the long term political interests, as in the long
term they can always leave South Africa.

political activities, even the symbolic act of voting for a man who has made certain promises, creates expectations in the electorate regardless of the power of the council being elected. If the elected members cannot fulfil their election promises, but can present convincing reasons why their failure is due to an external 'enemy' of the voters - be it the rival party or the foreign colonial power, then seeds are sown for unrest. It is perhaps significant in this regard that emergency regulations have remained in force for a record length of time in Pondoland, which is a rural area in the most politically advanced of the Bantustans. The security forces may be able to prevent large scale organised expressions of public anger or demands for a greater share in the South African cake, but they cannot prevent spontaneous explosions of rage from engulfing limited areas. Such explosions depend upon a rising pressure within the community demanding a better deal and some specific issue to spark off trouble. An economic recession, combined with growing political awareness would create the pressure, almost any unforeseeable event, like a child being injured by a police van in a crowded market could provide the spark.

Such incidents create a number of pressures for change. International opinion, tolerant perhaps of communal riots involving thousands in other countries, is highly sensitive to quite small incidents in South Africa, and the opponents of apartheid are swift to pounce upon any new proof of unrest and repression. In a period when South Africa is seeking allies beyond its borders, it may be worthwhile making concessions to reduce the explosive pressures in the rural areas where the policy of 'separate development' is allegedly being accepted. Business opinion in South Africa, for ever sensitive to violence which might damage its long term prospects as well as short term confidence, might well press hard for concessions as well as for greater assurance of security. Those who are truly committed ideologically to the concept and programme of separate development, as well as some pragmatists might well press for greater autonomy to be given to the Territorial Authorities so that they could be made more responsible for law and order within their 'own' areas. Only the isolationist protagonists of an economy-defying *real politik* would answer such unrest by force alone, without some constructive steps to ameliorate the causes.

(d)   The non-voters without a territorial base

Although there is a lack of unity of spirit or ethos among the urban Africans, the urban 'Coloured' people and the Indians, there are large areas of common interest. History, the infiltration of 'race group' attitudes into every sphere of life, class antipathy and cultural differences have

enabled the three groups of non-voters who lack a territorial base to be maintained clearly separate from each other. Indeed, within the residual category, that of the 'Coloured' groups, there have been a number of attempts by government favoured 'leaders' and business interests to ensure that mixing between Africans and 'Coloured' people is minimised and that neither Africans nor Indians are able to 'pass' as coloured. In the areas where there is a large number of urban Africans, they are generally considered by the other non-voter groups to be of an inferior caste and certain menial and unpleasant labouring jobs are felt to be *infra dignitatem* for the higher caste. With enforced separation into Group Areas, the people have tended to lose contact with members of the other groups and to lose sympathy too.

For the urban dwellers the ultimate goals of separate development are largely meaningless. They work in an integrated economy, even if their social amenities are separated on the basis of group classification and residence. Their experience of the common economy, of the different rewards given to different groups for the same work, of the humiliation suffered by all non-voters in myriad ways is tolerable only as long as they are convinced of their own inferiority. But slowly expanding educational and training facilities, the examples of successful men within their own 'racial' class both within the group and in the common economy, the examples of arbitrary actions by the state to prevent demonstrations of 'non-white' competitive ability in many spheres, and the enthusiasm of political leaders seeking support are combining to help people shake off their sense of 'racial' inferiority. One manifestation of this trend is the interest being taken in the idea of 'Black power' currently popular in the U.S.A., although the withdrawal from inter-group contact that some 'Black power' supporters demand may be a rationalisation of the belief that they cannot really compete on equal terms with hope of success. Regardless of the intellectual or ideological flourishes, however, there are impressive social reasons for the politicisation of the urban non-voters, a process which can be retarded but not stopped by repression. The logic is inescapable. In order to fill the reduplicated posts that are created by separate development, it is necessary for the state to educate a larger number of non-voters than ever before, and it is necessary for the state to pay them at least as well as commercial or industrial employers. A suppressed middle class, aware of the injustice of the restrictions placed upon it, and self-confident enough to know that racial classification is not an index of any form of qualitative stratification, is an explosive social force.

Already there is evidence of a growing anger and a rejection of white authority, although no misunderstanding about the strength and determination of white power. Notice is being served by the non-voters that

the whites have lost their moral leadership over the country because they have failed to exercise that leadership with justice. Fear and coercion alone will be available (quite adequately no doubt) to maintain the *status quo* before very long. Fear and coercion create hatred and determination, which can only end in violent eruptions.

If, as is possible, the growing non-voter middle class is able to establish some sort of unity, rather than being divided on the basis of racial classification, then it will constitute a significant force sooner rather than later. The revolutionary movements, which aborted at the end of the 1950's when, for example, the Langa march received virtually no support from the 'Coloured' Capetonians, and the 'Congress movement' was divided on the basis of state sponsored racial classification, could emerge on the basis of a greater unity among the non-voter leadership, rejecting the petty advantages that the 'Coloured' or Indian people hold over the Africans in the interests of a far greater common cause. At present, as then, there is great ambivalence among the 'Coloured' and the Indian people over their racial attitudes. On the one hand they reject white privilege as unjust, on the other they tend towards feelings of superiority towards the Africans. In the stable urban populations, with their growing middle class, the feelings of superiority can rapidly fade, whilst the sense of frustration in the face of white privilege only grows.

(e) *'Liberal opposition'*

Liberal readers of the English language press, members and friends of the Churches of the S.A. Council of Churches, those involved in the English universities or in the social science faculties of some Afrikaans universities and members of other liberal and/or Christian groups are inclined to seek for and to find signs of hope for their future in South Africa and for the eventual triumph of their cause. Their hopes, and their belief in the good that they can achieve by working from within South Africa are not shared by many of their old friends who have, for various reasons, become exiles. Cynics have shrugged off their efforts. 'They talk progressive, vote U.P. and thank God for the Nats', as one National Party candidate asserted during the 1970 elections. Others have observed the comfortable circumstances under which the majority of articulate white 'liberals' appear to live and the fact that the only constituency to return a Progressive to parliament has probably the highest *per capita* income in the country.

Within the broad category of 'liberal opposition' among the whites, there falls a range of political views which would cover just about the entire spectrum in some countries - from the free-booting capitalist democrat who sees the South African system as one in which opportunities for all can only lead to greater wealth for the already secure, through

to the leftist totalitarian who sees all events as leading to the ultimate dictatorship of the proletariat. The unity, such as it is, within the group is a unity of opposition to the status quo rather than an organic unity, a unity of interests rather than a unity of spirit or values.

Their numbers are small, and their influence correspondingly small politically, only their concentration in little groups might encourage them to imagine that they are more significant than they really are, a view maintained by the thoroughness with which their activities are observed by the security services.

Their role in the promotion of change would appear to lie in three main areas, the ideological, the human contacts, and the informational. By the articulate delineation of the goals of a just society, and by the suggestion of means, however currently unacceptable, for attaining those goals, the liberal academics and politicians can provide alternative policies which are carefully considered and which might become practically relevant in a time of crisis when panic might otherwise be the dominant motivating force. Further, by maintaining an intelligent and well informed critique of the status quo from clearly defined ideological positions, the liberals provide stable benchmarks against which the policies of the state can be evaluated by any who wish to draw conclusions from their observations. In any society there is a tendency for people to imagine that the middle of the road, the practical norm, is what is current today, even if by more international standards, or in comparison with previous situations, the current position is far to the right, or far to the left of that norm or average. If the totalitarian benchmarks are provided by comparison with Nazi Germany, Haiti or Russian control over its satellites, it is equally necessary to indicate the liberal benchmarks with their ideological principles and their institutional means of expressing those principles. Just as the emergence of the Herstigte Nasionale Party suggested that the National Party might be more moderate than some might have imagined previously, so the disappearance of the Liberal Party has put the Progressive Party in the (internationally) ludicrous position of the 'extreme left'.

The maintenance of human contacts is also a vital activity of the liberal opposition, although it is one liable to provide fewer gratifications to the paternalistic spirit in the future. One of the consequences of apartheid has been the reduction of informal personal contact across the barriers of racial classification. Fear, ignorance and inconvenience have bolstered the legal and residential barriers. Under such circumstances stereotypes based upon increasingly misleading evidence have tended to develop. For the whites the stereotypes are based upon the visible non-voters, i.e. domestic employees *(10)*, open-air labourers and others who cannot afford to travel in private vehicles. For the non-voters the stereo-

types are based largely upon the structured employment situation, upon the programmes conceived and carried out by the state and upon their experience with the state bureaucracy including the police force. Liberals will have to learn to listen rather than to lead, to develop the same sympathy with the aspirations and fears of the non-voters as they have developed with the aspirations and fears of the whites, to recognise that they have little more in common with the goals of Black power than they have with the reality of White power, and that agreeing with people in a *patronising attempt to ingratiate onesself is swiftly seen for what it really* is. The effort may be painful, but it will be necessary if the beleaguered bridges of hope are to survive the process of change and not be abandoned to a battle of totalitarian ideologies.

Finally there is the informational role. Apartheid has flourished in a climate of ignorance and self-deception. The defence of those charged with the prosecution of gross injustice in the past has always been either that they were obeying higher authority or that they did not know what was going on. But the systematic collection and publication of factual material on South Africa is of more importance than the mere compilation of the case for the prosecution after some hypothetical armageddon. Government servants who prepare policy plans, and electorates who support the various political parties are caught up in the vortex of self-deception. Whilst it will be argued by some that any sound research is likely to be used by the state to pursue its own programmes more efficiently, it is also an article of faith that truth is to be preferred to falsehood, and even from the viewpoint of liberal *real politik* it may be easier to predict the rational activities of an opponent than to predict and counter the irrational. And an understanding of events as they unfold in the present period will be of value in the future re-organisation of South Africa which will in time take place.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

In the social structure of South Africa the dominant position is held by voter or white led institutions. Despite considerable differences of interest and moral values which would appear to create internal conflicts, the common interest in the continuation of white control ensures that the overwhelming weight of institutional pressure is against change in the direction of a just (as distinct from a slightly less unjust) society. In terms of their real power, the non-voters' institutions are currently unable to exert significant pressure upon the whites to compel major concessions in the direction of a just society.

Within the informal structure of South Africa, the broad cultural and interest groups, there is a greater susceptibility for change, a greater responsiveness to overseas pressure, a greater possibility of unorganised

explosions of **rage** against the *status quo.* The total situation might be compared to that of the Middle East, where a small, technologically and organisationally superior country is surrounded by larger, poorly organised and resentful neighbours. The Arabs can lose a dozen times, the Israelis can only lose once. But while the Israelis may be fairly certain of winning in the foreseeable future, they would prefer to come to some sort of accommodation which will de-fuse the angry resentment of their neighbours and make peace possible. The saving in human misery on both sides may make sacrifices of land and tight control over the Arabs in Israel worth-while to the majority of Israelis. The voteless masses in South Africa can also lose a dozen times, while the voters can only lose once. The voters too may decide, in the course of time, that while repression may seem to be the better part of valour, the human and material cost is too great both for themselves and for their victims. But they must be fully informed of just what that human and material cost is.

FOOTNOTES

1. Cf. Malinowski B.: *A Scientific Theory of Culture.*
2. H.W. van der Merwe and J.J. Buitendag: Some Sources of Differentiation among White South Africans'. ms. 1970. Table 6.
3. 'The Dutch Reformed Church in South Africa and the Problem of Race Relations' (Report of the ad hoc commission for race relations appointed by the Federal Council of the Dutch Reformed Churches in South Africa) undated, p.6.
4. H.W. van der Merwe and J.J. Buitendag. *Op cit.* Table 6.
5. *Ibid.*
6. M.G. Whisson: 'The Coloured People'. (In Peter Randall (Ed.): *South Africa's Minorities.* Spro-cas 1971) passim.
7. M.G. Whisson and W.M. Weil: *Domestic Servants.* S.A.I.R.R. 1971. Chapter 3.
8. M.G. Whisson. *Op cit.* p. 56.
9. H.W. van der Merwe and J.J. Buitendag. *Op cit.* Table 3.
10. M.G. Whisson and W.M. Weil. *Op cit.* Chapter 3.

Chapter Four

CHANGE THROUGH THE INSTITUTIONAL NETWORK

L. douwes dekker

IT IS GENERALLY accepted that change in the apartheid system through revolution can, in the foreseeable future, be ruled out *(1)*. At the same time it is recognised that economic development brings about changes in the structure of the racial composition of the labour force *(2)*. On the production side, the nature of this economic change is both quantitative (that is, increasing numbers of Africans, Coloureds and Indians are being absorbed in the various sectors of the economy), *(3)* and qualitative (in that more job responsibility is being given to African, Coloured and Indian workers). The possible favourable impact of this qualitative aspect in terms of social mobility is not realised because the African, Coloured and Indian workers are not fully rewarded, either in terms of status or increased salary *(4)* and furthermore social integration of people in the same earning group cannot take place because of Group Areas Act proclamations *(5)*. On the consumption side, the 'Bantu Market' has become a target of sales campaigns and specific management courses on the topic are organised *(6)*. But the implication of making the African worker conscious of his importance as a consumer and creating expectations and unnecessary wants which, for the lower paid people, cannot easily be fulfilled, has not been analysed.

The unresolved question is whether economic change merely reinforces the *status quo* or whether it does bring about meaningful social change towards a more just society. In negative terms, a recession in the economy and a consequent drop in the standard of living of all racial groups will bring serious consequences in terms of industrial unrest. But a programme of action to work with or through economic changes

towards a more acceptable form of a shared or common society cannot aim to bring about economic recession.

I.   SCOPE FOR ACTION

The stalemate reached in the argument about the actual effects resulting from economic change can be broken if it is accepted that the term 'economic change' is not specific enough and refers to a variety of different events. It is necessary to isolate those which arise out of activities which can be influenced. Economic change is not in itself a direct catalyst for the bringing about of a more just society; the assumption that forces of economic change will bring about such a society in a pre-determined manner, cannot be upheld. At most it can be said that economic change can loosen certain structures and hence bring about the possibility of improvement. The question is, how can the possibilities arising from the loosening of economic structures, be realised.

It is necessary to analyse the influence of economic change on the institutional and organisational network and vice versa. Every day a vast number of decisions are taken by committees, boards of management, clubs, organisations, vigilance groups and action committees; these have small direct relevance and are possibly insignificant in terms of their immediate effects on the *status quo* and the apartheid system. But the total impact of such decisions in the course of time can, if influenced, ameliorate inequities. If decisions are taken, it means that there is a *choice of alternatives and the actual choice made is not necessarily* pre-determined by economic forces or made in terms of economic criteria. Alternative courses of action suggest that there is scope for influencing the decision-making process within a variety of organisations and committees.

The blame for South Africa's discriminatory racial system cannot be placed solely at the door of the Government and the ever-growing bureaucratic State Departments. The on-going process of industrialisation is directed, to an important extent, by the managerial elite. The value system of this elite, particularly as it governs their roles as entrepreneurs and directors, must be determined and, if necessary, challenged; they must be made to account for the decisions they take. This is very difficult because the decisions taken by individuals in their roles as directors, officers and executive members, are recorded in terms of the company or organisation concerned. Hence the corporate body acts as a shield which cannot easily be made to account for its action or challenged on the equity of its decisions.

It must also be accepted that many of the decisions taken by the managerial elite and the impact of these decisions on the socio-economic

structure, never reach the public eye or ear. Business leaders prefer to operate with little or no public interference and without having to justify their decisions and the consequent lines of action taken by the organisations they represent. There might well be just cause for such an approach in certain instances, but this does not mean that business leaders need not be confronted with the implications of their decisions. Such confrontations could be brought about within the sanctions of the board room or committee room and without the direct or even indirect help of the press and other public pressures.

The value systems of business leaders are affected and modified by the prevalent attitudes expressed by leaders of socio-cultural organisations, particularly those which represent the *status quo* (7). Businessmen do not want to appear to act in terms of values or principles outside the given norms of their social situation. But this sensitivity makes businessmen over-cautious regarding the actual scope they have in making decisions for example, connected with training of people within their organisations, promotion of people to more senior positions, payment of adequate wages, and ensuring that employees, in their contact across the colour line, use polite forms of address, etc. (8).

The assumption is made, in this paper, that there is a measure of goodwill to be realised in all organisations and this could make South African society more acceptable. Furthermore, through organisational confrontations, a more just society can be brought into being. Organisations generally work in the dark and, whether deliberate or not, are getting away with organisational murder or other forms of violence. Any society undergoing industrialisation and hence having to accommodate conflicting interests, operates through organisations and institutions but the ethics and morals which guide organisational behaviour are primitive. The problem is that organisations cannot be easily punished or made responsible for their actions although individual members of an organisation can be, but individual members of an organisation will claim that they are powerless in their roles as officials, ordinary members or executive members to correct inadequacies or wrong practices.

Guilt is not easily pinned down when the offence has been committed by a corporate body, whether business or socio-cultural organisation. The ideal would be for some form of self-regulating mechanism to be incorporated in an organisation's activities. But this is wishful thinking. Codes of behaviour must be established in order that the activities of organisations can be assessed in terms of objective criteria.

The problems arising from immoral organisational behaviour are not peculiar to South Africa. Whenever people hold privilege, they are loath to give it up. All sorts of means are used by the privileged to protect their position and to entrench their power through institutional and

organisational control. Operation in one organisation and the need to maintain control as well as to attain goals, requires involvement in other organisations. As a result, power channels are established between organisations. The purpose of such contact is either to assist and co-operate regarding mutual goals, or, in case of conflicting interests, to reconcile and establish acceptable boundaries of operation. These power channels which relate institutions and organisations to each other form an intricate network through which control is exercised over the mass of the people. Influence can and must be brought to bear on this network to bring about a more acceptable form of a shared society.

The peculiarity of the South African situation is that the whites are completely in charge of this institutional and organisational network. Not only in the sphere of the Government do whites form the Executive, but in all spheres of activity which are governed by institutional decision-making, whites have exclusive say. In this respect, the imperative under-lying the ideology of separate development has resulted in one significant possibility which must be explored. This possibility is the formation of separate institutions and organisations in all spheres of activity by each race group. Such separate institutional development would not have been allowed under a different ideology and has given the African people, in particular, scope for exerting influence. The corollary of this imperative is that separate institutions and organisations can only function in the respective separate states and hence their scope is limited, except through so-called multi-national involvement. But the reality of labour inter-dependence of the race groups dictates that these separate institutions must exercise power and control beyond their respective nations. Hence it is in, and through, the institutional and organisational network that the reconciliation of the paradox of separate development and labour inter-dependence must take place.

In the concluding paragraphs of this paper some remarks will be made regarding the significance of the all-African South African Students' Organisation (S.A.S.O.) and the representations by the Soweto Urban Bantu Council to employer organisations regarding wages. These separate organisations, which have only recently started to exert themselves, have been given a legitimate base from which to operate. Their presence cannot be ignored. How they will develop, what demands they will make, how they will be received by the existing white-oriented institutional and organisational network and what actual effects will result from such confrontation, constitutes a sphere of exciting possibilities. Alan Paton has suggested that the 'new instruments of power' which have been created by separate development for the African, Coloured and Indian people should be supported *(9)*.

II.   CONCEPTUAL CONSIDERATIONS

In order to give some idea of the forces at play in the institutional and organisational network of an industrial society, certain concepts must be elaborated upon. An understanding of these conceptual considerations will allow those areas to be identified where influence can be exerted.

(a)   Unseen or Hidden Association

It is often said that if South Africa is not following the path of separate development, then the fact of an integrated society must be accepted. The term 'integration' has certain emotional overtones and, in any case, is not very accurate, as the social and to a large extent cultural separation of the races has become, in the foreseeable future, an irrevocable fact (5).

Implied in the term integration is a distinction made by Prof. Kwant between what he calls 'I-possessions' or 'I-goods' and 'we-possessions' and 'we-goods' (10). The I-goods or individual goods are those which are meant for individual consumption. But any industrial society provides many other goods and services which, because of their nature and structure cannot be regarded as individual goods. The road system, the network of railways, the telephone service, the Electricity Supply Commission and other public boards, unemployment insurance schemes and pension schemes, financial dealings, retail associations and the central business districts of towns are all goods or services which have no direct purpose for the individual (although essential to the quality of his life) but are highly significant for the community. It might be more appropriate, instead of using Prof. Kwant's term of 'we-goods', to use the term 'common goods' and services. This distinction between individual goods and common goods emerges more specifically as industrialisation progresses and technological advancements are made. It is interesting to note that the increase in consumer goods so characteristic of our modern society has only come about because of the establishment of more prevailing common goods. Industrialisation has also brought in its wake common or community problems. Some of these problems are the need for preventative health measures, consumer protection, and protection against all forms of pollution, crime and drug abuse, etc.

Prof. Kwant argues that the increased emergence of common goods has brought forth a new form of sociability. Here arises a paradox in that the great potential for individualisation in modern society has only been made possible by the emergence, on a different dimension, of this new form of sociability or interdependence. The more people use individual goods, the more they are dependent on the community service for common goods. The more individual cars there are, the more essential is an effective road system. The more electrical household appliances are developed

to emancipate the housewife, the greater her dependence on electricity to perform all her tasks. If electricity (a common good) fails, then the independence of the housewife is denied expression and a type of regression can set in.

The term sociability implies that people have or should have a certain awareness of their common interest or interdependence. In South Africa, the existence of common goods, and the resulting sociability, have been pushed into the background and attempts have been made to deny their existence. For example, separate entrances attempt to deny the fact that a postal service is a common good and that once a stamp has been placed on a letter the postal system makes no differentiation as to how that letter is processed. Where financial costs have made it impossible, no separation of facilities exists, as, for example, with road systems. Because of this phenomenon, the term 'hidden association' might more adequately describe, in South Africa, the sociability resulting from common goods. The term hidden or unseen association describes the reaction of fear on the part of certain interest groups when they are confronted with the realisation that the four race groups are related and interdependent on each other.

