

AFRICA SOUTH

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Special Features:

REVOLUTION ROUND THE CORNER?

Articles by Julius Lewin and Dr. H. J. Simons

AN AFRICAN DIARY

by Rosalynde Ainslie

POLITICAL TRENDS IN KENYA

by Dr. Gikonyo Kiano, M.L.C.



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OCT.—DEC. 1958

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THE PATTERN OF BETRAYAL

THE recent visit of a United Nations Committee to South West Africa would have excited fluent speculation whatever form it took. The South African Government has, with unwavering arrogance, refused United Nations representatives permission to enter the Territory. It has treated the Fourth Committee with so corpulent a contempt as to make of the latter's deliberations a humiliating burlesque. It has ignored decisions of the General Assembly and snubbed the verdicts of the International Court. And when hard pressed, it has only had to sulk or stage a temporary withdrawal in order to induce all the proper noises of conciliation. It has learnt that it may do whatever it wishes with its mandate and get away with it. Why then, in the full flush of its effrontery, should it so suddenly have agreed to the visit of the United Nations Good Offices Committee?

It would be comforting to believe that the Government has begun to succumb to the pressure of world opinion. But the increasing virulence of its terror makes nonsense of the idea. If it considers it safe to continue laying waste the lives of the vast majority of its subjects, adding agony to agony till the act of living itself becomes a rebuke, why should its self-confidence stumble at continuing its assault on the non-White peoples of South West? Africa may stir in anger and hatred, and men and women everywhere regard it with disgust, but this has not saved the women of Zeerust from the batons and bullets of its police, or permitted the Indians to keep the businesses they have built and the homes into which they and their children have been born. The sudden concession of the Government to the United Nations is inexplicable—unless, indeed, it is no concession at all.

Speculation would doubtless have remained at this level of incipient suspicion if the Good Offices Committee itself had not given it rungs to climb. The actual visit of two of the three members to South West would have been ludicrous had its context been less cruel. Before their arrival in the Territory, the Press approached the Administration for details of their trip. But the Administration denied any knowledge of their visit, and the ineffaceable Mr. Louw, the Union's Minister of External Affairs, was on this one occasion too busy to be seen. Then suddenly, one day at the end of June, a

special South African Air Force plane touched down at Windhoek and discharged Sir Charles Arden-Clarke, of Britain, and Sr. Vasco Leitao da Cunha, of Brazil, into waiting cars, which carried them off speedily to a hotel in the city. There they refused, apparently on instructions, to sign the Visitors Book and shut themselves up in their rooms, presumably on instructions as well, lest the wrong people attempt to speak with them.

The following morning they were, it is rumoured, released for a while and taken on a stealthily conducted tour. One hopes that they spent a few fleeting moments in the Windhoek Location, though none of its inhabitants seems able to recall their visit. Perhaps, though, they were too carefully surrounded by servants of the Department of External Affairs to present much of a view. The Administration then informed the Press that they were going to Gobabis. And they left instead for Kietmanshoop.

Precisely what portion of South West Africa it was that the two United Nations representatives saw, no one but the Minister and his minions is able to say. Doubtless they were shown the recently completed £48,000 exhibition non-White hospital at Kietmanshoop, and the Administration has announced that they visited Okaukuejo and Namutoni in the Etosha Game Reserve. It is to be hoped that they caught a glimpse of a Herero, since it is, after all, the Hereros who have been troubling the ears of the Fourth Committee with their complaints. They certainly had no time during the three days of their stay to see the Paramount Chief who, as principal of South West's petitioners to the United Nations, one would have thought as deserving of a visit as the Etosha Pan or the inside of a Windhoek hotel.

It is difficult to believe that the United Nations representatives were unconscious of the violence that they were doing the faith and feelings of the non-White peoples of the Territory by ricocheting across the surface of South West in the way they did. They could hardly have doubted that their paper-back thriller movements would be noted and discussed by those men and women to whom United Nations Trusteeship offers the only escape from the unendurable. They have left behind them among the helpless peoples of the Territory a sense of abandonment, of backs turned finally upon their anguish. And they must surely have known that this would be so.

Why then did they come? Had they wished to find out something about South West, they would have been better advised to subscribe to the publications of the South African State Information Office and saved themselves the discomfort of travelling. Certainly their knowledge of the Territory would have been no less flimsy, nor their impressions less false, than now. They must themselves have realized that by seeing South West in this extraordinary manner they were not seeing South West at all. In accepting the Government's invitation, they must have accepted also the parody of investigation that they knew it entailed. What else have they accepted? The inevitability of South African rule?

It would be dangerous to predict the precise contents of the report that the Good Offices Committee is due to make to the General Assembly in September. But its general purport seems well enough known to South Africa's Minister of External Affairs to inspire him in advance with an unusual geniality towards the United Nations. Announcing in Parliament on July 15 that South Africa would return "with a strong delegation," to the General Assembly and full participation in the work of the United Nations, Mr. Louw stated:

"On September 26 of last year, soon after the United Nations opened, I said in the course of a Press statement that obviously the policy of token representation could not be continued indefinitely, and that sooner or later South Africa would have to decide as to its future relations with the U.N. I added that the Union Government would more particularly be guided by the attitude of those delegations which in the past had not shown themselves to be actively hostile to the Union, even though, for various reasons, they may not have supported South Africa's stand on Article 2 (7) of the Charter.

"After the Assembly had convened, it was soon evident that among many Western delegations—and also certain Eastern delegations—there was a real regret that South Africa was no longer fully participating in the activities of the United Nations. These expressions of regret, and assurances of friendship, emerged in the course of talks during and since the last session of the Assembly, and they were reflected also in the tone of the debates on the South African items in the First and Fourth (Trusteeship) Committees respectively. . . . This was particularly evident in the discussions of the South West African issue. On the motion of the representative of Thailand, who was also the Chairman of the Fourth Committee, a resolution was adopted by a large majority, calling for the appointment of a Good Offices Committee, which would

discuss with the Union Government ways and means for arriving at an arrangement on the South West African issue. . . .

“Pending publication of the Committee’s report, I am not at liberty to give information regarding the discussion, and the most I can say is that throughout they were conducted in an amicable spirit, and that they covered a wide field. In view of the more reasonable and conciliatory attitude towards South Africa shown by a fairly large number of delegations, the Cabinet has agreed that the policy of ‘token representation’ has achieved its purpose, and that in the circumstances the Union should now return to full participation in the work of the United Nations with the hope that the improved sentiment towards South Africa would continue in the future.”

The reason for Mr. Louw’s satisfaction is as apparent as the source from which he has obtained it.

Doubtless a number of motives conspire to persuade the Committee that the time for concession has arrived. The General Assembly can hardly allow the Union to continue snubbing its decisions on South West. The authority of the United Nations is fragile enough already, without the organization’s having to submit to the defiance of its gallery. The administration of South West Africa has become an annual abasement—the General Assembly is unable to persuade South Africa to submit, while the Afro-Asian bloc is unwilling to let it cease trying. Inevitably, the United Nations must either contemplate economic sanctions and, if these do not help, some form of military intervention, or succumb once and for all to South African intransigence.

An arrangement by which the South African Government would be permitted a free hand in South West, in return for the paper allegiance of officially doctored reports, would save the face of the General Assembly from further slaps while well enough contenting for the moment the Nationalist Cabinet. Incorporation would not be accepted in principle, but the practice would go undisputed. That the indigenous peoples of the Territory would as a result be finally betrayed to the terrifying lunacy of apartheid is not, after all, a matter of much moment in the moral manipulations of Cold War diplomacy. The Union is, decidedly, a fortress of anti-Communism, and its control of South West Africa can only be viewed with favour by the West. The Territory is rich in minerals of great strategic and industrial value, and the Union is well known for its accommodating attitude to the right kind of foreign investment.

It is to be supposed that the Afro-Asian nations will not easily swallow the sacrifice of South West. But effective opposition to any stealthy arrangement of the sort suggested can only exist side by side with a positive policy. Certainly the present farce cannot continue much longer. If the Union may flaunt its disregard of General Assembly decisions with impunity, the United Nations had better abdicate the luxury of discussing South West Africa at all. Motions of censure may conciliate the conscience of Asia, but they do neither the influence of the United Nations nor the position of the oppressed peoples of South West Africa any good.

A solution must be found but, in finding it, the General Assembly would do well to remind itself of Abyssinia and the last abject days of the League. For surely, if the non-White peoples of the Territory are betrayed to their oppression, they alone will not endure the anguish. On the grave of their trust, the United Nations itself will stand the tombstone.

ROSALYNDE AINSLIE

THERE is little for us to add to the article by Miss Ainslie in this issue. Her story is her protest, as it is ours. Though we have publicly demanded one, no explanation has been offered by the Federal Government for its expulsion order. And that is not surprising. A government that has something to conceal would hardly confess to its fear of investigation. What does seem surprising though, is that such a government should expect to be believed when it claims that it is morally capable of ruling its subject peoples justly and in peace.

Correction

In the last issue, Mr. V. Pillay, author of "The European Economic Community and Africa," was described as a Lecturer at the London School of Economics. Mr. Pillay is a graduate of the School and not a lecturer there, and we must apologise for any embarrassment caused him by our error.



AN OPEN LETTER TO THE UNITED NATIONS

ON behalf of the people of South West Africa, I would like hereby to register our strong suspicion about the movements of some of the members of the Good Offices Committee of the United Nations which recently interviewed the Union Government on the question of South West Africa.

It was surprising that the Committee should have been insulated of all South West opinion; that any interview with the Press should have been barred whilst they were in South West Africa.

This to us is a source of insecurity and despair. Even if granted that the Committee had been appointed solely for consultation with the Union Government and that their visit to South West Africa was purely on a tourist basis, their mysterious movements in the Territory could not but give rise to suspicion.

They were reported to have travelled in the Prime Minister's aircraft and in the company of an official of the Department of External Affairs who, with the Chief Native Commissioner of S.W.A., carefully guided them not to see any of our slums or to interview any of the African leaders. They were shown the more impressive side of our living conditions, such as the newly-built hospital at Keetmanshoop and the site for the new location there, as well as the Game Reserves in the northern part of the Territory.

Our fate being as it does in the hands of the United Nations, it is fitting that at this vital hour we send a note of warning to the United Nations not to be goaded by political expediency into any "solution" repugnant to the principles on which the mandate system was founded.

We need not remind the United Nations of its international responsibility with regard to the people of South West Africa.

We should finally exhort the United Nations Organization to recognize the fundamental principle on which we base our appeal, that of right and justice, and to act only on strong moral principles rather than on mere political technicalities. To us the future of South West Africa is much more than mere technical legalities. No finality should be reached over our heads. We must be consulted.

blosea kundakro

South West Africa
July, 1958.

Paramount Chief of the Herero People

SOUTH WEST AFRICA AND THE UNITED NATIONS

MBURUMBA A. KERINA

A South West African of Herero and Ovambo descent who escaped overseas to give evidence as a petitioner before the Trusteeship Council of the United Nations at its 11th and 12th Sessions. A graduate of Lincoln University, now studying Political Science and Jurisprudence at the New School for Social Research in New York City.

UNDER the terms of article 119 of Versailles, the Germans ceded South West Africa to the Principal Allied and Associated Powers. They, in turn, assigned the Territory to His Britannic Majesty, to be administered, on his behalf, by the government of the Union of South Africa as a Class C Mandate, an action approved on December 17, 1920 by the Council of the League of Nations. Class C Mandates differed from others in that they were to be "administered under the Mandatory as integral portions of its territory, subject to the principle that the well-being and development of the indigenous peoples form a sacred trust of civilization." The Union was also required to submit reports to, and be subject to the supervision of, the Permanent Mandates Commission of the League, while possessing the privilege of applying its laws to the Territory.

The administrative powers were delegated by the Governor-General to an Administrator who acted on his behalf. Under the constitution adopted in 1925, the European inhabitants were given the right to elect members to a Legislative Assembly. The same privilege was denied to the "Africans," whose affairs were dealt with not by the Legislative Assembly, but by the Administrator in Advisory Council. Only one member of this Advisory Council was selected on the ground of his "thorough acquaintance with the reasonable wants and wishes of the non-European races in the Territory."

Since 1955, however, the powers of the Administrator over African Affairs have been transferred to the Union Minister of Native Affairs. And since 1951, the Territory has been represented in the Union Parliament by ten Union nationals of European descent; six in the House of Assembly and four in the Senate. Two of the Senators are elected by the Territory's Legislative Assembly and two are appointed by the Governor-General, one of the latter being nominated "mainly on the ground of his thorough acquaintance . . . with the reasonable

wants and wishes of the Coloured races of the Territory." There apparently exists no intention to give direct representation in the Union Parliament to the non-European inhabitants of South West Africa, though they comprise some 85 per cent. of the Territory's total population.

The Legislative Assembly of the Territory is composed of 18 members, all Union nationals of European descent and elected entirely by Union nationals. No non-European is entitled to sit in the Legislative Assembly or to vote in the election of its members.

