

reality

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CHIEF GATSHA BUTHELEZI



CHIEF GATSH

A JOURNAL OF LIBERAL AND RADICAL OPINION

in this issue . . .

EDITORIALS: THOSE WHO GO AND THOSE WHO STAY	page 2
EVIL AND MAD	page 3
THE BANTU AFFAIRS ADMINISTRATION BOARDS	page 4
STAMPING OUT RACIALISM by Edgar Brookes	page 4
WHAT ABOUT THE OTHER SEVEN MILLION WORKERS? by Dave Hemson	page 5
TANZANIA — THE QUIET REVOLUTION by Kenneth Ingham	page 8
MARGINAL CHRISTIAN GROUPS IN SOUTH AFRICA by Manas Buthelezi	page 16
DON'T PLAY WITH APARTHEID — ISOLATE IT by Roger Roman	page 19
COVER DESIGN	P. Stopforth

EDITORIALS

1 THOSE WHO GO AND THOSE WHO STAY

An intense, sometimes bitter debate rages between those liberal and radical white South Africans who have decided to stay in the country and those who have decided to leave. (The debate between the blacks who have left and the blacks who have stayed is in some respects a similar one, but there is less guilt involved in it: all blacks, for obvious reasons, tend to be victims of the situation; most of those who stay are simply unable to go, and most of those who have gone have been forced away.) In the last few years particularly, a mental distance almost equivalent to the geographical distance has separated concerned white South Africans in and out of the country.

The diverging attitudes cannot be summed up adequately: there are too many aspects and complexities, and too many variations in intensity. Still, there may be some

point in attempting to set down a few of the main arguments offered on either side.

A politically-conscious white person who has left South Africa is likely to hold some or all of the following views. The whole South African "system" of economic exploitation and racial injustice is inherently violent (as the Carletonville shootings so clearly suggest), and is intolerable. The most sensible and indeed the most moral response to this system, since one cannot seriously hope either to change it or to subvert it, is to go away, and maybe to make some contribution to the pressures which are being brought to bear upon South Africa from overseas. In the end change will come mainly as a result of black exertion; probably there will be a revolution. Those

whites who decide to stay and to "carry on the struggle valiantly" are perhaps in many respects deluding themselves. Whether they like it or not and whether they know it or not, they are in fact in various ways both beneficiaries and even supporters of the whole system; they often possess status, wealth and ease which they would not have if they lived elsewhere; and besides, their "liberal or radical" efforts achieve little or nothing. But then this last fact seems often not to worry them as much as one would expect: they cry "Never say die" and continue optimistically. Could a reason for their "steadfastness" be that they are less deeply distressed by failure than they claim? . . . And beyond all this, there is often a further criticism of the whites who stay: their very opposition to the status quo is less radical than it should be. In the words of a recent letter to a South African newspaper: "All they want to do is to tinker with the machine as it exists and tune it up a bit. When one considers what the machine really is, this seems futile."

A liberal or radical white person who has decided (so far) to stay in South Africa is likely to hold some or all of the following views. The whole South African system of economic exploitation and racial injustice is inherently violent, and is appalling. But a person who feels that he belongs in South Africa, that his human responsibility is located here, must attempt to work for change—and obviously this can normally be done more effectively within the country than outside it. Any white person who decides to stay is bound to be caught up in various ways within the apartheid system; but it is his duty to try to make sure that the evil consequent upon his existence within the structure is outweighed, and if possible heavily outweighed, by the things that he can say and do. And can he say or do anything that is really valuable? Liberals have a few achievements to their credit already; but it has to be admitted that an ominous question-mark hangs over all their activities. If a violent revolution were to sweep over South Africa, the doings of white liberals would indeed appear almost completely pathetic and futile. But if change is not accomplished in a wholly violent manner (and revolution would not on the whole be a satisfactory solution, nor perhaps is it a very likely one), then the presence of white liberals may well prove crucial, particularly at certain key moments in the process of change. The most powerful movement towards change must of course come, is in fact already coming, from blacks. How far should change go? That the people and the future must decide . . . Those who stay in South Africa usually respect

the distaste or the despair of those who have left, but they do not believe, as they are sometimes urged to, that the act of leaving is in itself a large contribution towards a resolution of the problem, nor incidentally are they always willing to accept the clear moral superiority of people who so obviously relish the cultural stimulation of Britain or America.

There—roughly, inadequately, over-simply—are the two sides of the argument. What can one say about them?

An overseas reader might immediately object that *Reality* has no right to adjudicate: published in South Africa, it is bound to side with those who are still in the country. To which one would have to reply. "Who can adjudicate?" The answer is clearly, "Nobody". Everyone is apt to be prejudiced; yet everyone must try to work things out for himself.

One of the most important features of the debate, in our view, is that each side is more responsive to the attitudes of the other side than it is usually prepared to admit. After all, there are strong arguments from both directions, arguments that every sensitive person is bound to acknowledge; and yet every individual is forced to choose one way or another. Both points of view are powerful, and unsatisfactory. The situation is in fact a tragic one. And tragedy generates confusion, guilt, despair . . .

But is it not possible to say which view is the better one? No. In such a situation there is no right view, no "better" view. Morality is largely what an individual—responding with his whole being to what he believes and to all that he sees and knows—creates for himself. Every white South African (unless perhaps he is one of those few who has really suffered for his belief in justice) is tarnished, guilty; but everyone must decide, as honestly as he can, what is most creative in his own case. And when he has made his decision, let him be humble about it and recognise the power of the opposite point of view.

Some of our overseas readers will think that we are under an illusion in supposing that those who decide to stay have a strong case. Some of our South African readers will think that we are being too generous in supposing that those who have decided to go have a strong case.

We ourselves, those who edit and publish *Reality*, have clearly decided—so far—that there is some point in staying. □

2 EVIL AND MAD

As *Reality* goes to press, there is further news of the Government's ruthless campaign against the South African Students' Organisation (SASO) and the Black Peoples' Convention (B.P.C.)

The inhumanity and the short-sightedness of these actions is appalling. □

3 THE BANTU AFFAIRS

ADMINISTRATION BOARDS

The Bantu Affairs Administration Boards have now been brought into being in many parts of the Republic. Great things are claimed for them, in particular that they will make it much easier for African work-seekers to find work. Past experience does not lead us to be unduly optimistic about the effects of legislation sponsored by the present Government, but we are very willing to keep an open mind and to see whether the new Boards will help in this way. If they do, it would be a great blessing.

There is, however, another side to this legislation which demands consideration. It removes from the municipalities all privileges, duties and powers as regards their African populations. This tendency to whittle away the powers of Local Government has been very pronounced, and we have

now arrived at the stage when a Town Council can do little or nothing to help the Africans in its area. This is a very sad development, partly because where a municipality is more enlightened in its outlook than the Central Government, it is forced to conform to Central Government ideas; secondly, because any reduction of the powers of Local Governments is very bad for democracy. Across the years the Provinces have lost many powers, though curiously enough the fewer powers they have left the taller grow their administrative buildings.

Municipal self-government is a very vital part of the democratic system and we regret that the new legislation deals so shrewd a blow. □

STAMPING OUT RACIALISM

by Edgar Brookes

The office of Minister of Posts and Telegraphs is not usually regarded as the most important in the Cabinet, but he, more than any other Minister, controls the symbolism which has the most frequent effect on the daily life of citizens. Up to 1948 the royal family appeared frequently on the stamps of South Africa. The first Union stamp—the 2½ d of 1910—showed King George V in coronation robes and as late as 1947 the 2d stamp showed King George VI and Queen Elizabeth and the 3d stamp the Princesses Elizabeth and Margaret. Since 1948, with the exception of the 1953 Coronation stamp of Queen Elizabeth II, the stamps of South Africa have been pointedly if not blatantly non-British. The people represented on them (in order of the date of issue) have been Jan van Riebeeck, Maria de la Quellerie, President Kruger, President Pretorius, Andries Pretorius, the six Prime Ministers, John Calvin, Dr. Verwoerd, Martin Luther, President Fouchè, General Hertzog as a Boer general, Professor Barnard, Wolraad



Woltemade and C. J. Langenhoven. The English-speaking population must take such comfort as they can from the stamps representing "The Wanderer entering Durban" (2½ d 1949) and "The Chapman" (2d, 1962), and possibly a share in the pictures of a Rugby player (12½ c, 1964) and a Nurse (12½ c, 1964).

Far more important than this is that out of the more than one hundred and seventy designs used by our Post Office since 1910 only two have the slightest references to the African population. The 1½ d of 1938 showing the signing of the Dingaan-Retief treaty gives us at one end a tall Zulu bearing a shield, who might possibly be Dingaan, though Piet Retief and his comrades takes up three-quarters of the design, while an earlier issue (the 4 d of 1926) daringly shows what is described as "a Native kraal". It is no a high proportion. This is not all to be ascribed to Nationalist prejudices. The famous War issues

of 1941-2 show an infantryman (½ d), a nurse (1 d), an airman (1½ d), a sailor (2 d), a member of the Women's Auxiliary services (4d), electric welding (6 d), the Tank Corps (1/-) and a signaller (1/3), but no place is found for the Cape Corps, the Native Labour Corps or Indian medical and other personnel.



