



SEKRETARIAAT VAN DIE  
STAATSVEILIGHEIDSRAD  
SECRETARIATE OF THE  
STATE SECURITY COUNCIL



INSTITUUT VIR OPLEIDING  
COMMISSION FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
TRAINING INSTITUTE

**BEKAMPING  
VAN DIE  
REWOLUSIONÊRE AANSLAG**

\* \* \*

**COMBATTING  
THE  
REVOLUTIONARY ONSLAUGHT**

IF YOU KNOW

THE ENEMY AND YOURSELF

YOU NEED NOT FEAR THE RESULTS

OF A HUNDRED BATTLES

\* \* \* \* \*

IF YOU KNOW

YOURSELF BUT NOT THE ENEMY

FOR EVERY VICTORY GAINED

YOU WILL ALSO SUFFER A DEFEAT

\* \* \* \* \*

IF YOU KNOW

NEITHER THE ENEMY NOR YOURSELF

YOU WILL SUCCUMB IN EVERY BATTLE

(SUN TZU)

## THE MISSION

1. IT HAS BEEN ASSUMED THAT THE MISSION, THE OBJECTIVE IS THE ELIMINATION OF THE GUERRILLA ENEMY, THE LIQUIDATION OF THE GUERRILLA MOVEMENT.
  - THIS IS INDEED A MISSION, IT IS, IN FACT, PROBABLY THE MISSION THAT THE COUNTERGUERRILLA IS SUPPOSED TO HAVE.
  - BUT IT IS NOT THE MISSION OF THE GOVERNMENT THAT IS THREATENED BY THE GUERRILLA.
  - IT IS NOT EVEN THE MISSION OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THAT GOVERNMENT.
    - \* THEIR BASIC MISSION IS THE PROTECTION OF THE PEOPLE OF THE COUNTRY AND/OR THE GOVERNMENT.
2. THE MISSION OF THE GOVERNMENT IS TO REPRESENT ITS PEOPLE AND TO DEFEND THEIR INTEREST.
  - IT IS THIS SIMPLE AND REASONABLE PURPOSE THAT IS OFTEN OBSCURED, TWISTED AND FRAGMENTED UNDER THE ASSAULT OF A GUERRILLA MOVEMENT.

- FREQUENTLY, ONE OF THE FIRST OBJECTIVES OF AN INSURRECTION IS TO DRAW THE GOVERNMENT INTO A POSITION THAT MAKES ELIMINATION OF THE GUERRILLA SEEM ITS CHIEF, IF NOT ITS ONLY, MISSION.
3. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE ULTIMATE OBJECTIVE OF GOVERNMENT, AND ITS PERTINENCE TO COUNTERGUERRILLA OPERATIONS, BECOMES APPARENT ONLY AFTER ANALYSIS OF THE OPPOSING FORCES AT WORK IN A NATION UNDER GUERRILLA ATTACK.
- ON ONE SIDE IS THE GUERRILLA, WHO HAS A SIMPLE, PRACTICAL PROGRAM :
    - \* TO STAY CLOSE TO THE PEOPLE,
    - \* USING THEM AT ONCE AS HIS SUPPORT AND HIS SHIELD,
    - \* ROUSING THEM TO "SELF-DEFENSE" BASED ON THEIR OWN ILLS AND THE REMEDIES HE HAS PROMISED -
    - \* A RELATIONSHIP AS INTIMATE AS A FAMILY COUNCIL.

- ON THE OTHER SIDE IS THE GOVERNMENT,
- \* CONCENTRATED IN A NATIONAL CAPITAL,
- \* OBLIGATED TO PROVIDE SECURITY, ECONOMIC  
AND SOCIAL HEALTH, PROTECTION FOR ITS  
WEALTHIEST AS WELL AS ITS POOREST CITIZEN,  
AND
- \* OBLIGATED TOO, TO PROVIDE A PLACE AND A  
VOICE IN WORLD AFFAIRS FOR THE NATION.
- \* WHAT THE GUERRILLA IS PROMISING FOR SOME  
DISTANT DAY THE GOVERNMENT IS BOUND - BY  
ITS VERY EXISTENCE - TO PROVIDE IMMEDIATELY,
- \* AND THE RISE OF THE GUERRILLA MOVEMENT BRINGS  
A NEW AND HEAVY DUTY TO DESTROY THE GUERRILLA  
BEFORE HIS ACTIVITIES FORCE A NEW - AND UN-  
TESTED - SYSTEM ON THE PEOPLE.
- \* THAT DUTY IS FURTHER COMPLICATED BY THE  
GOVERNMENT'S OBLIGATION TO MAINTAIN SOME  
MEASURE OF FREEDOM FOR ITS INDIVIDUAL  
CITIZENS.

- THE GUERRILLA, ON THE OTHER HAND, IS FIGHTING FOR A CAUSE.
- \* HIS LEADERS MAY HAVE MISSTATED THAT CAUSE.
- \* THEY MAY HAVE CONCEALED THEIR TRUE OBJECTIVES.
- \* BUT THEY HAVE PROVIDED AN IDEAL FOR THE FIGHTING MAN.
- \* THEY HAVE PROVIDED A CAUSE SO APPEALING THAT MEN ARE WILLING TO FIGHT FOR IT, TO SHOW THE TENACITY OF PURPOSE, THE WILLINGNESS TO WORK, TO ENDURE, AND TO SUFFER THAT IS THE ESSENTIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE GUERRILLA.
- \* SUPPORTERS OF THE GUERRILLA MUST SYMPATHIZE WITH THAT IDEAL AND SHARE IN THE MOTIVATION FOR ITS ACHIEVEMENT, SINCE THEY DEPRIVE THEMSELVES IN ORDER TO SUPPORT THE GUERRILLA AND ARE QUITE POSSIBLY RISKING THEIR LIVES AND THOSE OF THEIR FAMILIES AS WELL.

- TO COPE WITH MEN SO MOTIVATED THE MEMBERS OF GOVERNMENT, THE DEFENDERS OF GOVERNMENT, AND THE SUPPORTERS OF GOVERNMENT MUST MUSTER
  - \* A COMPARABLE DETERMINATION,
  - \* A COMPARABLE TENACITY,
  - \* A COMPARABLE CAPACITY FOR SELF-SACRIFICE IN THE PURSUIT OF VICTORY.
  
- 4. FOR MOST PEOPLE, LIQUIDATION OF THE GUERRILLA MOVEMENT DOES NOT IN ITSELF CONSTITUTE A SUFFICIENT MOTIVE TO ROUSE THEM TO MATCH THE EFFORTS OF THE GUERRILLA.
  - MOST PEOPLE NEED SOMETHING MORE THAN A TENUOUS LOYALTY TO AN ABSTRACT IDEAL,
  
  - THEY NEED A CAUSE THEY CAN RECOGNIZE AS WORTH STRUGGLING, WORKING, EVEN SUFFERING TO ACCOMPLISH,
    - \* THEY NEED TO HAVE THAT CAUSE EXPLAINED IN TERMS THEY CAN UNDERSTAND.

- \* THEY NEED TO UNDERSTAND HOW THEY, AS INDIVIDUALS, CAN PARTICIPATE.

5. THE PERSONNEL OF GOVERNMENT

- MUST UNDERSTAND NOT ONLY THE MISSION OF GOVERNMENT,
- THEY MUST UNDERSTAND ALSO THE NECESSITY FOR MAKING THEIR EVERY ACTION FURTHER THAT MISSION.
- FINALLY, THEY MUST CONVINCE THE GOVERNED THAT THEY ARE EFFECTIVELY SEEKING TO ADVANCE THAT MISSION.

6. BASICALLY, THE LONG RECORD OF THE PHILLIPPINE GOVERNMENT'S FAILURE TO ELIMINATE THE HUK

- WAS DUE

- \* TO THE FAILURE OF MEN AT ALL LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT TO UNDERSTAND THEIR MISSION,



- \* THEIR FAILURE TO CONCENTRATE ON THE MAIN OBJECTIVE OF GOVERNMENT AND
  - \* TO MAKE THEIR ACTIONS CLEARLY COMPATIBLE WITH SERVICE TO THE PEOPLE.
- THERE WERE SINS, BUT THEY WERE SINS MORE OF OMISSION THAN COMMISSION.
- \* THERE WAS A BREAKDOWN IN COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN PEOPLE AND OFFICIALS.
  - \* THE OFFICIALS' WORDS WERE NOT ALWAYS CONSONANT WITH THEIR DEEDS - AND WHEN THERE WAS A CONFLICT, THE PEOPLE BELIEVED THE DEEDS RATHER THAN THE WORDS.
  - \* HUK PROPAGANDISTS SEIZED ON EVERY MISDEED WITHIN GOVERNMENT, PROCLAIMING THE OCCASIONAL DISHONEST OR INEFFICIENT OFFICIAL TYPICAL OF THE MEN IN GOVERNMENT.
  - \* THE MANY WORTHWHILE ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE GOVERNMENT WERE NOT EFFECTIVELY AND CONVINCINGLY BROUGHT TO THE ATTENTION OF THE PEOPLE.