The Union Government exercises both administrative and legislative control over the following matters which are integrated with the Union: African affairs, custom and excise, railways and harbours, police defence, the public service, external affairs, and immigration.

The Permanent Mandates Commission of the League of Nations, to which the Union reported on the administration of its Class C Mandate, was dissolved in the spring of 1946 at the last meeting of the League of Nations Assembly. By resolution of February 9, 1946 and letter of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the General Assembly requested that the six mandatory powers draft trusteeship agreements to place the Mandated Territories within the international trusteeship system and under the supervision of the Trusteeship Council of the United Nations Organization.

At the San Francisco Conference, Field Marshal Smuts had announced South Africa's desire to incorporate or annex the Territory of South West Africa. In response to the Secretary-General's letter, the Union Government requested that the Provisional Agenda of the General Assembly include an item concerning the consultations which the Government had had with the peoples of S.W.A. about the future status of the Territory. And the South African delegation presented a proposal to the second part of the first session of the General Assembly calling for approval of the annexation of South West Africa by the Union of South Africa, on the basis of their geographical contiguity, ethnological kinship, and the state of integration already achieved. The Union maintained that the Legislative Assembly of the Territory had requested incorporation and that a majority of the Native population had also been consulted and had voted strongly in favour of incorporation.

By resolution of December 14, 1946, passed 37 for, none

against, and 9 abstentions (#65 (1)), the General Assembly found itself unable to accede to the incorporation of the Territory into the Union of South Africa; recommended that the Territory be placed under the international trusteeship system; and invited the South African Government to propose a trusteeship agreement for the Territory: giving as its reasons that (1) Articles 77 and 79 of the Charter provided that the trusteeship system should apply to all territories then under mandate, and (2) it considered that the African inhabitants of the Territory had not yet secured political autonomy or reached a stage of political development enabling them to express a considered opinion which the Assembly could recognize on such an important question as incorporation. By letter of July 23, 1947, the Union Government informed the U.N.O. that it had decided not to proceed with incorporation, but declared that, in view of the wishes of the majority of the European inhabitants of S.W.A., it could not agree to placing it under international trusteeship; not did it consider itself under any legal obligation to propose a trusteeship agreement. It would therefore maintain the *status quo*, administering the Territory in the spirit of the existing mandate, and though it would transmit an annual report on its administration as required under Article 73e of the Charter, it would not allow the right of petition, the League no longer being in existence and the U.N.O. having no jurisdiction over S.W.A. On September 17, 1947, the Union Government again reported having consulted the Europeans of the Territory and claimed that they, by overwhelming majority, still favoured incorporation.

By resolution of November 1, 1947 (141 (II)), the General Assembly took note of the decision not to proceed with incorporation, firmly maintained its previous recommendation, urged the Union to propose a trusteeship agreement by the third session of the General Assembly, and authorized the Trusteeship Council to examine the report received from the Union Government. The Trusteeship Council examined the report, but found itself unable to make a thorough study of it in the absence of the South African delegate. The Union Government did, however, submit additional written information on request. In the Fourth (Trusteeship) Committee meetings, November 9-19 1947, the South African delegate pointed out that the report had been submitted voluntarily and that the Union had replied to requests for additional information, but that this was not

to be taken as a precedent or commitment, since his Government felt that the Trusteeship Council had exceeded its powers. S.W.A. was not a Trust Territory; the Union felt it neither in its nor the Territory's interest to submit a trusteeship agreement; and finally, it was planned to give the Territory representation in the Union Parliament, though this was not to be considered incorporation, but a grant of necessary self-government. By resolution of November 26, 1948, the General Assembly took note of this and recommended the continuance of the annual report until agreement between the Union and U.N.O. had been reached. By letter, July 11, 1949, the Union advised U.N.O. that, in the interest of efficient administration, no further reports would be forwarded. It also enclosed a copy of the S.W.A. Affairs Amendment Act of 1949, providing representation for the Territory in the Union Parliament, legislation which it maintained was in keeping with the spirit of the Mandate.

In its resolution of December 6, 1949 (337 (IV)), the General Assembly expressed regret that the Union would not submit further reports, renewed its recommendation that a trusteeship agreement be submitted, and invited resumption of the submission of reports. In another resolution of the same date (338 (IV)), it requested an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice on the present international status of S.W.A. The case was argued on May 16-23, 1950, by the Assistant Secretary in charge of the Legal Department of the U.N., the Government of the Philippines, and the Senior Legal Adviser to the Ministry of Justice of the South African Government.

The Court found unanimously, July 11, 1950, that S.W.A. was still to be considered a territory held under the Mandate of December 17, 1920; that the degree of supervision of the General Assembly should not exceed that which applied before and should conform as much as possible to the procedure followed by the League of Nations; that the Union was under an obligation to accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court; that it had an administrative obligation to promote the material and moral well-being and social progress of the inhabitants and to submit to control and supervision by the Council of the League; that the League had presupposed its functions would be taken over by the U.N.; that the necessity for international supervision continued to exist, despite the demise of the League;

that the provisions of Chapter XII of the Charter applied, in that they provided a means whereby S.W.A. could be brought under trusteeship; and that, while the Union was under no legal obligation to place S.W.A. under trusteeship, the Union acting alone could not modify the international status of the Territory, but required the consent of the United Nations, the proper procedure being to place the Mandate under trusteeship. The Court considered that the Mandate had not lapsed because the League had ceased to exist, that such an opinion was a misconception of article 22 of the League Covenant and of the Mandate itself, that the authority exercised by the Union was based on the Mandate, and if the Mandate had lapsed, so had the authority of the Union Government. To retain rights derived from the Mandate and to repudiate the obligations could not be justified. The terms of the Mandate involved no cession of territory or transfer of sovereignty to the Union.

In the Fourth Committee debates of November-December, 1950, the South African delegate maintained that the advisory opinion of the Court did not constitute a judgment binding on the parties concerned, and that, since the delivery of the opinion, new facts had come to light indicating that the League did not intend to transfer its supervisory functions to the U.N. In other words, South Africa stated bluntly that it would ignore the decision.

By resolution of December 13, 1950, the General Assembly created an Ad Hoc Committee to confer with South Africa on the procedures necessary for implementing the decision of the Court. This Committee reported on March 17, 1951, that the Union delegate had proposed that South Africa reassume its international obligations by negotiating a new international instrument with France, the United Kingdom, and the United States, the three remaining members of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers to whom Germany had ceded S.W.A., and stated that the South African Government would agree to final confirmation of any such new contractual agreement by the U.N. (providing for judicial supervision by the International Court of Justice). The Committee considered this proposal unacceptable, feeling itself bound to act toward implementing the Court's advisory opinion, and counter-proposed such implementation by a procedure as nearly as possible analogous to that which had existed under the League. There would be a 15 member Committee on South West Africa

with supervisory powers similar to those previously exercised, and a Special Committee on South West Africa to undertake examination of the annual report. This was opposed by the South African Government on the grounds that it imposed obligations more extensive than those implicit in the mandate system. The Committee expressed regret, could not reconsider its decision, and reported to the General Assembly that it had been unable to comply with instructions. The Fourth Committee took up the question of requests for hearings from representatives of the peoples of S.W.A., heard the Reverend Michael Scott, and deliberated the report of the Ad Hoc Committee. The General Assembly, by resolution of January 19, 1952 (570 (A and B VI)), made a solemn appeal to South Africa to reconsider its position, reconstituted the Ad Hoc Committee, and reaffirmed its previous stand.

On November 28, 1953, the General Assembly established a Committee on South West Africa to examine information and documents and receive reports and petitions until such time as agreement was reached, and on May 21, 1955, the Union withdrew its offer to create a new instrument with the Principal Allied and Associated Powers. The Committee on South West Africa worked out its procedures and rules in the meanwhile, basing its reports on information and documentation submitted to it by the U.N. Secretariat, and submitted two resolutions to the International Court of Justice for advisory opinions. The first asked whether decisions of the General Assembly on S.W.A. required a two-thirds majority of all members present and voting, and this the Court endorsed as a correct interpretation on June 7, 1955. The second resolution asked whether it was consistent with the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of July 11, 1950, for the Committee on South West Africa to grant oral hearings to petitioners on matters relating to the Territory of South West Africa. This was confirmed as consistent by the Court in June, 1956, and authorized by a General Assembly resolution of January 23, 1957. Thus the Committee is empowered to take testimony from petitioners.

The South African Government has co-operated with the U.N. General Assembly in the following instances:

- (1) *by placing before the General Assembly its proposal for incorporation in the face of the General Assembly's disapproval;*
- (2) *in submitting an annual report to the General Assembly in*

1946;

- (3) *in stating its opinions clearly in meetings of the Fourth Committee, the plenary sessions of the General Assembly, and in the meetings of the Ad Hoc Committee of 1951;*
- (4) *in arguing its side of the case before the International Court of Justice;*
- (5) *in continuing its assurances that S.W.A. would be administered in accordance with the spirit of the Mandate.*

The Union Government has criticized the U.N. for placing its annual report of 1946 before the Trusteeship Council, the Trusteeship Council for exceeding its powers in its examination of the report, and the Fourth Committee for exceeding its powers in granting the privilege of oral petition to inhabitants of the Territory.

The Union Government has been unco-operative in the following respects:

- (1) *by its refusal to negotiate a trusteeship agreement;*
- (2) *by its refusal to continue the submission of annual reports;*
- (3) *by its refusal to recognize the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice;*
- (4) *by its refusal to continue negotiations with the Ad Hoc Committee;*
- (5) *by its refusal to meet with the Committee on S.W.A.;*
- (6) *by its refusal to acknowledge the privilege of petition on the part of the African inhabitants, either written or oral;*
- (7) *by its recent refusal to participate in the discussion of matters pertaining to the future status of S.W.A.;†*
- (8) *by its refusal to permit petitioners to leave S.W.A. for the U.N.;*
- (9) *by its refusal to permit a U.N. Commission to enter S.W.A.;*
- (10) *by its refusal to allow the Reverend Michael Scott to visit the Territory.*

The South African Government acted unilaterally in modifying the international status of S.W.A. by:

- (1) *passing the S.W.A. Affairs Amendment Act of 1949, providing for South West African (European) representation in the Union Parliament;*
- (2) *by its transfer, on April 1, 1955, of the administration of "Native" affairs and any matters specially affecting "Africans", including the imposition of taxes upon their*

†This article was written before the visit of the U.N. Good Offices Committee to the Union and South West Africa. Comment on this latest development is contained in the Editorial.

persons, land, habitations or earnings, from the Administrator of the Territory to the Minister of Native Affairs of the Union.

These actions seem to be in conflict with the continued assurances that S.W.A. has not been incorporated and that it is still being administered in the "spirit" of the Mandate.

The U.N. seems to have accomplished the following things:

- (1) *the prevention of the outright annexation of S.W.A. by the Union;*
- (2) *the clarification of the international status of S.W.A. as a Class C Mandate to be administered by South Africa in accordance with Article 22 of the League of Nations covenant and the pertinent articles of the Mandate;*
- (3) *clarification of the obligations of the Union;*
- (4) *recognition of the fact that modification of the international status of S.W.A. may only be effected through a trusteeship agreement between the Union and the General Assembly;*
- (5) *the protection of the privileges of petition of the African inhabitants of S.W.A.*

The United Nations has acted within the limitations of its powers and has attempted to deal with the situation in South West Africa by the exercise of moral suasion. The measures it has taken have helped to prevent political turbulence in S.W.A., but it is not to be assumed that the patience and good faith of the African peoples are limitless in the face of the increasingly discriminatory and repressive measures imposed upon them by the Union Government.

Recent developments at the U.N.'s Twelfth General Assembly Session offer new promise. A three nation Good Offices Committee, consisting of the United Kingdom, the United States, and Brazil, has been established by the General Assembly to hold talks with the Union Government on a satisfactory definition of the status of the Territory of S.W.A. and the establishment of a working international agreement between the U.N. and the Union.

It is to be hoped that the United States will play a leading and positive role in these discussions and not allow this crucial issue, which involves the justifiable aspirations of an oppressed people, to become a pawn in the game of Cold War politics. Indeed, the results of these negotiations can do much to enhance or destroy her prestige in the eyes of the non-European nations of the world.

THE SEKHUKHUNELAND TERROR

JAMES FAIRBAIRN

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BEHIND the mass murder trial of Bapedi tribesmen from the "sealed off" Reserve of Sekhukhuneland, lies the story of their people's resistance to the Nationalist Government's Bantu Authorities—and of the intrigue, intimidation and armed force which the Native Affairs Department has employed to make them accept this final tightening of the screws of White control over African tribal life.

