

CONFIDENTIAL

88050502k15

SUMMARY MINUTES OF EXPLORATORY DISCUSSIONS HELD IN LONDON
ON 3 MAY AND 4 MAY 1988 BETWEEN A SOUTH AFRICAN DELEGATION
AND AN ANGOLAN DELEGATION, FACILITATED BY A DELEGATION FROM
THE UNITED STATES

List of Delegates :

SOUTH AFRICA

Foreign Affairs

Mr N P van Heerden (Leader)
Ambassador P R Killen
Ambassador P J Koornhof
Mr J H A Beukes
Mr D W Auret
Mr A Jaquet
Mr J de Goede
Mr J Sunde
Mr R Desmarais

SADF

Gen J Geldenhuys
Gen C van Tonder
Brig J Sonnekus

NI

Dr N Barnard
Mr J Boshoff

ANGOLA

Minister A van Dunem "Mbinda", Minister of Foreign Affairs
(Leader)
Gen F Ndalú, Deputy Minister of Defence and Chief of Staff
of the Armed Forces
Mr F van Dunem, Minister of Justice
Mr V da Moura, Deputy Foreign Minister
Col J Maria, Security Advisor to the President
Ambassador M Pacavira, UN Ambassador
Ambassador E de Figueiredo, Angolan Ambassador to Great
Britain
Mr A Pitra, Legal Advisor

CUBAN COMPONENT

Mr J R Valdes, Politbureau of the Communist Party (CCP)

CONFIDENTIAL

2

Gen U R del Toro, Chief of Staff, Ministry of the
Revolutionary Armed Forces
Mr C A Escalante, Secretariat, Central Committee (CCP)
Mr R R Kouri, Deputy Foreign Minister
R P Ferro, Central Committee (CCP) and Deputy Head of the
General Department of Foreign Relations (CCP)
Mr J A Fraga, Deputy Head of the Americas Department,
Central Committee (CCP)

UNITED STATES

Dr C Crocker, Assistant Secretary of State (Leader)
Ambassador E J Perkins, Ambassador to Pretoria
Ambassador H Cohen, National Security Council
Mr J Woods, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defence
Mr R Cabelly, Department of State
Mr L Napper, Department of State
Mr W Bellamy, Department of State
Mr M McKinley, Department of State
Mr J Kolker, USA Embassy, London

Dr Crocker, by way of introduction, described how the
United States saw the current talks in London. He said
that considerable interest worldwide had been focused on
this meeting since news of it had spread. He noted that
the United States had received warm support from many
quarters for this initiative, including supportive comments
from Africa, Europe and the USSR. He thanked the United
Kingdom for agreeing to provide a venue for what he termed
an historic meeting which had now become a matter of
interest worldwide. He pointed out that such a meeting had
never taken place before and that of the four countries
participating around the table, three were at war with each
other and one had a special relationship with the other
three.

Dr Crocker continued by saying that the time had now come
to examine whether the three countries in question prefer
to fight rather than talk, especially since the fighting
was becoming more intense. He felt that this was an

CONFIDENTIAL

3

historic moment to explore peaceful solutions. He said that the next few days would tell whether members of the delegation could become statesmen as well as warriors. Both sides had told him in different idioms that they were at the meeting to see "whether we can cook the meal". South Africa had asked whether we were cooking with gas and the Angolan Delegation had asked whether the temperature was right for the water to boil.

Dr Crocker emphasised that the changing US-USSR relationship also had implications for the meeting under way. He felt that in terms of this relationship much had been accomplished but that much lay ahead. The United States was seeking to facilitate the process towards peace. Americans were not dying in Africa but Angolan and South African sons were. It was the United States' opinion that both parties needed an early and honourable settlement because if the fight were carried on until the 21st Century, both Angola and South Africa would have more to lose than the United States had at the moment. The United States was making an effort to narrow the gaps in thinking or approach and was trying to play a responsible international role with the full support of all Americans.

The Director-General of Foreign Affairs said that South Africa had come to London to explore the chances of achieving peace in Southern Africa. Both Angola and South Africa had a shared interest in secure borders and in political and economic stability within these borders. Both parties needed peace in the region and the benefits of peace would be economic well-being and prosperity for both countries but peace was a pre-requisite for those conditions to arise.

CONFIDENTIAL

4

The search for peace had a long history. 20 Years had been spent in seeking a solution to the South West African problem, culminating in UN Security Council Resolution 435 in 1978. He affirmed that South Africa stood by its acceptance of Resolution 435.

The Director-General continued by saying that in the post-colonial rule in the Southern African region, certain distortions had arisen. The Alvor Agreement had broken down and foreign troops had been introduced, after which there had been no peace in the entire region and the security of all countries in the region had been affected. Many other things had occurred since then. For instance Resolution 435 had been adopted. The parties in the region were faced with practical situations on the ground. These were realities that had to be addressed at the present discussions. He said that peace in Southern Africa would only come if peace were brought to Angola. This was the time to do so. South Africa had come to these talks to see if a serious opportunity existed for peace in Southern Africa. The delegation had come with open minds and if serious opportunities for peace were present the South African Delegation stood ready to pursue these.