The increased emergence of common goods and services (and hence greater entrenchment of the new form of sociability) requires that all parties participating in the hidden association must be given a share in the control of the administrative machinery and decision-making function, and hence in organisations responsible for this unseen association. This requirement arises because those who take decisions must have available to them, and act upon, a feedback from all those who receive the common good or use the common service. This feedback is not forthcoming unless all interests are represented *(11)*. South Africa is facing the problem of giving all its peoples representational rights. The thrust of the hidden association is now manifested in the institutional and organisational network and will cause a crisis which might well become the characteristic of the Seventies. There is no easy formula to meet the issues involved.

(b)   Inter-Institutional and Intra-Organisational Crises

Mention must be made of certain peculiarities which are becoming more and more apparent in the organisational network prevading South Africa and the crises organisations are facing. As pointed out, the peculiarities of South Africa's organisational network arise from the fact that those controlling the organisations are white persons. Only in some cases are Coloureds, and only in a very few cases are Africans active in the institutional network *(12)*. It is particularly the executive powers which the whites control. The African and Coloured people are excluded from the established organisational and institutional activities because

separate development dictates that they can only develop organisations in their own areas or spheres. But the requirement that each race group should develop in its own sphere is leading to an interesting type of confrontation. Where each of these race groups is forming national organisations in spheres which really relate to the servicing or producing of a common good, a crisis is emerging. The question is, how can two or more national bodies operating in the same common field meet in order to work towards mutually satisfying goals. Sport is a significant example, and the organisational crisis South Africa is facing is already apparent in this sphere. Sporting bodies representing African, Coloured or Indian members are either operating on a racial basis or on a non-racial basis. The latter bodies at this stage do not trust or want to meet the equivalent white bodies *(13)*. The white bodies act in a ham-handed manner in an attempt to solve the problems regarding international expectations *(14)*. The question of non-racial sport and the demands made on South African sport policies by other nations, are issues which are bringing about significant change. The decisions being made by white cricket clubs for or against racially mixed cricket and the fact that the issue has progressed from individual clubs through provincial level to the S.A. Cricket Association means that the organisational network is being forced to take decisions and action instead of the usual tactic of laying the blame on the government *(15)*. It is interesting that a non-white team has subsequently tested the sincerity of the decisions taken by some white cricket clubs, by applying for affiliation to the Transvaal Cricket Union. The application by this Indian club was rejected two years ago *(16)*.

Prof. Kwant suggests that *when the hidden association is denied* existence or expression on one level - and the requirement that each race group should develop its own institutions separately is a case in point - then the presence of this hidden association will emerge on a higher level and demand to be attended to and given form and content.

The forms through which hidden association is expressed need not always be satisfactory and such expression does not automatically lead to a more just society. The form of the organisational expression which the hidden association takes is dependent on the understanding and awareness of the people who administer it and the people who exercise executive powers. Institutional violence or organisational injustices can still be perpetuated, but whenever the hidden association finds expression, structures are loosened and the possibility arises for change towards a more just society.

The Government is aware of the trend for the hidden association to emerge and tries to prevent it or at least expresses its displeasure against any person or organisation wanting to assist and guide its emergence.

Some recent examples where the hidden association is trying to emerge are listed below. Whether in each of the examples mentioned the organisational injustices are made less severe cannot be said from the description of what happened as reported in newspapers. Dr M. Whisson has suggested that some adjustments made by organisations are a compromise between internal *verkramptheid* and good external relations.

1.   The decision by the Soweto Urban Bantu Council to convene a conference of members of various Bantu Councils and Advisory Boards in order to 'exchange views and learn to improve our lot'. The Department of Bantu Administration objected to this idea because there is no provision for it in legislation, but the Soweto Urban Council decided to go ahead with the plan despite this objection *(17)*.

It is also significant that the Bantu Labour (Settlement of Disputes) Act does not provide for works committees, established by the Act, to form a co-ordinated body and meet to exchange views and ideas.

2.   The suggestion by the Jaycee South Africa to extend the Junior Sportsman of the Year Award to a non-white sportsman *(18)*.

3.   The change in the constitution of the South African Olympic and National Games Association in order that non-white delegates could become members *(19)*.

4.   The demand made by the Southern Durban Civic Federation (an Indian body representing 200,000 ratepayers) to be given direct representation on the Durban City Council in order to have a voice in the running of the civic affairs of the city *(20)*.

5.   The financial aid, advice and contact being given by the South African Institute of Personnel Management to the non-European Personnel Training and Development Association *(21)*.

6.   The suggestion that a special committee be established on which Coloured and Asian delegates serve to advise the Management Committee of the Johannesburg City Council on Coloured and Indian affairs *(22)*.

7.   The drastic changes in student organisations. In 1971, NUSAS, because of the existence and viability of SASO, accepted a project-orientated role to work for change amongst its white members. As a result the University Christian Movement has emerged as an organisation linking the interests of all students. 'The University Christian Movement provides a meeting ground where the differences that have emerged in NUSAS and SASO can be looked at and worked on, while not infringing on the autonomy of Blacks and Whites' *(23)*.

8.   The acceptance during 1971 of the African Independent Churches Association as an affiliated member of the South African Council of Churches. Furthermore, in 1971 that body also elected a Coloured President, which, it is felt, 'might have some influence in stemming the threatened Black breakaway from the Church because of the emergence of Black theology' *(24)*.

9.   A proposed meeting between the Christian Institute and a group of theologians in Potchefstroom to discuss the position of the Coloured people. The proposed meeting was allegedly called off because of the publicity given to it *(25)*.

10.   The conference convened by the Interdenominational African Ministers Association of Black cultural and educational organisations to discuss the future of the African people *(26)*.

11.   The emergence of a number of private or informal groups in order to work out patterns of future development. These groups have, wherever possible, shunned publicity.

Some of these are:-

(a)   the unofficial formation of an enlightened student group on the Pretoria University campus;

(b)   the formation of a study group called Synthesis, consisting of prominent members from the various racial groups, to promote dialogue and round-table discussions *(27)*;

(c)   the multi-racial 1971 conference organised by the United States and South African Leadership Exchange Programme, held behind closed doors, to discuss the common problems facing the different groups in South Africa.

A significant instance of the government's attempt to prevent the establishment of the hidden association and its opposition to multi-racial organisations was the demand by the Department of Social Welfare in 1966 that welfare organisations should constitute themselves along separate racial lines. This was accompanied by a threat that government assistance would be withdrawn as well as registration as welfare organisations from any bodies which did not comply. In the majority of cases the necessary constitutional changes were made but, as Judge O. Schreiner pointed out, 'In fairness, it should be added that encouraging racial groups to try to help themselves has undoubted merit. But the compulsory limitation of welfare activities across the lines of race has nothing to recommend it. The freedom of strong and independent voluntary bodies to conduct *their welfare work without subjection to ideological state control is*

essential to a healthy society' *(28)*.

It is because of this structural requirement postulated by Kwant that organisations concerned with preventative health services, sport, labour relations, consumer protection, drug prevention, training programmes, pollution campaigns, productivity drives, welfare services etc. are finding or will find themselves in a predicament. There should be only one body in each of these areas or at least a co-ordinating body if these issues are to be effectively dealt with.

(c)   Institutional Violence and Organisational Injustices

South Africa's withdrawal from international organisations and attempts by the rest of the world to isolate her can be interpreted as indicating that South Africa's social and legal systems violate human rights. South Africa had to withdraw from the International Labour Organisation, for example, because it could not uphold the conventions laid down by that organisation and ratified by countries affiliated to it.

To deprive a person of his rights is to do violence to him *(29)*. But it is not always realised sufficiently, or it is conveniently forgotten, that the injustices carried out against a racial group and hence the resulting violence against members of that group are reflected in the institutional network. The institutions and organisations which accommodate the conflicting interests in a modern industrial society reflect the socio-legal system and hence perpetuate discrimination in a discriminatory society and as such, commit violence and injustice. The sad fact is that the injustices are not generally recognised because institutional and organisational behaviour takes on, whatever is done, a form of respectability. In view of this, criticism by Christians of the discrimination practised within their own churches is encouraging.

The distinction between violence and injustice is not easily made, when it comes to the institutional and organisational network. Violence is committed because Africans are not given right of freedom of association. The various organisations concerned with labour relations, such as trade unions, employers' organisations, industrial councils and wage boards determinations perpetuate or support this violence, and as such organisationalised violence is committed. It could be argued that when attempts are made to rectify this violence within the system, then only organisationalised injustices are committed. For example, a trade union or industrial council which tries to compensate for the fact that African workers have no trade union power can alleviate the violence of the situation, but cannot negate the injustice still inherent in the organisational network.

It is for this reason that overseas opinion and organisations cannot accept or support anything in South Africa which is not aimed at doing away with the inherent violence, whereas organisations which operate

in South Africa believe that they can alleviate the position by continuing to work towards a more just society within the limits of the system. But they can only transform the violence into an injustice.

The urban African people are regarded as temporary workers in the urban areas, and, with the Coloured and Indian people, meet with either legal or social colour bars in all spheres of activities. The organisational network, which is concomitant with industrialisation, and through which the process of technological change takes place, cannot escape incorporating in its structure the inherent violence and hence commits discrimination. Whether the respective organisations in their activities and decisions commit institutional violence or organisationalised injustice can only be ascertained through an analysis of each situation.

(d) Breadth of Perspective

Sociologists of the symbolic interactionist school argue that human beings and groups only react to that part of the environment of which they are aware. This implies of course that there is a range of environments which a person can experience and furthermore that the sensitivity of a person or a group to the envrionment can be augmented. The term 'breadth of perspective' is used to describe this phenomenon and implies further that for any issue or problem, a range of alternative solutions can be conceived of, depending on the person's (or the organisation's) sensitivity.

Thus the decision by the Polaroid Company to promote Africans to higher paid jobs and to donate money for the educational needs of Africans and Coloureds, was only taken when this company were made aware of the fact that there was an issue on which they could take decisions. Pressure was exerted on Polaroid in America to withdraw from South Africa. South Africa is known as a lucrative field of investment and business activity. Hence, an alternative had to be, and was, found. In this instance, the company had to account for its profitable operations in South Africa and its refusal to act in terms of the value system upheld in America. The whole Polaroid incident and resulting experiment has wide implications for social change (7 and 30).

The writer Warshay suggests that 'perspective is a capacity or potential of the actor that he brings to a situation and which determines the amount of meaningful responses possible in that situation; breadth of perspective refers to the broadness or scope of perspective, to the range of meaningness and ideas that make it up' (31).

The argument followed in this paper is that the breadth of perspective regarding decision-taking and hence subsequent scope of action in the organisational network can, and must be, broadened to take in the implication of the 'hidden association'.

(e)   Alternative in Action

The concept 'breadth of perspective' suggests that alternative courses of action or alternative solutions to a problem do exist when decisions are taken. If there are different courses of action, then a choice has to be made. At all times, therefore, the decision taken by organisations or the courses of action selected, must be examined to see whether the fairest course was taken, or whether alternative courses of action should not have been considered. That is, it is desirable that the sensitivities of the members of executive committees of all organisations be broadened.

III.   HOW THE MANIFESTATION OF THE UNSEEN ASSOCIATION AND INSTITUTIONAL VIOLENCE CAUSES INSTITUTIONAL CRISES AND CONFLICTS

To the extent that the majority of the people of South Africa cannot participate in the decision-making process regarding matters which affect them (thereby perpetuating discrimination) all those organisations which take action affecting all the peoples of South Africa, particularly those organisations concerned with the 'unseen or hidden association', commit in one way or another, a form of institutional violence or organisationalised injustice. The following examples illustrate the chaotic position organisations find themselves in and the nature of the crisis which is emerging:

1.   Waking Up

National co-ordinating organisations concerned with some aspect of a common good or common service cannot escape having either to decide to ignore the hidden association or to take action to recognise it. The following is a case in point. A national co-ordinating organisation active in the field of health, had affiliated to it various organisations who, in their services, covered people from all race groups. The peculiarities of South African society, however, resulted in certain members on the executive of that national body believing that the organisation should only take action regarding the interests of white persons. But, as Dr Bloomberg of the Mines Benefit Society has stated, health services are indivisible *(32)*. When the organisation was confronted with a request for assistance from an affiliated member which implied taking up difficulties experienced by Coloured persons, these executive members voiced their disapproval. Their protest had no validity as the constitution did not mention that only white interests could be served.

This national co-ordinating association is now more conscious of its need to represent the interests of all persons if its objective in the field of health, a common good, is to be achieved. Here is a case where the breadth of perspective of individual persons had to encompass the signifi-

cance of the hidden association and where certain members could not accept it. At present, the Executive Committee has averted the danger of a split in the organisation, but in all probability the 'verkrampte' members will either become inactive or resign their respective organisations from the national co-ordinating body. Either action will be negative and self-defeating.

2. *Facing Backwards*

The period of indecision which TUCSA (Trade Union Council of South Africa) faced in the period 1968/1969 as to whether its Constitution should exclude African trade unions was probably one of the first signs of the organisational crisis South Africa will face in the Seventies. TUCSA, in view of the rippling effects of the attack by the Minister of Labour on its bona fide open membership policy, decided, at a special conference, to alter its Constitution to allow only for membership from registered trade unions. As Africans are not defined as employees in terms of the Industrial Conciliation Act, their trade unions, although they can exist, cannot be registered. Hence, in effect, TUCSA cannot accept African trade unions as members. Only trade unions with Coloureds or Whites or mixed memberships of these two groups can belong. The African trade unions in existence have neither found, nor been given, an alternative home and, except for two, have all foundered.

By turning its back on the African workers and hence having to deny the existence of the hidden association particularly in the work situation, TUCSA has ceased to function effectively. Not only has its Constitution been changed, but its actual administrative machinery has been altered. The main function of a co-ordinating body is to further the aims of the trade union movement. TUCSA's orientation has become more to conserve its activities and to assist only the interests of those workers affiliated to it, rather than promote the development of the whole labour movement.

Furthermore, TUCSA's service functions have also been curtailed. But TUCSA is continually being called upon to comment on matters relating to the hidden association of workers. Hence it is still looked upon as representing the interests of all workers, i.e., being representative of the 'hidden association'. Since it cannot be effective in this field, its many statements have a hollow ring. Critical comment in the press, however, can be deceptive, since it suggests that action will result *(33)*. Recently, Arthur Grobbelaar, the General Secretary of TUCSA, in commenting on the increased wage gap between Black and White workers, blamed the Government. Such accusation, although valid, conveniently forgets to mention that TUCSA hardly ever makes representations, as it used to do, to Wage Board hearings *(34)*. The Institute of Race Relations is now attempting to make such representations when possible.

3.   *Breathing Space*

Some national co-ordinating organisations have not faced the problem which the two organisations quoted above have encountered. Thus, for example, the National Association of Pension and Provident Funds has not been confronted with an issue pertaining to the hidden association, although, as the chairman said in his 1970 annual report, the Association was pleased to welcome as members Funds for Africans, Coloureds or Indians. In time to come therefore, the organisational violence inherent in that association, will manifest itself. But whether the breathing space will be used to advantage is doubtful.

4.   *Marking Time*

Other national bodies (such as the Medical Association), although aware of the problems of having persons from all race groups as members, are doing nothing active about the implications of this. The argument put forward by the Medical Association of S.A. that executives consist of white doctors because members of the other racial groups are statistically small in numbers, cannot be accepted *(35)*. In Natal, decisions have been taken regarding annual meetings and the social functions attached to these meetings. The annual dinner of the Natal Coastal Branch was called off last year because Indian members could not be present *(36)*.

5.   *What is Help?*

A national employer organisation is consciously aware of the fact that its problems are the same as those faced by the African counterpart body. But a *modus operandi* regarding the type of dialogue they should enter into has not been worked out. The main stumbling block is the fact that these two bodies would have to make contact in order to solve their mutual problems. The type of contact envisaged by the white body is too paternalistic for the African body to accept.

6.   *If we Leave where do we go?*

The South African Association of Theatrical Managements has split because of the decision of one of its members, the Johannesburg Operatic and Dramatic Society, to proceed with the production of a play against the copyright owner's wishes *(37)*. Here, as in the first example quoted above, misunderstandings arose regarding the basis on which the association could function when J.O.D.S. applied for membership. A similar problem will be faced by the newly revived South African Journalists Association which is a non-racial body dedicated to the advancement of journalism *(38)*. The relationship between this body and the South African Society of Journalists has not yet been worked out.

7.   *Who are Consumers?*

The South African Co-ordinating Consumer Council has been established with government blessing and financial help and has appointed a director. If it is to become an effective body, it will also have to face the problem of the hidden association *(39)*. As the activities in any shop in the business area of Johannesburg show, the consumer is judged according to his purchasing power and not the colour of his skin. An attempt by the Germiston City Council to set aside certain days for African shopping and other days for European shopping met with little success *(40)*. The Consumer Council must become multi-racial in its services.

8.   *What is a Student?*

In student affairs, difficulties of representation have always been present. The National Union of South African Students, which claims to be able to represent the interests of all students, found that this claim was being challenged, and the black students' organisation, SASO, was established. The Afrikaanse Studentebond has also encountered difficulties in maintaining the interests of its Afrikaans members. The confusion which exists is seen from the attempts by Pretoria University students to form a new organisation which is to be called the 'South African Student Congress'. This organisation wants to draw up a Constitution to give students of every university equal hearing in matters of national student interest *(41)*. Yet, in the meantime, Pretoria University students decided not to attend a multi-racial student conference which was held in Johannesburg July, 1971 *(42)*.

Black leaders are increasingly rejecting attempts by multi-racial organisations to help them, advising them to work within white society. But at times these leaders still informally seek the help and advice of multi-racial organisations: they too cannot escape the hidden association.

9.   *Splitting up to come together*

It is a requirement of the Industrial Conciliation Act that when a mixed registered trade union (White and Coloured members) is in existence, its executive should consist of white members only. This requirement constitutes a form of organisational violence and the National Union of Distributive Workers decided that the only way they could overcome this violence was to split up into two separate racial bodies. In order to serve the common needs of distributive workers, informal liaison exists between the two bodies to ensure that the interests of all distributive workers are protected.

10.   *Leaving out as long as possible*

The opposite happened in regard to the Engineering Workers' Association. This trade union was originally also registered for mixed membership but when the Industrial Conciliation Act was amended, it split up and formed a White union and a small Coloured union in Cape Town for Coloured artisans. Although repeated representations were made by Coloured workers in the Transvaal, the White union did not want to assist them. After more than ten years of making representations to the White body, Coloured electrical workers approached the Garment Workers' Union of South Africa for assistance, Miss Anna Scheepers, the President of the G.W.U., successfully organised the union and obtained registration for them. At this stage, however, the Engineering Workers' Union saw the threat of an opposition body and tried to obtain control of the Coloured workers by extending the jurisdiction of the Cape-based Coloured union to the Transvaal. This was, however, prevented through the efforts of Miss Scheepers, who refused to accept the undemocratic requirement in the Coloured Union's constitution that the secretary of the White union should automatically become the secretary of the Coloured union, unless he himself declined *(43)*.

Coloured people have been slow to use their trade union rights, as entrenched in the Industrial Conciliation Act. The Amalgamated Union of Building Trade Workers, which was registered as a mixed union and organised Coloured workers in the Cape, refused to do the same in the Transvaal. As a result, the Coloured and Malay Building Workers' Union was formed in the Transvaal. This union was not effective, however, and even after a decade had not penetrated the organisational network.

A change occurred in 1971 when the Amalgamated Union of Building Trade Workers sought the incorporation of the Coloured workers. This was not an altruistic gesture, but resulted from a desire to keep control and to bolster membership and hence income after the Blanke Bouwerkers Vakbond broke away from the Amalgamated Union. This breakaway was the result of the ending of job reservation in the building trade in the Transvaal with respect to Coloured workers *(44)*.

The Johannesburg Transport Workers' Union retained mixed registration although they did nothing about bringing in Coloured workers, who were organised in a separate union until this was squashed by court action instigated by the JTWU. When, however, it became impossible for the JTWU to prevent Coloureds being employed in the Johannesburg Transport Department, the JTWU accepted them, magnanimously, as members. But, by the requirements of the Industrial Conciliation Act, these Coloured workers do not have an effective say in matters affecting them. This is a neat example of the perpetuation of organisational violence: first nothing was done about recognising and representing Coloured workers, and then

they were prevented from effective participation in matters affecting themselves *(45)*.

11. *In whose interests?*

The Students' Representative Council of the University of the Witwatersrand faced an interesting problem when asked why its Rag Committee used a segregated function to raise funds for services for the Coloured community *(46)*. Nused, a branch of NUSAS, agreed by a narrow majority not to hold segregated fund-raising functions *(47)*. The Institute of Race Relations has faced the same problem, but does hold segregated functions. The problem may appear relatively petty, but it appears that many non-white people cannot see the good of any action which transgresses basic principles.

12. *Whose feast?*

The Wits. SRC rejected an invitation from the University of Pretoria to hold a joint Republic Day celebration, holding that it was rather an occasion for mourning. Students of the Johannesburg College of Education took a similar decision *(48)*.

13. *All cars are not the same*

When the Automobile Association took over the Royal Automobile Club, the interests of African, Coloured and Indian motorists (who had been represented by the RAC) were neglected. A non-white automobile owners' club is now in existence, and it has asked the AA for some form of liaison. The AA has not, however, taken up the challenge *(49)*. In time to come, the two bodies must co-ordinate their activities in order to overcome common problems. The AA has, in the meanwhile, resisted efforts to have its constitution altered to allow membership of race groups other than white.

14. *Are sewerage problems different?*

A township in Natal has been declared Indian and has an Indian town clerk. The presence of a member of another racial group at annual conferences of the Natal Muncipal Association is therefore going to create a problem *(50)*. The issues debated at such conferences are the same, whether the service rendered by an authority is for White or Indian persons. The journalist, Tertius Myburgh, supports the contention that the hidden association must find expression: 'A separate municipal association for Indians has been suggested. But even then it would become essential for the Indian body to meet with its White counterparts if there is to be orderly co-ordination of municipal affairs' *(51)*.

