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Reality

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EDITORIAL

Credibility in tatters

PRESIDENT DE KLERK has one last chance to restore his waning credibility in the eyes of longtime anti-Nationalists. That credibility was based on the courageous leadership he showed in his February 1990 speech, the speed with which he removed apartheid from the Statute Book, and his brave challenge to white conservatives in the referendum.

Today his reputation lies in tatters with most of those people. It has been destroyed by his party's arrogant ham-handedness in the CODESA negotiations, by the revelations of rampant corruption in the South African and homelands administrations, and, most damaging of all, by the crude attempts to hide the crimes which have been committed by the security forces and to protect

those who have been responsible for them.

President De Klerk's last chance of restoring his credibility lies in the hands of Lieutenant-General Pierre Steyn, the man he has appointed to investigate the activities of the Directorate of Covert Collection, that particularly degenerate component of the security forces.

If General Steyn turns out to be a man of integrity, who carries out his task fearlessly, and shares what he finds with Mr Justice Goldstone, as Mr De Klerk tells us that he has been instructed to do, then much may be saved. But if this is just another cover-up operation the De Klerk reputation will be damaged virtually beyond repair. ●

Disastrous failure by leaders

IN THE months after the collapse of CODESA the country was tossed from one crisis to another by political leaders, if one could call them that, who showed a fine aptitude for scoring party political debating points at one another's expense, and precious few of the qualities needed to get us out of the mess we are now in.

Nobody knows how many people died politically-related deaths in that time. However many it was, it was not enough to move those who hold high office in the Government, the ANC or KwaZulu to do anything effective about it. It took a long, hard look into the abyss which opened up at Bisho to bring at least some of them to their senses.

Mr De Klerk hastily called for an urgent meeting with Mr Mandela. Mr Mandela, in turn, gave a long, thoughtful and conciliatory interview to the Johannesburg *Star*, which showed that he shared many of the concerns about the dangerous state of drift in which we find ourselves. Now, at last, they have met.

Perhaps having plumbed the depths at Bisho, these two will have had brought sharply home to them just how recklessly they have been playing with our future.

Mr De Klerk, we hope, has realised that if that future is to depend on the support of the likes of Oupa Gqozo it will not be a democratic future at all.

By all means let the Nationalist Party go all out to win the first non-racial election, but for heaven's sake let it do it in such a way that, if it loses, it can still play a constructive and honourable part in making democracy work under some other government.

FROM MR MANDELA, for his part, we expect strong action to bring his radical supporters into line. It is no longer only the Nationalists who see the ante-diluvian ideas and antics of his allies in the Communist Party as something we do not need at all, either now or in our new society. He seems to have been badly shaken by the latest revelations about the state of the economy. We hope that his response will be to start telling his supporters that what the future offers them is not hand-outs but hard work, and an economic system, with a strong social welfare emphasis, where the most substantial rewards will go to those who do work hard and those who invest imaginatively.

CHIEF MINISTER Buthelezi's reaction to the De Klerk/Mandela agreements has been profoundly disturbing. We wish that he would stop calling his troops constantly to battles which nobody can win and, instead, would start arguing cogently, constructively and unthreateningly for a regional dispensation which would give the people of his region and others a large measure of control over their everyday lives.

From the Democratic Party we expect an injection of good sense and moderation into what, these last few months, has become an increasingly immoderate and dangerously polarising slanging match.

In short, what we now expect from people who claim to be our leaders, is some sign that they can lead. ●

Communists never influenced policy

IN THE May/June issue of *Reality*, Randolph Vigne, in the course of a review, writes: "By the early 1960s the SACP had taken over, with breathtaking skill and speed, the two main British institutions concerned with the struggle in South Africa, the Anti-Apartheid Movement and the International Defence and Aid Fund." This allegation is completely untrue.

In 1960 my husband, Canon Collins of St Paul's Cathedral, founded and continued to direct the British Defence and Aid Fund from South Africa. In 1964 this became the International Defence and Aid Fund with similar aims. Policy was in the hands of my husband as chairman, and a presidential committee — a Swedish missionary who had been expelled from South Africa for his stand against apartheid, a Swiss academic, and a law lecturer at Trinity College, Dublin. These were elected by and from the national committee. Later a

Dutch academic was added.

John Collins was sympathetic to the plight of South African exiles, and over the years the organization employed considerable numbers. Among these were from time to time, three members of the South African Liberal Party, and three members of the SACP. The Communists were never in any position to influence the policy of I.D.A.F., nor did they ever attempt or wish to do so. They were dedicated to the organization's humanitarian work of legal defence and family welfare. South African exiles from other parts of the political spectrum also did valuable work for I.D.A.F. All respected our insistence that aid was to be given without discrimination on grounds of race, religion or political affiliation; this policy was strictly adhered to:

At one time another South African Liberal, the lawyer Ruth Hayman, served on a small grants advisory committee.

I was personally fully involved in the work of B.D.A.F. and of I.D.A.F. From 1983-1991, when the organization was disbanded, I was one of the International Board of Trustees, chaired by Archbishop Trevor Huddleston, that directed the policy and affairs of I.D.A.F. During those years we must have employed around 50 people.

At one stage a book "The Puppeteers" by Harold Soeff appeared. It contained allegations about I.D.A.F. similar to that made by Mr Vigne. I.D.A.F. took successful legal action against the author and publishers. The offending statements had to be deleted and a public apology made in open court.

I am sorry that Mr Vigne should have made such a false and mischievous allegation, and that *Reality* should have published it.

DIANA COLLINS

Suffolk
England

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*Cover picture by RUPHIN COUDYZER of a scene from the Street Beat Dance Company presentation at the Arts Festival. From the left: Sibonqile Mavuso, Temba Twala and David Matamela.

RANDOLPH VIGNE REPLIES:

RANDOLPH VIGNE writes: When I wrote in your May/June issue that the South African Communist Party had "taken over" the Defence and Aid Fund after Rivonia, I did not mean to include the late Canon John Collins, the founder and director of the Fund, or his close associates in Christian Action. Neither he, nor they, were communists, what were then called fellow travellers, or sympathizers of any kind.

I would not like what I wrote to diminish appreciation of Canon Collins' contribution to the work of the Fund in paying for the legal defence of so many activists against white racial supremacy in southern Africa, and in supporting their dependants and other victims of the struggle.

No middle ground

BENJAMIN HASWELL (*Reality*, August 1992), urges liberals to rise from their chairs and keep up the good fight to capture the middle ground. History has taught us that there is no middle ground in politics.

Where in the world has liberal government succeeded? For that matter has any other ideology succeeded or united the world? Judging from the state it is now in, the answer is an emphatic "No."

In a very perceptive editorial *Le Monde* (July 26/27) headed "Doubts over a medal" the writer looks at the state of the world in the year of the

Olympics and poses the question, "what medal will our century deserve?"

Commenting on the failure of different ideologies the editorial says, "Liberalism has still not managed to resolve the scandal of inequalities and will perhaps wake up one day and discover it has been fostering future revolts in its bosom." Here obviously the word liberalism is used for capitalism whose child is liberalism without its parents fangs.

In the light of the failure of the various ideologies the *Le Monde*



editorial comments that there is a disturbing feeling in the final decade of this century that one's expectations will "strew the ground like statues of antique deities."

In terms of sheer destruction and human suffering this century may have no parallel. The barbarity of humans inflicted on his own kind will probably exceed the total of all the preceding centuries that mankind inhabited this earth.

Liberty after all is the right or power to do as one pleases and if its price is eternal vigilance, whose rights is one to respect and whose to criticise? Traditionally the liberals have been cast in the role of critics of the excesses of the government of the day, if allowed to do so. In the future what role will it profess to play taking into consideration the failure of others ideologies to bring peace and justice in our world?

Will our future expectations also end on barren soil, lifeless?

HASSIM SEEDAT Qualbert, Natal

No that simple

ANN COLVIN and Chris Mhlongo claim that true liberals should join the ANC. It is not that simple.

Certainly the ANC has, for many years, stood for ideals with which liberals fully identify. However, having consistently opposed the evils of the government, we must continue to speak out against injustice and, if necessary, against malpractices committed in the name of liberation.

We cannot give unquestioning allegiance or uncritical acceptance to a political line and it takes courage to stand firm in spite of the need to be seen as "politically correct."

Now, more than ever, the liberal must entrench his/her unequivocal independence by endorsing universally accepted values and principles which promote dignity, respect and tolerance for all human beings. To call a non-supporter of the ANC who will not abrogate his/her moral responsibility, an "opponent of democracy" is very unliberal!

In any case, the ideologies of both left and right would seem, at present, to be destructive to liberty and prosperity, exchanging one form of collectivism for another and showing little regard for individual autonomy.

ANN GRAYSON Pietermaritzburg

GERALD SHAW, associate editor of the Cape times, examines De Klerk's failure to empower a full investigation into suspected clandestine activities in the security forces.

DANGER POINT

PRESIDENT DE KLERK'S standing at home and abroad is in question as never before in his three remarkable years in office.

There are renewed doubts about his control of the security forces as further evidence comes to light suggesting that clandestine operations to destabilise the ANC have continued throughout his presidency, in spite of many assurances to the contrary since March 1990 when he first promised that all secret projects would be placed under strict Cabinet control.

Much is not yet clear, but for many of his critics President De Klerk already stands exposed as a leader with a double agenda, negotiating with the ANC on apparently equal terms while his security chiefs were running a campaign of anti-ANC disinformation by Military Intelligence. He is accused of failing to control the clandestine arm of the security forces, effectively condoning assorted dirty tricks even assassination. He is accused of allowing the resources of state to be used to weaken the ANC and so improve the chances of the NP at the polls.

There is also widespread suspicion, particularly in ANC circles, that the Nationalist government has maintained or condoned some kind of clandestine Third Force, stirring up hostilities between the ANC and Inkatha and generally keeping the pot of violence on the boil.

THE CRISIS of confidence came to a head when the Goldstone Commission raided a Military Intelligence establishment in the Transvaal recently and uncovered documents indicating that MI had re-employed the notorious CCB agent, Ferdi Barnard, a convicted murderer, after the CCB had been partially exposed in the media and officially disbanded. There have been other disclosures indicating that Military Intelligence has been running a disinformation campaign to damage the ANC and an admission by an SADF

general that he had lied to the Harms Commission about CCB plans to assassinate anti-apartheid activists.