- \* THE PRESS AND RADIO WERE LARGELY FILLED WITH CHARGES AND DEFENSES, WITH PROMISES AND DENUNCIATIONS.

MORE DEEP-SEATED AND FAR-REACHING THAN THE FAILURE IN COMMUNICATIONS, HOWEVER, WAS THE FAILURE TO CLARIFY THE MISSION AND THE URGENCY OF THAT MISSION, A FAILURE THAT VERY NEARLY CAUSED THE COLLAPSE OF THE GOVERNMENT.

- \* THE MISSION - TO PROTECT, REPRESENT, AND DEFEND THE INTERESTS OF THE PEOPLE - WAS TAKEN FOR GRANTED.
- \* STRESS WAS PLACED INSTEAD ON THE MYRIAD SECONDARY OBJECTIVES, EACH TREATED AS A CRISIS, WITH ANY SUCCESS HAILED AS THE END OF CRISIS.
- \* NONE OF THESE "CRISES" HAD THE BROAD APPEAL THAT WOULD HAVE OPENED THE WAY FOR A CRUSADE - THE APPEAL NECESSARY TO ENGAGE THE PEOPLE AND TO PERSUADE THEM TO SUBORDINATE THEIR INDIVIDUAL AIMS.

- \* THE FILIPINO SOLDIER AND POLITICIAN MAY OR MAY NOT HAVE REALISED HOW IMPORTANT LIQUIDATION OF THE HUK MOVEMENT COULD BE, BUT NO ONE WAS REMINDING HIM OF THIS.
- \* NO ONE WAS IMPRESSING ON HIM THE IMPORTANCE OF THIS INDIVIDUAL CONTRIBUTION OR DELINEATING THE AREAS OF THAT CONTRIBUTION.

7. TO BE STABLE AND POPULAR, ABOVE ALL TO BE SUCCESSFUL IN ELIMINATING A GUERRILLA MOVEMENT THAT THREATENS ITS VERY EXISTENCE, GOVERNMENT, AND THE PEOPLE WHO COMPOSE IT, MUST DO THREE THINGS :

- UNDERSTAND THE PRIMARY MISSION -

- \* THE PROVISION OF EFFECTIVE GOVERNMENT
- \* THAT REPRESENTS THE WISHES OF THE GOVERNED AND
- \* RESPECTS THEIR RIGHTS.

- ENSURE THAT ALL ACTIONS OF THE GOVERNMENT, AND ITS PERSONNEL, CLEARLY FURTHER THE PRIMARY MISSION.
  - CONVINCE THE GOVERNED THAT THE GOVERNMENT IS EARNESTLY AND EFFECTIVELY SEEKING TO ACCOMPLISH THE FUNCTIONS STATED .
8. THE MISSION MUST BE CLEAR AND UNMISTAKABLE AND THE SINGLE MAJOR OBJECTIVE TO WHICH EVERYTHING ELSE MUST CONTRIBUTE.
- NO ONE MUST BE ALLOWED TO FORGET THIS OR PERMIT SECONDARY OBJECTIVES TO APPEAR MORE IMPORTANT THAN THE PRIMARY ONE.
  - MANY THINGS MUST BE DONE TO ACHIEVE THIS OBJECTIVE, AND ONE OF THE MOST IMMEDIATE TASKS IS ELIMINATION OF THE THREAT
    - \* TO THE STABILITY OF GOVERNMENT AND
    - \* TO THE WELFARE OF THE GOVERNED
- THAT THE GUERRILLA MOVEMENT PRESENTS.

- EVERY MEANS POSSIBLE MUST BE SOUGHT TO MAKE IT CLEAR TO EVERYONE FROM PRESIDENT TO UNCOMMITTED CITIZEN, FROM SENATOR TO GENERAL TO SOLDIER AND INDIVIDUAL VOTER, THAT THE REAL ULTIMATE OBJECTIVE OF GOVERNMENT WAS THE ONE TO WHICH HIS AND THEIR ENERGIES MUST BE DEVOTED.
9. IT STILL DEMANDS THE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF MANY DIFFICULT TASKS.
- THESE TASKS INVOLVE, FOR THE MOST PART,
    - \* CHANGING THE WAYS IN WHICH THINGS ARE DONE;
    - \* SECURING THE ADOPTION OF TACTICS CONSONANT WITH THE MISSION AND WITH THE NECESSITY FOR SECURING PUBLIC SUPPORT.

- MANY MILITARY PRACTICES HAVE TO BE CHANGED RADICALLY TO SECURE POPULAR ACCEPTANCE OF THE CONCEPT THAT THE MILITARY ARE THE PROTECTORS OF THE CIVIL POPULATION.
  
- \* OBVIOUSLY, SUCH PRACTICES AS AREA CLEARANCE BY SLAUGHTERING EVERY MOVING THING COULD NEVER BE EMPLOYED AGAINST THE GUERRILLAS, FOR THIS IS ONLY THE MOST STRINGENT OF VARIOUS TECHNIQUES THAT WOULD INFLICT UNDUE HARDSHIP ON PEOPLE NOT PROVED TO BE GUERRILLAS OR GUERRILLA SUPPORTERS.
  
- \* THE SUSPENSION OF CIVIL LIBERTIES TRADITIONAL TO THE CULTURE IS SIMILARLY EXCLUDED, UNLESS THE PEOPLE COULD BE PERSUADED THAT SUCH MEASURES ARE NEEDED FOR THEIR OWN PROTECTION.
  
- \* THE ESTABLISHMENT OF CHECKPOINTS IS TYPICAL OF PRACTICES THAT CREATE WIDESPREAD ILL WILL FOR THE FORCES.

- \* EVEN MILITARY MEASURES DIRECTED SOLELY AGAINST THE ENEMY - THE GUERRILLA AND HIS SUPPORTERS - MUST BE WEIGHED FOR THEIR EFFECT ON THE ATTITUDE OF THE PEOPLE TOWARD THEIR GOVERNMENT AS WELL AS FOR THEIR MILITARY VALUE.
  
- \* THERE ARE OTHER PRACTICES OF THE MILITARY, SUCH AS THE VILLAGE-SCREENING OPERATION, WHICH CREATE ILL WILL TOWARD THE ARMED FORCES, YET ARE UNDENIABLY EFFECTIVE MEANS OF HITTING ACTIVE GUERRILLAS.
  
- THE ANSWER LAY IN CHANGING THE ATTITUDES OF THE SOLDIERS TOWARD THE CIVILIANS, TOWARD THE GUERRILLAS - IN FACT TOWARD THE WAR.
  
- \* SOLDIERS IN THE FIELD ARE NOT TO LOOK UPON THE CIVILIAN POPULATION IN THE AREA OF OPERATIONS AS COMPOSED LARGELY OF ENEMIES OR ENEMY SUPPORTERS, PEOPLE WHOSE PROTECTION WAS NO PART OF THEIR MISSION.

- \* THESE ATTITUDES HAVE TO BE CHANGED. ESSENTIALLY, IT MEANS INSTILLING IN THE SOLDIER, AT ALL ECHELONS, AN UNDERSTANDING OF THE MISSION OF GOVERNMENT, AND THE TRUE MISSION OF THE ARMED FORCES.
- THIS IS NOT A SIMPLE PROCESS.
- \* IT INVOLVES CONVINCING THE SOLDIER THAT THE GOVERNMENT IS DEDICATED TO, AND AGGRESSIVELY PURSUING, ITS MISSION
- \* WHICH NECESSARILY INCLUDE EFFECTIVE SUPPORT FOR THE SOLDIER.
- \* IT INVOLVES, TOO, DEMANDING THAT THE SOLDIER EFFECTIVELY ACCOMPLISH HIS MISSION IN ALL ITS ASPECTS, FROM PROTECTING CIVILIANS TO AGGRESSIVELY PURSUING AND IMPOSING HIS WILL ON THE GUERRILLA.
- \* ONE OF THE MOVES THAT CONVINCES THE SOLDIER IS THE EMPHASIS THE GOVERNMENT PLACE ON NEUTRALIZING SUPPORT FOR THE ENEMY BY ACTIONS OTHER THAN MILITARY.