15.   *Keeping peace by exemption*

As the vast number of people who have no representational rights namely the Coloured, Indian and African have been forced into accepting positions as workers, operators and labourers, they are particularly affected by those organisations which govern their conditions of work and wage levels. There are two wage-regulating mechanisms: Wage Board Determinations which are established by a Government-appointed board when there is no industrial council, and industrial council agreements. The latter are made when a registered trade union and an employer association meet and agree upon the minimum wages and working conditions in an industry. The industrial council has to administer such agreement during the period of its operation. The Minister of Labour, by exemption, extends all agreements to non-parties (which include the African workers). To the extent that Africans cannot belong to the registered trade unions in a particular industry, organisational violence is committed. To the extent that the agreements administered by industrial councils are extended to cover Africans who had no say during the negotiations, further organisational violence is committed. By extending the agreement through exemption to include African workers (which implies that African workers have to pay weekly contributions towards the administrative expenses of an organisation), further organisational violence is committed. The point made here is that although it is a good thing that Africans are protected by industrial council agreements, the organisational violence involved does not make for a just system *(52)*.

The following table gives a breakdown by race of the workers covered by Wage Boards Determinations and industrial council agreements.

	Whites	Coloured	Asians	Africans
Industrial council agreements	210,966	147,400	41,934	468,815
Wage Board determinations	110,396	57,795	16,872	290,502

The interests of the African workers and other unorganised workers are supposed to be protected on both these bodies by Department of Labour officials in terms of the Bantu Labour (Settlement of Disputes) Act. Although these officials perform a positive function, they cannot do justice to their responsibility. No official can, without working for an industry or being continually active in an industry, know enough about that industry to judge matters relating to reclassification, wages, dilution of labour and conditions of work. These officials should at least be present at all industrial council and other sub-committee meetings, but the shortage of staff and their other responsibilities, namely, trying to

settle numerous disputes between employers and African workers, make it impossible for them even to attend the three-yearly negotiations of an industrial council. This criticism has been applied particularly to the manner in which these officials have exercised their responsibility in the engineering industry, but it applies equally to all industrial council negotiations and meetings, as well as to Wage Board hearings *(53)*.

Because they have to contribute to the administrative costs of industrial councils (except in one case), nearly half a million African workers are victims of the organisational violence that is committed daily by these organisations. Industrial councils are service organisations, yet African workers, and many Coloured workers (for example, in the engineering industry), have no direct representation on them. When a worker who has no recourse to authority needs assistance or service from an official of an industrial council, it is clear that organisational violence may be committed. Even if a registered trade union should ensure that the needs of African workers are adequately attended to by industrial council officials, organisationalised injustice still exists.

The labour peace of which South Africa is so proud exists by exemption. As black awareness emerges more consistently, a challenge will be made to the industrial relations organisations. The practical problem is how the executive committees of the one hundred or more industrial councils can be made aware of their full responsibilities.

16.   When are they ready?

Through Urban Bantu Councils and Coloured Management Committees the African and Coloured people have the possibility of some say in matters like housing, transport, education and other civic affairs. The actual functioning of these bodies is, however, in many ways unsatisfactory. Because the Soweto UBC was ineffective, a 'shadow cabinet' was formed by some of the people of Soweto. This 'shadow cabinet' forced discussion on train accidents, after the UBC Transport Committee said that it had been attended to. As a result, the question of African train drivers received the attention of the UBC *(54)*.

The Port Elizabeth Coloured Management Committee recently walked out on account of 'disgust and disillusionment at the treatment dealt out to them by the City Council .... they claimed that although the Committee had been in existence for six years, the City Council had done little to accede to the requests made' *(55)*.

Although these committees and councils can eradicate some forms of organisational violence, their scope of action must be clearly spelled out, otherwise they will remain stooge committees.

CONCLUSIONS

What practical steps, arising from the above considerations, can be suggested? It stands to reason that an organisational structure is required to penetrate the institutional network and effect improvements. The following suggestion requires to be worked out in greater detail.

I. The arguments put forward suggest that the decision-making process within the whole range of cultural, business, social, educational and other interest organisations should be influenced to ensure that the breadth of perspective of executive members is broadened. This is to ensure that only those decisions are taken which work towards a more favourable form of a shared society. Much can be done within the present framework to ameliorate the position of the unorganised, the repressed and the exploited. The organisational network is complex and extensive and hence one can only hope that those South Africans who hold positions of responsibility in organisations will develop, in their roles as members or executives, greater consideration for all the people on whose behalf they take decisions. In order to make this effective, a code of ethics regarding organisational role behaviour is desirable.

Professor Lever's suggestions for a programme in race attitudes and human relations are commendable, but not specifically applicable to the problems arising from the 'unseen' or 'hidden association' *(56)*. His 'ten commandments' are not organisationally oriented. The ethical principles related to organisational behaviour should include the following points:

(i)   The common needs and the unseen association which each organisation serves should be clearly identified and the implications of these consciously accepted by its members and executive officials.

(ii)   All people affected by the decisions taken within an organisation should be consulted, even if only on an informal basis. In this way the breadth of perspective of those holding executive powers can be enlarged.

(iii)   Before decisions are taken, all the alternative avenues of action should be explored and the effects of the various possible decisions analysed. In order to do this some form of consultation with all concerned must be devised. (The unilateral decisions of the white South African Rugby Board and the white South African Cricket Association are examples of unethical organisational behaviour in that, without prior consultation, the former attempted to donate money to its non-white counterpart - which

was rejected - and the latter sought government permission to include non-white players in the team to tour Australia *(57)*.

(iv)   In the absence of effective multi-racial organisations in any particular field, viable uni-racial bodies should be established to give effect to points (ii) and (iii) above.

(v)   When decisions are taken, it should be carefully considered whether they are to be conveyed to the press and other media. If an organisation decides not to inform the press (and in some cases this might be justified) then a clear analysis should be made of the motives. Publicity should not be shunned simply because a decision may perpetuate some form of organisational violence or injustice. The English press forms an important reference group on what constitutes a just society, hence its reactions must be constantly borne in mind by those taking organisational decisions.

With regard to the formation of uni-racial bodies, there have been a number of experiences which would provide useful case studies: the relationships between the Christian Institute and African Independent Churches *(58)*, for example, and the creation of SASO. The latter's ability to enter into the small African organisational network, which NUSAS never could, is important. Black leaders have also to become aware of the hidden association and their responsibility toward it *(59)*.

II.   While it is desirable that the social conscience of people with institutional power is heightened as envisaged above, this is not a complete answer to the problems of organisational violence and injustice. Many blacks are tired of the 'soup kitchen' approach, regarding all forms of assistance by whites and their organisations as not really affecting the basic issues of discrimination inherent in the organisational network. Dr W.F. Nkomo recently said that Africans were rejecting whites and white leadership and were demanding to do things in their way, even at the risk of making blunders *(60)*.

Multi-racial organisations can no longer merely criticise the government; they must consider in what ways their own continued existence is justified and how they can meet the growing awareness of discrimination among black people. NUSAS seems to have gone furthest of the multi-racial organisations in attempting to deal with the institutional crisis resulting from acceptance of aspects of separate development and the emergence of black awareness. At its 1971 conference NUSAS decided to recognise SASO and to 'involve itself on black campuses where it was requested to do so' *(61)*. A further example of black awareness was the resignation of four non-white societies from the National

Catholic Federation of Students because they felt that 'no useful purpose could be served in maintaining a wishy-washy contact with whites' *(62)*.

The whites, and the organisations through which they exercise control in South Africa, have refused to recognise or have been unable to come to terms with the implications of the hidden association. The African group is now also beginning to refuse to accept the hidden association and the inevitable need for the races to come together on a common basis at the organisational level. Perhaps some form of black awareness and black power must be manifested before this working together can result. The responsibility of black leaders to the members of their own groups and also to the existing white controlling organisations is thereby becoming greater.

III. . Two recent suggestions have wide implications. The South African Foundation has urged that there should be contact between the leaders of the various race groups. This raises the question: to what extent have real leaders of the black groups been enabled to emerge and, in terms of the institutional network, is it not necessary first to ensure that such leaders are enabled to emerge? Professor S.P. Cilliers suggested that Africans and Coloureds who live in the urban areas should be given full citizenship rights: this implies that they must be allowed to become involved in the organisational network *(63)*.

The awareness of the need for change expressed by these suggestions probably reflects a far wider realisation amongst supporters of the *status quo* that all is not well.

IV. An educational programme should be initiated to ensure that people in organisations function effectively in terms of the forces described above. Africans have often been told that they are not ready for representative rights, but such readiness depends on their experience in the role-playing which organisational participation requires, particularly experience in the importance of working within the constitution. It is not merely a matter of how a chairman should behave at a meeting and the various points of procedure to be followed, but also of how the executive members of an organisation can, in order to further the interests of their organisation, participate in and influence the whole organisational network. The very fact that institutional violence and injustice exist indicates that whites need as much guidance as anyone.

V. The press should be asked to devote a section to reports on the decisions taken by organisations concerned with the hidden association. Coverage of such decisions is at present haphazard and scattered, and not all the relevant facts are given.

VI. An ombudsman, or ombudsman-organisation, could be established

in the field of institutional relations. There are going to be many more examples of people working in the same field but operating through separate organisations. In such cases, some form of arbitration or conciliation must be created, to assist with problems arising from organisational behaviour and involving some form of organisational violence. While various forms of watchdog organisation exist - the consumer council, associations of shareholders, the advertising standards association etc. - they are concerned with specific interests only.

The envisaged ombudsman for industrial relations will differ, for example, from a proposed South African Race Relations Board as follows:

(i) It would not be appointed and financed by the government. The nuclei of power in the institutional network should be prepared to finance the running expenses of the organisation if they recognise their participation in organisational injustice.

(ii) It would not deal only with problems of race relations, since many institutional decisions do not deal directly with such problems.

(iii) It would not deal with problems of race relations between individuals *(64)*.

If institutional violence is one of the terms of reference of the ombudsman body, then it would have to point out how organisations involved in such violence could tackle their common problems. If, for example, an industrial council is about to start negotiations for increased wages, then the ombudsman body could ask any relevant black organisations to submit evidence.

The Soweto Urban Bantu Council recently requested a meeting with employer organisations in order to explain to them the need for increased African wages. It should be noted that these employer organisations serve the interests of industry and commerce as a whole, and not specific sectors. After the meeting, the organisations promised to take the matter back to their respective executives *(65)*. The crucial question is, what effective consequences will result from this organisational confrontation, and could not more tangible steps have been taken and firmer promises extracted from the employer organisations? As already pointed out, there are two wage-regulating instruments, industrial councils and the Wage Board. Will the people serving on these take any heed? Furthermore, has a dangerous precedent been set in that a political body, which does not have to work within limits in its demands, has acted on behalf of unrepresented workers? *(66)*.

The real effectiveness of the confrontation was lost because the people who could have taken effective decisions, i.e. those per-

petuating some form of organisational violence, were not present. Again, the alternative forms of action had not been fully examined and those concerned seem to have rushed rather blindly into action which appeared appropriate. The importance of the meeting is that it was conceived and successfully convened *(67)*. It illustrates the degree to which white organisations are taking cognisance of the instruments of power allowed the African people within the separate development framework.

VII.   The role of movements in maintaining public awareness of the hidden association should be examined. The Committee for Clemency which appealed for an amnesty for political prisoners to coincide with Republic Day, 1971, showed that members of different race groups can be brought together to pursue a common purpose *(68)*. The movement for the abolition of the death penalty, which has now obtained a definite organisational form, is also an example of a common purpose being given expression.

VIII.   As suggested earlier, the whole question of publicity and organisational behaviour must be examined. The South African Society of Journalists and the South African Journalists' Association should be asked to lay down certain criteria. This would be relevant, for example, to the discussion at an annual conference of the South African Cricket Association where it was argued that multi-racial cricket and criticism of the Association's actions should not be tackled through publicity and press statements but through consultation behind the scenes *(69)*. Then there is the statement by the South African Lawn Tennis Union that details of its negotiations with the government regarding a declaration of principle on merit selection were kept confidential to avoid any public controversy *(70)*. Obviously certain principles are involved here which must be clarified. When can a meeting be closed? To what extent must the public be informed? What constitutes 'the public'? In many instances, the concept of 'the public' refers to white people. In this way, deception takes place. Thus the Star Seaside Fund appeals to the public but does not make it clear that the monies collected are for white children only *(71)*.

IX.   The question of service organisations and inter-racial contact also requires clarification. Johannesburg is faced with the problem of having African traffic policemen who have been told not to ticket a white person *(72)*. The shortage of white nursing staff also raises issues particularly now that dilution of the occupation of the nurse has been brought about so that the so-called menial tasks can be carried out by Coloured nurses *(73)*.

X.   In view of the complexity of the institutional network, a clearing house should be established to collect information about organisations

involved in the unseen association. The nature of the on-going process in the organisational network must be known, and a clearing house could scientifically gather as much information as possible with a view to publishing trends. There are probably a number of organisations whose decisions influence the extent to which South African society can be more just, but whose activities are not covered by the press. The clearing house envisaged would catalogue activities of all such organisations.

XI.   Many practices in the socio-economic system do not exist in terms of existing legislation but in spite of the requirements of this legislation. Either direct exemption has been granted from the legislation for such practices to take place or the letter of the law is simply not adhered to. Such practices include Africans using garden tools instead of trowels while laying bricks, White businessmen inviting businessmen from other race groups to functions where liquor is served, Coloured nurses in private nursing homes actually performing nursing duties, exemptions granted by the Minister of Labour so that African workers are covered by industrial councils, firms breaking the requirements of the Physical Planning Act and job reservation determinations and the National Development and Management Foundation holding seminars on 'neutral' ground so that members of more than one race group can attend *(74)*. These practices indicate where economic change is loosening structures in the social system. All these incidents should be analysed and be drawn to the attention of the ombudsman organisation for organisational relations.

The following examples should be borne in mind:-

1.   Can the National Productivity Institute, a Government body, do justice to its terms of reference (particularly in the field of projection of labour and productivity requirements), if it does not comment on those aspects of the South African legislative framework which are contrary to productivity improvements? This conflict that faces the N.P.I. is apparent in its second report for the clothing industry, where recommendations are contrary to the job reservation determination still in operation *(75)*.

2.   Can racially separate training colleges be established for each industry?

3.   Can health services be provided and preventative health measures be planned without acceptance of the inter-dependence of the race groups? What are the relevant organisations concerned doing about the crises they are facing?

4.   Can the problem of drug addiction be solved by racially separate

government departments?

5.   Can pollution be combated on a separate racial basis?

FOOTNOTES

1.   Little attention has been paid to the significance of unorganised and
       spontaneous outbursts by urban blacks. Schlemmer has commented on
       creation of such unrest through the communication of a 'developing
       social doctrine' (Schlemmer L: *The Negro Ghetto Riots*, SAIRR). This
       concept has not been further analysed, nor has the tenuous manner
       in which industrial councils maintain some semblance of industrial
       peace. Furthermore, scant attention has been paid to the possibility
       of pressure building up in the homelands and white-owned farms (see
       M. Landsberger: 'The Role of Peasant Movements and Revolts in
       Development', International Institute for Labour Studies, Bulletin 4,
       February 1968).
2.   Peter Randall: 'The Present Political Position' in *Anatomy of Apartheid*,
       Spro-cas, Johannesburg, 1970.
3.   Since 1960 the number of actively employed Africans, Coloureds and
       Indians has increased by 45% from 2,561,000 to 3,733,000, while the
       number of actively employed whites increased by 30%.
4.   1971 will be recognised as a turning point in the acceptance of the
       principle of equal pay for equal work, one example of which was the
       decision by two major banks to place Indian and Coloured staff on
       the same salary scale as whites.
5.   Different environmental conditions, partly caused by Group Areas
       proclamations, have created different needs and thus different forms
       of group action. Whereas the Sandton Action Committee, a vigilant
       white ratepayers' group, has fought road developments in their area,
       the black residents of Pimville, Soweto, have formed a civic guard
       to combat crime.
6.   The National Development and Management Foundation and the Institute
       of Marketing Management recently convened a conference to help
       businessmen gauge the potential of the R1,200m. African consumer
       market. *Rand Daily Mail* 16.4.71.
7.   *Newsweek* 29.3.71, p. 45: 'American firms have played no small role
       in this movement (building a self-sustained economy in South Africa);
       in fact, say the critics, they have gone beyond mere co-existence with
       apartheid and have actually extended it'.
8.   The suggestions by F.J. van Wyk regarding positive steps which foreign
       firms can take can be applied to all businesses. *Pro Veritate* April 1971.
9.   Alan Paton: 'Some Thoughts on the Common Society' in *Directions of
       Change in South African Politics*, Spro-cas, Johannesburg, 1971.
10.   Kwant R.C.: *Filosofie van de Arbeid*, De Nederlandsche Boekhandel,
       Antwerpen, 1964.
11.   It is because of this requirement that some industrial councils will in
       the long run fail to maintain peace unless African workers are given
       representational rights.
12.   The Indian people stand somewhat apart because they have always
       recognised the value of organisational methods to achieve objectives.
13.   'We accept nothing which makes us subservient to another body. We

are a non-racial body and we believe that merit only should count'. Mr Pather, secretary of the Southern African Lawn Tennis Union, commenting on the stipulation of the white body (SALTU) that players would not be eligible for the South African Open Tournament unless their clubs were affiliated to SALTU. (*Rand Daily Mail* 28.4.71).

14. 'No doubt Mr Cheetham and his Association's scheme (to include two unnamed Coloured cricketers) was intended seriously, and no doubt it had as its purpose the salvaging of the tour. But it falls short of freeing *the log jam in which South Africa's sporting relations are at the present time*. It is also not surprising that Mr Howa, president of the South African Cricket Board of Control, the non-white controlling body, which was not even consulted, should have rejected the Cheetham plan with contempt'. Denis Worrall, *Rapport* 18.4.71.

15. *Rand Daily Mail* 26.8.71 and *Sunday Times* 15.8.71.

16. *Rand Daily Mail* 14.9.71.

17. *Rand Daily Mail* 1.5.71.

18. Ibid 26.8.71.

19. Ibid 16.6.71.

20. Ibid 8.6.71.

21. Ibid 28.6.71.

22. Ibid 31.8.71.

23. *Race Relations News* August 1971.

24. *Rand Daily Mail* 5.8.71 and 6.8.71.

25. Ibid 30.6.71.

26. Ibid 12.8.71.

27. *Sunday Times* 12.9.71.

28. Schreiner O.: *The Contribution of English Law to South African Law*, Juta & Co., Cape Town, 1967, p. 71.

29. Prior A.: 'Towards a Theology of Transformation', *Pro Veritate* Vol. IX, No. 9.

30. 'The headquarters of these international companies must be confronted with the discriminatory system in South Africa and they must be made aware that the values they uphold in their own countries are being violated in South Africa, for example trade union rights .... These companies must not be pressurised to boycott South Africa, but must publically, on the international level, be made to relate what they are doing for the oppressed in South Africa .... Nowhere in the publicity regarding the Polaroid incident is mention made of the rights of workers to participate in the decision-making process affecting their wages and working conditions. It is time that Africans are promoted to more senior positions, but not all African workers can be promoted. Hence African workers must be given a say in matters affecting them'. (Editorial in the journal of the Garment Workers' Union of South Africa).

31. Warshav L.: 'Breadth of Perspective' in Rose A. (ed.): *Human Behaviour in Social Processes*, 1961.

32. 'As soon as it is accepted that preventative and curative steps have to be taken in order to provide for the health of a country, an important fact emerges. As Dr Bloomberg said, 'Health services are indivisible. The same treatment or preventative measures must be applied to all race groups'. Where people of different races work together, the possibility of infection arises and all must be treated equally. The Garment Workers' Union has always acted in terms of this principle ....' (Editorial in the journal of the Garment Workers' Union of South Africa, 26.2.71).

33. *The Star* 20.3.71.
34. *Financial Mail* 26.3.71.
35. *The Star* 19.9.70.
36. *Rand Daily Mail* 27.10.70.
37. The Copyright Tribunal granted JODS the right to produce 'Man of La Mancha' although the authors refused permission. *Star* 10.3.71.
38. *Rand Daily Mail* 20.3.71.
39. The council's aims are to act as a watchdog and seek out exploitation, and to make consumer information available. *Star* 30.9.70.
40. *Star* 24.9.70.
41. *Ibid* 26.3.71 and 24.2.71.
42. *Rand Daily Mail* 20.4.71.
43. Report by Miss A. Scheepers to the International Metal Workers' Federation, 25.9.70. See also TUCSA's 16th Annual Conference Proceedings.
44. *Star* 11.6.71.
45. *Rand Daily Mail* 18.11.70.
46. The Wits. SRC resolved the matter by deciding that although student activities should be integrated, fund-raising activities could be segregated. *Rand Daily Mail* 30.3.71.
47. *Rand Daily Mail* 7.7.71.
48. *Star* 20.2.71.
49. *Ibid* 13.3.71.
50. *Ibid* 5.9.69.
51. *Survey of Race Relations,* SAIRR, 1970, p. 125.
52. *Financial Mail* 24.4.70.
53. It is interesting that the International Metal Workers' Federation has taken no apparent action against the registered unions which are affiliated to it and who have done nothing for the African unions, although they have assisted African workers within the limits of the legal framework.
54. *Rand Daily Mail* 25.3.71.
55. *Rand Daily Mail* 20.4.71.
56. See Lever's chapter in this report.
57. The requirement placed by the SALTU on the Indian player Dhiraj regarding admission to the South African Open also seems unethical.
58. *Christian Institute Briefs,* December, 1970.
59. *Financial Mail* 12.2.71 and *Rand Daily Mail* 3.8.70.
60. *Rand Daily Mail* 29.3.71.
61. *Rand Daily Mail* 14.7.71.
62. *Rand Daily Mail* 3.7.71.
63. Cilliers S.P.: *Appeal to Reason,* UUB, Stellenbosch, 1971.
64. *New Nation,* April 1971.
65. *Rand Daily Mail* 16.4.71.
66. It is significant that the Johannesburg City Council and the Soweto UBC have already clashed over the question of acceptable incomes for residents of Soweto.
67. It can be argued that, intentionally or not, a buffer has been created between African leaders making demands and the organisations who can take action because employer organisations can now say with some justification that the matter is being attended to.
68. *Star* 11.1.71.
69. *Rand Daily Mail* 19.3.71.
70. *Star* 23.4.71.

71. This question was taken up with the Star Seaside Fund, who expressed surprise at their actions being questioned and stressed that the leaders of the Fund were of high Christian principles.

