HEGEL RECONSIDERED

Philosophical Studies in Contemporary Culture

VOLUME 2

Series Editor

H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr., *Center for Ethics, Medicine, and Public Issues, Baylor College of Medicine, Houston, Texas, and Philosophy Department, Rice University, Houston, Texas*

Associate Editor

Kevin William Wildes, S.J., *Center for Ethics, Medicine, and Public Issues, Baylor College of Medicine, Houston, Texas*

Editorial Board

Stanley Hauerwas, *Duke University, Durham, N.C.*

Terry Pinkard, *Georgetown University, Washington, D.C.*

Mary C. Rawlinson, *State University of New York at Stony Brook*

Stuart F. Spicker, *Baylor College of Medicine, Houston, Texas*

Marx W. Wartofsky, *Baruch College, City University of New York*

The titles published in this series are listed at the end of this volume.

HEGEL RECONSIDERED

Beyond Metaphysics and the Authoritarian State

Edited by

H. TRISTRAM ENGELHARDT, JR.

Rice University, Houston, Texas, U.S.A.
Baylor College of Medicine, Houston, Texas, U.S.A.

and

TERRY PINKARD

Georgetown University, Washington, DC, U.S.A.

SPRINGER-SCIENCE+BUSINESS MEDIA, B.V.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Hegel reconsidered : beyond metaphysics and the authoritian state / edited by H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr., and Terry Pinkard.
p. cm. -- (Philosophical studies in contemporary culture ; v. 2)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-90-481-4349-8 ISBN 978-94-015-8378-7 (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-94-015-8378-7
1. Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, 1770-1831--Contributions in metaphysics. 2. Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, 1770-1831--Contributions in political science. 3. Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, 1770-1831--Contributions in philosophy of categories. 4. Metaphysics--History--19th century. 5. Political science--History--19th century. 6. Categories (Philosophy)--History--19th century. I. Engelhardt, H. Tristram (Hugo Tristram), 1941- II. Pinkard, Terry P. III. Series.
B2949.M4H43 1994
133--dc20 93-41297

ISBN 978-90-481-4349-8

Printed on acid-free paper

All Rights Reserved
© 1994 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
Originally published by Kluwer Academic Publishers in 1994
Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 1994
No part of the material protected by this copyright notice may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording or by any information storage and retrieval system, without written permission from the copyright owner.

This Volume
is
Dedicated in Gratitude
to
Klaus Hartmann
(5 September 1925 – 30 July 1991)

Table of Contents

Preface ix

1. Introduction 1
H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr.

2. The Hegelian Project 19
Stephen Bungay

3. Hegel's Metaphysics, or the Categorial Approach to Knowledge of Experience 43
Tom Rockmore

4. Hegel's Critique of Kant and Pre-Kantian Metaphysics 57
Klaus Brinkmann

5. On the Theoretical Form of Hegel's Aesthetics 79
Reinhold Aschenberg

6. The Cogency of the *Logic*'s Argumentation: Securing the Dialectic's Claim to Justify Categories 103
Thomas J. Bole, III

7. The Meta-Ontological Option: On Taking the Existential Turn 119
George Khushf

8. The Logic of Contingency 143
Deborah Chaffin

9. Constitutionalism, Politics, and the Common Life 163
Terry Pinkard

10. Revolution as the Foundation of Political Philosophy 187
Dick Howard

11. Sittlichkeit and Post-Modernity: An Hegelian Reconsideration of the State 211
H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr.

12. Klaus Hartmann and G.W.F. Hegel: A Personal Postscript 225
H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr.

Bibliography of the Works of Klaus Hartmann 231

Notes on Contributors 243

Index 245

Preface

This volume is the result of discussions around a body of work and with a particular scholar whose views have made possible an important systematic reassessment of Hegel's philosophical theory. The volume's exploration of Hegel's work supports the view that the enduring contribution of Hegel is to a theory of categories and to understanding the central place of systematic reason in philosophical reflection. This view of Hegel offers an understanding of Hegel not as a metaphysician in the sense of an absolute idealist, or an ironist as characterized by Rorty, but as a thinker who recognized the unavoidably systematic character of thought. This reassessment builds on the work of Klaus Hartmann, a German philosopher whose concerns with the theory of categories and with political philosophy is now, after his death, becoming better known to English-speaking scholars.

This volume took shape with the generous assistance of many. Here we wish in particular to thank George Khushf and Thomas J. Bole III. We are deeply grateful to them for their help, without which this project would have floundered. Thanks are also due to Mark Cherry, without whom there would have been no index.

H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr.
Terry Pinkard

H.T. Engelhardt, Jr. and T. Pinkard (eds.), Hegel Reconsidered, ix, 1994.

H. TRISTRAM ENGELHARDT, JR.

1. Introduction

Hegel has been regarded as a metaphysician of an idealist persuasion. Whether in the work of McTaggart,[1] Royce[2] or Peirce,[3] Hegel is said to offer an account of the deep structure of being from the perspective of spirit. Much of this interpretation is due to Hegel. The language he employs is not only metaphysical but theological. It invites concrete construals of terms he uses such as God and Spirit.[4] The Marxists who drew on Hegel in framing dialectical materialism did not exorcise this metaphysical aura but only gave it a restatement.[5] In "righting" Hegel, they invested history and nature with a quasi-metaphysical and empirical dialectical character and force, using a language taken from Hegel. They converted an idealistic dialectic into a materialistic dialectic. Both in terms of his own work and that to which he gave rise, Hegel remains in the eyes of many a metaphysician making obscure claims about the dialectic as well as about the power of ideas and of reason.[6] His political works have often been construed in an even worse light.[7] They have appeared to be nearly devoid of moral claims save to canonize whatever power rules.[8]

This volume goes against these still widespread views. Following Klaus Hartmann's reassessment of Hegel and his exploration of transcendental argumentation, this work investigates what may be termed a non-metaphysical interpretation of Hegel's project ([10], pp. 101–124). This volume also provides grounds for securing more significance for the systematic claims of Hegel than those who have recently offered anti-metaphysical construals. One might think here of Richard Rorty's view that the true Hegel is the young Hegel who founded "an ironist tradition within philosophy . . . [and helped] de-cognitivize, de-metaphysize philosophy" ([28], p. 79). Hartmann's work shows hope for sailing between the Scylla of traditional metaphysical readings and the Charybdis of recent attempts to reduce Hegel's work to ironic narrative.[9] Hartmann indicates a way through the crisis of postmodernity.

Against the metaphysical reading, this volume provides transcendental and conceptual explorations drawing on Hegelian argument. Rather than construing Hegel's work as metaphysical, at least in some of the traditional senses of metaphysical, and in contrast to dialectical materialist accounts that would give

H.T. Engelhardt, Jr. and T. Pinkard (eds.), Hegel Reconsidered, 1–18.
© 1994 *Kluwer Academic Publishers.*

a quasi-empirical meaning to terms such as dialectic, this volume explores Hegel's philosophy as "a theory of categories or of such determinations of the real as permit of reconstruction" ([10], p. 104). Following Hartmann's reassessment of the meaning and significance of Hegel's work, this volume presents a Hegel who responds to the collapse of many of the Enlightenment hopes for reason by providing "a hermeneutic of categories" ([10], p. 124). Hegel's dialectic comes properly to be understood not as a force in matter or even in history or as the ironic use of language, but as the immanent rationale of a categorial hermeneutic.

There are numerous ambiguities attendant to the term "metaphysical", both in its affirmation and in its eschewal. Metaphysics has been used to identify philosophical enterprises with roots in antique thought, affirmed in the Western Middle Ages, and pursued by modern philosophers such as Descartes and Leibniz. Christian Wolff at the beginning of the 18th century understands metaphysics to include ontology, general cosmology, and the philosophy of mind (e.g., pneumatics). "Hence metaphysics is the science of being, of the world in general, and of spirits" ([31], p. 42, §79). Metaphysics took on a special but still ambiguous significance in the work of Kant. On the one hand, it identifies the "matron outcast and forsaken" ([17], p. 7, A VIII), the attempt through pure reason to go beyond the bounds of possible experience and to secure knowledge claims such as the existence of God, the immortality of the soul, and the freedom of the will. Here Kant considers metaphysics "lawless, speculative reason" ([17], p. 664, A849=B877). On the other hand, for Kant it identifies a study of the concepts necessary for the possibility of knowledge. Kant speaks of "the schema for the completeness of a metaphysical system, whether of nature in general or of corporeal nature in particular, [as] the table of the categories" ([18], p. 11 Akademie edition (AK) IV 473).

The critical Kant after the publication of the First Critique continues to affirm a limited but important role for metaphysics.

> All natural philosophers who wanted to proceed mathematically in their work had therefore always (though unknown to themselves) made use of metaphysical principles, and had to make use of them, even though they otherwise solemnly repudiated any claim of metaphysics on their science. Doubtless they understood by metaphysics the illusion of inventing possibilities at will and playing with concepts which perhaps do not at all admit of presentation in intuition and have no other certification of their objective reality than the fact that they merely do not stand in contradiction with themselves. All true metaphysics is taken from the essential nature of the thinking faculty itself and therefore is by no means invented. This is because metaphysics is not borrowed from experience but contains the pure operations of thought, and hence contains concepts and principles a priori, which first of all bring the manifold of empirical representations into legitimate connection, whereby such a manifold can become empirical cognition, i.e., experience ([18], p. 9, AK IV 472).

The metaphysics of nature for the critical Kant is the conceptual foundation underlying the mathematical system of nature provided through Newton's physics.

This metaphysics identifies what Kant in his First Critique characterizes as the "physiology of pure reason", which "treats of nature, that is, of the sum of given objects (whether given to the senses, or, if we will, to some other kind of intuition) . . ." ([17], p. 662, A845=B873). This is one of the two major branches of metaphysics. "Metaphysics, in the narrower meaning of the term, consists of transcendental philosophy and physiology of pure reason" ([17], p. 662, A845=B873). Kant defines transcendental philosophy as treating "only of the understanding and of reason, in a system of concepts and principles which relate to objects in general but take no account of objects that may be given (Ontologia)"[10] ([17], p. 662, A845=B873). The development of the physiology of pure reason as the metaphysical foundations of the natural sciences amounts to exploring "all determinations of the universal concept of a matter in general and, therefore, everything that can be thought a priori respecting it, that can be presented in mathematical construction, or that can be given in experience as a determinate object of experience. . . ."[11]

Hegel, for his part, uses metaphysics in both a positive and a negative fashion. On the one hand, metaphysics "is nothing but the range of universal thought-determinations, and is as it were the diamond-net into which we bring everything in order to make it intelligible."[12] In this sense, Hegel's account is metaphysical and his logic is a metaphysics. "Logic therefore coincides with Metaphysics, the science of things set and held in thoughts – thoughts accredited able to express the essential reality of things" ([15], p. 45, §23). On the other hand, Hegel also uses "metaphysics" to describe illegitimate claims about reality.[13] Finally, transcendental is a term rarely used by Hegel, and when employed, used with reference to Kant and Fichte.[14] When Hegel characterizes his own method, it is often as "speculative", a term that would nowadays likely cause even more confusion and misunderstanding than the terms metaphysics and transcendental.

As Kant is considered the philosopher who transformed the categories of metaphysics, which had been understood from the perspective of the deity, into the humanly conditioned, spatio-temporal categories of sensible discursive understanding, Hegel is often regarded as the philosopher who took the further step of embedding the categories in history. For example, Hegel argues, "All cultural change reduces itself to a difference of categories. All revolutions, whether in the sciences or world history, occur merely because spirit has changed its categories in order to understand and examine what belongs to it, in order to possess and grasp itself in a truer, deeper, more intimate and unified manner" ([13], vol. 1, p. 202, Zusatz §246). Still, Hegel's focus on history and reality generally is not that of the historian, but of a philosopher disclosing the developing hermeneutic of reason, which includes a systematic concern for that hermeneutic. When Hartmann terms his account of Hegel non-metaphysical, it thus has a meaning set over against the history of metaphysical understandings of Hegel as well as the history of the metaphysics against which Kant reacted. Hartmann construes Kant as providing a form of transcendental philosophy (e.g., a mixed transcendental theory), rather than a metaphysics, though Kant regarded himself as having indeed justified a metaphysics.[15] The rich ambiguities in the history of philosophy that have attended the terms transcendental and metaphysical have been explored by Klaus Hartmann. But they continue to cast their shadows. Their clarification remains a major task.

As early as 1965 Hartmann had articulated his understanding of transcendental philosophy as including the work not only of Kant, who inaugurated the project of transcendental philosophy, but of Hegel, who does not in fact employ "transcendental" to characterize his project. In his use of "transcendental", Hartmann advances the following account of Hegel's work as an example of philosophy that has taken the transcendental turn and accomplished a pure theoretical account.

> The Hegelian proposal is to avoid the problem of a first stance by invoking circularity, not now in terms of granting and reconstructing only, but in terms of a theory of categories whose justification is borne out by the result of the categorial doctrine itself. In other words, the principle of transcendental explanation itself can be grasped. This, however, in its domain, in the domain where its explanatory logic holds. Only the domain is now universal and all-inclusive in the sense that there is no division between ground and grounded left as one between a fixed stance and derivative results. The whole domain is self-grounding, self-validating. From "outside" it looks like a petitio principii, but only from outside. From inside we can demonstrate its systemic virtues ([11], p. 238).

The logic of reason's account of the categories is immanent to reason's reflection on the categories.

Hartmann takes pains to articulate a sense of the categories that can avoid metaphysical claims in the sense of a priori existence claims. It is precisely this that plagued prior ontologies. "We may once more remind ourselves that the development of ontology from a doctrine of categories to a body of assertions popularly called 'metaphysics' has given rise to objections. These objections are invariably due to a confusion of categories and specific existence claims in connection with them" ([11], p. 228). In this fashion, Hartmann frames a special use of the term ontology. "By invoking categories, ontology departs, if not fully, from an investigation of the real in terms of a philosophy of nature: it claims categories and concepts or, to use an apparent hypostasis, 'logos,' as the proper medium of the knowledge of being" ([11], p. 227). In this light, the dialectic is not: (1) a force immanent in the material of reality; (2) a force immanent in history, or (3) a force by which ideas compel the mind. The dialectic may be regarded as a way of rationally reconstructing history from a particular content-full standpoint.[16] It is most properly the method for organizing the categories in terms of reason's systematic needs. Hegel is best understood, even where he may not have so understood himself, as providing a philosophical project that does not through reason aspire to make truth claims about a transcendent reality or even to make particular existence claims. It is not a project that provides an a priori account of history or of the state of things. It is "an ontology which can be articulated as a system, or as a systematic hermeneutic, affording, in a broad sense of the term, a thoroughgoing transcendental grounding" ([9], p. 116). The explanatory focus is on ontological thought.

Reason is no longer shown to be legitimate through corresponding to an independent reality. The objectivity that philosophy vindicates is no longer a mere correspondence of reason to the object or the object to reason, as empiricists and rationalists had hoped. Nor is the objectivity that philosophy vindicates a mere subjectivity, a constellation of habits ingrained in the character of human nature or the character of human understanding, a la Hume. Nor is objectivity an intersubjectivity set over against a transcendent thing-in-itself. The objectivity that categorial philosophy vindicates is that which can be systematically reconstructed in terms of reason's own hermeneutic. Whatever reality, history, or experience, it can always be regarded, inspected, reconstructed, and justified from the perspective of reason. This objectivity is not merely the contingency of a particular historically and socially conditioned understanding of objectivity. The objectivity vindicated by reason is an objectivity that is the understanding of this contingency not just as contingency a la Rorty, but as necessary for reason's reflections and as rendered rational in terms of reason's rational goals – a point made by Chaffin and others in this volume.

Here also, as George Khushf suggests in this volume, Hartmann develops a reading of Hegel that indicates a way past the announcement that we live after philosophy and after metaphysics. Hartmann offers an approach to justifying a set of systematic philosophical reflections that develop out of the Western philosophical narrative about reason. On the one hand, this narrative is born of a particular history and has been shaped by particular peoples. On the other hand, it is just this narrative that attempts to tell its story in ways not bound to a particular history or to particular peoples. Hegel recognizes that this attempt is always realized in a particular history and in terms of a particular perspective. But the dialectic of the perspective is to set the particularity aside in ever more self-justifying universal understandings. Though this project may not discover moral or metaphysical content,[17] it is not just any project. It is a project that springs naturally from reason's concerns with rationality. It has an unavoidability that vindicates the special importance of this hermeneutic circle.

If philosophy is reason's reflection on itself and on reason's encounter with reality, then at philosophy's core there is an exploration of the cardinal elements of that rationality and its encounter with reality. It is these that are expressed in Hegel's categorial philosophy: a circle within which the concerns of rationality with rationality and with reality are rationally satisfied. The hermeneutic that frames this circle is Hegel's dialectic.

Hartmann's short article, "Hegel: A Non-Metaphysical View" can be regarded as a statement or manifesto with arguments for this revision of the received understandings of Hegel. As Hartmann appreciated through his reading of Hegel, Hegel's enduring insight is that the way out of the difficulties (contradictions) facing philosophy with the collapse of the old metaphysics is to be found in reunderstanding philosophy and its categories in terms of the circle of the hermeneutic of rationality. This hermeneutical circle is the circle of ontological categories. The diverse concerns of philosophy and of reason generally are then comprehended within the ongoing self-reflective narrative of reason. With this circle, within this rational narrative, isolated meanings are given context and a systematic appraisal.

> Meaning is enhanced by systemic meaning; systemic considerations constitute the explanans of categorial meaning. A category is "understood," explained, or justified in terms of its function with respect to making ontology – the satisfaction of reason – possible; in such a context it is immediate, determinate, or inclusive of otherness, and therefore infinite, whatever the case may be.
>
> In other words, the systemic program – to give a reconstruction of the real in a manner satisfactory to reason – provides for the successful execution of the categorial program. It constitutes an immanence of thought, an over-all sphere in which determinations are viewed as from within, from the stance of thought, and placed with respect to their "ontological" potential ([10], p. 107).

Hegel does not offer yet one more metaphysical system. Instead, Hegel discloses a standpoint from which metaphysical, ontological, and scientific concerns with knowledge can be understood in terms of reason's interest in accounting for itself. This general reading of Hegel's task and of the significance of philosophy is Klaus Hartmann's intellectual bequest to Hegel scholarship and to philosophy generally.

The essays that follow draw in various ways on these themes by developing concerns articulated in Hartmann's work. The volume opens with Stephen Bungay's overview of Hegel's philosophical project. As Hegel argues, philosophy does not give us new knowledge, but is rather a systematic inquiry into what we know and how we know. The very core of philosophy's method, as Bungay contends, is a rationality that is systematic, a rationality that rationally regards the elements of reason. Over against reality as well as thought and discourse about reality, there is philosophical thought and discourse, both about reality and thought as well as about discourse about reality. Categorial thought, as Hegel understands it, involves thinking about what it is to think about reality. Bungay provides not only an overview of the dialectic and the logic, but also relates the *Logic* to the *Realphilosophie*. The *Logic* provides the exposition of method, while the *Realphilosophie* regards the manifestation of method. Though the *Logic* is indifferent to space and time, the *Realphilosophie* takes account of space and time and the externality they impose. In his account of history, as Bungay establishes, Hegel clearly conflates sytematic thought and historical thought. Still, these difficulties are not fatal to Hegel's enterprise as a whole. Over against "the bad old Hegel", Bungay provides an account of "the categorial philosopher" who is worth our attention.

In his study of Hegel's metaphysics, Tom Rockmore contrasts Hegel's project with the metaphysics of Descartes and Kant, arguing that Hegel completed the Copernican revolution and ontology begun by Kant. So recast, metaphysics acquires a non-traditional understanding, that of a hermeneutic of categories. Metaphysics can now be appreciated as "an epistemological theory intended to reach full knowledge of what is given to mind from the vantage point of a categorial framework" ([27], p. 46). Rockmore argues for "a non-ontological science of the experience of consciousness." Metaphysics is not the science that can discover new truths about reality. Metaphysics is recast as a "categorial framework . . . through which content is made comprehensible to the mind of the knower" ([27], p. 47). This account reveals Hegel as anti-foundationalist in the sense that his categorial theory is not grounded in some claim about reality or in a particular starting point within thought, but in the systematic character of theoretical reflection. It is a categorial hermeneutic focused on giving an account of itself. Like all hermeneutic accounts, this one is circular. As a result, it does not matter where one begins the account. The circle is important because it is unavoidable. As soon as one attempts the philosophical project of reflecting on philosophy's understandings of being, one stands within it.

The exploration of Hegel's relationship to Kant and pre-Kantian metaphysics is continued by Klaus Brinkmann who examines the non-metaphysical character of Hegel's project as well as Hegel's use of the dialectic. As Brinkmann stresses, Hegel did not regard Kant's Copernican turn as central to the history of philosophy or the clasification of philosophies. Rather, Hegel gave his own classification in terms of objective thought (the view that only thought can reveal the true nature of things) versus subjective thought. The first he divided into "pictorial thinking-cum-reasoning [vorstellendes Denken plus Verstandesdenken] and . . . speculative thinking, which may also be termed categorial thinking" ([27], p. 59). Hegel saw the history of metaphysics culminating in categorial thought, which he termed speculative thought. It is therefore essential to note Hartmann's use of metaphysics as the project of dealing with transcendent objects of reason. Brinkmann provides an exploration of Hegel's history of philosophy, demonstrating that "Hegel's system of concepts is not only a doctrine of categories, but also their transcendental critique" ([4], p. 73). Brinkmann argues that Hartmann shows that "the dialectic is to be viewed as a procedure for the systematic construal and concatenation of categorial concepts, for which the principle of avoiding contradiction is absolutely essential" ([4], p. 57). Hegel's dialectic, rather than being a deductive way to discover the content of being, is a reconstructed hermeneutic that integrates categorial content. Hartmann not only establishes that it is possible to give a non-metaphysical reading of Hegel, but that this reading "makes more sense of, and is more consonant with, the spirit of Hegel's writings than a metaphysical interpretation" ([4], p. 57).

Through an examination of Hegel's categorial treatment of aesthetics, Reinhold Aschenberg explores further Hartmann's categorial ontological reading of Hegel's dialectic in terms of a transcendental grounding. Hegel understands philosophy as the "thinking study of objects", which commits him to providing not only (1) a regressive categorial reconstruction of content from the point of view of reason (i.e., the categorial rationalization of whatever is given), but also (2) a progressive account which shows the categorial necessity of that content.

> The necessity of a categorial determination can be shown if and only if it can be demonstrated to be a condition necessary to the very possibility of the dialectical (re)construction of those determinations that, as systematically internal articulations of speculative thinking itself, and thus of the methodological medium of the theory, can for their part only be doubted at the price of self-contradiction, and which therefore allow and require not a transcendental but an 'elenchic' legitimation ([1], p. 81).

This is not an a priori, metaphysical claim to be able to discover the character of the real, but rather a claim to be able to disclose its categorial necessity. In illustration of his general claims, Aschenberg lays out a deduction of art and an account of the theoretical structure of Hegel's lectures on aesthetics. Through a careful study of the systematic or categorial place of art, Aschenberg secures the transcendental status of aesthetics. This is not a deduction of Krug's pen or of a particular style of art, but the argument that "art and religion, as well as philosophy, are the functionally necessary forms for the very possibility of concrete subjectivity's becoming conscious of the absolute" ([1], p. 84). Aschenberg offers an illustration of how philosophical thought following Hegel can explicate concrete subjects within its conceptual structure.

In his essay Thomas J. Bole III is concerned with whether Hartmann's reading of the *Science of Logic* as a transcendentally argued theory of categories can be justified. The *Science of Logic* is basic to Hartmann's account of Hegel's philosophy as a theory of categories, since the *Logic* is said to constitute the argument that thought can categorize being. The *Logic* consists of explanatory thought's account of itself. It must therefore explain the determinations of the explanandum, being, in virtue of which it is accessible to thought or intelligible. The concepts that articulate those determinations would be justified as categories. Absolute Idea in its application to particular categories, the dialectic, explicates the logical function each category has in rendering being in terms of explanation. "The categories of the *Logic* are entailed in the dialectic's explanation of being's accessibility to explanation, and therefore in its explanation of explanatory thought" ([3], p. 109). Bole then indicates what concepts of the *Logic* can thereby be justified as categories. Bole reads Hegel's philosophy of the real as an explanation of how the categories of the *Logic* can take account of our explanations of empirical reality. Because explanations involve an irreducible contingent content, he does not think that they can be justified as categories in the way in which the crucial concepts of the *Logic* can be. Nonetheless, because the *Logic* has secured general categories of explanation, we can appreciate the categorial elements in our explanations of empirical reality.

The radical character of Hartmann's reading of Hegel is recognized in George Khushf's reformulation of a number of Hartmann's central contentions. To avoid an unnoticed ingression of metaphysical claims, Khushf suggests that Hartmann's endeavor be construed as meta-ontological rather than ontological. Each category can have two meanings, depending on whether it is regarded from an "ordinary" or "pure transcendental" perspective. Outside of the circle of transcendental philosophy and independent of it, each category gives a logos of being. As such, it implicitly entails existence claims, at least claims about the general structure of reality. The implicit existence claims justify designating the categories as "ontological". However, when the categories are placed within the pure transcendental domain, they take on a non-ontological character. Their determinations then specify other categorial determinations within the dialectical ordering, and not any existents. Thought's determinations of being (the categories) are now themselves regarded as that which is to be determined, thus providing a content of being which is wholly immanent for thought. As Khushf observes, "in order to maintain sufficient care in developing the 'non-metaphysical interpretation' of Hegel both the dialectic and the system should be characterized as meta-ontological. They do not give the logos of being but rather a logos of the logoi of being" ([20], p. 138). With these distinctions in hand, one can recognize in Hartmann's interpretation of Hegel's project an introduction to reason's narrative about being: a story told in reason's terms but without particular metaphysical claims. Each step in the story is indebted to particular metaphysical understandings and their critical apprehension (the "ordinary" function of a category). But within the story, the elements do not make claims about reality. Rather, they are the subject of critical reflection. A meta-ontological critique is possible in reason's terms. Thus, Hartmann's "contribution should not be underestimated as we search for the way into a 'post-metaphysical', 'post-modern' world" ([20], p. 140).

Deborah Chaffin contributes the first of a series of essays in this volume addressing the place of contingency and history in the work of Hegel. Chaffin gives a central place to the narrative of history, while showing how Hegel succeeds in placing contingency within the hermeneutic of systematic rationality. On the one hand, as she argues, "the genealogy of the actual requires the entire development of the categorial ontology presented in the Science of Logic" ([5], p. 156). On the other hand, the self-consciousness, which is the concrete universal realized in the Absolute Idea, encompasses the contingencies of history. "The concrete universal is just such an absolutely active subject: as the ultimate form of unity between thought and world, the concrete universal represents the highest rationalization of contingency. In this sense, the concrete universal establishes the necessity of contingency" ([5], p. 156). It is from this perspective that the role and function of history are apprehended by philosophy and portrayed as inherently rational. Since "history is not a perfect unfolding, but rather involves the give and take of contingency" ([5], p. 156), in which there is a "delineation and creation of norms" ([5], p. 157) in an attempt to think the actual in rational terms, the contingent is embedded in the necessities of theoretical concerns. What is produced is a series of categories, which is not the same as a series of existents; the conceptual order is not the temporal order of the development of appearances. Dialectical reason, the subject of Hegelian ontology, encompasses the contingent while satisfying the needs of systematic rationality.

The narrative is recounted, but not from the standpoint of contingency. Rather, contingency is brought within the standpoint and concerns of reason. The narrative character of Hegel's insight can be accepted, but the character of the narrative is not as Rorty contends. Hegel's project is not the creation of a novel narrative, nor the mere canonization of the contingent,[18] but the disclosure of the rational in the contingent. "Although Hegel often repeated the position that an essential component of the philosophical idea is always and necessarily concrete, is particular, in the tradition of Hegel scholarship almost no one believes him but Hartmann" ([5], p. 144). Many of those who did believe him regarding concreteness, such as Rorty, did not credit his claims for the vindication of the theoretical.

Hegel, as both Terry Pinkard and H. Tristram Engelhardt underscore, came to understand that the European ideal of the Greek polis could not be realized in contemporary large-scale states. The market and individualism, as well as the fracturing of the Western Christian hegemony, meant that the dream of an organic state on the model of Aristotle's polis could not be achieved. Hegel acknowledges this, inviting a reconceptualization of the state. Pinkard accepts Hegel's diagnosis and the general outline of his response as a point of departure for justifying a liberal democratic constitutional state. Pinkard draws on Hegel's view of the state as a social category that provides both meaning and direction, but without presupposing a particular idea of the right or the good, nor assuming a founding, legitimating contract. What is disclosed is a novel sense of community provided by the category "state", a category that can take seriously the pluralistic character of contemporary society. This leads Pinkard to endorsing not Hegel's Rechtsstaat, but the democratic liberal state in which the contingencies of history frame the character of constitutional and political decision-making. Over against the philosopher's Rechtsstaat, Pinkard defends the procedural and historical notion of the rule of law that has shaped the notion of a constitutional liberal democratic state aimed at ideals of fair play and justice. Appealing to the centrality of individual dignity and personal integrity, Pinkard draws on Hegelian themes so as to forward a Rawlsian idea of cooperation, now appreciated as an affirmative social category in the spirit of Hartmann's reflections ([9]). In this account of the state, "the notion of a type of social unity (a social category), not the ideas of the right and the good, will be basic" ([25], p. 181).

Following Pinkard's speculative justification of the liberal, constitutional, democratic state, the volume turns to Dick Howard's exploration of the role of revolutions in grounding the state, in particular, the democratic state. This exploration is in the service of further developing Hartmann's attempt to find in Hegel's theory what Hegel in fact did not provide, namely, a categorial justification of popular sovereignty. Hegel's rejection of popular sovereignty was in part constrained by his recognition that a merely contractual account of the state in nominalist terms cannot appreciate the categorial novum which the state is: a bond between citizens, whose meaning is not reducible to a contract or whose significance is not derived simply from the consent of those who fashion it. The state is a way of understanding the relationships of persons and is conceptually richer than a mere agreement or a simple community.

The second reason for Hegel's hesitation regarding popular sovereignty has a deep theoretical basis: the problem of transcendental linearity. Because Hegel provides a categorial account through which each subsequent category explains previous categories, it does not afford a way of talking about how the real (e.g., how the persons who are "understood" within categories such as the family, civil society, and state) should interact with those structures and across categorial levels. Because Hegel offers a categorial account, he seems disbarred from understanding an interactive dimension of the state and from determining how the persons who contingently constitute the state ought to act upon the state. This circumstance is twice over unsatisfactory. First, it leaves us with less than a congenial account of a state, one that appears to omit important considerations such as the legitimating role of popular sovereignty. Second, there is the theoretical difficulty that Hegelian theory would have failed to take account of the forms of polity that became clearly dominant after his death.

Hartmann recognized these difficulties and attempted to address them. Dick Howard in his essay takes Hartmann's concerns as a point of departure.

> The "riddle of all constitutions" which democracy resolves emerges from the fact that the political state, because it exists objectively, appears as a particular while the members of civil society, who come to exist universally in the form of the sovereign citizenry, are led to perceive critically this opposition of their universality to the particular state. Forms of democratic participation are necessary in order to produce that active confidence (Zutrauen) which provides a subjective mediation of this difference. To this subjective mediation must be added, of course, an objective moment in the form of constitutional guarantees like the free press, public audits, or judicial review ([16], p. 190).

A number of difficulties remain, as Howard stresses. One must determine the extent to which particular institutions and elements of life within a democracy must be leveled to the abstract equality required within political life. Hartmann addressed the scope of autonomy that should be acknowledged for institutions within the state on the basis of subsidiarity and within the constraints required for political legitimacy. These considerations have implications, for example, for the proper character of political parties (e.g., Hartmann's disallowal of those associations as political parties that are grounded in natural, non-universal interests).

Against this background of Hartmann's Hegelian exploration of a democratic constitutional state, Howard examines the originary relationship of philosophy and practice by using the American and French revolutions to provide a framework for understanding the relationship between revolution and the theory of democracy. Howard offers a categorial appreciation of the necessity of the contingent content provided to democratic understandings through a revolution. "The universality of the political is constantly present; its apparent absence at the moment of revolution leaves an open place which must be filled – with accidental content, in the course of the Revolution, and eventually with rational content at the end of History. But history does not end; political progress is not linear but originary" ([16], p. 195). A fundamental tension is thus understood and overcome. On the one hand, "conceptually, the Revolution is simply nothing!"; on the other hand, revolutions "are the origin of contemporary Western history, and of its political democracy" ([16], p. 195). Social institutions are unstable particulars. By recognizing their refashioning in the bond between democracy and revolution, Howard can justify the demand for democratization in the interplay between the political state and the political plenum. He thus challenges Hartmann's refusal to democratize particular structures within civil society. Most significantly, drawing from Hartmann's account of Hegel, Howard has charted the interrelation between social formations and the state.

This interrelation remains both practically and theoretically problematic. The development of Hegel's insights must now take account of the more than a century and a half of history since Hegel's death. From the vantage point of the end of the twentieth century, one looks back not only on the French and American revolutions, but on Europe and the world after the salience and then failure of both fascism and communism. In an unanticipated "reversal of history", the collapse of the October Revolution became manifest as the former Soviet Union went out of existence and the former Eastern Bloc countries ceased to be communist. Post-modernity discloses a post-Christian, post-communist Europe, in which old faiths are not only shaken and weakened, but in which, most significantly, there is no longer a universal, content-full moral narrative.[19] In the wake of these collapses, there has been an impassioned and often destructive return to natural, non-universal interests as individuals and communities seek after meanings drawn from past cultural convictions and ethnic bonds. The search for natural identities has been important not only in Eastern Europe, as in the former Yugoslavia and Soviet Union, but also in Western Europe, as in the resurgence of autonomous regions such as Catalonia. In the midst of disillusionment, comfortable disbelief, clashing moral narratives, and bloody attempts to reestablish traditional organic communities, one finds John Rawls recognizing the historically conditioned character of his understanding of justice and fairness [26] and Richard Rorty acknowledging the contingent character of the perspective of "we twentieth-century liberals . . . we heirs to the historical contingencies which have created more and more cosmopolitan, more and more democratic political institutions" ([28], p. 196).

In all of this the question is posed: is the universal perspective merely contingent? First and foremost, one must lay hold of the core Hegelian theme that all reflection, even the reflection that affirms post-modernity a la Lyotard or contingency a la Rorty, is a reflection that presupposes the ability of reason to reflect and to place content within the ordering concerns of reason. The content-full character of those ordering concerns will always be marked by the particularities of contingency and the character of history. That there are ordering concerns and that they have the dialectical character of moving from less explanatory and more one-sided accounts to more explanatory and less one-sided accounts, is not dependent solely on the character of history. That such concerns are taken seriously is dependent on contingent circumstances and on a particular history. But what is disclosed is the perspective of reason, which is always available to be taken, albeit when it is taken, it always has a particular, contingent, historically conditioned character.

The dialectic is the necessary hermeneutic for categorial criticism, which is itself unavoidable. The content of criticism is contingent. Even the content of the categories of criticism is contingent. But criticism, especially categorial criticism, is not contingent. It springs from the self-reflective, rational character of reason. The hermeneutic circle of categorial rationality is for reason as unavoidable as is the question about the character of reality and the relationship of reason to being. Following Hartmann, Hegel's dialectic provides suggestions about how to respond to post-modernity's acknowledgement of the plurality of moral narratives and the contingent character of all secular moral content. The response lies in the immanence of categorial reflection.

Pinkard in his examinations of Hegel's considerations of modern art acknowledges what is implicitly Hegels response to post-modernity: diversity and difference can be acknowledged and comprehended without being set aside. The pluralistic character of contemporary society despoils society of a unitary and content-full appreciation of art, heroism, and the ideal. In post-modernity, art is recognized as a plurality of narratives. But the difficulty encountered by art confronts moral and political philosophy as well. It despoils society of a unitary content-full appreciation of morality, bringing into question any state constitution that incarnates a particular understanding of justice, fairness, and equality. It undermines the legitimacy of any political program that attempts comprehensively to realize in society a content-full sense of justice, fairness, and equality. Thus, one finds a far stronger argument than Hartmann appreciated against a thoroughgoing imposition on civic life of the abstract equality of citizenship, against a thoroughgoing democratization of the society, and against the politicization of the private. One finds in fact a categorial argument for subsidiarity, which leads to sustaining extensive areas for rights to privacy and divergent communal understandings of the good life. The civil society encompassed by the state gives individuals space denied by the polities of the Western Christian Middle Ages as well as by some contemporary, rigorously socialist and democratic states.

Hegel's account of the state offers a radical reconceptualization of political structures precisely because he departs from the previously regnant notion of the Greek polis as the ideal for a polity. In recognizing the pluralist character of contemporary society, Hegel understands the impossibility of geographically located large-scale communities. More fundamentally, Hegel is post-modern in acknowledging the inability to discover a particular canonical content for morality, justice, or fairness. Engelhardt draws on Hegel's dialectic of abstract right, morality, and Sittlichkeit to show that the state structure that Hegel's categorial account requires is one that precisely is not a community. Nor does it offer the content, direction, or personal identity supplied by community membership. Political belonging is not the same as belonging to a community.

Abstract right reveals that one can categorially justify the keeping of contracts, though one cannot discover what contracts one ought to make. The search to define wrong action and the good leads Hegel to exploring morality. Yet one finds only that one should pursue the good; one does not discover the content of the good. Such content is only to be disclosed in particular communities. From the general secular standpoint, each Sittlichkeit has a different and contingent content. Civil society through the market and other structures binds persons as individuals and as members of different communities, but it does not realize that self-conscious unity achieved in the constitution of a state, in particular of a democratic state. Here the work of Hartmann helpfully recasts Hegel's arguments.

> The consequence of a categorial account of the state is therefore the sovereignty of the people. It is the expression of the relationship of the political many, who are all, as unarticulated universal, to the political state as an articulated objectification of the universal. It is this sovereignty which alone affords the self-affirmation of the universal as affirmation of the universal by the universal . . . by everybody's reference to the universal as to something objective: this option opens the way to universal suffrage in a democracy . . . ([9], pp. 126–7).

It is the democratic state that is the universal self-conscious realization of freedom. But the state must compass the diversity of a pluralist society. The state is not committed to setting the diversity aside. Rather, the diversity is placed within the neutral procedural structures of the state. Indeed, the state is not just the sovereignty of the people, but of people who are unavoidably bound by diverse moral visions in different moral communities. In encompassing this plurality, the state gives moral space for diversity. It is properly a limited democracy.

This cluster of essays reveals a Hegel who can help in the rational assessment of both ontology and of political theory. Indeed, the essays on political theory illustrate the non-metaphysical character of the fundamental issues explored in the studies that begin this volume. The dialectic is an invitation to ontological criticism. The categories are assessed and reassessed in terms of how categorially understood content can be related. The relations are not directly dictated by the real. Nor do the reflections attempt in an a priori fashion to dictate the character of the real. Rather, the reflections show how thought about reality can consistently be understood. In part, this can help exorcise misguided metaphysical claims. On the other hand, it can reveal conceptual bonds between areas of thought, such as the right, the good, community, society, and state. It was Klaus Hartmann more than any who understood these powerful implications of Hegel's thought. He knew that Hegel, freed from the misunderstandings of others and his own misunderstandings, could open an area of philosophical endeavor that would endure.

NOTES

1. "God, however, is held by Hegel to be the reality which underlies all finite things. It is therefore only when looked at as finite that they involve an untruth. Looked at sub specie Dei they are true" ([21], p. 8).
2. Royce characterizes Hegel as holding that "The Absolute, in order to express itself fully, must, in fact, for the very reasons which the dialectic method emphasizes, triumph over the unreasonable . . . reason is an active principle, finding its true place in the world as a process of conflict whereby it overcomes its own opponents, there is thus a good general reason why a great deal of what in each particular case is unreason should exist in the world to be overcome" ([29], p. 223–4).
3. According to Peirce, Hegel claims "if there is any sense in philosophy at all, the whole universe and every feature of it, however minute, is rational, and was constrained to be as it is by the logic of events, so that there is no principle of action in the universe but reason" ([24], 6.218).
4. An example of this interpretation of Hegel is provided by Mure. "Hegel's objective idealism, as it may be called, gives us, as he develops it from the level of ordinary consciousness, the same impression as his theistic doctrine. He is clearly making a supreme effort to conceive ultimate reality as truly and concretely knowable, and yet to do justice to the half-truth of realism and the profound, though not final, severance of subject and object which characterizes many levels of human experience. We find the same effort to synthesize without compromising difference when we ask what is to be said of absolute spirit in terms analogous to what was said of God, so passing from pictorial to explicitly rational thought. . . . This timeless movement of spirit self-reconciling through self-negation, or self-diremption, permeates and constitutes human experience in every shape and form in which it develops" ([22], pp. 8–9).
5. The standard "school" interpretation of Hegel by Marxists has been highly metaphysical. Consider this characterization of Hegel. "From this Hegel drew the conclusion that the

true basis of the world, which exists outside consciousness and which we investigate, is concepts or ideas, while all material objects and facts are products and manifestations of ideas. Whose ideas? Since they embrace the whole world they must clearly be the ideas of some 'spirit' which Hegel calls 'world spirit' or the 'absolute idea'. According to Hegel, the 'absolute idea' and the world are identical" ([2], pp. 36–7). Frederick Engels opines, for example: "It is . . . from the history of nature and human society that the laws of dialectics are abstracted. For they are nothing but the most general laws of these two aspects of historical development, as well as of thought itself. And indeed they can be reduced in the main to three: The law of the transformation of quantity into quality and vice versa; The law of the interpenetration of opposites; The law of the negation of the negation. All three are developed by Hegel in his idealist fashion as mere laws of thought . . . We are not concerned here with writing a handbook of dialectics, but only with showing that the dialectical laws are really laws of development of nature, and therefore are valid also for theoretical natural science. Hence we cannot go into the inner interconnection of these laws with one another" ([8], pp. 26–7). This understanding of dialectics led to books that can at best be described as publications concerning dialectical empirical science. See, for example, [23].

6. Metaphysical interpretations of Hegel continue. See, for example, [30].
7. For a well-focused but short account of the misconstruals of Hegel's political philosophy, see [19], pp. 21–60. For a view of Hegel that sees him as "radically anti-liberal", see [32].
8. One might think of the notoriously misunderstood phrase of Hegel, which is taken to support whatever power rules: "What is rational is actual and what is actual is rational" ([14], p. 10).
9. Rorty has framed one of the more fashionable examples of anti-metaphysical construal of Hegel. Rorty argues that Hegel "in practice, though not in theory, dropped the idea of getting at the truth in favor of the idea of making things new. His criticism of his predecessors was not that their propositions were false but that their languages were obsolete. By inventing this sort of criticism, the younger Hegel broke away from the Plato-Kant sequence and began a tradition of ironist philosophy which is continued in Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Derrida" ([28], pp. 78–79). Rorty then interprets Hegel's dialectic as "literary criticism". Rorty argues that Hegel obscured the true narrative character of his work. "It took Hegel a lot of hard work to manage the dialectical inversions he then pretended to have observed rather than produced" ([28], p. 134).
10. [17], p. 662. In his use of ontology, Kant employs the term coined by Christian Wolff, *ontologia*. Wolff speaks of *philosophia prima sive ontologia*. "That part of philosophy which treats of being in general and of the general affections of being is called ontology, or first philosophy" ([31], §73, p. 39).
11. [18], p. 12, AK IV 475f. Kant, for example, argues that "the concept of matter had to be carried out through all the four functions of the concepts of the understanding (in four chapters), in each of which a new determination of matter was added" (p. 13, AK IV 475).
12. [13], vol. 1, p. 202, §246 Zusatz. "Metaphysik heißt nichts Anderes, als der Umfang der allgemeinen Denkbestimmungen, gleichsam das diamantene Netz, in das wir allen Stoff bringen und dadurch erst verständlich machen."
13. "Sound and heat do not exist on their own account as does weighted matter, and the postulated materiality of heat and sound is a mere fiction, introduced into physics by the metaphysics of the understanding" ([13], vol. 2, p. 87, §304 Zusatz).
14. Consider this excerpt from Hegel's summary of the philosophy of Kant. "A Transcendental philosophy, i.e. a system of principles of pure reason which demonstrate the universal and necessary elements in the self-conscious understanding, without occupying themselves with objects or inquiring what universality and necessity are; this last would be transcendent. Transcendent and transcendental have accordingly to be clearly distinguished" ([12], vol. 3, p. 431).
15. In the preface to the First Edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant announces that he will complete the project of metaphysics. "Metaphysics, on the view which we are adopting,

is the only one of all the sciences which dare promise that through a small but concentrated effort it will attain, and this in a short time, such completion as will leave no task to our successors save that of adapting it in a didactic manner according to their own preferences, without their being able to add anything whatsoever to its content" ([17], pp. 13–14, A xx).

16. The reconstructive character of Hegel's account of reality, including his account of history, is presented at the end of the Preface to the Philosophy of Right:

> One word more about giving instruction as to what the world ought to be. Philosophy in any case always comes on the scene too late to give it. As the thought of the world, it appears only when actuality is already there cut and dried after its process of formation has been completed. The teaching of the concept, which is also history's inescapable lesson, is that it is only when actuality is mature that the ideal first appears over against the real and that the ideal apprehends this same real world in its substance and builds it up for itself into the shape of an intellectual realm. When philosophy paints its grey in grey, then has a shape of life grown old. By philosophy's grey in grey it cannot be rejuvenated but only understood. The owl of Minerva spreads its wings only with the falling of the dusk ([14], pp. 12–13).

17. I have explored at some length the inability of secular reason to discover and justify moral content. See [6]. The account in that volume realizes better the insights of Hartmann's reading of Hegel than [7].
18. For example, Rorty has the view that Hegel's dialectical method is not an argumentative procedure, "but simply a literary skill" ([28], p. 78).
19. To speak of a post-Christian, post-communist Europe is not to deny that there are still both Christians and communists. After all, the author of this introduction is an Orthodox Christian. It is, rather, to recognize that the taken-for-granted character of European society is no longer Christian or communist.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. Aschenberg, R.: 1994, 'On the Theoretical Form of Hegel's Aesthetic', in this volume, pp. 79–101.
2. Boguslavsky, B.M. *et al.*: 1978, *ABC of Dialectical and Historical Materialism*, Progress Publishers, Moscow.
3. Bole, T.J. III: 1994, 'The Cogency of the Logic's Argumentation: Securing the Dialectic's Claim to Justify Categories', in this volume, pp. 103–117.
4. Brinkmann, K.: 1994, 'Hegel's Critique of Kant and Pre-Kantian Metaphysics', in this volume, pp. 57–78.
5. Chaffin, D.: 1994, 'The Logic of Contingency', in this volume, pp. 143–161.
6. Engelhardt, H.T. Jr.: 1994, *The Foundations of Bioethics*, 2nd ed. Oxford University Press, New York.
7. Engelhardt, H.T. Jr.: 1973, *Mind-Body: A Categorial Relation*, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague.
8. Engels, F.: 1940, *Dialectics of Nature*, C. Dutt (trans. and ed.), International Publishers, New York.
9. Hartmann, K.: 1984, 'Towards a new Systematic Reading of Hegel's Philosophy of Right', in Z.A. Pelczynski (ed.), *The State and Civil Society*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 114–136.
10. Hartmann, K.: 1972, 'Hegel: A Non-Metaphysical View', in A. MacIntyre (ed.), *Hegel*, University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, pp. 101–124.
11. Hartmann, K.: 1966, 'On Taking the Transcendental Turn', *The Review of Metaphysics* 20 (December), 238.
12. Hegel, G.W.F.: 1974, *Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, E.S. Haldane and F.H. Simson (trans.), Humanities Press, New York.

13. Hegel, G.W.F.: 1970, *Hegel's Philosophy of Nature*, M.J. Petry (ed. and trans.), George Allen and Unwin, London.
14. Hegel, G.W.F.: 1965, *Hegel's Philosophy of Right*, T.M. Knox (trans.), Clarendon Press, Oxford.
15. Hegel, G.W.F.: 1965, *The Logic of Hegel*, W. Wallace (trans.), Oxford University Press, Oxford.
16. Howard, D.: 1994, 'Revolution as the Foundation of Political Philosophy', in this volume, pp. 187–209.
17. Kant, I.: 1964, *Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, N.K. Smith (trans.), Macmillan, London.
18. Kant, I.: 1970, *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science*, J. Ellington (trans.), Bobbs-Merrill, Indianapolis.
19. Kaufmann, W.: 1976, 'The Hegel Myth and its Method', in A. MacIntyre (ed.), *Hegel*, University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, pp. 21–60.
20. Khushf, G.: 1994, 'The Meta-Ontological Option', in this volume, pp. 119–142.
21. McTaggart, J.: 1964, *Studies in the Hegelian Dialectic*, Russell & Russell, New York.
22. Mure, G.R.G.: 1965, *The Philosophy of Hegel*, Oxford University Press, London.
23. Omelyanovsky, M.E.: 1979, *Dialectics in Modern Physics*, H.C. Creighton (trans.), Progress Publishers, Moscow.
24. Peirce, C.S.: 1935, *Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce*, C. Hartshorne and P. Weiss (eds.), Belknap Press, Cambridge, Mass.
25. Pinkard, T.: 1994, 'Constitutionalism, Politics, and the Common Life', in this volume, pp. 163–186.
26. Rawls, J.: 1993, *Political Liberalism*, Columbia University Press, New York.
27. Rockmore, T.: 1994, 'Hegelian Metaphysics', in this volume, pp. 43–56.
28. Rorty, R.: 1989, *Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
29. Royce, J.: 1919, *Lectures on Modern Idealism*, Yale University Press, New Haven.
30. Wartenberg, T.E.: 1993, 'Hegel's Idealism: The Logic of Conceptuality', in F.C. Beiser (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Hegel*, Cambridge University Press, New York, pp. 102–129.
31. Wolff, C.: 1963, *Preliminary Discourse on Philosophy in General*, R. Blackwell (trans.), Bobbs-Merrill, Indianapolis.
32. Wood, A.: 1993, 'Hegel's Ethics', in F.C. Beiser (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Hegel*, Cambridge University Press, New York, pp. 211–233.

STEPHEN BUNGAY

2. The Hegelian Project

Nobody knows for sure what Hegel's project was, but nobody can discuss him without having an opinion on the matter. The purpose of this essay is to form one. No attempt will be made to say whether his execution of the project is successful, and to that extent it will be uncritical. It assumes that Hegel's thought was coherent, and tries to find a way in which it makes sense, for the simple reason that finding a way in which it makes nonsense will always succeed, and is therefore pointless. This essay will entertain Hegel's conception of philosophy. To entertain a person is to invite him into one's own home, offer him some nourishment and engage him in polite conversation. To entertain a thought is to invite it into one's own conceptual world by explaining its terms, to nourish it with the willingness to find the strongest possible reading, and to ask it questions it recognizes to be genuine. The best point to take in order to break into the circle of circles is probably Hegel's own final exposition of the matter, the introduction to the third edition of the *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften* of 1830.

I. THE OBJECT OF PHILOSOPHY

Hegel opens his exposition by saying that the object of philosophy is Truth, an object it shares with religion, to the extent that religion conceives of God as Truth (*Encyclopedia*, §1). He continues by saying that philosophy can and *must* assume some prior acquaintance with its object, an acquaintance he later equates with the immediate experience of consciousness (*Encyclopedia*, §§6 and 12), if only because the mind forms representations (*Vorstellungen*) of objects before it has concepts (*Begriffe*). If the picturing thought of representation is adequate for immediate experience, philosophy has a more rigorous commitment to rationality, for it must show the necessity of its objects, prove them, give reasons for what it claims (§1). Philosophy is then characterized as a form of reflection upon the objects of our acquaintance (*Encyclopedia*, §2), so as to reproduce their content in a new form, putting thoughts, categories, or, more precisely, *concepts* in the place of representa-

H.T. Engelhardt, Jr. and T. Pinkard (eds.), Hegel Reconsidered, 19–42.
© 1994 *Kluwer Academic Publishers.*

tions (*Encyclopedia*, §3). This means that philosophy will not tell us anything we did not already know, like a new fact about the world, but will tell us about what we already know, by subjecting our knowledge to an examination. Philosophy will be an inquiry into our knowledge itself, in the double sense of 'knowledge': *what we know*, and *our knowing*, the former only being available through the latter. Philosophy will conduct its reflection through an alteration of form. The new form will be that of concepts rather than representations, and as he develops this notion, Hegel stops talking about '*Begriffe*' and starts talking about '*der Begriff*', saying that the form of Concept is the form of necessity (*Encyclopedia*, §9). So by 'Concept' he seems to mean pure, non-picturing thought *as such*, as well as particular thoughts.

If the object of philosophy is Truth, it will be achieved by transforming the material of philosophy, the representations of common experience, into concepts, by giving them the form of Concept, and showing their necessity. And for this procedure to be possible at all implies something which Hegel took more seriously, and put into practice more radically than anybody else. It implies that philosophy must form a system.

II. SYSTEMATICITY

It is, perhaps, the word 'system' which more than any other conjures up the pathetic hubris of German Idealism, the professor in his night-cap stuffing up the holes in creation.[1] In fact, what is systematized is not the world, but our knowledge of the world; not reality, but thought. Creating a system is largely a matter of bringing one's thoughts together and at one point Hegel actually says that a failure to understand dialectics is a failure to do just that (*Wissenschaft der Logik*, [14], vol. II, p. 496; hereafter abbreviated as *WL*, I or II). The material of philosophy, the representations, will be brought together in a system, so that they are related to, and determined against, each other (*WL* I, p. 46), in order to produce the True, or pure thought, which Hegel also calls 'the Absolute'. He explains the Absolute and its system as follows:

> The science of the Absolute is essentially a system, because only through developing out of itself, bringing and holding itself together in unity, that is, as a *totality*, can truth be made concrete. The freedom of the whole and the necessity of its differences can only be shown through the differentiation and determination of them within a totality (*Encyclopedia*, §14).[2]

The *goal* is the knowledge of the Absolute or Truth through its self-differentiation in the system, which is a totality, not an aggregate (*Encyclopedia*, §16), and the *procedure* is the gathering together and ordering of concepts so as to determine them, in such a way that they are *necessarily* the determinations of the Absolute, and are *all* its determinations. The rationale for the determining of the concepts is simply the relation between them and other concepts, a rationale which is immanent to the system, and is neither governed by, nor makes reference to, anything beyond itself. The only guarantor of Truth is systematicity itself:

> Trying to do philosophy without a system will never produce anything scientific. In fact, as unsystematic philosophizing is more a matter of subjective perceptions, it would contain much which is arbitrary. Any content can only be justified as a moment of the whole. Outside of the system it would be an ungrounded presupposition or scientific certainty . . . It is often erroneously supposed that a system implies the philosophy of a particular, limited principle. It is on the contrary the principle of true philosophy to contain all particular principles within itself (*Encyclopedia*, §14).

Systematicity is not just an element in philosophical method, it actually constitutes it, it is its rationality. If you have brought your thoughts together in a system, it means that thought X may be incompatible with thought Y, or may imply Z. It commits you to giving reasons for what you say, to relating your thoughts and explaining why you say X and not Y. If one were to relinquish systematicity altogether, one could have loose ends, assumptions and incompatible claims. Many, perhaps most, philosophers have been systematic thinkers for those reasons. But only Hegel has made do with systematics alone.

It has been far more usual to suggest that if philosophy is to have any truth, it must derive that truth from a first principle. Fichte claimed to guarantee the truth of the propositions of his *Wissenschaftslehre* by deriving them from the principle of identity; Spinoza based his system on axioms and definitions; Hume found it indubitable that our ideas originate in experience, and Descartes appealed to the certainty of the 'cogito'. Hegel abandons the quest for certainty as subjective (i.e., in this case, psychological), and seeks to eliminate the arbitrariness of any foundational principle or presupposition. All principles are within the system.

This being so, whatever it is that brings the principles together cannot itself be a principle in the sense of a tenet, a truth presupposed as self-evident. The principle of the system itself (and Hegel refers to it as a principle – see *Encyclopedia*, §81 and *WL* I, pp. 52 & 56) can only be that in virtue of which the principles relate to each other, i.e., method. Method is not a presupposition, but a result.

III. RECONSTRUCTION

It is the method of philosophy which distinguishes it both from the purely a priori science of mathematics (*WL* I, p. 35) and the empirical sciences (*Encyclopedia*, §246). It is the process of transforming picturing thought into pure conceptual thought, a process Hegel calls '*Nachbildung*' (*Encyclopedia*,

§12) or '*Rekonstruktion*' (*WL* I, p. 19).[3] Philosophical reconstruction involves giving an account of the empirical in a priori terms. It involves the translation of the content of a representation (*Vorstellung*) into the form of Concept (*Begriff*), eliminating the picturing element.[4]

To refer to '*Vorstellung*' as 'representation' or 'picturing thought' is vague, but not wrong. It does imply thinking in images, as the account in the *Philosophy of Spirit* (*Encyclopedia*, §§451–464) shows. The central point is that the content of a '*Vorstellung*' is in principle separable from the thought involved. It is thought directed towards an object, and is thus characteristic of an act of consciousness, and the opposition of consciousness and its object. Hegel uses the word '*Vorstellung*' in two main ways. In one sense it designates general concepts which refer to empirical objects or particulars, e.g. 'rose', 'cow'. There is nothing wrong with them, and they cannot be reconstructed. In the other sense, it designates a vague picture, an idea or intuition, of a potentially pure concept. For example, we all have some idea of what a limit is, but if called upon to explain it we may well resort to a picture of, say, a line dividing two areas, or the edge of something. But a limit is not itself an object like a rose or a cow, it is something which can only be thought – it is a category with which we make the world comprehensible to ourselves. Hegel wishes to think such categories, purely as they are in themselves.

The difference between representations and concepts is that concepts do not involve reference to particular entities. A concept is a determination of thought, with which thought can understand reality. To have a representation is to make the claim: "There is such a thing." To have a concept is to make the claim: "This is how we have to think." Hegel's aim is to reconstruct all those concepts capable of reconstruction, that is, all those which are necessary for the self-understanding of thought. They are peculiar in that they are not open to empirical verification. For example, it makes no sense to ask: "Is there really identity?" as if one were asking: "Are there really cows in that field?", because there is no such *thing* as identity. It is not appropriate to think of identity in terms of the opposition of consciousness, for the question is whether we are justified in thinking in terms of identity. If we can think in terms of identity, *there is* identity. It is a question concerning our conceptual framework, and once the question has been resolved for thought, it makes no sense to look at the world and ask: "Yes, but is it really there?" This is why the system is the reconstruction of the Absolute: it reconstructs those concepts which, like identity, do not have something beyond them to which they refer. They encompass otherness simply through being themselves, they fit reality if they are justified as thought; there is nothing outside them, their validity is absolute. It is for philosophy to check their credentials as determinations of thought (*Denkbestimmung* – Hegel's usual term). We must ask whether they are true concepts, not whether they are real things.

Reconstruction can be understood as consisting of two steps. The first step is the purely immanent deduction of a position within the system. Because concept X takes up this position, Y must take up that position, and this must be justified in terms of what comes before and what comes after them. The relation of X and Y implies something further, a gap, a position to be filled. A position has been determined systematically, and that means a priori, without reference to extra-systemic considerations. The second step is the *naming* of the position, the baptizing of it with the representation which fits, and which thereby loses its character as a representation, *precisely because it has been determined systematically and only systematically*. If you wish to know what the concept is, you can only be referred to other concepts it excludes or is related to, i.e., to the system. The rationale of the system is a priori, but it is making claims about a body of empirical discourse.

It is vital to an understanding of Hegel's project to see that his philosophy is meta-theory, the input of which is not reality, but language, the language of '*Vorstellungen*'. Being a form of translation, reconstruction is only possible from one language to another. The philosopher needs ordinary language to provide him with the general ideas he polishes into precise determinations of thought, but he also needs it as a source of inexplicit categories. Thus, Hegel writes, even a simple sentence like: "This leaf is green" contains categories such as Being, Singularity (*Encyclopedia*, §3). Philosophy is second-level reflection on first-level discourse which has reality as its object. There is reality, thought and discourse about reality, and the reflection of philosophical discourse on that. So philosophy is not thinking about reality, but thinking about what it is to think about reality.

It follows that the choice of name for a position is not arbitrary, but an essential step whereby philosophy makes specific claims about its object-language, and the relationship of the object-language to reality. In discussing the problem of naming, Hegel defends the right of the philosopher to use terms which approximate in their normal sense to the sense he requires (*WL* II, p. 357), and he also occasionally addresses himself directly to the task of justifying his usage (e.g. *WL* I, p. 147; *WL* II, pp. 219–220). Hegel is operating within the gap between name and meaning in order to make them more precise, and affirm their identity. This means that there is an irreducible hermeneutic element in his procedure, and that it is legitimate to challenge his interpretation of the systemic position. For example, he interprets the position 'Concept' as 'subjectivity' and 'freedom', and is thereby claiming to have said what subjectivity and freedom are. We could grant him his use of 'Concept' as a technical term, but refuse to admit that it makes sense to understand subjectivity or freedom in the way he claims, as a sort of self-relation. Or we may wish to take the line that it works as an understanding of one, but not the other. This is to suggest how one form of piecemeal criticism of the system is possible.[5]

To read Hegel in the way suggested is to defend him against the familiar criticisms that he transgresses the bounds of sense delimited by Kant, and that he produces a system which may be internally consistent, but has no relation to reality. He does not claim to have a priori knowledge of things, but a priori knowledge of thought about things: there are no entities corresponding to the determinations of pure thought.[6] And similarly, a reconstructive system is as related to its object-language as much as any translation is related to the original text. Nor is Hegel one of those idealists who believe that the world has sprung from our minds; he just investigates that small area of thought which is constitutive of reality, in which to think of something in terms of such and such (e.g. identity and difference) is for something to be such and such. He is thus addressing the problem which posed itself for Kant (and Aristotle) as the problem of categories.[7] The results are set down in the two versions of the *Logic*, the full, two-volume *Wissenschaft der Logik*, published in 1812 and 1816, and under revision at the time of Hegel's death, and the condensed version forming the first part of the *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences*, published in 1817 and revised in 1827 and 1830. The theory expounded in these two texts could be described as a *theory of determinacy.*

IV. LOGIC

'Determinacy' (*Bestimmtheit*) is that in virtue of which anything is distinct from anything else. A 'determination' (*Bestimmung*) is the determinacy ascribable to something in virtue of which it is what it is, and is not what it is not. We can say what something is, only in so far as it is determinate (*bestimmt*). The task of Logic is to give the determinations of the Absolute, by expounding the system of concepts which constitute the Absolute.

As the absolute system must include all principles, it cannot presuppose any. So Logic must begin by showing what presuppositionlessness might be, and so reflect upon the minimal conditions for its own existence, and, by implication, that of any theory whatsoever. A presuppositionless beginning cannot be such as to be unreliant on anything else, for a reconstructive enterprise needs some input – it must *take for granted* the *Vorstellungen* of its object-language. What it may not do, is to presuppose some logically relevant knowledge claim. A presupposition of Logic could only be in the same dimension as Logic, constitutive of the theory's progression, so as to be a potential posit of Logic itself. It could not be, for example, psychological or existential. The beginning of Logic is that particular beginning which must do without any presupposition.[8]

This beginning can be arrived at and determined in three ways. The first way is to take up the result of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* (*WL* I, pp. 29–30 & 42–3). The *Phenomenology*, published in 1807, is the science of *appearing* knowledge, and is thus distinct from Logic.[9] It gives an account of all the logically possible relationships between consciousness and its object, and Phenomenology comes to an end when that relationship is eliminated, as it is in the final chapter ([15], pp. 561–2). This final form of knowing, called 'absolute knowledge', is the form which deprives itself of the conditions under which knowledge of an object is possible at all. Consciousness has achieved complete identity with its object, leaving just an indeterminate self-relation, which is why it is called 'absolute' – it is without reference to what it is not. A relation of self-reference is not mediated. So the result of the *Phenomenology* is indeterminate and immediate, and Hegel suggests that indeterminate immediacy is the determinacy of pure Being (*das reine Sein*).

The second way would not justify the position of Logic as a result of an antecedent science. It would simply involve assuming that one wished to consider thought as such, and begin with what is irreducibly simple – pure immediacy or Being (*WL* I, p. 54). The third way would be to consider the concept of beginning, or rather, reconstruct the *Vorstellung* of beginning as a concept. This would give the unity of Being and Nothingness (*WL* I, pp. 58–9).

Hegel thus begins by reconstructing pure Being as indeterminate immediacy, which means: 'indeterminate immediacy' is the determinacy of pure Being, and 'pure Being' is the determination of indeterminate immediacy. 'Immediacy' is equivalent in Hegel's usage to 'self-reference', so by calling Being pure self-reference (*reine Beziehung auf sich*), he means that there is no reference to anything other than itself, i.e., it stands in no relation to anything [33]. It is pure affirmativity, without any further determinacy, without any difference. It is pure self-identity about which nothing can be said. In fact it is indistinguishable from Nothingness, the very category it is not. Thus in order to be what it is, it must exclude what it is not. But if it refers to what it is not by excluding it, it is mediating itself. Being has the same determinacy as what it excludes, Nothingness, but their identity is a mediation which is itself immediate – the disappearance of one into the other (*WL* I, p. 67). Hegel calls this unstable unity 'Becoming'. The result of the self-mediation of Becoming is the stable category of '*Dasein*', determinate Being. With this, Hegel has reconstructed the genesis of determinacy by going back behind it to its zero case.

The *Logic* proceeds by setting up all the categories which are further implied through standing in relations of exclusion or inclusion to one another. Hegel takes up the next level of determinacy, determinate Being, and determines it as '*Dasein*' or quality (i.e., he has reconstructed 'quality'). He then argues that determinacy must be understood as the mutual reference between the two sides of a difference which exclude each other, and calls them 'Something' and 'Other' (*WL* I, pp. 96–116). They are contrasting determinations of the same determinacy, and form a complete disjunction, excluding each other completely (as did Being and Nothingness) precisely because they are the same determinacy. Determinations which exclude each other through having the same determinacy are contradictory (*WL* II, p. 49), and are called *dialectical* (*Encyclopedia*, §§80–81). They can be said to stand in *negative unity*. Their *affirmative unity* is that concept which includes them as the moments of a more limited determinacy, and is called *speculative* (*Encyclopedia*, §82). The result is the mapping of determinations according to how determinate or limited they are, through *limitative contrast*.[10] The *Logic* moves from the simple or indeterminate to the complex (Hegel usually says 'concrete') or determinate, i.e., from determinations which do not exclude much to determinations which do. The word 'determinacy' designates the level of exclusion on which the categories operate, that is, the level of their limits. Therefore, earlier, less determinate determinacies are included in the later ones as their *moments*, in which case they are described as being *sublated* (*aufgehoben*) in them (*WL* I, pp. 93–95).[11] Reconstruction is total when a stable, non-dialectical determination is reached. Such a determination must constitute itself by encompassing what is other than itself, and have fully determinate limits. This category Hegel calls 'Idea'. At every stage, the earlier stages can be understood in terms of the one just reached, so at the end of the process the whole implementing procedure can be understood as a unitary one. The Idea of the Idea, the Absolute Idea, is method itself. At the end, the way in which concepts refer to each other can be seen as regular, a regularity described as 'negation', and as a unitary progression towards the Absolute, and can therefore be called the movement of Concept itself (*WL* II, p. 486).[12] The *Logic* just *is* an account of method.[13]

It is important to have some conception of the main differences between the three areas of Logic, constituting the three basic forms of negation, i.e., three ways in which concepts relate to each other. They are the *Logic of Being*, the *Logic of Essence* and the *Logic of Concept*. Hegel furthermore brackets the *Logic of Being* and the *Logic of Essence* together as the *Objective Logic*, and calls *Concept* the *Subjective Logic*. This is because *Being* and *Essence* reconstruct the traditional categories of ontology and metaphysics, and *Concept* is supposed to provide a model for the explanation of subjectivity, and uses the concepts of formal logic (*WL* I, pp. 46–7).[14] Hegel's technical terms for the mode of negation in each of these three areas of Logic are: *transition* (*Übergehen*), *reflection* (*Scheinen in Anderes*) and *development* (*Entwicklung*) (*Encyclopedia*, §161).

In the *Logic of Being*, progression from one determination to another is by transition. It is a process of immediate reference to each other on the part of categories which are relatively indifferent, because they are relatively indeterminate. Take the example of Something and Other with which Hegel works out the notion of determinacy as quality. Other is just 'not-Something', it is the determination standing in contrast with Something. But it is itself a Something, because its limit is the same. This negative reference of categories to each other is their determinacy. Now although any Something has its Other, it is not constituted by it, but indifferent to it, that is, it is not constituted through standing in some determinate relationship to it. The Other is indeterminate, and the mode of reference is also indeterminate – it is just *contrastive*.

The *Logic of Being* progresses by wearing away this indifference between its contrasting categories, the mode of reference between them becoming ever more mediated, which is to say: ever more determinate. At the end of the discussion of Measure, the Logic of transition ends, and we move into

Essence, which introduces the category of '*Schein*.'[15] If this move is to be coherent, two conditions must be fulfilled: as the successor to the *Logic of Being*, the *Logic of Essence* must include everything in it, so that no determinacy is left out; and at the same time, it must be distinct from *Being*. *Essence* is what it is by virtue of the fact that it is the result of *Being*, and so mediated by *Being*; and is other than *Being*, the point at which *Being* comes to an end, i.e., its negation. *Essence* is thus related to *Being* through negation. For *Essence* to get going, this negation must itself be negated, or the ties to *Being* will not be broken. This second negation is a negation of negation (absolute negation). Negation thus refers to itself. Self-reference is immediacy, or Being, so Being appears in *Essence* as a moment of it, in the form of absolute negation. As a moment of *Essence* which is its negation, Being is called '*Schein*'. The other moment of *Essence* is that novelty in virtue of which Being has become '*Schein*', the novelty of *Essence* itself. So throughout the *Logic of Essence*, Hegel is working with each of the moments '*Schein*' and '*Essence*', and the two together. This is where the difference in logic is apparent. The categories of *Essence* are not indifferent to one another, but stand in a determinate relation – they determine each other. Other is not what it is not, by virtue of its not being Something; but '*Schein*' is what it is, by virtue of its not being Essence. Essence determines, or posits '*Schein*', and the relation through which they constitute themselves is called 'reflection' or '*Scheinen in Anderes*'. Essence only is Essence in and through its '*Scheinen*' in '*Schein*', and '*Schein*' only is '*Schein*' in and through its '*Scheinen*' in Essence. The *Logic of Essence* is sustained by the difference of each of the moments, and the identity of each with their relation, and *Essence* ends when its moments become identical, and the two-tiered positing of difference is eliminated.

A familiar example may be useful here. The traditional problem of thing and property is dealt with in the *Logic of Essence* (*WL* II, pp. 105–122). 'Thing' and 'property' are different determinations of the same determinacy. But a thing only is what it is because it is a unity of properties, and properties only are what they are because they are moments of a thing. Both thing and property constitute each other – they are what they are only through the relation they have to each other. They both exhaust their determinacy, for there can be no property which is not the property of a thing, and no thing which is without properties; but they stand in contrast with one another, as each other's negation.[16]

In the *Logic of Concept*, the moments are not just identical with the whole structure of which they form part, as in *Essence*; they are the identical determination. The identity of moments in *Essence* is formal, whereas in *Concept* the identity is one of content. Concept is a categorial structure which is fully determined in itself, without reference to what it is not, because its moments are determinate, so on reaching Concept the indifference characteristic of the earlier categories has been fully eliminated, and all that remains to be seen is the *development* of the structure until the relations between its moments are fully determinate themselves. To call the *Logic of Concept* a logic of development is to imply that the subject remains the same; that nothing new or external enters into consideration (or one would have to speak of 'transformation') even in its structure (or one would have to speak of 'alteration'); and that the changes which do occur affect the whole ([9], esp. pp. 136–137).

The move from *Essence* to *Concept* consists in the relation between the two moments of *Essence* becoming fully determinate, so that the relation itself has the status of a moment in *Concept*, giving Concept three moments in all; universality, particularity and individuality (see *WL* II, pp. 242–3). Concept is *universal* because it is an internal self-relation, a self-relation which is unaffected by anything external or by context. But that universality must show itself to be determinate, and to the extent that it does this, Concept is *particular* and external. As a realization of the universal through the particular, Concept is *individual* and irreducible. With this, Hegel claims to have given the determination of Thought, or subjectivity. To be a (human) subject is something universal, for it consists in a formal property: to relate to oneself, i.e., to reflect. In order to be real, this universal quality of self-consciousness must limit itself to a particular context, in other words, it must be determinate with respect to space and time. As a concrete instance, it is individual. And this, the telos of Logic, the realization of Concept, Hegel calls 'Idea', the correspondence of Concept and reality (*WL* II, p. 409).

Logic concludes with an account of determinateness (*Bestimmtsein*), which is the logical term for individuality, i.e., what individuality is for pure Thought. It is able to understand itself in its own terms, and grasp its own Concept at the end: *Being* is universal, *Essence* is particular and *Concept* is individual. The final chapter is the realization of the Concept of Logic through a self-reflection on method. But Logic is a formal, and therefore universal consideration of individuality. Individuality has the structure of Concept, so a universal account of it must be incomplete: it must be particular and individual too. Indeed, the system does not end with the end of the *Logic*. It is followed by a *Philosophy of Nature* and a *Philosophy of Spirit*, which then form a complete system by considering all avatars of Concept as particular and as individual (*Encyclopedia*, §247, *Zusatz*). We must now consider how this is possible.

V. THE SYSTEM OF THE ENCYCLOPEDIA

Having struggled through nearly nine hundred pages to reach it, Hegel understandably allows himself some immodest remarks about the Absolute Idea,[17] and continues:

> It is the sole subject matter and content of philosophy. Since it contains *all* determinateness within it, and its essential nature is to return to itself through its self-determination or particularization, it has various shapes, and the business of philosophy is to recognize it in these. Nature and spirit

> are in general different modes of presenting its *existence* (*Dasein*), art and religion its different modes of apprehending itself and giving itself an adequate existence (*WL*, II, p. 484; the translation is from A.V. Miller's *Hegel's Science of Logic*, [17], p. 824).

The absolute Idea is the realization of systematic speculative method, so philosophy will be uniquely concerned with this. As particularity is one of its own moments, it must appear in determinate forms, in Nature and in Spirit. Whatever the material of philosophy may be, its object will be the Idea, and it apparently shares this object with art and religion. This passage is describing the relationship between Logic and the other two philosophical sciences, known collectively as '*Realphilosophie*', and despite its central importance, this relationship is very obscure. If any light is to be shed on it, it must be seen in the context of the whole system, which presents not one problem, but three: Hegel must argue for the *unity* of the whole system, the *duality* of Logic and '*Realphilosophie*', and the *triplicity* of Logic-Nature-Spirit. Clearly, these divisions can only be coherent if they are maintained with respect to different things. I would suggest the following:

- *unity* is with respect to *theory-type*
- *duality* is with respect to the presentation of *method*
- *triplicity* is with respect to the presentation of *individuality*.

Unity and triplicity are the least complex issues. The system is unitary because it is all a second-level reconstruction of thought about reality in speculative categorial terms. It is a priori systematics, committed to giving explanation about how we think. The system's triplicity is a demand of Concept-structure. Logic gives a *universal* account of individuality by giving its formal structure (determinateness); Nature gives an account of individuality as determined through a *particular* context, as spatio-temporally different; Spirit gives an account of individuality as *individual*, as realizations of the universal in the particular. If particularity is the universal as determined (i.e., posited), then individuality is determinate particularity: it shows not just *any* particular context, but *this* one or *that* one.

The most difficult issue is the duality of Logic and '*Realphilosophie*'. Logic is not simply an instrument which can be applied to other regions (*WL* II, pp. 355–6). Those regions, or the objects in them which are considered by philosophy, must be seen in and of themselves to have the structure developed in Logic, they must be forms or manifestations of the Idea. Logic, Hegel writes, might also be called a form, but this would be misleading because it implies a particular manifestation of the Idea, whereas Logic is universal. He continues:

> The logical Idea is the Idea itself in its pure essence, the Idea in simple identity with its Concept before its reflection (*Scheinen*) in the determinancy of a form. (*WL* II, p. 485; [17], p. 825.)

This suggests that although the objects of '*Realphilosophie*' must be manifestations of method, only Logic is an *exposition* of method as it is in itself. It is, as it were, thought thinking about what it is to think at all, whereas Nature and Spirit will consider what it is to think about particular things. The use of the term '*Scheinen*' is interesting, for it suggests that the relationship of philosophy to its objects will be one of Essence – philosophy will work out what is essential about its objects, what constitutes their identity. One could make the significance of this duality in the system more concrete by outlining five aspects of it.

1) Terms used in '*Realphilosophie*' are determined in Logic. Only in Logic does Hegel provide binding accounts of the meaning of his conceptual apparatus.

2) '*Realphilosophie*' is dual reconstruction, because it reconstructs its objects in terms of Concept, and this is itself something which has been reconstructed – in Logic. '*Realphilosophie*' takes up the result of Logic as a given, and operates exclusively on the level of Concept. Logic has in this respect too a certain primacy, because the philosopher must know what Concept or Idea is, in order to be able to recognize it in its various manifestations.

3) '*Realphilosophie*' is overdetermined with respect to method, whilst still being a manifestation of it. Hegel's claim to be able to understand the non-logical in terms of Logic rests upon his being able to understand those non-logical regions using sets of relations determined in Logic. The rationale for this is an argument of the type: 'A is to B as X is to Y'. The identity between Logic and '*Realphilosophie*' is an identity between relations, and the difference is that Logic shows only those relations, whereas '*Realphilosophie*' shows much else besides.[18]

An illustration of this could be provided by any part of Nature or Spirit, but perhaps the most familiar would be the *Philosophy of Right*, which is simply an expanded version of *Objective Spirit* in the *Philosophy of Spirit*. One could say first of all that the division of the *Philosophy of Right* into the three areas of *Abstract Right*, *Morality* and *Ethical Life* is not a harmless ordering of material, but already constitutes a claim, and corresponds to the division of Logic into Being, Essence and Concept.[19] Hegel is claiming that there are three fundamental ways of understanding the realm of practical relations between free agents, or what Kant would have called the realm of *practical reason*, and that the *Logic* provides the rationale for that understanding. As the *Logic* expounds the Idea as such, and gives all its determinations through its system, then it must have given the structure of the Idea of practical reason too. The Logic of relations is given, so reconstruction just has to *implement* the explanation. The logic of abstract legality is a contrastive logic of Being. The legal person stands in no relation to any other, he is simply referred to his other through property. It is the logic of Something and Other. Legal persons are indifferent to one another, and indeterminate – they could be anyone. Legality is operative at the level of persons and is universal, regardless of any further particular features of the persons: all are equal before the law. Moral action, however, is understood in terms of Essence. What is held to be right or wrong is particular, and alters with context. It is above all dependent upon the intention of the agent, which is essential, and its relation to the action, which the agent determines. To regard an action morally is to regard it as determined by a relation to an intention (intention corresponding to Essence, and action to '*Schein*'). Finally, in the sphere of Ethical Life, the agent is regarded as a totality of three moments: as the member of a family (universal), as a member of civil society (particular) and as a political citizen (individual). As telos, Ethical Life is the Concept of Objective Spirit.