10. ONLY IN AN ANTIGUERRILLA EFFORT DIRECTED OR, AT LEAST, WHOLEHEARTEDLY SUPPORTED BY THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE IS IT POSSIBLE TO USE ALL GOVERNMENT AGENCIES.
11. IN THE VERY PROPAGANDA SLOGANS THE GUERRILLAS FIND SUCCESSFUL, ONE MAY OFTEN FIND THE CLUE TO WHICH DEPARTMENT OF GOVERNMENT SHOULD TAKE COUNTERING ACTION.

- FOR INSTANCE :

- \* WHEN THE GUERRILLAS MAKE PROFITABLE USE OF THE SLOGAN "LAND FOR THE LANDLESS" THEN THE MINISTRY RESPONSIBLE FOR ALLOCATING AND/OR DEVELOPING LAND SHOULD PROCLAIM THE GOVERNMENTS INTENTION OF MAKING LAND AVAILABLE WITHIN THE LIMITS OF ITS RESOURCES FOR THOSE WHO HONESTLY DESIRE IT AND WILL WORK FOR IT.
- \* IF AN EFFECTIVE SLOGAN OF THE GUERRILLAS IS A DEMAND FOR "EQUAL JUSTICE FOR ALL", THEN THE MINISTRY OF JUSTICE MUST FIND SOME DRAMATIC WAY OF DEMONSTRATING THAT JUSTICE IS IN FACT DISPENSED EQUALLY TO ALL.

- IN THE PHILIPPINES, NO CABINET MINISTER DENIED THE DESIRABILITY OF SUCH ACTIONS. BUT NONE OF THE HIGH OFFICIALS IN GOVERNMENT UNDERSTOOD THE URGENCY FOR ACTION IN HIS OWN DEPARTMENT.
  
- \* THE SECRETARY FOR AGRICULTURE, FOR INSTANCE, WAS CONCERNED WITH RESTORING NORMAL AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION. THE ENORMITY OF THESE TASKS BLINDED HIM TO THE URGENCY, IF HIS GOVERNMENT WAS TO SURVIVE, OF RESPONDING TO THE DESIRES, TO THE DEMANDS SO SKILLFULLY ELABORATED AND EXACERBATED BY THE HUK, FOR LAND FOR THE LANDLESS. HIS ANSWER WAS : A RESETTLEMENT PROGRAM WAS IN PROGRESS, BUT IT WAS NOT IMPORTANT IN COMPARISON WITH OTHER AGRICULTURAL EMERGENCIES.

- \* THE SAME SORT OF REACTION CAME FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE. THAT DEPARTMENT WAS STAGGERING UNDER AN OVERWHELMING WORK LOAD. OFFICIALS WERE FOR THE MOST PART SINCERE, EVEN EFFICIENT, BUT THEY WERE MUCH TOO BUSY TO EXPEND TIME AND ATTENTION ON PETTY CASES, MUCH LESS ON PUBLICIZING THEIR ACTIONS ON SUCH CASES. AND THE SECRETARY WAS NOT INCLINED TO DIGNIFY THE UNWARRANTED BROADSIDE ATTACKS BEING MADE ON HIS DEPARTMENT BY ANY DRAMATIC ACTION.

12. THE BASIC PLAN FOR COUNTERGUERRILLA ACTION :

- MUST PROVIDE FOR IMMEDIATE AND EFFECTIVE ACTION TO :
- \* ENSURE NATIONAL SECURITY AND EFFECTIVE ADMINISTRATION;
- \* KEEP ACTIONS OF GOVERNMENT COMPATIBLE WITH THE OBJECTIVES OF GOVERNMENT;

- \* INFORM AND CONVINCE THE PEOPLE (INCLUDING THE GUERRILLAS) THAT THE ADMINISTRATION HAS A CAUSE AND THAT THEY SHOULD HELP THAT CAUSE (AN EFFECTIVE AND DESIRABLE GOVERNMENT).
  
- AT VARIOUS TIMES AND UNDER CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES, ONE OF THESE THREE ELEMENTS MAY TAKE PRECEDENCE OVER THE OTHERS, BUT NONE CAN BE FORGOTTEN.
  
- THE TASK BECOMES ONE OF ORGANIZING AND EMPLOYING ALL AVAILABLE RESOURCES FOR TRANSLATING THESE ELEMENTS INTO POSITIVE ACTION, POSITIVE ACHIEVEMENT.

13. IN THE PHILIPPINE :

- HIGH OFFICIALS IN THE ADMINISTRATION UNANIMOUSLY AGREED ON THE VALIDITY AND THE DESIRABILITY OF THE MISSION, BUT THEY FAILED TO RELATE IT TO THEIR OWN ACTIVITIES.

- TO OBTAIN THE BALANCED EFFORT NECESSARY TO WIN FOR THE GOVERNMENT THE NECESSARY POPULAR SUPPORT, ESPECIALLY FROM THE APATHETIC OR UNCOMMITTED MAJORITY, MAGSAYSAY WAS FORCED TO USE THE ARMED FORCES, THE PRESS, PUBLIC-SPIRITED CITIZENS. EVERYONE AND EVERYTHING POSSIBLE WAS MADE TO SERVE THIS PURPOSE.
  
- FURTHER, AS A FORMER GUERRILLA, MAGSAYSAY
  - \* REALIZED NOT ONLY THE NECESSITY FOR OBTAINING MAXIMUM COMMITMENT TO THE STRUGGLE,
  
  - \* HE REALIZED ALSO THE BASIC IMPERATIVE OF SUCCESSFUL COUNTERGUERRILLA WAR : THE NEED TO SEIZE THE INITIATIVE FROM THE GUERRILLA ON ALL FRONTS, PSYCHOLOGICAL AS WELL AS MILITARY.

- UNDERSTANDING ALSO THAT ONLY ACTIVE REFORM IN THE GOVERNMENT COULD WIN THE PEOPLE TO ITS SUPPORT, MAGSAYSAY HIMSELF BECAME THE MOST CONVINCING ARGUMENT THAT REFORM WAS IN PROCESS.
  - \* NO ONE, SEEING HIM IN ACTION, COULD DOUBT HIS DETERMINATION TO MAKE GOOD THE CLAIM THAT THE SOLDIERS WERE THE PROTECTORS OF THE PEOPLE, THE MEMBERS OF GOVERNMENT THE SERVANTS OF THE PUBLIC.
  - \* HE INSPIRED, AS WELL AS REQUIRED, THOSE UNDER HIS LEADERSHIP TO PROVE THEIR DEDICATION AND SENSE OF MISSION.
- THIS REDEDICATION TO THE ULTIMATE MISSION OF GOVERNMENT
  - \* OBVIOUSLY IMPOSED LIMITATIONS ON THE ACTIONS THAT COULD BE TAKEN.
  - \* MORE, IT IMPOSED STIFFER REQUIREMENTS FOR EFFECTIVE ACTION.

- TO DRAMATIZE THE INTENTION TO AFFORD THE MAXIMUM ASSISTANCE AND PROTECTION TO THOSE WHO WISHED TO BE GOOD CITIZENS, AND ITS COROLLARY OF RELENTLESS ACTION AGAINST THOSE WHO WISHED HARM TO GOOD CITIZENS, MAGSAYSAY ANNOUNCED THE POLICY OF "ALL-OUT FRIENDSHIP OR ALL-OUT FORCE".
14. IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT A COUNTERGUERRILLA LEADER UNDERSTAND, AND PURSUE, THE MISSION OF THE GOVERNMENT, AS WELL AS THE IMMEDIATE POLITICAL AND MILITARY ACTIONS NECESSARY TO DEFEAT THE GUERRILLA.
15. IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT MILITARY ACTIONS CONTRIBUTE TO THE OVER-ALL MISSION OF CONVINCING PEOPLE OF THE GOOD FAITH OF THEIR GOVERNMENT.
- IN COUNTERGUERRILLA WARFARE, AS DISTINGUISHED FROM CONVENTIONAL OPERATIONS, THE MILITARY IS THROWN INTO CLOSE CONTACT WITH THE CIVILIANS IN THE AREA OF OPERATIONS - SINCE THE GUERRILLAS USE THE CIVILIANS AS A SHIELD AND AS A SOURCE OF SUPPLIES.

- WHETHER HIS MISSION IS TO ATTACK THE GUERRILLAS, OR TO PROTECT THE PEOPLE FROM GUERRILLA ATTACKS, THE SOLDIER MUST ACT IN SUCH CLOSE PROXIMITY TO THE PEOPLE THAT THE MOST SIGNIFICANT PART OF THE ENVIRONMENT OF ANTIGUERRILLA WARFARE
  - \* IS NEITHER THE TERRAIN NOR THE WEATHER;
  - \* IT IS THE EVER-PRESENT "SEA" OF CIVILIANS.
  
