


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S.W.A.

NAMIBIA

A JOURNAL OF LIBERAL AND RADICAL OPINION

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EDITORIALS

ONLY THE TIP OF THE ICEBERG

As the Information Department scandal goes rumbling on, the rumbles growing louder each time the authorities take another clumsy step to prevent the full story reaching us, it is right that we should go on pressing questions on our rulers that they would rather we didn't ask anymore.

For instance:—

How much would we ever have learnt about the scandal if Judge Mostert had not defied the Prime Minister and made public what his investigations into contraventions of currency regulations had revealed to him about the Department's activities?

And why did the Prime Minister try to keep him quiet?

And, having failed to bludgeon the Judge into silence, why did the Prime Minister immediately threaten to prosecute any newspaper which published what he said?

And when every worthwhile newspaper did publish what the Judge had said, why didn't he prosecute them?

And why was it that, up until the day before the Judge's revelations, the Government furiously denied the need for a Judicial Inquiry into the Information Department, but no sooner had he made them than one was appointed? It cannot be that it didn't know that something fishy was going on in the Department, because the report of the Erasmus Commission makes it quite clear that it did.

While the cynic's view is that the answer to all these questions is that the Government was trying to stop us ever knowing the full extent of corruption in its ranks (and, indeed, that this is still its main concern) the Prime Minister insisted that his objection to the publication of Judge Mostert's allegations was that they told only one side of the story. But if that was his view in October, why should it have changed since then? Why, for instance, should the Prime Minister's considerable weight have been thrown behind the move to force Dr Connie Mulder out of Parliament, the only place where he could safely have

given his side of the story? And why does he appear to have accepted without qualms, the extraordinary decision not to charge former security chief General van den Bergh in a court of law (the only place where he could freely have given his side of the story) for his contemptuous references to the Erasmus Commission?

Neither Dr Mulder nor General van den Bergh were ever ones for giving their opponents the opportunity to state their case in public. They preferred to ban them or detain them. But that they should enjoy the right they denied to others we have no doubt at all and certainly so if we are to get the "clean administration" to which the Prime Minister says he is committed.

The attempts which have been made so far to conceal the full extent and implications of the Information Department scandal have been as sickening as the revelations themselves. But then South Africa is sick, and has been for a long time. The Afrikaner Nationalist's carefully nurtured image of himself as the clear-eyed, incorruptible, modern-day frontiersman lies in pieces. It has shattered along the fault-lines of a thread which has run through the application of his policies ever since he came to power those thirty years ago . . . the doctrine that where the end is the survival of the Afrikaner people any means are justified.

But it is not only the Afrikaner Nationalist who suffers from the sickness which flows inevitably from the acceptance as a basic, if unacknowledged, principle, that the end will justify the means. Long before the Union of 1910, as our recent Anglo-Zulu war issue showed, this was the principle on which men like Sir Bartle Frere were acting. The only difference between now and then, perhaps, is that with the passage of time the application of the principle has become more subtle. Instead of using the gun, one now uses the law. And for more than two generations, since 1910, white South Africans have been using their power to make laws to ensure that they will prosper at the expense of others.

What could be more corrupting than that? That one should use one's power, year after year, to arrogate to oneself, at the expense of people weaker than oneself, all the best things in life? The years of apartheid have simply sharpened an old process.

The Information scandal has only indicated the surface manifestations of our malady. Its roots go much deeper than that. Basically they stem from greed.

White South Africa had better start digging down a good deal deeper into its condition and start doing something about curing it, before it can assure itself an African future. □

A MIRACLE PENDING?

REALITY has viewed with a generally sceptical eye the progress of events in Namibia since the Turnhalle Conference was originally convened, in particular the South African-sponsored elections held last December and the DTA victory which they predictably produced. Some of the reasons for our scepticism about that election are dealt with in articles in this issue.

Nevertheless, what has happened since that election does

give grounds for hope. The agreement of all parties involved in Namibia to take part in UN-supervised elections before the end of the year and the fact that Mr Ahtisaari's January visit passed off without any serious differences appearing to arise between him and the South African authorities, suggest that we may still see a miracle performed there, and an internationally acceptable formula for independence found. Hold thumbs for that! □

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NAMIBIA:—

THE UNILATERAL DECEMBER ELECTION, AND PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE:

by Bryan O'Linn

The unilateral December 1978 election for a Constituent Assembly and to choose "leaders" which was conceived and manipulated by the S.A. Government, the Administrator General and the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (D.T.A.) will go down in the history of this country as a face saving device and an exercise in futility, but nevertheless an exercise which obstructed a settlement of the Namibia question and endangered the future of the country and all its people.

We can only hope that it will be the last demonstration of brinkmanship by the S.A. government in the affairs of Namibia and the last desperate attempt of the S.A. government, its agents and its dependents in Namibia to evade reality.

It is true that approximately 80% of the registered voters in fact voted and that approximately 82% of those voters were in favour of the D.T.A. The D.T.A., primarily, with the assistance of the S.A. government and all its institutions, some of the ultra-conservative political parties in Germany and some big business in S.A. and Namibia, has developed into a powerful, efficient and influential political force in Namibia.

Although its present image is that of a multi-racial movement, the dominant party in the alliance, namely the Republican party under the leadership of Mr D. F. Mudge, is exclusive to whites. The constitution proposed by the D.T.A. for an independent Namibia provides for the abolition of petty apartheid but the foundation would be massive, rigid enforced race and ethnic classification, and the vote to be exercised by the individual only within his ethnic group. Furthermore, the D.T.A. subscribes to the principle of consensus or **one group one veto** in the Central Government, which is totally impractical and unacceptable in the circumstances of Namibia where some groups constitute 1-5% of the population and others 10-45%.

In contrast to the D.T.A., the approach of the N.N.F. is a truly non-racial democracy with a heavy emphasis on fundamental human rights. The main problem of the N.N.F. is the lack of finance.

The voting pattern in this election will not be repeated in the envisaged election under United Nations supervision in which SWAPO (D) and the N.N.F. will participate and SWAPO (N) will probably participate.

Some of the reasons can be shortly stated:

1. The December election process was not **free and fair** in any sense of the term. When I say process, I deliberately include the conditions created over decades and particularly the actions and influences preceding the election itself.

All the institutions created by the Government over a long period were inspanned to get the required result, namely a high poll and a poll boosting the confidence of the D.T.A.

Foremost in the fray was the Adm. Gen. himself, descending into the political arena and literally leading his troops. The S.A.B.C., broadcasting in all the native languages, was allowed to suppress totally the views of those parties who were against the election and of course, the independent Press was bought out a year previously and played the rôle assigned to them by their D.T.A. bosses. But this was not enough in government sponsored publicity and communication services. The Adm. Gen. created a Government institution to replace the Department of Information called the Namibia/SWA Information Service. This department published and distributed thousands of pamphlets with the assistance of the S.A. Defence Force exhorting people to vote, saying that **"a vote is a vote against chaos, anarchy, and terrorism."** Even the department of Posts and Telegraphs placed a stamp on each postal piece with the words **"to vote is your duty"**.

All the black and brown ethnic governments and/or councils did their duty as usual. Fleets of government vehicles, inter alia that allocated to the so-called Owambo government and purchased mainly by taxpayers money from outside Owambo, were made available to the D.T.A. to bring voters to the polls.

Intimidation, undue influence, even in some cases bribery and corruption, some blatant, some more subtle, was the order of the day.

Millions of Rand have been spent on the D.T.A. campaign and the source of these massive funds is still unknown, although the suspicion grows daily that the S.A. Government has channelled big sums to the D.T.A., using a modus operandi similar to that disclosed in the Information scandal in the R.S.A. The Bureau of State Security (BOSS) has for a long time been visible in the politics of this country, but took a particularly strong interest in the affairs of the Turnhalle and subsequently, until this day in the affairs of the D.T.A.

2. In the election under U.N. supervision, the S.A. Government and all its organs will not be in the same position to advance the cause of their protégé.
3. A proper period will be available for campaigning under conditions approaching the ideal of fairness to a much greater extent.
4. The main contestants will not only be members of the Turnhalle Family, namely AKTUR and D.T.A. but will include the N.N.F., SWAPO (D) and probably SWAPO (N) Political prisoners, including very important personalities, will be released and thousands of political exiles and refugees enabled to return and to participate fully in the election process. The funds of SWAPO (N) will match that of the D.T.A., whereas the NNF and SWAPO(D) will hopefully also have more funds available than in the past.

The N.N.F. did not participate in the December election, inter alia because it was abundantly clear to it that the conditions for fair elections would not be established, the election would not lead to peace, certainty and prosperity as claimed but to the contrary and that S.A. would be compelled to consent to elections under U.N. supervision immediately after the December election.

Great progress has been made since the futile December election towards implementation of the Western proposals and the Security Council resolutions 431 and 435, but formidable obstacles remain. SWAPO (N) the D.T.A. and the Adm. Gen. may not have exhausted their bags of tricks.

