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**The Great
White Hunter**



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EDITORIAL

THE GOVERNMENT AND THE BLACK WORKER

The Government's banning of four young white trade union organisers is an act of madness. It is of course said to be an act of maintenance of law and order, but that does not prevent REALITY from seeing it as an act of madness. It is a mark of our dichotomous society that what one person sees as a highly sensible and necessary act, another should see as an act of madness.

The order is apparently directed at four young white people. But that will not prevent many people, both in this and in other countries, from seeing it as directed against the black worker of South Africa. It is this that

makes it appear to them to be not only unjust, but highly dangerous to the very people who issued it on the grounds of sensibility and necessity.

This act has several terrible implications. In the first place it is directed against the development of black trade unions. The Government is in effect saying to black workers. "We don't want you to have trade unions. We want to act in your best interests therefore we think you should have works committees and not trade unions. This will save you from the evil machinations of those who don't really care for your welfare, but are anxious to destroy law and order for their own purposes."

It should be said at once that it is the Government and some of the industrialists who want the works committees. It is the black workers, and again some of the industrialists, who want the trade unions. The reason is simple. Those who want the works committees want every manifestation of industrial discontent isolated in its own factory, where it can be dealt with by the management, and where the "agitators" can be clearly identified and if necessary punished or penalised. They are afraid lest the discontent should be referred to a trade union, whose power to press for the removal of grievances is much greater, and whose leaders are not necessarily subject to factory control.

Those industrialists who want trade unions have grasped the truth that only fair dealing brings peace, and therefore they are not afraid to deal with trade unions. As for the black worker, he knows that works committees, especially under unenlightened employers, are impotent.

The second implication is much more terrible than the first. All those who work for change know that one of the things that needs changing most is the gross disparity between black income and white income; for while this disparity is so gross, there can be no common society, whether unitary or federal. Will employers reduce this disparity? By themselves, NO. Will the Government reduce it? It appears not. Does that mean that the Government **wants** to maintain the disparity? Either the Government **wants** to maintain the disparity, or the Government does not see the urgent need to reduce it. Either implication is shocking.

The third implication is yet more terrible. The gross disparity means poverty for many black people. Poverty

means hunger. Poverty means malnutrition. Poverty means social insignificance. Does the Government, do some industrialists, do some white South Africans, actually **want** poverty to continue. It would appear, either that they want it, or that they do not care about it.

Poverty also means a poor education, the denial of the right to break out of your poverty. Do the rich volunteer to educate the poor? One is thankful that some of them do—TEACH, LEARN, the ESTCOURT INDIAN ONE CENT BURSARY TRUST (though by no means all of its donors are rich), the INSTITUTE OF RACE RELATIONS bursary funds, the many people who leave their money to educational trusts. This is wonderful, but it should not need to be done. Free education should be the right of all our children.

There is one last thing to be said. The denial of these rights, the right to education, the right to escape poverty, the right to earn a decent living, the right to organise labour, makes it necessary for a government to take to itself powers to silence and restrict all those who actively work to achieve them for all people. The Government is not maintaining law and order. It is maintaining the privilege of the white, the rich, the employers, the enfranchised, to preserve their wealth and their status, a wealth and status that are enjoyed at the expense of others.

REALITY reaffirms its support for all those people who are striving, very often at great cost to themselves, to achieve better and more equitable conditions for the black worker, and to create a social order that will be safe against the attacks of any enemy whatsoever. □

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Shortly before we went to press Mr David Hemson was banned. An article by him was to have appeared on these pages. We leave them blank partly to remind our readers of the impoverishing effects of banning, upon us all.

David Hemson was a member of the Editorial Board of **Reality**—a position which his banning order forces him to resign. He was an assistant-secretary of the Furniture Workers' Union, and was banned along with his fellow trades union workers Halton Cheadle, David Davis and Jeanette Cunningham-Brown. Reality records its thanks to David Hemson for the help he gave on the Reality Board and expresses to him and his colleagues its support for the work they were doing and its detestation of the unjust, cruel and senseless banning procedures. □

SOME IMPLICATIONS OF THE 1973 BANNINGS

(A talk given to a Progressive Party Lunch Hour Forum in Pietermaritzburg in December, 1973.)

by Colin Gardner

First, some general points about banning. By now it should be clear to any alert person that a banning order, so far from being an indication that the recipient of the order has committed some crime, is in fact more-or-less a proof that he has committed **no** crime. This Government is eager to get convictions; if a person is suspected of having committed an offence he is likely to be charged.

It would be wrong to suppose that the people who are banned are the only victims of banning. Society is a victim. Those who know banned persons or know their writings are unable to quote from them or even to refer to what they have said; those who have not known what they have said are not allowed to know. The impoverishment is serious. This is particularly so in the case of such a person as Dr Manas Buthelezi, who is a man of quite unusual originality and sensitivity. What he has to say, and the exact way in which he decides to say it, South Africa as a whole needs to know. He is in many respects the Martin Luther King of South Africa. He has been gagged, and we are the losers.

And we are the losers in other ways too. Bannings tend to intimidate people. We are all diminished by the silencing of a banned person.



Most of the people who have been banned in the past year—and there are many of them—are blacks. Articulate blacks, leaders of the community, people who have been voicing some of the feelings of the black majority of the population; leading members of SASO, BPC, Black Community Programmes, and now the Christian Institute. These people have not been plotting the overthrow of the state; they have not been breaking the law or (as far as I know) planning to break the law. Many of them have not even spent much of their energy denouncing the Government. They have been pointing out, much of the time in an incisive but reasoned manner (and here I am referring to a whole way of thinking, not to the specific utterances of banned persons)—blacks have been pointing out, firstly, that the present system of racial and economic injustice is

extremely painful to black people, and secondly, that by recognising their own humanity, their own importance as human beings, blacks can exert a steady pressure and thus contribute vitally to the process of change that the country so obviously needs. I wish I could talk about the way in which Dr Manas Buthelezi conceives these thoughts in profoundly Christian terms.

Now many of the people who have been giving particular expression to such thoughts have been silenced. There are still many people who can and will continue to say such things. There is always Chief Gatsha Buthelezi. But clearly the Government has been trying to stop articulate and enlightened black people from stating their views.

What is likely to be the result of this? The result is likely to be the same as in all other instances of the obstructing of a natural and healthy process. In this country black people suffer abnormally; it is natural and right that they should be able to express their feelings and, in doing this, work towards a fair sharing of the goods of society. When you obstruct a natural process, you produce either a certain inertness, or an explosive violence, or both. The silencing of black spokesmen is likely to produce **both**—an inertness in society, especially the dominant white part of society, which is unlikely to modify its views greatly unless it is made to face up (and soon) to the realities of black thinking and feeling; and then, an explosion of black violence, when the thoughts and feelings that are being so dammed up can be contained no longer.

The Government claims that certain English-language newspapers are inciting racial hatred. Such accusations are absurd. Nothing induces racial hatred and despair more than a banning order. The other day I met an old African friend who was so deeply moved and angered by the banning of Dr Buthelezi that he was unable to speak about it at all; he asked me, when I raised the subject, to talk about something else.