The Goldstone disclosures, it seemed, would be Mr De Klerk's great opportunity to smash what could possibly be an illegal conspiracy in the security establishment. It appeared probable that the hundreds of files presumably dealing with clandestine operations which Goldstone had discovered at the secret headquarters of the so-called Directorate of Covert Collection would be placed in the custody of the commission, enabling its investigators to get to the truth of the matter once and for all.

Mr De Klerk did not seize this opportunity, but instead appointed an SADF general to take over supervision of Military Intelligence and conduct an investigation of its operations. The DCC files, it appeared, would remain in the custody of the SADF. After a two-hour meeting between Mr De Klerk and Judge Goldstone, it was announced that the Goldstone Commission would investigate all security forces and private armies and it was said that the SADF investigation of Military Intelligence would be carried out in collaboration with the Goldstone Commission.

Yet many remain sceptical. Once again it would be a case of the SADF investigating the SADF. It was not clear how far the Goldstone Commission would be allowed to go in its independent investigation.

No one questions the integrity of the SADF general who has been landed with the invidious task of investigating his own colleagues. Yet the record of recent years suggests that there is scant prospect of getting at the truth by such means. This time it would be different, we may hope, but much depends on whether the Goldstone Commission is given unfettered access to the files of the DCC. Without such access its investigation will not command much credibility.

Cont. on Page Eighteen

Beyond the bodycount

THE BISHO dead have now been buried, and to all intents and purposes, South Africa has returned to its troubled normality. Indeed the "South African peace process" is now so awash with violence (more people die from political violence in an 'ordinary' week than were killed at Bisho) that it has become almost a necessity to bury introspection with the bodies of the dead.

Phoenix-like, hope must perpetually arise out of the latest tragedy, for otherwise the burden of pessimism becomes too much. What may appear to outsiders as a callous indifference on the part of both black and white South Africans to the victims of this latest disaster is, in fact, a necessity. To ponder too deeply upon the horror of Bisho could be to give way to despair, and beyond that to a resignation of the collapse of the country into anarchy and civil war.

Hence it is that within a few short weeks of the massacre, attention is turning to Bisho's silver lining. In short, this interpretation argues that, for all its brutality, Bisho was just what was needed to get negotiations going again.

Transitions to democracy from authoritarian rule are everywhere characterised by uncertainty, as divided societies seek to claw their way through political timetables which are far more compressed than history ever allowed to the emergent nations of Western Europe and North America. Indeed, diversions and distractions along the road to democracy are completely normal, and Bisho needs to be located firmly in perspective; it was only a concentration of killings amidst a wave of violence which has engulfed the country since 1990 as, in essence, the various political forces compete for space and loyalty amongst a black population which is about to become enfranchised. It follows that this violence is unlikely to cease until the political race is over, and a new government, whose standing is legitimated by a democratic election, is installed in Pretoria.

What is good about the Bisho massacre, therefore, is that one way or another it has massively increased pressures upon the major political actors, notably the ANC and NP, to resume negotiations where they were previously left off at CODESA.

FOR ALL its disturbing cynicism and instrumentality, this perspective packs a considerable punch. Yet what needs to be stressed is that the government and the ANC are not now due to resume talks out of the depths of their mutual horror, but because Bisho represented a major and fundamental defeat for the former. Indeed, the massacre indicated how quickly matters are beginning to slip out of President De Klerk's control.

A first point is quite simply that the government lost in the hail of Gqozo's bullets the very considerable ground which De Klerk had gained internationally when he won his handsome referendum victory for the continuation of reform. Then it seemed to many observers that apartheid, at long last, really was dead, killed off once and for all by the convincing defeat of the white right, which subsequently registered gaping divisions. But having pronounced it dead, the international press was forced to resurrect apartheid in the killing grounds of the Ciskei.

What the government tried to do, and in this regard its efforts were echoed by a large body of the established South African press, was to shuffle responsibility for the killings off onto the shoulders of the ANC, and especially Ronnie Kasrils, not only for staging the march in the first place, but also for breaking the terms of the agreement concerning the exact limits and constraints to which this particular instance of mass action should adhere. But much to its chagrin, what the government found was that although international opinion proved quite critical of the ANC, it was as overwhelmingly condemnatory of the De Klerk government as if it had been white fingers, and not black, which had been on the CDF's triggers. The unimpressive Gqozo was seen as the satrap he is, and the South African authorities were roundly censured for not having reined him in.

Having declared at CODESA for the re-incorporation of the TBVC states, how could the government ever contemplate that the inexperienced troops of the CDF should face a massive ANC throng with live ammunition? Where was any minimal concession to modern techniques of crowd control? And hence it was that, rather than being able to pass

ROGER SOUTHALL,
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LOOKS AT THE
PROSPECTS FOR PEACE
AND PROGRESS AFTER
THE BISHO MASSACRE

off the killings as yet another species of black on black violence (as so much of the conflict between Inkatha and the ANC in Natal has been internationally portrayed), responsibility for the deaths was pinned firmly on the government; for having established the divisive homeland system in the first place, for not having previously disposed of the local tyranny of Gqozo, and for not having exercised proper restraint over the CDF via the bevy of seconded South African military and intelligence officers who command it. Meanwhile, the ANC, although not smelling to the coterie of reporters and opinion-makers of roses, recovered much of the sympathy it had previously lost internationally.

A SECOND adverse consequence of the Bisho massacre for the government has been that it has narrowed its options. Since negotiations were broken off at CODESA II, the government has been busy at work promoting an anti-ANC coalition in support of a federal constitution.

It was significant that in drawing up its original constitutional proposals, and throughout CODESA I and CODESA II, the National Party avoided commitment to 'federalism' in favour of a preference for 'regionalism', a term which was sufficiently flexible to enable it to seek a compromise — even a consensus — with the ANC (which remained wedded to the notion of a unitary constitution). As a consequence, the prospect was glimpsed of a surprisingly trouble-free transition to an interim government and even a dual NP-ANC administration, founded upon a shared commitment to a shared South African nationalism. This new South Africa would be formally unitary, yet NP reluctance to concede power to a highly centralised ANC-dominated government would be catered for by the granting of



By exercising direct or shared power over the three economically most important regions in the country, the NP aims to inhibit severely the financial and physical capacity of an ANC-led government to rule.

significant (perhaps entrenched) powers to some nine or ten regional authorities.

HOWEVER, with the collapse of CODESA, the government signalled a new assault on the ANC by now openly espousing a federalism whose explicit design would be to shift the balance of power away from the centre to the regions. Meanwhile, the NP launched a pre-electoral strategy of attempting to broaden its base of support by opening its doors to all races and by seeking to construct a conservative alliance capable of securing control of, if not the majority, then the most economically important regions.

Pik Botha made the headlines with his upbeat proclamation that the NP could win an absolute majority in a non-racial election. Just as the government so gravely miscalculated the weight of popular support which swept ZANU-PF to power in the 1980 Zimbabwe election and SWAPO to power in Namibia in 1990, it is quite possible that it is seriously deluding itself as to its potential for garnering black votes in South Africa itself. None the less, rather than gamble upon the democratic option of securing majority support and thereby maintaining control of a centralised state, the government has reverted to exploiting the electoral-coalition possibilities provided by the continued existence of the bantustans.

This has recently been convincingly portrayed as follows (Grahamstown Rural Committee Newsletter 29):

(i) In KwaZulu-Natal, the NP believes it can forge an alliance with Inkatha to share power in a regional government;

(ii) likewise, in the ethnically diverse PWV region, it reckons that an NP-Inkatha linkage would block a victory by the ANC, which it continues to view as an overwhelmingly Xhosa organisation;

(iii) in the Western Cape, it confidently expects to capture control by virtue of its appropriating the vast proportion of the Coloured vote.

In short, by exercising direct or shared power over the three economically most important regions in the country, the NP aims to inhibit severely the financial and physical capacity of an ANC-led government to rule.

MEANWHILE, the government admits that the ANC will likely sweep the Transkei, Border and Eastern Cape, wherein lies two-thirds of the latter's national membership. Indeed, the government may further concede the ANC's proposal that this area be divided into two regions. However, for its part, it may go on to argue that such a division should be based upon an expansion of the existing bantustans of Transkei and Ciskei, just as in the northern Transvaal it would like to see the powers of the present Bophuthatswana government of Lucas Mangope confirmed, extended and entrenched.

The government has for some considerable time viewed Transkei as a lost electoral cause. However, its continuing support for Gqozo in the Ciskei indicates that, at the very least, it intends to take the electoral battle into the very heart of the enemy's territory. To this end, the launch by the Brigadier of his Inkatha-like African Democratic Movement (ADM) represents an attempt to mobilise conservative sentiment based upon what remains of the headman system, against the ANC and — who knows? — snatch the Ciskei-based region from under the latter's nose.

At the national level, meanwhile, a Christian Democratic Alliance of the NP, Inkatha, ADM and Mangope's Bophuthatswana Democratic Party and other sundry elements would form a tight-knit bloc in a second, regionally-based upper house of parliament, to operate as a check upon radical initiatives by the ANC majority government.

The march on Bisho was of course intended by the ANC to counter this strategy by depriving the envisaged Christian Democratic Alliance of one its homeland stilts. The same goes for the

projected marches upon the capitals of KwaZulu and Bophuthatswana. Whether or not, in the Bisho case, the ANC seriously believed it had a chance of toppling Gqozo remains unclear, but the more salient point is that it was utilising the march as a remarkable opportunity for mobilising and rallying its support.

Consequently, when the CDF let rip, they gunned down whatever minimal chance Gqozo ever had of promoting his ADM as a respectable minority tendency; and furthermore, whereas Gqozo previously was but an undistinguished nonentity with whom the NP might have chosen to coalesce, the killings exalted him to the ranks of an international criminal with whom it can now scarcely choose to associate. Meanwhile to dismiss him — by fiat or by coup — would imply a capacity to have prevented the killings; but to allow him to remain in power implies an incautious, if not callous, disregard for international opinion.

BY THREATENING to march on Bulundi the ANC has compounded De Klerk's problem, for whilst risking accusations that it is playing a dangerous game with the lives of its supporters, it knows that the government cannot afford any prospect of a repeat massacre. Hence, we may surmise, De Klerk's rapid and major concessions of amnesty for key political prisoners, just to get negotiations back on track. For what the government also recognises, with increasing urgency, is that it is rapidly running out of time if the economy is not going to relapse into a yet more vicious spiral of decline.

