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A JOURNAL OF LIBERAL AND RADICAL OPINION

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EDITORIALS

1. CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION

The fact that the Opposition persuaded the Government to amend considerably the provisions on conscientious objection in the new Defence Amendment Bill should not blind us to the fact that the Act as finally passed, is, in its own field, quite as obnoxious as anything we have on our Statute Book.

It is difficult to believe that the recommendations on which the Bill was based came from a commission chaired by a minister of religion and consisting of professing members of the Christian faith, for those recommendations showed a total disregard for some of the basic concepts on which that faith is supposed to be based. In particular they showed a total lack of compassion and nothing at all of "do unto others as you would be done by".

The Act, as we understand it, provides some sort of accommodation for religious objectors, depending upon which category a tribunal, at which they will have no legal representation, decides to put them into. If they are placed by it in the least favourable category they will be liable to a sentence of six years community service, during which six years they will be barred from all political activity. If an objector refuses to do military service on ethical or moral grounds he will be liable to a six-years prison sentence. The original sentence proposed by the Christian members of the commission on which the legislation was based was eight years. Its reduction to six years will, we understand, bring it into line with Soviet Russian legislation on the same subject.

The Nationalist government tells us that the South African Defence Force is protecting the State, and not its own policies, from attack. Our view is that if it had not been for

Nationalist Party policies we would not now have to be defending the State against the attacks being mounted against it.

We live in a deeply divided society. Some of these divisions are historical, but many of them have been created as a matter of deliberate Nationalist Party policy and without the consent of the majority of our people. If we are under attack it is because the Nationalist Party has deliberately excluded three-quarters of our population from any effective voice in the formulation of government policy since 1948.

In a free society, where **everyone** has a voice in electing the government, the State may have a case for conscripting everyone to defend it. But in a society in which that does not apply, surely it has no such right? What moral justification can there be for forcing people, under the threat of serving 6 years in prison, to defend a system which they think is disastrous for their children's future? In a country divided against itself, in a conflict which its own spokesmen have told us over and over again the SADF cannot win on the battlefield, a Christian government would surely be offering people who reject its policies on moral but not religious grounds, an alternative type of constructive service which would benefit society whatever system of government ultimately prevails?

In our society this would not only be a case of "doing unto others as you would be done by" but of "doing unto others as you **have** been done by". For the one thing which Nationalist supporters have never been forced to face, when wars of which they have disapproved have been fought by South African governments in the past, has been conscription. □

2. CAMPUS NEWS

Campus News is a publication which has appeared once. We hope it won't again. That one issue was distributed by persons as yet unidentified at the beginning of the academic year on and around the premises of a number of South African universities, and through the post to a selected mailing list. It was a highly inflammatory and treasonable document, the substance of whose message was "students, get ready to join the armed liberation struggle". It purported to come from the National Union of South African Students.

For 35 years NUSAS has been one of the Nationalist Government's staunchest opponents. Indeed, one of the Nationalist Party's most spectacular failures has been in its educational policy. This was designed to produce compliant students, black and white, and failed to produce either. That failure has made NUSAS a prime target for the attentions of the security police for years and a favourite whipping-

boy for Prime Ministers and Cabinet Ministers, especially Ministers of Justice.

What then has been the Government's reaction to **Campus News**, which seemed to offer a heaven-sent opportunity to deal with this troublesome irritant once and for all? The answer is, precisely nothing. The smear was so outlandish that not even the Government could bring itself to take advantage of it.

NUSAS has laid a charge against "persons unknown" over the attempt the pamphlet makes to discredit it. We wait with considerable scepticism to see how much further than that the case ever gets. Smear literature in a variety of forms produced by "persons unknown", but with obvious access to sources of information available only to the Government, has been directed against opponents of the Nationalists ever since 1948. When last was one of them found by the police? □

3. PRESS FREEDOM

Like most authoritarian regimes the South African Government's support for the concept of the freedom of the press is strictly conditional. As long as journalists and newspapers keep reporting the kind of things it likes to see, they have no problems, but as soon as they start reporting things it does not like, it is liable to silence them, or to threaten to silence them, or to try to frighten them into silence. There have been several recent examples of this.

In the parliamentary debate on the Salem oil swindle the Government, for the first time, threatened the traditional right of the press to report everything said in Parliament. Its argument was that, because South Africa had to buy its oil on the black market, any publication of information indicating where that oil was coming from was a threat to the national interest, a breach of national security, part of the "total onslaught". As far as we understood the debate on the Salem affair, it was not designed by the Opposition to be any of these things but simply to show that the Government had been made a fool of by a bunch of international oil crooks, who had sold it the same oil as they had already sold to somebody else, and that this had cost the taxpayers a great deal of money. But perhaps, when you have been in power for 35 years, even to be shown to have been made a fool of begins to feel like a threat to national security.

Secondly, there was the banning of the issue of March 14th and the attack on the March 21st issue of **Newsweek**, whose cover story was on apartheid. Mr. Pik Botha, Minister of Foreign Affairs, described the second article as "an example of what the West means by freedom of speech — the right to lie, deceive and distort". Ironically its author, Holger Jensen, had been described in similar terms, hardly a week previously, by the Zimbabwean Government, for his reports

on events in Matabeleland. For those reports he received extensive coverage on SATV.

Certainly there were some inaccuracies in Mr. Jensen's apartheid article, but we doubt if many black South Africans would have regarded the general picture it presented as a distortion of the kind of lives they have to live. Why could not the Minister reply to the inaccuracies in **Newsweek** itself?

Finally, there is the case of Allister Sparks, the security police raid on his house, and the confiscation of many of his personal records. It is rumoured that this assault on Mr. Sparks was triggered off by reports he has been sending to the overseas press in which he has quoted a banned person, Mrs. Winnie Mandela. Since when has this been an offence? Banned people have been quoted outside South Africa ever since the law was passed to gag them inside the country. Why this sudden concern now?

We think there are probably two answers to that question. The first is that Mr. Sparks's reports to the outside world give an authentic picture of parts of South African life that the South African Government would rather the outside world didn't know about. The second is that the South African Government would like the outside world to forget that the Mandela family exists. This, Nelson Mandela in Pollsmoor Prison, and Winnie Mandela, in Brandfort, assisted by friends like Allister Sparks, won't let the outside world do. The raid on his home is probably only the first step in a campaign designed to frighten Mr. Sparks into silence.

Restrictions on press freedom in South Africa have been steadily extended since 1948. It seems that more may be on their way. □

ALAN PATON

AT 80

– THE U.C.T.

CELEBRATION


by Tony Morphet

Alan Paton is 80 this year. There have already been several celebrations of the event and there will be more. U.C.T Summer School planned a set of five lectures "to consider and salute" his achievement. The impressions which follow are a record, from the inside, so to speak, of the occasion and I offer them to carry the celebration beyond the five days at U.C.T.

The programme had many points of origin. At a literary luncheon given by David Philip for the launching of "Ah, But Your Land is Beautiful" on 6 November 1981 I realized for the first time that 1983 would make Alan Paton 80. I checked it out with him as he sat beneath the arc lamps and the T.V. cameras and committed him to coming to Cape Town in January 1983. That was the most immediate origin. The roots lie further back. I first heard of Alan Paton in a car driving back with my father from Pietermaritzburg to Kokstad. I must have been 9 or 10. It was late evening and we were moving along the rough stony road towards Umzimkulu. I can recall him quoting as we came over a rise, "Below you is the valley of the Umzimkulu, on its journey from the Drakensberg to the sea; and beyond and behind the river, great hill after hill; and beyond and behind them, the mountains of Ingeli and East Griqualand."

It was a strange moment. My father was no reader. He was an East Griqualand farmer; an English immigrant with no education beyond a tiny farm school in the Yorkshire Dales, but his pleasure in quoting the words was unforgettable. It was pleasure in looking across to his own land but it was, much more, pleasure in having that land dignified, taken out of its ordinary heteronomous reality and given new shape and meaning.

This recollection came back to me when I was thinking about the lecture programme, particularly when I asked the question "What precisely were we celebrating?" The broad answer came – "the giving of meaning" – and that still seems to me to be a good answer. The 80 years show an undeviating



(Photo: Joe Alferts)

commitment to the creation of meanings. And so in thinking about four people to speak of the particular meanings I began to look for four different voices which could register, give shape to, and record the special impact which the Paton life has had. The speakers would have to be representative – they were to speak for all of us – they would have to be authoritative in their own fields and they would have to have had direct experience of the Paton life.

STRUCTURE AND SPEAKERS

To find the basic structure and the people to speak was not difficult. Denis Hurley, Colin Gardner, Richard Rive and René de Villiers. Religion, Literature and Politics. They were free to choose their approaches within the three fields. Paton would be present to hear all four and would himself speak on the fifth day.

Between the early planning and the event there came a steadily increasing flow of letters and telephone calls from Mr. P. On occasions the letters would crackle with irony and the aggressive teasing wit, but behind that surface there was visible no small anxiety. He referred to his illness, "I have been through deep waters since I last saw you" and he spoke of not feeling the old will to write. We debated the title of his lecture, "Politics and Literature?", "Writing and Politics?", "The Artist in South Africa?" – always the old contradiction and conflict but platitudinously put. In November the proposals suddenly change, "The two loves of my life . the land and the word". I balked at the nakedness of it – it seemed too strong, too confessional, too self-regarding – but the core of the conception was absolutely right. I realized then that he was in a deeply reflective mood and concentrating his attention on retrospective judgement. We toned the original title down to its final form "Two Loves . the land and the word" and under that heading he began to write, phoning from time to time to say how it was going. Invariably the report was "well".

During this intervening period I also received from Douglas

Livingstone a poem which he thought I might like to read at the opening of the final lecture. I persuaded him to send the poem to Mr P. on 11 January. It is a fine poem. The salute is full and unstinted, the verbal rhyming and teasing is one writer recognizing the other in a game.

“There is a lovely road that runs . . .” Each word
Is pulsed, soars from the first : prismatical,
Socratical, muscled, ecstatical
— Cut out as from a restive midday herd,
Transmuted, each : a legendary bird
Winged from a skull that’s emblematical,
Emphatical, yet democratical —
The man within the artist undeterred.

