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EDITORIAL

IS THE U.P. FOR REAL?

This editorial is written over my name, because the board of REALITY wants to write about the U.P., and because the U.P. is one of the issues about which we do not have a clear and common mind. This is not because there is something wrong with our mind. It is because for 25 years no one has really known what the U.P. was.

There are very few South Africans who do not believe that political change is inevitable, but there are differing views as to what the agent of change will be. Let us consider only three of them. The **first** is that the agent of change will be black power, assisted almost certainly by external power. The **second** is that the agents of power will be black power and white power in some kind of interaction, which will presumably be a complex of conflict, compromise, and co-operation. The **third** is that the agent of change will continue to be the white man, acting through his white parliament, ruling in "white" South Africa where he will constitute only one-third of the population, and having within his borders a Coloured Parliament and an Asian Parliament, not to mention 6 000 000 black permanent "temporary sojourners," all this surrounded by independent homeland states, who will

be free, according to Mr Vorster, to make treaties with Russia, China, and any other country they fancy.

No one with any intelligence entertains the **third** hope any longer, except perhaps the Hertzogites. But I fear that some Nationalists would resort to outright white domination in a time of extreme crisis. I take it that the U.P. is beginning to understand that such an extreme crisis must never arise. That is how I interpret the latest congress.

It is impossible for me to entertain the **first** hope. Black power is a fact of my life, but I have no wish to be ruled by it, no more than I have approved of being ruled by white power for the whole of my life. I feel no compulsion to yield to black power in order to make reparation for the sins of my forefathers. Therefore it is the **second** hope which I entertain.

I should make it quite clear that the vision of black and white interaction, characterised by conflict, compromise, and co-operation, is a hope, not a prediction. But obviously the U.P. cannot go round the country peddling hope.

It has to sell policies and programmes. And the policy — so far as I can judge — is to work **under white leadership** towards some kind of federation, and this federation will have a parliament whose powers will be allotted to it by the sovereign white parliament. Finally the day will come when the white parliament hands over its sovereignty to the federal parliament. REALITY in January 1973 wrote that "it takes a lot of believing."

REALITY also wrote in January 1973 that for this to happen, three other things must happen first.

One White fear must to a large extent have disappeared.

Two The gross disparity between white wealth and other wealth must to a large extent have disappeared.

Three racial discrimination must to a large extent have disappeared.

And all this must have happened while an all-white parliament was in control. It certainly does take a lot of believing.

It is clear to the outside observer that Sir de Villiers Graaff was determined to preserve the unity of the United Party. It is my belief that for this purpose he received generous help from his left and middle, and help, how generous one does not know, from his right. After the Congress the compliments, especially to the Leader, were flowing like milk and honey. It was not the Old Guard who had won, nor the Young Turks. It was the Leader, whom the SUNDAY TIMES had been urging to retire. It was just as well for the Party that he did not, for the U.P. would have fallen to pieces.

Who really **did** win? For those of us who are observers, the answer is plain — WAIT AND SEE. Wait and see what happens in the next General Election. Wait for the speeches, in Parktown, Rosebank, Caledon, Zululand. Wait for the speakers, Cadman, Streicher, Japie Basson, Schwartz.

One thing seems certain, that the slogan **White Leadership with Justice** has had its tail chopped off. And just as well too. The animal itself is a freak, but with the tail it was grotesque. The animal is not only a freak, it is a miraculous freak, for it has announced that it is going to work for its own death. I don't sneer at this because if one entertains the **second** hope, it is the only way it can be done.

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For fifteen years I was a member, and a loyal one, of the Liberal Party of South Africa, which was outlawed by the Nationalist Party in 1968. The goal of the Party was a unitary common society with a universal suffrage. Whatever the final goal may be, I no longer believe that this can be an immediate goal. I have been compelled to conclude that if a common society is to be achieved, it will be achieved by federal means of one kind or another.

I have been forced to this conclusion by several considerations. The first is that I now believe the policy of granting self-government to the homelands to be irreversible. I

could give a dozen reasons for doubting the practicability and the honesty of such proposals, but I can no longer doubt their irreversibility; and I accept them for their irreversibility, not for their moral or pragmatic beauty. My second reason is that I believe that white power — which is one of the agents of change in the **second** hope — will never accept a unitary common society as an immediate goal. My third reason is that I cannot work for a **political** ideal that I believe to be unrealisable. I can hold a **moral** ideal that I believe to be unrealisable, because I believe that the holding of it is a powerful incentive to do and be better. But I think that working for a political ideal that you believe to be unrealisable causes deep frustration, and in some of our young people a bitterness that is corroding them.

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The charge has of course been levelled at me that I have become a stooge, a sell-out, a peace-loving dotard. The devastating charge has been made that the Government should not send expensive ambassadors to America when they can let me go for nothing. And what is more, I can deceive the Americans far better than the ambassadors! Alas, I do not recognise this terrible deterioration in myself. I see it my task — a big task at low pay — to tell white South Africa the facts of life. It is a task I see for all liberals and for REALITY. I have nothing but contempt for the current fad of sneering at liberalism. The day I apologise for liberalism, the moral deterioration will really have set in.

But it is not only a task for liberals. It is the task of the U.P., if it has any role at all. If it does not perform this task at the next election, it will be finished as a political force. It has to be as forthright in Potchefstroom as in Parktown. It has to tell the white electorate the following facts of life:

- 1) The day of unilateral white political decisions in South Africa is over.
- 2) The co-existence of 9 or 10 separate, autonomous, independent states in South Africa is a myth. In other words the "commonwealth" is a myth.
- 3) Nevertheless the progress of the homelands to self-government is irreversible.
- 4) Therefore "white" South Africa must negotiate, consult, co-operate with the homelands, in an endeavour to decide what kind of inter-relationship there is to be.
- 5) "White" South Africa must face the fact that negotiation, consultation, and co-operation, will become progressively more difficult so long as the institutions of Apartheid are maintained.
- 6) Therefore "White" South Africa must **begin** the dismantling of Apartheid.
- 7) "White" South Africa must face the most difficult fact of all — that she will be the homeland of 4 million whites, 2 million Coloureds, ¼ million Asians and 6 million Africans.
- 8) She must then begin to plan the political constitution of the homeland of which she is a part.

These 8 facts of life must be presented by the U.P. to the white electorate. But it has to present a **ninth** fact of its own. It has decided to work towards a federal constitution and a federal parliament, the powers of which will be allotted to it by the white parliament of "white" South Africa. That in the first place is going to require an amount of co-operation from the other homeland governments of an almost unbelievable kind.

But suppose it is achieved. Then the white parliament must begin to allot yet more powers to the federal parliament, until eventually the transfer of power is complete. The U.P. will go down in history as one of the most extraordinary parties in the history of parliamentary government.

BUT – BUT – BUT –
The white fear!
The gross disparity!
The machinery of apartheid!

One cannot frontally assault the first, but the white parliament that is going to phase itself out must **first** phase out the gross disparity and start dismantling the machinery.

I am convinced that the gross disparity in financial status is one of the deepest causes of white fear and black resentment. The dismantling of apartheid would certainly decrease black resentment. But will it lessen white fear or increase it?

That is a big question. But the important thing is **to be doing, and to be seen to be doing**, something about it.

I wish to make one last point, I believe it is possible to cherish an ideal goal, and to be willing at the same time to pursue it by methods not so ideal, that is by methods one would not have used had one been able to use others. I realise that this causes tensions between young and old, between black and white, between the militants and the dogged sticklers, between the radicals and the liberals, between the all-or-nothings and the all-or-somethings. In fact an all-or-nothing finds it difficult – logically and psychologically – to understand an all-or-something. There is a kind of presumption that an all-or-something has already announced his intentions of settling for a very small something. And there is a kind of nobility accredited to those who take nothing, and a kind of ignobility to those who take something.

If I had a leaning when I was younger, it was to the noble side. I remember Donald Molteno saying to me at a Liberal Party meeting, in that devastating way of his, "the trouble with you, Paton, is that you think the Liberal Party is a church."

But now I'm out to get **something**. I'm out to make white South Africa do **something** (sensible, I mean). I'm out to make everyone who can, do **something**. Therefore I am out to make the U.P. do **something**.

