



TALKING WITH THE ANC...

Published by the Bureau for Information, Private Bag X745. Pretoria 0001, Printed by Perskor, Doornfontein, Johannesburg on behalf of the Government Printer, Pretoria.

ISBN 0-7970-05471

Published: June 1986

CONTENTS

- 1 Introduction
- 3 An historical overview
- 3 The early years
- 4 From co-operation to confrontation
- 8 The mission in exile
- 8 Soweto and the aftermath
- 11 The influence of the SACP and the Soviet Union on the ANC
- 11 The ANC-SACP alliance
- 13 National Executive Committee of the ANC (1985)
- 15 The two-phase revolution
- 19 The success of the two-phase revolution in other countries
- 22 ANC policy on violence
- 27 South African Government policy on violence
- 30 ANC policy on negotiations
- 33 South African Government policy on negotiations
- 33 ANC policy on the UDF
- 34 ANC policy on the economy
- 36 ANC policy on multi-party democracy
- 37 South African Government policy on multi-party democracy
- 37 ANC on foreign policy
- 40 South African Government on foreign policy
- 40 ANC on South Africa's attitude towards nationalists within the ANC
- 41 South African Government on nationalists within the ANC
- 41 South African Government on the release of Nelson Mandela
- 42 Conclusion

INTRODUCTION

This publication provides essential information on a question which is currently exercising many concerned South Africans — the question of whether or not negotiations should be conducted with the ANC.

The South African Government's position in this regard was clearly stated by State President P W Botha in Parliament on 15 May 1986:

"As far as the Government is concerned it remains adamant that it is prepared to negotiate with citizens of South Africa, provided that they do not resort to violence as a means of attaining their political and other goals, or call in foreign agencies to support them . . .

"Negotiation of necessity implies that participants should accept that not all their requirements are likely to be met; it implies a willingness to listen, to discuss and seek solutions. But these solutions will result from deliberations by South Africans in the interest of South Africans.

"Essentially it is a process of give and take during which people are required, on the one hand, to scale down their demands and, on the other, to be lenient when required to make concessions to satisfy reasonable demands".

The question is whether the ANC can comply with these reasonable requirements.

This publication is based primarily on the ANC's and the South African Communist Party's (SACP) own statements and documents and presents a strong case that:

 the ANC has a formal alliance with the SACP and both are committed to the violent overthrow of the present system of government for the purpose of seizing total power for itself;

- there are elements in the ANC who view negotiations simply as a tactic to assist it in its endeavours to seize power by violent means and not as a means to share power by way of constitutional compromise;
- there are influential elements in the ANC who play a leading role in a two-phase process of revolution which has as its objective the establishment of a communist state:
- the commonly applied two-phase theory of revolution has been implemented successfully in a number of countries. Ill-informed non-communists are recruited into "broad national fronts" during the first phase of the revolution to help achieve "national liberation" but are then dispensed with during the second phase;
- the SACP, although it acknowledges the ANC's role during the first phase of the revolution, has broad influence within the ANC and will, as the "vanguard party" of the workers, seek to assume leadership during the second phase of the revolution;
- the ANC indentifies closely with the objectives of global socialism, with the Soviet Union and its allies. It identifies itself with international terrorist organisations such as the PLO. Furthermore, the ANC strongly opposes the United States and the West.

In this publication the ANC/SACP speak for themselves.

Not only South Africans, but all reasonable people would be foolish to ignore the unambiguous statements of these organisations.

PRETORIA JUNE 1986

AN HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

The early years

In 1912, on the initiative of a Durban advocate, Dr Pixley Seme, prominent Blacks from all over the country met in Bloemfontein and established the South African Native National Congress, renamed the African National Congress (ANC) in 1923. Black unity, the extension of political rights, and the economic and social advancement of Blacks figured among the new organisation's primary objectives. The first president was the Rev J L Dube.

From its inception until around 1937 the ANC pinned its hopes for a fuller political role for Blacks on the influence of White liberals, and for most of this period its activities took the form of representations and petitions to the Government.

Indeed, in its early years the ANC encouraged "a spirit of loyalty to the British Crown and all lawful authority". It endorsed the Rhodes conception of "equal rights for all civilised men" and as late as 1928 its traditionalist leaders resolved against co-operation with the SACP because communists in the Soviet Union had overthrown the monarchy and the aristocracy.

However, the Communist International, at its sixth congress in 1928, had its own thoughts about the future of the ANC.

The congress resolved that

"The CPSA [Communist Party of South Africa] should pay particular attention to the ANC. Our aim should be to transform the ANC into a fighting nationalist revolutionary organisation . . ."

In the meantime the presence in those days of seven Whites representing Black interest in Parliament and the

considerable potential of the Natives' Representative Council, made co-operation with White liberals possible. As the failure of the Council became more and more manifest, the nature of Black political activity began to change, with the ANC setting the pace. From the early 1940s until around 1949 its leaders concentrated on creating a strong urban-based organisation that could act independently of Whites and Indians.

From co-operation to confrontation

By the late 1940s the ANC had changed its character. By this time known communists had infiltrated its leadership. No longer prepared to promote its interests through conciliation and existing constitutional channels, it adopted an increasingly confrontational and militant attitude. According to the *African Communist* No 87, Fourth Quarter 1981, the mouthpiece of the SACP, the catalyst of this

"ideological leap forward" [was] "the 1948 militants in the ANC Youth League led by men like Tambo, Sisulu and Mandela and supported by leading Communists in the ANC leadership like Kotane, and Mofutsanyana".