72. 'But the African inspectors, who at present are not authorised to ticket a white motorist, would be instructed not to enter into any confrontation with a white driver'. *Star* 20.11.70.

73. *Star* 26.3.71. The 'menial' tasks include making vacant beds, removing linen and water after patients have been washed, cleaning sputum mugs, serving tea.

74. *Rand Dail Mail* 15.4.71.

75. National Productivity Institute, unpublished report no. 2 on the women's wear clothing manufacture, April 1971.

Chapter Five

PROGRAMME TO REDUCE
INTER-GROUP TENSIONS

h. lever

THE TERM 'inter-group tension' is used in the generic sense to indicate
a strained relationship between groups. This 'strained relationship' may
be of several kinds of which the most important are prejudice (an attitude
or state of mind), discrimination (overt behaviour differentiating between
groups in the direction of inequality) and conflict (a process in which the
members of one group seek to remove or to physically injure the members
of another group or groups).

Some authorities consider that a programme designed to reduce tension
should concern itself principally with the changing of attitudes on the
assumption that the changing of practices would follow as a matter of
course. Other authorities, however, consider that it is necessary to change
behaviour and to re-structure situations before a change in attitudes can
be brought about. There is merit in both viewpoints. Most sociologists,
I think, would regard prejudice, discrimination and conflict as re-inforcing
each other. It is desirable, therefore, that a programme which seeks to
reduce tensions between groups should concern itself with the changing
of practices.

Other features which this programme seeks to incorporate are the
following:

1.   No person is required or called upon to give up his allegiance
     to any political party.

2.   No attempt is made to specify the form of an 'ideal' South African
     society apart from asserting that it will be relatively free from
     prejudice, discrimination, and conflict.

3. No theoretical model is provided for analysing the general societal conditions necessary for bringing about change and for stabilising behaviour when the desired change has been effected.

4. No attempt is made to survey the literature in its entirety. This programme will confine itself to the practical methods of effecting change.

5. As the literature on this topic is immense, the main methods of reducing tension will be considered in outline only. A bibliography, which is far from exhaustive, is presented at the end of the paper.

6. The programme is intended to operate within the framework of the law and does not contemplate or encourage the use of violence.

7. It is assumed that an organization will have to be called into existence to implement the programme.

For convenience the main methods of reducing tension will be considered separately. In practice, several methods may be required to be used simultaneously. The precise combination of methods will depend on the circumstances prevailing at the time.

Education

Education is in many respects the natural enemy of prejudice. Prejudice thrives on ignorance; it yields, in a great many cases, to the light of education.

A number of educational programmes have been devised to combat prejudice. One such programme which could be applied to South Africa with little modification is known as the 'Springfield Plan'. Earlier discussion in the Social Commission has pointed to the inadvisability of attempting to change the individual without at the same time attempting to change the group of which he is a member. The Springfield Plan seeks to deal with just such a contingency. Its supporters claim three distinctive features of the plan, namely:

1. Moral preaching is avoided in the educational programme.

2. The educational programme is not confined to the school but extended to the whole community.

3. The educational programme is attuned to the different educational levels of the pupils.

The Superintendent of schools in Springfield, Mass., had appointed a committee to examine the feasibility of an educational programme of inter-

group relations. Some of the findings of the committee were:

1. Prejudices reflect the forces operative in the school, the family, the club, and other groups. An effective educational programme should therefore reach the parents and the adult world which conditioned the attitudes.

2. The previous teaching of inter-group relations had been too idealised. There was too much disparity between principles and practices.

3. Pupils should understand the constituent elements that go to make up the population of their city and their country. They should also understand the historical background of each group.

4. The ideals of democracy should be presented in dynamic fashion.

In broad outline, the Springfield Plan operated as follows:

In elementary school, learning was centered around 'living and working together'. Pupils at the Junior High level were taught to appreciate the rich heritage of their country. The focus was on the contributions to the country made by groups of different cultures. Pupils at high school were given opportunities for democratic self-government. A comparable programme of education was launched at the adult level. Its purpose was twofold: firstly, to interpret the school effort to parents and secondly, to develop in adults an intelligent interest in public affairs.

In South Africa, the Springfield Plan seems well suited for use in parochial schools which are sited in the community from which they draw their pupils. The Church will be able to get its message across to both adults and children. Parochial schools sited outside the community and governmental schools may be induced to undertake a less ambitious programme of instruction focussing on the culture, background and contribution of the various ethnic groups. Goodwin Watson points out that it is often easier to bring in such a programme under an existing subject such as history or social studies than to try and introduce a new subject (e.g. Anthropology) into the school syllabus.

A major problem (there are many others) is that an educational programme can easily be sabotaged by the teacher. A teacher who merely recites the facts, making it plain that he disagrees or regards the task as an unpleasant chore may well do more harm than good.

Propaganda

The dividing line between education and propaganda is difficult to draw. For purposes of this paper propaganda will be defined as 'the deliberate attempt to change attitudes through the use of the mass media'.

There is some reluctance to make use of propaganda because of the bad connotations attaching to the word as a result of the use to which it was put in World Wars 1 and 11 and in totalitarian countries. Propaganda, however, need not be untruthful. In fact, the 'best' propaganda is that which is truthful. Many organizations make use of the technique of propaganda but prefer to use another name e.g. 'information', 'public relations', 'communications', 'advertising' etc. The U.S. Armed Forces, for example, have approximately 20 sections devoted to propaganda with each section having its own 'non-propaganda' title.

It has been said that if it is possible to sell tooth-paste through advertising, it should be possible to sell tolerance in much the same way. There does seem to be scope for the use of the mass media but it is suggested that it should not form a central part of a programme designed to reduce tensions. The main reasons are as follows:

1. Most people are selective as to the kinds of communications they expose themselves to *(The People's Choice)*.

2. Even if the individual receives the newspaper, magazine, pamphlet, etc. there is no guarantee that he will read the relevant section. A Detroit trade union during World War 11 published a cartoon strip in the union newspaper which was designed to show how prejudice affected work adversely and was detrimental to the war effort. A readership survey showed that only 50% of the union members received the union paper; only 23% read it regularly; 14% read the cartoon strip and only 10% finished reading it.

3. It is difficult to frame propaganda communications in such a way as to avoid a 'boomerang effect' (i.e. attaining the opposite effect to that intended). Examples: the radio programme 'Tomorrow the World' and the Mr. Biggott cartoons.

4. There are a number of psychological defences that enable the individual to shield himself from communications which are harmful to his belief system. The study of the Mr Biggott cartoons, for example, showed that the message of tolerance got through to the persons who were not prejudiced. But two types of response characterised prejudiced persons: they either tended to distort the message or experienced a 'derailment of understanding' and failed to comprehend it.

5. Propaganda is a particularly expensive method. Its high cost is accentuated by the fact that there are other, less spectacular, less expensive, but more efficient methods of inducing changes in attitude.

Motion pictures have brought about changes in attitudes, both favourable and unfavourable. Thurstone, who has done the pioneering work in this field, has shown that these changes endure for quite long periods of time. However, most social scientists working in this field will probably agree that motion pictures are most effective when they are coupled with some other technique e.g. when it is followed up by a group discussion or group decision.

Some political sociologists have expressed the view that instead of attempting to communicate directly with the general public, it is far more advantageous to secure the support of 'opinion formers'. Opinion formers are persons who because of their strategic position in one or more organizations, are able to influence the thinking of large numbers of other people. Opinion formers would include newspaper editors, trade union organisers, youth leaders, civic leaders, community leaders, student leaders, leaders of commerce and industry. Political sociologists have shown that communications in the mass media become effective when they are shaped, interpreted, presented and approved by the opinion formers in a community. In some cases, e.g. newspaper editors, opinion formers initiate their own mass communication.

It is likely that greater success will be obtained over a cup of tea with an opinion former than by the propagandist 'haranguing the masses'.

Social Contact

A number of dramatic changes in attitudes and practices have been reported when direct social contacts between members of different racial and ethnic groups have been established. This method of reducing tension is, however, beset with a great many problems. Under some conditions, social contact can increase tension rather than reduce it. The establishment of contact and the frequency or duration of contact are not the most important requirements. It is the *nature* of the contact that is crucial. Contacts based on a master-servant relationship or which highlight the lower status position of the under-privileged group are not likely to lead to understanding and will serve to re-inforce unfavourable stereotypes.

It is sometimes said that in order to reduce tensions, contacts between members of different groups should be of an equal-status kind. This proposition has been over-simplified. Tension is exacerbated when members of both groups are both of low status. Social contact has been most effective in reducing tension when members of the dominant group have *not* been of low status and when members of the dominated group have been of the same *or higher* status. In other words, situations should be contrived in such a way as to be of a stereotype-breaking nature.

Similarly, social contact has not been effective in reducing tension when the cultural differences between groups are considerable. Studies

in America, for example, show that student exchange programmes have not always been successful in leading to favourable attitudes simply on the grounds of cultural dissimilarities (e.g. Italian students). Cultural differences are even more marked in South Africa. As far as the African population is concerned, attention would have to be concentrated on those who are urbanised.

Social contacts between members of different groups should, where possible, be of a pleasant kind, take place in pleasant surroundings and not be of a competitive kind. Saenger has suggested that contacts related to leisure-time activities may be beneficial. The famous 'Robber's Cave Experiment' (a particularly important study reported by Sherif & Sherif which shows how groups come to live in harmony and tension) has shown that pleasant surroundings and equal-status contacts may not always be sufficient to reduce tension. The most favourable situation occurs where people have to co-operate with each other in order to achieve a common objective. This explains why White soldiers in the U.S. Army approved of Negroes in their platoons while engaged in combat duty but disapproved of them when they competed e.g. for the same women. According to Allport: 'Only the type of contact that leads people to *do* things together is likely to result in changed attitudes. The principle is clearly illustrated in the multi-ethnic athletic team. Here the goal is all-important; the ethnic composition of the team is irrelevant. It is the co-operative striving for the goal that engenders solidarity'.

It is suggested that social contacts should form a cornerstone in a programme aimed at reducing tensions. Its main advantages are:

(a) It is comparatively cheap especially when seen in relation to the costs entailed in the use of the mass media.

(b) It is particularly effective when it takes place under suitable conditions (those described above).

(c) It sets an example which can be carried over into other forms of activity.

(d) It provides a test of an important principle. If people are seen to get on well together, then there is a case for people to enquire just how realistic their fears and prejudices are.

(e) The majority of situations in which social contact between members of different races can take place are not against the law, although they may be against government policy. However, as a moral principle is involved, the Churches would be justified in pursuing their own policy based upon what they believe to be morally right.

(f) It leads to favourable changes of attitudes on the part of mem-

bers of the dominated group as well as members of the dominant group.

It is suggested that social contacts be encouraged in the following areas: at youth camps, scout and youth meetings, at sporting events, debating clubs, other voluntary organisations concerned with sporting or intellectual activities, church fetes, divine worship, schools (where legally possible).

In bringing about social contact between members of different groups, Goodwin Watson favours the *fait accompli* approach rather than getting verbal assent on the part of the participants in advance. He reports that the most successful administrators of race relations groups in America maintain that it is much easier to make the desired change in practice than to get approval for it beforehand. For example, when White stenographers were asked if they were willing to accept Negro colleagues they replied in the negative. However, when they were introduced into other offices they were accepted without difficulty. 'Advance contemplation produces apprehension'.

A major difficulty concerned with the technique of social contact is concerned with the compartmentalisation of attitudes. For example, persons may accept equal-status contacts in the camp environment only. This difficulty would have to be dealt with when it arises. There are some suggestions in the literature on how to combat this.

The Community Self-Survey

The community self-survey was developed within the field of intergroup relations. It was designed to combat discriminatory practices.

The originators of the community self-survey maintained that the members of a community are best able to deal with discriminatory and other undesirable practices in their area. Rather than secure the services of an expert who would direct a survey and write a voluminous report which would be filed and forgotten, the members of the community undertook responsibility for the entire project. The motivation for this technique is summed up in Lewin's dictum: 'Research that produces nothing but books will not suffice'. The community self-survey is aimed at both action *and* research. It is reasoned that if members of a community find out the facts for themselves they will take on the responsibility for changing whatever undesirable situations they uncover.

It is possible for a social scientist to sit on the relevant committees, but it is undesirable for him to encourage the others to regard him as the 'expert' in case too much work is delegated to him. It is sometimes better for a social scientist not to participate at all and for the community to rely entirely on the manual which has been worked out for this purpose. The manual provides guidance on all aspects of self-surveys including

the principles and methods of sampling and analysis of data (which is of an elementary kind, but sufficient for the purpose).

The self-survey encourages the maximum possible number of people to participate. Each willing person, irrespective of his ability, can be given some task to do and thereby is given some stake in the project.

The blue-print for the community self-survey does not contain directions on how undesirable practices are actually to be changed. It assumes that motivation will be high as a result of participating in the fact-finding process (this has been verified) and that the experience gained by using the scientific method is a good preparation for the programme of action that the community will decide upon. Contacts are also established with other community groups which are useful when the programme of action is embarked upon.

The community self-survey has been used to good effect in combating discriminatory practices in employment, housing and education. It has also proved useful in poverty programmes and health programmes.

In South Africa, the parish could be used as the focal group for conducting a community self-survey. Each parish could be encouraged to conduct its own self-survey on whatever it considers to be most vitally necessary in its own area. Self-surveys could be undertaken of servants' wages, living conditions, educational opportunities for the young, the extent of malnutrition, TB, etc. An opportunity will be provided to gain first-hand experience, to meet members of groups other than one's own, to become 'involved' and to do something practical.

The manual for self-surveys does recommend that the co-operation of other bodies be obtained e.g. Chamber of Commerce and Junior Chamber, Residents' Association, St John's, Social Agencies, other Churches etc. Usually they send delegates to committees and encourage their members to volunteer for some duties e.g. interviewing, clerical work, provision of transport. These associated agencies will be useful when a programme of action is decided upon.

The Law

Legal provisions may provide a satisfactory way of eliminating undesirable practices. The law has very little direct effect on the changing of attitudes. It has been said that: 'You can't legislate tolerance'. This is perfectly true. Yet the law can succeed in establishing norms and in ensuring compliance with more desirable practices.

Segregationists have not been slow in recognising the value of the law in standardising practices. Only in comparatively recent times has the value of the law been recognised as a vehicle of reducing tension.

The majority of laws in South Africa which have a bearing on race relations entrench discriminatory and segregationist practices. However,

there are some laws which can be used in a programme designed to reduce
inter-group tensions. For example, the Publications and Entertainments
Act (No. 26 of 1963) makes the following provision in section 5:

1.   'No person shall print, publish, manufacture, make or produce
any undesirable publication or object.

2.   A publication or object shall be deemed to be undesirable if
it or any part of it

(a)

(b)   is blasphemous or is offensive to the religious convictions
or feelings of any section of the inhabitants of the Republic;

(c)   brings any section of the inhabitants of the Republic into
ridicule or contempt;

(d)   is harmful to the relations between any sections of the
inhabitants of the Republic'.

Sub-section 6 provides that: 'Any person who contravenes any pro-
vision of this section shall be guilty of an offence'.

Similarly the Riotous Assemblies Act (No. 17 of 1956) is intended
to deal with matter which 'is calculated to engender feelings of hostility
between the European inhabitants of the Union on the one hand and any
other section of the inhabitants of the Union on the other hand'. Provision
is made for the prohibition of publications, holding of meetings and the
closing of public places.

Section 29 (1) of the Bantu Administration Act (Act 38 of 1927) makes
it an offence for any person to utter or do any act or thing 'with intent
to promote any feeling of hostility between Natives and Europeans'.

There is some feeling in liberal circles in South Africa that there
should be no bannings of publications, meetings, etc., even if Nazi pro-
paganda is being disseminated. The present writer does not subscribe
to this view and feels that the experience of the American agencies con-
cerned with inter-group relations work supports his view.

Laws by themselves are not enough. A law enforcement agency is
required. Nor are law enforcement agencies by themselves enough. As
Maslow puts it: 'Even well-conceived statutes are meaningless, unless
groups most directly concerned with improving race relations (that is, us)
exercise constant vigilance to ensure adequate enforcement'. The final
decision whether or not to institute criminal proceedings may be taken
by the Minister of Justice and not by the Attorneys-General. If it becomes
apparent that there is a general reluctance to prosecute, the widest possible
publicity will have to be given to the fact that the law is not being im-
plemented.

Workcamps and Workshops

It is suggested that a Church-sponsored organisation be established on the lines of the Peace Corps. Young people who are high on motivation and energy should be particularly attracted to such an organisation. Use could be made of young doctors, dentists, nurses, architects, engineers, carpenters, bricklayers, plumbers, electricians and other tradesmen. Assistance could be rendered to the disadvantaged by the construction and maintenance of hospitals, clinics, schools, churches, creches, etc.

Some Afrikaans students have advocated a kind of Peace Corps which would operate in neighbouring territories such as Malawi. In view of government restrictions on entry to African areas, a Peace Corps operating within South Africa would probably have to confine itself to the 'homelands' as far as the African population is concerned. Work undertaken in such areas may be construed as 'propping up' the government's Bantustan policy. Such work would also raise the living standards in these areas and should be undertaken for this purpose. As there is no similar restriction on entry to areas where Coloureds and Indians reside, this need not be a consideration as far as these two groups are concerned.

The value of Workcamps (Peace Corps) lies in:

1.   the actual construction, maintenance and ameliorative work that is done,

2.   the educational value to the volunteers, and

3.   the likelihood of changed attitudes on the part of the disadvantaged group.

Workshops are similar to workcamps except that they generally incorporate a formal educational programme for the volunteers e.g. lectures and discussions on the effects of discrimination.

The Probing of Weak Points

The institutional practices of discrimination are more susceptible to attack on some 'fronts' than on others. For example, Malherbe has shown that Whites are more inclined to allow greater educational opportunities for Africans than to allow them greater work opportunities. 'This suggests', says Malherbe, 'that an important reason why many people oppose opportunities for Natives is the fear of economic competition. Education is a less direct threat than jobs or political power'. Thus a campaign which seeks to obtain greater educational facilities for Africans will have a better chance of success than one which seeks better jobs for Africans, *unless*, of course, it can be shown that Whites will suffer economically unless Africans are given better jobs.

Research may be able to suggest other weak points.

The Training of Community Leaders

The role of leaders in organisations can be crucial in determining the patterns of inter-group relations in a community. For example, Robin Williams in his book *Strangers Next Door* points out that when a Negro enters a voluntary association the way in which he is received by the leader largely determines the way in which he will be received by the other members. If the Negro is welcomed by the leader, he is generally welcomed by the other members *irrespective of their attitudes* prior to the leader's intercession. If he is rejected by the leader then he tends to be rejected by the other members *irrespective of their attitudes* prior to the leader's rejection. This influence of the leader explains *some* of the inconsistencies in behaviour concerning inter-group relations. A study conducted by Lohman and Reitzes illustrates this point. They were concerned with trade union members residing in an area where the pattern was to reject Negro residents. The trade union, however, was adamant in abolishing discrimination in employment. It was found that the workers looked to the leadership for guidance. In the work situation the men followed the union lead in not discriminating. In residential matters they followed the lead of the property owner's association in opposing Negroes.

There are an endless variety of situations in which leaders can play an important part in reducing tensions in their area. Effective programmes have been worked out (in America) for training leaders to deal with these situations. A training course could be provided in South Africa for youth leaders, church leaders, trade union leaders, community leaders, scout leaders, leaders in commerce and industry, etc. Most courses are modelled to a greater or lesser extent on the training laboratory established at Bethel, in the state of Maine, U.S.A. The original training laboratory was established at the behest of the Connecticut Interracial Commission who wished to improve the skills of leaders in dealing with problems of inter-group relations. The T-group and other techniques developed from this course. A training programme conducted in South Africa would, of course, have to focus attention on the problems peculiar or more directly relevant to this country. It is also suggested that comparatively less attention be paid to sensitivity training and, following the original programme, greater attention be paid to role playing and the directed discussion. One development within the field of industrial sociology could also be incorporated into such a programme: namely, the 'risk technique'. This consists of encouraging participants in a discussion to enumerate all the possible 'risks' or fears they have of embarking on a new course of action. In the course of the programme evidence is brought to light to show whether or not these fears have a realistic basis. The programme comes to an end

when the last 'risk' has been eliminated as a 'risk' by unanimous agreement of the members of the group. The technique is based on the assumption (which the writer believes to be correct) that the majority of our fears in social life are without foundation. This seems to be particularly true in the field of inter-group relations.

Most workers in the field of inter-group relations would probably favour a 'laboratory' i.e. taking trainees away from their area of residence to a new environment. The rationale behind the removal is to encourage the development of new forms of behaviour which may be inhibited by the 'old' environment. Courses may vary in length with a possible minimum of one week.

One lesson learned from the original 'laboratory' course at Bethel was the desirability of having at least two members from each organisation attend the course together.

Personal Conduct

There is evidence to suggest that some of the most traumatic experiences encountered by members of dominated groups have been at the hands of private individuals of the dominant group. A social survey conducted for an Honours degree at the University of the Witwatersrand analysed over 300 situations in which members of a non-White group recounted what had happened to them when they were discriminated against or 'unjustly treated' because of their membership in this group. There were more incidents reported in the 'private' sector than in the 'government' sector. Many unpleasant incidents arise from contacts with police or officialdom who have to enforce governmental policy. But to a very large extent the character of inter-group relations can be shaped, for good or evil, by the behaviour of individuals. The point needs to be made that it is within the power of every individual in South Africa to improve race relations.

The brilliant series of studies undertaken by Lewin and his associates have shown that it is necessary to counter prejudiced remarks when they are made in public. It is unlikely that the intercession of a member of the public will lead to the bigot abandoning his prejudices. However, the bigot is likely to construe silence as signifying assent and unless stopped will use the opportunity to expand his philosophy. Uncommitted members of the public who hear the prejudiced remarks are likely to regard this as the norm unless views to the contrary are expressed. Although Lewin and his colleagues did not expect, in the replies which they devised, to bring about a more favourable attitude on the part of by-standers, they were able to show that a brief comment could in fact lead to more favourable attitudes. Speaking out in public against the bigot also raises the morale of the member of the dominated group.