But let us not, those of us who are whites, put all the blame on the Government. We are the people who allow this

sort of thing to happen. We are, partly, the society which acquiesces in banning. Many of us only think about it as we read the newspapers. Why? Because we feel secure. And why do we feel secure, most of the time? Because we don't know what black people are thinking and feeling. And if we did know, would we know how to respond? No.

Dr Manas Buthelezi, and many of the other black people who have been banned this year, have been showing the crucial truths about the state of affairs in this country, and they have been suggesting ways of responding creatively, both for blacks and for whites. They have been describing a way in which society might evolve naturally and humanely. Dr Buthelezi is a theologian and a dedicated minister of religion who prefers reconciliation to revolution.

As a reward for his insight and his dedication he has been banned. But in a sense we have all been banned. And in one sense, but an important sense, we have banned ourselves. And most of us don't even care.

• • •

I'd like to say a little more about the question of obstructing a natural process.

It seems to me that the body politic is in several respects like the human body. It depends for its health on many sorts of flow, movement, circulation. Stop up one of these natural flows and something dreadful happens.

The body politic functions in a different way and at a different pace; but there are many points of similarity. And let us not forget that, whether they are officially excluded or not, even if they are fobbed off with unreal provisions and promises, black people are a part of the South African body politic. They participate in and contribute richly to the society in which we all live. They are here, and they matter—they matter a great deal. They also suffer a great deal (as I said earlier), and it is essential that their suffering and their aspirations (whether or not most white people agree with all of these aspirations) be expressed, and be allowed to exert an influence, in the normal and natural way, upon the development of the body politic. People are alive, people change and develop; it is natural that a body politic should be alive, and change and develop. If it is not permitted to behave like a living and changing thing, something dreadful happens.

Now life, change, development within the body politic is precisely what this Government dislikes and is determined—in a Canute-like way—to thwart. The Government is wedded to the status quo. It loves to talk of the "traditional South African way of life"—in other words, it constantly looks back to the past. It loves to say, "If you want to change society, you must do it through the ballot-box"—in other words, live contentedly within the status quo of "whites only" politics. To black people it in effect says—in so far as it deigns to communicate with them at all—"We are busy constructing for you a little side-track of a status quo which will give you a vantage-point from which we hope you won't be able to have any



Dr Manas Buthelezi.

influence upon the **real** status quo, which we like to call **our** status quo."

It is all as if some surgeon, some crazed transplant-expert, were to channel the blood of a person's body into a limb, an artificial limb, in such a way that it could never flow back to the heart.

But English-speaking whites of a liberal or progressive persuasion often make the mistake of assuming that the damming-up that takes place in our society, the thwarting of natural movements in the body politic, is wholly or largely the work of Afrikaner Nationalism. I have tended to think so myself in the past. But I now think it is not so. If thoughtful English-speaking whites look around at their fellows, if indeed they look into themselves, they find that there is a great deal of **acceptance** of the situation in which we find ourselves. Of course it isn't easy to know what exactly one can **do** in the circumstances; I don't want to underestimate that problem. But it is surprising how many concerned or supposedly-concerned persons are content to do almost nothing.

They are content to do little or nothing because, essentially, and whether or not they are wholly conscious of the fact, the situation that they are in is a pleasing and convenient one. They too, essentially, are in love with the status quo, the "traditional South African way of life." The economic dice are loaded so attractively in favour of the white man. It has often been said that the English South African thinks Progressive, votes U.P., and thanks

God for the Nationalist Party. He enjoys the advantages of the status quo combined with the pleasures of what he thinks is a clear conscience.

And I think it would be only fair to add that it isn't only those who vote U.P. who quietly enjoy the South African status quo. People who are Progressives, even perhaps active Progressives, are often in the midst of a clandestine love-affair with the status quo. (I don't claim immunity myself, I may add). To take but one instance, some of the things that I have heard from members of the local students' Wages Commission suggest that Progressive people aren't always wholly progressive in practice ...

I think we whites must all shudder and bow our heads when we think of the implications of these recent bannings, the implications of what is happening in our society—implications which involve us all and which partly accuse us all.

• • •

There is one of these implications that I'd like to develop a little further. I said earlier that an obstruction of a natural process could lead to an inertness—in this case, an inertness among whites, who are unlikely to modify their views unless they are made to face up, before it is too late, to the thoughts and feelings of black people.

Let me apply this thought to the position of the Progressive Party. For all its talent, for all its strong arguments, it has not so far made much progress as a political force

among the whites. (Though I support the Progressive Party in very many ways, I am not at the moment speaking as a Progressive, still less am I voicing an official Party view). Now it seems to me that the Progressive Party's arguments, many of which are in themselves very powerful, will make little headway among whites until they are backed up by a **natural pressure from blacks**. It is pressure from blacks, real pressure, that whites understand. When that pressure begins to be exerted, and when it becomes clear that it cannot be stamped out by bannings, prohibitions, legislation, etc., then (I think)—and not before then—many white people will begin to pay attention to the Progressive Party.

"That's it," Mr Vorster might say, "and that's why I am trying to stamp out the black pressure." Mr Vorster might say it; but many whites, even secretly some Progressives, would agree with him. "I ban people," Mr Vorster would say, if he were in the habit of speaking openly about such matters, "I ban people in order to preserve the traditional South African way of life."

But of course society, especially a society like ours, cannot be static. Black people **are feeling bitter resentments** whether they are allowed to express their feelings or not. These resentments are beginning to boil and bubble under the surface. Most whites continue complacently to live their traditional way of life.

It is difficult to escape the conclusion that, as things are going now, sooner or later something dreadful must happen. □

SOUTH AFRICA AND 'THE CUBIST SENSIBILITY'

by Peter Strauss

The Cubist movement was such a complex affair that it probably changed our sensibilities in a thousand different ways. But why not start talking about the Cubists bit by bit, at any rate? They have changed our lives so radically that we should never stop analysing them. I want to talk about a particular effect that became less and less evident as the movement developed. It is most inescapable in the early canvasses of 1907 and 1908. Let me give some examples: Picasso's *Les Femmes d'Alger* (1907); his *Fruit and Wineglass*, and particularly his *Three Women*, both of 1908; Braque's *Houses at L'Estaque* of 1907. These pictures bring us into an extraordinarily close relationship with them, if we compare them with, say,

works of the High Renaissance. It is as though a broad carpet that had separated us from the canvasses were rolled away, and we could step right up to them now—and are almost drawn into them.

In Renaissance paintings I am always aware of this carpet. It is a broad carpet, obeying the laws of perspective, probably marked off in little squares also obeying the laws of perspective, and it calmly separates me from what is behind it: the event. Of course the painting itself is three-dimensional—in fact, it is an extension of this carpeted hall I am standing in; like a mirror in a restaurant

it gives the illusion of twice as much space. And within this extension of the space of the hall the event takes place. It takes place in three dimensions but not around me; I am not involved in it; I watch it across the carpet. The painter has put the event behind a theatre proscenium; it becomes a spectacle. Da Vinci's **Last Supper** is the perfect example.

