

whole male population of each school turning out in brown uniforms once a week.

The SADF now presents special camps for white school teachers, who are posted to Infantry school at Oudshoorn for this training. This helps to ensure uniformity of cadet training.

One of the most sinister aspects of the militarisation of white education is found in the Transvaal Veld School system. One week Veld Schools are held for Standard 5 and Standard 8 pupils, where attendance is compulsory. These are a blatant exercise in extreme forms of indoctrination. Highly militaristic in organisation, the schools provide a series of lectures designed to inculcate children with government and SADF views. Lecture topics include "What steps would you take to prepare the homelands against communism?" and "How would you gain the support of a non-white for your government?"



Survival training on a cadet camp



"The cadet system has brought a new awareness amongst school boys of the nature of the onslaught against South Africa. They recognise and understand the threat and are highly motivated to undergo training to aid them in combating it."

Paratus, 1980

Opposition to the militarisation of white schools has repeatedly been expressed by the PFP, particularly at the Provincial Council level. However, given the highly authoritarian structure of white schools in South Africa, the ability of pupils to resist is limited. The SADF is using the white education system to capture the hearts and minds of white children and convince them of the need to defend apartheid.

F. University Military Units

The universities have not been as easily penetrated by the SADF as the white schools. The growth of ARMSCOR has seen extensive research being conducted in university laboratories in the area of weapons development. Although there is extensive evidence of this, the Official Secrets Act makes it almost impossible to determine the precise nature and extent of this research. At another level, particular courses have seen the influence of the military prominent: "Strategic Studies" courses are good examples, with the University of Natal one being a good example. The course, whose content would supplement the training of an officer is taught at third year and honours level and is structured in such a way that part-time students, who need not even have a preliminary degree, can attend. This opens the way for SADF personnel to participate.

Some Afrikaans universities offer extensive academic facilities to the SADF, with B.Mil degrees being a good example. At Stellenbosch the Krygskunde (Military Science) Faculty is staffed by 25 SADF officers, and runs courses at under- and post graduate level which are open to SADF personnel. The SADF is trying through campus careers offices to attract more skilled personnel. The most blatant attempt to establish the SADF on English-speaking campuses is the attempt to establish University Military Units (UMU's)

Commando units consisting of staff and students were established at most Afrikaans campuses in the wake of the 1976

uprising and in 1980 these became incorporated into the SADF as "University Military Units". The OFS unit consists of three components: infantry, support and "campus defence". The unit at the University of Pretoria places a stress on border camps, with the rector having paid a visit by helicopter to the unit on their first border camp. With most Afrikaans campuses now having UMU's (Stellenbosch established one in 1982 despite some student opposition), the SADF has turned its attention to English-speaking campuses. At this stage the highly conservative UPE is the only English-speaking campus to have an UMU. Attempts to have UMU's at English-speaking campuses have thus far been frustrated by student opposition.

UMU's are either fighting or holding units who continue with forms of training while on campus. In times of "civil unrest" they would be responsible for guarding campuses. Where an UMU is established it is compulsory that all students, staff and administration personnel who are liable for camps register with the unit.

The SADF's motivation for these units is that students "de-learn" their military training at university, and involvement in an SADF unit while on campus would prevent this. The unit would expand the scope for students to gain promotion, and

more effective use would be made of skilled National Servicemen. The major reason, however, concerns students liable for camps. Although this applies only to a minority of male students (in the 1981 intake of male students at UCT, only 16 percent of student-national servicemen do camps each year, University Military Units would ensure that all students liable for camps perform them while at university. Finally, as Dr Keyan Tommselli has noted, because the English-speaking universities are often a major site of resistance to the SADF, they have become a prime ideological target.

During 1981 all the English-speaking campuses were approached about UMU's by the SADF, but only Natal responded. Professor Clarence saw major advantages in the unit: students would "get the most out of" the SADF because of specialised training and students would be provided with "positive motivation". He proposed the formation of a UMU for February 1982. Students and staff, co-ordinated by the SRC, voiced strong opposition to the plan. They saw the unit giving the SADF more control over students, forcing students to do camps and preventing them getting vac jobs and by giving the SADF access to information on students. The unit could be mobilised against student protest and student-soldiers could be required to spy on their fellows. This would increase tension on campus because many students opposed the SADF, and could have a negative effect on student political involvement. The UMU would also allow a more direct flow of SADF propaganda onto campus. Clarence con-

ceded that "if there were any unrest on campus, deployment of the unit to restore order could lead to the alienation of a sector of the student body."

The extensive involvement of the SADF in white education is part of an overall hears and minds campaign, designed to ensure unquestioning acceptance of the role of the SADF by those conscripted.

Student pressure on the administration at Natal, along with support from students on other NUSAS campuses, (without whose co-operation the UMU scheme cannot proceed) succeeded in stopping the Natal UMU. Numerous indications suggest that the SADF will attempt to proceed with UMU's at English campuses. Stellenbosch rector Professor Mike de Vries said in 1982 that he did not understand the "fuss" about UMU's on his campus, because all the English campuses would soon have them as well. In September 1982 a UCT student who had recently completed his training, informed the SRC that while stationed in Cape Town he had seen berets with badges saying "UCT Command" in a SADF store. And more recently Cape Times columnist Wilem Steenkamp, who describes his column as a "direct liaison between the SADF and the public", motivated strongly for a UCT military unit.

The SADF clearly wants to proceed with establishing military units on our campuses. At present, they are engaged in a continual ideological "softening up", distributing "uniforms" on all campuses and inviting SRC delegations for border trips. Clearly, it is united student opposition which presents their major obstacle.

Chapter 5.

Extending Conscription

When PW Botha was asked, shortly after last years referendum, whether it was planned to extend SADF conscription to coloureds and Indians under the new dispensation, he replied:

„Up to now we did not bring this matter forward because we did not have the accomodation, we did not have to be satisfied with the voluntary service they have rendered. But when they have the vote, gradually we will extend their service too, naturally, as we did with the whites.”

The extension of conscription to coloureds and Indians will begin over the next few years, and has aroused widespread resistance around the country. The UDF has taken firm policy to resist the extension of conscription. “We will not allow our children to die for an unjust cause,” said Mrs Ela Ramgobin at a UDF meeting in Durban recently. And the Cape Herald, a commercial newspaper aimed at the coloured community, recently carried an advice column for coloured youth on their rights as Conscientious Objectors. As the August elections for the tri-cameral parliament draw nearer, the extension of conscription is becoming a major political issue.

Black involvement in the SADF has expanded in recent years. Coloured and African soldiers served in large numbers during World War II, constituting nearly 37 percent of South African forces. Despite volunteering for the war against fascism, they were prevented from carrying arms and only played auxilliary roles, and were demobilised immediately after the war. In the past decade the personnel needs of the SADF have grown so rapidly that there has been extensive involvement of black troops in combat roles. This expansion has not only been motivated by the SADF in terms of personnel shortages, but also for its ideological impact. As Cmdt, M Swanepoel of 21 Battalion (a black unit) said:

“With blacks in SA army uniforms, you can say ‘Heck, this proves that this is not a white man’s struggle anymore.’”

This ideological impact is extended to the effects on black troops in the SADF, a captive audience for “hearts and minds” propaganda. Paratus recently wrote:

“The enthusiasm among 21 Battalion recruits was almost unbelievable.

Some of them had a comprehensive understanding of what communism and terrorism involves, whereas others only desire to fight for their country. All the men were aware of the threat facing South Africa."

SADF personnel have seen the "rights" accorded to Coloureds and Indians by the new deal as sufficient to justify conscription. Major General Britz put it this way:

"We believe we should give the coloureds the opportunity to protect themselves... my feeling is that once the coloureds go on the Voters Roll then they would have given someone the right to act for them and they must return the responsibility. We all have to protect what we have."

Although extended conscription will follow the new constitution, the SADF faces certain constraints in this respect at present. It does not currently have the resources to handle a large Coloured and Indian intake, but is presently expanding

the PF to create an officer corps which would train the new conscripts. Conscripted and thus unwilling, as well as potentially opposed to apartheid, conscriptees would not be as susceptible to "total onslaught" propaganda as Cape Corps volunteers (as shown by the Namibian experience). This could perhaps account for expanded SADF "hearts and minds" work in Cape Town's coloured communities.

The extended call up is likely to be a slow process, designed to defuse and disperse resistance. It would probably involve the introduction of cadet systems and registration in coloured and Indian schools. This may be followed by a selective call-up through a ballot system, dispersing the number of people conscripted from each area and focussing mainly on rural areas, to prevent the emergence of unified opposition. However, the leading civic, trade union, youth, student and religious bodies in these communities, coordinated by the UDF, have expressed their intention to resist incorporation into apartheid's army.

A. The Cape Corps



Coloured volunteers, mostly unemployed, who do "the maximum amount of border duty".


The South African Coloured Corps was formed in 1963 to involve Coloured in non-combatant roles in the SADF: cooks, drivers, storemen, etc. By 1972 the unit's name had been changed to SA Cape Corps, and had begun training programmes similar to white national servicemen.