In South Africa the language of intolerance is heard far more frequently in public places than the language of tolerance. Although it is unlikely that the prejudiced person's attitudes will be changed by outspoken comments, the community as a whole will benefit from the substitution of a tolerant climate for an intolerant one. The bigot may be given a sufficiently unpleasant experience to make him reluctant to express his views in public. It is suggested that a reply be given, no matter how brief. Even the barest expression of disagreement will have the effect of demonstrating to the bigot that he does not have the unqualified approval of his audience. The reply should generally be given in a calm voice. This has the effect of re-assuring the audience that the position is well under control and that the person replying is not a 'disturber of the peace'.

Some time ago Mr Gerdener, who was then Administrator of Natal, suggested a set of 'Ten Commandments for Good Race Relations'. The writer was unable to secure a copy of this document even by writing to Mr Gerdener (who did not seem to regard the speech in which the 'Commandments' were enunciated to be a major one). A set of 'commandments' would be a useful guide to personal conduct in inter-group relations. The writer, with the assistance of members of the Social Commission has, therefore, drafted the following propositions as a guide for conduct.

TEN COMMANDMENTS FOR GOOD RACE RELATIONS

1. *Prejudice and discrimination corrupts the minds and souls of* the persons responsible for it. Do not allow yourself to become a party to it even if others are willing to do so.

2. Do not use derogatory or insulting terms when referring to members of a group other than your own.

3. It is the duty of a Christian to speak out against intolerance wherever and whenever he encounters it.

4. It is the duty of a Christian to help the less fortunate members of the community. Sometimes it is necessary to help people in order that they can learn to help themselves.

5. When speaking to a person of a group other than your own you are not excused from the usual forms of courtesy such as saying 'please', 'thank you' or 'excuse me'; nor are you excused from using courtesy titles such as 'Mr', 'Mrs' or 'Miss'.

6. Treat your servant with consideration.

7. Pay your servants and employees a living wage.

8. Prejudice is, to a large extent, learned in the home. Make sure

that your home is free from prejudice and from the language of prejudice. Children also learn prejudice from their friends. Do not allow your child to succumb to it.

9.   Remember that there are all kinds of people in every group. There is no racial, cultural or national group which has the monopoly of *all* good or *all* evil.

10.   Whenever in doubt as to a course of action, always ask yourself the question: 'Would I like this to be done to me?'

The above propositions could be espoused from the pulpit or taught in Sunday school, the parochial schools and even the government schools.

Politics

It is suggested that comparatively little attention be paid to direct attempts to bring about changes in the political sphere. The founding of a political party, on Christian-Democratic lines, is not advocated. Attempts to bring about large-scale political changes in South Africa will necessitate an entirely different programme to that envisaged here. This does not necessarily mean that political change is not envisaged or regarded as desirable. It is hoped that if changes in attitude and practices are brought about in South African society, the repercussions will be felt in the political sphere. There is also no reason why the Church should not function as a political pressure group to ensure that the voice of Christian morality is heard in the councils of the nation. Protest marches, petitions, etc., can also be organised where appropriate.

There are, however, two situations which would require direct and concerted action on the part of the Church and these need to be considered. Firstly, the Church may have to deal with apartheid as a competing religion. There can be little doubt that apartheid has become a dominant institution in South African society. The values espoused by apartheid have obtruded into and been placed above the values of the institution of marriage, the family, education, the economy, the law and, in some instances, religion itself. Apartheid has many of the characteristics of the great secular religions of communism and fascism. Apartheid offers a set of moral (sic) precepts in terms of which other moral precepts have to take second place. There is also the undesirable practice of using the name of God in support of this dubious political credo. ('God is on our side. Who can be against us?').

Secondly, the Church may have to intervene if there is a strong move towards further totalitarianism. The lesson to be learned from Nazi Germany is that the Church is the only effective institution for combating a totalitarian regime. The efforts of trade unions, newspapers, universities, opposition parties are of little avail. Hitler succeeded against all of

these but never succeeded in 'breaking' the Church to his will.

It is not for the present writer to advocate a confrontation between Church and State. The desirability of such a confrontation and its timing are matters to be decided by the leaders of the Church. It is merely suggested that the possibility of such a confrontation be taken cognisance of. In the ordinary course of events a direct confrontation between Church and apartheid will result in victory for the Church provided that:

1. the issue is well chosen (a clear example of apartheid or state interference in the affairs of the Church rather than Church interference in the affairs of the state) and

2. there are no extraneous factors (e.g. the possibility of a military threat from outside).

Research

Research, in itself, does not reduce tension between groups. There are, however, at least two roles which research can play in a programme designed to reduce tension. Firstly, it can be used to test the effectiveness of the various methods used. A programme to reduce inter-group tensions which makes no provision for research has been likened by Lewin to 'the captain of a boat who somehow has felt that his ship steers too much to the right and therefore has turned the steering wheel sharply to the left. Certain signals assure him that the rudder has followed the move of the steering wheel. Happily he goes to dinner. In the meantime, of course, the boat moves in circles. In the field of inter-group relations all too frequently action is based on observations made 'within the boat' and too seldom based on objective criteria in regard to the relations of the movement of the boat to the objective to be reached'.

The second function of research is of a 'trouble-shooting' (not trouble-making) kind. That is to locate areas of extreme tension, deprivation or hardship and to take steps to redress the situation. What is needed is a type of action-research which, according to Lewin, is 'a comparative research on the conditions and effects of various forms of social action, and research leading to social action'.

If an organization is brought into existence to implement the proposals contained in this paper, it is suggested that it be built around a research division.

Psycho-therapy

The psychological treatment of prejudiced personalities generally involves lengthy and expensive treatment and the services of a skilled psychologist. In most instances where the malady is of a deep-seated kind, psycho-theraphy is beyond the bounds of this programme. There

is, however, at least one instance, requiring comparatively little skill, where psycho-therapy can be used. Frequently, as for example, in a leadership training course, a number of people participate in role-playing situations (sociodrama). There is generally a beneficial effect when prejudiced persons have to play the role of persons whom they generally regard as inferior or undesirable. Emotional involvement is quite strong with the prejudiced person obtaining an opportunity to 'feel' what it is like to be treated as a member of a group which encounters discrimination.

Non-directive counselling requires even less skill and may be used when opportunity presents itself.

The Role of Organized Religion

Because of the important part which it plays in people's lives, religion can be a crucial influence in controlling prejudice and discrimination. Clinchy gives three reasons why religion is a primary influence in such control:

1. The central element in the structure of a group's existence is its religion. If that religion inculcates fear, mistrust, and hostility toward out-group people, or tolerates an extreme degree of group loyalty which amounts to arrogance, bigotry and chauvinism, then in that case religion becomes a first cause of group prejudice.

2. If religion, with its sense of right and wrong, its motivation for goodness, truth, beauty and righteousness is omitted from the approach to prejudice, then prejudice will not be overcome.

3. Understanding (love) is the cement which can make 'one world' out of fragmentary groups.

Clinchy points out that in addition to the intellectual and emotional factors, cognisance should be taken of the spiritual factor. 'Each organized religion', says Clinchy, 'should use all knowledge that education, anthropology, sociology, history and psychology can contribute to control prejudice. But it must not stop there. Religion has within it additional resources not found in science. The sin of man lies in his idolatry, either consciously or sub-consciously making himself, his culture group, his race, God. Such prejudice cannot be controlled until he recognises that error, recognises the true God, and worships Him'.

Clinchy offers a number of practical suggestions including the holding of an annual Race Relations Sunday, the revision of texts which might have led to negative stereotypes, the experimental application of the Springfield plan to parishes and co-operation with police, teachers, Chamber of Commerce, etc., in civic neighbourhood problems. He also points out that the Catholic Church has published *The Faith and Freedom*

Readers for parochial schools. These readers, intended for pupils from kindergarten to the 8th grade deal objectively with the non-Catholic religions. In 1946 there were nearly two million copies in circulation.

Cautions

1. It will be desirable to attempt to change the attitudes of non-Whites as well as the attitudes of Whites.

2. Sufficient funds will have to be made available if the programme is to be effective. According to Clinchy: 'The great social conquest of controlling prejudice can be made if the approach is on a par with the brains, the energy, and the money expended in the battle against the polio virus and as systematic and persevering as the war against tuberculosis and cancer. The task clearly merits attention of that size. Far more people are affected. Moreover, the value at stake is the soul of each one of us'.

3. People are more inclined to follow accepted practices as an example to their own conduct than to re-orient themselves according to what *is said*. Discriminatory and segregationist practices are discerned quite easily even if the opposite *is preached*. In this sense, therefore, present practices within the Church may be the most serious handicap to the effective implementation of a programme designed to reduce inter-group tensions.

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Chapter Six

STRATEGIES FOR CHANGE

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IN THE WEEKS during which this chapter was being revised for publication a number of political events occurred.

A. INTRODUCTION: PITFALLS OF HOPE AND DISILLUSIONMENT

Nation-wide dawn raids were carried out by the security police, and the homes of over 100 South African clergymen, academics, students and teachers were searched. Nineteen people were detained under laws which provide for indefinite detention without trial, one detainee was admitted to hospital in puzzling circumstances, and another detainee fell to his death from the tenth floor of police headquarters in Johannesburg. The Prime Minister rejected pleas for a special enquiry into the detainee's death. The fear and caution which, to some degree, are ever present among opponents of apartheid in South Africa obviously was strongly reinforced by these events. Once again, the security service, acting outside the jurisdiction of the courts, had made it quite apparent to all that South African social order is, to say the least, well protected.

The results of a reputable nation-wide opinion poll on the future of the Coloured people were published in a leading Afrikaans paper (1). These results suggested strongly that support for equal citizenship for the Coloureds is weaker among young white adults than among their elders. The possibility of a trend towards greater intransigence on political rights for blacks in South Africa as a whole, cannot be overlooked (2).

In contrast, a conference on the political future of the Coloured people, attended by a large number of Afrikaner academics and some Coloured leaders, revealed a heartening determination among a significant group

of Afrikaners to work for full citizenship for the Coloureds and for other blacks in the 'common' area of South Africa outside of the African reserves.

More generally, many observers have sensed a growing awareness of the need for greater economic justice for blacks and a rejection of forms of so-called 'petty apartheid' among white businessmen and other community leaders, both English and Afrikaans.

This handful of examples of what political observers would regard as fairly significant political events and processes by no means represents a unique situation. At any time over the past ten years, a broadly similar set of apparently contradictory indications of trends could have been discerned. These vicissitudes in the surface political climate of South Africa keep many black and white opponents of apartheid in a perpetual state of alternating gloom and cautious optimism.

One can enumerate a host of issues which are hardy annuals of political discussion and speculation in South Africa. When these issues make their regular appearance in the mass-media, they alternately ignite or extinguish sporadic flickers of hope for change. On the positive side alone, the following examples come immediately to mind:

> the shortage of white skilled labour and the hopes this arouses for the occupational, economic, social and, ultimately, political advancement of blacks;

> apparently mounting conflict between business leaders, both English and Afrikaans, and government policy-makers in the economic and labour spheres;

> signs of changes in the political thinking of white Afrikaans-speaking businessmen, academics and intellectuals. Associated with this trend is evidence of a weakening of in-group nationalistic feeling among rank-and-file and some leading Afrikaners;

> the re-emergence of potentially effective black leadership; some of it making its appearance in the political and social organisations established by the government in accordance with the policy of separate development;

> some signs that the necessity for the government to improve South Africa's image in Africa and overseas will lead, eventually, to a relaxation of some aspects of the social colour-bar within the country - sport is one important area in this regard;

> pressures from overseas on local subsidiary companies to improve wages and working conditions for blacks;

> signs of increasingly severe internal contradictions in the

policies and statements of the ruling Nationalist party, coupled with earlier election setbacks for this Party and slight gains for the major white opposition party.

The list could easily be extended, but these examples may suffice. They are key matters of debate, and the way in which they tend to be reported in the press often leaves the impression that significant change is in the offing - that the situation is   fluid. These trends might indeed be significant - in fact some of them undoubtedly are - but they cannot and should not be uncritically accepted as indications that the structure of white supremacy and racial inequality is weakening. Facile speculation which takes yesterday's events as a standard for assessing the signifinance of today's news is dangerous. It engenders false optimism. It encourages the nation that press statements and public protests can tip the scales of political fortune. This sensitivity to the superficial blinds many people to the lessons of past decades, during which the basic structure of inequality has persisted despite many marginal adjustments in political terminology and practice. White supremacy is no delicate plant which will wilt in a slightly changed political, social or economic climate.

Nor, however, is apartheid necessarily like an eternal oak which will grow ever more massive and tough until destroyed in the fire of revolution. The basic patterns of inequality might be largely resistant to the effects of many of the issues enumerated, but there are potentially powerful contradictions in these patterns, and these contradictions imply the probability of conflicts, not necessarily violent or revolutionary, which, in the long run, will change the pattern of our society.

The role of the social scientist is to delve beneath the surface of social and political events, and in so doing to appraise critically the conventional wisdom and the hurried speculation of social commentators. In South Africa in particular, the social scientist's task is to disabuse others of facile political optimism, or of the equally facile negative response of apathy or cynical despair.

B.   UNDERSTANDING THE SITUATION

The preceding chapters in this report have suggested the need to bear in mind constantly the deeper-lying factors in our society, and will have conveyed something of the futility of activities for change which do not take account of such factors. Before discussing strategies for change, it might serve a purpose to set out briefly, and therefore at the risk of oversimplification, some of the major conclusions which can be drawn concerning the basic nature of these social, political and economic patterns in our society which are relevant to any discussion of change.

(i)   The attitudes of most whites in South Africa are not *simply* the result of racialism, prejudice and what often seems like an almost medieval unenlightenment, which could conceivably be influenced by persuasive rational argument, education or by passionate exhortations. These attitudes are also very deeply rooted in and logically related to the material and psychological self-interest of whites. The attitudes have, in large part, a very rational basis, whether individual whites are consciously aware of it or not.

(ii)   Furthermore, those aspects of white political motivations which are not related to material and other rational self-interest, are also not to be understood *simply* as prejudice or racialism. They appear to be deeply rooted in well-nigh universal needs for groups identification, and in irrational but potent fears of loss of identity. In a context of an over-whelming numerical preponderance of members of the 'out-group', the black 'strangers', these anxieties verge on a fear of total loss of identity or group annihilation. In this sense fairly universal characteristics have pathological dimensions in South Africa's white population.

(iii)   While the social system, seen in objective terms, quite clearly rests on a foundation of class interests, racialism, and deeply imbued mass-anxieties regarding group survival, the whites, subjectively, tend to interpret the situation differently, being influenced by a number of what one might term 'secondary factors'. These have an apparent cogency, but really originate in and derive their meaning and impetus from the aforementioned basic factors. The whites, for example, make much of cultural, educational and other social differences between the races, of their level of civilisation compared with that of most blacks, and of what they see as a natural tendency for people to stick to their own kind. These perceptions are sincerely held, but, seen objectively, operate to legitimise and justify continuing white supremacy.

(iv)   This distinction between the basic factors in white supremacy and the way the white actors themselves see the situation has two very important implications for change. Firstly, the way in which most whites understand the South African situation allows many of them to see it as a perfectly normal social arrangement. They do not see themselves as exploiters of blacks. As nice, ordinary conforming people acting in ways prescribed by the norms of the situation, they genuinely see active critics of the situation as troublemakers and agitators. The enforced surface calm among blacks also encourages this view. Accusations of selfishness, cruelty, unfeelingness etc. directed at whites make little sense to most of them. Within the norms of the situation they behave as perfectly decent and ordinary people. To appeal to the consciences of most whites is, therefore, a waste of time.

Secondly, because the motivations and perceptions of most whites are distinct from the basic underlying factors in the situation (although related to them) successful attempts to change white attitudes will not necessarily lead to a weakening of whites' dedication to their own self-interest. Their rationalisations could be replaced by others which are also congruent with the requirements of white domination. To see this principle in action one only needs to consider to what extent the terminology of National Party spokesmen has changed in recent years without any significant change in day-to-day policy occurring.

(v)   A number of conflicts in white politics tend to draw attention away from the basic issue of white/black conflict. One of these is the Afrikaans-English rivalry among whites. Both groups, generally, are committed to white supremacy, but pursue this ideal with policies which are formulated in different terms. While this conflict does, to some extent, weaken the political solidarity of the white group, the fact that white politics proceeds with heated debate within a democratic framework, creates the illusion of greater freedom for political dissent and debate than actually exists in South Africa.

In a similar sense, the conflict of interests between white businessmen and government policy-makers creates the impression of a deep cleavage among whites, and hence appears to indicate possibilities for change. The conflict, while very real in many ways, has never concerned the issue of bargaining rights for blacks in the labour-market. Hence there is an often unrecognised underlying solidarity between the government and private enterprise.

One of the reasons for believing that there is great significance in the pressure from private enterprise on the labour policies of the government is the thesis that economic growth and an expanding use of black labour will lead to a minimisation of potential conflicts over wages and material resources and ultimately to a peaceful redistribution of political power. This thesis has not been confirmed during the period of rapid economic growth over the past decade *(3)*, and, following on the analysis of Blumer *(4)*, has been widely and justifiably discredited. However, it would seem that if the occupational advancement of blacks is allowed to continue with fewer restrictions, a point will be reached where a sufficient number of blacks have sufficient skills (and scarcity value) to exercise real bargaining power on a significant scale. Only in this sense would there appear to be a significance in the conflict of interests between private enterprise and the ruling party.

(vi)   It is highly unlikely that whites will share power and privilege with blacks without a good deal of pressure being brought to bear upon them, or without it being in their self-interest to do so. It is understand-

able that any group which enjoys privilege in a basically acquisitive society will never willingly relinquish its power. In general terms, some degree of 'conflict', whether it takes the form of effective pressure backed by serious threats, or of more open confrontation, is likely to precede significant change in South Africa. Such pressure could emanate from other countries, or from the South African blacks themselves.

There is a very real danger that internal pressure will take the form, ultimately, of open and unregulated conflict. The very wide differences in wages and standards of living between most whites and most blacks, coupled with the fact that the absolute gap in incomes has widened significantly over past decades, suggests that when conflicts do emerge over the distribution of rewards, they are likely to be sharper than those which have occurred in countries where rather more of a gradation of material rewards existed before the emergence of organised industrial conflict. Furthermore, the colour-bar and racialism are likely to sharpen conflicts as well.

In regard to the prospects of ultimate civil disorder, South Africa might be very much involved in a race against time, as it were. If the system can become significantly less rigid before non-whites, particularly Africans, develop a political coherence and organisation, the heat of conflict is likely to be reduced. If Africans face the same intransigence as they face today when their political consciousness has developed, the degree of conflict could be considerable. It seems utterly crucial that the aim of working for conditions which will reduce the heat of inevitable conflict in South Africa be one of the major goals of strategic action for change. One very broad strategy in itself, is communicating to white South Africans the imperative need to avoid greater tragedy later by working for ameliorative conditions now.

The greatest hope for peaceful change in South Africa lies in the possibility of there being opportunities, in the not too distant future, for blacks to exert constructive pressure on whites and within white-controlled institutions. In South Africa the latent potential for ultimate violence can only be dissipated by institutionalised and regulated 'conflict', in the course of which blacks can press for specific rights and improvements in their circumstances. South Africa's future cannot be safeguarded by constant attempts to deny the legitimacy of black grievances, or by using repressive measures to stave off the time when these grievances will be openly expressed. Organised and regulated bargaining between blacks and whites, commencing as soon as possible, will provide the greatest guarantee of reasonable stability for South Africa in the long run.

(vii)   Even though South African society is very deeply divided along

lines of race and class, there is a massive interdependence between the races in the economic labour spheres. At its basis, the South African social order depends and will always be dependent on co-operation between the races, and for this reason, provided pressure is brought to bear on whites through organised conflict which does not threaten their entire existence, they are probably likely to compromise rather than risk losing everything they have.

(viii)   Organised pressure from blacks requires that black communities develop considerably more collective determination, coherence and internal organisation than they appear to possess at present. Due to security measures black communities are deprived of leaders who are free to motivate and organise people at the grass-roots level. Black communities, in particular the African communities, appear to suffer from very low political 'morale' and from an absence of active, organised and widely based co-operation on social, economic and political issues. This is understandable enough in view of the prevailing climate of fear, but other factors reinforce the lack of unity and determination among Africans *(5)*. In brief, one can say that lifelong experience of subservience, the daily struggle for existence, the massive proportions of white power and the superior morale of whites have produced divisions and conflicts within black communities, and a general feeling of disspiritedness and helplessness all of which are functional for the continuation of white supremacy. It is utterly fundamental for change that this situation be counteracted in as many ways as possible.

(ix)   Multi-racial co-operation and contact have long been assumed to be important for change. While such contact might have influenced the attitudes of a few whites significantly, it has, in my view, also generally operated to give prominent blacks some solace and a false sense of optimism, and also might have drawn some of their attention away from meaningful social and political involvement with their own communities. There are certain important benefits in multi-racial contact which will be dealt with later, but, in general terms, it is only when blacks develop to a much greater extent a spirit of full independence, a spirit of self-help, and an assertiveness as a group or groups with common interests, that meaningful change will occur *(6)*. The appropriate role for whites who are opposed to apartheid is not to attempt to woo the friendship and goodwill of blacks in a situation where the prevailing political and economic system makes a complete and utter mockery of such peripheral contact and friendships, but to work primarily in their own groups and in white-controlled organisations to facilitate the advancement of black interests, aspirations and influence.

(x)   Any attempts to encourage positive change should take account

of ongoing trends in the society and take advantage of areas of vulnerability in the present social order. The *status quo* in South Africa appears to be most vulnerable, or at least appears to reveal greatest possibilities for meaningful change, as a result of the following trends and issues:

> Changing patterns of labour and upward shifts in the occupational status of some blacks.

> Certain potentialities for the political, economic and social organisation of blacks, which, in part, are unintended consequences of the government's own policies of separation.

> International relations and international censure affecting specific areas of South African life.

> Changing attitudes and interests of Afrikaans-speaking white intellectuals and business-leaders.

These processes are likely to give some impetus to action for change which is aligned with them, as far as is possible. While strategies for change should not focus exclusively on these areas, they deserve priority nonetheless.