The Angolans had presented some ideas on Cuban troop withdrawal which were disappointing and which were disappointing and which differed substantially from previous positions. The South African Delegation assumed that the Angolans also wished to identify the obstacles which existed to peace. He emphasised that it was important for those around the table who were serious about these negotiations to give careful consideration to the use of inflammatory propaganda outside the conference. This would impede progress and create insurmountable problems at

the political level. If the aim were to achieve results then short term propaganda advantages should be forfeited. This would be a measure of how serious each side was taking this initiative. He said that the South African side was ready to explore with Angola chances for peace in Southern Africa. Angola and South Africa had demonstrated in the past, at Lusaka, that they could agree as brothers of the African continent should do. Peace should be given a chance.

Foreign Minister "Mbinda" in reply said that on behalf of the joint Cuban-Angolan Delegation he wished to express appreciation for the presence of the South African Delegation.

The Angolan Delegation welcomed the fact that South Africa also wanted the implementation of Resolution 435. The Angolan presence around the table signified an Angolan desire for peace. As pointed out by the Director-General, the Angolan side had also come to London for the purposes of peace. He underlined the Angolan desire for swift implementation of Resolution 435 to bring about peace in the region. He further pointed out that 10 years had elapsed since Resolution 435 had been adopted and 7 years had elapsed since the Geneva meeting with the participation of the United Nations Secretary General.

Addressing Dr Crocker, Foreign Minister "Mbinda" said he wished to make a statement of certain principles now that South Africa had agreed to stand by Resolution 435. Firstly, the Cuban presence in Angola was part of the sovereign right of the Angolan Government in terms of Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. Secondly, he did not share South Africa's view that Cuban troops were a

CONFIDENTIAL

6

disruptive force in the region. Thirdly, perceptions of different problems differed depending on the perspective of the viewer and therefore he felt that a refreshing of memories on the history of the matter would be in order. He said that facts showed that before independence in 1975 Angola was the subject of aggression by foreign forces and that in terms of UN Charter Article 51 Angola had the right to seek help abroad.

Dr Crocker said that major questions and important Cuban troops were in Angola as a result of a sovereign decision of the Angolan Government. The Angolan and Cuban Governments would decide when and if to withdraw when the causes for their presence were removed and once Resolution 435 had been implemented; when South African troops were out of Angola and interference in the internal affairs of Angola had ceased. There would then be no need to keep Cuban troops in Angola for one single day longer. When these concerns were met Angola and Cuba would present a timetable for the gradual and total withdrawal of Cuban troops. Angola and Cuba were in favour of negotiated solutions as long as these met the interests of all parties. It would serve no one's interest to dwell on past

history. Rather, attention should be focussed on the Foreign Minister "Mbinda" carried on to say that two months previously Angola had presented a proposal for the phased total withdrawal of Cuban troops as a token of sincerity and goodwill to bring peace and independence to Namibia. This was not a sign of weakness because Angolans would never get tired of fighting for their rights. It was a proof of willingness to effect peace and a first positive suggestion towards the goal. Further, Angola believe that all the parties involved in the conflict should be present during such negotiations including the United Nations Secretary General, South Africa and SWAPO. Angola believed

CONFIDENTIAL

7

that itself and Cuba would have their best interests served if these discussions would bear fruit.

Foreign Minister "Mbinda" then invited Cuban members within the delegation to comment but this was declined on the grounds that the statement made by Foreign Minister "Mbinda" had been a joint statement.

Dr Crocker said that major questions and important political problems had to be addressed and that he had received indications from both delegations that they wish to discuss broad issues of principle in plenary session. He then said that the Angolan Delegation had made reference to certain proposals presented to South Africa and wished to have the South African reaction to that.

The Director-General said that he wished to make two comments on the statement of the leader of the Angolan delegation before replying in detail to the proposals. Firstly, he said he appreciated the spirit in which Foreign Minister "Mbinda" had made his statement and secondly he said that it would serve no one's interest to dwell on past history. Rather, attention should be focussed on the situation as it existed now and the problems in the way of peace. He then replied in detail to the proposals made by the Angolans as per Annexure A to these minutes.

Dr Crocker invited the Angolan Delegation to respond to the comments.

Foreign Minister "Mbinda" said that various questions had arisen from the commentary made by the Director-General but that he would prefer to have the proposals in writing since some aspects were unclear. He also invited the Cuban

Delegation to comment. The latter agreed that it would be useful to have the South African comments to the proposals in writing for closer study and suggested an adjournment.

The meeting adjourned at 12h15.

(The South African Delegation prepared a composite document comprising the terms of the Angolan draft document handed to the Director-General in Washington on 30 March, together with South Africa's detailed response to each of the articles of that document. The document was handed to the Angolan Delegation at 15h00 who studied it, and the meeting reconvened at 17h10.)

Dr Crocker enquired whether the South African document should be seen as confidential. He suggested that confidentiality of the documents, would positively influence the spirit of the current meeting. (Both ~~delegations agreed on the confidentiality of the~~ documents.)

The Acting Head of the Angolan Delegation, Mr Ndalú, explained that the Chief of the Angolan Delegation could not be present because he had been invited to pay a courtesy call on Sir Geoffrey Howe. He would however rejoin the meeting later. He commented that time had not been sufficient to conduct an in-depth investigation of the South African comments. However the Angolan Delegation was ready to offer some comments and to pose some questions.