A ten thousand year-old Muse — just turned eighty
Years young — sustains your pen, and far from weighty
Bids us salute you : Dr. Alan Paton.
Your art rebukes, inspiring as to straighten
Spines for the morrow. It is in your voice
The beloved country can yet rejoice.

I kept it in my file and decided I would read it, if I could, as an introduction.

On the Sunday evening before Denis Hurley’s opening Monday lecture I received a phone call from Anne. She sounded tired, harassed and in a mood of retreat. The drive had been long, hot and tiring. I was apprehensive, fearing, as always, the strain being placed upon him. I learned later from Jannie O’Malley that on this first evening in Cape Town he had seemed nervous and anxious about what was to come. On the Monday morning he showed nothing of this anxiety.




DENIS HURLEY

Denis Hurley had made all of his own arrangements having sent me a letter early on to say that ‘in matters of accommodation we Catholics practice a convenient kind of communism’. Even as I mention the genial humour of this I have a twinge. Who knows what use could be made of such a charming way of saying he would be staying with members of his Order? He was already in the lecture room when we arrived, relaxed, easy and comfortable, as he invariably is, and he spoke of the great pleasure he had had in re-reading “all of Alan’s writing”. He wears his scholarship lightly but its thoroughness is never in doubt. The structure of his lecture he had found in a footnote in “Towards the Mountain” which gives six stages to the life. His theme, pursued throughout the lecture, was of a life of service to an ideal. It was a salute given, in the manner of the Church, sub specie aeternitatis, a recording of the meeting between the sacred and the secular in the life of an individual; of talents and graces given and used; of the universal and timeless inter-acting with the personal and the immediate. The Church is ancient and wise — it sees things with a broad and steady gaze — the Archbishop was unhurried, calm and sure, his poise telling the audience perhaps more even than his words.

He spoke of pilgrimage; of the journey toward the mountain of Isaiah; of the influences on Paton of the prophets, the New Testament and the life of Jesus. His conclusion joined both blessing and the giving of thanks.

“I thank him for his long and courageous service to truth, and love, and peace, and people. I thank him for the leadership he has given us by those six sturdy steps towards the mountain.”

I cannot imagine the precise emotion that must come to a person hearing his own life discussed in such a way and by such a figure. I do know that Alan Paton found it deeply moving.



COLIN GARDNER

Colin Gardner who had been present to hear Denis Hurley on the Monday could be forgiven for feeling a little daunted as he began on the Tuesday. He spoke to his own title “Alan Paton Writer and Fighter” and his focus was on the literature and the role it has played, and continues to play in South African life. His was an argument which began with “concrete instances” and broadened throughout the lecture into a commentary on the way “the Paton project” has acted out its values in the South African drama. He spoke of a deep “yearning toward harmony” present in the prose and poetry — a deep desire for unity and community — but added that such a longing had never blinded Paton to the battle surrounding the values of love, peace and community. He read and discussed the poem **I have approached** which talks so powerfully of words, sent to “awaken consciences”, “recall absenting obligations”, “assault the fortresses and bastions of our fears”.

Cry the Beloved Country he argued was controversial in the late 1940s, had remained that, and was increasingly so in 1983. It was not a book of political propositions or strategies; rather it spoke to a gradually growing human awareness and a steadily clarifying emotion concerned with the human need for the spirit of mutuality and community. For these reasons it drew the criticism of social radicals who were in search of political answers to social questions but who failed to see that social organization was not identical with the deeper sources of human trust and mutuality. The values of love and reconciliation which challenged the racism of the 1940s created a different kind of challenge for the radicalism of the 80s.

Colin Gardner’s lecture was marked by the lucid and sensitive articulacy in which he captured the movements of his own dialogue with the works. He spoke as someone who knows and feels the works from the inside, but also as someone who cannot forget that both inside and out of them is the South African reality. Perhaps more than anything else the life of the lecture was captured in the quality of his reading. Alan Paton said afterwards that he had always thought he was the best reader of his own work, until that morning.



RICHARD RIVE

Dr Richard Rive came into the programme from a different direction. He had not, as the other speakers, worked closely with Paton. "There's a distance between me and the old man" he said when we discussed his participating, "but yes, I'll do it". That distance he made plain in his early remarks. He spoke of his early discovery of **Cry the Beloved Country**. "I was young and bitter and badly hurt. I was mauled by the South African situation. . ." "I did not like Stephen Kumalo – but I'd met him. I did not like the words of Msimangu – but I'd heard them before. I didn't like Jarvis's boys' club – but I belonged to one myself."

It was a brusque, strong and straight opening – Paton from the outside, or the "other" side. In the background of Rive's lecture one could glimpse his development from the young angry man trapped in ghetto education, crammed full of "colonial" English literature and hating it, towards the fully established literary professional committed to the creation of an authentic common non-racial culture in the South Africa of the future. From this dominating vantage point he looked back over the landscape of South African literature towards the great figure of Olive Schreiner, whom he has studied so thoroughly and so fruitfully. And as he mapped the terrain, placing writers with brief pithy judgments, he gradually established Paton's position in the total scene.

He identified two traditions – the "liberal" and the "protest" – as the basic co-ordinates of his map and he argued that the late 1940s had been the point of transition between the two. Peter Abrahams' "Path of Thunder" was published in the same year as "Cry the Beloved Country". In one the protest tradition was taking shape; in the other the liberal tradition was nearing its end. He explored the different assumptions underpinning both traditions showing how they sprang from different needs and perceptions but how they both sought change. And, he argued, the protest tradition of the 50s and 60s had gained a good deal of its impetus from its arguments with the liberal tradition in place before it.

It was at this point that the scale of his tribute to Paton finally became clear. He quoted Paton's sharp question directed at the radicals of the 70s "Who were your mentors?" One mentor of the protest movement he showed as Paton himself. The tribute was to Paton the innovator and initiator whose writing had spurred into life a new tradition in South African writing. The accuracy and justice of the view was, as it were, guaranteed, by the even-handed scholarly detachment with which he had controlled his own young anger and through which he had established the professional authority and dominance with which he spoke.



RENE DE VILLIERS

René de Villiers has been in public life for three or four decades and the wealth of his experience shows in every phrase he uses but it has done nothing to cure him of speaker's nerves. He was present at every lecture and after each he would bewail his position as fourth man. However, once at the lectern all his assurance was with him and he warmed expansively to his theme "the political evolution of a great South African."

The lecture followed a structure similar to Denis Hurley's – looking for key experiences and defining vital stages of development in the biography. He touched some of the same areas as Hurley – the funeral of Edith Rheinalt-Jones; the appointment to the Bishops' Commission, but there were fresh reaches of experience opened up through the focus on political life. The style of the lecture, too, was different. De Villiers again and again found ways of leaving his grand theme to bring in the anecdotes and scenes that he has known from his 40-year friendship with Paton. His salute never lost its two sides – the one of profound respect for a great man who has struggled to free himself from everything narrow and confining, "the man who has done more than anyone in the last 20 years to keep the liberal spirit alive through his writing" – and the other of a close and old friend with a host of shared private recollections, jokes, anecdotes and stories. The skill of the lecture was that these two levels could live together so comfortably in an hour's talk.

Under de Villiers' attention Paton emerged as an archetypal figure. A man who put behind him the narrow provincialism of colonial Natal, who overcame his racist inheritance as a white, who struggled against the exclusive nationalisms of both English and Afrikaner in order to take on the character and dimensions of an authentic South African. From a friend and fellow citizen of a torn and divided country one could expect no fuller salute.

FINAL DAY

On the final day as we came up to the lecture theatre there was a great jostling crowd at the door. Deans were to be seen queueing behind schoolboys. We had to delay the start to get everyone in which was finally managed by asking the young and supple to take to the stairs. I found myself faced with the task of introducing Alan Paton – a prospect which seemed absurd after the previous four lectures. There was no way I would have managed to read Douglas Livingstone's poem. The situation was saved by remembering a biographical note in an S.A. Outlook issue to which Paton had contributed in the 70s. It said simply "Alan Paton is still Alan Paton." I adapted it slightly, with acknowledge-

ments, "Alan Paton at 80 is still Alan Paton — only more so". Surely the shortest possible introduction.

As he moved to the lectern I was sharply conscious of his age. He seemed for a moment frail, to show the signs of his illness, and his conversation just before the lecture flashed back. "It won't happen again my dear chap." And I recalled him being exceptionally careful on the stairs and his words "I don't want to fall and break my leg — it's like when I was finishing *Cry the Beloved Country* — I didn't want to become ill. It must be a fear of not finishing something."

All of these impressions vanished as he began speaking. The voice was as ever. The same simple, austere syntax, the same guttural, clipped diction — words under intense discipline. And the style retained all its vigour and power as the disciplines of the language contained the emotional pressure beneath the words.

The lecture had the simplest structure. Two halves — one to the love of the land, the other to the love of the word. In the love of the land he spoke, as a steadfast and stern lover, of a turbulent and testing relationship — of "a love and pride so sorely buffeted for sixty years" which "yet remains constant". In his rhetorical way he asked "What is a South African proud of?"

"Of the beauty of the physical land? — Yes
Of the beauty of its diverse peoples? — Yes.
Of its moral and social achievements? — No."

The drama of the relationship lies both in the questions and the fierce monosyllabic answers. More powerful still, a gesture possible only to someone supremely sure, not only of his own character and position but of his feelings as well, he went on,

"I do not expect to be able to lay my hand on my heart and to say before I die, I am proud to be a South African"

and then the relenting pause

"but I hope some of you will be able to do so"

his face turned towards the schoolchildren.

This sombre reflective phase of the lecture was caught in a sentence acknowledging René de Villiers' argument of the day before. "I am a servant of a nationalism which does not yet exist."

Somewhere near the middle of the hour the lecture changed course. It was done deliberately and skilfully, to go behind the severity and sombreness and into laughter and mockery. Paton recounted how he and René de Villiers have exchanged Christmas cards for 30 years and have carried on a long private joke. He told it all in Afrikaans and the joke turned on one of them having a sore chest and getting drops from the doctor. The drops are political — the Oom Hendrik variety followed, when they don't work, by the Oom John, the Oom Piet and the P.W. As the patient takes them he is seized by the visions and fantasies of Verwoerd, Vorster, Koornhof and Botha, and in the grip of the dreams he cries out in the night — to the rage and misery of his wife. It was excellent political satire and turned the love of the land inside out, to the huge pleasure of the audience.