(xi)   An area where the *status quo* is perhaps most strongly reflected, defended, and reinforced, is that of the attitudes of rank-and-file whites. Any strategies which are based on the assumption that the average white will ever be prepared to accommodate black interests without other changes having taken place first, would be misguided. It is pointless to confront popular racialism in South Africa. In view of the fact that the *status quo* is generally understood in terms of race, and is zealously guarded and defended because of the highly emotive nature of racialist views, strategies for change should attempt to circumvent the average white's racial sensitivities. An accommodation of the interests of under-privileged black groups is more likely to occur among the leaders in white institutions than among ordinary white voters. In general, therefore, the most realistic approach to change would probably be for the white leadership to be confronted by effective pressure, from blacks or from other quarters, and if accommodation does occur, for the resulting compromises to 'filter down' to rank-and-file whites. Mixed political parties, common voters rolls, mixed unions including African members, mixed suburbs, etc, however desirable, are unrealistic objectives in view of the prejudice and power of the average white voter. A common society with greater equality will follow on the attainment of influence and bargaining power by blacks; ethnic social integration is not likely to precede effective power and greater privilege for blacks.

The prospects for the Coloured community might just conceivably

be an exception to these general indications, but even in this regard, all faith should not be placed in significant proportions of whites accepting Coloured people on a basis of equality (7).

(xii)   This is not to suggest that all strategic attempts to influence the actions of whites are pointless. Most whites may not willingly accept blacks as equals in what they regard as their own spheres of interest, but the extent to which and the ways in which they protect their own assumed superiority are very important as factors which will or will not allow the necessary preconditions for effective black participation in change to come about. The patterns of organisation of the two opposed interest groups are continually being influenced by one another, and in this sense South Africa cannot be seen as an entirely rigid and static society, even though the extent of inequality has remained effectively unaltered. It i. in the influences on one another of white and black interests that the prospects for promising initial developments seem greatest. Strategies orientated towards whites can be effective, indeed crucial, albeit in an indirect sort of way.

(xiii)   Those South Africans working for change should pause to consider the possibility that unless their activities are definitely achieving or are very likely to achieve positive results, they could very well be strengthening the *status quo* by providing 'safety values', as it were, and by creating the impression, both here and abroad, that the situation is more flexible and less urgent and compelling than it rea'.y is. A certain amount of cautious dissidence and protest is probal.y very good for South Africa's image abroad, and may also encourage patient optimism and inactivity among many blacks in South Africa.

Certain strategic action and the changes which might or might not result from it (or have already resulted from it) also can have the effect of impeding more significant change by making the system of inequality in South Africa more flexible and able to adapt to changing internal or external forces without the relative distribution of wealth and authority being significantly affected. A careful distinction has to be drawn between such changes and other apparently similar changes which will or could have the effect of facilitating more significant changes at some later state. A restatement and consideration of the fundamental needs for change is a necessary first step in making this distinction, and this will be attempted in the next section of this chapter.

(xiv)   Finally, as was suggested in Chapter one, South Africa's tragedy is that it suffers from all the ingredients of the social ills of the world combined - distinctions in class, colour, status, language, religion, culture, as well as having the unfortunate legacy of a relatively recent history of

colonial conquest and wars over territory. In South Africa, these problems are writ large but they are not qualitatively different from the problems of plural societies the world over. White South Africans, as an aggregate of individuals, are no more blameworthy than anyone else. If blame is to be apportioned, the culprit is 'human nature', or, more precisely, the way in which human beings tend to be socialised in most cultures. Anyone looking forward to a South Africa of harmony, equality, unrestricted human opportunity and of brotherhood and goodwill between all colours and creeds is hoping for a new kind of society - a utopia.

Nevertheless, South Africans who are committed to the ideal of human dignity and human development in the fullest sense share with many concerned people all over the world a desire to minimise, at least, the effects on society of self-interest, negative forms of group consciousness, concern with status and power, and unthinking conformity to norms which protect some people more than others. Our short-term and most immediate commitment of necessity must be focussed directly on the racial inequality in South Africa. Our longer term goals are probably little different, in essence, from those of people commonly regarded as 'humanist idealists' anywhere.

What I am suggesting is that the realisation of Christian values in South African society is both an immediate socio-political challenge and a longer term educational challenge. Neither challenge can be deferred, and 'strategies' for change must be focussed not only on the immediate issue of racial inequality but also on the content of formal education and on the broader informal educational and socialising influence of the family, the school, the university, the church, and of mass-communications in general.

C. MEANINGFUL CHANGE

Before attempting a discussion of practical action for change, it is perhaps necessary to make some very obvious points, simply in order to orientate attention to strategies which might achieve really effective results.

These assumptions serve as a basis for an exclusion of any discussion of measures which have as their aim relatively nebulous or relatively trivial changes such as an improvement in relations or communication between races for their own sake or a reduction of discriminatory practices in areas which are essentially peripheral to the real issues. Changes such as these in some cases might be means to the more fundamental ends outlined, or they might well result from fundamental changes, but in themselves they are essentially side issues. Interest in such issues all too often has absorbed the energies of would-be social reformers to the extent that valuable efforts have been misspent.

Flowing out of the points made in the preceding section of this chapter,

and out of the conclusions reached in other chapters in this report, we can assume that the type of change which is desirable in South Africa is that which will:

(i)   lead to steady improvements in the economic position of the majority of blacks, and

(ii)   have the effect of closing the gap in average standards of living between black and white groups;

(iii)   result in steady improvements in regard to the civil liberties, social benefits, and freedom under the law enjoyed by members of all groups in the population of South Africa;

(iv)   lead to a political arrangement in South Africa which will avoid the exploitation and control of any one group by another group;

(v)   allow all members of all groups to enjoy self-esteem, pride, dignity and a release from these factors which presently undermine the morale and self-respect of individual members of black groups, as well as an elimination of factors which undermine the social 'health' of whole communities, particularly the poorer ones.

In broad summary, one can say that meaningful change is that which will lead to a significant reduction of social, economic, legal and political injustice and inequality, and also to an elimination of what we may term the 'psychological oppression' of subordinate groups in South Africa.

These aims have the following implications or necessary preconditions:

(a)   That eventually all members of all groups have an effective voice in the determination of their circumstances, i.e. political rights and privileges which relate in some effective way to the administration and control of economic and governmental institutions which affect the groups. The most obvious and undoubtedly the most effective political arrangement would be a universal franchise on a common roll for all members of all groups in the country. However, as has been suggested in Chapter 1, this arrangement is probably unrealistic as an immediate goal. Also, following on from a point made earlier in this chapter, actions aimed directly at this goal would have the disadvantage of 'confronting' the racialism of the average white voter head-on. Effective rights can be achieved by members of all groups if political change takes certain alternative courses; this point will be discussed more fully in due course.

(b)   That employees of all races acquire effective bargaining power in the field of labour relations.

(c)   More generally, and as a precondition for (a) and (b) above, that non-white communities develop forms of effective political organisation

which would allow them to acquire the influence necessary for partici-pation in the determination of policies in South Africa.

(d)   That public monies be utilised in such a way as to provide greatest support to those who need assistance most, in the field of edu-cation, welfare, pensions, and other social services.

D.   STRATEGIC ACTION ORIENTATED TOWARDS WHITES

I.   General

As Chapter 1 has suggested, the effects of the language division among whites on political development in South Africa have been enormous. The pluralism among whites has to some extent also had the effect of containing efforts which have been made to influence their racial attitudes, inasmuch as the two white language groups, to some extent, are sealed-off from one another, and various forms of communication do not reach both groups equally. There has always existed a not inconsiderable amount of reformist zeal among whites in the English-speaking group, and this has resulted in consistent attempts to propagate a more toler-ant racial ethos. However, due to the hitherto rigid socio-political di-visions between nationalist Afrikaners and other whites, most of these attempts at communication have been effectively limited to the non-nation-alist section. While the effect of all this work over the years has pro-bably been to maintain and strengthen a liberal/progressive element among better-educated English-speakers, similar effects among Afrikaners have been negligible.

It is this author's impression that liberal arguments tend to be mis-perceived by a great many Afrikaners. From a position of convinced racial-ism, they find it difficult to accept the sincerity of liberal English-speakers, and suspect that the latter are motivated as much by anti-Afrikaner sentiments as by sympathy for non-whites. This suspicion is probably based on the fact that so many English-speaking whites (not necessarily the liberals) in fact do harbour anti-Afrikaner sentiments.

Impediments to the propagation of a more tolerant racial ideology also exist between status-groups in the English-speaking white com-munity. Correlations between racial tolerance and occupational and edu-cational status are particularly marked in South Africa, and are under-standable since relatively high social and economic status provides a security which tends to free people for more altruistic pursuits.

For these two major reasons, among others, attempts at the mass-communication of ideas aimed at encouraging a spirit of racial tolerance are not likely to make a meaningful impact on the white electorate. It would be different if such attempts were to be backed or initiated by the authorities and by government spokesmen and government agencies. There

was one very worthwhile official programme of positive education in race attitudes initiated by the government in power before 1948 *(8)*. At this stage, however, one must assume that 'liberal' education in race attitudes is likely to be opposed rather than encouraged by the government, and this automatically reduces its influence.

For change-groups operating without official support, an exclusive dependence on the persuasive power of rational logic, or moralistic argument, or on the potential effects of whatever contact across the colour line can be arranged, is misplaced. In the following subsections, some thoughts will be offered on how change-orientated activity directed at whites could be more effectively structured, and suggestions made relating to the changing of attitudes among whites. These suggestions are not based on the assumption that a complete change of heart will ever occur among the majority of whites as a result of the type of activities proposed. Rather, the assumption is that it might be possible to soften white resistance to black progress just sufficiently to give blacks an opportunity to gain confidence and bargaining power.

II.   Attempts to change Attitudes and Values of Individuals by intensive means

There are very effective techniques for changing the attitudes of individuals and for reducing inter-group tensions in small contact-group situations, such as the so-called T-group method and similar face-to-face techniques. By and large, these methods operate at a 'therapeutic' level, and to some degree stimulate intensive self-examination by individuals of their basic attitudes and behaviour in relation to others, encouraging the individual to be open to having his attitudes influenced by the response from other group members or by the atmosphere in the group as a whole. The individual is strongly motivated to change his or her attitudes because of emotional rewards which arise out of the interaction in the group situation. This is a rather over-simple description of some of these techniques, but it is inappropriate to go into any detail, since the mastery of these techniques requires fairly intensive instruction which could not be offered here, and which I am unqualified to give. Suffice to say that such methods are rewarding for the individual, involve no coercion, and they are effective. It is necessary, however, to consider the scope and limitations of these methods in the context of meaningful *social* change.

As far as can be ascertained, no notable successes have been achieved in exposing completely unconverted or disinterested individuals to intensive programmes of attitude-change. It has been suggested time and again that Afrikaans-speaking nationalists and uncommitted or negatively committed English-speakers be included in these programmes. Intensive group methods are expensive, however, and even to engage people of the

types mentioned in the group activity would require intensive preparation and persuasion in itself. These methods assume a willingness among participants to examine their attitudes. There is also the probability that when isolated individuals whose attitudes have been changed are exposed to the pressures of their own environments their attitudes will simply revert very much to rationalised versions of what they were beforehand. These individuals also will probably have limited opportunities of making what they might have experienced in group work relevant in their day-to-day actions - thus missing the opportunity of having their behaviour reinforce their changed attitudes.

With these considerations in mind the following suggestions deserve consideration:

(a)   Intensive efforts to involve a wider range of people in intensive group activity for changing attitudes are probably justified if the efforts are directed at *opinion leaders* drawn from various groups and strata, since this will enable a wider target group to be influenced indirectly.

(b)   Individuals should *not* be involved singly, but in small friend-ship groups so that they can offer each other mutual support in resisting pressures in their own environments.

(c)   The content of group work should be so structured as to relate directly to situations in which people are involved in their day-to-day activities. This content should have as much intrinsic interest as possible, preferably an interest which is of practical nature. Examples would be programmes for white employers or supervisors on communicating with black employees, programmes in which white and black sportsmen partici-pate, programmes structured around urban problems for black and white social workers, etc.

(d)   There are certain people, like teachers and ministers of religion, who have access to a representative range of whites. Intensive group methods should be used to the full in providing interested ministers and teachers with skills which would allow them to influence attitudes among their audiences.

There is a need for intensive group methods, provided they are aimed at actual or potential opinion-leaders and improve their leadership skills in the process. This method when applied to rank-and-file individuals is not likely to improve human relations at a level where they are im-mediately and closely relevant to political and economic change in South Africa. It is far more important, at this stage, for a significant number of Africans and other blacks to be granted certain opportunities, however limited, for political, economic and social advancement, than it is for

much smaller numbers of blacks to be accorded unqualified social and personal acceptance by what could never be more than a relatively small number of whites whose attitudes have been drastically affected by intensive methods. One needs to attempt to alter white attitudes on a relatively large scale in the area of perceptions of the social, economic and political roles of blacks, rather than to alter the personality structure of whites by intensive means on a small scale. In any case, several studies have shown that discrimination in South Africa is not primarily rooted in personality factors, but rather in patterns of conformity to widely accepted social norms *(9)*. It is at norms rather than psychological processes that major attention should be directed.

III. Utilising the Mass Media

In South Africa, the English press has generally maintained a good record in its editorial coverage of negative aspects of apartheid. Through the editorial columns of large circulation newspapers large numbers of the white public have been regularly exposed to moral challenges and certain newspapers in particular have made a point of publishing courageous investigations of especially unpleasant aspects of apartheid. Because of the importance of the press, however, it is essential that additional and novel ways of using the mass-media be considered.

As a first step it might be a very good idea if research were conducted into typical reactions to various types of socio-political content in newspapers. It might be that dramatic case studies of individual victims of apartheid, for example, have the greatest effect. Some months ago, press coverage of the plight of an individual African cripple, separated from his wife by influx-control laws, seemed to provoke a widespread response in both the English and Afrikaans press. This requires investigation, and if the effects are generally positive, the plight of selected individuals suffering disadvantage as a result of a range of discriminatory laws could be highlighted. An abundance of material for this type of story is available. There are other questions which require answers as well. We need to know how warnings of future political turmoil affect various groups. It is necessary to establish how 'believable' editorial opinion in the English press is for different groups of whites. Do whites generally respond to criticism of their attitudes by rejecting what is said, or do they respond with some constructive reflection? Answers to questions like these will allow a much more adequate focus to be achieved in the preparation of statements, articles and news releases.

Research might be useful in another way as well. Generally speaking, public opinion polls seem to attract a good deal of attention when results are published in the press. It is commonly felt in Britain and America

that the polls in themselves tend to facilitate shifts in political opinion, because they provide reassurance to those with newly changed but still ambivalent attitudes by showing them that many others have also switched allegiance or altered their opinions. If used cautiously, public opinion polls, apart from providing a wealth of useful information for other types of strategies, could be an effective strategy in themselves. White attitudes to job reservation, for example, appear to be changing, and this process is one which could be facilitated by an intelligent use of polling techniques. Furthermore, popular reasons for holding particular opinions are very often vague, confused, and contradictory. Yet these reasons reinforce and justify opinions held. Skilfully conducted polls in regard to the reasons for various political or economic values could provide a basis for highlighting illogicalities and contradictions in a fairly dramatic way, hopefully weakening thereby some of the popular attitudes which impede change.

Very often people adopt their political stance from very confused and incorrect images of what the future would be like if the changes which they oppose were to occur. A series of popular and easily understood yet authoritative articles predicting what life could be like if various changes were to occur would assist in loosening up political thinking to some extent.

Another theme which could possibly be exploited with profit is that of the inter-dependence of the races in South Africa. This has been drummed home time and again in the press, but usually in a way which merely emphasises labour statistics and economic facts. There seems to be a need to go further than this and to attempt to devise dramatic popular ways to counteract the all too prevalent image of the black as the white man's burden and as a problem. The roots of a pluralistic view of South African society are deeply embedded in popular conceptions, and this seems to be one of the basic factors preventing the recognition of the non-whites' right to participation in decision-making in our society.

There might be some merit in dealing directly in a dramatic way with typical rationalisations which whites use in supporting apartheid; the type of thinking which allows the average white to remain a perfectly decent sort of person while supporting gross injustice. Perhaps one could present whites with a picture of themselves, sympathetically, in order to attract unguarded interest, and then, hopefully with some impact, point out the self-deceit involved. A variety of rationalisations could be dealt with - 'blacks are quite contented but for a few trouble-makers'; 'time will sort things out'; 'blacks in control will bring chaos'; 'blacks are not ready for advancement'; 'I'm not interested in politics'; 'I treat my servant/workers well'.

Whether these particular suggestions are constructive or not can be

debated, but more generally, there seems to be considerable scope for using the mass-media in a more systematic, deliberate and focussed way than has been the case up to now. Some newspapers often inadvertently encourage negative attitudes towards blacks. Crime reporting, with the race of the suspect/accused always mentioned, is one such way. There is also a tendency to refer to black accident victims as if they were of less human worth than whites: the death of an African pedestrain usually is reported much more briefly than a similar accident involving a white. The principle of 'bad news being good news' also results in a considerable amount of sensational reporting of political and other disturbances elsewhere in Africa, while objective comment on events in Africa is usually in the form of feature articles, which, one assumes, attract relatively less attention from average readers. Since most newspapers are orientated towards a white readership, the local news coverage, mainly because events in the white community are given more prominence than events in black communities, reinforces the general image of the white community as dominant and the black community as being of lesser consequence. Also some newspapers put news relating to black communities on separate pages. This probably has very subtle negative effects on the attitudes of readers.

One realises that newspapers are business concerns, and that they have to take into account the interests of their major audience, the whites. However, if editors and the directorship of English newspaper companies can be made more conscious of the fact that the subtle effects of their news coverage often neutralises the editorial comment, then some changes in policy might be introduced which would not necessarily affect sales.

IV.   Action Within the Framework of the White Political Party Structure

The clearly marked cultural and language group divisions within the white party structure and the importance of Afrikaans nationalism (even though it might be starting to decline) have created impediments for those working for change. These divisions, however, also make for somewhat less rigidity, potentially at any rate, vis a vis the major issue of inequality in the country. If all conservatives were in one party, that party would be far more powerful than the present National Party, which gained little more than 45% of the support of the total electorate at the 1970 election (abstainers included). Notwithstanding the effects of delimitation, this lack of an overwhelming consensus makes for greater vulnerability in the ruling party than is the case with the ruling party in Rhodesia. A numerically large opposition is a factor which can influence events, despite the strong-willed determination of the National Party Cabinet.

The major opposition party, the United Party, partly because of its

many years of opposition status and the consequent need to formulate alternative proposals for dealing with the colour issue, is probably less conservative than would otherwise be the case, and it has to some extent educated its supporters accordingly. Hence one of its platforms is that of a better deal for blacks: greater freedom of opportunity, less restrictive legislation, etc. etc. A strengthening of the United Party as well as the Progressive Party to the point where they become a real danger to National Party rule will probably have the effect of tempering the repressive actions of the ruling party. The National Party, in addition, has also to attempt to meet the demands of its own less conservative, more idealistic intellectual wing, and pay some heed to outside opinion. If the opposition is in a threateningly powerful position the National Party could not risk losing those in its ranks who plead for more sincere attempts to implement separate development; it will have to try and make this policy assume at least a semblance of reality.

Both these possible developments could have important positive effects on the morale, bargaining power, and political organisation of blacks. Whatever its present demerits, or its ultimate futility, separate development is providing non-whites with a legal basis for political organisation. The benefits of effective challenges to repressive policies by a more powerful opposition are obvious. There seems therefore to be every reason for those desiring change to support the interests of the white opposition parties, and wherever possible, to make criticisms of the government which might serve as effective challenges to implement certain positive aspects of separate development more dynamically.

In a preceding section of this chapter B (II), I claimed it was futile to attempt to confront white racialism directly by working, at this stage, for mixed political and other organisations. Partly because of this conclusion, I see certain advantages in pressure being brought to bear on the government to create, in terms of its policy of separate development, as many forms of black political organisations as possible, and for participation in these organisations by blacks to be encouraged, where more constructive opportunities for political organisation do not exist.

V.   Working Through or Within Organisations and Interest Groups

Economic organisations, apart from the public administration, are the most widespread and consequential forms of organisation in the country. In any discussion of change, the economy is of dominant importance. In section B (V) I concluded, as Adam has in his recent book *(10)* that the *basic* aims of both management and the government's economic and labour policy-makers are entirely congruent in their support for white supremacy. However, in the long run, the requirements of an expanding economy are such that more and more blacks must be drawn into the ranks of skilled

labour, a process which will offer greater potential bargaining power for blacks. Economic growth is essential for the continued ability of South Africa to withstand pressure from outside its borders, and is fundamental to the material interests of all whites, not only those of businessmen. Yet continuing economic growth will make it more and more necessary for businessmen to raise the occupational status of blacks, and, as at present, despite aspects of its policy, the government will have to grant concessions which will allow this process to continue. As Adam remarks: ..... 'while economic development may reinforce white supremacy in the short run, it also undermines it in the long run' *(11)* by giving blacks more and more strategic positions in the economy, and reinforcing the inter-dependence between the races. Adam is correct when he points out that the process of black occupational advancement will not automatically lead to the acquisition by blacks of effective power. It is only when blacks can put their occupational status to good effect by becoming organised for hard bargaining in the labour (and ultimately political) sphere that the process will be complete. However, an essential prerequisite for the achievement of power by blacks is economic, occupational, and educational advancement. As Adam says: 'There is no inherent conservatism among rising members of a subordinate class; on the contrary it was this group which initiated and led most historical uprisings' *(12)*. It follows, therefore, that activity directed towards the encouragement of occupational and educational advancement among blacks is fundamentally important. As noted in Chapter 1, the occupational role of blacks appears to represent a 'soft' area of the South African social structure, since a majority of both English-and Afrikaans-speaking whites seem prepared to countenance a relaxation of job reservation.

Recent developments involving the Polaroid Company of South Africa have emphasised the scope which private organisations have in advancement of black employees and in the provision of additional benefits. The employment structure as it relates to race in South Africa is only in part determined by legislation; in the main it reflects the distribution of skills, the weight of custom, prejudice, and a tendency on the part of individual employers to keep their own employment practices in line with those of everyone else.