The *Philosophy of Right* is thus a manifestation of method. If one wished to understand the Logic of Being, one could be referred to the nature of legal subjects. If one wished to understand Essence, one could be referred to the relationship between the intention of an agent and his action. It is important to notice two things: firstly, that the 'correspondence' is exact and strict, not a mere analogy, because it rests on *identical relations*. Essence is to '*Schein*' as intention is to action. Similarly, Being is to Essence is to Concept as Abstract Right is to Morality is to Ethical Life. This is how Logic acts as a set of principles which are instantiated in '*Realphilosophie*'. The *Philosophy of Right* exemplifies a set of relations, it does not expound them. But, secondly, there *is* mere analogy between the *relata* of these exact relations, and it is distant because the terms of *Objective Spirit* are far more determinate than those of Logic. If one just looks at the terms alone, it is hard to see any correspondence whatsoever, which is why the whole issue of '*Realphilosophie*' and Logic has remained so mysterious. What is there in common between Being and legality, or between Essence and intentions? A comparison will show nothing – only the logic of their relations is the same, if Hegel is correct. Terms like 'legality' or 'intention' are much more specific than 'Being' or 'Essence' – they have a lot more *in* them and a lot less *under* them; their meaning is more concrete, their scope is narrower: they are more determinate, and therefore overdetermined with respect to method. It follows that mapping Logic onto '*Realphilosophie*' works only in the one direction. Logic cannot be read in terms of '*Realphilosophie*', for to do so would be to interpret it in terms of things which are not there.[20]

4) Logic is universal because it is formal, i.e., it deals with structures or sets of relations. This being so, it deals with its object in a manner which is *indifferent to space and time*. The categories of Logic are spatio-temporally indeterminate. Logic begins where the science of appearing knowledge, Phenomenology, ends, and it ends with the elimination of time (*Phänomenologie des Geistes*, p. 558). Logic itself ends when space and time are brought back into consideration at the beginning of the *Philosophy of Nature* (*Encyclopedia*, §§254–259), so a further distinction between Logic and *Realphilosophie* is the relevance of spatio-temporality. The relevance of space and time is a matter pertaining solely to the manner in which categories are considered, not to the nature of the categories themselves. For example, the *Logic of Essence* contains discussions of thing and property, causality, and

other categories which are *only* open to spatio-temporal instantiation. But what is said about them in Logic is valid (or invalid) at any place at any time.[21] Thus, if Hegel is right, it should be inconceivable that one day somebody somewhere should discover a property which is not the property of any thing, or a thing without properties, a view which is at least not obviously wrong.

The question remains of how to get from Logic to Nature, and this transition has been the object of criticism ever since Schelling's attack in his lectures on Hegel held in Munich in 1827.[22] Schelling interprets the move as a semi-mythological *creatio ex nihilo*, analogous to God's creation of the world ([32], pp. 223–331). It would make more sense to see the move as analogous to the generation of the second person of the Trinity than the creation of the world ([8], pp. 79–96), but even to do this would be to regress from speculative categorial thought to the picturing thought of '*Vorstellung*', so cannot be intended. Furthermore, it would interpret the inter-systemic links as relations of Essence, whereas they are relations of Concept. Logic does not determine Nature, as Essence determines '*Schein*': Logic is the Concept of method in the moment of universality, and Nature is the Concept of method as particularity.

The move beyond Logic is motivated by the need to consider individuality as particular and individual and not simply as universal (for otherwise the full Concept of individuality is not realized); and the move to *Nature*, rather than anything else, is given by the self-negation of Logic, which Hegel describes in a celebrated phrase, by saying that the Idea "freely releases itself in its absolute self-assurance and resting in itself" ("*sich selbst frei entläßt, ihrer absolut sicher und in sich ruhend*" [*WL* II, p. 505; Miller, p. 843]). This is a self-*negation* because Nature is the Other of Logic: it is the determination of externality, appearance and difference, and Logic ends with internality, ideality and identity. It is a *self*-negation because it is a demand of the Idea itself that it be particular. It is 'resting in itself' ('*in sich ruhend*') because it can retain its identity whilst encompassing Otherness.[23] However, this is not the whole story. Hegel suggests that the move to Nature is still not fully motivated by describing it as a resolve (*Entschluß*) (*WL* II, p. 506), and at the end of the *Philosophy of Spirit*, he uses his doctrine of syllogisms, which are designed to determine the relationships between the three moments of Concept, to juggle with the three parts of the system (*Encyclopedia*, §§575–577). The unexpected result is that the optimal arrangement seems to be Spirit-Logic-Nature, rather than Logic-Nature-Spirit, which is what we have. This use of the syllogisms has been the object of much speculation,[24] but is still unclear. Only a suggestion can be made here. It is that it is methodologically desirable to start with the most simple and work up to the most complex, which is what Hegel actually does; but that this leaves an element of decision about the transitions, an element which would be eliminated by adopting the order Spirit-Logic-Nature, because the progression would simply be an explication of what had already been presupposed.

5) The final distinction between Logic and '*Realphilosophie*' is that only

Logic provides a justification of method, ending with a self-reflection on systematicity as Truth. The absolute Idea, as the realization of the Concept of Logic, is the determination of Truth, for Logic is an inquiry into Truth. The Idea is the determination of Truth as such, and '*Realphilosophie*' takes that up as given. Given its central role, Hegel's theory of Truth deserves some explicit consideration.

VI. TRUTH

We opened this exposition of Hegel by noting that his philosophy is an inquiry into Truth, which appears to be equated with the Absolute and God. This disconcerting set of identities is typically Hegelian, and it must be pulled apart in order to be understood, and then put back together again, if it can be. In the meantime, we have met the fourth term in the set, which is the key to the others. It is the logical term for Truth: Idea.

> The Idea is the adequate Concept, the objectively *true*, or the *true as such*. If anything has truth, it has it through its Idea, or, *something has truth only in so far as it is Idea* (*WL* II, p. 407; [17], p. 755).

The fundamental meaning of Idea as Truth is given here, and it also reveals a peculiarity. The Idea is "the adequate Concept" ("*der adäquate Begriff*"), that is, the unity of Concept and its object, or the correspondence ('*Übereinstimmung*' or '*Entsprechung*') of Concept and reality (*WL* II, pp. 407–413, *Encyclopedia*, §§213–214). This is the determination of Truth *as such*, it says what Truth is, i.e., it is a theory of Truth. On the other hand, *things* can have Truth if they are Idea, so the Idea is not just a theory, but something real. So there are at least two meanings at work: they are the theoretical determination of Truth as such, which is in the *Logic*; and the realization of this theory to express the truth of *things* in '*Realphilosophie*'. There is also a third, through which these two meanings link up: Truth as Absolute Spirit. Before considering these uses, I should mention a fourth which Hegel excludes: Truth as correct judgment. It is a traditional view that Truth is propositional or judgmental, but Hegel distinguishes the question of valid judgment from that of Truth by calling true judgments 'correct' ('*richtig*') rather than true (*wahr*) (*Encyclopedia*, §§171–172). Judgment is taken to be correct if it corresponds to a state of affairs – one checks up whether things are as the judgment says. In fact, as Kant pointed out,[25] this notion is incoherent, as one does not and cannot compare a judgment with a state of affairs, but can only judge the state of affairs again, and compare the resulting judgment with the first one. Judgments of this kind cannot express Truth, because they are *partial*. For example, the judgment: "The rose is red" may be correct, but it is not the Truth about the rose, for a rose is many other things besides red (see *WL* II, p. 275). Truth means the *whole* Truth – the Truth of something is its determination, and exhausts it. Empirical judgments of perception do not call for great powers of judgment. We only say of someone that they are good judges when they are skilled in performing the far more difficult task of judging objects which must be compared with their Concept, things like works of art (*Encyclopedia*, §171 *Zusatz*. See also *WL* II, pp. 301–2).

Truth has three forms to be distinguished.[26]

1) The *speculative theory of Truth* in Logic, which gives the determination of what it is to be true at all. In this sense, the Idea is the structure of Truth, the correspondence of reality and its concept. Hegel has here combined two traditional notions, the notion of Truth as coherence, and of Truth as correspondence or *adequatio*.[27] The Idea is the realization of Concept, and Concept is the ultimate form of systematicity, i.e., its validity rests upon its systematic coherence. The coherence of a system does not just depend upon its internal consistency (freedom from contradiction) but upon its comprehensiveness, and upon its explanatory force. The Idea goes beyond Concept by affirming the *actuality* of systemic claims. So one could understand a truth claim as combining the claims: "This is a possible way for things to be" (Concept/coherence) *and*: "This is the way things are" (reality/correspondence). The Idea gives the structure of this double claim as the single claim of speculative systematics, for it is at once Truth, true in itself, and the totality of the system, containing all determinacy in itself. The Idea *is* the system in an abbreviated form, and it is the result of an attempt to show that thought can in principle comprehend what there is. Systematicity is therefore the principle underlying the possibility of judgmental truth-difference (the possibility of a judgment being correct or incorrect), for a judgment will only be taken as meaningful if it can be integrated into our system of thought.[28]

2) The Idea as the *structure of truth-adequacy* in '*Realphilosophie*'. I call this 'truth-adequacy' to distinguish it from the familiar notion of truth-difference. Truth-difference is empirical, and is (supposed to be) based on the comparison of *two* dimensions: judgments and states of affairs. The Idea operates within a *single* dimension, comparing thought with thought, the degree to which something corresponds to its Concept. It operates in real areas, so that one can say: "This is a true X", meaning: "This is a realization of the Concept of X". Hegel justifies this sense of Truth by appealing to ordinary usage – for example, when we talk about a 'true friend', we mean a good friend, someone whose behavior corresponds to the concept of friendship (see *Encyclopedia*, §24, *Zusatz* 2 & §213, Zusatz). The term 'truth-adequacy' is important in two respects. Firstly, because the *object* will be *adequate* to the extent to which it corresponds to its Concept. This will mean, for example, that a work of art will be adequate, and have *value* attached to it, to the extent that it realizes the Concept of art. And secondly, because we are here dealing not with the yes-or-no question of whether or not a judgment is correct, but with a question of *degree*. The Idea covers the correspondence *and the non-correspondence* of Concept and reality (see *WL* II, p. 410), so the question of truth-difference (right or wrong, true or false) is replaced with the more

awkward question of the degree of adequacy with which a totality of determinations is realized.

3) Truth and the Absolute are identified with God, or the Divine. This is an identity straddling Logic and '*Realphilosophie*', and linking them through the problematic category of *Absolute Spirit*, the third part of the *Philosophy of Spirit* which is related to *Objective* and *Subjective Spirit* as *Concept* is to *Essence* and *Being* respectively.

We saw right at the beginning of this essay that philosophy shares its object with religion. Hegel's exact formulation is of importance here. Philosophy and religion deal with God, "in that God is Truth and He alone is Truth" (*Encyclopedia*, §1). The *Logic* is therefore, in being an account of the determinations of Truth, also an account of the determinations of God – at least, this is one way of putting it. Again, Hegel's exact expressions are important. Logic, he writes, is an investigation of pure thought, and Truth as it is in itself. He continues: "*It can therefore be said*, that this content is the exposition of God . . ." (*WL* I, p. 31; [17], p. 51, my emphasis). Similarly, when discussing Concept as universal, he adds: "We have called it free power, but it *could also be called* free love and boundless blessedness, for it bears itself towards its other as towards its own self . . ." (*WL* II, pp. 242–3; [17], p. 603, my emphasis). Such passages clearly show that in using theological vocabulary Hegel is explicitly referring to a form of discourse which is not his own (as shown in the terms I have emphasized), in order to make a further claim. He is claiming to have reconstructed as a theory of categories the determination of God used in theology and the onto-theological tradition – he has said what this tradition means by 'God' in his own speculative terms. If God is Truth, then an inquiry into it is an inquiry into His nature, but an inquiry which will understand Him in terms of pure thought, and that means philosophically, not religiously.[29] Hegel claims to have explained what theologians talk about in a way which makes no appeal to the framework of *belief*. Whether they will believe him is another matter, for this is one of his reconstructive claims most open to question. In the above quotation, 'love' is interpreted as the universal constituting itself by encompassing its differences. Whether or not this is so must be left to theologians to decide.[30]

God in the *Logic* is a dubious claim, but God in '*Realphilosophie*' is religious. He is distinguished from the theological one by being the object of belief, and by being, not a category, but an image, a *Vorstellung* (*Encyclopedia*, §565). As can be seen even from the contents of Hegel's *Philosophy of Religion*, which, like other works such as the *Aesthetics* or the *Philosophy of History*, is based on lecture-notes, the understanding of the Divine changes throughout history. So if God is equated with Truth in '*Realphilosophie*', we are obliged to ask: "When, and for whom?" Hegel maintains the equation, and with it produces the very important *historical* sense of 'Truth', meaning: 'what communities at certain times hold to be true'. Truth was expressed for the ancient Egyptians, or Greeks or Romans, by their gods, the principles which they regarded as governing their ethical life. So in

'*Realphilosophie*', Truth means the *seriously held beliefs of societies*, and it is covered in the category of *Absolute Spirit*, which is the category of the historically and socially determinate self-understanding of subjectivity.

The trouble is that Hegel believes that the difference between religious beliefs and speculative knowledge is one of *form*, and that he can translate the *content* of beliefs into conceptual terms. Furthermore, he links up the end of the *Philosophy of Spirit* with the *Logic*, making philosophy the final form of the category of *Absolute Spirit*. In other words, he is claiming that if we think through the various pictures of Truth which make up the historical filling of Absolute Spirit, we will arrive at his Logic. And there is good reason to believe that this constitutes a category error, the confusion of Absolute Spirit and Absolute Idea, the mixing of Logic and '*Realphilosophie*'. For Hegel makes no appeal to the beliefs of any societies in his *Logic*, and he makes no appeal to the validity of the beliefs he describes in the *Philosophy of Religion*. The link between the Absolute Idea and Absolute Spirit remains a mystery, for through it, systematic thought is made to link up with, and fit onto, Hegel's other main theme, the lesser one with which he has usually been identified: history.

VII. HISTORY

It has been Hegel's fate to be regarded by generations as primarily a philosopher of history, partly, perhaps, because of the role history seems to play in Marx, and his evident indebtedness to Hegel,[31] and partly because Hegel sounds so suggestive. It is exciting to imagine the World Spirit grimly pushing Napoleon across the Alps, and it suited the optimistic strand of nineteenth century ideology to fit itself into the march of Historical Reason, and imagine it was being scientific in doing so. The more pessimistic twentieth century has felt disenchanted with such visions, but has tended to accept that they were indeed Hegel's. Poking fun at the lecture cycle on the philosophy of history is easier than understanding it, because it once more only makes sense in its context, in the *Philosophy of Spirit*. I do not wish to discount history. But history is 'placed' in the system, so systematics must come first, for it is only in the system that Hegel says what he thinks history is. It forms the transition from *Objective* to *Absolute Spirit*, and the number of pages Hegel actually published on it is tiny compared to the number devoted to systematics. (They are *Encyclopedia*, §§548–552 & the expanded version in the *Philosophy of Right* §§341–360.)

There are three aspects of Hegel's general treatment of history which should be noted here. They are: the determination of history, the use of historical material in '*Realphilosophie*', and the illegitimate mapping of history onto systematics.

1) History is the temporal dimension to the development of individuality, its principle being what we can call the *principle of non-repetition*.[32] The

goal or end of history is the production of individuals, an end which is a process immanent to history, not a final point lying outside it – the 'end' of history does not mean 'when it stops'! ([16], pp. 74, 114) Hegel is attempting to consider historical relatedness, and works it out with recourse to the categorial distinction between Nature and Spirit, which is fundamental to the whole system, and provides the key to the distinction between natural time and historical time. In nature there is continued repetition, so that its regularities can be formulated as laws by natural science, and predictions can be made. History never repeats itself, because an historical event changes the context of its own possibility. What is historically past is no longer an option for the present age. The content of physics never changes, the content of history always does ([16], p. 19; [28], pp. 30, 171). This means that a product of history will be in some sense unique.

2) Much use is made of historical material in '*Realphilosophie*' in order to fill systemic positions. For example, the *Philosophy of Religion* shows a systemic progression through some ten different historical religions leading to Christianity, which realizes the Concept of religion most adequately. The rationale for this ordering is systemic: the system is supposed to demonstrate progressive concreteness or determinateness, so begins with the most abstract religion (natural religion) and ends with the most determinate (Christianity) ([18], 16 & 17). This use of history relies for its legitimacy on a distinction which Hegel never makes clear, the distinction between 'history' as *the totality of past events* and 'history' as *temporal succession.* The systemic use of history should take it in the first sense and not in the second, but Hegel's practice diverges lamentably from this. Even when he does not obviously have temporal succession in mind, it is often doubtful whether an unequivocal ordering is possible. The placing of Greek religion and Judaism causes Hegel problems, for although the Jewish God is abstract compared to the Christian one, Judaism is monotheistic, which indicates a higher level of reflection than that of the polytheistic Greeks. Against the odds, Judaism comes first, and the Greeks are the next step before Christianity ([18], pp. 46–154). One can only make conjectures about the reasons for this. It may be an expression of Hegel's youthful enthusiasm for the Greeks, or it may be because Judaism is older, and history was allowed to win the day.

3) Systematic thought and historical thought are distinct, so when they are forced to embrace, the results are predictably illegitimate. It is not well-known that Hegel fully recognized this. A passage to this effect from the *Philosophy of Right* is worth quoting in full:

> To consider particular laws as they appear and develop in time is a purely historical task. Similarly, explaining why one follows another by comparing them with existing circumstances is a job for the understanding, which has its rightful place in its own discipline. None of this has any bearing on philosophical reasoning, for derivation from history should not be confused with the development of Concept . . . (*Philosophie des Rechts*, §3).[33]

This is clear enough, and Hegel adds that the difference is very important, which is true. It is made rather more precise in the case of the *Logic*, where Hegel implicitly uses the distinction made above between history as a body of facts and history as temporal succession. He says that the principles of philosophy appear in history in the form of '*accidental* successions' (*Encyclopedia*, §13), and that this development is shown in philosophy itself "freed of that historical externality" (*Encyclopedia*, §14). This externality is that of space and *time*. Logic puts the principles into a different order, a systematic rather than historical one. The reliance on history is no more than the reliance on an object language, on there being '*Vorstellungen*' to reconstruct. It would be nonsensical to read the *Logic* as a history: Leibniz, for example, is the philosopher of '*Fürsichsein*' in the *Logic of Being*, whereas Plato is the thinker of the Idea, right at the end of *Concept*, a complete reversal of historical chronology.

Despite all this, one often meets passages which show that Hegel believed in a parallel between systematic and historical progression, which leads him to map one onto the other, and to talk about necessity in history because it parallels a necessary systematic progression. This is a belief Hegel had, and the only reason he ever gives for it is that the simple usually precedes the complex.[34] In a theory of determinacy, it must; in history it may do. He equates them. This is the bad old Hegel who tried to prove that everything in the world is necessary.[35] We come across him at intervals, but they are fairly widely spaced. The categorial philosopher in between is worth a hearing.

NOTES

1. As in poem LVIII of Heine's *Buch der Lieder*.
2. All translations from the *Encyclopedia* and the *Rechtsphilosophie* are the author's own. I have also taken the liberty of altering, sometimes severely, Miller's translations from the *Science of Logic*.
3. The concept of reconstruction is derived from Klaus Hartmann, [11], [13]
4. Adorno also describes the process as translation in [1], p. 126.
5. Adorno has a radical critique of reconstruction, but it is self-refuting. He asserts ([1], pp. 126 & 131) that the translation cannot account for experience, and that Hegel's latent positivism shows a stubborn insistence on what is, i.e., Hegel moves too far away from experience and concedes too much to it. At the other extreme from the accusation of positivism, Herbert Marcuse claims that Hegel wished to "sweep away" the "influence of common sense" and "the categories of traditional logic" which "perpetuate a false reality" ([26], p. 123). This is more consistent, but ignores Hegel's reliance on the given.
6. A balanced account of Hegel's complex relationship to Kant is given by John E. Smith [34].
7. Klaus Hartmann, indeed, argues throughout his work that Hegel gives an account of 'categorial' thought. That this issue is central has been seen before, though more vaguely, by, for example, Richard Kroner, who understands the *Logic* to be grounding the insight that thought is always more than thought ([25], p. 301).
8. Rüdiger Bubner analyses the beginning of the *Logic* from this point of view in [4]. See also Hegel's examination of the posit and the presupposition in the *Logic of Essence*, *WL* II, pp. 14–18.

9. An analysis of the distinctive nature of the *Phenomenology* is given by Kenley R. Dove in [6].
10. The term is borrowed once more from Klaus Hartmann, [12].
11. One could say that the simpler determinations have the more complex ones of greater specificity *under* them, and the more complex ones have the simpler ones of greater generality *in* them. The term '*Aufhebung*', with its three meanings of 'annul', 'raise higher' and 'preserve', is not the key to Hegel, but a short-hand description of a highly differentiated procedure.
12. Negation is not therefore a 'fundamental operation', as sought by Dieter Henrich [21], [22]. It too is a re-description of speculative procedure in terms of Concept.
13. Although there must be serious doubts as to whether method can be expressed formally, it could be illustrated by a diagram, as a possible aid to understanding.



14. The categories of *Being* correspond to Kant's 'mathematical' categories, and those of *Essence* to his 'dynamic' ones: see *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, B 110. Further remarks on the origins of Hegel's categories can be found in Kroner [25], Vol. II, pp. 435–6. Michael Theunissen has made this division of the *Logic* the starting point of his reading, seeing the role of the *Objective Logic* as '*Kritik*', and understanding the *Subjective Logic* to be a '*Kommunikationstheorie und Theologie*' ([36], pp. 24 & 50). The text is against him, as he admits (ibid., p. 472). *Being* and *Essence* are not *only* critical, and *Concept* does contain criticism (e.g., of Spinoza and Fichte). The unity of the *Logic* is central to Hegel (*WL* I, pp. 42–3), and by reading two utterly different theories into it, Theunissen is unable to say wherein this unity might lie.
15. What follows is indebted to Dieter Henrich's work on *Essence*, especially the second, revised version of his paper "Hegels Logik der Reflexion" [23], pp. 203–324.
16. Difficulties arise if it is not seen that identity is with respect to determinacy (limits). In dealing with Essence in Klaus Düsing criticizes Hegel's method because he fails to give the determination which unites the *meaning* of '*Gleichheit*' and '*Ungleichheit*' ([7], pp. 222–3). There is none: it is precisely with respect to their meaning that they are opposed. Their determinacy is identical – if two things are alike, they must also be unalike, otherwise they would not be alike, but identical.
17. "All else is error, obscurity, opinion, striving, arbitrariness, and transitoriness; the absolute Idea alone is *being*, imperishable *life*, *self-knowing truth*, and is *all truth*" (*WL* II, p, 484; Miller, p. 824). Even this propaganda retains some precision: the Idea is not error but Truth, not opaque but determinate, not opinion but knowledge, not striven for but actual, not arbitrary but necessary, and is indeterminate with respect to space and time, i.e., eternal.
18. A thesis similar to this one is defended by L. Bruno Puntel [30], one of the very few attempts to examine the crucial question of extra-logical systematics. Puntel sees that certain rela-

tions in '*Realphilosophie*' are co-primal ('*gleichursprünglich*') with those in Logic, but he restricts the claim to the *Psychology* and *Phenomenology* in *Subjective Spirit*, which, with Logic, form an '*Elementarstruktur*' or '*Urbestimmtheit*' (pp. 135–6 & 229–30). Puntel's understanding of the co-primacy is that Logic relies on the other two as much as they do on it, and this, I think, is to take things too far, as should be clear from the above.

19. See [5].
20. An example of the disasters which ensue if one does is provided by Theunissen, who would like the *Logic of Concept* to be a theological theory of communications (see [36], p. 26). The problems are:
    1. It is arbitrary. Theunissen chooses the metaphors 'Liebe' and 'Seligkeit' (*WL* II, pp. 242 & 277) and decides they are the key to the work [36], pp. 42–50). Why not choose "Anstrengung des Begriffs" as Adorno does ([1], p. 26)?
    2. It renders most of the text incomprehensible, leaving Theunissen no option but to criticize Hegel when his reading breaks down.
    3. It cannot explain even the *existence* of Logic, for in being reduced to '*Realphilosophie*' it is made superfluous.
21. This notion has proved rebarbative, even to Hegel's friends, such as G. R. G. Mure. However, Mure's unease might be soothed by appeal to the distinction made above, one which he does not make. See [27], pp. 313 & 327–329.
22. F.W.J. Schelling, "Zur Geschichte der Neueren Philosophie" in [32], pp. 196–234. A full discussion and critique of Schelling is given by Klaus Brinkmann, [3], pp. 117–210.
23. This is Hegel's normal usage. Compare, for example, this passage from *WL* II, p. 242; Miller, p. 603: "The universal is therefore *free* power; it is itself and takes its other within its embrace, but without *doing violence* to it; on the contrary, the universal rests in its other, at home with itself (*in demselben ruhig und bei sich selbst*)."
24. Some of the most extravagant of recent years has come from Michael Theunissen in his much-discussed book [35]. The final syllogism of Spirit-Logic-Nature inspires the following: "Mitte ist da die dank ihrer Freiheit sich wissende Vernunft, die sich vom Schein der unfreien Notwendigkeit des Logischen befreit hat, und Voraussetzung ein Geist, dessen zur Tätigkeit der Idee geläuterte Subjektivität vom Absoluten selber mit Freiheit durchdrungen wurde" (sic, p. 313). If this sentence has a sense, it is very un-Hegelian. The *Logic* ends with the opposite of '*Schein*' and '*Unfreiheit*', and the strange activities of the Absolute and its minion Spirit are all Theunissen's inventions.
25. *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, A58/B82 to A62/B86. He calls the dilemma in this account a 'Dialektik'.
26. The following is indebted to [2], pp. 220–224. This account differs in that it ignores the concept of Truth specific to the *Phenomenology* which is Aschenberg's primary concern, and distinguishes Truth in Logic and '*Realphilosophie*', which is our primary concern. This distinction is for explanatory purposes, for the notion of Truth at work is the same in both cases, but raises different questions.
27. For a typological discussion of modern theories of truth, see [30].
28. Puntel argues that the notion of systematic coherence is the most fundamental way of understanding truth [31], pp. 205ff.
29. Hegel's references to theological discourse have given rise to Heidegger's classic misreading "Die Onto-theologische Verfassung der Metaphysik", in [19], pp. 31–67. He reads the *Logic* as an account of God as causa sui or first cause and ultimate ground. The concepts Heidegger uses are ones placed in *Essence*, so they cannot apply to the *Logic* as a whole. Heidegger concludes by saying that a God which is just causa sui cannot be the object of religious worship, confirming the point made above (pp. 64–65).
30. This is one of the passages Theunissen decides is proof of Hegel's theological intentions ([36], pp. 42–50). His work is a perfect example of the reversal of Hegel's understanding of religion and philosophy: Hegel claims to understand religion in philosophy, whereas Theunissen says that Hegel's system needs the events of the New Testament to understand itself ([35], p. 322).

31. The two are notoriously denounced together as historicist prophets by Karl Popper, [29]. Some of Popper's excesses are examined by Walter Kaufmann, [24]. For a more analytic account of Hegel and Marx on history, see [10], pp. 57–61.
32. On the following see [28]. It is particularly gratifying to note that O'Brien places the theme of individuality at the center of his reading, even without recourse to the *Logic*.
33. The belief that Hegel was a historical thinker is so deeply entrenched that confronted with this passage Adorno is incredulous, and forced to explain that "in this passage . . . Hegel is indeed disavowing one of his central intentions" ([1], p. 114).
34. This is why he thinks the mind forms representations before concepts. See *Encyclopedia*, §1 and §552 (*Werke* 10, p. 363).
35. He is in fact the only philosopher to have proved the necessity of contingency, in the section on the modalities in the *Logic of Essence*. A useful examination of the central importance of contingency in Hegel is provided by [20], pp. 157–186.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. Adorno, Th. W.: 1974, 'Skoteinos, oder wie zu lesen sei', in *Drei Studien zu Hegel*, Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt a.M.
2. Aschenberg, R.: 1976, 'Der Wahrheitsbegriff in Hegels "Phänomenologie des Geistes"', in K. Hartmann (ed.), *Die ontologische Option*, Walter de Gruyter, Berlin, pp. 211–304.
3. Brinkmann, K.: 1976, 'Schellings Hegel-Kritik', in K. Hartmann (ed.), *Die Ontologische Option*, Walter de Gruyter, Berlin, pp. 117–210.
4. Bubner, R.: 1978, 'Die "Sache selbst" in Hegels System', in R.-P. Horstmann (ed.), *Dialektik in der Philosophie Hegels*, Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt a.M., pp. 101–123.
5. Dove, K.: 1978, 'Logik und Recht bei Hegel', *Neue Hefte für Philosophie* 17, 89–108.
6. Dove, K.: 1970, 'Hegel's Phenomenological Method', *Review of Metaphysics* 23, No. 4 (June), 615–41.
7. Düsing, Klaus: 1976, *Das Problem der Subjektivität in Hegels Logik*, Bouvier, Bonn.
8. Foster, M.: 1934, 'The Opposition between Hegel and the Philosophy of Empiricism', in B. Wigersma (ed.), *Verhandlungen des III. Hegelkongresses*, Tübingen, pp. 79–96.
9. Fulda, H.F.: 1978, 'Hegels·Dialektik als Begriffsbewegung und Darstellungsweise', in R.-P. Horstmann (ed.), *Dialektik in der Philosophie Hegels*, Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt a.M.
10. Hartmann, Klaus: 1970, *Die Marxsche Theorie*, Walter de Gruyter, Berlin
11. Hartmann, Klaus: 1972, 'Hegel: A Non-Metaphysical View', in Alasdair Macintyre (ed.), *Hegel – A Collection of Essays*, Doubleday Anchor, Garden City, New Jersey, pp. 101–124.
12. Hartmann, Klaus: 1973, 'Zur Neuesten Dialektik-Kritik', *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* 55, 220–242.
13. Hartmann, Klaus: 1976, 'Die Ontologische Option' in K. Hartmann (ed.), *Die Ontologische Option*, Walter de Gruyter, Berlin. pp. 1–31.
14. Hegel, G.W.F.: 1932, *Wissenschaft der Logik*, G. Lasson (ed.), Felix Meiner Verlag, Hamburg.
15. Hegel, G.W.F.: 1952, *Phänomenologie des Geistes*, J. Hoffmeister (ed.), Felix Meiner Verlag, Hamburg.
16. Hegel, G.W.F.: 1955, *Die Vernunft in der Geschichte*, J. Hoffmeister (ed.), Felix Meiner Verlag, Hamburg.
17. Hegel, G.W.F.: 1969, *Hegel's Science of Logic*, A.V. Miller (tr.), Oxford University Press, London.
18. Hegel, G.W.F.: 1970, *Werke in zwanzig Bänden (Theorie Werkausgabe)*, E. Moldenhauer and K.M. Michel (eds.), Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt a.M.
19. Heidegger, M.: 1957, *Identität und Differenz*, G. Neske, Pfullingen.

20. Henrich, D.: 1967, 'Hegels Theorie über den Zufall', in *Hegel im Kontext*, Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt a.M., pp. 157–186.
21. Henrich, D.: 1976, 'Hegels Grundoperation' in Guzzoni *et al.*, *Der Idealismus und seine Gegenwart. Festschrift für Werner Marx zum 65. Geburtstag*, Felix Meiner Verlag, Hamburg, pp. 208–230
22. Henrich, D.: 1978, 'Formen der Negation in Hegels Logik', in R.-P. Horstmann (ed.), *Dialektik in der Philosophie Hegels*, Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt a.M., pp. 213–219.
23. Henrich, D.: 1978, 'Hegels Logik der Reflexion', *Hegel Studien*, Beiheft 18, Bonn, pp. 203–324.
24. Kaufmann, W.: 1972, 'The Hegel Myth and its Method', in Alasdair Macintyre (ed.), *Hegel – A Collection of Essays*, Doubleday Anchor, Garden City, New Jersey, pp. 21–60.
25. Kroner, Richard: 1961, *Von Kant bis Hegel,* J.C.B. Mohr Verlag, Tübingen.
26. Marcuse, H.: 1955, *Reason and Revolution*, Oxford University Press, London.
27. Mure, G.R.G.: 1950, *A Study of Hegel's Logic*, Clarendon Press, Oxford.
28. O'Brien, G.D.: 1975, *Hegel on Reason and History*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
29. Popper, K.: 1945, *The Open Society and its Enemies* (2 vols.), Princeton University Press, Princeton.
30. Puntel, L.B.: 1978 *Wahrheitstheorien in der Neueren Philosophie*, Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, Darmstadt.
31. Puntel, L.B.: 1973, *Darstellung, Methode und Struktur*, Bouvier Verlag, Bonn.
32. Schelling, F.W.J.: 1928, *Werke*, M. Schröter (ed.), Beck, Munich.
33. Schulz-Seitz, R.-E.: 1973, '"Sein" in Hegels Logik: "Einfache Beziehung auf sich"' in H. Fahrenbach (ed.), *Wirklichkeit und Reflexion, Walter Schulz zum 60 Geburtstag*, Pfullingen.
34. Smith, J. E.: 1973, 'Hegel's Critique of Kant', *Review of Metaphysics* 26, No. 3 (March), 438–60.
35. Theunissen, M.: 1970, *Hegels Lehre vom absoluten Geist als theologisch-politischer Traktat*, Walter de Gruyter, Berlin.
36. Theunissen, M.: 1978, *Sein und Schein*, Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt.

TOM ROCKMORE

3. Hegel's Metaphysics, or the Categorial Approach to Knowledge of Experience

The modest aim of this discussion of Hegel's metaphysics is to indicate what the view is and to say something about its interest today. It has been claimed that metaphysics is the main problem in comprehending and evaluating Hegel's theory ([3], p. 3). Yet it has been widely rumored for some time that, if not philosophy, at least metaphysics has now come to the end, or perhaps even the end of the end, which is not to be confused with a new beginning. Certainly, metaphysics has lately been an unpopular theme. In our time, numerous writers from all sides of the discussion have suggested that metaphysics cannot be defended. So it is important to take stock, at least as concerns Hegel, of where things stand, in particular to determine whether, since Hegel is obviously committed to metaphysics, it makes sense to defend anything like a Hegelian view of metaphysics.

I. SOME CLARIFICATION

I will be discussing a metaphysical reading of Hegel. Before doing so, it is necessary to clear away an obstacle in the form of Klaus Hartmann's non-metaphysical interpretation of theory. But before we take up Hegel's theory, we will need to clarify the discussion of metaphysics that has recently combined loose use of terminology with sweeping claims about the end of metaphysics. Hence, it will be useful to begin with some remarks intended to clarify the situation.

The recent discussion about metaphysics has often been confused and inconsistent. Inspired by Heidegger, Derrida's attack on the metaphysics of presence silently presupposes a consistent view of metaphysics ([5], p. 3). This presupposition is violated in the discussion. Derrida bases his view of metaphysics on the later Heidegger. In fact, Heidegger has two, incompatible views of metaphysics early and late. One is the view proposed in *Being and Time* of the good, or authentic metaphysics that emerged in early Greece but was forgotten when later philosophy took a wrong turning in the road, which now needs to be recovered through the destruction of the later history

H.T. Engelhardt, Jr. and T. Pinkard (eds.), Hegel Reconsidered, 43–56.
© 1994 *Kluwer Academic Publishers.*

of ontology. The other is the later view of metaphysics, for instance in the essay "The End of Philosphy and the Task of Thinking" ([15], pp. 55–73), understood in a Kantian sense as a systematic analysis unified under a single idea intended to resolve questions like God, freedom and immortality that Heidegger later sees as equivalent to Western philosophy.

Heidegger's different ways of understanding "metaphysics" point beyond his theory to the different, even incompatible meanings this term has taken on in the history of philosophy. Those who disagree about metaphysics are often talking past each other since they do not have the same thing in mind. To take a recent example, Henrich has attacked Habermas for a possible confusion between the concepts of metaphysics and modernity while suggesting the need to renew metaphysics [18]. Habermas has replied that from the strict perspective of a philosophy of reflection there can be no metaphysics ([9], p. 428).

Habermas is certainly incorrect if he has Hegel in mind. The philosophy of reflection is routinely identified with Hegel who, as we shall see, does have a metaphysics. Yet since Henrich does not pose as a defender of this particular form of metaphysics, it is obvious that the dispute between them is at least in part due to different ways of understanding the meaning of the term. Different views of metaphysics similarly divide the two main critiques of metaphysics in our time, due respectively to the Vienna Circle theorists, particularly Carnap, who distinguish between metaphysics and philosophy, and to Heidegger and Derrida, who identify metaphysics with philosophy. For the former, metaphysics but not philosophy consists in assertions that are ultimately meaningless. Increasingly for Heidegger and consistently for Derrida, it represents the failure of philosophy in all its forms.

Obviously, different thinkers understand "metaphysics" differently. This is not surprising as merely the briefest glance at the history of the philosophical tradition will show. The term seems initially to have been applied by Hellenistic and later commentators to Aristotle's great treatise, although it does not occur in his writings. Metaphysics is often understood as the study of first and last things. In that sense, it is already found in the Eleatic thinkers, particularly Parmenides. As applied to Aristotle, it refers mainly to ontology, or the study of being, including concepts too general to receive treatment in the special sciences, such as causality, substance, potentiality, and actuality.

To understand Hegel's metaphysics, it is important to see the evolution of the term from a theory of being to a theory of knowing, or from ontology to epistemology. Since Aristotle, the term "metaphysics" has frequently been taken to mean first philosophy, especially ontology.[1] But in modern philosophy, the meaning of the term has undergone a sea change. At least since Descartes, and above all since Kant, metaphysics has become closely associated with epistemology, as exemplified in Kant's discussion of the conditions of the possibility of knowledge. Accordingly, the widely reported claim that Kant and the post-Kantians were opposed to metaphysics rests on a misapprehension.[2]

Kant famously credits Hume with waking him from his dogmatic slumber ([20], p. 8). "Dogmatic" here has the sense of "illegitimately assumed", "undemonstrated" or even "indemonstrable". The extent of Kant's direct knowledge of Hume is controversial.[3] Like Hume, Kant was not opposed to metaphysics as such; he was only opposed to bad metaphysics, or in his language metaphysics that was dogmatic or unscientific in failing to prove its assertions. He shared Hume's desire to examine the capacities of the human understanding in order to arrive at true metaphysics ([19], p. 21). We should not forget that the full title of Kant's short treatise, written to correct mistaken impressions of his theory, reads: *Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics that Will Be Able to Appear as Science* [*Prolegomena zu einer jeden künftigen Metaphysik, die als Wissenschaft wird auftreten können*].

II. HARTMANN'S NON-METAPHYSICAL READING

Hegel's view of metaphysics has not often been discussed. A recent survey of the topic simply omits Hegel's name, which surely suggests that his view of metaphysics is unimportant [29]. Obviously, a lack of attention by those committed to other perspectives is less damaging than an attack on Hegel's view by those well versed in it. A serious challenge to a metaphysical reading of Hegel's theory has been proposed in an important paper by Klaus Hartmann, the leading figure in the categorial interpretation of Hegel's theory [10]. Following others, notably Feuerbach and Kroner, Hartmann offers what he calls a non-metaphysical reading of Hegel's thought. He holds that we can provide a categorial and systematic interpretation of Hegel's position which reveals the latter's achievement as a hermeneutic of categories. And he suggests the interest of exploring questions of foundational philosophy in general in the light of a categorial and systematic interpretation.

Hartmann's approach is helpful to situate the present discussion. I think we can endorse his suggestion that Hegel offers us a hermeneutic of categories, as well as the further suggestion that there is much to be learned by exploring the relation of Hegel's thought to the problem of foundationalist philosophy. In my view, Hartmann is correct about Hegel, but unfortunately, certainly non-Hegelian in his choice of terminology. What Hartmann calls "non-metaphysical" should be called "metaphysical" since Hegel's hermeneutic of categories is in fact, from his angle of vision, a metaphysical theory.

When we refer to the Greek tradition, there is no need to distinguish between metaphysics and ontology since this distinction is only drawn later. With respect to Aristotle, these terms are clearly synonymous. Hartmann continues this practice to refer to modern philosophy where it is less clearly appropriate, even inappropriate. Hartmann's non-metaphysical interpretation of Hegel rests on running together metaphysics and ontology. Whereas Hartmann argues for a non-metaphysical interpretation, I will introduce a distinction between metaphysics and ontology in order to argue that Hegel is basically committed to the former. I believe that if Hegel's view can be defended at this late date, it is as a metaphysical but non-ontological categorial system, which I understand as an alternative term for Hegel's science of the experience of consciousness. To put this same point in less Hegelian, and perhaps less Aesopian, language, I think that Hegel's view of metaphysics is still relevant if we understand it, as he himself intended it to be understood, namely as an epistemological theory intended to reach full knowledge of what is given to mind from the vantagepoint of a categorial framework.

III. KANT AND HEGELIAN METAPHYSICS

Hegelian metaphysics has been under discussion for many years, although agreement is lacking about its interest and even its nature. The discussion of Hegel's idea of metaphysics was apparently begun not long after his death by Karl Rosenkranz, his biographer [28].

Hegel comments on metaphysics throughout his corpus, especially in the *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences.* In the *Encyclopedia*, the theme of metaphysics occurs in a number of disparate passages, mainly in the first part of the work, but elsewhere as well. Such passages include a remark on the speculative logic as containing prior logic and metaphysics ([11], vol. VIII, 9, Anmerkung, p. 53), meant to indicate his usual claim for the inclusive nature of his theory; a further, sarcastic remark in the "Philosophy of Nature" where he notes the relation of Newtonian mechanics to what he calls an unsayable metaphysics [mit einer unsaglichen Metaphysik] ([11], Vol. IX, 270, Anmerkung, p. 88), unsayable precisely because for Newton natural science was devoid of metaphysics; and another passage in the same section where, apparently following the Kantian view that empirical natural science leads directly to metaphysics, he mentions the form of metaphysics holding sway in chemistry and physics ([11], Vol. IX, para. 334, Anmerkung, p. 328).

These references suggest that Hegel does not think of metaphysics as an esoteric discipline, confined to a particular form of philosophy. It is rather part of such extra-philosophic regions as the special sciences, for instance, physics and chemistry, whose practictioners engage in metaphysics against their own better judgment, as Molière might have said, without knowing it. This does not, of course, mean that non-philosophical, or even philosophically naive, types of metaphysics are acceptable to Hegel. Before we can discuss what Hegel thinks is at stake in the differences between the various kinds of metaphysics, we need to know how Hegel understands "metaphysics" in general.

Like the rest of his theory, Hegel's view of metaphysics is strongly influenced by Kant's. If the additions [Zusätze] to the book are trustworthy, Hegel's general view of metaphysics is indicated in two passages where he links his view to Kant's and preceding philosophy, and to the theory of knowledge in general. So in the addition to a passage on the *Critique of Pure Reason,* he says that in the old metaphysics it is assumed that when contradictions appear there is a mistake, while in Kant they lie in the nature of thought itself ([11], Vol. VII, para. 48, Zusatz, p. 128). The effect of this statement is to relate Kant's view, regarded as a new form, to earlier forms of metaphysics. And in another passage on the relation of physics and the philosophy of nature, he rejects contemporary metaphysics, according to which we cannot know things, and adds that metaphysics is nothing more than the general thought determinations in which we place everything and through which it is first made comprehensible ([11], Vol. IX, para. 246, Zusatz, p. 20).

The latter statement, if genuine, is important, since Hegel here clearly links metaphysics to the theory of knowledge. In his rejection of scepticism, he signals his belief, hardly surprising for someone who makes claims for absolute knowledge, that knowledge is possible. We remember his criticism of the critical philosophy as a form of scepticism in virtue of its denial of knowledge of the thing-in-itself. Yet although like Fichte before him, Hegel is critical of the very idea of the thing-in-itself, he clearly does not abandon the Kantian goal of a future science of metaphysics. Hegel's intent here is to signal his conviction, despite his criticism of Kant, whose theory falls below its claims, that knowledge is possible as metaphysics. Now Hegel's approach to knowledge is not immediate, or intuitive, but mediate and categorial. In other words, whatever "metaphysics" may mean elsewhere in the philosophical tradition, for Hegel it is nothing other than the categorial framework, or as noted the general thought determinations, through which content is made comprehensible to the mind of the knower.

As such, metaphysics is a central part of the philosophical enterprise understood as Hegel, following the main line philosophical tradition understands it, namely as the pursuit of knowledge and the resolution of the epistemological problem. The relation to Kant's view is clear even if Kant's view of metaphysics is not. The main discussion of metaphysics in his writings, towards the end of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, even in the second edition betrays an inhabitual hesitation, more precisely an inability to come to a decision about this crucial concept in his thought ([12], B869–879).

Suffice it to say that in the critical philosophy "metaphysics" has two main meanings: ontological claims about the nature of ultimate reality itself, which cannot be sustained, and have been implicitly rejected in the recent attention to anti-representationalist theories of knowledge in the writings of Dummett, Rorty, and others; and the science of general concepts valid in the realm of experience ([7], p. 25). In Kant's language, the former is dogmatic but the latter is critical; his own theory can be regarded, as he himself apparently regarded it, as the indispensable preliminary to a rigorous, or scientific, theory of metaphysics as distinguished from that theory which is yet to appear.

Heidegger points out that Kant, like Hegel, relies on Suarez' systematization of Aristotelian metaphysics for a distinction between general and specific metaphysics, or metaphysics in general and the metaphysics of the special sciences ([17], p. 80). On scrutiny, Kant further distinguishes three subspecies of metaphysics, including in the widest sense the systematic unity of pure philosophy, or "all the principles of pure reason that are derived from mere concepts . . . from the theoretical knowledge of all things" ([21], B869–875); followed, more narrowly, by the system of pure philosophy opposed to the critical philosophy ([21], B869); and finally, most narrowly, the division into speculative and practical uses of pure reason in such particular disciplines as the metaphysics of nature, or philosophy of science, the metaphysics of morals or theory of ethics, and the metaphysics of pure reason or theory of knowledge ([21], B869).

IV. HEGEL ON THE POSITIONS OF THOUGHT TO OBJECTIVITY

The widespread influence of Kant on Hegel is particularly apparent in the latter's view of metaphysics. Although Kant influences Hegel's view of metaphysics, there are interesting differences between them. For a careful account, from the Hegelian angle of vision, of the relation of the Kantian and Hegelian ideas of metaphysics, we do well to look to the famous discussion of the "Positions of Thought to Objectivity" (§§19–83). This discussion comes at a strategic point in the *Encyclopedia* immediately after the introduction but immediately before Hegel develops his own alternative theory. It is obvious that Hegel here comes to grips with other theories as a preliminary step to stating his own view.

Hegel's discussion of the positions of thought to objectivity builds on remarks made in the *Phenomenology*. In that work, in the discussion of "The Truth of the Enlightenment" Hegel refers in passing to Cartesian metaphysics ([13], p. 352) and to the metaphysics of pure insight ([13], pp. 353ff.), opposite approaches that reach a higher level in the conception of utility. In the *Encyclopedia*, the discussion builds on this distinction, whose parts form two of the positions to objectivity, which is here supplemented by an additional attitude including empiricism on the one hand and the critical philosophy on the other ([27], ch. IV).

In the analysis of the first attitude, under the heading of metaphysics, Hegel describes pre-Kantian, or prior metaphysics. According to Hegel, who here follows Kant's own assessment of views of knowledge earlier than the critical philosophy, such claims to know were dogmatically asserted, but never critically demonstrated.

Kant consistently emphasizes the double status of the critical philosophy as empirically real as well as transcendentally ideal ([20], pp. 40–41). The second phase of Hegel's discussion, divided into sub-sections, is devoted to empiricism and the critical philosophy. In the section on empiricism, he remarks, in apparent reaction to Newton's celebrated condemnation of hypotheses, that scientific empiricism contains and makes uncritical use of metaphysical categories ([11], Vol. VII, §38, Addition, p. 77). Hegel here follows Kant's view, the basis of his theory of natural science, that the sciences of nature are founded in metaphysics ([22], p. 93). He further takes up a critical stance towards the critical philosophy that he regards as falling short of its own intrinsic standards. After noting that Kant discussed the concepts of the understanding employed in metaphysics, he asserts, silently following Maimon's sceptical reading of Kant,[4] that the critical philosophy ends in skepticism because of the impossibility of knowing the thing-in-itself. Thus, in §44, Hegel says that from the Kantian angle of vision, the categories cannot tell us about things-in-themselves. And in §46 he adds that within the Kantian theory there are only the categories with which to know things-in-themselves. According to Hegel, the critical philosophy also suffers from the inability, characteristic of dualistic systems, to unite what it differentiates. This is merely a recognition of its "analytic" character, adapted to thinking individual objects through the understanding rather than to grasping their interrelation through reason.

Hegel's critique of the critical philosophy is based on strictly epistemological grounds. Kant several times proclaims his intention to find a third way to knowledge between skepticism and dogmatism ([20], §4, p. 21 and §58, pp. 108–109). In turn, judging Kant by his proclaimed intention, Hegel objects that Kant fails to do so, and hence fails to solve the epistemological problem since the examination of the conditions of the possibility of knowledge ends in its impossibility.

A similar conclusion follows from the analysis of the third attitude of thought towards objectivity, or the idea of immediate knowledge associated with Descartes and also perhaps such unnamed thinkers as Schelling, Jacobi, and Schleiermacher. Hegel here considers the concern with thought as the activity of the particular dialectically opposed to what he regards as the abstract subjectivity of the critical philosophy in his objection in principle to the conflation between such activity and truth that reduces reason to immediate knowledge and belief. Once again he is clearly invoking the Kantian critical standard of the demonstration of claims to know, as distinguished from their mere assertion.

Other than by inference from the objections he raises, in the passage on the "Positions of Thought to Objectivity" Hegel does not provide us with a statement of his own positive doctrine. He does, however, furnish several clues as to where the positive statement of his view lies: in a statement in the "Preliminary Conception" where he mentions that logic coincides with metaphysics, we are told that the science of things captured in thought has as its task to state their essential properties ([11], Vol. VIII, para. 24, p. 81); and in a comment in the discussion of essence he says that this, the hardest part of logic, contains above all the categories of metaphysics and science in general ([11], Vol. VIII, §114, Anmerkung, p. 236).

It is clear that Hegel regards his logic as metaphysics, and his metaphysics, not in an Aristotelian or even vaguely Heideggerian way as an ontological theory of what is, or even in Derridean fashion as a theory of presence, but rather as the elaboration of an epistemological, categorial framework for the comprehension of experience as revealed in consciousness. The discussion of essence, which forms the second part of Hegelian logic, treats of the unity of immediacy and mediacy from a categorial perspective, in order to develop Hegel's own rival categorial framework ([11], Vol. VIII, §65, Anmerkung, p. 156).

An attempt to characterize the Hegelian categorial framework would require us to discuss in detail its relation to the conceptual matrices given by Kant and Fichte, to which Hegel is reacting. Here it seems preferable to address three topics concerning the viability of the Hegelian form of metaphysics as epistemology: its relation to the Kantian view of metaphysics, its ability to withstand the criticisms which have been advanced against metaphysics, and its contemporary interest.

We can begin with the claim frequently reiterated in these pages that Hegel generally intends, and hence can fairly be judged by his intention, to bring the revolution begun by the critical philosophy to a close in his own thought. Now clearly Kant's aim is to offer a categorial theory of knowledge that, as he says, begins with experience ([12], B1). Kant objects that Aristotle's theory is a mere rhapsody – from *raptein*, literally to sew or to stitch together – hence dogmatic or uncritical since from Kant's angle of vision Aristotle fails to justify the categories. Everything turns on the justification of the categories, on whether, to vary Kant's repeated objection, his own categorial scheme is not merely another rhapsody. For if metaphysics is understood from an epistemological perspective, then in a categorial approach to knowledge we can regard the metaphysical task as in part concerned with the absolute justification of the categorial framework .

Descartes introduces the standard of absolute certainty or apodicticity into modern theory of knowledge. With respect to the categorial framework, Kant's criticism of Aristotelian practice and his own tortuous but repeated effort to deduce the categories ([21], B91–169) suggest his acceptance of a similar standard. Now it may be that, as has been argued, a successful theoretical deduction of a categorial framework cannot be carried out [23]. If this is the case, then the very idea of a deduction of the categories in either the Kantian or any allied sense is questionable. Kant, who believed that knowledge in the full sense was a priori, naturally sought to justify his categorial framework apart from and prior to experience. Such a justification is absolute, not relative, since it is in no sense dependent on experience. Now perhaps it is not possible to go beyond a relative justification of the categorial framework, not as Kant believed in terms of the conditions of any and all experience, but rather in terms of the utility of various categories to interpret an ever changing field of experience.

If true, then this affects the very idea of systematic philosophy that Kant proposed in the critical philosophy. Kant's idea was widely followed in post-Kantian German idealism. Hegel did not doubt that the categories employed to interpret experience could be justified in some ultimate sense as Kant intended. He doubted rather that Kant had been successful in doing so. In effect, he held that Kant was unsuccessful in carrying out that task that since Aristotle remained unfinished. Beginning with his first philosophical publication, Hegel held that Fichte's contribution was in fact to deduce the categories which Kant merely asserted.[5] The force of this claim is to apply to Kant's position the criticism which he had routinely made of Aristotle, to accuse Kant of proposing another rhapsody. Hegel's system of logic, in particular the discussion of essence ([11], Vol. VIII, §§112–159), is meant by him as an absolutely justified categorial framework, intended, then, to meet the standard set by Kant, which Hegel clearly followed, the same standard that at least since Descartes has been routinely invoked in epistemology in the attempt at knowledge in the full sense.

V. CRITICISM OF HEGELIAN METAPHYSICS

If Hegel had succeeded in his endeavor, he would have presented a seamless categorial web, wholly justified at every point. Now if this is possible, and whatever the status of the Kantian theory, it is clear that Hegel did not fully succeed in this immensely difficult task; he did not present a wholly seamless argument that brings the discussion to a close. I have already argued that Hegelian metaphysics is notable in its insistence on the independence of claims to know from the beginning point and criticized this theory as inadequate to justify claims to know in the full, or traditional, sense. In terms of this characterization, I will now raise several criticisms of the project.

One set of problems arises from the relation of the categorial framework Hegel elaborates in his discussion of logic to its beginning point. These issues posed by the problem of where science must begin are only discussed in detail in the famous chapter in the *Science of Logic* literally called "With what must the beginning of science be made?" This discussion is fraught with consequences for the theory since, in a way which is still not fully understood, the later categories "follow from" or "emerge out of", or are "generated by" those preceding them – all roughly equivalent but equally vague descriptions of Hegel's discussions in both the *Phenomenology* and the *Logic* – so that literally the entire categorial analysis "emerges" from the starting point. The difficulty is that the theory of knowledge is, as noted, necessarily circular; but although Hegel insists that one can literally begin the discussion anywhere, if Hegel did not begin the elaboration of his categorial framework with being, as he certainly realized, he would not have been able to derive the explanatory network he in fact develops as the basis of his interpretation of experience. In a word, there is a tension between the circularity of the process of knowledge, to which Hegel is committed, and which implies, as he knew, that the process can begin anywhere, and his explicit insistence here that a categorial framework can start with no other category than being. Now if, as I believe, Hegel meant to bring the Copernican Revolution in philosophy to a close in his own thought by in fact doing what

Kant ought to have, but failed to do, for instance, by providing an adequate justification of the categorial scheme in his own metaphysics, then we must conclude that Hegel falls short of this goal.

Another set of issues is raised by the recent attacks on metaphysics from the perspectives of the Vienna Circle and Heideggerian ontology. The neo-positivistic critique exemplified in philosophers associated with the Vienna Circle, notably Carnap, Schlick, Neurath and, more distantly, perhaps Popper, aims to deny metaphysics the status of science and, in its most radical form, of meaningfulness.[6] It distinguishes between philosophy and metaphysics that, on one interpretation, is held to be meaningless since it fails to satisfy the empirical criterion of meaning [1].

On the other hand, there is a very different critique, in the writings of the later Heidegger and Derrida, from the perspective of the ontological difference, of metaphysics understood as presence.[7] In Heidegger's early theory, this view was associated with his effort to recover the arguably authentic, early Greek philosophical view of being. In his later writings, he tends to equate metaphysics with philosophy that he rejects for thinking supposedly beyond philosophy. Metaphysics is concerned with presence that shows itself in the effort to think being as a whole and in representational thinking ([15], pp. 55–73). This critique is applied by Derrida to Hegel's theory, [6].

The two views of metaphysics are very different and incompatible. The Vienna Circle attack on metaphysics continues, in the Humean tradition, to reject bad philosophy, not philosophy as such, which it regards as possible in the absence of metaphysics. It understands itself as evading metaphysics, a claim Heidegger later makes about his own theory. In its later stages, say after the famous turning in his thought, the Heideggerian attack on metaphysics is increasingly directed against philosophy itself in all its forms in the name of another view supposedly beyond philosophy.

The objection that metaphysics is meaningless since it fails the empirical criterion of meaning is not specifically raised against Hegel's theory that presents certain analogies with the Vienna Circle view. For instance, Carnap's own research in semantics is clearly related to Hegel's effort to develop a categorial framework for the comprehension of experience. Obviously, Hegel is not affected by criticisms of this kind. Although he was interested in experience as almost no other philosopher since Aristotle, he is not in the business of making empirically verifiable claims, or claims that can be tested empirically in more than the most general way, perhaps not at all.

The line of criticism following from Heidegger's theory that Derrida later redirects against Hegel is inherently imprecise, not to say vague.[8] The most one can say of this view is that it offers only a representation of metaphysics, one interpretation of the genre. Even if this view can be precisely formulated, it is clear that it does not count against Hegel's theory. It would only do so if Hegel's metaphysics were an ontology, say in the traditional Greek philosophical sense, precisely the point that I want to deny. For the critique of Hegel's metaphysics as a theory of representationalism rejects a concept of metaphysics that is nowhere to be found in Hegel's writings. Unlike Heidegger, Hegel is not concerned to understand beings in terms of being, in order to grasp the meaning of the latter term. Hegel is hence not hoist on a distinction which, while characteristic of a certain form of metaphysics, is certainly not central to his position.

My third point concerns the contemporary interest of the Hegelian view of metaphysics. Like other philosophers influenced by Kant, Hegel rejects the very idea of direct, immediate knowledge. Hegel shares the generally "constructivist", or "productive" view of the critical philosophy according to which what we perceive in experience is constructed or produced by us as a condition of perception. He further shares with Kant the effort to derive an a priori categorial framework adequate, in the terms of that other idealist, Whitehead, to interpret any and all items of experience. I believe this effort is suspect, since it is now too late to pretend that a categorial matrix useful for all experience whatsoever can be successfully derived independently of experience, a point Hegel himself made in his insistence on the inseparability of form and content. If this is the case, then the very effort to do so running from Kant through Hegel is now suspect. Surely Marx was correct that as the object changes, then the categories must also change. Marx makes this point in terms of his concern with the different categories needed to interpret different social stages, but it applies to all types of objects embedded within the historical flux ([24], pp. 100–108).

Yet the Hegelian approach to metaphysics as epistemology remains contemporary. If we deny, as Hegel argues strenuously ([13], pp. 58–67) and as I think we must, that we have immediate experience unmediated by mind, then the task of knowledge consists, as Hegel and the idealists already knew, in the elaboration of a categorial framework for the interpretation of experience. This is a valid task of metaphysics today.

VI. CONCLUSIONS

We can conclude with a remark on the relation of the Hegelian view of metaphysics to the end of philosophy. This topic has been on the agenda at least since Descartes, who desired to begin again, to finally make a true beginning, in order to obviate the need for other, later beginnings. In the later discussion, the claim to bring philosophy to an end has become a traditional theme that recurs inexhaustibly in a variety of forms in numerous writers. After Hegel's death, the Young Hegelians thought that he had in fact been successful in bringing philosophy to an end, in ending the philosophical tradition. Beginning with Engels, Marxists held that Marx stood outside the philosophical tradition. More recently, varying this claim, Heidegger has argued that Nietzsche, not Hegel, is the last figure in the metaphysical tradition that has now ended [16]. As the Marxists did for Marx, he has depicted his own theory as beyond philosophy.

If metaphysics is understood to mean something like ontology in the traditional sense, then perhaps it has already come to an end. From this angle of vision, we can only agree with Putnam that all the grand schemes for discovering the "Furniture of the Universe" ([26], p. 51) have ended in failure. Kant's lesson is that we need not and cannot know the way things really are, what the world is like without subjects for which it is a world. Yet there are, as we have already noted, other, perhaps more epistemologically viable forms of metaphysics. And although the end of metaphysics is supposedly in view, there seems to be no end to the end of metaphysics, in a word there is finally no end to ways to understand its end.

To bring this discussion to a close, dare I say to end it, we can usefully distinguish four ways in which Hegel's position can usefully be understood to mark the end of metaphysics. First, metaphysics for Hegel represents the end of philosophy, since its goal is to provide a systematic analysis of the experience of consciousness. According to Hegel, the often asserted, but never demonstrated, identity of thought and being is the goal of the entire philosophical tradition. If Hegel had in fact demonstrated this identity, then he could legitimately be said to bring metaphysics, as well as philosophy, to an end.

Second, Hegel's view of metaphysics is perhaps the final link in this conceptual chain that begins as early as Parmenides, since in his concept of absolute reflection Hegel intends to complete the Kantian study of the abstract conditions of the possibility of knowledge whatsoever through an inquiry into its real possibility. In introducing a reflexive, or self-reflexive moment into the discussion, Hegel addresses not only the conditions of knowledge but also the conditions under which a particular subject can have knowledge of the specified kind.

Further, Hegel's view is part of the modern turn away from metaphysics understood as ontology or as foundationalist epistemology; but is not part of a turn away from metaphysics as such. In contemporary terminology, we can say that Hegel is a metaphysician in that he proposes a new paradigm of systematic knowledge without foundations with an obvious, but as yet largely unexplored relation to pragmatism.

Finally, in Hegel's thought we find perhaps a contingent end of progress in metaphysics; for the widespread effort to pursue the problem of knowledge without adequate knowledge of his position arguably transforms the later discussion into a mere cul-de-sac, a dead end that makes it difficult to perceive and tends to hide the novel form of metaphysics he provides.

NOTES

1. [30], p. 9: "*Die Metaphysik ist die Erste Philosophy*; das ist die These der Metaphysik".
2. Beiser incorrectly claims that Kant and Fichte were opposed to Metaphysics ([3], p. 12).
3. Groos comes to the conclusion that 'die Möglichkeit von Kants Kenntnis des Hume'schen Hauptwerks nicht vollständig ausgeschlossen ist . . ." ([8], p. 181).
4. Maimon is never mentioned by name in the *Encyclopedia*. So far as I know, he is never

directly referred to anywhere in Hegel's writings. For a recent discussion of Maimon's thought, see [2], chapter 10.

5. [12], p. 79: "In the principle of the deduction of the categories Kant's philosophy is authentic idealism; and it is this principle that Fichte extracted in a purer stricter form and called the spirit of Kantian philosophy."
6. For a study of this problem that concedes metaphysics is not meaningless although it is not science, see [25], pp. 253–292.
7. This is a constant theme in Heidegger's writings. See [14], pp. 47–59.
8. For those facets of a doctrine whose outline is still not clear, see [4], pp. 206, 237, 146.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. Ayer, A.J.: n.d., *Language, Truth and Logic*, Dover, New York.
2. Beiser, F.C.: 1987, *The Fate of Reason: German Philosophy from Kant to Fichte*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge.
3. Beiser, F.C.: 1993, 'Hegel and the Problem of Metaphysics', in F.C. Beiser (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Hegel*, Cambridge University Press, New York, pp. 270–300.
4. Derrida, J.: 1967, *De la Grammatologie*, Editions de Minuit, Paris.
5. Derrida, J.: 1967, *La Voix et le phénomène*, Presses universitaires de France, Paris.
6. Derrida, J.: 1981, *Glas*, Denoel/Gonthier, Paris.
7. Ewing, A.C.: 1967, *A Short Commentary on the Critique of Pure Reason*, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
8. Groos, K.: 1901, 'Hat Kant Hume's Treatise gelesen?', *Kant-Studien*, 177–181.
9. Habermas, J.: 1987, 'Metaphysik nach Kant', in Cramer *et al.* (eds.), *Theorie der Subjektivität. Festschrift für Dieter Henrich*, Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt a.M., pp. 425–443.
10. Hartmann, K.: 1972, 'Hegel: A Non-Metaphysical View', in A. MacIntyre (ed.), *Hegel. A Collection of Critical Essays*, Doubleday, Garden City, N.Y., pp. 101–24.
11. Hegel, G.W.F.: 1970, *G.W.F. Hegel. Werke in zwanzig Bänden*, Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt a.M.
12. Hegel, G.W.F.: 1977, *Difference Between Fichte's and Schelling's System of Philosophy*, H.S. Harris and W. Cerf (trans.), SUNY Press, Albany.
13. Hegel, G.W.F.: 1977, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, A.V. Miller (trans.), Oxford University Press, Oxford.
14. Heidegger, M.: 1962, *Being and Time*, J. Macquarrie and E. Robinson (trans.), Harper and Row, Evanston.
15. Heidegger, M.: 1977, *On Time and Being*, J. Stambaugh (trans.), Harper and Row, New York.
16. Heidegger, M.: 1981, *Nietzsche*, Neske, Pfullingen.
17. Heidegger, M.: 1982, *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, A. Hofstadter (trans.), Indiana University Press, Indiana.
18. Henrich, D.: 1987, 'Was ist Metaphysik – was Moderne? Zwölf Thesen gegen Jürgen Habermas', in *Konzepte. Essays zur Philosophie in der Zeit*, Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt a.M.
19. Hume, D.: 1955, *An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding*, C.W. Hendel (ed.), LLA, Indianapolis.
20. Kant, I.: 1950, *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics*, L.W. Beck (trans.), LLA, Indianapolis.
21. Kant, I.: 1961, *Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, N.K. Smith (trans.), Macmillan, London.
22. Kant, I.: 1985, 'Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science', in J.W. Ellington (trans.), *Philosophy of Material Nature*, Hackett, Indianapolis, pp. 3–134.
23. Koerner, S.: 1970, *Categorial Frameworks*, Blackwell, Oxford.

24. Marx, K.: 1973, *Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy*, M. Nicolaus (trans.), Penguin, Baltimore.
25. Popper, K.: 1965, *Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge*, Harper and Row, New York.
26. Putnam, H.: 1990, *Realism with a Human Face*, J. Conant (ed.), Harvard University Press, Cambridge.
27. Rockmore, T.: 1986, *Hegel's Circular Epistemology*, Indiana University Press, Bloomington and London.
28. Rosenkranz, K.: 1846, 'Die Metaphysik in Deutschland seit 1831' in *Jahrbuch für spekulative Philosophie*.
29. Taylor, R.: 1963, *Metaphysics*, Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N.J.
30. Vollrath, E.: 1969, *Die These der Metaphysik. Zur Gestalt der Metaphysik bei Aristoteles, Kant und Hegel*, Alois Henn Verlag, Wuppertal/Ratingen.

KLAUS BRINKMANN

4. Hegel's Critique of Kant and Pre-Kantian Metaphysics

Two things have obscured an understanding of Hegelian philosophy more than anything else. One is the claim that Hegel's dialectic constitutes a violation of the laws of contradiction and excluded middle; the other is the verdict that Hegel is fundamentally a metaphysician. Klaus Hartmann has argued succinctly and convincingly that the dialectic is to be viewed as a procedure for the systematic construal and concatenation of categorial concepts, for which the principle of avoiding contradiction is absolutely essential ([4], p. 229; [5], p. 7). Above all, however, he was the first to have demonstrated that not only is a non-metaphysical reading of Hegel possible but that it makes more sense of, and is more consonant with, the spirit of Hegel's writings than a metaphysical interpretation.[1] According to this view, Hegelian theory is primarily a reconstructive hermeneutics of categorial concepts, i.e., an ontology ([6], p. 40f). Its greatest merits consist in the rationality of its procedure and its power to make thought intelligible to itself. The following may be seen, among other things, as a corroboration of this view.

In this paper, I propose to clarify Hegel's attitude vis-à-vis the tradition of philosophy in general, and vis-à-vis Kantian philosophy and medieval metaphysics in particular. I shall try to throw into relief Hegel's own methodological position while commenting on his criticism of the methodological attitudes of his predecessors. My aim will be to identify the fundamental principles that define the common ground Hegel shares with the metaphysical tradition and that at the same time set him off against its particular mode of thinking. In this, I shall rely mainly on Hegel's programmatic utterances in the Prefaces and the Introduction to the *Science of Logic* and on the more systematic exposition of his basic methodological ideas in the Introduction and the Preliminary Notion as well as the First and Second Attitudes of Thought to Objectivity in the *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences*.

H.T. Engelhardt, Jr. and T. Pinkard (eds.), Hegel Reconsidered, 57–78.
© 1994 *Kluwer Academic Publishers.*

I. Hegel and the Philosophical Tradition

Although Hegel regarded himself as bringing to consummation the tradition of metaphysics ([9], p. 63f), and although he explicitly praised the metaphysical thought of the ancient philosophers as occupying higher ground than the Critical Philosophy which succeeded it ([10], p. 48, sec. 28), he also severely criticized medieval scholasticism for what he called its dogmatism ([10], p. 52, sec. 32). And while Hegel gratefully acknowledged his indebtedness to the history of metaphysical thinking and to traditional logic for having provided the necessary material for his own work,[2] he also blamed medieval philosophy for its methodological approach to the subject matter of metaphysics and the metaphysical tradition in general for its uncritical procedure ([10], pp. 48ff, secs. 27–36). That is to say, although Hegel absorbed into his own system the main topics of metaphysics, his methodological treatment of them changed their character from being the transcendent objects of reasoning to becoming the subject matter of self-explicating thought.[3] Indeed, it can be said that Hegel found the new way which made possible that "future metaphysics" for which Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* was supposed to pave the way.[4] As it turned out, that metaphysics would have to be a logic of the most basic thought-determinations,[5] insofar as they can claim to be categories of what there truly is. Hegel thus transformed speculation about transcendent entities into a self-contained, and hence presuppositionless, theory of the structural analysis of categorial concepts.[6] He means to say both that the make-up of the theory exhibits the characteristics of a causa sui structure and that the concepts concerned have ontological significance in that they explicate the basic features of being which as such are basic features of thought itself. Metaphysics is replaced by an ontology which may justifiably be called "transcendental".

One further point concerning Hegel's general attitude towards the history of philosophical thought should be stressed. As can be seen from Hegel's words quoted above, his evaluation of the philosophical tradition is in one respect remarkably out of keeping with modern assessment. Hegel's disregard, even disrespect, for Kant's Copernican revolution must strike any modern reader as extraordinary. To be sure, there is due acknowledgement, in the *Science of Logic*, of Kant's transcendental apperception ([9], p. 584). There is also, and perhaps somewhat surprisingly, praise for the "Dialectic" of the *Critique of Pure Reason* in the *Encyclopedia* and the *Logic* ([10], pp. 74, 78f, 93f, secs. 46, 48, 60; [9], pp. 56, 190). However, when it comes to evaluating Kant's contribution to the history of philosophy as a whole, Hegel occasionally relegates Kant to the rather subordinate position of one who treats of spirit in its inferior appearance as consciousness only.[7] Indeed, as Hegel understands it, Kant's Copernican revolution with its contention that the forms of intuition and the pure concepts of the understanding are constitutive of reality as it appears to us, but not as it is in itself, was a step backwards in the development of philosophical thought. How are we to understand such an unappreciative judgement?

A careful perusal of the texts referred to above will reveal two basic theses governing Hegel's critical evaluation of the philosophical tradition. Firstly, there is one main split, in the history of philosophical thought, between those who do and those who do not adhere to the position of objective thinking (objektives Denken) with its fundamental tenet that thought, and thought alone, is capable of revealing the true nature of things, or, to quote from among a number of similar statements, that "Thinking (and its determinations) is not anything alien to the object", but that it rather is "its essential nature".[8] This split is due to the fact that the position of objective thought is contradicted by what Hegel calls the opposition of consciousness (Gegensatz des Bewusstseins), and which could also be called the position of subjective thinking. Secondly, there is a division, within the position of objective thought, between the attitude of so-called pictorial thinking-cum-reasoning (vorstellendes Denken plus Verstandesdenken) and that of speculative thinking, which may also be termed categorial thinking.[9] In what follows, we shall try to elucidate the significance of this structuring of the history of philosophy.

II. HEGEL'S CRITIQUE OF KANT

The position of naive or unself-conscious[10] objective thinking "has never become aware of the antithesis of subjective and objective" ([10], p. 47, sec. 26). It is of the "unsophisticated belief . . . that thought apprehends the very self of things, and that things, to become what they truly are, require to be thought" ([10], p. 48, sec. 28). The position of naive objective thinking thus tacitly presupposes the categoriality of thought, i.e., the belief that the determinations of thought "have objective value and existence" ([9], p. 51). It is by thinking over (Nachdenken) the immediate deliverances of the senses and the observed regularities in phenomena that the true nature of things is grasped. Thought is credited with being capable of getting at the heart of things and with the power of laying bare their essence. This, according to Hegel's assessment, is the position of philosophical thought up to and including Descartes, and even Leibniz and Wolff, but excluding Kant.[11] In its pure form, however, it is the position of the ancient philosophers.

The position of objective thought, then, is one which warrants, or purports to warrant, the epistemological claim to true knowledge by tacitly assuming the identity of the thought-determinations, or categories, with the essence of things. It therefore stands in sharp contrast with the position of subjective thinking, which is characterized by the so-called opposition of consciousness. The latter is the position of critical philosophy, i.e., that of Kant, but also of the empiricists.[12] This position explicitly denies that the conceptual determinations of thought be also that of things (in) themselves. Instead, it takes the categories to be subjective forms of the understanding only. Although the categories are claimed to be constitutive of the objective coherence of phenomena, that objectivity must not be regarded as forming part of the objects themselves. It is rather something imposed on the objects as they are in themselves by the human mind, thus turning the object into an appearance of some underlying reality which by definition must be reckoned to be beyond all objectivity, and hence unknowable.[13] From the point of view of objective thought, the categories, taken as both subjective forms only and as objective features of what there is or, rather, of what there appears to be, have the effect of turning the object of true knowledge into something which for its being is dependent on something else. Thus the non-substantial is made the true and only object of cognition.[14]

Since this is but another way of describing the conclusion arrived at by Kant himself, it must be assumed that Kant at once affirms and denies the position of objective thought. He affirms it, insofar as he rests his case for there being a thing-in-itself on a purely logical argument, i.e., on bare thought alone, by reasoning that "Though we cannot know these objects as things in themselves, we must yet be in a position at least to think them as things in themselves; otherwise we should be landed in the absurd conclusion that there can be appearance without anything that appears" ([14], p. 27 [B xxvif.]). He denies it, insofar as he restricts knowledge to appearances. This has the consequence of qualifying knowledge of appearances as being less than true knowledge which, after all, would have to be knowledge of the ground on which appearances depend. The fact that the latter is unattainable is at once the result of the Analytic and the presupposition of the Dialectic of the *Critique of Pure Reason*. Consequently, Kant emerges as a philosopher of that level of reflection for which the ground (or essence) of the object is something lying beyond what is accessible to cognition, viz. the level of consciousness. At this level, the more-than-sensible nature of the object becomes a noumenon "in the negative sense", i.e., an entity devoid of thought-determinations, simply on the grounds that all thought-determinations must be subjective.

A contemporary reader might interpret Kant's appearances as Heideggerian phenomena with their peculiar character of concealing rather than revealing the essence, turning appearances or the sensible world in general into signs or symbols of essence or primordial being instead of constituting its *parousia*.[15] Hegel's analysis differs from this modern interpretation in that Hegel rejects the positive result of the Analytic of the First Critique, and thus also the Copernican thesis with its restrictive conception of knowledge, but accepts the negative result of the Dialectic regarding the nature of the pure forms of the understanding, viz. that the categories qua thought-determinations of the conditioned are unfit for affording knowledge of the unconditioned, i.e., the truth.[16] Accordingly, knowledge attained through these "finite" forms of the understanding must be less than true knowledge. In itself, that knowledge constitutes apparent knowledge only, or knowledge as it makes its appearance at the level of consciousness. At this level, the subjective and the objective become mutually exclusive of one another, and their conceptually necessary cohesion can be maintained only on the strength of meta-epistemological, in this case logical, considerations.

And yet, Hegel's critical resume of Kantian transcendental epistemology is far from being tantamount to a radical dismissal of critical philosophy altogether. In the *Science of Logic*, Hegel concludes that "The criticism of the forms of the understanding has had the result . . . that these forms do not apply to things in themselves. This can have no other meaning than that these forms are in themselves something untrue" ([9], p. 46f). If the categories of the understanding are indeed unfit for affording knowledge of the unconditioned, then something must be wrong with those categories. However, it would be mistaken to think, as Kant would have us think, that the fault of the categories lies with their subjective character. As a matter of fact, "The things of which we have direct consciousness are mere phenomena, *not for us only, but in their own nature*" ([10], p. 73, sec. 45; italics mine). Kant's categories are deficient in structure or content, in what they authorize as having being in the true sense. They are inadequate with regard to their ontological import, and not in view of their epistemological status. As far as their epistemological status is concerned, they are a true and hence objective expression of knowledge at the level of consciousness. It is that level of subjective thinking which has to be superseded, if the true ontological meaning of the concepts of the understanding is to be realized. It is to be viewed as a lack of cogency on the part of Kant, that, while proving the categories to be ontologically inadequate in the Dialectic, he made them the condition of the possibility of the only kind of real knowledge in the Analytic.[17] It seems that the very attempt to prove the restrictedness of thought's capacity to know or cognize must be self-defeating.

Before we leave Hegel's discussion of Kant, we may ask ourselves whether we are really satisfied that Kant's position in the *Critique of Pure Reason* is in fact untenable. It seems, however, that an argument can be adduced to the effect that Kant's central distinction between the subjective and objective, or between appearance and thing-in-itself, must eventually break down. This distinction is a correlate of the parallel distinction between empirical knowledge on the one hand and transcendental knowledge on the other, and it is the latter which, at least in one crucial respect, cannot be upheld within the Kantian framework itself.

First of all, it is only from the transcendental point of view that empirical knowledge can be called subjective. For there can be no doubt that according to the plain doctrine of the Analytic, knowledge of objects of experience is objective in virtue of the subjective but necessary conditions supplied by the forms of intuition and the categories of the understanding, and that therefore such knowledge is subjective and objective alike. Viewed in this way, the subjective is the objective, since it supplies the principles of the necessary connectedness of phenomena which make possible a unified experience, and hence objective knowledge, in the first place. Thus it emerges that Kant's original insight in the Analytic consists in the fact that, viewed transcendentally, the opposition of consciousness is merely an apparent opposition: It holds good only at the level of consciousness, insofar as consciousness is aware of a basic difference between its own subjective (perspectival etc.) point of view on the one hand and its grasp of the object as it is in itself on the other. Consequently, the opposition of consciousness would collapse, were it not for Kant's more complicated doctrine that, because of the subjectivity involved in the constitution of objects of experience, their necessary coherence in a unified framework called nature ([15], pp. 42, 43, secs. 14, 16) is a matter of appearance only (in the transcendental, or meta-epistemological, sense of appearance).

What in fact happens is a carrying over of the opposition of consciousness from its original level of natural consciousness - where it had already been superseded – to the level of transcendental cognition. At this level, we have the contention, first, that the empirical thing-in-itself and the noumenal thing-in-itself are in fact identical[18] and, second, that cognition of this identity is impossible. The most that can be said, according to Kant, is that we are logically committed to posit the noumenal thing-in-itself on pain of logical absurdity (see p. 60 above). However, as becomes apparent in the Third Analogy of the Dialectic of the First Critique, that positing rests on the negative argument that it is not logically impossible to posit a noumenal thing-in-itself,[19] which is less than was required. For the statement that it is not logically impossible that there is or may be a thing-in-itself is compatible with its denial that it is not logically impossible that there be no thing-in-itself. Hence the proof, in the Third Analogy, of the compatibility of the noumenal and the phenomenal is too weak to support the claim, in the second Preface, that it would be logically absurd to speak of appearances while denying the existence of a thing-in-itself.[20] Transcendental cognition has landed itself in deadlock, because it is committed to holding both of the two contradictory propositions (1) that it is a logically necessary assumption that there be a thing-in-itself and (2) that it is logically possible that there be a thing-in-itself. The solution to this dilemma would be the conceptualization in categorial terms of the identity of the empirical and the noumenal thing-in-itself, which is, however, declared impossible.[21] If this is correct, then the conclusion becomes unavoidable that Kant's "transcendental distinction" is indeed lost.[22] For if the necessity for positing the noumenal thing-in-itself cannot be positively established, the distinction between appearance and thing-in-itself might just as well be restricted to the level of empirical knowledge. Its transference to the level of transcendental knowledge is an hypothesis.[23] It seems that this result must ensue, once we treat transcendental knowledge as being structurally analogous to empirical knowledge, insofar as both types of cognition are then held to be subject to the restrictions enforced by the adoption of the position of subjective thinking. Hegel's point may also be put in this way. By carrying over the opposition of consciousness from the level of empirical cognition (where it may legitimately be thought to hold) to the level of transcendental cognition, the significance of the transcendental standpoint is lost, since it is from that standpoint alone that the opposition can be seen to be an apparent opposition only. The opposition of consciousness cannot therefore be constitutive of the transcendental standpoint itself.