From 1949 to 1952 the ANC attempted to mobilise all Blacks in a mass movement, and tried to link up with the Coloured and Indian opposition movements. Passive resistance was the main weapon, and this phase continued until 1953. During the next few years the Congress Alliance was concluded — an alliance of Blacks, Coloureds, Indians and Whites — which was subsequently to produce many of the leaders of the SACP. The alliance was based on the Freedom Charter adopted at a rally in Kliptown in 1955 and co-signed by the ANC, the SA Coloured People's Organisation, the various Indian Congresses and the White Congress of Democrats. Being the product of a broad alliance of South Africans representing virtually every political and ideological shade, the Freedom Charter necessarily had to include democratic as well as socialist principles. The real origin of the document was, however, revealed by Bartholomew

Hlapane,¹⁾ former SACP and ANC executive member, in testimony before the American Senate Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism. According to Hlapane

"It [the Freedom Charter] is a document I came to know about just having been drafted by Joe Slovo²⁾ at the request of the Central Committee, and finally approved by the Central Committee of the Communist Party".

The SACP's approach to the Freedom Charter is the following:

"The Freedom Charter has become the immediate programme of the national liberation alliance and the short-term programme of our [Communist] Party". —South African Communists Speak, 1915-1980. Introduction by Dr Yusuf M Dadoo, former national chairman of the SACP.


Mandela himself confirmed this statement during his trial on 20 April 1964:

"Although it [the SACP] is prepared to work for the Freedom Charter as a short-term solution to the problems created by white supremacy, it regards the Freedom Charter as the beginning, and not the end, of its programme".

To this day the ANC claims this charter as its "ideological constitution". In the period 1957 to 1960 — younger, and in some cases more militant Black leaders, urged greater militance, racial assertiveness and identification with Pan Africanism. In 1958 a group of so-called Africanists were expelled from the ANC because of their objection to communist influences in the ANC. In 1959 these Africanists formed their own organisation, the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC). Black opposition and resis-

Hlapane was assasinated by the ANC at his home in Soweto on 16 December 1983

Joe Slovo is Chairman of the SACP, member of the National Executive Committee of the ANC, second in command of the military wing of the ANC, and a colonel in the KGB.



Nelson Mandela, former leader of the African National Congress (ANC): "We Communist Party members are the most advanced revolutionaries in modern history . . ."

tance came to a head in 1960, which in several ways was a watershed year for Black political activity. Competition between the ANC and PAC, both vying for the allegiance of Blacks, was intensified. The ANC tried to keep the initiative with a country-wide campaign against the pass laws which reached a climax towards the end of March 1960.

The ANC and PAC were banned but new underground organisations took their place. Umkhonto we Sizwe (Spear of the Nation) was established in 1961 by Nelson Mandela and other ANC leaders for sabotage operations in preparation for the commencement of guerilla warfare.

During the first half of 1962, Mandela toured Africa to obtain financial support for Umkhonto. During this tour

he also underwent military training in Algeria and arranged for Umkhonto recruits to undergo such training.

The ANC suffered a severe setback in 1963 when the core of its leadership was arrested in Rivonia, near Johannesburg.

The full extent of the Rivonia leaders' plans to overthrow the Government by violent means was revealed during the subsequent trial. Several articles in Mandela's handwriting were submitted to the court including articles on Dialectic Materialism, How to be a good Communist and Political Economy. In the latter document Mandela wrote:

"We Communist Party members are the most advanced revolutionaries in modern history . . ."

Another document submitted as evidence entitled *Operation Mayibuye* stated in part:

"As in Cuba the general uprising must be sparked off by organised and well-prepared guerilla operations during the course of which the masses of the people will be drawn in and armed".

A Croxley examination pad containing 18 pages in Mandela's handwriting was another of the documentary exhibits. One of the passages read:

"The people of South Africa, led by the South African Communist Party, will destroy capitalist society and build in its place socialism . . . The transition from capitalism to socialism and the liberation of the working class from the yoke cannot be effected by slow changes or by reforms as reactionaries and liberals often advise, but by revolution. One must therefore be a revolutionary and not a reformist".

Mandela admitted his guilt. He and seven others were imprisoned for life.

The mission in exile

The collapse of the ANC's structure in South Africa in the wake of the Rivonia trial, followed by the departure from the country of several of the movement's top leaders, led to the establishment in exile of both the ANC and PAC, which initially agreed to work together. Fundamental differences on ideology, as well as personality clashes, soon eclipsed their common ideals and the two organisations went their separate ways. One of the main reasons for this alienation was the growing communist infiltration and influence in the leadership of the ANC.

At the Morogoro Consultative Conference in Tanzania in 1969, the ANC licked its wounds. It resolved to intensify the internal struggle, reinforce unity within its own ranks and to strengthen the role of its external mission. The last function was regarded as crucial to provide "the rear base from which we would carry out our internal work". (Oliver Tambo: Kabwe conference, Zambia, June 1985.)

During the ensuing years the main focus of the ANC's actions was building up its position overseas. With the active assistance of the United Nations, the Soviet Union and its allies and some Western governments and organisations, the ANC made steady progress in achieving greater international support. In 1974 the United Nations recognised the ANC as the "authentic representative of the overwhelming majority of the peoples of South Africa". The United Nations, besides lending political and moral support to the ANC, channelled US \$20 million in material assistance to the ANC in 1984. The Soviet Union, its allies and front organisations, such as the World Peace Council, also extended massive assistance to the ANC. Interestingly enough they shunned the PAC which then received support from Communist China.