In the first place he felt that South Africa had over-emphasised aspects of style which could be easily overcome. In this respect he referred to the removal of brackets from words and other examples. The Angolan

Delegation had also noticed certain contradictions in the approach of the South African commentary, particularly regarding rejection of the role of the United Nations in Namibia, as in another part of the document South Africa had said that it had accepted Resolution 435. The Angolan Delegation would welcome further clarification on that point.

There were also substantive questions which the Angolan delegation wished to raise:

The Angolan view is that once no danger to Angola exists, Cuban troops would be withdrawn. Consequently, if South Africa were to accept Resolution 435 as is, (and the Angolan delegation believed that Resolution 435 was a cornerstone of any agreement), that would allow many obstacles to be overcome. There would then be no need for a ceasefire since Resolution 435 separated troops in both areas.

There was one aspect which the Angolan delegation did not understand fully. The Angolan view was that 15 days after Resolution 435 had been set in motion, a contingent of UNTAG troops would be introduced and troops on the Angolan side would be redeployed northwards. Therefore if there were no South African troops in Angola the need for a ceasefire would not arise - Angola felt that South African troops in Angola would make a ceasefire more difficult to achieve. Angola believed that if South Africa would implement Resolution 435, and if there were respect for territorial integrity and if there were non-interference in internal affairs, Angola would entertain South Africa's counter proposals for a timetable for the phased and total withdrawal of Cuban troops. The South African Government could then expect to receive counter-proposals from Angola.

CONFIDENTIAL

10

The Director-General felt that it would be appropriate to adjourn until the following day so as to allow time for reflection and for the formulation of a response by South Africa.

Dr Crocker then requested all parties including the United States delegation to reflect on the issues raised in the course of the day.

Mr Risquet Valdes, Head of the Cuban component in the Angolan delegation, said that he too had not had time to study the South African document. He said that there were matters of style as well as substance which the South African delegation had raised. On the questions of style, there seemed to be no insurmountable problems. He said that the Angolan proposal was not to be regarded as the only solution to the problem and that other proposals could be entertained. For instance he saw a series of bilateral agreements being reached and then forwarded to the Security Council of the United Nations to form the bases of a Security Council resolution. The Security Council of the United Nations could possibly become the guarantor of such a settlement.

He then referred to page two of the South African document in preambular paragraph (iii) saying that his delegation was not certain whether their interpretation was correct and wished to raise some questions for answering the following day. The statement in question he said ran counter to the wording of Resolution 435. He said the meeting should perhaps be reminded of a resolution in 1966 by which the United Nations withdrew South Africa's stewardship over Namibia. Resolution 435 had reaffirmed

CONFIDENTIAL

11

the juridical stewardship that the United Nations had over Namibia and he felt that the South African statement (under paragraph iii) ran counter to this.

He wished to pose a question to South Africa: did the South African Delegation accept in its entirety Resolution 435 together with the pertinent annexures which were now more than 10 years old? The answer to this question was crucial to negotiations. There could be no headway unless there were a full acceptance of the letter and content of Resolution 435. The full implementation of 435 represented the Gordian Knot which would settle the argument the two parties had. This was a cardinal question, but not the only one. There was also the question of aggression against Angola. Angola would no longer be a border country to South Africa if Resolution 435 were implemented. If Angola had friendly countries in its region such as Namibia the issue would be solved. Another issue which the Angola Delegation wished to raise was whether South Africa would accept the resolution on the illegal occupation of Namibia by South Africa. He asked that the South African delegation should reflect on these statements and provide answers.

Dr Crocker then moved for an adjournment of the meeting but raised the question of the press. He said that great public expectation had been created and asked whether the delegations wished to issue a separate or a common press declaration on the form and substance of the talks. Several questions could be anticipated and he requested that the delegations reflect overnight on their approach.

The meeting adjourned at 18h00.

CONFIDENTIAL

12

The meeting resumed at 09h15 on 5 May 1988.

Dr Crocker asked the South African Delegation to reply to a series of questions posed the previous day by the Angolan side.

The Director-General said that before responding to the questions raised the previous day he wished to touch briefly on an article that had appeared in The Independent newspaper on the morning of 4 May written by the African editor of that newspaper pointing out differences in the level of the Angolan and South African Delegations. An Angolan official had reportedly said that this indicated that South Africa was not interested to proceed with the talks. The Director-General pointed out it had been agreed beforehand that South Africa would be represented at this level and he asked the Angolan Delegation not to read anything into the fact that South African ministers were ~~not present. This did not indicate a lack of seriousness on South Africa's part.~~ He would not be giving that impression in briefing the South African press for background later on in the day. He repeated an appeal to all sides to avoid polemics and rhetoric in characterising these talks.

Turning to substantive issues the Director-General said by way of explanation that the South African Delegation was not mandated to commit the South African Government but it was prepared to recommend the following to the South African Government for consideration upon return of the delegation to South Africa.

For purposes of clarity the Director-General then held up copies of the original UN documentation containing the text

of Resolution 435 and the settlement proposal (UN Doc S/12636 of 10 April 1978), saying that this was the resolution and the settlement plan South Africa had accepted. South Africa stood by this acceptance. That, in the view of the South African Delegation, comprised a complete answer to the Angolan Delegation's questions concerning Resolution 435. Related to UN Resolution 435 was the Angolan Delegation's invitation for South Africa to present suggestions relating to timetables and execution. The South African Delegation accepted the invitation and would recommend to the South African Government that such proposals be prepared and presented to the Angolan Government at the very next meeting.