Having been incorporated as an operational unit of the Permanent Force, an officer corps was established in 1975 and in 1976 the first Cape Corps Infantry company went into action in Namibia. The Cape Corps has grown rapidly since 1975, with the present intake averaging 2000

According to the SADF, Cape Corps recruits perform "the maximum amount of border duty in their two years once initial training is finished".

There are approximately 5 000 troops in the Cape Corps. Unemployment has been a major factor forcing coloured youth to volunteer for the Cape Corps where they can receive skills training. This is particularly true for the rural areas, where political mobilisation is limited. 80 per cent of the Cape Corps troops in 1981 came from the rural areas, and it is likely to be these areas from which initial coloured conscriptees are drawn.

B. Indian Corps



SAS Jelsena recruits: "future leaders of the Indian community"?

A separate facility to train Indian recruits for the Navy was established at Salisbury Island in 1974. Renamed the SAS Jalsena, it became a full PF facility, recruiting about 200 people annually. It has received the backing of the politically conservative South African Indian Council but has not been as well supported as the Cape Corps. Indeed, the first two Indian recruits into the Air Force stated that "a big motivation was that they were unemployed."

The ideological intention of Indian recruitment is made clear by the stated aims of the SAS Jalsena training program which include "to provide future leaders for the Indian Community" and "to show the Indian Community of the RSA that there is a useful place for them in the SADF where they can contribute to the defence of the RSA". The Jalsena course curriculum includes subjects like ethnology and political science.

C. Africans in the SADF

SADF policy in relation to Africans was initially that they should be trained as members of the 'homeland' armies which have grown with SADF assistance since the late '70's or that they be incorporated in non-combatant roles in "ethnic battalions". This changed with the transforming of the Army Bantu Training Centre into 21 Battalion based at Lenz near Johannesburg. By 1978, this had become a combat training school for Africans of all language groups. Regionally based "ethnic units" with lower entrance qualifications were also established. Recruitment has not been large, with the total complement of All African units being estimated at 1 700 in 1982.

The SADF has encouraged the establishment of armies in all South Africa's "homelands". The SADF provided extensive assistance in the establishment of the Transkei army, the Venda National army and the Bophuthatswana Defence Force. These armies, although small, co-


operate extensively with the SADF in counter insurgency programs. Their major functions, however, are "policing" ones, as they are expected to counter any internal opposition to Bantustan governments.



112 Battalion: "Vendas maak knap soldate".

The possibility of fully fledged African Battalions has been raised, but this is seen by the government as being potentially risky. The Minister of Defence argued in parliament in 1977 that the SADF "cannot distribute arms on a very large scale to blacks without the necessary control measures". It would seem that in the long term the SADF would like to expand its African ranks, to consolidate the idea that South Africa faces a foreign onslaught. 21 Battalion recently received the "Freedom of Soweto" from the discredited Community Council, and were praised by former 'major' David Thebehali for bringing a "feeling of security" to the city. During the procession, youths wearing "Free Mandela" T-shirts marched along singing "We are the soldiers of Mandela."

The SADF's role in upholding apartheid makes it extremely difficult for it to reach the African community.



121 Battalion in Soweto. "We are the soldiers of Mandela" sang the youth.

D. The New Deal

The question of extending conscription to coloureds and Indians has been on the government agenda since 1977 when the Transvaal Nationalist Party passed a resolution calling for this. When press leaks created the impression that the 1982 Defence Amendment Bill would enforce such conscription, a massive outcry led to immediate denials from the SADF. The extension of conscription clearly required a more favourable political climate, with right-wing coloured and Indian politicians indicating that they could not support conscription without political reforms being instituted. SADF and verligte leaders intensified their pres-


sure for reform. Extended conscription was one of the arguments used by verligte nationalists to win NP support for constitutional reform. PW Botha asked the crowd at one NP meeting: "Do you want coloured people fighting on the border or not?" When they answered affirmatively he responded with "We must then treat them decently. They must not go behind the backs of our sons to fight for the enemy."

The majority who suffer under apartheid have shown themselves to be unwilling to participate in the army which defends that system.

Chapter 6.

Outside the Laager

A. Resistance to Conscription



"In my view any conflict arising in the near future on our borders will be in the nature of civil conflict, with people of the same country fighting each other. I believe it is our duty to discourage people from getting involved in this military conflict because of the realities of the South African situation — a situation of oppression ... We must recognize the right of the liberation movements to react to the situation in the country. We must look for a peaceful resolution to the question and face it with Christian conscience."

Archbishop Denis Hurley, 1974

The fact that such statements can emerge from the white community in South Africa is indeed surprising given the extent of SADF propaganda. Yet despite the increase in scale and intensity of the SADF propaganda offensive in the white community, the extent of white resistance to the SADF has actually grown in recent years. 14 people outside of the recognised "peace" churches have served sentences as conscientious objectors since 1976.

Most of them have based their stands to varying extents on the injustice of the system being defended by the SADF. Between 3000 and 4000 people annually fail to report for national service, many choosing to leave South Africa rather than fight in the SADF. And presently the call for an end to conscription into the SADF is gaining momentum, with many organisations from the white community having joined the End Conscription Committees.

The government has taken various steps to silence this resistance. In 1974 the South African Council of Churches adopted a declaration at its annual conference which stated that "the military forces of our country are being prepared to defend this unjust and discriminatory society" and resolved to challenge Christians as to "whether Christ's call to take up the cross and follow him in identifying with the oppressed does not, in our situation involve becoming conscientious objectors".

The SACC resolution caused a major stir in the white community, with the press and all parliamentary parties regarding it

with hostility. On the NUSAS campuses, it provoked debate, with the following statement being signed by the SRC Presidents at Wits, UCT, UND, UNB and the chair of Rhodes NUSAS Local Committee:

"It is the young people of South Africa who are being called upon to fight this war. Many of us are questioning two fundamental issues relating to this conflict. Firstly, the readiness with which the government is committing the people of South Africa to a prolonged war in defence of a system which promotes and protects the interests of whites and which discriminates at all levels against blacks."

Secondly, the repression of organised and peaceful black opposition to the conditions of domination and exploitation in our society has been responsible for black fellow South Africans taking up arms. It could be argued that we are being called upon to fight a civil war, the cause of which is rooted in the deep inequalities of our society...

... the government, through its propaganda, is developing a widespread war psychosis which blindly clings to militarism as the course of action open for resolving this conflict.

Many of us believe that this war can be avoided if the inequalities of our society are rooted out - if the aspirations of blacks to share equally in the political process and the wealth of the land are met."



End Conscription Campaign

The growing resistance to militarisation led to the government passing laws making it a criminal offence to suggest "or otherwise cause" anyone liable for military service to refuse to serve. The maximum penalty attached to the crime is a R5000 fine and/or six years imprisonment. Despite the widespread provisions of the law, no one has yet been convicted of this act.

Despite attempts to stifle questioning of

the military, the Angolan invasion of 1975 and the 1976 uprising saw an upsurge in resistance to the SADF. Between 1975 and 1978 alone, more than 5000 young white South Africans left the country to avoid the SADF. Today there are more than 1500 young white South Africans living in exile to evade their call-up. Between 1975 and 1978, 2337 people were convicted for refusing to render military service.

B. Conscientious Objection

The SADF had to some extent, recognised the rights of "peace church" members (Jehova's Witness and Christadelphians) to object, sentencing them to serve the period of their national service in detention barracks. However the objection of Peter Moll and Richard Steele, two Baptists who incorporated opposition to the SADF's defence of apartheid in their Christian stands, drew attention to the plight of objectors outside of the "Peace Churches"

Both spent long periods in solitary confinement for refusing to wear the brown uniform of the SADF while in DB, and eventually won the right to the blue overalls worn by "peace church" objectors. As more objectors offered themselves for incarceration, the SADF changed its tactics, sentencing these people to civilian jail terms with common criminals. Pete Hathorn, who objected from a secular viewpoint to the SADF's defence of apartheid, spent most of his sentence in Pollsmoor Prison.

Conscientious objection as a highly visible and sustained action posed an ideological threat to the government and SADF and the Defence Amendment Act was passed in order to stem the flow of objectors. The act reflects the standard Nationalist Party



Pete Hathorn

The SADF has also tried to prevent evasion or "draft dodging" inside South Africa by forming the South African Army Non-Effective Troops Section (SAANETS) in 1981. According to the SADF, SAANETS

must meet his obligations."

Despite all attempts to quell resistance, the number of people failing to report for SADF service is on the increase.

"Keeps tabs on, or tries to locate, those men who attempt to evade service by means of various subterfuges. For example, the chap who leaves university but still applies for a study deferment each year, or claims he has a one man business facing bankruptcy when it isn't, or is holding a non-existent key post. SAANETS will come down with a heavy hand on people like these, because the underlying idea is fairness — everyone

Instead of narrowing, however, the base of resistance to the SADF has broadened recently, with the formation of the End Conscription Committees. The proposed extension of Conscription to Coloureds and Indians has also provoked a fast expanding rejection in those communities as the UDF, representing more than 600 organisations, promotes its campaign against the "New Deal".