The Mannerists that followed on the Renaissance painters used three-dimensional space very differently, and they are probably to be taken seriously as the ancestors of Cubism, as well as of the horror comic. They used foreshortening and odd view-points and gesture in such a way as to lead the eye along a pattern of receding limbs rather deep **into** the picture. Space became active—a matter of grandiloquent gesture. In a new way, the space within the painting was linked to the space outside, in which the spectator was standing. The event in the picture was an extension of the events taking place in himself. For one thing, the space of the picture was usually an extension of the fact that the picture itself was towering over the spectator. The picture itself 'continued' this towering effect. The gestures of the figures in the picture were an extension of the spectator's own spiritual gestures. Unfortunately the emotion was invariably 'bad' emotion—grandiloquence—and if the new use of space, with its greater tactileness and its greater ability to involve the spectator in it as an extension of it, made a new intimacy possible, everything else about the art repelled any intimacy.

You need to jump all the way to Degas to find the same kind of space used to portray, say, a woman trying on hats. Degas used the unexpected viewpoint of the Mannerists (actually theirs tended to be in fact rather more predictable than his). He also used (to create an **active** space) a way of strongly suggesting planes at various interesting angles to each other and to the plane of the picture's surface. We are not looking at his images over a carpet, either. Nor are we looking through a window at a field of light, as with most of the Impressionists.

Degas is actually astonishing. If his pictures didn't have the air of being mere sketches, if his subject-matter were less charming and distracting—Degas would be a much more alarming artist than he appears. Fortunately, also, for his easy acceptance, his boldest experiments have the air of declaring themselves to be oddities. The Renaissance artists let us see the show as though we were sitting in the auditorium; Degas let us see it from the wings or from the flies. Which is a unique and magical experience, but one never need feel about it that this is the way the show ought to be seen. Degas brought us into a new and, at first, an odd-seeming intimacy with the world around us. But with him this could still seem like a holiday from 'proper' seeing. It took a man as tough-minded as Picasso to show us that the world outside us really is as close to us as his pictures make it seem.

For in the Cubist pictures I am talking about one is involved in the space of the picture as one never had been before. It is useless to use the old language and talk of the tactile qualities of three-dimensional form. It is that the shapes on the canvas have business to execute with our hands, and our hands have business to execute with them.

The world that is inside the picture is a world that is 'to hand' and 'at hand.' We become aware for the first time just to what extent we perceive the world as an extension of our body, and space in terms of it. These Cubist paintings make our body 'continue' into the objects of the everyday world. And the world, instead of remaining a spectacle, becomes an environment—presses on us with its information and its demands.

The sensibility developed by this element of Cubism is paralleled in the twentieth century views on perception—in the work of the gestalt psychologists and the phenomenologists. It has obtained the greatest mass significance through the most democratic of art forms, the cinema. True, we all know films that use the screen to suggest spectacle. But we have also all come across camerawork that has the effect of using the screen to place us in an environment.

We find a similar sensibility at work in the few mature poems of the English war poet, Isaac Rosenberg. It was the sensibility that enabled him to depict so much of the horror of life in the trenches in the First World War—and also so much of its humanity and harsh beauty. Rosenberg was a poet whose development we can follow from very early on, and the transformation of his style is astonishing. In his early works we find ourselves vaguely floating, disembodied through an adolescent's world of longings and intimations. With a late work, however, we find ourselves caught within a precise field of tensions—the poem is a place, an environment, where conflicting energies are held in the unstable synthesis of a human moment. The world has contracted to a place where meaning is learned from things as close to you as the poppy you have stuck behind your ear, or the rat that jumps over your hand.

If, then, the sensibility of the early Cubist paintings and the poetry of Rosenberg is one which—as I believe —characterises our twentieth century relationship with the world, what is there to learn from it that might help us—and particularly the Whites among us, who are about as helpless as soldiers caught up in a war—to live meaningfully in contemporary South Africa?

What choices are open to us in the realm of action? We can choose to do what we can within the White political establishment—certainly a choice that may be a noble one—but one in which one's power is virtually nil, and above all one that may be temperamentally repulsive to some of us. We can do our bit in getting the Black labour movement under way. But not all of us have the qualities of character that are requisite in such work. Moreover it must inevitably be work that strives to make itself—and all White intervention—superfluous. It is work that the White must feel in some degree to be destructive of his own freedom of action. One would like to be able to help form the future consciousness of one's country. But Black consciousness, on which it will depend, has rejected us. We are truly at a loose end. True, we can be sure that this will not always be the case. The time will come when even the White liberal or radical will have his hands more than full, when there will be only too much for him to do and decide. It is the interim that is so agonising to us. And we feel it as a subtle destruction of our character, so

that we are afraid that when the time comes we will no longer be able to rise to what is demanded of us.

To me it seems that all we can do in the interim is live as fully and as consciously as possible, and the 'Cubist sensibility' can help us to do this. We need to feel every aspect of our environment as something close and pressing on us, involving us. This entails a breaking away from all idealism, all Utopianism, all theoretic analysis. The liberal sensibility has been subtly undermined by the utilitarian reasonableness of nineteenth century thought. But our actual lives in South Africa have necessarily been different. We feel daily around us the naked impact of humiliation and despair, the horrible fecundity of misunderstandings multiplying in our relationships with each other— and occasionally we feel the flash, the unmitigated directness, of communication, and a sense of the fundamental unity of being in the same country for good or ill. This unity is not the unity of a utilitarian community that understands itself and its common needs as part of an abstract system, or part of a community of ideals. It is the unity of people responding with intense imaginativeness to their own pressures and needs, and so also to those of others, with

which they are inevitably involved. We understand each other because our jagged problems are locked together and complementary, like the pieces of a jigsaw or the planes in a Cubist picture.

So we should read not Mill but Fanon, that terribly distorted mind. Distorted he may be by his sense of injustice, by his bitterness, by his Black chauvinism—but the very distortion of his mind, so one thinks at times, is what he has to give to us, what he has to say to us. It should be the same with the writing we produce—we need a Fanon. We can no longer reach after ideal solutions or serene analyses: what we can produce is only the distorted moment of our being registered with urgent consciousness and humanity. We can make it clear to ourselves and to each other that we live in an environment in which the strengths and weaknesses of man reveal themselves with direct, though often ambiguous and difficult, intensity.

If we live and are conscious in this way we shall often find our consciousness intolerable to ourselves; but at least we shall know ourselves to be alive and human. □

BWANA GO HOME

(Bob Hitchcock: pub. Howard Timmins: 165 p.p. R4,75)

by Alan Paton

This book is easy to read, it is full of factual information, it is good lively journalism. But don't read it for relaxation, or to be cheered up, because it won't relax you and it won't cheer you up.

I am at a disadvantage because I have not been to independent Zambia at all. I last visited the actual country in 1958, when it was called Northern Rhodesia, and was part of the ill-fated Federation of Central Africa, one of the last attempts in history by the white man to impose his will on black men.

I must therefore rather relate the facts as Mr Hitchcock sees them, because I am in no position to confirm or contest them, I am going to assume that the facts are true, though it is possible that the whole sad story has been coloured by Mr Hitchcock's extreme disillusionment with Zambia and President Kaunda.

Indeed Mr Hitchcock can be said to have three themes. The first is Zambia and the President. The second is the inexorable growth of the guerrilla movement and its

immense threat to the rulers of Portugal, Rhodesia, and South Africa. The third is the warning, grave and authoritative, that if the white man in Africa doesn't come to his senses, the end of his tenancy is near.