Soweto and the aftermath

The Soweto riots in 1976 caught the ANC off-guard. The fact that the organisation had had little or nothing to do



Scene of Pretoria car-bomb explosion in 1983 which killed 19 South Africans of all races.

with the student rioting was an indication of the degree to which the ANC's leadership in exile had lost contact with developments in South Africa. Nevertheless, the organisation benefited from the disturbances as a result of the large number of young Black radicals who joined its ranks after fleeing from South Africa.

During subsequent years the ANC gradually escalated its armed struggle. It was *inter alia* responsible for the Pretoria car-bomb explosion in 1983, which killed 19 South Africans of all races. At its Second Consultative Conference at Kabwe in Zambia in June 1985 the ANC reconfirmed its policy of indiscriminate violence. The conference was described by Oliver Tambo, President of the ANC, as a "council of war" and during its deliberations



Five people were killed in a bomb blast in a shopping centre in Amanzimtoti, Natal, just before Christmas in 1985. "The distinction between 'soft' and 'hard' targets is going to disappear . . ." — Oliver Tambo.

its leadership decided that a distinction would no longer be made between civilian and government targets. In the words of Oliver Tambo:

"The distinction between 'soft' and 'hard' targets is going to disappear in an intensified confrontation, in an escalating conflict".

Tambo's words were soon translated into deeds in a number of indiscriminate land-mine explosions in the northern Transvaal and in a bomb blast in a crowded shopping centre in Amanzimtoti, Natal, just before Christmas 1985, which left five people, including a four-year-old girl, dead.

THE INFLUENCE OF THE SACP AND THE SOVIET UNION ON THE ANC

The allegation has frequently been made that the ANC is under the influence of the South African Communist Party and of the Soviet Union. What are the facts?

The ANC-SACP alliance

The first major contact between the ANC and international communism took place in 1928 with the visit of the ANC's President-General, J. T. Gumede, and Cape Provincial Secretary La Guma to the Soviet Union. The visit was described in the publication *South African Communists Speak* as

"a manifestation of the revolutionising of the oppressed masses of South Africa".

In a resolution titled "The South African Question" adopted by the Executive Committee of the Communist International in 1928 it was stated that

"The Party should pay particular attention to the embryonic national organisations among the natives, such as the African National Congress. The Party, while retaining its full independence, should participate in these organisations, should seek to broaden and extend their activity. Our aim should be to transform the African National Congress into a fighting nationalist revolutionary organisation . . . developing systematically the leadership of the workers and the Communist Party in this organisation".

During subsequent years the SACP continued its policy of infiltrating the ANC. This process accelerated after 1950 when the SACP was banned and when large numbers of communists had to find an alternative organisation through which to pursue their objectives. According to the testimony before the Denton Commission (see box on page 12) of Bartholomew Hlapane

DENTON HEARING

In 1982 American Senator Jeremiah Denton chaired hearings before the Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism of the United States Senate. The aim was to investigate the role of the Soviet Union, Cuba, and East Germany in fomenting terrorism in Southern Africa.

"What we seek to determine, through testimony of a number of witnesses, is the extent to which the USSR has successfully penetrated, and in large measure taken over, the direction of two organisations in southern Africa: the African National Congress and the South West Africa People's Organisation. I hasten to add that it is not my view that the entire membership of these organisations is Communist. History demonstrates, however, that Communist parties do not need 100 percent membership in order to operate. For example, in the Soviet Union substantially less than 10 percent of the population enjoys the 'privilege' of party membership. It was a smaller percentage than that in North Vietnam. The Communist objective is to assume leadership positions and thereby achieve effective control over the organisations.

"I might note, for those who may not know, that they don't have to assume the top leadership positions; they can assume positions of importance administratively or functionally in the organisation and have effective control over the nominal leader.

"The evidence received by the subcommittee is deeply disturbing. It suggests strongly that the original purpose of the ANC (and Swapo) has been subverted and that the Soviets and their allies have achieved alarmingly effective control over them".

—Statements by Senator Jeremiah Denton.

"It is a standing rule that members of the SA Communist Party must also belong to a mass organisation, such as the African National Congress or the South African Congress of Trade Unions. The idea was to get members to infiltrate any organisation described as reactionary, to undermine the leadership and ultimately gain control of such organisations".

Indeed, it was the growing influence of Whites and communists in the ANC which led to the split between the ANC and the PAC.

Over the years the relationship between the ANC and the SACP grew into a firm alliance, to the point where Oliver Tambo was able to tell the SACP on 30 July 1981, during its 60th anniversary celebrations, that when the ANC spoke it "was not so much as a guest invited to address a foreign organisation. Rather we speak of and to our own". In September 1985 the monthly ANC publication Sechaba stated that the

"Members of the ANC fully understand why both the ANC and the SACP are two hands in the same body, why they are two pillars of our revolution".

By June 1985 the influence of the SACP on the ANC had grown to such an extent that, a predominent group of the 30-member ANC National Executive Committee which emerged from the Second National Consultative Conference of the ANC held at Kabwe, Zambia, are known to have present or past association/membership with the SACP. (See list on page 14).

NATIONAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE ANC (1985)

The National Executive Committee of the African National Congress consisted in 1985 of the following 30 members. Those names that are highlighted are either members and/or active supporters of the SACP.