The love of the word dealt with Paton's love of literature, or rather poetry, since there were, oddly perhaps, no references to novels. The lover in this world has little of the stern moralist who loves the land. He is still enraptured, revelling in imaginative form and compressed expression. Tennyson, Yeats, Blake, Fitzgerald, Hopkins, Campbell.

All famous poems but all collected as part of a personal anthology — an anthology of emotional experience as much as of individual poems.

EMOTIONAL CURRENT

As the lecture proceeded I had become aware, sitting at the front, of a strong emotional current in the audience. I doubt that anyone could have articulated the feeling or experience but I was aware of strange low sounds and of people surreptitiously wiping an eye. This current became more palpable during Mr Paton's closing reading of his poem *A Psalm of the Forest* which, he said, expressed his world view although he did not write it for that purpose.

I have seen my Lord in the forest, He walks from tree to tree laying his hands upon them;
The yellowwoods stand upright and proud that He comes amongst them, the chestnuts throw down blooms at his feet.
The thorns withdraw their branches before Him, they will not again be used shamefully against Him.
The wild fig makes a shade for Him, and no more denies Him.

The monkeys chatter and skip about in the branches, they peer at Him behind their fingers,
They shower Him with berries and fruits, they shake the owls and the nightjars from their hiding places,
They say to each other unceasingly, it is the Lord.

The mothers cuff their children, and elder brothers the younger,
But they jump from tree to tree before Him, they bring down the leaves like rain,
Nothing can bring them to order, they are excited to see the Lord.

And the winds move in the upper branches, they dash them like cymbals together.

They gather from all the four corners, and the waterfalls shout and thunder.

The whole forest is filled with roaring, with an acknowledgement, an exaltation.

No discussion of love of the word could say more than the poem itself.

As he sat the audience rose to applaud — finding a way of expressing the strong feeling which had gathered in the hour.

Even while within the immediate pressure of the feeling I was aware that it was not a wholly new or unknown experience. It was something I had felt before, though by no means often. What made us applaud; what was it that we were hailing? A great figure certainly — one that we had heard described and discussed on the previous four days — a figure who had all the measure of his occasion and who understood himself and his situation to its full limits. But also much more than that. We were applauding a life lived to a measure far beyond our own capacities. The dimensions and commitments had been shown in the first four lectures, but in the fifth they were communicated immediately and directly into our experience.

The five lectures brought alive both the pattern and the passion of Alan Paton's life and, through that, experience was given shape, meaning and dignity. Paton has been, and still is, a giver of meanings. It was that that we were celebrating. It was the same thing that I had felt hearing my father quoting Paton on the road out of Ixopo. □

SOUTH AFRICA AND MEANINGFUL CHANGE

A paper read to members of the Southern African Studies Seminar, University of Natal, Pietermaritzburg

by Terence Beard

Change means different things to different people, and there are probably very few, if any, who are entirely clear as to the different meanings and implications of the concept in its numerous different contexts. What counts as change for one person may not count as meaningful change for another. In this paper I am concerned with a notion of meaningful change; but rather than analyse the notion as such, I shall be content to let my meanings emerge from the contexts and the kinds of arguments which I shall be presenting.

If one is going to address oneself to the problem of change in South Africa, then a question of basic importance and which is **absolutely** unavoidable is: What is the nature of South Africa, this country which is undergoing, or is about to undergo, or which one believes ought to undergo, change? It is surprising, actually, how frequently this question is neither asked nor answered in the context of discussions about change. How, then, would one describe and analyse the South African system? What sort of polity is South Africa? I shall begin by attempting to give broad and general answers to these questions.

I do not want to get involved here in the race-and-class debate. Suffice it to say that I do not believe that either notion or phenomenon can be reduced to the other, but that the two are closely inter-related. Thus neither concept can be dispensed with. What seems to me important is the fact that the past history of South Africa has to a very large extent been about the fight between new settler communities and the indigenous populations for the possession of the land, resulting in settler conquest, and this has led to class formation intimately related to racial factors. The relatively large indigenous population and the 'imperial factor' account for the indigenous population never having been entirely dispossessed of land, which is not to deny their having been dispossessed of a very large proportion of it. Dispossession was more often than not accompanied by continued occupation, but as squatters dependent upon and subordinate to the new settler owners.

LABOUR FORCE

The growth of agriculture necessitated an available labour force which was provided ready to hand in the squatter population whose status soon became in many respects analogous to that of serfs. The growth of market agriculture under the dominance of white farmers involved processes such as the limiting of the squatter population through their expulsion from white farms in large numbers, and, later, the development of structures which could be

employed to ensure adequate supplies of farm labour, given the previous reduction in the squatter population and the competitive demand for labour from the developing industrial and commercial sectors.

The discovery of gold and diamonds led, of course, to the development of the industrial and commercial sectors of the economy, and again the development of these sectors depended upon adequate supplies of labour. The labour supply was secured and maintained by various devices and methods. These included the introduction of hut and poll taxes which forced blacks to enter the money economy, recruitment from without South Africa's borders, from neighbouring territories, and, over time, the growing populations within those areas which were reserved solely for African occupation steadily reducing the ability and efficacy of these areas in producing the subsistence of their inhabitants. Gradually the migratory labour system became an integral feature of the South African social and economic system. Class formation and racial domination and subordination became to a large extent functions of each other.

This is not the place to elaborate upon the emergence and development of the industrial colour bar, for there is ample and recent literature on that; nor shall I dwell upon the gradual development of a system, the social, economic and political dimensions of which are characterised by the institutionalised subordination of blacks in terms of class, status and political power. These systems not only maintained black subordination, but developed and institutionalised race segregation in new forms appropriate to the developing capitalist system. South African society came to be structured in very distinct and significant ways which included a labour system which not only barred blacks from acquiring economic power, but in which black wages on average have been restricted to small fractions of white wages, so that wage differentials have traditionally been very high but also consistent with the colour bar, and black wages seldom above what has come to be called the Poverty Datum Line. There are signs of greater differentiation within the class of black labourers within recent years, and even of the emergence of a marginal group of black capitalists, but this does not significantly affect the overall picture which I have been painting.

SEGREGATION AND DOMINATION

A central aspect of the South African system is the system of segregation. As mentioned briefly above, the colour-bar was systematically developed in all sectors of the economy.

Control of the land by whites and its efficient development for capitalist agricultural and industrial purposes resulted in Africans being confined to what first of all came to be known as 'reserves', and, later, 'homelands' in the rural areas, and 'locations' or 'townships' in the urban or industrial and commercial areas. At the same time the demands for white security, for residential segregation, the need to control property relations, and the social and economic relations which all of this implied, necessitated the parallel development of a vast system of control, a system which within a fairly short time seemed to take on a life of its own. The consequence is a society structured in complex ways and in which force and power relations in all spheres of life play a more important role in the life of the community than in most other societies. The mailed fist tends to be more frequently visible than in most other societies, certainly than in most relatively stable societies, and the velvet glove rather more rarely seen.

This invites the obvious question as to how stable a country is South Africa. Without analysing it in detail, it does seem pertinent to say that insofar as South Africa can be regarded as a stable state, this stability is a function of the highly developed structures of domination, the power structures, with severe sanctions threatening challengers to authority. Stability is a function of the presence and the employment of a highly militarised police force, of an ever growing defence force, and of a large and ubiquitous bureaucracy with quasi-legislative, judicial and wide discretionary executive powers.

These are all essential features of the structures of domination. The first question which ought therefore to be asked of any proposals for change, is whether and to what extent they will contribute to the dismantling of these structures.

"NATIONAL STATES"

Now it seems to me that there is one factor which confuses the issue and which must therefore be placed in perspective. This is the 'homeland' policy and the emergence of the new satellite states, if 'states' is the correct term. It could be, and sometimes is, claimed that, in terms of the policy of creating new 'national states', the structures of domination are in fact being dismantled, and that in the course of time South Africa will have no African citizens, only citizens of the groups which government constitutional proposals are to cater for. There is, of course, no doubt that new power structures have been erected over the past years, and that the newly created 'national states' have achieved legal autonomy in the sense that theoretically they may legislate as they please, subject only to the limitations of their own constitutions. But the key to interpreting the implications of these changes lies in examining the overall context within which these 'states' exist, together with the fact that far from leading to the dismantling of the structures of domination in South Africa itself, these structures are actually being tightened up, and the bureaucracy is being given new teeth. I refer here to the implications of Wiehahn and Riekert, and to Dr. Koornhof's new Bills, among other developments.

The fact of the matter is, that although government policy aims at granting independence to all the 'homelands' so that in the eyes of South African law there will be no South African citizens of African descent, the *de facto* population of so-called 'white' South Africa includes at least 46% of the total black population. While it is government policy to decrease this percentage, it is unlikely in the extreme that

the black population will ever be much less than it presently is, and it seems fairly safe to say that the number of Africans working, as distinct from residing, in 'white' areas, will always be considerably higher than the number of whites. The legal position and the *de facto* position are and will continue to be very different, with the former masking the realities of South African life. This carries with it the clear implication that the structures of domination, far from being dismantled, will require shoring up. Apart from anything else, the forces driving blacks to the 'white' areas are strong enough to ensure a permanent illegal population in the urban areas of South Africa.

The position of the majority of people in 'white' South Africa insofar as legal rights are concerned is changing not for the better, but for the worse, for the future legal status of black Africans will be that of resident aliens, but resident aliens of inferior status. Unlike aliens who are accepted as 'white', blacks are and will continue to be prohibited, in terms of their race, from the privileges and rights which are normally accorded to and enjoyed by aliens. An African born and brought up, say, in Soweto, will not only be an alien in terms of the law, but will enjoy far fewer privileges and rights than a visitor from Europe or North America.