III. THE MEANING OF *VORSTELLUNG* IN HEGEL

At this stage of our discussion, it will be useful to put Hegel's review of the development of philosophical thought into a yet broader perspective. If we take a look at the introductory paragraphs of the *Encyclopedia* and the *Science of Logic*, we find that Hegel begins his critical survey by reference to what he calls natural thinking.[24] Natural thinking is the kind of thinking which is opposed to scientific and philosophical thinking. Its chief characteristic is a taking-for-granted of the validity and truth of the conceptual distinctions in terms of which consciousness views itself and the world. The contents of this thinking are the inner and outer world of consciousness. It is that which consciousness rightly calls reality. When viewed as a more or less coherent body of knowledge, that reality is what is commonly understood by experience ([10], p. 8, sec. 6). This content is the necessary material basis for philosophy. Philosophy does not create or invent the subject matter for its reflection. On the contrary, philosophical reflection presupposes the content of consciousness, since it is only by thinking over that content that philosophical thought attains to conceptual determinateness and true knowledge.[25] Philosophy starts out as a critique of natural thinking, or natural consciousness.[26] In this way philosophical reflection transforms the familiarity and absoluteness of everyday experience into a reality at once comprehended and relativized.[27]

The kind of thinking busy in everyday experience is, however, not uniform in character. Bringing together the different aspects Hegel discovers in natural thinking, we may say that natural thinking exhibits a dual nature. On the one hand, natural or everyday consciousness is persuaded that things are in reality what they are believed to be. They are believed to have an existence independent of consciousness, but that does not make them in any way mysterious objects for natural thinking. Things are what consciousness knows them, through experience, to be. We might call this the naive realism of natural thought. On the other hand, natural thinking is also persuaded that there is a difference between what things seem to be and what they really are, and that it is not always possible to determine, especially in cases of conflicting evidence, which of two hypotheses, if any, would be a correct explanation of the underlying reality. In cases like these, consciousness views reality as something lying beyond the domain of appearances and which may, for all consciousness knows, remain an in-itself forever divorced from what is accessible to consciousness, whence may be derived the kind of natural scepticism characteristic of ordinary thinking.

Both aspects of natural consciousness, though potentially incompatible, coexist in natural thinking.[28] And although Hegel does not say it in so many words, this diagnosis of ordinary thinking can serve as a guideline for his own explication of the development of philosophical thought. For it is easy to see that natural thinking combines within itself the two basic assumptions constitutive of the two fundamental approaches in philosophical reflection. Thus critical philosophy can be considered a systematic attempt to vindicate knowledge and truth for consciousness despite the divorce of thinking from the reality of things, a divorce fostered by the empiricists' scepticism and eventually held to be irrevocable by Kant. And ordinary thinking's naive realism is obviously at the bottom of the philosophical attitude called objective thinking.[29] Philosophical reflection, it may be said, comes to be initiated by becoming aware of this original dualism implicit in natural thought. Having already dealt with Hegel's critique of critical philosophy, we may now turn towards his analysis of the other ingredient in ordinary thinking which, in philosophical reflection, leads to the position of objective thought.

The aspect of natural thinking now to be dealt with, and which was earlier referred to as naive realism, takes the form of so-called picture-thinking or pictorial thought. This rendering of Hegel's *Vorstellung* or *vorstellendes Denken* is, however, rather unfortunate, because it is apt to obfuscate rather than explicate the true meaning of the terms.[30] What, then, does *Vorstellung* mean? In order to find out, we shall have to establish a correlation between sections 3, 20 and 459sqq. of the *Encyclopedia* and the opening passages of the second edition Preface to the *Science of Logic*. We may then apply the result of our analysis to Hegel's critique of metaphysics as it is developed in the chapter entitled First Attitude of Thought to Objectivity. We shall begin our survey of the relevant loci with section 3 of the *Encyclopedia*.

A faithful rendering of the sentence concerned would be something like this: "Since the [thought-]determinations implicit in feelings, intuitions, desires, volitions, etc., insofar as we are consciously aware of them, are generally called *Vorstellungen*, it may be laid down as a rule that philosophy replaces *Vorstellungen* by thoughts or categories, or, which would be even more to the point, by concepts."[31] It is interesting to note that Wallace's translation has "ideas (mental representations)" for the first occurrence of *Vorstellungen* in this sentence and that he translates *Vorstellungen* by "generalized images we ordinarily call ideas" on its second occurrence ([10], p. 6). The implied reference to Lockean ideas is indeed not too far off the mark (discounting the slightly paradoxical "generalized images"). However, as is already apparent from Wallace's translation, the kind of Lockean ideas that would be analogous to, even if not identical with, Hegel's *Vorstellungen* are not those of which Locke says that they are the material with which the yet empty cabinet comes to be furnished ([16], I 2, 15). Rather, they are those ideas which form the subject matter of Book III of the *Essay*. In other words, the meaning of *Vorstellungen* is analogous to Locke's "general terms", whereas his "particular ideas" are analogous to just those feelings, intuitions, desires and volitions mentioned in section 3 of the *Encyclopedia*. But it is equally important to emphasize the difference between Locke's general terms and Hegel's *Vorstellungen.* For while Locke may be credited with the view that general terms are indeed generalized images (whatever that may mean), it is quite clear that for Hegel *Vorstellung*, in virtue of having the character of a universal, cannot be anything like an image (nor a mental representation, if by that is meant an image of figurative conception). Attention must also be called to the fact that Hegel's "particular ideas", unlike Lockean particular ideas, are said to contain conceptual determinations, whereas in Locke the conceptual is supposed to supervene on bare concept-free sense impression.[32] And, finally, we note that *Vorstellung* represents a level of thought at which the manifold of "particular ideas" making up the immediate and contingent content of consciousness has already been translated into a homogeneous medium capable of expressing in a unified manner anything that may be an object for consciousness. *Vorstellung* is indeed a kind of ideation (Aufhebung) of the particularity and heterogeneity of the manifold of consciousness. In addition, however, it is implied that *Vorstellung* represents a specific mode in which the thought-determinations or categories embedded in "particular ideas" become an object for consciousness. This suggests that thinking in terms of *Vorstellungen* is not the adequate form in which categories are to be an object for analysis. We may wonder, however, what those general terms may be, if they are not images or concepts or, for that matter, just sense impressions. For a preliminary answer to this question we now turn to section 20 of the *Encyclopedia.*

There Hegel distinguishes between three levels or kinds of knowledge, knowledge based on sense impressions, on *Vorstellungen*, and on thoughts. To avoid misinterpretations, we may re-emphasize that knowledge based on sensible data can only be knowledge because of the thought-determinations already ingredient in the sensible. The same holds good for *Vorstellungen.* However, while the sensible is characterized by the atomization and the mere external side-by-side relationship of the individual sensa, *Vorstellung*, although its contents consist in part in material based on sensible data, constitutes a level of generality at which the unlimited discreteness of the *kath' hekasta* of sense impression has been transformed into something at once simple and universal. The most important characteristic of the contents of *Vorstellung*, however, lies in the fact that it is known by consciousness as being known, or as forming part of its knowledge. The basic quality of this content thus is its being a conceptualization and hence a thought-determined appropriation of the manifold of the senses, or its being known to be mine.[33] The idea, however, that an item of knowledge, in virtue of being mine, would *ipso facto* be something private must under all circumstances be avoided. The envisaged subjectivity of knowledge simply reflects the fact that it is only subjects who can meaningfully be said to have knowledge, or a conception of an object. Accordingly, this subjectivity is characteristic of a thinking subject as such, and hence of any subject. The point that matters is that at the level of *Vorstellung* consciousness not just has "particular ideas", but has a grasp of those ideas, albeit an incomplete grasp and a global understanding of them only. The global character of *Vorstellungen* is indicated by what Hegel calls the simplicity of the universal that forms the contents of knowledge at this particular level of knowledge, which is the level of being familiar with things through having an idea of them.

If we now add that the contents of knowledge at the level of *Vorstellung* comprise not just sensible data but also man's ideas of the just, the ethical, and the religious ([10], p. 30, sec. 20), then it becomes apparent that *Vorstellung* for Hegel represents that universal medium in and through which anything that is an object of consciousness becomes intelligible in a fundamental though preliminary sense. It is not difficult to see that this primordial level of intelligibility is provided by language and its peculiar mode of appropriation of objects of consciousness called meaning (in the sense of "what it is to mean something" and in that of "what is meant"). Hence *Vorstellung* is a synonym for (word-)meaning, and *vorstellendes Denken* is a thinking in terms of meanings, or thinking according to the semantics of language.[34]

The above interpretation finds its confirmation in Hegel's explication of the concept of *Vorstellung* as given in the Philosophy of Subjective Spirit (Enc. 451sqq.) The analysis is more complex there, since *Vorstellung* is first introduced as the general mode on account of which the contents of consciousness become intelligible or meaningful. Thus we are to distinguish between a generic and a specific concept of *Vorstellung*. Generically, *Vorstellung* represents the original and basic appropriation of whatever may come before consciousness in such a way that thinking becomes independent of a recourse to any external intuition when relating to objects.[35] This qualification is already partially met by the recollected image, which is capable of standing for or representing something, although it would lose its meaning, if we were to make total abstraction from its relationship to the represented (which, at this level, is to be some external intuitional content or other, i.e., an intuition not produced by the intelligence). The requirement of being independent of any external intuition while retaining at the same time full intelligibility is, however, met by word-meaning. Word-meaning is still dependent on some intuitional element, viz. the word qua sign, auditory or visual, which, however, is no longer external in Hegel's sense since it is a free production of the intelligence itself (this being the reason why it is called arbitrary).

Hence word-meaning constitutes the meaning of *Vorstellung* taken in its specific sense.[36] But word-meaning must not be viewed merely as a correlate of the word as sign (as Locke interpreted the relationship of *signifiant* and *signifié*). Rather, word-sign and meaning coalesce into one, and their synthetic unity is the name (by which Hegel means general noun).[37] It is names with which natural thinking is primarily familiar: "We think in names" ([11], p. 203, sec. 462). The thinking here referred to is, of course, natural thinking. Hence it is justified to say that according to Hegel the universal homogeneous medium in and through which anything has meaning for consciousness is constituted by language.[38]

The point is further elaborated by Hegel in the second Introduction to the *Science of Logic*. The thought-determinations which it is the business of philosophy to analyze originally become articulate through language. Everything insofar as it is to be "anything to me" – to use Kant's expression –, everything that comes to be something for consciousness, must have been assimilated through language. Every sentence contains a category, even if for the most part in a concealed manner only and mixed with intuitional or figurative elements ([9], p. 31). Hence, those categories are something with which we are perfectly familiar, but it is on account of their familiarity that they are generally not fully understood in their implications and their basic logic ([9], p. 33). Philosophical analysis must transcend the level of thinking in names, if not the limits of language,[39] in order to reach the level of "comprehensive thinking" (*begreifendes Denken*) ([9], p. 43), at which the most general forms or features of our conceptual structure may be laid bare.

Thinking at the level of meanings does not, in Hegel's view, by itself lead to the opposition of consciousness, and thus to the problem of the referentiality of thought or meaning so much discussed in contemporary philosophy. For not only do names represent a synthesis of the aspects of *signifiant* and *signifié*, they also must be regarded as a unity of *signifié* and object signified. That is to say that, at the level of thinking in terms of meanings, word and object are regarded as identical, and that natural thinking takes the meaning of a general name as representing the object itself.[40] In thinking according to the semantics of our language, we do not need to look to intuition, memory, or sense experience for an understanding of the meaning of a word. Thus, e.g., "The name lion enables us to dispense with both the intuition of such an animal and even with the image of it, for in that we understand it, the name is the imageless and simple presentation [Vorstellung] [sc. of the object]" ([11], p. 203, sec. 462). In understanding our language we have a grasp not only of words and their meaning but also of things.

It is precisely this identity of meaning and object that is characteristic of the objective element in natural thinking. And yet, thinking itself is not satisfied with this kind of objectivity. For one thing, what gives thinking in terms of meanings its intelligent structure and coherence is not just the intelligibility of words or the grammaticality of speech. Rather, it is the conceptual significance of the words used and the argumentative, or logical, quality of sentences which form the universal grid of our thinking. It is not in being capable of talking correctly that our understanding of the things we talk about consists.[41] That correctness is no more than a negative criterion of our grasp of words and things. Rather, it is our grasp of the logic of thinking in general, and of the logic of the conceptual elements embedded in language in particular, that enables us to talk intelligently as well as intelligibly.

Thus the conceptual and logical basis of language emerges as the foundation of that kind of knowledge which transcends the confines of familiarity with things. We may ask, though, why exactly Hegel thinks that representational thought or thinking in terms of meanings should be deficient and must be superseded in favor of conceptual analysis. The paramount reason for this lies in the lack of necessity typical of the semantical structure of language which in turn reflects only the lack of necessity characteristic of experience. At the level of semantics, language is a web of related – and unrelated – meanings rather than a system of concepts. It is in the interest of rationality that thought should become reflective and that it should supplant the *a posteriori* character of both experience and the "realm of representation" by introducing an element of logical and conceptual coherence into its thoughts. In so doing, reflective thought does not invent a new structure for language. Instead, in replacing Vorstellungen by concepts, it only uncovers the rational core inherent in language itself. For it is the structure of those concepts and their coherence that is ultimately at the basis of all intelligibility. To put it differently, in order to secure a rational basis for experience and the language in which it is expressed, thinking has recourse to the idea of concepts as principles, because it is principles which make rationality of thinking possible. In aiming at laying bare the *a priori* structure of principle and principiatum in things, thinking becomes wholly independent of the symbolic character of all thinking in terms of meanings. This is why Hegel is able to say that "Ideas or meanings as such [Vorstellungen überhaupt] may be regarded as metaphors of thoughts and concepts", and that in focusing on the conceptual basis of this kind of symbolic thinking thought comes into its own ([10], p. 6, sec. 3, translation mine). Still, it remains true that thinking in terms of meanings is the necessary starting-point for philosophical and scientific reflection, if only because "in point of time the mind makes general ideas [Vorstellungen] of objects, long before it makes notions of them" ([10], p. 3, sec. 1).

In the *Science of Logic*, Hegel elaborates on the role of concepts in representational thinking. In the attempt to clarify meanings, representational thinking is itself already concerned with their conceptual basis. However, the concepts which are the objects of such thinking are not necessarily what Hegel understands by a concept in the true sense. Thus general names or *Vorstellungen* are said to epitomize a multitude of representations of an object while remaining themselves a simple homogeneous universal. They function as abbreviations of a host of particular determinations, ([10], p. 34 ff.) but in being thus universals they exhibit merely the formal characteristic of the Hegelian categorial concept. On the other hand, Hegel holds that general names also represent the "indispensable foundation" of the things named, the "universal immanent in things themselves", and their "primordial predicate" ([10], p. 36 ff.), an echo of Aristotle's *eidos enon qua hypokeimenon.*[42] Hence the symbolic representation of an object called a general name offers two aspects, the abstract and the concrete universal. However, the attempt to determine the true meaning of a general name and thus the real nature of the object thereby named generally leads to a type of concept quite different from that of the *eidos enon*, viz. the kind of concept usually called a universal or sortal name. Traditionally, this type has been named a *conceptus communis*, or general notion.[43] Characteristically, things are subsumed under this kind of concept, and it is the *conceptus communis* as predicate which forms the object of Hegel's chief criticism of medieval and post-medieval metaphysics.

IV. REPRESENTATIONAL THINKING IN PHILOSOPHY

The lack of necessity, or systematicity, typical of representational thinking may be viewed as representing only the other side to its symbolic character. The reason why thinking is not fully satisfied with general names as expressions of the nature of the object lies in the fact that a name taken as a *conceptus communis* or class concept is merely a title for a group of object qualifications whose coherence in one determinate concept is not really understood. It may be a matter for argument which predicates belong to a given concept and which do not. At the level of representational thinking, the conceptual contents of a name fluctuate and may depend on agreement. In any case, it will necessarily be a matter for interpretation. Typically, representational thinking leaves it an open question as to what may be the ground for the inclusion of some predicate and the exclusion of another. The coherence of several predicates in one concept is only presumed to have some necessity or other about it. It is the work of the understanding to introduce some form of connection among the *notae communes* by conjoining them according to the categories of substance and accident, cause and effect, and so on and so forth.[44] From this there ultimately result scientific theories with a claim to a necessary, if only empirically necessary, coherence of phenomena.

Construction of scientific theories is the domain of the understanding. However, philosophical theorizing, too, may be entertained at this level of reflection. In its endeavor to clarify the meaning of *conceptus communes* and thereby also the nature of the object referred to by the name, philosophical reasoning characteristically may remain allied to the mode of representational thinking. It thus becomes representational thinking combined with reasoning.[45] It seems that Hegel believed that representational thinking-cum-reasoning was the mode of thought appropriate for scientific theory building. It is, however, inappropriate in philosophy. This explains why metaphysics, despite its un-Kantian belief in the objective validity of the thought-determinations,[46] is made the subject of criticism in sections 28sqq. of the *Encyclopedia*.

There are two main points of criticism, which both have to do with the fact that metaphysical reasoning typically remains attached to (a) symbolic thinking in terms of *Vorstellungen* or word-meanings and (b) the subject-predicate sentence or proposition (*Urteil*) as the basic form in which to express knowledge. Indeed, it seems that for Hegel both kinds of reasoning generally go together.

Every concept is a combination of several conceptual determinations.[47] In analyzing a *conceptus communis* in order to ascertain its true conceptual content, the understanding unfolds those determinations in a number of subject-predicate statements. The understanding itself is that mode of thinking for which the laws of non-contradiction and excluded middle constitute the ultimate criteria of truth. This has the immediate consequence of keeping in isolation the conceptual determinations which nevertheless are held to cohere in one concept.[48] The unity of the concept is thus no more than the list of the predicates said to belong to the subject term. X is F and G and also H, but not K or L or M. This is equivalent to saying that there is no unity in the concept other than that produced by the identical reference of all the predicates to the subject terms ([10], p. 50, sec. 29). In particular, there is no necessary connection among the predicates themselves, which would be the only way of establishing that kind of conceptual unity which could at the same time be considered an expression of the unity of the object itself and hence a categorial concept. It is only when the predicates themselves cohere that they may attain to categorial significance, because only thus may they lose their subjective air of having been strung together arbitrarily or accidentally. The unity thus conferred on the subject term is only formal, not substantial. Also, it remains doubtful whether or not the conceptual determinations of the object have been exhausted and whether the list of predicates is complete. The decision on these points hinges on the question of how the meaning of a given subject term is to be interpreted.

A possible alternative to determining the true nature of an object by giving the list of the predicates contained in its concept would be that of defining the concept. After all, as Aristotle puts it, the definition is precisely that *logos* which lays bare the *ousia* or essence (*An. post.* II 3, 91a, 90b, 16). However, if the representation of the object remains authoritative for which conceptual determinations are to be declared essential and which accidental, then the question of what the essence is becomes a matter of the accepted way of talking about the object to be defined. In this case, correctness of speech would be the guiding principle ([10], p. 53, sec. 33). However, to be able to use a concept correctly is merely to be familiar with its meaning, and though familiarity is equivalent to knowledge in a weak sense, it differs from knowledge in a strong sense (see note 27). Knowledge in the strong sense would have to have the form of non-symbolic expression, i.e., of conceptualization. In other words, as long as the predicates themselves, be they even essential predicates, remain simple universals, they will not lose the symbolic character typical of word-meanings. This criticism of the usual procedure followed in defining concepts does not mean that we ought to abstain from giving definitions. Rather, the consequence for Hegel is that conceptual analysis in philosophy must not proceed by way of definition.

Hegel's second important criticism is based on another meta-theoretical feature of the structure of the subject-predicate sentence. If it is correct to say that the predicate expresses, or purports to express, the essential characteristic of the object denoted by the subject term, then the predicate itself must be capable of replacing the subject term as far as the cognition of the object via the predicate is concerned. To put it another way, if the predicate is capable of functioning as a subject term, then this is proof that the predicate *is* essential. And if it is essential, then that predicate can claim to be the transformation of a symbolic expression into a concept, a concept which then would function as a subject term. But then, too, the subject-predicate form of the proposition will have become obsolete as the basic form in which to express knowledge. Rather, the structure of the resulting concept will then function as the methodological standard that must be met by any predicate which is to assume the role of a subject term.[49]

It is in this context of examining the capability of any given thought-determination to function as a subject term that Hegel saw Kant's real achievement in the First Critique. Kant's criticism of the categories of the understanding in their application to the unconditioned proved that those categories could not function as essential predicates of the ground of appearances. The conclusion Hegel drew from this, however, was not that we could have no knowledge (in the sense of cognition) of the unconditioned, but that the type of concept to be employed in determining the conceptual structure of the unconditioned must be different from the *conceptus communis* of the understanding. This different type of concept, generally called the Hegelian Notion, was prefigured by Kant's transcendental apperception, but in the Analytic of the *Critique*, Kant continued to look at the pure concepts of the understanding as if they were universals.[50] Hegel's critique of the methodological approach of pre-Kantian metaphysics points the way towards the revision of the concept of a concept which was adumbrated by the structure of Kant's transcendental apperception but not put to use by Kant in his analysis of the categories of the understanding. To end our survey of Hegel's critique of Kant and pre-Kantian metaphysics, we shall briefly comment on the methodological consequences Hegel derived from his criticism.

V. FROM REPRESENTATIONAL TO CATEGORIAL THOUGHT

The first point to be noted concerns the relation among the predicates. The requirement to transcend the level of symbolic thinking means that the isolation of the predicates over against each other must be broken up. In other words, the concepts which may pretend to be essential predicates of what there truly is, must lose their simplicity, or abstract universality. That is to say, first, that they must take on a relation to other concepts, and not just an identical reference to a single subject term. This relation must be one of negation, if the conflation of all concepts with each other is to be avoided. Second, such negative relationship, if it is not to be arbitrary, must hold between complementary concepts, i.e., concepts which in requiring each other also limit each other and thus mutually provide for their determinateness, according to the principle that *omnis determinatio est negatio*. This will result in the first step in Hegel's dialectic of concepts, which Hegel himself qualifies as the negatively reasonable (*negativ-vernünftig*) side of the logical development or the dialectical moment properly so called ([10], p. 113, 115, secs. 79, 81). This step is negative in character, because it leads to a contradiction. Since the negation or opposition that accounts for the determinateness of a concept must be an integral component of that concept itself (for otherwise the concept would still be a simple universal or a *Vorstellung*, i.e., a symbolic expression, and would be empty as far as its conceptual determinateness was concerned), there arises a conflict between the natural or first-order determination of the concept and its logical or second-order determination, in which it takes on the meaning of its complement also.[51] Obviously, this contradiction cannot stand. It demands a solution. Equally obviously, the solution cannot consist in the canceling out of the contradiction, since that would mean to undo the conceptual relationship so far established and to be back to where one started. Therefore, the contradiction must be resolved by a concept whose first order determination combines the first-and second-order determinations of its predecessor concepts. Hence they now receive the unifying conceptualization which, on pain of contradiction, they could not receive at the level of their complementary relationship.[52] The price to pay for preserving the principle of contradiction consists in the fact that the new concept is not and cannot be deductively inferred from its predecessors (because nothing can be deduced from a contradiction). It is a categorial novelty.[53] Hence Hegel's insistence that philosophy grants a familiarity with concepts and that the dialectic is a reconstruction, not a deduction of categories.[54]

This so-called positively reasonable (*positiv-vernünftig*) step thus results in what Hegel calls a concrete concept, or concrete universal.[55] It is also referred to as a negation of a negation, or determinate negation ([9], pp. 115, 54; Miller has "specific negation"), because the concrete universal, by combining the conceptual determinations previously kept apart, negates the contradiction made explicit in the predecessor concepts and thus limits its validity to the level of complementary relationships between concepts. The new concept is said to contain the preceding conceptual determinations ideally, or as moments ([9], p. 126). This is to say that they are preserved as distinct conceptual qualifications which, on account of their being constitutive of the conceptual contents of the new concept, no longer stand in conflict with each other. The contradiction has been superseded (*aufgehoben*), i.e., negated, while the conceptual determinations constitutive of the contradiction have been sublated (*aufgehoben*), i.e., integrated into a new concept. The new concept is therefore richer in conceptual determinations. Its excess in determinateness has thus received a rational explication or a genealogy which accounts for the concept's intelligibility.[56]

The second point to be noted in connection with the consequences of Hegel's criticism of pre-Kantian metaphysics concerns the transcendental character of Hegel's "system of concepts". Hegel's move to replace the subject term of a proposition by the predicate itself, which results from his metatheoretical reading of the judgment, has a number of repercussions on the fabric of his doctrine of categories. First of all, to transfer the predicate to the position of the subject term has the effect of dropping the reference to a representational substrate, or to supersede the level of symbolic thinking. It means that an immanence of the concept or a self-referentiality of thought is being established, not only because thinking thus is concerned with concepts alone, but also because the symbolic relationship between *signifiant* and *signifié* is now abandoned. To be sure, such replacement of *Vorstellungen* by concepts or thought-determinations works only for concepts which may pretend to be essential qualifications of being as such. That is to say, it works only for categories, because unlike a *conceptus communis* a category is not a symbol of a denotatum, but a form of thought, which provides for the intelligibility of any mode of thinking, symbolical or otherwise. To distinguish categories from other concepts, be they *conceptus communes* or conceptions in the sense of *Vorstellungen*, Hegel likes to refer to them as pure concepts.[57] For them alone Hegel's categoriality thesis, according to which the thought-determinations are expressive of the structure of what there truly is, can be claimed to hold good.

A final point to call attention to bears on the entelechy which issues from the combination of the two fundamental aspects of the dialectic so far considered. Granted that the predicates are to be tested for their capability of assuming the role of the subject term, they must ultimately meet the standard supplied by the idea of a subject term which exhibits the structure of the concrete universal itself. Only a predicate of this kind will be able to serve as a subject term which need not and cannot be replaced by another predicate. This implies that the final predicate term will have to be all-inclusive and that through it the system will become presuppositionless. At this final stage of the dialectic, which is identical with the absolute Idea or the so-called Hegelian Notion, subject and predicate, or *hypokeimenon* and *eidos*, coincide.[58] Their concurrence is the fulfillment of the assumption of the identity of the subject and predicate terms, an assumption on which the entire program is founded. It thus appears that Hegel's system of concepts is not only a doctrine of categories, but also their transcendental critique.

This is probably as much as one may say about the guiding principles underlying the Hegelian system without going into the detail of its execution. For our limited purpose of establishing a link between Hegel's critique and pre-Kantian metaphysics on the one hand and Hegel's own methodological position on the other, what has been said may suffice.

NOTES

1. By a metaphysical reading I understand a view which interprets Hegel's categorial claims concerning the logical structure of being or types of being as claims concerning the existence of entities. A typical Hegelian retort to a metaphysical interpretation in this sense of metaphysical would be to point out that the bare existence of something is a mere contingent fact which as such is of no special philosophical interest. It is only when it comes to determine what something is in reality, i.e., qua object of thinking, that an important question is being raised.
2. In the preface to the second edition of the *Science of Logic* Hegel says that "This traditional material, the familiar forms of thought, must be regarded as an extremely important source, indeed as a necessary condition and as a presupposition to be gratefully acknowledged even though what it offers is only here and there a meagre shred or a disordered heap of dead bones" (p. 31).
3. This is reflected in Hegel's remark that "What we are dealing with in [ontological] logic is not a thinking about something which exists independently as a base for our thinking and apart from it, nor forms which are supposed to provide mere signs or distinguishing marks of truth; on the contrary, the necessary forms and self-determinations of thought are the content and the ultimate truth itself" (cf. [9], p. 50). See also Hegel's statement in sec. 19 that the object of (ontological) logic is "thought . . . taken in the sense of the self-developing totality of its laws and peculiar terms" (p. 25).
4. Cf. [10], p. 36: "Logic therefore . . . coincides with Metaphysics, the science of things set and held in thoughts – thoughts accredited able to express the essential reality of things" (sec. 24). Cf. also [9], p. 63: "The objective logic . . . takes the place . . . of former metaphysics which was intended to be the scientific construction of the world in terms of thoughts alone."
5. The forms of thought are "the ABC of everything else [das Elementarische]" and "they are also what we are best acquainted with" (cf. [10], p. 25, sec. 19).
6. Cf. [9], p. 54 ("system of Notions" in Miller's translation).
7. Cf. [11], pp. 11, 13 (sec. 415). This statement is somewhat counterbalanced, though by no means canceled, by the footnote in the *Science of Logic* according to which Kantian philosophy "constitutes the base and the starting-point of recent German philosophy", a merit that "remains unaffected by whatever faults may be found in it" (cf. p. 61).
8. Cf. [9], p. 45. For the phrases "objective thinking", "objective thought" see p. 49 and [10], p. 36 (sec. 24). The classical statement of this categoriality thesis, as one might call it, may be found in the Introduction to the *Science of Logic* (cf. [9], p. 49): Philosophy as pure science "contains thought in so far as this is just as much the object in its own self, or the object in its own self in so far as it is equally pure thought."
9. Cf. [10], pp. 50–52. Wallace's rendering of Vorstellung or vorstellendes Denken is "conception", "popular conception", or "common sensualized conception", as in sec. 33. Occasionally, the term is left untranslated, even when used in its important terminological sense (cf. sec. 30). We shall have more to say on the technical meaning of Vorstellung at a later stage.
10. Or: ingenuous; this is Hegel's expression at the beginning of [10], sec. 26 (das unbefangene Verfahren) left untranslated by Wallace.
11. See [10], p. 47, sec. 27. – It is worth pointing out that Hegel obviously does not share the modern view that the fundamental revolution in philosophy inaugurated by Descartes was the turning towards subjectivity as the sole basis for the adjudication of epistemological claims. On the contrary, as an inspection of Hegel's lectures on the history of philosophy would show, the aspect of the cogito which Hegel stresses is not its subjectivity but its character as pure thought. Consequently, Descartes emerges as a representative of the position of objective thought. Descartes' cogito, ergo sum is to be seen as a formula for the identity of thought and being, which Descartes was the first to have pronounced, thereby proposing

"the most interesting idea of modern times" (cf. [8], vol. 19, p. 345. For Hegel's interpretation of the cogito see also pp. 339ff. and [10], p. 100f.).

12. Cf. [9], pp. 46sqq., 49. The expression "subjective thinking" is our own, not Hegel's. Hegel prefers to call Kant's position one of subjective idealism.
13. As is well known, it is almost impossible to decide, with Kant, what the categories or, for that matter, the forms of intuition are imposed upon. The idea of applying the forms of the understanding to some kind of material is at once logically necessary and logically impossible, hence an antinomy. For a related criticism of Kant's argument in the Analogies of Experiences see [2], pp. 50–52.
14. In Hegel's words: Critical philosophy has us "place our thoughts as a medium between ourselves and the objects", and "this medium instead of connecting us with the objects rather cuts us off from them" (cf. [9], p. 36).
15. For Heidegger's interpretation of Kant's concept of appearance see [12], p. 53f.
16. See [10], p. 77: "To offer the idea that the contradiction introduced into the world of Reason by the categories of the Understanding is inevitable and essential was to make one of the most important steps in the progress of Modern Philosophy. But the more important the issue thus raised the more trivial was the solution."
17. Cf. [10], p. 91 (sec. 60): "It argues an utter want of consistency to say, on the one hand, that the understanding only knows phenomena, and, on the other, assert the absolute character of this knowledge, by such statements as 'Cognition can go no further' . . .".
18. Cf. [14], p. 28 (B XXVIIf.): "There is no contradiction in supposing that one and the same will is, in the appearance . . . necessarily subject to the law of nature, and so far not free, while yet, as belonging to a thing in itself, it is not subject to that law, and is therefore free."
19. Cf. [14], p. 479 (B 586): "What we have alone been able to show, and what we have alone been concerned to show, is that this antinomy rests on a sheer illusion, and that causality through freedom is at least not incompatible with nature."
20. For a related criticism see [1], p. 194.
21. That identity is claimed by Kant at various places to hold good, although there is no way whatsoever, within the limits set by the First Critique, of spelling out what the identity would consist in. That identity would have to be a synthesis of the phenomenal and the noumenal, for which there is no categorial basis in Kant. For Kant's identity claim see e.g., [14], pp. 27, 28, 472 (B XXVIIf., 574f.).
22. Cf. [14], p. 84 (B 62): "We commonly distinguish in appearances that which is essentially inherent in their intuition and holds for sense in all human beings, from that which belongs to their intuition accidentally only . . . The former kind of knowledge is then declared to represent the object in itself, the latter its appearance only. But this distinction is merely empirical. If, as generally happens, we stop short at this point, and do not proceed, as we ought, to treat the empirical intuition as itself mere appearance, in which nothing that belongs to a thing in itself can be found, our transcendental distinction is lost."
23. The point is not that for Kant the noumenon must ultimately be posited in the interest of maintaining the possibility of a domain of freedom. What concerns us here is the question whether the conceptual distinctions which are at the very centre of the *Critique of Pure Reason* will not defeat this original intention.
24. See [9], p. 33. In the *Encyclopedia*, Hegel usually refers to natural thinking as ordinary consciousness or, simply, consciousness.
25. See [10], p. 3, sec. 1. It should be added that in Hegel's view philosophy is also a metaphysica specialis in the sense that it treats of the basic concepts of the individual sciences: see [10], p. 13, sec. 9. The subject matter of the sciences may also be considered to be a part of the contents of consciousness, if not of natural consciousness (as with Husserl).
26. Insofar as the subject matter of philosophy is experience or reality as it appears to consciousness, the agreement of any one philosophical theory with experience must be considered at least an external criterion of its truth (cf. [10], p. 8 sec. 6).

27. Philosophy is the transformation of what is known (in the sense of what one is familiar with: das Bekannte) into what is known (in the sense of what is understood or comprehended, das Erkannte), since to be familiar with is not equivalent to understanding: see [9], p. 33.
28. In cases of conflicting evidence, ordinary reflection habitually takes refuge in that kind of systematization which is systematic only in the very superficial sense that it leaves the various items of evidence "side by side in its vague mental spaces, connected only by a bare 'and'" (see [10], p. 30, sec. 20).
29. This suggestion is borne out by Hegel's reference to the belief of consciousness, when engaged in its everyday activities, in the objective value and validity of its thoughts (cf. [10], p. 47, sec. 26). Hegel's contention that the Kantian opposition of the subjective and the objective is prefigured in ordinary consciousness becomes evident, among other places, in [9], p. 45.
30. Thus, for instance, Miller translates "pictorial thought" at pp. 39 and 40 of Hegel's *Science of Logic* [9]; elsewhere he renders Vorstellung or the verb vorstellen as "image or conception" (p. 31), "figurate conception" (p. 33), "idea" and "conception" (p. 34), "ideating" (p. 35). Wallace has "conception" or "picture-thinking" at p. 30 of Hegel's *Logic* [10], where Hegel explains the technical sense of Vorstellung. – I would like to emphasize that in pointing out the variety of terms used to translate a single German expression, I am far from criticizing the translators who seem to me to have mastered an extremely difficult task with admirable skill. I am only trying to direct attention to an unsolved problem in the interpretation of Hegel.
31. In German: "Indem die Bestimmtheiten des Gefühls, der Anschauung, des Begehrens, des Willens usw., insofern von ihnen gewusst wird, überhaupt Vorstellungen genannt werden, so kann im allgemeinen gesagt werden, dass die Philosophie Gedanken, Kategorien, aber näher Begriffe an die Stelle der Vorstellungen setzt" ([7], p. 35). A similar statement is to be found in [10], p. 31, sec. 20.
32. It is on account of the fact that there is no such thing as a concept-free bare particular that the general principle (falsely) attributed to Aristotle and according to which *nihil est in intellectu quod non ante fuerit in sensu* must also hold the other way around: *nihil est in sensu quod non ante fuerit in intellectu* (cf. [10], p. 12, sec. 8).
33. See [10], p. 30, sec. 20. No doubt we may discover here an echo of the Kantian formulation that "the manifold representations, which are given in an intuition, would not be one and all my representations, if they did not all belong to one self-consciousness" (cf. [14], p. 153 [B 132]). Note, however, that Hegel is not concerned, as Kant is, with identifying the conditions of the possibility of the mineness of Vorstellungen and, consequently, that his analysis of knowledge at the level of Vorstellung grants the possibility of Kant's original sythesis.
34. It is thus very appropriate that the English meaning, like the German Meinung, should be an etymological cognate of being mine. Hence Hegel's reference to the mineness of Vorstellungen. It would also seem correct to equate Vorstellung and "idea", if this word be taken in its ordinary acceptation, or Vorstellung and "representation". One could use "representational thinking" as a technical expression to render vorstellendes Denken.
35. "Intelligence is . . . the power of being able to express what it possesses, and no longer to require external intuition in order to have this possession existing within itself. This synthesis of internal image and recollected determinate being is presentation proper [eigentliche Vorstellung]" (cf. [11], p. 155, sec. 454).
36. The dual sense of Vorstellung (Vorstellung as a generic and as a specific concept) is matched in English by "idea", which, at least in philosophical contexts (as with Locke), may cover anything from image to general conception or notion, on the one hand, and "meaning" in the sense of word-meaning, on the other. Hence, it would be correct to render Hegel's Vorstellung by "idea", whenever the term is used in its generic sense. Another possibility would be to translate the generic concept Vorstellung by "representation". In this acceptation, the word seems to have currency in philosophical discourse only.
37. "Through the recollection of appropriating the link which constitutes the sign, intelligence

raises the single link to the permanence of a universality, in which it has name and meaning objectively combined" (cf. [11], p. 199, sec. 461).

38. "On account of determinate presentations, tone articulates itself further as speech and the system of language, and it is this that endows the sensations, intuitions and presentations (Vorstellungen) with a second determinate being . . . , with an existence which is effective within the realm of presentation (im Reich der Vorstellung)" ([11], p. 179, sec. 459).
39. "It is . . . absurd to regard thought as defective and handicapped on account of its being bound to the word, for although it is usually precisely the inexpressible that is regarded as most excellent, this is a vain and unfounded opinion, for the truth is that the inexpressible is merely a turbid fermentation, which only becomes clear when it is capable of verbalization" ([11], p. 205, sec. 462).
40. Cf. [11], p. 201, sec. 462: "It is . . . in the name that the matter [Sache] is present in the realm of presentation [Vorstellung], and possesses validity."
41. Cf. [10], p. 6, sec. 3), where Hegel says that "To have these figurate conceptions [Vorstellungen, "general ideas"] does not imply that we appreciate their intellectual significance, the thoughts and rational notions to which they correspond."
42. Cf. W.D. Ross (ed.), *Aristotle's Metaphysics*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, Z 3, 1029a lsqq., where morphe is said to be a hypokeimenon. On my reading, morphe may be identified with the eidos enon (see K. Brinkmann, *Aristoteles' allgemeine und spezielle Metaphysik*, Berlin-New York, de Gruyter, 1979, pp. 130f.).
43. See, e.g., [14], p. 154 (B 134 footnote). In his *Logic*, Kant says that a concept is a generalized or reflected representation (Vorstellung), a representatio per notas communes or repraesentatio discursiva (cf. *Kant's Werke*, Akademie Textausgabe, vol. IX, p. 91).
44. Cf. [10], p. 30, sec. 20, where the understanding is said to introduce "relations of universal and particular, of cause and effect, etc." and thus to supply "a necessary connection to the isolated ideas of conception [Vorstellung]".
45. This is what was earlier referred to as pictorial thinking-cum-reasoning.
46. Pre-Kantian metaphysics took the thought-determinations to represent the fundamental qualifications of things (Grundbestimmungen der Dinge) (cf. [10], p. 48, sec. 28).
47. Cf. [10], p. 53, sec. 33: Any concept is "a self-contained unity of distinct characteristics". Cf. also [9], p. 35, where concepts are said to be complexes of thought-determinations. An exception to this characteristic of concepts must be made for the concepts of being and nothing at the beginning of the *Logic*. For an interpretation of the role of these special concepts, whose determinateness can only be spelled out on a meta-level, see [3], p. 108.
48. A similar criticism of the form of reasoning characteristic of the understanding was already brought forward at section 20 of the *Encyclopedia*. There Hegel says that the understanding differs from representational thinking only insofar as it brings relationships of necessity to bear on representations, but otherwise leaves the determinations bound up with a given representation in perfect isolation of each other. It is here too that Hegel reaffirms his view that philosophy's business is no other than the transforming of Vorstellungen into thoughts or, more precisely, concepts (see [10], p. 30f).
49. For a related and more extensive account of Hegel's criticism of the subject-predicate sentence as the methodological key instrument of metaphysical reasoning, see the recent study [13], pp. 49ff.
50. The only hint that Kant had already become aware of the structure of what Hegel, in contradistinction to a universal, calls a "concrete concept" is his explanation of the conceptus communis as given in the footnote to section 16 of the second edition of the First Critique (see [14], p. 154 [B 133f]). This, however, does not prevent Kant, in the Analytic of Concepts, from treating the categories as mere titles for thought-determinations, whereas in the Analytic of Principles the categories assume the role of establishing objective time relations, a role not commonly associated with the meaning of category.
51. Thus we get statements such as that "The other [which is the complement of the something], taken solely as such, is not the other of something but the other in its own self, that is, the other of itself [which is, in fact, the something]" (cf. [9], p. 118).

52. Thus, for instance, the concept of a limit combines the determinations of the something and the other (see [9], p. 126).
53. The expression is Klaus Hartmann's.
54. For "reconstruction" see [9], p. 39.
55. See [9], p. 28 for the phrase "concrete universal".
56. The term "genealogy" introduced by Klaus Hartmann is designed to avoid speaking of a deduction in Hegel while retaining a reference to the progressive increase in intelligibility afforded by the dialectic, an increase, however, that becomes apparent only in retrospect. "Genealogy" happily combines all these meanings.
57. Cf. [9], p. 37 and passim. For equivalent expressions such as "pure essentialities" and "pure thoughts" see p. 28 and passim.
58. From this we may conclude that the indictment brought forward against the project of Hegel's *Logic* by the most important among Hegel's early critics, viz. Schelling, was mistaken. For Schelling claimed that the *Logic* was a stringing together of predicates with no foundation in a subject, and hence without a *fundamentum in re* (see [17], XI 335).

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. Bennett, J.: 1974, *Kant's Dialectic*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
2. Hartmann, K.: 1972, 'The "Analogies" and After', in L.W. Beck (ed.), *Proceedings of the Third International Kant Congress*, Reidel, Dordrecht, pp. 47–62.
3. Hartmann, K.: 1972, 'Hegel: A Non-Metaphysical View', in A. MacIntyre (ed.), *Hegel. A Collection of Critical Essays*, Anchor Books, New York, pp. 101–124.
4. Hartmann, K.: 1973, 'Zur Neusten Dialektik – Kritik', *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* 55, pp. 220–242.
5. Hartmann, K.: 1976, 'Die ontologische Option', in K. Hartmann (ed.), *Die ontologische Option*, de Gruyter, Berlin/New York, pp. 1–30.
6. Hartmann, K.: 1984, 'Transzendentale Argumentation. Eine Abwägung der verschiedenen Ansätze', in E. Schaper and W. Vossenkuhl (eds.), *Bedingungen der Möglichkeit, "Transcendental Arguments" und transzendentales Denken*, Klett-Cotta, Stuttgart, pp. 17–41.
7. Hegel, G.W.F.: 1959, *Enzyklopaedie der philosophischen Wissenschaften*, F. Nicolin and O. Poeggeler, Felix Meiner, Hamburg.
8. Hegel, G.W.F.: 1965, *Sämtliche Werke*, H. Glockner (ed.), Bad Canstatt, Stuttgart.
9. Hegel, G.W.F.: 1969, *Hegel's Science of Logic*, A.V. Miller (tr.), Allen & Unwin, London.
10. Hegel, G.W.F.: 1975, *Hegel's Logic*, W. Wallace (tr.), Clarendon Press, Oxford.
11. Hegel, G.W.F.: 1978, *Hegel's Philosophy of Subjective Spirit*, vol. 3, M.J. Petry (ed. and tr.), Reidel, Dordrecht - Boston.
12. Heidegger, M.: 1962, *Being and Time*, J. Macquarrie & E. Robinson (trs.), Harper & Row, New York.
13. Horstmann, R.-P.: 1984, *Ontologie und Relationen. Hegel, Bradley, Russell und die Kontroverse über interne und externe Beziehungen*, Athenaeum-Main, Königstein/Ts.
14. Kant, I.: 1933, *Critique of Pure Reason*, N.K. Smith (tr.), Macmillan, London.
15. Kant, I.: 1950, *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics*, L.W. Beck (ed. and tr.), Bobbs-Merrill, Indianapolis.
16. Locke, J.: 1961, *Essay*, J.W. Yolton (ed.), Dent, Everyman's Library, London.
17. Schelling, F.W.J.: 1966, *Ausgewählte Werke*, Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, Darmstadt.

REINHOLD ASCHENBERG

5. On the Theoretical Form of Hegel's Aesthetics[1]

> I was young and proud, and I waxed in my arrogance when I learned from Hegel that it is not, as my grandmother had supposed, that the dear God resides in heaven, but rather that I myself here on earth am the dear God. (Heinrich Heine, *Confessions*, 1854)

The contemporary relevance of Hegel's *Philosophy of Art* is evident in recent discussions of his emphasis upon the historicity of art (cf. esp. [19, 28, 20, 4]). No other notion in that work has received such conflicting commentaries, or diverse evaluations of its capacity to illuminate the difficult situation of modern art, as the thesis ascribed to Hegel that art has come to its end (cf. most recently [8]). Yet there is no critical edition of the aesthetics lectures, and we must still refer to Hotho's compilation, which, if admirably cohesive, is not unproblematic either philologically or in many details.[2] Research has provided reliable information about the historical development both of the origin and first phases of Hegel's philosophizing in general,[3] and, more pertinently, of the genesis of his theoretical interpretations of art in particular, from the early discussions within the circle of his Tübingen friends up to the Berlin lectures of the 1820's, which presuppose the complete system of the *Encyclopedia* [7] and are the basis of Hotho's edition. These lectures have become an independent work because of the history of their effects. However, their exceedingly complicated theoretical form, which both corresponds to the "mature" Hegel's conception of the *Encyclopedia*'s system and must be considered authentic in its internal structure, has never been adequately analyzed.[4]

In what follows I try to contribute to the analytical description of this form. My working hypothesis is the particular construal of Hegel's philosophy inaugurated by Klaus Hartmann: as a categorial ontology claiming a transcendental grounding.[5] Insofar as the following remarks go beyond an analytic description of the *Aesthetics*, they apply this construal to a domain of Hegel's philosophy which has been similarly construed only in Stephen

H.T. Engelhardt, Jr. and T. Pinkard (eds.), Hegel Reconsidered, 79–101.
© 1994 *Kluwer Academic Publishers.*

Bungay's excellent study [5]. They also reveal certain exegetic and systematic limitations of this construal.

I. ON THE SYSTEMATIC PLACE OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF ART

Hegel presents the outline of his philosophical system in the *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences*,[6] according to which, the doctrine of ontological categories has three parts in all, viz., logic, philosophy of nature, and philosophy of spirit. The *Logic* provides both the basis of the system and the domain of the foundational principles for the other parts – indeed, it contains the logical distillation of the system as a whole – and the articulated grounding of the universal method of philosophy, the dialectic. To the system in the narrow sense, then, i.e., to it as a categorial ontology, those disciplines do not belong which Hegel repeatedly presented in influential Berlin lectures but never published in book form, namely, the philosophy of history, the aesthetics, the philosophy of religion, and the history of philosophy. The reason for this is, to oversimplify, that they do not contain any progressive determination of *categories*. Rather, they seek to interpret philosophically, hence by application of the dialectical method, each of the four "highest" categorial determinations in the system's hierarchy – state, art, religion, philosophy – in their *historical* development; they thus constitute hermeneutic excursus on the historical articulation of these categories. While the logic formally grounds the dialectical method and materially constitutes the *nucleus* of the entire system, the system attains categorial concreteness only in the two parts of the philosophy of the real (i.e., nature and spirit), and concreteness in terms of the philosophy of history, a concreteness which in part is even empirical, in these four excursus.

Hegel construes philosophy as the "*thinking study* of objects" (*E* # 2), so that "its content [is] the *actuality*" (*E* # 6) in its totality. Objects and contents which we cognize already in the intentional modes of intuition and representation are 'translated' from a specifically philosophical perspective into the form of thought, and are thus 'thought through' [nachgedacht], i.e., reconstructed categorially in their truth; in virtue of this *reconstruction*, they are explicitly recognized.[7] (There would be no difficulties in reformulating this thought of reconstruction, which Hegel grasps in the mentalistic language common to early modern philosophy, into the language of linguistic analysis, and thus to speak of kinds of language games, forms of discourse, etc., instead of modes of intentionality.) Such a program for reconstructing granted contents and objects of "actuality" does not, however, go beyond the claim of any descriptively analytic ontology. For Hegel the categorially reconstructible contents must be set out not only regressively, as the rationalization of whatever is granted, but also progressively, in their "*necessity*" (*E* # 9), and that means in the form of "the *a priori*" (*E* # 12); only under the latter condition can a regressive metatheoretical reconstruction be transformed into "the properly philosophical, *speculative thinking*" (*E* # 9); and only as this sort of speculative thinking can categorial ontology appropriate as its own the transcendental claim of a progressive grounding of an *a priori* valid categorial scheme.[8]

How, then, is this strand of progressive transcendental argumentation, which alone can elevate reconstruction to speculation, and thereby to the plane of the Hegelian concept of philosophy, constituted? In other words, how can the necessity of a categorial determination, which has already been regressively grasped in its actuality, be grounded progressively? The necessity of a categorial determination can be shown if and only if it can be demonstrated to be a condition necessary to the very possibility of the dialetical (re)construction of those determinations that, as systematically internal articulations of speculative thinking itself, and thus of the methodological medium and principle of the theory, can for their part only be doubted at the price of self-contradiction, and which therefore allow and require not a transcendental but an 'elenchic' legitimation (cf. [2], pp. 382–389). Such are (at least) the dialectical method, i.e., the so-called 'absolute idea', which is the category that concludes the *Logic*, and with reference to the whole system, its concluding category 'philosophy'. Accordingly, a categorial determination first must be set out regressively as a conceptual reconstruction of contents the instantiation of which is granted; otherwise it would not be a category, but an empty concept, and hence no concept at all. Second, the determination must, as categorial, be progressively deduced as an implicate of the (re)construction of those determinations that conclude the system; otherwise its transcendental or speculative 'necessity' could not be certified.

If one makes both these demands of a particular category, of art in our case, one gets the following. The category 'art' must first – the regressive strand – grasp the essential contents of that which we humans generally understand under art, and do so of course without being a mere reproduction of this richly diverse general understanding. Second, it must – this is the progressive strand – be deduced as an implicate of the category 'philosophy', which, as the conclusion of the system, expresses a resume of all the categories and of their methodological order. These two requirements also indicate the domains where an immanent examination of Hegel's philosophy of art can begin. Accordingly, the first topic to be examined is whether and to what extent Hegel's philosophical definition of art captures our general understanding in its essential strands. Such an examination would of course be a reflection external to the system; yet it is intrinsically required by the system in consequence of the regressive claim of reconstruction. The second topic to be examined is whether and to what extent the concept of art that is established by Hegel in accordance with the logic of the entire system is an implication of the concept of philosophy that terminates the system.

The first question elicits a reflection which, though motivated by systematic considerations, is itself external to the system, and so will not be pursued in these remarks. The second question provokes an examination of Hegel's transcendental or speculative deduction of art and is pursued in the second section. A third question touches on the internal structure of Hegel's theory of aesthetics. In the fundamental concept of the theory, that of art, the systematic categorial understanding of the real is entwined with a hermeneutical excursus on its history. This raises the interesting problem of whether and to what extent Hegel succeeds in connecting the system's categorial determinations in a strict, or at least plausible, way with an interpretation of the philosophy of history, and both again with empirical considerations usually accommodated in the history and science of art. The analytic description of these theoretical domains and of their interrelations are pursued in the third section. Finally, in the fourth section I try to draw out the implications of some of the results of the interpretations of the second and third sections for a transcendental, categorial approach.

II. On the Deduction of Art

The mere fact that there is something we humans call art, categorial determinateness of which we can reconstruct philosophically, does not imply the indispenseability of the concept of art – and whatever philosophy of art develops therefrom – for a transcendental theory of the universe of categories. For it is certainly conceivable that works of art exist but that the category of art cannot be deduced as an implication or necessary condition of the categorial totality. Art might be like Herr Krug's pen: its existence is granted, but there can be no transcendental deduction of a concept of pens in general, much less of Krug's in particular. Hegel must therefore give a transcendental or speculative deduction of the concept of art. A deduction of this sort is always effected in Hegel as a proof, executed by the dialectical method within a categorial genealogy, that the relevant concept is an implication of the absolute determination which concludes the system: it is always effected as an "immanent deduction" (*L* II 219; *E* # 81). Insofar as this proof succeeds, insofar, that is, as the concept is established as the logical antecedent of the genealogical (re)construction of the absolute determination, it can count as transcendentally or speculatively deduced.

Art, together with religion and philosophy, constitutes the sphere of the absolute spirit, which in turn, as the last part of the philosophy of spirit, concludes Hegel's entire system. The philosophy of subjective and of objective spirit encompasses "*finite* spirit" (*E* # 386), but it thereby encompasses spirit as such, which is "the infinite idea" (*ibid.*), "the highest definition of the absolute" (*E* # 384), only inadequately. Spirit first finds adequate reality, one that corresponds to its definition as absolute, when that relation of self-referential subjectivity which spirit signifies – which, as total, is always lacking in the domain of subjective spirit because of the particularity of the latter's theoretical and practical intentions, and in the domain of objective spirit is sundered by the demands of abstract right, moral obligation, and institutional order – is attained in free totality as pure self-referentiality. This distinction between "finite" and "absolute" spirit is neither mysterious nor metaphysical; it formulates a categorially comprehensible difference between inadequate and adequate forms of self-referentially subjective structures. It does not articulate ontically distinct entities, such as finite subjects (e.g., men) or absolute ones (e.g., god/gods); a misunderstanding of that sort would in Hegel's view be a pre-modern and unphilosophical anachronism, a reflex of the "representational" consciousness of religion, as well as of traditional theology and metaphysics to the extent that their points of view are indebted to such consciousness. While the relation of self-referentiality in concrete subjects is inadequately realized in the structure of finite spirit, it is adequately realized in that of absolute spirit. In both cases those ontic entities whose categorially different relations of self-referentiality are grasped in the structural concepts of finite and of absolute spirit are concrete subjects (cf. [22], pp. 590 f.).

We must still clarify how within the sphere of absolute spirit Hegel differentiates art, religion, and philosophy. Only if, first, this differentiation succeeds and, second, art and religion are proven to be implicates of philosophy – which is the resume that terminates the system "in that it ultimately grasps its own concept, i.e., only *looks back* at its own knowledge" (*E* # 573) – are they speculatively deduced in their necessity. This deduction is made difficult by Hegel's thesis that art, religion, and philosophy have "the same content and the same purpose" (*L* II 484); their "*highest* task" is "to bring to consciousness and to articulate the *divine*, the deepest interest of man, the most comprehensive truths of the spirit" (*A* I 20f.); they are as a group distinguished by "equality of content" and by the claim that their common "object" is "the absolute" (*A* I 139; cf. *E* # 573). How, then, if art, religion, and philosophy are supposed to be *identical* with respect to their "content", their "purpose", their "task", and their "object", are they nonetheless separate from one another and to be understood as *categorially different* structural forms of absolute spirit? To make their differences understandable, Hegel on the one hand offers a suggestion contained in the most abstract metacategories of the system's architectonic, according to which the 'one-sidedness' of art and religion is 'absolutely' overcome in philosophy (cf. *E* ## 572f.): art signifies the immediate grasp of the identical content (cf. *E* ## 556f.; *A* I 139); religion, this grasp as "immediacy sublated" in "*finite determinations*" (*E* # 565); and philosophy, the grasp of a completely mediated totality that has thereby been "raised" to "simplicity" (cf. *E* ## 572f.). This suggestion obviously exhausts itself in a sterile rhetoric about dialectic. Were the required deduction of art (and of religion) to depend on it alone, it would be too abstract and devoid of sense to explicate the structural differences of the three forms of absolute spirit.

Hegel does, however, make another suggestion for differentiation: he characterizes art, religion, and philosophy as the three diverse *forms* of bringing the identical content to *consciousness* (cf. *A* I 139), of obtaining *knowledge* of this content that is in each case different in *shape* (cf. *E* ## 553, 556, 565, 572f.). With this suggestion the philosophy of absolute spirit is categorially connected back to the philosophy of subjective spirit, and specifically, first, to the *phenomenological theory of consciousness*, whose fundamental thematic concepts are "consciousness" and "knowledge" (cf. *E* # 420), and second, to the *psychological* or – as I shall henceforth say, following a well-grounded terminological correction of Puntel ([24], p. 132, n. 254) – *noological theory of spirit*. The second connection to the philosophy of subjective spirit results from the circumstance that Hegel defines the three diverse forms of bringing the identical content, the absolute, to consciousness noologically, through the principiating modes of the intentionality of theoretical spirit, viz., through intuition, representation, and thought (cf. *E* ## 445–468): art is knowledge of the absolute in the form of intuiting (and sensing), religion is knowledge of the absolute in the form of representing, and finally, philosophy is knowledge of the absolute in the form of thought.[9] This noological tie comes to have a decisive significance; Hegel uses it not only in the *Encyclopedia* and the *Aesthetics*, but also in the *Philosophy of Religion* and the *History of Philosophy*.[10]

Hegel himself seems to have seen no problem in connecting the philosophy of absolute spirit (of absolute subjectivity) to that of subjective spirit (of concrete subjectivity), even though objections against this measure are obvious. These objections are, in terms of a strict reading of a categorial ontology,[11] the following: First, it is a major *methodological mistake* for speculative ontology, which presupposes that the standpoint of consciousness has been overcome and requires a consistently categorial explication of the sphere of absolute spirit, to regress to the standpoint of phenomenological consciousness, even more so at the stage of theory which is supposed to provide the final grounding of the entire system. Second, there is the no less grievous *categorial mistake* of mixing different dimensions by reducing the determinateness of the forms of absolute subjectivity to those of concrete subjectivity. – I shall return to these objections in Section IV; here I only want to mention a few consequences which result for the issue of the deduction of art (and of religion): The deduction of art (and religion) does not follow purely categorially; and in virtue of the identity in content and function of art, religion, and philosophy, it cannot follow purely categorially. It occurs predominantly by recourse to the theory of consciousness and of subjective spirit, that is, by means of the theory of concrete subjectivity; and in consequence of the differentiation of art, religion, and philosophy in terms of merely intentional forms, it cannot occur otherwise. If it is to be a transcendental deduction, it signifies that art and religion, as well as philosophy, are the functionally necessary forms for the very possibility of concrete subjectivity's becoming conscious of the absolute – necessary, because of the phenomenological and noological constitution of concrete subjectivity. Otherwise formulated, if and insofar as the intentional modes of intuiting, representing, and thinking are the principal noological forms, it must be possible for concrete subjectivity to bring to its consciousness the absolute in the forms of art, religion, and philosophy.[12] In contrast to a hypothetically thinkable, purely categorial deduction, in which art (and religion) would have to be legitimated *in the name of a speculative logic* as necessary conditions for the final systematic determination of the absolute, they are legitimated in the phenomenological-noological deduction which Hegel in fact executes *in the name of a transcendental ontology* from the constitution of concrete subjectivity. One might still want – perhaps because of the methodological and categorial mistakes mentioned above – not to allow these explications to count as an acceptable deduction of art (and religion). Even so, there would remain, as long as they were not replaced by a purely categorial deduction, only the conclusion that art and religion are in principle not at all *systematically* required categorial determinations, that their elevation to such is made illicitly, and that in truth philosophy alone, i.e., the *thought* of the absolute, occupies the sphere of absolute spirit which terminates the system and brings to a close the entire categorial systematic. (In Section IV I formulate an objection to this resolution.) With respect to a hypothetically thinkable, purely categorial differentiation of the sphere of absolute spirit, it suffices to observe that Hegel displays not the least disposition, beyond the unusable rhetoric about the dialectic mentioned above,[13] to give a categorial deduction of art, and that efforts based upon the logic of concept to read them into the *Aesthetics* or into the *Encyclopedia's* philosophy of absolute spirit (cf. [5], pp. 31f.) are not at all persuasive, not even as attempts at non-literal reconstruction.

An additional problem arises because the linearly progressive, *systematic* differentiation of the sphere of absolute spirit into art, religion, and philosophy is also shaped by an analysis of the *philosophy of history*, so that one occasionally gets the impression that the conceptual progression of those three forms is meant to be historical (as well). To be sure, it is possible to read Hegel's formulation that fine art has "its future in true religion" (*E* # 563) as metaphorical garb for what is in itself meant to be a conceptual relation, and to be able similarly to defang other temporalizations. Nonetheless, there can be no doubt that in Hegel's diagnosis of modernity (cf. e.g., [11], esp. pp. 34–58) – which at first, in his Tübingen years, had enthusiastically aimed at a renewal both of the Greek mores of aesthetic and ethical life and of the idea of freedom for all men that attains its harmonious realization as love, in order to fall later into resigned recognition of the ambivalence of the modern world and of its ineradicably disassociating and alienating feature – the insight that art (and in analogous manner religion) is "for us something past", at least "from the side of its highest determination" (*A* I 25, cf. 142; II 233), is essential. – One might think that the conceptually systematic progression and the historical progression, which is part of the philosophy of history, are incompatible and even mutually exclusive, that the deduction of art (and of religion) contradicts its character as past, and that as a result one can construct the following dilemma for the deduction of art (and religion) in terms of the theory of concrete subjectivity just sketched. Either art (and religion) is an implicate of concrete subjectivity; then it cannot be something past, so long as there is concrete subjectivity. Or art (and religion) is, under the conditions of modernity, something past; but then it cannot be an implicate of concrete subjectivity. In this case it would be contingent, and therefore transcendentally neither relevant nor even thematizable. Art and religion would merely be the forms in which the absolute had been brought to consciousness by a particular historical and cultural species of concrete subjectivity, which in the case of art would be that of the ancient Greeks. – In truth, however, this dilemma does not hold. Hegel never maintained anything other than that, with respect "to its highest determination" (*A* I 25), namely, its task of arriving at an *adequate* consciousness of the absolute, art and religion are overhauled in modern times. This diagnosis, grounded in the philosophy of history, contradicts neither the possibility that art (and religion) may in these times achieve a different or new significance in some other regard, nor the possibility of their transcendental deduction from the constitution of subjectivity, which shows all three forms of absolute spirit as functionally necessary possibilities for consciousness of the absolute, even if each of these possibilities may not possess the same actuality in every historical and cultural epoch. Accordingly, Hegel formulates not only a progression from art through religion to philosophy that is systematically, if not categorially, differentiated in terms of the theory of concrete subjectivity. He also formulates a diagnosis in terms of the philosophy of history, according to which the three forms of absolute spirit can do justice in differentiated epochs to their common "highest" task of bringing the absolute to consciousness with different degrees of adequacy, so that art was the most adequate form in the historical and cultural situation of the ancients, while philosophy is such a form under conditions of modern Europe. The former systematic perspective and this perspective in terms of the philosophy of history do not contradict, but complement, each other. Even so, they should be carefully distinguished in order to avoid confusions.

This complementarity of the perspectives of systematicity and of the philosophy of history does lead at one point to a modification of a cardinal systematic thesis of Hegel, namely, the thesis of the identity in content and function of art, religion, and philosophy. To be sure, the thought remains that the common "highest task" of art, religion and philosophy is "to bring to consciousness and to express the *divine*, the deepest interest of man, the most comprehensive truths of the spirit" (*A* I 20f.); yet their different formal determinations also predetermine the specific determinateness of content of the absolute which is present in them:

> For precisely because of its form, art is limited to a certain content. It is only within a certain circle and at a certain stage that truth is able to be presented in the element of the work of art; it must still be part of its own proper determination to proceed into the sensible and there to be adequate to itself in order to be a genuine content of art, as, for example, is the case with the Greek Gods (*A* I 23, cf. 100–102).

Only if, as was the case according to Hegel among the ancient Greeks, the absolute is understood by the historical and cultural epoch itself as something to which the form of its sensible structuring and intuition is adequate, is art the historically "highest mode . . . of one's being conscious of the absolute" (*A* I 24). If, on the contrary, as is the case in Hegel's opinion under the conditions of modern times, the absolute is understood as something to which the forms of sensible intuition and of representation are not adequate, then neither art nor religion can be the highest manner of consciousness of the absolute. That the formal determinateness of the intentional forms of intuition, representation, and thinking modifies the determinate content of the absolute that is presented in them, is part of the significance of the correlativity of form and content according to Hegel's logic of essence;[14] but it is also grounded in the circumstance that intuition, representation, and thinking are not at all simply different intentional forms of reference of the same content; rather, as *noological* structures, they signify three manners of the very relation of self-referentiality which concrete subjectivity *exists* as.

III. ON THE THEORETICAL STRUCTURE OF THE LECTURES ON AESTHETICS

Since Hotho's compilation of the aesthetics lectures has long since become an entity in its own right, and since it is improbable that a future, philologically more reliable edition will offer a text which essentially diverges in questions *relevant to theory*, it is appropriate to describe analytically the theoretical structure of this work. Such a description also appears to be needed. Even though the aesthetics lectures are justifiably considered the best, because fairly easily understandable, introduction to Hegel's philosophizing, and although they can win over the reader through their elegant presentation, as well as, through their conceptual pithiness and overwhelming richness of content, illuminate him with a plethora of significant individual interpretations, just these indisputable qualities can mask the fact that they constitute a very complex theory – or, more precisely, a conglomerate of several partial theories – which reveal to closer examination a considerable heterogeneity. Before attempting to delineate the diverse partial theories or planes of theory and to sketch their interrelations, I should like to develop a few central theses of Hegel concerning the foundations of aesthetics, because these theses might help us to understand the problems of theoretical structure which are here of interest.

Philosophical aesthetics is for Hegel a theory of the beautiful. He defines the beautiful as "the sensible *appearance* [*Scheinen*] of the idea" (*A* I 151). By "idea" Hegel understands the totality of the concept and of its reality, of subjectivity and objectivity, and as such, "the idea is the truth and all truth" (*A* I 150). We can *cum grano salis* equate this concept of the idea with that of the absolute (cf. *A* I 100) and conclude that what shows itself to the senses in the beautiful or as the beautiful is the absolute. This conclusion documents the high rank which Hegel concedes to the beautiful, in that he says it is the appearance *of the absolute*, and so identifies beauty and truth (cf. *A* I 151); but it also documents the defect which he burdens it with, for he says that it remains as well a merely *sensible* expression and only an *appearance* of the absolute. With the determination of the beautiful as the sensible appearing of the idea, a categorial structure from the logic of essence underlies the beautiful (cf. *A* I 21f.), in consequence of which, since appearance [Schein] is a "*determinateness of the essence*" itself (*L* II 11), the beautiful is a determinateness of the idea or of the absolute itself. This interpretation of the beautiful as appearance excludes an aesthetic subjectivism, to be sure, and so excludes the possibility of thus interpreting appearance *exclusively* in phenomenological terms, as the manner of the sensuous presence of the idea in the receiving subject. But it is thoroughly compatible with an interpretation which is *also* phenomenological: for what in terms of the logic of essence is the appearance of the idea *is* in consciousness and is for it a sensuous intuiting of the absolute. The logic of essence not only excludes a one-sided aesthetic subjectivism; more importantly, I think, it makes every aesthetic objectivism impossible: for, as appearance, the beautiful removes itself from every reified or reifying fixation, so that, although the object or event in which one is conscious of the beautiful may be regarded as something reified, its beauty cannot in any case be regarded as a reified quality. To the aesthetic appearance, more than to other types of appearance, there accrues the "advantage that it is significant through itself and refers out of itself to something spiritual, which is supposed to come to presentation through it" (*A* I 23). Differently than other, e.g., empirical, forms of appearance, the aesthetic appearance refers out of itself to the essence whose determinateness it constitutes, since the consciousness of its being an appearance is an element intrinsic to it; and that which appears to aesthetically intuiting consciousness is, in contrast to that which appears to the various other forms of intuition, the absolute.

Hegel's aesthetics is a philosophy of art. A glance at Kant shows that the restriction of aesthetics to philosophy of art is not at all self-evident. Kant's aesthetics has the shape of a general theory of aesthetic judgement, not limited to a theory of art, and in it natural beauty has priority even over the beauty of art, for the former is the paradigm of the latter. Hegel reverses this order of priorities and downgrades the naturally beautiful to a mere 'reflex' of the artistically beautiful (*A* I 15). The systematic reason for this measure lies in the categorial ranking of nature and spirit: just as nature is, in Hegel's language, the merely immediate existence of the idea, so natural beauty is the merely immediate form of beauty as the sensible appearance of the idea (cf. *A* I 157f.). And the main defects of the naturally beautiful result from its being a part of nature: the mutual indifference of inner content and outer shape, the arbitrary dependence upon the system of necessary relationships, and the particularity of all immediate, finite existence (cf. *A* I 190ff.).

Hegel's aesthetics is, as we have seen, primarily a theory of the beautiful and secondarily a theory of art. We can combine these determinations and say that it is a theory of the fine arts or of the artistically beautiful (cf. the introductory sentences of *A* I 13). Inasmuch as the purpose and task of the fine arts is to bring to intuiting consciousness the idea in sensible shape, it binds both "sides of the idea and of its shape" in a correlative unity (*A* I 103). Whatever degree of integration of idea and shape is attained, it is a qualitative criterion of art (cf. *A* I 103, 105f.), and the type of its correlativity is as much a principle of the differentiation of art into the three artistic forms of the symbolic, the classical, and the romantic (cf. *A* I 103, 106), as a foundation of sensible material concretization into the five species of art (cf. *A* I 103f.). The logical structure of the correlativity of idea and shape is conceived in terms of a relationship of essence between "content" and "form" (*A* I 100; cf. *L* II 75f.). – The unity of the aesthetic correlation between idea and shape is designated by Hegel as "ideal" (*A* I 104f.). The ideal is the idea brought to sensible intuition as the artistically beautiful: if, according to the logic of concept, it is as idea already *categorially* individual, yet it is as something that is sensibly shaped by man, as an idea that is brought to material reality and made intuitable by man, also individual in a more external and tangible sense, namely, as a *work* (cf. esp. *A* II 245; also *A* I 44ff., 52ff., 103f.). Hegel's concept of the work of art as sensuously materialized individual idea is so abstract and formal that it can also encompass artistic manifestations from which, as we can often observe in avant garde art in this century, the reified objectivity and persistent solidity, which is traditionally and normally associated in our language with the representation of the work, is absent. It is, therefore, not Hegel's philosophical concept of the work of art, but only our usual representation of this work, which – R. Bubner, for example, has sought to show, ignoring the concept – has been "put most fundamentally into question by the emancipation movement of modern art".[15]

Hegel's aesthetics, as a result of its orientation on the work of art, primarily develops a perspective upon the aesthetic work. However, it does consider secondarily those aspects of the production of art and of the appreciation of the beautiful which stand at the center of Kant's theory. Hegel's elucidations of aesthetic production are distinguished by their realism and temperateness. The universal capacity for artistic production is, according to Hegel, fantasy, the faculty of productive imagination; this capacity however requires rational direction and control, as well as the intensive exercise of technical handiwork (cf. *A* I 44ff., 62f., 362–385). To be sure, Hegel does not fail to realize that productive genius seems to be essentially constituted through a natural and irrational capability; nonetheless, he emphasizes the rational and handcrafting much more strongly than Kant, who tends even to describe genius as a "favorite of nature" psychopathically absenting himself from his subjectivity, and thereby categorially to remand artistic production to the stage of natural events (Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, ## 46f.). Despite remarks about the notion of aesthetic appreciation, Hegel offers no theory of aesthetic judgement and of its validity claim. Kant's doctrine of the *sensus communis*, the principle of the intersubjectively universal validity of that which is imputed by judgements of aesthetic taste, plays no role in Hegel. The few passages in which Hegel expresses himself on this question show that he holds taste *eo ipso* to be subjectively particular and ascribes to the judgement of taste at most a conventionally and contingently intersubjective normativity – but not, like Kant, one that is universally establishable upon an *a priori* principle (cf. *A* I 68f., 71f., 171). Methodologically, the theory of natural beauty, which was developed by Hegel only for the purposes of delimitation, is of interest only insofar as Hegel, compelled by the fact that the naturally beautiful does not possess the character of an artifact, gives up the otherwise dominant perspective of the aesthetic work for the perspective of aesthetic appreciation: for the naturally beautiful can only be discussed insofar as we judge something to be beautiful that is not produced by man (cf. *A* I 167ff.).

The theoretical structure of the *Aesthetics* cannot, of course, be exhaustively described here, only indicated in its fundamental outlines. Let me, then, next sketch in a schematically simplified form the organization and construction of the text of the lectures as Hotho presents them, classify them according to their theoretical type, and then comment upon some of the most important aspects of their theoretical structure:

Schematic Presentation (see p. 91 of this text):

Elucidations

(1) Hegel's *fundamental aesthetics* encompasses, in addition to the transcendental or speculative *deduction* of the fundamental concepts of aesthetics, namely, those of art and of the beautiful (see Section II above), the general *categorial explication* of those concepts, without being particular with respect to forms and species of art. The textual corpus of fundamental aesthetics is therefore constituted not only by part I of the aesthetics lectures (*A* I 127–385), but also by the introduction to these lectures (*A* I 13–124) and the pertinent parts of the *Encyclopedia*'s philosophy of absolute spirit (*E* ## 533–577) and of the *Logic*'s absolute idea (*L* II 483–506, esp. 484f.). To be sure, one cannot reckon all of the introduction in Section I of the lectures to be fundamental aesthetics, for Hegel often enlarges his expositions with illustrations and empirical specifications, e.g., such as those about the sociology, and the production and appreciation of art. This procedure corresponds almost perfectly to the style of a wide-ranging lecture that is concerned to go into particularities and intuitable presentation, and yet it should be clear that those specifications, from which a considerable measure of the public effect of the lectures was supposed to have resulted, do not belong to fundamental aesthetics as such.

(2) In Hegel's *philosophy of art history*, the universal idea of art is differentiated into the particular forms of the symbolic, the classical, and the romantic. Of course, this differentiation follows *conceptually* in accordance with whatever type of correlational unity between idea and shape is explicitly posited in the ideal (*A* I 107, 389; II 263); however, it is also directed by a *philosophy of history* and a *philosophy of the history of religion*. The

Schematic Presentation:

Division of Text			Typological Classification
I. (AI 127–385) Ideal	(*Universal* Idea of the Artistically Beautiful)		A: Fundamental Aesthetics
II. (AI 389–AII 242) Forms of Art	(*Particular* Forms of the Artistically Beautiful)		B: Philosophy of Art History
1. Form of Symbolic Art	(Oriental World)		
2. Form of Classical Art	(Graeco-Roman World)		
3. Form of Romantic Art	(Christian World)		
III. (AII 245–AIII 576) Species of Art	(System of *Individual* Arts)		C: Descriptive Ontology of the Arts
(i) Architecture — Sculpture — Painting — Music — Poetry (symbolic) (classical) (romantic)			a: Mythopoetic Derivation from II (the Forms of Art)
(ii) Architecture Sculpture Painting Music Poetry		(AI 123 f.)	b: Material of the Work
(iii) Architecture Sculpture Painting Music Poetry (Spatiality) (Temporality)		(AI 123 f.)	c: Structure of the Work
(Sight) (Hearing) (Sensuous Representation) (iv) Architecture Sculpture Painting Music Poetry		(AII 254 ff.)	d: Appreciation of the Work
(*) strict ideal pleasant		(AII 246 ff.)	a) Diachronic Stylistics
(**) symbolic classical romantic		(AII 246, 264 f.)	b) Historical Genesis
(***) epic lyric dramatic		(AII 271)	c) Doctrine of Literary Genera



sequence of the three "*world views*", which are held by Hegel to be essential for world history, function as the guiding thread (*A* I 103) for this differentiation. By a world view, Hegel understands the "determinate . . . , but comprehensive . . . consciousness of the natural, the human and the divine" (*ibid.*). The three "types of world view", which are in point of content concerned with the Oriental, the Graeco-Roman and the Christian-Germanic worlds, "constitute the religion, the substantial spirit of the peoples and times, and pass through all the other domains of what is at any time vitally present, just as they do through art" (*A* II 232; cf. also *E* # 562, on the convergence of world history and the history of religion). Since Hegel differentiates the three forms of art not only conceptually, but also in accordance with the guiding thread of the philosophy of history, they can each, in accordance with the theoretical context, be placed and understood, both typologically and historically; however, the conceptual and typological interpretation always remains derivative from that of the philosophy of history, so that Section II of the aesthetics lectures should, as a whole, surely be designated as philosophy of art history (*A* I 389–II 242). (This section also contains descriptively historical and other empirical specifications.)

(3) Hegel's system of the individual arts, Section III of the lectures (*A* II 245–III 574) shows what, in terms of typology, amounts to a *descriptive ontology* of the arts, for it analyzes and puts into theoretical context the ontological structure specific to each of the five arts or species of art in the works of which the universal ideal and the particular forms first obtain aesthetic objectivity (cf. *A* I 114f; *A* II 245). The distinction and derivation of the five species of art reflect diverse points of view. Hegel favors (i) a derivation of the species of art from the forms of art. But there are also classifications which are oriented toward established arrangements of aesthetics and artistic knowledge: (ii) in accordance with the 'sensible material' of the objectification (*A* I 123f.), (iii) in accordance with either the spatial or temporal structure of the work (*ibid.*), and (iv) in accordance with the subject's psychological capacity for appreciating the work[16] (*A* II 254ff.). Each of criteria (ii), (iii), and (iv) is quite plausible on its own, and one could, as Bungay has shown ([5], pp. 90–92), especially with the help of the spatio-temporal schema of criterion (iii), arrive at a combination which would even be capable of accommodating arts that Hegel either had not recognized as genuine, for example, theater and dancing, or that he was not able to consider at all, because, like photography and film, they did not exist in his time. Hegel himself, however, holds that these classificatory viewpoints, even when they have played certain roles in all of his concrete analyses and interpretations, are non-normative, i.e., merely criterial and external. In his eyes, only the derivation (i) of the five species of art from the three forms of art he takes to be 'fundamental types' is immanent, and therefore normative (cf. *A* I 115ff.; *A* II 258ff.). This immanent derivation offers us literarily well wrought narrations, to be sure; it ascends to a veritable mythopoiesis,[17] which would have powerfully impressed the contemporary hearers of the lectures. But precisely for this

reason it renounces the claims of logical rationality to which philosophical argumentation must accommodate itself in order to be taken seriously. Quite apart from more detailed discussion, and from a decision about whether that sort of mythopoiesis can count as philosophically serious, theoretical analysis shows that the ontological structure of this system of the arts has its ultimate basis in the philosophy of history; for it is derived from a theory of the forms of art that is itself essentially based upon the philosophy of history. By contrast, the three divisional criteria that are dismissed by Hegel as external would at least have possessed the one advantage of being able to establish the ontology of the arts on a foundation that is neutral with respect to a philosophy of history.

(4) Each of the five individual species of art is also internally differentiated, to wit, (*) according to styles of art, (**) according to forms of art, and in the case of poetry, (***) according to typical genera of that art. Decisive for viewpoint (*) is an analogy preserved by the tradition and, within the context which determined discussion at Hegel's time, viz., the classical epoch of German literature and philosophy, prominently formulated by Herder and Goethe. This is the observation, taken from the morphogenesis of the organic and then transferred to other domains of reality – to art, in this case – that a "golden age of perfected maturation" has "a period before and a period after this perfection" (*A* II 246). Hegel tries to see an organic evolution in each species of art as a law-like progression from a "strict" through an "ideal" to a "pleasant" style (*ibid.*). His concern is to give a morphogenetically motivated, diachronic stylistics for each of the five arts. – According to (**) it is also *within each* of the five arts, which together are supposed to be derived from the three forms of art, that a development from the symbolic to the classical to the romantic can be discerned as specific to the species of art (cf. *A* II 246f., 271f.). This thought is, quite apart from the question of its substantive possibility, theoretically problematic; for in consequence of it the three forms of art are not only ordered *over* the five species of art as their 'fundamental types', as we had assumed until now; each is also, and at the same time, supposed to be ordered *under* every species of art. It implies further that, in the ontological analysis of the five species of art, the basis of which is a philosophy of art history, there is, in addition to the genetic strand of the morphological stylistics, also the genetic strand of the philosophy of history. These difficulties, considerable by themselves, culminate in the circumstance that Hegel makes this historically genetic strand into the normative principle of division only in the analysis of architecture, i.e., of that species of art which corresponds to the symbolic form of art (cf. *A* II 266ff.); in sculpture the classical is supposed to dominate, and in painting and music the romantic is supposed to do so (cf. *A* II 271); finally, in the case of poetry – here viewpoint (***) comes decisively into play – instead of the detailed differentiation by historical genesis, there is a "division", which is particular to that species of art but otherwise purely structural, "into epic, lyric, and dramatic poetic art" (*ibid.*), and therewith the doctrine of the literary genera. – To me it is clear that this three-fold differentiation is in itself heterogeneous, that there is no

unified shape to its employment, that the relation of (*) and (**) remains fully undetermined, and that in the case of poetry the step of replacing the historically genetic division by a structural one that is particular to that species of art is thoroughly eccentric.