1. Olive	er Tambo	: President
2.	d Nzo	: Secretary-General
3. Tho	nas Nkobi	: Treasurer-General
4. That	o Mbeki	: Director of Information and Publicity
5. Chri	Hani	: Political Commissar of Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK)
6. Mos	es Mabhida	: Deceased
7. Dan	Thloome	: Deputy Secretary-General
8. John	nny Makatini	: Chief of International Department
9. Henr	y Makgothi	: Secretary of the Education Department
10. Simo	on Makana	: Administrative Secretary
11. Gert	rude Shope	: Chief of the Women's Section
12. Step	nen Diamini	: President of SACTU
13. John	Nkadimeng	: Secretary-General of SACTU
14. Joe I	Modise	: Commander of MK
15. Mzw	ai Piliso	: Member
16. Robe	ert Conco	: Member
17. Jaco	b Zuma	: ANC Representative in Mozambique
18. Flore	nce Mophosho	: Deceased
19. Joe I	Vnlanhla	: Member
20. Joe 5	Slovo	: Chief of Staff of MK and Chairman of the SACP
21. Mac	Maharaj	: Member
22. Aziz	Pahad	: Prominent ANC/SACP member in London
23. Regi	nald September	: Member
24. Jan	s Stuart	: Member
25. Fran	cis Meli	: Editor of Sechaba
26. Polic	Jordan	: Member
27. Ruth	Mompati	: Member
28.	ele Sigxhashe	: Former Director of Information and Publicity
29.	om Menuals	: Member
30. Cass	ius Make	: Member


THE TWO-PHASE REVOLUTION

If the SACP does have such great influence within the ANC why has it not asserted its leadership in a more positive fashion? Why does the ANC clearly continue to have non-communist Black nationalist members and allies?

To answer this question, we must have some idea of the revolutionary theory to which the SACP, the ANC and the Soviet Union all subscribe. Soviet revolutionary theory accords a central role to "national liberation movements" in Third World countries. Indeed, it identifies the "national liberation movements" as the third most important component in the world-wide revolutionary process, following only the ruling parties in the pro-Soviet states and by approved communist parties in other countries.

In terms of Soviet theory, Third World countries cannot move directly to the phase of a communist revolution. They must first pass through the phase of "national liberation". During this phase a broad national front should be created comprising a coalition of all "progressive elements" — liberals, churchmen, students and workers under the leadership of a "vanguard party". In the case of South Africa the "vanguard party" during the "national liberation" phase is the ANC. The rallying point for the national liberation phase in South Africa is the Freedom Charter.

Once the "national liberation" has been achieved and the "national democracy" has been established the second phase of the revolution takes place under the leadership of the "vanguard party" of the workers, i.e. the SACP. During this phase liberal and democratic elements in the former national front are dispensed with prior to the establishment of the "people's democracy", or communist state.



The SACP clearly subscribes to the two-phase theory of revolution. In the publication *The African Communist*, No 87, Fourth Quarter 1981, the SACP states that its *immediate* aim is to

"win the objectives of the National Democratic Revolution, more particularly to win national liberation, for all the black oppressed and to destroy the *economic* and *political* power of the existing ruling class".

Accordingly, the SACP also subscribes to the Freedom Charter during this phase of the revolution. In its programme it states that

"The Communist Party pledges its unqualified support for the Freedom Charter. It considers that the achievement of its aims will answer the pressing and immediate needs of the people and lay the indispensible basis for the advance of our country along non-capitalist lines to a communist and socialist future. It is in this situation that the Communist Party advances its immediate proposals before the workers and democratic people of South Africa. These are not proposals for a socialist state. They are proposals for the building of a national democratic state. The proposals are put forward within the framework of the Freedom Charter which the party considers to be suitable as a general statement of the aims of a state of national democracy".

The SACP's *strategic* aim is to

"destroy the system of capitalist exploitation in South Africa and to replace it with a socialist system in which the ownership of the means of production will be socialised and the whole economy organised to serve the interest of all the people".

The ANC also subscribes in recent publications to the doctrine of the two-phase revolution.

The first phase is "Liberation under the banner of the Freedom Charter." The second phase is the establish-



A variety of publications of the ANC and the South African Communist Party.

ment of a "people's democracy" with the emphasis on the "majority of the people", namely the proletariat or "the workers".

At the Kabwe Consultative Conference the ANC said that its "national liberation contains both a nationalist and a socialist tendency".

The ANC publication, Sechaba, published in East Germany, mentions in its September 1985 edition that

"We in the ANC know that a *nationalist struggle* and the *socialist struggle* are not one and the same thing, and they do not belong to the same historical period. The two represent two distinct categories of the revolution".

In the same publication the ANC states:

"We must not allow our desire for socialism to intoxicate us. The people of South Africa must be taught the bitter truth simply, clearly and in a straightforward manner: the chief content of the present phase of our revolution is the national liberation of the Black people. It is actually impossible for South Africa to make even that advance to socialism before the national liberation of the Black oppressed nation".

THE SUCCESS OF THE TWO-PHASE REVOLUTION IN OTHER COUNTRIES

The two-phase process of revolution is not an empty theory divorced from reality. It has already been successfully implemented in a number of countries.

In Vietnam there was a national front, the FLN, which included non-communists. Other democratic elements, including academics, Bhuddists, Catholics and students were also vociferously involved in anti-government agitation. However, as soon as the "national liberation" had been achieved the vanguard element of the front came to the fore and quickly eliminated its former democratic

and liberal allies in the front. Many of them found themselves in re-education camps. Many were forced to flee. And many were killed.