DEPENDENCE AND DOMINATION

The dependence of the 'homelands' upon 'white' South Africa is a structural dependence which is in part revealed by the fact that at any one time at least half of their working populations are in employment in South Africa. This dependence is likely to increase rather than decrease over the years, for the chances of development on a scale sufficient to lessen it, given the natural growth of the black population, the large-scale resettlement of blacks in 'homelands' which is in process, and the vast overpopulation which at present exists, are, apart from a few marginal areas, negligible.

The 'homelands' serve as little more than impoverished and therefore reliable reservoirs of cheap labour for 'white' South Africa. In addition they have the advantage of being legally self-administered, so freeing the South African government from the responsibility of caring for their starving populations despite the fact that starvation and impoverishment are largely the result of the apartheid structures and policies. At the same time, South Africa supplies their very life-blood in the form of employment for their labour, technical expertise, grants-in-aid and loans etc.. Consequently their ruling classes and elites are captives of the system of dependence, a dependence which substantially undermines their sovereignty in political and economic terms, and indirectly affects their legal sovereignty.

The regional system is thus not only dominated by South Africa but it bears striking resemblances insofar as military, political and economic power are concerned, with the Soviet Union presiding over its Eastern European satellite states, particularly if the post-World War II Stalinist period is considered. The raid on Maseru and the reactions which followed in Lesotho and Swaziland are indicative of South Africa's dominance in the region, especially when it is remembered that the dependence of 'homeland' states is even greater than that of Lesotho, Botswana and Swaziland. Policies which are disapproved of by the South African government, and which are seen as affecting South African security, will not be tolerated, a fact which is corroborated by the strategy of destabilizing the socialist oriented states in Southern Africa.

DISMANTLING OF STRUCTURES

It follows from this broad analysis and description that the dismantling of the structures of dominance is a necessary condition for meaningful change. A partial dismantling of these structures as could be brought about by a new dispensation for urban blacks would not include the regional structures so that the effect would be to include some blacks within the structures of privilege while retaining the overall dominance of 'white' South Africa within the overall system. To look at South Africa in isolation, or at 'homelands' in isolation is to run the risk of overlooking the fact that the region forms an organic system which has developed over the past century or so, and which is characterised by closely integrated structures and relations of dominance and dependence. The 'homeland' states, far from serving to dismantle 'white' hegemony, perpetuate that hegemony, for they are necessary conditions for the survival of the system of domination in 'white' South Africa itself.

This is not to say that a new dispensation for urban blacks ought therefore to be scoffed at, for once embarked upon it will create new centres and bases of power which are likely to gain a momentum of their own. The important point is that such a new dispensation will not of itself change the basic nature of the structures of dominance within the region. It will still be a case of economic and political power being vested in the dominant centre at the expense of an impoverished periphery. The majority of blacks will still be on the wrong side of these power structures.

All the proposals which have so far come from the government and from the President's Council may be said to be designed to put the finishing touches to the system of dominance as it has evolved over the past decade or so. They are schemes of co-option whereby domination over Coloureds and Asians may be secured, while allowing for minimal participation on their part. A modicum of participation is the price which the government is prepared to pay for the security of the system. But, as Alasdair MacIntyre has succinctly put it, "The cost of consensus is paid for by those who are excluded from it."

Some people have suggested that meaningful change would be signified by the repeal of the Immorality Act and the Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act, but this would not result in structural change, and I suggest that one of the most significant indicators would be the dissolution of or even a significant reduction in the size of the Department of Co-operation and Development. And of course this implies the abolition of the functions which the department fulfils, and not merely their transfer to some other department. For this kind of change would signify the dismantling of the institutionalised structures of domination, or at least some of them.

CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE

The proposals for constitutional change which have thus far emanated from the government side are all based to some extent upon the concept of the consociational democracy. This is true too of the thinking of the New Republic Party and more particularly of the Progressive Federal Party. Consociationalism is apparently the latest constitutional 'fad' in South Africa. I should like to make one or two methodological and theoretical points at this juncture in order to try to reveal what I believe to be the fundamental weakness in pluralist and particularly in consociational theory, at least insofar as its applicability to South Africa is concerned.

There is no need to labour the point that consociationalism is a variety of pluralism, and a variety in which the theorists lay stress not only upon the relationships between groups, but more especially upon the relationships between the elites or the leaders of the various groups. The theory tends to assume intergroup conflict, and also — and this is important — stable relations between group leaders and the groups which they represent, between leaders and followers. It is a theory which is appropriate in cases where accommodation between leaders of groups results in the lowering of the levels of inter-group conflict and succeeds in containing such conflict. But stable relations between leaders and led, and strong links between them, are essential aspects of consociational theory as Brian Barry also stresses.

But the history of Southern Africa suggests that this is precisely the assumption which cannot with any confidence be made of powerless and rightless nationalist groups. To mention one example: Joshua Nkomo's leadership first came under fire after he had accommodated with white Southern Rhodesians over the 1961 Constitution, and he was forced to retract and to condemn the constitution. Shortly afterwards the African Nationalist movement split and Ndabaningi Sithole emerged as leader of a rival organization. As Barry succinctly puts it: "If the present leaders agree to something on behalf of their followers it is always open to some rival to denounce the terms as a sell-out and seek to gather support for repudiating them." The history of political movements among the Coloured population and the history of African nationalism in South Africa itself, especially after the formation of the A.N.C. Youth League, reveals many examples of this kind. There are good reasons for supposing that consociationalism is appropriate only in very special circumstances, and that these circumstances do not obtain in Southern Africa, and this is what I shall now turn to discuss at a more theoretical level.

ASSUMPTIONS

Pluralist theory assumes far more about the nature of societies than its proponents are generally aware of, or at least than they articulate, and certainly more than they have conclusive evidence for. It assumes that elites are able to negotiate within a framework of equality, or at least that such inequalities as might exist are not likely to materially affect that consociational approach and the accommodation which is sought. The full implications of the existing distribution of power, political and economic, tend to be brushed aside or to be made no more than obeisance to. The Constitutional Committee of the President's Council, for example, stresses several times the importance of the inter-relationship between economic and political factors, but proceeds to ignore the economic factors. The same tends to be true of most South African discussions of consociational solutions. (e.g. *South Africa's Options*, by David Welsh and F. van Zyl Slabbert).

What I should like to try to demonstrate is the crucial importance of existing power structures, both political and economic. An example taken from an article by W.W. Sharrock, will, I hope, serve to illustrate just how important getting one's analysis and thus one's description of society right is, if reforms are to provide any chance of resolving problems and producing the kind of anti-conflict therapy which the proponents of reform presumably desire. For the shape or content of proposals for reform will depend upon the way in which the ills of society are diagnosed. Diagnosis determines therapy.

Sharrock, in his article, is wanting to show how important the concept of **ownership** is in social analysis, and how fundamental a difference it can make to the kind of analysis which is produced, or which results. He is concerned only with the ownership of **knowledge** in his article, but of course, ownership of other kinds of goods can obviously be at least as crucial. Ownership of property, particularly **property for power**, is the most crucial of all. **Property for power** is property which is productive of power relations, particularly relations of economic power.

TWO GROUPS

In the passage which is quoted from, Sharrock has been concerned with the implications of attributing a cultural feature or element to a particular group or collectivity, as he terms it, which cultural feature is adopted, or has been adopted, by another group or collectivity. What implications do such facts have for the analysis of the relations between the two groups or collectivities? Sharrock writes:

"The relationship between two collectivities, did we not ascribe ownership of cultural elements to the one, would be no more than that of resemblance in that they shared the same knowledge or beliefs; but where beliefs can be assigned to an owner, then we are able to conceive of collectivities as standing in an asymmetrical relationship. A brief discussion of Latin American politics shows what is involved here. Emmanuel de Kadt, in a discussion of political parties in Latin America, observes that

'Alan Angell . . . suggests that political parties should be seen as conglomerations of the politically ambitious from all classes, rather than as simple instruments of the oligarchy. It is an interesting viewpoint but seems to underestimate the extent to which those lower on the ladder identify with and express the interests of those higher up. (de Kadt, 1967, p. 468).'

We are here being offered two views of the social structure of political organization. On the one hand, we are offered what might be called 'pluralist democracy', the view that parties are constructed out of personnel drawn from different social classes and that the parties are not, therefore, aligned with any particular social stratum. The holding of the same beliefs by co-members of a party in such a setting represents the occurrence of a consensus which transcends lines drawn by social class membership. These same facts, that parties are made up of persons drawn from various social classes and that there is some consensus amongst party members independently of their class affiliation, alternatively can be reconstructed and transformed into a picture of political organization in which parties are entirely subordinated to social class, by the simple step of assigning ownership of beliefs to those 'higher up' the status system. The fact that those of higher and lower social status subscribe to the same beliefs is no longer conceived as simple agreement amongst persons of different social status: those 'who are of lower social status can now be seen as taking their ideas from those of higher status, identifying with them and expressing their views. Without assigning ownership of a corpus (i.e. of knowledge or beliefs) to one or other collectivity we should, then, be unable to talk of people 'identifying' with collecti-

vities in which they do not have membership and we should be unable to populate the social structure with such social types as 'stooges', 'mouthpieces' and 'tools of the oligarchy' in the ways that we presently do."

ONLY ONE RIGHT

What seems to me to be important in Sharrock's analysis is that:

- (a) of the two alternative descriptions of Latin American politics only one of the descriptions can be right, and that the question of which description is right is an empirical matter. For we can and do discover the kinds of relationships referred to; and
- (b) that the two descriptions, the pluralist and the 'structural', are so different in their implications that it is a matter of crucial importance which of the two is adopted and that the one which is adopted be the right one.

In other words, should the pluralist description be the right one in a particular case, then obviously pluralist answers to political problems, and perhaps the consociationist answer, could well be appropriate. But should the pluralist description be a misdescription, and the 'structural' description the right one, then pluralist recipes, including the consociationist one, would be inappropriate, and could, instead of leading to a lessening of inter-group conflict, exacerbate that conflict. Of course, when I refer to **right** answers in these contexts, it must be taken relatively, for no social diagnosis can be all-inclusive or right in a 'hard-science' sense.