Turning to a second aspect concerning the role of the United Nations, the Director-General said that the text of the South African Delegation's response handed to the Angolans the previous day had probably given rise to a misunderstanding. South Africa in accepting Resolution 435, accepted the United Nation's role as set out in the resolution. That position remained unchanged. South Africa did not however accept a role for the United Nations in a bilateral agreement between herself and Angola on Cuban troop withdrawal if such an agreement were to come about.

The Director-General turned to a third issue which was related he said to the second. In accepting a role for the United Nations in Resolution 435, South Africa did not accept the 1966 Resolution of the General Assembly concerning South West Africa/Namibia. He wished to suggest however that participants in this meeting did not engage in polemics. The South African point of view in this respect was adequately reflected in the clear position the South

CONFIDENTIAL

14

African Delegation had made relating to Resolution 435. From the South African side, there is no wish to introduce unnecessary obstacles to progress or issues extraneous to the present discussions which after all were aimed at finding solutions.

A fourth issue concerned the status of SWAPO. He wished to repeat that South Africa did not accept the inclusion of SWAPO in agreements between sovereign states. However he did take cognisance of the Angolan statement to the effect that there were various alternatives in respect of organisations in the region - these alternatives needed to be further investigated and discussed.

Finally he suggested that efforts should be made to have the next meeting in Africa in the very near future in order for the parties concerned to find a solution together which would do justice to the legitimate interest of all the countries in the region and bring peace with honour for all parties concerned. He then proposed a draft joint press statement which was typed and handed to the Angolan Delegation. (This was accepted with minor amendments - for text see Annexure B).

Dr Crocker asked the Angolan/Cuban Delegation if it wished to respond to the comments and the statement made by the South African side.

Foreign Minister "Mbinda" said that he had a few comments to make on the statement just made by the leader of the South African Delegation. Firstly, with regard to the press article that the Director-General had quoted, the Western press usually tended to be sensational and therefore he suggested to South Africa not to be misled by

CONFIDENTIAL

15

the press. It was not true that Angolan officials had made such a statement and the Angolan Delegation did not consider itself responsible for that statement. He invited the South African Delegation's attention to a report emanating from Johannesburg on the local television station concerning these negotiations with pictures of the delegations arriving at the hotel. Frank and constructive exchanges had taken place and he requested that these minor leaks be attributed to the characteristics of the Western press.

Concerning the level of representation, the Angolan Delegation had never questioned the level and seriousness of the South African Delegation. It was the sovereign right of every government to decide at which level it wished to be represented. All delegations had come to London to seek grounds to pursue discussions. On coming here, the level of the Angolan Delegation showed that the Angolan Government was serious.

He considered the South African Delegation as equals. He also pointed out that on the Cuban side there were some high officials not only from the Party but members of the Government as well. He wished to allay any fear that might have risen within the South African Delegation's minds as to any possible objection to the level of representation. As Minister of Foreign Affairs of his country he was in London to try and achieve peace and security in the region.

Reacting to the South African Delegation's statement, he had listened with interest to yesterday's statement that South Africa would not pose obstacles to the independence of South West Africa/Namibia and that no obstruction to peace in the region would be forthcoming. He hoped and

prayed that more progress would be made in the near future. He then referred in favourable terms to the spirit in which the South African Delegation had approached its task and said this was constructive and would give rise to more discussions in a harmonious and constructive context.

With regard to a follow-up meeting he said that an appropriate venue could be selected after consultations. He noted with approval the concrete proposal of the South African Delegation for an African venue but mentioned that a specific country had not been specified. The Angolan Delegation welcomed this proposal and said that the exact venue should be determined by mutual agreement.

Mr Risquest Vlades said that in the previous day's intervention he had underscored that implementation of Resolution 435 was the Gordian Knot in the conflict. That ~~of course was not the only~~ problem. He had also mentioned that non-interference in the affairs of other nations was important. He had been pleased to hear the categorical statement by the leader of the South African Delegation that the South African Government concurred with the adoption of Resolution 435 and the South African Government also concurred with implementation thereof. Cuba of course fully supported Resolution 435 as did Angola. Dr Crocker, in a meeting on 2 May 1988 had also reiterated that the US Government was in favour of Resolution 435. In fact most nations in the world were overwhelmingly in favour of that Resolution. This meant that delegations present should work very hard to eliminate all obstacles which impeded implementation of Resolution 435.

Dr Risquest Valdes continued by saying that the discussions had been most useful in identifying the differences between

CONFIDENTIAL

17

the parties and in mobilising both parties to work towards a common goal of peace. He had spent some time wondering about the date on which Resolution 435 had been passed which was 29 September 1978. A delay of 10 years had now occurred and during that period the blood of the young people of the countries involved had been shed. The eyes of the world were on the current meeting and there was a tremendous historic responsibility on all sides to solve the question of Namibian independence, Angolan sovereignty and peace in the region. His view was that delegations should work to avoid further delays in the process. He wished to suggest the date of 29 September 1988 as D-day for the implementation of Resolution 435 since this was the Tenth Anniversary of that Resolution. There were several important questions to examine closely in terms of logistics. There were many mechanisms that now had to be activated. Certainly in regard to the financing of Resolution 435, many adjustments would have to be made since countries that had originally indicated they were interested in financing the operation would now have to be approached again. He also pointed out that the Dollar had devalued considerably in the past 10 years.