Some compensation for the shortage of humans is found in the generous representation of animals—A 1954 issue shows the warthog (½ d), wildebeest (1 d), leopard (1½ d), zebra (2 d), rhinoceros (3 d), elephant (4 d), hippopotamus (4 d), lion (6d), kudu (1/-), springbok (1/3), gemsbok (1/6), nyala (2/6), giraffe (5/-) and sable antelope (10/-). It makes one think of the faintly ironic ceremony where Mr Piet Grobler, while Minister of Native Affairs, was given an honorary doctorate for his services in preserving South African fauna.

The religious issues are somewhat one-sided. They comprise Calvin (1963), the symbol of the N.G. Kerk (1965) the Groote Kerk pulpit, Cape Town (1965), Luther (1967) and the church door at Wittenberg (1967.) Even if we



exclude the rugby player (1964) and Dr. Verwoerd, with a halo round him (1968), it is clear that the Roman Catholic, Anglican and agnostic citizens of the Republic find little to comfort them in their country's philately.

It will come as a surprise to many to discover that South-West Africa has been somewhat more liberal than the Republic. In addition to featuring Bushman rock painting, it gives us in its 1954 issue three stamps depicting Ovambo women and one depicting a Herero woman. The 3c stamp of 1965 gives us a picture of an African mail runner of the 1890's. This is the only African male to appear on the stamps of South-West Africa, and all the five Africans are in tribal dress. It would be a matter of interest to see a representation of Fort Hare University College on our stamps and perhaps a whole series might form a 1974 issue depicting the executive heads of the Bantustans. The 4c black and carmine depicting Chief Gatsha Buthelezi and the 5c brown-black and apple-green showing Chief Kaiser Matanzima would assuredly be valuable collectors' items. □

WHAT ABOUT THE OTHER SEVEN MILLION WORKERS ?

by Dave Hemson

The Trade Union Council of South Africa (TUCSA) conference held between 13 and 17 August 1973 did very little about the 7 million unorganised workers in the South African economy. TUCSA has a long way to go from being an organisation representing unionised White, Coloured and Indian workers, to becoming the organising centre for unorganised workers in South Africa.

The real tension at the TUCSA conference was between Coloured and White-governed trade union interests, which could develop racial tension over job territory, blinding workers to the urgent problem of a path of liberation for black workers.

There were 28 resolutions passed at the Conference. Of

these, 10 originated from the garment unions and 8 from the distributive unions, showing a low degree of formulation of policy at the union level considering that there are 49 unions in TUCSA. Some of the most important resolutions concerned the following topics:

- 1) Unionisation of African workers,
- 2) Lack of confidence in the Minister of Labour,
- 3) A national minimum wage of R130 a month,
- 4) Elimination of racially mixed trade unions,
- 5) Abolition of African poll tax,
- 6) Elimination of discrimination against female workers,
- 7) The organisation of plantation workers,
- 8) The textile industry.

From the start of the Conference, however, it became apparent that the most important resolution was not the unionisation of African workers, but the threat to racially mixed trade unions from exclusively Coloured unions. One after the other delegates rose to demand that this issue be considered first. The racially mixed craft unions in the metal industry were particularly incensed by the resolution and demanded that it should be removed from the agenda paper altogether. The resolution was duly brought forward on the agenda paper for immediate consideration.

The whole issue was shabbily treated from the start. The Chairman, Steve Scheepers from the Leather Workers, did not allow the proposer A. Poole of the Engineering Union to speak for the resolution. The amendment to the resolution would have to be taken first, he ruled. This confused the proposer who then thought the procedure was grossly unfair since he would not have the right to speak for his resolution. The confusion which followed was not remedied by the Chair.

Eventually A. Poole took the rostrum. He read his prepared speech with difficulty since he realised it should have been made against the amendment and yet he had no time to rewrite it. The resolution was finally voted down by a vast majority.

The full importance of the issue did not rise to the surface:

- 1) Coloured workers in white-governed unions are chafing at the bit and wanting to take a more vital role in decision-making;
- 2) Coloured unions are being endangered by mixed unions which are in an evangelical mood in the metal industry.

It was said that the mixed unions wanted to wipe out the Engineering Union, which was originally fathered by the S.A. Boilermakers Union, one of the most powerful mixed unions. The metal industry is a rat race of competitive unions having the same job territory, and each union is out to win.

The whole position is complicated and is frustrating for leading Coloured workers because the present Industrial Conciliation Act lays down that all executives of mixed unions must be white even where 90 per cent of the members are Coloured or Indian. The mixed unions do, however, always have the advantage of established relationships with management, better benefits, complaint arbitration, and are tough enough to give competitive White and Coloured unions a rough time.

The whole issue was an ominous foretaste of yet another division in the ranks of labour in South Africa. It was also an indication of the articulation of the particular needs of the 'marginal' people in South Africa: Coloureds and Indians. Many Coloured and Indian workers and leaders see themselves as 'non-white', not 'black'. These unions can make TUCSA a platform for defining their particular niche in the racial hierarchy. All racial unions (both white and coloured) become in terms of their membership highly particularised special interest groups. Indicative of this trend were three other resolutions:

- 1) demanding the elimination of the tax on rice, the staple diet of 'our people';
- 2) demanding old age homes for Coloured and Asian people;
- 3) demanding integration in first-class railway compartments.

While these resolutions have legitimacy in a society in which all interests are channelled racially, it was uncomfortably obvious that the potential division is between 'brown' and 'black'. Some delegates complained at having to sit among workers in overalls at airport restaurants. A key indication of the expression of 'brown' interests will be found in the evidence to be submitted by Coloured trade unionists to the Commission of Enquiry into the Coloured Community.

The Coloured vs Mixed Union issue obscured the issue which theoretically everybody acknowledged as the most important issue: trade unions for African workers. This resolution was one step ahead of previous resolutions which piously called upon the Minister of Labour to allow Africans to become members of registered trade unions.

As was pointed out by Harriet Bolton at that time: 'Would there have been a trade union movement at all, of any colour, if the people in the old days had said to the Government: 'Make it legal and then we will do it? The workers in those days formed themselves into unions first, and then fought for their rights.'

The resolution at this conference called upon registered trade unions to set up parallel African trade unions, which could eventually be recognised by the Government.

The whole debate on African trade unions, divided by the inevitable tea break, took 12 minutes. Harriet Bolton who proposed the resolution said that TUCSA which represented 200 000 workers had to think about the other 7 million unorganised workers. The trade union movement should not wait for government permission to organise all workers in South Africa. She asked delegates not to pay lip service to an ideal but to get down to the job of effective organisation.

She explained some of her reservations about parallel unions. Existing trade unions were far too often small splinters of what they could be, dividing broad sectors of industry into fiddlingly small negotiating units. In the food industry, for example, there were sweet, biscuit, bread, canning and milk unions, none of any significance. What was needed was broadly-based effective mass unions for Africans, to make up in numbers what they lacked in legal recognition.

The debate came to a swift end because of the rule which restricts the number of speakers for a resolution. The potential conflict over various policies towards unorganised workers never surfaced. Some registered trade unions do view existing African trade unions with considerable disfavour since these unions do not fit into a comfortable parallel-union drawer. Registered trade unions in the metal industry, again, are irritated by the existing Engineering

Workers Union in Johannesburg and the Metal and Allied Workers Union in Natal.

The unionisation of African workers, originally placed high on the agenda paper, was moved down so that the Coloured vs Mixed Union issue could be dealt with first. That done, conference whipped through the other resolutions, even including the potentially contentious textile resolution.

The crucial issue of equal pay for women workers was treated with the same despatch as the unionisation of African workers. All manner of jokes were made on inevitable subjects, possibly to diffuse the real tension between male and female workers on this issue. More jokes per minute were totted up on this issue than any other, and the purpose of the resolution was blunted.

Overshadowing the conference from the first day was the desperate plight of the textile workers at Consolidated Textile Mills, Jacobs, the headquarters of the Frame Group. The Consultative Committee of the Garment and Textile Unions had voted thousands of rand in relief for weavers who had struck for higher wages on the Wednesday preceding the conference. These weavers had all been fired, the company claimed, because they had struck for higher wages. They demanded R21 a week basic wage. A tense situation developed outside the mill when the weavers were locked out on the Thursday morning. Eventually 75 workers were dismissed by the company, and these workers needed immediate relief.

The Textile Workers' Industrial Union, and in particular the Natal Branch was simply not in a strong enough position to provide financial support to these workers. The Union, through the Secretary of the Natal Branch; Harriet Bolton, appealed to other unions to give financial and moral support.

The lack of enthusiasm from the Chair for the issue was immediately evident. After discussion, which became quite heated, it was agreed that the resolution on the agenda paper on the textile industry be rewritten to encompass the new developments.

It is no secret that the resolution which expressed disgust

1) at the 'inhumanely low wage rates' particularly in the cotton section of the industry,

2) at the 'unjustifiable dismissals' of 10 members of the works committee and the Vice-Chairman of the Natal Branch of the Union,

which warned of the threat to industrial peace that could result from the recent attitude and actions of the management of the Frame Group, and which endorsed the strategy of the Textile Union and pledged financial support, had a stormy passage behind the scenes before being adopted unanimously by the Conference.

It was this opposition which created suspicion when eventually TUCSA and the Textile Union met the Frame Group and issued a press statement that the Textile Union and the Frame Group had agreed to settle their differences.