THE REVEREND TRAN HUU THANH

In a letter written to a South African bishop by two Vietnamese refugees in the USA, the following experience of a Catholic priest (Reverend Tran Huu Thanh) was described. In 1973 he organised an anti-government movement in South Vietnam in an attempt to bring about reform. He helped to organise the masses to stage protest campaigns and infused members of the defence force and public servants with feelings of hatred. These campaigns helped to bring about the fall of the government and precipitated the communists' final onslaught.

After the communist victory the Reverend Thanh and his fellow workers were arrested and imprisoned. Many were killed.

(Excerpt from the State President's speech in Parliament, 17 April 1986).

In Cuba there was also a broad front, known as the July 26th Movement, including many democrats opposed to the Batista regime. At this stage of the revolution Fidel Castro promised his liberal allies that he would lead the country to genuine democracy with free elections. However, once he had seized power many of his former non-communist allies were imprisoned, exiled or executed.

The same scenario was played out in Nicaragua after the success of the National Liberation Front in overthrowing the Samoza regime. Once again, the vanguard party, in this case the Sandinistas, seized power and began to eliminate the influence of its erstwhile democratic and liberal allies.

In this regard the comments of Sol Dubula, writing in the *African Communist* No 87, Fourth Quarter 1981, explain why it is correct that the ANC, and not the SACP, should lead the liberation alliance during the first phase of the revolution:

"If correct leadership of the democratic revolution requires the strengthening of the national movement as the major mass organisational force, then this is precisely the way in which the party exercises its leading and vanguard role in the real (and not vulgar) sense of the term. This is the way the Vietnamese Communists exercised their vanguard role in relation to the FLN during the liberation struggle, and it is also the way in which the early Cuban Communists related to Fidel Castro's July 26th Movement".

Here the SACP is admitting the nature of its leadership role in the ANC.

THE ANC IS A TERRORIST ORGANISATION

The armament of the ANC is, *inter alia*, land mines, limpet mines, demolition mines, explosives, hand grenades and AK 47 rifles. When mine warfare and motorcar bombs are used, the victim cannot be chosen and innocent civilians constitute the biggest percentage of the victims.

The onslaught by the ANC is, therefore, not primarily aimed at the Security Forces — as in the case of guerilla action but, as in the case of other terrorist organisations, ANC actions are directed at unidentifiable victims, with the aim to scare the population, thereby intimidating them.

In this regard, the ANC does not differ at all from the PLO, IRA and the Red Brigade.

The ANC's terrorist deeds are further reflected by

the fact that, from 1976 to the present, they were responsible, *inter alia*, for the following in South Africa:

- 12 land mines exploded, while the Security Forces located 30 land mines planted by the ANC;
- 113 hand grenades were used in attacks, while 1 273 were located and seized by the Security Forces;
- 115 limpet mines were used, while the Security Forces seized 409;
- 7 demolition mines exploded, while 87 were located;
- the Security Forces have furthermore located 85 anti-personnel mines in ANC depots;
- 60 terror deeds were perpetrated by the ANC from April 1984 to April 1985, and 193 from April 1985 to April 1986 some of which were launched from Zambia, Botswana and Zimbabwe;
- since 1976, 43 Black and 35 White citizens have been murdered in ANC terrorist action;

The ANC is part of the international terrorist network.

 D. J. Louis Nel, Deputy Minister of Information at an international Press conference, 21 May 1986

ANC POLICY ON . . .

VIOLENCE

It is necessary to look at a few important policy statements by the ANC on key issues. (The policy of the South African Government on these key issues is also given).



A display of confiscated armament used by the ANC originating from the Soviet Union and various Eastern Block countries.

According to the ANC, its policies of peaceful resistance were rejected by the Government, forcing its adoption of a policy of violence.

However, according to the publication *The African Communist* No 87, Fourth Quarter 1981

"A question which is often raised is that since violence is often linked with revolution (in some people's minds at any rate) the ANC must have been a 'moderate' organisation prior to 1961. Nothing could be more erroneous'.

Furthermore it is also stated that

"This [the use of non-violence] was a tactical necessity in order to build organisational strength and raise the fighting mood of the people".

On 1 December 1985 Joe Modise of the ANC made the following appeal on Radio Freedom³⁾:


"Our people must organise themselves into groups, manufacture traditional weapons which must be used against the enemy. After arming themselves in this manner, our people must begin to identify collaborators and enemy agents and kill them. The puppets in the tricameral Parliament and the Bantustans must be destroyed".

On 4 May 1986 Radio Freedom broadcast the following ANC message to South Africa:

"Let us take all our weapons, both rudimentary and sophisticated, our necklaces⁴⁾, our grenades, our machine-guns,

³⁾ Radio Freedom is the official radio service of the ANC, broadcasting from a number of African countries.

^{4) &}quot;Necklacing" is a method of public execution where a tyre is put around the neck of the intended victim, usually a Black moderate, and in some cases children as young as 9 years who have incurred the displeasure of the radicals. The tyre is then soaked with petrol (gasoline) and set on fire.



our AK47s, our limpet mines and everything we can get —let us fight the vigilantes, the so-called 'fathers', together with the apartheid regime, together with the police and the army''.

On 18 February 1985 Radio Freedom broadcast the following appeal:

"Enemy property must be petrol bombed or attacked in any possible way. Enemy agents and collaborators must also be isolated and attacked".

Earlier, on 20 January 1985, Radio Freedom had been more explicit about ANC targets and objectives:

"Puppets" were killed, their houses burned, many were forced to resign and are still resigning today".

Later, on 7 October 1985 Voice of Freedom, broadcasting from Zimbabwe, expressed satisfaction with this policy as follows:

"The strategy of burning sell-outs of the system seems to have paid out well in the ultimate end".