The latest example of bungling is the astonishing attempt by the Adm. Gen. to give his baby, the Constituent Assembly, a new lease of life and respectability, by declaring how important the Assembly is and how it will be indispensable to him as an arm of government, even until independence and even after election of a real Constituent Assembly in the U.N. supervised elections envisaged for September 1978.

It is clear that the Prime Minister of S.A. was forced to intervene immediately and to repudiate Adm. Gen., His Excellency, Mr Justice Steyn.

The Constituent Assembly and the S.A. Government practically wrote the death notice of the present Constituent Assembly when it decided in December 1978 under extreme pressure from within and without, that the price for a U.D.I. in Namibia was too high and agreed to co-operate in the implementation of Security Council Resolution 435 of 1978, which resolution included the following paragraph: **"6 The Security Council declares that all unilateral measures taken by the illegal administration in Namibia in relation to the electoral process, including unilateral registration of voters, or transfer of power, in contravention of Security Council Resolutions 385 (76) 431 (78) and this resolution are null and void."**

The clear implication of South Africa's acceptance of Security Council Resolution 435 is that the present Constituent Assembly will be **dissolved** at the latest when the transition period begins, i.e. the beginning of actual implementation of Resolution 435.

Furthermore, the continuation of the present Constituent Assembly in any shape or form after the beginning of the transition period, would frustrate the basic aim of elections fair to all the participants, because the present one will be entrenched.

It would also be an anomaly to have a Constituent Assembly which cannot perform its main function, i.e. of writing a constitution and which was elected for that purpose.

To say as the Adm. Gen. does that the present Assembly could co-exist with the real Constituent Assembly even after the latter Assembly has been duly elected in terms of Resolution 435, is the limit of absurdity.

The main parties at present represented in the Constituent Assembly, are certainly expected to take part in the forthcoming election in terms of Res. 435. They will either be elected or defeated in the forthcoming election.

To the extent that they are elected in the U.N. supervised election, they will sit in the real Constituent Assembly. If defeated, not even the Adm. Gen. could proceed with the argument that they are true leaders and/or representatives of the people. How then could the Adm. Gen. justify an Assembly for the defeated? It seems that the Adm. Gen. is willing and determined to perpetuate a myth of his own making.

The present approach of the S.A. Government to co-operate in the implementation of Resolution 435 of 1978, is realistic and wise and should be welcomed.

Paradise as promised by the D.T.A. in the December election, has not been achieved and will not be achieved by an election under U.N. supervision in terms of resolution 435.

But it is a step in the right direction with no visible alternative. It is our last opportunity to achieve an internationally recognized settlement and the only hope to achieve relative peace, security, prosperity and a non-racial democracy. It will be disastrous to squander this opportunity. □

THE S.W.A. / NAMIBIA ELECTION

by Paul Weinberg



Polling Day.

Contrary to what the S.A.B.C. and most of the South African press reported, numerous accounts of intimidation occurred during the South African directed elections in S.W.A./Namibia last year. In the Keetmanshoop area alone Mr Hercules, an N.N.F. organizer had collated at least 15 sworn affidavits in which employees explained how they were forced to vote. "There would have been far more but the majority of people fear to lose their jobs by reporting intimidation" he said.

The major culprit in the town was said to be the Stellenbosch Farmers Winery. Although the manager Mr B. Müssler denied any accounts of intimidation, many of his employees complained of how they stood to lose their jobs if they did not vote.

One particular employee of the firm, Mr A. Stephanus, in his affidavit, explained that workers were divided into two groups — one was to vote for Aktur and the other for D.T.A. "It was made known to me that if I did not vote I would lose my job. As an NNF supporter I refused to vote and now stand to be laid off".

In another incident Mr Hanse a farm labourer and a NNF supporter was refused back pay until he had voted for Aktur.

Reports of intimidation in the Northern areas were received from Bishop Awala. He stated that people were threatened that they would not receive pensions or would lose their jobs if they failed to vote.

Reports of intimidation came from all the non-participating parties, Swapo, Swapo Democrats, and the N.N.F. who all claimed that many of their supporters had phoned in complaining of intimidation. Cases of people being paid to vote and children under 18 voting were also reported.

WHAT THE NON-PARTICIPATING PARTIES HAD TO SAY . . .

INTERVIEW DURING THE ELECTION WITH Mr A. Shipanga, an ex-member of Swapo executive, who was detained by Sam Nujoma along with many other Swapo members in April 1976 and released in June 1978. He then, after a brief period overseas, returned to South West Africa/Namibia and formed the Swapo Democrats.

Q. What were the reasons for the split with Nujoma culminating in your detention in Tanzania?

A. There was in fact no split with Swapo until 2 April, 1976 when we found ourselves surrounded by Zambian troops under the instructions of Kaunda.

The reason given for our detention by Nujoma was an attempt to take over the leadership.

Q. What are the differences between Swapo and the Swapo Democrats?

A. Firstly, we disagree with the assertion made by Nujoma that Swapo is a party of peasant workers and revolutionary intellectuals. Swapo we believe is a party of all committed Namibians who want independence. Secondly, the fact that Swapo is committed to scientific

socialism will only bring about chaos. The high number of illiterate people cannot appreciate what scientific socialism means.

Thirdly, we disagree with Swapo's notion of a classless society — this is merely a utopian dream. While we do not tolerate apartheid or exploitation we propose equal opportunities for all.

Q. What is the Swapo Democrats strategy for a S.W.A./ Namibian solution?

A. In the short term through United Nations supervised elections.

Q. How do you rate your chances in the U.N. supervised elections?

A. We have no doubt that we will play an important part in the election.

Q. What are your economic reforms?

A. No radical change — but a gradual shift of control to the public sector.

Q. Do you see anything positive emerging from the South African directed elections?

A. Not at all. These elections will not offer any solutions — they do not address themselves to the problems of this country.

4. INTERVIEW WITH MR E. S. TRIRIMUJE — SWAPO INTERNAL WING SECRETARY FOR FINANCE, ONE OF THE FEW EXECUTIVE MEMBERS WHO WAS NOT DETAINED DURING THE ELECTIONS.

Q. What impact have the detentions made on the party?

A. Nothing — we are used to it. Many of our members were detained earlier, after Kapuuu's death in terms of proclamation AG 26. It does not matter if we are detained, new young dynamic leaders will take our places.

Q. Has the party been subject to other harassment by the South African administration?

A. Yes, we have never been given a free hand in campaigning. Two of our party organisers in the Caprivi area were detained a week before the election and other organisers left for fear of detention. During a peaceful demonstration on the Saturday before the election 70 of our supporters were detained and many were beaten up.

Q. What has Swapo's attitude been to the elections?

A. A farce — we advised our members not to participate or

if they do to spoil their papers. We believe there is a direct correlation between army presence and a high percentage poll.

Q. Will you participate in a U.N. supervised election?

A. Yes because we know they will not be manipulated.

INTERVIEW WITH NNF SECRETARY FOR PUBLICITY AND INFORMATION AND SECRETARY GENERAL OF SWANU, MR V. RUKORO.

Q. To what extent has South Africa deviated from the Western proposals which it initially accepted?

- A. 1. By instigating a unilateral process
2. The election was not fair or free. S.A. was in charge and not the U.N.
3. Political prisoners have not been released.
4. We cannot campaign properly because of the Group Areas Act.
5. There is no common voters' role in the electoral process. The X-Ray system which has been used is open to abuse by South African officials in control.

Q. What would the outcome of this be?

A. Firstly it may lead our country to disaster which would result in an escalation of the bush war and economic sanctions being applied. Blacks would then be placed in the difficult position of accepting the D.T.A. government or Swapo.

Q. How do you view the South African supervised election?

A. A non-event, a face-saving formula by the South African government which will not secure our independence.

Q. What is the NNF's alternative?

A. To place our full weight behind the U.N. elections which will pave the way for a peaceful solution. If the U.N. elections failed to take place we would seriously consider taking up arms against the South African colonialists.

Q. In what ways do you differ from Swapo?

A. Firstly on the question of a democratic process. People should have a free hand in electing a government. Secondly on the question of human rights — Swapo detains fellow country men.

Thirdly, economically, we disagree with nationalisation — we therefore propose foreign investment — to create employment and increase production. Instead of complete state intervention in private enterprise we propose a limited degree of national intervention — in other words a mixed economy. □



Mr Hanse, a N.N.F. supporter, "I was refused backpay unless I voted for Aktur."



Mr A. Stephanus, a Stellenbosch Farmers Winery employee, who stands to lose his job because he refused to vote.

CRISIS IN EDUCATION —

A BLACK MAN'S VIEW

by Nthato Motlana

Throughout history education (and therefore knowledge) has been used by the ruling élite, whether this was the clergy of the Roman Catholic Church who used Latin to confuse the masses or the slave owners of America who made it a criminal offence to teach a slave to read and write.