SOCIAL STRATIFICATION

Pluralist solutions tend to disregard the significance of social stratification, positing as they do, the adoption of **supposedly** symmetrical political relations to be secured through formal political institutions, while ignoring the asymmetrical relations of class, status and power which characterise the society. I say **supposedly** symmetrical political relations, because insofar as pluralist schemes embody the principle of group parity and the group veto in contexts in which asymmetrical relations of class, status and power prevail, formal equality serves to maintain the existing system of stratification and conceals what are substantively asymmetrical political relations.

It is precisely because pluralists ignore or underestimate the significance of social stratification that pluralist solutions tend to be restricted to the level of formal and primarily political institutions. When we are dealing with a society such as is encountered in South Africa, a society which is characterised by the domination, political, social and economic, of a minority group over a whole population, and one in which the dominant group possesses an overwhelming preponderance of power and wealth, the attempt to apply consociational schemes of a formal political kind could hardly be more inappropriate unless accompanied by schemes to dismantle the social and economic systems of domination. Otherwise they can be seen as so many attempts to limit the scope of change, for devices such as the group veto serve to ensure that substantial dismantling of the structures of social and economic dominance and significant redistributions of wealth become well-nigh impossible. Hence such schemes may well turn out to be recipes for heightened inter-group conflict. There are thus good reasons for scepticism regarding the suitability of consociational schemes in South Africa.

ANOTHER PERSPECTIVE

I turn now to examine consociationalism, from yet another perspective, a perspective from which the principle of constitutionalism is, *contra* the above arguments, conceded. In the past, which is to say before pluralist theories were fitted out in modern dress, and when pluralism was concerned primarily with federalism or with the recognition of the importance of interest or pressure groups within political systems, the question of democracy was addressed in a rather different way from what now seems to have become the practice, at least in South Africa.

Democratic writers were then concerned with the whole question of the representativeness of political systems, and this led to inventive individuals such as Thomas Hare, Charles L. Dodgson (Lewis Carroll), and C.C.G. Andrae, coming up with ingenious schemes in order either to increase the representativeness of political systems substantially, or to eliminate as far as possible those features of electoral systems which were the cause of their unrepresentativeness. They concentrated, therefore upon what came to be termed **giving the vote its value**. Hare and Andrae, independently of each other, devised the Single Transferable Vote system, and a multitude of systems and sub-systems of proportional representation (P.R.) were devised, many of which were put into practice in various parts of the world. It seems to me to be a matter of some significance that these alternative electoral systems have not even been considered in South Africa.

LEAST REPRESENTATIVE

The Constitutional Committee of the President's Council, to use their own words, "formulated six conceivable choices before South Africa at the national level, which it then proceeded to discuss. They are:

(1) One man, one vote in a single (whether unitary or federal) state. (This choice is **simple majoritarianism**.)
....."

All the other choices, apart from partition pure and simple, comprise compromises between simple majoritarianism or consociational democracy and majoritarianism. Is it not strange that only the least representative of the unitary and federal systems which do not accord specific weight to racial and ethnic groups should have been regarded as a **conceivable** choice and discussed by the Committee? Anyone with the least knowledge of electoral systems knows that the First Past the Post or simple majority, single-member constituency system, is disastrous for minorities which are thinly spread across electoral divisions.

The electoral history of the British Liberal Party over the past fifty years is a lesson in itself, and for those whose horizons do not stretch across oceans or continents, we have right at our door the example (and it is but one of many) of the Orange Free State. When the last opposition seat vanished in the Free State, between one quarter and one third at least of the electorate were opposition voters. And yet with this kind of knowledge available the Constitutional Committee saw fit to consider only the least representative of the common voters-roll systems. The Single Transferable Vote system could be employed, for example, in such a way as to ensure that all minority

groups of more than a certain specified size are guaranteed representation, provided only that their members vote as a solidary group. Not only would such a system enable group membership to be voluntary, which at present it is not, but it would provide groups with a 'fall-back' position should their members feel threatened, while it would permit individuals either to choose their own group allegiances or abandon them for allegiances based upon straight political and ideological principles rather than racial and ethnical ones. Only constitutionalism based upon some such system of **individual** equality would be compatible with the kind of economic and social changes which are necessary conditions, albeit not sufficient conditions, of social justice and social stability.

GROUPS, NOT INDIVIDUALS

It is indeed ironical that in a context in which protection of minorities is avowedly considered to be of fundamental importance, the only type of 'one man, one vote' system in a unitary or federal state which was regarded as 'conceivable' was precisely the one which affords least protection to minority groups! But the main reason for having raised this question of the desirability of giving the vote its value, is because consociationalism **abandons** this principle except perhaps within the confines of specific groups. Groups, and not individuals, are treated as equals, all groups having veto rights, and, as has already been pointed out, if one group already dominates the economy, the effect of the group veto is to maintain this dominance, with the consequence that group equality is purely formal, substantive inequality being perpetuated.


The only case in which it is possible to give the vote its value under such a system would be in the special and unique case where the constituent groups are all of a size; and consociationalism is likely to be compatible with stability, even in this case, only where all groups comprise fairly consistent cross-sections of the class and status systems. Apart from these special cases, consociational plans are not concerned with democracy in the traditional sense, and place the notion of conflict-resolution above democratic values and procedures in the scale of priorities in what is likely to prove an abortive attempt to contain conflict. In other words, except in these special cases, consociationalism is likely to prove self-defeating.

I conclude that the path to future stability and social justice lies not in the direction of consociationalism but in change of a kind which does not divorce constitutionalism from social and political realities. At the same time this leaves unanswered the question as to whether or not or to what extent consociational schemes such as the government's plan will generate or lead to conditions under which further and more meaningful change will be brought about.

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KENYA: FAVOURERED NATION OR NEO-COLONIAL FIEF?



by Kenneth Ingham

To many Western observers Kenya is one of the success stories of the post-colonial era. Critics within the country argue that the government's policies amount to a rejection of the objectives for which the independence struggle was waged and a betrayal of those who sacrificed most in the struggle. This conflict of opinion is not a recent phenomenon. It emerged within months of Kenya's achievement of independence in December 1963. It was epitomised in the treatment of the survivors of the Mau Mau risings who were regarded by some as a tragic, anachronistic embarrassment in a progressive new country and by others as the neglected heroes of the war against colonialism. Many of those who had taken part in the political campaign for independence looked upon the Mau Mau rising as a diversion. At times it had assisted by disconcerting the colonial authorities but there was always the danger that it might distract attention from, or even arouse hostility towards, the legitimate claims of educated Africans to assume the responsibility of governing their country. By contrast, those who saw the independence movement as a stark confrontation between an oppressive alien regime and a too-long subject people could only look upon the forest fighters as the spearhead of the freedom movement.

Whether the Mau Mau rising did, in the long run, delay the British government's approval of independence for Kenya — as seems probable — or whether, on the other hand, without the attribution of the Mau Mau campaign settlers of Kenya would have been more difficult to shift are questions as yet resolved. But the character of the Mau Mau rising and the interpretations put upon it inside Kenya since independence have highlighted the divisions in Kenya society.

DIVISIONS

In the first instance, because of the rising, Kenya became independent after a greater measure of violence than had previously been experienced in any British dependency in Africa. The European settlers, upon whose activities the country's economy had turned for more than half a century, were apprehensive about the future. Many of them regarded Jomo Kenyatta, the leader of the emergent state, not as a national figure but as the evil genius of the Kikuyu people who had until recently been at the heart of the Mau Mau struggle. Their doubts were shared by the supporters of the Kenya African Democratic Union, a party made up of members of the lesser tribes who feared the domination of the two large Kikuyu and Luo peoples who formed the bulk of the ruling party, the Kenya African National Union. The Asians, who for two or three generations had controlled all but the higher levels of commerce and trade, also felt their security threatened by the hopes of Africanisation stirred up by the independence movement. The immediate problem of an independent Kenya was to decide whether to allay these doubts and fears or to adopt a bold policy of Africanisation and of social reform.

The question of the future ownership of the land was probably the most potentially inflammatory issue. It had been the hope of acquiring land which had fired the enthusiasm for independence of many of the Africans of Kenya, and it was the Europeans who owned the greater part of the most desirable land. Some of the country's future leaders, like the passionate Luo politician, Oginga Odinga, would have seized the land and handed it to African cooperatives or retained some of it in government hands to be administered by an agricultural civil service.



Jomo Kenyatta

Kenyatta preferred a less revolutionary solution and his view prevailed. The Europeans who suspected his character and doubted his statesmanship had overlooked two important things. First, he did not belong to the young revolutionary school of African leaders like Nkrumah of Ghana. Kenyatta's roots were bedded in an older campaign which, initially at least, had sought to share power with the Europeans, not to oust them. Second, his trial and imprisonment for allegedly masterminding the Mau Mau rising had made him a martyr for the independence cause — and a living martyr at that. It had also removed him from the scene of action so that he emerged from his incarceration without any taint of failure or compromise. No-one could match his qualifications for leadership of his country. His age, his experience, his education in Europe and his suffering for the cause gave him a charismatic status which enabled him to silence the clamour for the spoils of victory. He chose the line which he was to pursue because it was one he had always embraced, because he saw himself as the heir to the colonial inheritance. His campaign for independence had not been waged on a politically ideological basis. He was purely and simply a Kenyan nationalist. With political power in his hands he tackled his problems pragmatically.

CAUTIOUS APPROACH

Faced with 40,000 unemployed in Nairobi alone and a further 60,000 in the Rift Valley province, he concluded that any sharp change of direction, either in the economic or political fields, might lead to disaster. Stability was what was needed and that, he considered, could best be achieved by a cautious, reassuring approach to the country's affairs. A machinery of government and of economic production had been created by the Europeans. It might not be ideally suited in the long term to the needs of an independent Kenya, but trained manpower was in short supply. The easiest course, therefore, was to take over the existing apparatus of government while leaving the economy as undisturbed as possible, given that some sort of response was needed to the demands of the landless. With British financial assistance those European farmers who wished to leave — most of them in the arable farming region — were bought out and their land divided up and made available as small holdings for the resettlement of Africans. Many Europeans, especially those engaged in ranching, were encouraged to stay. In deference to the prevailing liberation rhetoric the term "African socialism" was added to the vocabulary of Kanu's political platform, but Tom Mboya, Kenyatta's minister for economic planning made it clear in a white paper published in 1965 that nationalisation would only be adopted if individual circumstances made it essential, and if it did take place full compensation would be paid.