Conclusion

"The Black Sash demands that the South African government abolish all conscription for military service. We maintain that there is no total onslaught against the people of South Africa, and the total strategy (we need to adopt) is not the military defence of a minority govt, but the total, all out effort of South Africa's people to bring about democratic government and the relief of the poverty and deprivation suffered by the majority."

This was the call issued by the Black Sash at its conference last year, and endorsed by the Conscientious Objector Support Group who decided to form End Conscription Committees, since then a number of organisations, including NUSAS, have involved themselves in the End Conscription Campaign. The Church, student and civil rights organisations involved in the End

Conscription Campaign are drawn mainly from those communities already facing conscription. Campaigning against the extension of conscription is being spear-headed by the UDF, forming an important part of the campaign against the tricameral parliament.

Conscription is rejected because it forces South Africans to fight in a civil war on the side of apartheid. It forces them into situations of implementing government policy. It also forces them to participate in the illegal occupation of Namibia. The expanding influence of the SADF at all levels of our society is an obstacle to the attainment of peace in our country.

The alternative to the civil war is a sovereign national convention which can dismantle the root cause of the war: the

apartheid system. The Freedom Charter - minimum demands of the majority of South Africans - adopted at the Congress of the People in 1955:

" There shall be Peace and Friendship.

South Africa will be a fully independent state, which respects the rights and sovereignty of all nations: South Africa shall strive to maintain world peace and the settlement of all international disputes by negotiation not war.

Peace and Friendship amongst all our people shall be secured by upholding the equal rights, opportunities and status of all."

Peace and Friendship in South Africa are only possible when the root causes of conflict are eradicated. This will involve

implementing all the demands of the Freedom Charter-

The People Shall Govern.

All National Groups Shall have Equal Rights.

The People Shall Share in the Country's Wealth.

The Land Shall be shared among those who work it.

All Shall be Equal before the Law.

All Shall enjoy equal human rights.

There Shall be Work and Security.

The Doors of Learning and Culture Shall be opened.

There Shall be Houses, Security and Comfort.

There Shall be Peace and Friendship

It is the implementation of these demands, and not conscription into apartheid's army, which will bring peace and security to our land.

**THERE SHALL BE PEACE
AND FRIENDSHIP**

Towards a Just Peace

A Declaration to End Conscription

We live in an unjust society where basic human rights are denied to the majority of the people.

We live in an unequal society where the land and wealth are owned by the minority.

We live in a society in a state of civil war, where brother is called on to fight brother.

We call for an end to conscription.

Young men are conscripted to maintain the illegal occupation of Namibia, and to wage unjust war against foreign countries.

Young men are conscripted to assist in the implementation and defence of apartheid policies.

Young men who refuse to serve are faced with the choice of a life of exile or a possible six years in prison.

We call for an end to conscription.

We believe that the financial cost of the war increases the poverty of our country, and that money should rather be used in the interests of peace.

We believe that the extension of conscription to coloured and indian citizens will increase conflict and further divide our country.

WE BELIEVE THAT IT IS THE MORAL RIGHT OF SOUTH AFRICANS TO EXERCISE FREEDOM OF CONSCIENCE AND TO CHOOSE NOT TO SERVE IN THE SADF.

WE CALL FOR AN END TO CONSCRIPTION

WE CALL FOR A JUST PEACE IN OUR LAND

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RENTAL

IN WHOSE DEFENCE?

26

W. H. H. H.
T. H. H. H.




CONSCRIPTION AND THE SADF

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Introduction



While at school, every white South African male wears a brown uniform once a week to participate in the compulsory "Youth Preparedness" programme. After school he is compelled to give 4 years of his life to the SADF. This is the immediate effect of the SADF on the lives of white South Africans. Soon this reality will be faced by Coloured and Indian South Africans.


In this publication we aim to look at the issue of compulsory conscription into the SADF. It is important that we understand why conscription occurs and the role of the SADF (and therefore at what conscripts may be ordered to do). This will be

examined in Chapter 1 and 2. The expanding role of the military in other sectors of society ie. government, economy and education, is an important aspect of the overall preparation for civil war in our country, and this will be examined in chapter 4. The impending conscription of Coloureds and Indians and the role of blacks in the SADF at present will be covered in chapter 5. Resistance to SADF conscription and the politics of conscientious objection will be covered in chapter 6.

More and more South Africans today are questioning the role of the SADF, and challenging conscription. Hopefully this publication can contribute to that process.

Chapter 1.

Why Conscription?




A. The History

Apartheid is a system which guarantees power and privilege to the white minority, and misery, oppression and exploitation to the majority. Any system of minority rule could survive only if it convinced or confused the majority into accepting the situation, or if it forced them to do so. And in South Africa force has played a major part in maintaining apartheid. Its violent laws are protected by a massive police force and security apparatus. And its last line of defence is the SADF. In 1965, former prime minister Vorster told parliament: "I believe in the supremacy of the

white man over his people in his own territory and I am prepared to maintain by force." Those instances in our history in which apartheid was severely threatened by mass opposition saw the SADF being brought in to "restore order." This is clearly illustrated by the mobilisation of the SADF during the Sharpeville crisis of 1960 and the nationwide uprising of 1976.

Compulsory conscription into the SADF began and expanded in response to a growing challenge to apartheid.



Conscription by ballot only began in 1961. Before then the SADF had comprised of a standing professional army of about 10000 men. The 1950s saw massive non-violent resistance to apartheid led by the ANC (then a legal organisation) and other organisations of the Congress Alliance. 100s of 1000s of people were involved in these struggles with a high point being the adoption of the Freedom Charter in 1955. Almost a million people had been involved in shaping the charter's demands for a free and democratic South Africa. Peaceful opposition often met with a violent response from the government, with arrests, bannings and sometimes shootings. Every day thousands endured the violence of pass arrests and removals.

In the midst of this violence the Charter called for 'peace and friendship'. However, the government would not tolerate this challenge to its policies, and the violent suppression of opposition reached a peak in 1960 when police gunned down 69 peaceful anti-pass demonstrators at Sharpeville and Langa. In the weeks that followed the government banned the ANC and PAC, and declared a 'state of emergency'. Thousands of democrats were detained for months while the army besieged South Africa's townships.

The following year, after a 'whites only' referendum, the Nationalist government declared South Africa a republic. Despite the rising intolerance of opposition to apartheid, Nelson Mandela and others called for a national convention, where South Africa's elected leaders could sit down and map out a common future. This call was ignored, and repression intensified.

Finally, With all channels of peaceful opposition closed the ANC opted for armed struggle, and its armed wing

Umkhonto We Sizwe (Spear of the Nation) was formed to take up a sabotage campaign. Chief Albert Luthuli, former ANC president who had been awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1961 explained things this way: "The African National Congress never abandoned its method of a militant, non-violent struggle, and of creating in the process a spirit of militancy in the people. However, in the face of the uncompromising white refusal to abandon a policy which denies the African and other oppressed South Africans their rightful heritage — freedom — no one can blame brave, just men for seeking justice by the use of violent methods; nor could they be blamed if they tried to create an organised force in order to ultimately establish peace and racial harmony."

This extreme crisis for apartheid led to the "ballot" system being introduced, conscripting 7000 white males into the SADF each year, to cope with intensified resistance. The intake was soon increased and by 1964, 16500 people were balloted annually. From 1960 to 1964 alone the defence budget tripled.

Although the initial armed actions of Umkhonto We Sizwe and the PAC were eventually contained new threats soon arose. Nearly 10 years of peaceful opposition to South Africa's occupation of Namibia (declared illegal by the World Court) had brought little success to the Namibian people. Peaceful opposition led by SWAPO was violently suppressed, and in 1966 the People's Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN) was formed to fight South African colonialism. This, together with renewed armed efforts of the ANC alongside ZAPU in Zimbabwe in 1967 led the government to take new measures. The ballot system was deemed inadequate to cope with the new situation.


B. Compulsory Conscription

In 1967 compulsory conscription for all white males between the ages of 17 and 65 was introduced.

Renewed resistance to apartheid in South Africa as well as the growing threat to colonialism in Namibia, Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe placed new pressure on the SADF during the 1970s. In 1972 the National Service period was increased from 9 to 12 months with 5 compulsory 19 day camps to follow. The previous year thousands of Namibian contract workers had gone on strike. After being fired and sent back to homelands, many of them joined SWAPO. By 1974 the growing

challenge mounted by SWAPO saw the tasks of "policing" Namibia transferred completely to the SADF.

The mid-1970s saw a dramatic increase in the demands placed by the SADF on conscriptees, as the apartheid system was forced by its strongest ever challenge. In the wake of the Portuguese withdrawal from Africa in 1975, the SADF invaded Angola in an attempt to prevent the MPLA coming to power. Thousands of SADF troops poured across the Kunene River from August 1975, but less than 4 months later they were rapidly retreating, having been repelled the combined efforts of Angolan and Cuban troops.