There is a good cause, therefore, for proposing that whilst Bisho has propelled both the ANC and the NP back into negotiations, it has enabled the former to reassume the moral high ground at the same time as seriously compromising the development of the latter's immediate strategy for retaining a significant hold on power. But Bisho has also likely had a longer term impact which could also work against the government's interests.

There can be no doubt that the massacre has sharpened the lines of cleavage. Whereas CODESA operated (not unsuccessfully until the final breakdown) upon a basis of 'sufficient consensus', the distrust between the major actors may now have risen to such a level that the search for compromise — at



CODESA III or any other forum — may well become more difficult. Nor indeed, has the prospect of what we might call the government's other possible strategy, aiming for an NP-ANC duumvirate, in any way been enhanced.

What we may see instead is a greater determination by the ANC to push for concessions in an area the government is least disposed and perhaps least able to make them: control of the security forces. Indeed, any forthcoming battle over the federal or unitary nature of the new constitution may well pale into insignificance compared with the struggle for control of the security forces — seen as the final guarantor by the NP of white living standards and as the key instrument by the ANC for breaking the back of white minority rule. Few should doubt that the third round of the negotiation process looms as much tougher than the second; and there is no guarantee that the match will not last a full ten rounds.

Against that, there is some speculation that, in a desperate bid to rescue the economy, both the ANC and NP may decide to go for broke in an earlier than expected election in recognition of the fact that only a fully legitimated government can conceivably hope to re-establish political order and attract much needed foreign investment. And in that case, what can be argued is that the Bisho massacre will have had the major consequence of having increased the determination of the international community to despatch an army of electoral monitors.

MUCH HAS been said in recent times concerning the fact of South Africa's increasing marginalisation. With the end of the Cold War, the West can concede black rule and, if need be, allow South Africa to collapse back into its declining continent as just another chaotically run African country. But against that, what is really not in the West's interests is for South Africa to descend into civil war. It would be far more convenient if a new South Africa could be ruled by an indisputably, legitimated government. However, what the massacre has done has been to suggest that, for all Mr De Klerk's nice face, the government has scarcely changed its spots. To put it bluntly, a government so crass as to kill protesters in front of the television cameras can scarcely be

In the years between Sharpeville and Bisho many have died

ON MONDAY, 7 September 1992, at least 24 ANC demonstrators were shot dead and nearly 200 wounded when Ciskei soldiers in Bisho opened fire on a 40 000 strong crowd protesting against the homeland's military rule. The permission had been granted by Ciskei authorities for the march and a rally to be held in the Bisho Stadium.

trusted to hold a free and fair election. To put it equally bluntly, what the outside world now wants to see is the election of an at least ANC-led government, so that the issue of apartheid finally goes away.

ALL THIS implies bad news for the NP's projected Christian Alliance. Quite how an election will be conducted in this country whilst violence is so rife remains a question which neither the ANC nor NP have as yet given adequate attention. However, what the idea of the Christian Alliance rests upon is the ability of its various ethnically-defined constituents to deliver their ethnic votes. And behind this lies the long experience of controlled and rigged elections in the bantustans.

But what would happen if in Bophuthatswana, KwaZulu and Ciskei there were to be a truly free vote? What would happen if in the secrecy of the polling booth and the integrity of the vote counting process the ethnic construct fell apart? The answer is self-evident: the Christian Alliance could well be blown apart.

In the final analysis, what the Bisho massacre has done has been to reinforce the international community's determination to push for a viable settlement in South Africa. It has had enough of its Somalias and its Yugoslavias, and if nothing else, it would prefer South Africa to hang together.

That requires a genuinely democratic election. That has to be good news for the country as a whole; but it is a far more ambiguous message for Mr De Klerk and the National Party.

● Professor Southall's article was written immediately after the Bisho massacre.

According to journalists who were on the scene, the shooting took place after some protesters stormed through an open rear entrance to the stadium, while another group of demonstrators removed a section of razor wire adjoining the stadium. It is reported that the Ciskeian troops opened fire on ANC marchers without any warning. Brigadier Gqozo insists that his soldiers had received orders to shoot in self-defence

**RONSON DUMISANE
KHULUSE, OF THE CENTRE
FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE
AT NATAL UNIVERSITY,
RECALLS OTHER
MASSACRES AND
QUESTIONS THE
METHODS USED BY
THE SECURITY FORCES
TO CONTROL
DEMONSTRATING
CROWDS**

after shots were fired and hand grenades were flung at them from within the ANC crowd. The ANC says that the shooting was unprovoked and that the Ciskeian soldiers had at no time been in danger.

Other ANC supporters were stopped by Ciskeians shortly before reaching the border on their way to the march. They were thoroughly searched and the troops swore at them and said they were fooled by Chris Hani into believing they could topple Gqozo. The troops were also reported to have said that in Ciskei they did not use teargas and they did not have bullets to waste by firing warning shots.

Surely, soldiers are taught the circumstances justifying the use of different types of equipment, the handling of various weapons, and how to assess whether a crowd is aggressive and threatening, or merely excited.

Emphasis should always be placed on the need for minimum force and its gradual escalation. The first step should be to speak to the crowd. If this did not result in its dispersal, a warning should be given that, following a specified time,



force would be used. Tearsmoke should be used first depending on wind and other conditions. Only after that should rubber bullets be used, or possibly bird-shot. Live rounds of ammunition should not be used in the absence of particular threat to the soldiers or to others. No firearm should be loaded until the commanding officer has ordered this.

The commanding officer should keep in constant contact with his men, informing them how to handle particular situations and keeping them as calm and confident as possible. If the crowd failed to disperse, force could be used but the force used should not be greater than necessary and should be moderate and proportionate to the circumstances of the case.

Firearms and other lethal weapons should be used to disperse a gathering only where weapons less likely to cause injury or death had first been used to no avail; or where there had been violent behaviour on the part of the crowd. In addition, firearms should be used with all reasonable caution, without recklessness or negligence and without causing unnecessary injury.

THERE HAVE been many demonstrators killed or injured over the years.

On 21 March 1960 several thousands of people gathered near the police station at Sharpeville to protest against Africans having to carry reference books. The demonstration was peaceful and had been in progress for some hours, when an unidentified member of the police force is said to have panicked and fired a shot without warning and without an order to do so.

This was followed by shots from numerous other members of the force, including the policemen manning machine guns. Sixty-seven people were killed and 186 injured. Of these forty were women and eight were children. The police said in justification of the shootings that they thought that they were being attacked. But of the bullet wounds that could be classified, 30 were inflicted from the front and 156 from behind.

On 21 March 1985 a police patrol in two armoured cars confronted a crowd marching from Langa to KwaNobuhle to attend a funeral in contravention of a magisterial prohibition imposed on the gathering. The gathering was peaceful. According to the police a member of the

Cont. on Page Eighteen

Political commentator ANTHONY HEARD believes the root cause of Bisho-type massacres is the Bantustan system which the Nationalist government "clings to like a bad habit."

SUCH TRAGEDIES ARE INEVITABLE OUTCOME OF VERWOERD'S CRAZY VISION

IT WAS all so obvious. The dream had to become a nightmare, the government's creation a Frankenstein.

Yet it took 33 years for South Africans to witness the events that signalled the death-throes of the Bantustan policy. And to this day the government shows unwillingness to ditch the scheme, clinging to it like a bad habit.

An SADF-trained brigadier from Ciskei was the agent of the latest terror. But if it was not Brigadier Gqozo it would have been some other tinpot dictator who would have done it. Bishos were built-in inevitabilities of the system.

To heap all or most blame on Ronnie Kasrils's charge of the light brigade is, literally, to seek a red herring. A cacophony of criticism has been directed at this flamboyant adventurer. Yet were he a Chinese hot-head in Tiananmen Square, he would have been hailed to Pretoria's rafters and feted by White South Africa.

The blame for the deaths lies squarely on Brigadier Gqozo: the responsibility rests with President De Klerk; and the root cause must be sought in the crazy vision of Bantustans which Dr Hendrik Frensch Verwoerd announced to Parliament in 1959.

In doing so, in the debate on the Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Bill, Verwoerd was laying the legislative foundations for what happened to African National Congress protesters in Bisho, in "independent" Ciskei.

IT IS ideologically important to note that they were not South African government troops who fired indiscriminately into a crowd of protesters, killing about 28, wounding nearly 200.

No, they were the troops of a puppet state of Pretoria's whose collapsing flagpole at independence summed up its rickety nature.

Bisho drew attention as never before to "Bantustans" set up under apartheid, and still thriving, in a perverse sort of way, to this day.

In various Papa Doc Haitis scattered around South Africa, brutality and disrespect for decent standards have become the order of the day. In this system, tear gas, warnings and orthodox crowd control give way to unheralded volleys of deadly fire.

Because the Bantustans are its creature, unrecognized by the world, the government of F.W. de Klerk must carry ultimate responsibility for what happened — if not specific blame for pulling the trigger. That is a constant, whatever the inquiries find on specifics.

While argument rages over the rights and wrongs of Ciskei troops gunning down scores of civilians who had broken through a line drawn by a magistrate, it is instructive to look back to the ideology that started it all, and to consider what can urgently be done about it.

DR VERVOERD was Prime Minister from 1958 to 1966, the years I happened to be in the Press Gallery. When the Nationalist caucus chose him to succeed Hans Strijdom, a prescient Nasionale Pers journalist, Schalk Pienaar, turned to fellow journalists and muttered to us: "This is bad news. His mind is far too tidy."

Within a year of his accession, Verwoerd informed the country and the world of his new vision. It concerned setting up "Bantu" states.

There was much excitement, and confusion. There were henceforth to be not one but about nine or ten South Africas, and very fragmented. There was a helter-skelter map-race, as journalists sought to pinpoint where the boundaries of these states would be. A country whose



‘ Verwoerd set about racial engineering with a self-assured vigour which chilled his opponents and impressed his friends . . . “Doubt was unknown to him . . . ” ’

motto was *Ex Unitate Vires* was about to be ripped apart, not by war but by tidiness.

With formidable attention to detail, Pretoria saw to it that tribal groups would get their Bantustans. The map would look as if black ink had been splashed at random. A Verwoerd lieutenant saw nothing wrong with this — he likened it to the scattered Greek Islands.

Ignoring the post-war reality of a world which had turned its face against racism, Verwoerd set about this racial engineering with a self-assured vigour which chilled his opponents and impressed his friends. A supporter, Professor A.N. Pelzer, wrote: “Doubt was unknown to him.” His confidence won many converts and stilled many critics.