FIERCELY CRITICISED

The government's policy was fiercely criticised from within by Odinga. He was angry that large sums of money loaned by Britain should be used to buy off European settlers, leaving Kenya with a large debt and unable to use the loan to finance its own development. He did not believe the land available for resettlement was adequate and he rightly forecast that, under small-scale individual tenure, much of it would revert to subsistence farming and so fail to produce the surpluses necessary to provide the services which the country needed. The whole policy he denounced as the result of neo-colonialism on Britain's part. To his autobiography, published in 1967, he gave the title **Not Yet Uhuru** to emphasise the view that political independence alone did not constitute **Uhuru** (freedom) while the economy was still dominated by external forces and while poverty and inequality remained.

Whether Odinga's alternative of investing the aid in African cooperatives or in government-controlled development schemes would have been successful — or acceptable to Africans, even if Britain had been prepared to see its money used for that purpose — is an open question. The fact that it was never tried still gives it, in the eyes of the government's critics, an aura of desirability.

In the 1960s, however, there was little prospect that Odinga could successfully challenge any policies promoted by Kenyatta. Yet he maintained his criticisms and, as KADU disappeared with the abandonment of any prospect of regionalism, opposition to KANU's policies increasingly centred upon the proposals put forward by Odinga. At first he struggled to convert KANU from within, and with such vehemence that in April 1965 he found it necessary to deny formally that he was trying to usurp the government. He did not disagree with the view that foreign investment was essential — if not to the prosperity at least to the stability of his country. Where he diverged from official policy was in his attitude towards the sources from which aid might be sought and the uses to which it should be put. To Kenyatta

it was clear that the best prospects of aid lay in support from western Europe and the US. Russian aid seemed potentially less generous. It was to Britain, Canada and Australia that he turned in 1966 when drought forced a quarter of a million people to seek famine relief, and his requests for assistance were fully met. With such backing he could afford to treat the representatives of the eastern bloc with less consideration. In any case, he was suspicious of their motives in offering assistance.

RESIGNATIONS

This increasing commitment to the West and to the policies to which the relationship gave rise convinced Odinga that the government had become incapable of adopting an attitude of non-alignment. He therefore resigned the office of vice-president of Kenya and within a few days twenty-nine other M.P.s. resigned from KANU in sympathy.

It has been said that opponents of Kenyatta who sought to abide by the rules of the constitution were at an immediate disadvantage because the president did not hesitate to change the rules to serve his ends. Here was one of a number of occasions on which he earned that reputation. Summoning parliament, he engineered the passing of a law which stated that any member of parliament elected as a KANU candidate who resigned from the party must seek re-election. Odinga responded by forming the Kenya People's Union and campaigning for re-election under that banner. The party organisers of KANU were too experienced to be daunted by the challenge and though Odinga himself was re-elected KANU gained 21 out of the remaining 29 contested seats. Four months later, in October 1966, another restraint upon the powers of KANU was removed with the abolition of the senate and a proportionate increase in the membership of the lower house. Again, in the local government elections of 1968, many KPU candidates were disqualified because, allegedly, they had filled in their nomination papers incorrectly, while other prospective candidates were forced to withdraw when their deposit was suddenly raised from £5 to £10. Such practices did not reflect credit on the government, but they proved effective. A number of KPU supporters, despairing of making any impression in opposition, joined KANU in the hope of obtaining preference.

POLICY TOWARDS ASIANS

If Kenyatta appeared unduly anxious to encourage European participation in Kenya's economy his government's policy towards the Asians of Kenya was less tolerant. In May 1966 Mboya urged non-African business men to speed up African participation in their activities if they wished to escape a take-over by the government, and a few weeks later the government radio station openly criticised the Asian community. The position of the Asians was weak because of the operation of Kenya's citizenship laws. At the time of independence citizenship had been granted automatically to second and third-generation settlers, while first generation Asians were given two years in which to decide their nationality. Many of the latter, knowing they already possessed British citizenship and feeling uncertain about their future in Kenya, had allowed the two years to elapse without taking any action. The increasing pressure to Africanise the lower levels of the business world consequently caused grave consternation to the Asians, many of whom decided to emigrate. They were spurred on by the fear that new, more restrictive immigration legislation in Britain might prevent them from achieving sanctuary there if they did not hasten to take advantage of their British passports. This large-scale movement of people with commercial ex-

pertise threatened to create new problems for the economy, but this possibility neither deterred the government nor evoked any comment from the government's political opponents. The fate of Kenya's Asians appears to have aroused only limited sympathy in any quarter; and, more recently, it was the Asians again who suffered most as a result of the attempted coup in 1982, due, it would seem, to the continuing criticisms of their tenure of jobs to which Africans aspired.

OPPOSITION ALLIANCE

In 1969 a new element made its appearance on the political scene, one which was to attract intermittent but serious attention over the following years. In January Kenyatta ordered the closure of Nairobi's university college after students had boycotted lectures because Odinga had been refused permission by the government to address them. This was the beginning of an alliance between some of the young, educated people of Kenya and the political opponents of the government which was to lead to recurrent friction between the government and the university college, soon to become the University of Nairobi. Initially it was almost certainly concern about the denial of free speech which led the students to act as they did. Subsequently, disappointment at the government's apparent failure to achieve the objectives to which they aspired mingled with ideological opposition to the policies the government was pursuing to produce a commitment to reform which still pervades student politics.

Odinga himself was not silenced, and in August 1969 he inquired in parliament about the oath-taking which was rumoured to have been taking place in the vicinity of Nairobi. This was not, apparently, a question of clandestine opposition to the government but a means of enforcing support for KANU. Odinga complained that, if true, the accounts were proof that the government had failed to win support for its policies and was resorting to illegal pressures to force people into compliance. Members of KANU itself, from the western province, echoed Odinga's fears, and when Kenyatta visited Kisumu in October there were violent demonstrations which led to the banning of the Kenya People's Union. Consequently, when the elections for parliament were held in December only KANU-supported candidates were registered. As a result of the election, however, 71 former M.Ps. failed to gain re-election, five of them former ministers, and five junior officials. When it is noted that 22 members had not sought re-election it is clear that a considerable majority in the new parliament were newcomers. This can be seen to support Odinga's criticisms and to suggest that there was widespread dissatisfaction with the government's performance. On the other hand it may be looked upon as proof that the government's fierce measures against opposition parties had not seriously affected the democratic basis of Kenya's political life; that the country was reverting to a system of government more common in the pre-colonial era when opposition groups did not have any permanent form.

POPULATION INCREASE

In the same way Kenyatta's appeal to the new parliament to abstain from harassing the government may also be viewed either as a threat to free speech or simply as an appeal to national unity in the face of prodigious problems. Indeed, the efforts of the government to introduce further land reforms aimed at increasing the production of foodstuffs firmly underlined the struggle which Kenya faced to meet the needs of a population whose rate of increase, by the 1980s, was to become the highest in the continent.

It was a problem which could be tackled in a variety of ways, according to ideological preference. For Kenyatta the offer of substantial aid from Britain to assist his policies was a reasonable incentive to carry on as he had done previously. Again he emphasised that overseas investors would be welcome and that expatriate skills were essential to the country's future prosperity.

His policy appeared to pay off, for West Germany, Sweden and Denmark all offered financial assistance in support of various farming projects while the Federal House Loan Bank of New York made a substantial contribution in 1975 to the construction of 4,300 low-priced houses. There was further aid from Britain, too, but again £7m. of the additional £17m. offered was intended to assist in the transfer of British-owned land to Africans and consequently became the subject of criticism by the government's opponents.

It was in 1974 that the pressure against the government began to build up more seriously. Continuous drought, coupled with the rapid rise in oil prices, placed an even heavier strain upon the economy. In February 1975 a poor people's movement claimed responsibility for a number of bomb explosions in Nairobi but the perpetrators were never traced. In March, James Kariuki, a leading parliamentary critic of the government, went missing and was subsequently found murdered. Demonstrations by university students and powerful speeches in parliament itself led to the appointment of a committee of inquiry. Some of the students taking part in the demonstration were arrested and a subsequent protest meeting of students was broken up by police. This led to rioting and the temporary closure of the university. When the committee submitted its report the government attempted to postpone a debate, but its efforts were defeated by a parliamentary vote. A minister and two assistant ministers who approved the report were nevertheless dismissed, and later in the year two leading figures in parliament were detained for alleged disloyalty to the government.

FURTHER CRITICISMS

The area of criticism of government policies was further extended when the U.S. secretary of state, Henry Kissinger, paid a visit to Kenya in 1976 which led to an agreement in principle for the supply of twelve jet fighter planes to counter Russian activities in Somalia and Uganda. To the government's opponents this was a sinister move, parallel with U.S. intervention in Zaire and aimed at extending the capitalist grip upon Africa on the pretext of checking Russian military aggression. For the government the U.S. offer constituted much needed aid to counter the incursions of Somali raiders who had intermittently threatened the country's north-eastern frontier ever since independence, and as a warning to the unpredictable tyrant now ruling in Uganda who had recently demanded a portion of western Kenya. Inevitably, it would seem, there was a vigorous debate in parliament in response to criticisms of the government's handling of its relations with Uganda, and again it culminated in an appeal by Kenyatta for greater national unity. Again, too, later in the year, the government took further repressive measures against its opponents. Odinga had been readmitted to membership of KANU in 1961 but had been prevented from standing for election to parliament in 1974 because of a carefully-timed new ruling that only people who had been members of the party for the previous three years were eligible as candidates. He was again thwarted in 1977 when he was banned from competing for the vice-presidency of KANU because Kenyatta claimed he



Ngugi wa Thiong'o

had not been cleared of his association with the K.P.U. Later in the year he was arrested as, also, shortly afterwards, was another prominent critic of the government, Ngugi wa Thiong'o. Ngugi, a distinguished author, had recently published a novel, *Petals of Blood*, in which he had described Kenya as a country whose leaders had allied themselves with foreign investors to exploit the country's resources for their own profit with cynical efficiency. The novel contained all the criticisms customarily levelled against the government by its opponents, including disregard for the rural poor, rejection of the Mau Mau heroes, the imposition of oaths to ensure support for KANU, restrictions imposed upon students who would not comply with official policy, profiteering among party leaders and widespread corruption in the country. That there was truth in Ngugi's accusations is beyond doubt. The question, however, was whether, in the eyes of the Kenyan people as a whole, the allegations merited a complete change of direction or whether the errors were looked upon as the regrettable but excusable by-products of Kenya's efforts to establish itself as an independent nation.