The SADF's Angola invasion : New demands on conscriptees

The defeat in Angola along with the new impetus given to struggles in Namibia and Zimbabwe by the FRELIMO and MPLA victories saw the government's 'cordon sanitaire' around South Africa rapidly eroding. The government's crisis developed a massive new dimension during the 1976 national uprising, when thousands of people expressed angry rejection of apartheid.

SADF troops were mobilised all over South Africa, as the ability of the police to maintain apartheid came into doubt. The impetus of the events of 1976 created ongoing problems for the rulers: Thousands of township youths who had faced batons and bullets unarmed left the country to return in subsequent years as ANC guerrillas. Others took their struggle forward by building strong anti-apartheid organisations at home in the factories, schools and communities. Apartheid forced its most concerted challenge — and this necessitated the strengthening of the SADF.



In 1977 the period of national service was doubled, with white males now being liable for 2 years service plus a further 240 days of camps. Opposition to apartheid intensified in the early '80s, with mass campaigns for the release of Nelson Mandela and against the republic celebrations in 1981. Thousands of people around the country joined trade unions and civic organisations, expressing their demand for democracy in South Africa. This process culminated in the formation of the United Democratic Front (UDF) in August 1983, in which more than 600 organisations have united in non-racial opposition to the government's 'New Deal'. The armed threat to apartheid has mounted with the increase in guerrilla activity in the early 1980's. Increasing resistance to apartheid has seen the SADF continually needing to expand.

In 1982 the number of camps was increased from 240 days to 720 days. White South African males are now liable for 4 years of service. At the same time the government indicated its intention to eventually extend conscription to white women and coloured and Indian males. At the time Magnus Malan told parliament, "The permanent force and the present number of national servicemen are no longer able to guarantee your safety."

The government is anticipating an escalating civil war in South Africa, and is drawing thousands of people into the SADF to prepare them to defend apartheid. The history of conscription shows clearly the close relationship of the SADF to apartheid. Compulsory conscription exists in South Africa to force large numbers of people to defend the apartheid system.

SPECIAL
R8.00
50c

TODAY'S SPECIAL
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Flaming night

Riots rage —Army on standby

SWAZI REPORTERS
TWO HUNDRED were on standby
last night in Swaziland last night
while rioting broke out in
Africans with their buildings
and cars after a day of
violence and death.



GOVT. WOULD
NOT
be danger,
says MP

Suspect's death

Victim 'loved Africans'

BY THE PRESS

The victim of the attack was a young man who was well known and loved by his fellow Africans. He was a member of the African National Congress and had been active in the struggle for freedom. His death has caused a great deal of grief and anger among the people.

CHECKERS
ESKORT
pork
sausages
50c

Soweto 1976 : The SADF was ready to back up the police

Chapter 2.

The SADF at work

A. 'The Boys on the Border'

When South Africa sends its troops to occupy Namibia, we are told they are being sent to "the border", as if to suggest that they are defending our country against foreign aggressors. Namibia is a country whose right to independence is recognised by every country in the world: not even the "independent" homelands have recognised South Africa's occupation of that country as legitimate.

South Africa claims the right of occupation on the basis of a mandate of trusteeship from the League of Nations after World War I. Yet, in 1966 the United Nations, legal successor to the League of Nations, terminated SA's mandate and called for its withdrawal from the territory.

This call was repeated in 1969 and 1970, and upheld by the World Court of Justice in 1971. In 1978, following a visit by UN representative Matti Attishari to Namibia for talks with the South African administration, the UN adopted Resolution 435 which contained a plan for ceasefire pro-

cedures and UN supervised elections. Although South Africa claims to be as committed as SWAPO to seeing "435" implemented, it has tried every blocking manoeuvre from "internal" DTA elections through the "Cuban linkage" issue to the recent erection of the Multi-Party Conference as yet another attempt to manufacture a "credible" alternative to SWAPO to prevent its implementation. South Africa has therefore deliberately prolonged the war in Namibia. Colonel Ken Snowball of the intelligence wing of the SADF's Namibia command told Financial Mail the following, late in 1982: "This year we've had a lot of success. We believe we've killed a lot of SWAPO commanders, in fact we've just killed a People's Liberation Army of Namibia detachment commander...Generally we'll be able to maintain the status quo for a long time.

What is the status quo in Namibia and who does the SADF have to kill in order to maintain it?


B. Namibia

Power and wealth in Namibia are concentrated in the hands of a small group of white settlers. Only 2 per cent of Namibia's 83 million hectares is suitable for cultivation, and a minority of whites own 38 million hectares of the best farming and ranching land. In 1977 the average annual income of the country's 110 000 whites was R3000. The comparable figure nearly 1.3 million black Namibians was R125, just over R10 per month. While 68 per cent of white children finish secondary school, less than 3 per cent of black children achieve this level of education.

Namibian society is characterised by gross inequalities of wealth, while a highly distorted economy allows foreign multinational companies to drain Namibia of its mineral wealth. Colonial exploitation is maintained by a massive arsenal of apartheid laws. The South African administration has attempted to maintain ethnic divisions by instituting 12 separate parlia-

ments despite widespread popular rejection. Large parts of the country are ruled under martial law, with the SA administration able to manipulate legal procedures as in the recent "banning" of an appeal on behalf of Namibians detained incommunicado for more than 5 years at camp near Mariental.

The SADF itself is contributing significantly to the misery of many Namibians. Numerous allegations of torture and brutality have been levelled at the SADF by various South African church delegations. South African troops in Namibia are regarded as an army of occupation rather than protection. Pastor Kameeta of the Namibian Council of Churches said recently: "the people speak about the SADF as 'terrorists' while they refer to SWAPO guerrillas as 'our boys.'". So who is the SADF 'protecting' in Namibia, and who is it fighting?



Patrolling in Ovamboland : an army of occupation

C. SWAPO

In March 1984 Toivo Ja Toivo, the founder of SWAPO, received a tumultuous welcome in Windhoek after spending 16 years on Robben Island. In 1968 he asked the South African court which sentenced him: "Is it surprising that in such times my countrymen have taken up arms? Violence is truly fearsome, but who would not defend his property and himself against a robber? And we believe that SA has robbed us of our country..."

Only when we are granted our independence will the struggle stop. Only when our human dignity is restored to us, as equals of the whites, will there be peace between us.

We believe that South Africa has a choice — either to live at peace with us or subdue us by force. If you choose to crush us and impose your will on us then you not only betray your trust, but you will live in security only as long as your power is greater than ours."



*SWAPO rally in Windhoek:
massive internal support*



HERMAN TOIVO JA TOIVO

'NAMIBIA WILL BE FREE'

Namibians have always fought against colonialism. South African colonialism was no less welcome than the German colonialism which it succeeded after 1915. Thousands of Namibians have risen in rebellion throughout this century. Years of opposition resulted in the founding of SWAPO in 1960, as a political organisation committed to uniting all Namibians in a non-violent mass movement against South Africa's occupation. Violent suppression of peaceful protest, particularly the 1959 massacre in Windhoek, and South Africa's refusal to heed the call of Namibia and the world for its withdrawal, led to the launching of an armed struggle by SWAPO. The People's Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN) fired its first shots late in 1966.

The war escalated dramatically during the 1970s, particularly after the liberation

of Angola in 1975. Despite the massive SADF presence there, SWAPO's armed struggle has continued to escalate. Although the government would have us believe that SWAPO represents a foreign onslaught from which it is protecting the Namibian people numerous church sources have indicated tremendous support for SWAPO. South African Anglican Bishops found that most Namibians supported SWAPO, and that many had relatives involved in the organisation.

Most political commentators agree that a SWAPO victory is inevitable in the event of free and fair elections in Namibia.

South Africa's propaganda efforts to discredit SWAPO were dealt a blow recently

by a prominent white Namibian. Advocate Anton Lubowski, a respected member of the Windhoek bar and former Stellenbosch student, told the press that after meetings with SWAPO leadership, "... I realised that SWAPO's leaders are competent, capable, extremely responsible and deeply committed about their country's future, despite all the propaganda to the country. SWAPO is the only movement that can lead Namibia to a peaceful and prosperous future."

He proceeded to announce his membership of SWAPO, and called all white Namibians to join him.

The "enemy" of the SADF is no one else but the Namibian people fighting for independence.

D. The SADF in Namibia

After Angolan independence in 1975, 45 000 SADF troops were stationed on the Namibian/Angolan border. Today that figure has risen to over 90 000 as SWAPO's efforts have intensified. Today the Namibian war costs South Africa almost R2m every day. As Toivo pointed out, South Africa is relying mainly on its armed might to maintain control over Namibia.

South Africa's major political strategy has been an attempt to create the impression of a vast internal opposition to SWAPO.

At the political level this has involved erecting bodies like the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance and the Multi-Party Conference which involve some black Namibians and trying to proclaim these as

representative. At the military level it has meant trying to "Namibianise" the war.