Let us consider the first theme. Mr Hitchcock is not a racist and he does not write like a racist. On the contrary he believes in human equality. But every black Zambian who reads this book will regard him as a racist. His condemnation of modern Zambia is extreme. But so also is his condemnation of colonial North Rhodesia, where a white miner could earn R200 per month and pay his servant R4,00 where men like Kaunda could be thrown out of white-owned shops, and where the noble white-wash of "partnership" covered up the dirty structures of race discrimination.

Then came Mr Hitchcock's turn, not exactly to be thrown out, but to go with good intentions into a Zambian bar, and be totally ignored by the barman. Mr Hitchcock regards the Zambian army as "one of the most undisciplined armies in Africa" and gives examples of white

motorists and others who have suffered at roadblocks and other places the same kind of humiliations that black people had to suffer in the colony of Northern Rhodesia. Some white inhabitants have become Zambian citizens, but Mr Hitchcock regards them as "sad people".

I could go on at length like this, but the substance of it is already written. It is a story of black revenge for white contempt. This is the thing that white South Africans fear. It is the theme of Mr Karel Schoeman's novel *NA DIE GELIEFDE LAND*. Chief Buthelezi says it needn't happen here, but is he right? The Chief received a great reception at the January Conference of the Institute of Race Relations, but the atmosphere of the whole Conference was one of anxious hope. And the great question, the abiding question, is whether white South Africa has time to make amends, and will it help if she does. And because no one knows the answer, there are two courses open. One is to make amends. The other is not to make amends, or if you do make them, make them as slowly as possible, and get yourself blown sky-high in the company of the Cadmans and Wileys of this stupid world.

Mr Hitchcock's disillusionment with Zambia extends to the President himself. He believes that Zambia has become a dictatorship but that it is not Dr Kaunda who rules it. I must confess that I did not understand clearly who rules it, unless it is Minister Grey Zulu and Brigadier Kingsley Chinkuli. But that was certainly not Chief Buthelezi's impression. Therefore I shall leave it.

Mr Hitchcock believes that the President did not believe the Army account of the tragic shooting of the two Canadian girls, but that he had no alternative but to accept it. The official viewpoint was that the Rhodesians were to blame, and that they had arranged the killing for political purposes. Now white Rhodesians have done many stupid and outrageous things, but they didn't do that.

I have received a letter from Mrs Oscar Drijber, the mother of one of the dead girls. It is a letter seeking for enlightenment. She has also been and still is a well-wisher of the new African countries. What has happened? Can I explain it? She hopes she is not intruding.

I gave her what enlightenment I could. I found myself passing the same judgement as Mr Hitchcock. I wrote that one must recognise the intense enmity and even

hatred that exists between Zambia and white Rhodesia, and that I had no doubt that it was this hatred that was one of the main causes of her daughter's death. And I told Mrs Drijber that she certainly was not intruding. She was writing about something that I felt deeply.

Mr Hitchcock's second theme is frightening. He calls the present situation a war between Peking and Pretoria, which is exactly as our government regards it. Although the President and his Foreign Minister deny the presence of guerillas, Mr Hitchcock calls Zambia, "with certainty," the nerve-centre of guerilla war, and he visited some of their leaders. Paulo Gumane, leader of the Coremo (a breakaway from Frelimo), regards South African towns as easy to conquer because of their large black population. He thinks that 1974, 1975, and 1976, will be "bloody" years. Mr Hitchcock believes that China's moral influence and hold on the guerillas is very great. He regards the building of the new Botswana-Zambia highway as very dangerous to white South Africa. He reckons that 1976 and 1977 will be critical years. As I said, a white South African, or anyone who hopes for a reasonably peaceful solution, won't find any cheer in this book.

Mr Hitchcock's third theme is one of the recurring themes of REALITY. He writes this of the period 1976-1977.

What will happen from then on will depend largely on the racial climate at the time inside South Africa.

If the people in power insist on continuing to make life unpleasant for the Black majority, bloodshed is probable. And the world will regard such an act by rebels as justifiable social surgery on an unjust regime.

A regime that rejected its chance to encourage evolution and encouraged instead revolution.


It is clear I think to an increasing number of white South Africans that the hostility of the world and the intensity of guerilla warfare, far from abating, are mounting. It is to be admired that Mr Hitchcock, in spite of his disillusionment with Zambia, is no believer in the maintenance of white supremacy.

Some people will say that all liberals must read this book, and it will teach them a lesson. But it is not they who need the lesson. It is the Nationalists and the HNP, and the Old Guard of that sad United Party, and all other white South Africans who fear and resist change. □

THE STRUGGLE FOR INDEPENDENCE OF 'PORTUGUESE' AFRICA.

Reprinted from the UNESCO COURIER, November, 1973

by Basil Davidson



(Unesco Courier)

Map, left, shows in white the African territories under Portuguese administration. On September 24, 1973, the Republic of Guinea (Bissau) was proclaimed by the first session of the newly elected National Assembly held in the liberated areas of the country. General elections for the members of the National Assembly were held in 1972 by the African Party for the Independence of Guinea (Bissau) and Cape Verde, known as PAIGC, following meetings throughout the liberated areas.

Africa's problems of today are sometimes described as being those of the transition from ways and ideas of the more or less distant past to ways and ideas of the modern world. This idea of transition is a useful one, at least so long as one keeps in mind that the ways and ideas of Africa's more or less distant past were valid forms of civilization, in their day and age, and not some kind of hopeless barbarism.

But there may be a better definition for Africa's problems of today, especially in those large regions that are still under foreign rule, whether colonial or racist. I suggest that these problems are really those of the renewal of indigenous processes of social and cultural development: of the renewal, that is, of processes which were already in existence before the period of foreign rule but which

were stopped and distorted by the consequences of foreign rule, and remain so to this day.

Essentially, then, these are the developmental problems of a genuine and effective democratisation within the framework of modernising institutions. Looked at in this light, the problems of the inhabitants of the Portuguese colonies, a total of some fifteen million Africans and about half a million Portuguese and other European settlers or employees, appear in all their difficulty.

The position of these Africans is a rather special one, though possessing obvious parallels with that of their neighbours in Rhodesia and South Africa. This specialness doesn't arise from the antiquity of Portugal's adventures in Africa, for the story of Portuguese colonialism is little

different in its broad outlines from that of any other colonial power.

It's true, of course, that Portuguese soldiers were able to seize and minimally colonize a few coastal areas of Angola and Mozambique as long ago as the 16th century, while others pushed up the valley of the Zambezi as far as Sena and Tete, where they had founded settlements before 1600. But the effective colonial occupation of these vast territories of Angola and Mozambique, and of the smaller territory of West African Guiné (the old "Rios do Cabo Verde"), began only in the 1890s and was not made complete until the 1920s.

The specialness arises from something else. It arises from the nature of the Portuguese colonial system and ethos, and above all from their refusal to make any least concession to the claims of African equality and sovereignty in Africa.

The motivations of those who govern Portugal are various and interesting. But whatever they are their stern intransigence—and words far less polite could reasonably be used, and often are—has enormously enhanced the problems of modernisation.