All that I can say to them is, do it quickly. Otherwise violence and death will be the destiny of many of us, both black and white, many of us yet not born.□

Alan Paton

FEDERATION

by Leo Marquard

I should like to congratulate and thank those responsible for calling this conference. If anything is to become of the much-talked about federation it is at such conferences as this that ideas will have to be sorted out before they are presented to the public – that is, to 14 or 15 million adult South Africans.

The word 'federation' is very much in the air these days, and I mean that in both senses: it is being talked about a good deal in rather limited circles, and the talk is often divorced from reality. This is the result, I think, of the rather loose conceptions of federation that are current. I have an uncomfortable feeling that it has become fashionable to throw off remarks at cocktail parties that, of course, what we really need is federation. more often than not with the

(Paper read at the Conference on Federation, held near East London on the 9th November 1973.)

corollary that this will fix the Nationalists or possibly even the United Party. It is rather like a doctor saying to a banned person whose passport has been taken from him: 'What you really need is to get away from South Africa for a long holiday. Why not go to the Riviera?'. Alternatively, of course, you can establish yourself as an up-to-date authority by saying, possibly even at the same cocktail party: 'Of course it's quite absurd. Federation has never worked anywhere else and it certainly won't work here.'

The reason why the feeling I have about this superficial attitude is uncomfortable is that, as you all know, federation is not going to come about merely as the result of a change of government or of a slight shift in white political power or of sloans. There is nothin' 'mere' about what is required

before a federation can be brought about. And unless it is recognised that it is going to be a long and hard job we shall fail to take even the first step, which is to bring the idea of federation into the sphere of public consciousness and thus of practical politics.

It is because I believe that federation, properly understood, could be a useful constitutional device in South Africa's circumstances that I think it is important to be clear about what we mean by it. I suggest the straightforward definition that it is a system of government best suited to those **who desire union but do not want unity**. And federation will come about only when people believe that it is both useful and safe.

It is hardly necessary to say that South Africa is essentially a country in which federation would be more appropriate for all the inhabitants than either of the two alternatives of total partition or total union. The conditions that make it so are its diverse population with great differences of race, language, history and culture; its divergent climatic regions and **great** geographic distances; and its diverse economic conditions.

Not only is South Africa – and, indeed, Southern Africa an area where federation is an appropriate form of government: these conditions have, after all, always been there. But, so it seems to me, conditions have never been so favourable for fruitful discussion about it. The main reason for this is the very general realisation that South Africa's race policies are rapidly reaching the end of the road. What we are now experiencing is the logical outcome of generations of those policies which, during the past twentyfive years, have gone under the general name of apartheid. And the logical consequences of apartheid are not pleasant to contemplate. That is why more and more people are seeking alternatives.

I don't want to be misunderstood when I say that the fear of worsening racial disharmony is a powerful factor in inducing South Africans of all races to seek an escape. I do not regard federation as a means of solving race questions or dissolving race prejudice and I do not advocate it for that reason. But it could provide a constitutional framework within which such questions may find more rational answers.

Incidentally, there seems to be an idea abroad that there is something ignoble, almost dishonest in acting under the spur of fear. This seems to me to be nonsense and I hope advocates of federation will not for one instant allow this to deter or inhibit them.

It would take a lot of hard, clever, and honest propaganda to persuade the people of South Africa that, in theory at any rate, federation would be a good thing. But it is not, I believe, impossible to do so. A much bigger snag comes in the second part of my definition. You can persuade South Africans that federation is useful. But can you convince them that it is safe? How do you set about persuading the Zulu and the Xhosa that federation is not just the latest model of colonial exploitation? How do you convince Afrikaners that their language and culture will be

safer under federation than they are now, when political power, however illusory, is in Afrikaner hands? .

* * * * *

I am not going even to suggest answers. That is, after all, what this conference is about. But I would like to make a few observations.

In the first place, let us not fall into the trap of expecting federation to do what it never was designed to do. It is not designed to rid society of race prejudice, to abolish greed and the exploitation of the weak by the strong. It is not designed to ensure either weak or strong central or local government. In other words, federation is not a social or political panacea. It is not a super washing machine into which you can put all your dirty political and economic linen and expect to have it come out clean and shiny.

In the second place, while it is of great advantage not to be dogmatic about any federal arrangements that are suggested, it is important to realise that there are three essential principles in federation: the division of sovereign powers, the special function of the supreme court, and the machinery for constitutional amendment. Any plans for federation should be measured against these three principles. If they are violated or even watered down and weakened, the result will almost certainly be a pernicious distortion of federation.

Finally, let us, black and white together, not underestimate the immensity of the task of persuading black and white that federation is sound and safe. Nor, at the same time, let us shrink from it.

This conference may not be the beginning of the end; but as Churchill said, it might well be the end of the beginning. And to quote another great man, Albert Luthuli, who once said to me: ' It doesn't matter how fast the car goes so long as it's going in the right direction.'□




APARTHEID—SEPARATION OR EXPLOITATION

by John Wright

South Africa has grown used to having a Prime Minister who seldom speaks in public without making threats against one or other of the wide range of institutions which he sees as enemies of the apartheid state, but Mr Vorster's recent promises to place tighter controls on the Press deserve to be taken very seriously. For not only does the Prime Minister normally follow up his threats with action, but the legislation which he seems to be contemplating will do more than curb newspaper reporting: it will also inhibit further what local debate there still is at an academic level on contentious issues in South African public affairs. Explicitly, Mr Vorster has stated that he will pull off the streets any newspaper which in his view is guilty of inciting racial hostility and thereby undermining the security of the state; implicitly, his statements have revealed a strong desire to stamp out criticism that strikes at the moral credentials of the National Party's policies of 'separate development'. Nowhere has this been made clearer than in his reaction to the **Rand Daily Mail's** publication on September 4 of a letter that shortly and sharply castigated separate development as a system for the oppression and exploitation of blacks. The appearance of this letter in the columns of the **Mail** seems to have been a major factor in provoking Mr Vorster's public ultimatum to the Press to put its house in order by the new year, for he singled it out in his speech as an example of comment that should not be allowed to appear in print. Written by Vitalis Monkhe of Natal, it originally appeared as part of a series of letters arising out of the Johannesburg City Council's investigation into municipal 'petty apartheid'. To illustrate the sort of opinion that Mr Vorster wants to silence, it is given here as republished in the **Mail** of September 15.

"Behind the refusal to allow the Black to enter the same public bus, train, taxi, the same park, zoological or botanical garden or church, is a complex system of colonialism, racial discrimination, economic exploitation and oppression.

This system is called "baasskap". Separate development or apartheid robs an African of his land and produce; it forces him to live in poverty, misery and disease. It denies him modern education; it herds him into barren reserves called Bantustans. It cuts him off from every form of real democratic expression, freedom of speech,



Miners a mile under the Witwatersrand

(Margaret Bourke-White, LIFE)

Press and mobility. The most effective of these is the enslavement of the Black mind.

From one end of the country to the other, apartheid is backed by force; with an army and with a galaxy of oppressive racial laws.

The whole concept of apartheid is an outrage to human intelligence, dignity and worth. It is our belief that the people of South Africa, both White and Black, will one day jerk themselves out of their complacent smugness and prostration, wake up to their responsibilities, and seek to wipe out from the book of history this chapter of degradation, misery and moral destitution".

This, then, is the kind of thinking that Mr Vorster does not want to see made public. He did not make clear his specific objections to Mr Monkhe's letter, but they are not hard to imagine: the flat statement that apartheid

makes slaves of black men is hardly likely to find favour with the system's chief executive officer. From an apartheid supporter's point of view, Mr Vorster's reaction is justified, but for the opponents of apartheid it is highly disturbing for the state of mind it reveals among the country's political bosses towards public criticism of their policies. Race issues are a part of everyday life in the state that Mr Vorster rules, and action by his dominant minority group against what it regards as 'incitement' will certainly have the effect of further curtailing their public discussion.