The most important strategy here is the forced conscription of all black Namibians aged between 16 and 25 into the South West Africa Territorial Force (SWATF). Although under SADF command, SWATF is intended to give the impression that those fighting SWAPO are Namibians fighting a foreign onslaught. Conscription of black Namibians has proved to be a dismal failure.


It forced many Namibians who had previously remained uncommitted, to take a side. Nationwide protests flared up, reflecting overwhelming support for SWAPO. Thousands chose to leave Namibia rather

than join the SADF; more than 8000 young Namibians enlisted to fight for SWAPO in the first 3 months of conscription. The new recruits for SWAPO created by forced SADF conscription were so many, that conscription for the northern regions of Kavango, Ovambo and Caprivi, where SWAPO support is greatest, was withdrawn.

So, the SADF has attempted to extend conscription to sectors of the Namibian population who support, if not comprise, "the enemy". In April 1981 a group of 28 coloured conscripts expressed support for SWAPO. They were immediately detained and taken to an undisclosed destination in the 'operational area' for an 'orientation programme'. In June 1981 their parents held a large demonstration in Windhoek against their treatment and

their conscription. Problems of extending conscription were recently highlighted by the case of Erik Binga. Binga recently went before the South West African supreme court as a Namibian conscientious objector. Binga challenged South Africa's right to conscript him in terms of the illegality of its occupation, and pointed to SWAPO's armed struggle as a response to injustice. More specifically he pointed out that his older brother had been fighting for SWAPO since November 1978, and that he himself had been a card carrying member of SWAPO since 1977. He told the court that he was not being called on to defend his country against a foreign aggressor, but rather to participate in armed conflict against his own brother, who is fighting for an organisation of which he is an acknowledged member.

His case has been dismissed by the court.



SWATF roadblock in Ovambo land : Namibians unwilling to serve

E. Koevoet

Conscription is not the only tactic used to 'Namibianise' the war. The "police" unit Koevoet is today responsible for most immediate counter-insurgency activity. Made up of unemployed black Namibians and South Africans, with white officers, the unit has become recently renowned for its brutality, which has been exposed in a number of trials.

The recent trial of Koevoet member Jonas Paulus revealed that Koevoet have on occasion posed as SWAPO guerrillas seeking shelter from Namibian villagers. If shelter is given, they reveal their true identities, and it is alleged, often burn the kraals and kill villagers. If shelter is refused the pretence of being SWAPO guerrillas is maintained, and the same routine followed. More recently two Koevoet members were fined R50 each after being found guilty of roasting a man alive during interrogation.

Koevoet is formally a "police unit", this being a strategy to bypass Resolution 435 which demands the withdrawal or disarmament of all military units but allows for the continued functioning of police units. Effectively it is part of the SADF's overall operations in Namibia.

The SADF's role in Namibia is to delay that territory's independence for as long as the Nationalist government desires. It has caused an escalating war in Namibia which causes widespread suffering. The situation is best summed up in a letter sent to UN Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar by the Namibian Council of Churches: "The

South African government is continuing with its military build-up in Namibia and especially in the northern region of the country. This illegal and dangerous exercise intensifies the destruction of the lives of the people and further destabilises the whole country. We consider the pre-occupation of the South African government with so-called national security a threat to Southern Africa and to international peace."



Andreas Kipitingo: spitroasted by Koevoet

F. Destabilisation

The signing of peace treaties with Mozambique and Angola has highlighted the fact that the SADF has been very active outside our borders. This aspect of SADF activity has received very little attention in South Africa as a result of restrictions on the press. Although in the ceasefire with Angola

South Africa agreed to withdraw its occupation forces, the South African public had never been informed of the occupation. Even from the limited information available, however, a discernible pattern of intervention in neighbouring territories is evident. This pattern was even identified in parliament by PFP Foreign Affairs spokesperson Colin Eglin in 1982, when he aroused the anger of Magnus Malan by alleging that South Africa had been 'destabilising' neighbouring territories.

The policy of destabilisation began in earnest in the mid-1970s, after Angola and Mozambique became independent. Its aims are to prevent neighbouring territories giving assistance to South African refugees and liberation movements, and to expand South Africa's economic and political domination of the region by sabotaging independent economic development in those countries. Its methods vary from covert support for dissident forces through "pre-emptive strikes" and other commando operations to full-scale invasions.

The recent destabilisation programme began in 1975 with the invasion of Angola in an attempt to set up a puppet government before the present MPLA government took power. Although driven out by combined MPLA/Cuban forces, the SADF inflicted great damage on Angola's economy.



Nkomati Accord: The peace that needs a bigger army.



Kassinga : Namibian refugees lie in an open grave after an SADF raid

G. Exporting War

From that point onwards South Africa's destabilisation is estimated to have cost Angola more than S7 billion. Although ostensibly aimed at SWAPO military installations, South African raids have hit a lot harder. In 1978 nearly 600 Namibian refugees were massacred at Kassinga during an SADF raid, and buried in a mass grave. Although the SADF initially claimed that they had killed SWAPO guerrillas, they subsequently admitted that women and children had been killed.

South Africa initially maintained a constant presence in Angola through their

Reconnaissance Commando ("Recces") and 32 Battalion. 32 Battalion was staffed by former FNLA members and mercenaries, under the leadership of SADF officers. These units fall directly under the chief of the SADF. According to the testimony of Corporal Trevor Edwards, a member of 32 Battalion, "Our main job is to take an area and clear it. We sweep through it and kill everything in front of us, cattle, goats, people — everything. We are out to stop SWAPO so we stop them getting into the villages for food and water."

Clearly, the role of units like 32 Battalion involves a systematic scorched earth policy in Southern Angola, and terrorising the local population. This would be aimed at restricting SWAPO's ability to operate from Angola, and at undermining the MPLA government.

The third prong of South Africa's strategy has been UNITA, a right-wing organisation which collaborated with the Portuguese during the war of independence. Although the local press has tried to present UNITA as a credible political alternative to the Angolan government, it is clear that whatever success UNITA has achieved recently has been made possible by outside backing.

Corporal Edwards put it this way: "The point is that UNITA are a load of crap. They hang around in the South-east where their tribe is and they can probably defend themselves. But they can't go out and take somewhere like Savate (an Angolan base). We do it for them because it improves their bargaining position, gives them more talking power."

From Operation Protea in 1981 onwards, the SADF permanently occupied a sector of Southern Angola. This was denied by the SADF for more than 2 years, but recently acknowledged through the signing of a ceasefire/withdrawal agreement with Angola. Large scale invasions have become a regular feature of South African operations in Angola, with the recent operation Askari being the 11th of its kind. Ostensibly "hot pursuit" operations, these have involved extensive damage to Angolan economic and military installations, and more recently deliberate combat with Angolan forces.

The strategy of invading neighbourly states would certainly appear not to have been ruled out by the SADF when we consider recent armaments development like the Olifant Battle Tank and the 6 155mm cannon. These are conventional weapons unsuited to fighting a counter-insurgency war against guerrillas.


Support for right-wing dissidents has been a major element of SADF strategy in Mozambique. The Mozambique National Resistance (RENAMO) is a motley crew of former Portuguese colonists, FRELIMO renegades and bandits. It was set up in Rhodesia during 1976 by Ian Smith's Central Intelligence Organisation to fight FRELIMO. This was because of FRELIMO's active support for ZIPRA and ZANLA guerrillas in the Zimbabwean liberation war.

It engaged mostly in small scale acts of banditry and economic sabotage. After Zimbabwe's independence, the MNR is alleged to have moved to South Africa. Its radio station began broadcasting from the Northern Eastern Transvaal. And numerous allegations of South African involvement began to emerge. Simon Jenkins wrote in The Economist last year that Renamo (the MNR) "lack any guiding ideology beyond a hatred of President Machel. Pretoria persistently denies offering the MNR anything more than moral support and maintains this denial against all evidence to the contrary... When international opinion complained that the MNR had no programme, Pretoria researchers hurriedly put one together (of quite staggering blandness). Yet SADF helicopters have regularly droned over the Kruger National Park carrying MNR supplies into Mozambique. And Pretoria must suffer the occasional

embarrassment of South African "advisers" caught or killed (as two were in March) and arms caches discovered whenever the MNR suffers an occasional reverse."

When an MNR attack on Cahora Bassa caused severe power cuts in Natal, PFP MP Graham MacIntosh blamed an "incompetent ass" in either the Dept. of Defence or the National Intelligence Service for the target selection. He later said in Parliament: "It is difficult by a process of simple exclusion to come to any conclusion other than that the organisation is being supported, with or without the knowledge of our government, by South Africa"

There have also been numerous raids on Mozambique by SADF claiming to be conducting operations against "ANC bases", which Mozambique has denied exist. For example, after a raid in which the SADF claimed to have killed 41 ANC guerrillas in June last year, Mozambique as well as foreign diplomats and journalists claimed that the SADF had hit a jam factory and day care centre and some houses, and that 5 Mozambican civilians and 1 soldier were the only fatalities. The destabilisation of Mozambique has been designed to inhibit FRELIMO support for the ANC, and to assert South Africa's military and economic dominance in Southern Africa.