- IN MOVING IN THIS SEA,
  - \* MILITARY PERSONNEL MUST, OF COURSE, BE EFFECTIVE IF THEY ENCOUNTER GUERRILLAS.
  - \* MORE, THEY MUST SO ACT AS TO CARRY CON=  
VICTION TO THE CIVILIANS THAT THEY ARE NOT SHARKS SEEKING TO SNAP UP GUERRILLAS AND ANY OTHER "FISH" THAT COME THEIR WAY;
  - \* BUT THAT, INSTEAD, THEY ARE SEEKING TO DRIVE AWAY THE GUERRILLA SHARKS,
  - \* AND TO HELP IN OTHER WAYS AS WELL.



- THE CRITICAL MILITARY NEED IN ANTIGUERRILLA OPERATIONS IS
  - \* TO OBTAIN INFORMATION ABOUT THE GUERRILLAS, AND
  - \* TO DENY THEM INFORMATION ABOUT FRIENDLY FORCES.
  - \* THIS IS MOST EFFECTIVELY AND ECONOMICALLY ACCOMPLISHED BY SECURING CIVILIAN COOPERATION.
  
- A FORM OF MILITARY ORGANIZATION MUST BE PROVIDED CAPABLE OF EFFECTIVE ACCEPTANCE OF RESPONSIBILITY IN A GIVEN REGION FOR OPERATIONS AGAINST THE GUERRILLAS, AND FOR THE INHABITANTS.
  - \* WHATEVER FORM OF ORGANIZATION IS CHOSEN, IT MUST BE ONE THAT WILL PROVE TO THE LOCAL CITIZENS THAT THE PRIMARY MISSION OF THE TROOPS IS THE WELFARE OF THE NATION AND THE PROTECTION OF ITS CITIZENRY.

- \* EFFECTIVE ACTION AGAINST THE GUERRILLAS IS ESSENTIAL, BUT EFFECTIVE ACTION AGAINST THE GUERRILLAS THAT SIMULTANEOUSLY ALIENATES THE PEOPLE IS SELF-DEFEATING.
- \* HOWEVER, EFFECTIVE ACTION THAT GAINS THE SUPPORT OF THE PEOPLE FOR THE ARMED FORCES WILL ALMOST CERTAINLY LEAD TO EFFECTIVE ACTION AGAINST THE GUERRILLAS.
- PLANNING AND ORGANISING EFFECTIVE ACTION TO GAIN THE SUPPORT FOR THE ARMED FORCES PARALLELS THE STEPS NEEDED TO GAIN THE SUPPORT OF THE PEOPLE FOR THE GOVERNMENT. BOTH MAY OFTEN BE ACHIEVED BY DRAMATIC ATTACK ON CONDITIONS THAT HAVE GIVEN RISE TO EFFECTIVE SLOGANS OF THE GUERRILLAS,
- \* A POPULAR GRIEVANCE USUALLY TO BE FOUND IN COUNTRIES SUBJECTED TO PROLONGED GUERRILLA AND ANTIGUERRILLA EFFORT, IS THE BEHAVIOUR OF THE TROOPS.

- \* TROOP MISBEHAVIOUR UNDER THESE CONDITIONS RESULTS NOT ALONE FROM LACK OF DISCIPLINE; MORE OFTEN, IT IS TRACEABLE SIMPLY TO INADEQUATE APPRECIATION BY THE COMMAND OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF ANTIGUERRILLA OPERATIONS.
  
  - \* FOOD (OR COMFORTS) FOR SOLDIERS, ESPECIALLY FOR TROOPS ON PATROL OR ACTIVELY ENGAGED IN OPERATIONS, IS OFTEN A PROBLEM THAT GENERATES UNNECESSARY CIVILIAN HOSTILITY.
  
  - \* FORAGING AND STEALING BY COUNTERGUERRILLAS MUST BE STOPPED IF POPULAR SUPPORT FOR THEM IS TO BE ACHIEVED.
- MAGSAYSAY SAID THAT EVERY MEMBER OF THE ARMED FORCES HAD TWO MISSIONS :
- \* HE MUST BE AN AMBASSADOR SEEKING TO BUILD GOOD WILL FOR HIS OUTFIT AND HIS GOVERNMENT
  
  - \* HE MUST ALSO BE A FIGHTER SEEKING TO KILL OR CAPTURE AT LEAST ONE ENEMY.

16. EFFECTIVE ACTION TO GAIN POPULAR SUPPORT USUALLY NECESSITATES MANY ACTIVITIES NOT IN THE NORMAL ROLE OF THE ARMED FORCES. SOME OF THESE SHOULD BE UNDERTAKEN BY OTHER MORE APPROPRIATE AGENCIES OF GOVERNMENT.

- THESE ACTIONS (ALTHOUGH OFTEN PROMPTED BY GRIEVANCES EXPLOITED BY THE GUERRILLAS) MUST NOT APPEAR TO BE TAKEN BECAUSE OF GUERRILLA DEMANDS, BUT MUST RATHER SEEM TO PROVE THE FUTILITY OR MALICE OF THE GUERRILLAS.

- FOR EXAMPLE, "LAND FOR THE LANDLESS" WAS AN EFFECTIVE BATTLE CRY FOR THE HUK.

\* THE REACTION TO THIS WAS SO HIGHLY EMOTIONAL THAT THE SLOGAN COULD NOT BE COUNTERED; IT HAD TO BE CAPTURED BY DRAMATIC GOVERNMENT ACTION.

\* THE NEED FOR LAND-SETTLEMENT PROGRAMS, AT LEAST AS A POLITICAL MEASURE, HAD LONG BEEN ACKNOWLEDGED BY THE GOVERNMENT AND A PROGRAM OF LAND-SETTLEMENT WAS ACTUALLY UNDER WAY.

- \* BUT THE PROGRAM LACKED EMPHASIS, DRAMA, AND POPULAR APPEAL.
- \* THE OFFICIALS IN CHARGE OF THE PROGRAM COULD SEE NO NEED FOR EXPLOITING THEIR TASKS AS PART OF THE ANTIGUERRILLA EFFORT.
- \* IDEALLY, THEY SHOULD HAVE EXPANDED THIS PROGRAM WITH A COORDINATED PUBLICITY PROGRAM TO DRIVE HOME THE REALIZATION THAT ANYONE WHO CLAIMED TO BE FIGHTING TO GET LAND OF HIS OWN NEEDED ONLY TO SURRENDER, AND DEMONSTRATE HIS SINCERITY, IN ORDER TO BE HELPED TO HIS OWN FARM.
- ANOTHER PLEA, "EQUAL JUSTICE FOR ALL", HAD FOUND WIDESPREAD SUPPORT.
- \* TRADITIONALLY, THERE WERE COMPLAINTS THAT THE AGENCIES OF GOVERNMENT AND ESPECIALLY THE COURTS, LISTENED ONLY TO THE RICH AND INFLUENTIAL. PEASANTS BELIEVED THAT THEY COULD NOT HOPE FOR A FAIR HEARING, MUCH LESS JUSTICE, IN COURT UNLESS THEY COULD HIRE AN EXPENSIVE LAWYER.

- \* OBVIOUSLY, AN EFFECTIVE, AGGRESSIVE, PUBLIC DEFENDER PROGRAM, WAS IN ORDER.
- \* OBVIOUSLY, TOO, IF THIS PROGRAM WAS REALLY TO PAY OFF IN TERMS OF WINNING SUPPORT FOR THE GOVERNMENT, IT MUST BE EFFECTIVELY PUBLICIZED.
- THE PHILIPPINES IS A COUNTRY WHERE PEOPLE HAVE A PASSION FOR EDUCATION.
- \* MANY OF THE SCHOOLHOUSES HAD BEEN DESTROYED DURING THE JAPANESE OCCUPATION. MANY OF THOSE THAT WERE LEFT, WERE EITHER DESTROYED DURING THE CAMPAIGNS AGAINST THE HUK OR WERE USED BY THE MILITARY AS TROOP HEAD QUARTERS.
- \* REALIZING THE IMPORTANCE PLACED ON EDUCATION, MAGSAYSAY ORDERED THE TROOPS OUT OF THE SCHOOLHOUSES - EXCEPT FOR THOSE SOLDIERS WHO COULD ACT AS TEACHERS.