And it is not only journalists who will feel the screws, but also those academics who are professionally concerned with analysing the structure and evolution of South African society and who put forward their findings for open debate. Though legislation against 'incitement' may not affect them directly, it will reinforce the climate of opinion which is more and more inhibiting the inclination of South African academics to do research and to publish on topics that are likely to be regarded by the leaders of Afrikaner nationalism as 'political'. Nor, for that matter, will they find much support from the English-speaking section, as is implicit in a statement made by Mr Radclyffe Cadman, leader of the United Party in Natal, at his party's congress in Durban in September. 'White leadership in South Africa, 'he said,' is an existing fact which arises from the political and economic history of this country. It needs neither explanation nor justification because in our context and at this time it is the most natural thing in the world'. (*Sunday Times*, 30.9.73). By this criteria, the researches of sociologists, political scientists and historians into the origins and effects of 'white leadership' are, if not redundant, then 'unnatural', and therefore to be regarded with suspicion. The portents for social scientists in South Africa, being able to continue their work relatively unfettered are not good.

What makes Mr Vorster's threats to freedom of speech even more ominous for local academics is that they come at a time when many students of South African society, particularly overseas, are beginning to base their thinking on the view that the apartheid system is in fact what Mr Monkhe says it is, and what Mr Vorster says it is not. In the process they are beginning to move away from the idea that is held not only by the Nationalist protagonists of apartheid but also by many of its liberal antagonists, the idea that the present-day apartheid system must be seen essentially in 'racial' terms; that it has developed primarily as a result of the wide cultural (and, according to protagonists like Mrs Betsie Verwoerd, biological) differences that exist, and have in the past existed, between the various race groups; and that the political, social, and economic dominance of the whites today is simply the outcome of their subjugation of the blacks in the course of the 19th century. Superficially, this idea contains an element of truth, but by not taking into account the actual processes by which white domination has been consolidated over the last 100 years, it obscures the real nature of apartheid today. Recently social scientists have begun rather to see apartheid in 'economic' terms, to see that the inter-group tensions which are reflected in a systematic discrimination by whites against blacks are not so much race conflicts as class conflicts.

South African history since at least the 1870's is seen to exhibit a classic case of the struggle between haves and have-nots, whose nature has long been obscured from observers by their own obsession with the more blatant manifestations of race discrimination. This is not to deny the great importance of racial and cultural distinctions as exacerbating factors in these class conflicts, nor to deny that the distinction between haves and have-nots has crystallized in terms of race, but the tensions in South African society are coming to be regarded as fundamentally economic in origin, and apartheid, which is founded on those tensions, as primarily a system not of racial separation but of racial exploitation.

This view began gaining intellectual respectability in the 1960's among British and American sociologists and political scientists, but now the historians, normally more cautious in their professional judgements, are also beginning to add the weight of their opinions to it. Significantly, it has to a large extent been the appearance of the **Oxford History of South Africa**, with its liberal thesis, that has stimulated them into doing so. (Vol 1, 1969; Vol. 2, 1971.) The publication of volume two in particular has provided the opportunity for several leading overseas Africanists to write incisive critiques which are concerned not merely to bring out the book's merits and demerits but to point to possible new directions for the writing of South African history. Examples are the reviews by Martin Legassick (*Journal of History*, Vol. 13, 1972), Shula Marks (*Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies*, Vol. 10, 1972), and Stanley Trapido (*African Affairs*, Vol. 71, 1972). But the most deliberate and sustained attempt made so far to formulate a new conceptual approach is that of two young British historians, Anthony Atmore and Nancy Westlake, in their review article, 'A liberal dilemma: a critique of the **Oxford History of South Africa**', which appeared in the October 1972 number of **Race**. Though the authors tend to oversimplify some of their judgements, and to obscure their argument with sociological jargon, their closely-reasoned thesis provides a starting point for a fresh look at South Africa's past, and at the same time provides some much-needed historical insights into the nature of apartheid.

The main thrust of their argument is directed against what they see as the liberal notion that apartheid is based on white, and particularly Afrikaner, race phobia, which have their origins very early in South African frontier history and which have, rather surprisingly, not disappeared with the growth of white prosperity since the beginnings of industrialization in the 1870's. The key to their approach lies in the following statement:

"one of the main presuppositions of current liberal ideology, certainly in the South African context, is that modern capitalism is basically an economic and social system which results in the peaceful interaction of mutual co-operation between, and equivalent benefit to all its participants". If the Progressive Party can be regarded as one of the major voices of liberalism in South Africa, then this statement holds good, for the party's leaders have frequently expressed their belief that the capitalist system of 'private enterprise' is a catalyst for beneficial social change. Similarly, Alan Paton, one of the most respected of South Africa's liberal leaders, exhibits

the same belief in his recent statement: 'In white South Africa the struggle between ideology and economics has become intensified, but ideology, though grievously wounded, always wins'. (**Sunday Tribune, 25.11.73**)

But, Atmore and Westlake claim, it is not the perpetuation of an old, frontier-type racial ideology that underlies the apartheid of today, but the development of an economy whose purpose above all is the making of profits, which the whites have been concerned to seize for themselves by excluding blacks from any real share of political power. As they see it, systematic apartheid essentially took root 100 years ago with the beginnings of large-scale mining in the 1870's. They do not deny that white racism had existed in South Africa for two centuries before, but insist that it is important to differentiate between the comparatively flexible racism of the pre-industrial period and the much more rigid attitudes of the industrial period. In quoting recent studies which point out the considerable amount of informal intermingling that was still taking place between blacks and whites as late as the mid-19th century, they specifically contradict the **Oxford History** (and Nationalist) supposition that race distinctions were by then already rigidly established. In the pre-industrial period, though relationships between white small-scale farmers and their black servants were frequently marked by violence, blacks were allowed a certain measure of agricultural independency, and often became involved in the life of the master's family. By contrast, after the rise of an industrial economy, relationships between the small number of mine and plantation owners and their large numbers of black labourers became much more formal and impersonal. Racially discriminatory practices, in the form of job and wage bars, became established in laws as a result of the demands made by the small class of white workers, supported by politicians, for privileged treatment. The owners were certainly under considerable political and social pressure to favour their white workers, but the point that Atmore and Westlake stress is that it was to their own advantage to co-operate with the state and with the white labour aristocracy to enforce wage and job bars against black workers. Where the **Oxford History** tends to see the owners as having been forced by political pressures to discriminate against their black employees, Atmore and Westlake emphasize the obvious but nowadays often disregarded point that a cheap and easily controlled labour force was precisely what the owners themselves wanted, and still want. Thus it is that the president of the Natal Chamber of Industries, Mr E. G. Hotchkiss, can say that the time is not ripe for African trade unions (**Natal Witness, 30.11.73**; **Natal Mercury, 1.12.73**); thus it is that a Bull Brand subsidiary in Durban can dismiss 155 black workers without notice (**Daily News, 30.11.73**).

Apartheid, then, is seen to have developed in intimate association with an economic system that has a vested interest in keeping workers underpaid and rightless. This is not to say that some blacks have not made good under the system, but this is in spite of apartheid, not because of it. Economic intermingling of black and white has, ever since the destruction of black political independence in the 1870's and 1880's, taken place not on the black man's

terms, but on those of the white, according to the white's particular needs. Thus the **Oxford History** itself points out that blacks have in many cases risen to become managers of farms for absentee white owners, but that it is inconceivable in the 1970's, just as it was in the 1870's, that blacks should become managers of white-owned factories or mines.

Hand in hand with legislation which erected job and wage barriers against blacks went laws designed to ensure a constant flow of controlled labour from the African reserves to the mines, industries and farms of the whites. Such was the Natives Land Act of 1913 which, by curtailing the rights of blacks to buy land, had the effect of squeezing out those who could not make a living in the reserves as they began to become overpopulated, and forcing them to take the only course that was open to them — to work as wage labourers for white owners. This view receives strong support in another article of seminal importance, ('The emergence and decline of a South African peasantry', **African Affairs, Vol. 71, 1972**), written by Colin Bundy, a former Natal University student now studying in Britain. As a counter to the stereotype which most white South Africans hold about blacks as always having been lazy and ignorant farmers who could only be trusted to ruin good land, Bundy makes a convincing case that in the second half of the 19th century a small but thriving class of African peasant landholders was beginning to emerge in parts of the eastern Cape and Natal, and even in the two Afrikaner republics where the land and labour laws were quite uncompromising. By producing a surplus of food, which they exchanged for material goods, this class was beginning to make the transition from a subsistence to a market economy. In so doing it came into competition with white farmers, and also created an obstacle to the flow of the labour which was essential for the growth of industry, and in the first decades of the 20th century it was broken up by laws like the Natives Land Act and the Land Bank Act of 1912 which was designed to provide state assistance for white farmers and hence protect them from competition.