It is not by accident that the churches of the ruling white elite in South Africa, the churches of the men in direct conflict with us blacks for the control of this, our common fatherland, were conspicuous by their determination not to be associated with the grand missionary endeavour of the Methodists, the Anglicans and the Roman Catholics to educate South Africa's indigenous peoples.

It is indeed common knowledge that there is a crisis in education. It is not caused by lack of funds — a diversion of a mere 10% of the millions wasted in arming against an imaginary Russian threat — wasted because the Russians have no intention of attacking South Africa, and if they did the war would be over in less than an hour! That 10% — amounting to well over R100 million — would go a very long way to improving the appallingly poor state of black education.

The crisis is not because of the lack of teachers. There are thousands of black teachers now in commerce and industry because of the intolerable conditions in the classrooms, the discrimination in salaries and conditions of service. There are also many people of other races here and overseas who would be only too willing, given the right conditions, to come to the rescue of black education. In fact the story goes that one of the so-called Homelands opted for so-called independence because it could not get entry visas for the many teachers it had recruited overseas.

The crisis is not because of lack of classrooms. Geniuses have been nurtured from backyards and under marsela trees. Jews of the Diaspora and the ghettos of Europe and Russia produced Einsteins taught in their living rooms.

No. The crisis is because the essential ingredient is missing —. This is the will and determination to so educate the black child that he may realise his full human potential. On the contrary there is an obvious will and determination actually to deny the black that education which permits the realisation of his human potential. And when Dr Verwoerd gave us that masterpiece — the Bantu Education Act — it was immediately dubbed Education for Ignorance. And when the said act went further to state that "It is a criminal offence for one Bantu to teach another," it became a Recipe for Disaster.

Intrinsic to this crisis is the dilemma of South Africa's ruling white elite. They have always looked upon us blacks as a colonised people, have exploited us just as Britain exploited India and the Indians, used them as sources of cheap raw materials and as markets for their over-priced goods.

To maintain this type of relationship, it was necessary to prohibit industries and other meaningful commercial activities among the colonised people. That is why poor Mr Sam Matsuemyame pleads in vain for the liberalisation of policies that decree the exclusion of the black man from the so-called free enterprise system. It would contradict the basic South African political beliefs enshrined in the statement "There shall be no equality in Church or State."

To educate the black man fully is to raise him to realise his full humanity, on a par with other races, especially the ruling white elite, to raise expectations that must lead to his demanding full equality in the land of his fathers.

This, of course, is heresy! Our rulers are, therefore, forced to compound the dilemma by conning us with devices such as the Bantu Education Act — a system scientifically tailored in the immortal words of Dr Verwoerd to remind us blacks always of our inferior position in the body politic.

And to black parents and students who over the years have cried out for a uniform, universal, national system of education, the dilemma is how could the colonised, the servants, the maids, the petrol attendants, fated never to rise above those stations in our apartheid society, how could you ask that these people have the same educational system as the ruling white elite? Ridiculous!

And where in the aftermath of Soweto 1976 when even the white elite is willing to concede that the late Dr Verwoerd might just have overstated his case, though refusing to repudiate his basic stand, the new Minister of Bantu Education insists on coming up with another Bantu Education Act, for whatever name he gives the new act, that is what it will be called. After all will it not like Bantu Education 1 be specially designed to cater for the peculiar and unique needs of the so-called Bantus?

My brief, Mr Chairman, was to share with you a black South African's thoughts on the crisis in our education system. It is not to suggest solutions. But may I point out the very obvious solution staring us all in the face? Let us all work hard to convince this short-sighted white ruling elite that their salvation lies in a common fatherland — that their "pie in the sky" unattainable policy of separate development, separate educational systems etc., etc., is a sure recipe for disaster — that this crisis as far as we blacks are concerned will only be solved when all our countrymen, black or white, are regarded and treated as South Africans, equal before the law, and all equally entitled to the best educational system available. There is still a tremendous fund of goodwill in this land waiting for a true statesman to exploit it in the interests of all, not for the benefit of one tribe fortuitously in power and who may, just as fortuitously, lose that power. □

GANDHI THE LAWYER

by H. E. Mall

To commemorate the 109th birth anniversary of MAHATMA GANDHI

So much has already been said and written about this complex and many faceted personality that George Woodcock in his book on Gandhi was constrained to say:

“Neither national liberation or social revolution is a category sufficiently wide to contain the objective that evolved with and out of Gandhi’s life of action. He was not concerned primarily with the creation of an Indian nation or with the abolition of poverty. Indeed he was opposed to nationalism in its narrower definition for he sought to make his fellow countrymen feel that in becoming fully Indian they were also becoming citizens of the world, unbound by exclusive loyalties of race or creed or class. And far from wishing that man should cease to be poor he taught that a deliberate poverty based on the conscious shedding of attachment to material things was the happiest of possible human conditions.”

Though he was educated and trained to be a lawyer he only practised as such until about 1914 when he left the shores of South Africa to return to India. He was called to the bar on the 10th June 1891 and on his return to India this shy, serious-minded and earnest young barrister found that there was no demand for his services in Rajkot and so proceeded to Bombay. Conscious of the fact that he knew little or no law he visited the Court daily in the hope of learning some law by seeing justice in action. He was shocked to discover that not only the most humble vakils (solicitors) but also the most exalted barristers all obtained cases by employing the services of touts who hung about the Courts. He felt that touts were a disgrace to the profession and refused to have anything to do with them. So for several months he did not get a case. One day, however, he did receive a brief to appear in the small causes Court. The trial commenced and during the proceedings when he stood up to cross-examine his first witness he was utterly dumbstruck. The words just refused to leave his mouth and in utter humiliation he walked out of the Court and returned the brief and his small fee to another practitioner. One can well imagine the shattering effect this experience had on this sensitive young man. He returned to his lodgings and there and then made up his mind that he was not suited to the practice of law and went in search of a job as a school teacher. He had no qualifications and consequently could not find a job. He returned to Rajkot and there assisted an attorney in doing chamber work. Just as things were looking particularly gloomy fate stepped in in the shape of an opportunity to go to South Africa to assist in litigation which involved a wealthy merchant of Durban who also hailed from Rajkot. So in April 1893 the young Gandhi set forth to South Africa to render his services to Dada Abdullah Seth, a prominent businessman who had a very large claim (£40 000) against an equally prominent businessman from Pretoria. Why was

it necessary for Dada Abdullah Seth to import a barrister from India? Ved Mehda in his book on Gandhi and his disciples says: “The local Indian lawyers working on the case there were all so deficient in English that they could not even carry on the necessary legal correspondence and the merchant decided he wanted someone trustworthy from Porbamdard who had been to England, to help them with their English for about a year.” Quite clearly the author is historically incorrect for there were no Indian lawyers in South Africa at the time. Gandhi himself was the first Indian ever to practice as a lawyer in South Africa. Within days of his arrival in Durban Gandhi went one day to the Magistrate’s Court in Durban as an observer. A Magistrate noticed him standing there with his turban on and immediately ordered him to remove his turban. Gandhi did not understand this request. He was taken aback and refused to remove his turban but was constrained to leave the Court.

The case for which he had come from India was to be argued in the Transvaal and Gandhi immediately set about acquainting himself with the facts in issue. He demonstrated to himself his ability to unravel the complicated skein of events and occurrences and was pleased with his own powers of comprehending the facts and his capacity for marshalling evidence for his client. It was during the preparation of this case that he learnt a valuable lesson, namely that if a lawyer takes care of the facts of the case the law will take care of itself. Gandhi says he learnt that ‘facts mean truth and once we adhere to the truth, the law comes to our aid naturally.’ As the days and the weeks went by it dawned on him that if this trial were to commence there was no saying how long it would take before it was finalised. It was easy to discern that a protracted trial such as this would ruin both the plaintiff and the defendant. This plus the fact that already bitter hatred was being generated between the parties as a result of the dispute caused Gandhi to recommend to his client that efforts should be made to settle the matter by arbitration. Dada Abdullah Seth was persuaded by Gandhi and with his consent Gandhi made overtures to the defendant and his efforts resulted in the dispute being referred to arbitration and was eventually settled. Both parties were obviously satisfied with the result and Gandhi says:

“My joy was boundless. I had learnt the true practice of law. I had learnt to find out the better side of human nature and to enter men’s hearts. I realised the true function of a lawyer was to unite parties riven asunder. The lesson was so indelibly burnt into me that a large part of my time during the twenty years of my practice as a lawyer was occupied in bringing about private compromises of hundreds of cases. I lost nothing thereby — not even money, certainly not my soul.”

Dada Abdullah Seth had engaged Gandhi's services for about a year and this period had come to an end and Gandhi was making preparations to return to India. At that time the Natal Legislature had before it the "Franchise Amendment Bill" which it was debating. It contained a provision aimed at disfranchising the Indians of Natal. At a farewell party on the day before he was due to leave there appeared an article in the Natal Mercury referring to the debate on this important bill. This article read in part:

'The Asiatic comes of a race impregnated with an effete civilisation with not an atom of knowledge with the principles or traditions of representative government. As regards his instinct and training, he is a political infant of the most backward type from whom it is an injustice to expect that he should have any sympathy for our political aspirations.'