Influence groups in Britain, America, Holland, Germany, Japan and other countries with firms who have branches in South Africa are probably in the best position to initiate developments, as was the case with the Polaroid Company. With the increasing importance of the black local market, however, there might be possibilities for local action as well.

The following example is speculative. If just one or two major firms can be persuaded to engage in 'company image' advertising among blacks, in which opportunities for black workers are stressed, and if the black

press were to provide additional publicity, a snowball effect could take place and pressures for a better deal for black workers could be generated locally.

Other more direct means of influencing employment practices by working through employer organisations should be attempted. A concerted programme of activities in this area is called for. This might include making available to employers and their organisations the results of research on the relationship between poverty and under-productivity, distributing case studies of successful experiments in the advancement of blacks, distributing a simple summary of available research results in regard to the employment of blacks in supervisory and other responsible positions, and a concerted drive to publicise the extent of poverty and lack of opportunity in our society and their effects.

Partly as a result of external pressures, and possibly partly as a consequence of excellent local publicity regarding poverty, certain major employers are taking steps to improve wages and benefits for black workers. This is highly commendable, but inevitably it amounts to little more than a form of charity. In addition to the suggestions made above, it is necessary to attempt to persuade employers to allow Africans to establish labour organisations, even if they are within the framework of the government's 'Works Committee' system *(13)*. This system, although it provides for no effective power for African workers, at least has the potential of allowing African workers in an industry to acquire coherence as a group, and hence lays the foundation for more effective forms of organisation in the future. The current international pressure on certain companies operating in South Africa allows some scope for encouraging this type of development, and for offering African workers who become effective leaders in company labour organisations some protection against dismissal.

Employers, employer organisations and the English press are at the present time quite vociferous in their demands that job reservation be relaxed in order to help in solving the problem of the shortage of skilled personnel. These pleas cannot logically be made without also calling for more money to be spent on technical education for all blacks and on education in general. Even without restrictive labour practices the shortages of skills would remain.

Higher average levels of education and an increase in the size of the group of well-educated blacks in South Africa is of obvious importance in regard to change. Everything possible should be done to persuade businessmen and editors to link the need for more education with all statements in regard to labour policies, and actively to support bursary schemes and the establishment of training facilities. A simple pamphlet on the importance of education for future economic growth which em-

phasises the practical benefits for whites, distributed widely among interested bodies, would be one way of tackling this issue.

In a wide range of different types of organisations, including service organisations, medical schemes, insurance and other financial concerns, to mention only a few examples, the activities are financed by and/or carried out on behalf of members of all race groups. There is a tremendous degree of what we might term 'hidden association' between the races in the institutional life of South Africa. In all too many instances, this hidden association tends not to be acknowledged and because control is in the hands of whites, the activities tend to either benefit whites more than other groups, or else are completely white oriented. This is an area where political considerations are of fairly low keyed intensity, and where vital power relations are not involved. For this reason, representations on behalf of black interests are not likely to be received with too much hostility and resistance. Yet considerable practical benefits for blacks could be obtained which would play a part in the material and social upliftment of their communities. This is a specialised area and I do not propose to go into any detail. In the chapter by Douwes-Dekker an analysis of the situation and recommendations are presented. There would seem to be tremendous merit in the proposal that a study group survey the possible field of action, with a view to stimulating various bodies to make the necessary representations, or else make representations to various organisations itself.

VI.   Action Within the Framework of Cultural (14) and other group Differences between Whites:

People who are to some extent committed to fundamental change quite rightly tend to be concerned primarily about exploitation and deprivation in relation to black groups. However justified this is, we should guard against over-reacting to the racialism of whites and to the injustices of white domination and running the risk of overlooking or discarding aspects of the heritage of whites which are also to some extent deserving of our concern. I say this not only because of an appreciation of the intrinsic merits of some aspects of white culture, but also because our stance in regard to change often earns us the label of being hostile to white interests, or more particularly, of being hostile to Afrikaans interests.

Rejection of white interest in retaining total power, in maintaining excessive privilege, and rejection of all the other white interests which lead whites to exploit and dehumanise non-whites is entirely appropriate. We should not go further, however, and reject, for example, the Afrikaner's interest in safeguarding his language and culture. The Afrikaans language is one of the more precious and valuable fruits of our country's turbulent history. But the preservation of the Afrikaans culture and language is

not necessarily dependent on the maintenance of total power by whites. In fact there are indications that the aims and requirements of domination are weakening Afrikaans.

Firstly, the association of Afrikaans with the more extreme forms of discrimination and repression introduced since National Party rule commenced has bred hostility towards the language among many English-speaking whites, among Africans and Indians, and among Coloureds, many of whose own home language is (or used to be) Afrikaans. Secondly, the need to import thousands of white immigrants in order to avoid status advances in the workplace for non-whites weakens the strength of Afrikaans in numerical terms in the white community: only a very small percentage of immigrants, even Netherlanders and Germans, adopt Afrikaans as their first language in South Africa. Thirdly, the apartheid system has almost completely alienated the Afrikaners in the eyes of most opinion leaders in the Netherlands, and thereby has cut Afrikaans culture off from a powerful source of international support and cultural enrichment. Lastly, the members of the conservative Afrikaner establishment, partly because they tend to equate power with cultural and language group survival, have imposed stultifying and oppressive moral restrictions on the forms of expression which Afrikaans culture can take. Afrikaans culture becomes more attenuated daily. One of our best Afrikaans poets in exile in Paris writes:

> *,..... in stiller betragtinge as jy maanhelder sien*
> *hoe alle alternatiewe lei na die donker see*
> *..... verdrietig daal jy af in die nederduitse vrees*
> *om met Kersfees*
> *nostalgies te peusel aan jou Engelse kos'*

Popular forms of expression for Afrikaans culture are virtually non-existent. In my research experience and that of others in areas such as the Witwatersrand and Natal, younger Afrikaans families increasingly seem to be using more and more English in their homes. In these areas Afrikaans teenagers often speak an impoverished argot slang. All over the world, when culture has to become the superstructure and the justification for power and privilege, the quality of that culture suffers. This is happening to Afrikaans. Spro-cas is concerned with all matters of deeply human consequence in South Africa, and a unique and potentially rich culture like Afrikaans is of great consequence. It might be a very worthwhile experiment to encourage some of our younger Afrikaans authors to visit Afrikaans campuses and colleges to explore, with the students, the question of how congruent the interests of domination and the real interests of culture are. Afrikaans theologians who are well-acquainted

with the nature of Calvinism in the Netherlands might also profitably explore the question of the extent to which power and material privilege have distorted Calvinism in South Africa. The automatic assumption that the preservation of Afrikaans culture is dependent on a monopoly of political power needs to be challenged.

VII.   External Influences on South Africa:

The moment one suggests employing strategies for change which are in any way connected with external influences on South Africa, one is accused of treason and betrayal. There are possible strategies which would be odious and which must be summarily rejected; these would include anything connected with the liberation movement on our borders, and with economic boycotts, which if one takes all factors into account, will probably do more harm than good.

There have been certain pressures from outside South Africa which have done little harm and which have had some constructive effects. The Polaroid incident which has been mentioned is one example. Peter Hain's activities have hurt some people's patriotic pride and the careers of some of our white sportsmen, but might result in black sportsmen enjoying better facilities and the opportunity to compete at the highest level. These effects can hardly be considered destructive.

Pressure from overseas on South Africa is a fact. One cannot wish it away. These pressures are at present stimulated by relatively extreme groups of exiles and others whose understanding of the complex problems of achieving change in South Africa is generally inadequate. Another well established form of influence overseas is the official government public relations programme, which by tending to try and whitewash South Africa's image for a critical and intelligent audience, brings discredit upon itself. Both these forms of influence can do untold harm to forces working for greater justice in South Africa. A balanced picture of South Africa can be presented by many people overseas, and these people could also make constructive proposals in regard to appropriate action. If it can be done in a way which will not give so much offence as to defeat the purpose, it might be a constructive move to encourage the formation of action-groups of balanced and objective critics overseas and to keep such groups well supplied with objective information.

VIII.   The Role of 'Protest':

It is impossible to decide how much good or harm the conventional forms of protest have done to the cause of greater equality in South Africa - they have probably had both effects.

Highly emotional, morally coloured, bitingly critical statements or demonstrations of protest serve to maintain a sense of purpose among

social reformers, but can often create an impression that South Africa is a more open society than it really is. These forms of protest can have some very negative effects. They might convert a few individuals in the white groups but it is to be doubted whether the number is significant. Protest might hearten some blacks, but there is a considered opinion freely expressed, that many younger blacks either despise or feel pity for conscience-stricken whites who persist in fruitless activity of this nature. The accusation is often levelled that this is a way in which some whites can salve their over-burdened consciences and little else.

'Conscience' is an important concept in relation to protest. If protests are effective, which is not always the case, they probably cause many whites to feel guilty. People generally do not acknowledge guilt, even to themselves, and it can become transformed into aggressive, defensive reactions. Many protests leave very little alternative for the audience except for this type of counter-reaction, because the protests themselves are all too often completely negative and offer the audience no guidelines as to how to channel their reactions.

On the basis of these considerations, the following suggestions are made:

Protests of the usual kind should only be launched if there is a very adequate basis for anticipating very wide public support, as, for example, in the fairly recent case of the 22 terrorism trial detainees, where many conservative whites seemed to be shocked by the duration of their detention without trial. Protests should generally be concerned with the type of issue where the emotional and moral content of the protest can back up a request or demand which will not be popularly seen as being unreasonable among whites, like, for example, a call for higher minimum wages for Africans living below the poverty datum line. If protest can provide its audience with something with which they can agree, then the defensive reactions referred to earlier might not occur. These defensive reactions are dangerous because they can reinforce negative attitudes and practices. In the case of people who have been banned or restricted, protests should be designed to justify a demand, say for example, that a small Commission of Judges be appointed to investigate the banning and make recommendations in regard to its 'advisability' to the Minister. In this way one might even be able to emphasise some basic principles of justice in a way which avoids use of terms like 'the rule of law' which the public generally does not understand.

Taking a long view of our situation, and bearing in mind the conclusions reached in section B. (VI), it can be argued that South Africa's future stability is undermined by the extent to which present security legislation and the actions of the authorities in terms of such legislation, outside the jurisdiction of the courts, represses or inhibits the open expression

of opinion and political organisation among blacks. The need for strict security measures against those who plan the armed and violent overthrow of any existing government is not questioned. What is questioned, however, is whether the repression of peaceful forms of political organisation will not lead to a greater likelihood of violence in the future. Protest can play a constructive role in change if it offers black political leaders and organisations with non-violent aims some protection against repressive security measures. It seems highly desirable, therefore, that protests against arbitrary bannings and detentions without trial become more effective. It would possibly be very useful if a widely based committee of citizens with high standing in the community could be formed to act as a 'watchdog' group, and to protest and make representations in regard to unnecessarily repressive measures.

Students are arch-protestors but very little more, and it is very often only at times when their consciences have been shocked that most of them display a sense of commitment. The commitment which the cause of the protest stimulates and which the protest itself reinforces, should always be used to arouse interest in some practical project which is connected with the cause of the protest, even if only vaguely so. Such projects should be of limited duration and, if possible, have goals which are attainable. Student protests which culminate in a call for, in effect, a complete restructuring of our society are so futile as to be pathetic.

In regard to public protests, my own general observations as well as some current research on which I am engaged suggests that there is a surprisingly widespread concern among whites about black poverty and wages. This, I feel, can be seen as a very constructive basis for protest in view of the analysis provided in the next section, and protests which lead up to carefully phrased calls for a new approach to minimum wages might be more successful than one would imagine.

From time to time incidents involving the rights of blacks cause a flurry of mutual recrimination between the English press and opposition groups on the one hand, and the Afrikaans press and the authorities on the other. The forced resettlement of Africans is one example. Inevitably, people making public protests are branded as trouble-makers, agitators, and the protests are labelled as attempts to make political capital out of the incident. Presumably members of the general public are left in some doubt about the merits and demerits of whatever official action prompted the incident. In view of this, it might be a very positive step if an independent committee of representative, public-spirited businessmen, professionals and academics could be established, perhaps under the chairmanship of a former judge, to consider such incidents, invite representations from the parties concerned, and deliver an impartial and authoritative statement concerning the incidents. This would presumably

carry weight with the public and contribute to greater justice in the administration of the affairs of blacks.

E. ACTION ORIENTATED TOWARDS BLACK SOUTH AFRICANS

It will be from the various black communities, ultimately, that decisive pressures for change must come. With the interests of everyone in mind, it obviously will be most desirable if these ultimate pressures involve as little disorganised violence and unrest as possible. If one projects the present relatively unorganised black political situation forward in time, assuming quite legitimately that with increasing sophistication, education, and an increasing sense of relative deprivation among ordinary people, will come increasing bitterness and frustration, one cannot escape concluding that the possibilities of destructive violence are great. Prevailing social conditions in black township ghettoes, the relatively high rates of violent crime, the reactions of crowds after train smashes and demonstrations (as in the recent Gelvandale incident), are pointers in this direction. At present the sense of powerlessness among blacks is probably accompanied by relatively low levels of expectation. Numerous factors, including the advertising industry, the likely economic advancement of some but by no means the majority of members of the black proleteriat, increasing literacy, the weakening of bonds with tribal life and a weakening of the latter as a reference to the assessments people make of their present situations in life, and even the unfulfilled promises of separate development, are all likely to raise levels of popular aspirations and frustration in the future. Powerlessness and relative apathy account for the civil peace which the country experiences today. Powerlessness and a common sense of dissatisfaction and a feeling of deprivation in relation to what is hoped to be achieved, as a legitimate right, could account for a violently different situation in future years. Some understandably embittered people in South Africa might anticipate these possibilities with a measure of satisfaction. What everyone should bear in mind, however, is the probable violence of any counter-reaction from whites, which could result in a bloodbath. If this were to occur, change will probably result, if for no other reason than the strength of reaction of foreign powers to large-scale bloodshed in South Africa. But people who for a variety of reasons are carelessly, selfishly, or knowingly prepared to see this situation develop are, in a sense, guilty of cardinal irresponsibility (this includes the majority of whites, as well as some blacks, and also those responsible for short-sighted security measures which contribute so much to the hopelessness of the black political situation).

As we have said before, in the final analysis, those who are serving

their country and all its people best are those who are working for the advancement of organised black political development. The only hope of a peaceful solution to the problems of inequality in South Africa lies in the eventual possibility of organised political and economic bargaining between the various interest-groups. Another theoretical alternative, and one which would possibly serve the long-term material interests of whites best, is slow evolutionary change towards a more equitable society via the social, occupational, economic and political mobility and acceptance by the whites of individual blacks and their families. But social groups tend more often than not to be self-seeking in a short-sighted way, and this alternative has minority support among whites (and will probably soon have virtually no support among the mass of blacks). We have to accept the alternative path of change via bargaining and conflict along racial lines, and from a Christian or humanitarian standpoint we have a duty to do what we can to encourage processes which are likely to make it possible for the conflict to be contained and as constructive and as peaceful as possible.

Black powerlessness results from a wide range of factors, some of which have been outlined in a previous Spro-cas publication *(15)*. On the basis of that analysis, it is possible to conclude that the following preconditions have to be met before active popular participation from blacks can be expected in seeking positive changes in our society. In stating these preconditions, this author has assumed that the present impediments to the exercise of effective political leadership among blacks are likely to prevail for some time to come. The difficulties in the path of the effective political mobilisation of blacks are greater in South Africa at the present time than at any time in the past or than they have been anywhere else in Africa. For this reason, a greater degree of political sophistication at the community level, and higher levels of community organisation among blacks, are necessary as a precondition for political and economic mobilisation than would be the case in a less repressive society. The following points, therefore, should not be interpreted as casting a slur on the political 'maturity' of blacks. They are no more than an attempt at an objective assessment of what is required in the particularly hazardous political climate in South Africa. The preconditions stated below also arise out of the conclusions drawn in section B (IX), and out of the assessment by the authors Adam and Feit *(16)* of the reasons for the failure of internal resistance in the past.

(a)   Higher levels of literacy among the black peasantry and proleteriat have to be achieved, as a means to greater political awareness and sophistication.

(b)   Black communities have to achieve a greater cohesiveness and

solidarity. The dividing and atomising effects of high crime rates, small clique loyalties of a variety of types, extreme poverty which tends to make the day-to-day struggle for personal survival of paramount importance, and other factors have to be effectively combated.

(c) Rank-and-file blacks should gain greater experience in working with one another in voluntary community organisations. This experience will develop a spirit of voluntary co-operation and, hopefully, will tend to accustom people to accepting group goals at the expense of short term personal aspirations.

(d) Non-white communities should develop an advanced sense of pride, dignity and self-esteem as a necessary precondition for the emergence of an active appreciation of their rights in the larger society.

(e) The 'embourgeoisement' and marginality of many blacks who have achieved higher occupational status has to be counteracted, so that they will identify more closely with their communities and make their skills available in popular community organisation.

(f) Greater avenues for the exercise of political and community leadership in black communities have to come into existence.

(g) The notion among some blacks, particularly sections of the Coloured and Indian communities, that they, in contrast to Africans, have a hope of being fully and officially accepted by whites, is a divisive factor of utmost importance and has to be dispelled.

(h) Blacks have to come to occupy positions of skill and responsibility in employment in significantly greater numbers than they do at present, so that fewer and fewer black workers are easily replaceable labourers with little intrinsic bargaining strength. This will also have the effect of alleviating some of the extreme poverty in black communities.

(i) In order to facilitate the process mentioned under (h) above, and generally to increase the potential for a more sophisticated political awareness, educational standards among black communities have to be raised as quickly as possible.

Open political organisation among blacks is virtually impossible except within or in relation to the political machinery created by the government in terms of its policy of separate development. Secret political activity

is no doubt possible, but in view of security legislation and control and the ubiquity of informers, such organisation, if it were to survive, would have to be so secret as to be futile. In any case, activity which is secret cannot demonstrate whether its goals are constructive or not, and must therefore be excluded entirely from this discussion.

The political structures created in terms of the policy of separate development might, as officially constituted, be largely confined to issues which are irrelevant to the major issue of inequality in our society, but they nevertheless offer scope for the exercise of political leadership and for the involvement of large numbers of rank-and-file blacks in organised political activity. Experience in both these fields relates to the preconditions for the emergence of effective black pressure mentioned above. Some people, on grounds of principle, still refuse to take these opportunities seriously. In the absence of any other practical alternatives this attitude is self-defeating. Urban Bantu Councils, the Coloured Representative Council, any future Indian Representative Council, and the Territorial Authorities in the African reserves must be utilised to the fullest possible extent under present circumstances.

Some astute black student leaders have warned, quite correctly, that working within the system in the way suggested is playing at 'sectional politics', and increases the risk of dividing the black community into the ethnic segments which are defined by government policy. This danger is obvious, but need not necessarily apply. It depends, overwhelmingly, on the way black political leaders define their situation, and on the attitudes which they encourage among their followers. All black communities have much in common, and if leaders stress this fact continually, their activities within the system need not be divisive.

In Soweto, an interesting development occurred as a result of certain dissatisfactions with the operation of the Urban Bantu Council. An informal 'Shadow Council' was formed which keeps a watching brief on the activities of the Council, holds public meetings, and seeks to put pressure on Urban Bantu Councillors to take popular needs fully into account in every possible way. The Urban Bantu Council might be a powerless body, but particularly with the developments mentioned, it is an invaluable avenue for the exercise of leadership and fostering of political coherence in the township. People in other areas might profitably study this development to see whether similar approaches could not be adopted with regard to other bodies.

Recent statements by the Chief Minister of the Transkei and by the Chief Executive Officer of the Zulu Territorial Authority have attracted widespread attention. Their respective roles might be powerless in a direct way at the moment, but these represent possibly the most significant political developments since the early sixties. The concern of

both these leaders with living and working conditions of rank-and-file Xhosa's and Zulu's is most encouraging and it seems clear that the political institutions of separate development could become mouthpieces for the expression of the interests of thousands of voiceless blacks in both rural and urban areas.

However, until such time as these leaders have powerful and active popular support, the authorities will continue to ignore their representations. The only potential bargaining power which these leaders have is labour, and since South Africa's labour force is overwhelmingly and increasingly black, this could be a very powerful lever; one which theoretically could lead ultimately to black participation in government, initially by means of some type of federal arrangement.

This bargaining power could only be realised once the rank-and-file blacks are much more effectively politicised than they are currently.

To work for the other preconditions for effective political development which have been set out above, a great deal of basic work has to be performed. Strategies should be formulated at this level.

The following are tentative suggestions:

The non-white press has an undoubted flair for very dramatic reporting of crime and scandal, while their political content tends, on the whole, to be somewhat drier and far less prominent. If some of the techniques used in crime reporting (i.e. dramatic photographs, emotive quotes from ordinary people involved in incidents, highly intimate detail, all of which tend to produce a feeling of identification in the reader), were to be applied to reports on incidents in the political and in the labour field, political coverage could be more widely read. If someone were to launch a photo-picture story magazine with incidents from real life situations in South Africa, drawing the line at anything dangerously political, it would also be constructive, and perhaps fewer blacks would waste their money on magazines of the crime/romance/voodoo type. This might not be possible in view of management policy or possibly because of the Publications Control Act, but should be considered. Essentially what one needs is for black communities to be given 'feedback' on themselves to help reinforce a sense of a shared situation.

There is a veritable army of more than 50,000 African school teachers who are presently not as involved in community organisation and leadership as they might be. Their fears are understandable, but any activities in this field need not necessarily be political in content. Before rank-and-file Africans can organise effectively in the political sense, they need experience in working in organisations no matter of what type. From my experience in employing African school teachers as interviewers in surveys, it would seem that many of them, if not most of them, find it

difficult to relate to ill-educated members of the labouring classes. The difficulty is partly due to a status barrier erected by the white-collar Africans themselves and is very understandable. However, growing status divisions in the black communities need to be discouraged and might be effectively countered by the communication of some form of 'popular' ideology.