The Bantu Authorities Act, which was passed in 1951 without any consultation with the African people, changed the traditional forms of African tribal and rural local government without providing for any form of African political expression. The Act called for the setting up of tribal and regional Authorities under chiefs or headmen, with all appointments—there are no elections—subject to Native Affairs Department (N.A.D.) approval. These Bantu 'Authorities' replace the traditional tribal gathering, or *kgotla*, as the final tribal forum, and also replace the considerable number of existing, partly elective, local and general councils, which had enabled many educated Africans to play a part in rural affairs. The Bantu Authorities Act is, in short, an unashamed buttressing of tribalism under the strictest governmental control. In this, it completes the process begun by General Hertzog's Native Administration Act of 1927, which brought tribal chiefs under the control of the Governor-General as their 'Great Chief', and made them liable to dismissal at the slightest sign of opposition.

To understand recent events in this loosely defined area, which lies in the Lulu mountains of the Eastern Transvaal, one must remember that its native Bapedi 'group' were amongst the very last of the Bantu tribes to be conquered by the White man in South Africa.

The Bapedi—whose chief Sekwati gave that most obdurate of all trekkers, Hendrik Potgieter, the land for his Andries-Ohrigstad headquarters in 1844—were, like many Bantu tribes, an amalgamation of several smaller groups. Their last great chief, Sekhukhune I, emulated Moshesh's Basutoland example by successfully amalgamating the Bapedi with the surrounding Bakoni and Batau people, permanently binding them by

'diplomatic marriages' with his sisters and relatives.

As is common in such processes of Bantu tribal growth, each original group retained its own name, but so successful and accepted was the fusion that when Sekhukhune defied the authority of Burgers' Transvaal Republic in an armed conflict lasting from 1876-78, the Bakoni people fought as part of the Bapedi.

Disputes about the succession of Sekhukhune I, who was finally defeated and deposed by the British, were settled in 1883; the Bapedi were disarmed; and for the past 75 years the inter-linked Bapedi, Bakoni and Batau peoples have lived in as much peace as the impact of successive White laws, taxes and agricultural betterment schemes permitted them.

Their health and education have, more recently, been helped by the establishment of the Jane Furse Mission Hospital and primary-cum-secondary school by the Community of the Resurrection, and the 200 miles which separate Mōhaletse, the royal seat, from Johannesburg have not proved too long for Bapedi working in the city to maintain contact with their homes, through a voluntary Association. Some few of these men inevitably became active in the African National Congress and filtered some of its ideas back to the Reserve, but, on the whole, life in Sekhukhuneland changed little over the years.

No sooner had the Bantu Education Act been passed in 1954, however, than the N.A.D. took over the Jane Furse Mission school run by "Father Huddleston's friends", and abolished its three high school classes. The principal, a Pedi, resigned in protest against the Act, and considerable resentment was aroused, fanned by the dictatorial manner in which the local N.A.D. agricultural officer is said to have imposed stock restrictions, new local taxes and even residential bars to the Bapedi's traditional polygamy.

When, therefore, Dr. Verwoerd himself held an *indaba* a few months later with Eastern Transvaal chiefs and counsellors to explain the blessings of his Bantu Authorities and Bantu Education Acts, the Bapedi representatives were unimpressed.

Their Regent, Moroamoche, returned home and called a 'report-back' meeting, the assembled tribe rejected the Bantu Authorities system—and the four year war of attrition with the N.A.D., which has turned Sekhukhuneland into to-day's Government-occupied armed camp, began.

A network of spies and informers was established throughout

the Reserve, but even by May, 1956, only four headmen had been persuaded to back Bantu Authorities. When attempts were made to trick Moroamoche into signing Bantu Authorities papers, his counsellors pulled him away physically, and in June, 1956, a tribal gathering once more decisively rejected Bantu Authorities, though a few more headmen had been 'won round'. In November, the local officials having failed, no less a person than Mr. C. W. Prinsloo, Chief Information Officer of the N.A.D., came to promise the Bapedi a railway bus service, a new secondary school, a clinic, a post office and a telephone if they accepted Bantu Authorities. The Bapedi, however, resolutely refused the bribe. Rumour spread that Moroamoche was to be deposed, and the tribal council dismissed its secretary and head councillor, whom it suspected of intriguing with Prinsloo to foist Bantu Authorities on them. Phetedi Thulare, a senior member of the royal house who had been working in Johannesburg as a messenger, became secretary in March, 1957—and was deported without warning exactly one month later.

Mr. Prinsloo's repeated unofficial offers, in the pseudo-Bantu idiom beloved by his chief Verwoerd, to bring the two deportees "out of his stomach" if the tribe accepted Bantu Authorities, were rejected; but by July 5 of last year, he had apparently bullied Moroamoche into submission. The setting up of a Bapedi Bantu Authority was gazetted. Some 8,000 members of the tribe then donned ceremonial dress and gathered from as far as 20 miles away, at Mohaletse, where they presented a petition bearing 30,000 signatures to N.A.D. officials, demanding the return of their exiled "sons".

Their petition was completely ignored and, although two new secondary schools were set up, matters came to a head at the end of last November. On the 29th, the Bapedi Authority was disestablished "for lack of support," and on the 30th the regional Chief Native Commissioner, backed by an armed police convoy, informed Moroamoche at Mohaletse that he was suspended as Regent for a month. Simultaneously, seven men were arrested, and two of them, including the new tribal secretary, immediately deported. The five others were gaoled on charges of obstructing the authorities. It is perhaps significant that one of these five subsequently made application to the Supreme Court, on December 4, when his counsel alleged that the police at Schoonoord, the Sekhukhuneland administrative centre, had refused to give him access to his client. The

matter was settled out of Court after ready access to the accused was promised, and the State agreed to bear the costs of the application. In February of this year, three of the five men were acquitted and minor fines imposed on the other two.

Before this, however, the Government decided to reverse the history of over a century, and to facilitate the setting up of Bantu Authorities by separating the 'Bapedi' from the 'Bakoni'. The removal of the latter to the Nebo part of Sekhukhuneland under their "own" Native Commissioner was begun, but they have reportedly been trickling back to their old homes recently.

At the end of last year Moroamoche's suspension was extended for another three months, and after this the Government, which was simultaneously encountering stiff resistance from the Bafurutse around Zeerust, quickened the pace of its persuasion.

Acting under a law of 1927, Dr. Verwoerd took powers on February 28 of this year to "seal off" any Native area at will. Within such an area, "Any person who . . . makes any statement, verbally or in writing—

- (a) which is intended or is *likely* to have the effect of subverting, or *interfering* with, the authority of the State, the Native Commissioner or any other officer of the Department of Native Affairs, or of any chief or headman; or
- (b) which consists of or contains any threat that any person will be subject to any boycott, or will suffer any violence, loss, disadvantage or *inconvenience* on account of such person's obedience to the State or its officers, the legislature or his chief or headman"; (my italics)

becomes liable to a fine of £300 and three years imprisonment. Cases under this proclamation, on which comment would be superfluous, would in the ordinary course be heard by the local Native Commissioner doubling up as Magistrate.

On March 7 this proclamation was applied to the 'Bapedi' part of Sekhukhuneland (as well as to Zeerust and a third Reserve), and since then, reliable first hand reports have been understandably hard to come by. However, the Government's publicly taken measures speak for themselves.

On March 11 Moroamoche won a Supreme Court appeal against his continued suspension, on the grounds that the Government had not given him the chance to defend himself, demanded by the law it had invoked. With impressive

promptness, the Government re-suspended him on the very next day—this time under a different law which contained no such 'democratic' safeguards.

Five days later the African National Congress was declared an illegal organization in Sekhukhuneland—once more through a mere proclamation in a Government Gazette—and anyone even giving its 'thumbs up' sign or 'Afrika!' greeting became liable to a fine of £300 and three years imprisonment.

On March 21 Moroamoche was deported, without any warning, to Cala in the Transkei, together with his wife and one child; and shortly afterwards, on April 11, the Bantu Trust, which is in effect the N.A.D., took over all functions of the disestablished Bapedi Authority.

One would think that there was nothing except remaining alive which the Bapedi could now do, but apparently they were not yet crushed. At Easter the primary school at Mohaletse was permanently closed down as a result of a boycott, and its 300 children reportedly barred from all other schools.

Heavy police reinforcements were brought into the area and, after several 'nominees' had refused the position, an attempt was made to set up a retired Pedi police sergeant as acting Regent of the tribe, which promptly rejected him. As the boycott of schools became general, heavy police reinforcements took over the Reserve, headed by a special mobile column under Detective Sergeant Jan Hendrick van Rooyen, already notorious for his unbridled terrorism whilst commanding a similar force in Zeerust.

Tension rose as police raids increased, and the by now inevitable flow of blood began on May 16. An armed police detachment arrested Phasoane Nkadimeng, a minor chief who had been threatened with deposition because of his opposition to Bantu Authorities, as well as his brother and a senior counsellor. Phasoane's villagers apparently rushed up, surrounded the police van into which their chief had been thrust, and held it to prevent his being driven off. What followed is a sadly familiar story. The police claim that stones began to fly, and that they were reluctantly forced to open fire in self-defence. Four men were shot dead, and six men and a woman wounded. The police van roared off, and the enraged crowd took its revenge on the nearest Government 'collaborationists'. The wave of retributory violence spread, and for several days assaults and arson swept the Reserve. Seven more tribesmen

died, and many were seriously wounded.

Convoys of fresh police reinforcements were rushed to Sekhukhuneland under the personal command of top brass, including Col. C. de Wet van Wyk, Deputy Commissioner of the South African Police, and the arrests of the tribesmen now facing murder charges began—many of them reportedly ‘smelt out’ by ‘loyal’ headmen.

On May 26 yet another Government Gazette proclamation made the carrying of “dangerous weapons”, which include the heavy ‘kierrie’ sticks and indispensable knives habitually carried by tribesmen, punishable by a year’s imprisonment and/or a £100 fine or whipping.

I will not attempt to recount the many harsh sentences which have been imposed by local courts there under the various and incredibly restrictive decrees now in force. In some cases, the timely intervention of White lawyers has led to the noting of appeals, but the authorities alone know how many other convictions there have been. Meetings of more than ten Africans have, of course, been banned together with all other possibilities of even verbal protest, and those reporters who have been allowed into the area entered it under the strictest official supervision. Their ‘sight-seeing tour’, though otherwise barren, did provide one final touch to fill in the public’s picture of enlightened White guardianship.

Standing in front of a smoking, sealed-off Reserve occupied by sten-gun carrying police, Mr. C. W. Prinsloo and his fellow Native Affairs Department ‘information’ officers explained what the “real” cause of the trouble in Sekhukhuneland was. The 20,000 strong Bapedi, said Mr. Prinsloo, were (after 75 disarmed years of White rule) trying to maintain an “*assegai* empire” over their 280,000 strong Bakoni neighbours, and were therefore against the “progress” brought about by new chiefs appointed by the Government. But the terrorized Bakoni need not worry, Mr. Prinsloo assured the world, for the Government would protect them and deliver them from oppression.

I know of at least one Bakoni headman who will be glad of Mr. Prinsloo’s assurances—one Frank Maserumule, who, after being rewarded for his espousal of Bantu Authorities by being made chief of a brand new village which the N.A.D. had set up at Nebo for the Bakoni it had forced to move from northern Sekhukhuneland, was forced to flee for his life from the wrath of his enforced subjects.

NO GOD. NO HOME.

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ON the 26th of June there was a break in the daily life of the Durban Indian community. All the Indian schools in the city and district closed for the day. At 1 p.m., every Indian business and shop put up its shutters, and the streets of the Indian quarter were left silent and deserted.

The meeting at Curries Fountain Sports Ground started at 2.30. The tall new buildings of Durban shimmered distantly in the afternoon haze. Business was "as usual" in the shops and offices in West Street. Tourists, down for the season, sunned themselves on the beaches. On the racecourse opposite Curries Fountain, horses were being put through their paces in preparation for the "July". When the meeting ended at 5.30, the lights were coming on in the White homes on the Berea. A new night club was having its "Gala Opening" later that evening, on the sea front.

More than ten thousand Indians were present at the meeting. (No Africans could attend. The Government's "election period" proclamation banning gatherings of more than ten Africans still operates in Durban.) There were factory workers and clerks and shop assistants and professional men. There were housewives and school children. There were the solid figures of merchants and the smooth, easy faces of playboys. For these people had come from many districts of Durban. They had come from the Beach and the Berea, from Woodlands and Montclear, from Merebank, from the Bluff, from Rossburgh and Sea View and Bellair. They had come from Hillary, from Briardene, from Prospect Hall and from Cato Manor. In many of these places, their communities had been established for generations. They had built temples and mosques, halls and schools. They had opened shops, they had cultivated gardens, and they had made homes. In Riverside, to take one example, they began their settlement 95 years ago—decades before Whites started to occupy nearby areas. But from all of these places they were going to be uprooted and, sooner or later, moved to remote undeveloped areas. That was why they had come to Curries Fountain—a diversity of persons united as a people.