(5) As we have already seen, both in his fundamental aesthetics and in his philosophy of art history, Hegel again and again intrudes into realms of empirical specification and thus into questions and problem fields the discussion of which *ex definitione* can not fall within the possible competence of fundamental aesthetics or of a philosophy of art history. One must not, however, take this state of affairs as indicative either of an intent to flatten the stratification of theoretical levels or of an arrogance about the competence of speculation. Rather, one can explain it in terms of the rhetorical and didactic requirements of lecturing, inasmuch as, in these contexts, empirical exposition has a function that is relevant neither to fundamental aesthetic theory nor to the philosophy of history. By contrast, it is only within the descriptive ontology of the system of arts that empirical positivity is in fact also *theoretically* relevant. To wit, since in the case of the individual arts – otherwise than in the case of the ideal and of the forms of art – "the concrete existence of the art" is supposed to be rendered in terms of the discursive language of philosophy, "we *must* now . . . go over into the empirical" (*A* II 263, emphasis by R.A.). "[T]he historical" – and, differently than in the philosophy of art history, the *empirically* historical – enters "*necessarily*" into the "consideration and evaluation of works of art" that is now required (*A* II 264, emphasis by R.A.). The philosophy of art, insofar as it contains an ontology of the arts, is thus supposed to develop out of itself and into the empirical science of art and the history of empirical art. Hegel thinks that this step is quite necessary: without it, that is, without proceeding out of philosophy, the philosophy of art would not be capable of grasping art in "its concrete existence", for which, differently than for the existence of religion and of philosophy, sensuous externality is *constitutive*.

(6) In Hegel's *Aesthetics*, manifold and sometimes conflicting dialectical and pseudo-dialectical progressions are interwoven into a scarcely transparent network. The macro-structure of the work constitutes a progression, conceived in accordance with the logic of concept, from the universal ideal through the particular forms to the individual arts (cf. for a problematizing discussion: [5], pp. 51–61). Within the philosophy of the history of art, and partly too within the historically genetic differentiation of the individual arts, which itself falls within descriptive ontology, a typology of correlations between idea and shape is set forth in a progression from the symbolic through the classical to the romantic. Although this typology is formulated according to the logic of essence, it is properly founded upon the philosophy of history. The progression among the five species of art is obtained in a mythopoetic procedure, which is at best signified as pseudo-dialectical, from the progression of the forms of art as its "fundamental types". On the plane of each of the five arts a banally dialectical, morphological genesis comes into play in

addition to the quite heterogeneous differentiation by historical genesis. Finally, within the specific art of poetry there is a dialectical arrangement of the doctrine of the literary genera.

(7) The upshot of this attempt to give an analytical description of some aspects of the fundamental structure of Hegel's *Aesthetics* can be summarized as follows: The work offers a highly complex *mixed theory*; it brings together into book or lecture form, and on the categorial foundation of a macro-structure in accordance with the logic of concept, explications which belong *per se* to different planes of theory and are methodologically disposed in very different ways. Fundamental aesthetics, with its transcendental deduction and categorial explication of the general concept of the artistically beautiful, is developed into a philosophy of art history of the particular forms of art, and this is carried over into a descriptive structural ontology of the individual arts. Each of these three theoretical planes is laced with empirical explications (historical, stylistical, and sociological) which are only *de facto* present on the first two planes, but necessarily present on the third. The three theoretical planes, including the diverse strands of the third plane, with its partly dialectical, and partly pseudo- and banally dialectical progressions, are skillfully related to and interwoven with one another; but one cannot assert that these interrelationships are really cogent; rather, in many respects only grounds for their plausibility can be given. This heterogeneity constitutes a considerable fault in Hegel's aesthetics with respect both to the strictness of the logic of this theory and to the purity of its aesthetics. It is nonetheless clear that the unsurpassed richness of content and the admirable hermeneutical power of this work are essentially owed to this heterogeneity and to the inclusion of the empirical and historical concretion.

IV. ON THE TRANSCENDENTAL STATUS OF AESTHETICS[18]

The two main results of this attempt at a summary description of the theoretical form of Hegel's aesthetics are the following: (1) The aesthetics is a complex mixed theory in which several partial theories are woven into a relatively coherent pattern; however, measured both by the systematic root of Hegel's philosophy and by the (other) branches of Hegel's philosophy of history, it is heterogeneous and deficient in argumentative strictness. (2) The deduction of the fundamental concept of aesthetics, the concept of art, is part of an articulation of the sphere of absolute spirit that is not purely categorial but dependent upon the phenomenological and noological philosophy of subjective spirit. Both results put into question the option of reading Hegel's systematic philosophy as a categorial ontology which claims a transcendental grounding.

With respect to the first result, viz., that the aesthetics must be characterized as a mixed theory, it is clear that only the fundamental aesthetics can be part of a system of categorial ontology. The philosophy of art history should then be seen as a historical and hermeneutical excursus of the system. The descriptive structural ontology of the arts appears methodologically and typologically to represent something unique in Hegel's philosophy. It cannot belong to the categorial system, because its foundation is an excursus of that system, namely, the philosophy of art history. The ontology that arises from the philosophy of art history differentiates itself from absolute spirit's other excursus, the philosophy of the history of religion and the history of philosophy, by the fact, unique to it, that it *necessarily* – namely, in virtue of its object, which alone possesses concrete existence in the form of works that are brought into sensible objectivity, and for which this form of existence is therefore essential, indeed *defining* – discharges itself into empirical and historical concretion, and therewith into positive theory. Accordingly, its object, art, leads Hegel's aesthetics not only out of the categorial system into a philosophy of history that, within the 'types of world view' that constitute the forms of art, explicates the particular historical conditions of art's objectification into its *individual types*, but further, out of this into the empirically filled structural ontology of the arts. Hegel was consistent in making the necessity, grounded in the concept of art itself, of this transition from speculation to the empirical into the architectonic principle of the *Aesthetics*; for its macro-structure, regulated by the logic of concept, which leads from the universal through the particular to – what in the particular case of art is necessarily not only conceptual, but also sensible – the individual, is just the methodological expression of that necessity. To this extent, the methodological heterogeneity of aesthetics, its character as a mixed theory, is an implicate of its object, at least in its fundamental lineaments. Does not aesthetics therefore disrupt every attempt to read Hegel in terms of a categorial ontology, and this not only *de facto*, but precisely in virtue of the *logic* of its concern, art, which lives only in the individual work? And to the conceivable suggestion that, for the sake of its purity and homogeneity, Hegel's aesthetics should be limited to fundamental aesthetics and subsumed in this reduced form into the categorial system – quite apart from the fact that this suggestion would do violence to the logic of the *Aesthetics* – should not one also object that it demands the abandonment of precisely that which for more than 150 years has continuously preserved its hermeneutical power?

With respect to the nature of the deduction of art in fundamental aesthetics, it has already been shown that this deduction follows not purely categorially, but only by recourse to the philosophy of subjective spirit, and that this can be seen to involve, first, a methodological mistake, and second, a categorial one. In order to do more than simply concede that there is such a mistake, one could seek either to remove the theoretical defects by reconstruction, or one could contend that theoretical defects are actually being made here. I should like initially to set forth and criticize the first possibility and then to defend the second.

Just as the methodological mistake seems to consist in the introduction of the difference of consciousness into the speculative doctrine of categories, so the categorial mistake seems to consist in the reduction of the distinctive determinations of absolute spirit to those of subjective spirit. Two possibilities suggest themselves for removing the alleged defects in the course of reconstructing Hegel's thoughts. Either one could seek to reformulate purely categorially the phenomenological and noological sequence of the three determinations of absolute spirit which are identical with respect to their function and content and different only with respect to their intentional forms. This attempt could find support in the pair of categories, governed by the logic of essence, that lies at the basis of the correlation of form and content in theoretical consciousness, as well as in the thought of the relativity or reversibility of form and content (cf. *E* ## 3, 133), and it would lead to the thesis that the differentiation of the sphere of absolute spirit only *seems* to follow from the phenomenological standpoint of consciousness, but that in truth it follows categorially. However, this way would at best remove only the methodological defect; for in terms of *content*, the separation of art, religion, and philosophy would even then require recourse to the corresponding noological distinctions, and thereby to the theory of concrete subjectivity, if the categorial reconstruction of the difference of consciousness should be regarded as having succeeded methodologically. – Or, much more radically, one could abruptly reduce the three determinations of absolute spirit to one determination, namely, philosophy, and set aside the others, art and religion, as irrelevant to the categorial *system*, since they are not determinations that are *functionally* required to construct the ultimate and self-grounding conclusion of the system; they would then be classified as possible objects no longer of a speculative doctrine of categories but simply of historical and hermeneutical reflection. Even so, however, this not unattractive suggestion would not remove the defects named; the residual concept of absolute spirit, of philosophy as *thinking* the absolute, still contains both the form-content difference proper to consciousness and, ingredient in the determination "thinking", a recourse to the noological theory of concrete subjectivity.

The failure of both these suggestions for removing the defects by reconstruction encourages the assumption that the alleged defects are in truth not defects at all. – Once the metaphysical (mis-)understanding of absolute spirit and therewith the picture that it is concerned with an ontically absolute entity, whatever that might be, is overcome, one realizes instead that in the concept of absolute spirit Hegel tries to articulate the distinctive structure of just that relation of subjective self-referentiality which is spirit in general, and the ontic bearers of which are concrete subjects, and in particular, if accidentally, the exemplars of the biological species *homo sapiens*. Then, if the basic structural determinations of concrete subjectivity are established in the philosophy of subjective spirit, and if the distinctive structure expressed in the concept of absolute spirit cannot be construed otherwise than as resulting from these basic determinations, then the theory of absolute subjectivity *must* be bound to that of concrete subjectivity, both in terms of content and in terms of method. The philosophy of absolute spirit deals with (a distinctive structure of) concrete subjectivity, and the speculative doctrine of categories only assumes in its final stage strands of the transcendental ontology of subjectivity.

According to the explications by Hegel in the introduction of the *Encyclopedia*, which are definitive for the standpoint of the developed system, philosophy is to be understood as a categorial reconstruction, within the medium of thought, of contents that are presented in other forms of intentionality. Philosophical thought therefore has, with respect to the truth, a privileged position over and against the other modes of intentionality; but it still remains dependent upon the forms of intuition and representation, for it would have no extensional content without them (cf. on the justification of this interpretation: [1], pp. 254–259). In the introduction of the *Encyclopedia* this theorem about reconstruction is, as it must be in an introduction, only asserted and presupposed; its grounding can, however, ensue in the course of the articulation of the entire categorial system, one of whose tasks is to elucidate conceptually the intentional forms of subjectivity and their interrelations, as well as, in particular, that intentional form which designates the operative medium of the theory itself: thought. Within the entire Hegelian system the determination 'thought', which is distinctive because operative within the theory, occurs thematically in three or four places. Each of these places articulates a transcendental or speculative self-reflection, since each points to the theoretical operator in a different and in each case indispensable function: in the *Logic*, as the transcendental or speculative *intensional* semantics of determinations of thought purely as such; in the *phenomenology* and *noology* of *subjective spirit*, as an epistemology of concrete subjectivity integrated into an ontology of the real; and in the *philosophy of absolute spirit*, as the system-terminating self-reflection of the specifically philosophical claim of knowledge of the totality (cf. *E* # 467; on interpretation cf. [24], pp. 136 ff.). While the capacity of thought to categorize contents presented in other forms of intentionality evidently *cannot* be discussed within the *Logic*, phenomenology and noology display this same capacity, along with a dependence of thought upon the intentionality of intuition and representation,[19] which for their part, to the extent that they are shown to be functionally necessary conditions of thought itself, are transcendentally legitimated. Accordingly, intuition, representation, and thought are to be categorially differentiated as the essential, and functionally necessary, possible forms that the theoretical intentionality of concrete subjectivity can take, and the cognitive dispositions of intuition and representation are established as necessary conditions for the possibility of every thought that is *extensionally* related to content, i.e., that is related to the real.

But if intuition and representation are already set out as preliminary stages of thought in the general epistemology of concrete subjectivity, why must there also be a discussion of them once more in the form of art and of religion? Because the specific proof of that capacity which is specifically claimed by philosophical thought, namely, to grasp the absolute and the totality in concept, is not furnished with the general proof, set forth in the philosophy of subjective spirit, of the general capacity of thought to reconstruct the contents of intuition and representation in their truth. The philosophy of the absolute spirit is concerned not with any particular content whatsoever but with the absolute. It must therefore be demonstrated capable of thinking this distinctive content, and, indeed, this content in its concreteness, as it occurs pre-philosophically, in the forms of aesthetic intuition and religious representation that are necessarily presupposed by philosophical thought.[20] Accordingly, if Hegel's speculative doctrine of categories *must* have recourse to the philosophy of concrete subjectivity precisely at the stage of its fulfillment, if it takes on strands of transcendental ontology precisely here,[21] then it is ultimately the *epistemology* implicit in Hegel's program of categorial reconstruction that makes each of the three possibilities of bringing the absolute to consciousness, possibilities that are functionally necessary in terms of theoretical subjectivity, also necessary in terms of the categorial system. The philosophical thought in which the system culminates should, therefore, be able to explicate in its conceptual structure all that concrete subjects know, even when they, as is usually the case, are not thinking philosophically.

NOTES

1. I first presented several of the thoughts in this paper within the aegis of a seminar on "Conceptions of Philosophical Aesthetics", which took place in Oberjoch under the direction of Klaus Hartmann. In the running text I use the following abbreviations to refer to Hegel's works: *A* I, II, III = [18], vol. 13, 14, 15 (*Vorlesungen über die Aesthetik*); *E* = *Enzyklopaedie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundriss* [17]; *L* I, II = *Wissenschaft der Logik* [15].
2. Cf. most recently [9], esp. pp. 94 ff.; [10]. These contributions show that Hotho attempted to turn Hegel's progressive and cosmopolitan views back into nationalistic ones. This tendency of Hotho, however, expressed itself primarily in certain interpretations of particular works of art, and not in theoretical and structural questions.
3. A good introduction into the most important results of this research, initiated in the German-speaking world by Dieter Henrich and Otto Poeggeler, is to be found in [6], esp. pp. 63 ff.
4. The most recent contribution by O. Poeggeler [23] is not very fruitful. H. Zander [29] analyzes the *Aesthetics* in terms not of its internal logic but of extrinsic criteria. An interpretation worth reading for its treatment of questions of theory is P. Szondi's ([25], esp. pp. 589–638).
5. Cf. esp. the following works by Klaus Hartmann: [12, 13, 14]. Recently V. Hoesle [22] has formulated a comprehensive theoretical account of the transcendental interpretation of Hegel's philosophy.
6. I neglect the question as to whether the *Encyclopedia* offers the only possible or adequate presentation of the whole system. In any case it is the only actual presentation; on this question, or rather on the thesis that several forms of presentation are possible, cf. [24]. On critique, see [22], esp. pp. 116–122.
7. For the attempt at a more accurate presentation of the strands of this concept of reconstruction, which was first emphasized by Klaus Hartmann, see [1], esp. pp. 254 ff. Outside the circle of those authors who have been immediately influenced by Hartmann, Hegel's concept of reconstruction has been defended by L.B. Puntel ([24], esp. pp. 185–195, 247–258).
8. For my attempt to systematically develop within a Kantian context the thesis that

transcendental philosophy presupposes a structurally progressive theory, see [2], index, catchphrase "Theoriestruktur". For an application of this thesis to a Hegelian context, see my "Kategoriale Transzendentalphilosophie. Unzulängliche Bemerkungen zu einem Theorieprogramm", in D. Koch and K. Bort (eds.), *Kategorie und Kategorialität. Historisch-systematische Untersuchungen zum Begriff der Kategorie im philosophischen Denken* (Festschrift für Klaus Hartmann), Koenigshausen & Neumann, Würzburg, 1990, pp. 439–456.

9. Cf. *E* ## 556, 565, 572; *A* I, pp. 139–144. In order not to complicate the problem unnecessarily, I disregard the details of how far the anthropological determinations play a role and how far noological determinations are yet again conveyed phenomenologically.
10. Cf. [18], vol. 16., pp. 27–35; vol. 18, pp. 81f., 88–113. Of course, the noological connection is also present in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, which, as a precategorial introduction into the system, is a theory of consciousness and spirit.
11. Objections of this kind, if not exactly these, can already be found in C.H. Weisse's detailed review of the aesthetics lectures [27].
12. Next to the transcendental argument that was sketched above, the theory of concrete subjectivity also admits of an argument, which can be properly called "axiotic", for the necessity of art. To wit, art offers the subject the possibility of appreciating its true freedom and worth – a possibility which is denied it as long as it remains within the domains of nature and finite spirit (cf. *A* I, p. 201f.). According to this argument art would be, so to say, an axiotic extrapolation from the deficiency of finitude. En passant one also finds in Hegel the thought that art is the condition of the self-formation of concrete subjectivity (cf. *A* I, p. 50f.). This is a thought which plays an important role in the transcendental-axiotic grounding of aesthetics in the work of Hans Wagner ([26], # 27). In any case, the axiotic motive does not assume a crucial role in Hegel's aesthetics.
13. In opposition to S. Bungay ([5], p. 32), I do not hold Hegel's use of the determination of conceptual particularity in *E* # 566 to be an unambiguous indication that he had seriously thought about an explication of the sphere of absolute spirit in accordance with his dialectical logic of concept.
14. For Hegel's formulation of the thought that the formal noological determinations modify the content, see *E* ## 3, 22, 133.
15. Cf. [3], pp. 38–73, here 62, cf. 49. In consequence of this interpretation, the crucial theses of Bubner's otherwise interesting article are problematic. Also cf. [7], pp. 294–304, on the concept of the work of art in Hegel's *Aesthetics*.
16. We shall hereafter take for granted the division into fine arts (sense of sight), audible arts (sense of hearing), and poetry (faculty of sensual representation). By the standards of the categorial doctrine of subjective spirit, the foundations of these divisions are heterogeneous, because sight and hearing are anthropological determinations (cf. *E* # 401), whereas the faculty of representation is a noological one (cf. *E* ## 451–464). There is also the problem that the noological form of representation is assigned to religion.
17. On the nice transitions from architecture to sculpture and from sculpture to the other arts, cf. *A* I 117ff. For another critique of Hegel's derivation of the species of art from the forms of art, cf. [22], pp. 625 ff., 636 ff.
18. In opposition to Klaus Hartmann, I am of the opinion that Hegel's *Realphilosophie* can be read as transcendental theory not as such, i.e., as a whole, but only in certain selected parts. Cf. [2], pp. 374–382, 397–399, 433–438. Cf. also the essay quoted in n. 8.
19. Cf. [24], pp. 184–200. This *genetic*, although for concrete subjects functionally necessary, dependence on intuition and representation does not compromise the *a priori validity* of thought. Hoesle has correctly made this point against Puntel ([22], pp. 79 ff., esp. p. 80, n. 50).
20. Cf. Hegel's own emphasis on the functional necessity of the noological forms in *E* # 573.
21. This confirms a suggestion I made earlier ([2], pp. 437f.), that there is a necessary complementarity of concrete and absolute subjectivity and of consciousness-oriented and speculative transcendental philosophy. D. Henrich has recently formulated a similar idea under the motto of a systematic "unification" of the basic thoughts of Kant and Hegel ([19], pp. 173–208, esp. 206–208).

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. Aschenberg, R.: 1976, 'Der Wahrheitsbegriff in Hegels "Phänomenologie des Geistes"', in K. Hartmann (ed.), *Die ontologische Option*, de Gruyter, Berlin/New York, pp. 211–308.
2. Aschenberg, R.: 1982, *Sprachanalyse und Transzendentalphilosophie*, Klett-Cotta, Stuttgart.
3. Bubner, R.: 1973, 'Über einige Bedingungen gegenwärtiger Aesthetik', *Neue Hefte für Philosophie* 5, 38–73.
4. Bubner, R.: 1980, 'Hegel's Aesthetics - Yesterday and Today', in W.E. Steinkraus and K.I. Schmitz (eds.), *Art and Logic in Hegel's Philosophy*, Humanities Press, Sussex; Harvester Press, New Jersey, pp. 15–33.
5. Bungay, S.: 1984, *Beauty and Truth. A Study of Hegel's Aesthetics*, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
6. Fulda, H.F.: 1981, 'Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel' in O. Hoeffe (ed.), *Klassiker der Philosophie* II, Beck, München, pp. 62–92.
7. Gethmann-Siefert, A.: 1984, *Die Funktion der Kunst in der Geschichte. Untersuchungen zu Hegels Aesthetik*, Bouvier, Bonn.
8. Gethmann-Siefert, A.: 1984, 'Hegels These vom Ende der Kunst und der Klassizismus der Aesthetik', *Hegel-Studien* 19, 205–258.
9. Gethmann-Siefert, A.: 1986, 'Die Rolle der Kunst im Staat. Kontroverses zwischen Hegel und den Hegelianern', in A. Gethmann-Siefert and O. Poeggeler (eds.), *Welt und Wirkung von Hegels Aesthetik*, Bouvier, Bonn, pp. 65–102.
10. Gethmann-Siefert, A.: 1987, 'Kunst für schwache Kosmopoliten', *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 30.9, p. 36.
11. Habermas, J.: 1985, *Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne*, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main.
12. Hartmann, K.: 1972, 'Hegel: A Non-Metaphysical View', in A. MacIntyre (ed.), *Hegel. A Collection of Critical Essays*, Anchor Books, New York, pp. 101–124.
13. Hartmann, K.: 1976, 'Die ontologische Option', in K. Hartmann (ed.), *Die ontologische Option*, de Gruyter, Berlin/New York, pp. 1–30.
14. Hartmann, K.: 1988, *Studies in Foundational Philosophy*, Rodopi, Amsterdam.
15. Hegel, G.W.F.: 1934, *Wissenschaft der Logik* Bde I, II, G. Lasson (ed.), Meiner, Hamburg.
16. Hegel, G.W.F.: 1965, *Aesthetik*, F. Bassenge (ed.), Europäische Verlagsanstalt, Frankfurt am Main.
17. Hegel, G.W.F.: 1969, *Enzyklopaedie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse* (1830 ed.), F. Nicolin and O. Poeggeler (eds.), Meiner, Hamburg.
18. Hegel, G.W.F.: 1969, *Werke in zwanzig Bände*, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main.
19. Henrich, D.: 1966, 'Kunst und Kunstphilosophie der Gegenwart (Überlegungen mit Rücksicht auf Hegel)', in W. Iser (ed.), *Immanente Aesthetik Aesthetische Reflexion* (Poetik und Hermeneutik II), Fink, München, pp. 11–32.
20. Henrich, D.: 1974, 'Zur Aktualität von Hegels Aesthetik', in H.-G. Gadamer (ed.), *Stuttgarter Hegel-Tage 1970*, Bouvier, Bonn, pp. 295–301.
21. Henrich, D.: 1982, *Selbstverhältnisse*, Reclam, Stuttgart.
22. Hoesle, V.: 1987, *Hegels System*, Meiner, Hamburg.
23. Poeggeler, O.: 1986, 'System und Geschichte der Künste bei Hegel', in A. Gethmann-Siefert and O. Poeggeler (eds.), *Welt und Wirkung von Hegels Aesthetik*, Bouvier, Bonn, pp. 1–26.
24. Puntel, L.B.: 1973, *Darstellung, Methode und Struktur. Untersuchungen zur Einheit der systematischen Philosophie G.W.F. Hegels*, Bouvier, Bonn.
25. Szondi, P.: 1974, *Poetik und Geschichtsphilosophie* I, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main.
26. Wagner, H.: 1959, *Philosophie und Reflexion*, Reinhardt, München/Basel.
27. Weisse, C.H.: 1838, in *Hallische Jahrbücher für deutsche Wissenschaft und Kunst* 1, pp. 1673–1676, 1681–1720.
28. Wolandt, G.: 1967, 'Zur Aktualität der Hegelschen Aesthetik', *Hegel-Studien* 4, 219–234.
29. Zander, H.: 1970, *Hegels Kunstphilosophie. Eine Analyse ihrer Grundlagen und ihrer Aktualität*, Henn, Ratingen.

THOMAS J. BOLE, III

6. The Cogency of the *Logic*'s Argumentation: Securing the Dialectic's Claim to Justify Categories

I. PROMISE AND PROBLEMS

Klaus Hartmann reads Hegel's philosophy as a non-metaphysical theory of categories that combines classical ontology's concern with conceptualizing determinations of being qua being, and modern philosophy's concern with explaining why such conceptualizations must be accepted by the subject as true. Accordingly, the *Science of Logic* presents a successful transcendental argument for those categories in virtue of which thought accounts for being's explanability in the course of accounting for itself as explanatory (cf. [12], pp. 3f.).[1] His philosophy of the real presents a similar transcendental argument, justifying more concrete categories as principiata of the *Logic*'s categories (cf. [13], p. 277). Such a reading navigates the Charybdis of making Hegel's system inextricably depend upon an indemonstrable metaphysics of absolute idealism, and the Scylla of divorcing particular critical insights from their own systematic place in Hegel's system. On this reading, the dialectic provides the principle in terms of which the categories are supposed to be justified, and the cogency of the justification requires that it be independent of any metaphysical claims.

The success of the dialectic's justification of categories, however, remains an open question. Hartmann has only set out his reading of Hegel's system programmatically [12, 13, 14]. It has not been shown that the reading is in fact successfully executed by the details of the *Science of Logic*. There are also several reasons for wondering whether it can be executed, and so for doubting that the *Logic* can provide a successful transcendental argument. One is that many of the *Logic*'s particular transitions obviously lack soundness.[2] This would seem to defeat the cogency of the dialectical weaving of the whole of the *Logic*. A second is that, even if one were to allow that the dialectic does weave a cogent whole, it is unclear what particular categories are, or could be, thus justified. Entire subsections of categories in the *Logic* seem to presuppose either an outdated picture of the world (e.g., the subsection of objective explanation, 'the object', with its categories of mechanism, chemism, and teleology) or an obsolete notion of explanation (e.g., concepts of pre-Fregean

H.T. Engelhardt, Jr. and T. Pinkard (eds.), Hegel Reconsidered, 103–117.
© 1994 *Kluwer Academic Publishers.*

formal logic). Third, even if one could resolve the intrinsic problems of the *Logic*, it is difficult to see how one could claim that a successful deduction could be given of particular categories of the real, i.e., of categories of the sort that are handled in Hegel's philosophy of nature and the philosophy of spirit. If the *Logic* succeeds at all, it does so because it and the categories it justifies are shown to be principles for the explanation of any possible ontology of our particular natural and human worlds. These ontologies are particular, contingent, and revisable; so, too, must be their explanatory principles. It is difficult, therefore, to imagine how the dialectic, even if it succeeds in the *Logic*, can sublate the contingent character of the explanatory principles of the real, as it must if these principles are to be given a transcendental deduction.

Such are the doubts surrounding Hartmann's reading of Hegel's system as a theory of categories for which the dialectic provides the equivalent of a transcendental deduction. In what follows I shall be primarily concerned to show how the *Logic* provides in principle such an argument, and what categories are thereby secured. I then say in what sense one can and cannot talk about transcendentally secured categories of the real. First, however, I expand upon the importance for Hartmann's reading of showing that the *Logic* does in principle provide a successful transcendental justification of categories.

II. CONSTRUING THE SYSTEM

Hartmann construes Hegel's systematic works – the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, *Propaedeutic*, *Science of Logic*, *Encyclopedia*, and *Philosophy of Right* – as doctrines of categories ([12], p. 2]). Of these the *Phenomenology* argues that any claim about an object of consciousness, or scepticism about the veracity of such a claim, or theory about the conceptual scheme or cultural context embracing such a claim, logically presupposes "absolute knowledge". That is, self-consciousness about such claims and sceptical doubts presupposes that the terms for framing them – subject and object, being for another and being in itself, etc. – are drawn by, and can be explained in terms of, explanatory thought. The *Science of Logic* is supposed to provide this explanation. It explains what that "absolute knowledge" is by explaining what thought is as explanatory, and why explanatory thought's general explanandum, being, is accessible to explanation. The concepts by which thought is thus explicated would then equally be the general determinations of being in virtue of which it is intelligible. They would be justified as general categories of being, because they would have been shown to be logically presupposed to explain anything in particular, even why we should adopt a sceptical or relativist standpoint. The *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences* outlines the categories of Hegel's system of philosophy, dividing it into two parts, logic and a philosophy of the real, which in turn is divided into natural philosophy (*Philosophie der Nature*) and a philosophy of the human world

(*Philosophie des Geistes*).[3] The philosophy of the real argues that the categories of the *Logic*, which have been shown to be so because they have been shown to be principles of explanatory thought in general, are foundational for the explanatory principles of the full-bodied world of human experience that ordinary and scientific, artistic, and religious discourse articulates. If the *Logic* cannot be shown to be, or to provide the lineaments of, a successful transcendental deduction, then the philosophical cogency of Hartmann's reading of Hegel's system, as well as the basis of Hartmann's own critical analyses of other transcendental arguments, is brought into question.

III. THE NEED FOR TRANSCENDENTAL ARGUMENT

The categorial claim for Hartmann implies a transcendental claim, because it claims that being is as the category conceptualizes it ([3], p. 3). Hartmann is clearly correct on this point.

A category is a conceptual determination of what being is. To be sure, such a description would seem to fit most of our concepts when they function in true propositional claims. Most of our concepts articulate determinations that are necessary to explain some aspect of being, where 'being' is taken in the most generic sense, as that which refers to possible objects of theoretical claims. But their meaning depends upon their functions in propositions with which we deal with those objects; i.e., it depends upon their function in what Kant would call synthetic *a posteriori* propositions. Their truth is more or less dependent upon, and subject to modification by, their function in the web of propositions by which we make sense of and explain things. These propositions are determined by our perspectives upon things, and are subject to revision so as to help us better to deal with those things. Categories also function in this way; they help make sense of and explain things, as when we name particular substances, or qualities, or persons (i.e., subjects, in Hegelian terms). However, they function differently insofar as they are categories. The categories of substance, quality, subject, etc., claim to conceptualize determinations of being qua being. Such determinations are different from non-categorial determinations of the real, because as categories they are not determinations of some particular region of being but principles of all particular determinations of the real, and all particular regions of being (cf. [1], IV, 1). They also claim to be principles in that they ground the intelligibility of being, as Aristotle remarks of the principle of non-contradiction (cf. [1], IV, 3). The categories of substance, quality, subject, etc., claim to conceptualize determinations of what being is per se, and to be true of being apart from being propositionally asserted of, or referred to, particular substances, or qualities, or subjects, etc. In epistemological terms, they claim to be logically presupposed by synthetic *a posteriori* propositions. In other words, categories claim to conceptualize those determinations of being, in the sense of the general explanandum of explanatory thought, in virtue of which its intelligibility, or accessibility to explanation, can be accounted for.[4] As categories they claim to be ingredient in the very logic of being, i.e., to be determinations necessary for being to be truly explainable. One or more of the categories would, therefore, be ingredient in any true explanation (of that region), and as a group they would be necessarily presupposed by every true explanation because they are implicated in what it is for being (of that region) to be explainable. Because such a claim is logically presupposed by any particular judgments, categories claim to be *a priori* true.

One can, of course, make categorial claims without advancing a transcendental argument in their behalf. Aristotle does [1], and so does Nicolai Hartmann (cf. [16], pp. 13ff.). However, without transcendental argument it is difficult to understand precisely the roles of categories as general principles of being and knowledge.[5] One might show that the categories are required, or logically presupposed, by some concretely familiar view of reality (or domain of the real, or picture of objective or intersubjective experience, or language game). This is a procedure familiar to Aristotle ([2], I, 1, 184 a15ff.) and Hegel (e.g., [17], I, p. 11f.), in which one analyzes concrete experience in order to explicate the principles upon which it depends. Indeed, this procedure is necessary in order to grasp and articulate the contents of the principles. But it is by itself insufficient to explain two features claimed by categories. The first is their claim to be determinations of being qua being, rather than of this or that particular view of the real, or particular picture of objective or intersubjective experience. Second, even in the case of indisputable determinations of being qua being, such as the categories of substance, quality, and quantity, their explication is likely to be determined in ways that are contingent to the view from which they are taken. Kant's category of substance has nothing of the form or soul, the autonomous center of activity, that marks Aristotle's category of substance. Categories must be analytically explicated from the various domains of our knowledge, in order to assure that they conceptualize what is the case, that they do so in its essential lineaments, and that what they conceptualize are principles for these domains. Nonetheless, the analytical explication of their principles is insufficient to show that they are categories; it marks them only as metatheoretical, and therefore logically dependent upon the domain from which they are analyzed. As Hegel remarks, and Hartmann has emphasized, to establish their categoriality, they must also be progressively reconstructed, or justified, in terms of thought as a logically absolute principle of explanation, so that they are freed from their dependence upon the particular domains from which they are analyzed and shown to be ingredient in the very rationale, or explanability, of being ([18], ## 9, 12; [13], pp. 268f.).[6] They would then be established as determinations of being qua being, because they would be shown to be required in order for any particular determinations of what is the case to be accessible to explanation. Such is the program of Hegel's *Science of Logic* read as a successful transcendental argument justifying the categories.

IV. THE STRUCTURE OF THE ARGUMENT

Why should one agree with Hartmann in regarding this program as having been successfully articulated in the *Science of Logic*, in the face of the faulty execution – of which no one was a keener analyst than Hartmann – of many of its details? What are the features of the *Logic* that make it a successful transcendental deduction of the categories of being qua being quite apart from the defects in many of its particular lineaments?

The answer to the former question is that the *Logic*, alone among the programs in the history of philosophy, gives a systematic explanation of the unity of thought and being, i.e., the categorization of being, in terms of thought alone. No other terms could justify categorial determinations as true, because all other terms that would explain the unity of thought and being presuppose that being is intelligible, which is what an account of categorial thought is supposed to explain.[7] One may object that an account in terms of thought alone is a petitio. But because the account must justify categories as principles of explanation, normative for whatever can be truly explained, it cannot rely upon non-categorial items; it must be an account in terms of explanatory, or categorial, thought itself.

The answer to the second question lies in appreciating the two parts of explanatory thought's account of its unity with being. The first is that the *Logic* offers a structured exposition of those concepts in virtue of which the intelligibility of being, that is, the accessibility to explanation of the most generalized explanandum, is itself supposed to be made intelligible or explained. The second is that the method by which the structured exposition is set out is itself a function of the categorial claim of the concepts involved to render being in terms of explanation. In the course of reconstructing itself as explanatory, categorial thought would thus reconstruct those concepts in virtue of which being is accessible to it. Since explanatory thought is itself a principle that not even the sceptic can deny, it only remains to be seen how the account proceeds in each of its parts.

The structured account must treat all of the concepts involved in explicating thought's categoriality in such a way as to show that the explication completely explains categoriality. Since the account must be worked out intracategorially, it must begin with a category. On the other hand, because the account must be presuppositionless, it cannot simply assume being's categorization but must provide a warrant for saying that being admits of categorial explanation. The structure of the account must commence, therefore, with the categorization of the intrinsically uncategorized, i.e., unexplained, character of that which is to be categorized. It must show that that which is itself indifferent to categorial explanation is nonetheless subject to the jurisdiction of the categories. It first shows categorially that, if being is not nothing,[8] it must admit of determinations that are immediate, i.e., indifferent to each other and to that which explanation makes of them. This is the so-called doctrine of being. But even as indifferent, they are differentiated for explanation. The *Logic* therefore proceeds to a phase in which categorial determinations are intrinsically related to each other, so that one pole of the relation is the explanans in terms of which the determination of the other pole is explained, but in which the significance of this relationship is not itself explained. This is the doctrine of essence. Because the *Logic* must explain both why categorial determinations can be explained in terms of their relations to one another and its own status as categorially explanatory, it culminates in a phase in which the status of categorial explanation is itself explained, the doctrine of concept. This is simply to say that the *Logic* progresses from being considered as it is "in itself", i.e., apart from that in terms of which its determinateness is explained, to being considered as "for itself", i.e., as explicitly explained in its own terms, the being of concept, and through an intermediate stage of differentiation. What is *a fronte* a progression from being that is explainable to the determination of explanatory thought in terms of which that explanability is explained, is *a tergo* a regress to the standpoint of explanatory, or explicitly categorial thought. The *Logic* is a reconstruction within the domain of categorial explanation of those determinations in terms of which being's intelligibility is explained, and which therefore say what thought is such that in its explanatory function it can in principle explain that of which is supposed to be true. It is explanatory thought's explanation of itself, of thought as categorial.

This structure is ordered architectonically by the purpose of the *Logic*, to show that being, that which is in and by itself not categorially determined, is intelligible or explainable in categorial terms. To achieve this purpose, the development from one phase to another must also be accounted for. Since the general character of each phase is too undifferentiated to do this, each phase must itself be internally complex, exhibiting a development from point of origin, what it is "in itself", to point of completion, what it is "for itself". The concepts taken up in the course of the *Logic*, therefore, are those expressing determinations that can be understood as terms in the development of one or the other of the *Logic*'s phases. Each such concept assumes a distinctive logical function relative to its role in explaining the categorization of being and thereby explicating thought as categorially explanatory. It is this logical interpretation, the special systemic meaning each concept has in virtue of its place and role in explicating the account of explanation, that frees that concept from its non-categorial connotations and marks it as a category.

In addition to the architectonic principle in virtue of which the categories are assigned logical functions, the *Logic* also requires a principle of development to exhibit just what the logical function of each category is, and to justify the development of the account of categorial explanation from that function to the next. The principle is Hegel's dialectic or, in its application to particular categories, determinate negation ([17], II, p. 487). It is Hegel's method of moving from one category to the other and of drawing the logical connections between them as it goes.

The nature of the dialectic and the rationale for its employment are dictated by what it means to say that a category has a logical function in the account of explanation. We have suggested that the logical functions of the categories are the roles they play in explicating the categoriality of thought and thus explaining explanation. But the conception of a successful explanation of explanation that is inherent in the *Logic*'s architectonic has it that explanation is to be explained by showing that being, that which in and by itself is without a principle of explanation, is itself a moment of explanation ([17], II, p. 484). Understood as logically functional, therefore, the categories are renderings of being in terms of explanation. To say that the categories possess logical functions is to say that they mark off the differences that being makes to explanation by figuring as one of its moments, and the differences that explanation makes to being by rendering being in terms of explanation. The dialectic is the procedure for construing categories so as to make their logical functions explicit ([17], II, p. 501). It does so as follows.

Each category in the *Logic* occurs as a rendering of being in terms of explanation. It is a conceptualization of what explanation makes of being. It marks a difference which explanation makes to being by being conceptually determined. The first step of the dialectic is to render the otherness of being with respect to explanation (and so with respect to what explanation makes of it) as the negation of the posited categorial content. In other words, given any category, the dialectic posits that category's negation. It states the otherness of being and explanation in terms of what has already been explained. In this first negation, therefore, explanation makes itself explicable by rendering its otherness to what has been explained in such a way that that otherness can be explained ([17], II, pp. 495–496). The dialectic then accounts for the opposition that characterizes the otherness of being and negation as stated in the first step. This second negation resolves that opposition by comprehending it in a new categorial determination that explains being so as to incorporate all previously stated otherness into it. The resulting category then serves as the basis of a new dialectical development ([17], II, p. 502).

The dialectical method of the *Logic*, therefore, involves just the explication of the categories' logical functions. It is a procedure for moving from one category to another without imposing an external methodological principle upon them ([17], II, p. 486). The method of the *Logic* turns out to be the same as its content; it is the same as the array of its categories construed as logically functional. The dialectic is categorization ([17], II, p. 496), the overcoming of the prima facie otherness of being and explanation through comprehensive conceptualization ([17], II, p. 496). The categories of the *Logic* are entailed in the dialectic's explanation of being's accessibility to explanation, and therefore in its explanation of explanatory thought (cf. [17], II, pp. 500, 505). They are justified as categories of being qua being, because they are shown to be principles of being and principles normative for knowledge, principles that, as implicates of the principle of explanatory thought, are logically presupposed in any explanatory claim.

It is this unity of architectonic and method, I suspect, that is the basis of Hartmann's confidence in the *Logic* as a successful transcendental argument on behalf of categories. The method shows that, insofar as being can be conceived at all, it is intelligible, or accessible to thought, and thought is in principle explanatory of that intelligibility. The architectonic orders those concepts that can be shown by the dialectic to play logical roles in the explication of explanatory thought. That certain of the *Logic*'s transitions are faulty, or that Hegel does not purify some categories of extralogical associations, e.g., in mechanism and chemism, does not undermine the *Logic*'s achievement of being a consistent program for explaining the unity of thought and being, i.e., for explaining what categorial thought is in a way that shows why some of the elements of that thought, some of the categories, must principle both any determination of being and any explanation.

V. WHAT CATEGORIES ARE JUSTIFIED

Nonetheless, the method cannot stand alone, and the architectonic makes no sense unless there are certain concepts for it to order. Some categories are justified because they represent certain logically necessary steps in the explication of explanation, and other categories can be accommodated by the explication. It may be worthwhile indicating which categories are justified by the *Logic* and why.

Those categories are justified that are necessary to constitute each of the three phases of the *Logic* and to constitute those steps within each phase in virtue of which that phase develops. These steps number nine. The first, however, because it must be presuppositionless yet point beyond itself, has complications.

Being must first be accounted for as simply – immediately – determined, or in Hegel's terms as *quality*. In order to do so, the *Logic* must show, on the basis of a presuppositionless beginning, that the principle of being's determinateness is not extrinsic to being. This it does by giving a genesis of being's determinateness that shows that being, were its determinateness not conceptualizable, would be indistinguishable from nothing. The *Logic* begins with the concepts of *pure being* ("Sein", not "Seiendes"), *pure nothing*, and *becoming*. Pure being and pure nothing are, as Hegel remarks ([17], I, p. 70), "Gedankendinge", i.e., theoretical constructs rather than items instanced in the real. Insofar as being is not distinguishable from something that could be other than it, it is for thought indistinguishable from pure nothing. But inasmuch as it is supposed to be distinguished from pure nothing, being must be understood not simply as being but as determinate by explicit contradistinction from nothing. Hegel must give a genesis of the determinacy of being that undercuts the distinction between being and its negate. Otherwise, the negate's opposition, in terms of which the determinations of being are reconstructed, would be presupposed, and the resulting determinations could not be shown to be congenial to being rather than drawn in terms of an external perspective. The concept of becoming is the indeterminate unity of being and nothing, reflecting both the indistinguishability and the intended distinction of being and nothing. Conceptually, the category of becoming is an abstraction of the category of *determinate being* in general (Dasein). In the concepts that initiate the *Logic*, therefore, Hegel gives a genesis of being's determinateness. The genesis is the argument from within the *Logic* against the sceptic that, if being were not intelligible as determinate, it could not be distinguished from nothing. Hegel can then argue that determinate being in general ("Dasein") is determinate because negation is ingredient in it: it is not nothing.[9]

As determined, or qualitative, being is what it is in virtue of that which is the negate of it and can be contradistinguished from it. Immediately determined being is indifferent to what it is not, but its negate must be different from it in order for it to be determined at all. As indifferent to that which is extrinsically differentiated from it, being is categorized as *quantity*. The quantity of something does not further determine it. But even as indifferent, being is differentiated. Consequently, determinate being cannot be only immediate. The category of *measure* expresses the resulting contradiction in accounting for determinateness simply in terms of immediate being and its negate, that being is intrinsically determined (therefore differentiated) by being extrinsic to that by which it is differentiated.

The contradiction is resolved by considering that same structure from the standpoint of that in terms of which the being's determinateness is accounted for, i.e., in terms of the negative. Hegel construes the relational structure of *essence* in terms of reflection, or self-relating negativity. (Hegel recognizes that essence is necessarily relational, but nonetheless employs the nonrelational name by which the tradition nominated the determining relatum.) The negativity of reflection is identical with itself in its negative, the being which it determines. What is determined, on the other hand, is not only that in which, by being essentially determined, negativity is identical with itself; it can also be considered as the simple negative of the essentially determining reflection, the essentially determined thing in which the reflection fulfills its grounding function. The immediacy of this negative shows that for Hegel reflection does not account for the existence of that of which it is the essence. As self-relating negativity, reflection must presuppose its negative as that for which it functions as ground, which is to say why in terms of the logic of explanatory thought essence must presuppose the being of that onto which it reflects and which it determines. It is also to say that the essential relationship is an explanatory relationship, but one that is immediate, not explicitly explanatory.

The logic of essence is the development of reflection so as to account for this presupposed immediacy. First, the structure of reflection is explicated as that which is identical with itself in essentially determining its negate. This is essence as determining *ground* or substructure of something with essential determination(s). Second, since reflection's grounding relationship is itself determined in that into which it reflects, its negate, this is examined in the category of *appearance*. The essential ground is so in the determinations of appearance that it grounds. Appearance is not only that in which negativity is identical with itself, or reflected, in the determinations that it grounds; appearance is also the negative, or other, of the negativity. However, considered by itself appearance does not make sense save as the negative of negativity. The laws unifying the determinations of appearance are not only not hypostasized noumenal essences or things in themselves; the laws into which the determinations of appearance reflect are unifying grounds in appearance. As self-relating, negativity cannot be understood apart from its negative, that is, apart from the determinations of appearance which it reflects into and grounds, so the determinations of appearance, considered by itself, must reveal the unifying ground.

Each of ground and appearance, when considered apart from the other, reflects into the other. Each thus determines itself as the negative which the other is. The logical unity of their mutual implication is self-grounding *actuality*, or substance that manifests itself by determining its accidents. However, the immediate being of each of substance and accident contradicts the logical unity. And the contradiction is resolved by considering the self-grounding unity not as really existing but simply as conceptual. The doctrine of *concept* constitutes the third phase of the *Logic*.

The development of concept posits the totality structure of concept in its moments. The first is that of *subjective logic*, the treatment of the structures of formal inference. These claim to be normative for explaining what is other than thought, its objects, but do not claim to constitute explanations of those objects. For Hegel this moment consists of the terms, judgments, and syllogisms of syllogistic logic. It suffices to overlook the particular faults, e.g., in the treatment of syllogistic, and note that the section would have to be radically reworked in order to rationalize dialectically formal inference as understood in the wake of Russell and Frege. The second moment, that of *objectivity*, considers structures of material inference, of types of systems explanatory of the subject matter of theoretical claims. Here the *Logic* treats the systems of mechanism, chemism, and teleology. The faults in the treatment are clear: thematically, mechanism depends upon the real, for it is a system explanatory of pluralities coexisting externally, or spatially. Systematically, the only sort of system explanatory of objectivity appropriate here is that in which the objectivity is governed by subjective purpose, which is a system of purposiveness, not a teleology, which is more precisely a functionalism. The final moment of the logic of concept is that of the *idea*, the explanation of explanation, and therefore of explanation's own being. The idea is fully articulated in the categorial expression of the dialectical whole, the *absolute idea*.

These are the clearly necessary categorial steps to the *Logic*. They correspond to the three major phases and the development of each phase, as well as to the *Logic*'s initial steps which articulate categorial antecedents of determinacy. Given this necessary structure, an ampler exposition should show some additional sorts of categories that obviously fit it. The first are those at each phase of the *Logic* that limn the argument of that phase that being – as immediate in the first phase, and as an essential relationship in the second – is as that phase conceives it to be: in the first phase, this is the transition from *determinate being* to *being for itself*; in the second phase, the transition from *identity* to *ground*. (That there seems to be no such corresponding set of categories for the doctine of concept suggests a defect in Hegel's execution of the *Logic*.) The other sort are those concepts that cannot be treated elsewhere, because they are too general to belong to this or that particular domain of reality or of explanation, e.g., something, other, unity and plurality, identity and difference, form and matter, essence and existence, appearance and reality, thing and properties, whole and parts.

The crucial point, however, is that the dialectic recapitulates the architectonic. The architectonic can order any candidate for a category in its proper place, between pure being and pure nothing, which are the elements of any intelligible determination of being, and the determination of thought as categorially explanatory, i.e., as the absolute idea. Because any categorial candidate claims to render being in terms of explanation, that candidate should, if it is indeed a category, be able to be dialectically reconstructed, so as to be purified from its non-categorial experiential connotations, and architectonically placed according to its function in a complete account of categorially explanatory thought. The adequacy of this program for accounting for categorial thought, along with the absence thus far of any sufficiently nuanced alternative in the history of philosophy,[10] is sufficient proof of the correctness of Hartmann's confidence in his reading of the *Science of Logic* as a transcendentally justified theory of categories. The *Science of Logic* successfully articulates the lineaments of this program in sufficient detail to assure its success, despite faulty explications of particular categories, insufficient refinement of content so as to prune experiential and not properly logical connotations, faulty transitions between categories, faulty placement of particular categories, and probable omissions.

VI. Some Implications

Some of the implications of Hartmann's transcendental reading of the *Logic* may be worth noting.

First, the comprehensive character of dialectical explanation permits one to go beyond proposing alternatives to those explanatory schemes he finds insufficiently explanatory. Rather, they can be comprehended in an account which explains the senses in which they can be said to be indispensable, theoretically attractive, as well as the senses in which they are defective. The *Logic* can therefore provide diagnosis of the explanatory schemes of special-metaphysical explanations of what there is, explanations that depend upon supersensible existents such as Spinoza's absolute substance, or Kant's subjective idealism. From within the standpoint of the dialectic as explanatorily absolute, special-metaphysical explanations are shown not to be generated by properly explanatory demands, for these have their proper telos in the absolute idea. Hartmann's reading of the *Logic* is anti-metaphysical, therefore, in that it deprives special metaphysics of its theoretical justification. Moreover, details of the *Science of Logic* that are metaphysical, such as the claim that everything is inherently contradictory ([17], II, p. 59), cannot be included in the reading of the *Logic* given here.[11] If they were included, they would undermine the *Logic*'s claims to explain explanatory thought ("das begreifende Denken", [17], I, p. 23). The function of thought as explanatory is logically presupposed by any claim to explain what is the case extra-categorially, and could not itself be explained in terms of such claims.

In the face of Hegel's use of "transcendental" as a derogatory term, it is worth noting why it can be used appropriately of his system, once it is removed from its Kantian context and used to refer to argument in terms of logically absolute thought to justify the normativity of categories. The object of Hegel's philosophical concern is the absolute, which is idea and, more concretely, spirit epitomized as philosophy. Unlike a metaphysical absolute such as Spinoza's substance, Hegel's is not only the object of reflection but also that which is the organ of critical reflection. It thus constitutes argument the validity of which can be detached from the claim that the absolute idea, or absolute spirit, exists apart from the rational argument that constitutes it. In taking the former apart from the latter, Hartmann's non-metaphysical, categorial, and transcendental reading can capture the argumentative core of Hegel's philosophy.[12]

Hartmann has noted that Hegel gives the first extension of categories since Aristotle, to categories for subjectivity and for explanation ([14], p. 215f.). Such an extension is necessary not only for explaining structures of the human world such as civil society and the state,[13] but also for understanding what validity structures, e.g., in theoretical claims and practical activities, are. A special-metaphysical reading, however, would seem to destroy the peculiar value of these categories. Since such reading logically presupposes validity structures, it cannot explain them. Moreover, if one construes the concepts by which Hegel explains structures of the human world metaphysically, they could not be understood to be compatible with the freedom of the plurality of individual human subjects that are encompassed by them. The state, e.g., would not be understood as the realization of certain practical goals of the citizenry, with which the individual can identify in thought, but as a supraindividual whole whose compatibility with the goals of the individual could not be understood. A metaphysical reading, then, would undermine what many readers of Hegel take to be one of his peculiar virtues.

One implication of the transcendental reading of the *Logic* with respect to regional categories, e.g., of nature or of the human world, of the sort Hegel treats in the philosophy of the real, should be noted. The concepts there treated show how the logical principles of categorization principiate what we ordinarily take to be explanation in the realm of objective and of human experience. However, since experience is open-ended and susceptible of alternative conceptualizations, revision in Hegel's philosophy of the real is possible. (Indeed, it is probably called for in the case of his categorization of nature.) This means that a strict transcendental justification cannot be given of the concepts treated in the philosophy of the real, Hartmann to the contrary notwithstanding (e.g., [13], p. 277).[14] Their content remains in some way determined by the particular conception of experience, or of language, or of the real, from which they are analyzed. The dialectic constitutes only the formal principle of the philosophy of the real, not its material principle, i.e., not its conceptual contents. Their dialectical reconstruction explains their normative elements in terms of the logical categories that principle them. Moreover, it draws dialectical relationships between them in accordance with their indifference to or congeniality with the demands of explanation. But it cannot justify their *a priori* truth. Even so, the *Logic* articulates a principle that even the sceptic and the relativist must presume, and the philosophy of the real shows how the elements of this principle of explanation ground what we happen to take to be true explanations of the real. From this angle, the sceptic and the relativist will have to mount their own positive counterclaims, a task that seems impossibly formidable in the face of transcendental reading of Hegel's system.

In fine, Hartmann's transcendental reading of Hegel's *Logic* and the larger system makes good sense philosophically. Even so, Hegel's execution of that program in the *Science of Logic* has so many flaws that scrutiny of those flaws in detail, and of how they would have to be repaired in order to execute Hartmann's reading consistently, would surely be worthwhile.

NOTES

1. Hegel would have called such an argument 'speculative', because he uses 'transcendental' to refer to arguments made in terms of a particular existent self-conscious thinker (cf. [17], I, p. 46), such as are found in Kant and early Fichte, and such arguments assume a certain picture of how the thinker and the world interact to yield knowledge. Properly grounded transcendental argument – speculative argument – undercuts this picture.
2. An obvious example is the transition from mechanistic to teleological explanation in the doctrine of concept's treatment of objectivity, or the norms of material inference ([17], II, pp. 353–396). Teleological explanation refers to functional explanation, though the dialectic requires purposive explanation. This problem is also adverted to in the text below, in discussing the categories that are dialectically secured.
3. The *Encyclopedia's Logic* is a brief version of the *Science of Logic*. The differences between them, especially in the 1830 version of the *Encyclopedia*, are not insignificant. These differences may be ignored for the purposes of this paper, which shall use "*Logic*" to refer to the *Science of Logic*.
4. This characterization anticipates the characterization sketched below of Hegel's program; but it seems to be congenial as well to Aristotle's categories, and to Kant's, if we abstract from the worldview Kant presupposes, that knowledge is restricted to sensible objects.

5. One is liable to lapse into pre-critical metaphysics by mistaking the categories' claim of logical priority for one of ontic priority, as Aristotle does in epitomizing the expression of *to on he on* in *to theion* (cf. [9]). Hartmann suggests that special metaphysics, i.e., *a priori* claims about objects transcending possible experience such as God, result from such mistakes, and his reading of Hegel's system shows that the demands of explanation can, and are properly, met without special metaphysics. Cf. [14], p. 198: "the development of ontology from a doctrine of categories to a body of assertions popularly called 'metaphysics' has given rise to objections. These objections are invariably due to a confusion of categories and specific existence claims in connection with them – the prototype is Aristotle's bifurcation of ontology as the science of '*to on he on*' and of '*to theion*' – or to imaginative inferences playing over into 'special' metaphysics (cf. e.g., Kant's characterizations of metaphysical assertions about the soul or of a first cause). A doctrine of categories has no such special existential implicates. . . ."
6. The theoretical importance of the distinction between regressive metatheory and transcendental argument proper, which must be progressive, has been emphasized by Reinhold Aschenberg [3].
7. In the alternative, if they assume or assert that being is not intelligible, they would be committed to saying what being is such that it is unintelligible. This is a contradictio in adiecto, unless they mean to be saying in what respects being is susceptible to full explanation and in what respects it is not, i.e., is simply immediate, which is what the account of categorial thought in the *Logic* does, as we shall see.
8. This assumption is categorially articulated at the very beginning of the *Logic*, and is discussed below.
9. He can also go on to reconstruct the determinations of being to the point at which thought, which turns out to be determinate double negation, is that type of being which explains the determinateness of its negate. At the end of the *Logic*, thought can explain itself as being that which is identical conceptually with the being which it explains, and yet able to differentiate itself from its explanandum in order to explain it. Pure being and pure nothing may be viewed *a tergo* as abstract expressions of the absolute idea, i.e., of thought's dialectical union with being.
10. Hartmann briefly considers some of the possible alternatives, including the most plausible, that of Hans Wagner [20], in [12]. For a brilliant analysis of the various types of possible alternatives, see R. Aschenberg ([4], pp. 365–440). As is clear from [6], Aschenberg thinks that there is a necessary complementarity between the logically absolute transcendental philosophy of the *Logic* and concrete, consciousness-oriented transcendental philosophy. I am less certain.
11. I show why such assertions play no role in the cogent development of the structure of the essential relationship, or in the categories of identity, difference, contradiction, and ground that are elements of that development, in [8].
12. In [11], Hartmann's reading of Hegel's philosophy is criticized for disregarding too much of Hegel's actual philosophical writings ([7], p. 3; [21], p. 124). This criticism has been sufficiently answered with respect to the philosophy of history and the philosophy of religion by T. Pinkard [19], and with respect to aesthetics by S. Bungay [10] and Aschenberg [6]. Aschenberg shows how the categorial reading of the *Logic* and the *Encyclopedia* may be viewed in connection with Hegel's lectures as a whole, and his lectures on aesthetics in particular.

   F. Beiser [7] holds that Hegel's position is that of a critical, rather than a pre-critical, metaphysician, because the absolute is to be conceived "in naturalistic terms", rather than in terms of a transcendent existent (p. 8); "Kant denies, and Hegel affirms, that we can know that nature *is* an organism" (p. 9). But it is difficult to see how such alleged knowledge would be different from alleged knowledge about the world as a whole, which does transcend possible experience. It is also difficult to see what is wrong with the non-metaphysical reading of the philosophy of nature, as the explanation of how the appropriate categories of the *Logic* provide principles and explanations for what we take to be explanatory principles of nature, that which is determined as external to explanatory thought.

T. Wartenberg [21] argues that Hegel's idealism must be regarded as a metaphysical "conceptual idealism according to which conceptuality itself determines the nature of objectivity. This conceptuality is then applied to two domains – nature and spirit" (p. 117). Concept or idea develops from what it is in itself, to what it is for itself, spirit as the rational structure of reality (cf. pp. 112–114) by means of negation and contradiction. The problem with accepting this reading is precisely its metaphysical, non-transcendental, non-explanatory strand: Why think it true, or ascribe it to Hegel in place of the more plausible, transcendental (or, in Hegel's terms, "speculative") reading, which, as Aschenberg, Bungay and Pinkard show, can make better sense of at least as much of Hegel's philosophical writing?

13. By way of illustrative contrast, Aristotle knew that the state was no accidental unity; but in terms of his categories he can only describe it as a number of substances. In contrast, Hegel can describe it as a unity of objective spirit, i.e., a development of practical reason, with which the individual citizen can identify insofar as the state executes some of the aims of practical reason.
14. This has been pointed out by R. Aschenberg [5].

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. Aristotle: 1957, *Aristoteles Metaphysica*, W. Jaeger (ed.), Clarendon Press, Oxford.
2. Aristotle: 1966, *Physics*, W.D. Ross (ed.), Clarendon Press, Oxford.
3. Aschenberg, R.: 1978, 'Über transzendentale Argumente', *Philosophisches Jahrbuch* 85, 331–358.
4. Aschenberg, R.: 1982, *Sprachanalyse und Transzendentalphilosophie*, Klett-Cotta, Stuttgart.
5. Aschenberg, R.: 1990, 'Kategoriale Transzendentalphilosophie?', in D. Koch and K. Bort (eds.), *Kategorie und Kategorialität*, Königshausen & Neumann, Würzburg, pp. 439–456.
6. Aschenberg, R.: 1994, 'On the Theoretical Form of Hegel's Aesthetics', in this volume, pp. 79–101.
7. Beiser, F.: 1993, 'Introduction, Hegel and the Problem of Metaphysics', in [11], pp. 1–24.
8. Bole, Thomas J., III: 1987, 'Contradiction in Hegel's *Science of Logic*', *Review of Metaphysics* 40:3, pp. 515–534
9. Brinkmann, K.: 1979, *Aristoteles' allgemeine und spezielle Metaphysik*, Walter de Gruyter, Berlin.
10. Bungay, S: 1986, *Beauty and Truth: A Study of Hegel's Aesthetics*, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
11. *Cambridge Companion to Hegel*: 1993, Frederick C. Beiser (ed.), Cambridge University Press, New York.
12. Hartmann, K.: 1976, 'Die ontologische Option', in [15], pp. 1–30.
13. Hartmann, K.: 1988a, 'Hegel: A Non-Metaphysical View', in [15], pp. 267–287.
14. Hartmann, K.: 1988b, 'On Taking the Transcendental Turn', in [15], pp. 193–219.
15. Hartmann, K.: 1988c, *Studies in Foundational Philosophy*, Editions Rodopi, Amsterdam.
16. Hartmann, N.: 1949, *Neue Wege der Ontologie*, W. Kohlhammer Verlag, Stuttgart.
17. Hegel, G.W.F.: 1935, *Wissenschaft der Logik*, G. Lasson (ed.), 2 vol., Felix Meiner, Hamburg.
18. Hegel, G.W.F.: 1959, *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse (1830)*, F. Nicolin and O. Poeggeler (ed.), Felix Meiner, Hamburg.
19. Pinkard, T.: 1991, 'The Successor to Metaphysics: Absolute Idea and Absolute Spirit', *The Monist* 74:3, 295–328.
20. Wagner, H.: 1967, *Philosophie und Reflexion*, Ernst Reinhardt Verlag, Munich.
21. Wartenberg, T: 1993, 'Hegel's Idealism: The Logic of Conceptuality', in [11], pp. 102–130.

GEORGE KHUSHF

7. The Meta-Ontological Option: On Taking the Existential Turn

Klaus Hartmann has advanced a "non-metaphysical" reading of Hegel which he calls "the ontological option" ([9], [10]). With this reading one carefully distinguishes between "ordinary level" concerns, such as whether or not something exists, and "pure categorial" concerns, in which a systematic program is developed for the satisfaction of reason.[1] Through the non-metaphysical reading one thus avoids confusing transcendental and ordinary domains. However, in this essay I shall argue that the ontological option develops only one side of the non-metaphysical reading. It enables one to appropriately take the "transcendental turn" and thereby guards against the importation of ordinary level concerns into the transcendental level [6]. It "makes space" for the satisfaction of reason ([9], p. 1). But it does not sufficiently develop the implications of the transcendental, systematic ordering for ordinary level concerns.[2] Nor does it sufficiently guard against importing results into the ordinary level that are only applicable at the pure transcendental level. We also need help in taking the turn back to the ordinary level once we have taken the transcendental turn – a turn back that I shall call the "existential turn".

In this essay I shall attempt to address these deficits by developing the non-metaphysical reading as a meta-ontological option. This will involve extending H.T. Engelhardt's characterization of the dialectic as meta-ontological to Hegel's whole system [1]. In so doing I shall suggest that when the non-metaphysical reading of Hartmann is carried out to its full implication, it not only enables the satisfaction of certain "luxury" concerns in philosophy ([10], p. 124), but it also has profound implications for ordinary level concerns.

I. THE NON-METAPHYSICAL READING OF HEGEL

Traditionally three major criticisms have been leveled against the philosophy of G.W.F. Hegel:

1. Hegel conflates thought and the world: The world of thought is no

H.T. Engelhardt, Jr. and T. Pinkard (eds.), Hegel Reconsidered, 119–142.
© 1994 *Kluwer Academic Publishers.*

longer distinguished from the world of existence.[3] An example of this can be found in the way he takes a process of thought (the dialectic) and views it as a process of history.[4] But such a conflation falsifies both thought and existence. There is an irreducible difference between the two such that existence "stands out" (existere) of thought even as it stands in it.[5]

2. Hegel conflates a category and that of which it is a category[6]: A category is a function of thought which enables the appropriation and integration of a non-categorial or trans-categorial content (existence). There is thus a difference between a category and that of which it is a category (the content that is being appropriated).[7] But Hegel abolishes the difference. In the *Encyclopedia* the categories are taken as the true content of all affirmations and concerns. They appropriate no other content than themselves. It is only on the basis of this false identification of category and content that Hegel can make the claim that he has grasped The Truth in its appropriate medium.[8]
3. Hegel conflates otherness and negativity: The facticity of existence – the existential surd – is of great significance to the concrete, existing person. But to pure thought this otherness is nothing or "negativity". Pure thought cannot grasp the irreducible otherness of existence. Thus metaphysically there is a difference between otherness and negativity, but for thought, epistemologically, there is no difference because thought cannot grasp the difference in terms of itself. Hegel falsely took the epistemological identity of otherness and negativity as a metaphysical identity.[9]

Klaus Hartmann accepts the validity of the three above-mentioned distinctions, but he argues that they do not provide the basis for a criticism of Hegel. In order to defend Hegel, Hartmann distinguishes between a metaphysical and a non-metaphysical reading of the *Encyclopedia*. The above criticisms assume that Hegel's thought should be interpreted metaphysically. But Hartmann advocates a non-metaphysical reading in which the *Encyclopedia* is viewed as a "foundational ontology" rather than a metaphysic ([9]; [10]; [12], pp. 9–19]). The above criticisms can then be addressed as follows:

1. Hegel does not conflate thought and existence. To the contrary, he recognizes that there are important distinctions between the concerns of pure thought, requiring a full justification of knowledge claims, and existential considerations such as whether or not something exists.[10] And, even further, Hegel saw that the concerns of right and justification (the "quaestio juris") must be addressed independently of concerns with fact (the "quaestio facti") ([6], p. 225). Hegel thus sought to bracket existential concerns in order to make room for a satisfaction of the concerns of pure reason.[11] He set aside the questions of fact in order to deal with the questions of right. In the metaphysical reading this "setting aside" is confused with elimination or conflation. Such an accusation, however, misses the nature of Hegel's task.[12]
2. Hegel does not conflate a category and that of which it is a category

([10], pp. 114–115). He also does not claim to give a genesis of the categories. Instead the *Encyclopedia* provides a genealogy of the categories ([10], pp. 106, 108; [7], p. 53). It presupposes them as those categories that are given at the ordinary level, and are not fully identified with their content, and then it *reconstructs* them in the interest of pure thought. In this reconstruction the categories are viewed in a new way. Only then is the difference between a category and that of which it is a category overcome. This, however, is not a final elimination of the difference. As in the case of thought and existence, the difference is set aside in order to give the conditions for the satisfaction of the interest of reason ([10], pp. 104, 109; [7], p. 53; [9], pp. 5–6).

3. Hegel does not conflate otherness and negativity ([7], p. 57; [10], p. 108). Again, for the purpose of providing a full justification of knowledge claims, Hegel sets aside any difference that cannot be given in terms of pure thought ([7], p. 52). He thus takes otherness as negativity. But this is not a metaphysical identification. Hartmann also makes an additional point: By replacing otherness with negativity Hegel brings otherness to thought; i.e., he rationalizes it ([10], p. 109; [9], p. 8).

In this way Hartmann "makes space" for the satisfaction of reason without making the mistake of the metaphysical reading. Hartmann's non-metaphysical interpretation involves distinguishing between two "levels" of philosophical concern ([6], pp. 232–233; [12], p. 12). At the "ordinary level" one is concerned with both questions of fact and right. But at the "transcendental level", also called the "pure categorial level", one does not allow for questions of fact. In doing this one sets aside the irreducible otherness of existence (its facticity) and evaluates the pure thought content that is implied in existence. This pure thought content is given in the categories. These functions of integration and appropriation are themselves taken as the content of concern. Since, as content, they are pure thought (i.e., their existence and the thought of their existence are identical), they give that material which can be fully justified in terms of thought. This full justification can then be taken as a justification of justification - a specification for thought of thought's specification of being, which in turn provides explicitly for thought the implicitly presupposed view of "right" that is given when one merges questions of fact and right at the ordinary level.[13]

There are, however, some difficulties with Hartmann's interpretation of Hegel. There are many passages in which Hegel seems to express metaphysical intent.[14] But even more significantly, it is not always clear that Hartmann has fully liberated himself from a metaphysical reading. For example, when Hartmann argues that Hegel replaces otherness with negativity in order to bring otherness to thought, it is not clear how the *Encyclopedia* could serve such a function when otherness is left behind in the move to the transcendental level.[15] Is Hartmann speaking of a different "otherness" than the irreducible otherness of existence? Before, however, we more carefully consider these issues it will prove helpful to outline the view of existence that lies in the background of Hartmann's distinction between the metaphysical and non-metaphysical reading of Hegel.

II. EXISTENCE

Hartmann's understanding of existence is not explicitly developed in those articles which advance the non-metaphysical reading. But there is an implicit view of existence that can best be discerned by bringing together the above-mentioned distinctions between thought and existence, negativity and otherness, and a category and that of which it is a category.

The view of existence which lies behind Hartmann's distinctions can be summarized as follows: The *difference* between the world of existence and the world of thought is *otherness*.[16] Existence is a unity of determinacy amenable to thought and otherness. A category is then that function of thought which specifies the specificity or determinateness of existence. As such, in terms of its ordinary function, a category specifies for thought the unity of thought and being given in existence ([9], pp. 3–4; [8], p. 221; [10], p. 108). To the degree that existence is thought, to that same degree the thought of existence is one with existence.[17] And a category specifies the nature of this unity by specifying the degree of thought in the being of existence.[18]

At this point in our discussion we need not resolve whether existence is taken as the world "out there" in a realist sense, as experience in the Kantian sense, or as some type of unity of the two.[19] The key point is that existence can be regarded as a unity of thought and irreducible otherness. The otherness is the facticity or existential surd of existence.[20] Different modes of existence depend upon the degree of thought content. At the extremes there are brute facticity (the "now" or "this" of existence) and pure thought. In specifying the unity of thought and otherness, a category specifies the mode of existence. But a category also exists. It is the mode of existence which is pure thought. A category is both a specification of a mode of existence and that mode of existence which is pure thought. If one were to move to a universe of concern in which the only content were the categories themselves, then one could say that otherness *is* negativity; thought *is* existence; and a category specifies as its content a category. In such a universe there would be no irreducible otherness. The categories are thus the content that lies on one extreme of the continuum which ranges from brute facticity to pure thought.

The universe or domain of being in which existence is pure thought can be spoken of as the "pure transcendental level". The full continuum of existence can then be referred to as the "ordinary domain". Viewed in this way the transcendental domain is a subset of the ordinary domain. But this does not mean that transcendental philosophy is a subset of ordinary philosophy. At the ordinary level one is concerned with existence as it is given. But in transcendental philosophy one takes the content of the transcendental domain and reconstructs it, systematically ordering everything within that domain in the interest of reason. The result is Hegel's *Encyclopedia* ([6], p. 235–241).

III. THE TRANSCENDENTAL TURN

The above discussion gives a crude summary of a profound view of existence that lies implicit in Hartmann's distinction between the metaphysical and non-metaphysical interpretation of Hegel. But a discussion of the implicit view of existence does not yet prepare us for an appreciation of the relation between transcendental philosophy and the ordinary level. We must, in addition, discuss the transition from the ordinary to the transcendental. This is a transition which Hartmann calls "the transcendental turn", and it can be viewed as a method of bracketing out all content except for the transcendental domain.

Hartmann defines transcendental philosophy as "a philosophy which insists on justification of knowledge" ([6], p. 225). *All* knowledge claims must be justified if one is to attain to the satisfaction of reason, which is the goal of transcendental philosophy. In order for there to be such a justification "there must be a basis which does the justification or which accounts for the truth" ([6], p. 225), and this basis must be transparent to thought, otherwise it could never be taken by reason as a justification. But if *all* knowledge claims are to be justified – and this is the task of transcendental philosophy – then the basis which does the justifying must itself be justified. The basis is a knowledge claim and must therefore be submitted to the same demand as the original claim, which it justified. Its status as a justification of another claim is not a sufficient justification of itself. Thus the basis must itself have a basis. This dilemma provides one of the chief obstacles to transcendental philosophy.[21]

The only way to solve this problem is to develop the basis in such a way that it justifies the given knowledge claim (the content in question) *and* the given justifies the basis; i.e., the knowledge claim in question must be justified and it must itself provide a justification of that which justifies. Otherwise one will have an infinite regression: a given is justified by a basis which, in turn, is the given that is justified by another basis, etc. Thus the only way to satisfy the demand of transcendental philosophy is to have a reciprocal relation of justification between the knowledge in question and the basis which grounds the knowledge. And there is still one additional requirement: The meaning of "justification" in the reciprocal relation cannot be equivocal. In both cases it must involve a basis which is transparent to thought, i.e., which is taken by reason as a justification.

Hartmann distinguishes between two types of transcendental philosophy, the mixed and the pure. In the mixed type, exemplified in the philosophy of Kant, one begins in a "realist frame of reference", in which knowledge rests upon an intuitive givenness ([6], p. 232); i.e., a givenness is implied in knowledge and this givenness is such that it cannot be viewed as a product of thought; it is irreducible. Thought is then added as a "second 'strain' of knowledge"

([6], p. 229). When these two strains are brought together, the result is consciousness or experience. The problem, however, is that Kant defined the given (the content of intuition) in such a way that it is completely heterogeneous to thought (the form). Kant assumes that the given (the manifold of intuition) does not directly supply knowledge. It must be unified by the forms of thought and then integrated into the unity of consciousness (the transcendental unity of apperception) before it can be taken as knowledge. Kant is thus faced with the question: how is a unity of experience generated out of the heterogeneous content and form? An account of the genesis is needed to provide a justification of the claim that experience arises from the two strains of knowledge. In order to answer this question, Kant moves to a "depth level" (the transcendental) which attempts to provide the basis or the principle which accounts for the way in which the heterogeneous contents (intuition and thought) are brought into the unity that is found in experience. Kant thus has two levels: an ordinary level in which one has heterogeneous contents (or, rather, form and content) and the unity of experience; and a transcendental, depth level which attempts to account for the way in which the unity of experience is generated out of the heterogeneous components. The depth level gives the justification of the ordinary level; i.e., it is the basis.[22]

The problem with Kant's philosophy, however, becomes apparent when we look for the justification of the transcendental level. It is well known that his attempt to justify the thought forms (the transcendental deduction) does not succeed. And even if it had succeeded, it would not have provided a full justification of the transcendental level in Kantian terms. In order to have that, one must account for it as the unification of the heterogeneous strains of knowledge. Also the knowledge of the ordinary level – i.e., the initial knowledge that Kant sought to justify – could never be taken as a justification of the transcendental level. If it were taken as a justification, then the meaning of "justification" would be different from the meaning in the first case, and this would violate the conditions which make transcendental philosophy possible. One would be confronted with the question: what justifies justification. And the contradictory meanings given at the transcendental and ordinary levels could never give the justification of justification that is required. In addition, the ordinary level involves a moment, namely sensibility, that cannot be provided by thought. It involves a transcendence of thought. Thus one would have a basis that could not be taken by reason as a basis since it is not transparent to thought.

In conclusion: any mixed theory cannot provide a full justification of all knowledge claims. Thus Hartmann moves to a pure transcendental philosophy. This is exemplified in Hegel. Here one sets aside any content that cannot be completely transparent to thought. In the end one only has left that content whose existence is pure thought – the categories. The being of the categories is fully being-for-thought. There is no otherness, although at the ordinary level a category specifies a unity of otherness and being-for-thought. The category can be taken as the being-for-thought whose knowledge claim involves a specificity of the specificity (=thought) of being. Hegel takes the categories as the initial knowledge claims and then attempts to justify them by ordering them in such a way that each category specifies the specification of another category. The whole system then gives a third degree specification: a specification of each specification of specificity. This system is structured such that it both provides the justification of the categories and is itself justified by the categories. Since the categories are fully transparent to thought they can be taken as a basis of the basis. The result is a justification of justification which satisfies the interest of reason ([6], pp. 235–241).

Before, however, we further elaborate on the system, we must return to the question of how one moves from the ordinary to the transcendental level. In Kant the move was necessitated by the ordinary level itself. One moved to a transcendental level to account for the way in which the ordinary level knowledge claim could be generated. But in Hegel the knowledge claim which is justified (the category) is itself already a transcendental claim when it is taken as the content rather than a specification of a mode of existence. One thus requires some kind of "leap" to move into transcendental philosophy ([6], p. 244).

According to Hartmann the closest we can come to an introduction into the transcendental level is provided by Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* ([6], pp. 237–238). In this work a "philosophical commentator" who already knows the logic of transcendental philosophy leads an initiate from the modes of existence in which there is a high degree of otherness up to that existence which is fully being-for-thought. Note the important distinction between the *Encyclopedia* and the *Phenomenology*: in the *Encyclopedia* one takes the categories as themselves the content and then orders them in terms of their specification of specificity. But in the *Phenomenology* the categories are used in an ordinary way. One focuses upon the existence which is specified by a category. But the philosophical commentator directs the journey through the modes of existence in such a way that one begins with that mode which involves the greatest irreducible otherness. The focus is then put on the being-for-thought of that mode of existence. The otherness is taken as the insufficiency of the given mode. One then takes the next mode of being as that which addresses the insufficiency of each previous mode. Step by step one moves to a greater being-for-thought. If, however, one simply moved to a different mode of being each time, then there would be no advance as one moves through the *Phenomenology*. The genius of the philosophical commentator is that he presents each successive stage as one which encompasses the being-for-thought of the previous stage; i.e., each previous mode of being (or rather, the thought content of each previous mode) is "aufgehoben" into the next mode of being. In this way one does not simply gather a panoramic view of the various modes of existence. Rather, one *sets aside the otherness* of existence as one journeys to that mode which is fully being-for-thought. And when one arrives there one has gathered together the specification of the specificity of each mode of being that one has touched on along the way.

At the conclusion of the *Phenomenology*, when one steps into the transcendental level, one has at hand all the knowledge claims that can appropriately be given at the transcendental level; i.e., one has the categories.

Viewed in this way the *Phenomenology* can be taken as a specific type of mixed transcendental philosophy.[23] In each step the thought contribution of a successive mode of being is presented as the basis or justification of a previous mode. The basis accounts for the insufficiency for thought of the being of the previous mode. In each step one has a *leap*. But one begins with leaps that can be easily made because two already known modes of being are juxtaposed in such a way that the transcendental turn (i.e., the turn away from otherness to being-for-thought) is exhibited at a lower level. In the end, when one comes to uncharted territory (for the initiate), the transcendental turn can be completed because one has already been shown how to follow the leap in which the otherness of a given mode of being is set aside. The philosophical commentator – i.e., the one who has already braved the way to the transcendental level – knows where one is going. He can thus structure the leaps of the earlier levels in such a way that they exhibit the final transition into the transcendental domain.

It is not difficult to agree with Hartmann when he says that "it must be admitted that this is the most ingenious method of providing an introductory argument to transcendental philosophy" ([6], p. 237). But we must also take care in the way in which the *Phenomenology* is embraced. It is important at this stage to ask: is the movement exhibited in the *Phenomenology* purely heuristic (the implication of the non-metaphysical reading) or is it presented as a representation of the true genesis by which each successive mode of existence came into being? In order to answer this let us now briefly consider the first stage of consciousness that Hegel discusses in the *Phenomenology*.

Hegel begins by considering "immediate knowing". This is "sense-certainty: or the 'this' and 'meaning'". In this first stage of consciousness the irreducible otherness of existence is taken as the most significant truth; it is plenitude in both being and value.[24] But then Hegel, the philosophical commentator, forces the initiate to focus on the consciousness rather than the object; he makes consciousness the object. In this way he brings one to look at the knowing rather than the known. E.g., when he "look[s] carefully at this pure being [in question]" and concludes that "in sense certainty, pure being at once splits up into two 'thises', one 'this' as 'I', and the other 'this' as object", he has already turned away from the object itself, and focuses on the relation between subject and object. In order to take this turn from the known to consciousness, the immediacy of knower and known must be broken and the otherness that was taken as plenitude must be set aside ([16], p. 70, Engl. ed. p. 59).

The way in which otherness is set aside is well illustrated when Hegel attempts to evaluate the content given in sense-certainty. Sense-certainty is concerned with the "this" of existence. And "What is the This?" For Hegel it has a twofold form: "Now" and "Here".