TEST

The test of opinion appeared to be at hand when Kenyatta died in August 1978. The question of who would succeed had been in the forefront of people's minds for some years because of his considerable age. Many considered that the discontent with official policies was so widespread that only Kenyatta's reputation had sustained his government in office. He alone had embodied Kenya's national spirit and there were fears that the divisions he had frequently criticised would become immediately apparent when he was no longer on hand to hold them in check. Clearly no-one could replace him. He was unique in having led the country to independence. His death provided the opportunity for a coup which might reverse the policies pursued since independence. In the

event no such coup took place. The efficient team which, in spite of frequent intervention by Kenyatta himself, had effectively administered the country in recent years continued to do their job. It is true that, four years later, a coup attempt was launched but it failed immediately.

QUESTIONS

Does this mean that parliamentary criticism in Kenya does not imply condemnation of the fundamentals of policy but that it is the healthy expression of democratic discontent at the efforts put into the execution of policy? Was the failure of the coup attempt due to the efficiency of the measures taken by the army, or was it evidence of the limited support which it attracted? Were the leaders of the coup merely a group of disaffected, ideologically opposed intellectuals who could arouse no echo of sympathy in the rest of the country? Was the looting in Nairobi the work of an incensed proletariat, or of opportunists preying upon the longtime butt of every section of the African community, the Asians? It is a moot question whether the sight of Africans acquiring large farms from Europeans and mingling easily with the remaining European settlers arouses a desire for Marxist egalitarianism among the dispossessed. Or is it a cause for satisfaction that some Africans can succeed which creates a spirit of emulation rather than of envy among the rest of the community? Again, are such developments seen to be the result of the machinations of foreign capitalists or as the first fruits of independence which all might in due course share to a greater or lesser degree? The less-involved observer might recognise the difficulties faced by a government striving to restrain the population outburst but lacking sufficient trained social workers to carry their campaign to people who regard their children, in part at least, as a form of security against their old age. Nor is it surprising that an attempt to diversify agriculture so as to avoid over-production fails. There are, after all, not enough agricultural officers to ensure that growers do not en masse abandon the production of maize, after a bumper harvest has brought prices crashing down, in favour of sugar growing. They are not to know that there is only a very limited demand from the sugar cane factories. In any case, can any alternative economic system produce the money needed to meet the ever increasing demand for schools?

The sincere concern of many of the government's critics for the sufferings of the poorer people of Kenya is beyond doubt. Their suspicions of the government can scarcely have been assuaged by the political sleight of hand to which the government has often resorted. One can, however, ask with equal sincerity whether their alternative solutions are not too simplistic. Perhaps the survival of the government after Kenyatta's death and the failure of the 1982 coup indicate that a considerable proportion of Kenya's population believes that, while criticism of the government is justified, a total reversal of its policies is not acceptable. The vigour of the parliamentary criticism of government policies is a healthy sign. The failure of the resort to armed opposition to the government may well be another hopeful indication that Kenya does not believe that a revolutionary approach to political and economic objectives is the panacea which some may claim. □

APARTHEID – OUR PICTURE

By Y.S. Meer and M.D. Mlaba; The Institute of Black Research, Durban, 1982.

Reviewed by Marie Dyer.


This book sets out to give 'an authentic account of Apartheid as it affects the African people'. The phrase indicates that what is attempted is not a historical or theoretical or statistical survey of Apartheid, but a view of it in practice as a force determining the lives people lead; a definition of it in terms of its human results. There are brief introductory chapters giving details of the 'homeland' policy, but in general 'Apartheid' is seen simply as a kind of totality of the discriminatory and exploitive 'system' in which African people live. The lives described are those of rural people in the 'homeland' areas of Nqutu and Lebombo, migrant workers living singly in Durban hostels, women working in Durban, and inhabitants of Durban townships. A claim for representativeness is made in the preface:

The location of the account is the African ghettos of Natal, but Natal is only one of the four provinces in which Apartheid happens and KwaZulu is one of the two largest 'homelands' in the country. We are thus writing about Apartheid, and we are writing about South Africa.

The question that this approach raises is 'How does one set about describing the lives of thousands of people?' Facts and figures can give accounts which are accurate and comprehensive: 'authentic' in one sense; but they can't convey — sometimes even conceal — the individual 'authentic' humanity of all the people who collectively constitute the thousands being surveyed.

In this book, the authors have attempted both kinds of authenticity. Large numbers of facts and tables of figures are included, but illuminated throughout by case histories, descriptions of daily routines, reconstructions of the experiences of individual people. Thus in a section on health in Nqutu, associated with figures and tables about health and hospital services, malnutrition and infant mortality in KwaZulu, there is a detailed narrative — 'A Child Falls Sick' — of a young mother taking her sick and dehydrated baby first to a herbalist and then — after selling both the household hens for the busfare — to the hospital, leaving the baby there ("Explain to her that the child is very sick and she must leave it with us at the hospital". Ma Gumede had been relieved. What would she have done if the doctor had said "Take your baby home and give her proper food"? Where would she have got such food?) then taking it home again after some weeks happily recovered, leaving the doctor saying to the nurse, 'That one will be back again.' The chapter on migrant workers in hostels includes detailed general statistics and then personal accounts of migrants' situations and daily routine:

..... There are 8 men to a house, 2 to a room. These houses have no toilet facilities or bathing facilities. In John's case 3 toilets and a cold water tap are found up Road 8, about 100 metres from his room. They serve more than 10 houses which means at least 80 people use them. John pays R9.60 for his shed-like room which he shares with another worker who also pays the same rent. They have divided the room with a floral curtain for privacy.....



The sections of the book vary in the amount of research detail presented. The chapter on Nqutu is very full indeed, indicating, for the families studied, information about land-holding, water supply, livestock, family size, schools, medical services, cash remittances from migrants, income from home industries, housing, bedding, food, clothing, taxes, pensions, income. The survey on migrant men deals mainly with figures of income and expenditure but also surveys their contact with their homes. An additional survey of their organisational affiliations, and attitudes to political leaders and Inkatha gives significantly inconclusive results, with a very large — sometimes overwhelming — proportion of 'no comment', 'no response' replies to all questions. The township section includes — as well as a historical and factual general account of the townships — figures drawn from a sample survey of families in Lamontville, Umlazi and Kwa Mashu, dealing with accommodation, education, social and other problems, attitudes to bosses, neighbours and fellow-workers.

These figures are all interesting and illuminating, sometimes startling, often horrifying. Some random examples give an impression of their nature and scope:

In the Nqutu study of 200 families, the average plot size per family was 1 acre, the average cash income per capita R60 per year. 77% lived in huts of grass and cane; virtually all children spent 9 hours a day or more attending or travelling to school. The migrant men (a sample of 200 in 6 hostels) sent on the average 25% of their income (usually between R11 and R22) home to their families. Of the rest, 22% went on food, 21% on transport, 21% on liquor and cigarettes. More than half visited their homes less than 4 times a year, spending on average 3 or 4 days per visit. In the townships — a sample of 195 township residents — more than half the families accommodated 5–6 people in each room of their house; half the men (but only 1/3 of the women) had no education at all; 75% had difficulties with H.P. accounts. An analysis of the accounts of the Port Natal Administration Board revealed that 78% of its income is derived from

the African township residents through beer sales (68%), rents, fines and levies; while 1,4% of its expenditure goes direct to the residents in health services and grants-in-aid and 20% to its staff salaries and wages.

The main value of all the figures in this book, however, seems to be in the authority and substance they give to the 'pictures' of real experience and real life. Many other books and journals present perhaps more rigorous and systematic analyses in figures and tables of social and economic facts; but other surveys don't give, as this one does, a complex impression of the 'feel' of Apartheid from the bottom, an insight into what emerges most vividly as its grinding relentless daily struggle, its discomfort, fatigue, and frustration, as well as its frequent real pain and suffering, degradation and despair.

Here are extracts from an account of a worker's encounter with a trade union:

Hlulwalini went home once a fortnight – the return trip cost him R3.50 in rail and taxi fare. He did not have far to walk. He purchased all household provisions and took these home with him. So he sent no money home. He had four children, a wife and mother at home. He was reasonably happy with the set up there. He was even able to take some interest in the planting and in the care of livestock. They got a fair amount of their maize and vegetables and milk requirements from their domestic produce. Three of his children were at school. He had come to value education since he had joined the Trade Union and all his children would be educated up to matric and even beyond if he could manage it. He had been employed with the warehousing firm for the last 13 years.

All three men qualified to bring their families into the urban area, but Mhlongo alone was positive that he would bring his family to town, if he could. The others thought that they would do so too. But there were no houses to be had and so the right they had earned through long and continuous employment with a single firm was a very dubious right.

All three men had had very little formal education. None had gone beyond Std. II, and none could speak any English when they first came to the city. Their English had improved considerably after they had attended the classes organised by the Trade Union. They were continuing to attend classes.

All three were summarily dismissed a month ago. Sam had taken up the matter to the industrial court twice now for unlawful dismissal, but their case had been dismissed because S.A.A.W.U. as an unregistered trade union, had little if any recognition there. Their problems were confounded because all three were now facing evictions from the hostels and the prospects of being refused permits to work in Durban by the KwaZulu Government.

They were competent and efficient workers, so much so that they had been elected on to the works committee.

Hlulwalini spoke of a big meeting at which they had been told that things would be different, that they would have their own trade union, "but it wouldn't be a union for just the workers. It would be a Union of workers and management. It would be like a happy big family, where we could talk freely about things that worried us. Management was like our fathers and we like sons, and there would be no need for outsiders to come in. They must be kept out, because they only disrupt work, cause mischief, bring in the police, cause arrests, bring in politics. Then people would lose jobs, production would go down and there would be no improvement."