Verwoerd gave the Nationalists what they had been searching for: a “morally defensible” way to carry on the self-same white domination which was stunting blacks and enraging the world. Before Verwoerd’s accession, apartheid was understood as white baasskap over all South Africa, pure-and-simple — a bit awkward for those in power who made much of their devout church-going.

SO VERWOERD introduced his Bantustans, arguing that Africans could be “emancipated” in certain areas, as long as it was not in “white South Africa” (which, in reality, was always destined to have a black majority).

That the white minority would hog 87 percent of the country did not worry him at all: history had decreed that, “Here the Bantu occupied certain parts of an uninhabited country and the whites occupied other parts,” he explained. That, of course, would be seriously challenged by experts, such as Monica Wilson, who had concrete evidence of African settlement well down in South Africa long before the whites arrived. But Verwoerd ignored awkward facts.

He was miffed at the British refusal to allow him to incorporate the three

Protectorates into South Africa, which meant into his Bantustan scheme, for that would have made the black-white land ratio a more acceptable-looking 50-50.

Verwoerd pushed ahead with his scheme despite warnings from the Parliamentary opposition that he was creating a Frankenstein which would one day come back to haunt his government. He was accused of over-emphasizing tribalism, robbing blacks of solemnly-granted white Parliamentary representation, refusing to recognize the permanence of urban blacks and in the process denying them political rights, fragmenting the country on a racial basis to its detriment, and so on.

THE BLACK opposition outside Parliament, such as the ANC, saw the Bantustans as a means to divide and rule blacks, with Pretoria buying in stooges who would bolster apartheid through the barrel of a gun. Conflict was inevitable.

Verwoerd wanted at all costs to withhold political rights from blacks living in “white” cities, towns and farms. He thus refused to accept their permanence, envisaging a “changing group” of black workers coming and going from their homelands. He said: “Large numbers of them will come and work and live here for a number of years as family units but will then be interchangeable.”

Just like that; interchangeable.

Some of his lieutenants outdid his eccentricity, dreaming up impossible schemes to whisk rural blacks to and from cities in long-distance bullet trains, just to ensure that they would not live there. In high-density areas, like Hillbrow, there were “locations in the sky”. Urban blacks were officially described as “surplus appendages”.

We were living in cloud cuckoo land.

Verwoerd put the alternatives as he saw them: “We are faced with the choice of either giving the white man his own area and the Bantu his, or having one

state for all in which the Bantu will govern.”

He promised that “if it is within the power of the Bantu, and if the territories in which he now lives can develop to full independence, it will develop in that way.”

Some did, with a vengeance.

INSTEAD of being sent for immediate certification, Dr Verwoerd was hailed as a great man, his schemes blindly followed for years. The Nationalist caucus, which in time was to include F.W. de Klerk (son of staunch apartheid man, “Swaer Jan” de Klerk) uncritically accepted the Bantustan policy. Try as they might Nationalists could find no other scheme that would, in their view, give them a moral defence.

They invested enormous confidence in Verwoerd, even hailing his being (in effect) booted out of the Commonwealth, because of apartheid, as an art of rare statesmanship. This writer saw the wildly cheering crowds, brought to D.F. Malan airport in Cape Town by party formations.

The nightmare from then on is well known. After Verwoerd was stabbed to death in 1966, new premier John Vorster moved ahead swiftly with the Bantustan policy; work continued by P.W. Botha. Impoverished, overpopulated tiny specks of South Africa were given “independence”. For the most part, they were placed in the hands of pro-government lackeys, who distinguished themselves by winning favours from Pretoria and, some, lining hefty pockets. Elections showed their support among the people to be unconvincing.

Military rule became a popular option, with Pretoria currently wringing hands and urging a return to “civilian rule”, as if that would be a cure-all in the crazy world of Bantustans.

THE MOMENTUM of the policy was so powerful that many in the Parliamentary opposition buckled under pressure into uncritical acceptance. Political gymnast Marais Steyn, for one, ended up as Pretoria’s envoy to a Bantustan he had so darkly warned Verwoerd against establishing. So did Horace van Rensburg, no mean gymnast either.

In the Verwoerd years, it took rare courage to stand firm against the tide. With the black opposition leadership silenced, exiled, jailed or dead, only a few whites dared to challenge the ruling



Bisho incident stresses the urgency to dissolve the Verwoerd empire

philosophy in a fundamental way — people like Laurence Gandar of the Rand Daily Mail; “Notes in the House” writer Tony Delius and cartoonist David Marais of the Cape Times; John Sutherland of the Evening Post; and, in politics, the two Helens (Joseph and Suzman), Alan Paton and Peter Brown; in the church, Archbishops De Blank and Hurley. There were remarkably few, for it was unprotected and cold out there at the anti-Verwoerd barricades. The day will come, surely, when a democratic government will recognize such efforts.

The Bantustan policy created new cottage industries, in re-drawn maps, geography curricula, uniforms, designs for flags, a plethora of tribal institutions.

Far too many took the policy seriously.

YET THE world community refused to recognize Pretoria’s creations. It held Pretoria responsible for them. In time, the Bantustans were gobbling up to 40 percent of the South African budget.

In the rest of South Africa, subservience and repression were the lot of Africans until, largely with their bare hands, they slowly began to turn the tide.

It was logical that, when the ANC was unbanned, it would target the pro-government statelets in order to consolidate rural support before elections. It seemed to underestimate Ciskei’s guns.

To this day, the De Klerk government, in spite of its disavowal of apartheid, seems reluctant finally to wind up the Bantustan era. It gives the puppet states much aid and psychological support: in return, there is the prospect of a political coalition, along the lines of the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance based heavily on Bantustans.

THERE HAS been a general assumption that, if constitutional talks succeed, the Bantustans as tribal entities must be reincorporated into South Africa. But how and when? De Klerk could do it unilaterally tomorrow by threatening to cut off funds. Yet will he? It will reduce his power base.

The incident in Bisho stresses the urgency to dissolve the Verwoerd empire, once and for all. In the interests of future peace and safety, the sooner the better.

ARTS FESTIVAL

An American professor affronted some local academics with his forthright but singularly engaging views, writes HUMPHREY TYLER, theatre critic of the Sunday Tribune, in a look back at this year’s national event in Grahamstown.

HARDLY ANYBODY seemed to have more fun at the Standard Bank National Arts Festival in Grahamstown this year than Richard Schechner. It’s typical of the man. He says to himself when he gets up in the morning “Okay, get up and have fun. Play is more enjoyable than work.”

He’s not very young, and you wouldn’t call him thin. But you could hardly find anybody more energetic or enthusiastic about the performing arts.

He’s a professor at New York University though it’s difficult to figure out how he finds the time. He does a lot of tripping around the world directing plays in countries as diverse as India, parts of Europe, and China. After Grahamstown he was off to direct some Eskimos somewhere. I think. I can’t find my notes about that. He also writes books.

Schechner has an appealing ability to put a lot of people’s noses out of joint in a remarkably short time. Several local Grahamstown literati and some critics seemed to be particularly miffed with him for a variety of reasons, but mainly, it appeared, because he presumed he could actually teach them something new. Schechner is after all a Guggenheim Fellow, not to mention his numerous other awards and being invited around the world specifically to teach.

He directed a play at the festival called *Ma Rainey’s Black Bottom*. It’s by a black American writer, August Wilson,

although Schechner’s first idea when he was invited to Grahamstown was to present something rather more traditional, *The Merchant of Venice*, in fact. He planned to have six black actors dressed as rabbis play the part of Shylock.

I’m not sure why he settled on August Wilson instead. It was a good choice. None of Wilson’s work has been seen in this country before because of the cultural boycott and, as much as you may have come to hate the word, the play is almost rackingly “relevant” to South Africa. And “instead of the usual bullshit you see in most programmes”, Schechner had a display at the back of the performing area full of notes and drawings about the gestation of his production and various letters to and from the African National Congress’s “cultural desk”.

For the record, Schechner was born a Jew, was later initiated as a Hindu and is now professedly an atheist. He also has a huge sense of humour.

He makes a good teacher. He is extremely knowledgeable and vitally creative and provocative. Invited to talk during the Winter School about “Theatre Now” he digressed somewhat to laud certain sports events — the Olympic Games, say — as “major performing arts”. It’s an interesting analogy but this didn’t please everybody either.

Ma Rainey’s Black Bottom was quickly sold out but Schechner was so enthusiastic about it that he continued to invite more people to the show, promising to fit them in somehow “and what’s more, it’ll be free”.

It was certainly the most adventurous festival production I saw. Various locals who were outraged by an off-the-cuff assessment by Schechner that South Africans generally aren’t ready for really avant-garde theatre were among the first to miss the point of the production completely, leaving the hall puzzled and



Ebullient American Robert Schechner, Professor of Performance Studies at New York University: Turning work into play.





Die Vleiroos, premiered at the Grahamstown Festival, is Pieter-Dirk Uys's first full-length drama in Afrikaans in years. It tells the touching story of an old woman's battle to retain her inheritance. Joey de Koker (left) is Nedda Barnard, the landowner who is finally dispossessed, and Theresa Cloete is Lizzie.


generally uncomprehending, compellingly confirming Schechner's view.

The set was by Sarah Roberts. It was a remarkable three-tiered affair. You are at a recording session and high up is the (white) director and a technician in a glass box. Down below is the "rehearsal room" where a group of (black) musicians warm up their instruments, preparing for the session, and also discuss their generally low opinion of the whites they have to deal with. Hovering between is a third acting level, the "recording studio" where the (black) star, Ma Rainey is about to do her thing. The audience becomes almost inextricably a vital part of the situation because the seats (including a large lounge down below, in the centre) are so placed as to oblige members of the cast to straggle through the audience's legs on occasion as they move from one acting area to another. It's part of Schechner's belief that the audience should be intimately involved in the drama, to the extent that he leaves enough lights on right through the production so that people in the

audience not only watch the actors but one another, too. Schechner likes them to pick up the vibes, "you know, body language", he says.

What helps make the action almost eerily "real" is that the actors who play the parts of the musicians really are musicians and the singing star, Ma Rainey (who enters with her entourage like a queen), really can sing the Blues. She does this so well that the members of the audience applaud rapturously, just as if they were at a concert, forgetting for a while that they are watching a play. This astonishing realism (it often seems it could go also for the contents of the bottle of Black Daniels the musicians pass around) gives arresting effect to the discussions the actors/musicians have about their disillusionment with rapacious and vicious whites, the position of blacks in America generally and their cynicism about their present situation.