- \* MORE THAN THAT, HE ENCOURAGED TROOP UNITS TO BUILD SCHOOLHOUSES IN THEIR SPARE TIME.
- \* WHEN THE NATIONAL SITUATION PERMITTED, HE ORGANIZED A SPECIAL UNIT OF ARMY ENGINEERS THAT PREPARED 4 000 PREFABRICATED SCHOOL=  
HOUSES TO BE ERECTED BY TROOPS OR CIVILIANS.
- AS MAGSAYSAY SAW IT, THE LIMITED MISSION GIVEN HIM OF ELIMINATING THE GUERRILLA REBELLION WAS IN=EXTRICABLY LINKED WITH THE NATIONAL MISSION. ACCORDINGLY, HE FELT FREE TO DO ANYTHING THAT, IN HIS JUDGEMENT, WOULD ADVANCE THE NATIONAL MISSION.
- IN HIS LETTER OF RESIGNATION FROM THE POST OF SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, WRITTEN TO THE PRESIDENT (28 FEBRUARY, 1953) MAGSAYSAY SAID :
  - \* "UNDER YOUR CONCEPT OF MY DUTIES AS SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, MY JOB IS JUST TO GO ON KILLING HUK.
  - \* BUT YOU MUST REALIZE THAT WE CANNOT SOLVE THE PROBLEM OF DISSIDENCE SIMPLY BY MILITARY MEASURES.

- \* IT WOULD BE FUTILE TO GO ON KILLING HUK, WHILE THE ADMINISTRATION CONTINUES TO BREED DISSIDENCE BY NEGLECTING THE PROBLEMS OF OUR MASSES".

17. THE LEADER OF ANTIGUERRILLA OPERATIONS IN A NATION SHOULD BE THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE.

- ONLY HE CAN ASSURE

- \* THAT THE NECESSARY ACTIONS ARE TAKEN BY THE APPROPRIATE AGENCY OF GOVERNMENT;

- \* THAT EXISTING ORGANIZATIONS, PLANS, AND ASSETS ARE USED TO THE BEST EFFECT.

- IF UNDERTAKEN IN THIS WAY,

- \* THE ACTIONS NECESSARY TO COUNTER THE GUERRILLA THREAT CAN BETTER BE FITTED INTO THE LONG-RANGE PROGRAMS OF GOVERNMENT,

- \* AND PRESUMABLY ASSIGNED TO THE MEN BEST FITTED FOR THE TASKS.



- \* THERE WILL BE LESS WASTE MOTION AND DUPLI-  
CATION OF EFFORT.
- \* THERE WILL BE FAR BETTER ASSURANCE OF A  
CONTINUATION OF LONG-RANGE PROGRAMS.

18. THERE ARE MORE WAYS THAN ONE TO SKIN A CAT.

- IF ONE AGENCY OF GOVERNMENT CANNOT ACCOMPLISH A FUNCTION NECESSARY TO SUCCESSFUL PROSECUTION OF THE COUNTERGUERRILLA EFFORT, ANOTHER AGENCY, OR EVEN A CIVILIAN ORGANIZATION MUST DO IT.
- IF NO ORGANIZATION FOR A PURPOSE EXISTS, ONE MAY BE IMPROVISED, OR THE TASK ACCOMPLISHED WITHOUT ORGANIZATION.
- IF A NEEDED LAW DOES NOT EXIST, AND CANNOT BE SECURED, THERE MAY BE WAYS TO ACCOMPLISH THE TASK WITH NO OTHER LAW THAN THE CONSENT OF THE PEOPLE.

19. THERE HAS BEEN MUCH DISCUSSION OF THE PROPER RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN MILITARY AND CIVILIAN AUTHORITIES AT PROVINCIAL AND LOWER LEVELS IN "COUNTERINSURGENCY" SITUATIONS.

- THE BRITISH HAVE EVOLVED A SYSTEM, APPARENTLY THEIR STANDARD, OF FORMAL COMMITTEES, CHAIRED BY THE CIVILIAN EXECUTIVE, INCLUDING MILITARY, POLICE, AND INTELLIGENCE CHIEFS OF THE AREA, AUGMENTED BY CIVILIANS.
- \* THIS IS UNDOUBTEDLY EFFECTIVE UNDER THE CONDITIONS OF RESPECT FOR LAW AND MUTUAL TRUST FOUND IN THEIR TERRITORIES.
- \* IN MANY PARTS OF THE WORLD, SUCH A SET-UP WOULD BE ALMOST A GUARANTEE OF DELAY AND INEFFECTIVENESS.

- COUNTERGUERRILLA OPERATIONS IN THE PHILIPPINES WERE CARRIED OUT WITHOUT ANY FORMAL ARRANGEMENTS GOVERNING MILITARY AND CIVILIAN RELATIONSHIPS ON THE WORKING LEVEL.
  
- \* SINCE THE LOCAL EXECUTIVES WERE EITHER ELECTED BY THE PEOPLE UNDER THEIR JURISDICTION OR APPOINTED BY THE NEXT HIGHER ELECTED OFFICIAL, THE CIVILIANS HAD POLITICAL INFLUENCE THAT THEY DID NOT HESITATE TO USE.
  
- \* THE MILITARY OFFICIALS MIGHT OR MIGHT NOT HAVE POLITICAL INFLUENCE, DEPENDING ON THEIR INCLINATIONS AND ON THEIR FAMILY CONNECTIONS.
  
- \* BEFORE MAGSAYSAY BECAME SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE (1950), THE SOLDIER WITHOUT POWERFUL POLITICAL CONNECTIONS WAS ALMOST SURE TO LOSE IN ANY DISAGREEMENT WITH THE POLITICIANS.

- \* AFTER MAGSAYSAY BECAME SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, THE OFFICER WHO WAS TRYING TO DO A JOB WAS ASSURED OF POLITICAL BACKING IF HE WAS RIGHT IN WHAT HE WAS DOING. THAT BACKING WAS NOT ALWAYS ENOUGH TO ENSURE THAT THE OFFICER WON, HOWEVER.
  
- PROBLEMS DO EXIST WHEN THERE IS NO FORMAL DIVISION OF AUTHORITY BETWEEN CIVILIAN AND MILITARY COMMANDERS.
  
- MORE PROBLEMS MAY ARISE IN A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY WHEN THE MILITARY COMMANDER (WHO HAS NO INTEREST IN VOTES, EXPECIALLY THOSE OF GUERRILLA SYMPATHIZERS) IS PLACED UNDER THE AUTHORITY OF ONE WHO MUST SEEK VOTES WHEREVER THEY EXIST.
  
- ALL IN ALL, THE AD HOC SOLUTION IS PERHAPS THE BEST POSSIBLE FOR A SITUATION WHERE MILITARY COMMANDERS AND PROVINCIAL GOVERNERS HAVE APPROXIMATELY EQUAL POLITICAL INFLUENCE WITH THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE.

- THE IMPORTANT THING IS THE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF THE MISSION BY MEANS NOT INCONSISTENT WITH NATIONAL PURPOSE, WITH THE MISSION OF THE GOVERNMENT.
  
- \* WHO DOES WHAT, AND HOW THE ACTIVITIES ARE ORGANISED (IN COUNTERGUERRILLA OR GUERRILLA WARFARE), IS FAR LESS IMPORTANT THAN UNDERSTANDING THE MISSION AND BEING DETERMINED TO ACCOMPLISH IT BY MEANS NOT INCONSISTENT WITH THE MISSION.
  
- SO LONG AS A SUFFICIENT NUMBER
  - \* UNDERSTAND THE MISSION AND WHAT IT IMPLIES,
  
  - \* SEEK TO ACCOMPLISH IT WITH A DEDICATION AND AN INTELLIGENCE NOT SUBSTANTIALLY INFERIOR TO THAT OF THE ENEMY,
  
  - \* AND RECEIVE ADEQUATE POLITICAL SUPPORT.

THE COUNTERGUERRILLA EFFORT SHOULD NOT USUALLY BE DIFFICULT.

20. THE MISSION :

- TO ESTABLISH A POLITICAL BASE.
- TO PROTECT IT FROM THE PHYSICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSAULTS OF THE GUERRILLA, AND
- ABSORB WITHIN IT THE POLITICAL BASE OF THE GUERRILLA.

TEEN REV O STRATEGIE

OPSOMMING VAN MC CUEN SE TEORIE

VERTROULIK

Kopieno:

REVOLUTIONÊRE STRATEGIE

Reeksno	Onderwerp	Bls
1	Fase 1 : Organisasie	1
2	Fase 2 : Terrorisme	4
3	Fase 3 : Guerrilla-oorlog	6
4	Fase 4 : Mobiele Oorlog (Nie ingesluit nie)	

VERTROULIK



VERTROULIK

REVOLUTIONÊRE AKTIWITEITE

FASE 1 : ORGANISASIE

1. Normaalweg beplan 'n groep politieke andersdenkendes uit frustrasie 'n revolusie.
2. Die revolutionêre organisasie word van nuuts af begin en tydens 'n organiseringsfase geskep.
3. Die andersdenkendes vorm eers ondergrondse politieke selle.
4. Die selle word later tot 'n goedgekoördineerde selle-netwerk uitgebrei.
5. Om elke sel word :
  - a. politieke propaganda-groepe gevorm om populêre steun onder die massas te werf;
  - b. terrorisgroepe gevorm om intimidasie uit te voer wanneer die propaganda faal.
6. Die revolutioniste vorm dan fronte, partye en drukgroepe om populêre steun onder die massas te mobiliseer.