Nevertheless the textile resolution was important as it mustered excellent support from other delegates and brought some of the fighting spirit back into TUCSA which has been so lacking in the past few years.

The 19th Conference of TUCSA avoided some of the most important pressing aspects of labour policy in South Africa:

- 1) The attitude which trade unions should take toward foreign capital in South Africa.
- 2) The necessity of absorbing the vast pool of Black unemployed.
- 3) The imposition of works committees and new methods of wage determination through the Bantu Labour Relations Regulation Amendment Act.
- 4) The setting up of Bantu Labour Boards to control the mobility of Black workers.
- 5) The urgent necessity of a National Health Scheme for all workers.
- 6) The attitude which trade unions should take toward White immigration.
- 7) Effective policies for training and upgrading Black workers in industry.
- 8) A national plan for the organisation of African workers in major industrial sectors.

On the other hand policy was set for a national minimum wage (R130 a month); elementary educational benefits; the elimination of job reservation; the containment of inflation; and the extension of benefits from the Unemployment Insurance Fund.

It is up to the trade unions participating in TUCSA to see that these policies are carried further than a letter to the appropriate government department.□

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TANZANIA —

THE QUIET REVOLUTION


by Kenneth Ingham

(Typed from a tape recording of the last of six lectures given at the University of Natal, Pietermaritzburg in August and September 1973 by Professor Ingham, professor of History at Bristol University.)

My theme this evening has a rather pastoral character—the Quiet Revolution in Tanzania.

Now I know that Tanzania provokes rather strong feelings in South Africa, so that if I sound somewhat euphoric in what I have to say it's partly in order to redress the balance, partly because it's my last lecture and I'm leaving tomorrow, partly because I believe what I'm saying.

However, if any one had asked in 1953 which of the three mainland territories of East Africa was likely to be the last to gain independence, he would likely have been told that the question was purely academic, that independence was so remote anyway, that there was no point in asking the question, but if he persisted I think the experts would have replied unanimously, "Of course Tanganyika". Why would Tanganyika be the last? Primarily for economic reasons. Tanganyika is a large country, about three-quarters of the size of the Republic of South along with South-West Africa, roughly the same size as, perhaps a little smaller than, Nigeria, but with a very much smaller population, 13 or 14 million people, and very, very few resources indeed. Take the quantity of minerals. In 1940 Dr. Williamson, against all predictions, discovered some very workable diamonds in Tshenyanga, but against the competition of De Beers and other powerful companies, this meant that he could make a reasonable profit, but provided very little wealth for the country. There is a certain amount of coal in the South-East of Tanzania, but coal in Tanzania isn't exactly a big sell; so that minerals are pretty thin. Agriculturally, too, the country doesn't offer a great deal. The biggest earner is sisal, which isn't exactly a big money-spinner either. The country isn't particularly wealthy nor is it very obvious that it is likely to be any wealthier in the future. Moreover, its population, too, is rather oddly placed. The population of Tanzania is scattered around Lake Victoria, particularly around Mount Kilimanjaro, and along the coast line which is fairly well populated, with other groups scattered in the North. If Cecil Rhodes had stood in Dar es Salaam and pointed westwards and said, "Your hinterland lies there", you'd have had a long way to go to find it! And this has its disadvantages and also its advantages. I'll deal with the advantages on the political side later. It means that the population is singularly scattered and communications



Prof. Ingham (Photo J. Alferts)

are difficult. Much of the central portion, if not actually desert, is extremely arid, and nothing will grow where you expect it to grow.

The history of Tanganyika militated against a great deal of advancement and development. It first of all became, in the late 19th century, a German Dependency, and then after the first World War it became a British Mandate, but it had suffered very heavily in the War. The first Governor

after this war decided he would let things simmer for a while before he started to get things moving again, which I think was probably a very reasonable attitude, but it didn't mean that development was swift. Then in the later 1920's there was quite a step forward under the dynamic government of Sir Donald Cameron, and then almost immediately the world depression at the beginning of the 1930's struck a severe blow to any prospect of expansion at that particular time. This led to caution in the 1930's, and then the second World War, and after that we were in the modern era and independence was being bandied around in the various countries of Africa, but Tanganyika was scarcely in the running—hadn't even been brought to the starting point.

As a result of the poverty of the country many requisites of independence were missing. Education had scarcely developed, partly because of the history of the country. The Germans had done quite a lot for education before the first World War broke out. After the war they were required to leave, missionaries and all, so that in the 1920's and 1930's there was quite a slow recovery in the educational scene. Although a foundation was being laid around the country for elementary education with Government assistance, it hadn't spread very far when the second World War came. Subsequently, when we move into the area of University education, Tanganyika was so poor it could scarcely afford to send students to Makerere College in Uganda, which acted as the central University for students in the whole of the East African territory. (Just briefly, so far as Makerere is concerned, in the 1950's each of three main territories, Uganda, Kenya and Tanganyika, had a quota which they were to fill. The remaining places were filled partly from Zanzibar, a few from Northern Rhodesia as it then was, and a very few from Nyasaland as it then was, and the remainder of the places were filled by any of the three main territories which could afford to send qualified students.) Whether Tanganyika had qualified students or not, it couldn't afford to send them, so even in this area it fell well behind the standards which had been achieved by Uganda and Kenya at that time. Secondary education was very sparse. There was an excellent Government Secondary School at Tabora right in the middle of Tanganyika, and there were two mission schools, one Roman Catholic and one Protestant, near Dar es Salaam, but the output of these schools was remarkably small. When independence came there was one university graduate. This was a very serious situation.

These are some of the problems which faced Tanganyika in the 1950's, and this explains why, even though at that time there was a state of emergency in Kenya due to Mau Mau, and great tension in Uganda with the recent deposition and exile of the Kabaka of Buganda, nevertheless, the experts still would have guessed that either Kenya or Uganda would achieve independence far ahead of Tanganyika. And yet, Tanganyika achieved independence in 1961, Uganda in 1962 and Kenya in 1963.

Now how did that come about? I think this is where the beginnings of the quiet revolution are to be found. Tanganyika, in the early 1950's, was just about as a-

political as any country could be. As the second World War was drawing to a close some of the administrative officers in Tanganyika got together and said, "When the troops return from India and Burma"—where many of them had been serving with the 11th East African Division—"they're bound to take a much greater interest in local affairs than they did in the past, and if we're going to avoid discontent and possibly even conflict, we've got to make provision for these people when they do return". And so a scheme was worked out on a local government level, on the basis of which returning soldiers in particular would have an opportunity of playing a much fuller part in decision-making and in the execution of policy than they had before. But, contrary to all expectations, when the soldiers came back, rather like civilian soldiers in any circumstances, all they wanted to do was get home, forget the war and anything outside their own village. They disappeared into the undergrowth, more or less, and that was that!

Political silence was as intense as ever. There was no real problem from that point of view. Indeed, the problem was to arouse interest in the political scene. The Governor at that time, that vigorous gentleman, Sir Edward, (later Lord) Twining, hadn't a great deal of time for politics and thought that economics would provide the answer—that is, if there had been any economics to provide an answer with, which unfortunately there weren't—and he remained in opposition to the bitter end, and bitter, I think indeed, it was. However, though he thought that politics weren't as urgent as economics, nevertheless, he did attempt to encourage a greater interest among, certainly, the more educated African, in the political scene. Sir Donald Cameron had, to some extent, laid the very, very simple foundations. He had urged the African civil servants, most of them very low-grade clerical officers, to form the Tanganyika African Association, and this Association operated more as a sort of Old Boys' Society of Tabora Government School than as any particularly vigorous political group. In any case, the members were so scattered over the whole country that it was only in Dar es Salaam and in Tabora that there was any sign of action on the part of the Association, and really the members only met to discuss Shakespeare's plays or something of that sort, in a half-hearted fashion, rather than independence tomorrow. So this was a rather stagnant scene, a rather idyllic scene in the eyes of many local administrators in Tanganyika in the early 1950's.


The change really came for two reasons, I think, both important because they both intermeshed, providing an internal and an external impetus to change. The external impetus came with the conversion of the Mandate into the Trusteeship which succeeded the second World War. The old Mandatory system had been an excellent system for the retention, the preservation and indeed the encouragement of the status quo. It was rather like **1066 and All That**, you remember, when Magna Carta, among other things, specified that barons would be tried by other barons—who would understand! The criticism of the operation of the Mandate was made by experienced colonial administrators, who had faced all the problems and who were deeply sympathetic to the efforts of their successors. Change was

not unlikely, but with the coming of the Trusteeship Council and the conversion of Tanganyika's relationship with Britain into one of Trusteeship, the new factors began to play their part. The new countries were beginning to make themselves heard very, very vigorously in the United Nations, turning the spotlight on to what was going on in the new Trust Territories. They also had visiting Commissions which came every few years to these territories and looked at what was going on and criticised most vigorously what they felt to be wrong. It could well be that the visiting Commissions were not particularly experienced in colonial administration, and they may have been unsympathetic at times to the problems which the colonial administrators faced. Certainly they urged a more immediate interest in political affairs among the African population and they demanded that the administering power did something to encourage that sort of interest among the African people. This was a stimulus which not only hit Tanganyika but also had repercussions on the world scene in the meeting of the Trusteeship Council in the United Nations. I don't know that this necessarily stirred opinion in Britain, I think possibly, if anything, it stirred resentment of the interference of inexpert speakers on the subject; but nevertheless, it kept things boiling.