South African helicopter offloads its cargo : exporting war?

In 1982 three SADF troops were killed in Southern Zimbabwe. Months later it was discovered that an anti-Mugabe radio station was broadcasting from the Transvaal. Robert Mugabe has also alleged that South Africa is presently training 5000 troops loyal to Bishop Muzorewa as part of a wider attempt to destabilise his country. More recent allegations in the British press have charged that South Africa is training and arming former ZAPU troops, fuelling the conflicts in Matabeleland. Lesotho has also been a target of SADF operations, both through direct attacks on refugees there (which have involved the death of Lesotho civilians) as well as the alleged backing of the anti-government Lesotho Liberation Army (LLA). The LLA clearly operates from South Africa and PW Botha recently told

Lesotho that "there would be no LLA if you removed all refugees from Lesotho. It has been acknowledged that the SADF was involved in the 1982 attempt to overthrow the government of President Alibe Rene in Seychelles. Numerous other acts of sabotage and assassinations have been linked to the SADF.

Although PW Botha is presenting himself as a peacemaker today, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that South Africa has in fact acted as an aggressor in the region. Its actions have attempted to undermine the independence of neighbouring territories, in order to prevent them assisting ANC guerrillas and refugees, and to force them to accept economic cooperation with South Africa.



Children survey the wreckage after an SADF raid on Lesotho in 1982

Chapter 3.

Winning Hearts and Minds

A. Civic Action

"Bullets kill bodies, not beliefs, I would like to remind you that the Portuguese did not lose the military battle in Angola and Mozambique, but they lost the faith and trust of the inhabitants of those countries. The insurgent forces have no hope of success without the aid of the local population." Magnus Malan 1979

By the late 1970s, the SADF had developed an understanding of the war in which it was involved which went beyond military action. They told the public that the war was 80 per cent political and only 20 per cent military, and according to General Boshoff "If we lost the socio-economic struggle we might as well not fight the military one!" "Local Population" became a key catch-phrase of the SADF as they set about trying to win the 'hearts and minds' of the majority of South Africans, trying to win their support or at least neutralize them.

According to Major General Charles Lloyd the Civic Action Programme was devised "to secure through administrative and socio-economic action, the good will, support and co-operation of the local population by :


- 1) alleviating friction points, grievances and dissatisfaction;
- 2) improving their standing of living;
- 3) giving them something worthwhile to defend in a revolutionary war...

At the same time the SADF utilizes the opportunity to demonstrate to the local population that they are there to help and protect them and not to harm them."

The SADF therefore uses the CAP to present apartheid in a positive light. After 6 months basic and 6 months CAP training, it deploys uniformed national servicemen in forms of service which would not con-

ventionally be called military. They are seconded to government or bantustan departments, working as teachers, engineers, legal, agricultural and financial advisers, doctors, dentists, vets, lecturers, admin-personnel and even as traders and directors of tourism. CAP activities centre mainly around edu-

cation although many other forms of welfare projects are often undertaken in rural areas. These include providing medical and technical assistance and emergency aid such as drought relief. These actions are undertaken particularly in areas of potential support for guerrilla forces, for example in Northern Natal.



Literacy training : courting the goodwill of the "local population".

B. 'Killing Beliefs'


"The basic aim of Civic Action, apart from assisting the black man in various fields is to project an image of the soldier as a man of action but who is nevertheless a friend of the black man and who is prepared to defend him. We want the national serviceman to teach the black man whilst his rifle is standing in the corner of the classroom". Maj. Gen. Charles Lloyd

CAP teachers wear military uniform and carry a 9mm pistol. They are carefully screened to ensure ideological conformity to SADF views. Besides their teaching function, they are expected to play an intelligence gathering role in the communities in which they work. They are expected to monitor the activities and mood of particular individuals and whole communities. They are also expected to make propaganda interventions on behalf of the SADF to promote its image. CAP teachers have distributed copies of *The Warrior*, an SADF magazine aimed at promoting government propaganda amongst black schoolchildren:

"Some of the frustrated agitators are trying to boost the image of a pitiful old man in a prison, a plain convict, who for all we know, does not even feel like these "energetic adventures". Mr David Thebehali (Community Council Chairman) and his colleagues are the true leaders of the black people which the government is prepared

to talk to... The constant claim that the peoples of the republic are downtrodden is sickening, just as naive as the effort to press the government through church assemblies to do things which are not the wishes of the majority. Only the government has the power to do things in this country. Let us speak through our true leaders, not through convicts like Mandela and others."

Other CAP publications have echoed this promotion of apartheid with the *CONTACT* newsletter aimed at Coloured school children in Cape Town vigorously promoting the Labour Party and the new constitution.



Rural aid : capturing hearts and minds ?

In Namibia, CAP teachers have faced hostility and boycotts, and particularly in the northern regions the programme has been abandoned altogether because of the widespread support for SWAPO. In 1982 Colonel Martins told journalists that "in Ovamboland (where almost half of Namibians live) I'm not sure that the hearts and minds strategy does much good because of the large numbers of SWAPO there."

And as the Catholic Justice and Reconciliation Committee noticed in Namibia, "The results (of the CAP) for the army seem to be poor because repeated detaining, beating and even killing of civilians overshadow the "positive" aspects and give people the feeling that they are living in an occupied country deprived of their basic rights."

There has also been widespread resistance to the CAP in South Africa, with schools boycotts in Soweto having demanded the withdrawal of SADF teachers. In situations where access to schools by the SADF is difficult, more devious means such as weekend camps and sporting programmes have been organised to reach the hearts and minds of children. These camps have occurred around the country, and parents are often not informed that their children are being taken to an SADF camp. The extent of overt propaganda in these camps varies, with some used as blatant SADF recruiting opportunities. Parents have responded angrily. A letter to the community from parents in Hanover Park (Cape Town) after the SADF attempted to woo their children on a camp said: "Why do the SADF and the teachers who organise these

camps hide it from the parents?... Can we be sure that our children will be safe with SADF soldiers? What will our children do on these camps?

We want our children to grow up in peace and friendship. Our children must not believe that violence, war and the army are here forever. But the Nationalist government and the SADF want to win the hearts and minds of our children. Then the government can conscript them and force them to join the army. This is the same army which chased and shot students in 1976 and 1980. All this is part of the Nationalist's "New Deal". They want to offer some sections of the population a vote in apartheid so that they can force our sons to defend apartheid."

So the SADF's attempts to win the hearts and minds of the people are fraught with problems, as more and more South Africans reject the system which the SADF defends. The problems of the Civic Action Programme were highlighted in 1983 by conscientious objector Paul Dobson. Having served as a CAP teacher for 14 months in Natal, Dobson chose to object on the grounds of the role he was being forced to play:

"Although I have been serving in a non-combatant position, this does not detract from my reasons for objecting. Whatever position I may occupy in the SADF, I remain associated with and supportive of an institution which serves to protect and reproduce an unjust society. I find this situation untenable."

C. Repression

" The responsibility for combatting and especially urban unrest rests primarily on the SA Police. Nevertheless the SA Army must at all times be ready, on a countrywide basis, to quickly mobilise trained forces to render assistance to the SA Police."

Defence White Paper, 1977

Driving on South Africa's national roads today one is very likely to be stopped at a number of roadblocks. Whereas a few years ago these would have been manned by the SAP, today it is uniformed soldiers carrying R1 rifles who flag down cars. This phenomenon shows, at a day-to-day level, the increasing assumption of "police" roles by the SADF.

The involvement of the SADF in repression of those opposing apartheid gives the

final lie to any arguments about the "neutrality" of the SADF.

The Civic Action Programme has demonstrated the ideological dimension of the SADF's attack on opponents of apartheid. The repressive dimension is revealed at crisis points. In 1962, ANC President Chief Albert Luthuli noted:

"Since the emergency of 1960, a thorough reorganisation has taken place in the relation between the police and the army. The army has a new role - not the defence of our borders, but 'internal security'. It is clear that when we press our claims to the rights of citizenship and human dignity, this newly organised force will be turned on us as a last resort."



The point had been clearly illuminated by the Sharpeville events. Mass protests broke out around the country after the shooting of 69 unarmed pass demonstrators at Sharpeville. The state clamped down, declaring a state of emergency, and banning the ANC and PAC. To quell the protest, however, took systematic violence - all over South Africa army units were mobilised. They surrounded Langa township in Cape Town, laying siege to it preventing food and water passing through. House to house searches followed, and any men found at home (observing the ANC's stayaway call) were beaten. After two weeks the army had broken the resistance. Clearly, when apartheid was in crisis, the SADF would bale it out.

When peasants in the Pondo land area of the Transkei organised peacefully against government imposed tribal authorities in 1961, the police opened fire with ten guns killing 15. In the crisis which followed the SADF was deployed helping to suppress the revolt.