> To the question: 'What is Now?', let us answer, e.g. 'Now is Night'. In order to test the truth of this sense-certainty a simple experiment will suffice. We write down this truth; a truth cannot lose anything by being written down, any more than it can lose anything by our preserving it. If now, this noon, we look again at the written truth we shall have to say that it has become stale. The Now that is Night is preserved, i.e. it is treated as what it professes to be, as something that is; but it proves itself to be, on the contrary, something that is not ([16], p. 71, Engl. ed. p. 60).

In this passage Hegel begs the question. If the irreducible otherness of the Now – i.e., that plenitude that cannot be captured and preserved in language – is indeed the content of concern, then it is blatantly false to say that "a truth cannot lose anything by being written down". Written language can only directly embody the being-for-thought of a thing. Otherness can only be gestured toward; it is only known in the immediacy of the encounter. But the philosophical commentator of the *Phenomenology* forces one to embody linguistically the content of concern. This means that only that content which is being-for-thought will be allowed.

Speaking of the one who wishes to maintain the truth of the irreducible otherness of e.g., the sense-certainty of a piece of paper, Hegel says:

> They *mean* 'this' bit of paper on which I am writing – or rather have written – 'this'; but what they mean is not what they say. . . . The sensuous This that is meant cannot be reached by language, which belongs to consciousness, i.e. to that which is inherently universal. In the actual attempt to say it, it would therefore crumble away; those who started to describe it would not be able to complete the description, but would be compelled to leave it to others, who themselves finally have to admit to speaking about something which *is not* ([16], pp. 77–78, Engl. ed. p. 66).

By not allowing for the difference between the "meant" and the "said", Hegel eliminates the metaphysical viability of irreducible otherness (the difference between thought and existence). And from the metaphysical identity of otherness and negativity Hegel goes on to conclude that the "plenitude" is actually an "absence". "Consequentially, what is called the unutterable is nothing else than the untrue, the irrational, what is merely meant".[25]

This step from being (the unutterable is nothing) to value (the unutterable is untruth, irrational, even evil[26]) is important to notice. When one sets aside the value of the "unutterable", then one sets aside all basis for a concern with that unutterable; i.e., one sets aside any *question* which asks about it. It is one thing to say that the meant that cannot be said is nothing. This is to set aside the being of the object of concern. But one may still have the concern left.[27] It is thus another thing to set aside the value of the object of concern. This is to set aside any basis for concern. It is to set aside the question about the object. And Hegel does both in the first section of the *Phenomenology*.

The parallel to Hartmann's suspension of "questions of fact" is not too difficult to discern. One sets aside not just the realm of existence (in so far as it is other from the pure categorial) but also the concern with that realm (the questions of fact). But there is this important difference between Hartmann and Hegel: With the former there is a recognition that e.g., questions of fact were set aside for a particular purpose. But with Hegel this "setting aside" is viewed as a process that is necessitated by the nature of the content itself – not just the transcendental content but even the ordinary content. Language is unequivocally glorified. It "has the divine nature of directly reversing the meaning of what is said, of making it into something else, and thus not letting what is meant get into words at all" ([16], p. 78, Engl. ed. p. 66). This is not simply taken as a heuristic function. It is a function of Truth. Language discloses the falsity in being (the meant that cannot be said) and brings one to The Truth. This is a point that Hegel reasserts in the introduction to the *Encyclopedia*:

> In that language is the work of thought, nothing can be said in it that is not universal. That which I only mean (meine) is mine (mein); it belongs to me as this specific individual. If language only expresses universality, then I cannot say that which I only mean (meine). And the unsayable, the feeling, the reception, is not the most significant and truest but the least meaningful and least true ([15], sec. 20).

Here "truth" and "meaning" are defined in such a way that they are tied directly to the being-for-thought of the thing. That which language cannot say (the unutterable) is the untrue. When one attempts to say the meant one is involved in a contradiction which forces one to move to a "higher" level of consciousness. In the *Phenomenology* the moral movement and even the movement of history itself is aligned with this process in which the intended (meant) – and thus irreducible otherness – is set aside in favor of the conceptuality of a thing. Here Hegel's intent is not non-metaphysical. Nowhere does he in any way relativize the identification of irreducible otherness and negativity. This is not a part of a heuristic that provides an introduction to the transcendental level. It is a statement of the Truth of existence. This meant that Hegel nowhere distinguishes between questions of fact (as excluded) and those of right. Instead he identifies the two and believes that he resolves them in the *Encyclopedia*.

Because Hegel intended his work to be metaphysical that does not mean, however, that he cannot be read non-metaphysically. Hartmann well recognizes that there are passages where Hegel lapses into metaphysics. But he argues that the non-metaphysical reading can be taken as a "minimal" reading – one that relativizes the identification of irreducible otherness and negativity, and thereby makes place for a satisfaction of reason without eliminating the important distinction between thought and existence ([10], p. 108).

IV. THE NON-METAPHYSICAL INTERPRETATION OF THE ENCYCLOPEDIA

Let us now assume that the transcendental turn has been properly taken. All content that is not fully transparent to thought has been set aside. Now, in the transcendental universe, all that is real is rational and all that is rational is real ([15], sec. 6; [12], p. 13). This rational, real content is the set of categories.

At the ordinary level a category is a function of the unity of thought and otherness that is in a given mode of existence; it specifies the specificity (for thought) of being. To the degree that being is thought, to that same degree "being matches what thought thinks of it" ([10], p. 108). In this way a category can also be taken as a claim about the match of thought and being. In the transcendental level, however, otherness and a concern with otherness are not allowable. Nor does one allow for any mode of existence that is not fully being-for-thought. This means that a category can no longer be taken as a function of the unity of thought and the irreducible otherness of existence. Instead of specifying existence, a category is taken as a specification of *another category*.[28] This other category, in turn, is viewed as a unity of thought and negativity. That which would have been taken as 'otherness' in the ordinary function of a category, is now taken as the incompleteness for thought of the thought content of the specified category. A category in the *Encyclopedia* is thus a function of the unity of thought and thought. This self-referentiality of thought distinguishes the role of a category in transcendental philosophy from its ordinary level function.

Hartmann refers to the degree of a category's specification of specificity as the "categoriality" of a category ([9], p. 18; [12], p. 13). The greater the thought content of the being specified by a category at the ordinary level, the greater the categoriality of that category. Inversely, one could say that the degree of a category's specification of otherness is the "existentiality" of a category (this term is mine, not Hartmann's). The greater the otherness of the being specified by a category, the greater the existentiality of that category, and thus the greater the difference between a category and that of which it is a category (at the ordinary level).

One can now view the *Encyclopedia* as an ordering of the categories from the least to the greatest categoriality. If one focuses on the ordinary level function of a category, this is an ordering from a relative incomprehensibility of being (e.g., being – whose being for the most part transcends thought) to complete comprehensibility (e.g., notion – where being is thought) ([10], p. 105, 108). If one focuses on the transcendental function of a category within the system, then the ordering is in terms of a category's completeness, which indicates the being-for-thought of that which is specified by a category at the ordinary level. The ordering process can then be taken as "a procedure to establish the ingredients of being in thought" ([10], p. 108). This process is the dialectic and, according to Hartmann, it should not be confused with the process of history or anything else in existence. It is simply an "artificial means of regarding the synthesis of a granted content" ([10], p. 109). It takes the otherness of being as negativity (the negativity of a category is directly proportional to its existentiality). As the attempt to 'say the meant' involves one in a contradiction that, in turn, brings one to overcome the difference between the two; so also a category's attempt to articulate its own negativity brings it to overcome the difference between itself and the successive category. In this way, negativity moves thought to a greater categoriality by establishing the elimination of itself. This self-eliminating process provides a procedure for reconstructing the categories in an ascending order of categoriality.

Each successive category in the *Encyclopedia* is developed in such a way that it encompasses the previous one. As a result, it can be viewed as an explanation or justification of the previous category. It places that category within a larger systematic framework of thought and therefore accounts for it. And likewise, each previous category can be taken as a justification of the successive one. The very dialectical process that enabled the reconstruction can be taken as the progressive justification. In the completion of the system, the progressive and regressive justifications[29] come together as the categorial content itself:

> It thus appears that the method is not an extraneous form, but the soul and notion of the content, from which it is only distinguished so far as the dynamic elements of the notion even on their own part come in their own specific character to appear as the totality of the notion ([15], sec. 243).

This method is *thought*. It is the justification of justification which brings to a completion the task of transcendental philosophy. Reason is provided with a systematic whole in which all content is fully transparent to thought and justified. The basis is one with the result.

This is indeed a grand achievement. But what now? Is this all a wonderful game that reason plays with itself but irrelevant to the concerns of life?[30] Kierkegaard ridicules Hegel as one who builds a great castle in the air, but then goes into life and dwells in a dog house ([5], pp. 43–44). Is it a castle for thought but irrelevant for life? At times, Hartmann almost gives this impression. In attempting to diffuse the criticisms of a metaphysical Hegel, Hartmann will strongly emphasize that the architectonic of the *Encyclopedia* is in no way "an imposition on pre-existing material" but simply "an innocuous ordering in the interest of rationality" ([10], p. 110). Hegel's system simply involves the appropriation of the categories that are already given in such a way that those categories are viewed in terms of their thought content. The ordering and thus the *Encyclopedia* itself is simply a "luxury in philosophy" ([10], p. 124).

But then, immediately after arguing that it is simply a "luxury", Hartmann will go on to argue that Hegel's thought is "fruitful and indispensable" ([10], p. 124; [12], p. 18). And it offers "solutions in the theory of theory construction" that movements such as philosophical positivism have not been able to answer. He will also criticize those who argue that the "Hegelian ontology" is simply "a game that reason plays with itself" ([9], p. 12). When one gathers the various statements that Hartmann makes, at least four significant achievements are attributed to Hegel's system:

1. It enables one to discuss the relation between thought and existence. In contrast to Feuerbach and Marx, Hegel's categorial theory shows that Marx's attempt to bring together philosophy and the world is actually a "category mistake" in that it wrongly views an abstract categorial level as if it were a concrete level. It confuses a category and that of which it is a category ([10], p. 115).
2. Hegel's solution solves the problem of reference that is so perplexing in modern philosophy by allowing for both "reference and immanence". He shows that "reference to being is already a constitutive feature of its being thought". In this way Hegel's system enables something that language philosophy was not able to do of itself; namely, it allows us to theorize about "the relation of language to the world" ([10], pp. 115–116).
3. The *Encyclopedia* enables us to say what a subject is. Or, to put it in broader terms, "The virtue of Hegel's philosophy is that it offers a comprehensive scheme of explanation for the world's 'what', the limitation being that such 'what' can claim to be categorial; i.e., reconstructible" ([10], p. 112). The system thus helps make clear what one is talking about when one is talking about something.
4. Hegel's *Philosophy of Right*, a part of the *Encyclopedia*, gives a foundational philosophy for addressing questions of right. This point of course touches on the very distinction Hartmann initially made between "questions of fact" and "questions of right". It will thus be important to discuss this contribution in greater detail.

In "Die Objektivität der Freiheit" Hartmann argues for Hegel's *Philosophy of Right* as a "*normative* ontological theory" ([11], p. 336; my emphasis). He begins by asking whether freedom can be objective. By this he means an objective order of individual freedoms that, as a whole, empowers the subjective freedom of the individual. In such a case social freedom is taken as complementary – even further, as a broadening – of individual freedom ([11], pp. 315–316). This is in strong opposition to e.g., Kant, who develops individual freedom in relation to reason (the categorical imperative) and then develops social freedom as that limitation of individual freedoms, which avoids the collision of such freedom. "Social freedom is here negative, thought as the limitation of individual freedom" ([11], pp. 316–317).

Hegel develops freedom out of the concept of the will. The freedom of the will depends not on some law but on the *object* of the will. In this way, Hartmann argues, Hegel overcomes the Kantian dualism of eudeimonism (the "lower" will) and morality (the "higher" will). Hegel evaluates the different types of relations that exist between the will and an object of the will. The greater the congeniality between the will and its object – i.e., the more the will is one with its object – the greater the freedom of the will ([11], pp. 318–319). Hartmann then summarizes the introductory part of Hegel's *Philosophy of Right* (secs. 4–29) as follows:

> The objects of the will accordingly allow themselves to be ordered according to whether they are categorially foreign to the will – as a thing in opposition to a subject – or not. A thinglike object of desire (ein dinglicher Gegenstand des Begehrens) stands in its dignity under the will that desires it and is not congenial. An object like the will, an other freedom, . . . would be congenial to it. Such a relation would be valued by Hegel as higher; even more, as a self-identification of the will; as a coming to itself through the other (als Zusichkommen durch den Anderen); as a being-with-itself in the other (als Beisichsein im Anderen) ([11], pp. 318–319).

In this "concrete universal" – the objective freedom – freedom finds its own fulfillment. In Hegel's *Philosophy of Right* the different objects of freedom are ordered according to their congeniality to the will. This "congeniality" corresponds to the being-for-thought of the object. The same principles that we have thus discussed in our overview of the transcendental turn and the *Encyclopedia* all apply in the case of the *Philosophy of Right.* But now we see that Hartmann addresses some very important ordinary level concerns by way of the ordering that is prosecuted at the transcendental level.

In the *Philosophy of Right* the general ordering goes from family to society to state. And all of these provide an object that is of a higher dignity than individual concerns. Thus when there are conflicting claims, Hegel's ordering gives criteria for their resolution. The claim of state is higher than that of society, the family, and the individual. And in the case where the ideal state is actualized, then one has an objective legislation of ends.[31] One can thus call upon the transcendental ordering to address questions of right and value even though it does not address questions of fact.

We are at this point, however, confronted with an important question. Is Hartmann correct in identifying the above "contributions" as Hegelian or are they rather Hartmannian? Do they arise out of Hegel's categorial evaluation or out of Hartmann's specification of the evaluation as non-metaphysical?

As already noted, Hartmann recognizes that his interpretation of Hegel does not always accord with what Hegel intended ([9], pp. 19, 26). In responding to the criticisms by Schelling and E. Gilson against Hegel and his categorial system, Hartmann says:

> The problem can be tackled in this way: the fault of Hegel's may be not so much that his is categorial thought, but that he makes concessions to existential considerations ([10], p. 119).

By eliminating the metaphysical claims – i.e., those involving existence – Hartmann offers a "minimal interpretation" of Hegel. And "in its light, Hegel can be censured to the extent that he . . . engages in metaphysics" ([10], p. 123).

The question we must consider is: Does Hartmann's reading of Hegel simply give a minimal reading of Hegel or does it give a reading against Hegel? Does it simply appropriate what Hegel has done and leave out where Hegel goes too far or does it in a more essential way argue against the way Hegel did things? In answering this question it is important to distinguish two levels at which Hartmann argues. On one level of argumentation, he operates at the level of Hegel himself; namely, at the transcendental level. This is the perspective of "Absolute Spirit" (the universal knower) at which the project of the *Encyclopedia* is prosecuted. But Hartmann also philosophizes from an ordinary level, attempting to address existential concerns. When he allows the irreducible otherness of existence to stand as a positivity whose integrity must be respected, he has already stepped out of the transcendental level which regards irreducible otherness as negativity. The "transcendental turn" involved the setting aside of any perspective that could not itself be accounted for within the necessary progressive and regressive justification of the categorial ordering. It thus involves a setting aside of the very viability of the realm of existence as an independent realm. The only "existence" that the transcendental level knows is that "existence" which is itself a category in the system ([15], sec. 123). Hartmann's very distinction between the metaphysical and non-metaphysical reading is thus not a distinction that could be made at the transcendental level. It is based on a difference between otherness and negativity that is only viable at the ordinary level. By allowing a positivity to the irreducible otherness of existence, Hartmann relativizes the pure categorial level. This relativization is what raises the additional question of how the pure categorial level and the ordinary level relate, and of the limitations that must be imposed on the results of the transcendental deliberation.

As we have already seen in our discussion of Hegel's *Phenomenology*, Hegel refused to allow a positive valuation to irreducible otherness. He thus would not have accepted Hartmann's relativization of the *Encyclopedia*. Hegel believed that his system gave the truth of history and religion (among other things).[32] Hegel's metaphysical claims coupled with his refusal to relativize the identity of irreducible otherness and negativity show that not only does Hartmann give a minimal reading of Hegel, he also gives a reading against Hegel. One could say that Hartmann is in accord with Hegel from the perspective of the universal knower (in the transcendental level). But when he relativizes this perspective and in turn prohibits an extension of the pure categorial to the metaphysical, then Hartmann is against Hegel.

Now let us return to the four contributions that Hartmann attributes to Hegel's system. Are they Hegel's contribution, resting on the system, or Hartmann's, resting on the distinction between the metaphysical and non-metaphysical interpretation of Hegel? The first three can, I think, quite clearly be attributed to Hartmann and not to Hegel:

1. The avoidance of a "category mistake" rests upon a distinction between thought and existence, a category and that of which it is a category; i.e.,

it rests on the distinction between the metaphysical and non-metaphysical interpretation of Hegel's *Encyclopedia*.

2. The discussion of reference likewise rests upon the relation between a category and that of which it is a category. To the degree that the mode of existence specified by the category is being-for-thought, to that same degree existence is one with the thought of existence. Here the identity of indiscernibles can be said to apply and the being to which one refers is immanent to thought. But to the degree that the given mode of existence "stands out" of thought, to that degree reference to the thing involves a transcendence of the thought of the thing. It is in this way that Hartmann, not Hegel, can theorize about "the relation of language to the world" ([10], p. 116). This rests on Hartmann's view of existence, not Hegel's transcendental philosophy.
3. Is it the *Encyclopedia* or the category that enables us to say *what,* e.g., a subject is? The *Encyclopedia* says *what* a category is. But it is a category that says *what* a given mode of existence in the world is. In fact, as Hartmann points out, the *Encyclopedia* must presuppose and then reconstruct the categories that are already given at the ordinary level. Thus to take a category as a specification of the world's 'what' should be viewed as an ordinary level contribution, not a transcendental one. The *Encyclopedia* then specifies the specification of the world's "what".

The fourth contribution, however, does indeed rest upon the order of categories that is prosecuted at the transcendental level. It should thus be attributed to Hegel. *But* it involves an inappropriate extension of the transcendental level to the ordinary one.

4. The status of the *Philosophy of Right* as a "normative ontological theory" depends upon the legitimacy of the affirmation that an "object like the will" is to be valued as higher than an object that is *other* from the will. But does the will attain to a greater freedom in willing that which is congenial to itself? Should an object with a greater being-for-thought be valued above one which involves a greater otherness? Hegel would, of course, answer "yes". But this is because "will" is, in its Truth, the rational will (Kant's "higher will"); namely, it is the will for thought – that very will, whose interest Hartmann seeks to satisfy in the transcendental project. It is "the resolve that wills pure thought" ([15], sec. 78). Hegel identifies Truth with the being-for-thought of existence and defines freedom in such a way that it aligns with thought (and is one with necessity) ([15], sec. 35, zusatz; secs. 158–159). But at the ordinary level such a view of truth and freedom would not be accepted (or it would at least be taken as problematical). Thus one would not necessarily value the greater category (that which involves a greater "affirmativity") above the lesser one.

In his discussion of the "objectivity of freedom" we can see that Hartmann's "ontological option" has not sufficiently guarded against importing the results of the transcendental level back into the ordinary level. It seeks to guard against, e.g., the metaphysical conflation of otherness and negativity. But it does not take care to guard against the *valuational* conflation. At the transcendental level all concerns with otherness have been set aside. Truth and value are identified with thought. But when one moves back to the ordinary level, one must take care to reinstate both the metaphysical and valuational merit of irreducible otherness. E.g., to sense certainty, the will finds its appropriate object in the plenitude of the "Now".

Thus in the one area where the presumed contribution is indeed Hegel's, the contribution involves an inappropriate extension of results that are only valid at the transcendental level.

V. THE EXISTENTIAL TURN

In order to more carefully discuss the way in which the *Encyclopedia* makes a contribution to ordinary level concerns, it is important to carefully consider the "existential turn"; namely, the turn from the transcendental level back to the ordinary level. In the initial move into the "pure categorial" realm, the being and value of otherness (the *difference* between thought and existence) was set aside. Truth was identified with thought. But now, in turning back, we must bring this "Truth" into question; we must question the question of Truth that Hegel posed in the transcendental turn. Perhaps no one formulated this questioning of the question of Truth in more eloquent terms than Nietzsche:

> What in us actually wills "Truth"? In fact we took a long pause before the question about the origin of this will – until we finally came to a total standstill before an even more fundamental question. We asked about the value of this will. It was supposed we want Truth: why not rather untruth? and uncertainty? even ignorance? ([17], p. 7)

Remember what Hegel said of irreducible otherness. It was untruth, uncertainty, even ignorance! What if Truth is not just the Truth of Hegel but also involves this "womanly truth" of Nietzsche; not just the rigid, haveable being-for-thought but also the unhaveable plenitude of the "other"? This is the question that must be posed with all seriousness when one comes out of the transcendental perspective. The being and value of otherness must be reinstated.

If one properly takes this existential turn, then two important correlates of the non-metaphysical interpretation will be properly appreciated:

1. One will avoid viewing the relation between categories in the *Encyclopedia* as a relation between categorial content (the mode of being specified by the category) at the ordinary level. The categories at the transcendental level were developed in such a way that they were intimately related to each other. But this relation between categories *cannot* be taken as a relation between the modes of being that are specified by the categories. To extend the categorial ordering to such a metaphysical ordering can be

taken as the *metaphysical mistake*. Hartmann is careful to avoid this ([10], p. 109).

2. One will avoid viewing the relation between categories in the *Encyclopedia* as a canonical ordering of values for the ordinary level. In the transcendental turn value was made directly proportional to being-for-thought. But this legislation of value depended upon the identification of otherness with negativity. It must thus be taken as provisional. To extend the categorial ordering to a valuational ordering can be taken as the *valuational mistake*. And as we have seen in "Die Objektivität der Freiheit" Hartmann has not always taken sufficient care in avoiding this.

VI. THE META-ONTOLOGICAL OPTION

In attempting to avoid the metaphysical and valuational mistakes that come with a metaphysical interpretation of Hegel we shall take issue with Hartmann's characterization of the non-metaphysical interpretation as an "ontological option". Instead, the interpretation shall be characterized as a "meta-ontological option".

Hartmann states that Hegel's *Logic* (or *Encyclopedia*?) can be called an ontology, where "ontology" gives the "logos of being" ([10], pp. 106–107). It gives the determinations of being for thought. However, the word "being" itself has two meanings – one being the meaning of "being" to the pure categorial perspective (being=being-for-thought) and the other involving the ordinary meaning, which refers to existence (being=unity of being-for-thought and otherness). Does Hegel's *Logic* give the logos of that being which is existence or the logos of the being of pure thought?

Hartmann's discussion of the problem of reference in linguistic philosophy shows that he would not be comfortable with the neat either/or that we just formulated above. Even in his discussion of the non-metaphysical reading Hartmann sees reference to being (presumably existence) as already a "constitutive feature of its being thought" ([10], p. 115). Presumably by this he means to say that the being-for-thought of a given category (something that is determined by the place of the category within the ordering – a later category has a greater being-for-thought) is one with the being-for-thought of an instance of such a category ["what is a 'match' of being and thought, has to be considered a coincidence, an identity of being and thought" ([10], p. 108]. But even with such an assumption regarding the relation between a category and that of which it is a category, can we accept Hartmann's characterization of Hegel's *Logic* as ontology?

The problem with such a view on ontology becomes clearer when we consider H. Tristram Engelhardt's interpretation of the dialectic of the *Logic* as a "meta-ontological method". Engelhardt further develops Hartmann's interpretation of Hegel ([1], p. 424). He thus does not set meta-ontology (used of the dialectic) against ontology (used of the system of the *Logic*):

> The dialectic as a *meta-ontological* method is not external to the *Logic*, but represents the internal ordering of the components of the *Logic* towards its specific goal – a systematic *ontology* translucent to the interests of reason ([1], p. 428, my emphasis).

But why does he use "meta-ontology" of the dialectic, and "ontology" of the system? Why not e.g., use "ontology" of both the system and the method? The answer to this can be found at the beginning of Engelhardt's essay. Following Hartmann, he argues that "Hegel used the dialectic in the greater and lesser *Logic* as a means for ordering, not discovering categories" ([1], p. 424). The categories thus are already present. They in fact are categories of being (existence). And in Hegel's system these already existing categories are brought together in a new ordering. The dialectic then "serves to translate the categories of being into the framework of the needs of reason" ([1], p. 424).

In the light of this distinction between the two meanings (or roles) of the categories we can see how Engelhardt uses "ontology" of the system of categories and "meta-ontology" of the dialectic. The basic idea behind this is the very same one we referred to when we discussed Hartmann's distinction between the metaphysical and non-metaphysical reading of Hegel. But Engelhardt's distinction between meta-ontology and ontology enables us to discuss an area that needs to be further clarified. Note that there are still two meanings of "ontology" corresponding to the two levels at which a category may operate. In one sense the "logos of being" (ontology) is each individual category. And this is so apart from the ordering of the categories in the system. In fact, this first sense is what justifies the second sense; namely, referring to the system of the *Logic* as an ontology. But when "ontology" is used of the system, then it not only refers to the determination of being-for-thought that is constitutive of each individual category. It also refers to the interrelation of determinations that is brought about in the dialectical ordering; i.e., it refers not just to the categories but to the *system* of categories.

Engelhardt seeks to be very careful to avoid an extension of the systematic ordering into a metaphysical ordering. Speaking of the *Logic* as an "ordering of ontological categories" he notes that "it is not a justification of the ways in which being is apprehended in thought, but of reason's apprehension of thought's apprehension of being" ([1], p. 426). This is an important distinction. It is central to avoiding the metaphysical reading of the *Logic*. But when one moves to viewing the "ordering of ontological categories" (=the Logic as system) as itself an ontology, then one makes possible again the metaphysical mistake which one took such care to preclude. One then makes "reason's apprehension of thought's apprehension of being" into "thought's apprehension of being", and "being" then means not just the being of the categorial ordering but also existence; for it was the initial recognition of the double meaning of "being" that allowed us to view the categories themselves as the "logoi of being".

Thus in order to maintain sufficient care in developing the "non-metaphysical interpretation" of Hegel, both the dialectic and the system should be referred to as meta-ontological. They do not give the logos of being but rather a logos of the logoi of being. It is thus correct to refer to the categories as "ontological categories" but inappropriate to refer to the ordering of ontological categories for the interest of thought as an "ontology".

When Hartmann referred to the "non-metaphysical" interpretation as an "ontological option" he established a very interesting opposition between metaphysics and ontology. By calling the system "non-metaphysical" he implied that the ordering could not be taken as a direct ordering of being – i.e., it was not a metaphysic. But then when he calls the system an "ontology" he implies that the ordering of the system is relevant as an ordering of being. The only way out of this opposition was to take the ontology as one of value. It answered the questions of right. However, this involved an extension of the metaphysical reading that should be relativized with the relativization of the identity of otherness and negativity. In order to avoid this valuational mistake we now speak of the non-metaphysical reading as a "meta-ontological option". But if the transcendental ordering provides neither a description of existence nor a canonical ordering of value, then what role does it or can it serve at the ordinary level? Do we have nothing more than a game reason plays with itself?

Any valuation of Hegel's *Encyclopedia* that provides contributions relevant to the ordinary level must bring together the ordering prosecuted at the transcendental level (Hegel's system) with Hartmann's discussion of the relation between the ordinary and the transcendental level (a discussion that involves Hartmann's implicit view of existence). It will thus not be purely Hegel's contribution; nor will it be a contribution of purely transcendental philosophy. It will involve bringing together transcendental philosophy with other forms. When we do bring them together, however, then some important ordinary level concerns can be addressed by way of Hegel's system.

In outlining the potential contribution of the *Encyclopedia* I can only be suggestive. A more careful discussion must be developed at a later time. But at least three important problems in modern philosophy can be addressed by way of a non-metaphysical reading of the *Encyclopedia*:

1. The *Encyclopedia* orders the categories in terms of the degree to which the being specified by each category can be embodied linguistically. One of the central concerns of modern philosophy involves the question of the relation between language and reality. This question is related to (but not identified with) the question about the relation between the said and the meant. Since the categories are a specification of the specificity of existence, the ordering of the categories can be viewed as an ordering for thought and thus language of the modes of existence. The greater the existentiality of a category, the greater is the difference between the said and meant; between thought and existence. As one increases in the categoriality of a category, one also moves to those modes of existence which

are more available to thought and, in turn, more amenable to linguistic embodiment.

2. The *Encyclopedia* orders the categories in terms of the degree to which the ordinary level knowledge of the being specified by each category involves immediate experience. This contribution is directly connected with 1. It gives an epistemological formulation of the same theme that was linguistically formulated above. The greater the existentiality of a category, the more an experience of the mode of existence that is specified by that category will involve an immediate experiencing that cannot be grasped in terms of thought or embodied in language. Such an ordering is of central importance in addressing existentialist concerns such as the degree to which existence "stands out" (existere) of thought. But the vagueness of the existentialist philosopher can be avoided. To the degree that being is available for thought, to that same degree thought grasps that being in its own terms and one can say the object of concern. And this degree is specified by the ordering of the *Encyclopedia.*
3. The *Encyclopedia* offers a finite, synchronic system in which the specific difference of each term is fully defined in relation to all other terms. In this way one has a text whose meaning is fixed (from the transcendental perspective). One thus has a language about language that escapes the ambiguity that post-modernist critics like Derrida have attributed to all language. This synchronic system can be taken as a periodic table of the elementary thought specifications of being. It provides an ordering of thought's grasp of existence in terms of the ambiguity of the relation between langauge and the existence which the language seeks to express. The greater the difference between said and meant; i.e., the greater the existentiality of a category, the greater the ambiguity for thought of a word that qualifies or expresses such a mode of existence.

Whether or not Hegel's *Encyclopedia* can concretely address the above concerns is a matter that scholarship must decide as it further explores the attendant problems and their resolution. But Hartmann's programmatic research on the non-metaphysical reading of Hegel's *Encyclopedia* seems to offer considerable promise in approaching some of the most significant challenges faced by modern philosophy.

Gadamer, in discussing Heidegger's attempt to overcome metaphysics and thus Hegel as the consummation of metaphysics, notes that such an "overcoming" can not simply involve a "mere putting it behind us". "On the contrary, 'overcoming' (Überwinden) implies, as Heidegger's inimitable way with language and thinking brings out, 'getting over', in the sense of 'coming to grips with' (Verwinden)" ([2], p. 100). This task of "coming to grips with" Hegel is posed by many as one of the foremost tasks of modern philosophy. In relativizing the claim of Hegel in such a way that the absoluteness of Hegel's philosophy of the Absolute is abolished, Hartmann has provided a way to appropriate the results in such a way that they can address concrete (though admittedly finite) needs in modern philosophy. In doing this he "comes to grips with" Hegel and metaphysics. His contribution should not be underestimated as we search for the way into a "post-metaphysical", "post-modern" world.

NOTES

1. Hartmann develops the two levels in [6]. This distinction is presupposed in the non-metaphysical reading; e.g., when Hartmann argues that the "ontology" of Hegel provides a new meaning at the transcendental level to categories that already have a meaning at the ordinary level ([10], p. 106).
2. This weakness was first brought to my attention in an unpublished article by Terry Pinkard titled "Need We Take the Transcendental Turn".
3. This is one of Kierkegaard's most significant objections ([4], pp. 9–10; [20], pp. 352–353).
4. [4], p. 11; Note also Hartmann's critique of Karl Popper's *Conjectures and Refutations*, pp. 316, 322, 329 in [9], p. 8, note19.
5. See e.g. [19], pp. 19–26. Note esp. his discussion of Hegel and essentialist thinking on pp. 23–24. See also [10], p.117 on the criticism leveled by Schelling and E. Gilson.
6. On this "Feuerbachian and Marxian criticism" see [10], p.114.
7. This would be the Kantian and Neokantian understanding of the role of a category. See e.g. [3], A79=B104–105.
8. On Hegel's view that philosophy grasps in categories the content that is otherwise given in e.g., representations, see [15], sec. 3. Here representations are taken as metaphors of categories. On the view that these concepts give e.g., the content of history in its appropriate medium, see sec. 14.
9. See [4], p. 13, esp. on the move from "other" to "evil" as one moves from metaphysical to ethical concerns. This transition will prove important later in this essay. Hartmann also sees the problem of otherness and negation to be one of the key concerns of the Neokantians ([9], pp. 8–15). Although the criticism is formulated in terms of being and knowing rather than otherness and negativity, I think this criticism also lies behind Sartre's criticism of Hegel ([18], pp. 319–329).
10. On the idea that we do not cease to know things we did not know, see [10], p. 109; that no existential claims are made see [10], p. 110. The theory/practice distinction can be taken as another form of the distinction between the concern of pure thought and existential consideration. In the "ontological option" one sets aside concerns of practice in favor of those of theory ([9], p. 1).
11. Ontology gives a satisfaction of reason, [10], p. 107; [9], p. 1.
12. This accusation of not appreciating Hegel's task is seen in Hartmann's critique of Becker, [8], p. 241.
13. On the nature and role of categories, see [10], pp. 103–104, 108, 117; [9], pp. 2–4; [6], pp. 225–226. On justification of justification and explanation of explanation, see [10], p. 106; [6], p. 235; [9], p. 4.
14. Hartmann himself recognizes this in [9], pp. 19,26; [10], p. 119. See also the discussion of the *Phenomenology* in sec. III of this essay.
15. See sec. III of this essay.
16. I think that this simple formula can be used to address some of the most significant problems in modern philosophy. E.g., it could be called upon to address the relation between Derrida's "difference" and Levinas' "other" in such a way that a true dialogue could be opened up between the conceptual systems. Likewise, the issues of "presence" could be addressed by noting that "irreducible otherness" is both presence and absence. To thought it is absence, and it can only be conceptualized in terms of difference. But to the sensibility of the existing individual this absence is nothing less than the presence of the other.
17. [10], p. 108: "What is a match of being and thought is an identity". A category can thus be specified as an "identity of identity and non-identity" ([8], p. 234); i.e., to the degree

that the being of existence is being-for-thought, to that same degree one has identity; but to the degree that the being of existence is irreducible otherness, there is a non-identity (difference) between being and thought.

18. This degree of thought is identified by Hartmann as the "categoriality" of a category ([9], p. 18).
19. I.e., we need not resolve whether we are dealing with the first, second, or third attitude of thought toward objectivity ([15],secs. 26–78).
20. One can also speak of it as "non-resolveable novelty" ([7], p. 57); on otherness as facticity, see ibid., p. 58.
21. I take this to be the main idea in Hartmann's discussion of the "fictive premise" in Kant; cf. [7]; [6]; and [12], pp. 17, 18.
22. This discussion as well as that of the next paragraph is a summary of [6], pp. 229–234.
23. Hartmann does not seem to have appreciated this in his criticism of the mixed form and his discussion of the *Phenomenology*.
24. It is taken as the "truest knowledge", "a knowledge of infinite wealth for which no bounds can be found" ([16], p. 69; Engl. ed. p. 58).
25. [16], pp. 77–78; Engl. ed. p. 66; also p. 69, Engl. ed. p. 58: "this very certainty proves itself to be the most abstract and poorest truth".
26. On the unutterable as evil, see [15], sec. 24, zusatz: "evil and untruth may be said to consist in the contradiction subsisting between the function or notion and the existence of the object". Also sec. 35, zusatz.
27. In this case one could say that the being of the object is the concern rather than anything intrinsic to the object itself.
28. [9], p. 4: the categories lead to other categories. In this way a new meaning is given to categories that already had a meaning, [10], p. 106.
29. On the need for both a progressive and regressive justification, see [10], p. 111.
30. This is Feuerbach's criticism, [9], p. 12.
31. It is important here to distinguish between the value of the state as the object most congenial to the will and the value of a state in a particular time and place. See [14], p. 302, note 7.
32. "The same evolution of thought which is expressed in the history of philosophy is presented in the system of philosophy itself. Here, instead of surveying the process, as we do in history, from the outside, we see the movement of thought clearly defined in its native medium" ([15], sec. 14). See also ibid., sec. 13. On the relation between philosophy and religion see the preface to the second edition of the *Encyclopedia*, [15], pp. 23–31 (German ed.).

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. Engelhardt, H.T.: 1976, 'The Dialectic as a Meta-Ontological Method', *Hegel-Jahrbuch, 1975*, Pahl-Rugenstein Verlag, Köln, pp. 424–429.
2. Gadamer, H.-G.: 1976, *Hegel's Dialectic*, P.C. Smith (tr.), Yale University Press, New Haven.
3. Kant, I.: 1965, *Critique of Pure Reason*, N.K. Smith (tr.), St. Martin's Press, New York.
4. Kierkegaard, S.: 1980, *The Concept of Anxiety*, R. Thomte (tr.), Princeton University Press, Princeton.
5. Kierkegaard, S.: 1980, *The Sickness Unto Death*, H. Hong and E. Hong (trs.), Princeton University Press, Princeton.
6. Hartmann, K.: 1966, 'On Taking the Transcendental Turn', *The Review of Metaphysics*, vol. xx, no. 2 (Dec.), 223–249.
7. Hartmann, K.: 1972, 'The "Analogies" and After', in L.W. Beck (ed.), *Proceedings of the Third International Kant Congress*, D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht-Holland, pp. 47–62.

8. Hartmann, K.: 1973, 'Zur neusten Dialektik-Kritik', *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* 55.2, 220–242.
9. Hartmann, K.: 1976, 'Die ontologische Option', in K. Hartmann (ed.), *Die ontologische Option*, Walter de Gruyter, Berlin/New York, pp. 1–30.
10. Hartmann, K.: 1976, 'Hegel: A Non-Metaphysical View', in A. MacIntyre, *Hegel – A Collection of Critical Essays*, University of Notre Dame/London, pp. 101–124.
11. Hartmann, K.: 1977, 'Die Objektivität der Freiheit. Hegels Rechtphilosophie heute', in J. Simon (ed.), *Freiheit. Theoretische und praktische Aspekte des Problems*, Alber, Freiburg/München, pp. 315–37.
12. Hartmann, K.: 1988, *Studies in Foundational Philosophy*, R. Berlinger und W. Schrader (eds.), editions Rodopi N.V. and Königshausen, *Reihe Elementa*, vol. 47, Amsterdam.
13. Harvey, R.: 1982, 'The Linguistic Basis of Truth for Hegel', *Man and World* 15, 285–297.
14. Hegel, G.W.F.: 1967, *Hegel's Philosophy of Right*, T.M. Knox (tr.), Oxford University Press, New York.
15. Hegel, G.W.F.: 1970, *Enzyklopaedie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse 1830*, Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt a.M.; English edition: 1981, *Hegel's Logic*, W. Wallace (tr.), Oxford University Press, Oxford.
16. Hegel, G.W.F.: 1988, *Phänomenologie des Geistes*, Felix Meiner Verlag, Hamburg. English edition: 1952, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, A.V. Miller (tr.), Oxford University Press, Oxford.
17. Nietzsche, F.: 1964, *Jenseits von Gut und Böse*, Alfred Kröner Verlag, Stuttgart.
18. Sartre, J.-P.: 1966, *Being and Nothingness*, H.E. Barnes (tr.), Washington Square Press, New York.
19. Tillich, P.: 1957, *Systematic Theology*, vol. 2, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
20. Thulstrup, N.: 1980, *Kierkegaard's Relation to Hegel*, G. Stengren (tr.), Princeton University Press, Princeton.

DEBORAH CHAFFIN

8. The Logic of Contingency

Toward the beginning of both *The Phenomenology of Spirit and The Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences*, Hegel observes that philosophy is not shoemaking, adding, in one of his characteristically tongue-in-cheek comments, that ". . . when it comes to philosophy, . . . everyone nevertheless immediately understands how to philosophize, and how to evaluate philosophy, since he possesses the criterion for doing so in his natural reason – as if he did not likewise possess the measure for a shoe in his own foot."[1] In passages such as this, Hegel means to call attention not only to the disanalogy between philosophy and shoemaking, but even more importantly to those traits which constitute an affinity between philosophy and the craft of the shoemaker. According to the presentation in the *Encyclopaedia*, *both* philosophy and shoemaking require skill, study and application, in spite of the fact that almost no one seems to recognize this! And while one has no problem recognizing the requisite craft and important practical consequences of shoemaking, Hegel laments the fact that this same status and respect aren't accorded philosophy. Thus, Hegel's persistent commitment to the underlying affinity between philosophy and shoemaking cannot but appear a bit strange to us; having grown accustomed to a conception of philosophy as a labor of luxury, it is difficult to conceive of it as bearing immediate practical utility. We can only wonder what the polemical occasion would have been for Hegel to have framed his analogy with the craft of the shoemaker. Whatever model of philosophy it was such that the skill, study and application involved in shoemaking should have been an equivalent and, perhaps, obviously appropriate basis for the analogy, it has long since disappeared from philosophical consciousness. The reconstitution of a possible context in which Hegel's model could even begin to look plausible and something someone might be tempted to endorse belongs to a kind of conceptual archeology, the very possibility of which suggests that the history of the Western philosophical tradition is *dis*continuous, that far from exhibiting one gradual development of, say, the sovereignty of reason, this history rather shows us not to have made progress, but to have simply changed the subject.[2]

Klaus Hartmann has observed that Hegel's transcendental project is

H.T. Engelhardt, Jr. and T. Pinkard (eds.), Hegel Reconsidered, 143–161.
© 1994 *Kluwer Academic Publishers.*

virtually unappreciated today, and while this is not as obviously true in 1994 as it was in 1966[3] it cannot be underestimated how much context has to be made visible before Hegel's conception of philosophy as the endeavor to apprehend and portray what is as something inherently rational can be made intelligible. Since such apprehension and portrayal is understood from the outset as having important *practical* consequences, it would appear to be far removed from any contemporary view. In Hegel, as well as Hartmann, we find an animus toward apriorist, abstract, unapplied philosophy. Although Hegel often repeated the position that an essential component of the philosophical Idea is always and necessarily concrete, is particular, in the tradition of Hegel scholarship almost no one believes him but Hartmann. Thus, the Hegel interpretation of Klaus Hartmann may be viewed not only as a helpful guide to the Hegelian project, but it must be seen as well as an extension and exemplification of Hegel's conception of philosophy.

It is well known that Hegel based his conception of philosophy on a conviction, namely, the conviction that "What is rational is actual and what is actual is rational" ([27], p. 10). As noted above, however, what is not often commented upon is the fact that Hegel took this to be a claim that had important practical consequences. And because he took such unity to be based on a *universal* human conviction, he frequently makes use of the analogy with the craft of the shoemaker. Hegel's is a *production* analogy: philosophy and shoemaking have similar requirements and similar ends – they both involve the transformation of the given into a *new* product, and a better one.

Yet we must also heed the disanalogy in Hegel's example: in spite of the similarities, unlike shoemaking, philosophy is not just high-powered common sense, it is not just an easier way to get around in the world. If philosophy were strictly analogous to shoemaking, then the model of rationality would be an abstract logic of the understanding, a model Hegel never ceased to impugn. Yet the abstract, apriorist model Hegel opposes is one which survives with enough force today that Klaus Hartmann has attacked forms of it in all his work. For example, in his critiques of "picture-thinking" or representationalism in phenomenology and contemporary Anglo-American analytical philosophy,[4] and in his analyses of the social philosophies of Karl Marx and Jean-Paul Sartre,[5] Hartmann shows the inadequacy of grounding philosophical theory on a subject taken as either an epistemologically necessary postulate, or as an individual in the historical specificity of concrete praxis. Now it might appear that the philosophical context thus demarcated is the typically abstract and esoteric one immediately obvious to even the most casual reader of Hegel; that the old distinction between philosophy and life is simply assumed, giving yet further evidence for the current claim that the Hegelian conception of philosophy is a form of "idealizing mastery",[6] or, that Hartmann's interpretation does nothing to dispel Feuerbach's ironic description of Hegel as having been a "speculative Dalai Lama, . . . the incarnation of reason itself" ([14], p. 103). Yet I do not think that this is necessarily the case; in what follows I seek to show that it is precisely as a hermeneutic of categories occasionally embodied as concrete universals that Hegelian ontology begins to have import for daily life; I argue that concrete universals are moments of unity that serve to articulate life, shaping it even as they reconstruct its outlines.

Since this conception of the legitimacy of Hegelian philosophy runs counter to many of Hartmann's explicit statements,[7] any determination of its appropriateness as an interpretation of his views must wait until those positions are presented. However, at the outset we could recall that Hartmann has continually referred to Hegel as a modest philosopher, or that an essential feature of the Hegelian view of philosophy is its unsuspected modesty ([26], pp. 210, 286–287, 297). I seek to show that this 'modesty claim', in addition to its function as an indication of the limits of the transcendental claim in Hartmann's interpretation, also serves well as an indication of the impact of Hegelian understanding on the social world. Thus, while the insight afforded by Hegelian transcendental understanding may *not* 'make the world philosophical', nor bring all that is within its vision, by showing that there always already has been a mediation between thought and social life (or politics in the narrower sense), Hegelian theory is always one step ahead of mere 'philosophical labor' and, in Nietzsche's image, at the transcendental standpoint ". . . 'knowing' is *creating*, . . . creating is a legislation. . . ." ([36], # 211, p. 136). However, and contrary to the most dominant tradition of Hegel scholarship, this is not an ontological legislation resting on metaphysical claims, but rather, and as Nietzsche too intended, it is a legislation of values, an unmasking that is simultaneously a creation of norms.[8]

My emphasis on the creative, hermeneutical aspect of the Hegelian position rests in part on Hegel's repeated criticisms of the distinction between fact and value in philosophy.[9] For Hegel, values are moments of facticity, yet further evidence of the unavoidability of thought in life. Thus, since knowing is creating, and creating may be viewed as a legislation of value, for Hegel knowing is itself a legislation of value. The precise ways in which knowing legislates are accessible to us through the categories, for their most basic claim is simply that being matches what thought thinks of it. Neither Hegel nor Hartmann holds that the categorial claim is equivalent to the claim that all that is rational is actual, and all that is actual is rational. As I understand them, Hegel and Hartmann make the more relativized claim that being involves a certain unity of otherness and thought, and the actual is the unity of rationality and otherness. Thus, the categorial claim *only* claims that there is a rational aspect or 'kernel' in reality, not that the entirety of the real is rational. That the rational is actual, and the actual rational, in this sense, is a necessary condition for thought's reconstruction of knowledge *and* for its self-validation, even if it is not a sufficient condition.[10]

Although Hartmann has acknowledged other, far less than modest claims made by Hegel, he nevertheless has focused primarily upon and argued for the *philosophical* legitimacy of two non-representational aspects of Hegel's theory: the non-metaphysical "hermeneutic of categories" ([26], p. 287) delivered in *The Science of Logic*, and what I will call the model of rationality presented there. It is this latter aspect of Hegel's contribution, his model of rationality, that makes possible the recognition that there are "concrete universals", or what Hartmann calls "particularized expressions" of universals, events when reason is a general principle incarnate in the individual and equally incarnate in, or absent from, social formations.[11] If it is true that the concrete universal is an instantiation of reason, then we must be able to understand contingency, since *as* an event or particularized expression, the concrete universal is chiefly available through contingency. Thus, even if the concrete universal should not itself be constituted by contingency, contingency is necessary to understand that the concrete universal is instantiated, for contingency is necessary to instantiation. As *instanced*, as an *event*, each instantiation of the concrete universal is contingent. Therefore, the present investigation will focus almost exclusively on the model of rationality presented in the hermeneutic of categories in the *Science of Logic*, in order to argue, finally, that this can provide a rationality for concrete reality.

In the following section I give an overview of Hartmann's interpretation of the Hegelian categorial ontology in the *Science of Logic*. In this analysis attention will be directed especially to the implications of Hartmann's general view for the understanding of the concepts 'rationality' and 'actuality'. My presentation of the outlines of Hartmann's interpretation of Hegel's theory of categories will be at the same time the attempt to present a conceptual archeology of 'the rational' and 'the actual'. If successful, such an archeology will be a reconstitution of a context within which Hegel's best known claim concerning the relation of the two – that they are coextensive and equivalent – will begin to look plausible and something someone might be tempted to endorse. Finally, I will indicate how such a context makes possible an understanding of the concrete universal not only within the order of categories, but as a powerful form of understanding of contemporary life.

I. THE HERMENEUTIC OF CATEGORIES

> In my scientific development, which began from the subordinate needs of men, I was bound to be driven on to science, and the ideal of my youth had to be transformed at the same time into reflective form, into a system. I ask myself now, while I am still occupied with this, how I am to find a way back to intervention in the life of men. (Hegel, letter to Schelling, 2. Nov. 1800)

In this early statement of his project are contained two essential clues for our reading of the *Science of Logic*. First, by 1800 Hegel was led to the acknowledgment that the ideal of his youth – the observation and rejuvenation of enlightened rationality[12] – had to be transformed into reflective form. And second, that reflective form meant systematic form. In this section I will attempt to show that the theory presented in the *Science of Logic* can be profitably viewed as just such a systematic, reflective delineation of what the youthful Hegel called 'enlightened rationality'. Hence, 'rationality' is not one of the categories to be found within the system of categories of the *Logic*, but is rather the title for that which is presented by the theory as a whole. Such an understanding of the nature of rationality allows us to see a continuity between Hegel's earliest understanding of his project, and the standpoints adopted in the *Phenomenology*, *Science of Logic*, and the *Philosophy of Right*. In other words, rationality is understood to be the *telos* of the system as a whole: it is that which is progressively uncovered in the shapes of consciousness and self-consciousness in the *Phenomenology*, that which is interpreted, explained and justified in the *Science of Logic*, and that which is shown to hold true for concrete reality in the *Philosophy of Right*.[13]

Most interpreters of the *Science of Logic* assume that Hegel is concerned there with the relations between knowledge and being. Even those who take Hegel at his word concerning the necessity of having worked through the epistemological stances (or: noetic stances) of the *Phenomenology* often make the distinction between the categories of the *Logic* and 'Hegel', that is, between the determinations of the *Logic* and he who makes such determinations. Hence, it really comes as no surprise that a consistent complaint has been that Hegel follows his contemporaries in reducing being to thought by illicitly allowing his own concrete context to dictate the categories of the *Logic*. In other words, such views take the individual Hegel as the *subject* or starting-point of the theory, as the subjectivity 'objectified' through the particular concatenation of determinations presented in the Logic.[14]

Now in a sense such views are correct: the theory presented in the *Logic* is a form of transcendental theory. That is, it is a systematic theory which accepts the knowledge of science, experience and philosophy as a fact; further, the theory begins from a unitary principle, variously called self-reflexivity, reflection or the figure of subjectivity. However, and contrary to a prevalent view, for Hegel this figure of subjectivity is not limited to specific concrete contexts, or existential concatenations, for it ". . . is simply the resolve, which can also be regarded as arbitrary, that we propose to consider thought as such" ([31], vol. 1, p. 54; [28], p. 70). Thus, the starting-point of the *Logic*, the principle serving as its basis or ground, the Idea, is a wholly abstract figure of subjectivity, what he also calls pure knowledge or pure knowing:

> . . . this Idea has determined itself to be the certainty which has become truth, the certainty which, on the one hand, no longer has the object over against it but has internalized it, knows it as its own self – and, on the other hand, has given up the knowledge of itself as of something confronting the object of which it is only the annihilation, has divested itself of this subjectivity and is at one with its self-alienation (Entäusserung) ([31], vol. 1, p. 53; 28, p. 69).

At the outset of the *Science of Logic* the subject is thus reduced to a principle, a presuppositionless *principle* which serves as the basis for the subsequent account of the structures or concatenations within which the unity of itself and being can be interpreted and explained. For this standpoint, the resolve to begin with *immediacy* is simply the most abstract determination of thought itself. As the theory presented in the *Logic* goes on to show, underlying and supporting the reduction of the subject to a principle able to explain and justify its interpretation of being, is an inherent rationality which becomes progressively less abstract until becoming fully concrete. Thus, the great merit of Hegelian ontology viewed from this perspective is that it accepts the necessarily abstract character of thought as such in order to exhibit the specific ways in which thought becomes progressively concrete. Moreover, as Hegel points out in all his work, without such concretion, thought would be incomplete and comparatively untrue.[15]

This broad description of Hegel's project in the *Science of Logic* permits us to focus more clearly on the sense in which it is a transcendental project. First, it insists that knowledge be justified,[16] and to this end it takes abstract thought or pure reflection ([26], p. 257) to be the basis which does the justifying or accounts for the truth of knowledge claims. Only pure reflection, so it seems, will be able to account for the privileged character and viability of the subject in its transcendental import as opposed to the alleged privilege and viability of the existential subject. As we have seen above, such reflection, or thought, is stripped of all factual elements, a necessary process if it is to serve ultimately as a non-external foundation of the theory in *a priori* terms.

That the subject, understood in the transcendental sense, is non-external is a result in part of the fact that classical understandings of subjectivity are themselves placed within the system: for example, Kant's understanding of the subject of transcendental theory as a unity of intuition and thought, is seen as the result of earlier, less determinate, and presupposed forms of unity. And the form of unity denoted by 'intuition' is, finally, not open to understanding: it is an existential basis, a stream of consciousness which we 'are' ([26], p. 224). Hegel's argument here appears to be that we cannot understand the subject without at the same time understanding the structures (forms of unity) that lead up to it, *and* those higher order forms of unity within which it belongs. Eventually the subject with which the system began – pure reflection, thought – shows itself to be the legitimate basis for the system as a whole by placing itself within it and showing itself to be the only medium within which the unity of thought and being can be disclosed.

The classical schema for the representation of the extent to which concrete reality can be legitimately viewed as a series of unities of thought and being, is as a system of categories. And since its formulation in Kant, such categories have been viewed as necessary to knowledge, as those determinations without which knowledge of being would be impossible: they are the *a priori* bases of concrete objects of experience. Thus thought claims that its contributions, in the form of categories, are necessary for knowledge; or, the fact that the categories "govern" the real in some sense, is what makes knowledge possible. Categories govern the real in the sense that they govern the predicates of concrete things or objects, they are *a priori* contributions to the real on the part of thought. The content of the categories is a series of 12 intimate unities of being and thought, serving, finally, as the foundation of *knowledge*, not of action or belief.[17]

Hegel accepted this view of the nature of the categories, and his practice in the *Logic* includes a presentation of the major categorial determinations of the real. Since Hegel believed that only thought could account for being, his ontological theory supplements the disclosure of such unities with a justification of the theoretical standpoint underlying the system of categories. In other words, a necessary aspect of transcendental argument as established in Hegel's *Logic* is the justification of the claim made by the categories that they govern our knowledge of being.[18] Such a justification shows that thought is constituted by successful 'appropriations of'[19] or unities with being. Thus, Hegelian ontology includes the establishment of thought itself as a type and degree of unity, as that which is able to articulate the difference thought makes to what is since the very reference to being is taken to be a condition of anything's being thought. The establishment of a complete system of such concepts or categories thus rests on the logical self-referentiality of the system as a whole.[20]

The argument which provides a critical justification of the categories in Hegel's *Logic* is two-part and results from the dual nature of the dialectic. As observed both within the individual categories and between the spheres of them indicated by the headings "being", "essence", and "concept", the dialectic has a forward moving, or linear, aspect. ". . . thought, to set up its own genealogy, or the justification of its match with reality, has to regard its antecedent determinations as stances of grasped being, or of being grasped in various degrees of coincidence with thought" ([26], p. 273). Since thought's reconstruction is presuppositionless, it is committed to ". . . a linear development, to a sequence or genealogy of categories, such that each item can be regarded as 'justified' in view of its antecedents" ([26], p. 270).

This 'progressive' character of the structure of categories is that which allows certain forms of unity to be understood, to be reconstructed by thought, as relatively less or relatively more successful in their articulation of what is. In this schema, the determinate character of a particular category is related to preceding and subsequent categories in a genealogy which progressively explicates the types of unity between thought and being. With its fundamental modes of negation and double negation the dialectical relationship between being and thought is portrayed as a series of increasingly determinate delineations of what is. This procedure is able ". . . to consider the otherness of being with respect to thought as a negation, and the difference such otherness makes to thought as 'determinate negation'" ([26], p. 273).

Thus, 'later' categories appear as the more determinate forms of their predecessor categories, e.g., the category of being-for-self (*Das Fürsichsein*) appears as the solution to the rational deficiency of determinate being (*Das*

Dasein). For even though negation, as determinate being, preserves being, it does so in an immediate and simple way so that the unity between itself and being only gives rise to the realm of difference, of dualism, of what Hegel also calls "the field of finitude" ([31], vol. 1, p. 147; [28], p. 157). The determinateness of this form of negation provides only a relative comprehension of being. In the category of being-for-self this deficiency is overcome through the *positing* of the difference between being and negation. The structure of negation and double negation at work in the interplay of the categories of being, determinate being and being-for-self illustrates how the dialectic issues in a progressive unfolding of further categorial content and determination.[21]

Although the preceding description of the dialectic is that aspect most often commented upon by interpreters of Hegel since Marx, by itself it would not justify the categorial claim, i.e., that being matches what thought thinks of it. The linear aspect of the dialectic is complemented by what Klaus Hartmann has called the "architectonic" or systematic aspect:

> The progression will have to begin with the presuppositionless, the zero case of categorization (being); it will lead to the fulfilled case of categorization, where thought categorizes itself as having enclosed all determination (concept). In between, there will be an area where being is regarded as on the way to such selfhood or closure, the area of essence. The architectonic thus provides for a basic ordering of material at large, but it also permits of application in any one sphere or area, such that categories will be arranged both by their subservience to being, essence, or concept, and within each sphere or area by relative proximity to immediacy or closure ([26], p. 271; see also [37], pp. 101–103).

In terms of the previous example, the architectonic aspect of the dialectic means that the determinations of being as immediate, of determinate being as comparatively determinate and of being-for-self as inclusive of otherness have both a formal application within the logic of being, and they have a substantive application within the spheres of being, essence and concept at large ([26], p. 271). It is only on the basis of this architectonic that thought, as comprehension, is able to justify its claims about what is since it is only as fully conceptual, only as that category which is determinate in virtue of its inclusion of otherness, that thought can exhibit its unity with being. Further, Hegel's *Logic* shows that such understanding, in order to be complete, must include an understanding of its own starting-point; in this sense, the doctrine of categories presented in the *Logic* constitutes a *hermeneutic* – it is an understanding of understanding which includes its own self-understanding.

From this brief overview of the Hegelian procedure in the *Logic*, we can understand the sense in which thought is understood there as pure reflection. Although this procedure assumes that thought as such can be studied and delineated, it makes good this assumption by including thought as a structure of unity within its reconstruction of knowledge. Hegelian ontology includes the conceptual delineation of the subject, and this conceptual explication is a complex one: the understanding of the subject changes depending upon what aspect of being is focused upon. For example, there are different categories of the subject depending upon whether the subject is considered in its immediate determination, its essential determination, or its fully conceptual one. In other words, the subject, as the *principle* of thought's reconstruction of knowledge, is self-validating since its final result is also its ground, the basis upon which the structure is presented. Thus, the resolve with which the *Logic* began, the resolve to consider thought as such, is shown not only to have been a legitimate one, but one which is also able to be justified as an appropriate procedure to establish that the way thought thinks about being can furnish truth.

II. ACTUALITY AND THE CONCRETE UNIVERSAL

We have seen that Hegel's ontology is committed to a subjective orientation: thought, understood as pure reflection, is both the starting-point and the ground for the system of categories. And Hegel is careful to distinguish the *type* of reality contained in the *Logic* from the type of reality which is the content of the sciences of nature and spirit ([31], vol. 2, pp. 230–231; [28], p. 592). Since the philosophies of nature and spirit present themselves in a more real form of the Idea than logic, they have a certain advantage; however, they are subsidiary to the *Logic* insofar as their content is the result of the free creation of the Idea, a creation which it has been the purpose of the system of categories to prepare the ground for ([31], vol. 2, p. 231; [28], p. 592).

The overview of Hegel's procedure in the *Logic* thus leads to the claim that it is dialectical reason which is the subject of Hegelian ontology. The dialectic is able to begin with the most abstract determination of "pure being" and by moves of negation and double negation attain categories of greater concreteness. In this section I will focus on the category "actuality" (*Wirklichkeit*) in order to demonstrate that the linear concatenation of categories leads to this more concrete unity, and in order to differentiate the category "actuality" from what I have earlier called the conceptual genealogy of 'the actual'. For while the actual bears an intimate relation to the categorial determination "actuality", it is not equivalent to that category. As I shall show, the actual is the real which is rational, it is a coherent whole, self-differentiating and explicitly self-conscious. Hegel calls such a unity of thought and world the 'concrete universal', and the truth of the explanation offered in the *Science of Logic* rests, finally, on the extent to which such unity is reached.

Hegel's development of the category "actuality" has been the subject of numerous scholarly treatments.[22] It has long been recognized that his delineation of actuality as "the unity of essence and existence" ([31], vol. 2, p. 156; [28], p. 529), concerns primarily the activity of reflection and reflection's two major components, essence and appearance. In the *Science of Logic's* treatment of this category,[23] it appears both as the third, and final, section of Book II, following "Essence as Reflection Within Itself" and "Appearance", and as chapter two of this section, in between "The Absolute" and "The Absolute Relation" ([31], vol. 2, pp. 156–205; [28], pp. 529–571). Thus, the category "actuality" is both the final determination of the Objective Logic (Books I and II) and the transition to the Subjective Logic (Book III). And its dual role within the Logic of Essence, as final chapter and as penultimate determination of the final chapter, signifies a conceptual complexity on the basis of which the Logic of the Concept will go on to present further rationalizations of contingency. For in its determination of the role of contingency the category "actuality" makes possible higher categories of concreteness, as for example, those of Life, the Idea of Cognition, and the Absolute Idea. In fact, to the extent that all the categories of Book III are higher categories of concreteness, they may be viewed as rationalizations of contingency.

In order to situate Hegel's treatment of contingency within the category "actuality", we should recall, first, the place of this determination within the *Logic* as a whole. In the first book, the logic of being, we have an account of those concepts which are necessary to think being in its immediacy. As the development of the categories of quality, quantity, and measure show, however, at the level of being in its immediacy, the significance of the other does not appear. Because immediacy is 'indifferent' to its determining other, the principles of immediate being – being and negation – show this sphere to be only relatively rational.

It is this indifference of immediacy which motivates the move to the following sphere, that of the logic of essence. Because the determinateness of immediate being depends upon its differentiation from its other, thought must now give an account of such mediation. The mediation involved in distinguishing things as such, and in distinguishing a qualitative thing from its contraries, depends upon an act of reflection. And the most general characterization of the logic of essence is that it is that sphere within which thought's reflective activity is analyzed.[24]

Since it is the mediating other of immediate being, reflection determines immediate being. Yet this negativity of essence is itself immediate, and thus simply self-identical. As self-identical, essence is self-related and thus *posits* its own determinateness in distinction from the region of being in its immediacy. Thus, the logic of essence gives an initial development of the *necessity* inherent in thought's own activity. Reflection is not simply the differentiation of moments in an intellectual process, but rather an act of distinguishing which takes place *only* because in being aware of itself *as* distinguishing, thought is aware of itself as process. The process and that which is distinguished in the process are next used self-reflexively: reflection dissolves and cancels its own negativity. As Hegel says, "Being, in its determining (*das resultierende, unendliche Zusammengehen mit sich*) has thus determined itself to essence, a being which, through the sublating of being, is a simple *being-*

with-itself (*ein einfaches Sein mit sich*)" ([31], vol. 1, p. 385; [28] p. 398, English translation altered).

The being-with-itself involved in the sphere of essence is the internalization or 'recollection' (*Erinnerung*) of thought itself. As such, reflection signifies an intellectual act which arises from relating; and it is on the basis of this movement into itself through the *self*-sublating of otherness, that essence is the transition from being *per se* to conceptuality, or being in *and* for itself. Yet in its inital form essence is not yet for itself. The determinate being it gives itself is determinate being as *determined* by, as posited by essence. As Hegel puts this point: "Essence is the Concept as posited (*gesetzter*) Concept, the determinations in essence are only relative, not yet as simply reflected in itself; accordingly the Concept is not yet the Concept for itself" ([30], # 112, 162). Thus even though the sphere of essence is relatively more rational than that of being, since it at least involves a combination of immediacy and mediation, it is still governed by a relation of dependence since the ground of its appearance is outside itself. Thus, as immediate negativity, the categories of essence cannot fully explain the sense they make of determinate being. "The sphere of essence thus turns out to be a still imperfect combination of immediacy and mediation. . . . And so it is also the sphere of the posited contradiction, which was only implicit in the sphere of being" ([30], # 114).

The posited contradiction of the sphere of essence is that essence's determinate reflection into itself is as well reflection into the determinate other. The two principal regions of essence, appearance and actuality, are determined by the relation these two reflections bear to one another: if the relation between them is one of immediate difference, we have the sphere of appearance; if the relation is one of mediated identity, we have the sphere of actuality. Hence, insofar as the analysis presented in the section "Actuality" delineates substance as relational, it presents the argument that the categories of actuality are the primary categories of objective being ([31], vol. 2, pp. 156–205; [28], pp. 529–571).

However, the narrower determination of "actuality", that of the chapter, has a more limited import. The treatment of the modalities contained in this chapter is, like the section as a whole, an analysis of the explicit unity of essence and existence. Both the section and the chapter "actuality" are the posited unity of reflection and its other. In the modal theory presented in the chapter, the analysis is of an absolute which posits itself in immediacy. Hence, the modalities are the various ways in which the absolute manifests itself in externality; or, the modalities are the stages in the unity of reflection and immediacy.

The region of appearance had already shown that the essential unity of being lies in the transition between the immediate being of reflection and its other; actuality posits this unity in immediacy. Actuality as the posited unity of essence and existence is, then, a regional category in which being (*Seiendes*) exhibits an intrinsic unity with ground. In other words, in the regional category "actuality" (the category signified by the *section* "Actuality"), the ground of actuality is posited *in it*, its ground is explicitly in and of being. Since actuality is thus externally unconditioned, it is no longer opposed by content which is supposed to ground it but remains "indifferent" to it. Since ground is intrinsic to the being (*Seiendes*) of actuality, the regional category is the posited unity of the logical structure with reality. As real, such a ground is the absolute ([31], vol. 2, pp. 156–169; [28], pp. 530–540).

Although the absolute is not determined, then, with respect to content, it is determined with respect to form. As so determined, the absolute is the predicate of the absolute, or the absolute attribute ([31], vol. 2, p. 373; [28], p. 533). Yet in the determination of absolute ground as form and matter ([31], vol. 2, p. 297; [28], p. 451), it has already been established that form is self-relating negativity, and hence negates itself in its other. Therefore, as self-related, the attribute is the determinate absolute. Yet the attribute is *also* reflection external to the absolute, since it is only by virtue of this characteristic that it is the determinateness of the absolute. The absolute can only be understood to be determinate if it posits the negative *and* remains identical with itself in the negative. In other words, to be determinate, the absolute must be self-relating negativity, the reflective movement of and out of itself on the basis of which it manifests itself ([31], vol. 2, p. 374; [28], p. 535).

The manifestation of a determinate content is a mode; and content can best explicate itself in its modes by means of its identity through formal difference. This actuality, the self-explication of the absolute, is one in which content is absolute. As absolute form and absolute matter, the absolute is posited in the chapter "actuality" as being which is self-grounding, as independent actuality. In other words, this actuality is the absolute which posits itself in immediacy. As Hegel says, actuality is "reflected absoluteness" ([31], vol. 2, p. 380; [28], p. 541). Actuality is ground which determines itself as real reflection, and posits itself in its external manifestation. And the modalities are the various ways in which the actual manifests itself in externality.

As stages in reflection's real unity with immediacy, the modalities are the internal differentiations of the absolute, and it is only by virtue of such differentiations that the absolute manifests itself in actuality. The modalities may be viewed as structures of determinate ground which govern external being; they 'map' the grounding relations into being's determinations. Yet actuality is more than ground, and since as ground it is the inner to the outer of determined being, it is being-in-itself (*Ansichsein*). And each mode of actuality reflects the ambiguity of *Ansichsein*: each mode can be construed as the immediate and contingent, and each can be construed as the necessary. Thus, in addition to the major modal determinations of actual being and intrinsic ground, the other modal determinations are intra-modal differentiations of the relationship between immediacy and reflection.[25]

The analysis of the modalities of actuality show that it is as a result of thought's reflective activity that things can be shown to have an identity through their possible appearances. As the terms of this identity-specifying activity, the modalities are analyzed in such a way that there emerges a dialectical continuity between their form and content. For example, in the case of the final modality, absolute actuality, its being in itself is real necessity, and real necessity is determinate contingent upon external conditions ([31], vol. 2, pp. 389–90; [28], p. 551). However, this does not mean that contingency is extrinsic to real necessity as determinate; as Hegel argues, contingency constitutes the *content* which is real necessity's being in itself. In other words, the contradiction between the extrinsic, existential relationship of the two contents, and the intrinsic, conceptual unity of the categories of real necessity and contingent condition, is resolved *categorially* in the higher unity of "absolute necessity".

Absolute necessity is the identity of being with regard to content and its negation, or essence. It is absolute necessity because it is, as Hegel says, "because it is". Yet this indicates that it remains uncomprehended as "reflection or form of the absolute" ([31], vol. 2, p. 391; [28], p. 552). Since absolute necessity is thus simply self-identical, the positing of its own contingency cannot be integrated into it and it remains "blind". Thus, absolute necessity is actuality which is absolute in content but contingent in form ([31], vol. 2, pp. 391–2; [28], p. 553). It is contradictory since it is reflection and form of the absolute, yet contingent upon another actuality. It is supposed to be necessary, but is contingent. This contradiction can only be resolved in a categorial unity which abstracts from the real differentia by determining them as a conceptual whole. For, as *immediate negativity*, essence cannot fully explain the sense it has as determinate being.

Only at the level of conceptuality, in Book III, the Logic of the Concept, is there a full integration of sense and determinateness. Within this sphere we see that conceptual being is a negative unity which posits itself *in* its negative. In the being of conceptuality, otherness, or real negativity, is sublated. The sense of subjectivity is determined by the sense of objectivity; and objectivity possesses sense only through its negative. In the category of the Absolute Idea this mutual implication is posited, and the rationality of being is explicated by dialectical thought. It is in this general sense that Hegel's procedure in the *Science of Logic* attempts to resituate what is commonly given in experience, science and philosophy into the form of thought. His account does not begin on the presupposition of the givenness of experience, but rather justifies the theoretical acceptability of the given on the basis of theoretical principles. And the *Logic* provides an account of those principles which shows, finally, that thought itself is the principle of the account: ". . . not only the account of scientific method, but even the concept itself of the science as such belongs to its content, and in fact constitutes its final result" ([31], vol. 1, p. 23; [28], p. 43).

III. Conclusion: The Conceptual Genealogy of the Actual

Hegel himself was the first to recognize that the attempt to think the actual, or the concrete, presents a special problem for transcendental theory. As he remarked in an Addition to Paragraph 32 of the *Philosophy of Right*, this problem involves our ". . . wish to look on at the way in which the concept determines itself and to restrain from adding thereto anything of our thoughts and opinions. What we acquire in this way, however, is a series of thoughts (*eine Reihe von Gedanken*) and another series of existent shapes of experience (*eine andere Reihe daseien der Gestalten*); to which I may add that the time order in which the latter appear (*die Ordnung der Zeit in der wirklichen Erscheinung*) is other than the logical order (*die Ordnung des Begriffes*)" ([27], p. 47). In other words, the sequential pattern of the categories, as for example in the modal determinations of actuality, may conflict with the coexistence of several modes of actuality in experience. Such a situation would seem to undermine the major claim of transcendental theory, which is to be able to delineate and justify the understanding of the concrete.

It is precisely in relation to this problematic, however, that I believe the distinction between "actuality" and the actual may be helpful. As we have seen, the category "actuality" represents a sustained attempt to think the unity of essence and existence. Yet at the level of the Essence Logic, thought is not explicitly self-conscious about this unity. In other words, thought is not yet aware of itself as actually existent, as encompassing being and essence in one complete self-consciousness. It is only *for us* that actuality is absolute, it is not yet absolute for itself. Actuality becomes absolute in *and* for itself only as Absolute Idea. That is, actuality is absolute only as a complete system of categories which ". . . contains *all* determinateness within it, and its essential nature is to return to itself through its self-determination or particularization . . ."([31], vol. 2, p. 484; [28], p. 824).

Such self-determination or particularization is, I believe, the meaning of "the actual". In distinction to the category "actuality", the genealogy of the actual requires the entire development of the categorial ontology presented in the *Science of Logic*. For it is only as a self-conscious, explicitly active rationality that reason can be incarnate in the individual or in social formations. As the embodiment of the idea, the actual is ". . . the absolutely active as well as actual" ([30], # 142A). The concrete universal is just such an absolutely active subject: as the ultimate form of unity between thought and world, the concrete universal represents the highest rationalization of contingency. In this sense, the concrete universal establishes the necessity of contingency. In this sense, too, we might return to Hegel's production analogy represented by his comparison of philosophy with shoemaking. For the craft of shoemaking surely is one which exhibits the role and function of history; as every shoemaker knows, history is not a perfect unfolding, but rather involves the give and take of contingency. While this allows for the possibility for error, it also makes possible progress through heightened skill and new application. The flow of contingency shows that our knowledge is something like the craftsman looking at the product of his labor: the facts of history might be represented by the particular pieces of the craftsman's labor, and it is only through a retrospective look at his product that the shoemaker sees the necessity of the unity. As in the reconstructive delineation of the philosopher, necessity is isomorphic only through the retrospection made possible by study, skill and application. Thus, Hegel's model of rationality, insofar as it is simultaneously a delineation and creation of norms, is not so far removed from the history of the Latin *norma*: originally a carpenter's or mason's square, the norm is a standard, pattern or type always subject to the give and take of history and contingency.

NOTES

I gratefully acknowledge the helpful conversations with Richard White, Thomas Bole, Terry Pinkard, Robert Pippin, Lyle Anderson and George Khushf concerning much of the essay.

1. *Phänomenologie des Geistes*, [29], p. 49: In Ansehung der Philosophie dagegen scheint jetzt das Vorurteil zu herrschen, dass, wenn zwar jeder Augen und Finger hat, und wenn er Leder und Werkzeug bekommt, er darum nicht imstande sei, Schuhe zu machen, – jeder doch unmittelbar zu philosophieren und die Philosophie zu beurteilen verstehe, weil er den Massstab an seiner naturlichen Vernunft dazu besitze – als ob er den Massstab eines Schuhes nicht an seinem Fusse ebenfalls besasse". The English translation is from [32], p. 41. This same production analogy occurs in *Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences*, [30], para. 5, p. 8: "Everybody allows that to know any other science you must have first studied it, and that you can only claim to express a judgement upon it in virtue of such knowledge. Everybody allows that to make a shoe you must have learned and practised the craft of the shoemaker, though every man has a model in his own foot, and possesses in his hands the natural endowments for the operations required". And finally the analogy is presupposed in Hegel's discussion of the types of scorn to which philosophy is subject in 1831, in his "Preface" to *The Philosophy of Right*, [27], p. 5.
2. This formulation of the relation between the task of understanding and historical specificity, the concept 'conceptual archeology', was suggested to me by Arthur C. Danto's analysis of the use of the philosophy/eating metaphor in Santayana and Sartre in [9].
3. The original date of publication of "On Taking the Transcendental Turn", in [18].
4. Critiques of representationalism in phenomenology may be found in all the following: Klaus Hartmann, "Self-Evidence", in [26], pp. 23–52; "Abstraction and Existence", [26], pp. 53–69; "Metaphysics in Husserlian Phenomenology", [26], pp. 70–90; "Phenomenology, Ontology and Metaphysics", [26], pp. 91–119; "Thought, Word and Picture", [26], pp. 168–189; and in two articles on Sartre, "Sartre's Dialectical Schemes", [26], pp. 331–340, and "Praxis: A Ground for Social Theory?", [26], pp. 341–364. The critique of epistemic representationalism is most obvious in Hartmann's "Transcendental Argumentation – Options and Preferences", [26], pp. 237–264, and in "Analytic versus Categorial Thought", [26], pp. 288–297.
5. On Marx: [20], [24]. On Sartre: [19]; "Sartre's Dialectical Schemes", [26], pp. 331–340; "Levi-Strauss and Sartre", [26], pp. 153–167; and "Sartre's Theory of *ensembles*", [26], pp. 365–405.
6. See, for example, [10] and especially [11]. I have offered two analyses and critiques of this view in [6] and [7].
7. I am thinking here both of Hartmann's general claim that dialectical concept analysis or categorial ontology delimits what can and should be handled by philosophy to "what-is"

questions and genealogical explanation ([26], p. 431), and the numerous specific claims concerning the 'proper' subject matter of categorial theory. The most characteristic formulation of this claim appears in "Hegel: A Non-Metaphysical View": "Categorial theory answers only the peculiar questions a philosopher may have as to what it is that a certain discipline is about. Categorial questions are luxury questions" ([26], p. 277). This point, too, underlies Hartmann's critiques of the dialectical methods of Marx and Sartre. In this context, Hartmann argues that the raison d'etre of dialectic is to ". . . devise a progression of concepts in the direction of affirmative concreteness". Hence, the portrayal of a nominalist real in Marx and Sartre dooms their analyses as dialectical theories of the social world. For, according to Hartmann, the ". . . dialectic can tell us what kind of social set-up it would be rational to defend, but it cannot commit us to the alienating inevitabilities of a social world restricted to individual praxes" ([26], pp. 338–339).

8. Although this relation between unmasking and the creation of norms is most explicit in Nietzsche's remarks in *Beyond Good and Evil*, I believe it can also function as a helpful analogy for understanding Hegel's own claim late in the *Logic* that the exposition of substance at the end of the *Wesenslogik* is an "unveiling" (*Enthüllung*) of substance, which is at the same time the "genesis" (*Genesis*) of the Concept ([31], vol. 2, p. 218. The English translation is in [28], p. 581).
9. Whether this criticism took the form of his repeated attack on Kantian ethics with its reliance on the ought, see, for example, [32], pp. 211–409, or whether formulated in the justly famous phrases of the "Preface" to the *Philosophy of Right*: "One word more about giving instruction as to what the world ought to be. Philosophy in any case always comes on the scene too late. As the thought of the world, it appears only when actuality is already there cut and dried after its process of formation has been completed. The teaching of the concept, which is also history's inescapable lesson, is that it is only when actuality is mature that the ideal first appears over against the real and that the ideal apprehends this same real world in its substance and builds it up for itself into the shape of an intellectual realm" ([27], pp. 12–13).
10. Perhaps it is precisely here that Hartmann's distinction between the metaphysical and non–metaphysical readings of Hegel assumes profound importance. For if Hartmann is correct and the categories are only structures of unity that enable a *knowledge* of being, but not being itself, then it would seem that my emphasis on the hermeneuticist Hegel is misguided. Nevertheless, in what follows I seek to show that the self-justification of rationality presented by Hegel in the *Science of Logic* finally results in the collapse of the genealogical and genetic aspects of the development of the categories. Insofar as the result of *The Logic* is the self-justification of the resolve with which it began, the system results in a closure not given in the purely formal ordering of already given categories. And I furthermore believe that in spite of his declarations otherwise, the Hartmannian Hegel interpretation necessitates such an active, creative view.
11. It is this model of rationality which underlies Hartmann's sustained critique of Sartre's social theory. In the context of this critique, most especially in "Praxis: A Ground for Social Theory?", Hartmann suggests the outlines of what I present here as an interpretation of the social import of the concrete universal; the relevant steps can be found in [26], pp. 346, 351–363.
12. I follow here Harris' immanent interpretation of Hegel's early development.
13. The fact that some of Hegel's categories and explanations of the relations between categories in the *Philosophy of Right* do not hold up to the systemic requirements of his theory as a whole, does not falsify the claim but rather serves to point to its legitimacy as a guiding principle for understanding. In other words, it is precisely on the basis of the richness made possible by Hegel's logico-dialectical mode of thought that his own practice in the *Philosophy of Right* may be criticized from a systemic standpoint. For a detailed argument concerning this point see [22] and "Towards a new systematic reading of Hegel's *Philosophy of Right*" in [26], pp. 298–330.
14. Variations on this complaint may be found in Kierkegaard's *Concluding Unscientific*

Postscript [34], and in Sartre's "The Singular Universal", esp. pp. 246–251. Such concern appears as well in Robert B. Pippin's *Hegel's Idealism: The Satisfactions of Self-Consciousness*, [38]. Although Pippin's formulation is the most sophisticated, in his constant raising of the issue as to whether or not the categories of the *Science of Logic* really tell us about "reality" instead of "thought's reality", we see a strategy similar to that of Kierkegaard and Sartre. See [38], pp. 9, 99, 182–188, and especially footnote 7 to Chapter 8, p. 295. Although unlike Kierkegaard and Sartre, Pippin not only raises this issue but provides an answer to it as well, an investigation of the appropriateness of that answer cannot be investigated here.