But much more important, I think, was the arrival on the scene, from education in Scotland, of Julius Nyerere. Now, he is so very much the key figure, and one can't begin to understand him, I think, unless one is prepared to recognise that he is a thoroughly good man, almost painfully good—and I use that adverb rather as C.S. Lewis would, in the sense that sheer goodness is painful to people who are not quite so good. By that I don't want to say that he is a good man in any political sense at all. Indeed, it could well be that to some extent there is a political naivety about him. I think this arises out of a deep simplicity in the man.

Again, by simplicity I would not suggest stupidity; I mean the simplicity which sees only what he believes to be the good and true. This can be a very dangerous thing in a statesman, I can assure you, but certainly it must be appreciated before one even begins to understand his impact upon his own people and his success in the country. Because his impact upon the people was, and still is, quite astonishing. But it is not the impact of a demagogue who stands with his medals on his chest and lots of braid on his hat and recently-promoted shoulder signs, like that other gentleman whom we could think of without straining too hard. He dresses simply, he speaks simply in language which ordinary people can understand and believe in. They don't see him as someone apart from themselves, they see him as one of themselves, in a sense translated into something almost ethereal as well. It is a strange combination of utter realism, utter contact between the people and the man, and a remoteness that is not one of distance so much as one of inflation of their own feelings to a much higher level.

When Nyerere came back, he didn't of course immediately have this effect upon the people, he wasn't particularly well known. What he did was to turn to this rather moribund afternoon-tea Tanganyika African Association and convert it into the beginnings of a political party. He called it the Tanganyika African National Union. He began to instruct



President Julius Nyerere

and then use the members to instruct others over a wide area. To demonstrate the importance to them of being political beings not in order to create a revolution in the sense of simply overthrowing, by force if need be, the colonial powers, but to make of themselves full men, not partial men who are content simply to get on with the daily things of life; but to look at their fellows next door, and beyond in the neighbouring tribes, and beyond even as far away as Dar es Salaam. Now this was a very difficult thing to achieve for people who lived such remote and separated lives as most of the people of Tanganyika did, and again, stressing the separation of the population's scattered character this was a particularly important job; but he made out of T.A.N.U. an organisation which got in touch and kept in touch with the people as a whole.

In some ways the delay in the development of education in Tanganyika to this extent helped, because it meant that there wasn't really an elite in the West African sense. The educated people, few as they were, were still closely linked to their families. They were not congregated in Dar es Salaam carrying on businesses of their own and already half-Westernised. They were recent products of Makerere College or Tabora Government School, many of them living either in their home towns or in some rural centre, acting as clerks or lesser officials in very close touch constantly with

the people. They had not pulled away from them. This, I think, is tremendously important. Again, one can perhaps decry the use of the indirect rule system, particularly the rather exotic form introduced into Tanganyika by Sir Donald Cameron, who more or less said, "If you can't find a traditional Chief, make one!" Nevertheless, this has helped in that it has emphasised the continuing traditions of local government. And when, superimposed upon this, came the development of the T.A.N.U. political party, there was no sharp division between politics as a centre and local government, which had occurred so very much in other areas where the British had emphasised the indirect system of government, and where there was a division between the elite and the Chiefs, the elite whom the British were rather wary of, and the Chiefs, who were good chaps, whom they could rely on. This wasn't so marked in Tanganyika as it had been elsewhere. This, I think, helped. Then again, if I may refer to the geographical distribution, this too helped, for in so many other countries the capital has been fairly central—for example, Nairobi, in the vicinity of the powerful, numerous, articulate, relatively well-educated Kikuyu people or again in Uganda, Entebbe and Kampala, with all about the powerful, wealthy, well-educated, articulate and well-organised Buganda, all round the capital and a power in themselves, something which provided a central element, pushing the rest of the country away, saying "We are what counts". This was the problem in Mau Mau to some extent. The Kikuyu were rather isolated from the rest of the country. It was a serious problem in Uganda where the Buganda always regarded themselves as a natural elite, and the rest as something to be controlled by them. Not an easy situation for a newly independent political power; but in Tanganyika the situation was different. Dar es Salaam, the capital, was right on the edge, and no big population centred round about it. The peoples of the coast, although linked together in their Swahili civilisations, were not a powerful tribal unit in the traditional sense at all. The big areas of population were some distance away and not easily connected with Dar es Salaam itself. The main population groups were well removed from the centre of affairs. They didn't present a permanent cloud enveloping the capital and weighing down the body. They were scattered at a considerable distance and because of this, I think, Tanganyika never had the political pressure of the heated, over-tense atmosphere in the capital which so many other countries suffered from, rather than gained from.

Dar es Salaam remains a remarkably cosmopolitan city with no strong political views. On the other hand, the very fact that Nyerere apparently began to organise successfully a political interest through the agency of T.A.N.U. made Sir Edward Twining rather wary. Twining was prepared to see politics develop rather slowly and under his control. He didn't like to think of it moving quickly outside his power and becoming, as it appeared to him, very much an African thing, because Twining still believed that a great deal would be gained in Tanganyika if it could emerge as a multi-racial country. By multi-racial he did not mean that white people and brown people would live happily side by side with the black people in the country, or even that white people and brown people would have equal votes and equal rights with black people, but rather that the white race and the brown race and the black race

should be all equal irrespective of the fact that the black people of the country number something like 98%, with a handful of brown people and scarcely a fingerful of white. This was his aim, and his aim was based upon the fact that the wealth and the expertise were properly shared equally, even although the population was not equal.

Since the white people had contributed greatly to the development of the country (not perhaps anything like as much as they had in Kenya, but nevertheless, to a considerable extent), since the Indians too, in their way, had made a remarkable commercial contribution to the country, and, consequently, since relations, so far as one could see, had been happy and satisfactory between the three races, there was a lot to be said, so Twining argued, for his concept of a multi-racial state. Indeed, seeing the development of T.A.N.U., he even went so far as to create his own political party to counter the activities of T.A.N.U., the United Tanganyika Party, whose membership rose, perhaps, to twenty at any given time, and that was about all. The idea was that the United Tanganyika Party should pursue this multi-racial aim along the lines which Twining adumbrated.

But this didn't quite work out like that. Partly due to pressures in the United Nations, but I think very much more due to the fact, which I indicated as far as the Kenya situation is concerned, that Britain herself was moving towards independence, it was determined and decided that in 1958 and 1959 elections should take place to an enlarged Legislative Council, the basis of elections being that of a highly qualitative franchise, but not a racial one. This would be a total non-communable franchise, a common roll, but one where each voter must vote for three people, one white, one brown, one black; and those three people from this particular constituency along with three from nine other constituencies, would form a grand total of thirty in the Legislative Council, where they would be outnumbered by one or two on the Government side, but nevertheless would have a much larger voice in discussing, if not determining policy, than anyone from the Legislative Council had previously had—other than Government servants, of course.

There was a certain amount of discontent at the slow progress that was being made, but it does seem that there wasn't intense pressure for more rapid progress. I think, if anything, the criticisms of T.A.N.U. were levelled against this compulsory qualitative franchise, and their having to vote for three people whether they liked it or not, rather than against the number of members of the Legislative Council, or indeed, the composition of the Legislative Council itself. Had even Julius Nyerere been asked in 1957 how soon Tanganyika was likely to get or should get independence, I think he might have said, "In ten years we should, but we are likely to in about 15 years." I doubt whether he would have been more optimistic than that. But I think a number of events took place in 1958 which completely changed the pattern of development. First of all, Sir Edward Twining left the country. This I think was important, because Twining, as I said, had been a great power for economic development but he did not accept the pressures from the political group which was increasingly enveloping the country. He was replaced by that remarkable man, Sir Richard

Turnbull, a man who adopted a protective camouflage so brilliantly wherever he went that his presence was rarely to be found, only in the excellence with which things developed subsequently. For example, as Provincial Commissioner in Northern Kenya he had been the wonderful father of his family, the benevolent paternalist; subsequently, as Chief Secretary in Kenya, he had been a powerful fighter, a rather ruthless organiser, a brilliant planner in the campaign against Mau Mau. A very odd appointment it might seem, for the quiet and peaceful Tanganyika, moving gently forward to some ultimate goal of independence away beyond the horizons of human thought. But lo! when Sir Richard Turnbull arrived in Tanganyika he immediately became the reforming Governor, the man who was going to push Tanganyika forward as fast as it could advance. Indeed, he summoned Julius Nyerere to see him at a time when he was being tried for making a statement which the British Authorities didn't entirely approve of, and he said to Nyerere, "There are two people who can make this country work, you and I. If we work together it will work well. If we don't work together it will pull apart. What do you think?" Nyerere said, "We'll work together." Now this was the simplicity of the man, the honesty of the man, on Nyerere's part. Here he met someone whose whole tradition had been authoritarian and yet who frankly came to him and said they were going to work together. Nyerere accepted this absolutely and went back—I was told this by a close friend of Nyerere's—he came back to the friend and said, "Things are going to be all right. This man we can trust." And indeed he could. And Turnbull was a great friend of Nyerere's and has remained so to this day.