For non-European peoples, June 26th is a day of very special

significance. It has been marked, during the past eight years, by a series of dedicated efforts. On the 26th June, in 1950, a nation-wide protest was made against the growing burden of apartheid laws. It was on June 26th, in 1952, that the Indian and African Congresses launched the Defiance Campaign. On the same date, in 1953, the Congresses made their final formulation of the Freedom Charter, and in 1957 the day was dedicated to a general protest against the Government's racial policies.

On one level, this whole series of demonstrations might seem to have been futile. The Government moves forward remorselessly on its course of oppression. But anyone who was present at Curries Fountain could feel that these people were joined together by a bond of infinite strength. Together they had suffered and feared and talked and prayed—and it was this unity that saved them from complete despair. To-day they had come together for a single day of "prayer and protest". In the presence of their quietness, their dignity, their pride and their grief, the expressionless policemen round the edges of the crowd looked more than usually absurd. And their guns were a reminder that the Indian people, in the land of its origin, had forged, in passive resistance, a weapon that had defeated a great imperial power.

To-day, however, the occasion of the meeting was one which seemed to offer a greater opportunity for despair, perhaps, than any other. The present Durban City Council, realizing the injustice of a previous Council's 'ghetto plans', wishes to change them. But the Government has accepted the proposals made in 1953. The proclamations still stand and must be faced as they stand—the pledge not only of displacement, but of ruin. 60,000 Indians and 80,000 Africans in Durban will lose properties and businesses valued at over £30 million. And, in the words of one speaker at the meeting, "they would be unable to occupy their homes, yet completely unable to sell at a price that would enable them to become home owners in another area". These were the simple figures, the simple facts behind the Durban Group Areas Proclamations.

Only a scattering of Whites was present at the meeting. Alan Paton, in a brief but moving speech, remarked on the fact that he could not say he was representing Europeans. "If I were," he said, "there would be no meeting here to-day." Those White sympathizers who were present felt an overwhelm-

ing shame at the apathy of their people. And, at certain moments during the meeting, the word "apathy" was revealed, with a terrible clarity, as wholly inadequate. Mr. J. N. Singh, who chaired the meeting, reminded the audience that the Development Board created by the Development Act, and given the right of pre-emption at its own price, could economically ruin those affected by "buying off their properties for a song". Dr. G. M. Naicker (who is prohibited from attending gatherings and whose speech was read by Mrs. S. M. Mayet) quoted Dr. Theo Gerdner, a prominent Natal Nationalist. Dr. Gerdner, at a public meeting, stated that with the implementation of the Group Areas Act, 90 per cent. of the Indians engaged in commerce would "have to find other occupation". These instances, among others, gave what was perhaps the most terrible and haunting reminder of all—that easy profits and financial *coups* would be made from the dispossession of a people and the destruction of their livelihood. This was something that touched the roots of our shame—as Europeans and as human beings. Into one mind at least came the memory of a description of the first performance of "The Diary of Anne Frank" in Berlin, soon after the war. When it ended, there was no talking amongst the German audience, and no applause. They left the theatre without looking at one another—and in utter silence.

Certainly the implicit comparison did not seem too strong when Professor Pollak spoke of her experience in post-war Germany—among "9½ million survivors of German concentration camps and slave labour camps." "I emphasize," she said, "the human loss—the corroding of spirit and mind—and the inner turmoil, confusion and despair." The human loss. Looking around that gathering, how inevitable, and how true, it was to link these people with all persecuted peoples. Paraphrasing Dostoyevsky, spokesman of the tortured and anguished, the insulted and injured, it was right to say: "Kneeling to you, we kneel to all suffering humanity". For in front of our very eyes was a ragged Indian child, carrying a placard. On it was written, in straggling capitals, "No God. No Home. No People. No World."

THE VILLAGE AND THE CASTLE

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REALITY as we know it most is in the calm settled acceptance of social and personal relationships within a stable environment. In an ordinary environment it does not often happen that authority, acting blindly and needlessly, sweeps away these things, and substitutes a jumbled world of indecisive nightmare. When Kafka wrote of a young man called K. who arrived at a village subject to the arbitrary dictates and strange whims of the dwellers in the Castle above, he created such a world. So, with less genius, has the Nationalist Government in the Population Registration Act.

Kafka's hero never found out why he needed a permit in the village, or what sort of permit he needed. Neither did he know who was in the Castle, or by what right they governed. He did not know what set apart the dwellers in the Castle from the dwellers in the village, from where their authority was derived, or what the laws were that he had to be so careful not to transgress. He found himself in a strange nightmare world of apartness. The strange judgments of the people in the Castle decreed it. He could not understand why.

This is a predicament not unknown to the majority of our "citizens". The fact that they were born into it, and conditioned so from earliest childhood, may or may not make acceptance a little easier. The man, however, who comes under the shadow of the Population Registration Act has had created for himself the world of Kafka.

This is how Act No. 30 of 1950 has affected a great number of ordinary law-abiding citizens in Cape Town. The subject is leading a fairly ordinary life, normally in a working-class suburb such as Parow, Goodwood or Woodstock. He may or may not know that "coloured blood flows in his veins". He is certainly in intimate association with people who are accepted as "white". In some cases he is married to one; and in at least one publicized instance he was engaged to an ordinary South African girl—which means, *ipso facto*, to one possessed of ordinary South African colour prejudice.

He has his faults and failings and he has, within the scope his environment has permitted him, his virtues too. In short, it is reasonable to expect that he will be protected from

arbitrary processes of law. This particular citizen, however, has had the misfortune to have been born into Kafka's world. Someone might have formed an obscure grudge against him. Some zealot might think his existence among the people of the Castle threatens the fundamental moralities of the place. At any rate, someone writes a letter.

The letter probably goes to Pretoria, and will probably be placed in a buff file in the Population Registration Building. This is an interesting building, big and imposing, flanked in winter by the stark branches of the unbudding jacranda trees. Once it flaunted on its walls a statue of a half-naked man and woman, carved by Kottler, a famous South African sculptor. This was removed, however, as an offence to public morality, another uneasy symbol of a strange ethical code. Within this buttress of racial purity, due processes take place. Our subject gets a letter "inviting" him to appear before the race tribunal in Cape Town.

Now he can exist on a variety of levels. He can be white, and his whole family, to his knowledge, can also be white. He can be white with a few distant, never-referred-to skeletons in the cupboard. He can be a "play-white" with the consent of his family. He can also be a "play-white" subject to envy, or that strange thing "racial pride" which regards, with the usual Kafka logic, his rejection of his "race" as a disgrace. There have been many people, according to officials of the Population Register itself, who have been unjustly accused of this strange crime, but let us assume that our subject has, in fact, passed the "colour line"—it is difficult in this context to be more sparing of quotation marks.

He will appear by appointment at a bleak room near the centre of Cape Town. Two or three members of the tribunal will sit, in the accepted fashion, with their backs to the rather inadequate light, and the inhospitable quality of the room will be added to by grey drapes on the walls. He will enter, nervously, and he will be required to answer questions which he will regard as being of an almost unbearable delicacy. At this time, or subsequently, his family may be sitting with him.

Descriptions are taken of the colour and texture of hair, eyes, skin and bone structure of the face, and searching inquiries are made about ancestry, associations, social habits. The fact that no satisfactory definition of race has ever been formulated is, of course, ignored. A feat that would baffle any known

anthropologist is expected of comparatively minor civil servants. To a question asked by the *Cape Times*: "Is there an ethnological or anthropological formula which is applied, and if so what is it?", Officialdom replied: "Refer to Sections I (III), (X), (XV) and 3 of the Act.

To illustrate the peculiar quality of the definitions it is only necessary to quote them. Section I (III) states that a "coloured person" is a person who is not a white person or a Native; I (X) that a "Native" is a person who is, or who is generally accepted as, a member of any aboriginal race or tribe of Africa (What would an American Negro or a West Indian be?); I (XV) that a "white person" means a person who is in appearance obviously, or who is generally accepted as, a white person; and Section 3, that the particulars required for the compilation of the register shall be extracted by the Director from the forms and returns received by him under the Census Act.

We may assume that our subject has been tried and found guilty. The final decision has lain with the Director in his chaste and purified building in Pretoria, but there are "safeguards". Now officially coloured, our subject can appeal to a Board in Pretoria. He is, almost certainly, however, a working man with a modest income—those in different categories seem somehow to escape the net—and he will have to get leave from his work, convey himself and his witnesses, all at his own expense, a distance of roughly 1,000 miles.

From the decision of this Board, an appeal can be made to the Supreme Court. This has the happy effect of making the whole thing public property. And by this time too, of course, the expense is very far outside the compass of any ordinary wage earner. So he will probably accept his lot, and probably even regret the impulse that lead him before the Cape Town tribunal to protest against that initial little slip of paper which told him he had been removed from the voters' roll.

The strange underground workings of the mechanism of the Act can well be illustrated by an actual case, which is fairly typical. A man who lives in a European suburb and holds a fairly responsible job in a factory, out of a blue sky received a card from Pretoria telling him that his name had been removed from the voters' roll. No reason was given. A clergyman of the church where the man was married, it subsequently turned out, had two years previously received a notification from the Register of Births, Deaths and Marriages in Pretoria as follows:

"Sir, a request has been received for the amendment of register No. in respect of the marriage of As the necessary documentary proof has now been lodged, please amend the original register of this marriage in terms of the provisions of regulation No. 13 (5) framed under Act No. 17 of 1923, as amended, by deleting the husband's race description and substituting therefor 'coloured'".

The clergyman said he had assumed the request had come from the man himself, although it is difficult indeed to imagine why anyone should make such a request. It was not until two years later that he showed the document to the man concerned, who was bewildered and horrified. He sent to Pretoria for his birth certificate, which came back describing him as "coloured". This man went to a European school, his father and mother lived as Europeans, his children played in European sports teams.

He and his wife and sons appeared before the tribunal. The children, for the first time, heard that their father might be classified as non-European. The effect on an average South African youth can be imagined with difficulty. The questioner made notes of the colour of their hair, eyes and skin, and each member of the family was asked whether he knew if any of his relatives was coloured. This family is still waiting for the verdict from Pretoria.

Other examples of the whimsicalities of the whole procedure are not hard to find. There was, for example, the woman who said that one of her children was illegitimate to prove the "whiteness" of the others; there was the engaged man who went to Pretoria to get a provisional certificate of "whiteness". The fundamental point, however, was made with admirable directness by the Cape Town Nationalist newspaper, the *Burger*, which inquired: "How can there be race separation without race classification?" Satisfactory answer came there none. In other words, if one builds a society on Alice-in-Wonderland principles, Alice-in-Wonderland results can fairly be expected.

It is also, of course, an ingenious method of protecting privilege, simply by getting it down in black and white. Colour is not really sufficient of a rubber stamp. There is all this irritating borderline stuff, which must also be cleared up to preserve the lunatic logic of a caste society. A Nationalist Senator, the session before last, put the matter with appealing clarity. The Population Register, he averred, was a thing to be mightily thankful for, as now one knew whether one was white

or not. Much the same thought was expressed with more suaveness by the Minister of the Interior, Dr. Dönges, when he said in February this year: "To many a certainty has been given that they had never had before".

Now, it requires the utmost exercise of double-think to quite grasp how the individual affected by a declaration of his race is in any way altered, except in relation to the pressure of social forces upon him. The implication of the statements of Dr. Dönges and others is that there is a special mystique in whiteness, which must somehow effect some strange kind of inner essence.

Since the wrong kind of pigmentation is a distinct social, political and economic disadvantage, to be escaped by every means at the disposal of care and cunning, it must be completely obvious that very many people who appear to be above the disagreeable implications of the Act are not whole in their whiteness. Therefore, it would seem that the possession of "colour" can not really affect one's essence. The logic, however, stops there, and the protective double-think takes over again. So lack of colour, it might appear, is a gift not of God, but of the Director of Census and Statistics. That would certainly seem, in quite a number of "borderline" cases, to be exactly the case.

While not impugning the integrity—or as much of it as his job can leave him—of any official engaged in this unsavoury task, it must surely be possible to get a "case" where the white pro's and the black con's are exactly balanced. Let us say our official has an attack of liver on the morning when he is called upon to exercise this particular judgment of Solomon, and there are very few men who can rise above the functionings of their livers. Might he not, being a little less than divine, allow his judgment to be deflected into the black camp? Or does the doctrine of predestination affect him and impart to his actions a little of the godly, in spite of his liver?

Dr. Malan once described the Population Registration Act as the cornerstone of apartheid. It was the foundation of a glorious new era in our race relations. No doubt, the doctor had pondered the theological implications of the system, and, no doubt, he had found them to his satisfaction. To those of less biblical learning and subtlety they do not seem very clear.