This intransigence has meant that the necessary journey "into the modern world" of the Africans whom they rule cannot begin so long as they remain in command.

Within the Portuguese system these Africans may be able, if rarely, to acquire the elements of modern education, but it will only be an education designed to serve the ends of Portuguese nationalism. These Africans may be able to participate in modernising forms of economic activity, but once again it will only be as servants or subordinates of an economy designed to benefit Portugal.

The present Prime Minister of Portugal, Professor Marcello Caetano, has explained why. "The natives of Africa," he wrote in an important doctrinal statement of 1954, never since modified "must be directed and organised by Europeans but are indispensable as auxiliaries. The blacks must be seen as productive elements organised, or to be organised, in an economy directed by whites." (*Os Nativos na Economia Africana*, Coimbra 1954).

Denied the hope of peaceful change, the "natives of Africa," as we know, have chosen armed resistance rather than continued surrender to foreign rule, just as the natives of other continents have done in situations not dissimilar.

Much has been written about this armed resistance, but really it is not the interesting or important part of the story. That part lies in the use which the movements of resistance have made of areas, large or small, from which they have evicted Portuguese control. There, at last, they have been able to begin to run their own affairs, and, in doing that, to forge new institutions and structures of society that can underpin the needs of material and cultural progress.

Here, in other words, the tasks of democratisation within modernising frameworks are being tackled for the first time in these territories. No longer "auxiliaries" of the colonial system. Africans in these liberated areas can stand on their own feet and face the challenge of their own problems.

What do you find in these liberated areas? Many visitors from many countries, and of many political loyalties, have gone there to discover the answer. Almost all their reports, whether enthusiastic or sceptical, "committed" or neutral or even hostile, are in substantial agreement on the essence of the matter (1). They find long-deprived peoples who are caught up in a major effort to modernise their lives, and to rule themselves in ways that are as different from their own ways of the more, or less distant past as from the ways of colonial rule.

These peoples apparently see no gain in working for a mere reform of colonial structures and institutions, for no such reform, as they often say, can set them free. What they are engaged upon is something greater and more useful. They define this by what they do and aim for, but their leading spokesmen have also defined it in words which have the ring of profound meditation. They are fortunate in having found spokesmen and leaders of an often remarkable and momentous talent.

Thus the late Amílcar Cabral, founder and outstanding leader of the PAIGC in Guiné and the Cape Verde Islands, is the author of writings now widely recognised as significant contributions to the theory of social change among so-called "under-developed" peoples.


He has described the movements of liberation as comprising "a forced march on the road to cultural progress," because the compulsions of armed resistance have here found their most positive element in the drive for and achievement of new understandings, new ideas, new modes of individual and community behaviour, and, with all this, a new means of mastering the problems of national freedom" (A. Cabral, *National Liberation and Culture*, lecture delivered at Syracuse University, New York, Feb. 20, 1970).

And they have done this because these movements are nothing if not movements of voluntary participation. They are "schools of progress" even more than they are fighting units or other means of self-defence.

Or consider a definition of what these liberated areas are really about that comes from the Angolan leader, Dr Agostinho Neto. What they are trying to do, he said in 1970, "is to free and modernise our peoples by a dual revolution—against their traditional structures which can no longer serve them, and against colonial rule."

(1) After an initial visit to colonial Angola in 1954, the present writer has so far made four visits to liberated areas: to those of the liberation movement in Guinea (Bissau) and Cape Verde (PAIGC) in 1967, to those of the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) in Mozambique in 1968, to those of the People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) in Angola in 1970, and again to Guinea (Bissau) in 1972.

High priority is given to education. As soon as the army has established sufficient control over a region bush schools are set up for full time primary education for children and usually run adult literacy classes as well.



Their aim, in other words, is not only to displace the Portuguese who claim to rule them but to build a new society: to found and develop institutions of self-rule whose democratic and modernising vitality can overcome not only the heritage of foreign autocracy, but also the heritage of an older Africa divided into small groups and rival ethnic states.

One may well think this a bold and unexpected aim to find among peoples so sorely ravaged and harassed by military repression and all its accompanying evils, yet this is none the less the aim that visitors have all agreed that they have found here.

But what does it look like on the ground, this "forced march on the road to cultural progress?" What you find, obviously, differs much according to time and place, for all this has to take place in the midst of wars of repression that are savagely pursued.

Some liberated areas have long been safe from any effective enemy intervention, and there you find the building of a new society already far advanced. Other areas are newly wrested from the enemy, or subject to frequent ground-raids and bombing forays; there you find that the work is often interrupted, and sometimes at an early stage. But although the momentary contrasts are many, the policies and "atmosphere" are strikingly the same. All three movements are in close touch with one another, and have the same basic approaches.

Two examples from my own experience. Travelling in 1970 through areas of eastern Angola under MPLA control, I coincided with one of the Portuguese Army's periodical "sweeps in force." The MPLA's fighting units there were on the move and so, in consequence, was the local population that look to these units for protection. Woodland villages were abandoned for the time being; social services, such as schools and medical services, were likewise disrupted.

Weeks would pass before things could be put together again. It was a trying time, and bore witness to the sufferings caused by these colonial wars. Yet the national movement remained in being, whether in its fighting units, its village committees, or its co-ordinated groups of workers concerned with this or that social and cultural activity, and could settle back to its work again as soon as the danger had passed.

In areas long safe from danger the picture is a different one. Last winter I spent some time in the Como sector of southern Guiné. From this sector the Portuguese were completely evicted in 1965, and had not been able to return. So for seven years the people of Como had been free to work at the building of their new society.

They had gone far towards it. Long-established village committees, all of them elected from local people, had an uninterrupted responsibility together with the full-time workers of their national movement, the PAIGC, for every aspect of public affairs, educational or medical, legal or political.

Here and elsewhere, even before the independence of Guiné was officially proclaimed, a new state was already in existence, a new society was already taking shape, and in an atmosphere of calm and confidence that seemed continuously impressive.

Statistics can tell a little of this story. By 1972, for example, the PAIGC had promoted enough schools and trained enough teachers to give some 8 500 boys and girls the elements of a modern education. They had even carried through a general election for a sovereign National Assembly by direct and secret ballot in wide-ranging liberated areas.

Similar statistics from the liberated areas of Angola and Mozambique can usefully add to the picture. It is also clear that much more could be achieved if the means were to hand, whether in trained personnel or material necessities, and especially the second.

Yet the living reality that unfolds before you in these plains and forests, swamps and woodlands, goes beyond the statistics, even very far beyond. Whether in large liberated areas or in small, strongly held or subject to repeated raids and bombing, here are "backward" people who have become determined to win free from their "backwardness," and to understand the world as it really is.

These are people who are working to achieve this by setting aside the blinkers of tradition or subjection, racism or "tribalism," despair or lack of self-belief. And this they are doing by a process of voluntary participation in the changing of their lives and thoughts.

No one who travels in these areas will come back with any impression of utopia. Far from that, daily life is harsh in toil and hunger or the threat of violent death. Not everyone understands what is being attempted. Many confusions remain, and no doubt will do so for long to come. The timid withdraw, the fools betray.