VERTROULIK

7. Die revolusioniste infiltrer agente in die :
  - a. administrasie;
  - b. veiligheidsmagte;
  - c. vakbonde;
  - d. ander belangrike organisasies.
  
8. 'n Wydverspreide en uiters doeltreffende ondergrondse inligtingsnetwerk word gestig.
  
9. Om verhoogde propaganda teen die regering/administrasie te bewerkstellig, veroorsaak die revolusioniste :
  - a. demonstrasies;
  - b. stakings;
  - c. sabotasie; en
  - d. onluste.
  
10. Alle tekortkominge tov politieke, administratiewe en maatskaplike aangeleenthede word deur die revolusioniste se propaganda-masjien oordryf en uitgebuit.

11. Die regering/administrasie se optrede maak die revolusioniste meer gehard, gedug en ervare.

## FASE 2 : TERRORISME

1. Terrorisme behels die gebruik van geweld om mense , politieke doeleindes te intimideer en tot samewerking dwing.
2. Die revolusioniste moet van terrorisme gebruik maak as hulle nie instaat is om hulle politieke en militêre organisasies tot stand te bring om guerrillas te ondersteun nie.
3. Die revolusioniste mag ook van terrorisme gebruik maak waar die terrein en/of hulle organisasie onvoldoende is vir guerrilla-oorlog.
4. Dade van terrorisme word gepleeg :
  - a. óf deur individue of klein groepies soos bv sabotasie, bomaanvalle en sluipmoorde;
  - b. óf deur groter groepe terroriste in die vorm van hinderlae of aanvalle op burgerlikes of polisie.
5. Terroriste opereer in klein groepies wat instaat is om dmv geweld klandestine politieke/administratiewe organisasies in elke dorp of stat tot stand te bring. Persone wat weerstand bied, word vermoor. Dit lê die ander die swye op. Sodoende word die PB van die administrasie afgesny.

6. Die terroriste bly permanent onder die PB.
  
7. Nieteenstaande die suksesse wat met terrorisme bereik word, kan die revolusioniste nie permanente ondersteuning van die bevolking verkry deur middel van terreur nie. Terreur kan mense dryf om die administrasie te ondersteun indien die owerheid hulle kan beskerm.

## FASE 3 : GUERRILLA-OORLOG

## STADIUMS

1. Guerrilla-oorlog gaan deur drie stadiums :
  - a. Stadium 1 : Vestiging van guerrilla-basisse.
  - b. Stadium 2 : Uitbreiding van basisgebiede (konsolidasie).
  - c. Stadium 3 : Beeldbou.

## STADIUM 1 : VESTIGING VAN GUERRILLA-BASISSE

2. Die stigting van 'n basisgebied vind normaalweg plaas in 'n plattelandse gebied, in moeilike terrein en waar regeringsbeheer en toesig op die swakste is.
3. Rekrute word deur revolusionêre politieke agente en propagandiste gewerf om klein plaaslike guerrillabendes te vorm.
4. Beheer word deur middel van intimidasie en oorreding oor afgeleë gemeenskappies verkry, waar hulle guerrillabasisse stig.
5. Parallele administratiewe en wetstrukture word gevestig.

6. As gevolg van intimidasie en oorreding vind die bevolking dit meer voordelig om saam te werk.
7. Politieke- en guerrillavermoëns word vergroot deur propaganda op veral die jeug toe te spits.
8. 'n Begin word gemaak met die lei van lae-intensiteitoperasies soos hinderlae en aanvalle vanuit die basisgebied.
9. Guerrillas se veiligheid word verseker deur die bevolking se vrees vir die terroris se volgehoue teenwoordigheid.

STADIUM 2 : UITBREIDING VAN BASISGEBIEDE (KONSOLIDASIE)

10. Na verloop van tyd, een tot drie jaar, is groter en beter toegeruste guerrillagroepes instaat om in die eksterne gebied van hulle eie basis te opereer.
11. Om te veg word 'n voltydse beroep.
12. Geledere word aangevul deur rekrute van ander gemeenskappe. Hulle word streekgebonde.
13. Ander revolusionêr gedomineerde gemeenskappe word as tydelike basisse gebruik.

14. Guerrilla-aktiwiteite word na die eksterne gebied uitget
15. Dmv politieke aksie word gemeenskappe saamgevoeg om gro  
basisse te vorm.
16. Parallele administratiewe en wetstrukture word tot c  
bestaande orde toegevoeg.
17. Die nodige infrastruktuur vir die ondersteuning van  
langdurige oorlog, word ontwikkel.
18. n Hoë prioriteit word verleen aan die mobilisering va  
die bevolking ter ondersteuning van hulle saak :
  - a. Effektiewe gebruik word van die bevolking se griewe  
en aspirasies gemaak.
  - b. Die bevolking word van eksterne invloede geïsoleer
  - c. Die kommissar maak gebruik van persoon tot persoon  
kontak.
19. Die guerrilla vestig n regeringsgesag en organiseer die  
bevolking sodat elkeen betrek, beïnvloed en toesig oor genou  
kan word.
20. Plaaslike verdedigingsmagte en guerrillagroepes word ontwik=  
kel om die gebied te polisiëer, toesig oor die bevolking te  
hou, asook om ondersteuning te



21. Guerrillabendes en -basisse word aan die buiterand van die beheerde gebied gestig.

22. Politieke en militêre agente word na die eksterne gebied geïnfiltreer om nuwe selle, nuwe politieke netwerke en nuwe guerrillabendes te vorm. (Die toepassing van die oliekolstrategie om basisse uit te brei totdat die hele gebied onder beheer is).

### STADIUM 3 : BEELDBOU

23. Na die konsolidasie van sy basisgebiede moet die revolusionêre die beeld van regmatigheid verwerf om totale interne en internasionale steun te verwerf.

24. 'n Sentrale regering word in 'n veilige basisgebied of in 'n bevriende aangrensende staat gevorm.

25. Aanspraak word daarop gemaak dat hulle die ware aspirasies van die bevolking verteenwoordig.

26. Die leierskap tree te voorskyn op die internasionale politieke platform om politieke druk teen die bestaande bestel te mobiliseer ter verwesenliking van hulle oogmerke.

### DIE PROBLEME VAN DIE REGERINGSMAGTE

27. Die aard en omvang van die bedreiging word onderskat.

Regeringsmagte tree op teen dit wat bogronds sigbaar is en die optrede is hoofsaaklik reaktief van aard.

28. Die ooglopende teen-optrede tydens die guerrilla se vestigingsfase, naamlik om die bevolking van die guerrilla te isoleer, is teen-produktief tov die verkryging of behoud van die bevolking se steun.

29. As gevolg van ontoereikende magspeile, word regeringsmagte en middele in kritieke gebiede ontplooi wat aan die guerrilla bewegingsvryheid in ander gebiede gee.

30. Die guerrilla lê hom toe op die aanval van swak teikens.

31. Die guerrilla se vermoë om te verdwyn indien hy teenoor meerdere magte te staan kom.

32. Die guerrilla beskik oor 'n goeie inligtingstelsel.

33. Die guerrilla se politieke netwerk is gevestig onder die bevolking.

34. Regeringsmagte is nie voldoende sterkte om alle gebiede voltyds te domineer en om die bevolking voltyds teen intimidasie en weerwraak te beveilig nie.

35. Die verwydering van magte uit hulle eie strategiese basis vir ontplooiing elders, maak die tuisbasis kwesbaar vir infiltrasie en besmetting.

GEHEIM

Kopieno .....  
van .... kopieë

IMPLEMENTERING VAN DIE TEEN-  
REVOLUTIONÊRE STRATEGIE

Reeksno	Onderwerp	Bls
1	Teen-organisasie	1
2	Teen-terrorisme	9
3	Teen-guerrilla oorlog	16
4	Teen-mobiele oorlog	22
5	Aanhangsel A : Samestelling van 'n Burgersake Span vir Dorps= bestuur	A-1

GEHEIM

## TEEN-ORGANISASIE : INTERNE GEBIED

## EFFEKTIEWE ADMINISTRASIE

1. Organiseer 'n effektiewe administrasie, ook in afgeleë plekke/gebiede.
2. Die administrasie moet die steun van alle bevolkingsgroepe verseker.
3. Die administrasie moet 'n duidelike nasionale strategie/beleid en 'n program volg.
4. Die administrasie moet doeltreffend funksioneer.