Those present at the farewell party were stunned at the news and prevailed upon Gandhi to stay on in Durban for a while to help them mount a campaign against the bill. The merchants agreed amongst themselves to retain Gandhi as their counsel and the farewell party took on the atmosphere of a working committee meeting.

It became necessary for Gandhi to make an application to the Supreme Court to be admitted as an advocate. This application was opposed by the Natal Law Society whose secretary filed an affidavit in which he based his opposition on two grounds, namely:

- (a) that the applicant had not furnished the original certificate which had been issued to him by the 'Inner Temple' — it being contended that a certified true copy from the Bombay High Court was not good enough,
- (b) that the applicant was not a European and therefore ought not to be admitted to practise as an advocate.

At the hearing of this application the latter ground was not proceeded with and, despite the objection contained in the first ground, Gandhi was admitted as an advocate. Almost immediately after he was admitted Gandhi set up chambers in Durban. Some of the more important cases which he handled are reported in the early Natal Law Reports. He was well supported by members of the Indian Community and one can fairly assume that he had a varied commercial practice. It appears that in the Natal of those days an Indian entering a Courtroom was required to remove his shoes and his headgear and to 'Salaam' or salute the Bench. Failure to do so amounted to a contempt of Court. This practice of leisurely colonial days was bound to be challenged in a Court of law sooner or later and it is not surprising that Gandhi was instrumental in successfully attacking this practice. Gandhi's legal practice was disrupted during the Anglo-Boer War. It is well known that during the war he and a band of his followers organised themselves in to an ambulance core and rendered voluntary service.

After the war Gandhi was admitted as an attorney in the Transvaal Republic and set up practice in Johannesburg.

As a lawyer he maintained the highest traditions of his profession. Indeed he imposed on himself the duty to observe the strictest discipline in his search for the truth. This unusual lawyer warned every new client at the outset that he should not be expected to take up a false case or to coach the witnesses about their evidence. He was sorely grieved on one occasion when after winning the case he discovered that his client had deceived him.

On another occasion it transpired in the middle of a case that his client was not telling the truth. Gandhi discovered that he had been deceived by his client who broke down in cross-examination. Without argument, Gandhi asked the Magistrate to dismiss his case. Opposing counsel was no doubt astonished and the Magistrate pleased. His devotion for truth had become well known in the Indian Community and it enhanced his reputation amongst his colleagues.

He says in his autobiography that:

'During my professional work it was also my habit never to conceal my ignorance from my clients or my colleagues. Whenever I felt myself at sea I would advise my clients to consult some other counsel.'

He looked upon his practice of the law as a service to his community and looked upon himself as a servant of 'truth'.

From all accounts Gandhi had a busy legal practice but, as might be expected, his public activities as organiser and leader of the Indian Community had first call on his time. His fearless search for and adherence to truth as a lawyer pervaded all his other activities and bred in him a discipline which, in the course of time, changed Gandhi the lawyer to Gandhi the Mahatma. South Africa was the crucible in which he tested and fashioned a new weapon in his fight against injustice and racial discrimination. The two main components of this weapon were the observance of truth and a total commitment to "non-violence". The second passive resistance campaign resulted in some amelioration of the lot of the Indian Community and resulted in the passing of the Indians Relief Act.

He returned to India in 1914 where his great fame as a political leader had preceded him. Though he never practised law again his friends Polak, Brailsford and Pethick-Lawrence in their biography of Gandhi say:

'Strange as it always seemed to many of his contemporaries Gandhi also carried with him to his dying day the legal outlook which he had imbibed during his early youth when he had studied law in a lawyer's office in London. This unusual combination of the saint and the lawyer made him often a baffling person with whom to conduct negotiations.' □

THE TRANSVAAL GANDHI

CENTENARY COUNCIL

109th Anniversary of Mahatma Gandhi's birth.

Speech by Sheena Duncan

These are dark days indeed for those millions of people in South Africa who earnestly desire the transformation of our society, the achievement of justice, and who long for peace; – not peace in the debased sense in which the word is so often used nowadays to mean a passive situation in which there is an absence of violent conflict, but peace in the full meaning of the word – Shalom – joy, love and liberation.

All of us are daily made aware of violence escalating around us in many different ways and all of us fear that we may eventually be engulfed in all the tragedy, horror and chaos of civil war such as our neighbours in Rhodesia are suffering now.

Many South Africans believe that violence is inevitable before political, social and economic justice can be achieved. Surveys published earlier this year in Germany by the Arnold Bergstraesser Institute showed that 65,2% of white South Africans believe that there will eventually be a black uprising in South Africa and that 28% of black South Africans in urban areas believe that Africans will never get improvements without fighting and violent action.

The survey among blacks was conducted before the death of Steven Biko and before the bannings and detentions of 19th October last year. That was the latest in a long history of actions taken to destroy all peaceful efforts made by black people to cause the transformation of our society and to attempt to persuade those in authority to negotiate a new dispensation. To many it seemed then that there is no use in trying to use non-violent means to force change and the Government had demonstrated finally and irrevocably that it is not prepared to deviate one inch from its disastrous policies. My guess would be that the percentage of black people who now see fighting and violent action as the only means to liberation is now greatly increased.

I am acutely aware that many black people say that it is always whites who say that they are in favour of non-violence and that they condemn violence in others while failing to acknowledge how much they themselves are acting violently just by being part of the white society and by giving their tacit, if not overt, consent to the tools of violence being used to maintain a false peace. I take this accusation very seriously indeed because I think that it is largely true.

Those who are most vociferous in condemning violence in others keep handguns at home, carry them around in briefcases and handbags and teach their wives to shoot. I cannot see how these things can be consonant with a declaration in favour of non-violence.

I believe that the World Council of Churches errs gravely when it gives money to military organisations but the majority of white Christians who condemn the Council so bitterly and so stridently do not confess their own daily contributions to militarism in our own society or to the Christian Churches' long history of blessing war and violence in innumerable different situations in innumerable different countries. The very words in which some Christians phrase their condemnation are the antithesis of peace and non-violence.

In a paper entitled "Militarism – some theological perspectives" Wolfgang Huber has this to say:

"Militarism is the willing recognition or preference of war as a means for solving problems of international politics. It takes for granted that the application of military force is an acceptable and unavoidable way of clearing up international relations. This agrees with the conviction that military armament and weapon deals ought to extend to all parts of the world; militarism is global.

The effects of militarism on domestic policy are especially apparent where the borders between the military and politics become blurred. This occurs in different forms: officers take over political leadership, or they have the power to force their goals on to politicians; or politicians make decisions in accordance with criteria of the soldier's ethos. Such an expansion of military criteria may be found, for example, where the demand for 'national security' becomes a criterion for decisions in domestic policy; in general this ends in a de-democratization and in a limitation or rather a breach of human rights.

Belonging to the military, whether as a soldier, as a member of military and paramilitary forces or even as a worker in the armaments industry, results in a change in attitudes and behaviour patterns for many people. A majority of them share the opinion that conflicts ought to be solved not by mediation and reconciliation but by force. But to the extent to which the military is accepted as a self-evident element of society, these attitudes are transferred to other members of society.

These attitudes become associated with others; militarism becomes an element of a complex of attitudes pervading one's entire social existence. Attitudes such as nationalism, conservatism, a law-and-order mentality, ethnocentricity, anti-internationalism, authoritarian thinking and behaviour, the rejection of humanitarian attitudes and similar behaviour patterns prevail. . . . Militarism . . . denotes a comprehensive life-style."

Professor Huber was not referring specifically to South Africa but to societies in general but I have not read anything which better describes what is now happening to white South African society.

In his first address as Prime Minister last week Mr P. W. Botha said "We want to co-operate with all peace-loving nations to maintain peace. Peace cannot look after itself, it must be worked for. Peace must be protected and we can rely on our security forces to maintain peace."

Can a situation where order can only be maintained by massive security operations be described as peace and can peace be found if the means we use to work for it are the very antithesis of peace? Many people through the ages have wrestled with this question in many different places.

Mahatma Gandhi would have answered these questions in the negative. During his lifetime he forged a creative instrument for fundamental change. This instrument has many elements each of which is essential to the whole. He showed the way to a constructive rather than a destructive resolution of human conflicts and thirty years after his death his influence can be seen and felt wherever men struggle to understand and to follow his example in the conflicts in which they are engaged.

There are many who maintain that his "experiments with truth" as he called them, only had relevance to the particular situation in India at a particular time and in a particular struggle. I believe that this criticism is due to a misunderstanding of the nature of satyagraha and a failure to regard it as a whole. Too often critics pick out one or two of the elements involved without grasping that each is absolutely necessary to the whole and that one cannot be used successfully and truthfully without all the others.