For this reason and in view of some organisational difficulties at the United Nations it would be appropriate for all parties to press on with implementation of Resolution 435 so as to stop the suffering that had occurred in the previous 10 years in the military clash. It was important for his delegation to deal with implementation of Resolution 435 urgently. He therefore suggested the first objective of 29 September 1988 as D-day for Namibia and on 10 October 1988 Cuba would start re-deployment of its troops northwards. He stressed Cuba's willingness to be of assistance in this regard and said that it would be a most joyful day when all this had occurred.

Dr Crocker then made some comments on the United States' participation in the meeting. The United States had made significant efforts to let the Angolan and South African Delegations talk themselves and had not intervened on substantive points. It was not for the United States to approve or disapprove of the ideas of the different delegations but he wished to make some general observations. Firstly, he noted (jokingly) that there was agreement amongst the delegations on the question of the Western press. Secondly, a South African draft press statement had been tabled for consideration. Thirdly, he said that both delegations had stressed that continued momentum and serious work was a priority. South Africa had proposed a date in the very near future and he would like clarity on what this meant. As to the African location or venue of the next meeting he wished to solicit more precise ~~views from both delegations.~~ In respect of the follow-up ~~meeting, various ideas had been agreed to by the~~ delegations. He said the United States was in favour of any venue in Africa except Libya.

Foreign Minister "Mbinda" indicated that a venue in Africa would be acceptable to his delegation - he and the Leader of the South African Delegation had agreed informally during the coffee break that the two countries should try to communicate with each other on dates and a venue within one week.

Dr Crocker said that though the meetings had been constructive, much remained to be done for instance a proposed agreement had been drafted by the Angolan Government and the South African Delegation had agreed to seek approval to come with its own framework for an

CONFIDENTIAL

19

agreement. There were many experts around the table on Resolution 435 and on issues that would have to be addressed to end the conflict on the ground. Here he referred to the sequencing of withdrawal and verification thereof.

The experts must be frustrated that a sandwich had been put on the plate but that the cooks had put nothing in the sandwich. This reminded him of the words of the Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Adamishin who had said recently to him that some good principles were emerging but that the devil was in the detail.

There remained hard questions and hard answers to be dealt with. The United States would be happy to provide ideas and to define certain issues where it was appropriate. He saw General Ndalu, General Rosale del Torro and General Geldenhuys around the table and also Mr Woods from the United States military establishments. These people must be wondering whether the diplomats at the table would continue sending helium-filled balloons up into the London sky for months or whether they were going to get down to discussing real issues.

Dr Crocker continued by saying that certain indicators of progress could be determined. Firstly, it had been agreed that rethoric and polemics had no place around the table. The United States would go out of its way not to characterise in pejorative terms the intentions and decisions of the parties around the table. Secondly, realities on the ground were still of such a nature that while we were in the midst of discussion around the table, the countries were in the midst of a war. Fighting in that war should not become an obstacle to these talks.

The Director-General, in his closing statement, said that on behalf of the South African Delegation he wished to express appreciation to the Leader of the Angolan Delegation for the spirit in which these discussions were held. All contributions from the Angolan side had reinforced the positive spirit and there was hope that conditions had now been put into place which would allow for real progress. The notion of fixing a D-day at this early stage was problematical but there was nevertheless agreement with the suggestion that we should conclude an agreement for peace at the earliest date. He thanked Dr Crocker and the US Delegation for the facilities they had provided. He also thanked the British Government for providing a revue for the meeting and the translator for his competent services.

Foreign Minister "Mbinda", in his closing statement, thanked Dr Crocker and the Leader of the South African Delegation on behalf of his Delegation and wished to express his appreciation of the kind words that had been said about the spirit of the meeting. This spirit had accurately reflected the initial objectives of the meeting which was to come with open minds and constructive attitudes. He congratulated Dr Crocker on the outstanding manner in which he had conducted the meeting. Significant but limited areas of common ground had been achieved. He agreed that objective conditions were now in place for the continuation of the discussions. The Angolan Delegation stressed its concern that all sides should now make every effort to resolve the differences. The world and Africa in particular had their eyes turned on this meeting. The Angolan and Cuban Delegations were determined to work seriously towards the independence of Namibia and to achieve peace in the region.

CONFIDENTIAL

21

The meeting adjourned at 12h00 on 4 May 1988.

JOINT PRESS STATEMENT

Delegations of the Republic of South Africa, the People's Republic of Angola/Republic of Cuba, and the United States of America met in London on 3 and 4 May 1988 to discuss the situation in the Southwestern African Region. The meetings took place in a constructive atmosphere and progress was made.

The parties agreed that a follow-up meeting should take place at an African venue in the near future.

The parties wish to express their appreciation to the British Government for agreeing to provide a venue for this conference.