## BURGERLIKE OPLEIDING

5. Stuur 'n grootskaalse burgerlike opleidingsprogram van stapel om belowende, lojale plaaslike leiers sowel as die jeug vir die administrasie op te lei.
6. Die opleiding moet daarop toegespits wees om
  - a. 'n effektiewe administrasie daar te stel wat kontak met die massas sal behou;

- b. plaaslike lede aan die administrasie te lewer wa-  
toegewyd, simpatiek, oplettend en lojaal sal wees;  
en 'n goeie werksverhouding met die massas sal hand-  
haaf;
- c. die administrasie in staat te stel om probleme plaas-  
lik te kan identifiseer en regstellingsaksies so  
spoedig moontlik te kan neem;
- d. plaaslike lede van die administrasie toe te rus  
met kennis van die nasionale strategie en program.

#### TEEN-ORGANISASIE VAN DIE MASSAS

- 7. Begin met Teen-organisasie van die plaaslike bevolking  
nadat 'n effektiewe administrasie gevestig is.
- 8. Identifiseer belangstellendes onder die plaaslike bevolking  
en lei hulle op.
- 9. Organiseer selle en doen informele opleiding met hulle.
- 10. Brei die belangstelling van die plaaslike bevolking uit  
na ander aktiwiteite en stig kulturele, sport- en ander organi-  
sasies wat onder eie beheer staan.

11. Identifiseer potenssiële leiers op al die terreine v. die samelewing en lei hulle op.

#### SELFVERDEDIGING

12. Stig selfverdedigingseenhede onder die plaaslike bevolking om intimidasie en afpersing teen te werk - dit is die belangrikste deel van die Teen-organisasie van die massas.

13. Stig 'n polisie-hulpdiens en militêre milisie op 'n vroeë stadium en plaas lede by elke gemeenskap.

14. Die milisie moet gesteun word deur beskermings- en mobiele magte.

15. Lede van die polisie-hulpdiens en milisie moet politiek ge-oriënteer word en vanweë hulle beïnvloedingsvermoë gebruik word om 'n brug te vorm tussen die administrasie en die massas.

#### INLIGTINGSTELSEL

16. 'n Doeltreffende inligtingstelsel, wat ook die funksie van Teen-inligting insluit, is 'n voorvereiste.

17. Inligtingsinsameling moet in die Teen-organisasiefase aanvanklik hoofsaaklik deur die administrasie, politieke organisasie en polisie gedoen word en later ook deur die militêr.

18. 'n Kovertê inligtingstelsel, met wortels tussen die mass en alle organisasies, moet revolusionêre en nie-revolusionêre organisasies identifiseer.

19. Die insameling, verwerking en verspreiding van inligting moet gesamentlik deur die veiligheidsmagte sowel as die administrasie en politieke instansies op alle vlakke uitgevoer word.

#### GEBIEDSVERDEDIGING

20. Ontplooi militêre eenhede sodat maksimum kontak met die massas gemaak kan word.

21. Die militêre bevelstruktuur moet parallel tot dié van die administrasie funksioneer en effektiewe skakeling en koördinasie moet gedoen word.

22. Die militêr moet burgerlike projekte steun en die administrasie bystaan. Tydens rampe moet die militêr die massas help.

23. Die militêre poste moet die selfverdedigingstelsel bystaan tydens operasies en help met opleiding, transport en logistiek.

#### MOBIELE MAGTE

24. Stel hoogs mobiele veiligheidsmagte daar wat vinnig na

enige plek in hulle verantwoordelikeheidsgebied kan beweeg en instaat sal wees om

- a. die selfverdedigingseenhede onmiddellik te kan ondersteun;
- b. toegangswêë te kan beheer en blokkeer.

#### TAKTIESE RIGLYNE

#### 25. Met betrekking tot Effektiewe Administrasie

- a. Die vlak is belangriker as die vorm - dit moet op 'n persoon-tot-persoon basis funksioneer.
- b. Die administrasie moet by naam/persoon op grondvlak gesien en geken word.
- c. Die administrasie moet instaat wees om 'n gegewe situasie goed te kan ontleed, uitbuit en beheer.
- d. Lede van die administrasie moet gemotiveer wees.

#### 26. Met betrekking tot Burgerlike Opleiding

- a. Persone moet aantrekklike diensvoorwaardes, insluitend 'n goeie salaris ontvang ten einde omkoperij te verhoed.



- b. Opleiding van die plaaslike bevolking, met die klem op die korttermyn, is belangriker as die indiensneming van deskundiges of gekwalifiseerde persone wat op die langtermyn beter sou wees - die primêre doel is die onmiddellike stuiting van die revolusie.
27. Met betrekking tot Teen-organisasie van die Massas
- a. Gevorderde opleiding kan in dorpe of stede plaasvind.
  - b. 'n Duidelike nasionale politieke beleid, of program is noodsaaklik vir die effektiewe teen-organisasie van die plaaslike bevolking deur 'n effektiewe administrasie.
28. Met betrekking tot Selfverdediging
- a. Tensy die massas oor die wil en middele beskik om weerstand te bied, sal hulle behoeftes aan persoonlike veiligheid hulle lojaliteit aan die owerheid oorskadu.
  - b. Keuring van lede vir die polisie-hulpdiens is belangrik - plaaslike hoofmanne en leiers moet geken word.
  - c. Rekrute behoort verkieslik vorige polisie/militêre opleiding te gehad het.

- d. Die milisie moet gebiedsge-oriënteerd en met ligte wapens, masjiengewere en mortiere toegerus wees.

29. Met betrekking tot die Inligtingstelsel

- a. Uitruiing moet op alle vlakke deur 'n gesamentlike komitee gekoördineer word.
- b. Die voorsitterskap van die komitee sal bepaal word deur die verantwoordelike gebied waarop die komitee opereer.

30. Met betrekking tot Gebiedsverdediging

- a. Die aantal militêre poste word bepaal deur die geïsoleerdheid van die gebied. In 'n geïsoleerde gebied is meer klein poste meer effektief as minder grotes.
- b. Die veiligheidsmagte moet wandade teen die plaaslike bevolking vermy.

31. Met betrekking tot Mobiele Magte

- a. Lugmobiliteit is van primêre belang.
- b. Goedopgeleide verkenningsmagte moet beskikbaar wees.

- c. So ook noue lugsteun, dag en nag.
- d. Riviere moet beheer en blokkeer kan word, indien nodig.

## TEEN-TERRORISME : INTERNE GEBIED

## TEEN-ORGANISASIE VAN STRATEGIESE BASISSE

1. Identifiseer gebiede wat nie geaffekteer is nie en konsentreer daarop.
2. Bring 'n sterk administrasie in die gebiede tot stand - lei amptenare daarvoor op.
3. Organiseer die bevolking.
4. Bring 'n goeie inligtingstelsel tot stand (veiligheidsmag/politiek/burgerlik).
5. Organiseer selfverdedigingsmagte.
6. Stig administrasiesentra op streeks-/stangebied grondslag wat as opleidingsentra, saantrekplekke en veilige gebiede kan dien.

## POLISIE-OP TREDE

7. Opsporing en vernietiging van die vyandelike politieke organisasie onder die plaaslike bevolking - dit is 'n hoofdoelwit in die teen-terroris strategie.

8. Inligtinginsameling.
9. Teen-terroris optrede.
10. Daarstelling van 'n polisie-hulpdiens om beskermingstake te verrig.

#### GEBIEDSKONSOLIDASIE

11. Konsentreer op
  - a. gebiede met 'n baie hoë bevolkingsdigtheid; of
  - b. kritieke gebiede wat deur terroriste beïnvloed word.
12. Versprei veiligheidsmagte oor die gebied om gebiedsbeskermingstake te verrig.
13. Konsentreer daarop om terrorisme in die gebied te onderdruk sodat Teen-organisasie van die plaaslike bevolking kan begin deur die inisiatief te verkry en aggressief op te tree deur middel van :
  - a. 'n Goeie inligtingstelsel.

- b. Dag-en-nag-operasies om terroriste geen rus te gee nie.
- c. Gereelde patrollies wat die gebied deurkruis om terrorisbewegings aan bande te lê.
- d. Hinderlae/padblokkades.
- e. Opsporing van opslagplekke.
- f. Kontak met die plaaslike bevolking te bewerkstellig.
- g. Vernietiging van die terroris-organisasie.

## BURGERSAKE

14. Burgersake moet die Teen-organisasie van die bevolking te weeg bring ná die uitwissing van die revolusionêre organisasie, dit wil sê ná gebiedskonsolidasie, deur die volgende maatreëls.

15. Vyandelike beheer oor lede van kraal of stat moet verbreek word deur middel van :

- a. Hervestiging.
- b. Voedselbeheer.

- c. Bewegingsbeheer.
- d. Aandklokreël.
- e. Dra van identiteitsdokumente.