Commando and Citizen's Force units were mobilised during 1976 and 1977 to assist the police in suppressing nationwide protests following police shootings of peaceful demonstrators on June 16. The extent of SADF involvement is difficult to estimate, but the message again was clear: the SADF would be apartheid's last line of defence and would not stand by and watch it destroyed. The expanding struggle within South Africa has led the SADF to take new measures of response.

SADF troops conducted a house to house search after sealing off Bosmont Township near Johannesburg during the 1981 schools boycott. Most recently it has become clear that SADF troops have been involved in the implementation of the government's resettlement policy. The recent forced removal of people from Magopa in the Transvaal is a good example: the area was sealed off and declared an "operational area" as the SADF moved in to make sure Magopa residents complied with the removal order.

D. Area Defence

"They (the ANC) apparently do not have a border war in mind. They are going to fight an area war . . . we are going to deal with it by using area defence . . . People living in an area must be organised to defend themselves. They must be our first line of defence. Our full time force must be a reaction force."

Gen. Constand Viljoen, 1982.

The "area war" strategy reflects the SADF's recognition of the war as ultimate-



ly a civil war fought from within South Africa's borders. It is a response to expanding resistance on all levels: such units will also be used in combatting "labour and political unrest". Beyond assisting commando units, "area defence" involves the activating of "Dad's Army" units, consisting of older white men called up for active duty. 200 men were called up to the first "Dad's Army" unit at Vryheid in Northern Natal in May 1983. More units are planned for areas which are considered sites of actual or potential guerrilla activity.

first "Dad's Army" unit at Vryheid in Northern Natal in May 1983. At the same time all white males aged between 18 and 54 years old in the Nelspruit, Carolina and Piet Retief areas were obliged to register with their local commando. Further 'Dad's Army' units were activated in Paulpietersburg and Utrecht in Northern Natal, Ermelo in the Eastern Transvaal and Soutpansberg in the Northern Transvaal. Further units are planned in areas considered to be sites of potential or actual guerrilla activity.

Along South Africa's borders, particularly in the North Eastern Transvaal, the SADF set about trying to halt the depopulation flow. Deputy Defence Minister Kobie Coetzee remarked that "we must secure our border region, otherwise the white heartland will contract." A series of plans for protected villages, communication networks and expanded commando units were devised. The government also tried to create incentives for farmers to move back into border areas. These trends reflect the intensification of South Africa's civil war.

E. Dad's Army





F. SADF: Shield or Weapon?

Having examined the various roles played by the SADF, we can assess its place in the apartheid system. Government spokespeople have consistently attempted to portray the SADF as "neutral" and outside of politics. This misleading view has been incorporated into the outlook of some sections of the PFP. Former PFP Defence spokesperson Harry Schwarz put it this way:

"The Defence Force acts as a shield to enable South Africa not only to live in peace, but also to affect changes by constitutional means, and particularly by means of negotiation. The Defence Force is a shield to protect South Africa from aggression and violence while South Africans seek by peaceful means to find solutions for coexistence."

Although elements of the PFP, like Mrs Bishop, have taken a courageous stand in exposing and condemning the activities of the SADF, the party policy gives cause for concern. For example, PFP Defence spokesperson Phillip Myburg's recent comment that "this country needs strike air-

craft, helicopter gunships and maritime surveillance aeroplanes. The Prime Minister and others need to go over and persuade the Western leaders that we have genuinely moved away from the philosophy that led to the arms boycott". This shows a startlingly naive view both of the role of the SADF and of the sorts of "changes" that are presently taking place in SA.

Indeed at present there appears to be a high degree of consensus between all the parliamentary parties on the need to bolster the SADF. The recent parliamentary Defence debate was confined to issues of whether the navy or the airforce should be expanded, completely ignoring the role of the SADF.

Speaking recently on the need to challenge the myths of government defence policy and the activities of the SADF, Professor John Dugard noted:

"Liberal institutions and voices have a poor record in this regard. The PFP's record is dismal...."



Parliamentary Consensus. Gen. Magnus Malan (NP), Mr J W. Groef (Speaker of the House), Mr Vauso Raw (NRP), Mr Wiltz Hefor (NP) and Mr Phillip Myburgh (PFP) visit the 'operational area'.

Indeed, the lie is given to the idea of the SADF as "neutral" by comments of Defence Force leaders. In 1979, while head of the SADF, General Magnus Malan told the public:

"The Defence Force supports government policy and is responsible for peace, law and order in South Africa. This policy is the same as that laid down by Dr H. F. Vorwoerd, namely multi-nationalism and the self determination of nations."

More recently, in response to speculation of right wing dissatisfaction with the new constitution in the SADF, General Malan committed the armed forces to uphold the new constitution, claiming that the SADF "serves the country as a whole, receiving its orders from the government just as in any other democracy....." We know however, that South Africa is not a democracy, and that in South Africa "receiving its orders from the government" reflects the SADF's role in defending apartheid. As we shall see in the following chapter, the SADF is not only responsible for defending and at times implementing government policy; it is often involved in formulating that policy.

The SADF is clearly deployed in defence of apartheid: it maintains an occupation of of Namibia which the world considers illegal, and it has committed acts of aggression against neighbouring territories. The recent peace accords, however, have highlighted the fact that the SADF's major role is in fact the defence of apartheid within South Africa's borders.

NKOMATI: THE 'PEACE' THAT NEEDS A BIGGER ARMY

"For the present and foreseeable future, events and circumstances in Southern Africa will continue to exert considerable pressure on South Africa in the military sphere. It can therefore also be expected that the threat will make increasing demands on the SADF in respect of both full time and part time personnel."

1984 Defence White Paper

This statement highlights the fact that the SADF is primarily concerned with combatting an internal 'threat', a challenge to apartheid. MILITARY BALANCE, the journal of the International Institute for Strategic Studies recently showed that the combined military personnel of Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe amounted to about half the size of the SADF. Their combined defence spending is significantly less than one half the amount spent by the SADF. This together with peace agreements with Angola and Mozambique makes it very difficult to talk about South Africa facing a foreign threat. Indeed, the fact that as much as 33 percent of the 1983/4 Defence Budget was spent on 'Area Defence' illustrates the fact that the SADF is gearing up for an escalation civil war in South Africa. It is to fight this war, that the SADF has expanded the conscription of Whites and is planning to extend conscription to Coloureds and Indians.

Chapter 4.

Militarisation

A. Total War

"The resolution of conflict in the times in which we now live demands interdependent and coordinated action in all fields – military, psychological, economic, political, sociological, technological, diplomatic, ideological, cultural etc. . . . the striving for specific aims . . . must be coordinated with all means available to the state."

Defence White Paper, 1977.

Thousands of young white men walk around our cities in brown uniforms. At any stage up to 800 000 South Africans can be placed under arms by the SADF. Up to 400 000 young whites are being prepared through cadet training to fight in the SADF. The media is filled with stories of "heroism" on "the border", of the latest in SADF weaponry and with adverts to

buy a variety of military orientated products from Defence bonds to those which urge you to buy the "revolutionary new riveted yo-yo" on the grounds that "every SADF yo-yo bought provides another contribution to the cause. . .". More than 700 companies are involved in producing military hardware and commodities are marketed especially for national servicemen: from special banking accounts to a special "troopie pack" manufactured by Brut aftershave. Travelling the national road involves stopping at numerous army roadblocks, and passing endless "ride safe" signs for hitching soldiers.

In 1982, Minister of Foreign Affairs Pik Botha, appeared at a press conference wearing the uniform of a SADF Colonel.



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the direct control or influence of the SADF. The SADF was trying to act on their formula that the war was 80 per cent political and 20 per cent military.

Their strategy was to press for certain "reforms", which help alleviate the skilled labour shortage and give a minority of black South Africans a few concessions, which would hopefully make them more ably disposed to apartheid. Major General Charles Lloyd spoke of "giving them something worthwhile to defend in a revolutionary war...". On the other hand, the "defensibility" of the system would be enhanced by imposing increased control on the lives of most South Africans. The most recent highlight of this reform/repression strategy has been the new constitution and the Koornhof Bills.

THE RISE TO POWER

The policy direction promoted by the military and other 'verligte' elements was not supported by the Vorster-Van Den Berg leadership of the Nationalist Party. The ousting of this grouping after the Information Scandal is hence particularly significant, for it brought PW Botha into the premiership. As Minister of Defence his power base had always been the SADF, and he represented the new military verlig trend in Nationalist politics. The changes heralded by Botha's rise saw a rapid increase in the prominence of the SADF in government.

Botha ushered in an era of executive government, with effective decision-making being increasingly removed from Parliament and the cabinet and centralised among executive committees. Botha streamlined the bureaucracy down to five cabinet committees, the most important one being the State Security Council. In

addition he created 15 interdepartmental committees to coordinate the activities of all government departments in line with the total strategy. Each of these committees is chaired by an SADF officer, and the SADF participates in all their proceedings whether or not they are pertinent to SADF activity. In a cabinet reshuffle, General Magnus Malan was brought into the cabinet as Minister of Defence (without ever having been an MP), and Kobie Coetzee who had been Botha's deputy in the Defence portfolio, became Minister of Justice.