The joint Angolan-Cuban delegation was led by Angolan Foreign Minister Afonso Van Dunem "Mbinda". Other Angolan members of the delegation were:

General Franca Ndalú, Deputy Minister of Defense and Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces
Franca Van Dunem, Minister of Justice
Venancio da Moura, Deputy Foreign Minister
Colonel Jose Maria, Security Advisor to the President
Ambassador Manuel Pacavira, UN Ambassador
Ambassador Elisio de Figueiredo, Angolan Ambassador to Great Britain
Antonio Pitra, Legal Advisor

The Cuban members of the delegation were:

Jorge Risquet Valdes, Politbureau of the Communist Party (CCP)
General Ulises Rosales del Toro, Chief of Staff, Ministry of the Revolutionary Armed Forces
Carlos Aldana Escalante, Secretariat, Central Committee (CCP)
Raul Roa Kouri, Deputy Foreign Minister
Rudolfo Puente Ferró, Central Committee (CCP) and Deputy Head of the General Department of Foreign Relations (CCP)
Jose Arbesu Fraga, Deputy Head of the Americas Department, Central Committee (CCP)

The South African delegation was led by Neil van Heerden, Director General of the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA). Other members were:

General J. Geldenhuys, Chief of the South African Defense Forces (SADF)
Ambassador P. Koornhof, Ambassador to Washington
Ambassador R. Killen, Ambassador to London
Ambassador J.H. Beukes, Deputy Director General, DFA
Dr. N. Barnard, Director General, National Intelligence Service
General N. Van Tonder, SADF
D.W. Auret, Foreign Affairs
Brig. G. Sonnekus, SADF
J. Boshoff, NIS
A. Jaquet, Foreign Affairs
J. Sunde, Foreign Affairs
R. Desmarais, Foreign Affairs

The United States Delegation was headed by Assistant Secretary of State Chester A. Crocker. Other members were:

Ambassador Edward J. Perkins, Ambassador to Pretoria
Ambassador Herman Cohen, National Security Council
James Woods, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
Robert Cabelly, Department of State
Larry Napper, Department of State
William Bellamy, Department of State
Michael McKinley, Department of State
Jimmy Kolker, U.S. Embassy, London

ANNEXURE B

SOUTH AFRICAN RESPONSE TO DOCUMENT RECEIVED FROM ANGOLA VIA THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ENTITLED "DRAFT AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA, THE REPUBLIC OF CUBA, THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA AND THE SOUTH WEST AFRICAN PEOPLE'S ORGANIZATION (SWAPO) : WASHINGTON, D.C., 30 MARCH 1988

1. In continuation of the meeting held between delegations of the Republic of South Africa and of the United States of America at Geneva on 14 March 1988, a further meeting between the two countries took place at Washington, D.C. on 30 March 1988.
2. During the course of this meeting, the delegation of the United States of America, at the specific request of the Government of the People's Republic of Angola, handed to the South African delegation a copy of a document entitled "Draft Agreement between the Governments of the People's Republic of Angola, the Republic of Cuba, the Republic of South Africa and the South West African People's Organization (SWAPO)", with the request that the South African Government provide Angola with a response to the proposals contained in the document.
3. The South African Government has studied these proposals and wishes to indicate that they are, in their present form, unacceptable as a basis from which to proceed towards the solution of both the situations in South West Africa/Namibia as well as Angola.
4. Apart from the objections we have to the form of the document, the South African Government wishes to point out a number of matters which have contributed to the conclusion to which it has come in this regard.
 - (i) The title of the "Draft Agreement":

**DRAFT AGREEMENT
BETWEEN
THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA
THE REPUBLIC OF CUBA, THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA,
AND THE SOUTHWEST AFRICAN PEOPLE'S ORGANIZATION (SWAPO)**

The South African Government does not agree to the inclusion of the South West African People's Organization (SWAPO) as a party to any agreement which is concluded between sovereign States.

(ii) Preambular paragraph 1:

THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA, THE REPUBLIC OF CUBA AND THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA AND THE SOUTHWEST AFRICAN PEOPLE'S ORGANIZATION, HEREINAFTER DESIGNATED "THE PARTIES",

Again the South African Government does not accept the inclusion of SWAPO as a party to any agreement which might be concluded between sovereign States.

(iii) Preambular paragraph 2:

CONSIDERING THAT THE PROBLEM OF THE INDEPENDENCE OF NAMIBIA CONTINUES TO BE A RESPONSIBILITY OF THE ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS,

The South African Government rejects the assertion contained in this paragraph that the United Nations has the responsibility for South West Africa/Namibia ascribed to it.

(iv) Preambular paragraph 3:

CONSIDERING, FURTHER, THE UNSC RESOLUTION 435 REPRESENTS THE SOLE LEGAL BASIS FOR THE ACHIEVEMENT OF SAID OBJECTIVE,

The use of the words "sole legal basis" is not acceptable to the South African Government. At best the description "a basis" can be considered.

(v) Preambular paragraph 4:

CONSIDERING, MOREOVER, THAT THE QUESTION OF THE INDEPENDENCE OF NAMIBIA IS CLOSELY CONNECTED TO THE PROBLEM OF PEACE AND SECURITY IN SOUTHWEST AFRICA (ANGOLA, NAMIBIA),

The South African Government would wish to add the words "and the situation in Angola" after the word "Namibia" and to change the concept "Southwest Africa (Angola, Namibia)" to read "the southwestern African Region".