16. Die plaaslike bevolking moet beskerm word teen terrorisme en intimidasie, aanvanklik deur die span en dan deur die plaaslike bevolking self.

17. Die plaaslike bevolking moet spesifieke opleiding gegee, polities geïndoktrineer en spoedig geherorganiseer word.

18. Take moet aan die plaaslike bevolking oorgedra word sodra die Teen-organisasie ver genoeg gevorder het.

#### MOBIELE OPERASIES

19. In die dun bevolkte gebiede moet mobiele magte aangewend word om die vyand te verhinder om daar basisgebiede te stig, terwyl op die digbevolkte en kritieke gebiede gekonsentreer word.

#### TEEN-ORGANISASIE VAN DIE BEVOLKING IN YLBEVOLKTE GEBIEDE

20. Hervestig die wydverspreide bevolking om bevolkingseilande in die gebied te vorm wat beheerbaar en verdedigbaar sal wees.

21. Bereik plaaslike bevolking wat nie hervestig is nie de middel van Burgersakespanne wat met mobiele operasies geïntegreer is.

#### TAKTIESE RIGLYNE

22. Met betrekking tot Teen-organisasie van Strategiese Basiss

- a. Die burgerlike owerheid is verantwoordelik vir al die take met uitsondering van die organisasie en opleiding van die selfverdedigingsmag.
- b. Groter magte moet aan die owerheid op die strategiese basis vlak gedelegeer word.

23. Met betrekking tot Polisie-optrede. Die polisie moet nou saamwerk met die militêr en nie met hulle meeding nie.

24. Met betrekking tot Gebiedskonsolidasie

- a. Die doel is om beheer oor die plaaslike bevolking te verkry, om kontak met hulle te bewerkstellig en nie om terrein te beset nie.
- b. Die militêr en administrasie moet parallel met mekaar funksioneer.



- c. Militêre inligting en operasies moet gekoördineer word met polisie en burgerlike instansies.
- d. Die weermag en plaaslike polisie moet hulle poging konsentreer.
- e. Die opleiding en aanwending van sporsnyers en tolke is essensieel.
- f. Soldate moet nie te swaar dra nie sodat hulle opvolgaksies vinnig te voet kan uitvoer.
- g. Aanvulling moet per lug of voertuig gedoen word.

25. Met betrekking tot Burgersake

- a. Burgersake kan meer effektief as 'n spanpoging tussen die militêre en burgerlike owerheid uitgevoer word.
- b. Die samestelling van spanne sal afhang van die plaaslike omstandighede en die beheer wat die vyand oor die bevolking het.
- c. In afgesonderde gebiede waar die burgerlike administrasie nie genoegsaam is nie, sal die spanne oorwegend militêr wees. In ander gevalle moet dit oorwegend burgerlik wees.

- d. Die samestelling van 'n Burgersakespan vir doeleindes van dorpsbestuur moet uit bepaalde elemente bestaan (Kyk Aanhangsel A).
- e. Beheermaatreëls moet gelyktydig ingestel word en nie een na die ander nie.

26. Met betrekking tot Eenheid van Poging

- a. Die pogings van almal in die stryd teen terrorisme moet 'n eenheid vorm.
  - i. Die administrasie, polisie en weermag moet saamwerk.
  - ii. Gemeenskapsleiers moet deelneem, advies gee en alle Teen-terroris-operasies ondersteun.
- b. Daar moet op elke regeringsvlak iemand in bevel/beheer wees wat verantwoordelikheid kan aanvaar.
- c. Daar moet van dag tot dag op die grond besluit word wat gedoen moet word.

## TEEN-GUERRILLA : INTERNE GEBIED

## ALGEMEEN

1. Voldoende middele ontbreek normaalweg.
2. 'n Gefaseerde plan, gebaseer op die werklikhede van die situasie, wat kritieke doelwitte sal verwesenlik, word benodig.
3. Die "Olie-kol" strategie is die antwoord.

## STRATEGIESE ONTWERP

4. Stap Een. Vestig effektiewe beheer oor die plaaslike bevolking in een of meer strategiese basisse in die geaffekteerde gebiede. Die selektering en vestiging van sulke strategiese basisse is 'n voorvereiste voordat enige ander optrede geneem kan word.
5. Stap Twee. Herwin beheer oor die plaaslike bevolking in ander belangrike gebiede deur vanaf die strategiese basisse te opereer - identifisering van hierdie belangrike gebiede is die tweede voorvereiste tot verdere optrede.

## TAKE

6. Taak Een. (Guerrilla-geaktiveerde gebiede) : Verkry beheer oor guerrilla-geaktiveerde gebiede binne die strategiese basisse :

- a. Vernietig die guerrilla militêre struktuur.
- b. Neutraliseer sy politieke/administratiewe struktuur.
- c. Ontwikkel 'n eie strategiese basis deur middel van teen-organisasie op politieke, sosio-ekonomiese en sielkundige terreine.

7. Taak Twee. (Gebiede waar terrorisme voorkom) : Pas dieselfde afbrekende/opbouende taktiek toe as die vyand in gebiede waar terrorisme voorkom.

8. Taak Drie. (Nie-geaffekteerde lojale bevolking) : Teen-organiseer onmiddellik die nie-geaffekteerde lojale bevolking.

9. Taak Vier. (Beheerde bevolking) : Stel die bevolking instaat om hulself te beveilig, belangrike installasies en punte te beskerm en as bron van soldate en administrateurs te dien, deur middel van :

- a. Para-militêre magte gewerf uit plaaslike bevolking en opgelei.
- b. Voltydse gebiedsbeskermingsmagte wat para-militêre magte kan ondersteun.

c. 'n Mobiele offensiewe reserwe.

10. Taak Vyf. (Gebiede aangrensend tot die strategiese basis) : Voorkom die opbou van guerrilla-basisse en mobiele magte in gebiede aangrensend tot die strategiese basis.

#### UITVOERING VAN TAKE (Metode)

11. Taak Een

- a. Gebiedsoffensief.
- b. Militêre Burgersakespanne.
- c. Hervestiging.
- d. Verbode gebiede.
- e. Spergebied.
- f. Teen-guerrilla.

12. Taak Twee

- a. Gebiedsoffensief.
- b. Hervestiging.

c. Verbode gebied.

d. Spergebied.

e. Teen-guerrilla.

13. Taak Drie

a. (Militêre) Burgersakespanne.

b. Hervestiging.

c. Verbode gebied.

14. Taak Vier

a. Militêre Burgersakespanne.

b. Hervestiging.

c. Verbode gebied.

d. Spergebied.

15. Taak Vyf

a. Hervestiging.

- b. Verbode gebiede.
- c. Spergebiede.
- d. Mobiele operasies.
- e. Teen-guerrilla.

#### TAKTIESE RIGLYNE

- 16. Wend maksimum middele en poging aan in voorafbepaalde gebiede binne die strategiese basis.
- 17. Wend gebiedsbeskermingsmagte en burgersakespanne gekoördineerd aan.
- 18. Konsolideer die strategiese basis deur middel van militêre politieke en sielkundige aksie alvorens na aangrensende gebiede oorgegaan word.
- 19. Handhaaf 'n gesonde balans tussen militêre, politieke en sielkundige aksie tydens teen-organisasie.
- 20. Wys genoegsame magte toe aan take.
- 21. Tyd moet nie 'n bepalende faktor wees nie.

22. Gebiedsbeskermingsmagte moet in 'n gebied bly totdat die burgersakespanne genoegsame selfverdedigingseenhede opgelei het, asook 'n milisie om die gebiedsbeveiligingsfunksie oor te neem.

23. Burgersakespanne moet bly opereer totdat plaaslike bevolking weerstand teen intimidasie en infiltrasie ontwikkel het.



TEEN-MOBIEL : EKSTERNE GEBIED

VERKRYGING VAN BUITELANDSE STEUN

1. Dit vereis suksesvolle :
  - a. Diplomatieke aksie.
  - b. Ooreenkomste en verdrae.
  - c. STRATKOM.

VESTIGING VAN STRATEGIESE BASISSE

2. Identifiseer en verseker hoofbasisse.
3. Beheer die eksterne vlakgebied militêr. Beheer ook die plaaslike bevolking in die eksterne vlakgebied.
4. Identifiseer teikengebiede.

MOBIELE VERDEDIGING

5. Verdedig die hoofbasisse.
6. Voer 'n gebiedsoffensief en teen-organisasie.

## TEEN-OFFENSIEF

7. Laat mobiele magte vyandelike basisse, opslagplekke en logistieke verbindingslyne aanval.
8. Oefen konstante druk op die vyand uit en gun hulle geen kans nie om te hergroepeer en te herorganiseer.