A "senior Nat MP" told the Sunday Express in 1977 that "the Government would not be able to meet future demands without giving heads of the Defence Force a definite say in the decision-making process in the country, and that South Africa may ultimately be ruled by a civilian-military junta".

If this is the case, then the State Security Council would certainly facilitate such a process. Professor Deon Geldenhuys and Dr Hennie Kotze of RAU recently caused a furor by publishing an exposé of the State Security Council. They showed that it was dominated by military and security personnel and how its decisions did not need the ratification of the cabinet. The cabinet's role in decisions had been greatly diminished, they argued, and "parliament had had also seen a further erosion of its already marginal role in the shaping of government decisions". Dr Robert Rotberg also suggests that the SSC stamps the military's authority on decisions, alleging, for example, that the extensive curfew provisions of the Koornhof Bills were included for 'security' reasons at the insistence of the SSC.

The SSC was formed in 1972 as an advisory body. After Botha's rise its functions were adapted to include 'inter-departmental coordination'. By 1979 it had become the body responsible for the "national strategic planning process", and its functions expanded to control policy decisions of all government departments. The extension of the powers of unelected bodies like the State Security Council which have extensive military representation, as well as the increasing involvement of military personnel at all levels of government, reflect the growing influence of the SADF on the direction of government in South Africa. P W Botha's new constitution, which, according to Rotberg, the SSC would have had to ratify, enhances the scope for the military to direct South Africa's immediate political future. The new constitution proposes the incorporation of unelected personnel (specifying

inter alia SADF personnel) into key cabinet and executive posts. Gerald Shaw of the Cape Times summed it up this way:

"The record suggests that as long as Mr Botha continues as Prime Minister the military will increasingly call the tune. Mr Botha's constitution, if enacted as it stands, will provide a facade of representative government behind which the military, working through the State Security Council, will pretty well run the country and rule the roost in the sub-continent."

So the SADF is not only involved in defending apartheid, it is actively involved in formulating government policy. When the role of a body like the State Security Council is considered, it is clear that the government's "reforms" and even their recent "peace" initiatives are part of a strategy devised by military leaders.

C. The Arms Economy

Our economy has become highly militarised in recent years, with massive spending (and increasing investment) being devoted to arms procurement. The Defence Budget has become a major portion of state expenditure: from R40 million in 1960, the real total today would be R4000 million. The military budget initially presented to parliament does not reveal the full extent of military spending. The SADF's budget can be increased through the Post Appropriation Bill (mini budget) early the following year. Aspects of Defence spending fall under different government departments: SADF is housing is financed by the Department of Commu-

nity Development, while funds for intelligence gathering operations are drawn from the Treasury Vote.

The Defence Budget has more than doubled since 1977 alone. Today the SADF costs South Africa More than R10 million per day. And the 1982 Defence White Paper warned that "the allocation of funds to the SADF will have to be increased accordingly if its required defence potential is to be maintained." The mass of South Africans who live in poverty often bear the burden: the recent increases in GST were motivated partly in terms of generating revenue for defence spending.

D. Arms Procurement


In 1963 the United Nations Security Council declared an advisory arms embargo on South Africa, in abhorrence of apartheid. In 1977 that became a mandatory embargo. This has made arms procurement overseas difficult for the SADF. It has not prevented certain Western countries from continuing arms supplies to SA in various ways: foreign companies establishing local subsidiaries or selling licensing agreements. South African weapons have been developed from Western aid.

The bulk of SADF arms, however, are produced by the mushrooming local arms industry. ARMSCOR (The Armaments Corporation) was established in 1964 to undertake local production. According to its chairperson, Cmdt. Piet Marais, ARMSCOR "is part of and exists only to render a service to the SADF. The aim of course is to procure arms at the lowest possible cost." By the early 1980's ARMSCOR was the third largest financial undertaking in South Africa (after Anglo-American and Barlow Rand). In the 10th year since 1974 its assets have grown by more than R1000 million. It is the largest arms manufacturer in the Southern Hemisphere, the 10th largest in the world.

The private sector has been drawn extensively into the arms industry, which provides an important avenue of investment particularly during a recession. 40 percent of South Africa's defence spending occurs directly in the private sector. Besides arms production the private sector is involved in the production of the massive logistical needs of the SADF. 80 percent of ARMSCOR production is undertaken in the private sector, with approximately 400 main contractors, 400 sub-contractors supplying main components and 1500 firms supplying smaller components. More than 100 000 people are employed in arms production in South Africa today.


It has also been alleged in the past that South Africa has developed nuclear arms, and has tested these in the Kalahari Desert and over the South Atlantic.

In 1983, former UN Commissioner for Namibia Sean Macbride alleged at a press conference in Paris that South Africa had developed nuclear weapons with assistance from NATO countries. South Africa certainly has the capability to produce nuclear weapons, and former Deputy Defence Minister Kobie Coetzee told Newsweek in 1979 that:



"If nuclear weapons are a last resort to defend oneself, it would be very stupid not to use them"

Large sections of our economy are gearing up for war, and the implications of this are highly disturbing for the direction of government policy. The SADF-private sector relationship has had a political dimension as well.



*South African nuclear weapons?
Repeated allegations*

The Generals and the Tycoons

"I want to unite the business leaders of South Africa . . . behind the SA Defence Force. I want to unite the private sector behind the SA Defence Force. I think I have succeeded in doing so."

P W Botha in Parliament, 1980.

The joint business military conference of 1977 and P W Botha's Carlton conference for businessmen in 1979, consolidated the political relations between big business and the military. More recently, business personnel have been seconded to play roles in the military, and representatives of large corporations have served on SADF committees. Most significant among these is the Defence Advisory Council, a body which advises on national policy formulation concerning the internal workings of the SADF and on arms procurement. The Council includes representatives from Anglo American, Barlow Rand, Tongaat and South African Breweries.

There has also been a close relationship between the private sector and the military on political projects. The Urban Foundation, set up by big business after the 1976 uprising to undertake social welfare projects with a "hearts and minds" dimension, has at times worked very closely with the SADF's Civic Action Programme.

The National Supplies Procurement Act of 1970 gives the Minister of Defence the power to effectively commandeer industrial plants for military use in times of crisis. The National Key Points Act of 1980 enables the Minister to declare any factory a "National Key Point", thereby demanding that prescribed security standards are complied with.

Large sections of our economy are being prepared for war, while business leaders are drawn into an alliance with the SADF in the defence of South Africa's 'free enterprise' system. The expanding SADF presence in the economy, and the

willingness of big business to be drawn into such an alliance are particularly disturbing phenomena, as they reflect a long term commitment to trying to solve South Africa's conflict by military means.

E. Training People for War



Cadets

Although the constant bombardment of SADF propaganda from the media is important, the school is one of the most important institutions through which white South Africans are socialised to accept the values and attitudes the SADF demands of them. In 1976, P. W. Botha told parliament that "Our education system must train people for war". Since then the SADF has moved into white education on a large scale.

"Youth Preparedness" (YP) programmes which incorporate cadets have become part of the compulsory curriculum at most schools. Before 1976 the YP programmes had not always incorporated cadets, and covered a wider range of topics than today. Government pressure has seen the "total onslaught" become a major theme in YP curricula, and expanded cadet training as the education system implements what amounts to an SADF orientation programme. Talks by SADF members on the "total onslaught" and by former pupils on their SADF experiences, and government and SADF propaganda films have become a feature of the programme. According to the Cape YP syllabus its aim is to create individuals who are "able to withstand the onslaught against (their) spiritual and physical integrity".

After 1976 the SADF became involved in school cadet training in order to prepare white youth for national service. By April 1980 125 000 children around the country were involved in cadet training, and by 1983 this figure had almost doubled. It was announced in 1980 that cadet training for



*South African public holiday:
a celebration of arms*



Teachers and pupils in uniform : catching them young

girls was also envisaged. The aims of the programme include rudimentary military and civil defence training, as well as ideological orientation for service in the SADF. The programme is also used to cultivate "leadership", with pupils becoming cadet "officers". A select group go on an SADF training camp at the end of each year. As one master at SACS in Cape Town put it, "It is very important that the boys learn to take commands even if it is your best buddy shouting those commands".

The ideological dimension is stressed by those involved in the programme. A teacher at Groote Schuur High in Cape Town put it this way:

"Because of the serious nature of the onslaught it is necessary that boys at school come to understand the total national strategy and the importance of fighting in the army. The cadet

programme is designed to instill this in the boys so that they are ready for the army when they get there."

The Cadet Programme is therefore also able to serve (not necessarily explicitly) as an anti-liberal force in English-speaking schools.

Besides endless drilling, cadet programmes usually include shooting practice in their curriculum. Some schools have chosen to provide more advanced training, including camouflage, map-reading, weapon stripping and even mock combat situations. School ceremonies have become characterised by displays of cadet marching: a microcosm of society outside. The wearing of brown cadet uniforms has also become compulsory, with teacher-officers turning out in full SADF uniforms on cadet day once a week. The extent of militarisation of white schools is vividly reflected in the