All things natural to the human condition are present here. Yet these things include clarity and courage, steadfastness and hope, while the unrelenting growth and expansion of these movements suggest that these are the qualities which prevail. These movements of renewal could not otherwise have gained their remarkable success. It is a success that looks to the rest of the world for understanding, and so for aid and friendship. □

"THE EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL MENACES TO LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC SOCIETIES"

by John M. Raftery

It will be impossible to analyse or even mention, in this short exposition, the whole spectrum of internal and external menaces, and their interconnections. So, in order to give a meaningful treatment to a few selected topics, I will dispense with definitional problems, (apart from a comment about the misuse of words in the next paragraph).

At present, we are indisputably living through one of those periods of cultural collapse that periodically overtake history, a time when the human estate is at low ebb, only tenuously connected to the sources of its replenishment. This is more or less a feature of Eastern and Western societies, so my first contention is this: The question of

whether an economic and political system furthers the cause of human freedom cannot be answered in political and economic terms alone. The only criterion for the realisation of freedom is whether or not the individual actively participates in determining his life and that of society, and this not only by the formal act of voting but in his daily activity, in his work, and in his relation to others. Modern liberal democracy, if it restricts itself to the purely political sphere, cannot in my opinion, sufficiently counteract the results of the economic insignificance of the average individual. And on the other hand, purely economic concepts like socialisation of the means of production are not sufficient either, because of the probability of manipulation by a powerful bureaucracy. So, the first menace to a more liberal democratic society, is **dogmatic concentration on political and economic goals and means to goals, rather than a multi-dimensional view of the responsible individual in a responsive society.** More often than not, the political and economic concepts used to define these goals are expurgated and often transformed into the antithesis of what they originally meant: the conquest of small nations goes by the name of "a pact of friendship" and the brutal suppression of the whole population is perpetrated in the name of "National Socialism." The concepts of freedom, democracy, and liberalism have also been much misused. On democracy, I would agree with Erich Fromm (1) when he says that it is "A system that creates the economic, political, and cultural conditions for the full development of the individual." This individual in a true liberal democracy, would be similar I would imagine to self-actualising man as described by Abraham Maslow (2). From contrasts democracy with Fascism which "is a system that, regardless under which name, makes the individual subordinate to extraneous purposes and weakens the development of genuine individuality."

This genuine individuality based on social commitment, must be distinguished from the **spurious individualism based on ostentation and invidiousness**, that prevails today. This latter form of individualism constitutes a second internal menace to liberal democracy. When the need to free oneself from the emotional barrenness of depersonalised control mechanisms of existing society is generalised to freedom from "all" social conditions, a greater tyranny than before is created. The menace lies in the fact that radical youth, who have such potential for critical thought and action, are often led astray by this form of pseudo-radical anarchy. The belief that everyone should pursue autonomously his own destiny has forced us to maintain an emotional detachment from our social and physical environment. This type of individualism finds its roots in the attempt to deny the reality and importance of human interdependence. One of the major goals of technology in western countries is to 'free' us from the necessity of relating to, submitting to, depending upon, or controlling other people. Phillip Slater (3) notes, in this context: "Many societies exert far more pressure on the individual to mould himself to fit a particularised segment of a total group pattern, but there is variation among these circumscribed roles."

Our society gives for more leeway to the individual to pursue his own ends, but, since it defines what it worthy

and desirable everyone tends, independently but monotonously, to pursue the same things in the same way. The first pattern combines co-operation, conformity and variety; the second competition, individualism and uniformity." I believe that uniformity is a much bigger menace than conformity, to a vibrant liberal democracy. The petty freedoms that are extended to everyone to indulge their stereotyped and shallow eccentricities and quirks point to the totalitarian character of consumer societies, as any protest against the society appears neurotic and impotent. At least the classical type of coercive totalitarian society can be identified and fought against. But the society in which what C. W. Mills (4) called 'The Cheerful Robot' flourishes, is the antithesis of a free democratic society. The trouble for the individual in this society is a vague feeling of uneasiness, discontent and indifference, behind the fun and the hollow-smiling facade. And the issue for the whole society is no less than the continued existence of a liberal democracy based on criticism, participation and reason. Mills identifies the core of this menace when he notes these troubles and issues have not been clarified "because the chief capacities and qualities of man required to clarify them are the very freedom and reason that are threatened and dwindling."

The next point concerns revolution and the decline of critical reason. Unless we see revolution as a form of evolution, a critical exchange between man and society, we render it a virtually impotent concept. It could mean no more than the rise and fall of empires in a cyclical, pointless fashion, the replacement of one system by another as in a South American coup. Consequently, **Revolution as a sudden social upheaval is a menace** (internal or external) **to liberal democratic societies.** Camus observed that the course of revolution from Rousseau to Stalin has led inevitably to a reinforcement of state power, usually in the form of authoritarian dictatorship. Revolutionaries, Camus noted, begin by demanding justice and end by establishing a police state. They are inspired by abstractions and believe that a utopia is possible, and so they are led to excess. The critical liberal affirms a human value and not merely an abstract one. He strives for partial reforms and limited victories and thereby hopes only to create the conditions of a more livable life. Camus argued that the cause of historical revolution during the past two centuries is romantic quest for totality which has resulted in despotic and apocalyptic ideologies. Starting from the promise of unlimited freedom they arrived at unlimited despotism. The only effective revolution consists in holding the conditions and institutions of society under the constant scrutiny of critical reason. In this way weaknesses are more easily seen, and strengths can be better utilised. The menace posed by the violent revolutionary is partly explained by his idea that if "things get bad enough," a revolution will occur. But it is only when things get better—when small improvements generate rising aspirations and decrease tolerance for existing injustices—that the lot of a human society can improve. People can bear almost anything, and the longer it exists the more placidly they will bear it; change can take place only when liberal pressure is strong and when it softens up an initially rigid status quo.

To undertake this softening-up process presupposes alert critical faculties, and discerning voting behaviour. But in

most societies, the mode in which the electorate expresses its will is similar to their choice in buying commodities. They hear the drums of propaganda and facts mean little in comparison with the suggestive noise that hammers at them. Politics seems far off, and the private citizen feels that he is a member of an unworkable committee, the committee of the whole country, and this is why he expends less disciplined effort on mastering a political problem than he expends on a game of cards. As Joseph Schumpeter (5) observed: "Thus the typical citizen drops down to a lower level of mental performance as soon as he enters the political field. He argues and analyses in a way which he would readily recognise as infantile within the sphere of his real interests. He becomes a primitive again."

Factors which dull the capacity for critical thinking are more dangerous to our liberal democratic ideal than many of the open attacks against it. With regard to all basic questions of individual and social life, a great sector of our culture has just one function—to befog the issues. One kind of smoke-screen is the assertion that the problems are too complicated for the average individual to grasp (when, in fact, the fundamentals are usually very easy to understand). The individual feels helplessly caught in a chaotic mass of data and specialists discourage him from trusting his own capacity for thinking about problems. This is analagous to the situation in education, where knowledge, seen as a commodity, is locked in special languages, and specialised teachers live off its re-translation. In this environment, fewer and fewer minds are being developed, which are capable of critical thought, or facing the disapproval of their peers, whether conservative or revolutionary.