Basic to an understanding of what Gandhi called "the force which is born of truth and love" is the concept that ends and means are inextricably part of one another. In her book *Conquest of Violence*, Joan Bondurant begins her preface with these words:

Point not the goal until you plot the course,
for ends and means to man are tangled so
that different means quite different aims enforce.
Conceive the means as end in embryo.

Later she quotes Krishnalal Shridharani describing the means as the end in process and the ideal in the making.

For Gandhi the means is the end and the end is the means. Peace cannot be achieved by violence and non-violence is both the means and the end.

For him ahimsa, non-violence is not in his own words "merely a negative state of harmlessness but it is a positive state of love, of doing good even to the evil-doer. But it does not mean helping the evil-doer to continue the wrong or tolerating it by passive acquiescence . . . Without ahimsa it is not possible to seek and find truth. Ahimsa and truth are so intertwined that it is practically impossible to disentangle and separate them . . . Ahimsa is the means; Truth is the end. Means to be means must always be within our reach, and so ahimsa is our supreme duty. If we take care of the means we are bound to reach the end sooner or later. When once we have grasped this point, final victory is beyond question . . ."

And again "Truth is the end, Love a means thereto. We know what is love or non-violence although we find it difficult to follow the law of love. But as for truth we know only a fraction of it . . ."

Of suffering . . . : "Non-violence in its dynamic condition means conscious suffering. It does not mean meek sub-

mission to the will of the evil doer, but it means the pitting of one's whole soul against the will of the tyrant. Working under this law of our being it is possible for a single individual to defy the whole might of an unjust empire . . ."

"Suffering injury in one's own person is . . . of the essence of non-violence and is the chosen substitute of violence to others. It is not because I value life low that I can countenance with joy thousands voluntarily losing their lives for satyagraha, but because I know that it results in the long run in the least loss of life, and, what is more, it ennobles those who lose their lives and morally enriches the world for their sacrifice."

"Non-violence cannot be taught to a person who fears to die".

"Just as one must learn the art of killing in the training for violence so one must learn the art of dying in the training for non-violence."

"Truthfulness is the master-key. Do not lie under any circumstances whatsoever, keep nothing secret, take your teachers and your elders into your confidence and make a clean breast of everything to them. Bear ill-will to none, do not say an evil thing of anyone behind his back, above all 'to thine own self be true' so that you are false to no one else. Truthful dealing even in the least, little things of life is the only secret of a pure life."

Those quotations from the Mahatma contain the essence of his philosophy as he formulated it during his life time of striving to understand the Truth which for him is God. Because he believed that full understanding of Truth cannot be attained by man he saw the necessity of loving the opponent, of attempting to win him over by persuasion, of protecting him from injury, of refusing to triumph in his defeat and of finding ways to allow him to save face when he is defeated. It was Gandhi's perception that, because it is impossible for man to know the truth, there must be constant and humble reassessment of demands and openness to the opponent's point of view. Civil disobedience, passive resistance, strike action, marches and sit-ins were all used only within this context because without it they too can become unacceptable coercion which distorts the end desired.

He believed that **nothing** can force a man to do anything against his will, that only individual liberation can free a man to serve society and that such service is an essential ingredient of non-violence.

His teaching was essentially formulated in action and that action sought the means to exercise power and influence to effect change without injury to the opponent, with constant adherence to truth and non-violence and with constant stress on the dignity of labour, self sufficiency and willingness to sacrifice and suffer while offering, out of love, support and reassurance to the opponent.

What is the relevance of Mahatma Gandhi's life and teaching to our present situation in South Africa. I do not know the answer to that question. I only know that as a Christian, I have been helped by him to an understanding of my own faith and I believe that for each one of us he showed in his own life the solution to our conflicts and demonstrated a power which lies within the grasp of us all.

When we have failed I do not believe that it is due to any fault in his teaching but to our own fault for being unwilling to subject ourselves to the necessary discipline and for being incapable of loving as we ought.

If we can only learn from him then indeed "final victory is beyond question." □

CASEY AND COMPANY

edited by Mthobisi Mutloose; Ravan Press, 1978

Reviewed by Marie Dyer.

This is a collection of stories, sketches and other short pieces (most of them first published in *Drum*) written by the Johannesburg journalist Casey Motsisi over a period of 20 years up to his death in 1977.

They derive from the "shebeen culture" of Johannesburg's black townships, and the earlier sketches offer as a response to the hardships of township life – squalor, poverty, arrests, evictions, pass raids, muggings, robberies – a determined gaiety and frivolity; an ebullient acceptance of all these trials as background facts of a life whose main preoccupation is gathering enough cash or credit for a convivial session at Aunt Peggy's joint. The characters depicted are dauntlessly enterprising and resourceful, using their wits to challenge all of society indiscriminately. There is Mattress who

locks himself in from the outside with a padlock and then squeezes through the window at night. This will give the cops the impression that he had already left when they come a-raiding in the wee-small hours.

There is Kid Newspapers who

pulls out a newspaper and points at it. There's a ring around a little advert for a night watchman. Kid Newspapers tells me that on the same night that the advert appeared in the newspapers he went around to the firm, and he and the boys had the easiest time removing the safe and bolting away with it as there was no watchman.

Kid Sponono assures Casey's money-grabbing landlord that his missing son has been arrested and is working on a farm in Nigel. He collects £15 for the fine; but all the time the son has actually been

doing the dog's meat act somewhere in Houghton with a 'menyana I wouldn't look at twice.

Even Aunt Peggy herself manages not to sell-out in the potato boycott. Although her Joe-Louis-Knock-Out concoction is usually brewed with horse lungs and potato jackets

she tells me she's a true daughter of Africa and wouldn't touch a potato even to throw at a cop batoning her. But seeing she has to satisfy her customer's thirst, she decided to use banana peels instead.

Confronting intolerable social or political situations (or refusing to confront them) by demonstrating a determined undauntedness was possible in Sophiatown in the 50's, but not in Soweto after 1976. Motsisi acknowledges this by a kind of drift into nostalgia and vagueness in a piece written in 1976:

Ah well, things aren't what they used to be. But Aunt Peggy is still there. Lumpy and lofty. Serene. Bearing things with patience until next year when we shall all see what will happen. Will Black Sense take over from Black Power. We want to see things shaping up nicely and going on smoothly . . .

The Sophiatown sketches, then, are real period pieces depicting a vanished time.

In the very few short stories, situations are dealt with realistically and vigorously. Ma Tladi, a shebeen queen addressing the father of an illegitimate child, and her own remonstrating husband, is very different from the "serene and lumpy" Aunt Peggy of the sketches:

"You drunkard of a pig . . . You come here saying 'nip, auntie'. You rubbish. You had better save that five shillings and go and buy your child clothes and napkins. Get out of here and stop saying 'nip, nip, auntie', before I throw boiling water on your face, you drunkard . . . You keep that babelaa's bek shut before I bash it in with this pot . . ."

The single poem in the collection, "The Efficacy of Prayer", is quite mordant:

. . . How the kids used to worship Dan the Drunk!
He was just like one of them grown older too soon.
'I'm going to be just like Dan the Drunk' a little girl
said to her parents . . .
The parents looked at each other and their eyes prayed.
'God Almighty, save our little Sally'.
God heard their prayer.
He saved their Sally.
Prayer. It can work miracles.
Sally grew up to become a nanny.

But it is probably Motsisi's comic writing, his response to his own exhortation "Forward the Light Brigade", by which he will be remembered most affectionately. ¹¹

COMMENT

by Oscar D. Dhlomo

Sheena Duncan's article on the Freiburg Conference (Reality September 1978) does not reveal the findings of the Conference with reference to the role of Chief Buthelezi and Inkatha in black South African politics. In fact, instead of reporting objectively on the conference findings in this regard Mrs Duncan deliberately casts a slur on Chief Buthelezi's leadership, alleging that he is "the only leader who has been allowed to organise and create his power base in Inkatha." It is clear that this allegation is based purely on Mrs Duncan's personal beliefs since it does not appear anywhere in the published findings of the Freiburg Conference. Mrs Duncan herself states that these surveys were conducted between 1974 and 1977. During this period the leaders of other black organisations were also still free to organise their followers. It is known that most black organisations were banned in October 1977 when the survey was already concluded. In Freiburg I recall that as I was standing next to Chief Buthelezi during tea break, Mrs Duncan came up to us and "heartily" congratulated Chief Buthelezi on the German scientists' findings with regard to his leadership role in South African politics! On this occasion Mrs Duncan did not express the views she now expresses in your September issue of Reality. I am therefore left wondering why she decided to be hypocritical about the whole issue. Is this perhaps typical of our so-called liberal friends? For the benefit of your readers who were not in Freiburg I wish to summarise (with your permission) the full text of the published findings of the Conference with reference to Chief Buthelezi and Inkatha in South African politics. I will leave it to the readers to judge whether or not Mrs Duncan's comments on Chief Buthelezi and Inkatha can be regarded as an authentic, objective and scientific account of the findings of the Conference in this regard.