As a result of this development, and of the fact that by about 1900 most land once occupied by Africans, had been expropriated in one form or another, the African reserves came more and more to be what they largely are today — overcrowded rural slums which cannot produce enough food to support the resident population, let alone a surplus. On this point Bundy takes the Oxford historians to task for their uncritical assumptions about the nature of South Africa's 'dual economy', as they call it. Where the Oxford historians talk of an industrial economy in the towns operating side by side with a subsistence one in the reserves, Bundy points out that the economy of the reserves is in fact at sub-subsistence level, and that its inability to support the population of the reserves is directly related to the nature of the white-controlled capitalist economy with its demand for a large and cheap labour force. Approaching this subject another way, Atmore and Westlake point out that the poverty-stricken rural societies living in the reserves today do not simply represent curious relics of the past which have somehow missed the benefits of 'progress', but exist because they

fulfil necessary functions in the modern economy. Similarly, the serf-like status of farm labourers, factory workers, kitchen maids and garden 'boys' is not simply a cultural survival from the feudal-type African societies of the pre-industrial period, but a direct product of laws designed to keep the present-day profit-oriented economy running as efficiently as possible. The designation of these people as 'migrant' labourers covers the fact that they have no alternative means of livelihood, and is simply a euphemism to rationalize the payment of low wages to blacks and their exclusion from political power.


The maintenance of a large, minimally-paid, and politically rightless black labour force is, then, seen as the basic function of apartheid. Where the Oxford historians tend to see it as a survival of what they call the Afrikaner's traditional outlook, Atmore and Westlake see it rather as a product of the capitalist economy that has grown up over the last 100 years. Where the Oxford historians see apartheid as an aberration which has lingered on in spite of the supposedly civilising effects of capitalist industrialization and urbanization, it is these very processes which Atmore and Westlake see as responsible for fostering a more extreme form of racism. Where the Oxford historians accept the idea that apartheid has been developed by the Afrikaner to safeguard his heritage, Atmore and Westlake see the Afrikaners' obsession with their past sufferings as obscuring the fact that they have been the most successfully aggressive of all southern Africa's peoples. Where the Oxford historians believe that economic growth will undermine apartheid, Atmore and Westlake consider that if South Africa becomes rich under the present economic system, it will still remain racist.

Some liberal commentators see the emerging Bantustans as possible platforms for a black nationalism that will eventually undermine or else crush apartheid, but in the view of Atmore and Westlake their development will not basically affect the political predominance of the whites. Whatever formal political status they may achieve, they will still remain integrated into the South African economy, and hence in the last resort politically subservient to the South African state. The industrial economy that has developed over the last 100 years has always depended heavily on black labour, but this has not given blacks any control over it, and the development of the Bantustan concept is dismissed as an exercise in sleight-of-hand. Possibly it could be said that Atmore and Westlake do not take sufficient cognizance of the rôle which independent Bantustans could play as political catalysts in the Southern Africa of the future, but certainly the author's conclusion gives added weight to the view that the Bantustan policy is designed not so much to give blacks their 'own' political rights as to exclude them from any share of the political power now held by whites. The idealism, or wishful thinking, with which some whites, at least, regard the Bantustans policy (witness the declaration made recently in its support by a large number of Afrikaner academics) covers a much more pervasive selfishness and cynicism.

Such are the judgements which in the post-Oxford History era historians are beginning to pronounce on apartheid. If

Mr Vorster does not like Mr Monkhe's opinions, he will like what the academics have to say even less. And if he shares the view of General van den Bergh of the Bureau for State Security that the **Oxford History** itself is subversive (see Monica Wilson's article in **S.A. Outlook**, October 1972), then the long-term prospects for historical research in South Africa are dark.

Meanwhile liberal critics of the apartheid system would do well to enlarge their understanding of it by studying its historical dimensions. It is vital to appreciate that apartheid is not simply the recent creation of Afrikaner ideologists but that the Nationalist governments which have been in power since 1948 have taken over and refined a pre-existing system of racial discrimination that has its main roots in the last third of the 19th century. Statements such as the following befog the issue by shifting the responsibility for the present existence of apartheid from where it should be: 'Separate development . . . was a blend of incompatibles, of courage and fear, of love and hatred, of idealism and cruelty. It was Dr Verwoerd, with the help of Dr W. W. M. Eiselen, Secretary of Native Affairs and son of a missionary, who planned it all.' (**Alan Paton in the Sunday Tribune, 25.11.73**). Dr Verwoerd may have given apartheid a new ideological gloss with his talk of 'separate development,' but he made no radical changes: His Bantustan hallucinations were still centred on the same poverty-stricken reserves whose history goes back to the mid-19th century. Dr Paton's comment obscures the fact that apartheid as a system of exploitation is not merely a product of Nationalist ideology. It is buttressed by the tycoons of Anglo-American Corporation and the English-speaking golfers of the country clubs, no less than by the railway shunters and the Afrikaans-speaking farmers of the platteland. White liberals have an important role to play in unmasking them. □



J. Alfiers

1.

APARTHEID AND THE ARCHBISHOP

Alan Paton: *Apartheid and the Archbishop: The Life and Times of Geoffrey Clayton*
(David Philip, Cape Town 1973).

by Edgar Brookes

Alan has done it again. What Dr Johnson wrote of Oliver Goldsmith "Nullum fere scribendi genus non tetigit, nullum quod tetigit non ornavit." ("He left scarcely any kind of writing untouched, and touched nothing which he did not adorn") is true of Alan Paton. Here we have him in the new field of ecclesiastical biography, and it is a biography, not the prolonged sneer which Lytton Strachey would have made it, nor the tasteless hagiography which it might easily have become in the wrong hands.

The author moves freely in the world of the organised Church. He is at home there, as he was in the world of Parliament when he wrote his life of Hofmeyr; and of course as a practising Anglican Christian he is at home. But this is no facile quality. This reviewer, equally at home in such surroundings, is impressed by the accuracy, the fullness and the understanding of the book. Thoroughness of research is one of Alan Paton's merits as an author. Genius is more than "an infinite capacity for taking pains", but it is that among other things, and Alan possesses it.

Perhaps he is not to be overpraised for not making Geoffrey Clayton a saint. The Archbishop himself told a congregation not long before his death that he was "a shopsoiled sinner". That he was a misogynist might be explained away as an idiosyncrasy. That he was irascible might be forgiven to anyone living in such a land of fools as South Africa so often is. But that he was generally irritable until he had had his breakfast, and irritable even after a service of Holy Communion, is something that cannot be explained away or justified: it must simply be noted, not without regret. Alan calls him "this great, strange, extraordinary man", not "this spotless saint"!

Many Liberals would condemn Clayton out of hand because

he did not approve of Trevor Huddleston or Michael Scott, for there is no orthodoxy so pitiless or so self-righteous as the orthodoxy of the heterodox. Clayton would have been an even better man had he recognised the greatness and the Christlikeness of these two courageous and turbulent Priests. To Clayton it seemed inexcusable that Michael Scott, licensed to the cure of souls at St Alban's Coloured Church, Johannesburg should, without the permission of his Bishop, be camping with Indian passive resisters in Durban, and should be paid by the Diocese of Johannesburg for doing so. Edward Paget would perhaps have said of Michael Scott as he said of Arthur Shearly Cripps: "I leave him alone: I know a Saint when I see one." Geoffrey Clayton was not cast in that mould. But the compassion of Alan Paton can reach out to understand Clayton, Scott and Huddleston alike. This is assuredly Alan Paton's greatest gift. From "Cry, the Beloved Country" onwards it shines through all his writings, illuminating all with the springtime beauty of sun after rain.

All the faults of Geoffrey Clayton notwithstanding, he remains a great man. He was not always right but he was always honest. He had at times a voice like a trumpet call. It gave forth no uncertain sound and bade his troops prepare themselves for battle. He made his Cathedrals in Johannesburg and Cape Town great interracial centres. He fought a good fight, and, finishing his course, he kept the faith. On Ash Wednesday, 1957, he signed, on behalf of all the Bishops of the Church of the Province of South Africa, a letter to the Prime Minister refusing to obey and refusing to counsel his people to obey, the provisions of section 29(c) of the Native Laws Amendment Act. This Act would have forced apartheid in all Christian congregations.