School teachers and other white-collar Africans could also theoretically take the lead in fostering a spirit of pride in own identity, aimed at improving the morale of African communities. The more developed skills of teachers and other white-collar workers could also be employed in organising things like neighbourhood or community development groups who could tackle small community projects or make representations in regard to specific grievances. They could also organise or participate in neighbourhood co-operatives and welfare societies. Any little success in this area is bound to help dispel the apathy and feeling of powerlessness of many rank-and-file Africans.

All this requires that a significant number of African, and for that matter, Indian and Coloured, school teachers as well, actively begin to identify 'downwards' with the peasantry or urban workers, instead as is sometimes the case, of emulating the manners and consumption patterns of white middle-class society to the exclusion of concern with the wider black community. Teachers unions should be involved in debate on these issues. It might also be an excellent idea if an inexpensive mimeographed magazine could be produced regularly by a small working group, in which the anti-bourgeois ethos is communicated in subtle but effective ways, in the form of fiction, jokes, cartoons, etc., and in which suggestions could be made for community involvement. Obviously funds would be required, particularly since such a magazine would have to be distributed without charge.

Leadership training courses for blacks orientated towards community development and welfare are probably more important than similar courses for whites at this stage. An amount of the attention being devoted to group work designed to improve inter-personal contact between the races could, in my opinion, be redirected profitably in the direction mentioned.

An obvious course of action in regard to black social, economic and political development is support for bursary funds and educational trusts. Mention has already been made of this need in dealing with action orientated towards whites and nothing more can be said here. One tentative thought is that black South Africans prominent as leaders, or in the teaching profession, should be sponsored to undertake fund-raising trips overseas, and visits to the headquarters of large foreign firms operating in South Africa might not be inappropriate.

Another extremely worthwhile venture which is currently in preparation

aims at the establishment of an industrial advice office for black workers. A leadership training scheme for industrial workers is also being planned. Both these projects are Johannesburg-based, but they should be watched with interest, and if possible, assistance should be provided to duplicate any successful ventures elsewhere in the country.

Everything possible should be done to encourage the development of African trade unions. Since they are not recognised in law at this stage, their role would be mainly educative, but nonetheless, the ground-work could be done in preparation for organised bargaining in the future.

Many of the forms of community organisation and leadership training which have been mentioned should be orientated towards the spread of literacy. There are effective organisations for the training of individuals to undertake literacy training. These are probably under-utilised at the present time. Far more black school teachers and social workers, as well as people specially trained could be involved in extra-mural literacy training than is presently the case. Organisations with contacts in the black townships should intensify efforts to stimulate neighbourhood literacy groups, one or two members of which could be selected for training, so that they in turn can teach basic reading ability in the groups. Token fees should be required from all members of such groups to help finance the training of literacy teachers. This might give the groups a sense of greater commitment and encourage regular attendance. The black press might also be encouraged to respond to literacy campaigns by providing very simple summaries of important news and events in large type on their front pages, so that newly literate people can begin to benefit from their training as soon as possible.

Turning from urban to rural issues, a matter of extreme urgency is the problem of low productivity in agriculture in the reserves. As long as an adequate living cannot be made off the land in the reserves, there is likely to be an overall surplus of cheap unskilled labour in Southern Africa. The problems of developing under-developed rural areas are admittedly enormous, but every attempt should be made in this direction, because with the present substantial reservoirs of under-employed peasants living at or below subsistence levels in the reserves and ex-Protectorates, the black unskilled labour force in the cities will always be faced with the insecurity of being able to be readily replaced, hence undermining its bargaining power. Obviously the development of the reserves is an extremely worthwhile endeavour in itself as well. The development of the reserves is being undertaken by the government with some determination, but this is not sufficient. Church missions in rural areas, universities, private firms and all other appropriate organisations and groups should be encouraged to undertake or sponsor research, consultations and experimentation in order to provide ideas, insights, and assistance

in regard to providing increased employment and a more adequate liveli-
hood in the reserves and in the independent African states in Southern
Africa.

One of the goals of development-orientated research and experimental
projects should be the achievement of higher agricultural production based
on co-operative schemes which allow peasants to be engaged in meaningful
economic and social co-operative organisations in the local areas. As
far as is possible, agricultural development should be accompanied by
labour intensive small-scale industrial development which is fully in-
tegrated into the agricultural economy of the local areas. Cultural life
and the system of administration and authority at the local level should,
ideally, evolve in such a way as to involve the peasantry as much as
possible in the development of their own communities. Schemes should
be evolved which do not require heavy investment or the need for bureau-
cratic control by agencies in the urban centres. This is *not* to say that
investment in urban industrial development in the under-developed areas
should be discouraged. The need is rather for urban development to be
balanced by comprehensive rural development which would offer the
peasants in the rural areas far greater scope for responsible participation
in the development of the countries or reserves, as well as greater scope
for the realisation of their aspirations in their home districts. In other
words, development, as far as possible, should counteract the migrant
labour system and its attendant dangers. Admittedly, the extreme shortage
of land in some of the reserves makes it totally impossible for peasants
to avoid having to work in the cities. However, any development which
reduces the reserve army of labour even to a small extent is worthwhile,
particularly if such development embraces the development of people
and communities as well as the rural economy.

In making these suggestions about possible forms of action orientated
towards black South Africans, the author's intention is not that whites
should actually undertake work among black communities. Obviously, this
is the role and task of blacks themselves. However, whites can play an
'enabling role', by attempting to make funds and training facilities avail-
able to blacks wishing to undertake projects in their own communities.

F.   DISCUSSION

Throughout the preceding sections the aim has been to concentrate
on possible action which could lead directly, or indirectly, to some form
of change in the structure of our society as it relates to inequality. The
issue of improving race relations, as a topic of intrinsic interest, has
been ommitted. For this reason many of the older favourite forms of
strategy have not been included, and nor have some recent issues which
might appear to have strategic value.

One of the latter is the current debate among Afrikaans nationalists about petty apartheid. Although the long-term implications of a success for the more enlightened participants in the debate might be constructive, it seems that the short-term effects will be simply to introduce a little more flexibility into the system and create an illusion of progress. Except in the case of some contributions to the debate in the English press, the issues raised have tended to relate mainly to the more peripheral colour taboos in South Africa. Black men travelling with whites in elevators will make very little difference to anything of any real consequence. One constructive way of participating in this debate is to attempt to show the 'verligte' Nationalists how self-centred and patronising some of their newly formed attitudes are, and to encourage them in a constructive way to look to the material interests of blacks rather than to the subtleties their own colour tolerance.

On a completely different issue, it would seem that a broad and comprehensive strategy might be necessary to make other more specific types of action more effective. This broad strategy relates to the 'image' of people who wish to attempt to bring about changes. Their image in the eyes of the white voting public is important in the sense that a less unfavourable image would offer action groups some protection and would also lend weight to their representations. It is completely natural that people concerned with preserving the *status quo* should see those who oppose the present order as trouble-makers. This reaction is strengthened by continual smear tactics employed by spokesmen for the ruling party, in whose claims even T-group trainers, committed Christians and those who do not condemn the 'permissive society' are tools of communism. Constant efforts should be made to counteract this type of labelling. Once again highly personalised material might be effective. It might be a good idea, for example, if one of the larger English newspapers were to run a feature series of interviews with South African personalities well known for their work on behalf of greater justice and equality in South Africa, in which these individuals explain how they have come to oppose the system, what their motives are, and what their hopes and aspirations are for white South Africans.

G.   CONCLUSION

A number of broad suggestions have been made and a number of specific strategies have been recommended. There are a fair number of organisations operating in South Africa who could put some of these suggestions into effect, if they are considered useful. It would be a great pity, however, if the Study Project on Christianity in Apartheid Society were not to continue functioning for an extended period of time after all the final reports have been tabled, so as to put many of its own proposals into effect.

Most of the existing organisations have their own very full programmes
and their personnel are generally extended to the limit. It is unlikely that
any of the organisations which will be prepared to study the proposals
of Spro-cas will be in a position to form specialist action groups to work
intensively in specific areas of South African life. If Spro-cas were to
continue in operation for an extended period this approach would seem
to be both appropriate and possible.

Many of the recommendations and suggestions contained in this report
overlap areas of concern of the other commissions in Spro-cas. This is
unavoidable, since the field of the Social Commission, by definition,
includes all types of institutions in society. As an inclusive report,
this analysis possibly has the merit that a broad spectrum of issues
can be looked at in relation to one another. This report might be of some
value, therefore, in helping to assign priorities to the proposals made
by other commissions.

In regard to priorities, this author's own assessment is that greatest
weight should be given to action among black communities. This does not
mean, however, that activities directed towards whites are unimportant.
I repeat what I have said earlier: whites might never willingly relinquish
power, but the extent to which and the ways in which they strive to main-
tain their power and privilege are very important as factors which will in-
fluence the emergence of the necessary preconditions for effective black
participation in change.

In this chapter, very little has been said about the policy of separate
development. For the very large 'common area' of South African life ·
the cities, industrial areas and the developed agricultural economy, se-
parate development appears to be little more than a sophisticated rational-
isation for continuing apartheid and white supremacy. This is substanti-
ated in the appendix to this report. No one should be deceived by claims
that separate development holds out any promise for the solution of South
Africa's major problems. However, for those African reserves which have
the potential for adequate development, this policy must be taken seriously,
provided, of course, that such development is pursued with only the parti-
cular territory itself and its de facto inhabitants in mind. That aspect of
the policy of separate development which assumes that the tiny African
reserves will absorb or provide political opportunities for the millions
of Africans in the 'common area' is unrealistic and must be opposed.
However, an independent Transkei, for those Transkeians who actually
live there, would be a positive development. One must, of course, be wary
of the dangers of the larger South Africa manipulating weaker independent
former reserves along neo-colonialist lines; an ever-present possibility.

While the present government's policy of separate development, as it
relates to the large common area of South Africa, must be approached

critically, this does not mean that all policies which do not plead for direct and immediate developments toward a common society are not deserving of careful study. **Any** policy, whether it be partition, some form of federal arrangement, or other possible varieties of political thinking, *provided* it has the potential for the evolution of *effective* black influence in South Africa, must be given careful consideration, in view of the wellnigh complete intransigence of whites in regard to ethnic integration.

I have made a number of suggestions in regard to practical action for fundamental change in South Africa. It is possible that my motives will be seen as being totally in opposition to the interests of whites. I am secure in my conviction, however, that provided meaningful change along non-violent lines can occur before it is too late, in the long run whites have little to fear apart from the loss of their near-exclusive privilege and their enormous material advantages over blacks. Even in Zambia, skilled whites from the hated white South are tolerated and paid very well, because they are an economic necessity. By virtue of their education and their skills, whites can anticipate a secure future in a changed South Africa, provided they are prepared to make a timeous sacrifice of the *unfair* advantages which their political hegemony affords them. And those aspects of their culture and way of life which are not dependent on exclusive privilege will also survive if the whites so desire. The world abounds with minorities without any noteworthy political influence which are able to preserve their distinctive cultures.

On the note of culture, and in conclusion, I would like to refer readers back to what has been said in an earlier section B (XIV) about the need to think beyond the immediate and pressing problem of racial inequality in South Africa. Even the most prosperous, privileged and self-satisfied whites live in a state of 'unfreedom' which compels them to conform to a pattern of existence in which status and success are the gods, and which is becoming increasingly associated with mindless mass-consumption, nervous diseases, congestion, pollution and bureaucracy. Apart from action within the educational system, there is, potentially, a significant role for the church in attempting to attune people to the rewards of a heightened quality of human association and of greater freedom of personal endeavour. It is my personal conviction that, in the very long term, the Christian values of love, sisterhood and brotherhood can only be realised fully in our society if most individuals are able to feel more secure in their own personal identities, and hence become less dependent for their sense of worth on extreme group concern, status, power, unquestioning conformity, and a rejection of those who are different from themselves.

FOOTNOTES

1. Poll by Market and Opinion Surveys, *Rapport*, 22/10/71.
2. See also: L. Schlemmer, 'The Future Political Implications of Present Trends' in *Directions of Change in South African Politics*, Spro-cas 1971.
3. See the summary of an article by Sean Gervasi: 'Poverty, Apartheid, and Economic Growth', UN No. 30/71, in *Race Relations News*, Vol. 33, No. 10, October 1971, p. 3.
4. Herbert Blumer: 'Industrialisation and Race Relations', in Guy Hunter (Ed.): *Industrialisation and Race Relations*, Oxford University Press, 1965.
5. See L. Schlemmer 'Factors Underlying Apartheid' in *Anatomy of Apartheid*, Spro-cas, 1970, and also Herbert Adam, *Modernising Racial Domination*, University of California Press, 1971, pp. 105-111.
6. For an excellent discussion of this necessity in liberation movements see Gary T. Marx and Michael Useem, 'Majority Involvement in Minority Movements', *Journal of Social Issues*, Vol. 27, No. 1, 1971, pp. 81-104.
7. There is a very valuable discussion of this issue by Dr Denis Worrall. See the Editorial in *New Nation*, Vol. 5, No. 2, September 1971.
8. I refer here to a programme of general education and information run among the members of the Defence Force in the early 1940's.
9. See, inter alia, C. Orpen, 'Just How Prejudiced are White South Africans', in *New Nation*, February, 1971.
10. Adam, *op cit.* Chapter 6.
11. *Ibid*, p. 153, passim.
12. *Ibid*, p. 155.
13. See Recommendation B4 in *Power, Privilege and Poverty*, Report of the Spro-cas Economics Commission (to be published in 1972).
14. In this section the word 'culture' is used in a popular sense to denote those characteristic forms of expression and ways of life in a group which are historically derived and which give the group an identifiable social character independent of political power or economic status.
15. L. Schlemmer, 'Some Factors Underlying Apartheid' in Peter Randall (Ed.): *Anatomy of Apartheid*, Spro-cas, 1970.
16. Adam, *op cit*, pp. 111-118, Edward Feit, *African Opposition in South Africa: the Failure of Passive Resistance*, Stanford, Hoover Institute, 1967.

APPENDIX

APARTHEID
AS RATIONALISATION

h. lever

THE POLICY of apartheid (or separate development) claims to take cognisance of the different cultures of various groups and to 'protect' those cultures. Separation is supposed to be based on cultural and not on racial differences. The supporters of the policy claim that they are not motivated by a dislike of the non-white. They also claim that the goal of apartheid is the elimination of prejudice and discrimination. Discrimination is seen as a temporary, but necessary, measure until such time as the final stage in separation is attained. It is also claimed that the ideology of apartheid is in the best traditions of 'Western' culture and Christianity. The policy of apartheid is offered as a 'final solution' to the 'race problem' and more especially the 'Bantu problem'. The arrogance underlying the policy is evident. It is arrogant to regard other people as a 'problem' and to offer a 'final solution' for them. It could be argued equally well that the 'problem' in race relations is a 'white problem'. It has been said that the white man's narcissistic pre-occupation with his own skin colour is the chief problem (1).

Another view of apartheid is that it is a rationalisation, that is, an attempt to preserve a position of privilege by formulating an ideological system which gives credence or justification to it. In other words, it is a kind of moral window-dressing for the outside world as well as for the dominated and dominating groups in this country. Discrimination is the reality for a great many South Africans. Apartheid appears to them largely as a verbal edifice.

Having examined the evidence for and against apartheid, members of the Social Commission have come to the conclusion that apartheid can

best be described as a rationalisation. This conclusion is based on the following grounds:

1. Despite protestations to the contrary, the rights and privileges of South Africans are determined by racial and not by cultural considerations. A black man, no matter how high his level of civilisation or adherence to Western culture, can never attain the same status of privilege of a white man regardless of his level of civilisation or his adherence to heathenism, polygamy, witchcraft or black magic. All restrictive legislation in South Africa is in terms of racial grounds and not cultural groups.

2. The policy of apartheid does not take account of the urban African who has abandoned his tribal way of life in favour of that associated with urbanism and who has no tribal 'homeland'.

3. The transition from the period of the premiership of Mr Strydom to that of Dr Verwoerd is relevant. The late Mr Strydom asserted that the policy of the National Party was to assure white domination whether it be called 'baaskap' or 'apartheid'. The late Dr Verwoerd chose to speak of 'separate development'. There was a change in wording, not of policy.

4. The lack of honesty in apartheid is most apparent in the case of the Coloureds. The language of the Coloureds is overwhelmingly Afrikaans and most of them belong to the Dutch Reformed Church. Their style of dress and way of life is essentially European. The cultural differences between Coloureds and Afrikaners are not greater than the cultural differences between English-speaking and Afrikaans-speaking whites. Colour and not culture is the basis for the differentiation of Coloureds.

5. If apartheid is based on cultural and not racial grounds, the policy should be applied to Portuguese, Italians, Greeks, Jews, English- and Afrikaans-speaking whites.

6. Although there has been a great deal of talk about independence, no Bantustan has been granted independence. There seems to be some substance to the view that many supporters of apartheid do not believe that independence will really be granted (except at some unforeseeable time in the distant future). There has been a suggestion fairly recently that political independence can be granted before economic independence has been attained. The value of political independence without economic independence is questionable. Only when a significant measure of *real* independence is granted can the government be regarded as sincere.

7. There are a number of studies which show that support for apartheid is associated with a dislike of Africans (2). It is difficult to determine

a causal relationship between correlated attitudes. Does a dislike of Africans lead to a belief in separation? Or does a belief in separation lead to a dislike of Africans? The latter proposition, namely, that a belief in separation leads to a dislike of Africans, would be sufficient reason to reject apartheid on Christian grounds. The alternative view that apartheid is prompted by a dislike of Africans is the more feasible and lends support to the view that apartheid is a rationalisation.

8. It is difficult to provide an operational definition of rationalisation, that is, a measuring instrument which can determine whether a set of propositions constitutes a genuine attempt at a solution or a mere justification for maintaining a position of privilege. One such indication occurs when the members of the privileged group maintain that the policies which ensure their privileges are (a) actually in the best interests of the less privileged group or (b) that they (the more privileged) are actually suffering because of these policies, i.e. they have to shoulder the responsibilities of government, 'the white man's burden'. Both these aspects are discernible in apartheid. Rhoodie, a Professor of Sociology and supporter of apartheid, goes so far as to say that by encouraging the African to believe in equality, 'we are promoting laziness, incompetence and intellectual stagnation and destroying human endeavour and initiative' (3). The supporters of apartheid are doing the Africans a favour by withholding equality! If the supporters of apartheid intend to assert that restrictive practices encourage initiative and ability (this is so by implication), then their views are without a factual foundation. Social science has shown that discrimination leads to a lowering of achievement motivation, aspirational level, efficiency and self-confidence (4). Discrimination may in fact encourage laziness and inefficiency on the part of members of the dominating group (5).

9. Far too frequently ideals give way to expediency. For example, Port St Johns is quite clearly part of the Transkei; yet it is asserted that it will always remain a 'white' area simply because it is convenient to keep it 'white'.

10. The implementation of apartheid is supposed to require a measure of sacrifice from both whites and non-whites. As far as the sacrifice of whites is concerned, Rhoodie states that: 'The whites of South Africa will have to tackle the Bantu problem on a scale which, in terms of sacrifices, will have to assume at least the same relative proportions as the sacrifices that were made during the Second World War' (6). Yet it is obvious to the most naive observer that the burden of sacrifices falls disproportionately on the shoulders of the non-whites (who have not requested apartheid).

11.   A great deal of the apartheid ideology is characterised by a distorted sense of reality, e.g. there are frequent references to a multiplicity of (non-existent) 'nations' in South Africa. Or 'Port St John's is linked geographically to the rest of white South Africa by way of the Indian Ocean'.

12.   There are a number of contradictions in apartheid. An enumeration of all these contradictions would require a separate monograph. One may be mentioned. Apartheid purports to foster the traditions and values in the culture of each ethnic group. Yet the governmental institutions in the Bantustans are not based on tribal traditions.

13.   There is a great deal of hypocrisy in apartheid. For example, an African post-graduate student is refused permission to study overseas on the stated grounds that he is needed in South Africa to 'serve his own people'.

14.   Apartheid purports to seek separate and equal facilities for members of different ethnic groups. The facilities which are provided are unequal. For example, the education provided for non-whites is clearly inferior to that provided for whites (7). The general school conditions under which non-white children have to study would not be tolerated by white parents for their own children.

15.   Apartheid has undergone a number of changes in name. It is known as 'separate development', 'parallel development', 'separate freedoms', 'separate ethno-national development' and 'multi-national development'. The search for more palatable names suggests that there is a need to make apartheid *appear* to be more attractive.

The above argument has not been concerned with determining whether apartheid is just or unjust *(8)*. It must be recognised that governmental policy has led to some good. It must also be recognised that governmental policy is responsible for a great deal of human suffering. The point at issue here is the genuineness or otherwise of the policy.

The policy of apartheid is essentially dishonest and lacking in sincerity.

FOOTNOTES

1.   H.R. Cayton, 'The Psychology of the Negro Under Discrimination' in A.M. Rose (Ed.), *Race Prejudice and Discrimination* (New York: Knopf, 1951) p. 288.
2.   For example, I.D. MacCrone, 'Psychological Factors Affecting the Attitude of White to Black in South Africa', *South African Journal of Science*, 27: 591-598, 1930; H. Lever and O.J.M. Wagner, 'Urbanization and the Afrikaner', *Race*, 11: 183-188, 1969; W. Hudson, G.F. Jacobs

and S. Biesheuvel, *Anatomy of South Africa* (Cape Town: Purnell, 1966), Chapter 6.

3. N.J. Rhoodie, *Apartheid and Racial Partnership in Southern Africa* (Pretoria: Academica, 1969), p. 353.

4. B. Rosen, 'Race, Ethnicity and the Achievement Syndrome', *American Sociological Review*, 24: 47-60, 1959; G.E. Simpson and J.M. Singer, *Racial and Cultural Minorities* (New York: Harper, 1965), p. 139.

5. I. Chein, 'What are the Psychological Effects of Segregation Under Conditions of Equal Facilities?' *International Journal of Opinion and Attitude Research*, 3: 229-234, 1949.

6. Rhoodie, *op cit.*, p. 383.

7. See *Education Beyond Apartheid*, report of the Spro-cas Education Commission, Johannesburg 1971, especially Chapter 5.

8. This question is dealt with at various other places in this Report.