It is obvious that, from an abstract and ideal point of view, no one should mind whether he has been classified as "coloured" or not, and that, in a sense, many of the people so classified are

hoist with their own petard, and are paying for their complicity in a gigantic swindle. The strange point is, however—and again this has the nightmare logic of a Kafka novel—that the effect of such classifications is a harsh and yet intangible punitive sentence for an unknown crime, committed by unknown persons. One cannot dismiss the sufferings of the convicted “play-white” as just punishment for a distorted social system.

There can also be little moral objection to the carrying and issuing of identity cards. It is normal practice in European countries, and is often a great convenience when one wants quickly to identify oneself. It also has a function in the tracing and detection of criminals—real criminals, that is. The moral objection in South Africa, however, is that a normal process of state procedure has been twisted into the “cornerstone of apartheid”. This, of course, is a fairly familiar process, about which many words have been written. But, in this instance, by acting as an extension of the already pernicious “pass” system, its effect is even more basic, and in its amorphous quality even more frightening, than any other item in the constant parade of diminishing liberties which are now as familiarly South African as biltong or a mixed grill.

Recently there emanated from the chaste headquarters in Pretoria a statement that several hundred “borderline cases who had lived under a racial cloud” now enjoyed security after being “upgraded” by the sympathetic application of the Act. Ignoring the fascinating implications of the phrase “racial cloud”, many people whose work takes them among the strata of society most affected by these fiats, said in a newspaper interview that they were appalled at this statement. One described it as a “bland and callous euphemism”. The point at issue, however, which State officials never seem to be able to grasp at all, is that the arbitrary lifting of people in and out of clouds, racial or otherwise, can hardly be said to be a recognized function of legitimate government.

Another interesting facet is the way in which the workings of the Act in application to the classification of “coloured” people first came to the public attention. The race tribunals, apparently, had been taking place for some time in a shrouded secrecy not only about the identity of the victims, but as to the very existence of the tribunal. In the course of a routine inquiry, a *Cape Times* reporter, Mr. Brian Barrow, discovered by chance that the “inquiries” were taking place, and that apparently the

officials whose lot it was to undertake them felt a little harassed about their work. He was told when he taxed the officials that under no circumstances could any information be given to the Press about the affair. His way out was to wait outside the building and to waylay the victims as they entered and left.

All of those he approached showed bewilderment and horror—to such an extent that most agreed to talk about their experiences. He discovered, for instance, that several people under this racial cloud had left the country—and exile seems a heavy penalty to pay for an unknown crime which the fugitive did not commit. One man, it seems, had a wife of inviolate whiteness. He left by himself.

Kafka's hero K. to whom miasmatic nightmare eventually became a reality, apart from his difficulties with identity cards in the environs of the Castle, also found himself on trial before unknown inquisitors, and for an unknown crime. Called upon to address the court of unknown authority, he said this, and his words will find an echo among the largely inarticulate victims of this persecution.

“There can be no doubt that behind all the actions of this court of justice, that is to say in my case behind my arrest and to-day's interrogation, there is a great organization at work. An organization which not only employs corrupt warders, stupid Inspectors and Examining Magistrates of whom the best that can be said is that they recognize their own limitations, but also has at its disposal a judicial hierarchy of high, indeed of the highest rank, with an indispensable and numerous retinue of servants, clerks, police and other assistants—perhaps even hangmen, I do not shrink from that word. And the significance of this great organization, gentlemen? It consists in this, that innocent persons are accused of guilt, and senseless proceedings are in motion against them, mostly without effect, it is true, as in my case. But considering the senselessness of the whole, how is it possible for the higher ranks to prevent gross corruption in their agents? It is impossible. So the warders try to steal the clothes off the bodies of the people they arrest, the Inspectors break into strange houses, and innocent men, instead of being fairly examined, are humiliated in the presence of public assemblies.”

APARTHEID IN NURSING— A CHALLENGE

AN AFRICAN NURSE

and

FR. MARTIN JARRETT-KERR, C.R.

Fr. Jarrett-Kerr is Chairman of the South African Arts Federation and the African Education Movement, and the author of several books of Literary Criticism and Philosophy. The African Nurse must, for reasons apparent in the article she has helped to write, remain anonymous.

SINCE the Nursing Amendment Act (1957) was passed, it has become increasingly evident that between concocting a law and enforcing its provisions successfully a great gulf exists. The opposition of non-Europeans especially to all the discriminatory features of the Act has continued unabated. Very few 'Advisory Committees' (of Africans and Coloureds) as provided for in the Act have been formed, since the non-European nurses regard these as pitiable and even treacherous substitutes for direct representation on the South African Nursing Council (SANC) and Board of the South African Nursing Association (SANA). Non-White nurses have refused to form separate branches of SANA. And "when the Chairman of the Nursing Council and President of SANA (both senior ex-matrons) toured the country to 'explain' the Act to White and non-White nurses separately, they drew the following non-White audiences: Cape Town, 14 out of about 1,000 possible; Port Elizabeth, 18 out of 500; Durban, nil out of about 1,000." (Port Elizabeth *Evening Post*, February 21, 1958.)

But opposition to the Act has recently been more specific still. For one of the implications of the Act is that the SANC is, in effect, under State Control and must comply with the Government's apartheid policy. The first signs of this subservience appeared when the SANC sent instructions to matrons of hospitals that all applicants for training, or for registration with the SANC, had to fill in an innocent-looking form, requiring, among other items, "Identity number and race classification under the Population Registration Act, 1950." Europeans, Coloureds and Asiatics can obtain their number from the Population Register; but Africans can only obtain a number by accepting a 'pass' (reference book). The violent opposition of African women to carrying 'passes' is well enough known. For the SANC therefore to demand information which requires

African women to accept 'passes' was to show the Council's subservience to Government policy. Fortunately the African nurses have been so firm in their refusal to take out 'passes' that the SANC was hastily compelled to issue amended instructions, "that if you do not already have an identity number issued to you, this need not be reflected in the form." But this is merely a breathing-space, until the issuing of 'passes' to African women is implemented in all areas—if, indeed, it ever will be.

Opposition to supplying 'race classification' on this form continues in many areas. For the form itself clearly states that it is being issued in order to complete the Separate Registers required by the Nursing Act. The non-European nurses argue that to sign such a form, and give such particulars, is both to help in implementing an Act to which they totally object, and to imply their own acceptance of it. And they argue, further, with some weight, that if there is any possibility that the International Council of Nurses (ICN) will regard the Nursing Act as a contravention of international standards of nursing and therefore no longer recognize a colour-bar SANA, then those nurses (European and non-European) who have opposed the Act on these very grounds may yet, by their signature to this document, be disqualified from membership of the ICN.

It is ironical that last year, when protests against the Nursing Act Amendment Bill were being organized, a notice was put up in every hospital reminding nurses that those who "take part in political activities" are liable to dismissal. For, by consenting to the Act—indeed, by asking for it—the SANC is itself now committed to political activity. It was noteworthy that this threatening notice last year was *not* brought to the attention of those nurses who had sent telegrams to the Minister of Health applauding the Bill, nor of those delegates who had appeared before the Select Committee in favour of the Bill, nor of those nurses who were members of the FAK (Federasie van Afrikaanse Kultuurvereniging) that conducted a vigorous campaign to get the Bill brought before Parliament. As usual, 'taking part in politics', in a bad sense, only applies to those who oppose the Government.

One of the deepest fears of the discriminatory clauses in the Act arises from the provision that, in addition to separate Registers and the deprivation of all direct representation of non-Whites in the SANA and SANC, the SANC is specifically empowered

now, by law, to issue a differential syllabus, and therefore different examinations and different certificates, according to race. For up till the present all nurses, irrespective of colour, have taken the same examinations and obtained the same qualifications, which are recognized anywhere in the world and therefore enable non-White nurses to do further training overseas. There were certain indications between the passing of the Act in July, 1957, and the early months of this year that the SANC was making plans to implement this policy; and it was this threat that aroused the hostility of the non-White nurses most fiercely. It is good to know therefore (if true) that as a result of their agitation, and of the various deputations to Nursing bodies, an assurance has at last been given by the SANC that there is, after all, to be no discrimination in this sphere; that the same syllabus, examinations and certificates will be available to all, irrespective of colour. The non-White nurses regard this as a victory for their cause, and a vindication of their strenuous opposition to the Act. But so long as the Act is in force, the power still remains with the SANC to introduce this kind of discrimination. And we can have no assurance that it may not one day be introduced; for it was noteworthy that many Nationalist speakers, in their election speeches in March, 1958, referred to the Nursing Act, and to this very aspect of it, as the expression of their policy; they said, in so many words, "But for the Nationalist Government, with its introduction of apartheid into nursing, your White daughters might be ordered about by senior Native nurses." This motive, after all, was clearly expressed in framing the Nursing Bill. Witness Mr. van Niekerk, to the Select Committee:

"The fact that Europeans and non-Europeans have to wear the same uniforms and insignia, is . . . causing friction as a result of the fact that Europeans are thereby compelled to acknowledge and respect non-European seniors as their superiors." (June, 1956.)

Or Mr. van Schalkwyk:

"The non-European is not regarded as being capable of carrying the responsibility implied in a certificate." (25 April, 1956.)

Or Miss Nothard:

"They (the non-European nurses) are very ready to go back to the savage." (April, 1957.)

Until the Act is expunged from the Statute Book, there can be no security here. And meanwhile the other discriminatory clauses in the Act remain in operation as before.

This Act therefore presents a challenge to international standards of Nursing and, specifically, to the ICN. The challenge has been taken up in some quarters overseas. In the important medical journal, *The Lancet*, an article appeared, saying categorically about the Bill:

“What does seem surprising is that both the South African Nursing Council and the South African Nursing Association, in their evidence to the Select Committee, favoured racial discrimination, and are not at present voicing any dissent to the Bill. . . . Apparently the South African Nursing Association does not recognize fully its duty to the non-White members, and its present actions do not seem to be in line with the International Code of Nursing Ethics. (8-6-57.)”

The Editor of the *New Statesman and Nation* asked a pointed question of the ICN:

“It (the Act) raises a principle which may apply to other international organizations. If South African affiliates exclude or discriminate against part of the potential membership, will the White minority be accepted as representative of South Africa?” (16-9-57.)

The General Nursing Council for England and Wales, on January 24, 1958, passed the following recommendation of its Registration Committee:

“That the General Nursing Council for England and Wales, placed on record its regret at the provisions in the Nursing Act, 1957, of the Union of South Africa which discriminate between White persons, Coloured persons and Natives.”

The GNC for England and Wales is one of the oldest and most respected Nursing bodies in the world. What will be the attitude of the ICN itself to this challenge?

The matter was discussed at a Board meeting of the International Council of Nurses in May, 1957, i.e., before the Bill became law. The accounts of that meeting (which was private) as given to the South African press have been very inadequate and even misleading. Miss Borchers (National President of the SANA) admitted that “misgivings were expressed” at the meeting; but the Executive Secretary of the ICN (Miss D. Bridges) said afterwards that “Miss Borchers answered (the questions of Board members) to the satisfaction of all present.”

(*Star*, Johannesburg, 7-8-57, and *Cape Argus*, cited in *Hansard*, col. 8651). And Dr. C. de Wet, in the House of Assembly, gave the impression that there was nothing for the Government to fear, since "a strict policy of non-interference" prevented the ICN from taking any action with regard to the Bill. In fact the discussion at the Board Meeting of the ICN appears to have been very heated; Jamaica, India, the Netherlands, Finland and Sweden were most active in opposing the concept of apartheid in Nursing; one member suggested bluntly that any national association (such as the SANA) in which there was racial discrimination should be considered a temporarily inactive member of ICN; and the upshot was that, if the Bill became law (which it had not at the time of the Board Meeting), the SANA would have to revise its constitution, in line with the Bill, and then re-submit it both to the Constitution and to the Membership Committees of ICN. The code of ethics of ICN is quite clear: "Professional nursing services should be unrestricted by considerations of race, creed, or colour or social status. Inherent in the code is the fundamental concept that the nurse believes in the essential freedoms of mankind. . . ." And further, it is stipulated that every member association of ICN must be governed "by its own members"; can this be applied to SANA, in which a large proportion of its members have been deprived of all executive powers? In other words, will the ICN allow SANA to eat its cake and have it? Miss Borchers, in her evidence to the Select Committee, admitted that the only reason why non-White nurses were retained as members of SANA (though discriminated against and deprived of franchise in it) was that SANA must remain officially 'inter-racial' in order to remain in the ICN. No less a person than Dr. W. M. Eiselen implied that this policy was 'dishonest'—he said, to the same Select Committee, that according to the Bill, non-Europeans would be *de facto* members, but "in reality they are not members. For that reason it would be more honest to give them their own association. . . ."

The final decision of ICN is yet to be made; its nature will depend upon the awareness of nurses all over the world to the issues raised by the South African Nursing Amendment Bill.