"We should ourselves be unable to obey this Law or to counsel our clergy and people to do so.

"We therefore appeal to you, Sir, not to put us in a position in which we have to choose between obeying our conscience and obeying the law of the land."

Clayton knew what he was doing. He took one of his Bishops by the arm and said, "I don't want to go to prison, I am an old man. I don't want to end my days in prison. But I'll go if I have to."

On Thursday afternoon, the day after the drawing up of the letter of protest, he was found dead of heart failure on his study floor. Alan deliberately refrains from overdramatizing this incident, but it speaks for itself. In his restrained handling of the matter Alan reminds me of the Presbyterian elder of whom it was said that "he was so upright that he bent backwards".

Here, then, is available for all our reading the magnificently

written life of this "great, strange, extraordinary man".

Perhaps the reviewer may be allowed to break the conventions of reviewing and give a personal reminiscence of Archbishop Clayton. Very troubled by a Christian book which seemed to make nonsense of the fight which he and others were putting up in Parliament, he rang up the Archbishop to ask if he could see him and talk things over. The response was warm and immediate. He went out to "Bishopscourt". The Archbishop gave him dinner, then sat with him in an alcove and talked in the moonlight. He gave him a bed for the night and the hospitality of the Holy Communion in the Archbishop's Chapel the next morning. I do not know that a solution was found of all the intellectual difficulties involved, but the strain had all gone and had been replaced by peace.

The book is aptly dedicated to David Russell.

The publisher, David Philip, has made a splendid job of the set up of the book.□

2.

THE FINAL SPRO-CAS REPORT

Peter Randall: *A Taste of Power* (Spro-cas publication No. 11)

by Marie Dyer

A Taste of Power is the final, co-ordinated Spro-cas report written by the Director. Part One brings together the detailed conclusions of the six special Spro-cas reports and some Black Community Programme documents into an elaboration of two central themes. The first is "that the South African social system is in urgent need of radical change, in the sense of a fundamental redistribution of power and resources. The aim must be to re-allocate power so that the black majority can exercise an effective role in the decision-making processes of the society and gain a more equitable share of the land's resources."

This proposition is seen as not only morally imperative but also practically necessary for future stability and peace.

The second theme is that these major changes will be initiated by blacks; that we have entered a new historical phase in South Africa in which blacks have begun to have

the 'Taste of Power' of the title, and that whites are not going to be able indefinitely to prevent them enjoying the full meal.

The special Spro-cas reports are substantial, concentrated and heavily documented works; and it is a considerable achievement to have produced a final summary as cogent and fluent as this report. In the account and indictment of the Apartheid society which develops the first theme, the combination of carefully selected details with confident and uncompromising general assertions is strikingly persuasive.

The opening section gives the Basic Patterns:

... "Every institution in our society reflects the basic patterns of enforced racial segregation, discrimination in favour of whites, inequality in the provision of resources

and facilities, and inequality of opportunity. From birth to death we live in a segregated, discriminatory, unequal and unjust society . . .”

The social structures are described under the headings of education, the economy, the legal system, the political system, and the church. Here is a comment on some of the cynical inadequacies of Bantu Education:

... “By the end of Standard Two more than half the African children admitted in Sub A will have left to join the street gangs, the newspaper vendors, the glue sniffers and the crowds of caddies who are sometimes controlled with whips and dogs as they clamour for work. Their so-called education has been useless, almost a total waste of time and money, since they are not even literate in an African language, their white masters having decided that on top of all their other disadvantages they should start learning English and Afrikaans, as well as their vernacular, during their first year at school. According to the Sprocas Education Commission this would seem to be a linguistic burden unique in the history of formal education, and one motivated by nothing more noble than a self-defeating wish to impose, and thereby entrench, the Afrikaans language.”

Migrant labour is described as the ‘single and most distinguishing feature of the South African economy’ and one that is ‘fundamentally evil in its operation’. It probably affects six million people, causing enormous human suffering and helping to perpetuate poverty. The recent increases in miners’ salaries, for instance, the report points out, have actually increased the gap between the conditions of black and white workers; and figures investigated by the Financial Mail suggest that ‘The black miner’s family in the homelands is likely to be starving’ The report quotes the conclusion of the Economics Commission Report:

... “only marginal changes are possible given the ‘white monopolisation of power’ through the white-controlled organisational and institutional network that is the ‘root cause of our irresponsible society.’”

The opinion of Prof. S.A. Strauss, of the Law faculty of the University of South Africa, is given that “the greatest threat to the basic values of South Africa’s legal system is the kind of ‘extra-judicial criminal law’ which the Suppression of Communism Act makes possible. Pointing out that the Act is employed against people who are not Communists, Professor Strauss concludes that ‘we have thereby virtually abandoned the principle of legality.’”

The political system is described as a racial oligarchy in which all significant political power is vested in white hands. It follows from this that inequality and injustice are built into the existing system. In the changes, realignments and regroupings which have begun with the development of black initiatives, this system is seen as performing a conserving and restrictive, rather than an innovating role.

‘No-one who is concerned for human dignity’ declares the report, ‘no-one who professes any of the great religious faiths, no one who claims to be concerned about the future

of our country, can be complacent or apathetic in the face of this picture of white power and privilege, and black poverty and frustration.’

The report gives illuminating insights into the processes by which the structures of Apartheid are maintained and perpetuated. It adopts the concept of ‘structural violence’ to describe some of these processes.

“Structural violence occurs when resources and power are unevenly distributed, concentrated in the hands of a few who do not use them to achieve the possible self-realisation of all members, but for self-satisfaction for the elite or for purposes of dominance, oppression and control.”

The report suggests a significant connection between the high degree of personal and communal violence in the black community, and the structurally violent conditions which create social injustice and social hopelessness. (The incidence of violence in black townships and ghettos in South Africa is estimated to be the highest in the world)

It is pointed out that the positions of authority and control in the state services, including education departments for all races, are usually filled by people deeply committed to the ideology of apartheid. Further, ‘thousands of whites are living parasitically off the whole complex system of ‘Bantu Administration’. To illustrate this parasitism, the report examines some aspects of the composition of the new Bantu Affairs Boards. The salary bill for white officials in the East Rand board alone is estimated at more than R500 000 p.a. (This does not include for incidentals like motor cars for the chairman; and this is one board out of a proposed total of 29). These boards receive no subsidies from the state but their income is to be derived from local authorities, increased levies from employers and higher rentals in African townships – income which would normally be used for township services and facilities.

“A vast, poorly paid black proletariat is enmeshed in a huge and bewildering bureaucratic machine that determines where they may live, for whom they may work and, indeed, whether they may even live together as man and wife.”

The laws themselves are described as another irresistibly powerful social process:

... “laws in South Africa, in making existing social norms and practices more rigid and authoritative, have made discrimination, inequality, status distinctions and distinctions in privilege so utterly pervasive that these characteristics have penetrated deep into the consciousness of both blacks and whites. If any one factor is to be singled out as accounting for the surface calm and lack of open conflict in South Africa, it is the rigidity and pervasiveness of inequality in the society. In a macabre sense, therefore, the authorities in South Africa are right when they maintain that the myriad laws and regulations are there to preserve ‘harmonious’ and ‘peaceful’ relations between the groups in the country. Or, as the authorities are also fond of saying, the laws are necessary ‘to preserve the South African way of life’, for that way of life is discrimination, inequality and authoritarian control. Or, as they also say, ‘to preserve white culture and western civilisation.’”

and again:

"Apartheid is justified as necessary to reduce racial friction. Good fences, it is said, make good neighbours. There is a plausibility about this argument which renders it attractive. In the South African context, however, it is vitiated because the neighbour with the biggest property decided where the fence should be, how much it should cost, who should pay for it, and who should erect it."

The section concludes with the observation that the whites are themselves victims of the system. In the rhetoric and actions aimed at self-preservation, the values of love, compassion, and humanity are replaced by those of toughness, discipline, obedience and conformity; in turn the qualities of individuality and spontaneity suffer, and white men place themselves in a racial jail in which they are less free than those they seek to dominate.