15. As suggested earlier, this standpoint can be viewed in Hegel's earliest writings (cf. [17]), and in all his major texts, from the explicit formulation in the "Preface" to the *Phenomenology* through the systemic formulations in *The Philosophy of Right* and *The Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences*.
16. This formulation of the nature of transcendental philosophy follows closely that of Hartmann, especially that found in [26], p. 194.
17. See Hartmann, "On Taking the Transcendental Turn", and "The 'Analogies' and After", [26], pp. 193–219 and 220–236.
18. The justificatory aspect of Hegel's project has always been one of the major emphases in Hartmann's interpretation, see esp. "On Taking the Transcendental Turn", [26], pp. 193–219, and [21] "Introduction", p. 1–39.
19. In spite of the notorious difficulties with this term, I think there is good reason to retain it here: one mark of its post-Kantian meaning in Hegel resides in the deeper connotations of "appropriation". In his book, *Remembering: A Phenomenological Study* ([4], p. 192) Edward S. Casey hints at this meaning in his discussion of 'Place Memory': appropriating, or making one's own, ". . . does not imply possession in any literal sense; it is more deeply a question of *appropriating*, with all that this connotes of *making something one's own* by *making it one with one's ongoing life*." It is this sense of appropriation which I believe the categorial claim evokes; the categories are that through and by means of which one makes sense of the actual. Thus, even though today the very meaning of "appropriation" often seems at one with the ideology of exploitation and oppression – in a more recent expression of Casey's, to appropriate ". . . is also to grasp actively in an imperialism of the gaze and step that lays claim to what it sees and touches" ([5], p. 14) – *this* meaning of "appropriation" is historically relative and has its origins in the Age of Exploration that occurred in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries in the West. In short, I believe Hegel's use of "appropriation" is more adequately understood when it is taken in the sense of "making one with one's own life", recognizing and acknowledging the otherness of what is made one with that life, indeed Hegel shows that it is only on this basis that something can be made part of one's life.
20. This does not mean, however, that the particular group of categories presented in the *Science of Logic* is eternal: if science, philosophy or experience suggest determinations not present within the system of the *Logic*, this indicates the need for a new categorial ontology. That the Hegelian project, even in the *Science of Logic*, is historical in this sense is pointed out by Hartmann in his distinction between the three senses of history at work in Hegel's texts, "Hegel: A Non-Metaphysical View", [26], p. 285. This point also serves as an organizing principle for the interpretation of Hegel's philosophy of history provided by Terry Pinkard in "The Possibility of History", Chapter 8 of [37], pp. 152–166. Finally, this view of the function of history in Hegel's philosophy allows us to understand Hegel's general view of the nature of the progression in the history of philosophy, cf. esp. his description of the sense in which Spinoza's philosophy represents a *necessary standpoint* of thought, but not the highest one, [31], vol. 1, p. 218; [28], p. 580.
21. Hartmann's many and varied interpretations of the nature of the dialectic are among his greatest contributions to Hegel scholarship. In addition to his more general remarks on the dialectic, e.g., [26], pp. 193–219, and 267–287, there are a variety of 'applied' readings available in his political writings. For example, in his analyses of Sartre's *Critique of*

Dialectical Reason, [26], pp. 331–340, 341–364, and 365–405, in his analysis of Marx's political theory in [20], and in his various proposals for categorial social theory, esp. [25] and [23].

22. Some of the interpretations most valuable for the present work are: [35]; [33]; [15]; [3]; [16]; [2], pp. 163–207; [37], p. 55–71; [38], pp. 201–231.
23. For an informative survey of the treatment of "actuality" from the Jena period to the Berlin writings, see [1], pp. 123–138; and my reply [8].
24. This description is indebted to Pippin's analysis of the movement of the Essence Logic, [38], pp. 201–207.
25. These intra-modal determinations are indicated in the chapter divisions of 'A. Contingency, or Formal Actuality, Possibility, and Necessity', and 'B. Relative Necessity, or Real Actuality, Possibility and Necessity', and 'C. Absolute Necessity', which, as Hegel says, ". . . is absolute *possibility* and *actuality*" ([31], vol. 2, p. 381; [28], p. 542).

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. Baptist, G.: 1990, 'Ways and Loci of Modality. The Chapter "Actuality" in the *Science of Logic* Between its Absence in and its Disappearance in Berlin', in G. de Giovanni (ed.), *Hegel's Science of Logic*, State University of New York Press, Albany, pp. 123–138.
2. Bole, T.: 1973, 'Hegel's *Science of Logic* as a Transcendental Ontology', unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Texas.
3. Burbidge, J.: 1980, 'The Necessity of Contingency: An Analysis of Hegel's Chapter on "Actuality" in the *Science of Logic*', in W. E. Steinkraus (ed.), *Art and Logic in Hegel's Philosophy*, Humanities Pr., Atlantic Highlands, NJ, pp. 201–218.
4. Casey, E.S.: 1987, *Remembering: A Phenomenological Study*, Indiana University Press, Bloomington.
5. Casey, E. S.: 1990, 'Moving (Bodies) Between Places: Narrating the Journey', unpublished manuscript.
6. Chaffin, D.: 1988, 'Hegelian Dialectic and the Limits of Representation', in H.J. Silverman and D. Welton (eds.), *Postmodernism and Continental Philosophy*, State University of New York Press, Albany, pp. 85–95.
7. Chaffin, D.: 1989, 'Hegel, Derrida, and the Sign', in H.J. Silverman and D. Welton (eds.), *Continental Philosophy II: Derrida and Deconstruction*, Routledge, New York and Albany, pp. 71–91.
8. Chaffin, D.: 1990, 'A Reply to Gabriella Baptist', in G. Baptist (ed.), *Hegel's Science of Logic*, State University of New York Press, Albany, pp. 139–140.
9. Danto, A.C.: 1981, 'Nausea and Noesis: Some Philosophical Problems for Sartre', p. 3–19.
10. Derrida, J.: 1982, 'The Pit and the Pyramid: Introduction to Hegel's Semiology', in *Margins of Philosophy*, A. Bass (tr.), University of Chicago Press, Chicago, pp. 68–108.
11. Derrida, J.: 1978, 'From Restricted to General Economy: A Hegelianism Without Reserve', in *Writing and Difference*, A. Bass (tr.), University of Chicago Press, Chicago, pp. 251–277.
12. Dove, K.R.: 1972, in *Hegel's Development*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, p.
13. Dove, K.R.: 1973, Review of Henry S. Harris, Hegel's Development. Toward the Sunlight. 1770–1801, in *Hegel-Studien 8*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, p. 8.
14. Feuerbach, L.: 1983, 'Towards a Critique of Hegelian Philosophy', Z. Hanfi (tr.), in L.S. Stepelevich (ed.), *The Young Hegelians*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 95–128.
15. Fleischmann, E.J.: 1964, 'Die Wirklichkeit in Hegels Logik: Ideengeschichtliche Beziehungen zu Spinoza', *Forschung*, XVIII, 3–29.
16. Giovanni, G. di: 1980, 'The Category of Contingency in the Hegelian Logic', in W.E. Steinkraus and K.I. Schmitz (eds.), *Art and Logic in Hegel's Philosophy*, Humanities Press, New Jersey, pp. 179–200.

17. Harris, H. S.: 1972, *Hegel's Development. Toward the Sunlight.* 1770–1801, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
18. Hartmann, K.: 1966, 'On Taking the Transcendental Turn', *Review of Metaphysics* 22:1, 223–249.
19. Hartmann, K.: 1966, *Sartre's Ontology*, Northwestern University Press, Evanston.
20. Hartmann, K.: 1970, *Die Marxsche Theorie*, Walter de Gruyter & Co., Berlin.
21. Hartmann, K.: 1976, 'Die ontologische Option', in K. Hartmann (ed.), *Die ontologische Option*, Walter De Gruyter & Co., Berlin, pp. 1–39.
22. Hartmann, K.: 1976, 'Ideen zu einem neuen systematischen Verständnis der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie', in *Perspektiven der Philosophie*, Neues Jahrbuch Bd. 2, pp. 167–200.
23. Hartmann, K.: 1978, 'Reiner Begriff und tätiges Leben', in *Staat und Gesellschaft. Studien über Lorenz von Stein*, Walter de Gruyter, Berlin, pp. 65–95.
24. Hartmann, K.: 1981, *Politische Philosophie*, Karl Alber, Freiberg.
25. Hartmann, K.: 1982, 'Kategoriale Topik im Politischen', in *Neue Hefte für Philosophie* 21, 22–34.
26. Hartmann, K.: 1988, *Studies in Foundational Philosophy*, Rodopi, Amsterdam.
27. Hegel, G.W.F.: 1965, *The Philosophy of Right*, T. M. Knox (tr.), Oxford University Press, Oxford.
28. Hegel, G.W.F.: 1969, *Hegel's Science of Logic*, A. V. Miller (tr.), Allen & Unwin, London.
29. Hegel, G.W.F.: 1973, *Phänomenologie des Geistes*, Ullstein, Frankfurt a. M.
30. Hegel, G.W.F.: 1975, *Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences*, Wallace (tr.), Oxford University Press, Oxford.
31. Hegel, G.W.F.: 1975, *Wissenschaft der Logik*, G. Lasson (ed.), Felix Meiner, Hamburg.
32. Hegel, G.W.F.: 1977, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, A. V. Miller (tr.), Oxford University Press, Oxford.
33. Henrich, D.: 1959, 'Hegel's Theorie Über den Zufall', *Kant-Studien*, 131–48.
34. Kierkegaard, S.: 1968, *Concluding Unscientific Postscript*, D.F. Swenson and W. Lawrie (trs.), Princeton University Press, Princeton.
35. Marcuse, H.: 1987, *Hegel's Ontology and the Theory of Historicity*, S. Benhabib (tr.), M.I.T. Press, Cambridge.
36. Nietzsche, F.: 1966, *Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future*, W. Kaufmann (tr.), Random House, New York.
37. Pinkard, T.: 1988, *Hegel's Dialectic: The Explanation of Possibility*, Temple University Press, Philadelphia.
38. Pippin, R.: 1989, *Hegel's Idealism: The Satisfactions of Self-Consciousness*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
39. Sartre, J.-P.: 1972, 'The Singular Universal', in J. Thompson (ed.), *Kierkegaard: A Collection of Critical Essays*, Doubleday, New York, pp. 230–265.

TERRY PINKARD

9. Constitutionalism, Politics and the Common Life

Apparently late in his life, Hegel came to the conclusion that the possibilities of modern art were limited. "Art is for us a thing of the past", he noted in his 1828 lectures on Aesthetics, just three years before his death.[1] By that he seems to have meant two things. First, art could no longer play the central role it once did; it would "for us", members of pluralist constitutional states, henceforth be an important but no longer central cultural activity. Second, the form of life of our modern society is such that the category of the beautiful is inapplicable to the basic structure of that society, which is a constitutionalist state committed to the rule of law. Although we can regret this, we must also acknowledge the rational superiority of constitutionalist societies to their alternatives. Markets and the rule of law have much to recommend them, even if they can make no claims to being aesthetically pleasing.

Hegel's reflections on aesthetics and politics are important in ways that go beyond his philosophy of art. They are instructive both for what they say about *his* political theory and for what they have to teach us about *our* political theory.

I do not wish here to offer a commentary on Hegel but to offer what I take to be a Hegelian understanding of the notion of the state as a novel type of community. I then wish to show how Hegel's idea of the exclusion of aesthetic categories from politics helps us to understand the kinds of principles appropriate to the modern constitutionalist states. Finally, I shall argue that the shortcomings of Hegel's constitutionalist theory have something to teach us about the shortcomings of some of recent political theory.

I. PLURALISM AND PHILOSOPHY

Like many of his generation, Hegel had begun his political reflections influenced by a highly romantic understanding of the Greek *polis*, in which the *polis* was seen as a kind of fusion, a unity of social, political and individual life, in which the right and the good totally coalesced and in which there

H.T. Engelhardt, Jr. and T. Pinkard (eds.), Hegel Reconsidered, 163–186.
© 1994 *Kluwer Academic Publishers.*

could be no disunity between self-interest and the principles of morality. Although he perhaps never completely abandoned this romantic understanding of the Greeks, he nonetheless came to believe in its utter inapplicability to the world in which he lived. His reflections on the conditions and principles of modern politics led him to the conclusion that the romantic desire to recreate the *polis* in modern terms was false in relation to the conditions of modern social practice and was therefore so totally unworkable as to not even serve as an ideal. Influenced greatly by his study of the figures of the Scottish enlightenment, Hegel came to believe that market forces, not ideals of the good or the beautiful life, were to guide a substantial portion of the life of modern society.[2]

It was only natural in these conditions to see the modern state in terms of principles of individualism and market economies. The state was then conceived as a body united through the coordination of various actors pursuing a conception of their own advantage. For example, social contract theory understood the state as a product of rational individual choice. Although Hegel resisted the idea that social contract theory fully captured the ethics of the modern state, he was not so naive as to think that pointing out that no state had ever actually been the result of such a choice was enough to refute the basic individualist principles of social contract theory. The theory of the market, after all, showed that certain results could predictably come about without those results being the intention of any of the actors that contributed to the production of the result. If social contract theory and all its market-oriented cousins were wrong, they would have to be wrong because they did not and could not comprehend certain features of the political state that they pretended to explain.

Why is this? Left to their own, market societies could at best produce a certain type of unity of coordination, in which each adjusts his or her behavior according to what the other does. In this competitive market society, this need for coordination would quite naturally give rise to a quasi-state apparatus complete with a system of law and administration that would be necessary to protect the orderly workings of the market. Hegel called this the *Notstaat*, the "state based on need", which would naturally arise in a society that is no more than an association of people held together by the 'glue' of mutual benefit, with each being given reason to cooperate through the belief that this arrangement is for his or her own self-interest.

The only basis for obligation in such a *Notstaat*, however, is either fear of the law's punishment or calculations of self-interest. True political obligation, however, is derivative from *belonging* to a community that both treats one in a fair and principled way and with which one identifies. Only in a social unity in which we encounter each other in ways that express a non-instrumental relation to each other is genuine obligation possible. Political obligation transcends calculations of mutual benefit or even a general commitment to some abstract principle of fairness (as if political obligation consisted only in the obligation to repay benefits not received as gifts). It must arise from a sense of *identification* of one's own interest with those of a larger community. Without this identification, the individual can have no real motive for doing what his or her community requires.

Why? A community is obviously more than the need for mutual economic support. Hobbesian individuals will obviously economically need each other, but the Hobbesian view hardly qualifies as communitarian. Hobbesians see only competitive and cooperative interests as motivating people, that is, interests satisfied by private goods ([28], [29]). Communal interests (those that are genuinely shared and are not satisfied by private goods) can play no essential role for the Hobbesian. Likewise, if true political obligation is derivative from a sense of community, then the principle of fairness alone cannot generate political obligation. The principle of fairness alone only specifies a type of principle of cooperation that gives certain probabilities to private interests being satisfied ([28], p. 409). It is not necessarily equivalent to an interest in community (although members of a community may take an interest in fairness for its own sake, as determining the form of their common life, in which case it becomes a communal good).

What exactly is this need for community, either in a practical sense or in some deeper idealistic sense? The claim about the need for community must be something like this. People need community in order to attain any worthwhile or successful notion of who they are. Without an identification with a cultural and linguistic community, life is adrift. There can be nothing to a person's life without such an identification. We need community for both recognizing and achieving certain goods in ways that go beyond the senses in which an economic underpinning is necessary. Without such an *integration* in community, the individual both loses a sense of self and therefore of a life that embodies certain goods in it.[3] The individual will thus lose any sense of political obligation that is not immediately tied into calculations of personal advantage.

The ideal of complete integration sees the individuals' sense of who they are and what they value as being continuous with those of their community. There are shared values between citizens that both structure their community and their personal lives. The communal individual is considered to be incomplete without others. The question then is: what is such integration and is anything like such integration possible in a modern pluralist society based on something like justice as fairness?

Such integration is possible in modern pluralist society only if those goods that an individual finds powerfully enough motivating to be good reasons for action for him or her as an individual are continuous with the goods embodied in the larger community. But it would seem as if this is precisely conceptually ruled out in a modern pluralist society. In such societies, the goods that motivate individuals are varied and often incompatible. What seems like the pursuit of a good to one person will be just the naked expression of desire to another. Indeed, the whole point of justice, so it might seem, in such a state of affairs is to put certain kinds of individual desires off limits.[4] In such a state of affairs, the role of justice, like all morality, would be to limit self-interest.

Hegel thought that this motivational problem was not restricted to problems of justice in a pluralist society but was a general problem for all moral psychology, and he thought that it sufficiently motivated his move from moral psychology to social philosophy.[5] The dilemma is this. On the one hand, morality (expressed in Kantian moral philosophy) requires us to take an impartial stance toward our own projects and desires. Those projects that cannot meet the demands of the categorical imperative are decisively ruled out.[6] However, any adequate theory of motivation must, as Aristotle saw, give *me* a reason for acting. Impartial reasons can be motivating only if they are also good reasons for me as an individual to act. Kantian morality thus leaves it open that I may find myself in the position of being required by duty to do something for which I have no personal motivation, and being motivated by some fundamental project for which I have no real impartial reason. (These kinds of dilemmas are discussed by Bernard Williams in [33]; see also [29].)

Kantian morality must therefore postulate that we have a kind of 'pure interest' in acting. However, this ruse fails for two reasons. First, there is no reason to think that we have such an interest, since it is hard to make sense of it outside of an insupportable Kantian metaphysics.[7] Second, the Kantian ideal leaves us without any conception of an *integrated* agent. The agent becomes bifurcated into two spheres, the moral and the personal, each with its own set of demands.

But then we are stuck: without reasons becoming *my* reasons and not just the reasons of any rational agent in general, it is difficult to say why I should act at all. If moral motivation is possible, it must therefore be possible for me to rationally reflect on my dispositions and order them according to principles that are both rationally (that is, impartially) acceptable and nonetheless of interest to me as an individual.[8]

This problem of *moral* theory therefore is a problem of social philosophy and ultimately of *political* theory. The only way to resolve this theoretical question is to construct the idea of a form of social life in which personal and moral motivation meshed, in which the right and the good were either congruent or at least were self-supporting and not inconsistent. This is not just a philosophical problem of constructing a possible utopia but a practical problem of fashioning a society in which such meshing could occur. Hegel himself originally thought he had found such a meshing of personal and political in his youthful understanding of the classical Greek *polis*, and like many of his contemporaries, he had also originally hoped to recreate the *polis* in modern times. However, in his later thought, particularly, the *Aesthetics*, the *Philosophy of Right* and the *Philosophy of History*, he came to the conclusion that however initially attractive that life might seem, the idealized Greek *polis* was able to overcome the oppositions of personal interest and the good of others only through a kind of denial of individuality.[9] The *polis* did this by seamlessly meshing the categories of the beautiful with those of political life. In doing so, it underwrote the claim that any deviation from the communal demands of political life could only result in one's leading an ugly life, obviously not in one's self-interest (conceived aesthetically).

Hegel was acutely aware that the traditional types of community were ruled out by modern conditions. However theoretically appealing they might be, conceptions of traditional community were practically incoherent possibilities in modern settings. First (as Hegel was too aware), the wars of religion in Europe were evidence for the political impracticality of imposing any traditionalist idea of organic community. Second, the precepts of modern individualism ruled out in principle the Greek aesthetic solution. Hegel's question therefore was: if political obligation is possible only in some form of community, and traditional communities (particularly the *polis*) were ruled out as possibilities, then what form of community would be suitable for the modern market-oriented state? This became the central question for his political philosophy. His answer came in his understanding of the modern constitutional state and its relation to a market-oriented society.

In order to understand Hegel's point, we can contrast three different types of association for the members of a pluralist society. First, we might have what we could call a radical pluralist and individualist model of political association. In such an association, individuals confront each other with no deeper tie between them than that of being in the same place at the same time and sharing mutual dependencies. On this view, any shared goals are accidental. Let us call this the morality and politics of complete strangers.

Second, it would be natural that such an association of radical pluralists would develop a more complex scheme for mutual advantage. As Hobbes argued, their mutual frailty would lead them to see that a mutually agreed upon system of rules to regulate their encounters would perhaps work out to interests of all. However, these rules need not represent any shared moral ideals held among the people setting them up. They would only represent the rules on which each party, seeking his/her own advantage, could agree with the others. These rules would represent, that is, only compromises based on possibly antagonistic interests. We can call such an arrangement a *modus vivendi* (the term is originally used to characterize the relations between foreign states). This model of association supplements the morality of strangers with that of contracts.

However, the model of strangers and the model of a *modus vivendi* do not exhaust the possible conceptions of political association for a pluralist society. We can imagine two alternative third forms of community. We can imagine the inhabitants of the newly formed contractual society coming to adopt the same religion and its associated ideals. We might also imagine through intermarriage and death the creation of a homogeneous ethnic stock. We would then have a *traditional* community.

Or we can imagine yet another form of truly *political* community whose ties are not merely accidents of time and place, nor simply elements of a *modus vivendi* constructed around compromises of interests, nor identification with others in terms of common ethnic or religious heritage. Rather, the community would be structured around a shared commitment to and identification with certain goals and principles. In such a community the members see their encounters with each other in terms not exclusively of mutual advantage but in terms of some shared set of principles that also structure to a great extent their conceptions of who they are.

Such a political community would be a *constitutionalist* state, in which the various practices that make up politics in it should be interpreted according to the principles that make up the common set of constitutive commitments in terms of which members judge their encounters with each other in the political arena. These principles are constitutive of those encounters; they form the basis, that is, for the constitution of that social and political order. Such a union is structured by ideals of fair play and justice, and in which a certain set of virtues (such as civic courage and tolerance) emerge as ideals of character. In a constitutionalist state, moreover, these shared goals do not exclude great differences in ways of life in the community. This form of social unity expresses a common point of view about political principles that are widely shared; but it does not express a common point of view about what is of ultimate value in the universe.

The Hegelian conception of the constitutionalist state expresses this latter conception of a community bound together by common shared principles. These various principles, however, are all developments of the social practice that may be construed as giving expression to what Hegel called the specifically modern "principle of subjectivity".[10] This "principle" includes a wide range of ideas and ideals of personality, of a development of a sphere of privacy, a sphere of intimacy and of a sense of personal independence. The "principle of subjectivity" embraced the development of an individualist ideal, although it was not identical with it. Hegel understood, for example, part of the *moral* force of the institutions of free markets to lie in their vouchsafing a sphere of personal independence that was absent in other types of social unity. However, the principle of subjectivity divorces politics from aesthetics. In markets, the shape that society took was not determined by any goal of a good life or of a beautiful existence but was only the product of a series of seemingly disconnected individual choices that the Scottish thinkers showed to result in a kind of equilibrium and not just an unordered overall chaos. The "principle of subjectivity" finds its fruition in the modern market-oriented constitutionalist state. People in such a state need only swear allegiance to a set of common propositions about justice and fairness and to certain virtues of citizenship, not to a common religion or comprehensive vision of life.[11]

Justice is important in such a community for three reasons: (1) The "principle of subjectivity", which makes a social appearance as individualism and the fact of pluralism, makes it impossible to organize society around any shared comprehensive aesthetic or religious goals; therefore justice as an ordering relation among individuals in a pluralistic setting takes priority.[12] (2) The "principle of subjectivity" expresses itself in ideals of independence; this may take the form of either personal or of communal independence – for example, not merely individuals but also small ethnic or religious communities might claim a certain sphere of independence from the larger society. Justice then becomes the basic framework for the duties of these individuals or communities to the larger society as a whole.[13] (3) Justice provides an overarching unifying ethical ideal in that it both offers a source of motivation and a sense of character for the individuals involved; it expresses a form of social unity appropriate for the integration of other determinate types of social unities.

As a novel type of community, one not necessarily united by a common sense of being part of a "*Volk*" or a common religion, the modern constitutionalist state is a special type of *political* unity of its members. It is more than a *modus vivendi*, in that it expresses this common ethical point of view on the political principles that structure social life. However, it does not exhaust all that can be said about ways of life nor does it rest on any comprehensive set of personal ideals. Rather, it rests on general political ideals – among them, justice and fairness. In it, the members encounter one another and adjudicate their disputes in terms of the common principles that structure that community. They do not necessarily encounter each other in terms of some comprehensive ideal of life. This is a *novel* form of community, to be distinguished from the more homogeneous *Gemeinschaften* of the past.

This might seem like a rather anachronistic reading of Hegel, but one finds this view expressed in his theory of art.[14] There Hegel expresses in his most clear form his views on pluralism and truth. On the Hegelian view, art is the presentation of the truths of a culture in individual works having the "form" of beauty; this distinguished art, for example, from philosophy, which presented the same and some other truths in terms of general propositions and theories.[15] His reflections on pluralism led him to the conclusion that art "for us" – for those people living in societies characterized by the fact of pluralism and by the principle of "subjective freedom" – could no longer fulfill the function that it had, for example, in ancient Greece. In a such a society, art could present the truths of that society without, as it were, any residue; there were no truths that escaped it. In our society, however, this is not possible. This is true for two different reasons. First, the truths that present themselves as capable of artistic presentation are many and varied; that is the meaning of pluralism. The artist presents nowadays not *the* truths of the whole culture; she presents the truths of a part of the culture. These 'truths' need not cohere with each other; they may be mutually exclusive. (For example, the 'truths' underlying the life of the Catholic ascetic may be completely at odds with those underlying the secular jazzman. An artist may present either set of truths in a fashion that allows the other side to see its attractions without in any way making the two compatible.) These 'truths' may, after all, rest in irreconcilable comprehensive doctrines, to use John Rawls' phrase. It is not that there are no great truths in a pluralist society; it is that there are simply too many irreconcilable truths to be successfully captured in a work of art. (For that reason, Hegel argues, there *can* be no great epic of the modern world.[16]) Second, the basic truths of our society that we all do share, and which enter into the makeup of our identities, are not truths that lend themselves to aesthetic presentation. They are instead the truths of the rule of law, of the need for rules to set legitimate expectations, of constitutionalism and the like – hardly the stuff of epic poetry.

However much some have longed for a past in which such a fusion was so complete that the opposition of self-interest and general welfare was unthinkable, that day is gone. (Such a day probably never existed in the first place, but that apparently does not stop people from longing for it.) The task of moral theory, therefore, would have to be to construct the possibility of a form of social life in which the demands of morality were met that at the same time gave individuals a sufficient personal motivation to do those actions which were right. That is, moral philosophy must see if the abstract *ideal* of the *polis* – that is, a state of affairs in which the claims of justice and my personal good coincide – could be achieved without our having to invoke any standards of the "beautiful life" in doing so. To put it in another way: we must see if a form of social and political life is possible in which even if the right and the good are not congruent, they are at least complementary.

A Hegelian understanding of the role of markets and constitutional politics permits us to fashion our social theory as a theory of categories of the basic types of social unity possible in modern conditions.[17] On the one hand, Hegel conceived the market as offering an adequate personal motive; on the other hand, he conceived the state as offering a type of *political* community united under constitutional principle rather than by some comprehensive or aesthetic vision of life and offering therefore a more general motive. In doing so, he believed he could construct the possibility of a set of social categories in which the diversity and pluralism of modern life could be understood without requiring the kind of fusion that constituted the ideally conceived Greek *polis*. Each category would express a type of social unity characteristic of modern social practice, and the succeeding categories would provide an integration of the earlier ones. How?

Consider why the Hegelian rejects the Kantian conception of morality and politics. The Kantian strategy is a *bifurcated* strategy. It leaves the agent with two different rational strategies for life: on the one hand, there is the rationality of impartial morality, and on the other hand there is the (personal) rationality of individual lives and satisfactions. Such a bifurcation offends the ideal of reason, namely, that our lives should rationally cohere. This may not always be possible, but it remains present as an ideal.

The Hegelian strategy is an *integrated* strategy, in which there is only one rationality, that of personal and moral interest. The separation of a sphere of personal independence from the identification with the political community of the state allows for this possibility. The individual belongs to several different communities, the point of each being different. In the sphere of personal independence, individuals are free to pursue their own goods and advantage. They are free in their religion, in their concern with what constitutes a satisfying and fulfilling life, in whom they will marry, what career to pursue and so on. Belonging to a community specifies concretely ideals of the person; in our identification with certain communities, we acquire desires to be a particular type of person. We thus acquire motives that are both general and personal.

The political community gives us a more general motive by giving us what Hegel would call a 'universal' identity. However, this political identity is not complete and exhaustive. Individuals *identify* with the political community only partially. By this I mean that they do not necessarily regard all elements of personal or impersonal value as being exhausted by their membership in the political state. This is expressed in the fact of pluralism; there is no 'one truth' that could capture all the senses of value in a social setup that recognizes the "principle of subjectivity". In such a situation, neither art nor politics is capable of a seamless and comprehensive vision of 'one truth'. Yet by sustaining a social setup in which individuals both have a reason to *cooperate* out of self-interest (the market society as the satisfaction of individual desire) and yet which puts definite limits on the formation of certain desires, the political community offers a fuller integration of life than a mere setup for mutual advantage could possibly extend.[18] By integrating the principles of communal life into his or her own character in the form of the liberal virtues – e.g., toleration, the willingness to compromise, the willingness to see the other person's point of view, to cooperate with others on a basis of mutual respect, etc. – the individual has an integrated self in his encounters with others that would be lacking in any arrangement in which the only 'glue' that bound people together was the mutually held belief that this best furthered their own particular interests. Thus, the constitutionalist state can claim a greater stability than a purely liberal state based simply on calculations of self-interest. The constitutionalist state can supply individuals with the sense of community that enables them to achieve a fuller sense of self without having to swallow up the individual's identity completely.[19]

In Hegelian *categorial* theory, we have some idea of the *point* of the different kinds of social unities in which we encounter each other and an idea of how to specify what is and is not proper to those communities. What part of a person's life is included in its integration into the political community? Only that part that is concerned with constitutional politics and the goods that make up the common life. Just as there is no one art for pluralist society, there is no one deep communal truth for all of society. Many individual 'truths' will fall outside of politics. The state may properly try to foster certain virtues (such as liberal toleration), but it must be neutral on others; it may not, for example, foster the Christian virtues as Christian. Nor may it foster a particular conception of, say, the proper form of love of husband and wife. Nor may it determine the bounds and qualities of friendship. None of these serve the point of politics, which in the Hegelian state is to define the conditions for the equality of freedom. The point of politics remains the creation of a common form of life, but this common form of life can no longer be seen in terms of a fully shared set of truths any more than art can be seen as articulating 'the truth' of a society.

The resulting society can hardly be described as 'beautiful'. The full integration of personal and political life is missing in it, and out of this pluralism the possibility of a classical aesthetic is also lost. On Hegel's view, however, this is an advantage, not a detriment. The full mesh of personal and political that had characterized the idealized *polis* had turned out not to be an ideal after all. What modern society lacked in full integration, it gained in a richness of diversity and differentiation. It was, for all that, more *valuable* as a society. Its richness and stability has even allowed it to tolerate dissent from its basic principles.

From the Hegelian standpoint, we can understand that a common form of life need not entail a shared comprehensive view of life. Hegel saw correctly that art could not comprehend this common form of constitutional civic life. He still continued to believe, however, that philosophy could. However, we could radicalize Hegel's conclusions a bit. In a pluralist society, there can be no one *comprehensive* theory that explains all of the 'truths' of that society ([24], [25]). There can be a philosophical theory of the various social unities and how they relate, but there can be no general theory of value that can serve as a foundation on which to build the common life. The 'truth' that philosophy grasps is not some single comprehensive 'truth' but a *categorial* understanding of the complexities of the life in which it now finds itself. For the various areas of life, there will not be developments of one theory but many *local* theories. Hegel gives us a broader understanding of how such local theories all fit in with the society for which they are partial theories.

However much it strays from aesthetic ideals of the "beautiful life" in politics, a society based on justice expresses the essence of the modern pluralist constitutionalist state. Hegel's views in his *Aesthetics* mirror his views on constitutionalism. Both are formed by an awareness of the importance of the fact of pluralism in the modern world. This is not a transitory condition that we can expect to vanish. It is a deep fact about our world, indeed, even constitutive of it. For this reason, any attempt to create an *aesthetic* union in society – to form society around some one set of ideals ("truths") – is an attack on the modern constitutional state and its rationality. Hegel's warnings were to prove prophetic: the longing for "one truth" that could be expressed in aesthetic terms was a rejection of the fact of pluralism.[20] It can only try to graft a heroic form onto society, in the shape of 'great individuals' who personify in themselves all morals and law; but this stands in direct contradiction to the principles of the modern state (See *Aesthetics*, I, [10], pp. 182–189). If anything, one can fault Hegel with perhaps being too optimistic that this attempt would not come about.[21]

We can put this extension of Hegel's aesthetics to his politics in a larger context. Jerome Schneewind has argued that what moral theorists take to be the very *point* of moral theory depends on the historical period in which they are operating. Prior to the eighteenth century the task of the moral philosopher was not justification or vindication but explanation. In the context of a very theologically rooted worldview, one did not need to justify morality; its existence and content was obvious and beyond question. The only real task for moral theory was to explain, for example, whether all the moral laws reduce to one moral law or how we apprehend the principles of morality (through our intellects, a special moral sense, whatever). It is only later in the context of skepticism about whether God or Nature has constructed us so as to guarantee that our actions will automatically coordinate to a common good that the more contemporary problems of justification in moral theory begin to take shape. Once the functions of social coordination or the production of a greater good (or whatever is taken as the goal or point of morality) is conceived as *our* responsibility and not something that is written into our nature, we are called upon to be able to *justify* what we do. It is this shift in the idea of the point of moral theory that gave rise to the great foundationalist programs of modern moral theory, of which Kant's, Hegel's and Mill's are perhaps the most eminent examples.

The great comprehensive doctrines of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were attempts to provide an exhaustive justification that would supplant and supersede the theological worldview. Having lost the belief that God or Nature has constructed us automatically to coordinate our actions to a common good, the moral philosophers were led to the idea that the very point of moral theory was to construct a comprehensive doctrine that would provide an adequate rational basis to resolve social disputes. By putting philosophy above art and religion, Hegel seemed to share this view. But I have suggested here that we need not share Hegel's optimistic foundationalist view of his own thought; it is not intrinsic to Hegelian theory, and Hegelian theory may profitably be reconstructed without it.

II. Constitutionalism and the Common Life

Hegelian theory provides an interpretation of the constitutionalist state in terms of its role in fashioning a common life, as expressing and maintaining a kind of shared ethics among its members. However, we should ask whether Hegel's theory perhaps leans too much in the direction of being *purely* a constitutionalist theory and neglecting to its detriment the non-constitutionalist elements of political life. After all, there is more to political argument than just constitutional issues. Many of the important rights of a modern liberal democratic community can probably only be justified in terms of certain specific goods to be found in a particular way of life. Disputes about these rights depend on conflicting interpretations of what is required of the practices that sustain these goods.

An example will perhaps make this point and the more general principles connected with it more clear. Consider the right to privacy. In order to understand why rights to privacy would be thought to be important, we must first understand the *point* of the intertwined social practices of respecting privacy, of defending privacy and so on. Let us refer to this somewhat awkwardly as the "practice of privacy". This practice includes much more than just the legal protections that privacy has. It also includes everyday social conceptions of what it means for something to be private and what it means to respect someone's privacy, of when one is supposed to look the other way and so on.

Several things stand out. First, privacy concerns both information about oneself and certain types of disclosure of oneself. Someone invades your privacy when he illegitimately looks at your bank records or when he peeks in your windows or listens in on your conversation. Moreover, if he hangs around in a public place, say, on the sidewalk in front of your house on a warm day, listening to the conversations that he can hear because the windows are open, he invades your privacy. Second, privacy concerns a sphere of intimacy among people, such as husband and wife, a sphere in which the rest of the world does not share. This may be displayed in a number of ways that only with some stretching could be said to concern information about oneself. Third, there is a sphere of private action, of actions that intimately concern one's sense of self; we could call this a 'liberty' sense of privacy, a freedom to pursue certain fundamentally 'private' matters. What ties these various senses of privacy together is what I called the "practice of privacy". This should not be taken as consisting of a set of necessary and sufficient conditions defining *a* concept of privacy but rather a set of social practices that offer related conceptions of what it is to be "left alone", along with corresponding conceptions of a *kind of self* that people legitimately may expect or even be encouraged to form.

It is no accident that ideals such as autonomy and privacy make virtually simultaneous appearances in our culture. Our notions of privacy (encompassing both the ideal and the associated practices) are tied up with a modern ideal of the self that itself includes various practices and ideals of solitude, self-presentation and so on. Understanding the value of privacy and why it should be protected depends on an understanding of social goods as embedded in historically determinate practices. From the common life of the medievals in which the notion of being alone was virtually unthinkable, we have developed a sense of subjectivity and intimacy, in which the practice of privacy has its home. This practice has its point in the various goods that it embodies, and these goods are available only in certain forms of common life that we have developed.

Because we value what this practice in our common life promotes, our-conceptions of rights to privacy demarcate what we might call "safe areas" of life. Those areas are safe in the sense that we require overriding justifications for entering them without the person's consent. Without such 'safe areas' in social life, we cannot realize the goods protected by a right to privacy, and the construction of privacy rights helps to carve out these safe areas from the swirl of public life. Widespread agreement on the value of privacy rights is indicative of widespread agreement about the value of these goods, founded in a common form of life. These 'safe areas' have both a legal sense and a wider sense connected with the more inclusive social "practice of privacy".

It is doubtful, however, that the goods that play such an important role in justifying a right to privacy could be generated out of the purely constitutionalist political position such as that sketched out above. After all, whether the necessity of such safe areas of social life is required depends on one's understanding of a number of other goods, such as the good of constructing a certain type of self, the goods of intimacy, and so on. The right to privacy depends not just on the modern constitutionalist idea of someone's having *a* determinate conception of the good but on an understanding of very specific goods. Under different social assumptions and different ways of life, such goods will most likely not appear. Nonetheless, we do not have to make terribly controversial metaphysical or religious assumptions to establish an interpretation of these goods or this right. It will no doubt be more controversial than the establishment of, for example, the Rawlsian primary goods as the social conditions necessary for the realization of the two moral powers of Kantian persons; but it need not rest on any comprehensive conception for its justification. Arguments for a right to privacy will depend on there being available a widespread understanding of the goods that such a right protects.

The only way to get a handle on such rights is to admit that they require an understanding of the types of goods embodied in certain historically determinate forms of social unity. There is no set of principles that can be formulated independently of this understanding of goods and social unities that will generate these kinds of rights. It follows from the basic principles of Hegelian theory that for modern pluralist constitutionalist societies there is also no theory of *the* good for such a society that can be captured in a way so as to make the whole social setup unambiguously good. Just as there is no single aesthetic unity for the society, there is no single common good.

The issue here in democratic politics, both legislative and constitutional, is the *common life*, the principles in terms of which people in a social setting mediate their encounters with each other. This common life can exist only if there is a kind of shared ethics, a *Sittlichkeit* that provides a basis of motivation that is strong enough for people to be able to mediate their encounters in terms of some set of shared principles. The idealized *polis* did this in terms of a shared vision of the good life. The modern liberal democratic state does it in terms of a much more complex set of principles that recognize the 'principle of subjectivity' yet also promote a kind of political encounter with each other in which certain sets of reasons count and others do not. The goods of the common life, such as the goods that the right to privacy protects, must be structured in terms of larger principles of justice and of right living that mediate such encounters. This does not prejudge whether, for example, in a just state there should be a constitutionally protected right to privacy. It only points out that such a right exists, and its validity depends on a set of goods that are historically relative but on which widespread agreement may still be found.

We might put it like this. Hegel's own theory understands liberal *constitutionalism* well, but it is not at all clear that it understands liberal *democratic politics* nearly as well.[22] One historical reason for this deficit in Hegel's theory was no doubt the lack of a genuine democratic parliament in the Prussia that Hegel was reconstructing ([13], p. 110). Hegel's theory of parliament in his *Philosophy of Right* certainly suggests this. He finds himself unable to conceive of a legislature as being comprised of anything but the Estates (*Stände*), social classes defined independently of any popular will (such as the agricultural class, the business class, etc.). The classes are considered as essential moments of society, and the deputies of the Estates represent those moments. Nonetheless, the function of the deputies is to represent in their deliberations the goods and interests of the whole society, not just their particular class. But it turns out that the inclusion of the essential classes in the legislature rests not on any individual right to be represented so much as it rests on what seem to be pragmatic considerations that certain crucial policy matters will not be left out of consideration (see *Philosophy of Right*, [8], §301, Remark; §309). It is as it were an insurance policy that certain facts will not be overlooked, not the idea that different interests have some basic moral right to be heard.[23]

What is at stake in the political process are various goods, competing arguments about the power to get them, and competing conceptions of the form the common life is to take. Much literature on liberalism seems unfortunately to assume that the only struggles in liberal society are over these goods, whether they be material goods or more intangible goods such as power and status. But part of the political struggle in any society (liberal democratic society being no exception) is more pointedly directed at the shape the common life will take. That the form should be a competition for goods against a neutral backdrop of rights and liberties is but one among many competing conceptions of that common life.

All this is related to Hegel's critique of Kant's moral philosophy and its application to political theory. The issue here between Hegel and Kant is much deeper than being merely an intramural squabble between camps of German idealism; it concerns the basic paradigms by which we construct theories of liberal democratic societies. Much contemporary liberal philosophy has been dominated by the legalist constitutionalist metaphor, just as Hegel's own theory was so dominated. There has been quite a bit of theorizing about justice, about whether a liberal state must base its policies on neutral principles (that is, principles of state action that make no suppositions about any form of life being intrinsically better than another), and so on. Much of this seems to operate in the ambit of what German jurisprudential thinkers call the *Rechtsstaat*, the state based on law. The *Rechtsstaat* is often equated with a state based on the "rule of law", but there are important differences between the two conceptions ([13], §27). A literal translation as "state of law" partially shows this. Indeed, the idea of the *Rechtsstaat* derives from the tradition of natural law; it is originally the idea of a state ruled by principles of law that are discovered (as is the natural law). As the idea developed, in a *Rechtsstaat* there were seen to be clear principles and laws that form a system and which protect rights of individuals or social classes.

Note that a *Rechtsstaat* need not be a *democratic* state, but it may very well be a *liberal* state. Even among the early American liberals, there was some hesitation as to whether a truly liberal government ought to be democratic. A liberal state was believed to involve limited government, protection of basic liberties and material progress. It was not at all clear that a democratic state was the best way to secure the protection of such basic liberties, especially property. Pure liberals (as opposed to democratic liberals) can feel at home in a *Rechtsstaat*; a liberal *Rechtsstaat*, after all, can embody perfectly all the liberal principles, including protection of basic rights.

It is quite natural to combine the ideal of the *Rechtsstaat* with a Kantian premise about moral theory. By a "Kantian premise", I mean the idea that the good is dependent on empirical inclinations, which may or may not vary with individuals and which are subject to rational disagreement, whereas the right can be fixed *a priori* by reason alone, does not vary with individual cases, and consequently is not subject to rational disagreement in the same way. Kant applied this idea to the state (a *Rechtsstaat*) in holding that the state could only coercively enforce duties of justice, not duties of virtue. What was legitimately subject to state coercion could be determined by reason alone. Something was a subject of coercion if it fell under the category of justice, and the universal law of justice was to "act externally in such a way so that the free use of your will is compatible with the freedom of everyone according to universal law" ([12], p. 35; p. 231 in the edition of the *Königliche Akademie der Wissenschaft*). Not only could one determine *a priori* the basic elements of the constitution of a state, one could also determine *a priori* what was suitable for state coercion and what was not.

Those who are attracted to the image of the *Rechtsstaat* will be drawn to this image of constitutionalist political life, since a constitution is, among other things, a collection or expression of principles that helps to define the common life of its citizens. Such a purely constitutionalist orientation can be especially attractive to a philosophical turn of mind. A constitution may be seen as a set of principles resting on some basic principle (such as "a basic right to free choice", "neutrality", "equal concern and respect" or whatever); these principles put certain types of reasoning and decisions out of bounds. Now, it only comes natural to philosophers to argue about whether, for example, a just state may or may not redistribute property or prohibit such and such form of sexuality; and if the constitution is an Idea of Reason, then it would seem to be at least partly up to philosophers to determine what a just constitution will or will not permit and protect. Justice, so it will be said, requires (or permits or maybe even rules out) the redistribution of property. It is a short step to the conclusion that the principled bases of political argument and life end there. The Kantian premise combined with the image of the *Rechtsstaat* goes nicely to put moral philosophers in charge of political issues.

However, in a democratic state based on *rule of law* rather than the *Rechtsstaat*, there is a different model of political argument and political life. The idea of a rule of law in such states is both a proceduralist and historical notion. It is the idea of types of decisions that affect people being reached through certain procedural means. People are represented, and all voices are ideally heard (as mediated through their representatives). The political process is like the judicial process, except that the 'judge' in the case (i.e., the citizen) is also a party to it.[24] Indeed, the practice of the rule of law itself precedes democracy and lays the foundation for it; without formal protections like, for example, *Habeas Corpus* and the established principle of the rightness of hearing of many different voices in a dispute, there could probably be no development of modern democracy ([13], p. 153). It is only when the procedural notion of the rule of law is united with *liberal* notions of limited government that we are on the road to liberal democracy.

It is in that combination that the real conceptual and historical differences of the *Rechtsstaat* and the rule of law begin to stand out. Whereas the idea of the *Rechtsstaat* grew out of a certain type of philosophical theorizing about the state and its principles – with its model of a few basic principles in terms of which the forms of state life could be derived – the idea of the rule of law grew out of the *practice* of judicial interpretation of law and the establishment of precedent, with its more complex web of principles and rulings. The rule of law, so we might say, had a historical development in which differing solutions to social problems grew up and competed for superiority against a backdrop of increasingly established precedent. And interestingly enough, the great heroes of the rule of law were not academic jurists or philosophers but judges.

But if one abandons the Kantian, *Rechtsstaat* image, then how can one decide if a set of rights belongs properly to the constitutionalist domain or to the give and take of the democratic political domain? I have argued that it is not by a rigid distinction between the right and the good, since some modern constitutionalist rights (for example, privacy) require an understanding of goods in order for an argument for them to be made. It must rather be about the *type* of good that is at stake. In the modern liberal democratic state, this seems to have something to do with the abstract but nonetheless powerful idea of dignity or personal integrity as forming the basis of the type of social unity that characterizes these types of common life.[25] Those liberties are more basic that are most deeply involved with personal dignity or integrity; those are less basic that deal with goods or activities that society allows but which do not impinge on individual integrity. For example, we have basic rights to bodily integrity and psychological privacy but not to keep all our money away from the tax collector. (A workable distinction between personal and commercial property could perhaps also be teased out of this distinction, since personal property will be more integral to the integrity of the person than will commercial property.) We have rights to have our voices heard in the political process (a development coming out of the judicial practice of hearing all sides to a dispute), but we have no right that our side always wins. Of course it is true that not all goods concern integrity, and not all goods concern integrity as deeply as other goods. It is also true that there will be no doubt conflicting accounts of how deeply something (say, job security) touches on the dignity of individuals.

This suggests that the model for reasoning about such rights is not the Kantian, *Rechtsstaatlich* "Principle-Instance" model. Rather, it is the idea that our conception of basic constitutional rights based on something like a scale of nearness and distance from what is necessary for sustaining individual integrity. What counts as a right depends on its proximity to the standard cases of individual integrity. If that is true, then we cannot expect a neat formula to clearly demarcate all constitutional rights from all political rights (whether the formula be epistemological or be something like neutrality).

This moves such constitutional considerations from the domain purely of the "right" at least partially into the domain of the "good", but this should not be thought to make it more controversial or less amenable to rational discussion unless one is operating only with a Kantian premise in mind.[26] Without this Kantian premise, there seems to be no reason to believe that judgments about the right will be any less controversial than judgments about the good. Nor does the conception of constitutional rights as depending on fundamental goods undermine the idea that such constitutional considerations should rest on a broad overlapping consensus. Indeed, one would expect that where there was no broad agreement, or the good in question was controversial, there would be corresponding controversy about constitutional provisions relating to it. Generally (but not always), we have found that for political reasons in those situations where there is reasonable disagreement about how deeply something touches on our integrity, it is best to leave it to democratic politics and not to constitutional adjudication. However, this is not a philosophical theorem derived from epistemology or from the structure of moral reasoning so much as it is just a historical lesson. Moreover, the various related conceptions of all that is involved with the notions of integrity or dignity are themselves dependent on conceptions of goods that are themselves historically developing. They cannot be defined exclusively in terms of categories purely of the right. (In passing, we can note that this does not lead to anything like utilitarianism unless one also makes the assumption that all reasoning about the good involves ideas of maximizing it; however natural that belief might be, it is certainly not the only view of reasoning that is possible.)

In much contemporary political philosophy, democracy and liberalism often seem to have been run together as if they were only aspects of each other or were intrinsically mated for all time. This is not so. A democratic liberal state represents the confluence of these two separate ideals, that of a liberal *Rechtsstaat* and a democratic political state. Together, the two form a kind of common life that is novel and may not be reduced to the kind of political struggle that would be characteristic of a pure democracy nor to the kind of principled decision from on high that would be characteristic of a pure *Rechtsstaat*.[27] In such a common life, the purely constitutionalist regime will not serve to sustain the whole set of goods that make up that shared life. Democratic politics, with its basis in historical experience and rule of law, is required.

III. HEGELIANISM AND LIBERALISM

Where does this leave us? These reflections on Hegel's theory point to a kind of one-sidedness in some contemporary political philosophy. On the one hand, we now have a rather extensive literature in the constitutionalist, *Rechtsstaat* image; on the other hand, we also have an emerging communitarian literature that does not find itself at home in the image of the *Rechtsstaat* so much as it finds itself at home in the image of democratic politics and its attempts to fashion a thicker, common life. Both may be taken as one-sided expressions and reconstructions of the common life and social practice of liberal democracy. As only one-sided, neither quite gets it right.

Any theory of democratic liberalism must therefore make room for both elements within it. I have argued that a Hegelian theory (in some distinction from Hegel's own theory) may still be equipped to do this. I have tried to sketch out how something like the Hegelian notion of the "principle of subjectivity", although obscure, is not hopelessly so and is a promising way to articulate the goods of such a common life without relying solely on the purely constitutionalist model. The Hegelian model allows us to understand how motivation and morals can be at home with each other in politics. It fashions a workable conception of social union for the liberal democratic state in which the conception of integration with the community is given a defensible form; and it gives us the outlines of a theory of constitutionalism and democratic political activity in terms of the ideals of personal integrity.

We could put this in more general terms. (1) Constitutional matters depend on an understanding of certain goods. This is compatible with Rawlsian ideas of "free public reason" (see note 26), but not necessarily with any rigorously understood priority of the right over the good. (2) Non-constitutional politics has as its ideal the pursuit or the establishment of common goods. In its preferred form, it is more than just a series of compromises based on naked interest. However, given the fact of pluralism, any ideal of a fully shared good to direct the political process seems to be just romantic longing, similar to the longing for the *polis* that affected Hegel's generation. The Rawlsian idea of cooperation based on mutual respect in terms of the ideals established by a just community is the morally preferable alternative. (3) The communitarian wish to fuse the constitutional and the political life of a pluralist democracy is just dangerous romanticism; the legalist-*Rechtsstaat* image of putting all issues of justice into the constitutional realm is one-sided and indefensible.

Finally, we can very generally specify what form a Hegelian conception that takes this into account will have. (1) A Hegelian theory will be dialectical: it will try to show how the "principle of subjectivity" requires a kind of articulation of different spheres and types of social unity to be coherent. (2) It will be categorial, in that its focus will be not on general premises but on the development and articulation of various social categories, interpreted as reconstructions of basic types of social unity. The notion of a type of social unity (a social category), not the ideas of the right and the good, will be basic. More needs to be said about all this, of course, but not everything worth saying can be said in one place. I have only tried to give some idea that there are indeed many things worth saying about such a Hegelian theory. The indebtedness of these reflections to Klaus Hartmann's work in Hegelian theory goes without saying.

NOTES

1. Although Hegel's thesis concerning the "end of art" is well known, it apparently did not appear in his lectures on the subject until 1828, three years before his death. At least this is the claim that Dieter Henrich makes on the basis of reading the unpublished manuscripts of the lectures ([11] p. 114, note 1).
2. Although Hegel was clearly influenced by his reading of Adam Smith in regard to markets, his reading of some of the other figures of the Scottish enlightenment, particularly James Steuart, led him to the conclusion that markets will not necessarily automatically correct themselves if left alone. For Hegel's relation to the thought of the Scottish enlightenment – particularly to Scottish ideas about the nature and value of markets – see [3].
3. "Integration" is the term I have chosen to translate Hegel's usage of "*Aufhebung*". See [19].
4. Thus Rawls argues that those desires that conflict with the principles of justice have no standing, no value ([21], §50).
5. For Hegel's moral psychology, see G.W.F. Hegel, *Encyclopedia*, §§469–482. This is his *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften.* A common edition is [7]. In English, [9]. I discuss his moral psychology more fully in [19].
6. See [16] for a defense of this type of interpretation of Kant's ethics. This understanding of Kantian ethics interprets the categorical imperative as a kind of procedure for testing hypothetical imperatives. Hypothetical imperatives express our own plans and projects. We then see if they can be suitably universalized. If they cannot, we are to discard them. For the idea of self-legislation found in Kant's writings, this interpretation substitutes a metaphor of self-judging. It substitutes, as it were, for the legislative picture of the agent more in terms of a Supreme Court exercising judicial review over the laws. Maybe that puts it off limits as an interpretation of Kant, but I doubt it.
7. Without such a pure interest, Kantian agents would be frequently in exactly the position described. John Rawls offers a non-metaphysical defense of Kant's notion of the person in his [21]. This pure interest, Rawls seems to argue, is best parsed as an interest in being a certain *type of person* expressed by the Kantian ideal, namely, of making reason effective in our lives and living free from the dictates of nature. Rawls seems to interpret the pure interest as a conception of the person that we affirm. As Kantian persons, we are motivated by what he calls higher order interests, namely, a regulative and effective desire to

be a certain kind of person, not by our particular conceptions of the good. Rawls then interprets heteronomy as acting according to principles that hold in virtue of relations among the objects that are not determined by this Kantian conception of the person. However, in strictly Kantian terms, acting on the basis of an interest we have in being a type of person is still a heteronomous act, since it presupposes an empirically based interest. Only *if* we have a desire to be a certain type of person (and it is possible not to desire it or to desire to be a different type of person), then we have a rational justification for certain moral prescriptions. It does seem clear that Rawls regards this conception of the person as empirically conditioned, in that he has emphasized that he intends this to hold only for a political conception, not for a general moral conception (see [24], [25]). This avoids the pitfalls of the Kantian conception for moral theory, since my justifications for my actions cannot conflict with my motivation to be a certain type of person. However, this puts Rawls near to Hegel's conception of the relation of motivation and social theory: my desire to be a certain type of person is best expressed in terms of a particular type of society. The real issue, then, between Rawls and Hegel concerns just how detailed the delineation of the 'type of society' and the 'type of person' must be.

8. "But impulse and passion are the very life [*Lebendigkeit*] of the subject; they are needed if the subject is to be in his purposes and their execution. The ethical concerns the content, which as such is the *universal*, an inactive thing that finds its being set into motion in the subject. It finds it only when the purpose is immanent to the subject, is his interest and, when it claims his whole effective subjectivity, is passion" (Hegel, *Encyclopedia*, §475).
9. "This supreme end in Greece was the life of the state, the body of the citizens, and their ethical life and living patriotism. Beyond this interest there was none higher or truer. But political life as a mundane and external phenomenon, like the circumstances of mundane reality in general, falls prey to transitoriness . . . For in this immediate coalescence of the individual with the universality of politics the subject's own character and his private individuality does not yet come into its rights and it cannot find room to develop in a way harmless to the whole." G.W.F. Hegel, *Hegel's Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art* ([10] Vol. I, p. 510). (Hereafter just cited as *Aesthetics*, volume and page number.)
10. See Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, §260 [8]: "The principle of modern states has prodigious strength and depth because it allows the principle of subjectivity to progress to its culmination in the extreme of self-subsistent personal particularity, and yet at the same time brings it back to the substantive unity and so maintains this unity in the principle of subjectivity itself."
11. The myth abounds that Hegel's view of the state was organicist in a bad sense. Charles Larmore construes Hegel's conception of the state as communitarian in the sense that it supposedly is based on the idea that the state must express a deep commitment to a particular way of life (see [14]). The shared ethics that the state embodies is a full blooded ethics about all aspects of life. Hegel's alleged nostalgia for Greece, in Larmore's view, supposedly led him to mistakenly believe that if the state had any moral foundation, it must be a full fledged moral foundation. That is, the state must exist in such a manner so that each of the members of the state can recognize in it their own deepest ideals. The state must be an 'organic' unity like the classical Greek polis, because only such an 'organic' unity could provide the basis for this kind of shared ethics. To say this, Larmore has to ignore Hegel's rather sharp criticism of the nostalgia for Greece in his *Aesthetics*. Hegel, of course, helped Larmore's misreading along by explicitly referring to the state as an "organism" and by identifying the constitution as "the organism of the state". (See, for example, *Philosophy of Right*, §269 and Addition [8].) How important these texts are depends on how you understand Hegel's overall system. However, we might well take Hegel's usage as metaphorical. After all, we often speak of the 'organs' of government without believing that this metaphor commits us in any literal way to conceiving of our government as an 'organism' of any kind. Besides, even if Hegel did mean it literally – which is doubtful – it is certainly not self-evident that this was the best way even for him to under-

stand his own doctrine. If nothing else, Hegel's hierarchical way of ordering his categories does not fit well with non-hierarchical organistic metaphors.

12. "This mode is present where the conception of ethical life (*sittlicher Begriff*), i.e., justice and its rational freedom, has already been worked out and preserved in the form of a regime of law (*gesetzliche Ordnung*), so that now, alike in itself and in the external world, this regime exists as an inflexible necessity, independent of particular individuals and their personal mentality and character . . . In the true state, that is to say, laws, customs, rights are valid by constituting the universal and rational characteristics of freedom, and, moreover, by being present in this their universality and abstraction, no longer conditioned by accidental whims and particular personal peculiarities . . . Such a situation presupposes an actual cleavage between the universals of the legislating intellect and immediate life, if we understand by 'life' that unity in which everything substantial and essential in ethical life and justice has won actuality only in individuals as their feeling and disposition, and is administered solely by means of these" (*Aesthetics*, I, p. 182; I altered the translation slightly from Knox's).
13. In his *Aesthetics*, Hegel has a short section titled, "Prosaic States of Affairs in the Present" in which he discusses how the modern world of the market society and the constitutional state, with its laws and institutional setups, leave little room for classical heroism. Our choices are hemmed in by market conditions, laws, etc. not of our own creation. He says of such a situation, for example, "It would be inappropriate to set up, for our time too, ideal figures, e.g., of judges or monarchs. If an administrator of justice behaves and acts as his office and duty demands, he is simply carrying out the specific responsibility prescribed to him by *jus* and *lex* in accordance with the juridical order" (Vol. I, p. 193). Hegel concludes of the modern individual, "[H]e is not, as he was in the Heroic age proper, the embodiment of the right, the moral and the legal as such" (Vol. I, p. 194). The conclusion is that such an age cannot produce the kind of "beautiful lives" that characterized classical art.
14. See Stephen Bungay, *Beauty and Truth* ([2]), for an especially insightful and lucid discussion of Hegel's views on art.
15. Hegel thought that the basic categories of art were that of form and content. Thus, he thought, there were really only three possibilities for the relation of form and content in art. First, there could be determinate form that expresses indeterminate content. He called this symbolic art and found the art of ancient Egypt to be paradigmatic for it. One has a determinate form (say, a statue of Osiris) that stands for (symbolizes) a vague, partially inexpressible meaning (content). Second, one could have determinate form and determinate content that each match the other. He called this classical art and found the art of ancient Greece paradigmatic for it. In it one does not have a symbol and its meaning as two separate things; one has a form that is perfectly suited to its content. The statues of the Greek gods do not *symbolize* the gods (nor do they symbolize anything else, such as forces of nature); they *express* the Greek gods perfectly. Third, there can be indeterminate form that expresses determinate content. Modern art is paradigmatic of this. The content is subjectivity. This content is in the early stages of modern art the truths of revealed Christian religion; nowadays it is the inner life of the artist or the group represented. Moreover, there is no particular kind of form – statuary, poetry, dance, whatever – that is best suited to express this determinate content. Thus, modern art will often seem arbitrary in its presentation, since it is not tied down to any one form. Moreover, given the pluralism of society, there can be no art form that expresses the content without residue; something will always be left over. (If it expresses completely the subjectivity of one artist, it will not express completely the subjectivity of another.)
16. "If we are to find truly epic productions in the most recent times, we have to look around for some sphere different from that of epic proper. For the whole state of the world today has assumed a form diametrically opposed in its prosaic organization to the requirements which we found irremissible for genuine epic, and the revolutions to which the recent

circumstances of states and peoples have been subject are still too fixed in our memory as actual experiences to be compatible with the epic form of art" (*Aesthetics*, Vol. I, p. 1109).

17. I discuss the theory of social categories and how they tie in with Hegel's other categories in [19], Chapter Seven.
18. The political community puts definite limits on the formation of certain desires in that those desires that contradict the basic principles of justice have no standing. "*Unification* pure and simple is the true content and aim of the individual, and the individual's destiny [*Bestimmung*] is the living of a universal life" (*Philosophy of Right*, §258). "Living a universal life" here means precisely putting no value on those personal desires that conflict with the 'universal' (i.e., constitutional political unity).
19. Hegel emphasizes this idea in the *Philosophy of Right* when he discusses poverty and how to handle it in civil society. The problem is to secure a kind of integration of the individual in society in terms of principle, and poverty works against that ideal. For example, the conditions of poverty remove the social bases for an individual's "self-respect" ("*die Rechtlichkeit und die Ehre*"), §244. The programs of civil society to eliminate poverty and its effects are therefore not political compromises of interests but duties that the society owes to its members.
20. "Thought and reflection have spread their wings above fine art. Those who delight in lamenting and blaming may regard this phenomenon as a corruption and ascribe it to the predominance of passions and selfish interests which scare away the seriousness of art as well as its cheerfulness; or they may accuse the distress of the present time, the complicated state of civil and political life which does not permit a heart entangled in petty interests to free itself to the higher ends of art. This is because intelligence itself subserves this distress, and its interests, in sciences which are useful for such ends alone, and it allows itself to be seduced into confining itself to this desert . . . consequently, the conditions of our present time are not favorable to art . . . the point is that our whole spiritual culture is of such a kind that [the artist] himself stands within the world of reflection and its relations, and could not by any act of will and decision abstract himself from it; nor could by special education or removal from the relations of life contrive and organize a special solitude to replace what he has lost" (*Aesthetics*, Vol. I, pp. 10–11).
21. However, even this judgment itself might be too rash – there is good evidence to show that late in his life, Hegel was becoming very pessimistic about the easy triumph of constitutionalism. See [31].
22. Klaus Hartmann argues this point and tries to construct an integration of Hegelian categorial theory and problems of facticity on the basis of the work of the nineteenth century philosopher and jurist, Lorenz von Stein. Von Stein shares some of Hegel's ontological outlook on the relation of state and society, but he conceives of it a bit differently. State and society are conceived as two existences that stand in a 'reflective' relationship to each other (Hartmann notes that this corresponds to Hegel's logic of "Essence" in the *Science of Logic*). As two separate entities, they coordinate with each other; as moments of an overall "essence", society stands in a relationship of subordination to the state. Hartmann expresses von Stein's point in terms of the difference of "pure concept" and "active life". The constitution of a given social and political order expresses the "pure concept", the ideals of affirmativity for that society. The given society, with its inequalities, its class structure and its hidden centers of power expresses the "active life" in which the "pure concept" must find instantiation. Overall, the distinction is between the political ideals that are the stock and trade of the philosopher and the real day-to-day existence in which these ideals are realized and sometimes betrayed. For a succinct statement of this view, see, among others, *Hartmann's* "Reiner Begriff und tätiges Leben" in [5]. The point is also made in *Hartmann's* "Hegel: A Non-Metaphysical Interpretation", [4], pp. 112–113.
23. For a discussion of the deeper systemic reasons for this failure, see Klaus Hartmann, *Politische Philosophie* (Munich: Karl Alber Verlag, 1981).
24. See [13], p. 108. Kriele quotes the Latin phrase, "audiator et altera pars" and its ancient

German equivalent, “Eenes Mannes Rede ist keeines Mannes Rede, man muß sie hören alle beede” (roughly, “One man’s speech is no man’s speech, one must hear both sides”).

25. This is an idea that has much in common with Michael Walzer’s notion of various types of good demarcating spheres of justice in his work, *Spheres of Justice* [32]. Walzer, however, seems to think that the different spheres are simply different, with nothing really in common. He does not seem to entertain the notion that self-respect or dignity (discussed as a good in the section on “Recognition” in the book) actually runs throughout his discussions of the other goods and seems to play a kind of justificatory role for his other demarcations of spheres of justice.
26. A Rawlsian might object that what is at stake in constitutional matters is what may be reasonably decided by people in their capacity as free and equal citizens. (This point is made by Thomas Nagel in [15].) He calls this “free public reason” (“On the Idea of an Overlapping Consensus”, p. 20), that is, reason that takes into account evidence on which we can gain a broad-based public agreement, which comes down to empirical, common-sense, and scientific evidence. As free and equal citizens, people can come to reasonable agreement about basic liberties but not about other things (including, for example, what legislation is required in order to satisfy the Difference Principle). In this sense of “free public reason”, there can also be reasonable disagreement about matters such as, for example, what is the true religion; therefore, these matters cannot be part of the constitutional structure of society. That just means that if somebody says that only within a particular church is there salvation, then we can point out to him that he is being unreasonable, in the sense of free public reason, not in the sense of Reason in some grand philosophical sense. They are trying to use the coercive powers of the state to compel someone to do something about which there can *in this sense* be reasonable disagreement. This is not to say that to assert the truth of some particular religion is unreasonable *per se*; it is only to say that it is in the sense of “free public reason” unreasonable to assert its truth. It is another issue, however, whether the “Kantian premise” in Rawls’ version is correct: that the right can be reasonably determined without any notion of the kinds of goods beyond those of the primary goods. I have argued that privacy could not be so sustained except by presupposing some idea of a kind of modern self and what is involved in sustaining that self’s integrity. Nonetheless, it seems to me that something like the Rawlsian idea of free public reason is the correct one, namely, that those rights are basic that concern widely accepted goods concerning personal integrity.
27. I have defended this idea in more detail in [18].

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. Ariès, P. and Dubuy, G.: 1988, *A History of Private Life II: Revelations of the Medieval World*, A. Goldhammer (tr.), Harvard University Press, Cambridge.
2. Bungay, S.: 1987, *Beauty and Truth*, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
3. Dickey, L.: 1987, *Hegel: Religion, Economics and the Politics of Spirit, 1770–1807*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
4. Hartmann, K.: 1972, ‘Hegel: A Non-Metaphysical Interpretation’, in A. MacIntyre (ed.), *Hegel: A Collection of Essays*, Doubleday, Garden City, pp. 112–113.
5. Hartmann, K.: 1978, ‘Reiner Begriff und tätiges Leben’, in R. Schnur (ed.), *Staat und Gesellschaft: Studien über Lorenz von Stein*, Duncker und Humbolt, Berlin, pp. 65–95.
6. Hartmann, K.: 1981, *Politische Philosophie*, Karl Alber Verlag, Munich.
7. Hegel, G.W.F.: 1969, *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften*, in E. Moldenhauer and K. M. Michel (eds.), *Werke in zwanzig Bänden*, Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt a.M., Vol. 9.

8. Hegel, G.W.F.: 1969, *Philosophy of Right*, T.M. Knox (tr.), Oxford University Press, London and New York.
9. Hegel, G.W.F.: 1971, *Hegel's Philosophy of Mind*, W. Wallace and A.V. Miller (trans.), Oxford University Press, Oxford.
10. Hegel, G.W.F.: 1975, *Hegel's Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art*, T.M. Knox (tr.), Oxford University Press, Oxford.
11. Henrich, Dieter: 1979, 'Art and Philosophy of Art Today: Reflections with Reference to Hegel', in R.E. Amacher and V. Lange (eds.), *New Perspectives in German Literary Criticism*, Princeton University Press, Princeton. pp. 107–133.
12. Kant, I.: 1965, *Metaphysical Elements of Justice*, J. Ladd (tr.), The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., Indianapolis.
13. Kriele, M.: 1975, *Einführung in die Staatslehre*, Rowohlt Taschenbuch Verlag, Reinbek bei Hamburg.
14. Larmore, C.: 1987, *Patterns of Moral Complexity*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
15. Nagel, T.: 1987, 'Moral Conflict and Political Legitimacy', *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 3, 215–240.
16. Nell, O.: 1980, *Acting on Principle*, Columbia University Press, New York.
17. Pinkard, T.: 'What Constitutes an Invasion of Privacy in Social Science Research?', in T. Beauchamp, *et al.* (eds.) *Ethics and Social Science*, Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, pp. 257–273.
18. Pinkard, T.: 1987, *Democratic Liberalism and Social Union*, Temple University Press, Philadelphia.
19. Pinkard, T.: 1988, *Hegel's Dialectic: the Explanation of Possibility*, Temple University Press, Philadelphia.
20. Pippin, R.: 1989, *Hegel's Idealism: The Satisfactions of Self-Consciousness*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
21. Rawls, J.: 1971, *A Theory of Justice*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge.
22. Rawls, J.: 1980, 'Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory: the Dewey Lectures', *The Journal of Philosophy*, LXXVII, 9, 515–572.
23. Rawls, J.: 1982, 'The Basic Liberties and Their Priority', in S. McMurrin (ed.), *The Tanner Lectures*, University of Utah Press, Salt Lake City.
24. Rawls, J.: 1985, 'Justice as Fairness: Political Not Metaphysical', *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, 223–251.
25. Rawls, J.: 1987, 'On the Idea of an Overlapping Consensus', *Oxford Journal of Legal Studies*, 7, 1, 1–25.
26. Reiman, J.H.: 1976, 'Privacy, Intimacy, and Personhood', *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, 6.
27. Schneewind, J.: 1983, 'Moral Crisis and the History of Ethics', in P. French *et al.* (eds.), *Midwest Studies in Philosophy VIII*, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, pp. 525–539.
28. Scott, S.: 1987, 'Self-Interest and the Concept of Morality', *Nous* 21, 407–419.
29. Scott, S.: 1988, 'Motive and Justification', *Journal of Philosophy*, LXXXV, 9, 479–499.
30. Smith, S.: 1989, *Hegel's Critique of Liberalism*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
31. Smith, R.: 1985, *Liberalism and American Constitutional Law*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge.
32. Walzer, M.: 1983, *Spheres of Justice*, Basic Books, New York.
33. Williams, B.: 1985, *Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge.

DICK HOWARD

10. Revolution as the Foundation of Political Philosophy

Klaus Hartmann has articulated an increasingly systematic political philosophy whose aim seems to be the avoidance of politics. Hartmann was aware of the paradox. For example, in the first paper I heard Hartmann deliver, in 1966, he explained the theoretical necessity of "taking the transcendental turn" and then replied to those who demanded more realism from philosophy that "even if we were to reach the conclusion that the problem cannot be solved, it is only on the level of transcendental philosophy that we can see that it cannot. The problem would indicate that there is nothing to be 'understood.'"[1] Some years later, in "Hegel: A Non-Metaphysical View", Hartmann insisted on "a philosophy devoid of existence claims", which, he admitted, answers only "luxury questions". Yet, after repeating that "such a pursuit is a luxury" even "in philosophy", his conclusion recognized the need to "apply insights from such a [non- metaphysical] reading to concrete problem areas that without them must be relinquished to uncomprehending positivism" ([5], pp. 110, 113, and 124). What such an application might mean, beyond his proposal to develop "a theory of theory construction" was not spelled out. Yet Hartmann has felt it necessary to cross lances with nearly all contemporary attempts to expand the reach of philosophy. Alongside his two books on Sartre, and his – unjustly neglected – reconstruction of *all* of Marx's work stand articles on Habermas and Husserl, Heidegger and Luhmann – even an (unpublished) lecture on Marcuse, delivered in the United States in 1970, at the height of the student movement. The paradox is not only philosophical; it is also political. The brief "Concluding Word" to the *Politische Philosophie* admits the costs of this strategy while insisting not only on its benefits but also on its necessity:

> This presentation of political philosophy will be criticized. Is it not a plaidoyer for a bourgeois political solution? Or is it not backward (*ruckständig*) in its insistence on an ontological point of view . . . rather than arguing for a theory of action? . . . One might also question its structure, which largely excludes genetic problems, including revolution and decay (*Verfall*)? Does this not lead to a static picture? Or, are not socialism and

H.T. Engelhardt, Jr. and T. Pinkard (eds.), Hegel Reconsidered, 187–209.
© 1994 *Kluwer Academic Publishers.*

> communism seen in a too dry and academic manner when both of them are put under the rubric of "social monism"? Are we not missing an historical-philosophical presentation and a positive appreciation of utopia, which could after all be demanded under the normative orientation? . . . And is our notion of legitimacy not too closely bound up with Western conditions?
>
> It may suffice to have mentioned these critical hesitations and thus to make clear that the author is aware of them. The line he has followed obeys the normative and systematic considerations of classical and modern political philosophy; this is the ground for rejecting the above questions. The author must accept the objection that he is caught within the immanence of Western traditions of thought – although it is also true that the burden of proof for the existence (*Vorliegen*) of superior normative concepts in other traditions must be born by the critics ([9], pp. 267–268).

Such an affirmation tempts the reader to dismiss Hartmann as a "Right Hegelian" whose goal is at best to update and correct the Master.[2] That Hartmann wants something more than merely systematic reconstruction of the Western tradition is suggested by the play on Marx in the interrogative title of his essay, "Democracy: The Solved Riddle of all Constitutions?" That article concludes with a curious affirmation: "One must will (*wollen*) democracy in order for it to be the resolved riddle of all constitutions. One must campaign (*werben*) for it" ([8], p. 42). There are overtones of activism here, echoed in Hartmann's stress on the need for popular "confidence" (*Zutrauen*). Democracy is not simply to be "willed", or desired (*wollen*); Hartmann recommends an activism that "campaigns" for it! Such conclusions are surprising, at least to this former student who has not given up on politics.

The relationship between categorial philosophy and political practice cannot be established on the basis of the priority of the one or the other. Rather, it is their *relation* that makes sense of both philosophy and practice. To establish this argument, I will look (I) at Hartmann's categorial account of democracy, and the conceptual innovations he introduces in order to account for practice. Hartmann's argument depends on his limitation of democracy to the political sphere. (II) The definition of the properly political follows from Hartmann's general conception of philosophy and its limits. This self-limitation is based on a systematic ontological reading of Hegel. But that approach has difficulties in confronting Hegel's attempt to deal with the problem of historical contingency, which is, however, the place where the demand for democracy takes root. (III) Hartmann is aware of the problem. But to account for political history without abandoning the categorial approach is as one-sided as would be the attempt to explain philosophy as the result of practice. I propose to avoid the difficulty by explaining the relation of philosophy and practice as *originary*. I use this term in a somewhat idiosyncratic manner, but one which is not foreign to the innovations introduced by Hartmann in order to make room for practice. My usage is illustrated by a brief account

(a) of the American Revolution, and (b) of the French Revolution. (IV) On the basis of this historical reconstruction, I will propose a reinterpretation of the notion of Objective Spirit in order to understand the origin of the political and the phenomenon of revolution. The originary approach, articulated by the unity of the moments of genesis and normativity, suggests a (Kantian) reinterpretation of that historical sphere as articulated by the symbolic nature of the political. (V) Finally, this originary method permits a rereading of the two Revolutions which provides the framework for a theory of democracy and its relation to revolution. In this way, Hartmann's invitation to activism (*werben*) is given a new sense. At the same time, the necessary *relation* of philosophy and politics can be established.

I. DEMOCRACY AS POLITICAL

More strongly than even Hegel, Hartmann attacks repeatedly what he calls "social nominalism". Contract theories or the attempt to make the individual, or socialized individuals, into the foundation or end of political theory or praxis are condemned because the categorially higher level cannot be made to depend on something less rational or inclusive than itself; the universal cannot depend on the particular, nor does the universal exist, somehow, for the sake of the particular. Hartmann calls such a position "genetic"[3]; its theoretical presupposition is not reason but the understanding working in terms of representative thought (*vorstellendes Denken*). Its result only appears to build a positive relation between the individual, society and the state; in fact, such a theory gives no grounds for the citizen to be loyal, nor can it demonstrate why the state must work for the common good. The individual or social freedoms which such a theory claims to affirm remain particular and dependent, lacking the universality which would give them true subsistence. Underlying these arguments is a theory of *the* political in its autonomy and in its specificity.[4]

The usual objections to a theory of the autonomy of the political are addressed to a caricatural Hegel who is seen as the father of totalitarianism. Liberal contractarianism insists that it alone can insure protection for the individual in the face of a state which threatens personal autonomy. It is easy enough to reply by pointing out that Hobbes and Rousseau illustrate the same danger from within contractarian theory. The liberal may then call on Locke – to whom Hartmann shows a somewhat surprising generosity – but this solves the problem by avoiding it, as if the classical notion of "political society" were more than a theoretical oxymoron in modern conditions. The problem is that a pre-political "*pouvoir constituant*" cannot institute a political space whose autonomy and universality are in fact the logical prerequisites for that constitutive act. But it is too soon to get lost in paradoxes; the Hegelian knows that the objection itself is based on a misreading; he or she need only recall the attack on Plato in the "Preface" to the *Philosophy of Right*. The task Hegel sets himself is to articulate the modern *relation* between the free individual, societal liberties, and the rational freedom of the citizen in the state. Hartmann develops the implications of this originary insight.

Hartmann's argument for a democratic theory of the political nonetheless recognizes the difficulties in Hegel's solution. He first applies Hegel's argument in a critique of the theory of democracy as social. Its societal institution would rule out any articulated hierarchy among the facets of human life, leveling all and instituting a system of mutual and reciprocal dependence which is the opposite of the freedom which it takes as its premise.[5] Hegel's problem, however, is what Hartmann calls "transcendental linearity". The progression through ever-less deficient figures of freedom concludes with the state, whose universality, in turn, must become objective in the form of "the political state".[6] Existing objectively, the political state is a being for others; it must adapt itself not only to other states but also to the family and civil society (rather than simply dictate new structures to them). Hegel's progressive linear development to ever richer and more universal categories provides no means for understanding the action of the many, as sovereign, on the really-existing political state. To do so would be apparently to fall back to a nominalist or contract theory. Instead, Hegel has to give a political existence to categories previously described at a social level, presenting a rationalized monarchical *Standesstaat* for which Marx justly criticized him. The point is that Hegel's rejection of popular sovereignty is not based only on his critique of contract theory; its foundation is, rather, the linearity of his theory. The amorphous "many" of particularist civil society exist also universally, as citizens, at the level of the state. The problem is the *relation* of "man" as social and as political. The political state, as the objective existence of the state-as-universal, corresponds to the articulation of the citizenry in the forms of universal franchise, political parties, and the openness of state offices to all (qualified) citizens. These are universal ends; the place of the particular remains to be determined.

Hartmann's categorial democracy is explicitly a *political* democracy. The qualification is important. The "riddle of all constitutions" which democracy resolves emerges from the fact that the political state, because it exists objectively, appears as a particular while the members of civil society, who come to exist universally in the form of the sovereign citizenry, are led to perceive critically this opposition of their universality to the particular state. Forms of democratic participation are necessary in order to produce that active confidence (*Zutrauen*) which provides a subjective mediation of this difference. To this subjective mediation must be added, of course, an objective moment in the form of constitutional guarantees like the free press, public audits, or judicial review. Hartmann describes the resulting situation as "an open-ended reflection playing between the political state and the political plenum [i.e., the citizenry] once sovereignty of the people is granted" ([7], English ed., p. 130). But what are those issues with which the "political plenum" is allowed to "play"? This indetermination explains the temptation to generalize democracy to the particular structures of civil society.