A POSTSCRIPT—OPERATION PARASOL

On Saturday morning, March 22nd, outside the gates of Baragwanath Hospital, in Johannesburg, a comic opera took

place with a large cast. On one side of the main Johannesburg-Potchefstroom road stood a group of women, mostly Africans, but with a sprinkling of Europeans among them, carrying a Congress banner and one or two placards ("Strijdom, You Have Struck a Rock"), and armed with parasols (for there was no shade there). On the other side of the road, for most of the time outnumbering the women, were massed 350 armed policemen, with revolvers, stenguns, and, in the background, tear-gas ready for use. Throughout the week alarmist rumours had spread: the women were going to break the gates down, to march into hospital, and to . . . well, no-one knows quite what they would do when they got inside, but presumably they intended to march off with all the bed-pans, or something equally seditious. As a result, police leave was cancelled; the doctors were told to get rid of all merely convalescent patients in order to make room for casualties; all women staff (lady doctors, radiographers, radiotherapists, occupational therapists, chemists, etc.) were advised not to report for duty; all doctors were issued with special passes to let them in and out of the gates, which would be manned by police; and rumour has it that the gas-masks were held in readiness in the casualty station. However, as if this were not enough to ensure safety, the City's non-European Affairs Department had police-blocks stationed at the two main points on the Baragwanath road, to stop all 'unauthorized' traffic. As a result, by 11 a.m., when the main deputation was admitted into the hospital to interview the Superintendent and Matron, the women numbered a little over 300. (When the police blocks were removed, more women joined them.)

The deputation was received courteously by the hospital authorities, and the discussion lasted an hour and a half. The women were assured that the South African Nursing Council had no intention of forcing nurses to take 'passes', and therefore that the demand for 'identity numbers' was in their case being at present withdrawn. (For how long, is still in doubt.) Also that 'Separate Registers' did not mean a lower standard of nursing training—the Administrator of the Transvaal, Dr. Nicol, was quoted as having authoritatively said this. (The deputation was not told why, if training of non-White nurses is to remain at the same standard, there should be any need for differentiation at all.) The hospital authorities were courteous in their attitude. But the women, most of them

respectable, middle-class housewives with daughters in the nursing profession, wondered why they needed to be received with sten-guns and massed policemen. The question remains unanswered.

However, the same hospital has been providing evidence in its practical working which should show, to any unbiassed eye, how totally unnecessary the racially discriminatory provisions of the Act are. The tenth anniversary of the Baragwanath Hospital was observed, among other things, by a special number of *Medical Proceedings (Mediese Bydraes)*, 17 May, 1958, being devoted to accounts of work, research, etc., carried on in the Hospital. In the opening article by the Senior Physician, Dr. V. H. Wilson, ("10 Years' Medical Experience at Baragwanath non-European Hospital") Dr. Wilson goes out of his way to state that

"I have . . . been favourably impressed with the ability of the non-European nurse. For the past two years the Medical Wards have been administered and worked entirely by her. Her standard of work can be as good as any I have experienced in London hospitals. . . . The work of our nurses is especially praiseworthy when the rapid turnover and over-work is remembered." (p. 251f).

And the Principal of the Nursing School, Miss E. W. Petersen ("African Nurse Training—Ten Years of Progress") says in the same number:

"Ten years of training in this Nursing College have produced the conviction that once the initial educational and adjustment needs of the student have been met in the Pre-Nursing Course . . . there is absolutely no need to consider a special syllabus to meet the needs of African nurses." (p. 333.)

In view of this, a conclusion based on practical experience and backed by the statistical evidence of examination figures, etc., it is surely obvious that much of what was said in the Evidence before the Select Committee, which determined so disastrously the nature of the Nursing Act itself, was both ill-informed and unjust; and this strengthens our conviction that all those who believe in the high calling of Nursing can do no other than continue to work for the repeal of the objectionable clauses in the Act.

JOB RESERVATION (II) THE ACHILLES HEEL

ALEX. HEPPLÉ

Former Leader of the Parliamentary Labour Party

IN spite of protests from organized industry and commerce, leading economists and trade unions, the Government of South Africa is sweeping onward with job reservation. The Minister of Labour, in what may prove to be his first determination fulfilled without complications, has ordered the Durban Corporation to employ only White drivers on the vehicles used to remove night soil and refuse.

He ran into trouble, however, with the recommendation of the Industrial Tribunal that the Cape Town Tramways should be ordered to reserve 84 per cent. of its running staff jobs for Whites. The Industrial Conciliation Act does not allow him to apply racial quotas, although it permits the total reservation of industries, trades or occupations for the employment of workers of a particular race.

But Senator de Klerk is not dismayed at the setbacks that hamper the speedy enforcement of his plan to reserve the cream of employment for Whites. He has ordered the Industrial Tribunal to investigate the building trade in the Transvaal and the O. F. S., the tea and coffee packing trade in Pretoria, liftmen's jobs in Johannesburg, Pretoria and Bloemfontein, jam and food processing, leather goods making and tanning, and the manufacture of electric stoves, refrigerators, water heaters and metal kitchen furniture.

The Clothing Industry.

Meanwhile, the situation in the clothing industry (the Minister's first target) is becoming more complicated. First, there was the consternation when the Minister declared that the industry's main categories of employment would be reserved for Whites; then there was the confusion when he upset his order by issuing a general exemption; now there is widespread fear.

It seems that the clash between apartheid and industrial progress has come sooner than expected. The Tomlinson Plan (and its variations) for the development of the Native Reserves quickly whetted the appetites of entrepreneurs, who are now establishing factories where African labour is plentiful and cheap. This development has struck a mean blow at job reservation.

At dawn on the 25th March, 1958, two specially chartered railway buses left Johannesburg for Natal, carrying eighty-five White garment workers, most of them ardent believers in apartheid and firm supporters of the colour bar. They were on a "See for Yourself" tour of the new clothing factories that have been established in and around the African townships of Natal country towns.

At Charlestown, two miles beyond the Transvaal border, the sightseers visited three factories set amidst the mud and straw huts of the Native Location, the 'reserve' for the African people of Charlestown. The visitors were greeted by crowds of bare-footed, ragged African children, who excitedly chased the buses down the dusty location streets, until they stopped at the factories. It was the lunch hour, and the factory workers sprawled in mealtime comfort about the open square facing one factory. This was their novel rest room, providing all the joys of location life right outside the factory doors. There, the White garment workers from the Rand were able to ply their Black fellow workers of Charlestown with all sorts of questions about wages and conditions of work. They also spoke to managers and supervisors at the factories.

From Charlestown the sightseers went on to Ladysmith, one hundred miles away, where they saw two more clothing factories. Here the buses parted, one turning off to the Free State towns of Villiers and Parys. The other continued down the Durban main road to Camperdown, a village between Pietermaritzburg and Durban, where a new factory, larger than all the others, had gone into production.

The establishment of this factory is a model of the Tomlinson Plan applied in the correct Verwoerd manner. The undertaking is White owned; it has a prominent Nationalist Member of Parliament on its Board of Directors; it is neatly situated on the border of a Native Reserve. It has other features which must appeal to any ambitious industrialist. A large slice of the capital has been provided by the Industrial Development Corporation, the body set up by the Smuts Government in 1940 to assist in the development of South African industry. The premises were erected by Africans, at wages less than one-third the standard White rates, and they worked every day of the week, including Sundays.

In the course of their tour, the White garment workers saw eight rural factories and came away wondering how Senator

de Klerk could ever enforce his job reservation order of October, 1957. The rural factories all operate on a similar basis. Most of them are situated inside African locations. The owners, managers, administrative staff and supervisors, comprising less than four per cent. of those engaged in these undertakings, are White persons. The other 96 per cent., the factory workers, are African men and women.

Many of these factory hands are children between the ages of ten and fifteen; a large number of them work barefooted and in tattered clothes. Their working day begins at 6.30 a.m. The Whites earn far more in these rural factories than they could in the cities. On the other hand, the Blacks earn a mere one-third (and sometimes as little as one-fifth) of the wages paid for similar work in Witwatersrand factories.

The factory workers have no trade union; their working week is 46 hours, compared with 40 hours in the cities; they are granted no sick leave; they have no Sick Fund or Medical Benefit Society; because their low wages are less than the minimum qualification for African workers, they are excluded from the protection of the Unemployment Insurance Act; worst of all, they are subject to the Native Labour (Settlement of Disputes) Act, which denies them the rights of other workers. It is this last factor which plays the important role in the rural pattern.

The Native Labour (Settlement of Disputes) Act not only makes it almost impossible for African workers to fight for improvements without falling foul of the law, but also makes it a crime to react in a normally human manner to bullying and unjust treatment at the hands of employers.

In a recent case at Charlestown, a strike occurred in one of the factories because a European supervisor, in a fit of anger, struck one of the workers, a girl of fifteen. Other workers were also threatened with assault and ran out of the factory. The police were called and sixteen workers were arrested. They were charged under the Native Labour (S. of D.) Act with striking illegally, found guilty and sentenced to £5 or one month's imprisonment each, suspended for three years.

Referring to this case, the *Garment Worker*, newspaper of the Garment Workers' Union, commented:

"The Charlestown case shows that the manufacturers in the uncontrolled areas not only enjoy the advantage over their competitors that they can pay very much lower wages. In addition, their

employees are virtually prohibited from demanding living wages and proper treatment. . . . It is no wonder that factories are deserting the controlled areas and opening up in places like Charlestown, where they can make the fullest use of unorganized, unprotected Africans. . . ."

The Achilles Heel

The rural factories are manufacturing top grade articles of clothing, although some of the factories are specializing in cheaper qualities of men's wear. The standard of work done by the tribal Africans in these factories is generally high, once they have been trained. Some of the visiting workers from the Rand admitted that they saw work as good as that performed by White craftsmen, an admission borne out by the large slice of Government contracts captured by new rural factories. They make most of the blazers for White schoolchildren, the uniforms for the police, and for other officials.

Seeing all these things was a disturbing experience for the sightseers. They are now asking how the Minister of Labour came to declare the whole clothing industry reserved for White employment. If these rural factories, inside the African townships and on the border of the Native Reserves, attempted to comply with the Minister's order, they would have to import White workers into these non-White areas. This would not only be flagrant defiance of the professed policy of apartheid, but illegal into the bargain.

Fresh from the scenes of thriving industrial activity, the White garment workers returned home. There they were met with a different situation. The factories in which many of them worked were feeling the effects of a depression which had begun to creep over the Transvaal clothing industry. Several were working short-time.

Since then, the depression has worsened. Now, one-third of the Transvaal clothing factories are on short-time, some of them working only two days a week.

The manufacturers and the Garment Workers' Union attribute the slackness mainly to the loss of business to the factories in the uncontrolled areas. Usually at this time of the year the trade experiences a seasonal slackness, but nothing like that of the present time. In May 1957, there were 24 factories and 636 workers on short-time; this year there were 107 factories and 2,566 workers on short-time. By June last year

the slackness was over, and the factories were back to full production. This year the slackness has increased, and more workers are being put on short-time.

This should be Senator de Klerk's hour of triumph. This was the day for which he made his plans. Just over two years ago, when pushing his job reservation measure through Parliament, Senator de Klerk said that its purpose was to protect White workers when jobs became scarce. Referring to the very industry that is now in difficulties, he said: "Now is the time to tackle this matter, because when a recession comes, we will have the weapon." The Minister's recession has certainly come—but so have the rural factories.

On July 11 1958, the Wage Board began its investigation into the clothing factories in the uncontrolled areas. It will be some time before the Board is able to submit its report or before the Minister of Labour is likely to make a new wage determination. But whatever the Wage Board recommends, it is certain that Senator de Klerk will not raise the wages of rural African garment workers to the Witwatersrand levels. That would kill the main attraction of the rural factories, and frustrate the 'White man boss' plans of the Government.

The rural factories are an essential part of the Verwoerd pattern, as is his artificial tribal society, where needs must be simple and discipline strong. Job reservation in the clothing industry may yet prove to be the Achilles Heel of economic apartheid.



CHRISTOPHER GELL: AN OBITUARY

JOHN SUTHERLAND

A Port Elizabeth journalist

IN Port Elizabeth Diary, a critical survey published in *'Africa South'* just a year ago, Christopher Gell wrote: "And if the Port Elizabeth I have written about is unrecognizable to its average White inhabitant (as I have no doubt it is), I am confident that it will long outlive the mirage city which he thinks he sees. For the seeds of the future are deep in *my* Port Elizabeth."

Christopher foresaw a big change in South Africa—though, brave realist that he was, he did not expect to live to see it himself. Yet perhaps the change is not so far off as some fear. Certainly the congregation at his funeral service last Union Day (May 31) seemed to presage a change.

There has been no congregation like this one inside a fashionable church in the White part of the town. The congregation of some 400 people was a cross-section of the kind of South Africa for which Christopher fought tirelessly: Africans in the majority, interspersed with Whites, Coloureds and Indians side by side. At the end the ringing words of the African national anthem, "Nkosi Sikelel' i-Afrika" (God Bless Afrika), sung by the African National Congress group, rose from the church and radiated out into the suburban streets.