When critical faculties atrophy, and society's institutions are no longer held under the progressive scrutiny of its citizens, another menace to liberal democracy becomes apparent: **Bureaucracy, and the 'Rationality' of growth, efficiency and technological progress.** Internally, the fact that frustration is expressed in accusations of inefficiency rather than in opposition to policies indicates how powerful bureaucracies (state and business) are. Externally, multinational corporations become, in effect supranational bureaucracies and so can constitute a threat from outside, especially to smaller liberal democratic societies. As regards the state bureaucracy, just and equitable treatment of citizens requires complex laws and administrative codes, and a modicum of obedience to these is a necessary condition for democracy. But experiments a few years ago by Stanley Milgram (6) testing people's willingness to obey commands to inflict pain on another person (electric shocks), indicated that people are much more compliant than is generally assumed. The appurtenances of science hold so much legitimacy that people are willing to suspend their judgement and behave in ways that would normally be described as sadistic. Rejection of authority it appears, is much more the exception than the rule. The implications of this for alleviating internal menace potential, are that bureaucracies should be less concerned with eliciting obedience from clients and more sensitive to suggestions and disagreements that are voiced.

A bureaucracy is an organisation oriented toward efficiency—whether or not it attains high efficiency. This differs fundamentally from democracy, since the 'rational' judgement of experts, rather than the will of the majority reigns supreme. Freedom of dissent become dysfunctional, since it is the efficient and not the popular methods of operation, that are sought. Powerful private bureaucracies put pressure on governments to safeguard their interests, for example, by enacting protective—tariff laws and setting up the bureaucratic apparatus necessary for enforcing them; their preoccupation with efficiency blunts moral sensibilities and means that people are regarded as objects for the attainment of material goals. As E. J. Mishan (7) notes: "Not only a sense of our own worth but a sense of the worth of others, is being lost in pursuit of efficiency. The more we become fascinated with the measurable aspects of human achievement, the easier it is to slip into a frame of mind that judges people according to numerical systems and that ranks their worth on some scale of efficiency. In time we lose sight both of the subtle and engaging facets of the character of each individual and of the intrinsic value of each human life." An awareness of this value is, I think, a sine qua non of liberalism and democracy. The menace lies in the fact that people are unaware of the deeply irrational character of the forces which propel efficiency, productivity and economic growth, at the risk of growing destruction, and to the detriment of the individual. Herbert Marcuse (8) makes a pertinent comment on these issues: "Technical progress, extended to a whole system of domination and co-ordination creates forms of life (and of power) which appear to reconcile the forces opposing the system and to defeat or refute all protest in the name of the historical prospects of freedom from toil and domination." This leads to an excessively economic orientation which develops only those faculties of individuals which are necessary for economic growth. And those faculties do not thrive on the concepts of liberalism or democracy.

Other menaces—which I will not discuss in depth—are **authoritarianism, oligarchy and nationalism.** These are anathema to liberal democracy, and if the regime is expansionist, there is a threat to other liberal democratic societies. Robert Michels (9) sees oligarchy as immanent in every social regime: "Historical evolution mocks all the prophylactic measures that have been adopted for the prevention of oligarchy." Even syndicalism and anarchism both succumb to the law of oligarchy and authoritarianism as soon as "they abandon the region of pure thought, and as soon as their adherents unite to form associations aiming at any sort of political activity."

Nationalism relies on xenophobia and archaic ties to blood and soil, while it taints and disparages the 'imperialist aggressor.' In much the same way, the dominant party in a country might try to create public antipathy against a radical opposition. For example, the Gaullists ensured a majority in a recent French election by tainting the Communists as extremist fanatics. This process tends to operate in most 'liberal democratic' societies, and results in a stereotyping of political parties, and in a permanent exclusion from power of all radical forces that could give a real choice to the electorate.

Many of the menaces I have discussed in this essay have external as well as internal features, depending on the perspective they are viewed from, and it would have been tautological to have tried to draw sharp distinctions. Insidious menaces transcend the categories "external and internal." In modern societies, it often seems to make

little difference whether the increasing satisfaction of needs is accomplished by an authoritarian, or a liberal democratic system. Smooth efficiency and a constant flow of goods are all that matters. This happy consciousness is the Arch-Menace that subsumes most other menaces. □

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THE INSTITUTION FOR INDUSTRIAL EDUCATION

by Foszia Fisher

An Institute for Industrial Education (I.I.E.) research team investigating the Durban strikes and their relation to the system of labour relations in South Africa, came to the following conclusions:

- 1) There are in fact objective conflicts of interest between worker and employer, and these conflicts cannot be overcome merely by improving communication between the two.
- 2) Institutions for mediating between the two sides must therefore recognise the fact that there is a power dimension involved.
- 3) If in fact the institutions that exist are such as to render the workers powerless or to deny the actual power that they do have, then there will be certain consequences which, although not usually recognised by management as resulting from the conflict situation, are in fact the only weapons which remain to the workers. These consequences are, cumulatively, very serious indeed. They include "conscientious withdrawal of efficiency", high labour turn-over, increased sickness and accident rates, industrial sabotage.

- 4) This means that, although in one way it is in the employer's interest to maximise his power to coerce the workers, in another way the failure to grant some power to the workers over wages and conditions is actually against the real interest of both worker and employer.
- 5) Finally, in the absence of some meaningful sharing of power, communication itself will almost certainly not occur.

Thus we can conclude that the development of Trade Unions for Africans is not only an urgent necessity for African workers; it is also necessary for further industrial development and for social peace in South Africa. But, given the short-sightedness of most employers, of the government, and of most white workers, such Unions will have to be developed by workers themselves against considerable opposition. Their margin of manoeuvre, given the rather repressive nature of industrial relations in South Africa, is not very large. Would-be African Trade Unionists are faced with obstructionist tactics by management, with a general lack of information, and also with great difficulties in actually organising workers. There is great enthusiasm amongst African Trade Unions, but turning

this enthusiasm into efficient and viable organisation is a difficult task. It is not helped by the generally low level of education of African Workers, and by the fact that what education they have had has prepared them to understand orders, but has not given them the information necessary for them to understand the economics of industry and the legislation affecting them as workers.

Thus the development of African Trade Unions requires, inter alia, a system of education designed to meet the needs of workers. Workers need to know the existing system of industrial legislation, how it is enforced, and how they can use it. They need to be able to understand and refute the sophistries frequently presented by management to justify paying low wages. They need to understand what causes inflation, the exact nature of the relation between wages, productivity, and training, and the relation between wages, profits and expansion. To meet this need for an "industrial education" the Institution for Industrial Education has been brought into being.

The I.I.E. is not designed only for African workers. There is no full-time educational institution specialising in workers education in South Africa, and we hope that our courses will be useful to all workers. But we expect the biggest demand to come initially from African workers, and their need is certainly greatest.

The I.I.E. is the joint product of Natal Trade Unionists and academics, and it also enjoys the support of the Kwazulu government. Chief Gatsha Buthelezi has agreed to become chancellor of the Institute. The Trade Union support comes from both registered Unions and from the new young African Unions in Natal. Although the I.I.E. will concentrate on Natal in 1974, the intention is to expand to a national basis after the first experimental year.