While they rap below, the white studio manager glowers down from on high, clearly annoyed by apparently lackadaisical black behaviour and impatient



Pieter-Dirk Uys

for action. After all, he's paying isn't he? In the end he tries to cheat the artists by offering mean payment for their services thus betraying for the umpteenth time any black hopes there might have been for white integrity.

Many of the parallels with the situation here are almost agonising. And



From elephants of Africa to larking in the sky

THERE ARE some engaging diversities in theatre in South Africa at present, though some are totally exasperating. But it's quite fun, for example, that it was a South African group, Theatre for Africa, that was singled out by the British Royals just a short while ago to take time off please from the Edinburgh Festival to present a show "for the family" in the ballroom at Balmoral Castle.

When one of the actors finished a calculated leap to land more or less at the feet of the Queen she muttered something that sounded like "jolly good show". How quaintly British. (Earlier, when the group arrived at the castle, an elderly woman waved to them, then set off briskly for a walk with her apparently innumerable corgis.)

Theatre for Africa bills itself as a company involved with advancing environmental concerns. Its leader is Nicholas Ellenbogen, once head of drama at the Natal Performing Arts Council. It's because of Prince Philip's own concern with wildlife that the group was asked to present at Balmoral this year its evocative piece, Kwamanzi, about animals struggling for survival around a drying waterhole. Apparently both Prince Philip and Prince Charles recognised instantly the animals the actors enacted.

But it's not only ecology that typifies Theatre for Africa productions: It's also humour. Probably the best-known example of Theatre for Africa at its zaniest is the Raiders of the Lost Aardvark series. This year Grahamstown saw Raiders 3, aka Carry on up the Aardvark. The stars are Ellenbogen and Ellis Pearson who is the invincible World War I flying ace Salty Hepburn. Ellenbogen plays a host of characters including (in a singularly hairy orange wig) the notorious spy Mata Hari. It seems inevitable that there will be Raiders 4 next year.

Also in the company's repertoire are two plays featuring "the postal workers of Nuga Moya", a "town somewhere in

Northern Natal". The first of the plays is A Nativity. Some critics labelled it blasphemous when it was presented in Durban a few years ago. They didn't like the Three Wise Men clumping on-stage on motorcar hubcaps and they weren't enchanted either by the fact that the guiding star in the heavens was played by a go-go dancer in a tutu. However you will be able to judge for yourself; the play has been filmed and goes on circuit around Christmas. The second play in the same series is Cinderella which features a white Zulu chief with a mysterious squeaking disease and two (black) male "sisters".

The latest in the company's ecology series is a moving fable, Elephant of Africa, about the birth, life and death of a huge African elephant. It was on the Main Programme at Grahamstown this year. It exemplifies several of Theatre for Africa's greatest strengths. Visually it is often utterly splendid. The music, by Neill Solomon, is outstanding. But Raiders-style humour sometimes intrudes awkwardly. In the Grahamstown version, for example, the "district commissioner" wore hockey boots with the Union Jack painted on them. Almost okay but maybe not quite. It's great to have a laugh even in a "serious" piece, but it has to be integrated very carefully.

But Theatre for Africa is remarkable nonetheless for its almost astonishing successes in the just more than two years of its existence. It has won awards in South Africa and at the Edinburgh Festival. Apart from performing for the Queen at Balmoral and Prince Philip in Switzerland, it has played for the King of Malaysia during a Far East tour. It has so much creative energy you sometimes think it will explode. Provided it doesn't and provided, probably, that it reins in the multitude of its productions, concentrating more time on fewer works, it seems certain to continue to be a major force in theatre here. ●

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finally, when black hurt at white betrayal boils over into violence the first victim is, typically, a black.

It isn't just a play: it is a poignant (and often risible) theatrical experience. The word is that Schechner may bring it back to the Market in Johannesburg and if he does, do try to see it. The cast, one hopes, will be the same (all South African) that played in Grahamstown. It's only fair to single out Sophie Mgcinga who was a magnificent Ma Rainey.

Schechner's Ma Rainey was controversial but there was plenty more at Grahamstown to talk about. For a start there were two important plays by Pieter-Dirk Uys, one of the most splendidly lucid of dramatists. Like other satirists he has been having something of a hard time keeping up with political change here, sometimes even having to telephone through last minute changes to his script to keep up with Mr De Klerk et al.

Neatly presented, well-rehearsed and with a more sophisticated set than you

find often at the festival was his ambitious "post-apartheid play", Die Vleiroos, his first full-length play in Afrikaans since Die Van Aardes van Grootoor in 1978. The most touching protagonists are an elderly white estate owner and her "coloured" companion.

It may be post-apartheid but there are many calculated and totally realistic and inevitable apartheid hangovers in the exchanges between the two. The tension is engendered by attempts by the old woman's son to swindle her out of her refuge. He succeeds but the two old ladies in the play actually are the ones to triumph. It is remarkable that theatre managements have not been bidding for the rights to put the play on elsewhere.

The two leading female roles are something that actresses could be expected to fight over.

Among many interesting things about this fairly complex, layered play is that Uys has gone back to a fairly traditional format, setting his scene carefully, developing his characters, giving them depth and complexity, and so on. There

are also typical Uys-style one-liners that illuminate the text like fireworks.

Also in a post-apartheid framework was Uys's rewrite of his earlier play Paradise is Closing Down. Instead of bitchy women playing the leads he put bitchy homosexuals on stage. Thankfully he withdrew this version of the play later. In Grahamstown he looked mightily uncomfortable in a black corset, a wig and a beard. This was not post apartheid but post-post and would require virtually a hand-picked audience to be successful.

Then enter the enfant terrible of South African drama, Ian Fraser, the henna-haired maniac, so to say.

He is one of the most precociously promising of all the young writers around, a real Rocky Street (Johannesburg) rocker, but also sometimes most dismally disappointing. His The Sugar Plum Fairy deservedly won an Amstel Award for its inventiveness this year, but his main play, Heart Like a Stomach (which won him an Amstel Award for



Best Playwright before Grahamstown) was vastly disappointing. In earlier years he has presented at Grahamstown such other striking pieces as Blitzbreeker and the Chicken from Hell (a semi-surrealist triumph featuring the inimitable Jonathan Pienaar as Blitzbreeker) and the moving Dogs of the Blue Gods.

Fraser veers almost enragingly between highly intelligent crafted work to smutty gutter muck which he extrudes with apparent total delight.

Sometimes this has some dramatic point; often it seems intended merely to shock, which it does less and less. But he shows he is concerned with some major philosophical issues, ethics, morality and a doom-laden view of death.




Ian Fraser is at once one of the country's most engaging and infuriating young playwrights.

Lots of people have decided God is dead. But that is a pretty futile putative end to the story. If God is dead what is there to put in his place, if anything? Do we all go around cutting our throats and bleeding on the carpet? It would be interesting to see how Fraser engages this next pretty obvious challenge.

In Dogs of the Blue Gods, Fraser introduced very effectively the issue of free will. Ah so. That has a thousand implications in itself. Meanwhile Fraser remains one of the most promising and also too often just provocative writers. Yet, what talent there is here. It would be a great pity if he accepted the role simply of a limited cult composer.

And a brief halloo and hooray for another triumph at Grahamstown. Paul Slabolepszy is a careful craftsman and a resilient performer. His magnificent performance in The Return of Elvis du Pisanie was superb. I'm not so sure about the text (which he wrote) though. You weren't quite sure at the end if you were wildly applauding the play, the late, doomed Elvis or Slabolepszy. On reflection it was definitely Paul Slabolepszy. He deserved his Big Hand. ●

‘ I didn't join the ANC to protect my future — in fact I haven't really decided what my future is ’



ROB HASWELL SAYS HIS CAREER IS FAR FROM SECURE

This interview was conducted with the former Democratic Party M P by freelance writer JENNY PIENAAR

Q: Was your decision to leave the Democratic Party an easy one for you?

HASWELL: Yes and no. I was very conscious that a lot of people had worked very hard to elect me to Parliament on a DP ticket. But after my election I began to know more about the politics of the country and became more familiar with the ANC and what they were doing. The DP's programme of action as it is written into their constitution called for interaction and seeking of alliances — obviously not with the Nats. To me this meant that we would become part of a broader democratic alliance, part of a coalition government.

Q: Did external political events influence your decision?

HASWELL: When De Klerk unbanned the ANC the idea of a coalition with them became a reality. I began to be part of a group of people within the DP who felt that we should be making more serious contact with the ANC as the other party to the left of centre. Who better than the DP, with their big business support to inject greater econo-

mic pragmatism into the ANC? You can only do that by working with them. We set up a number of meetings and at the end of the day it became clear that there were merely differences of emphasis in the policies.

Q: You are talking about similarities in policy. How do you reconcile the ANC's actions on the ground?

HASWELL: Yes . . . but there are paradoxes on both sides. How many DP members actually practise non-racial, non-sexist policies? How many of them underpay the maid? Are they making attempts to get rid of racism in clubs and institutions in the country? Obviously the answer is no as the great bulk of institutions in the country are in fact racially exclusive.

Q: But you're talking about the man in the street here. Let's talk about the ANC actions within the upper echelons of the organization. Aren't you embarrassed by authoritarian elements like Winnie Mandela and Chris Hani?

HASWELL: It's not a question of em-



‘For every person in the city who calls me *traitor* there are ten in the townships who regard me as their friend’

barrassment. I am not a violent person but I’ve been very close to the violence over the last 5 or 6 years. I think one has to understand the structural nature of violence. To believe that all that needs to happen is for Mandela and De Klerk to shake hands and produce a peace accord — we’ve had all that and it’s clearly insufficient. Are the so-called hardliners simply reacting to things as they are on the ground as opposed to others who aren’t? Why is the ANC in the Midlands supposedly hard-line? It’s because they are living in a war zone and they have been for several years.

Q: *Is what they are saying aimed at coping with violence?*

HASWELL: Yes, I think so. I know it’s an over-worn phrase to say that one has to understand it in context. But it is so — in the context of talking a community through a crisis of life, of helping them. In the context of the 2nd World War Winston Churchill did the same — quite outrageous war talk. The fact is that most white people seem unable to accept that there is a war and the evidence is increasingly that the state security forces are involved. Over 1000 ANC activists have been shot. In spite of this the ANC has suspended the armed struggle, sooner, I felt, than they should have. This is enormously to their credit. People have to accept that there are people being killed and brutalised — under these circumstances what do you say to a community as the whole fabric of their society is being stretched beyond breaking point. Do you make nice speeches in Johannesburg about peace while people are dying in Richmond?