Many in that Port Elizabeth Anglican church had not been able to meet Christopher: like people in other parts of South Africa and across the seas, they knew him only by his vigorous anti-racist articles and letters in the newspapers, exposing, informing, encouraging and condemning.

For Christopher spent only the last three of his 40 years in Port Elizabeth. He was confined to his iron lung or his bed throughout that time, unable to move through the town even in a car because he was limp, on his back, totally paralysed from the shoulders down. Yet he was as much a part of the pulsing life of what he called the Africans' "segregated dormitory suburb" (New Brighton) as the people themselves. He identified himself wholly with their struggles.

And so, of course, not all the people of Port Elizabeth mourned Christopher's death. As Canon John P. Gutch said: "Some may be glad that his light may seem to have been extinguished, for they prefer the darkness—how great a darkness. No longer

will the uncharitable statement, the unjust action, the oppressive legislation, be exposed by the searing light of his courageous mind. No longer will the complacent be challenged by the uncompromising logic of this modern prophet."

The Christopher Gell story cannot be told within the limits of a short article. I believe the full wonder of his triumphs is not yet comprehended by anyone—and will not begin to be known till a biography is published. Exciting discoveries await his biographer as he tries to establish just what it was that enabled Christopher Gell and his South African-born wife, Norah, to achieve their magnificent victory together after the doctors in England had decided in 1947 that there was little hope of his being able to live more than another few months.

Christopher created a resounding new career for himself, and became an international celebrity, in a new country, after being totally paralysed by polio in India in 1945, at the age of 27, when he was a most promising young administrator (Under-Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, Political Department). In 1947 he was invalided from the Indian Civil Service and moved to South Africa, partly because of the climate and partly to enable Norah to set up practice as a physio-therapist in Rustenburg, Transvaal, where her parents have a farm.

Through his newspapers and the people of all races who began to visit his bedroom (some from Johannesburg, 80 miles away) Christopher developed an interest in South African problems. In 1950 he began to write articles for South African periodicals, notably *'Indian Opinion'*, founded by Mahatma Gandhi and then edited by his son Manilal. Soon his articles were being accepted by influential journals in India, Britain and North America.

He was justifiably proud of his new career, which supplemented his wife's earnings and his small invalidity pension. His administrative thoroughness and self-discipline stood him in good stead as a journalist: no writer ever scanned newspapers, weeklies and books with a sharper eye for the *fact worth filing*. Near his bed stood two steel cabinets of facts on file. Some opponents of Christopher's anti-racist attitude did not know how meticulously he noted and stored his facts; these jumped into the newspaper arena to join issue with "the crank", or "English sentimentalist". Most hurriedly withdrew from the arena, however, licking their wounds. . . .

There are two main criticisms of Christopher Gell. One is that he was too critical and intolerant in his attitude to

opponents; the other, that he was "soft on Communists".

It is true that sometimes Christopher often seemed uncharitable towards those who did not see problems as he did. Partly the trouble was that, with clear thinking his dominant occupation, especially in the iron lung (where he could not read), he saw things so very clearly. He was exacting in his self-discipline concerning his own conduct, and he tended to apply the same high standards to others. And finally, of course, he was so pressed for time: his working day (out of the lung) was short; and he knew that he had not long to live.

As to his relationship with Communists: Christopher was far too analytical, independent and realistic a thinker to fall for any totalitarian ideology, least of all the Moscow party line. For him the end could *never* justify the means. But he was a dedicated anti-racist, and in South Africa he found C.P.-line people consistent at least in their anti-racism. That made them his allies, but solely in the South African struggle. He accepted former members of the Communist Party on their individual merits, on the ground that in South Africa Enemy No. 1 is racial bigotry, and that anyone who is genuinely anti-racist can help to do useful work. In lighter moments his big, lively eyes sparkled mischievously as he pulled the legs of Moscow-line associates about their post-Stalin somersaults.

The impact of Christopher's tireless and eloquent journalism cannot be measured. His approach to journalism provided the key to an understanding of his approach to life and to the immense personal disaster that befell him in India in 1945. He was for ever pursuing the truth, the facts, and woe to those who "took cover" (his phrase) behind sham or ignorance or deceit. He was a spirited and meticulous debater, yet he was always alert to opportunities to learn a new fact or sharpen his awareness.

This scrupulous respect for truth and his capacity for spiritual as well as intellectual growth were his principal qualities. He was purposefully growing in stature, as a man, a journalist, a politician, a scholar and a husband, all the time, right up to the very end. I believe it was this zestful, adventurous spiritual and intellectual searching that enabled him to wield such far-ranging influence from his bedroom in South Africa. Here lies the key to his triumph and his unorthodox Christian faith: the rejection of dogma, the unending quest for *the facts*, the insistence on good conduct and human brotherhood—"reverence for life".

MORE GRIM FAIRY TALES

E. V. STONE



DEEP, deep in the forest lived Hyena. Hyena was very wise and Hyena was very crafty.


One day as he sauntered through the forest, he spied a lion cub on the forest path, and his first thought was to fall upon it and eat it. Being very wise and very crafty though, he merely seized it and ran back to his lair. There, he determined to train Lion to obey him, for besides being very wise and very crafty, he was also very kind-hearted and realized how lucky Lion would be to have him for a master.

As Lion grew up, the arrangement proved excellent, for Lion would kill the meal and Hyena would eat most of it, thus saving Lion from indigestion. Whenever Lion got any great ideas as to who was who, Hyena very properly tweaked his tail and reminded him that all his good fortune and his freedom from indigestion were due to the self-sacrifice of Hyena. This puzzled Lion rather, for he was a trifle slow on the uptake in such matters, but he took it for granted that it must be right.

One day, however, unworthy thoughts came to Lion, after he had overheard Hyena talking to Mrs. Hyena. The good lady had suggested that Hyena ought to treat Lion better. "Really," she said, "Lion cannot really enjoy sleeping on the mud at the river bank where you chain him, and now that you've put him on a diet of bananas, he may get dangerous." "Nonsense," said Hyena, "You don't know Lion like I do; give him an inch and he'll take an ell. He likes to be treated firmly." Mrs. Hyena was still very doubtful about this, and thought that all the hyena population would feel a great deal safer if Lion were given a comfortable bed and just enough meat to keep him happy. Of course, she would not suggest anything so unthinkable as giving Lion his freedom, for she knew that that

would not be good for Lion. After careful consideration, she reckoned it would not be good for Hyena either. Neither of them thought of asking Lion what he thought, but then of course, lions don't have thoughts, and if they do they are probably silly ones.

Lion began to think that hyenas were very nasty, but he was quite wrong. He soon found out how nice they were—much nicer than bananas.



ONCE upon a time there was a Kingdom of Ethnaria, but all was not well, for it was discovered that the great virtues of the people, such as pride, selfishness, arrogance, hatred and greed, were in danger of being watered down or even lost altogether, through indiscriminate marriage and association.

As a first step, it was decreed that all long-nosed people should be kept separate from their less endowed fellows, as the nation was in danger of losing the ability to look down its nose. Again, the long-sighted members of the community were to be kept free from association with the short-sighted, the tall from the short, the blue-eyed from the brown-eyed, the hairy from the glabrous, the freckled from the clear, the bow-legged from the bandy, the left-handed from the right-handed, and the stout from the thin.

Step by step the policy was enforced. Each group had its separate area, and although there were some attempts made to evade the law, marriage between the groups was kept to a minimum, while the King had emblazoned on his coat of arms the legend, "Divided we stand; united we fall."

The only thing that remained to be done in order to perfect the system, was to separate the male from the female. In spite of pessimistic warnings that this would result in the death of the nation, it was agreed by the King, in consultation with the Monarch, that those who criticized the plan were just agitators, and that if the ship should go down, it would do so with its colours flying.

Once upon a time there was a Kingdom of Ethnaria.

IN the dim and distant days when morals weren't all they are to-day, there lived a robber called Nathaniel.


One bright noontide, Nathaniel strolled into a garden in the High Street of Myopia on his regular round of business, and the citizens of this worthy town gathered at the fence to see how he would set to work. As he approached the door, a fierce-looking dog leapt at his throat, causing him to pause in his stride to break every bone in the beast's body.

Undismayed and heroic in defeat, the valiant hound snapped at the heels of anyone who attempted to interfere, proclaiming that his only was the right to be watchdog. He had watched the robber come in, and nobody else was going to watch him come out.

So touched was Nathaniel by this display of heroism that he offered the beast the chance to come into partnership with him. Melted to tears by such magnanimity, the dog accepted, and so long as his life lasted (which wasn't very long), he fed out of a silver dish; for Nathaniel always kept plenty of silver around—it was one of his whims.

Right to the end of his life, the dog never let Nathaniel out of his sight, and when he died a lamented death, this epitaph was inscribed above his remains:

“Here lies Nat's lackey
Devout to the end;
He found out the knack, he
Turned foe into friend.
Now who will be watchdog?
Who faithful will be?
Who, tell me now, who
Will be faithful as he?”



NO REVOLUTION ROUND THE CORNER

JULIUS LEWIN

VISITORS from abroad, and even my friends, often ask me "how long it can go on". By "it" they mean the present state of the Union. They are always surprised at my answer, because I tell them that I see no reason why "it" should not go on almost indefinitely and certainly for a good many years. People who think otherwise talk in terms of an impending "explosion". When you press them for a clearer idea of what that word really means, you soon find that it implies a revolution of some sort.

The belief that a revolution is due to occur in South Africa sooner or later is derived from the political circumstances that have developed since 1948. Before that date it seemed to most people that, however bad conditions in the country were for the majority of the people—the Africans—slight improvements were made from time to time, and these gave people hope for the future. When the Nationalists came to power, however, they set about closing all the doors that had kept open the possibilities of change. What is more, it was soon made plain that the Nationalists did not want progressive change, however small and slow, to occur; on the contrary, they were determined to subdue everything that might promote social change in the direction taken by the rest of Africa and the rest of the world. The previous policy of amelioration was displaced by the new policy of regimentation. Moreover, the new rulers of the Union took steps to make it impossible for any political party or, indeed, any political organization to get the present policy reversed fundamentally by ordinary constitutional means.

Once people realize that public policy cannot be altered in the traditional way, their thoughts turn to unusual methods of making their opinions heard. Hence the use of the term "extra-parliamentary methods". It is used, rather vaguely perhaps, to indicate the publicity value of strikes, popular demonstrations, processions, and similar techniques of protest. In recent times, the Torch Commando and the original Black Sash movement were respectable examples of such attempts to make protest effective by means other than putting up candidates to contest elections. Although such methods of protest were new to Europeans, Africans have long had to rely on them.

But since 1948, meetings and even processions, always hard enough to organize, have, generally speaking, become unlawful except by permission of the authorities, who prefer to prohibit them altogether.

Knowing or feeling all this, social reformers have despaired of seeing any real changes in the total situation. That is why they keep asking when the revolutionary explosion will occur.

Behind this question there is a simple idea that revolutions just happen when the time is ripe. The serious study made of the subject by Professor Crane Brinton, the Harvard historian, in *The Anatomy of Revolution* (Vintage edition, 1957) should disillusion those who hold this idea in their heads. The historical fact of the matter is that certain well-defined circumstances have to be present in combination before an attempt at revolution is likely to succeed.

Let us look at the conclusion drawn by Professor Brinton from his study of the four famous revolutions—the English one in the seventeenth century, the American and the French in the eighteenth, and the Russian in the twentieth. Different as these obviously were in time and circumstance, Brinton shows that they all had certain features in common. Let us see what they were and then ask whether comparable conditions prevail in South Africa.

First, all four countries were on the upgrade economically before the revolution came. The revolutionary movements originated in the discontents of fairly prosperous people who felt restraint, cramp, annoyance, rather than downright crushing oppression. (This description applies to Africans in the Union). Certainly, Brinton says, these four historic revolutions were not started by down-and-outers, by starving, miserable people. The revolutionaries were not worms turning, but men of hope with a philosophy of optimism behind them.

Secondly, we find in these societies, in the years before each revolution, very bitter class antagonisms of a rather complicated kind. It is not simply a case of feudal nobility against bourgeoisie in 1640, 1776, and 1789, or of bourgeoisie against working class in 1917. The strongest feelings seem to have been generated in the hearts of men—and women—who had made money, or at least who had made enough to live on, and who contemplated bitterly the barriers presented by a socially privileged aristocracy. Revolutions seem more likely when social classes are fairly close together than when they are far

apart. "Untouchables" very rarely revolt against a God-given aristocracy, and Haiti gives one of the few examples of successful slave revolutions. (This agrees with the fact that in South Africa the loudest rumblings of discontent do not come from farm labourers or peasants in the Reserves, but from the African middle class—such as it is—and the urban working class, who are better off than their rural cousins).