Now this was a very, very important thing. It meant there was a man as Governor, sympathetic to Nyerere's political aims. Whether he could help him fulfil those political aims depended a lot upon Nyerere himself. Could Nyerere produce the goods? If he couldn't, of course, all Turnbull's benevolent attention would have been wasted. But that Nyerere could produce the goods was proved astonishingly in the elections in 1958 and 1959, for every single candidate who was elected had T.A.N.U. backing. Not a single person was elected who didn't, which put an entirely different complexion on things. If Europeans could stand with T.A.N.U. backing and be elected, and if Indians could stand with T.A.N.U. backing and be elected, then really, T.A.N.U. was a force in the land and could not be ignored; and I think as a result of this close integration of action, and indeed of sentiment, between Sir Richard Turnbull and Julius Nyerere, the British Government was well disposed towards development and sent Sir Richard Ramage in 1959, not to report on the possibilities of independence in 1970 or in 1975, but to suggest the next stage towards the achievement of responsible government, at once if this were possible. And Sir Richard Ramage, himself a very experienced civil servant, and certainly not to be carried away by wild excesses of emotion, reported that in his view, responsible government could be given at once, and it could be along these lines: 71 seats in the Legislature, of which 50 would be elected on an adult suffrage with a common roll, and there should be 11 places for which only Europeans could stand and 10 for Asians. This was acceptable to T.A.N.U., which was not racial in its views, and acceptable to the British Government. An election did take place in 1959.

Of the 71 seats, 58 were unopposed. The remaining seats were won by T.A.N.U. candidates, with one exception—one Independent. An astonishing feat! The United Tanganyika Party just fizzled away and was forgotten in no time at all.

Now this was quite remarkable, and I think it was remarkable in the eyes of the British Government: it was such a smooth operation. There had been virtually no turmoil involved in bringing about this election, and yet T.A.N.U. had swept into power in quite an astonishing way, and Nyerere became at this stage, not Prime Minister, but Chief Minister, so that when McLeod became Colonial Secretary, a McLeod who was committed to independence as soon as was feasible for all the territories in tropical Africa, he had discussions with Nyerere, the Governor and various other officials in the country, and decided that Tanganyika should achieve self-government early in 1961 and independence later in the year. The speed of this was quite astonishing and is only explained, I think, by the apparent quietness and smoothness of the various steps which had so far been taken. There wasn't a tremendous surge of feeling, and yet there was a powerful ground swell of feeling, which was carrying the country forward. I think this was entirely due to the organisation which Nyerere was able to infuse into T.A.N.U. and which T.A.N.U. in its turn, had been able to spread throughout the whole country.

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Now the story sounds, so far, too good to be true, and I suppose, really it was, because after all it's one thing to move towards independence, but to achieve it with the responsibilities it imposes is a very, very different thing indeed; and here, of course, was Nyerere's problem. With self-government first and with independence on hand, he became Prime Minister of a country which really, had only one political party. It is true there was a People's Democratic Party, which appears briefly on the scene, but I've only ever heard of one person being a member of it. There were, presumably, more. It was certainly not significant. Anyhow, he was in power, but what did this power amount to? It amounted to a handful of really well-educated people. a very small handful of people with any experience of responsibility at that level at all, but even worse, there was a big gap below, where the next level of people should have been—and these were seriously lacking. Nyerere made it clear that he must rely as long as possible on British civil servants staying on doing their jobs. He didn't want them to get out too quickly because he saw what an appalling vacuum this would create; but, while Nyerere had had unanimous support throughout the country up to the point of the election, of course, again, once independence had been achieved, there were inevitably those who wanted something quickly for themselves, and there were those who were violently opposed to his keeping on any Britons in the Civil Service, because this was blocking the promotion of Africans. They were foolish enough to think that they could fill these places easily and immediately, and Nyerere had considerable trouble with just this type of criticism. Again, there were those who expected they would be able to feather their own nests very quickly when

they had a job which had formerly been handled by British personnel. Again, Nyerere was opposed to this, but it wasn't easy to contain the situation, so that when he resigned from the Prime Ministership there were a lot of people who thought he had lost his grip, that he wasn't really able to keep a firm control of these dissident elements in his own party: it was easy enough for him while they were in opposition; now that they were in power the situation was more difficult. In fact, I think, they were wrong. What Nyerere did was to resign the office of Prime Minister because he realised that the important thing was to make sure that the machinery of the country was effective, and the only machinery that was operating on an African basis was T.A.N.U. It is true that the administrative machinery of the colonial situation still remained and that Africans were moving into this machinery; but it was not a living machine, it was simply an inanimate object, and the only thing which had fire and life in it was the political party. He spent the early months of 1962 re-organising the political party, giving it life, so that the country should feel that even in its remotest parts it was in touch, through a clearly defined chain of personnel, with the centre. There should be no separation of the small elite at the top from the rest. He even saw to it that there were appointed Regional Commissioners, who were really like Junior Ministers, whose job it was to convey policy to the people and to convey the people's response to the policy-makers. There should be no isolation of the top group from the rest of the country. From his own point of view, he made a particular point of getting around the country, seeing it and being in touch with it constantly, dressed simply, so that he could make easy contact, so that the people would not feel rebuffed by the magnificence of his appearance. He kept in constant touch with them and then he re-asserted himself in his position as Prime Minister, having got the party machine moving.

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All right, again one might argue, this is all very sound and praiseworthy within his own country; but outside his country he was already making a mark which some might regard as unfavourable. To begin with, at the very moment of achieving independence he said he did not wish to belong to a Commonwealth which had in it South Africa, as long as South Africa continued its apartheid policy. An abrupt, brash statement made by the leader of a tiny, new state, which had only achieved independence, literally, yesterday. It is quite understandable that there should be reaction against this, but again I think, whether one agrees with what he says or not, the explanation rests on what I said earlier about the man, his absolute absorption in his own principles. He could not credibly be a free man himself and yet accept what he believed to be the subjection of other African people, particularly when they constituted a majority. This concerned him deeply. He had to make this statement; and let it be said that, in saying this, had South Africa remained in the Commonwealth, he would have taken Tanganyika out. He wasn't saying, "I will say this, but I won't accept the consequences." He would have accepted the consequences (and they would have been serious) of withdrawal from the Commonwealth at this stage. Political naivety, you might argue. Perhaps it is, but it stems from such a burning honesty that he felt he must say this. However,

he was saved from the consequences of this statement by South Africa's own withdrawal from the Commonwealth at that particular moment. But again subsequently, he was to adopt an exactly similar line with regard to Rhodesia and UDI, when he broke off diplomatic relations with Britain, greatly to the detriment of economic affairs in Tanganyika, because he believed Britain should have taken firm action.

Now this, I think, is an indication of the nature of the man, that he is prepared to accept the consequences, and yet, there is a weakness at the same time. There is a weakness of complete faith in other people. This was first revealed, I believe, early in 1964, when there was a mutiny in the very small Tanganyikan Army. Nyerere didn't want an Army in any case. He is reported to have said when he attended Nigeria's independence celebrations, and saw all the people marching past, that he didn't really see himself as a general because he didn't really see the Tanganyikan Army fighting anyone. He later added in a Press conversation that Tanganyika couldn't fight Russia, she couldn't fight Britain, she couldn't fight America, so what was the point in having an Army? She didn't propose to fight Kenya or Uganda—of course, she didn't know about Amin in those days! —why, therefore, have an Army? Would it not be better to get rid of it? I think that he was wishing he had done so early in 1964, because the Army mutinied for two reasons. Firstly, for higher pay, and also because he had not got rid of the British officers, because he believed the Army was not ready to do so. At that stage Nyerere disappeared for forty-eight hours. No one quite knows why he disappeared at that time, but my own view is that he disappeared because he just couldn't accept that this horror had happened. He did not believe that Tanganyikan people could behave in this terribly wrong-headed fashion. I believe it's not a question of physical cowardice, but of sheer sensitivity which hurt him to think that Tanganyikan people should act in this way. He re-emerged of course, and invited the British Marines to come ashore to straighten things out. He did so, I think not so much from a sense of humility, but almost of self-hate that he had had to resort to force to deal with the situation in the country. He quickly asked Nigerian, or at least African troops, to come and take the place of the British, again because he thought it was right and proper that if there must be force used, at least black people should use it against their own people. It was an unhappy situation, but I think this is an indication of the weakness of the man, a weakness stemming from what might be termed human goodness.

Again, I think his attitude towards other forms of external relations reflects something of the same sort of naivety, and yet again, I don't believe this is true stupidity. Almost immediately after achieving independence he began to enter into commercial and economic relations with the Eastern powers, more particularly China. One might argue that having been on such good terms with Britain and the West, having created for himself and his Government an excellent reputation for moderation, wasn't it really asking for trouble to go hob-nobbing with China, of all powers? Again, his explanation was fairly straightforward. He particularly wished Tanganyika to be non-aligned outside the African continent; therefore, to be

non-aligned he must move somewhat away from the West—not deliberately towards the East, but away from the West, which of course brought him towards the East, willy-nilly. Secondly, he recognised Tanganyika's very weak economic position; therefore he must get aid. But again, he did not wish to have this aid all from the same quarter, because this, willy-nilly, would lead him to some sort of dependence upon that particular area. This might affect his political thinking, and indeed the country's freedom. So he looked to China for assistance. Of course, China very gladly gave it, for what motives it is hard to say; but it looks as if he's rather playing into the hands of different powers. Again, over Zanzibar—here was another problem. Off-shore, there was a small island where suddenly there was a revolution. Particularly China and East Germany intervened and gave it support, and it looked as if there was a prospect of a constant source of trouble just off-shore. So what does Nyerere do? Not build up armaments against it, not align himself more powerfully with the West, so that in case of conflict he would have strong friends to defy this recalcitrant area on the coast; instead he embraced it, clasped it to him. Zanzibar is a tremendous embarrassment to him as he has practically no control over its administration, but at least he avoided armed conflict. Here is another instance of his integrity. Refugees who had been plotting against the ruler of Zanzibar were arrested in Tanzania and Nyerere handed them back to Zanzibar. They were immediately executed, which was a great shock to Nyerere. Since then he has not handed such refugees back but has himself imprisoned them on the mainland. This action of taking Zanzibar under his wing seems to have worked: it keeps the matter internal and prevents intervention by Eastern and Western powers.