Q: *Are you outspoken by nature?*

HASWELL: If I am I probably get it from my Welsh mother. She was a very open, up front person. If she felt an injustice was being done she would be the first one down to the school or wherever to give the headmaster a piece of her mind. I’ve always had a sense that

if I was going to do something I must get my sleeves rolled up and give it my best. Even in my school days at Highlands North — we were a small school and our rugby team was small. We knew that if we were going to win we would have to rely on our own resources — lift ourselves up by our bootstraps. I think I’ve always kept this sense of having to live off my wits. I’ve always stood up for what I believe in.

Q: *Your shift to the ANC has been called a cynical career move — positioning yourself advantageously for a change of government?*

HASWELL: I understand people reacting initially in this way but it is based on a misconception of what the ANC is and how it operates. I have no position whatsoever within the ANC. In a way the 5 of us are actually high and dry. I didn’t join to protect my future in fact I haven’t really decided what my future is. Maybe I could’ve sat tight in the DP and become spokesperson for local government. If I hadn’t ruffled feathers in Scottsville I think I would have been assured of being re-elected onto the Council. Some thought I might be the next mayor. I think a number of things suggest that if I had been motivated purely by what’s best for me, for my family, for my career, then in fact joining the ANC was quite the opposite as it has generated enormous pressure, uncertainty and abuse. My career is far from secure. There is no free ride. To be either a national, regional or local candidate for the ANC I am going to have to prove myself.

Q: *Was your decision to leave the DP a rather rash, emotional one?*

HASWELL: No. I had to weigh things up. I knew I had a lot to lose. Without wishing to sound arrogant I was a fairly big fish in a fairly small pond. I have a wife and a large family. They go to school and to church here and it would have been difficult for me to act rashly. I discussed it with my closest friends and family. I was compelled by my commitment to building a new South Africa. I was already committed to doing that when I joined the DP so it’s not as if I woke up one morning and changed my mind.

Q: *With hindsight, how would you evaluate your position? How effective do you feel you are now as an MP, a Councillor and family man?*

HASWELL: As an MP I represent the whole of Pietermaritzburg, beyond the artificial boundaries and I have been

doing that since ’89. That has always been my commitment and how I saw my role as an MP. We have to stop talking about people who are white rate payers and others who are non ratepayers. We are interdependent and we must acknowledge that everyone contributes to the city. The stayaway illustrated that. When someone walks into your office you can’t say “Excuse me, are you on the voters roll?” I continue to argue for what I believe is best for the country and for Pietermaritzburg. I continue to represent the city, not just white Pietermaritzburg, but the city’s interests as a whole and I continue to raise local issues where possible. I am an Independent Member, I don’t represent the ANC. I haven’t changed dramatically. I am still advocating the same things.

As a Councillor — when people expect me to advocate white interests over black interests — I think they’re unlucky. I represent the interests of the whole city not a fragmented “whites only” sector. We have an apartheid city which banished poor, black people from living in the city and we must now repeal those acts. We know that these people will choose to live close to their work and we must be prepared to deal with this reality. Again, I have always felt this way. In the end you must be judged by your actions rather than words.

From a family point of view it was traumatic to go through the onslaught that followed the public announcement of my decision. Sure, I regret that my family has been subjected to such abuse. It is different to be criticised for what you have done. But when criticism is based on phobias and myths you wonder what people are so afraid of and if the fear is within themselves. Still, we are a normal, active family and we have all got on with our lives.

It is easy to feel sorry for yourself and perhaps I should have been more sensitive to their needs. But when I weigh up what we have been subjected to and compare it to what families in and around Maritzburg have been subjected to — houses burnt down, families shot and brutalised, then our experience pales into insignificance.

Since I have appeared on TV I am now recognised in the townships. For every person in Pietermaritzburg who calls me “traitor” there are 10 in the townships who regard me as their friend. It has been a warming experience to be accepted as a fellow South African. If only more people would grasp this simple truth — that this is the beloved country and that we do love it. ●

Helpful outside pressure on the negotiating parties will not continue indefinitely, warns JACK SPENCE, Director of Studies at the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London.

GET THINGS RIGHT IN THE INTERIM PHASE OF REFORM!

IN A caustic leader *The Times* berated Douglas Hurd, the British Foreign Secretary for leading a *troika* of EC ministers to South Africa. Ostensibly, the paper's scorn seemed justified: after all, by his own admission, Mr Hurd's visit was "not to knock heads together".

What then — one might legitimately ask — was it for? Fact finding — that excuse for a junket that's so beloved of politicians? Hardly, given that the 'facts' of the three month old stalemate in negotiations were well known. In any case, what are ambassadors for if not to brief their political masters on events in distant places?

Yet, to put the kindest interpretation on what *The Times* called a "pointless mission", Douglas Hurd was doing no more than could be expected of a foreign minister dealing with a state where British interests remain important: that is, engaging in diplomatic double-speak, disguising his real intent to knock some sense into parties which appeared unable to compromise and return to the conference table.

That objective, following a De Klerk-Mandela summit has now been achieved. (Nonetheless, Chief Buthelezi's deliberate active self-exclusion from negotiations is alarming. President de Klerk may well be counting on Inkatha support in the long run, but if it is not forthcoming and elections, for example, are boycotted, the potential for yet more violent confrontation cannot be excluded. Come back Douglas Hurd — all is forgiven!)

The precise degree to which EC pressure was instrumental in getting agreement between the NP government and the ANC is difficult to judge, but no doubt it was one factor among many which led the two leaders to the summit. Indeed, whatever the strictures of *The Times*, the fact is that external involvement in domestic South African politics is now a fact of life. Both the NP government and the ANC have accepted (and in the case of the latter welcomed) the presence of UN monitors/observers

while Mr Pik Botha, the Foreign Minister, is on record requesting a senior UN "person" to "act as a catalyst" to help get negotiations under way and, more important, keep them going until agreement is reached.

The dye was cast with the visit of Mr Cyrus Vance, the UN Secretary-General's special envoy earlier this year and we may confidently expect an international presence (UN-EC-Commonwealth) to monitor the first non-racial election whenever that is held.

THIS FLURRY of international commitment is surely to be welcomed. The fact that it occurs indicates that South Africa is still on the international agenda, that the external world retains a profound interest in a decent political outcome of the protracted negotiations that began over two years ago. Indeed, the external observer cannot but conclude that the local actors need all the help they can get to maintain the momentum of constitutional resolution.

This is not to say that the UN will play that "imperial" role in South Africa to which Douglas Hurd alluded in a recent press interview: the deliberate intervention in a conflict-torn society e.g. Somalia, regardless of local susceptibilities, and, in particular, insistence on the time-honoured principle of state sovereignty. We are a long way from such radical departures from the traditional norms that have governed and ordered international society in the past, and that proposition holds for South Africa as much as it does for Yugoslavia.

Clearly, there is a limit to what the outside world can do to help the negotiation process along.

It can, no doubt, "facilitate" by applying discreet pressure on local actors; it can and will stress the consequences of delay in reaching a new apartheid-free political and economic order. Its spokesmen and emissaries can and will legitimately point out that time is running out, that at most South Africa has two years to achieve a durable

political structure and one capable of attracting both private investment (a scarce good, hotly competed for elsewhere in the world) and aid from international funding agencies such as the World Bank and the IMF.

Failure to reach this goal means that an economy even more depressed than now will be unable to satisfy even modest expectations of jobs, food and housing on the part of a population set to expand from 38.1 million in 1990 to 47.5 million by the year 2000. Nelson Mandela — following his interview with Derek Keys, the Finance Minister — can be in no doubt about the time constraints and this remains a crucial imperative pushing the two leaders towards agreement.

FURTHERMORE, the world's interest in South Africa might well in these circumstances turn to indifference — especially as the 'Time of Troubles' characteristic of global politics looks set to persist indefinitely. There will be correspondingly less commitment to do much more — in South Africa's case — than engage in band aid diplomacy e.g., look after the interests of external passport holders and salvage whatever remains of their interests in a broken-backed economy and a political system barely able to cope with unprecedented social pressures.

So what's new, South African readers might well retort to this gloomy litany?

We all — insiders and outsiders alike — subscribe to the conventional wisdom that the major actors will remain committed to a negotiated outcome because no other alternative is available.

The NP government remains powerful, but it cannot effectively govern without acknowledging the countervailing presence of the ANC and its capacity to resort to 'mass action' (as it had to in June) in desperation at government's refusal to make concessions.

True, 'mass action' (strikes, etc.) had short term utility in demonstrating to ANC rank and file that the organisation



Federalism is more than a mere 'nuts and bolts' issue: it is a fundamental constitutional principle

had bargaining power outside the confines of the conference room. Yet the use of the so-called 'Leipzig option' in the Ciskei demonstrates all too clearly that elements in the ANC leadership have failed to recognise the profound difference between an East German state with virtually no popular support and denied the prop of Soviet intervention and a South African government still capable — in the last analysis — of ruling even without a truly *popular* mandate.

Yet in one profound sense *The Times* leader writer is right: only the local actors "can find an agreed route down which to go to a new constitution and . . . they must find a way of delivering the support of their followers in going down that route."

Both are formidable tasks: the late intrusion of "federalism" into the constitutional debate by the state president suggests that the oft quoted view that broad agreement exists on general principles needs drastic qualification. Whether the new South Africa should be federal or unitary is far more than a mere 'nuts and bolts' issue; it is a fundamental constitutional principle with crucial implications for power distribution, the protection and enhancement of civil liberties and the role of an independent judiciary. We need only recall the way in which General Smuts 'dished' the federalists at the national convention in 1908 and the consequences that followed for the development of the South African state.

NO DOUBT this topic will engender fierce debate when talks resume and compromise will not be easy. ANC reservations are understandable: capturing the state at the centre seems to offer the prospect of using its exclusive power to do what has to be done to promote the dignity and welfare of a citizenry long deprived of these precious goods. Yet the Latin American experience suggests that the recovery of several states in that region occurred in part because their publics (the very poor included) were

finally forced to acknowledge the myth of the omniscient state. Virtually all other ideological prescriptions had been tried and found wanting. One can only hope that the new South Africa will avoid a similarly painful learning process.

Thus there is much to be said for setting limits to the capacity of the state and mechanisms such as privatisation, deregulation and, above all, a devolution of power should not be casually dismissed.