1. Black Leadership and Political Organisations

Who are the Political Leaders of the Blacks?

In the survey the black respondents were asked: "Among Black leaders in South Africa, who do you admire most?" The following is a comment on the results:

The leading personality emerging far on top was Chief M. G. Buthelezi, the President of Inkatha, who was named by 43,8% of those questioned. The leaders of the A.N.C. followed in second place with 21,7% jointly. Of these Mr Nelson Mandela emerged with 18,6% of the support, while Mr Oliver Tambo, Chief Albert Luthuli, Mr Walter Sisulu and others were all named by less than 1% of the sample.

The third place was taken by a group of homeland leaders representing together 18,3% of the sample. Among them Dr Cedric Phathudi of Lebowa was named by 6,4%, followed by Prof. Hudson Ntsanwisi with 4%. Only 3,6% of the sample named Chief Kaiser Matanzima of Transkei and Chief Lucas Mangope of Bophuthatswana.

In fourth place with 7,4% came the deceased P.A.C. leader Mr Robert Sobukwe.

The fifth and last group of politicians worth mentioning were the leaders of the Black Consciousness Movement. Only 3,5% of the sample named this Movement. Of these 2,1% named Mr Tsietsi Mashinini, and 0,8% named Mr Steve Biko (the survey was conducted before his death).

The scientists did indicate that in fact the Black Consciousness Movement was really not a movement in the true sense of the word but just a state of mind. So that it was difficult to pinpoint any one individual as a leader of such a movement. Graphically the findings can therefore be summarised as follows:

Chief Buthelezi	43,8%
Homeland leaders	18,3%
A.N.C. leaders	21,7%
PAC leaders	7,4%
Black Consciousness leaders	5,6%

Is Chief Buthelezi a "homeland leader?"

The scientists' findings on this regard were:

"The outstanding political phenomenon in urban Black politics is without doubt Chief Buthelezi. The results of the survey show not only that he is the homeland leader who is a national political figure, but that he is the political figure of Black South Africa in general. His following actually goes beyond the 43,8%. Those questioned who had named, as a preferred political leader neither Chief Buthelezi nor another of the homeland leaders, were asked an additional question:

"Is there a homeland leader whom you recognise as a genuine political leader?"

An additional 6,9% of those asked named Chief Buthelezi in reply to this question. None of the others reached more than one half of one percent. This means that more than half of those asked consider Chief Buthelezi either as the political leader or at least as an acceptable political leader."

Commentary:

The findings with reference to Chief Buthelezi's role in black politics in South Africa are indeed significant. Chief Buthelezi's opponents often claim that he is a homeland leader and that he is "working within the system". Indeed there have been taunts to the effect that if he were to resign as Chief Minister of KwaZulu he would get even a bigger following. Sometimes even government spokesmen boast that the policy of separate development has "produced leaders like Chief Buthelezi". This of course is a gross untruth which springs either from ignorance or a deliberate attempt to distort History. Long before the advent of homelands and the policy of separate development Chief Buthelezi's role was that of Prime Minister to the Zulu nation. During the last century Chief Buthelezi's great grandfather Chief Mnyamana Buthelezi was Prime Minister and Commander-in-Chief of the Zulu army. When the Zulus were defeated by the British in 1879, and King Cetshwayo was taken prisoner, the Prime Minister Chief Mnyamana Buthelezi and the King's brother, Prince Ndabuko, kept the loyal Zulus together. Chief Buthelezi's leadership therefore has nothing to do with homelands.

In fact even if he were to resign tomorrow as Chief Minister of KwaZulu, his traditional and historical role of Prime Minister to 5½ million Zulus would be unaffected. Nobody is therefore "allowing Chief Buthelezi to organise his people" as Mrs Duncan alleges in her article.

Is Chief Buthelezi a tribal leader?

The findings revealed that Chief Buthelezi was not only a leader of his own group but that his following extended far beyond. A total of 40,3% of his followers among urban blacks were not Zulus. Among Zulus in Durban and Soweto his followers represented an absolute majority, as was the case among the Ndebeles who have historical links with the Zulus. But also among other groups Chief Buthelezi was found to command considerable support as the following table shows:

Soweto Zulus	54,2%
Durban Zulus	78,3%
Xhosas	23,4%
Pedis	20,3%
S. Sothos	26,5%
Tswanas	39,1%
Vendas	36,5%
Swazis	42,1%
Ndebele	63,4%
Shangaans	29,5%

The conclusion of the scientists in this regard was that the political tendency represented by Chief Buthelezi constituted an All-South African force.

The Role of Inkatha

The conclusion of the scientists with reference to Inkatha was that Inkatha would play a key role in the future orientation of the urban black population.

When the survey was conducted 60% of the sample already knew about Inkatha, while 40% had never heard of the organisation. In Durban, where it originated it was already known to all strata of the population at the time of the survey. In Soweto Inkatha was known to 58,6% of the lower and to 74,8% of the higher strata of the population. In Pretoria on the other hand not quite one half of the higher population strata knew the organisation, as against only 14% of the lower strata.

Among reasons which were cited as a basis for a positive attitude towards Inkatha, the most prominent was the black solidarity aspect which was mentioned by 7,9% of those asked. Other reasons mentioned for supporting Inkatha were the organisation's concern with self-aid for development (3,6%) and its struggle for black liberation without violence (3,2%). On the whole, 21,9% of all those asked expressed themselves positively about Inkatha, as against 17,1% who were negative. This, according to the scientists is an appreciable result for an organisation which, at the time of the survey, had only been active for four years. Since the survey, Inkatha membership has already topped the 200 000 mark. The conclusion of the scientists in this regard was:

"On the basis of these results, there can be no doubt that Inkatha represents by far the strongest organised political tendency among urban blacks – the organised nucleus of a much larger following of Buthelezi."

Conclusion:

To many people (except Mrs Duncan) the findings of the Freiburg Conference with reference to Chief Buthelezi were not unexpected. These findings simply helped to confirm the findings of previous scientific surveys: In 1973 the Quotso Survey in Soweto revealed that Chief Buthelezi was the most popular politician among the people of Soweto. In 1974 a wide-scale Markinor Survey revealed that he was the only leader with measurable support outside his own territory.

We must warn against this dangerous tendency which is increasingly becoming a favourite hobby of some of our liberal fellow countrymen, whereby they take it upon themselves to anoint and reject leaders on behalf of blacks. This hobby does not only smack of paternalism but it is also a direct threat to peaceful change in this country. □

Oscar D. Dhlomo
SECRETARY-GENERAL : INKATHA

A REPLY

by Sheena Duncan

I regret that Mr Dhlomo should have taken exception to what I wrote. I tried to make it clear that I was reporting on the conference itself and *not* on the surveys. I did state that there was no space in a magazine article even to summarize the findings of the survey. The article was written at a time when the responses to the Black leadership questions had been prominently and recently reported in the national press.

I do not quite understand Mr Dhlomo's disagreement with the statement that Chief Buthelezi is the only Black leader who has been allowed to organise. The harassment and banning of Black leaders and organisations began long

before the crackdown of October 1977 which was only the most recent in a long history of such action – for example, that taken against the A.N.C. and the P.A.C.

Chief Buthelezi has every reason to be pleased with the result of the survey (and I am not sure how it can be hypocritical to have told him so) but this does not mean that one can ignore the undoubtedly significant groups of people who do not regard him as their leader. In the discussion at Freiburg it was pointed out that the 21,7% for A.N.C. leaders was astonishing in view of the fact that these leaders have been in prison or exile for many years. To report on these things is not "to anoint or reject leaders on behalf of Blacks". □

A CENTURY OF SOUTH AFRICAN SHORT STORIES

Introduced and edited by Jean Marquard, Ad. Donker/Publisher. Paperback R7,95.

Reviewed by Tony Voss

You know the old joke?

"They're pulling down the old pub! "

"Boo! "

"They're building a new one! "

"Hooray! "

"Only one bar? "

"Boo."

"Half a mile long."

"Hooray! "

"No barman."

"Boo."

"Fifty barmaids! "

"Hooray."

"They don't sell beer."

"Boo."

"They give it away free."

"Hooray."

etc.

Well:

"All the old South African short story anthologies are out of print or out of date, and the new ones are not comprehensive enough."

"Boo."

"Jean Marquard has produced a new one."

"Hooray"

"366 pages."

"Boo? "

"37 stories by 30 writers."

"Hooray."

"From 1895 . . ."

"Boo."

"To 1977."

"Hooray."

"Of the 30 writers, 15 are dead."

"Boo."

"The other 15 are still living."

"Hooray."

"Of these 15, 5 do not live in South Africa."

"Boo."

"The other ten do."