It must be emphasised that the situation in Tanzania can only be understood if one realises the total support Nyerere enjoys from virtually the whole population. He had, when Tanganyika achieved independence, announced as the slogan of the country "Uhuru Nakazi", an astonishing thing to say—Freedom and Work. You've actually got to work for it now that you've got it. There aren't many people who would have the nerve to stand up and say that. They'd probably say, "Now that we're free, let's sit back and rest and enjoy all the fruits of the colonial past". But he didn't. In the Arusha Declaration he formulated in greater detail this philosophy. He urged upon his country that it must depend upon itself. It would have to look outside for some help, but above all it should produce its own wealth if it could, and rely upon its own resources—and its own resources, as he very bluntly pointed out, were not mineral wealth, not even agricultural wealth: they were just work and manpower. If everyone pulled his weight, then, he said, there wouldn't be the millenium—only a slight improvement. That is what he was offering, just a slight improvement if you work hard. Again, an astonishing line to adopt, but he took it because he believed that this was the only thing to do if the country was to be truly independent, in other words, if people were to say "I rely on myself, I do not go cap-in-hand to anybody else". Again, an impossibility to achieve in this absolute form. Tanganyika was getting aid, at least until 1967 when aid was stopped after Tanganyika broke off diplomatic relations over UDI—had been getting considerable aid from Britain; also from West Germany. She had got

aid from China, she had got aid from East Germany. From every quarter she was receiving some aid. But the main source of Tanganyika's wealth was coming from her own citizens. One mustn't over-praise the situation. After all, nothing could have happened without these loans, without the expertise of other countries too. But nevertheless, the emphasis he placed was on self-help.

But the next problem, of course, was that of UDI and its effect upon Zambia. Out of this sprang the idea of the Tanzam Railway. I don't see that Tanzania is going to get a great deal out of this. And here again, one may say that this is political naivety. Here is an idealistic proposal to build a railway to Zambia so that Zambia should not be dependent upon the Southern powers for the export of her copper—and, above all, to get the Chinese to come and do it! Again, I think that Nyerere's idea was that the Chinese perhaps, in a sense, would tie fewer strings to Tanganyika by undertaking this job, than would the powerful industrial nations of the West. He believed that an association with a country still struggling to establish itself, although on a much larger scale than Tanzania, was a healthier relationship than being linked up with, say, West Germany, the United States, or even the old stand-by Britain. Anyway, Britain wasn't standing so closely by since UDI! . . . Will it work? Is it possible to keep the railway as a sort of separated strip, from which political ideas will not spread to the rest of the country? It seems to be working. One doesn't know for certain, but Nyerere has stated that it will work. He believes that it must, because he makes it clear that he is not committed to any particular policy. This is where African Socialism creeps in, because African Socialism, which is in many ways feared by some of the capitalist states, is not the socialism of alliance with Communism; it is a mutual responsibility, a traditional tribal attitude. Everybody is responsible for everybody else in the country. This is really what is meant by African Socialism—helped by the expertise of the West, helped by the money of the West and East and the Chinese labourers along the railway, the Chinese technicians and so on. But one doesn't know whether it will really work. One simply, as far as the Tanganyikans are concerned, must take Nyerere's word for it and go on as if it will work until something goes wrong.

As far as the future is concerned, it's very hard to say what will happen. But again, Nyerere's concern about Southern Africa is potentially a source of weakness. It may be a source of strength in winning over the allegiance of the other African territories, but the fact that he has provided in Tanzania a launching-pad for guerilla activities against Mocambique and so on, may or may not be of value to him in the long run. Is it a good thing? I'm not sure myself; I don't really know about this. I'm doubtful about the effectiveness in the long run, as opposed to the short run of guerilla activities. But Nyerere deeply believes that he must provide this help if the people need it. These are the people he thinks are fighting the fight which he did not have to wage because independence came so easily to him. But he must help those who think they must help themselves. Right or wrong—I don't know! But it is a dangerous commitment. Again, it is an act of faith on his part that it is the right thing to do.



TANZANIA

As for the future, one can offer no very clearcut prophecy. Again, this depends a lot on Nyerere's presence. At the same time, although he does undoubtedly fall into the realm of charismatic leader, nevertheless I think he has attempted, as far as possible, to build up a sense of unity in the country, not simply focused on himself, but upon Tanzania. Now this, I think, is the revolution he has achieved—a pride in Tanzania. If he had gone to the interior in the days I have spoken of in 1953, and asked the people there, "What is Tanganyika?" very few people would have known anything about it. If you had said, "Do you feel strongly there should be self-government in Tanganyika?" people would have wondered what on earth you were talking about. What he has managed to do is to make people conscious of Tanganyika. And oddly enough, they are proud of it. I say "oddly" because, by the criteria

of the European nations, I think Tanzania is a deeply backward country. But there has not been a pulling away of the wealthy elite from the rest. There may have been a levelling down; there has also been to some extent, a levelling up from the bottom—not very high. No great hopes have been raised, but there is a gradual improvement to be seen for the majority of the people. For some, rather a falling away—people who haven't done too well at the top. Nyerere isn't very keen, for example, on Ministers having lots of directorships, or even earning extra money from boarding houses or anything like that. He likes to think of his Ministers as salaried men serving their country. Perhaps unduly idealistic when people are all too keen to earn a little bit on the side, as they undoubtedly are. It is not a perfect country, any more than any other country. These have been his aims and these are the difficulties that he is bound to face. One difficulty is that the powerful people of the country are those for whom self-interest is likely to prevail, if he's not careful.

The insurance against this, I think, for the future, is the involvement which he has been able to create for the country in the affairs of the country. There has not grown up a political professional class which is thought by the majority of the people to be separate from them. They all belong to T.A.N.U., and the machine looks upward and outward to the centre and is concerned about what's going on. Again, an over-simplification. Probably the peasant working in his field knows nothing of the intricacies of the T.A.N.U. policy, or the working of the Cabinet system in the Central Government. But he is concerned, and he feels that he is part of the system. This, I think, is a hope. Whether it is a stable hope or not is hard to say. Whether or not, if Nyerere moved from the scene, things would collapse, one can't forecast. As long as he's there, however, he manages to keep this incredible hold over his people. This is a hold which is not one simply of awe or respect, although both are there; I think it is a very profound affection for the man. A man who could happily argue that he has a one-party state, not because he is a doctrinaire one-party man, not even perhaps because this is the African system, but because there is no opposition. There is no point in creating one if there isn't one! When he was asked, "What on earth do we do, trying to pursue the Westminster system of having the Government on the left and the Opposition on the right, or vice versa?" he said "Oh! we'll have A to K on the right and M to Z on the left!" He can take that reasonably light-heartedly. He can do that simply because he believes that things are working the way he would like to see them working.

Tanganyika is not a wealthy country, as I have already suggested. If Sir Edward Twining couldn't find wealth, I'm pretty sure Julius Nyerere can't. But at least he has got what Twining tried, by different means, to achieve but didn't succeed in achieving—the backing of 99.99 recurring percent of the population! □

MARGINAL CHRISTIAN GROUPS IN SOUTH AFRICA

(Speech given at the annual general meeting of the Christian Institute of South Africa in Durban, September, 1973 entitled *The Role of Marginal Christian Groups in Promoting Security Inside South Africa.*)

by Manas Buthelezi

By "marginal groups" I mean those voluntary christian organizations which have committed themselves to the prophetic carrying out of one or more aspects of the christian ministry. In so far as their aims fall within the ambit of the general ministry of the church, the attitude of the church towards them manifests itself in a relationship that ranges from moral support to financial assistance or seconding of personnel.

The marginal organizations I have in mind should be distinguished from those denominational agencies whose terms of reference are explicitly outlined in church resolutions or articles and by-laws of the church constitution e.g. youth leagues, commissions, etc. They are for the reason of this distinction marginal. They are marginal also for another reason: although they may have a broad appeal, since they cannot speak with the authority of the church, theirs may appear to be a minority voice. They are to the church marginal in the same sense as one may speak of the church as being a marginal group in relation to the rest of society which does not claim to be motivated by christian principles. They may either be in a denominational or ecumenical margin, e.g. Mission Societies, YMCA, Revival Movements, Africa Enterprise, Christian Institute, etc.

Because of the limited time I have, it is impossible for me to do justice to the wide variety of rôles all these marginal christian groups are or are not playing in promoting meaningful security in South Africa. Seeing that this occasion coincides with the tenth Anniversary of the Christian Institute, in this lecture I am going to limit myself to the example of the rôle of the Christian Institute.