Moreover, South Africa is trying to reform within the confines of existing state boundaries in contrast to what has happened in the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia where suppressed ethnic tensions burst the state asunder. Thus, devolution as a means of forestalling such catastrophic division has, therefore, much to recommend it.

The events of the last few months have also demonstrated the importance of getting and sustaining grass roots support for constitutional compromise. Indeed, the Boipatong and Ciskei tragedies have made the task even harder for the "moderate" leadership of the ANC, given what appears to be widespread distrust of the De Klerk government and its intentions on the part of many rank and file members.

Particularly resented is the failure of the NP government to take effective means against dissident members of the security forces.

The difficulty for De Klerk is that the security force/violence issue is a structural one with its roots deeply embedded in the psychology and sociology of the apartheid state. Overnight root and branch reform is, therefore, an unrealistic expectation; certainly more is required than just moving police generals around. The task is immense and one that will have to be high on the agenda for a transitional government and probably its post-apartheid successor. But how to convince the rank and file of the truth of this proposition when so many are affected by the daily round of political 'violence' that corrodes their lives?

AND HERE the contrast between the smooth running of the State President's office and the cumbersome decision making process of the ANC is instructive. The former is stuffed with clever civil servants and policy advisers, all secure in the mandate provided by the government's white constituency in the March referendum. On the other hand, the ANC leadership has to filter decisions

via a twenty-member National Working Committee (NWC) and an eighty-eight strong National Executive Committee (NEC). These bodies no doubt reflect the diverse constituency the ANC represents; Mandela may indeed be more accountable than his counterpart, but it does mean that he has a far harder task in trying to devise a strategy broadly acceptable to the membership of his organisation.

These random reflections were prompted by a recent visit to South Africa and the news that a summit involving De Klerk and Mandela had agreed to restart the negotiation process. The major item on the agenda will be the structure, composition and role of a transitional administration. Its major advantage will be that the key actors will be locked into government and, therefore, have to share the responsibility for policy making particularly on such issues as the control and reduction of political violence in the direction of economic policy.

These are, of course, potentially divisive and all the parties will have to compromise if effective government is not to be paralysed and the threat of 'walk-outs' avoided.

The transitional authority will also be responsible for supervising elections to a constituent assembly — an historic moment for South Africa as the black population votes en masse for the first time.

THE ELECTORAL process has already begun as politicians and psephologists alike do frantic sums to calculate voting outcomes while De Klerk and his colleagues look to the "uncommitted" black voter for support in their efforts to ensure that a "power sharing" rather than a majoritarian post-apartheid regime will emerge following elections based on a new constitution. Whether the white minority in South Africa can buck the trend of elections elsewhere in Africa — e.g. Namibia and Zimbabwe — in which the dominant liberation movements emerged with clear majorities is another matter entirely.

These developments ensure that for some time to come South Africa will continue to engage the attention of the outside world. Thereafter, South Africa — for good or ill — will have the status of "just another country" and that is why it is so important to get things right in the interim phase, to give the new South Africa the best chance of survival in what will be a difficult and dangerous world. ●

Nation of 50 million paupers

ETHIOPIA, a country twice the size of France, is the third most populous in Africa, with a population of about 50 million. It has been described by its Interim President, Meles Zenawi as 'a nation of fifty million paupers.' Its infant mortality is a staggering 146 per 1,000 live births, more than twenty times higher than that of Sweden. Its capital, Addis Ababa, has swollen from 500,000 in the 1960s to more than three million, of whom more than a third have arrived destitute from the ravages of war and famine in the last two years.

The problems of the capital, alone, are mind-blowing. The wars are estimated to have caused the death of more than a million people, and to have cost over \$10 billion.

After centuries of local imperialism and almost 20 years of wars resulting from an attempt to impose a system of communism by a tyrannical militarist Marxist regime, heavily armed by the USSR, Ethiopia stands at the threshold of a new era with the promise of achieving a democratic parliamentary system for the first time in its history — a promise that hangs on the success of maintaining the country's unity.

This is a formidable challenge to a society of more than 70 distinctive ethnic communities, of whom the most important are the Amharas, Tigrayans, Oromos, Afara, Benishangul, Gambela, Gurage, Kambata, Sidama, Somali and Welayta.

Two unique features characterise the policy of the new rulers of Ethiopia. It is the first time in history that a movement which gained the upper hand in an armed struggle voluntarily surrendered the right to assume power for itself, choosing instead to form a coalition of representatives of recognised parties and of all the major ethnic communities. And it is the first time that a new democratic constitution is to be based on the idea of ethnic federalism, recognising that ethnic problems are a major source of conflict.

The first major achievement of the new interim government was to secure unanimous agreement to a National Charter setting out the principles guiding the transitional period. These principles included the safeguarding of all democratic rights as defined in the Universal

Declaration of Human Rights of the United Nations; the right of 'nations, nationalities and people's to self-determination', including the right of each ethnic community to preserve its identity with respect for its culture, history and language, to administer its own affairs within its own defined territory, and to effective participation in the central government.

It specifically grants the right to every community to opt for independence (as in the case of the Eritreans) if it were convinced that its guaranteed rights were denied, abridged or abrogated.

Agreement was also reached on a tentative division of the country into 12 ethnic regions as the basis for the new federation. The basic administrative

The Oromos are much the larger ethnic community in Ethiopia, constituting at least half of the total population. They are spread in a horseshoe right around the country but, like Pakistan before its partition, the Oromos are divided in two widely separated wings — Western Oromia on the highlands, and Eastern Oromia in the lowland Ogaden and Harare regions. The Oromos — known as Gallas in the old empire (literally meaning slaves) — were conquered when the Amhara Empire expanded from the north to the south. A considerable proportion of their land was confiscated by the Amhara rulers during the time of Emperor Menelik, and the Oromos were treated as subject peoples. A century of mistrust grew up.

Regional councils have the power to establish their own security and police forces, to borrow money, raise taxes, set local budgets and regulate the exploitation of natural resources within their own boundaries.

units in the regions are at district (woreda) level, with populations ranging from 30,000 to 70,000. Each district elects representatives to a national regional council, which elects its own executive committee with direct links to the president and prime minister.

The regional councils have the power to establish their own security and police forces, to borrow money, raise taxes, set local budgets and regulate the exploitation of natural resources within their own boundaries. Each also has the right to determine its own working language.

This remarkable start to the creation of national unity based on ethnicity held up well until the first-ever exercise in democratic elections for the district and regional councils in June 1992 when the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) and two small Amhara factions decided to boycott the elections — a decision that marked the first serious setback to the process of democratisation. This breach with the OLF has opened up the possibility of a major source of conflict. To understand the import of this development it is necessary to trace the historical and contemporary sources of this conflict.

Under the sophisticated leadership of educated Oromos in exile, the OLF proclaimed the need for an Oromia state embracing both the eastern and western wings of their people. While their wish for Oromo self-determination was unequivocally expressed, there has all along been some ambiguity as to whether their programmes envisages the creation of an independent Oromio state outside of Ethiopia along the lines of Eritrea. The conflicting statements made by the Interim Government and the OLF's reasons for deciding to boycott the first tier elections and to withdraw their ministers from the government are not immediately relevant; what is important is to point up how a sense of historic injustice promotes lasting suspicions.

There are other historic legacies inherited by the makers of a new democratic Ethiopia which are not unique to that country. For example, it is possible to draw some parallels between current developments in South Africa and Ethiopia. Both countries share a history of dominant minorities ruling through force; when the old systems break down

Cont. on Page 20

Danger point

WHILE Mr Nelson Mandela, anxious to keep the negotiations on track, is at this point still giving the State President the benefit of the doubt, others in the ANC are rather less trusting. Unless the current investigation succeeds in convincing the public that the whole truth has been uncovered and published for all to see, ANC distrust and cynicism about the negotiating process will grow.

As some in the ANC are asking: How can you negotiate with people — let alone go into an interim government with them — when you are convinced

they are using the resources of the state to harass you and destabilise your organisation?

The NP for its part, is just as concerned about the activities of the ANC's so-called self-defence units and wants to see MK disbanded before it will feel more at ease.

At the time of writing, the ANC national executive committee was meeting in Durban to discuss the leadership's conciliatory proposals for the next phase of negotiations and the danger was that those who are loath to share power in

government with the National Party, even for a limited time, have been given enough ammunition to hold up the process.

A spectre of mistrust hangs over the whole proceeding with suspicions on both sides about double agendas and dirty tricks.

Just at the point when a negotiating breakthrough is on the cards, President De Klerk's reluctance to submit Military Intelligence to independent scrutiny has placed everything he has achieved in jeopardy. ●

Between Sharpeville and Bisho

crowd produced a petrol bomb and the police fired at the crowd.

Witnesses denied that any member of the crowd had produced a petrol bomb. They said the gathering was peaceful and the police were hostile.

Although the commanding officer claimed to have fired a warning shot, the order to fire came almost immediately after it.

The police did not use alternative less violent crowd control methods because they had been deliberately refused equipment such as teargas, rubber bullets, loudhailer and birdshot. They were equipped solely with lethal weapons. The crowd comprised a significant number of children and women. As in Sharpeville, the overwhelming preponderance of people were shot in the back or the side. Only one out of 20 fatalities was shot directly from the front.

On 26 March 1990, a crowd of about 50 000 gathered in Sebokeng and some 90 policemen confronted them. The mood of the crowd was excited but not menacing or aggressive. The crowd moved to some 40 metres away from the police line, but there was very little stoning and no immediate threat to the police. Firing began without an order to shoot. A constable fired a teargas canister from a stopper and sparked a chain reaction in the police line. Shooting lasted between 10 and 20 seconds. Some 60 rounds of ammunition were fired. Five people were killed and 161

wounded, 84 from behind.

The subsequent commission of inquiry, chaired by Mr Justice Goldstone, found that the shootings were unjustified, as the force used was immoderate and disproportionate.

On 24 March 1991, a group of some 200 ANC supporters gathered in Daveyton on East Rand. No permission was obtained for the march. The ANC stated that the police arrived on the scene, gave the group ten minutes to disperse and then, while the men were still discussing the issue, opened fire. The men ran away but were trapped by a second police vehicle, from which shots were also fired. Twelve ANC supporters were killed and 27 injured. One policeman was hacked to death and two injured.