During a meeting at California State University on 10 October 1985, ANC spokesman Alosi Moloi, justified this policy of violence as follows:

"Among us we have people who have openly collaborated with the enemy. You have to eliminate one to save hundreds of others".

His colleague, Tim Ngubane, told the same meeting that

"We want to make the death of a collaborator so grotesque that people will never think of it".

Freely elected Black town councillors are often regarded as puppets.

And on 13 April 1986 Winnie Mandela shocked the world when she said:

"... with our boxes of matches and our necklaces, we shall liberate this country".

SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT POLICY ON . . .

VIOLENCE

"I would, however, shirk my responsibility if I do not state clearly that the Government is adamant to maintain order. People who perpetrate violence must take note that if they do not renounce violence, they will inevitably face the full power at the disposal of the State, which has not nearly been applied to the full. In future there must be no misunderstanding about this.

"It is my deepest wish that senseless violence be abandoned now. I plead with the public media to assist in this regard."

- State President P W Botha, 15 May 1986

BLACK-ON-BLACK VIOLENCE

The State President, Mr P W Botha, spoke recently in Parliament about the current unrest occuring in certain Black communities in South Africa and said in this regard that:

"It is common knowledge that innocent and moderate people are the victims of the so-called 'necklace' executions in public, people who do not support the violent aims of the ANC and the instigators of unrest. They are the ones who are being coerced and intimidated to toe the line of violence. In the name of freedom and democracy, moderate Blacks are being robbed of their freedom of choice — for peace".

The State President added:

"It has become common practice to report on the violence in South Africa by referring to the number killed in violent actions or unrest situations, without stating the cause of the deaths or the circumstances in which people were killed. Invariably, the impression is created — and it would seem often wilfully so — that these violent deaths are the result of a spontaneous uprising against the so-called apartheid system and subsequent security force or police action to quell such uprisings. The violence and deaths are then blamed on the police and Security Forces and put on the account of the Government".

Mr Botha said that:


"From the start of the unrest in September 1984 until 22 April 1986, 508 people, mostly moderate Blacks, were brutally murdered by radical Blacks, mostly by the so-called necklace method. Of this figure, 205 were murdered since January 1986, that is during the past four months, (April 1986), most of them after the lifting of the state of emergency in February".

Mr Botha also mentioned that:

"Since September 1984 no less than 1 417 Black-owned businesses, 4 435 private homes (including 814 homes of Black policemen), 28 churches, 54 community centres, several hundred schools and a number of clinics — all serving the Black community — were either totally destroyed or badly damaged by petrol bombs or other forms of arson or attacks. In addition, during the same period, several thousand private vehicles — again Black-owned — were destroyed or severely damaged".

In addition, Mr Botha said:

"The violence against which the police have to



react is perpetrated by ruthless and unscrupulous people who make use of savage and barbaric methods to achieve their goals.

"In exercising their responsibility to protect the lives and property of innocent people, death as a result of security action is sometimes inevitable".

The State President also asked the following question:

"Can any reasonable person expect of the police, who are responsible for the protection of lives and property and for the maintenance of law and order, to sit back and not to act when these dastardly acts of destruction are being perpetrated by elements out to intimidate the communities among whom they operate?"

ANC POLICY ON . . .

NEGOTIATIONS


In numerous statements the ANC has indicated that it regards negotiations not as a means for achieving mutually acceptable constitutional compromises, but as a means to achieving total power.

Accordingly, during a Radio Freedom broadcast in October 1985 Oliver Tambo said:

"... the ANC will talk to somebody at the proper moment in the proper conditions, but will do so just because our struggle has reached a point where we believe that talking, apart from anything else we'll be doing, is the way forward".

During the Kabwe conference, Tambo had the following to say with regard to negotiations:

"However, the NEC is of the view that we cannot be seen to be rejecting a negotiated settlement in principle. In any case



A Black funeral showing the ANC flag draped over the coffin in the foreground.

no revolutionary movement can be against negotiations in principle. Indeed, in our case it is correct that we encourage all forces, particularly among our White compatriots and in the Western world, to put pressure on the Botha regime to abandon the notion that it can keep itself in power forever by the use of brute force".

Nevertheless, the ANC has never said publicly that even if it were to enter into negotiations it would abandon violence.

On 4 February 1985, in an interview with the *Zimbabwe Herald*, Oliver Tambo expressed himself as follows:

"In any case if there were any talks and if we thought the time had come for talks with the Pretoria regime, we would not abandon the armed struggle, we would simply carry on".

Apart from this, ANC pre-conditions for talks are so extreme, that they in fact constitute a demand for the unconditional transfer of power to their organisation.

In fact, on 18 May 1986 Oliver Tambo had the following to say over a Radio Freedom transmission from Zambia:

"I, Oliver Tambo, would not meet him [State President P W Botha], but if the time came for the ANC and the people of South Africa — the leadership as a whole of South Africa — when the time came in South Africa for a meeting to take place, then of course, a meeting will take place. It will come when the struggle is so far that Botha sees it to be in his own interest to transfer power to a democratic majority, not Black majority".

Thus in an ANC broadcast on Radio Freedom on 7 May 1986 the following statements were made:

On talks — "The ANC demands the dismantling of the apartheid Government before it will consider talks, as well as the release of all detainees and the disbanding of the SA Defence Force".

On a National Convention — "The time is long past for a national convention. We know what we want".

On unbanning the ANC — "If they unban the ANC under the apartheid Government, they can just as well ban it again".