In order to forestall wrong expectations of what I am going to say, I should state that I am not going to present you with a catalogue of the achievements of the Christian Institute as such. There are people who would be more qualified to do that than myself. My approach to the question of the Christian Institute in the promotion of security in South Africa will neither be historical nor

question of the contribution of the Christian Institute in the promotion of security in South Africa will neither be historical nor descriptive. On the other hand, it will be reflective, that is, I shall reflect as a simple South African christian on how the rôle such as that of the Christian Institute serves the promotion of security in South Africa. I will begin by analysing the present quest for security in South Africa in a Christian perspective. In other words I will describe the essence of the current security problem as a setting for evaluating a rôle like that of the Christian Institute. In short I am investigating the Christian Institute using the criterion of a christian concept of security in South Africa. You will have the benefit of following my reasoning step by step until I reach recommendations which I shall address to the christian conscience.

1. The Christian Quest for Security in South Africa.

I will begin by announcing that I am one of those who believe that for its own survival this country needs security badly. Therefore the creation of the atmosphere and reality of security is priority number one. The country, as well as all of us christians, needs to guard against all that poses a threat to security. All this is of course orthodox phraseology. The basic question centres around how we understand that which constitutes security. Security may mean many things to many people. For instance, to a robber security means feeling that his loot is firmly in his hand and beyond recapture. For the robbed man security means the experience of the repossession of what was taken from him. This crude example illustrates the need of defining our terms.

Understandably the whole of our country suffers from a security psychosis. You can hardly turn a newspaper page without reading something about or an indirect allusion to a threat to South African security. At least among those who subscribe to the tenets of Christian faith it is necessary to arrive at some form of consensus as to what constitutes security for all in our country. After all if security is to become a prized ideal and possession at all, it is all of us who should be in a position to appreciate what it guarantees to our daily life. Security is something that

is as concrete as life itself. Its appreciation can never be a monopoly of those who claim to have some esoteric insight into what constitutes the common good. It is something whose essence should be understandable to us all.

In what follows I want to argue the case for a theology of security in South Africa. I will explain why I think the church needs to outline an ethic which puts in perspective the present quest for security especially in the body politic. I will illustrate that what a marginal christian organization like the Christian Institute is trying to do is just that.

The theological basis for security is Christ's atoning work. It is Christ's act of bringing reconciliation between God and man and the opening of the possibility of reconciliation between God and man which accounts for security. Reconciliation is security—the opposite of disquiet and apprehension that results from an awareness of an existing belligerent state of affairs. In as far as a security problem exists only as long as there are two parties, the threat and threatened, a deliberate creation of reconciliation is the only reasonable solution short of mutual annihilation or the destruction of the imagined threat by the threatened.

As the Gloria in Excelsis of the Angels put it, the birth of Christ ushered in a new possibility of security on earth. Instead of the word "security" the bible speaks of "peace on earth"

Without reconciliation there can never be security. It is because whites have rated reconciliation as such a low priority that they are such victims of insecurity. For many decades blacks have been seen as a potential danger to whites. Whites have been accordingly impressed with this imagined reality. The programme of the segregation of blacks from whites has been a desperate attempt to invest the white man with a sense of security. Distance was imagined to be a healthy medium of security. On the other hand any physical fellowship between black and white was seen as a major threat to the security of the white man. That is why to many people security has racial overtones; that is why it is such an emotive word in the political jargon. To say that the programme of segregation has aggravated instead of decreased the white man's sense of insecurity is to state the obvious. The white man has found it necessary to build more security fences around himself without satisfying the most fundamental of his fears: imagined threat to his survival as well as that of the values and ideals he has committed himself to protect and preserve.

The security legislation and events of the last decades have proved that no amount of "physical fencing" can satisfy a basically spiritual and psychological quest: what security shall I have in order to believe that I shall continue to be? A Swedish theologian has described this spiritual phenomenon in modern man in very poignant words.

"Such is the nature of the life lived by man under wrath and death. He is continually struggling to abolish fear and build a 'world without fear', trusting in new healing media (for instance, in the power of science), and allowing his fear to take concrete form in petty fears of minor and avoidable dangers. At the same time he conceals from him-

self his deepest fear, the fear of death itself, against which he is powerless. He uses his power to 'govern' creation in order to avert the external aspects of the tyranny of death. These can be averted, since they are simply the outward 'masks' of death, and not death itself. In so averting them, man comes to put his hope and trust in the means which he has used to prevent the onslaught of death. In this confidence he begins to worship the creature, although he knows in his inmost being that nothing can ultimately help him, and that the tyrant will come against him in a different mask and destroy him. His ruling over creation does not save him from making idols. On the contrary, it forces him to do so, for he is unable to produce in himself the faith which can withstand death without idols".

This is in essence a theological analysis of the South African security psychosis. I know that it is very humiliating to go through the motions of being told what you are suffering from. As you lie on the doctor's couch stripped naked and the doctor casually handling even the ugliest and most private members of your body, you begin to realize that you are helpless: you do not have power of privacy, and it hurts; but it is a humiliating hurt that is a prelude to healing.

This is the phase we are in in South Africa; it is a phase of the fear of confrontation with the naked reality of our situation and a desperate attempt to build security walls of self-deceit, like a king who admires those who tell him that he has the mightiest army in the world and who persecutes messengers who come to tell him that his army has been routed and that he should seek shelter in another castle.

In which castle should South Africa find shelter and security? In strengthening and not threatening or destroying the forces that are designed to promote harmony and reconciliation between black and white people in South Africa. It is significant that no less a man than the State President has in his recent statement courageously come out to the side of those who believe that reconciliation between black and white is the only thing that will guarantee security in South Africa.

I have not met the State President. I have every reason to think that he understands himself like all of us to be a follower of Christ and that such a statement is a reflection of the insight he is also seeking in Christ. If that be the case I make bold to say that I have discovered something I have in common with the faith-insight of the State President namely, a commitment to bringing about a reality and atmosphere of reconciliation between black and white in South Africa. Let us rally behind the State President and fight the enemies of good will and christian fellowship between black and white while at the same time being aware of the fundamental truth that you "cannot have your cake and eat it". You cannot desire reconciliation and at the same time censure those who see to it that it happens: you cannot reconcile by dividing people and making it impossible for them to realize that they have something in common. As a black christian who is struggling to make christianity a reality in his country, in the recent statement of the State President I read a voice

of encouragement from high up in the rungs of power that what I am doing is not undesirable after all. Although the State President did not mention me by name, I feel entitled to claim it as a voice of encouragement for me. I hope that those of you who are committed to bringing about reconciliation between black and white feel encouraged that this is not the darkest hour of their strife but really the dawn of a new day which will confirm that contrary to appearances their labours have not been in vain.

Let me illustrate the current problem of security in South Africa by saying a few words on some of the often forgotten casualties of the security confusion in South Africa. I would not be surprised if I turn out to be the first person ever to speak for the welfare and security of these people. I am speaking for the oppressed underdogs of the South African Society. I mean the members of the black Security Police popularly known as the Special Branch. It is relatively easy to summon moral arguments behind the expression of sympathy for the poor, for the oppressed, for political detainees but I have yet to hear any one who publicly argues a christian case for the morality of the work of the black Special Branch. These men, some of whom are our brothers, fathers, cousins and uncles, actually do a thankless job simply because the average black man fails to grasp the essence of the security of which the Special Branch man is an agent.

A Special Branch man is strictly speaking a banned man and somebody under house arrest. He is banned because he is cut off from the pool of black community confidence. His circle of intimate friends hardly ever stretch beyond his family and colleagues and agents in the security force. He is a branded man in that people never feel at ease in his presence. In actual fact an instrument of security should bring an atmosphere of confidence and assurance of safety. A security body guard does not inspire panic and fear but a feeling of safety. This is not the case with the Special Branch. This is confounded by the fact that among their clients are almost all significant leaders of the black community. There is a saying that if you are a black leader worthy of any salt you must prove it by the frequency of visits and surveillance by the Special Branch. That is why even bishops and ministers of the Gospel are not exempt from the visits of the Security Police. This makes many black people confused as to what is meant by talk of security.

For a security system to be of lasting value it is important that its basic underlying principles and goals must be simple enough to be understood by the average citizen; after all he should be its primary beneficiary. It is the aim of these remarks to describe the christian basis of those principles and goals.

A threatening security is no security at all, just as one reconciled with God is no longer threatened and repelled by God's wrath but cemented to him by fellowship of his love. To the innocent therefore, security should bring with it an experience of serenity and joy and not insinuations of potential criminality.

A security system based on reconciliation will liberate, for instance, the black Special Branch man from doing an inappreciable job to the black community. The community will be reconciled to him and see him as its genuine body guard instead of an instrument of harassment. Many a Special Branch man leads a miserable life of being resented and isolated by the community.

If the ministry of the church is to be relevant at all it must be related to people in all walks of life and professions, including the Special Branch men. Christ died for them too. It is the task of the church to promote good will not only between man and man, but also between government and people, leader and follower and even between the community and the Special Branch. In order to do this effectively, the church must so interpret the Gospel of reconciliation as to condemn all that makes good will impossible. It is not the duty of the church to "cover up" and white-wash wrong foundations. If a foundation is shaky, it must be replaced by a new one. In this case the shaky foundation is programmed confrontation between black and white which must be replaced by reconciliation. It is against the background of this need that we have to understand the role of marginal christian groups.