For the academics concerned, an important motivating factor has been an awareness of the extent to which existing universities are management and middle-class oriented. This shows itself partly in the recruitment of students, which, as a result of the fact that university education requires full time non-earning for a number of years, is predominantly middle class, and destined for management.

This applies to a slightly lesser extent to black students, but in any case most students at university in South Africa are white. The management bias also shows itself in the subjects that are being taught and in the way that they are taught. There are many courses designed to help businessmen increase their profits, but none that we know of is designed to teach workers how to organise a successful strike. Similarly, research problems are usually set within a management framework. We suspect that any student intending to do research aimed at improving bargaining techniques for workers would have difficulty in getting a research grant!

This means that there will be interesting problems involved in adjusting traditional teaching material to fit the different problems and perspectives of workers. Of course, there are a number of workers' education institutions in existence outside South Africa, and we hope to benefit

from their experience. The I.I.E. has already established links with the most prestigious of all these institutions, Ruskin College, Oxford. Ruskin College has agreed to act as the external examining body for our courses, which means that syllabi will be set in consultation with them, and they will ensure that our standards are up to international levels.

Ruskin College is run on a residential basis. Trade Unions negotiate periods of release from work for their members so that they can attend short courses on a full time basis. Such a system is not possible in South Africa, partly because Unions have not as yet been able to arrange release, and also because in any case group areas legislation would make it very difficult to run a college open full time to all workers. Most of the Institute's teaching will be done by correspondence, and this has its own difficulties. In a face-to-face teaching situation it is possible continuously to adapt the methods and the material to the students, although, of course, this is frequently not done in practice. This cannot be done with correspondence education. Also, the workers have a relatively low standard of formal education, and are perhaps not all that used to using written material.

Nevertheless, our mode of operation does have some advantages. Education is usually geared towards "certification", towards the attainment of a certificate which will give access to better jobs, and will increase personal prestige. Under these circumstances the actual content of the education has no immediate and obvious relevance. Learning it is part of an abstract test of the right to certification, rather than part of a personal growth process in which students are coming to understand better themselves and their social situation. Our material, on the other hand, will, in its content, be directly relevant to the everyday problems of our worker-students. Also those who enroll with us will be highly motivated individuals already active in the Trade Union movement. Much of our teaching will be designed to help workers find out how their particular industries operate. Our "tests" will require them to investigate what is happening around them, and so to show in action that they have understood the principles.

This does not mean that we foresee no problems. In preparing teaching material, it is easy to make false assumptions about what the workers know, or, on the other hand, to produce insultingly elementary material. In an attempt to avoid this we are working with a number of workers in the production of the teaching material. They are presented with the first drafts, which are then revised in the light of their criticisms and of any problems which they have had in understanding them. Our basic course, the Diploma in Trade Unionism, lasts for one year, and during that year we shall also organise a number of seminars for the participants, at which we will be able to get feedback from them about the course, and will be able to use face-to-face teaching techniques to reinforce the written material.

Most Trade Unions run their own training courses for Shop Stewards, and we do not envisage that our courses will supplant these. They should be complementary, pro-

viding written material which the trainees can use before and after their short, specialised courses to help them get a more adequate overall grasp of the situation.

An important factor with regard to written material is that publishing in South Africa, as elsewhere, is geared to the needs of a highly educated middle-class, and English-speaking, public. There is hardly any "academic" literature available in simple English, or in any of the African languages. We believe that there may well be a positive demand for the written material itself. All our material for the Diploma course will be written initially in both Zulu and English. As we extend our activities outside Natal, we will introduce other South African languages as well.

Provisionally, we have divided our syllabus into three sections: The Worker in the Factory; The Worker in the Union; and the Worker in Society. The first section will deal with elementary economics of the firm: production, costs, profits, and factors affecting wages. It will also include an introduction to industrial legislation. This section of the course will be organised around a Legal Handbook, containing a guide to the use of all the legislation relevant to the work situation, such as Factory Acts, Unemployment Insurance Act, and wage regulating machinery. The lessons will be designed to teach how to use the Handbook, so that at the end of the course, the workers will be able to discover in the Handbook what they need to know to handle any particular problem which arises in their everyday activity.

The section on The Worker in the Union is particularly important. The early growth of Unions in most countries illustrates the same set of problems, particularly accidental or intentional financial mismanagement, personality conflicts, and very rapid bureaucratisation. We will attempt to illustrate these problems by a study of Trade Union history, in South Africa and elsewhere; to analyse the structural factors creating these problems; and to explain the techniques of financial management and democratic organisation which can be used to overcome them. This will include an account of book-keeping methods, how to collect and record money, meeting procedure, and how to maintain adequate communication between leaders and members. We hope that our courses will make this information available to members as well as to leaders, since knowledge specialisation is an important factor in encouraging bureaucratisation.

Trade Unions negotiate with employers within a social context, and employers often argue that it is general factors, such as taxation or inflation, or a rapid drop in demand, which prevent them from paying the high wages that they would love to pay. On the other hand, workers often attempt to reinforce their demands for higher wages

with reference to poverty datum lines and other general problems faced by workers. Thus it is important for workers to have an overall understanding of both the macro-economic factors affecting wages, and the nature of the social forces, which, in South Africa, are leading to the inevitable urbanisation of the bulk of the African population, and are making nonsense of that favourite management standby: "Africans are only working for a supplementary income. Their standard of living is maintained by their farming in the reserves". The third part of the course, The Worker in Society, will deal with these problems in relation to a detailed study of collective bargaining techniques in the context of South African wage regulating machinery.

In addition to this basic course on Trade Unionism, the Institute will engage in a number of other activities. From the beginning of 1974, it will publish a monthly "South African Labour Bulletin", which will contain an analysis of the labour scene in South Africa, reports of research undertaken by the I.I.E., and of other academic research in South Africa, book reviews and discussions of significant developments in labour relations outside South Africa, and articles on economic and social issues of general interest to workers and unionists.

The I.I.E. already has two research projects underway. The first (in conjunction with the S.A.I.R.R.), now nearly completed, deals with the Durban strikes, and the second with the methods of communication between Union officials and workers in Natal. At present, there is an urgent need for two kinds of research. Unions bargaining at Industrial Council meetings, or putting forward demands to the Wage Board, need basic comparative information on their industry, its wage levels and profitability. Secondly, there is a need for research into the structure of industry in South Africa, the problems faced by workers in the course of urbanisation, and the particular problems of Union organisation which result from South Africa's unique history. The extent to which we are able to undertake this research will, of course, depend on our financial position. In the long run we believe that it is important that an organisation like the I.I.E. should be largely financed by the Unions it serves. At the moment, the African Unions in particular, are financially very weak, and of course, many of the registered white-controlled Unions are very conservative, so that it will be some time before this position is reached. Meanwhile, we shall concentrate our resources on developing and improving the basic Diploma in Trade Unionism.

Any one interested in doing the Diploma, or in subscribing to the Labour Bulletin, or in assisting with funds, should contact: The Chairperson, The Institute for Industrial Education, P.O. Box 2103, or at Flat 4, Central Court, 125, Gale Street, Durban.□