Hartmann's political democracy rejects the demand for the "democratization" of society. Typically, he presented his argument first at the height of German student activism [6]. The position is reaffirmed in the interrogation of "the solved riddle of all constitutions". Although the German state defined the university as a state-institution of which the students were considered an "organ", Hartmann rejects the students' demand for a right to co-determination in the courses offered, particularly when this takes the form of so-called "active strikes" disturbing classes. Political equality, he insists, concerns only those issues where all, as citizens, *can* be equal; it is not possible or desirable that other, particular, levels of social life be leveled to abstract equality. That would be a politics of abstract understanding which can lead to the domination of an active minority over a passive majority in the guise of a rejection of 'mere' formal democracy. Further, Hartmann insists that students do not, as students, possess the competence to exercise judgment as to professorial qualifications (any more, he adds, than workers have the capacity to administer their own work). Neither competence nor the goals of the university can be opened to *social* democracy. The problem with this position is not simply empirical – notions of competence are not universal, goals are not eternal: how is their change to be understood? –; the difficulty lies in the project of a categorial theory and the tools it offers for understanding history and historical change.

Hartmann is aware of the theoretical problem. His distinction between the state and the particular political state permitted him to understand the *origin*[7] of the demand for democratization. He now presents two methodological innovations. The first attempts to deal with what Hartmann calls "subsidiarity", while the second confronts the problem of "legitimacy". The question of subsidiarity asks what institutions can be granted autonomy without the state losing its own universality by becoming dependent on the particularity of these autonomous moments. Questions of federalism, of communal government and the like can be approached in these terms since each of these concerns the citizens in their universality.[8] The concept of subsidiarity permits the categorial framework to avoid the problems of theoretical linearity. It must, however, be supplemented by an account of legitimacy. Since the concept of sovereignty articulates a "political novum", a universality distinct from the forms of social particularity, Hartmann suggests that a legitimacy "from below" must correspond to the conceptual legitimacy "from above" provided by the political. As with Hegel, a constitution cannot be justified by the picture-thinking of contract theory or in terms of some *pouvoir constituant.* Instead, the delimitation of those properly political zones presented by the subsidiarity principle must be complemented by the existence of participatory institutions such as political parties in which individuals act together as *individuals defined by their concern with the universal.* Although such institutions are not free from particular interest, their self-definition comes from their universality. For this reason, for example, Hartmann refuses to legitimate youth branches of the parties, since membership in these is based on natural, non-universal interest. He does not explain, however, how such legitimatory institutions arise.

As *Politische Philosophie* admitted with modest pride, the picture that emerges from the categorial reconstruction resembles our own Western societies. The theory is "its time grasped in thought", as Hegel would have it. True, Hartmann's theory excludes many of those "finite" concerns that occupy everyday existence. But this is one of the virtues claimed for categorial ontology: it does not confuse what Benjamin Constant called "the freedom of the Ancients" and "the freedom of the Moderns". But Constant's dichotomy is too simple – the Hegelian would say, too abstract. Expressed in Hartmann's categories, modernity could be described as a structure articulated by the relations of subsidiarity and legitimacy. Concerned with the categorial problem of linearity, Hartmann does not stress that his categories imply that modernity is also, and inherently, *historical*. Although the state is by its very nature ("*an ihm selbst*") legitimate, this *normative* moment demands a *genetic* correlate. The unity of these two moments defines what I call an *origin*. The necessarily historical nature of an originary structure transforms the task of categorial philosophy. "Grasped in thought", modernity entails the demand for the "democratization" of society, whose origin Hartmann's play of the state and the political state clarifies. The reformulation of the categories that he uses to defang this dilemma as the moments of genesis and normativity, whose tension and unity has the structure of an origin, poses the question of the *relation* of philosophy and politics. At the same time, it permits a clearer understanding of the domain which Hegel called Objective Spirit.

II. Hartmann and Hegel on the Role of Philosophy

Hartmann's Hegel is the ascetic author of the System. Neither the young philosopher who could not remain indifferent to the French Revolution, nor the mature lecturer speculating on World History belong to the strict System. Although Hartmann abandons his self-limitation to confront the demand for "democratization", his goal remains the establishment of a conceptual structure articulating affirmative relations among the institutions of society. *Politische Philosophie* does not ignore the distinct validity claims of ethics, law, social and political relations; but it refuses to reduce the properly political sphere to these relatively less universal validity claims. Hartmann does not introduce the distinction between subsidiarity and legitimacy in this context; the hierarchy of domains is itself the guarantor of normative legitimacy. The System confronts practical problems in terms of its own ontological logic which demands that the achieved political Plenum, as the highest form of affirmativity, particularize itself as a concretely existing state. This political state relates to other states; and it enters history as the World Spirit. This, says Hartmann, "opens up an ideal sphere". However, he concludes, "We cannot take this question any further here".[9] Hegel of course did go "further".

On what basis are the standpoints of System and of History to be distinguished? The System is patient. Hegel remarks, for example, that although the principle of the freedom of the person began to bloom more than 1500 years ago, the freedom of property has only been recognized, here and there, "since yesterday". "This historical example shows the length of time needed by Spirit to progress to self-consciousness – and serves as a warning to the impatience of opinion" ([11], 62, my translation). History, however, seems less willing to wait. Speaking of the French Revolution, Hegel's *Philosophy of History* waxes lyrical. "Thought, the concept of right, made itself valid *with a single blow* . . . This was a glorious sunrise. All thinking beings celebrated this time together" ([12], p. 529; English ed. p. 447). It might be said that here, as in his other "cultural" lectures, Hegel simply *applies* the categories of the System to a reality which remains external to it. That, of course, was not his intent. The French Revolution is explained as "logically" as are the transitions in the *Philosophy of Right*. The crucial difference is found in the *starting point* of each (ad)venture. The ontological status of the *origin* of History, as opposed to the starting point of System, presents the apparent paradox that history is the origin of the systematic philosophy which, in turn, depends on politics for its realization. A closer look shows that the paradox is only apparent.

"World History", asserts the *Philosophy of History*, "can speak only of those peoples which form a state".[10] Hegel does not explain the birth of the state; whatever pre-stately peoples may accomplish, he insists, this achievement does not account for the origin of the political. Hegel first explains his project logically. "Historical change essentially attaches itself to the state. The successive moments of the Idea manifest themselves in it as distinct *principles*". Yet, he continues, historical assertions "must be derived empirically and historically proven". This combination of empiricism and idealism is explained by the logical passage from "original history" to the forms of "reflective history" and finally to "philosophical history". This permits Hegel to define World History as "the progress of the consciousness of freedom". The centrality of the state follows necessarily. "It is the state which first presents subject matter that is not only adapted to the prose of history, but involves the production of such history in its very being. Instead of a government issuing merely subjective mandates sufficing for the needs of the moment, a community that is acquiring a stable existence as a state requires formal commands and laws, comprehensive and universally binding prescriptions". Although Hegel insists also on the agency of the Idea, in the forms of the World Historical Individual and the Cunning of Reason, his philosopher of history functions like Hartmann in relation to Western society. The existent political state guides the affirmative reconstruction. The origin of the state is left aside.

The definition of the philosopher's task in the systematic *Philosophy of Right* follows a different logic. Hegel explains that its starting point is the result and the truth of what precedes it. This differs from the immanent relation between philosophy and its subject in the *Philosophy of History*. It suggests that political philosophy is necessary to the completion of the System. The subject matter of the *Philosophy of Right* is the Idea of right, by which is meant the concept of right *and* its actualization. The forms in which the concept of right is realized are *principiata* of the *principle* of the will as free; each stage is a relatively more universal institution of the freedom of the will in the form of right. The will comes to know itself explicitly as free only at the end of the reconstructive systematic path. Yet the *Philosophy of Right* culminates in World History, that "ideal sphere" which Hartmann left uninvestigated and which seems to lie outside the System. Hartmann might argue that the categorial completion of Hegel's political philosophy is simply the achievement of the "political Plenum", and that the particular forms adopted by the political state are matter for empirical study.[11] But that leaves open the problem of the rational starting point for a modern political philosophy. Hartmann's summary of his previous work, in "Kategoriale Topik im Politischen", explains simply that he adopts an "ontological standpoint" which presents "a multiplicity of social figures in a normative order" ([10], p. 23). More can be said, I think, and on the basis of Hartmann's own arguments.

Hartmann's ontology demonstrates the theoretical necessity of democracy while insisting on its real contingency, and on the need to "campaign" for it. This makes philosophy more than a "luxury" which is "devoid of existence claims". Despite Hartmann's rejection of its place in the System, the *Philosophy of History* also imposed a self-limitation on the philosopher. *That* Hegel would agree with Hartmann's suggestion that the need to "apply insights" implies the task of proposing a "theory of theory construction". On the other hand, the Hegel of the *Philosophy of Right* can be read in a different, a political, light. The system must be grounded in an *origin* which realizes its originality only at the end of its self-development. This means that the System includes not only political *philosophy* which reflects on its completion; *politics* provides the necessary actualization through which the System realizes (in both senses of the term) its completion. Its contingency is no reason to refuse to a modern politics its systematic place. To demarcate that place, Hartmann's categories of subsidiarity and legitimacy have to be reformulated in an originary System able to know itself as systematic. This proposal should not surprise; Hegel's *Philosophy of Right*, after all, is the systematic origin of his *Philosophy of History*.[12] But philosophical reflection on our Western societies must also take into account their own revolutionary origin.

III. REVOLUTION AS THE ORIGIN OF THE POLITICAL

Hegel confronted repeatedly the problem of revolution. The difficulties are obvious. The revolutionary takes the stance that Hegel denounces as "the atheism of the ethical world". How could one think that the old world could be radically eliminated, without a trace, and that a new social contract could then be founded on nothing? If there is a rupture, a nominalist contract theory must be either its premise or its result. Hegel's critiques of the revolutionaries are trenchant. Yet he never develops the foundation of his argument, which is not simply the critique of nominalism, as was seen above. Insofar as World History is that of states, which are universal in principle, the rationality of Revolution must be excluded. The *Philosophy of History* therefore explained the necessity of the French Revolution from the inability of the regime to undertake its own reform. The continuation of the Revolution in the immanent contradictions of the Constitutional Monarchy established in 1791 in turn made necessary its overthrow. But, continues Hegel, "a government (*Regierung*) is always present. The question is, whence did it come?" ([12], p. 532) The universality of the political is constantly present; its apparent absence at the moment of revolution leaves an open place which must be filled – with accidental content, in the course of the Revolution, and eventually with rational content at the end of History. But history does not end; political progress is not linear but originary. This is implied by the structure of "Modern Times" described in the *Philosophy of History*. The effect of the Reformation on the formation of States is shown to produce the happy solution incarnated as a concrete-universal by the Prussia of the Philosopher-King. But that universal is particularized again in the final section, "The Enlightenment and the Revolution". This pair works in tandem, as did the Reformation on the formation of the State. But the situation of France after the Revolution of 1830 is not a reconciliation. Revolution remains on the agenda.[13]

Conceptual clarification needs to supplement political history. Conceptually, the Revolution is simply nothing! It *is* neither what existed before it took place; nor is revolution what exists after it occurred. Yet revolutions have taken place. Indeed, they are the origin of contemporary Western history, and of its political democracy. *Origin* does not mean cause, any more than *democracy* refers to a simple state of affairs. Revolution and the political occupy the same categorial place; they present a *novum*, giving universal meaning to the particular persons and interests which constitute civil society. Each is a universal which must be particularized. The problems that emerge in the space opened by their particularization can be analyzed in terms of Hartmann's twin categories – or, as I propose, in terms of the originary unity of genesis and normativity. A philosophical reconstruction of the two Revolutions which are at the origin of Western democracy will serve to clarify the origin of systematic political philosophy, which Hegel's two accounts left unclear. And it will permit us to situate the contemporary demand for democracy and the place of the philosopher in the "campaign" for its realization.

A. *The American Revolution*

The American Revolution is usually conceived as a Lockean evolution from which the properly political moment was absent.[14] The theoretical principles animating the Revolution are said to be expressed in the Declaration of

Independence, which defines the polity in terms of "self-evident" rights belonging to man-as-man. This would be uninteresting for political theory (unless its goal, like Hegel's, were to explain the weakness of the American state that emerged from the break with England). The interpretation suffers also from the attempt to define revolution punctually, as if it were a real moment in time which existed somehow between the old regime and the new order. The Declaration of Independence in 1776 would then *be* the Revolution. But the Declaration itself affirms more than a series of human rights; its brief initial propositions are followed by a *history* whose purpose is to justify the separation from the mother country.[15] The Lockean reading of the catalogue of rights makes the American events simply a repetition of the Glorious Revolution of 1688, whereas the interpretation of the history prior to the Declaration articulates a theory of *political* sovereignty. The one interpretation was called, in the language of the time, Whig; the other was designated as Old Whig, civic republican, or Commonwealth. The latter approach is political; the former is social. The concretization of the two theories forced the Americans to draw the implications of the question of sovereignty; in this sense, the revolution articulates what Hartmann calls the categorial *novum*, the political.

The first phase of the American Revolution was defined by the debate around the question of sovereignty. After the expulsion of the French at the end of the Seven Years' War, the British imposed new taxes to repay their war-debt *and* to create a new order for their new empire. The colonists refused to accept these measures. Their refusal was based, of course, on material, social interest; but their pamphlet war, and their organized resistance, took an increasingly political stance. Accustomed to domestic self-government, they had to address the problem of an *imperium in imperio*. In Hartmann's terms, they sought to thematize relations of subsidiarity. For example, they attempted to distinguish between acceptable "internal" and illicit "external" taxes, only to find their temporary tactical victory over the Townshend Acts nullified by the Declaration Act of 1767, which affirmed the absolute sovereignty of Parliament. The issue was reformulated, this time in terms of what Hartmann calls the concept of legitimacy. The colonists had to refute the notion of their supposed "virtual representation" in Parliament. Their continuing skirmishes with Parliament can be left aside here. The important point is that when the rupture finally came, the Declaration of Independence was addressed to the King, whose sovereignty in the Empire had not been contested in the long battle with Parliament. The transition from colonists to independent Americans thus brought with it a new problem: how to represent sovereignty.

Despite the legalism of the pamphlet war, the Continental Congress which declared its independence had no legitimate political status. Sovereignty reverted to the 13 independent states, each of whom set out to write a constitution. With the exception of the unique case of Pennsylvania, these documents express the Whig theory of *social* sovereignty in the form of a mixed government. Meanwhile, the Congress, at war with England, existed *de facto* as sovereign. It took nearly two years to write the Articles of Confederation, whose ratification took place only shortly before the decisive battle of Yorktown in 1781. But the victory that guaranteed national sovereignty did not end the Revolution. With peace, prosperity returned gradually. Yet the colonists had not taken arms simply to insure their material well-being. The Old Whig doctrine was radically political. It portrayed an essential conflict between Power and Freedom. Power tended to increase because Freedom let itself be corrupted. Material prosperity, often based on speculation or war-profiteering, symbolized the onset of such *political* corruption. The Whig doctrines that had been applied in the state constitutions were unable to provide an antidote. Their vision of a political *society* ordered by a mixed constitution made no sense in a sovereign nation without Estates. When the states become prey to unrest, the weak Confederal government was unable to offer material aid or theoretical comfort. Shays' rebellion, which was not a *jacquerie*, set a match to the powder.

The Constitutional Convention that met in 1787 produced a new articulation of political sovereignty. Its explanation in *The Federalist* is often misunderstood. The tenth *Federalist* elaborates a theory of factions, whose multiplication in an extended republic provides a check on the danger of majority tyranny. This *sociological* account is assumed to explain the acceptance of a national government by the jealously autonomous states and their citizens. The same sociology is said to account for the later inability of the Americans to unite around political solutions to their problems.[16] This interpretation neglects the other feature of *The Federalist*'s theory: the division of powers, each checking and balancing the other. Combined with the sociological portrait, this political technology appears to guarantee governmental paralysis. The result recalls the North American society described by Hegel as "a community which is based on atomized individuals, so that the state is only something external which serves to protect property.[17] But *The Federalist* is more subtle, and more political. The problem of sovereignty, present from the beginning of the Revolution, is given a new articulation by means of a theory of *political* representation.

The Constitution of 1787 belongs still to the Revolution. The crucial argument explaining its status is found in *Federalist* 63, which explains the need for a Senate. The Whig-inspired mixed constitutions of the states had been unable to account for this institution; there existed no social Estate to fill the role implied by its existence. *The Federalist* takes a different tack. It insists that the new constitution is republican; its three branches must therefore be representative. *What* they represent, each in its own way, is the sovereign people. *How* they represent it is the crucial issue. Comparing the new institutions to the Ancient governments, *The Federalist* asserts that "The true distinction between these and the American governments lies *in the total exclusion of the people in their collective capacity* . . ." The sovereign people is *everywhere and nowhere*: everywhere, freedom finds always its champion; nowhere, none of the institutions of government can claim to *be* the people, to speak the truth of the people, to incarnate a will independent of the people. In this sense, the Constitution founds a societal democracy which is *legitimated* as politically sovereign; and it does so without fixating once and for all the political relations of *subsidiarity*. This historically open solution is not the "end" of the Revolution. A look at the French Revolution will make clear the sense in which this American solution remains revolutionary because it maintains the originary structure.[18]

B. *The French Revolution*

Hegel was correct; the Revolution of 1830 no more resolved the problems that burst forth in 1789 than did any of the political solutions that replaced one another during the previous – or the following! – 40 years. The most reflective of contemporary French historians, Francois Furet, formulates the difficulty:

> For the history of the French 19th century in its entirety can be considered to be the history of a struggle between the Revolution and the Restoration taking place through episodes in 1815, 1830, 1848, 1851, the Commune, May 16, 1877. It is only the victory of the republicans over the monarchists, at the beginning of the Third Republic, which signals the definitive victory of the Revolution in the depth of the country . . .

Even the apparently successful Republic remained haunted by the Revolution. "The 19th century believed in the Republic. The 20th believes in *the* Revolution. Both images are founded on the same event" ([3], pp. 16–17). The historians of the French Revolution were writing, and acting in, the history of their own times. The theorist of the July Monarchy, Guizot, worked from this premise; he was opposed by the radical Catholics Buchez and Roux, the romantic nationalist Michelet, the socialists Blanc and Lamartine, and the unrelenting Protestant republican Quinet. The struggle against the Republic was animated by historical reinterpretations by Renan and Taine. The finally established Republic installed the "Girondin" Aulard in the first chair of the Revolution at the Sorbonne. This canonization did not stop the debate. Jaures wrote his "socialist" history before the War; and Mathiez interpreted the Bolshevik Revolution as the noble successor to the Jacobin failure. In short, the Revolution remained a political presence in France: it was present as a universal, in the same way that Hegel described the presence of the political (the *Regierung*) during the stages of the French revolution; it was present as an absence. This curious presence will take the form of an origin.

The conflicting interpretations of the French Revolution are not the quarrels of empiricists; their premise is philosophical. After debunking the various Marxist readings of the Revolution, Furet criticizes what he calls "commemorative history". "The" Revolution cannot be delimited from the standpoint of the participants. Such an interpretation is necessarily one-sided. Furet develops his argument by juxtaposing the interpretations of Tocqueville and

Cochin, the former emphasizing the normative moment, the latter the genetic. Tocqueville's analysis of *The Ancien Regime and the Revolution* never realized the task proposed by its full title; it could offer no theory of "the" Revolution. Tocqueville could explain the "long" history which made revolution necessary, but the active rupture – which, for Hegel, took place "with one blow" – remained to be understood. The Revolution could as well be dated, Tocqueville suggests, to 1787! Furet thus turns to Cochin, who analyzed the new modality of action born in the Clubs and *sociétés de pensée* which was realized socially in the radical democracy of 1793. But this new mode of action, based on the premise of equality, could not be institutionalized. Neither the normative nor the genetic, alone, suffices to explain the revolution. The problem posed by the French Revolution recalls Hegel's description of the Thirty Years' War: "The struggle ended without an Idea, without having achieved the thought of a principle, with the fatigue of all . . . and the mere tolerance and existence of the different parties on the basis of external power. The solution must be *political*" ([12], p. 516).

Although Hegel saw the French Revolution as philosophical, he specified that it was a philosophy based on formal, abstract understanding. The universal implied by the demand for equality was presented in particular demands for individual advancement and collective participation. No political regime could be adequate to this universalized particularity. Suspicion ruled; the legislature was condemned because it had no instance of decision; Napoleon's seizure of power replaced the rule of mistrust by an expansionist military government based on respect and fear. But, concluded Hegel, "never has the powerlessness of victory appeared in a brighter light" ([12], p. 533). The "national conviction" (*Gesinnung*) which triumphed over Napoleon left France confronting an uncertain future while Prussia emerged from the universal lie of the Holy Roman Empire as a strong state in which those with talent and moral will could participate. This, concludes Hegel, is the "world historical significance" of the French Revolution, which can affect only those peoples who have already undergone the Reformation. But this argument is unsatisfactory, if not apologetic. It does not explain the Revolution. Instead, Hegel constructs a dialectical unity of the abstract understanding which began the Revolution with the particular actualization which translates that understanding into laws of the political state; this unity is the German "national conviction" which wills inwardly its laws as superior to any particular will. But this happy solution flies in the face of Hegel's own analysis of "Modern Times".

A different interpretation of the French Revolution, joining Furet with Hegel, suggests a more political relation of philosophy and history. Furet's goal is to *think* the Revolution. But the Revolution *is* nothing: it is neither what came before – Tocqueville's "long" Revolution – nor is it what came after – the exacerbation of egalitarian direct democracy which, for Cochin, culminates in the Terror. Neither historian is simply wrong; both describe the particularization of the political concept of Revolution. The moment of particularity is always dual since the universal is preserved within the particular. This duality exists as a tension, which I have called *originary*. These categories of ontology can be replaced by the more political concepts of normativity and genesis. Tocqueville and Cochin illustrate respectively the implication of this shift. The conceptual unity of their accounts is the Revolution, which is the political instance which both gives sense to each of the moments and explains its necessary partiality. The conceptual difficulty and practical danger is that one of these moments becomes dominant, suppressing or deforming the other. This dilemma is complicated by the fact that the moment of genesis can take on a normative legitimatory role, just as the moment of normativity can assume a genetic function. This basic *reversibility* explains the temptation toward a *constitutive* theory,[19] particularly in an historical revolution which, after all, breaks with all established norms and which is itself its only legitimate genetic source. Revolution tends to totalize by constituting one or the other of its moments as simultaneously genesis and norm – as real and realized origin. The same dilemma appears in the political, whose particularization can either call forth the demand for social democracy, or attribute to itself the tasks which ought to be left to the particularity of civil society.

This categorial logic is illustrated in the French Revolution. For example, genesis determines normativity when the Jacobin appeal to *le peuple* results in the elimination of all constitutional protections for the really existing people. The imperative to action is globalized, eliminating the norms in terms of which, or for the sake of which, the action was justified as necessary. This structure is inverted in the case of the incapacity of the Directory that was installed after Thermidor. Its constitutionalism made decisive action impossible (or extra-legal). The normative dimension expressed as legalism became an end in itself, regardless of the changing political content of the Directorial institutions. The phenomenon of reversibility within these simple oppositions can be illustrated as well. A genetic principle like the appeal to *La Patrie en danger* can be inverted to function as a normative standard against which the behavior of the apparently indifferent is judged "suspect". Or, a normative principle can become the animating moment of society, as when the Constituant Assembly abandoned its place in favor of the Convention, which then suspended the Constitution of 1793 on the grounds that the constituting Nation must first be assured its sheer physical existence. The examples could be multiplied, but the point is clear. Revolution is originary; the attempt to realize the origin leads to its one-sided particularization as genetic or as normative. Yet the quest for realization is not a simple "error"; its necessity is systematic, based on the need for the particularization of the universality of the political.

The comparison of the French with the American Revolution helps to resolve an apparent difficulty in this interpretation. From the standpoint of ontology, the French Revolution as the originary unity-in-difference of genesis and normativity corresponds to the moment of particularity whose contradictory existence in the domain Hegel called Objective Spirit demands resolution through its realization. Hegel's Prussianism was an unsatisfactory development of this ontology. The American Revolution, as reconstructed in terms of the categories of subsidiarity and legitimacy, presents an alternative. The French experience illustrated the mutual implication of these categories. Given the reversibility of the moments, the categories can be reinterpreted in terms of genesis and normativity. This should not be surprising, since Hartmann introduced them to avoid the linearity of Hegel's theory. But Hartmann's "categorial topics" seeks reconciliation too quickly; he unites the state and the political state ahistorically. But in the domain of Objective Spirit, the moment of particularity or externality is foundational. That is why, in the *Philosophy of Right*, the transitions presented as an *apparent* synthesis are always negative: crime, hypocrisy, the separation of the individual from the family, and so on. This does not imply that reconciliation comes only in Absolute Spirit. It suggests the need to develop the dialectic between the political and the particular political state as manifested in the relations of genesis and normativity, state and revolution, and their reversibility.

IV. THE ORIGINARY TRANSFORMATION OF ONTOLOGY

In a sense, the empirical result of the French Revolution was achieved at its outset; the Napoleonic Code Civil only made explicit the self-proclaimed death of feudal particularism on the night of August 4, 1789. The empirical result of the American Revolution was a self-proclaimed republic, slave-owning, and defined by the clash of social interests and factions. Both empirical results deny the Revolution which was their origin. The reconstruction of the rationality of revolution has to abandon the notion that its result is somehow a reconciliation of opposites. The results remain in the realm of particularity, and hence of history. Neither the Code Civil nor the American Constitution are the realization of the Revolution, its subsistent existence for-itself. Ontologically, the political state is always a particularization of the universal structure of the political. This means that the historical relation between the political and the revolution must be specified. Until this point, I have treated them as functionally equivalent. Yet the political exists as a universal; revolution, in its duality and tension, is particular. A dialectical syllogism would conclude that revolution is therefore a kind of political state existing as a "permanent revolution". Such a solution appears to be no more satisfactory than the empirical account in terms of results. It will prove to be less absurd than it appears.

If we can explain the origin of the political and its relation to revolution, the nature and place of democracy can be specified. Hartmann's categorial philosophy can reconstruct the political within a given political state. But that *application* of ontology to the field of Objective Spirit made it necessary for him to leave history as an "ideal sphere". The "luxury" of the ontological standpoint admitted the place of contingency and tried to integrate it so far as possible through the categories of subsidiarity and legitimacy. But there is no philosophical place for the *politics* that seeks a reduction of contingency, extension of the autonomous subsidiary spheres, or practical debate around the problem of legitimacy. Of course, Hartmann knows that these take place; but they are not the concern of philosophy, even in the apparently more acceptable variant of von Stein. What, then, is democracy to do? Hartmann does not introduce it apologetically, as simply a legitimation of the middle-class society he admittedly sees as desirable. Democracy, he insists, must be understood as a form of sovereignty. This recalls the American Revolution, which developed from the *question* of sovereignty without stopping at its achievement. It could be said that this sovereignty was realized finally in the republican Constitution of 1787 in the form of that people which is everywhere and nowhere, present in each branch of government and yet fully incarnate in none. In the particular political state of the Americans, the democratic sovereign is *the* political which is its foundation. But this democratic sovereign is not simply a norm, an abstract universal or a regulative Idea. To understand its historical practice, its revolutionary origin must be considered as well.

The American Revolution, and its democracy, are not reducible to the Constitution. Democracy is not a formal or ontological universal demanding particularization. The dialectical scheme in which the political is the universal and the political state its particular existence must be replaced. The implications of the reversibility of the genetic and the normative poles point in a different direction. If the originary is the existent tension of genesis and normativity, its realization presents a reversal of the dialectical ontology. The originary is the first moment; but it is dual; it exists therefore as an ontological particular. Two questions emerge. What founds this originary moment? To what affirmative structures can its further development give rise? The ontological dialectic treats these two questions as interdependent, reducing the origin to an onto-logic and making the Revolution a particular state. A method more adequate to the originary structure is suggested by Kant's theory of reflective judgment. The two ontological questions can be reformulated. What are those particulars which can*not* be subsumed under the pre-given universals? What explains the normative acceptability of the reflectively posited universals asserted on the basis of these particulars? This Kantian method can be said to reappropriate the categories of subsidiarity and legitimacy; the former corresponds to the question of (genetic) particularity, the latter to that of (normative) receptivity. The French Revolution illustrates this originary political logic. The totalization on the basis of genetic particularity is no more adequate than the subsumption under normative universality. The failure of the French Revolution is the result of its inability to elaborate the political equivalent of reflective judgment. This lapidary, and abstract, assertion can be amplified by a return to the American Revolution.[20]

The three phases through which the American Revolution developed can be defined categorially as the "lived experience", its "conceptualization", and the "reflection" of the entire process. The first moment turned around the problem of sovereignty, the second sought to resolve the issue of its representation genetically within the Confederation and normatively within the States, while the third attempted to formulate their constitutional unity. Within each of these three periods, similar categorial phases can be analyzed. The problem of sovereignty was lived in terms of the "rights of an Englishman"; it was conceptualized as the questions of the *imperium in imperio* and virtual representation which present respectively the genetic and the normative moments of the originary unity; and it was reflected in the Declaration of Independence. The reflected moment of independence, however, was not a synthesis; it remained originary, structured by the contradiction between its Whig and Old Whig premises, which provide the first moment of a new triad, the unstable Confederacy. The conceptualization of the experience of independence sought a solution to the problem of representation. The direct democracy established by the radicals of Pennsylvania represents the attempted genetic solution while the mixed Whig governments typified by John Adams' Massachusetts stressed the normative pole. Shays' Rebellion illustrated dramatically the inadequacy of any synthesis, while providing the lived experience out of which the Constitution of 1787 was to emerge. That Constitution becomes again a first, still originary, moment. Its further genetic particularization took the form of the "Revolution of 1800" which legitimated the co-existence of competing political parties by bringing the Jeffersonians to power. Normative particularization followed shortly, with the institution of the practice of judicial review by a Supreme Court led by the Federalist, John Marshall. No synthesis closed the American Revolution; its result was only the development of the peculiar forms of American *democracy*, which neither party nor Court could direct or control.

What, then, *is* the American Revolution? It is no more a thing or a real event in time than *is* the French Revolution. The stress on the originality of *the* political as political suggests an interpretation that goes beyond ontology. As originary, the political is the *symbolic* level of meaning-giving through which a society comes to reflect upon itself and to give itself subsistence as autonomous. This self-given subsistence mediated by the relation to the political articulates the ontological distinction between the state and the particular political state. The ontologically universal category of the political could not found the concept of revolution, save in the apparently self-contradictory sense that it grounds a government of "permanent revolution". Ontology must reject such a concept because that would make the universal or normative foundation from which the reconstruction began dependent on the particular or genetic action which, ontologically, depends on it. But institutions in the domain of Objective Spirit are founded on particularity. The implication is that Objective Spirit has to be interpreted symbolically, not ontologically. The symbolic is originary; its particularization as the political state, or as the revolution, makes explicit its duality; and its realization is not a unification but the foundation of a new movement *which is itself historical*. What Hartmann called an "ideal sphere", and what Hegel ontologized as the Idea of World History, has to be interpreted in terms of the logic of the symbolic.

V. AN ORIGINARY THEORY OF DEMOCRACY

This interpretation permits a reconceptualization of democratic politics which avoids Hartmann's restrictions without falling back to a genetic social contract theory. The sovereignty asserted by the Declaration of Independence, the failed attempts to realize it in representative government, and its national Constitution "exist" as symbolic or originary. If their political realization takes only the genetic or the normative institutional form, a deformation results; one of the three branches of government asserts that it incarnates the entirety of the sovereign people. This has of course happened historically – for example, in the Warren Court, the "Imperial Presidency", or post-Watergate presidency which recalled what Woodrow Wilson denounced as "Congressional Government". But citizen of the *republic* intervenes, not as a contingent particular but necessarily, and as citizen, to restore the *symbolic* tension which is the condition of possibility of democracy. That is why Kant's political development of reflective judgment, in "Perpetual Peace", insisted on the republican form of government as opposed to the democratic form of sovereignty. The *res publica*, which no particular citizen or social interest can possess, exists as that symbolic instance whose constant presence (but real absence) makes necessary the affirmation of the tension-filled unity that is the particularism of civil society. As Kant insisted, such a structure does not fix once-and-for-all an end to the process of Enlightenment. It does, however, explain the place of politics within a democratic society.

The question posed by the French Revolution remains. It is obviously vain to tell the French that they needed a theory of reflective judgment. The French conceived their Revolution as a rupture, a radical break consecrated by the invention of a new calendar, institutions, even personal forms of address. Their intuition was correct; the break was symbolic. But the actors took it as real, or to be realized. They were, one is tempted to say, Hegelians *avant la lettre*! Enemies of the particular, in all its forms, they sought a realization of the Revolution, an end of politics. For all their political agitation, they seem to have left nothing political in their wake, neither theory nor institutions. But one should not rush to judgment. They left something more important than political institutions; their legacy, and our heritage, is *the Revolution as the origin of the political.*[21] The Americans' democratic republic has lost touch with its revolutionary origin; it has become, in the words of two contemporary historians, "a machine that would go of itself", rather than the "*novus ordo seclorum*" which it inscribed on its dollar bills ([20], [21]). The Americans have occluded the symbolic dimension which is the foundation of their democracy while the French have preserved the ontology of the political at the cost of effectively doing politics.

The two Revolutions have to be thought together in a theory of contemporary politics. Alone, French politics becomes that unending, because unrealizable, quest for the realization of "the" Revolution which Furet described. Politics becomes normative; the norm generates actions whose particular realization can only betray their authors' intentions. No theory of institutions is possible; historical progress loses its meaning when compared to "the" revolution which remains to be realized. The real, everyday questions, which demand attention in the world of particularity, are left to force or political venality. But the American solution, alone, is equally unsatisfactory. It exists only as formal institutions, particular interests, and their *ad hoc* resolution by the machinery of government. Politics becomes pragmatics; genesis determines normativity by decreeing that if the forms are obeyed, the content must be acceptable. Progress is replaced by a quantitative quest from which the qualitative is absent. In the end, legitimacy suffers, participation decreases, and middle-class *society* replaces the political sense through which that society could achieve or alter its identity. The results of both Revolutions deny their own origins in the practice of a politics devoid of the symbolic presence of the political.

This conclusion need not echo the historical pessimism of the Preface to the *Philosophy of Right*, any more than it consecrates the established order as the realization of rationality. As symbolic, the Revolution is present as the moment of the political which permits society to reflect on itself, to judge itself and to change itself. This symbolic presence is neither a particular, functioning genetically nor a universal acting normatively. The philosopher-citizen is not the Hegelian who seeks to circumscribe particularity in order to return it to its concept. The democratic philosopher-citizen puts into question the apparent subsistence of the moments of particularity in order to return them to the symbolic tension which is their origin; subsistent facts become the source of political questions. This symbolic transformation of particularity into the interrogative mode poses a challenge to Hartmann's refusal of "democratization". The Hegelian critique, with the modifications introduced by the concept of subsidiarity and the problem of legitimacy, is to the point. But the replacement of the ontological interpretation of Objective Spirit by the originary nature of the symbolic gives an active meaning to the quest for affirmative structures on which Hartmann insists. Social institutions are unstable particulars founded by and in the originary tensions which Hegel called Objective Spirit. Just as Hartmann used the tension between the political and the political state to reinterpret democratically Hegel's rationalization of a non-democratic polity, the symbolic relation between the revolutionary origin and the existent forms of political (and social) subsidiarity can be reinterpreted. This is occurring today in what political science, unable to categorize them, calls redundantly, and incorrectly, "new social movements".[22] These movements are neither so new, nor are they simply social; they have to be understood in terms of the political.

The theory of revolution proposed here as a foundation for political philosophy is not an ontological reading of that concept. The goal is not finally to realize the old dream of revolution – itself caught up in the same dialectical ontology – nor is it to use that concept to condemn the established order. What is cannot be separated from what ought to be, as Hartmann learned from Hegel, and I learned from Hartmann – and from Marx. The theory of revolution that emerges from this debate with Hartmann has tried to show why democracy is the central issue for contemporary politics. The origin of democracy is that symbolic structure whose particularization in the domain of Objective Spirit takes the form of the *tension* between genesis and normativity, and their essential reversibility. The historical realization of the origin, which was the criterion that Hegel set for himself in the *Philosophy of Right*, takes the form of the democratic polity as *both* normative and genetic. The demand for "democratization" is thereby integrated into the "play" of the political state and the political plenum which Hartmann had left undefined. The result is a theory which can account both for the necessity of institutions of political decision (in the political state) and for the constant challenge (from the political) to these same institutions. This permits the articulation of the *interrelation* of social formations and the state, as Hartmann's correction of Hegel's linearity demanded. At the same time, it establishes the necessary *relation* of philosophy and politics, which was our goal at the outset. It remains to elaborate the normative institutions and genetic activity which are the *historical* existence of that democracy at any particular moment. The task here has been simply to analyze the origin of that democratic politics. Such is the "luxury" which this philosopher has allowed himself.

NOTES

1. I am citing from p. 26 of the manuscript of the lecture, delivered in April 15, 1966, at the University of Texas at Austin.
2. It should, however, be stressed that Hartmann has done yeoman service in this regard. See particularly [7], pp. 167–200, and [10].
3. To avoid confusion with the terminology introduced below, it should be noted that I prefer to designate this orientation as *constitutive*. Cf., below, note 19.
4. Hartmann notes, in the closing lines of *Politische Theorie* [9] from which I cited a moment ago, that he does need to apologize for his orientation insofar as he has emphasized German and Anglo-Saxon political theories (p. 268). I should note in turn that my reading of Hartmann's contribution, as well as my own arguments below, depend on French thought, in particular that of Castoriadis and Lefort. The substantive formulation, "the political", is infrequent in the German and Anglo-Saxon traditions, whereas contemporary French theory distinguishes "*le* politique" from the particular everyday practice of "*la* politique". Hartmann does stress repeatedly the autonomy of the political, which he tends to call "the political plenum" (he also uses the expression "Politizität" in *Politische Theorie*, p. 166). My own usage will become clearer below; c.f. also my *Defining the Political* [15], and *The Politics of Critique* [18].
5. This argument is developed at length and in detail in the critique of Marx's idea of a *Gattungsleben* in *Die Marxsche Theorie* [4]. I will remain here within the sphere of Hartmann's positive Hegel-reading, rather than taking up his critique of others.

6. This distinction between the state and the political state is crucial to the argument. What Hartmann calls the state, or the political plenum – and I call simply the political – is, in the Hegelian dialectic, an abstract universal which must particularize itself in the form of an existent political state. This imperative is, however, not only dialectical or ontological; we will see that it is due also to the nature of the domain of "Objective Spirit", i.e., to the nature of history itself.
7. This category, as well as those which I will introduce in a moment, is developed systematically in my *From Marx to Kant* [13], which includes an interpretation of Hegel.
8. In this context, Hartmann suggests, but does not develop, a notion of "social subsidiarity" which would permit an analysis of functions like education, welfare, health or culture as being either social or private responsibility. This issue can be left aside in the present discussion, although its implications should be noted, especially with regard to the issue of "new social movements" to which my Conclusion alludes.
9. In [7], English ed., p. 135. So far as I know, Hartmann has not developed his argument since this statement was made.
10. Citations in this paragraph are from the *Philosophie der Geschichte*, translated by me from [12], pages 65, 66, 87, and 83. (English translations in *op. cit.*, pp. 388, 399, 422 and 419.)
11. Or, he might say that these relations are subject only to what he calls "optimation" – a somewhat curious locution that seems to have been developed by Hartmann's study of Lorenz von Stein. Its systematic place is suggested first in *Politische Theorie* [9], p. 244; it is related to Hegel, and to the problem of subsidiarity, in Pelczynski, *op. cit.*, p. 133; and it is developed toward the notion of a "political topic" in [10], p. 34. A possible implication of the notion should be mentioned here. Hartmann's discussion of democracy remarks that "freedom is not only reason but also independence . . .", an assertion that puts into question the sheerly political definition of democracy ([6] or [8], p. 25).
12. Hegel remarks in the Introduction to his first Lecture that paragraphs 341–360 of his *Philosophy of Right* have given a "more precise (*naeheren*) concept of world history as well as the principles or periods into which its analysis is divided" ([12] p. 11, note).
13. Hegel descries the challenge facing a liberalism opposed to the divided "Catholic principle" (incarnated by the Bourbon and Orleans factions). He rejects both the idea of an empirical universal will and the liberal critique of the Charter of 1830 which insured rational rights, freedom of person and property. Nothing fixed can come from a regime based on particular caprice, he asserts. A new revolutionary round appears necessary, and "this problem is the one facing history, and which it will have to solve in future times" ([12], p. 535).
14. I may be permitted to refer to my study of *La naissance de la pensée politique américaine* [14] for the details from which I derive the following paragraphs.
15. Cf., my presentation of Jefferson and the Declaration, in [19].
16. When they do unite, as Tocqueville observed of democracies, it is on the basis of a *moral* conviction which gives to their actions the character of a crusade. Thus, for example, Americans are generally isolationist; when they go to war, it is to fight "the war to end all wars". Critics such as James MacGregor Burns descry what they describe as a "deadlock of democracy" built into American institutions. A parliamentary system, many assert, would be more adequate. Such proposals do not take into account the specific, revolutionary origins of American democracy.
17. [12], p. 112. Hegel does stress that compared with Europe, North America presents a "perennial example of a republican constitution". But he adds immediately that its "fundamental character is to direct the private man to acquisition and gain, and consists in the domination of the particular interest which turns to the universal only to aid in private enjoyment". Hegel thinks that "an actual state and an actual government arise only when there is a difference of classes (*Stände*), when wealth and poverty become large, and conditions are such that a large mass of people can no longer satisfy their needs in the manner to which they are accustomed". This turn of events is not to be expected, he

continues, because of the possibility of migration to the West. Hence, he concludes, "had the forests of Germania still existed, the French Revolution no doubt would not have taken place" (Citations from *ibid.*, pp. 112–13).

18. This account could go a step further to talk about another political *novum* realized by the Americans – the birth of political parties and the establishment of judicial review – as I have tried to show in [16] (Translation in [18]). I will allude to these points again below.
19. Hartmann would use here the term "genetic", as suggested above. More important, this argument for the necessary reversibility of these categories clarifies what might be otherwise an ambiguity in Hartmann's account of subsidiarity and legitimacy. When political parties, for example, become legitimate, their relation to the political would seem to change; their subsidiary status is affected by this shift. The same would hold, for example, in the development of political federalism, as illustrated in the case of the emerging United States. Such a reversibility is present also in the case of the French Revolution, as we shall see in a moment.
20. I can only make plausible historically this move to Kant's theory of reflective judgment; its immanent philosophical necessity is suggested in [13]. The same restriction holds for the categories used in the next paragraph, which are developed in [14] and [15].
21. Once again, I am playing on a term – "legacy" – which I have elaborated elsewhere. In this case, cf., [17], especially the Afterword to the Second Edition, "The Marxian Legacy Today".
22. There is no place here to nuance this rather general assertion, which could certainly be challenged. The best illustration of what I have in mind would be the Polish *Solidarity* movement. But that took place within a non-democratic setting. For the democratic context, cf., [1] and [2].

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. Cohen, J.: 1985, 'Strategy or Identity: New Theoretical Paradigms and Contemporary Social Movements', *Social Research*, 52(4), 663–716.
2. Cohen, J. and Arato, A.: 'Civil Society and Social Theory', to appear in a forthcoming *Festschrift* for Jurgen Habermas.
3. Furet, F.: 1978, *Penser la Revolution Francaise*, Gallimard, Paris.
4. Hartmann, K.: 1970, *Die Marxsche Theorie*, De Gruyter, Berlin.
5. Hartmann, K: 1972, 'Hegel: A Non-Metaphysical View', in A. MacIntyre (ed.), *Hegel: A Collection of Critical Essays*, Anchor Books, Garden City, pp. 101–24.
6. Hartmann, K.: 1973, 'Demokratie und Universität', in *Informationen, Berichte Diskussionen*, Informationsdienst der Eberhard-Karls-Universität Tübingen, 19 Juni, 1–4.
7. Hartmann, K.: 1976, 'Ideen zu einem neuen systematischen Verständnis der hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie', in *Perspektiven der Philosophie*, Band 2, Amsterdam; English ed. 1984, Z.A. Pelcyznski (ed.), *The State and Civil Society, Studies in Hegel's Political Philosophy*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 167–200.
8. Hartmann, K.: 1980, 'Die Demokratie – das aufgelöste Rätsel aller Verfassungen' in K. Hartmann (ed.), *Die Demokratie in Spektrum der Wissenschaften*, Verlag Karl Alber, Freiburg/Munchen, pp. 13–42.
9. Hartmann, K.: 1981, *Politische Theorie*, Karl Alber Verlag, Freiburg/Munchen.
10. Hartmann, K.: 1982, 'Kategoriale Topik im Politischen' in *Neue Hefte für Philosophie*, Nr. 21, Göttingen, pp. 22–34.
11. Hegel, G.W.F.: 1970, *Philosophie des Rechts*, in *Werke*, Band 7, Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt am Main.
12. Hegel, G.W.F.: 1970, *Philosophie der Geschichte*, in *Werke*, Band 12, Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt am Main.
13. Howard, D.: 1985, *From Marx to Kant*, State University of New York Press, Albany.

14. Howard, D.: 1987, *La naissance de la pensee politique americaine*, Ramsay, Paris.
15. Howard, D.: 1988, *Defining the Political*, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis.
16. Howard, D.: 1988, 'La modernite de la Revolution americaine', in *Revue francaise de science politique*; tr. in *Politics of Critique*, *op. cit.*
17. Howard, D.: 1988, *The Marxian Legacy*, Macmillan, London, and University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis.
18. Howard, D.: 1988, *The Politics of Critique*, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis.
19. Howard, D.: 1989, 'Jefferson: La Déclaration d'Indépendance', *Dictionnaire des oeuvres politiques*, eds. E. Pisier-Koutchner and O. Duhamel, Presses Universitaires de France, Paris.
20. Kammen, M.: 1986, *A Machine That Would Go of Itself: The Constitution in American Culture*, Alfred A. Knopf, New York.
21. Williams, F.: 1985, *Novus Ordo Seclorum: The Intellectual Origins of the Constitution*, University Press of Kansas, Lawrence, Kansas.

H. TRISTRAM ENGELHARDT, JR.

11. Sittlichkeit and Post-Modernity: An Hegelian Reconsideration of the State

Moral disputes are interminable: the Enlightenment failed to provide by sound rational argument a principled basis for resolving controversies in ethics or in politics among persons and communities with different understandings of morality. There are as many secular understandings of justice, fairness, and equality as there are major religions. This is the case because the rational resolution of moral controversies depends on accepting a particular moral vision, along with its particular premises and understandings.[1] Each moral understanding is only one among many alternative, competing moral and political visions. One must already possess a moral understanding to make a morally directed choice.[2] Moral controversies are soluble not by thought,[3] only by will, not by discovering a general canonical content-full moral truth, but by imposing a truth or accepting a solution.[4] If post-modernity is the post-Enlightenment recognition that there is no universal moral narrative, then Hegel discloses its roots.[5]

Hegel's development of the concept of Sittlichkeit and his criticism of Kant marks the acknowledgement that moral content is provided in particular communities, not by thought (i.e., as moral understanding) or through a human communality of sentiments or passions. The content of secular morality is not universal. One must not seek universal secular moral content in an ever more encompassing moral community, but in a moral structure that compasses diversity without itself being yet one more community. Hegel's post-Enlightenment assessment of morality leads to an escape from the cacophony of competing moral visions through a categorially principled account of objective moral volition in the state. The state as the political unity of a pluralistic society is the categorial resolution of the pluralism that marks contemporary secular moral and political life.

The arguments in this essay do not lead to conclusions endorsed by Hegel in his *Philosophy of Right*. Nor are they in full conformity with Hartmann's restructuring of Hegel's account. They do develop out of the general categorial architectonic Hegel provides and from Hartmann's attempt to clarify the relationship among democracy, society, and the state. In the light of Klaus Hartmann's reading of Hegel,[6] this essay develops a categorial interpretation

H.T. Engelhardt, Jr. and T. Pinkard (eds.), Hegel Reconsidered, 211–224.
© 1994 *Kluwer Academic Publishers.*

of Hegel's theory of morality, society, and the state as a solution to the failure of the Enlightenment project and as a basis for justifying a limited democratic constitutional state compassing a pluralistic society. In terms of a categorial solution to the cacophonies of competing moralities and divergent moral communities, we are given grounds not to seek a foundation in thought for a general canonical secular content-full morality.[7] Instead, we should understand the solution is at a categorial level that compasses divergent moral communities in a social structure that is not another community, but the way one thinks the unity of persons interacting politically across divergent communities, without setting those communities aside.

I. CATEGORIAL ANALYSIS

As with all of Hegel's work, *The Philosophy of Right* contains material at different levels, including socio-political arguments, moral assertions, insights regarding the challenges of his day, as well as a categorial account in the sense of a "means of linking categories with one another in the dialectic, to establish affirmative relations between the various levels of social formations that may be legitimated" ([4], p. 116). Through a categorial account, a categorially later stage

> is proved to be more perfect or complete, i.e., more rational or more true. An early stage such as the legal person and his property is deficient and as such demands further steps – contract, punishment, etc. – leading to the family, which in its turn requires the introduction of society, and this, by yet another move, calls for the state. . . . This concluding stage has the logical meaning of what one could call a "vertical" inclusion of the previous stage. The deficient stage is logically completed by what, according to the organizing rational principle, it lacks to make up a whole . . . ([4], p. 118).

A categorial account provides a conceptual relation among levels of moral and social meaning and structure. This categorial dialectic shows how conceptual problems that arise within one level can only be resolved at a higher conceptual or categorial level. The higher category provides a new understanding in which the elements of the quandary are reordered and the problem is seen in terms of a conceptual solution.

This conceptually driven dialectic is to be distinguished from other dialectical accounts found in Hegel's works, including a metaphysical dialectical account (i.e., involving a motive force at work in history, bringing reality towards a goal) and a heuristic dialectical account (i.e., a construal of history so that it can be read as if it led to a goal).[8] A categorial account of rights, morality, and the state discloses a solution to the problems of post-modernity within a conceptual understanding of the moral content of social structures. This categorial account offers a conceptual organization in terms of which the inability to ground a canonical content-full morality ceases to be a problem and becomes a part of a solution. It is not a creation or a proposal. It is a conceptual diagnosis of the contemporary character of the state so as to disclose a necessary understanding of polity in the face of fundamental moral diversity.

II. THE DIAGNOSIS AND TREATMENT OF POST-MODERNITY

The crisis of post-modernity is not merely sociological, it is epistemic. Outside of a particular moral vision, it is not possible to know which moral account or theory of justice one should endorse. This justificatory quandary is rooted in the circumstance that any justificatory account of moral content depends on a particular moral narrative or moral vision. One must presuppose that content which one wishes to justify. For example, in order to provide a consequentialist account of morality, one must know how in general to compare particular consequences (e.g., liberty consequences, prosperity consequences, security consequences, and equality consequences) or preferences (e.g., rational preferences, impassioned preferences, etc.). In addition, one must know God's discount rate for time (i.e., in order to compare present versus future preferences). Or, to use a hypothetical choice account, one must fit out the hypothetical chooser or the group of hypothetical contractors with a particular moral sense, thin theory of the good, sense of risk aversiveness, etc. The same is the case with any appeal to a notion of moral rationality. Even after general formal conditions are met, a truly disinterested, non-perspectival account of rational moral choice, moral deportment, or fairness or justice will not justify one unique, canonical, content-full, moral vision. Particular moral choices require not being disinterested, but in fact having a particular set of moral interests. The same is the case with regard to any moral vision or moral account dependent on a particular view or account of nature. To justify one understanding over others, one must already have at hand an account of proper moral rationality in terms of which to interpret, rank, or place one's findings about nature.

One confronts a fundamental tension within secular morality. Content is purchased at the price of universality, and universality is purchased at the price of content. The more a particular account of moral sense, moral intuition, thin theory of the good, thin theory of justice, or hypothetical choosers has content, the more parochial it becomes. The more universal it is, the more it must eschew content, and the less direction it provides for resolving controversies. For example, the more a hypothetical choice theory removes particular content from the thin theory of the good or justice that is to motivate its hypothetical chooser or contractors, the fewer the choices that can be justified. The more one attempts to escape the problems of justifying the content of morality by asserting the moral canonicity of a particular consensus or historical state of affairs, the more the morality one seeks to justify becomes arbitrary. If one attempts to escape these problems by searching for a general justification for particular content-full moral claims, one finds that content is secured by embracing particular principles which from the standpoint of general moral understanding appear to be arbitrary.

In despair, one may simply embrace one particular moral vision or set of intuitions as canonical. But when one confronts others who have different visions, one has no rationally justifiable general grounds for dismissing their moral intuitions, or for using state force to impose one's own moral understandings over theirs (e.g, particular taxes to support particular welfare programs). If one abandons the justification of particular moral content, then one embraces moral contingency (e.g., should one choose the liberal democratic vision regnant in Cambridge, Massachusetts, or a vision of authoritative capitalism as one may find in Singapore). If one makes an arbitrary choice, appealing to the mere arbitrary presence of some rather than other moral intuitions or sentiments, one canonizes the non-rational, which cannot without force or agreement bring a resolution to a controversy.

III. ABSTRACT RIGHT AND MORALITY: THE CRISIS OF CONTENT

A striking feature of Hegel's mature work is that he advances few normative claims and provides instead a categorial architectonic within which levels of normative claims can be related and understood. Moreover, his account focuses on the diversity of the views of the good and their conflicting character. The first two sections of the *Philosophy of Right* (i.e., das abstrakte Recht and die Moralität) show that contracts should be honored and the good should be pursued, although a content-full account of the good or of what promises one should make is not secured. In Abstract Right,[9] Hegel gives an account of property, the settlement of disputes about property through contract, and the response to non-malicious wrongs, fraud, and crime. The core of this account is abstract. It articulates an account of morality as will meeting will, including the attempt to restore balance after a wrong.

> Abstract right is a right to coerce, because the wrong which transgresses it is an exercise of force against the existence of my freedom in an external thing. The maintenance of this existence against the exercise of force therefore itself takes the form of an external act and an exercise of force annulling the force originally brought against it ([6], p. 67, §94).

One must know what it is to act wrongly. But an adequate account of wrong done to others requires not merely the will acting externally, but a subjective will that "wills the universal as such". This cannot be provided within abstract right, but requires the exploration of moral subjectivity, the focus of "morality".

The recourse to further conceptual structure in order to account for Abstract Right is a categorial development. "Morality is not simply something demanded; it has emerged in the course of this movement itself" ([6], p. 73,

§103). Hegel progresses from an abstract relationship among wills given in the section on Abstract Right to an exploration of Morality in the attempt to understand wrong action in terms of a will that wills universally. The difficulty is that canonical moral content cannot be discovered within moral subjectivity.

> Because every action explicitly calls for a particular content and a specific end, while duty as an abstraction entails nothing of the kind, the question arises: what is my duty? As an answer nothing is so far available except: (a) to do the right, and (b) to strive after welfare, one's own welfare, and welfare in universal terms, the welfare of others ([6], p. 89, §134).

The challenge is to define welfare, good, and duty in universal terms. "In consequence of the indeterminate determinism of the good, there are always several sorts of good and many kinds of duties, the variety of which is a dialectic of one against another and brings them into collision" ([5], p. 251, §508). The attempt to discover in universal terms the character of morality goes aground on the plurality of goods and duties, as well as their conflicts.

There is also the need to establish the proper balance between the right and the good. "Welfare without right is not a good. Similarly, right without welfare is not the good; fiat justitia should not be followed by pereat mundus" ([6], p. 87, §130). The difficulty is that a correct balance between the right and the good cannot be discovered in universal abstract terms. In his criticism of Kant, Hegel speaks to this radical difficulty and to the impossibility of remedying it by an appeal to universality or the principle of contradiction. "Kant's further formulation, the possibility of visualizing an action as a universal maxim, does lead to the more concrete visualization of a situation, but in itself it contains no principle beyond abstract identity and the 'absence of contradiction' already mentioned" ([6], p. 90, §135). The turn inward to reason does not disclose a canonical content. "Here we at once come back to the lack of content. . . . The universal, the non-contradiction of self, is without content, something which comes to be reality in the practical sphere just as little as in the theoretical" ([7], p. 460). Kant's Enlightenment project of discovering a universal substantive morality by an appeal to reason fails.

In order to gain substance and give guidance, Morality must possess a content it cannot supply from moral understanding. The next categorial step is to overcome the vacuity of Morality, "the abstract universality of its goodness" ([5], p. 253, §513). Sittlichkeit (often translated as "ethical life", "the moral life", or "social ethics") offers a categorial resolution of the problems faced both by Abstract Right and Morality because it provides content. "In an ethical community [einem sittlichen Gemeinwesen], it is easy to say what man must do, what are the duties he has to fulfil in order to be virtuous: he has simply to follow the well-known and explicit rules of his own situation" ([6], p. 107, §150). The solution that is offered is not to deduce content from moral understanding, but rather to recognize the rational necessity of content, even when it is contingent. Indeed, it is to recognize that all content, from the perspective of reason, will appear contingent. Here one finds a particular application of a general theme of argument in Hegel through which he shows the necessity of giving contingency a necessary standing.

Once this realization is in place, individuals have content for their moral lives. The content is both particular and normative.

> The right of individuals to be subjectively destined to freedom is fulfilled when they belong to an actual ethical order, because their conviction of their freedom finds its truth in such an objective order, and it is in an ethical order that they are actually in possession of their own essence or their own inner universality ([6], p. 109, §153).

It is not just that content is provided, but also that true freedom is realized. Sittlichkeit provides content, obligation, and motivation. "It is the good become alive" ([6], p. 105, §142).

Through this account of Abstract Right, Morality, and Sittlichkeit, Hegel gives a conceptually principled account of the place of moral content in the face of reason's failure to discover canonical moral content. Sittlichkeit is not just a category of social reality in which content is provided; it is most importantly the category within which the contingency of moral content is recognized as necessary. None of the particular content is necessary. But its presence as contingent content is acknowledged to be necessary. Content exists within a particular narrative with a particular history with particular views of the good and understandings of rights and obligations. The problem is now to understand the unity of the diverse communities within which one comes to live a content-full, ethical life. The problem is to understand the unity of the diverse Gemeinschaften with their different Sittlichkeiten.

Within civil society, on the one hand, one understands the universal character of persons as possessors of rights, as, for example, in the administration of justice. "A man counts as a man in virtue of his manhood alone, not because he is a Jew, Catholic, Protestant, German, Italian, &c." ([6], p. 134, §209). On the other hand, one confronts (along with Hegel) the differences in understandings of the good that are framed in terms of class interests and other concerns. Hegel's account leaves space for the recognition of the diversity of human visions of the good as well as the universality of basic human rights. More significantly in categorial terms, Hegel must acknowledge the many not only of individuals, but the many of moral communities. Because of the categorial architectonic of the Philosophy of Spirit, he fails to draw fully on the obvious example of diversity in civil society, the plurality of religious confessions, though he recognizes the necessity of gaining content from a particular community. Indeed, Hegel would require that all belong to some religion.[10] Yet importantly, Hegel recognizes the diversity of religious confessions as a basis for the categorial significance of the state.[11] Civil society is marked not just by the interaction of atomistic individuals; it is marked as well by the plurality of ideological and religious groups. Both the atomistic individualism of the cosmopolitan, as well as the conflicting communities of moral commitment require a categorial unity. This categorial unity must be achieved against the failure of Abstract Right and Morality to discover moral content and the recognition that moral content comes from diverse moral narratives, which a state for a pluralistic society must encompass.

IV. THE DIALECTIC OF SITTLICHKEIT: COMMUNITY, DIVERSITY, AND STATE

Sittlichkeit opens with the natural ethical unit, the family. The family is an immediate presentation of concrete ethical relationships. It is a unity of action and purpose. Yet any one family is one among many families, and any one family is subject to being dissolved by death and other forces. It is this dialectic of the one and the many that introduces civil society within Hegel's account of Sittlichkeit. Civil society is the "state external", the "system atomistic" ([5], p. 257, §523). Civil society is

> an association of members as self-subsistent individuals in a universality which, because of their self-subsistence, is only abstract. Their association is brought about by their needs, by the legal system – the means to security of person and property – and by an external organization for attaining their particular and common interests ([6], p. 110, §157).

It is important to note Hegel's accent on both particular and common interests. Hegel's recognition of civil society as a free space within the state within which market transactions can occur is well appreciated. What is not as well appreciated is that civil society is also understood as the place within which diverse moral understandings can have communal place.

The plurality of moral communities and moral visions is categorially necessary, given the character of Hegel's solution to the problem of securing moral content. The *Philosophy of Right* begins with individuals and moves to a concrete universal, the state. Individual wills in taking property and in making contracts cannot account for the notion of wrong that they need if they are to make sense of harms, fraud, and criminal acts. A concept of wrong requires an account of duties, right action, and the good. Abstract Right, therefore, requires Morality. But the attempt to affirm a universal good or duty reveals only particular goods and duties. Either good and duty are universal and vacuous or they are particular and conflicting. This difficulty can be resolved by recognizing that the right and the good exist only within the substantial setting of Sittlichkeit. The difficulties of Abstract Right and Morality can be resolved only by making Morality particular and contingent. Then Morality becomes substantive as Sittlichkeit. It becomes actual and necessary. But there is not one Sittlichkeit but many Sittlichkeiten.

This plurality of moral communities and moral visions can only be understood within a category of society as pluralistic. As merely an external unity, civil society, even including the administration of law and enforcement, is incomplete. The state is the actuality of concrete freedom ([6], p. 160, §260) by being the structure through which one understands the legitimacy of the procedural protections and welfare rights that unite individuals as citizens of a polity. The state affords a political unity and an identity, not a social unity and identity. The unity is a political structure that can self-consciously compass the diverse communities of a pluralistic society. "The state is the actuality of the ethical Idea [der sittlichen Idee]" ([6], p. 155, §257), but it is neither a large family nor the encompassing community. It is the political unity of diverse communities. To see the force of this contrast between civil society and state, as well as the implication of recognizing the pluralistic character of society , one must develop further a number of important suggestions in Hegel's work tied to his departure from the Aristotelian understanding of polity.

V. THE STATE AND PLURALISTIC SOCIETY

Aristotle envisioned the state, the ideal political structure, as a city-state, a polis, compassing no more than 100,000 individuals of similar background and moral understandings (Nicomachean Ethics IX.10.1170b). It was not to be a pluralistic society. He was clear in wishing to exclude foreigners and others who would not share the common understanding that framed the polis.

> . . . if the citizens of a state are to judge and to distribute offices according to merit, then they must know each other's characters; where they do not possess this knowledge, both the election to offices and the decision of lawsuits will go wrong. When the population is very large they are manifestly settled at haphazard, which clearly ought not to be. Besides, in an over-populous state foreigners and resident aliens will readily acquire the rights of citizens, for who will find them out? (Politics VII 4.1326b).

The vision is of a society built around a single moral narrative and of a citizenry educated in a particular paideia.

The Western Middle Ages developed a similar understanding, now fortified by a synergy of faith and reason that gave grounds for fashioning an empire as if it were a polis. The Christian commitment in faith to the City of God was conjoined with a faith in the capacity of reason to discover the general content-full lineaments of natural law and proper public authority for persons as such. The Western Christian view was that reason could discover much of what Christian faith and paideia offered. It was not simply that the Pope of Rome and the Western Emperor could be accepted in faith as directing in God's name, but rather that moral understanding could establish the general lineaments and legitimacy of public authority and the public good.

The Reformation challenged both the practical and the theoretical dimensions of this Western Christian synthesis. Not only was there the religious conflict of Protestants and Roman Catholics, but an adequate way of thinking of Protestants and Roman Catholics as citizens of one state was lacking. The Enlightenment attempted to meet this need by offering access through reason to a content-full, canonical understanding of morality and public authority. The divergence among persons could be healed by their understanding themselves to share, as rational persons, in one content-full moral vision. Following Kant, they could envisage themselves as members of the kingdom of ends. From this perspective, they could (1) discover how rational persons should act, (2) dismiss all who disagreed with them as irrational, (3) understand how they might rationally use coercive public authority to impose correct behavior on the unwilling, and (4) recognize that this imposition was not alien to those constrained, but rather restored them to their true rational deportment. However, there is no content-full, canonical understanding of morality that moral understanding can discover. Moral content is available only within particular moral narratives, of which there are many.

Hegel in recognizing the plurality of moral visions and the pluralistic character of large-scale societies invited a reconsideration of both society and the state. Neither can be considered communities bound by a content-full moral vision. They are rather that which binds numerous moral communities with diverse moral visions. The contingency of the canonical content of any particular community is mediated, rendered rational, within a civil society that can compass numerous moral communities. There is no universal canonical content-full morality that defines societies (Gesellschaften) or communities (Gemeinschaften) as such. Moreover, a society (a Gesellschaft) is not a community (a Gemeinschaft). The unity of diverse moral perspectives is for its part understood within the moral category of the state, which completes a predominantly procedural civil society, but without the state's moral significance being merely contractual. Nor is the state simply a higher level community.

Hegel recognizes his account of the state as able to compass a plurality of communities. For example, his account of the state provides him with a basis for criticizing the anti-Semites who would not recognize Jews as citizens.[12] More generally, it is a recognition of the large-scale state as the category of social unity that gives moral place to a number of moral communities.[13]

Hegel also recognizes the organization of different communities through his account of estates. "Masses each of which possesses its own basis of subsistence, and a corresponding mode of labour, of needs, and of means for satisfying them, also of aims and interests, as well as of mental culture and habit – constitutes the difference of Estates (orders or ranks)" ([5], p. 258, §527). The estates are a plurality of communities within the polity. "The history of constitutions is the history of the growth of these estates, of the legal relationships of individuals to them, and of these estates to one another and to their centre" ([5], p. 258, §527). The state is a category of social reality that can compass in a categorial unity a diversity of understandings of the content-full character of morality. To read the estates as moral communities obviously recasts or at least develops Hegel's intentions. The estates to which he makes reference are not moral communities in the same sense that we recognize communities of moral commitment and belief within a contemporary pluralistic society. Yet the generality of Hegel's considerations have been appreciated. Consider, for example, Allen Wood's reinterpretation of estates in terms of contemporary pluralistic societies.[14]

> Even within modern society, Hegel thinks there are a plurality of different social estates or positions, each with its own characteristic ethical disposition. This is part of the "articulation" of modern society, which goes hand in hand with its emphasis on the principle of subjective freedom. People with different social roles and dispositions may have different conceptions of the good, and they may be equally right. What is objectively good for one social type may not be the same as what is objectively good for another type ([12], p. 375).

The force of Hegel's fundamental analyses reaches beyond what he had concretely envisioned.

Hegel makes the watershed contribution of breaking with the Aristotelian ideal of polity. He sees society anew and aright as diverse. The plurality of moral communities demands the moral space that civil society affords. The diversity of moral visions can then make plausible representational devices and constitutional accommodations in ways that draw on Hegel's general concern with the estates. One needs a recognition of the diversity of communities, their heterogeneous understandings of the good, as well as general procedural protections that bind all citizens.[15] The state must be a structure in which persons with diverse moral views can understand their common action as free.

> The state consists (a) so far as its content is concerned, in the unity of objective freedom (i.e., freedom of the universal or substantial will) and subjective freedom (i.e., freedom of everyone in his knowing and in his volition of particular ends); and consequently, (b) so far as its form is concerned, in self-determining action on laws and principles which are thoughts and so universal ([6], p. 156, §258).

Hartmann recognizes that Hegel's account rightly understood supports a democracy. "The consequences of a categorial account of the state is therefore the sovereignty of the people. . . . this option opens the way to universal suffrage in a democracy" ([4], pp. 126–7). But consideration of the pluralistic character of societies requires that the government be one that is limited in the sense of affirming moral space for the diverse moral communities it encompasses. The state as the self-aware political unity of diversity must be neutral regarding the content-full communities it compasses. It is ideally a limited democracy. Only in a limited democracy can there be a social awareness and recognition of the pluralism of society and the unity of state in actions on behalf of its citizens as self-affirmation of the universal. What from one perspective (i.e., that of Denken als Verstand) may appear as a limitation (i.e., that the state should not suppress peaceable diversity) should not appear as a limitation within the project of categorial explanation. The capacity to comprehend diversity without setting it aside is the force and novel scope of the category state.

Since the state is not a larger-scale community, it cannot give the moral content and direction afforded by membership in a particular content-full moral community. Indeed, to seek it here would be a category mistake. On the other hand, it provides a categorial unity that is a novum. The state provides a disinterested administration of laws and procedures in terms of a new general identity as citizens. It is for this reason that the universal class is not the workers, pace Marx, or some other particular group, but rather the civil servants ([6], p. 197, §303). One properly identifies as a citizen with the state, but not as one identifies with one's family or moral community. The invitation to tyranny is to think of the state as a community whether organic, religious, or ideological. Given the failure of the Enlightenment project, the attempt to impose a particular political correctness or concrete understanding of equality, fairness, or justice is no different from imposing a scholastically defended account of the filioque. The universality of the state, the state "as the self-knowing ethical actuality of mind" properly eschews "authority and faith" ([6], p. 173, §270), such as one would find in a church or similar moral community.

The state is the political unity with which one identifies and understands common action while maintaining individual and communal moral space. Individual rights announce the limits of plausible state authority without having to invoke a notion of constitutional contract to justify limits. The limits are set by the existence of peaceable diversity with the state as the unity of that diversity. The state is properly ideologically neutral because it is a *res publica* for communities with diverse concrete understandings of justice and fairness. The state is properly evacuated as far as possible of commitments to content-full understandings of justice or the good so that welfare rights emerge as political creations, not expressions of foundational claims in justice. The state is a place of transmoral political creation and compromise in the face of irremedial moral difference. There is no one canonical content-full sense of justice or fairness. It is in this neutrality that the state concretely compasses a diversity of moral communities with their disparate moral views.

VI. CONCLUSION

Hegel faced the plurality of moral visions, which the Enlightenment failed to set aside through a canonical content-full account of morality grounded in moral understanding. By recognizing the content-full diversity of moral communities, and their necessity as the origin of moral content, including the necessarily contingent character of their content, Hegel provided through his notion of the state a deliverance from the challenges of post-modernity. The pluralism of moral narratives cannot be overcome in a higher level content-full moral narrative. It can only be overcome in a mode of social organization that does not require further moral content. Hegel's account of the political unity of a pluralistic society offers a categorial justification of a political unity in the face of moral diversity, rather than an attempt to justify yet another particular content-full moral vision.

Contrary to Hegel's expectations, this social category is best understood as a neutral limited democracy. This is not the view of the state Hegel sees himself as defending. Yet Hegel's acknowledgement of the diversity of duties and the good, and of the necessity of the acquisition of content in the contingency of Sittlichkeit, when combined with his recognition of the pluralistic character of society, requires an account of the state that provides unity while preserving diversity. A state that does not unite its diverse communities ceases to be a state. A state that suppresses the content-full, peaceable diversity of its communities evacuates its specific content. It becomes a deficient instance of a crucial category of objective mind.[16] Even more central than the democratic character of the state, for which Hartmann argued in categorial terms, is the state's character as a *limited* democracy.

These conclusions are not those that Hegel himself embraces. In particular, Hegel regards the state and reason as providing more than the categorial resolution for which the foregoing has argued. Yet the general structure of Hegel's categorial architectonic sustains the basis for unifying various important insights of Hegel in an account to which his general reflections lead and which speak to contemporary challenges in moral and political theory. Hegel accomplishes more than he realizes, but such is the cunning of reason. He has given us a basis for reassessing previous understandings of the state. Where these reassessments will lead as we step away from the Enlightenment and through the truth of post-modernity, only Minerva's owl can tell for sure, and then only later.

NOTES

1. The terms "moral vision", "understanding", or "narrative" are used interchangeably to indicate framing contexts that establish a particular set of content-full moral claims. Religions, traditional cultural understandings, as well as particular philosophical accounts of morality are instances of moral visions, moral understandings, and moral narratives. They show why certain actions or circumstances should be regarded as good or bad, and particular individuals as blameworthy or praiseworthy. Orthodox Judaism, liberal democratic politics, and the philosophy of Immanuel Kant are examples of particular moral visions, understandings, or narratives.
2. The contingent character of moral content has been a focus of contemporary philosophers since Friedrich Nietzsche. See Alasdair MacIntyre, for example, who underscores the perspectival character of moral rationality by the title and substance of *Whose Justice? Which Rationality*? [10].

3. "Thought" is used not in Hegel's sense of Vernunft, but in the sense of Denken als Verstand.
4. For a study of the patterns of controversy resolution, see [1].
5. "Post-modernity" is used stipulatively to identify the condition under which one cannot on the basis of rational argument choose among competing moral accounts. Here I apply Jean-François Lyotard's characterization of post-modernity as that circumstance in which "The grand narrative has lost its credibility, regardless of what mode of unification it uses, regardless of whether it is a speculative narrative or a narrative of emancipation" ([9], p. 37). The condition of post-modernity is not simply a sociological circumstance, but more fundamentally an epistemological condition.
6. See [2]. This essay is reprinted in a collection of other essays pertinent to a categorial reading of Hegel: [3]. See also [8].
7. The author, with conviction, and some post-modern passion, notes that this is a problem and a solution seen within secular morality. He is an Orthodox Christian who possesses the narrative.
8. For example, Hegel's *Philosophy of History* concludes "that the History of the World, with all the changing scenes which its annals present, is this process of development and the realization of Spirit – this is the true Theodicaea, the justification of God in History. Only this insight can reconcile Spirit with the History of the World – viz., that what has happened, and is happening every day, is not only not 'without God', but is essentially His Work" ([7], p. 457). Is this a metaphysical discovery or a powerfully insightful conceptual heuristic imposed on history? Such passages admit of both a metaphysical and a heuristic interpretation. In my account of Hegel's dialectic, I agree with Pinkard when he distinguishes between categorial and metaphysical accounts. "There is the categorial answer (it is possible only if we construe the categorial structure of being in such and such a way), and there is the metaphysical answer (it is possible only if Spirit exists and progressively discloses itself to us in such and such developmental forms). I shall argue that Hegel need take only the first type of explanation, and that he may take the second but need not do so" ([11], p. 15). In *The Philosophy of Right*, it is the categorial dialectic that is significant.
9. To indicate the parts of the *Philosophy of Right* as well as the areas of categorial focus, Abstract Right and Morality are capitalized.
10. Hegel argues that "the state should even require all its citizens to belong to a church – a church is all that can be said, because since the content of a man's faith depends on his private ideas, the state cannot interfere with it" ([6], p. 168, 268). Though religion has a special status in Hegel's categorial architectonic, religion may be recast to identify membership in some moral community. The state presupposes individuals who have moral content and place because they are considered as citizens.
11. "It is only thereafter that the state, in contrast with the particular sects, has attained to universality of thought – its formal principle – and is bringing this universality into existence" ([6], p. 173, 270).
12. Hegel, *Philosophie des Rechts*, 270.
13. "A state which is strong because its organization is mature may be all the more liberal in this matter; it may entirely overlook details of religious practice which affect it, and may even tolerate a sect (though, of course, all depends on its numbers) which on religious grounds declines to recognize even its direct duties to the state" ([6], p. 168).
14. For Wood's much more critical assessment of Hegel's account, see in particular [13], p. 231.
15. One might think, for example, of the state of Israel that provides general procedural justice for all while recognizing that marriage law is dependent on particular religious communities.
16. This account of a state that would repress or attempt to eradicate the moral diversity of its moral communities is categorial. Such a state would not simply be a deficient realization of the state, it would also be tyrannical and repressive. The state is the political structure or category that compasses a pluralistic society.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. Engelhardt, H.T. Jr. and Caplan, A.L. (eds.): 1987, *Scientific Controversies*, Cambridge University Press, New York.
2. Hartmann, K.: 1976, 'Hegel: A Non-Metaphysical View', in *Hegel: A Collection of Critical Essays*, A. MacIntyre (ed.), University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, pp. 101–124.
3. Hartmann, K.: 1988, *Studies in Foundational Philosophy*, Rodopi, Amsterdam.
4. Hartmann, K.: 1984, 'Towards a new Systematic Reading of Hegel's Philosophy of Right', in *The State and Civil Society*, Z.A. Pelczynski (ed.), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 114–136.
5. Hegel, G.W.F.: 1971, *Hegel's Philosophy of Mind*, A.V. Miller (trans.), Clarendon Press, Oxford.
6. Hegel, G.W.F.: 1965, *Hegel's Philosophy of Right*, T.M. Knox (trans.), Clarendon Press, Oxford.
7. Hegel, G.W.F.: 1956, *The Philosophy of History*, J. Sibree (trans.), Dover, New York.
8. Koch, D. and Bort K. (eds.): 1990, *Kategorie und Kategorialität*, Königshausen & Neumann, Wurzburg.
9. Lyotard, J.-F.: 1984, *The Postmodern Condition*, G. Bennington and B. Massumi (trans.), Manchester University Press, Manchester.
10. MacIntyre, A.: 1988, *Whose Justice? Which Rationality*?, University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame.
11. Pinkard, T.: 1988, *Hegel's Dialectic*, Temple University Press, Philadelphia.
12. Wood, A.W.: 1991, 'Does Hegel have an Ethics', *The Monist* 74 (July), 358–385.
13. Wood, A.W.: 1993, "Hegel's Ethics", in *The Cambridge Companion to Hegel*, F.C. Beiser (ed.), Cambridge University Press, New York, pp. 211–233.

H. TRISTRAM ENGELHARDT, JR.

Klaus Hartmann and G.W.F. Hegel: A Personal Postscript

This book is about ideas and the relationship of ideas. It is not about a man. Yet it is inspired by the scholarship of Klaus Hartmann and his influence on a group of philosophers who, because of him, came to understand better the significance of Hegel's corpus and the work of other Continental philosophers, especially Kant, Husserl, Marx, and Sartre. This book is dedicated to him in gratitude. Hartmann taught about much he never directly addressed. To the editors of this volume, as students, he conveyed a sense of intellectual probity. He provided an induction into the intellectual life.

There is the feeling on the part of some that the intellectual life of the university is weakening. Be that as it may, this life, if it is to be sustained, will be secured by those who imbue students with the excitement of ideas, the thrill of investigation, and the importance of scholarship. These individuals form the apostolic succession of the academy across the generations. They show how not to succumb to contemporary academic fashion, the political correctness of the moment, the merely popular. They impart the platonic romance with ideas that began in the Academy and which holds scholars in a community of fascination with ideas. Now some 52 years of age, I have known three such individuals, one of whom was Klaus Hartmann. He touched my life. He influenced each of the contributors to this volume.

In January 1966 on a leave of absence from my medical studies, I met Klaus Hartmann. I had left a world of waking around 5 a.m. each morning to start surgery rounds at 6 a.m. I came from the very concrete, fact-of-the-matter context of medicine to philosophy where I enrolled in my first graduate course in Kant, taught by Klaus Hartmann who was then a Visiting Professor in Austin. The world of Austin must in some ways have been as strange to him as leaving medicine's world was to me. He complained of the absence of bread (adamantinely refusing to grace what was available in Texas by the same name he applied to its more substantial equivalent in Germany). During that year, and in subsequent visits, Hartmann inspired young Texans encountering for the first time Continental philosophy and the canons of rigorous scholarship. I can still recall vividly Hartmann's reaction after reading the final version

H.T. Engelhardt, Jr. and T. Pinkard (eds.), Hegel Reconsidered, 225–229.
© 1994 *Kluwer Academic Publishers.*

of my dissertation. He found me irredeemably a neo-neo-Kantian rather than a Hegelian. My dissertation he considered impoverished of footnotes, at least from the standpoint of his understanding of good scholarship.[1]

It was Hartmann's recurringly uncompromising stress on careful argument and thorough scholarship that attracted students.[2] He offered a disciplined, serious approach to Hegel and Continental philosophy. Where many found obscure sources of edification in Hegel's *Phenomenology*, Hartmann disclosed rigor of analysis. Indeed, the preferred work was the *Logic*, not the *Phenomenology*. The *Logic* promised opportunities for sustained analysis and the careful reconstruction of arguments unencumbered by the passions still reverberating in a manuscript written at a time of personal and national turmoil.