II. The Essence Of The Role Of Marginal Christian Groups

Individuals and groups of individuals in the church have a responsibility to witness about the meaning of the Gospel to the various situations of daily life. In relation to the topic under discussion, the Christian Institute is one organization which has tried to highlight the centrality of reconciliation in bringing about Christian harmony and understanding among the various racial groups in South Africa. Bridge building is an important strategy in the security system of a country. This is true both in a literal and metaphorical sense. Good human relations is an art of establishing links of communication between individuals and groups.

If christian fellowship is to mean anything at all, it is necessary that there should be models of christian fellowship. To talk about the need of reconciliation between blacks and whites in South Africa would remain empty noise if it were not followed by the creation of concrete models of a reconciled black-white community.

Some years ago I had a very tough time trying to reconcile two families. One family was eager for reconciliation while the other was not. One member of the reluctant family explained the situation this way. "You see, if we get reconciled it will mean that they will come to our house, and then they will be potentially more dangerous to us than they are now. Let them remain where they are, and we shall keep to our place".

This story is a parable of our situation. Some people see reconciliation as in itself an abandonment of a position of security: it is placing oneself in a vulnerable position of openness to the other. As long as we talk theoretically about the need for reconciliation in this country, there is no problem; but as soon as you bring in the question of building concrete models of a reconciled community then you run into all kinds of difficulties.

By a concrete model of a reconciled community I mean a social situation in which people are made to experience what it means to go through the process of reconciliation and also appreciate the fruits of fellowship. The present segregated structure of the church in South Africa has meant that the church has failed to be such a model of a reconciled community. The church has virtually become a microcosm of the racially balkanized society we find in South Africa. It is considered axiomatic by some people that the church should fashion itself after the image of society. Any form of deviation from the pattern of traditional apartheid in South African society is considered an act of undermining the security of the country. The church is no longer a salt to the world but is instead salted by the world. I say this in full awareness and appreciation of the growing concern in many churches for redeeming the situation.

It cannot be denied that groups like the Christian Institute have in the past devoted all their attention to the

problem of reconciliation as a basis for real and lasting security in South Africa. We should thank God for this.

In my opinion it is because many white people have not accepted reconciliation between the races in South Africa as the only basis of the future security that they call in question the christian integrity of those who have tried to create models of reconciliation. Yet there is an urgent need for such models. It is to the credit of bodies like the Christian Institute that concerned christians have been given the opportunity of witnessing to reconciliation as an alternative basis for security in South Africa. The credit also goes to those churches and christian groups which have given the Christian Institute moral and material support in its contribution towards the search for security in this country.

Against the background of all these facts I recommend that we thank God for one of his gifts to South Africa, the Christian Institute. □

DON'T PLAY WITH APARTHEID — ISOLATE IT

by Roger Roman

1970 saw the cancellation of the proposed tour of Britain by a 'whites only' Springbok cricket team. This was the result of what was perhaps the most successful protest campaign ever witnessed, namely the "Stop the Seventy Tour" (S.T.S.T.) campaign. Now a new action-group has been formed along the same lines, and with several of the same leaders. "Stop the Apartheid Rugby Tour" (S.A.R.T.), is going to be in the front lines of a battle to bring about the cancellation of the proposed British Lions rugby tour of South Africa, next year. This article will give some of the background information needed to assess S.A.R.T., and to understand its motives.

The whole sports system is controlled by whites, for the enjoyment of whites, and to the practical exclusion of all others. Racial discrimination rules every facet of it at all levels, and in all its forms. White South Africans have more leisure, economic resources and opportunities to play sport; whereas the blacks have to contend with apartheid as well as having less leisure, economic resources, and opportunities.

The greatest discrimination lies in the facilities available to the whites and blacks; It starts at grass-root level with the virtual absence of public parks and play-grounds in black areas, severely retarding the growth of sporting in-

terests and skills in the black youth. A statement by the Director of Housing and Coloured Affairs for Port Elizabeth was made in 1969: "There are 4,000 registered adult members of Coloured rugby and soccer associations in Port Elizabeth. This means that there are 364 individual teams for which we need 61 fields for weekend league fixtures. We have 13 fields available. "This illustrates the position at club level. Where in South Africa do we find such a lack of facilities for whites? At first class level we find no Ellis Parks, Kings Parks, or Loftus Versvelds for the black athlete. Thus even if he has the opportunity to play sport regularly the black man is severely handicapped by lack of facilities.

Racial discrimination means that the Government decides who can play whom, not the sportsmen themselves. It means that the spectators at matches are fenced off from one another into racial groups. It means that there is a complete lack of reports of black sporting events, in the sports pages of white newspapers. It means that the different races cannot share the enjoyment of sport together in the way they want to. It means that the black sportsman is also denied the right officially to represent his country overseas.

Small wonder, then, that the Basil D'Olivieras, the Precious McKenzies, the Steve Makones and the Albert Johannesons, to name but a few, have had to leave their

homes in South Africa in order to obtain sporting honours. In the long run it has been South Africa who has been the loser. She has lost unofficial ambassadors who would bring credit to any country in the world, and this is something she can ill afford to do.

This resumé gives us some idea of how the whole sporting life of South Africa is riddled with apartheid. Perhaps the worst aspect of it all is that the blame for the racialism must fall fairly and squarely on the shoulders of the white sports bodies, with very few exceptions. As the Minister for Sport, Dr Piet Koornhof, said recently when referring to the Aurora Cricket Club "... that whereas the law does not provide for a ban on multi-racial sports events on private property, the Government would not permit its policy to be circumvented at club level". From this it becomes apparent that White sportsmen have, in fact, imposed and enforced racial discrimination in their own organisations though no law forced them to do so. Whilst proclaiming themselves to be against racialism they themselves have been practising it by not doing what they could to prevent it. This two-faced attitude is a sad reflection on our white sportsmen. The usual bleat heard from the sports bodies is "the Government makes the laws, not us, so can we be held responsible for the present system?" They certainly can, and indeed must, be held responsible for not doing what they quite legally could have done to help their fellow black sportsmen. The pitifully few whites who have gone into black townships to coach or to arrange non-racial events, must be commended for their actions in the sports world. They have revealed the ugly hypocrisy of the other white sport bodies.

Racial discrimination became more entrenched with the Nationalists' rise to power, and resistance began immediately. Initially it came mostly from black organisations who extended invitations to the whites to join them, and applied for international recognition. They were almost totally unsuccessful in both of these fields. In 1958 the first step towards a more united front took place with the formation of the South African Sports Association (S.A.S.A.). Prominent in this body's lobbying, petitioning and appeals were Dennis Brutus (later banned and now helping S.A.R.T. in Britain), and Alan Paton. S.A.S.A. worked for the recognition of black sporting organisations, and for the participation of blacks in international events. After several fruitless years they came to the conclusion that they must work for the isolation of the white bodies in order to force them to change. 1962 saw the formation of the South African non-Racial Olympic Committee (S.A.N.-R.O.C.) to concentrate on the Olympic scene. S.A.N.-R.O.C. was forced into oblivion by bannings, arrests and intimidation by the Security Police. It re-formed in London and was instrumental in causing the Seventy Tour to be stopped.

The next few years were characterized by a growing opposition to racialism in sport, with South Africa being banned from competing in events in almost every branch of sport. She was not allowed to compete in the 1968 Mexico Olympics, and was expelled from the whole Olympic movement in 1970. In other words South Africa began to be isolated from event after event.

This was very painful for our white sporting bodies, and they at last began to confront the government. When isolation began to hurt them, then, and only then, were they prepared to make some changes. It is thus evident that change has to be forced on them from outside South Africa, and this must continue for as long as the present system remains unchanged. It must be borne in mind that it is the aim of groups such as S.A.R.T. to create a climate more conducive to change. They cannot change the policy, but they can change the minds of those who practise racial discrimination in South African sport. The change in any organisation must come from within, as the only other alternative is complete isolation.

It is on the above facts that S.A.R.T. is to wage its campaign for non-racial sport, along the lines of isolation for South Africa. We now come to the somewhat thorny issue of what methods S.A.R.T. will use. S.A.R.T. is modelled on the lines of S.T.S.T., and so the question of 'direct-action protesting' must be considered. I feel that S.A.R.T. must stay within the law in its campaign. There are two reasons for this. Firstly the infringement of the civil rights of others can never be condoned. The S.T.S.T. argument against this was that the need for action against Apartheid necessitates and justifies the use of militancy. Whilst agreeing on the need for action, I cannot agree with disruptive protests as a means of action. Democracy is a tool that S.A.R.T. can use, but it must not be abused as it was in Britain during the Springbok rugby tour. S.A.R.T. must stick to the principles of democracy, as failure to do this can eventually lead to the destruction of these principles. The second reason for sticking to the law will mean that those who are being attacked will not be able to avoid the main issue of racialism in sport, by launching a counter attack on the methods of the demonstrators. They will be forced to answer the attacks on the principles, and not the methods, if they can; and the campaign will have far greater effect.

S.A.R.T. is going to be calling for support in the months ahead, and it is to be hoped that white South Africa shows it has a conscience and gives the movement its support. The vast majority of South Africans will be thrilled if another tour is cancelled, as it brings closer their hopes of eventually seeing black and white together on the sports fields of this land. □

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