In discussing the possibilities of change from the rigid patterns of discrimination, inequality and dominance which it has described so graphically, the report begins with the new Black Strategy, which its second opening theme presented as crucial. For many years, it points out, the aim of black leaders was to win participation in the white-dominated institutional network; to attain recognition for Africans as equal citizens in a common society. Mass political parties pursuing this aim reached their zenith in the 1950's; but the white power structure effectively and progressively resisted their intentions. It appears that after 1961 most African leaders despaired of attaining these aims by lawful and peaceful means; and some, not surprisingly, resorted to violence and guerrilla tactics.


The report discerns a dramatic shift into a new separatist strategy, which aims at the creation of a black institutional network as a counter to white domination. The recognition appears to have grown that before liberation there must be unity, and unity needs organisation. The Spro-cas Black Community Programme's survey of the organisational network already in existence listed more than 70 black-controlled cultural, educational political, professional, religious, self-help, student and welfare organisations. Most of these have in common the espousal of the concept and strategy of Black Consciousness, a "a three-year-old movement which is rapidly becoming one of the most powerful forces for change in South Africa. The phenomenon is clearly much more than political; it represents a culture rediscovering itself and beginning to assert itself. Thus it reaches beyond the influence of African political movements of the '50's which the government effectively crushed. It reaches beyond the aims of politically aware and articulate blacks toward the very heart and dignity of Black culture. Its latent power is tremendous and probably cannot be crushed, although its growth may be slowed. One strong element in black consciousness is its rejection of many white values and attitudes, such as competitiveness, acquisitiveness and materialism, which have led to the moral and physical violence of South African society. Black Consciousness is not an anti-white philosophy. One is forced to conclude that it is anti-white-values."

Thus since whites have kept race at the centre of South Africa's politics for so long, the report asserts that the

quest for equality will also be carried out under the banner of race. Group politics as opposed to individual political participation will become increasingly important; it seems not unlikely that the resolution of this conflict will take the form of some sort of bargaining or confrontation between institutions representing racial interests.

In a comment revealing the pace and significance of contemporary developments, the report points out that at the end of 1970 it was not possible for the Social Commission to say whether the major lines of race conflict would be drawn between whites and all blacks collectively, or primarily between whites and Africans, with other groups in a marginal position. Now, however, the report considers it clear that at least the coloured group has moved significantly toward identification with the black cause.

The question posed by the report is thus not whether there will be conflict, but what the nature and extent of the conflict will be. The great danger is that internal pressure



will take the form ultimately of open and unregulated conflict. The report quoted Professor L. Schlemmer:

"In regard to the prospects of ultimate civil disorder, South Africa might be very much involved in a race against time, as it were. If the system can become significantly less rigid before blacks, particularly Africans, develop a political coherence and organisation, the heat of conflict is likely to be reduced. If Africans face the same intransigence as they face today when their political consciousness has developed, the degree of conflict could be considerable. It seems utterly crucial that the aim of working for conditions which will reduce the heat of inevitable conflict in South Africa will be one of the major goals of strategic action for change."

The report regards as facile the belief that economic growth in itself will bring about major changes in South Africa. However the real (though not yet legal) bargaining power of black workers is seen as a strong and practical hope. The relatively successful organisation of the Durban strikes of 1973 would seem to be an indication that the long and inevitably painful movement to build and organise this power is under way. There is a possibility that an over-arching all-black trade union would be attempted, the political implications of which would be immense. Its philosophical basis is expressed as follows:

"The classical western elements of trade unionism have to be modified to accommodate the fact that black worker interests extend beyond the factory; they extend to the ghetto where black workers stay together in hostels under squalid conditions; to the crowded trains and buses . . . to the absence of amenities . . . to the stringent, irksome and humiliating application of influx control laws . . . to lack of proper channels whereby people could equip themselves with basic skills . . . Black workers are beginning to realise how the system rests squarely on their shoulders while giving back just enough to enable them to come to work the following day."

Paradoxically, as the report points out, government policy increases the possibility of black workers to organise, through migrant labour and the housing of workers in hostels where communication can take place quickly and privately.

In a chapter headed **The New Society**, and introduced appropriately by a quotation from Andre Bieler. 'The world has arrived at a point where Utopia alone is realistic', the report describes in brief and general but explicit terms the ideal policies and aims of Education, Economics, Law and Politics, which are implicit in all its accounts and criticisms of the present system and which would be calculated to create a free, creative, and

mutually concerned and responsible community. It challenges white South Africans to decide whether this is the future society they wish to bring about, and if so to face the implications of working towards it; it challenges black South Africans to measure the vision against their own aspirations.

The report, besides recording final conclusions reached by Spro-cas, is an account of Sprocas itself and its methods; and includes a series of documents illustrating its history. It makes modest claims for the success of Spro-cas as an organisation, and for the usefulness of its proposals, and suggests especially that its systematic effort combined with flexibility of structure has provided a model for other change-orientated programmes. It lists practical suggestions provided in some Spro-cas publications – for instance Francis Wilson's proposals for the phasing out of migrant labour; and a 'Code of Management Responsibilities' drawn up by a panel convened by Dr Beyers Naude which investigated the Palabora Mining Company. This 'provides a lucid and comprehensive yardstick whereby the performances of employers can be measured in terms of their moral responsibility'.

It is not possible to assess the final significance of Spro-cas, although its impact on political thought in South Africa has been considerable. One achievement which is made obvious in the report and clearly illustrates Spro-cas's very dynamic flexibility, is the apparently easy and amicable emergence of an active black separatist movement within Spro-cas itself. Another tribute to its systematic effort is the extent and number, the scope, and the high standard of its publications. A press digest quotes a comment from **Hoofstad** whose political reporter visited a Cape town bookshop where books like the *Social Report* were selling 'like hot cakes' and being 'devoured by young Bantus and white intellectuals'. He contrasted their soft covers, eye-catching designs and cheap prices with the 'handful of books from Afrikaner intellectuals who support separate development', and which are 'not generally available, are expensive, and have uninteresting hard covers'. (He found 'Towards Social Change' to contain 'many statements which would make the Afrikaner's hair rise')

The report ends with Mr Randall's own open letter to Sir De Villiers Graaf urging the United Party to withdraw from the Schiebush Commission and explaining his own reasons for refusing to testify before it. Although in the rest of the report Mr Randall is officially a spokesman for Spro-cas, his own strong feelings and commitments are obvious, and are what give the report its life and power. It is appropriate that the report should end with a personal statement, so serious and so significant. □



3. THE FOREIGN POLICY OF APARTHEID

Amry Vandenbosch: *South Africa and the World, the Foreign Policy of Apartheid.* (University Press of Kentucky, 1973).

by Edgar Brookes

Amry Vandenbosch should be known to serious students of politics in South Africa as he has already written more than one book on our affairs. In his study of the foreign policy of the Republic he has contributed a text of considerable value, touching on the relation of South Africa to the rest of the world, particularly since 1948. Inevitably he has to make two points. The first is that the Government of South Africa has handled its foreign policy with very great skill. The second is that all its activity has been, in the words of a great Frenchman, "an agony in the impossible". Nationalist governments in South Africa have been in the position of a man playing bridge who holds a nine-high hand, but at the end of the game we may congratulate him on the exquisite skill with which he has played his unpromising cards, though we shall have to condone with him on losing the round.

As the book shows, South Africa has never been able to

get an ally except Portugal, which is also a target of international attack.

Professor Vandenbosch goes into the activities of the United Nations regarding the treatment of Indians in South Africa, the position of South-West Africa (Namibia) and apartheid generally. He is able to show that South Africa has handled with some skill and a modicum of success its relations with the former High Commission Territories. It has also been able to give Rhodesia considerable practical help without appearing before the world as Rhodesia's ally and supporter. As one tries to peer into the future, one cannot see any chance of the international hostility to South Africa diminishing unless the policy of apartheid is very drastically changed, so that we shall have to continue to play a losing hand.

Professor Vandenbosch's book is well documented and maintains the high level of accuracy and impartiality which his friends have learnt to expect from him.□



DIFFERING VALUES

Extracts from the 1973 Academic Freedom Lecture delivered at the University of Cape Town.

by E. G. Malherbe



We are apt to think that it is only governments, political parties or the church that have deprived universities of academic freedom. They are, however, not the only violators of academic freedom. University authorities themselves and even students have also been guilty.

Only recently at one of our universities a politician of some standing was officially invited by the students to address them, but when he got on to the platform he was refused a hearing by the students putting up a continuous barrage of noise throughout the whole period that he was supposed to speak. In so doing the students were guilty of violating the fundamental right of free speech so well expressed by Voltaire when he said: 'I disapprove of what you say, but I will defend to the death your right to say it'.