"Hooray! "

This generous collection, generous both in its offering of stories, and in Ms. Marquard's careful introduction deserves a cheerful response. The selection opens with William Charles Scully's "Umtagati" of 1895 and closes with Mbulelo Mzamane's "The Party" of 1977. The contrast between these two stories suggests that South African writers have written, as Joyce claimed to have done in **Dubliners**, "chapters in the moral history of their country", even if South Africa remains as divided as Joyce's Ireland. "Umtagati" (the title means "black magic" rather than simply "magic") turns on the use of a simple chemical experiment devised by a colonial civil servant and executed by his black messenger, to defeat ancient magic and uphold white rule. "The Party" concerns a group of black university students, two of whom are studying science. In one episode they are interrogated by the police:

Was it true, they asked, that we were being taught to manufacture small firearms and Molotov cocktails under the tutelage of American and British lecturers?

Ms. Marquard's selection makes many revealing juxtapositions possible and her introduction encourages critical reading.

The chronological range of the stories doesn't quite measure up to the century of the title, but the edition may justly claim that her selection covers a larger time-span than anything similar that has appeared. She suggests in her introduction that some previous collections have been limited by "the personal taste of the editor" or by an "educative" aim which meant that "pieces were chosen on the basis of their suitability for school or college courses". In my view, on the grounds of literary taste (as examples of a literary form or a good read), the stories in this collection by Fitzpatrick (1897), Glanville (1897), Cornell (1915), Gibbon (1918) and, perhaps, Cripps (1918), do not deserve the space (admittedly less than 30 pages) they occupy. But Ms. Marquard's aim has been "to meet the need for a comprehensive anthology of short stories

from Southern Africa." And who feels that need? Certainly teachers and pupils and lecturers and students. So Ms. Marquard's selection is illustrative, historical, and her introduction assumes an interest in the academic study of the short story. But that this book will or should reach a wide market in education does not mean that it has nothing to offer that person we're all longing to meet, the general reader. It has plenty, and Ms Marquard's introduction should be of wide critical interest, outside the strictly academic sphere.

For me, the collection is dominated by three persons: Pauline Smith, H. C. Bosman and Doris Lessing. It seems to me impossible to miss, reading through or dipping into this handsomely produced volume, the mastery of these three writers. Behind them, close behind them, come Dan Jacobson, Nadine Gordimer, William Plomer, A. C. Jordan, Can Themba Bessie Head Ahmed Essop, Barney Simon and James Matthews. And Ms. Marquard's selection acknowledges precedence: only five writers (the three masters and Gordimer and Jacobson) are represented by more than one story. In the short story these writers have found a *métier*: in each of their stories, for good or ill, they strike their own individual note. This is true of other writers represented here (Jordan, Essop, Simon), but one needs the evidence of their collections of short stories to be convinced of their mastery.

You can usually hear how good a story is in the first sentence:

At Naudé, who had a wireless set, came into Jurie Steyn's voorkamer, where we were sitting waiting for the Government lorry from Bekkersdal, and gave us the latest news. (Bosman, "A Bekkersdal Marathon")

It came about, according to some tale, that there was a man named Nyengebule. (Jordan, "The Turban")

They were good, the years of ranging the bush over her father's farm which, like every white farm, was largely unused, broken only occasionally by small patches of cultivation. (Doris Lessing, "The Old Chief Mshlanga")

This assumption of the significance of what they have to say, of their characters, of the emotions of narrator, persona or writer, makes for the intensity and economy of the best short stories. They concentrate, in a spirit of creative or imaginative provincialism, on the matter in hand, and by the close attention to the manner of their telling, to the universals of the story-teller's art, can reach the widest audience. One Doris Lessing story, for example, ("The Old Chief Mshlanga") has all the ecology of Jack Cope's "The

Little Stint" (a ponderous story, he could have been better represented), all the childhood evocation of Uys Krige's "The Coffin" (a fairly ponderous story) and most of the politics and psychology of Peter Wilhelm's "Pyro Protram" (a pretty smart story), and more besides.

There is a significant contradiction at the centre of this book: although it is called **A Century of South African Short Stories**, Ms. Marquard claims in her introduction to have prepared "a comprehensive anthology of short stories from southern Africa." (My emphasis.) Is South equal or not equal to Southern? What exactly are some of us writing/reading/talking about, others fighting for, others paying taxes to? While Babel lasts it is difficult to see how we can do without nations and attempts to make South Africa one of them. Certainly only the South African economy in Southern Africa could produce such a book as Ms. Marquard's for its home market. And she acknowledges in her introduction that she has

been obliged in this edition [there's hope in that phrase] to exclude the work of several distinguished writers – particularly Ezekiel Mphahlele, Alex la Guma, Lewis Nkosi – because at present their works are banned in South Africa.

And Can Themba's vivid, lucid, scary story, "The Suit", appears only thanks to the Secretary for Justice, R.S.A. The most powerful writer in the volume, Doris Lessing, is not now and never has been a South African.

As with all the best writers in this selection, the sense of place in Doris Lessing's stories is very strong indeed: and that place is not South Africa. This is noticeable also by contrast with those writers who evoke South Africa so particularly: Pauline Smith and Bosman especially, whose rural fictions, as Ms. Marquard remarks of the latter, have "the power to alter the map of a country by creating archetypes from that country's raw materials." But these stories evoke the urban scene as well. Peter Abrahams's "One of the Three", of 1942, is the first urban story: but there are also the township of Can Themba, the suburbs of James Matthews and Richard Rive, and the periurban areas of Sheila Roberts. A subtle transmogrification of setting takes place in Peter Wilhelm's story. And Mbulelo Mzamane's story is not set in South Africa, but his characters spend rands, smoke Van Rijn and drink Oudemeester.

One of the most satisfying things about Ms. Marquard's book is that it shows the variousness of the short story writer's art, from fireside folk-tale to fictional autobiography. I hope it runs to another edition and that by then Ms. Marquard's choice will be unrestricted. □

THE ANGLO-ZULU WAR OF 1879 -

AN EVALUATIVE REVIEW

by Oscar D. Dhlomo

Prologue

The January issue of *Reality* (Vol. 11 No. 1) was devoted to a series of articles on the origins, conduct and aftermath of the Anglo-Zulu War of 1879. The Editorial Board have in their wisdom requested me to write an evaluative review of that issue of *Reality*.

Reality must be congratulated on its apparently lonely efforts to re-examine the history of the Zulu people during the period of the war "in the light of facts kept hidden or glossed over in the past" (editorial). During the past 100 years most historians of the Anglo-Zulu War have indeed done a thorough and efficient job in either hiding, glossing over or blatantly distorting facts pertaining to this war. Consequently many myths pertaining to the war have found their way into history classrooms in the length and breadth of our country. A frank discussion about the war will therefore in the words of the editorial, "dispel some of the myths which history teachers have, no doubt unwittingly, helped to sustain these hundred years."

A cursory examination of the articles in the January issue of *Reality* reveals that the authors have touched on three main aspects, namely: (i) The white man's view of the War. (ii) Causes of the War and (iii) aftermath of the War.

1. The White Man's view of the War

John Wright's introductory article clearly portrays the white man's view of the war in terms of which British aggression against and invasion of the Zulu kingdom is seen as a triumph of British Civilization over Zulu savagery. This view is indeed prevalent especially amongst historians of the colonial era. The fact is that Zulu warriors who fell in 1879 were defending the territorial integrity and sovereignty of their kingdom against the aggression of the British Government — a government which they had for years regarded as a friendly neighbour and protector. Bishop Colenso's highly introspective sermon delivered two months after Isandlwana is precise on this point:

"I repeat the question, Wherein, in our invasion of Zululand, have we shown that we are men who love mercy? Did we not lay upon the people heavily, from the very moment we crossed their border, the terrible scourge of war? Have we not killed already, it is said 5,000 human beings, and plundered 10,000 head of cattle? . . . Have we not heard how the wail has gone up in all parts of the country for those who have bravely and nobly died in repelling the invader and fighting for their king and fatherland?" (p.7). Colenso's pointed question. "And shall we kill 10,000 more to avenge the losses of that dreadful day?" was decisively answered by British officials and their answer was the subsequent battles of Hlobane, Khambule and Ulundi. There is clearly a crying need for a critical study of the actions of certain British officials (notably Sir Bartle Frere) during the war who allowed, greed, hypocrisy and a lust for cheap and short-lived honour to dictate the pattern of their relations with the Zulu kingdom.

Jeff Guy (pp. 8-13) takes a broader and essentially original view of the war and shows how the distorted and sometimes blatantly false reports of British officials have misled generations of western writers. He sees the war for what it really was: "a calculated attack by the most powerful nation in the World, made to bring about certain changes in the social and political order in Southern Africa," and the machiavelian tactics used in this attack are also clearly high-lighted: ". . . solemn pledges were broken, and lies were propagated, by men who are still described as upright and true by historians".