Preambular paragraph 5

CONSIDERING, FURTHER, THE SEVERAL DIRECT AND INDIRECT NEGOTIATIONS HELD AT DIFFERENT LEVELS, AMONG THE PARTIES,

(vi) Preambular paragraph 6:

WISHING TO CONTRIBUTE TOWARDS THE SETTLEMENT OF THE PROBLEM OF NAMIBIAN INDEPENDENCE AND THE SETTLEMENT OF THE PROBLEMS RELATIVE TO PEACE AND SECURITY IN SOUTHWEST AFRICA (ANGOLA AND NAMIBIA),

The South African Government would wish to add the words "and the situation in Angola" after the word "Independence" and to change the concept "Southwest Africa (Angola, Namibia)" to "the southwestern African region".

(vii) Preambular paragraph 7:

TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE PERTINENT UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTION ON THAT SUBJECT,

The South Africa Government considers this preambular paragraph to be superfluous.

(viii) Operative paragraph 1(A):

THE SOUTH AFRICAN PARTY UNDERTAKES TO:

- A) WITHDRAW ALL ITS TROOPS AND AUGMENTATION FORCES FROM THE TERRITORY OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA NO LATER THAN _____ DAYS AS OF THE DATE OF THE SIGNATURE OF THIS AGREEMENT;

The words "troops and augmentation" are not acceptable and should be replaced by the concept "forces". It should be noted that no additional description is used in regard to Cuban forces mentioned in operative paragraph 2(B).

(ix) Operative paragraph 1(B) :

- B) TO CEASE IMMEDIATELY ALL ACTS OF AGGRESSION, INTIMIDATION AND DESTABILIZATION AGAINST THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA AND TO RESPECT IS SOVEREIGNTY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY;

This is not acceptable to the South African Government as it stands formulated.

(x) Operative paragraph 1 (C):

- C) TO CEASE IMMEDIATELY ANY AND ALL TYPES OF SUPPLY OF WEAPONS, AMMUNITION AND OTHER WAR MATERIEL, AS WELL AS THE RECRUITING, TRAINING, EQUIPPING, TECHNICAL, FINANCIAL, MANPOWER AND DIPLOMATIC SUPPORT TO UNITA AND ANY OTHER ARMED GROUP, TO INCLUDE MERCENARIES WHO CARRY OUT ACTIONS AGAINST THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA;

The South African Government considers that if it is insisted to include this paragraph then all parties involved in the conflict in Angola should be included

in this provision.

(xi) Operative paragraph 1 (D):

- D) TO CONCLUDE A CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT WITH THE ORGANIZATION OF SOUTHWEST AFRICAN PEOPLES (SWAPO) WITHIN A PERIOD OF _____ DAYS AFTER THE DATE OF SIGNATURE OF THIS AGREEMENT, IN ORDER TO ENSURE THE INDEPENDENCE OF NAMIBIA AND THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL SOUTH AFRICAN TROOPS BACK TO ITS TERRITORY.

The South African Government does not consider that the question of the independence process for South West Africa/Namibia should form part of any agreement between it and Angola. This process has been adequately provided for in a resolution of the United Nations Security Council and the South African Government has in the past consistently made its views on the implementation of this resolution clear. The withdrawal of the Cubans from Angola would be a precursor to setting in motion the process envisaged in the settlement proposal foreseen in UNSCR 435/78 and the South African Government has made its position on its acceptance of its obligations in this regard very clear in the past. The South African Government stands by those undertakings.

(xiii) Operative paragraph 2 (Preamble):

ARTICLE 2:

UPON THE FULFILLMENT OF THE OBLIGATIONS CONTAINED IN ARTICLE 1 OF THIS AGREEMENT, THE ANGOLAN PARTY UNDERTAKES TO:

The South African Government does not accept the proposition put forward by Angola that it will only undertake its commitments in terms of the agreement "upon the fulfillment of the obligations contained in Article 1"

(xiv) Operative Paragraph 2 (A) :

- A) COLLABORATE WITH THE ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS IN THE SENSE OF HELPING RESOLVE THE PROBLEMS RELATIVE TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF RESOLUTION 435/78 OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE VARIOUS PROPOSALS MADE BY THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA TO ARRIVE AT A SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEMS OF PEACE AND SECURITY IN SOUTHWESTERN AFRICA (ANGOLA, NAMIBIA);

Again, replace the words "Southwestern Africa (Angola, Namibia)" with the words "the southwestern African region".

(xv) Operative Paragraph 2 (B) :

B) CONCLUDE WITH THE REPUBLIC OF CUBA, WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THEIR BILATERAL RELATIONS, AN AGREEMENT RELATIVE TO THE GRADUAL WITHDRAWAL OF THE INTERNATIONALIST CUBAN TROOPS.

The concept that Angola would conclude an agreement with Cuba relating to the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola only after (a) South African troops have been withdrawn from that country and (b) the implementation of UNSCR 435/78 has commenced cannot be considered.

(xvi) Operative paragraph 3 :

THE ANGOLAN PARTY RESERVES TO ITSELF THE RIGHT TO ANNUL OR SUSPEND THE WHOLE OF THE ACCORD IF ANY AGGRESSION - OR IMMINENT THREAT OF AGGRESSION - FROM THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA WERE VERIFIED DURING THE COURSE OF THE TIMEFRAME OF THIS ACCORD.