Clearly, meaningful negotiations could never take place on such a basis.

SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT POLICY ON . . .

NEGOTIATIONS

- "... negotiations will not be conducted with the SACP, international or national terrorist groups or other fanatics".
- State President P W Botha, 17 April 1986
- "As far as the Government is concerned, it remains adamant that it is prepared to negotiate with citizens of South Africa, provided they do not resort to violence as a means of attaining their political and other goals, or call in foreign agencies to support them.
- "Negotiation of necessity implies that participants should accept that not all their requirements are likely to be met; it implies a willingness to listen, to discuss and seek solutions. But these solutions will result from deliberations by South Africans in the interest of South Africans.
- "It is in this spirit that the Government approaches the process of negotiation and I want to appeal to all who have made the choice for peaceful and constitutional change, to display a similar disposition".
- State President P W Botha, 17 April 1986

ANC POLICY ON . . .

THE UDF

In his presidential address for 1984 Oliver Tambo made the following statement concerning the United Democratic Front (UDF):

"A special responsibility rests on the shoulders of the ANC and the most advanced members of our broad, democratic

movement to act as revolutionaries — as such, to wage revolutionary struggle; and, basing themselves on the conscious and organised involvement of the masses of the people, to build a strong and disciplined revolutionary movement. In this context, the further mobilisation and organisation of the masses of our country assumes special importance. Quite clearly, we have made great strides in these areas of work. This is evident in the strength of the UDF and the pace at which it continues to grow".

In an article published in *Dawn*, journal of Umkhonto we Sizwe, it was stated that

"The national liberation alliance headed by the ANC shall be able to guide the UDF only if we have our own underground structures within the UDF. These structures must skilfully give the correct guidance to the UDF and above all raise the tasks of the Front".

In a broadcast on Radio Freedom on 11 May 1986 the ANC made its views on the UDF known when it said:

"Already we have filled a million strong front like the United Democratic Front, which has been able to ensure that the tricameral system becomes still-born. However, for the United Democratic Front and other democratic organisations to be a powerful, dynamic force, the role of the workers who constitute the backbone of our revolution is indeed decisive now more than ever before".

THE ECONOMY

The Freedom Charter calls for a dramatic redistribution of wealth in South Africa and for the establishment of a socialist economy. The Freedom Charter says in this regard:

"The mineral wealth beneath the soil, the banks and monolopy industry shall be transferred to the ownership of the people as a whole . . .

"All other industry and trade shall be controlled to assist the well-being of our people . . .



The communist and ANC flags are often prominently displayed at rallies and funerals of radicals.

"The land shall be shared among those who work it".

In an article written by Nelson Mandela in 1956, quoted in the August 1985 edition of *Sechaba*, he says with reference to the economy that

"It is true that in demanding the nationalisation of the banks, the gold mines and the land, the Charter strikes a fatal blow at the financial and gold-mining monopolies and farming interests that have for centuries plundered the country and condemned its people to servitude. But such a step is imperative because the realisation of the Charter is inconceivable, in fact impossible, unless and until these monopolies are smashed and the national wealth of the country turned over to the people. To destroy these monopolies means the termination of the exploitation of vast sections of the populace by mining kings and land barons and there will be a general rise in the living standards of the people".

MULTI-PARTY DEMOCRACY

Although it avoids direct advocacy of a one-party state, it is clear from the ideological framework within which the ANC operates that there would be very little room for dissent in an ANC-dominated South Africa.

On 5 July 1985 Oliver Tambo made the following statements over Radio Freedom:

"A better life in our country can only be achieved after the destruction of the White minority dictatorship and their stooges, the Buthelezis, the Mangopes, the Mantanzimas, the Rajbansis and all other sell-outs who have sold their birth right to the South African nation for a mess of pottage".

The ANC advocates the establishment of a "people's democratic republic" in South Africa. (It is important to note that most communist states designate themselves as "people's democratic republics".)

According to the September 1985 edition of *Sechaba*, the ANC does not foresee that a new dispensation can come about as a result of negotiation with the old regime, but only as a result of a constitution adopted by a "people's assembly". The ANC is of the opinion that

"The People's Assembly that can have the power to create a new constitution for South Africa, and not merely to fit itself into a constitutional arrangement manufactured by the oppressor and the exploiter, can only be an outcome of a victorious mass insurrection, a conquering political and military force of the armed masses led by the African National Congress".

SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT POLICY ON . . .

MULTI-PARTY DEMOCRACY

The Government is committed to devise such democratic solutions in co-operation with South Africans who are also committed to peaceful and democratic solutions and who reject violence as a means of achieving political goals.

"We believe that a democratic system of government, which must accommodate all legitimate political aspirations of all the South African communities, must be negotiated.

"All South Africans must be placed in a position where they can participate in government through their elected representatives".

- State President P W Botha, 15 May 1986

ANC ON . . .

FOREIGN POLICY

The ANC sees its "struggle" as part of a of socialist revolution. In its publication, ANC Speaks — documents, and the statements of the ANC, it states that

"The struggle of the oppressed people of South Africa is taking place within an international context of transition to the socialist system, of the breakdown of the colonial system as a result of national liberation and socialist revolutions . . ."

The ANC clearly aligns itself with the Soviet Union in global policies. In the January 1984 edition of *Sechaba*, Alfred Nzo, Secretary-General of the ANC, and a Vice-President of the World Peace Council said the following:

"The ANC has been a consistent champion of the cause of world peace, and voices its full support for recent Soviet peace initiatives which are aimed at making this planet a secure place".