The most scandalous case, however, of violating free speech within the precincts of a university was that recently perpetrated by a bunch of Communist students in the London School of Economics when they, in a lecture, beat up the internationally famous psychologist, Prof. Hans Eysenck, a most tolerant and humane scholar who had been invited to lecture at that institution. The irony of the situation is that he had a short while previously written an article in the journal, *Encounter*, in which he complimented English students by saying that, in contrast with those on the Continent, "they never for a moment indulged in or even threatened violence. Never were my classes broken up. There is obviously a rather more healthy liberal democratic climate in England at the moment." The "*London Times*" in describing this attack said that Dr. Eysenck had the melancholy distinction of being the first man in post-war Britain to be beaten up solely because of the views he holds, or rather **because of the views he did not hold**. You may remember that Dr Eysenck in his book 'Race, Intelligence and Education' (the I.Q. argument in the United States) discussed dispassionately and humanely the evidence for and against the belief that intelligence is to some extent genetically determined and not solely the product of environmental conditions. He did

not conclude, from the intelligence test results obtained from Negro children in comparable environmental backgrounds with white children, that black people were inferior as human beings to white people, or that racial segregation and discrimination were in any way justified, or that resources devoted to the education of Negroes were wasted, or that Negroes had gravitated to the deprived environments in which so many of them live because they were of low intelligence predetermined by genetic factors. In fact, Eysenck's views were in many cases the exact opposite of those attributed to him. The '*London Times*', commenting on this episode, wrote as follows: 'Eysenck is not a racist, but it has to be said that, even if he were, nobody would have the right to prevent others from hearing him, let alone to beat him up, any more than those who wished to call him a racist ought to be prevented by suppression or violence from doing so. The criminal law is armed to catch those who stir up racial hatred, and the civil law is adequate to deal with those who describe as a Fascist a liberal advocate of equality for people of all races and special help for the deprived. That, after all, is what **the rule of law** means, that anybody can operate within its framework and nobody is allowed to prevent anybody else from doing so. Similarly, tolerance is defined not by the agreeable views which it permits us to hear but by the disagreeable ones, and from these two definitions a conclusion can be drawn which was elegantly drawn many years ago: 'Your fist's freedom ends where my nose begins'. (Quoted in *Encounter*, July 1973).

However deplorable these two instances that I have quoted may be, let me point out that their incidence in university life is negligibly small when compared with the grand scale violation of academic freedom which has been perpetrated in this country as a result of government legislation and police action.

At the time when I was a student at Stellenbosch, i.e. about 60 years ago, I don't think we ever heard the words 'academic freedom' mentioned on the campus, during all the years that I spent there. Academic freedom

never came up as an issue in those days despite the fact that they were fraught with great civic trouble. It was at the time of the 1914-1918 World War in which South Africa was actively involved. No sooner had we started to invade South West Africa than the Rebellion broke out and we were engaged in Civil War. There was hot political controversy on the campus as to whether the rebellion was justified or not. Feelings ran high. Some students even went to join the rebels.

I don't remember any of them subsequently being imprisoned or banned. They were not important enough. Nor was any action taken against students for using the most treasonable language in their fiery speeches. There were in our Defence Force many students who, for political reasons, objected to wearing the khaki uniform. Though they looked rather ridiculous they were allowed to appear on parade in their blazers and flannels. These anti-khaki units found themselves, however, at a distinct disadvantage during manoeuvres!

Thinking back I am still amazed at the tolerant attitude of the authorities towards the anti-government activities of students during those critical years of civil strife.

Much the same liberal attitude towards students prevailed two decades later in World War II against Nazism and Fascism. South Africa was involved on two fronts: One "Up North" on the battlefields of North Africa and Italy, and one at home because of the numerous Nazi sympathisers within our own borders. The country was rife with subversion. Security was a serious problem. As Director of Military Intelligence at the time, I can speak with some experience and authority in this connection. Though the country was at war and operating under a state of emergency at the time, we did not bother about what students **said**, not even when making the most vociferous speeches on the campuses of the Afrikaans medium universities, or attacking the constitutional order of the country. It was however, when they **did** things, like making bombs in the university laboratories or engaged in overt sabotage, that they were punished – but only after open trial in court. It was General Smuts' policy to lay off the universities.

While Military Intelligence had spies amongst the enemy and subversive organisations, it would have been regarded as an act of sacrilege by General Smuts if anyone had suggested planting informers in our universities. I can honestly say that at the time such a thought never entered my head. General Smuts was always a great protagonist of freedom within the university. At the same time he was able to regard students' opinions about putting the world right in their proper perspective. In this respect he had a statesmanlike wisdom which, alas, is tragically lacking in high places today in this Republic of ours.

..... over the years non-white students began to attend Cape Town and other universities while none went to Stellenbosch and certain other universities. The racial constitution of the student body of the various universities was determined largely by usage and custom, depending on the **mores** of the surrounding community. The universities were autonomous institutions as regards the

admission of students. There was no exclusive legislation forbidding students from entering certain universities or limiting their attendance to others. Even Fort Hare, which was started as an all-black institution, had some white students – no trouble at all.

The Cape Technical College had up to as many as 1 000 Coloured students. Though current custom and usage limited the students' choice of teacher to certain universities, the right to decide **whom** to teach and **whom** not to teach was still the prerogative of the universities themselves, and was entrenched in the university statutes. The only limitation was the so-called 'conscience clause' by which religious belief was not allowed to be taken into account when considering the admission of a student or the appointment of a staff member. As autonomous universities we were then still accepted in the ranks of the Commonwealth and World Universities on a par with denominationally-oriented (especially Catholic) universities in Europe, America and Canada (especially Quebec). After all, it was only a little more than a century ago that those citadels of learning, Oxford and Cambridge, used their autonomy to exclude students who were not members of the established Church from the full privileges of those universities, and it was only by act of parliament that they were ultimately forced to relinquish this. It is interesting to note that throughout civilised democratic countries, and even in Russia, state legislation when it interfered with university autonomy always tended to do so in the interest of a **greater** academic freedom and mobility of students. In South Africa, on the other hand, state legislation has gone in exactly the opposite direction, so much so that South African universities have today become unwelcome in university circles outside this country; and the representatives of South Africa's universities have this year been boycotted from attending the Congress of the Association of Commonwealth Universities held in Edinburgh. The Universities of Holland with whom we always had the most cordial associations have virtually turned their backs on us. This would never have happened 25 years ago. In fact, I can personally testify to the high prestige which South African universities enjoyed in the Commonwealth before racial apartheid became the principle on which the South African government based its interference with the autonomy of our universities. If the same degree of interference had been based on religious grounds, it would probably have been regarded as an anachronism and would not have evoked such vehement and widespread aversion.

In South Africa academic freedom began to be threatened when the Nationalist Party came into power in 1948 and Dr Malan started thundering against the **deurmekaarboerdery** of white and non-white at certain universities. Ever since and right up to the time of the notorious Schibusch Commission the English medium universities have been under threat.

The application of the government's racial policy to the universities in South Africa went through two successive stages; first, in separating white from non-white; and second, in segregating the non-whites into their respective ethnic groups. If they had their way, some of those politicians who are obsessed with ethnic identity would

like to apply the same principle of compulsory ethnic segregation in the education of English and Afrikaans-speaking whites as well. Even here, the only area left over where the parent or student still has freedom in the choice of institution is at the university level – and that only if he is white. We are gravitating towards the position in which Germany found itself under the Nazis, namely “what is not compulsory, is forbidden.”

..... the government proceeded to appoint an Inter-departmental Committee consisting of government officials to deal with the matter.

Though this committee’s report was not published, its outcome was the legislation published under the double-talk but euphemistic-sounding title ‘Act for the Extension of University Education, No. 45 of 1959’. This laid down the basis of the present ethnically segregated universities which, because of their totally unrealistic constitution and administration, are proving at present such a ‘pain in the neck’ for the government as well as for their respective rectors.