One finds little fault with Guy's "holistic" view of the war, including his thesis that the war must be seen within the framework of the needs of developing capitalism in Southern Africa coupled with British imperialistic tendencies which were embodied in Lord Carnarvon's confederation scheme.

Of particular interest to all historians is Guy's questioning of the importance of the British military victory at Ulundi. It is interesting to note that Zulu oral tradition appears to support Guy's view in that it attributes the British victory at Ulundi only to the failure of the Zulu forces to heed King Cetshwayo's advice. It is such a pity that modern historical research methodology is still loathe to accept traditional oral narratives as reliable historical primary sources. As long as this state of affairs persists the complete story of the Anglo-Zulu War and indeed the whole history of the Zulu people shall never be told. According to oral tradition King Cetshwayo, a seasoned military strategist, had warned his generals the day before Ulundi that the British would send only a small force to test the Zulu strength and also to select a suitable site for the battle that was to come. He warned his forces against engaging British troops on the open plains and suggested that they should rather adopt guerilla tactics in the rugged terrain. The King was, however, overruled by his Generals and young Zulu national servicemen all of whom rightly thought that Ulundi was to be a serious British onslaught. Had the King's advice (wrong as it was) been heeded British troops would have found it very difficult to annihilate the Zulu army within a short time in rugged terrain. This narrative is supported by W. H. Longcast in an article published in the *Cape Times* of 11 September 1879 and also quoted by C. T. Binns (*The last Zulu King: The Life and Death of Cetshwayo* p.165).

The fact quoted by Guy that British riflemen only fired an average of 6,4 rounds each could best be explained by the assumption that other Zulu regiments might have heeded the King's warning that the British would send only a small force and therefore decided to remain in their barracks during the battle.

As another reason why he feels that Ulundi was not such a great military victory as it was made out to be, Guy quotes the fact that King Cetshwayo was only captured in August — about a month after the Battle of Ulundi.

While this may be so, we should not ignore the fact that

one important reason for the delay in the capture of King Cetshwayo was the remarkable loyalty of the Zulus to their King as exemplified in their total and uniform refusal to disclose his hiding place. Longcast who accompanied Lord Gifford in the search for the King remarks:

"We could get nothing from the Zulus. We were treated the same at every kraal. I had been a long time in Zululand. I knew the people and their habits, and although I believed they would be true to their King, I never expected such devotion. Nothing would move them. Neither the loss of their cattle, the fear of death, or the offering of large bribes would make them false to their King". (Binns p.169).

On the whole, Guy's approach is praiseworthy in that he attempts to open up new horizons in the search for a just and historically balanced estimate of the Anglo-Zulu War.

2. The Causes of the War:

There is little comment one could make on Peter Colenbrander's article since it is, in his own words, based mostly on A History of Natal by Brookes & Webb and Cope's unpublished M.A. dissertation entitled "Shepstone and Cetshwayo 1873-79." His narrative also coincides with Binn's account. In his concluding paragraph, Colenbrander intimates, without, however, substantiating his point, that the Zulus were also not blameless in this war. To my knowledge there has never been any historical evidence to prove that the Zulus had at any one time acted aggressively against Natal. On the contrary, King Cetshwayo had strictly avoided invading Natal even when he had the opportunity to do so. Further, after Isandlwana, King Cetshwayo sent messengers to Lord Chelmsford in an attempt to start negotiations for the ending of hostilities. These overtures were spurned by Lord Chelmsford who was bent on revenging the British defeat.

3. Aftermath of the War:

The capture of King Cetshwayo and his subsequent imprisonment in Cape Town led to the disintegration of the Zulu Kingdom and the advent of internal rivalries within the kingdom. It is difficult to escape the conclusion that this is exactly what the British officials were aiming at when they deliberately went out of their way to humiliate the king's senior advisers like Chief Mnyamana Buthelezi (the King's Prime Minister) who was placed under Chief Hamu's jurisdiction, and Prince Ndabuko (the King's brother) who was placed under Chief Zibhebhu and later under John Dunn. Further the British officials' blatant favouritism in respect of Chief Zibhebhu and Chief Hamu did not go unnoticed by Zulus who were still loyal to the King. This is further confirmed by King Cetshwayo's old headmen who once remarked as follows to the white officials: "We are not killed so much by Zibhebhu as by your White House. You have placed our section of the Zulu nation aside. You have taken into your special favour Zibhebhu and his people. With you Zibhebhu can do no wrong. Our King may not fight nor lift a hand. Zibhebhu may do as he likes, it is winked at, an official reprimand is made to him as a matter of routine but he suffers no real check". (Binns p. 210).

When the King returned from captivity it became clear that the terms for his return were designed to make it impossible for him to avoid a further conflict within his depleted kingdom. This British strategy also did not go unnoticed by Zulu leaders. During the King's second coronation at Emtonjaneni Prince Dabulamanzi delivered a remarkably prophetic speech which he addressed to Sir Theophilus Shepstone: "We thank you Sir, for bringing him (King Cetshwayo) back to us. But since it is we of the Reserve who came down to the Authorities in Maritzburg praying for him and saying This Chief and that Chief are troubling us, but we cannot fight them since they too are Cetshwayo's people, 'tell us now who are these 'dissatisfied

ones' for whom you are cutting off the land? Do you say that you are restoring him, this son of the Queen while all the time you are destroying him, just as you did formerly? Sir, you are killing him still as you did before when you made him king and then killed him. Show us these dissatisfied ones' for whom you are cutting off our land, who do not wish for the King.

Do you say that we are to move? Where will you put us since you are eating up all Cetshwayo's land? Tell us where you fix Zibhebhu's boundaries. Why do you give the land to the very people who have been killing us? Do you approve of their bloodshedding? You have come to kill him, not restore him." (Binns p.202). Campbell supports this view. "Fair play is a jewel which has been utterly lacking in the treatment Cetshwayo has received since his restoration". (Binns p.210).

Prince Dabulamanzi was proved right for in 1883 Chief Zibhebhu's Mandlakazi faction got engaged in battle with the King's Usuthu faction and in the process the King's Ulundi kraal was devastated and he himself was stabbed in the thigh by Chief Zibhebhu's men. The King fled to Nkandla where he found refuge with Chief Sigamanda Ncube in the Nkandla Forest. He was later persuaded to return to Eshowe where he died in February 1884.

Dick Cloete's assignment (pp. 20-23) has been the most difficult of all the others. To trace the fate of the Zulu people from 1879 to the present is no mean task. One glaring short coming in Cloete's article is that it conveys the false impression that political activity among the Zulus ended with the banning of the African National Congress in the 60's. The fact is that the struggle for liberation goes on unabated. Chief M. G. Buthelezi, grandson of Chief Mnyamana Buthelezi (King Cetshwayo's Prime Minister and Commander-in-chief) and great grand son of King Cetshwayo is now at the helm of the liberation struggle. Through Inkatha Yenkululeko Yesizwe of which he is President he has not only intensified the liberation struggle but he has also broadened it to include all oppressed black people in the country. The 200,000 strong Inkatha Movement has already spread its tentacles to the four provinces of the Republic and 40% of its membership is non-Zulu. One historical incident that many political commentators conveniently ignore is that Inkatha has already played a crucial role in thwarting the Pretoria Government's designs to deprive 5 million Zulus of their South African citizenship.

During the last KwaZulu elections Inkatha won 100% of the Legislative Assembly seats on the ticket of total rejection of independence for KwaZulu. Inkatha has also stood its ground against attempts by some officials of the now defunct Department of Information who have over the years tried unsuccessfully to form pseudo-opposition parties in KwaZulu with an aim of grooming puppet leaders who would sheepishly toe the Government line and plunge KwaZulu into so called independence and thus declare 5 million souls stateless in the land of their birth.

Last, but not least, Inkatha has participated in the formation of one of the most powerful black political alliances ever to be witnessed in South Africa – the South African Black Alliance. In this way Inkatha has joined forces with the Labour Party of South Africa (Coloured) the Reform Party (Indian) the Inyandza Party (Swazi) and the Dikoankwentla Party (Sotho) with an aim of forcing the Government to heed the united voice of the oppressed black masses. The enormous power wielded by the South African Black Alliance keeps on increasing each year as more political groupings join in large numbers.

So it is that Inkatha under the leadership of Chief Buthelezi has earned itself an undisputed role in the black liberation struggle in the 70's, and no perceptive political observer can deny the fact that any South African political dispensation that tries to ignore Inkatha and Chief Buthelezi shall never see the light of day.

Conclusion:

I am rather disappointed that not a single article amongst those evaluated conveys a spirit of reconciliation between Zulu and Briton and between black and white. The Zulus defeated the British at Isandlwana and the British in turn defeated the Zulus at Ulundi. However, wars are wars and history is studded with accounts of enemy nations which have emerged from opposing battlefronts to become mutual partners in the creation of a just society. Let it be with us after the Anglo-Zulu War, the Battle of Blood River, and

all the other holocausts we have had to witness in this part of the continent of Africa. □

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