The South African Government does not accept this proposal which gives Angola the right to end any agreement which may be concluded with South Africa unilaterally. Should Angola insist that such a concept be retained in any agreement which is concluded, South Africa would for its part, insist that a similar right to terminate any agreement also be included as far as it is concerned.

(xvii) OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 4 (PREAMBLE):

ONCE THE OBLIGATIONS REFERRED TO IN ARTICLE 1A OF THE PRESENT ACCORD HAVE BEEN CARRIED OUT, THE CUBAN PARTY COMMITS ITSELF TO:

The South African Government does not accept the proposition put forward that Cuba will only undertake its commitments in terms of the agreement "once the obligations referred to in Article 1 (A) of the present accord have been carried out..."

(xviii) OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 4 (A):

CONCLUDE WITH THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA, WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THEIR BILATERAL RELATIONS, AN AGREEMENT RELATIVE TO THE GRADUAL WITHDRAWAL OF ITS INTERNATIONALIST TROOPS FROM THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA COMMENCING THE DAY OF THE BEGINNING OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF RESOLUTION 435/78 OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

As in (xiii) and (xv) above.

(xix) OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 4 (B):

NOT TO CARRY OUT ANY TRANSFER WHATSOEVER OF ITS UNITS OR ANY KIND OF MANOEUVERS SOUTH OF WHERE THEY FIND THEMSELVES AT THIS MOMENT, ONCE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF RESOLUTION 435/78 OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL OF THE UNITED NATIONS HAS BEGUN.

South African Government is of the view that this undertaking should come into effect at the moment an agreed ceasefire is implemented. As formulated at present, this proposal is unacceptable to the South African Government.

(xx) OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 5

ARTICLE 5:

THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA AND THE REPUBLIC OF CUBA COMMIT THEMSELVES WITHIN 15 DAYS AFTER THE IMPLEMENTATION OF RESOLUTION 435/78 OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL OF THE UNITED NATIONS HAS BEGUN, TO INITIATE THE TRANSFER OF ALL CUBAN TROOPS TO THE SOUTH OF THE 13TH PARALLEL TO NORTH OF SAID PARALLEL, WHICH WILL BE CARRIED OUT IN A TIMEFRAME OF 17 MONTHS; AND TO EVACUATE TO CUBA 20,000 MEN IN THE TIMEFRAME BETWEEN THE 13TH MONTH AND THE 24TH MONTH AFTER THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SAID RESOLUTION HAS BEGUN.

THE REST OF THE CUBAN TROOPS WILL BE WITHDRAWN FROM THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA BETWEEN THE 30TH AND THE 48TH MONTH AFTER THE IMPLEMENTATION OF RESOLUTION 435/78 OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL HAS BEGUN.

The proposal contained in this paragraph is not acceptable to the South African Government. The number of Cuban troops mentioned and the proposed withdrawal time-scale will have to be substantially improved upon before a basis for further consideration can be found.

(xxi) OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 6

ARTICLE 6:

THE SOUTHWEST AFRICA PEOPLE'S ORGANIZATION (SWAPO) COMMITS ITSELF, ONCE THE SOUTH AFRICAN PARTY HAS FULFILLED THE OBLIGATIONS CONTAINED IN THE LINES A, B, C AND E OF ARTICLE 1 OF THIS ACCORD, TO:

A) CONCLUDE A CEASEFIRE AGREEMENT WITH THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA WITHIN A PERIOD OF DAYS;

B) COLLABORATE WITH THE UNITED NATIONS WITH A VIEW TO IMPLEMENTING RESOLUTION 435/78 OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, AND TO REFRAIN FROM CARRYING OUT ANY ARMED ACTION IN THE INTERIOR OF NAMIBIA AND IN THE TERRITORY OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA.

The South African Government is of the view that positive measures to prevent continuing SWAPO activities against the territory and people of South West Africa/Namibia are indispensable for the success of the process which is now under consideration. As mentioned before South Africa is opposed to the inclusion of SWAPO as a party to any agreement which may come into being between the sovereign States concerned. South Africa is not prepared to sign any agreement with SWAPO in the form of a cease-fire or otherwise. The South African Government considers that Angola, as the country which provides SWAPO with safety and support for its activities directed against the territory and people of South West Africa/Namibia, should accept responsibility for all SWAPO activities during the period of any agreed cease-fire and in the period thereafter. The South African Government must insist that an accurate assessment be made of SWAPO elements, regarding strength and disposition, before any decision regarding the ultimate placement or confinement of these elements to a specific area is reached. In addition, the South African Government requires that an adequate and comprehensive system of monitoring of these elements be devised which would satisfactorily limit the possibility that any further violent actions by SWAPO against South West Africa/Namibia or its inhabitants can be undertaken.

(xxii) OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 7

ARTICLE 7:

THE PRESENT ACCORD SHALL BE SIGNED BY THE DULY ACCREDITED REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PARTIES IN THE PRESENCE OF ALL THE MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS WHO WILL SERVE AS GUARANTORS.

The question of the parties who are to be signatories to the agreement which is ultimately decided as well as the "guarantors" of such an agreement should be further explored.

LONDON

3 May 1988