This legislation was passed in the face of strong opposition in Parliament, and the dignified warnings and protests contained in that publication, **The Open University**, which was drafted jointly by the Universities of Cape Town and Witwatersrand and which was issued in 1957 by their respective Chancellors, the late Chief Justice, The Hon. Mr Justice Richard Feetham and Mr Justice Albert v.d. S Centlivres. Previous to that Dr T. B. Davie your former principal, an intimate friend, and a fellow student of mine at Stellenbosch, had already formulated “the four essential freedoms” of a university – to determine for itself on academic grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught and who may be admitted to study. These “four freedoms” became the four pillars of the platform on which the students in the English medium universities and NUSAS in particular have all along taken their stand.

On the evening of 30th April, 1959, as the debate on the third reading of the Extension of University Education Bill drew to a close, members of the University of Cape Town stood in silent vigil outside Parliament and a torch of Academic Freedom was extinguished by the S.R.C. President who used a copy of the Bill to put it out.

The University of Natal was most seriously affected by this legislation, because of all the universities it had by far the largest number of non-white students. While Wits. and Cape Town did not have more than a few hundred, Natal, by the time the law came into force, had nearly 900 non-white students consisting of Bantu and Coloureds, as well as Indians – in fact the largest group of non-white university students south of the Sahara studying in various other faculties as well as medical.

I think it was because the University of Natal and its students were at the time so seriously affected, that it became the first university to institute a Day of Affirmation and put up a plaque in the Students’ Union in 1963 to remind students of the loss of university autonomy and academic freedom which Act No. 45 of 1959 had brought about. Academic freedom lectures were also instituted by the students in the early 1960’s – first in Durban and later also in Pietermaritzburg.

Our universities are faced with a choice between differing values. It is a choice as to which should have the higher priority: those values which are **particular**, parochial, i.e. **volksgebonde**, on the one hand, or, on the other hand, those which are **universal** and internationally recognised values as essential for a **Universitas**. Of the two, the universal is undoubtedly a much more difficult and fragile concept to realise and maintain. The history of Christianity with its embracing values has proved how difficult that is. But does that make it less worthy?

It would seem that the preference which the Afrikaans universities have shown in its choice between these two priorities arises from the belief that **volksgebondenheid** should be the main characteristic of the university if it is to serve its people. The university must be a sort of tribal cultural kraal within which the Afrikaner will find his true identity, just as the Zulus and Xhosas are supposed to find their identities in their respective tribal universities. At the moment this attitude also gives the Afrikaner a sense of security and cosiness within his own homogeneously Afrikaans university.

However, this way of achieving identity through isolation has been severely criticised by the Afrikaans poet, van Wyk Louw, in his **Lojale Verset** and in the **Halwe Kring**. Adam Small, in associating himself with van Wyk Louw recently wrote as follows when referring to these ethnically separate universities: “To search for identity by closing their ranks, by drawing a solid circle about them, by negating their **Halwe Kring** . . . they are suffering from the deepest misconceptions about the meaning of identity. The only way to any worthwhile identity for oneself is through other people. The injunction ‘know thyself’ cannot be pursued through separation, but only through relation”.*

If one studies the cultural and linguistic background of those who have contributed most to the building up of Afrikaans literature and language, one finds that the vast majority of them, have had their education almost exclusively through English medium. This applied to all the earlier Afrikaans writers like Jan Celliers, Langenhoven, Totius, D. F. Malherbe, Eugene Marais, Leipoldt, Toon van der Heever, Haarhoff, Fagan, and to most of the younger Afrikaans writers of note, like C.M. van der Heever, N.P. van Wyk Louw, W. E. G. Louw, Elisabeth Eybers, I. D. du Plessis, Dirk Opperman, Uys Krige, Breyten Breytenbach, Andre Brink and Etienne le Roux. As Professor Ernst van Heerden pointed out recently, “English-medium universities, strange as it may seem, have during the last generation achieved a record in contributing to Afrikaans literature which surpasses that of the Afrikaans universities.” The Afrikaner tradition has been enriched by many cultural influences from without, particularly from the English-speaking world. For example, what would the Afrikaner be today without all the forms of sport imported from overseas? Rugby has virtually become the Afrikaner’s second religion.

Obviously a university must have its roots in the cultural soil of the country which it serves, just as the students, having grown up in it, have their roots in that country. This does not apply to visiting students. But to confine, by means of state regulation, the association and activities

of a university-on the principle of **volksgebondenheid** — to the ethos of a group in that country not only negates the true spirit of a university, but may even be politically dangerous and disruptive as recent events have shown.

A university is par excellence the place of sharing the fruits of various cultures.

At a university congress which I attended some years ago in Tunis, Professor Cecil Hourani, one of the leading educators in the Middle East, when speaking of training leaders in the Arabic world, said: 'To be a modern Arab man he must pass through the medium of other cultures . . . In order to be himself he must temporarily lose himself . . . One finds oneself through others, not by being enclosed in oneself . . . The University of Damascus was a failure because it did not allow for the re-fertilization of the Arab mind which comes only through outside contact. Such a refertilized mind becomes more and more creative in its own language and culture'

But to return to the question: Why have students in the Afrikaans universities never felt strongly enough about the inroads on university autonomy and academic freedom to institute, like the English medium universities did, a "Day of Affirmation" in order to keep on reminding every batch of new students of the significance of these principles?

The fact is that most students, English as well as Afrikaans, do not seem to think about these matters. They appear to regard the university merely as a service institution provided by the state for getting diplomas and degrees. It remains a fact, however, that whatever articulate thinking has been done on these matters has come only from the English-medium universities.

In a way, one can understand the indifference of the Afrikaans university students as a group, because, after all, they belong to a privileged group, — to a group that is in the saddle at the moment. They feel themselves safe within the framework of the government's ideology. They know that if they do not rock the boat they will be accepted without question in the Public Service and on important government commissions. Students and teachers in the English-medium universities do not feel quite so secure. Cabinet Ministers are repeatedly warning parents not to send their children to English-medium universities. The Prime Minister himself has attacked Nusas as a group, and is continually threatening them with further inquisitorial attentions, despite the fact that 99,9% of them are decent law-abiding young people. The Afrikaans-medium university students know that, as long as they play safe within the framework of the Nationalist ideology, the dice is loaded in their favour. They know that they are members of a group and an institution that is 'right' (regs not necessarily 'reg'). Consequently, they feel no urge to question anything

concerned with the status quo. Why should they? Everything is going their way domestically. I-am-alright,- Jack, thank-you, seems to be the general attitude at Afrikaans-medium universities.

I know, of course, that there are some students and staff in the Afrikaans universities, who are very concerned about what is going on, just as there is complete apathy among some in the English-medium universities. It is unwise to generalize. Nevertheless, there is still a general reluctance on the part of the Afrikaans university students to have open debate with their opposite numbers in the English-medium universities- though there are signs of easing up. The government, of course, frowns on dialogue between groups of students from white and non-white universities and makes that virtually impossible. It seems that they are afraid of what Walter Bagehot, founder of **The Economist**, 140 years ago, puts so well in his remarkable book. **Physics and Politics**: "Once effectively submit a subject to that ordeal of discussion and you can never withdraw it again. You can never again clothe it with mystery, or fence it by consecration. It remains forever open to free choice and exposed to profane deliberation."

I hope you will pardon me if I conclude by repeating what, as President of the Institute of Race Relations, I said here in Cape Town some years ago in an address entitled **The Nemesis of Docility**.

That this unhealthy condition of docile acceptance of the "status quo" and of sitting securely within the laager manifests itself particularly amongst the Afrikaner youth is as unnatural as it is ominous. It goes contrary to our whole history in which we Afrikaners have always been known for our love of independence and freedom.

The fact that it is so out of keeping with our history may be a consolation. Let us hope that it is just a passing phase — a sign of immaturity which we shall outgrow in time.

However, let there be no mistake, this will be no passing phase as long as we persist with threats to do away with the fundamental freedoms, namely freedom of the Press, freedom of the universities, and freedom of human association. These are the self-correcting, self-healing agencies of any society.

As Senator J. William Fulbright pointed out in his recent book "The Arrogance of Power": "A nation which not only allows dissent but encourages it is adult and confident. A people which fearlessly exercises the right of criticisms is civilised and intelligent." He goes on to say — and I hope that all South Africans will get the message: "In a democracy, dissent is an act of faith, and criticism an act of patriotism; a higher form of patriotism than the familiar rituals of adulation."□

Footnote: ***Student perspectives on South Africa** (David Philip, publisher)



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