In the summer of 1969 I went to Bonn to study further under Professor Hartmann. After finding lodging in a suburb of Bonn, I proceeded to contact Hartmann. The next day I entered his apartment somewhat out of breath, having climbed four flights of stairs. The apartment to my amazement was one enormous room. Later, I would find there was a small bathroom, as well as a kitchen into which no one was ever allowed to enter. The capacious room formed the corner of the building's attic and on one side looked down on the university, parts of which dated from the 18th century. The room spoke of a man whose life was given in great measure to scholarship. Only later would I discover how rich in friendship and love of students that scholarship was, of how conviviality and reflection were tightly intertwined. The room was lined with bookcases, furnitured by a spartan bed, somewhat like an army cot, a radio, a stereo, and a typewriter. Amidst the bookcases there was an area with a small Persian rug, a coffee table, and four chairs. Subsequently, I was to find that it was here that the best philosophy seminars in Germany were held, inspired by liberal libations of good German wine, mostly Moselle.

Hartmann sat me down in one of the chairs by the coffee table. At first, he resolutely refused to speak German (his English was flawless), though as a sixth generation German Texian, I just as stiffneckedly forced upon him my Texas Gebirgsdeutsch. Despairing of any hope of dislodging me from my ancestral dialect, Hartmann turned to warning of culture shock, somewhat like a physician might warn an early 19th century immigrant to Texas of yellow fever. Hartmann considered culture shock the affliction most likely to undermine serious scholarship. Only one prophylactic was known, namely, good wine. Hartmann suggested I consider drinking up to a bottle a day, if necessary, to protect myself against the malady. Diagnosing some measure of concurrence in my face, he declared that the matter was settled and that I should follow him at once to his wine purveyor. We careened down the four flights of stairs, through winding alleys, to his wine store. Hartmann, as a good physician with patient in tow, turned to the woman who sold the wine and instructed her (reminding her to admonish her husband similarly) that for at least the first six months I should drink only Moselle wines. Afterwards I might consider Rhine wines, Rhine-Hessen, and perhaps even, if the treatment went well, an Alsatian wine or two. Then wines were poured out, tasted, tested, and I was sold a supply sufficient for the week.

As I came to the routine of studies, they included a weekly meeting over beer late Friday evening subsequent to a Hegel seminar held from about 7 to 9 p.m. Here, the serious students, brew in hand, the air awash in fumes from cigarillos, explored the works of Hegel, Husserl, Kant, Marx, and Sartre. These were wonderful conversations, rich in erudition and wide-ranging. Hartmann sat at the head of the table, somewhat like the conductor of a small chamber orchestra, encouraging certain lines of discussion, or throwing back his hands as if to ward off the naive from fruitless exploration. He created in Bonn something like what I imagine Benjamin Franklin may have found in Paris or Ashbel Smith in London: a collection of young, impassioned philosophers, overseen by a wise spirit. It was a sort of late-night Bonn salon in which one experienced the fun of being a scholar. Watered by excellent conversation, good fellowship, and German beer, the endeavors of academia seemed far from dry and dusty.

At least weekly one was called to discuss philosophy in the enormous room. The meeting required preparation. But how to prepare? One had to know everything. At times, the only device was to develop a well-articulated concern so that on the one hand one could show one's knowledge without embarrassment, while on the other hand directing the professor's attention to an issue sufficiently interesting to be the focus of the afternoon's exploration. The result was a private tutorial, conducted at the coffee table on the Persian rug, in the midst of books at easy hand for consultation. As the bottle of wine emptied, anxiety evanesced and the student was set free to wander unconcerned through philosophy and belles lettres.

One was not alone. There were other students who had similar conversations. One came to know of their conversations with Hartmann in the course of discussions at the University. In the end, one realized how much time Hartmann was spending nurturing young minds who hoped some day to be philosophers. The attention was severe but gentle, genteelly understated, but ever-present. There was the sense that one had to live up to high ideals, to take ideas seriously, and to be careful in one's scholarship. But there was also real satisfaction. The life of the mind was manifestly pleasurable. Moreover, the intellectual life was not solitary. It was marked by fellowship. Hartmann created a small invisible college of students whose lives were touched and transformed by the experience. Many of those have contributed to this volume. Some of the contributors came to know Hartmann primarily in Austin, others in Bonn, others in Tübingen. Some studied with him in all of these places. The contributors even include a student of a student. Hartmann lived to see the intellectual children of his intellectual children.

This volume reflects the wide-ranging influence of Klaus Hartmann as a thinker. It draws primarily on essays written by Hartmann's Texan and American students; contributors primarily from Europe have already fashioned a collection of essays in German in his honor [3]. In exploring philosophical concerns raised by Hartmann, this volume gives special place to Hegel. This accent is given to Hegel and Hartmann on Hegel, despite the fact that Hartmann never in his lifetime published a volume on Hegel. Yet just as Hegel cast his shadow and light across all subsequent Continental philosophy, Hartmann began his presentations of Marx, Husserl, and Sartre against the background of Hegel's work. Hegel was always there also in his own right as a central figure in Hartmann's work as a teacher.

With Hartmann's encyclopedic grasp of the works of Hegel, Marx, Husserl, and Sartre, and with his keen attention to detail of argument, one had the sense of a colloquium among these four individuals joined by others from the history of philosophy. In his lectures and discussions, Hartmann brought these individuals and their philosophical problems into a critical reexamination that always occurred against the background of Hegel's work. He took seriously the rigor in Hegel's thought and the ways in which Hegel's arguments and concerns remain of contemporary importance for philosophers. To look at Hartmann's work has been to look at Hegel's. As this volume shows, to understand the full significance of Hegel, one must look at themes of investigation undertaken by Hartmann.

Besides the conversation, good wine, and cigarillos, there were also the lecture notes – detailed, typed notes of Hartmann's lectures on Hegel, Marx, etc. At times, the notes were provided by other students who had made xeroxes. A kind of samizdat developed, mediating between the published word and the university lectures. It, along with a manuscript on Hegel to appear in 1995, has provided insights into puzzles and disclosed puzzles as yet unaddressed. Many of the essays in this volume draw from this special written tradition, as well as from numerous conversations with Hartmann himself. A number of the essays in this volume have a special debt to Hartmann, which cannot be adequately footnoted or acknowledged. Each of us who is a contributor to this volume has seen our work influenced by his scholarship and his personality.

The list of Hartmann's published works reveals only a part of the rich range of his interests and his influence. Hartmann, having taught a medical student on the way to becoming a philosopher, became himself a contributor to the reflections and literature of bioethics. This is but one of many examples repeated in different ways with different students. In discussions regarding persons and topics from Immanuel Kant and transcendental philosophy to John Rawls and bioethics, Hartmann showed himself a man at home with thought, and possessed of a style rightly associated with the life of the humanities. The message as one drank good wine and explored the foundations of thought was to think clearly and live *humaniter*.

This more than anything is Hartmann's special legacy to his students and explains the energies invested to frame this volume. In "Humanism: An Essay at Definition", Irving Babbitt remarks that "The virtue that results from a right cultivation of one's humanity, in other words from moderate and decorous living, is poise" ([1], p. 29). Hartmann possessed an intellectual poise that conveyed a *studia humanitatis* that was careful without being dry, exact without being tedious. This volume does little to convey this element of the man. Good conversations, those that strive to go to the root and the core of thought, can never be captured by essays or a collection of essays.

NOTES

1. Professor Hartmann suggested that my dissertation was good as the work of a Texan or an American, but anemic when it came to footnotes by any standard he would take to be appropriate. As a good student, I set about remedying this defect. My first book (which I completed during a fellowship studying under Hartmann in Bonn) sported one footnote commanding two-thirds of the bottom of three pages. See [2], pp. 102–104.
2. One might wonder at the resonance between Hartmann and his exposition of Hegel and Continental philosophy, on the one hand, and young Texans aspiring to be philosophers, on the other. Of the contributors to this volume, four share this connection. Just as there have been Ohio and St. Louis Hegelians, there were Texas Hegelians as well. Perhaps Absolute Spirit finds humor in what may appear to many an idiosyncratic expression of its history. As evidence of previous Texas Hegelians, the papers of William T. Harris preserve with the records of the St. Louis Philosophical Society letters dated 1875 from a Dr. P. Pracht of the Valley post office in Guadalupe County, Texas, addressing various concerns regarding Hegel's philosophy. These papers are to be found in the St. Louis Public Library.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. Babbitt, I.: 1930, 'Humanism: An Essay at Definition', in Norman Foerster (ed.), *Humanism and America*, Farrar and Rinehart, New York, pp. 25–51.
2. Engelhardt, H.T. Jr.: 1973, *Mind-Body: A Categorial Relation*, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague.
3. Koch, D. and Bort, K. (eds.): 1990, *Kategorie und Kategorialität*, Königshausen & Neumann, Wurzburg.

Bibliography of the Works of Klaus Hartmann (September 5, 1925 – July 30, 1991)

1. 1953, *Husserls Einfühlungstheorie auf monadologischer Grundlage*, unpublished dissertation.
2. 1962, *Lebendiger Realismus*. Festschrift Johannes Thyssen (ed. in collaboration with H. Wagner), contribution within: 'Das Realitätsproblem', pp. 115–130, Bouvier, Bonn.
3. 1963, *Grundzüge der Ontologie Sartres in ihrem Verhältnis zu Hegels Logik*, De Gruyter, Berlin.
4. 1966, *Sartres Sozialphilosophie*, De Gruyter, Berlin.
5. 1966, *Sartre's Ontology*, Northwestern U.P., Evanston (2nd impression 1980, paperback edition 1980).
6. 1970, *Die Marxsche Theorie*, De Gruyter, Berlin.
7. 1976, *Die ontologische Option* (ed.), contribution within: 'Die ontologische Option', pp. 1–30, De Gruyter, Berlin.
8. 1980, *Die Demokratie in Spektrum der Wissenschaften* (ed.), contribution within: 'Die Demokratie – das aufgelöste Rätsel aller Verfassungen?', pp. 13–42, and introduction, pp. 7–11, Alber, Freiburg/München.
9. 1981, *Politische Philosophie*, Handbuch Philosophie, E. Ströker and W. Wieland (eds.), Alber, Freiburg/München.
10. 1983, *Die Philosophie J.-P. Sartres*. Zwei Untersuchungen zu L'être et le néant und zur Critique de la raison dialectique, 2nd ed. of *Grundzüge der Ontologie Sartres and Sartres Sozialphilosophie*, De Gruyter, Berlin.
11. 1988, *Studies in Foundational Philosophy*, R. Berlinger and W. Schrader (eds.), editions Rodopi N.V. and Königshausen, Reihe Elementa, Vol. 47, Amsterdam.
12. 1994, *Praktische Philosophie im Blick kategorialer Ontologie* (Vorträge und Aufsätze), Würzburg.
13. 1995, *Hegels Logik*, De Gruyter, Berlin.

H.T. Engelhardt, Jr. and T. Pinkard (eds.), Hegel Reconsidered, 231–241.

© 1994 *Kluwer Academic Publishers.*

SMALLER INDEPENDENT WORKS

1. 1968, *Marxens 'Kapital' in transzendentalphilosophischer Sicht*, Bouvier, Bonn.
2. 1969, *Johannes Thyssen. In Memoriam* (written with H. Wagner), Hanstein, Bonn.

ARTICLES

1. 1962, 'Sartres Stellung zum Marxismus', *Archiv für das Studium der neueren Sprachen und Literaturen*, 199(5), 298–312.
2. 1965, 'Zwischen Phänomenologie und Dialektik. Zur Ethik J.N. Findlays', *Kant-Studien* 55(1), 86–101.
3. 1966, 'On Taking the Transcendental Turn', *Review of Metaphysics*, 20(2), 223–249.
4. 1967, 'Ehrenfels', vol. 2, pp. 467–468, 'Schuppe', vol. 7, pp. 336–337, in *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, Macmillan & Free Press, New York.
5. 1968, 'Phenomenology, Ontology, and Metaphysics', *Review of Metaphysics* 22(1), 85–112. (Also in *Studies in Foundational Philosophy*.)
6. 1970, 'Praxis = A Ground for Social Theory?', *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology* 1(2), 47–58. (Also in *Studies in Foundational Philosophy*.)
7. 1971, 'Abstraction and Existence in Husserl's Phenomenological Reduction', *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology* 2(1), 10–18. (Also in *Studies in Foundational Philosophy*.)
8. 1971, 'What is a Social Category', *Idealistic Studies* 1(1), 65–72.
9. 1971, 'Ein Leben für den philosophischen Realismus', *Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung* 25(3), 448–452.
10. 1971, 'Lévi-Strauss and Sartre', *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology* 2(3), 37–45. (Also in *Studies in Foundational Philosophy*.) + discussion periods 35–36, 44–45, 51–52, 57–58, 62–63 Reading workshop.
11. 1972, '"Freedom and Determinism." Reply to Miss Berry's Paper', in W. Mays and S.C. Brown (eds.), *Linguistic Analysis and Phenomenology*, Macmillan, London, pp. 33–39, 40–56 passim, 98–99, 289–290.
12. 1972, 'The "Analogies" and After', *Proceedings of the Third International Kant Congress 1970*, Reidel, Dordrecht, pp. 47–62. (Also in *Studies in Foundational Philosophy*.)
13. 1972, 'Ekel' 432, 'Engagement' 500, 'Existentialismus' 850–852, and 'Existenzphilosophie' 862–866, *Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie*, Bd. 2 D-F, Schwabe, Basel.
14. 1972, 'The German Philosophical Scene', *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology* 3(1), 11–14.
15. 1972, 'Hegel: A Non-Metaphysical View', in A. MacIntyre (ed.), *Hegel.*

A Collection of Critical Essays, Doubleday, Anchor Books AP17, New York, pp. 101–124.

16. 1972, 'Labyrinthe und Differenzen', in: Erich Heintel, Die beiden Labyrinthe der Philosophie, Bd. I, *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* 54(2), 187–198.
17. 1972, 'Phenomenology, Realism and Logic. A Reply to Professor Findlay', *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology* 3(3), 245–251.
18. 1973, 'Comments' (Dublin Conference Papers), *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology* 4(1), 45–46.
19. 1973, 'Demokratie und Universität', *Informationen Berichte Diskussionen.* Informationsdienst der Eberhard-Karls-Universität Tübingen, 19.6, Nr. 7, 1–4.
20. 1973, 'Zur neuesten Dialektik-Kritik', *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* 55(2), 220–242.
21. 1973, 'Systemtheoretische Soziologie und kategoriale Sozialphilosophie', *Philosophische Perspektiven*, Bd. 5, Klostermann, Frankfurt, pp. 130–161.
22. 1973, 'Diskussionsbeitrag zu H. Willke, "Universität in der Demokratie"', *Informationen Berichte Diskussionen.* Informationsdienst der Eberhard-Karls-Universität Tübingen, 15.12, Nr. 12, 24–26. (On: H. Willke, 'Universität in der Demokratie', a.a.o., 15.10. 1973, Nr. 10, 22–23.)
23. 1974, 'The Logic of Deficient and Eminent Modes in Heidegger', *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology* 5(2), 118–134. (Also in *Studies in Foundational Philosophy.*)
24. 1976, 'Ideen zu einem neuen systematischen Verständnis der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie', *Perspektiven der Philosophie*, Neues Jahrbuch vol. 2, Editions Rodopi N.V., Amsterdam, pp. 167–200.
25. 1976, 'Staat oder Gesellschaft?', *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, Fernausgabe Nr. 277, 26.11, p. 28.
26. 1976, 'Analytic *versus* Categorial Thought', in G. Ryle (ed.), *Contemporary Aspects of Philosophy*, Oriel Press, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, pp. 214–222. (Also in *Studies in Foundational Philosophy.*)
27. 1977, 'Self-Evidence', *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology* 8(2), 79–93. (Also in *Studies in Foundational Philosophy.*)
28. 1977, 'Die Objektivität der Freiheit. Hegels Rechtsphilosophie heute', in J. Simon (ed.), *Freiheit. Theoretische und praktische Aspekte des Problems*, Alber, Freiburg/München, pp. 315–337.
29. 1977, 'Analytische und Kategoriale Transzendentalphilosophie', in G. Schmidt and G. Wolandt (eds.), *Die Aktualität der Transzendentalphilosophie.* Hans Wagner zum 60. Geburtstag, Bouvier, Bonn, pp. 45–58.
30. 1977, 'Die Konkurrenz spekulativ-philosophischer und theologischer Wahrheit', in D. Papenfuss and J. Söring (eds.), *Transzendenz und Immanenz. Philosophie und Theologie in der veränderten Welt.* Tagungsbericht eines Symposiums der Alexander von Humbolt-Stiftung 1976, Kohlhammer, Stuttgart, pp. 3–28.

31. 1978, 'Karl Marx', *Die Grossen der Weltgeschichte*, Vol. 8, Kindler, Zürich, pp. 209–225.
32. 1978, 'Ein neu gedeuteter Sartre? Arthur C. Dantos Darstellung', *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, Fernausgabe Nr. 91, 21.4, p. 34.
33. 1978, 'Reiner Begriff und tätiges Leben', in R. Schnur (ed.), *Staat und Gesellschaft.* Studien über Lorenz von Stein, Duncker & Humbolt, Berlin, pp. 65–95.
34. 1978, 'Gesellschaft und Staat – Eine Konfrontation von systemtheoretischer Soziologie und kategorialer Sozialphilosophie', in D. Henrich (ed.), *Ist systematische Philosophie möglich?*, Stuttgarter Hegel-Kongress 1975, pp. 465–486.
35. 1978, 'Moralität und "konkretes Allgemeines"', *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* 60(3), 314–324.
36. 1979, 'Der Marxsche Kritikbegriff und seine Auswirkungen', in E. Eeintel (ed.), *Philosophische Elemente der Tradition des politischen Denkens*, R. Oldenbourg, Wien, pp. 257–275. (Insignificantly altered version of n.d., 'Der Marxsche Kritikbegriff . . .', in O. Saame and P. Schneider (eds.), *Wissenschaft und Kritik.* Eine interdisziplinäre Ringvorlesung. Studium Generale der Johannes Gutenberg – Universität Mainz, Sommersemester 1971, Mainz, pp. 21–29.)
37. 1979, 'Freiheit als Negation?', *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, Lokalausgabe Nr. 262, 10./11.11., p. 67f. (Also in 1982, H. Helbling and M. Meyer (eds.), *Querschnitt.* Kulturelle Erscheinungen unserer Zeit, Verlag NZZ, Zürich, pp. 259–263.)
38. 1979, 'Denken, Wort und Bild', in H. Brunner, R. Kannicht, and K. Schwager (eds.), *Wort und Bild.* Symposion des Fachbereichs Altertums – und Kulturwissenschaften zum 500 jährigen Jubiläum der Eberhard-Karls-Universität Tübingen 1977, Fink, München, pp. 13–27.
39. 1980, 'Kunst, Wahrheit und Werk', in H. Lützeler et al. (eds.), *Kulturwissenschaften.* Festgabe für Wilhelm Perpeet zum 65. Geburtstag, Bouvier, Bonn, pp. 154–163.
40. 1980, 'Sartres Phänomenbegriff'. Neuere Entwicklungen des Phänomenbegriffs', *Phänomenologische Forschungen* 9, Redaktion E.W. Orth, Alber, Freiburg/München, pp. 163–183.
41. 1981, 'Thought, Word and Picture', *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology* 12(1), 14–28. (Author's translation of 'Denken, Wort und Bild'; also in *Studies in Foundational Philosophy.*)
42. 1981, 'No Logic of Modes in Heidegger?', *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology* 12(1), 74.
43. 1981, 'Pensée analytique contre pensée catégoriale', A. Younger (tr.), *Revue de métaphysique et de morale* 86(2), 215–224. (Translation of 'Analytic *versus* Categorial Thought'.)
44. 1981, 'Le problème de la réalité', A. Younger (tr.), *Revué de Métaphysique et de Morale* 86(2), 225–228. (Translation of 'Das Realitätsproblem'.)

45. 1981, 'Der Mensch – die Begierde, Gott zu sein', *Jean-Paul Sartre – ein Atheist?*, Herrenalber Texte 30, Karlsruhe, pp. 28–41.
46. 1981, 'Sartre's Theory of *ensembles*', *The Philosophy of Jean-Paul Sartre*, Library of Living Philosophers, Vol. XVI, Open Court, La Salle, Ill., pp. 631–660. (Also in *Studies in Foundational Philosophy*.)
47. 1982, 'Linearität und Koordination in Hegels Rechtsphilosophie', D. Henrich and R.P. Horstmann (eds.), *Hegels Philosophie des Rechts*, Klett-Cotta, Stuttgart, pp. 305–316.
48. 1982, 'Kategoriale Topik im Politischen', *Neue Hefte für Philosophie* 21, 22–34.
49. 1983, 'Marx als Denker', *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, Fernausgabe Nr. 58, 11.3, p.30.
50. 1983, 'Philosophische Begründungen des Sozialstaatsprinzips', in P. Koslowski, P. Kreuzer, and R. Löw (eds.), *Chancen und Grenzen desSozialstaats. Staatstheorie, Politische Ökonomie, Politik*, Vol. 4 of Civitas-Resultate, Mohr-Siebeck, Tübingen, pp. 251–2532 + Discussion contributions pp. 25, 40, 215, 228.
51. 1984, 'Los esquemas dialécticos de Sartre', *Iztapalapa* No. 7, Numero Especial 1982, Mexico, D.F., 154–161. (English version in *Studies in Foundational Philosophy*.)
52. 1984, 'Die Republik des Handelns. Zu Ernst Vollraths Politischer Philosophie', *Philosophisches Jahrbuch* 91(1), 139–131.
53. 1984, 'Transzendentale Argumentation. Eine Abwägung der verschiedenen Ansätze', in E. Schaper and W. Vossenkuhl (eds.), *Bedingungen der Möglichkeit*, Klett-Cotta, Stuttgart, pp. 17–41. (English original in *Studies in Foundational Philosophy*.)
54. 1984, 'Towards a new systematic reading of Hegel's Philosophy of Right', in Z.A. Pelczynski (ed.), S. Bungay and author (trs.), *The State and Civil Society. Studies in Hegel's Political Philosophy*, Cambridge U.P., pp. 114–136. (English version of 'Ideen . . .'. Also in *Studies in Foundational Philosophy*.)
55. 1984, 'The German Philosophical Scene 2', *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology* 15(2), 301–306.
56. 1984, 'Handlungstheorien im Politischen', *Perspektiven der Philosophie*, Vol. 10, Editions Rodopi N.V. & Königshausen, Amsterdam, pp. 11–36 (part one).
57. 1985, 'Konsensfähige Begründung sozialer Gerechtigkeit? Neuere Wege praktischer Philosophie', in K. Weigelt (ed.), *Werte Leitbilder Tugenden. Zur Erneuerung politischer Kultur. Studien zur politischen Bildung*, Hase & Koehler, Mainz, pp. 283–312.
58. 1985, 'Do Philosophers Need an Absolute and Which One?', in R.S. Cohen, R.M. Martin, and M. Westphal (eds.), *Studies in the Philosophy of J.N. Findlay*, SUNY Press, Albany, pp. 276–293.
59. 1985, 'Human Agency between Life-world and System = Habermas's

Latest Version of Critical Theory', *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology* 16(2), 145–155.

60. 1985, 'Metaphysics in Husserlian Phenomenology', *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology* 16(3), 279–293.
61. 1986, 'Types of Explanation in Hegel and Whitehead', in G.R. Lucas, Jr. (ed.), *Hegel and Whitehead. Contemporary Perspectives in Systematic Philosophy*, SUNY Press, Albany, pp. 61–85. (Also in *Studies in Foundational Philosophy*.)
62. 1986, 'Handlungstheorien im Politischen', *Perspektiven der Philosophie*, Vol. 11, Editions Rodopi N.V. & Königshausen, Amsterdam 1985, pp. 339–347 (second part).
63. 1986, 'Existenzphilosophie', *Staatslexikon*, 7th ed., ed. by the Görres-Gesellschaft, Vol. 2, Herder, Freiburg, pp. 527–530.
64. 1986, 'Was ist und was will Ethik?', *Philosophisches Jahrbuch* (Görres), 93.1, 1–18.
65. 1987, 'A Reply to My Critics' (re. 'Metaphysics in Husserlian Phenomenology'), *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology* 18(2), 189–191.
66. 1987, 'Subjektontologie und ihr Verfahren', in H. Radermacher and P. Reisinger (eds.), *Rationale Metaphysik. Die Philosophie von Wolfgang Cramer*, Klett-Cotta, Stuttgart, pp. 209–221.
67. 1989, 'The Foundations of Bioethics' (re. H.T. Engelhardt, *The Foundations of Bioethics*, Oxford University Press, New York/Oxford, 1986), *Journal of the British Society of Phenomenology* 20(2), 63–66.
68. 1989, 'Was ist und was will Ethik?', *Concilium* 25(3), 199–210. (= Philosophisches Jahrbuch (Görres) 93.1, 1–18.)
69. 1989, 'Ethische Fragen zum Gewinnstreben in der Medizin', in J.P. Wils and D. Mieth (eds.), *Ethik ohne Chance*, Attempto Verlag, Tübingen, pp. 158–181.
70. 1989, 'Is Phenomenology a Tenable Position?', in G. Müller and T.M. Seebohm (eds.), *Perspektiven transzendentaler Reflexion. Festschrift Gerhard Funke*, Bouvier, Bonn, pp. 15–26.
71. 1989, 'Qué es y qué pretende la etica?' *Concilium*, Revista internacional de teología, no. 223, May, 371–394. (Spanish version of *Philosophisches Jahrbuch* 93.1, 1–18.)
72. 1989, 'Einheit-Vielfalt. Whiteheads Metaphysik und der Mensch', *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, Lokalausgabe Aug. 19–20, No. 191, p. 68.
73. 1989, 'Che cosa è e cosa vuole l'etica?', *Concilium*, Rivista internazionale di teologia 3, 18–43. (Italian version of *Philosophisches Jahrbuch* 93.1, 1–18.)
74. 1989, 'Der wissenschaftliche Status der Medizin in philosophischer Sicht', in D. Rössler and H.D. Waller (eds.), *Medizin zwischen Geisteswissenschaft und Naturwissenschaft*, Tübingen, pp. 45–65.
75. 1990, 'Whiteheads Metaphysik and der Mensch', *Allgemeine Zeitschrift für Philosophie* 15.3, 17–38.

76. 1990, 'Kritik und Affirmation der Metaphysik in der politischen Philosophie' in V. Gerhardt (ed.), J.B. Metzler, Stuttgart, pp. 189–215.
77. 1990, 'Types of Explanation in Hegel and Whitehead', in G.R. Lucas and A. Braeckman (eds.), *Whitehead und der deutsche Idealismus/ Whitehead and German Idealism*, Bern, pp. 93–113.
78. 1991, 'Politische Philosophie', in P. Koslowski (ed.), *Orientierung durch Philosophie*, Tübingen, pp. 94–117.
79. 1991, 'The Profit Motive in Kant and Hegel', in T. Bole and W. Bondeson (eds.), *Rights to Health Care*, Kluwer, Dordrecht, pp. 307–325.
80. 1991, 'Metaphysik und Metaphysikkritik', *Neue Hefte für Philosophie* 30/31, 109–138.
81. 1991, 'Democracy and Justice', *Epistemologia* 14.2, 319–332.
82. 1992, 'Jean-Paul Sartre; Das Sein und das Nichts', in *Interpretationen Hauptwerke der Philosophie 20. Jahrhundert*, Stuttgart, pp. 236–255.
83. 1992, 'Vernunft und Gewissen. Gibt es eine philosophische Begründung für die Normativität des Gewissens?', in G. Höver and L. Honnefelder (eds.), *Der Streit um das Gewissen*, Paderborn, 101–111.

REVIEWS

1. 1960, 'Leclerc, *An Introduction to Whitehead's Metaphysics*', *Kant-Studien* 51(2), 219–225.
2. 1960, 'Leibniz, *Herrings Leibniz-Übersetzungen*', *Kant-Studien* 51(4), 496–498.
3. 1961, 'Klemmt, *Locke*', *Kant-Studien* 52(4), 451–454.
4. 1963, 'Kopper, *Dialektik der Gemeinschaft*', *Hegel-Studien*, 2, 340–344.
5. 1965, 'Erdei, *Anfang der Erkenntnis*', *Philosophische Rundschau* 13(1), 66–72.
6. 1965, 'Findlay, *Meinong's Theory of Objects and Values*', *Kant-Studien* 55(1), 122–123.
7. 1966, 'Kern, *Husserl und Kant*', *Philosophical Quarterly* 16, 65, 368–370.
8. 1967, 'Kaufmann, *Hegel*', *Hegel Studien* 4, 280–284.
9. 1967, 'Hegel-Symposium Texas 1962', *Hegel-Studien* 4, 325–326.
10. 1967, 'Kern, *Husserl und Kant*', *Kant-Studien* 58(3), 370–375.
11. 1968, 'Loewenberg, *Hegel's Phenomenology. Dialogues on the Life of Mind*', *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 6(1), 91–95.
12. 1968, 'Tugendhat, *Wahrheitsbegriff bei Husserl und Heidegger*', *German Studies* (Philosophy and History) 1(1), 53–55.
13. 1968, 'Avineri, *Social and Political Thought of Karl Marx*', *Erasmus* 20, No. 17/18, 513–516.
14. 1968, 'Adorno, *Negative Dialektik*', *German Studies* (Philosophy and History), 1(2), 147–149.
15. 1968, 'Sartre, *Kritik der dialektischen Vernunft*', Soziale Welt 19(2), 183–186.

16. 1968, 'Heidegger, *Wegmarken*', *German Studies* (Philosophy and History) 1(2), 158.
17. 1969, 'Kant, *Politische Schriften* (ed. by D. Gablentz)', *German Studies* (Philosophy and History) 2(2), 150–151.
18. 1970, 'Fackenheim, *Religious Dimensions in Hegel*', *Erasmus* 22(4), 131–134.
19. 1970, 'More, *Philosophy of Hegel*', *Hegel-Studien* 5, 297–298.
20. 1970, 'Benner, *Theorie und Praxis*', *Hegel-Studien* 5, 332–335.
21. 1970, 'Rader, *Wordsworth*', *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* 52(3).
22. 1970, 'Becker, *Hegels Begriff der Dialektik*', *German Studies* (Philosophy and History) 3(2), 131–134.
23. 1971, 'Maurer, *Hegel und das Ende der Geschichte', Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* 53(1), 107–110.
24. 1971, 'Becker, *Idealistische und Materialistische Dialektik*', *German Studies* (Philosophy and History) 4(2), 174–176.
25. 1971, 'Tucker, *Marxian Revolutionary Idea*; Kolakowski, *Marxism and Beyond*', *Soviet Studies* 22(3), 630–637.
26. 1971, 'Theunissen, *Hegels Lehre vom absoluten Geist*', *German Studies* (Philosophy and History) 4(2), 174–176.
27. 1971, 'Seel, *Sartres Dialektik*', *Philosophischer Literaturanzeiger* 24(6), 321–325.
28. 1971, 'Gebaude, *Jeune Marx*', *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* 53(3), 318-321.
29. 1972, 'Hegel, *Philosophy of Nature*, *Philosophy of Mind* (A.V. Miller, W. Wallace)', *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* 54(1), 93–94.
30. 1972, 'Harlander, *Absolute Subjektivität und kategoriale Anschauung*'; *Hegel-Studien* 7, 303–307.
31. 1972, 'Müller, *Hegel. The Man, His Vision and Work*', *Hegel-Studien* 7, 397–399.
32. 1972, 'Tuschling, *Metaphysische und transzendentale Dynamik*', *German Studies* (Philosophy and History) 5(2), 171–173.
33. 1973, 'Becker, *Phänomenologies des Geistes*; Marx, *Phänomenologie des Geistes*', *Hegel-Studien* 8, 196–201.
34. 1973, 'Becker, *Kritik der Marxschen Wertlehre*', *German Studies* (Modern Law and Society) 6(2), 209–212. *German Studies* (Philosophy and History) 6(2), 131–133.
35. 1974, "Sarlemijn, *Hegelsche Dialektik*', *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* 56(1), 120–123.
36. 1974, 'Marxismusstudien, 5., 6. u. 7. Folge', *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* 56(1), 123–125.
37. 1974, 'Ilting, Hegel, *Rechtsphilosophie* Bde. 1 u. 2', *German Studies* (Philosophy and History) 7(2), 137–143.
38. 1976, 'Neuere englishsprachige Kantliteratur (Bennett, Hintikka, Rescher)', *Philosophische Rundschau* 22(3/4), 161–190.

39. 1976, 'v. Rintelen, *Contemporary German Philosophy and Its Background*', *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology* 7(1), 68.
40. 1976, 'Ulmer, *Philosophie der modernen Lebenswelt*', *Philosophisches Jahrbuch* 76(1), 207–216.
41. 1976, 'Ilting, Hegel, *Rechtsphilosophie* Bde. 3 u. 4', *German Studies* (Philosophy and History) 9(1), 22–27.
42. 1976, 'Marx, Wolfgang, *Hegels Theorie logischer Vermittlung*', *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* 58(1), 91–94.
43. 1977, 'Reiner, *Die Grundlagen der Sittlichkeit*', *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology* 8(1), 61–62.
44. 1977, "Kumpits, *Sartre und die Frage nach dem Anderen*', *German Studies* (Philosophy and History) 10(1), 22–24.
45. 1977, '*Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie*. Bde. 1 A-C, 2 D-F, 3 G-H, 4 I-K', *Philosophisches Jahrbuch* 77(2), 392–394.
46. 1977, 'Flechtheim, *Hegels Strafrechtstheorie*, 2. Aufl.', *German Studies* (Modern Law and Society) 10(2), 148–152.
47. 1977, 'Rubel, *Marx critique du marxisme*', *Der Staat* 16(4), 577–581.
48. 1978, 'Simon (ed.), *Freiheit*', *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, Fernausgabe No. 12, Jan. 17, p. 17.
49. 1978, 'Cook, *Language in the Philosophy of Hegel*', *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* 60(1), 101–105.
50. 1978, 'Rosen, *Hegel. An Introduction to the Science of Wisdom*', *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie*, 60(1), 105–108.
51. 1978, 'Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit* (A.V. Miller)', *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophy* 60(3), 333–335.
52. 1979, 'Zahn, *Die letzte Epoche der Philosophie. Von Hegel bis Habermas*', *German Studies* (Philosophy and History) 12(2), 170–171.
53. 1980, '*Die Welt des Menschen – Die Welt der Philosophie*. Festschrift Patocka. Phaenomenologica 72', *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* 62(3), 345–348.
54. 1981, 'Düsing, *Das Problem der Subjektivität in Hegels Logik*', *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* 63(2), 206–213.
55. 1981, 'Avineri, *Hegels Theorie des modernen Staates*', *Philosophisches Jahrbuch* 88(2), 412–414.
56. 1982, 'Habermas, *Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns* (unter dem Titel: "Lebenswelt und System")', *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, Fernausgabe No. 46, Feb. 26, pp. 29–30.
57. 1982, 'Rorty, *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*', *Philosophisches Jahrbuch* 89(1), 168–173.
58. 1982, 'Schmidt, Josef, *Hegels Wissenschaft der Logik und ihre Kritik durch Adolf Trendelenburg*', *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* 64(1), 106–109.
59. 1982, 'Kliemt, *Zustimmungstheorien der Staatsrechtfertigung*', *Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft* 138(2), 338–341.

60. 1982, 'Ottmann, *Individuum und Gemeinschaft bei Hegel*', *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* 64(2), 208–210.
61. 1982, 'Rosen, *Hegel. An Introduction to the Science of Wisdom*', *Contemporary German Philosophy*, Vol. 1, Pennsylvania State U.P., University Park & London, V. McCarthy (tr.), pp. 275–278. (English ed. of the review in Archiv . . . 60 [1978].)
62. 1983, '*Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie*, Vol. 5 L-Mn', *Philosophisches Jahrbuch* 90(1), 221–222.
63. 1983, 'Recent Anglo-American Literature on Kant', *Contemporary German Philosophy*, Vol. 2, Pennsylvania State U.P., University Park & London, T. Pinkard (tr.), pp. 288–315. (English version of the review in *Philosophische Rundschau* 22 [1976].)
64. 1984, 'Nolte, *Marxismus und Industrielle Revolution* (under the title: "Das englische Erbe des Marxismus")', *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, Fernausgabe No. 45, Feb. 24, p. 32.
65. 1984, 'Sartre, *Cahiers pour une morale* (under the title: "Nachexistentialistische 'Ethik'")', *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, Fernausgabe No. 75, March 30, pp. 33–34.
66. 1984, 'Koslowski, *Gesellschaft und Staat*; Ders, *Ethik des Kapitalismus*', *Philosophisches Jahrbuch* 91(2), 411–415.
67. 1984, 'Arendt, *Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy*', *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology* 15(3), 317–319.
68. 1985, 'Holz/Wolf – Gaxo (ed.), *Whitehead und der Prozessbegriff. Whitehead and the Idea of Progress*', *Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung* 39(4), 651–654.
69. 1985, 'Hegel, *Philosophie des Rechts. Die Mitschriften Wannenmann und Homeyer* (K.-M. Ilting [ed.])', *Allgemeine Zeitschrift für Philosophie* 10(1), 82–85.
70. 1985, 'Hegel, *Philosophie des Rechts. Die Vorlesung von 1819/20 in einer Nachschrift* (D. Henrich [ed.])', *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* 67(3), 338–342.
71. 1986, 'Sartre, *Critique de la raison dialectique II* (A. Elkaim – Sartre (ed.)) (under the title: "Geschichte à la dialectique")', *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, Fernausgabe No. 151, July 4, p. 37.
72. 1987, 'Luhmann, *Soziale Systeme*', *Allgemeine Zeitschrift für Philosophie* 12(1), 84–88.
73. 1987, 'H.S. Harris, *Hegel's Development. Night Thoughts*', *Philosophische Rundschau* 34(1/2), 49–58.
74. 1987, '*Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie*, Vol. 6 Mo-O', *Philosophisches Jahrbuch* 94(2), 440–441.
75. 1987, 'Horstmann, *Ontologie und Relationen*', *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* 69(2), 220–226.
76. 1988, 'J. Hübner, *Die neue Verantwortung für das Leben*', *German Studies* (Modern Law and Society), Vol. XXI, 145f.

77. 1988, 'J. Habermas, *Nachmetaphysisches Denken*?', *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, Fernausgabe 28, No. 215, p. 44.
78. 1989, 'Neuerscheinungen zu Hegels Logik der Philosophie', *Allgemeine Zeitschrift für Philosophie* 14(2), 45–71.
79. 1989, 'S. Priest (ed.), *Hegel's Critique of Kant*', *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology* 20(2), 89–91.

Notes on Contributors

Reinhold Aschenberg, Ph.D., is Oberstudienrat, Uhland Gymnasium, Tübingen, Germany.

Thomas J. Bole, III, Ph.D., is Assistant Professor, Southwestern University, Georgetown, Texas, U.S.A.

Klaus Brinkmann, Ph.D., is Associate Professor, Department of Philosophy, Boston University, Boston, Massachusets, U.S.A.

Stephen Bungay, Ph.D., is a consultant for Boston Consulting Group, Munich, Germany.

Deborah Chaffin, Ph.D., is Associate Professor, Department of Philosophy, San Diego State University, San Diego, California, U.S.A.

H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr., Ph.D., M.D., is Professor, Department of Philosophy, Rice University and Professor of Medicine and Community Medicine, and Member of the Center for Ethics, Medicine, and Public Issues, Baylor College of Medicine, Houston, Texas.

Dick Howard, Ph.D., is Professor, Department of Philosophy, State University of New York at Stony Brook, Stony Brook, New York, U.S.A.

George Khushf, Ph.D., is Managing Editor, Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, Center for Ethics, Medicine and Public Issues, Baylor College of Medicine, Houston, Texas, U.S.A.

Terry Pinkard, Ph.D., is Professor, Department of Philosophy, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C., U.S.A.

Tom Rockmore, Ph.D., is Professor, Department of Philosophy, Duquesne University, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, U.S.A.

H.T. Engelhardt, Jr. and T. Pinkard (eds.), Hegel Reconsidered, 243, 1994.

Index

Absolute 15, 20, 22, 26, 33, 35, 40, 83-85, 87, 88, 98, 99, 139, 152–156
Absolute certainty 50
Abstraction 183
Abstract Right 14, 30, 31, 82, 213, 215–217, 223
Accident 69
Action 217
Actual 145, 151, 156, 159
Actuality 44, 112, 146, 151–156, 160
Adams, John 203
Administration 164
Adorno, T. 38, 40, 41
Aesthetics 8, 35, 79, 80, 82, 84, 85, 87–96, 99, 100, 163, 167, 168, 170, 172
Affirmativity 25
Agent 166, 181
Age of Exploration 159
Aliens 218
Amacher, R.E. 186
America 197, 198
American 202, 204, 205, 207, 208, 227, 229
Analysis 226
Ancients 192
Anderson, Lyle 157
Anthropological 100
Antinomy 75
Anti-representationalist 47
Anti-semantic 219
Apodicticity 50
Appearance 32, 60, 62, 63, 87, 88, 112, 113, 151–153
Apperception 124
Arato, A. 208
Architecture 91
Architectonic 83, 96, 108, 110, 113, 150, 211, 213, 222, 223
Aries, P. 185
Aristotle 24, 44, 45, 50, 51, 52, 68, 70, 76, 77, 105, 106, 114, 115, 117, 166, 218
  eidos 68
  metaphysics 47, 49
  polis 10
Aristotelian 218, 220
Art 8, 13, 29, 34, 79–98, 100, 163, 171, 173, 181
  classical 89- 91, 93, 183
  modern 79, 163, 183
  romantic 89–91, 93
  symbolic 89–91, 93, 183
  theory of 169
Articles of Confederation 197
Artist 169
Artistic 105
Aschenberg, Reinhold 8, 17, 40, 41, 101, 116, 117, 243
Assembly 200
Atheism 194
Attribute 154
Aufgehoben 26, 125
Aufhebung 65
Authority 221
Autonomy 12, 174, 191, 206
Axiotic 100
Ayer, A.J. 55

Babbitt, Irving 228, 229
Baptist, G. 160
Barnes, H.E. 142
Bass, A. 160
Bassenge, F. 101
Beauchamp, T. 186
Beautiful 87–91, 163, 164, 166, 168, 172
Beauty 88, 90, 169, 183
Beck, L.W. 55, 78, 141

H.T. Engelhardt, Jr. and T. Pinkard (eds.), Hegel Reconsidered, 245–257, 1994.

Becker, Lawrence 140
Becoming 110, 111
Being 2, 8, 23, 25–28, 30, 31, 35, 39, 44, 52–54, 58, 74, 105, 107, 110, 111, 125–129, 134–137, 139, 140, 147–150, 152–154, 156, 158
  as negativity 130
  determinate 25, 111, 113, 149, 150
  for another 104
  for itself 108, 113
  for others 190
  for self 149, 150
  for thought 124–129, 132, 134–136, 141
  immediate 152
  in itself 104, 108, 154, 155
  pure 25, 110, 151
  qua being 103, 105–107, 109
  with itself 152, 153
Beiser, F.C. 18, 54, 55, 116, 117
Begriff 22
Belief 35, 36, 149
Bennett, J. 78
Bennington, G. 224
Berlin 79, 80, 160
Berlinger, R. 142
Bestimmt 24,
Bestimmtheit 24
Bestimmtsein 28
Bioethics 228
Blackwell, R. 18,
Boguslavsky, B.M. 17
Bole, Thomas J., III ix, 8, 9, 17, 117, 157, 160, 243
Bonn 226, 227, 229
Bort, K. 117, 224, 229
Bourgeois 187
Brinkmann, Klaus 7, 17, 40, 41, 77, 117, 243
Bubner, Rudiger 38, 41, 89, 100, 101
Bungay, Stephen 6, 7, 80, 92, 100, 101, 116, 117, 183, 185, 243
Burbridge, J. 160
Burns, James MacGregor 207

Capitalism 214
Caplan, A.L. 224
Carnap, Rudolf 44, 52
Cartesian 48
Casey, Edward S. 159, 160
Castoriadis 206
Catalonia 13
Categorization 108, 109, 150
Category ix, 2–12, 14, 19, 24, 27, 35, 37, 38, 49, 58–61, 64, 67, 68, 73, 75, 80, 81, 83, 88, 96–100, 103, 104, 106–110, 113, 116, 120, 122, 124–126, 128–130, 133–137, 139–141, 147–151, 154, 156, 159, 163, 166, 180, 183, 193, 219
  of essence 153
  mathematical 39
Categorial
  approach/interpretation 43, 45, 47, 49, 74, 82, 119, 188, 212
  architectonic 214
  claims 74, 105
  concept 57, 58, 68
  deduction 85
  determination/evaluations 108, 132
  development 214
  dialectic 212, 223
  explanation 107, 108
  framework/system 50–53, 62, 99, 133
  grounding 223
  hermeneutic 2, 7, 13
  justification 222
  logic 200
  novum 196
  ontology 79, 80, 81, 84, 95, 159, 192
  philosophy 5, 188
  reflection 13
  revolution 211
  state 221
  theory 171, 184
  thought 6, 7, 32, 59
  understanding 82, 172
  unity 217
Categorical Imperative 131, 166, 181
Catholic 169
Cause 69
Causality 31, 44
Causa sui 58
Cerf, W. 55
Chaffin, Deborah 5, 9, 17, 160, 243
Character 168
Chemism 103, 110, 112
Chemistry 46
Christian 171
Christianity 37, 183
Church 223
Citizen 11, 31, 185, 190, 191, 205, 218, 219, 223
Citizenship 168
City state 218
Civil servants 221
Civil society 11, 12, 14, 31, 114, 184, 190, 195, 200, 204, 216– 220
Class concept 68

Closure 150
Copernican Revolution 7, 51, 58, 60
Cosmology 2
Cogito, ergo sum 74, 75
Cognition 2, 60, 62, 75
Cohen, J. 208
Compromise 171
Common life 163
Common Wealth 196
Communal government 191
Communism 12, 17, 188
Communitarian 165, 182
Community 10, 14, 163–165, 167–169, 171, 180, 211, 219
  ethnic 168, 169
  cultural 165
  democratic 173
  liberal 173
  linguistic 165
  political 167, 168, 170, 171, 184
  religious 168, 169
  traditional 167
Conant, J. 56
Concept 19, 20, 22, 23, 26–35, 37, 38, 41, 65, 67, 68, 71, 81, 87, 108, 112, 117, 149, 150, 152, 153, 158
  concrete 77
  pure 58
Conceptual archeology 157
Conceptual determinacy 65
Conceptual framework 22
Conceptualization 65, 70
Conceptus communis 69
Concrete 89
Concrete subjectivity 84–87, 97–100
Concrete universal 146
Confederation 203
Congress 196
Consciousness 22, 24, 59, 60, 62, 63, 65–67, 75, 83, 84, 86, 87, 96, 97, 100, 104, 124, 126, 193
  of self 9, 151, 156
Consequentialist 213
Constant, Benjamin 192
Constitution 10, 172, 177, 180, 188, 191, 198, 202, 204
  American 201
  of 1787 197, 200, 202, 203
Constitutional contract 221
Constitutional Convention 197
Constitutionalism 163, 170, 172, 175–181, 184, 200
Constitutional monarchy 195
Constructivism 53
Content 80, 83, 84, 97, 155, 183, 215, 216
Continental Congress 196
Continental philosophy 225, 227, 229
Contingency 5, 9–13, 41, 54, 143, 146, 152, 154–157, 160, 194, 201, 202, 215, 216, 218, 221, 222
Contract 11, 167, 212, 219
Contractarian 189
Contract theory (see also social contract theory) 189–191, 195
Contradiction 72, 75, 81, 112
  law of 57, 215
Cooperation 11
Courage 168
Cramer 55
Crime 201, 214, 217
Critical philosophy 47, 49, 50, 53, 58, 59, 64, 75
Critique of Pure Reason 2, 3, 16, 46, 47, 58, 60–62, 71, 75
Creatio ex nihilo 32
Creation 145
Creighton, H.C. 18
Culture 86, 87, 169, 222
Customs 183

Dalai Lama 144
Dancing 92
Danto, Arthur C. 157, 160
Dasein 25, 29, 111, 150
Declaration of Independence 195, 196, 203, 204, 207
Deduction 22
Deity 3
Democracy 10–12, 173, 178, 179, 188, 189, 191, 192, 194, 195, 198–204, 206, 207, 211, 212, 214, 220, 222
  neutral 222
Democratic state 10, 11
Denkbestimmung 22
Derrida, J. 16, 43, 44, 49, 52, 55, 139, 140, 160
Descartes, Rene 2, 7, 21, 44, 49, 50, 51, 53, 59, 74
Desires 165, 166, 181
Determinacy 24–26, 28, 29, 63, 65, 111, 122, 150, 155
Determinate absolute 154
Determination 151
  essential 151
  immediate 151
  fully conceptual 151
Development 26

Dialectic 1–5, 7, 8, 10, 13–16, 20, 25, 57, 58, 71, 78, 81, 83, 94, 95, 103, 104, 109, 110, 112, 113, 115, 119, 120, 129, 130, 136–138, 149, 150, 155, 158, 159, 181, 201, 202, 207, 212, 223
Dialectical materialism 1
Dickey, L. 185
Difference 32, 113
Difference Principle 185
Divine 35, 83, 86
Dogmatism 45, 47–49, 58
Dove, Kenley R. 39, 41, 160
Dualism 131, 150
Duality 29
Dubuy, G. 185
Dummett, M. 47
Dusing, Klaus 39, 41
Duty 166, 215, 217

Eastern Bloc 12
Effect 69
Egalitarianism 199
Egypt 183
Egyptian 35
Eleatic 44
Elenchic 8, 81
Ellington, J. W. 18, 55
Emancipation 223
Empire 196
Empirical 22, 48, 61, 94
  knowledge 62
  sciences 21, 46, 94
Empiricism 5, 48, 59, 64, 193
Engelhardt, H. Tristram Jr. ix, 10, 14, 17, 119, 126–128, 136, 137, 141, 224, 229, 243
Engels, Frederick 16, 17, 53
England 196
English 76, 190, 192, 226
Enlightenment 2, 48, 164, 204, 211, 215, 219, 221, 222
  Project 212, 221
  Scottish 164, 181
Entelechy 73
Entwicklung 26
Epistemology 44, 46, 47, 49, 50, 51, 53, 54, 59, 61, 62, 74, 98, 99, 105, 120, 139, 144, 147, 179
Essence 26, 27, 28, 30, 31, 32, 35, 39, 40, 49–51, 59, 70, 89, 97, 108, 111–113, 149–153, 155, 156
Estates 176, 219, 220
Ethical
  idea 218
  order 216
  relationship 217
Ethical Life 30, 31, 35, 85, 181, 183, 215, 216
Ethics 48, 66, 140, 158, 164, 169, 173, 175, 181, 192, 194, 211, 218
Europe 12, 13, 17, 167, 207, 227
European 10
Equality 12, 13, 14, 211, 213, 221
  political 191
Evil 140, 141
Ewing, A.C. 55
Excluded middle, law of 57, 70
Existence 29, 59, 113, 120–122, 124–134, 136–141, 153, 194
Existential turn 119
Experience 43, 50–53, 61, 68, 122, 124, 147, 148, 151, 159
Explanation 104, 107–109, 113–116, 130, 158
Externality 32, 201

Fairness 13, 14, 164, 168, 169, 211, 221
Family 11, 31, 132, 190, 201, 212, 217, 221
Fascism 12
Federalism 191
Federalist, The 197
Feuerbach 45, 131, 141, 140, 144, 160
Fichte, Johann G. 3, 21, 47, 50, 51, 54, 55, 115
Filioque 221
Film 92
Fleischmann, E.J. 160
Foerster, Norman 229
Force 214, 221
Foreigner 218
Form 89, 97, 106, 113, 154, 155, 183
  determinant 183
  indeterminant 183
Foster, M. 41
France 195, 199
Franklin, Benjamin 227
Fraud 214, 217
Freedom 2, 23, 44, 75, 85, 100, 114, 131, 134, 171, 174, 177, 183, 190–193, 197, 207, 213, 214, 216, 218, 220
  concrete 218
  individual 131
  objective 132
  social 131
  subjective 169
  substantive 220

Free will 190
Frege, Gottlob 112
Fregean 103
French, P. 186, 198, 201, 204–206
Friendship 171
Fulda, H.F. 41, 101
Furet, Francois 198, 199, 205
"Furniture of the Universe" 54

Gadamer, H. G. 101, 139, 141
Gemeinschaften 169
Geneology 149, 156, 158
Gesellschaften 219
Gethmann-Siefert 101
German 76, 208, 226, 227
  literature 93
  philosophy 93
Germany 225, 226
Gilson, E. 132, 140
Giovanni, G. di 160
Goal 37, 168
God 1, 2, 15, 19, 32, 33, 35, 40, 44, 79, 86, 173, 213, 223
Goethe, J. 93
Goldhammer, A. 185
Good 163, 164, 179, 180, 182, 213–215, 217
Grammar 67
Grand narrative 223
Greece 43, 169, 182, 183
Greek 35, 37, 45, 85, 86, 87, 164, 166
  gods 86
  philosophy 52
  polis 10, 14, 163, 164, 166, 170, 218
Groos, K. 54, 55
Ground 113

Habeas Corpus 178
Habermas, J. 44, 55, 101, 187
Haldane, E.S. 17
Harms 217
Harris, H.S. 55, 158, 160
Harris, William T. 229
Hartmann, Klaus ix, 1–15, 17, 38, 39, 41, 43, 45, 55, 57, 77–79, 99–101, 103–110, 113–117, 119–134, 136–141, 143–146, 150, 157, 159, 161, 181, 184, 185, 187–189, 191, 192, 194–196, 201–208, 211, 220, 222, 224–229, 231–241
Hartshorne, C. 18
Harvey, R. 142
Hegelians
  St. Louis 229
  Texas 229
Heidegger, Martin 16, 40, 41, 43, 44, 47, 49, 52, 53, 55, 60, 75, 78, 139, 187
Heine, Heinrich 38, 79
Hellenistic 44
Hendel, C.W. 55
Henrich, Dieter 39, 42, 44, 55, 99, 100, 101, 161, 181, 186
Herder, Johann G. 93
Here 126
Hermeneutic 2, 5, 6, 8, 23, 82, 96, 145, 150, 158
  circle 5, 6
  of reason/rationality 3, 6, 9
  of categories 2, 45, 144, 145, 146
  philosophy 80
  reconstructive 57
Heroism 183
Heteronomy 182
Historicity
  of art 79
Historian 3
History 1–5, 9, 10, 12, 13, 17, 36–38, 58, 86, 87, 92, 120, 129, 133, 140, 144, 156, 157, 172, 176, 179, 196, 199, 201, 203, 204, 223
  of empirical art 94, 96
  of philosophy 44, 74, 80, 96, 107, 113, 141
  of religion 92, 96
  political 187
  world 92, 192, 193, 194, 195, 204, 207
Hobbes, Thomas 167, 189
Hobbesian 165
Hoeffe, O. 101
Hoesle, V. 99, 100, 101
Hoffmeister, J. 41
Hofstadter, A. 55
Holy Roman Empire 199
Homo sapiens 97
Hong, E. 141
Hong, H. 141
Horstmann, R.P. 41, 42
Hotho, H.G. 79, 87, 90, 99
Howard, Dick 11, 12, 18, 208, 243
Humanism 228
Hume, David 5, 21, 45, 55
Husserl, Edmund 75, 157, 187, 225, 227, 228
Hypothetical imperative 181

Idea 4, 26, 29, 30, 32, 33, 34, 38, 39, 64, 68, 87, 89, 144, 147, 151, 152, 193, 199, 204, 225
  Absolute Idea 8, 9, 16, 26, 28, 36, 81, 112, 114, 152, 155, 156

Idealist ix, 1, 24, 53
Idealism 20, 32, 48, 50, 55, 75, 117, 175, 193
  absolute idealism 103
  subjective idealism 114
Ideation 65
Identity 22, 27, 32, 62, 75, 113, 154, 218
  universal 171
Image 65
Immediacy 24, 50, 148, 150, 152, 153, 154
Immortality 2, 44
Independence 168, 169, 170
Individual 29, 31, 32, 218
Individualism 164, 168, 216, 217
Individuality 28, 29, 36
Insight, pure 48
Integrity 179
Intellectual life 225
Intellectual probity 225
Intelligence 66
Internality 32
Interpretation of Hegel
  metaphysical 1, 15, 16, 43, 45, 74, 83, 121, 122, 123, 128, 130, 133, 134, 136–140, 158, 159, 223
  non-metaphysical 1, 45, 57, 103, 114, 115, 117, 120–123, 126, 129–140, 145, 158, 159, 184, 187, 211, 223
Intersubjective 106
Intersubjectivity 5, 89, 90
Intimacy 168, 174, 175
Intuition 22, 66, 67, 75, 84, 87, 148
Investigation 225
Ironist ix, 1, 2
Iser, W. 101
Israel 223

Jacobi, F.H. 49
Jacobian 198
Jager, W. 117
Jazzman 169
Jefferson, Thomas 207
Jeffersonian 203
Judgement 33, 34
Judaism 37
Judicial review 190
Justice, 13, 14, 66, 165, 166, 168, 169, 170, 172, 177, 181, 183, 185, 211, 213, 216, 221, 223
Justice as fairness 165
Justification 123, 124, 125, 130, 148, 149, 173, 213, 214, 222

Kammen, M. 209
Kant, Immanuel 2, 3, 4, 7, 16, 18, 23, 24, 30, 33, 38, 39, 44–55, 57- 64, 71, 75, 76, 78, 88, 89, 90, 100, 105, 114–116, 123–125, 131, 141, 148, 173, 176, 181, 185, 186, 204, 208, 211, 215
Kantian 44, 46, 47, 57, 72, 73, 74, 76, 114, 122, 124, 131, 140, 158, 159, 166, 170, 175, 177, 178, 179, 181, 182, 189, 219, 222, 225, 227, 228
Kaufmann, Walter 18, 41, 42
Khushf, George ix, 5, 9, 18, 157, 243
Kierkegaard, Soren 130, 140, 141, 158, 159, 161
Knowledge 2, 6, 20, 43, 44, 50, 54, 60, 61, 63- 66, 70, 83, 84, 123, 124, 145, 147–150
  claim 120, 121, 123–126
  empirical 62
  pure 147
  speculative 36
  transcendental 62
Knox, T.M. 18, 142, 161 183, 185, 186, 224
Koch, D. 117, 224, 229
Koerner, S. 55
Kriele, M. 186
Kroner, Richard 38, 42, 45
Krug's pen 8, 82

Ladd, J. 186
Lange, V. 186
Language 23, 66, 67, 68, 80, 127, 128, 131, 134, 139
Language games 80
Larmore, Charles 182, 186
Lasson, G. 41, 101, 161
Law 163, 164, 170, 176–178, 183, 192
Lawrie, W. 161
Lawsuits 218
Legality 30
Legislature 176
Legitimacy 191, 192, 194, 196, 201, 205
Leibniz, G.W. 2, 38, 59
Levinas, Emmanuel 140
Levi-Strauss, Claude 157
Liberalism 176, 177, 179, 207, 214
  American 177
Liberty 173, 190, 213
Life 144–146, 152, 163–165, 170–172, 175, 211
  beautiful 172, 183
  constitutional civic 172, 175
  good 168
  individual 163

  moral 211
  political 163, 167, 172, 177, 178, 182, 211
  social 163, 175
Linguistics 80, 127, 136, 139
Literary genera 93, 95
Locke, John 65, 78, 189
Lockean 64, 195, 196
Logic 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 24, 25, 28–41, 46, 49, 51, 58, 61, 67, 80, 81, 104, 113, 136, 226
  Objective 26, 152
  of Being 26, 27, 31, 38,
  of Concept 26, 27, 40, 89, 152, 155
  of Essence 26, 27, 31, 38, 87, 88, 111, 152, 156, 160
  ontological 192
  speculative 85
  Subjective 26, 112, 152
Logos 4, 9, 136, 138
  of being 136–138
London 227
Love 35, 85, 171
Luhmann, Niklas 187
Lyotard, Jean-Francois 223, 224

MacIntyre, A. 17, 18, 42, 55, 78, 101, 142, 209, 221, 224
Macquarrie, J. 55
Maimon, Salomon 54, 55, 98
Mathematics 21
Marcuse, Herbert 38, 42, 161, 187
Market 163, 164, 167 168
  forces 164
  free 168
  society 164, 183
Marshall, John 203
Marx, Karl 36, 53, 56, 131, 144, 150, 157, 158, 160, 187, 190, 206, 208, 221, 225, 227, 228
Marxist 53, 140, 198
Marxism 1, 15
Massachusetts 203, 214
Massumi, B. 224
Matter 113, 154
McTaggart, John 1, 18
Meaning 6, 23, 52, 66–68, 76, 127, 128, 138, 139
Measure 26, 111, 152
Mechanism 103, 110, 112, 115
Mediacy 50, 153
Memory 67
Mental 76
Meta-ontology 9, 119, 136–138
Metaphysician ix, 1
Metaphysics 1–7, 43, 44–55, 57, 58, 64, 69, 71, 72, 75, 97, 103, 114, 116, 117, 120, 127, 128, 132, 135, 136, 138–140, 157, 166, 175, 212, 223
Meta-theory 23
Method 6, 21, 29, 30, 31, 32, 109, 110
Methodology 57, 58, 71, 73, 84
Michel K.M. 41, 185
Mill, John Stuart 173
Miller, A.V. 38, 39, 40, 41, 55, 74, 76, 161, 186, 224
Mind 4, 46, 60
Modality 154–156, 158
Modernity 44, 85, 86
Moderns 192
Modus vivendi 167, 169
Moldenhauer, E. 41, 185
Moliere 46
Monarchist 198
Monism 188
Moral 128, 180
  action 30
  choice 213
  claim 214
  community 15, 212, 217, 219, 220, 221, 223
  content 17, 182, 214, 217, 219
  contingency 214
  disputes 211
  diversity 213, 223
  force 168
  ideals 167
  intuition 213, 214
  law 173
  narrative 211, 217–219, 221
  obligation 82
  philosophy 176
  psychology 166
  rationality 213, 222
  reasoning 179
  sense 213
  subjectivity 214
  theory 166, 170, 172, 173, 177
  understanding 215, 217, 218, 221, 222
  view 221
  vision 15, 213, 214, 217, 219, 220, 222
Morality 1, 5, 14, 30, 31, 48, 164, 166, 167, 170, 173, 212, 214–217, 219, 221, 223
  of strangers 167
  secular 211, 213, 223
Motivation 165, 166, 170, 180, 216
Munich 32

Mure, G.R.G. 15, 18, 40, 42
Music 91

Nagel, Thomas 185, 186
Name 23
Napoleon 36, 199
Napoleonic Civil Code 201
Natural 104
  law 218
  science 37, 48
Nature 1, 28, 29, 30, 32, 37, 40, 62, 80, 88, 100, 151, 173
Necessary 69
Necessity 155, 157, 160
  absolute 155
  relative 160
Negation 26, 27, 32, 39, 72, 109, 111, 112, 149–152, 154, 155
  absolute 27
  determinate 108
Negativity 120–122, 127–129, 133, 134, 140, 153, 154
  immediate 155
Neil, O. 186
Neo-Kantian 140
Neo-neo-Kantian 226
Neo-positivism 52
Neske, G. 41
Neurath, Otto 52
Neutrality 176, 221, 222
New Testament 40
Newton, Issac 3, 46
Newtonian Mechanics 46
Nicolaus, M. 56
Nicolin, F. 101
Nietzsche 16, 53, 135, 142, 145, 158, 161, 222
Noetic 147
Nominalism 158, 190, 195
Non-contradiction, law of 70
Non-repetition, principle of 36
Noological 95, 97, 98, 100
  structure 87
  theory of spirit 84, 85
Notae communes 69
Nothing 111
  pure 110
Nothingness 25,
Notstaat 164
Noumenal 112
Noumenon 60, 75
Now 126, 127, 135

Object 34, 80, 104, 126
Object language 23, 24
Objective 5, 59, 61, 76, 106
  order 216
Objectivity 48, 49, 57, 60, 67, 87, 89, 92, 112, 141
O'Brien, G.D. 42
Ontologia 3
Ontology 2, 4–10, 15, 16, 44–47, 49, 52, 54, 57, 61, 74, 79–81, 84, 92–96, 98, 99, 103, 104, 116, 119, 131, 134, 136–138, 140, 146, 148–151, 156, 157, 184, 187, 193, 194, 200–204, 206, 207
Order 168
Origin 192, 194, 200
Other 25–27, 30, 32, 113, 140, 152, 154
Otherness 109, 120, 121, 122, 124–130, 133–136, 140, 145, 150
Orthodox Christian 17, 223
Owl of Minerva 17, 222

Painting 91
Paris 227
Parliament 176
Parmenides 44, 54
Parousia 60
Part 113
Particular 29, 31, 189, 205
Particularity 28, 32,
Patriotism 182
Peirce, C.S. 1, 15, 18
Pelczynski, Z.A. 17, 207, 224
Pennsylvania 196, 203
Person 30, 105, 217
Personality 168
Petry, M.J. 18
Phenomena 60, 61, 69
Phenomenal 62
Phenomenological theory of consciousness 84
Phenomenological-noological deduction 85
Phenomenology 24, 31, 40, 84, 88, 94, 97, 98, 100, 144, 157, 226
Philosopher-king 195
Philosophy 5, 10, 19, 20, 23, 28, 43, 53, 54, 76, 81–87, 140, 143, 144, 145, 147, 155, 158, 159, 169, 172, 173, 187, 193, 194, 199, 202, 206, 227
  Anglo-American analytical 144
  ancient 58, 59
  end of 53
  medieval
    scholasticism 58
    metaphysics 57

  - modern 45, 80, 103
  - of Art 79, 80, 82, 88, 93
  - of Art History 90, 91, 93, 94, 95, 96
  - of History 35, 36, 80, 82, 83, 85, 90, 93, 116
  - of History of Religion 90
  - of mind 2
  - of Nature 28, 31, 47, 80, 104
  - of Religion 35, 36, 37, 80, 116
  - of Right 17, 30, 31, 36, 37, 131, 132, 134, 217
  - of Spirit 28, 30, 32, 36, 80, 82, 104, 216
  - of the human world 104
  - of the real 80, 103, 104, 105, 114, 115
  - pure 48
  - social 144, 166
- Photography 92
- Physician 226
- Physics 46, 47
- Pictorial thinking-cum-reasoning
- Pictorial thought 76, 144
- Pinkard, Terry ix, 10, 13, 18, 116, 117, 140, 157, 159, 161, 186, 223, 224, 243
- Pippin, Robert 157, 159, 160, 161, 186
- Plato 16, 38, 189
- Pluralism 10, 113 165–172, 175, 180, 183, 211, 216–223
- Pneumatics 2
- Poeggeler, O. 99, 101
- Poetry 91, 95, 100, 170
- Polis (see also Greek polis) 170, 172, 175, 180
- Political correctness 221
- Political parties 12
- Political philosophy ix, 167, 179, 180, 187, 188, 192, 194
- Political theory 15, 160, 163, 166, 196
- Politics 145, 163, 164, 167, 168, 170–172, 175, 176, 182, 187–190, 193–195, 197, 200-206, 211
  - democratic 175, 176, 179, 180, 190, 191, 195
  - liberal 176
- Polity 218, 220
- Pope of Rome 218
- Popper, Karl 41, 42, 52, 56, 140
- Positivism 131
- Possibility 160
- Post-Christian 12, 17
- Post-communist 17
- Post-Kantian 44
- Post-metaphysical 9, 140
- Post-modern 9, 12, 140, 211, 212, 213, 222, 223
- Potentiality 44,
- Pouvoir constituant 189, 191
- Poverty 184, 207
- Power 35, 40, 197
- Pracht, Dr. P. 229
- Practical reason 30, 117
- Pragmatism 54
- Predicate 69, 70, 71, 73
- Preference 213
- Primary goods 175
- Primordial being 60
- Principles 168
- Privacy 168
  - right to 173–175
- Private
  - action 174
  - goods 165
  - interests 165
- Production 144
- Productive 53
- Property 27, 31, 32, 113, 177, 178, 193, 213, 217
- Protestant 218, 219
- Prussia 176, 195, 199, 201, 211
- Psychology 40, 84
- Public audit 190
- Public authority 218, 219
- Punishment 164, 212
- Puntel, L. Bruno 39, 40, 42, 84, 99, 100, 101
- Putnam, Hilary 54, 56

- Quality 25, 105, 106, 110, 152
- Quantity 106, 111, 152

- Rational 129, 144, 145, 151, 152, 189, 212
- Rationalism 5, 6, 68
- Rationality 13, 144, 146–148, 157, 170, 219
- Rawls, John 11, 13, 18, 169, 181, 182, 185, 186, 227
- Rawlsian 175, 180, 185
- Real 83, 129, 148, 149, 151
- Realism 6, 15, 64, 122, 123, 187
- Reality 4–7, 15, 17, 22, 23, 29, 33, 34, 47, 58, 60, 63, 74, 87, 113, 138, 147, 149, 154, 159, 219
- Realphilosophie 6, 29–37, 40, 100
- Reason ix, 1– 6, 9, 10, 13, 49, 119, 121, 123–125, 128, 130, 131, 137, 140, 144, 151, 177, 207, 216, 218, 219, 222
  - dialectical 10
  - historical 36
  - impartial 166

  pure 2, 3, 48, 120
  speculative 2, 8
Rechtsstaat 10, 176–180
Reconstruction 2, 4, 8, 22, 25, 26, 29, 30, 35, 38, 57, 78, 80–82, 98, 108, 113, 121, 123, 130, 131, 149, 150, 157, 173, 180, 189, 193
Reference 131
Reflection 19, 23, 26, 27, 111, 151–155, 184
  absolute 54, 152
  pure 148, 150, 151
Reformation 195, 218
Reiman, J.H. 186
Relation 192
  absolute 152
Relativist 115
Religion 8, 19, 29, 35, 37, 40, 66, 80, 82–87, 92, 97, 98, 99, 104, 133, 141, 166–169, 171–173, 175, 183, 211, 216, 217, 222, 223
Religious beliefs 36
Representation 19, 21, 41, 52, 84, 87, 140
Representationalism 144
Republic 204
Republican 196, 197, 198, 204
Respect 180, 184
Res publica 204, 221
Restoration 198
Revolution 11, 12, 50, 194–197, 199, 200, 205, 207
  American 12, 189, 195, 196, 200–203
  Bolshevik 198
  French 12, 189, 192, 193, 195, 198–204, 208
  October 12
  of 1688 196
  of 1800 203
Right 163, 177, 179, 180, 183, 193, 196, 212, 215, 216, 221
Robinson, E. 55
Rockmore, Tom 7, 18, 56, 243
Roman 35
Roman Catholic 218, 219
Romanticism 180
Rorty, Richard ix, 1, 5, 10, 13, 16, 17, 18, 47
Rosenkranz, Karl 46, 56
Ross, W.D. 77
Rousseau, J.J. 189
Roux, Claude 198
Royce, Josiah 1, 15, 18
Russell, B. 112

Santayana, George 157
Sartre, Jean-Paul 140, 142, 144, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 187, 225, 227, 228
Sceptic 115
Scepticism 47, 49, 63, 64, 104, 173
Schein 27, 40
Scheinen in Anderes 26, 27
Schelling, F.W.J. 32, 40, 42, 49, 78, 132, 140, 146
Schleiermacher, Friedrich 49
Schlick, Moritz 52
Schmitz, K.I. 101
Schneewind, Jerome 172, 186
Scholarship 225
Schrader, W. 142
Schulz-Seitz, R.E. 42
Science 51, 52, 67, 147, 159
Scientific 105
  method 155
  theory 69
Scott, S. 186
Sculpture 91
Secular reason 17
Security 213
Self 174, 175
  alienation 147
  conscious 151, 156
  contradiction 81
  definition 191
  differentiating 151
  identity 25, 152
  interest 164–167, 170, 171
  legislation 181
  reference 25, 28, 82, 83, 87, 129, 149, 154
  reflection 33, 111, 147, 152
Semantics 52, 66, 68, 98
Senate 197
Sense 155
  impressions 65
  experience 67
  certainty 126, 127
  data 65
Sensible expression 88
Sensible world 60
Sensus communis 89
Seven Years' War 196
Shape 89
Shay's Rebellion 197, 203
Sibree, J. 224
Silverman, H.J. 160
Simson, F.H. 17
Singapore 214
Sittlichkeit 14, 175, 211, 215–217, 222
Singularity 23

Smith, Adam 181
Smith, Ashbel 227
Smith, John E. 38, 42
Smith, N.K. 18, 55, 78, 141
Smith, P.C. 141
Smith, R. 186
Smith, S. 186
Social
  category 222
  contract theory 164
  democracy 191
  life 145
  reality 219
  theory 182
  unity 11
  world 145
Socialism 187
Society 132, 163–167, 169, 172, 176, 184, 190, 191, 211, 212, 217, 219
  legal 217
  political 189
  western 192, 193
Sociology 90, 223
Something 25, 26, 30, 113
Sorbonne 198
Soul 2, 106
Sovereign citizenry 11, 14
Sovereignty 190, 202–204, 220
  national 197
  political 196–198
  social 196
Soviet Union 12, 13
Space 7, 31, 38
Spatio-temporal 31, 32
Speculative
  argument 115
  deduction 81, 83
  doctrine 96
Speech 67
Spinoza, B. 21, 114, 159, 160
Spirit 1–3, 28, 29, 30, 32, 37, 40, 80, 83, 86, 88, 92, 100, 151, 193, 223, 227
  Absolute 33, 35, 36, 83–86, 90, 96, 97, 99, 100, 114, 133, 201, 229
  finite 82, 83, 100
  Objective 30, 31, 35, 36, 82, 189, 192, 200, 201, 203, 205, 207
  Subjective 35, 40, 66, 82, 84, 94, 96–100
  theoretical 84
  world 192
Stambaugh, J. 55
Standestaat 190
State 10–12, 14, 80, 114, 132, 163, 164, 167, 170, 171, 180, 182, 184, 190–193, 197, 201, 202, 203, 206, 207, 211, 213, 216–219, 221, 222
  constitutional 167, 168, 171–173, 183, 212
  democratic 177, 178
  liberal 171, 176, 177
  political 201
  universal 190
Steinkraus, W.E. 101
Stengren, G. 142
Stepelevich, L.S. 160
St. Louis Philosophical Society 229
Suarez, Francisco 47
Subject 71, 104, 105, 126
Subjective 5, 59–62, 76, 83, 148, 151
Subjectivity 23, 49, 65, 74, 84–87, 98, 147, 174, 215, 216
  principle of 168, 171, 175, 180–182
Subsidiarity 191, 192, 194, 196, 198, 201, 202, 205
Substance 44, 69, 105, 106, 112, 114, 153
Substantial
  will 220
  freedom 220
Substantive morality 215
Supreme Court 181
Swenson, D.F. 161
Synthetic a posteriori 105
System 20, 21, 22, 34, 192, 193, 194
Systematicity 21, 23, 34, 50
Szondi, P. 99, 101

Talent 199
Taylor, R. 56
Teleology 103, 112, 115
Telos 28, 31, 147
Texan 225–227, 229
Theater 92
Theism 15
Theodicaea 223
Theology 1, 35, 40, 83
Theory 43, 58
  of forms of art 93
  construction 130
Theory/practice distinction 140
Theory–type 29
Theunissen, Michael 39, 40, 42
Thing 27, 31, 32, 113
Thing-in-itself 47, 49, 58–62, 75
  empirical 62
  noumenal 62
Thinking subject 65
Third Republic 198

Thirty Years' War 199
Thompson, J. 161
Thomte, R. 141
Thought ix, 2, 3, 6, 20, 28, 29, 34, 35, 38, 48, 54, 57, 58, 64, 65, 74, 84, 85, 87, 98, 99, 107, 108, 119, 120, 122–129, 130, 131, 133–135, 137–139, 145, 147–151, 153, 155, 156, 158, 159, 184, 211, 223
  analytic 157
  categorical 59, 157
  comprehensive 67
  explanatory 8, 105, 108, 109, 111, 117
  historical 7, 37, 41
  natural 63, 64, 66, 67
  objective 7, 59, 64, 74
  ordinary 64
  philosophical 63, 98, 99
  pictorial 76
  pure 35, 121, 122, 124
  representational 68, 69
  scientific 63, 68
  speculative 8, 59, 81
  subjective 7, 59, 75
  symbolic 69, 71
  systematic 7, 37
Thulstrup, N. 142
Time 7, 31, 38
Tillich, Paul 142
Tocqueville, Alexis de 198–200, 207
Tolerance 168, 171
Totalitarianism 189
Townshend Acts 196
Transcendent objects of reason 58
Transcendental 3, 4, 16, 58, 61, 62, 71, 73, 82, 86, 114, 119, 122, 124–126, 129, 132–140, 143, 148, 187
  aesthetics 95
  apperception 58
  argument 1, 103, 106, 110, 115, 149
  claim 105, 145
  cognition 62, 63
  deduction 81, 86, 104, 107
  epistemology 61
  grounding 8, 79
  justification 104, 113
  knowledge 62
  linearity 11
  ontology 85, 99
  philosophy 3, 4, 9, 122, 123, 143, 228
    mixed 123, 126
    pure 123, 124
  reality 5
  standpoint 63
  theory 147, 156
Transcendentally ideal 48
Transition 26
Trinity 32
Triplicity 29
Truth 19, 20, 21, 33–36, 39, 40, 49, 63, 64, 70, 74, 75, 86, 120, 127, 128, 134, 135, 169, 171, 172
Truth-adequacy 34
Tübingen 79, 85, 227
Typology 92, 94
Tyranny 197

Übergehen 26
Unconditioned 61
Understanding 30, 37, 44, 49, 58, 60, 61, 69, 70, 71, 75, 82, 157, 158, 222
United States 187, 208
Unity 29, 113, 129, 144, 145, 148–151, 153–156, 163, 192, 216, 219
  aesthetic 175
  affirmative 25
  categorical 217, 221
  conceptual 70
  constitutional 203
  correlative 89
  external 217
  of state 220
  negative 25, 155
  political 169, 218, 221, 222
  social 170, 171, 175, 181, 218, 219
  thought and thought 129
Universal 11, 12, 29, 31, 35, 40, 65, 66, 68, 73, 77, 144, 145, 146, 156, 183, 189, 195, 199–202, 205, 207, 216, 217, 220
  concrete 9, 10, 77, 217
  terms 215
  will 207
Universality 32, 189, 191, 213, 215, 216, 221, 223
University 225, 227
Utilitarianism 179
Utopia 166, 188

Validity 63
Value 135, 138, 145
Virtue 168, 171
Volk 169
Vollrath, E. 56
Von Stein, Lorenz 184, 202, 207
Vorstellung 22, 25, 32, 35, 64–66, 68, 69, 73, 74, 76, 77
Vienna Circle 44, 52

Wagner, Hans 100, 101, 116, 117
Wallace, W. 18, 64, 74, 142, 161, 186
Walzer, Michael 185, 186
Warren Court 204
Wartenberg, T.E. 18, 117
Watergate 204
Weiss, Paul 18
Weisse, C.H. 100, 101
Welfare 170, 214, 215, 218
Western
  Christian hegemony 10
  Christian Middle Ages 14, 218
  Christian view
  History 12
  Middle Ages 2
  philosophical narrative 5
  philosophical tradition 143
Whig 196, 197, 203
White, Richard 157
Whitehead, Alfred N. 53
Whole 113
Wigersma, B. 41
Will 134, 215
Williams, Bernard 166, 186
Williams, F. 209
Wilson, Woodrow 204
Wine 226, 228
  Alsatian 226
  Moselle 226
  Rhine 226
  Rhine-Hessen 226
Wolandt, G. 101
Wolff, Christian 2, 16, 18, 59
Wood, Allen 18, 220, 223, 224
Word-meaning 66, 69
World 119, 156
World Spirit 16, 36
World views 92, 173
  Christian 91, 92
  Graeco-Roman 91, 92
  human 104
  oriental 91, 92
Wrongs 214, 217

Yolton J.W. 78
Yorktown 197
Yugoslavia 13

Zander, H. 99, 101

Philosophical Studies in Contemporary Culture

H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr., Series Editor
Kevin William Wildes, S.J., Associate Editor

1. G. Motzkin: *Time and Transcendence.* Secular History, the Catholic Reaction and the Rediscovery of the Future. 1992 ISBN 0-7923-1773-4
2. H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr. and T. Pinkard: *Hegel Reconsidered.* Beyond Metaphysics and the Authoritarian State. 1994 ISBN 0-7923-2629-6

KLUWER ACADEMIC PUBLISHERS - DORDRECHT / BOSTON / LONDON