On Friday 9 August 1991, Mr F.W. de Klerk was scheduled to address a meeting of the National Party in the Commando Hall in Ventersdorp. Right-wingers are said to have threatened to disrupt any meeting held by the State President in the town. Shortly before the NP meeting was to begin, some 2 000 AWB supporters — heavily armed with pistols and hunting guns — approached the Commando Hall, which was guarded by approximately 2 000 policemen, and attempted to break through the police line. AWB supporters were initially repulsed, following an exchange of teargas from both sides. AWB supporters then attacked two minibuses, firing on one. The police then opened fire on

AWB supporters. One AWB man was shot dead, one was killed instantly by a careering minibus and a third died later in hospital, also having been knocked down by the minibus. In the ensuing street battle 48 people were injured, including six policemen and thirteen AWB supporters.

The AWB claims that the police acted without warning, and had been ordered to 'shoot to kill'. The police concede that this order was given, but that this was only after three policemen had already been shot down. In addition, the police claim that — even after this order was given — mainly teargas and birdshot were deployed; and that 'no ball ammunition' was used. It seems, however, from the reports of journalists present at the scene, that the AWB supporter shot dead by the police was killed either by SSG buckshot or by sharp ammunition.

According to the police, 10 889 gatherings were held during 1990 and the first seven months of 1991. Of these, 1 360 were authorised. In 70 instances, permission was sought and refused. For 851, permission was not sought, although the gatherings were planned in advance.

Spontaneous gatherings, for which no permission was obtained, numbered 8 608.

The total number of illegal gatherings held in the Republic, during 1990 and the first seven months of 1991, was 9529. Of these, three gave rise to sustained controversy because of deaths and injuries resulting from police actions. ●

REDISTRIBUTION:

Empower disadvantaged to take part in advantages of the free market

WHATEVER ONE thinks of the idea of redistribution, it is a topical subject and it cannot be wished away.

Because of the sufferings of many under apartheid, it is widely felt that something must be done to "level the playing field", so that the disadvantaged can be given a reasonable chance in the new South Africa. The view of the Free Market Foundation is that the disadvantages which have been suffered were largely due to the constraints placed on the economic freedom of the disenfranchised. Their movements were limited, they were not free to buy property or to sell their labour where they chose, and their choices generally were restricted under a paternalistic system in which many actions were either compulsory or forbidden. In short, they were denied access to the most fundamental benefits of the free market system which has been the basis for prosperity in the western world.

Whatever system of redistribution is used, we believe that it should be such as to empower the disadvantaged to participate in the advantages of the free market.

As it was state coercion that brought about these major disadvantages, it is easy to promote and popularise the idea that state coercion should now be used to put matters right. Some even think of the state in the role of Robin Hood: rob the rich to help the poor. But this route is loaded with problems.

It was the perception of this kind of threat which drove the majority of skilled people out of Moçambique, Angola and Uganda with disastrous economic effects, leaving the poor more deprived than ever before.

When one advocates nationalisation, the question is to know how to compensate the previous owners. If they are not compensated, there is no way that the country will attract investment. If they are compensated from the treasury, less funds will be available for education and social services. Either way the economy will be severely damaged. Yet, this is not sufficient reason to rule out redistribution altogether.

Russia has a similar problem in that

oppressive state control denied the masses prosperity, and it is refreshing to note that President Yeltsin is well aware of the problem. He is quoted as saying: "We need millions of property owners, and not just a handful of millionaires." He has marked the anniversary of the abortive hard-line coup with an announcement of a first step toward privatising state businesses. Each citizen will receive a voucher for 10 000 roubles of state property, which he would be free to sell or to hold as a share in a privatised state enterprise.

The Free Market foundation advocates a similar approach to the problem of redistribution. It recognises that the state's investment of R600 billion in land, housing, transportation, broadcasting, parastatals like Eskom and Telkom, etc. are rightly the property of the people.

There is an excellent case for giving practical effect to the people's ownership of this property. This could be done by issuing negotiable share certificates to the people, specifically identifying ownership. As shareholders, the people would not only have a say in how and by whom these former state enterprises were managed, but would also have the facility of cashing in part or all of their investment.

They might invest the proceeds in something else, such as housing or starting a business. But the whole idea obviously needs careful working out, and it need not be done in exactly the same way for all people.

A good start could be made by giving people title to state property they occupy. This would immediately ease the present problem of rent boycotts. In the case of at least some squatter communities, group title could be given for the areas they occupy. If such an area is particularly valuable, it might be exchanged for cheaper land plus cash, with the cash being devoted to housing.

When it comes to issuing shares in enterprises like Eskom or Telkom, it would probably be desirable to do so in a programmed stepwise fashion, so that the stock market was not immediately flooded with new shares. The first shares might be issued to people of, say, over

WHITE BLUES

(PMB 1992)

*It's all become so difficult
now the ANC's unbanned:
on things that we took within our
stride
this body must take a 'stand'.*

*The police have always harassed
blacks,
it's part of our way of life,
but this bunch of moaning
'activists'
must make it a cause of strife.*

*And now they've had a stay-
away -
our firms are all in debt -
all because some people are
getting shot:
how petty can you get!*

*We must build up the economy
(have they got the point at
last?),
but making a fuss about human
lives
is just living in the past.*

- VORTEX

60, and the last issued to those who are just reaching voting age, with suitable adjustment in cases where people have already benefited by the grant of real estate.

In advocating this approach, the Free Market Foundation is not dogmatic on the question of whether it is justifiable to limit the redistribution to those who have not enjoyed the full rights of South African citizenship. Such one-time discrimination would be a small price for whites to pay in the interest of compensating people for the wrongs of the past. On the other hand, the percentage of whites in the population is so small that their participation would not make a great deal of difference to the others.

The paternalistic argument that the bounty would be squandered by ignorant people will certainly be raised, but we have had far too much paternalism in the past, and it is high time we treated our fellow citizens as adults.

If any advocate of redistribution can come up with a better method of implementing it, let him by all means speak up, so that we might have some choice as to the best method. ●

- P.N. Malherbe
chairman of the Free Market Foundation

VIVA! VIVA!

by DAVID BASCKIN

UIT DIE DIEPTE

IT HAD been a long day. But now, with the success of the case behind him, the Inspector of Police sat back to enjoy a pipe, only to find that his tobacco ration had run out. Damn. First no bread for three months, and now this.

Purging his mind of unfashionable thoughts, he turned his inner attention to a review of the day's events. It had been the little oval tattoo on the prisoner's left buttock that had been the give-away.

For months now, the Inspector plus his elite team of Korean-trained special investigators had been hard on the heels of a dangerous Die Stem singing gang. No matter what the occasion, be it a bridge opening in Umtata, a labour corvee in the Vaal Triangle or a symbolic occupation of the former Stock Exchange in Diagonal Street, from somewhere would come the eerie and gut-churning sound of the old and damned national anthem. On hearing it, the masses would retch, cows spontaneously abort, dogs howl, seeming, by some dark counter-revolutionary process, to instinctively know the tune.

The State responded by suspending the Bill of Rights. With unlimited powers, the Police ranged the country searching for the gang. But nothing came of their enquiries, until, during a routine body search of a routine suspect (his card read: Name: K. Occupation: Cheerleader (retired). Address: Unknown. Next of Kin: Satan) the curious tattoo came to light.

What could it be? Leipzig-trained forensic scientists shook their heads. Cuban cryptologists were puzzled. And then suddenly, out of the blue of our heavens, the truth came to the Inspector on wings of gleaming gold. A rugby ball! The tattoo on the buttock was a rugby ball, the sign of the secret game playing society.

Well, with the evidence staring them all in the face, the suspect broke down. Not only could he sing Die Stem, but with very little provocation volunteered the entire lyrics of Sannie Met Die Rooi Rok Aan. Within hours, the rest of the gang was in custody. Once more, peace and freedom ruled the land.

Tomorrow was going to be a lovely day.

NEXT YEAR IN PRETORIA

AS YOU KNOW, Colonel Ghaddaffi will attend the next All-Islam summit in Djakarta. To salve the weeping wound of home-sickness, he has demanded 1) a site to pitch his tent, and, 2) the personal attentions of a female camel, so that he can be assured of his daily pinta camel milk. But what you don't know, is that in the very near future, the leaders of the tiny Volks Republiek van Oranje will attend the New South African Summit in the former Pretoria. Like Colonel Ghaddaffi in Djakarta, they will be glad to be there. And again like Colonel Ghaddaffi, they will have a few special ethnic requirements of their own. First of these, will be a place to park the ceremonial Casspir. Knowing them, I suspect the site where the statue of Oom Paul once stood, will be acceptable. Next, the right to walk the streets of the Capital, bearing cultural weapons, in this case, the gold-plated Mausers that represent the Oranje struggle against colonialism and imperialism, 1899-1902 AD. Then, the special culinary needs of the Oranje delegates. Made up of ten oxen, metres of wors, a herd of live sheep, litres of mampoer and 'n bietjie vark for vegetables, the Oranjes will request a special dispensation to conduct a mixed braaivleis in public. The event will be guarded by their own men to keep the salivating New South African masses at bay.

From Page Seventeen

Will ethnic federalism succeed?

and negotiations begin for a redistribution of power to achieve a democratic system, the questions of safeguarding the interests of the former dominant minority and of overcoming a legacy of oppression and deep suspicion become paramount.

The old Ethiopian empire was founded by Amhara conquest. The downfall of Haile Selassie brought about not only the crumbling of the old empire but also the loss of Amhara power. The dominant new forces are principally non-Amharic and are committed to eradicating the power structure built up over the centuries by the Amhara. The Amharic community — like the Afrikaners in South Africa — are naturally anxious

about their future in the new society, while the formerly oppressed communities remain suspicious of the rearguard actions which the Amharas might be expected to adopt to prevent the total loss of their power.

As in South Africa, old attitudes die hard. There is a hard core of Amharas who find it difficult to reconcile themselves to being ruled over by those they have been accustomed to regard as inferiors. One still comes across Amharas in the south who speak contemptuously of giving votes to Oromos as being comparable to 'giving votes to old socks.' Little credit is given to the EPRDF for the tolerance and statesmanship shown by its leaders in not grabbing power.

The crucial question is whether the policy of ethnic federalism will succeed. Building on a base of ethnic autonomy is a better guarantee that a system of national parties will evolve, thus holding out the promise of a multi-party democracy. Success is by no means assured, but at least this courageous and novel experiment in dealing with the realities of ethnic conflict offers a way forward which might in future also serve as a model for other developing nations, as well as for the older established democracies which are increasingly coming under the strain of ethnic/regional pressures as their governments become increasingly more remote from the electorate. ●

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