Mzonjani and Mhlongo helped Hlulwalini to recall the excitement of the meeting they had had to elect the works committee.

Management had organized the voting procedure, explained it to the workers and from each department a representative was elected. The works committee elected in turn Hlulwalini as the Chairman.

Hlulwalini continued, "Now we started the committee but we were alone. The boss was not available to speak to us. If management wanted to talk to the workers, they summoned me. I became their messenger boy. Before, when a worker had a complaint, he went to the foreman, and if he worried him sufficiently the foreman took it to the manager. He got some sort of individual attention. Now the worker had to come to me, I took his complaint to the foreman who usually waved me off. He'd say that's not company policy. I didn't know what was company policy. I saw it almost like God – some force like that no one could do anything about. It was only later when I joined the Trade Union that I realised it was whatever management wanted and whatever suited management.

"I would go back from the foreman to the workers. They would be angry and insulting. They'd send me back and say I must speak to the manager, not the foreman. So I would try to force the foreman to take me to the manager, and sometimes it worked. When I got in that office, I got royal treatment – soft chair like the boss, tea in a cup same as the boss, and boss offered me his cigarettes. The boss listened like a father and reasoned like a father. But he also said 'it wasn't policy.' One time he said "Look Mr Hul", he could go no further with my name, "you went to school." I said, "Yes boss". "You can do arithmetic?" I said "Yes boss". Then he did some sums and he put the figures before me and it all came out that if they agreed to the pay rise the workers were asking, the warehouse would have to close down.

"Then I faced my committee members who were just sad, but the workers were very angry. What kind of policy is this that says we must starve and they must grow fat on profits?" "They don't listen in there" I pleaded, "they only talk." "So why are you going there to listen like a woman?" That hurt very much. I was made a fool everywhere. They called me and my committee 'puppets'. We were nothing to them. I didn't know what to do and was thinking of resigning from the works committee when I met Sam. Sam said "when you got the workers with you you can get somewhere. Organise and I'll put my trade union at your disposal. Get them to join SAAWU, that will fix up those buggers." Sam is a strong man. He's afraid of no one.

But the management was also working. It called our committee and we saw our committee was divided now. They had got around to some of the members and we could smell bad blood. Management offered a R2 increase per week. We knew we could settle for R5. But the three of us were alone in holding out. By now victimized by the police and threatened with dismissal, the workers were relieved to take the R2 and return to work. They would fight again they said. When pay day came we got 2 month's wages not one. We were told to get off the factory grounds and never to come again.

The style of these many and varied accounts is one of the strengths of the book – sober, factual and detailed, restrained but sympathetic – perfectly suited to the subject. This is a large achievement for a volume compiled from the work and interviews of so many researchers. The book is handsomely produced – a large paperback with a stiff and glossy dustcover, attractively printed (but with a fairly heavy sprinkling of errors) and very fully illustrated.

It is surely impossible to convey the 'truth' about Apartheid in any single volume – but this book conveys more kinds of 'truths' about it than are usually attempted. □

DOCUMENTS OF INDENTURED LABOUR:

NATAL, 1851 – 1917

Y.S. Meer et al (eds): Durban, Institute of Black Research, 1980, 690 pp.

Reviewed by Surendra Bhana

The migration of indentured Indians to Natal between 1860 and 1911 has received little serious attention. Works on European immigration are substantially more numerous. The major works on Indian immigration are:

C.J. Beyers: "Die Indiervraagstuk in Natal, 1870-1911" (D. Litt. diss., PUCHO, 1969), A.G. Choonoo: "Indentured Indian Immigration into Natal, 1860-1911" (M.A. thesis, Univ. of Natal, 1967), Z.A. Stein: "A History of Indian Settlement in Natal, 1870-1893" (M.A. thesis, Univ. of Cape Town, 1942), and L.M. Thompson: **Indian Immigration into Natal, 1866-1872 in Archives Year Book for South African History**, 1952. C. Kondapi's **Indians Overseas, 1839-1949**, Bombay, 1951, and Hugh Tinker's **A New System of Slavery: The Export of Indian Labour Overseas, 1830-1920**, Oxford, 1974, place the Indian indenture movement within a broader context, and are indeed very useful.

The History Department at the University of Durban-Westville is in the process of analysing the ship's lists of all indentured Indians, and should be in a position to generate new research on this neglected aspect of our history when the project is completed.

In view of the historiographical gap, this work by Y.S. Meer and ten others, sponsored by the Institute of Black Research is particularly welcome, despite some serious technical flaws.

The book draws attention to the days when Natal's young sugar industry desperately needed labour, and, finding that Zulus and other Africans could not be attracted to the venture, it turned to India. The experiment in indentured labour was already under way in Mauritius, Demerara (British Guiana), and Trinidad. The first application was made in 1854 unsuccessfully. It was renewed, and, when Natal agreed to introduce minimum conditions of service as required by India, emigration was sanctioned in August 1860.

Thus began Indian indentured immigration. The first ship to arrive was the **Truro** on 16 November 1860 with 342 passengers. The depression in Natal, among other reasons, temporarily halted indentured immigration between 1866 and 1873. It was resumed in 1874 and was continued until 1911. A total number of 152, 184 persons arrived by 1911, of whom 50, 716 embarked from Calcutta and 101, 468 embarked from Madras.

Those are the bare facts. The drama of an immigrant community's transplantation on the soil of another country in all its complex manifestations, is what the collection of documents seeks to portray. Indentured labour was a new experience both for the estate owners and the Indian immi-

grants. The documents directly and indirectly reflect many aspects: recruitment by emigration agents (this aspect has not been adequately covered in the book), embarkation on vessels either at Madras or Calcutta, reception by authorities in Durban, temporary housing in ill-equipped depots, allocation of workers to planters, and the organising of marches to the assigned estates within the radius of 30 miles.

The documents reflect the patterns of work and relaxation, housing and shelter, health and diet, death and burial, complaints and redress. The planters' primary concern was profit, and they were prepared to expend the minimum of money to see to the needs and welfare of the workers. Prejudices and discriminatory practices emerged against all classes of Indians. Free Indians, especially those in trade, presented a threat to the whites. Some of these feelings are expressed by whites in their testimonies to commissions of enquiry.

The first 21 documents deal with labour requests in Natal, and the official and legal aspects to the triangular relationship among Natal, India, and Britain. A chronological sequence is maintained in the presentation of the documents.

Documents 22 to 28, incorporate, *inter alia*, ship's lists for the **Truro**, **Belvidera**, **Scindian**, and the **Saxon**. The Register of Indian Immigrants for the **Truro** also gives employers against the names of the immigrants.

The balance of the documents from 29 to 66 (except for 49 and 62 which are two further ship's lists) deal with the problems that faced the indentured worker in one form or another. Documents are again arranged chronologically (except for the last one), so that one gets a reasonably clear picture of how problems and solutions, attitudes and opinions, beliefs and practices evolved from the one decade to the next. The 1890s and 1900s are not as fully reflected in the documents as the earlier decades. There are four commission reports (documents 37, 42, 58, and 60), a detailed analysis of laws and regulations (document 53), two Protector's Reports (documents 57 and 61), and an assortment of related documents.

Of great significance is the Wragg Commission (document 58). This 386 - page document is essential for any student studying the indentured labour system in Natal. The commission, headed by Puisne Judge Walter Thomas Wragg of the Supreme Court of Natal, heard the testimonies of 72 whites and 48 Indians, and visited estates, hospitals, prisons, Indian schools, the Indian cemetery, the fishing settlement in Salisbury Island, the depot at Point, Indian barracks in Durban and Pietermaritzburg, and the location of free Indians. The commission also inspected rivers and streams

to determine for itself whether they constituted a health hazard to the indentured worker.

The perspectives offered by Indians themselves are valuable in reflecting an immigrant community's history. Telucksing, who had been in Natal for about 25 years, became a store-keeper in West Street, Durban, selling rice, ghee, and clothing (p. 388).

Aboobakker Amod, a trader from Mauritius, opened a business in Durban because he was "well acquainted with the general condition of the Indian population" in Natal. (p. 389). George Mutukistna was employed by the Natal Government Railway, and could read, write, and speak Tamil, English, and French. He could also speak Hindustani and Telegu. Mutukistna came to Natal because he could find no job in India. (p. 392).

Positive as all these points are in this book, they are marred by serious technical flaws. Taken together, these faults detract substantially from the book's usefulness as an easy source of reference. There are an average of 1100 words per page (17 cm x 22 cm in size) in very small print. The main body of the book is printed in a 7 - point typeface with a section (pp. 211-239) in 6 - point typeface, with no space between paragraphs to ease the movement of the eye. One has to struggle to read. The reviewer had to use a magnifying glass to read parts of the book.

Add to this the absence of a subject index. How does a student find references to say, food rations or punishment in the book? Short prefatory remarks to individual documents may have helped the reader to some extent. But

there are no explanatory remarks for most documents, not even for so massive a document as the Wragg Commission. The chapters at the beginning ("Labour for Natal" and "Introduction to Document") do make some amends for the absence of an index, but they can hardly be considered as an adequate substitute. Besides, the "Introduction" (pp. 1-2) fails to sketch a picture of economic conditions in India that forced thousands into the indenture system.

The source of the document is frequently missing or inadequate in its details. There is no bibliography that might help a reader to consult additional material. It does not appear as if the editors made a systematic attempt to search through a most important source in the Natal Archives at Pietermaritzburg, namely the Indian Immigration (II) records. Had they done so, they would have been able to attain greater balance in variety and depth in their selection. As it stands, the volume consists solely of official documents, a great many of which could have been left out to make place for the non-official documentation that is to be found in the II series. The inclusion of such material would have countered the relative under-representation of Indian perspectives.

Even if maps had been included (say of Natal's sugar estates and the major towns and villages from which the immigrants were drawn in India), and the editing had been more rigorous to eliminate inconsistencies and incomplete citations, the book has far too many fundamental problems to make it the kind of reference work it was intended to be. □

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