The ANC has consistently adopted outspoken positions against the United States on international affairs. In his presidential statement published in the *Sechaba* of March 1984 Oliver Tambo made the following statement:

"We therefore have an international obligation to be active in the struggle to defeat the counter-offensive that the imperialists, led by the Reagan Administration of the United States, have launched.

"We too must speak out, and have spoken out, against the attempts of the United States to impose its will on the people of the world. This policy has already resulted in the criminal invasion of Grenada, the undeclared war against Nicaragua, and the direct intervention of the United States in El Salvador, in support of a gang of murderers".

Alfred Nzo reiterated ANC views in a speech in East Berlin in April 1983:

"Within this past month and addressing himself to the antiimperialist struggles currently raging in Central America,
Reagan made bold to proclaim that the Soviet Union is the
'focus of evil in the modern world.' This grand patron of the
butchers of San Salvador, Tel Aviv and Pretoria, a warmonger who is pushing the world to the brink of a nuclear
holocaust, a self-proclaimed friend of capital whose policies
have forced the United States working class to depend on
charitable soup kitchens for its sustenance — this representative and leader of arch-reaction has the arrogance to
make this insulting statement while presenting himself as
the epitome of a universal benevolence".

At the Kabwe conference in June 1985 the ANC adopted an uncompromisingly hostile attitude towards the United States, which was generally described as the leader of the "global offensive of imperialism" and "extreme reaction". Among other attacks, the National Executive Committee of the ANC compared President Reagan's anti-Soviet stance with that of Hitler. In the document published after the Kabwe conference, under the heading "US Offensive", the United States "imperialist actions" are *inter alia* catalogued:

"US imperialism has also helped to sabotage all efforts to resolve the problem of Western Sahara by giving maximum support to King Hassan of Morocco to defeat the Polisario Front. In the Middle East it has encouraged the forces of reaction to liquidate the PLO and permitted Zionist Israel to invade Lebanon in an effort to turn it into a pacified dependency of this ally of racist South Africa".

The March 1982 edition of *Dawn*, monthly journal of Umkhonto we Sizwe, reports a speech by Oliver Tambo on 14 February 1982 in Maputo. In this speech Tambo said, *inter alia:*

"Imperialism is hitting out against the people everywhere. It considers certain parts of the world as areas of strategic importance to its global strategy. These include such areas as Southern Africa, Central America, the Middle East and Europe. All these regions of the globe are today areas of international tension because imperialism, and especially the United States, has decided that in these regions, it will resist all progress, encourage the most backward political forces, assume direct command of the counter-revolutionary offensive and use all possible means to achieve its objective.

"This situation demands that the world forces of progress must enhance their unity, their vigilance, their mutual solidarity and their offensive against imperialist reaction. There is urgent need for all of us to act in solidarity with the PLO and the Palestinian people, with the POLISARIO Front and the people of Sahara; with the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front and the people of El Salvador, the people of East Timor and their organisation, the Fretilin; with

SWAPO and the Namibian people, with the ANC and the South African people; with the front line states of Southern Africa".

SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT ON . . .

FOREIGN POLICY

"We reaffirm our continued commitment to peaceful international co-existence through co-operation and negotiation. This applies to all nations, but particularly to Southern Africa".

- State President P W Botha, 31 January 1986

ANC ON . . .

SOUTH AFRICA'S ATTITUDE TOWARDS NATIONALISTS WITHIN THE ANC

In reaction to the State President's statement on 28 April 1986 that "it was high time for those ANC leaders who do not support communism to step out, to come back to South Africa and to take part in constitutional action," the ANC's Radio Freedom on 11 May 1986 stated:

"If Botha expects to buy time by appealing to non-existent, non-communist African National Congress leaders, then Botha has missed the freedom boat".

In a broadcast on Radio Freedom on 7 May 1986 the following statement was made with regard to the possibility of breaking links with the SACP:

"The ANC does not subscribe to anti-working class demands. The alliance of the ANC and the SA Communist Party has contributed to the ANC's strength".

SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT ON . . .

NATIONALISTS WITHIN THE ANC

"The South African Government has never said all ANC members are communists. As a matter of fact, it is clear that there are confirmed Black nationalists within the ANC who are not aware that they are being manipulated by hardened communists".

State President P W Botha, 17 April 1986

SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT ON . . .

THE RELEASE OF NELSON MANDELA

"I made an offer last year which could have set Mr Nelson Mandela free. The principle involved in this offer was not designed as a particular condition for a particular person. It applied equally to all of us and it is assumed that the principle is subscribed to in all civilized countries of the world. The principle simply proscribed the use of violence to achieve political objectives. Mr Mandela is therefore, in effect, being jailed by the South African Communist Party and its affiliate, the African National Congress. For obvious reasons, it suits them that he remains in prison".

State President P W Botha, 31 January 1986

CONCLUSION

All reasonable people would like to see peaceful and negotiated solutions to the problems of our country. It is accordingly understandable that concerned South Africans should be exploring all the possible options in this regard. However, in their consideration of the advisability of talking with the ANC they should ask themselves:

What price by way of personal, community, political and economic freedom, they would be prepared to pay for peace?

What chance they would have of securing their basic interests through negotiations? and

What guarantees there would be that promises made at the negotiating table would be kept?

The Government has made it clear that it will negotiate only with those South Africans who renounce violence. It has insisted that negotiations must essentially be a process of give and take, aimed at satisfying reasonable demands. At the moment the ANC does not comply with these requirements.