Thirdly, the machinery of government in all four countries was inefficient. This was due partly to neglect and partly to a failure to make changes in old institutions. New conditions, arising from economic expansion and the growth of new monied classes, new ways of transport, and new business methods, laid an intolerable strain on governmental machinery adapted to simpler, more primitive conditions. This last point best shows us where South African circumstances differ materially from those prevailing at the time of the four historic revolutions that seem to provide parallels to the situation here.

To start with, the machinery of government in South Africa is not, on the whole, inefficient. Inefficiency in this context must surely imply much more than the administrative deficiencies which are a common source of public irritation. Indeed, since the vital machinery is manned almost exclusively by Afrikaners in sympathy with the Government and its policies, it is more reliable in its operations—from the Nationalist point of view—than it would be in the hands of a different set of civil servants, whose greater technical efficiency would be offset by their political neutrality or opposition.

This point acquires special importance in relation to the control of the armed forces. Brinton finds that "no government has ever fallen before revolutionists until it has lost control over its armed forces or lost the ability to use them effectively; and, conversely, no revolutionists have ever succeeded until they have got a predominance of effective armed force on their side. This holds true from spears and arrows to machine guns and gas." Brinton is also aware that the loyalty of the armed forces could be a crucial factor in a revolutionary situation. He says "that the nowadays common view that modern weapons have for the future made street risings impossible is probably wrong. Even modern weapons have to be used by police or soldiers, who may still be subverted."

But that view is not wrong when applied to South Africa. Not only have non-Europeans no access to modern weapons and

training in their use, but the loyalty of the men who do handle such weapons is of a different quality from that found outside Africa. The attitude of soldiers and policemen towards non-Europeans is notorious. No realist believes that the loyalty of the men in the armed forces is open to subversion, least of all in a racial crisis. It follows that the race riots that occur periodically are inevitably localized and therefore subdued without much difficulty. Least of all in so large a country with such poor communications as South Africa can rioting spread and grow into a revolution.

In any case, it is important to distinguish revolution from disorder. As Brinton himself admits, "disorder in some sense appears to be endemic in all societies and certainly in our Western society. The historian turned diagnostician can find evidence of disorders and discontents in almost any society he chooses to study. If a stable or healthy society is defined as one in which there are no expressions of discontent with the government or with existing institutions, in which no laws are ever broken, then there are no stable or healthy societies. A normal or healthy society will not be one in which there are no criticisms of the government or the ruling class, no gloomy sermons on the moral decay of the times, no Utopian dreams of a better world around the corner, no strikes, no lock-outs, no unemployment, no crime waves, no attacks on civil liberties. All we can expect of what we may call a healthy society is that there should be no striking excess of such tensions; and perhaps also that most people should behave as if they felt that, with all its faults, the society were a going concern. Then we may look about for the kind of signs just described—discontents expressed in words or deeds—and try to estimate their seriousness."

It is my contention that the signs of discontent in South Africa, when all added up, do not amount to a serious situation in the sense of a prelude to revolution. For one thing, the continued economic prosperity, which is shared to a significant extent by Africans, and the rising standards of living generally tend to compensate people for the sense of personal frustration induced by colour bars. In South Africa to-day most people do still behave as if they felt that, with all its weaknesses, the country were a going concern. Only a small minority think otherwise, and even their actions commonly belie their fears.

When I have persuaded my visitor from overseas that there will be no revolution to-morrow, he turns to another possibility.

Surely, he argues, the non-Europeans have already learnt how to use the moral force of passive resistance. The campaign of 1952 and the stay-at-home strike on the Rand on 26 June, 1957 (and in previous years) indicate the future trend. If this trend continues—so it is argued—the Africans, assisted by Indians and even by Coloured people, will sooner or later be able to paralyse the country and so force concessions from the Government.

There are two points to be answered here: one concerns the effectiveness of a general campaign of passive resistance and the other the effect of strikes by workers in particular industries.

The experience of 1952 offered only limited encouragement to those who put their faith in passive resistance. The campaign lasted from June 26 until it reached its climax on December 8, when a small band of Europeans led by Patrick Duncan "defied an unjust law" by entering the Germiston location without permits. In all, more than 8,000 non-Europeans were sent to jail for short terms. It is commonly believed that the campaign was killed by the ferocious new Acts of Parliament passed in February, 1953. The fact of the matter, however, is that the campaign had showed signs of waning late in November, 1952, and the Congresses really made a virtue of necessity by calling it off some weeks later, after the climax had been reached. I have no desire to belittle the courage displayed or the hardships endured by those who courted punishment in those fateful months. But facts are stubborn things, and the fact is that at no time did the campaign shake—though it did anger—the Government; nor does anyone who was wide awake in that period honestly think that it ever looked like producing anything remotely resembling a truly revolutionary situation. Since that time the severe new laws, passed as a direct result of the campaign, have sufficed to suppress any inclination to organize another campaign on similar lines. It is one thing to go to prison for two weeks and another to go for two years and to be flogged into the bargain.

There remains the other question, whether strikes in particular industries can become general enough and last long enough to wring major concessions from any South African government. Only those who have never been close to trade unions imagine that it is an easy matter either to organize aggressive trade unions or to lead them into strikes for a political purpose. The idea of trade unionism is fully thirty years old among Africans in the Union. It goes back to Kadalie's day, the mid-

nineteen-twenties. This is not the place to discuss why Africans are so slow and so ineffective in organizing trade unions. But when every allowance is made for illiteracy and other obstacles, such as hostile laws, the fact remains that Africans have made comparatively little headway in the last generation in this field of endeavour.

Moreover, even if trade unions were much stronger and more wisely led, it is difficult to see what vital industries or essential services could be brought to a standstill. If and when urban Africans did strike in large numbers, their place would be taken and their work carried on somehow by White workers or by other Africans brought, if necessary, from neighbouring territories where Africans are more backward and much less politically conscious than they are in the Union. Add to this the fact that African workers predominate in hardly any service or industry where stoppage or slowing down would at once create a national crisis impossible to resolve. The gold mining industry is not such an industry. Even if it were, the experience of August, 1946 showed how a strike could be dealt with and terminated within a week or two.

The events of March and April, 1958, confirm this conclusion. The various reasons for the failure of the proposed three-day stoppage are not relevant here. What is significant, however, is that official arrangements were made on a high level to prevent the break-down of essential services. These arrangements were planned by an inter-departmental committee, headed by the Secretary of Labour and representing the Union Defence Forces, the police, the prisons, and the Department of Native Affairs. Nothing is gained by forming opinions on the basis of illusions; and it is an illusion to suppose that South Africa, so obviously rotten with injustice, must be ripe for revolution. Yet the last word need not strike an entirely hopeless note. The view that change will not come in the foreseeable future by reason of an "explosion" of a revolutionary character does not imply that no changes at all are possible in the status and condition of Africans. It does mean that such changes are likely to depend more on the slow and difficult emergence of effective trade unions than on any other single factor. The increasing employment of Africans in industry offers the best hope that in due time collective action will produce social change. But in Thomas Hardy's words, "if way to the better there is, it exacts a full look at the worst".

AN ADDENDUM

DR. H. J. SIMONS

I APPLAUD Julius Lewin's Freudian device of bringing submerged ideas to the surface. Revolution, as a method of social change, figures prominently in the social sciences, and one should feel free to discuss it without taboos, let alone the limits placed by the Suppression of Communism Act. Important practical questions are involved, as he points out. What, for instance, are appropriate forms of action if revolution is not, so to say, on the order of the day?

He finds that only two of the ingredients of revolution are present: rapid economic growth and a rigid class system. The one has given rise to an African middle class and large proletariat; the other denies them freedom of development. This is the classic setting for revolution. If the stresses are not relieved, and conditions are ripe, an explosion takes place that blasts social obstacles aside and opens the way to a freer and more productive form of society.

Two of the prerequisites are lacking: a feeble government and a mass army. Power is concentrated in the ruling section, which is acutely aware of any challenge to its supremacy and determined to resist it with all the forces of the State. There is, he suggests, no reason to suppose that its authority will be weakened in the foreseeable future.

This analysis is surely correct, as far as it goes. But it was clearly not meant to give the whole picture. My comment will, therefore, take the form of additional observations which, I hope, will put the problem he raises in a broader context.

Despotic governments flourish most in stagnant, backward societies. When economic growth is great, people take on new habits, ideas and ambitions, which bring them into conflict with old, traditional ways and institutions. This is what South Africans have found in the course of the past three generations. Let me illustrate.

The urban population was 23 per cent. of the whole at the beginning of the century; now it is 44 per cent. In numbers this means that about 5½ million people live in the towns to-day, as compared with 1¼ million in 1900. The proportions are 78 per cent. for Europeans and Asians, 65 per cent. for Coloured, and only 27 per cent. for Africans, but the latter, with nearly 2½ million in the towns, are the most numerous.

Two further points need to be made about this movement. Firstly, it flows mainly to the big industrial centres, where changes are most rapid and far-reaching. Over 3 million people, or 60 per cent. of the urban population, are now concentrated in the four biggest metropolitan regions, which produce nearly 80 per cent. of the gross value of manufactured goods. The second point is that, though nearly a million Africans are migrant workers, something like 1½ million have made their homes in the towns and are likely to remain there.

Because of the very big differences between tribal culture and urban civilization, and the unsettling effects of the migrant system, a satisfactory adjustment to town life usually takes place only in the third generation. Most urban Africans are in the first or second generation stage; that is, they or their parents were born in the country. There are many, however, whose families were settled for a longer period in the towns, and their numbers will grow rapidly in the next ten or twenty years.

Statistics are dull, but give useful insights into social relations. So here are some more. It may surprise some readers to learn that only about two-fifths of the White urban population belong to the working class, in the usual sense of manual wage-earners, but few will wonder at the fact that of every 100 of these workers, 82 fall in the skilled categories, 15 are semi-skilled and three are unskilled. There is evidence to show that, in the past 25 years, Europeans of working class origin have moved up the ladder into managerial and white-collar jobs. This trend towards a bourgeoisie may have something to do with the elimination of Labour as a parliamentary party.

The White population, having rejected the possibility of augmenting its numbers by immigration, has been hard pressed to fill all posts over which it once claimed a prerogative. Coloured, Indians, and Africans are moving into professional, administrative, clerical, commercial and technical occupations, but their greatest advance has been into skilled and semi-skilled trades. Together they form 17 per cent. of skilled workers in industry, and 66 per cent. of the semi-skilled. Their share of these preferred jobs would undoubtedly be much greater if the jobs they do were classified according to actual skill and not the colour of the worker's skin.

The upward trend can be seen also in education statistics. Some 54,000 Africans and 26,000 Coloured and Indians are

in secondary schools (Standards 6 to 10) and 1,500 are enrolled in universities, besides another probable 1,500 who are taking correspondence courses for University of South Africa examinations. These figures are far behind the European enrolments of 140,000 in secondary schools and 23,000 in universities, and are likely to remain so, but it is clear that a fair-sized middle-class is taking shape in the non-European population.

If the economy keeps on expanding, the process of absorption at different social levels will gain fresh momentum and, with it, pressure on colour-class barriers will intensify. This, I think, is generally acknowledged. Hence the talk of slowing down the pace of industrialization, or diverting it to the Reserves. Both suggestions can be dismissed: the first, because an economy must go ahead or stagnate, and stagnation will not be deliberately chosen; the second, because it is cheaper and more profitable to move people to centres of production than to bring the means of production to people. If a large part of the country's small capital resources were diverted to the Reserves, the effect would be to sharpen class antagonisms in the European zone and hasten the growth of an African proletariat and middle-class.

The rate of growth may slow down, of course, but only if a general deterioration sets in throughout world capitalism. This would have other repercussions, such as the further strengthening of anti-colonial movements and of socialism, which would react adversely on the depigmented oligarchy. In a boom or bust, its position, relative to that of the voteless masses, is bound to weaken. Indeed, it has weakened, for all the show of strength and spate of repressive actions in the past ten years. *Kragdadigheid* may be esteemed for its own sake, but dykes are not built against receding waters.

It is this insecurity that the outside observer senses. South Africans are no more aware of the dangers than are people living on the volcano's edge. Few of us give more than a passing thought to the pattern of extreme violence that pervades our culture and is symptomatic of inner stresses: ten unlawful killings a day, four of them murders, which is seven times the number in Britain, possessing a population four times as big. Must we say that our enormous crime rate has no political significance?

This analysis does not refute Lewin's main point, which is the absence of overt signs of revolutionary ferment, but it gives reason to suppose that the position is more fluid than

might appear from the monopoly of power exercised by the White population.

My opinion is that the extra-parliamentary opposition has matured and expanded in the past quarter of a century, and that it will advance at a greater rate in the next decade. There is a vast difference between the leaders of the 1920's, who protested but asked only to be consulted, and those of to-day, who organize mass campaigns of action and demand the right to take part on an equal footing in the making of decisions. Political education, which is something different from school education, is proceeding apace, and as the town-bred youth comes into politics, an alliance between workers and intellectuals, which is the most formidable of all political combinations, will take the initiative.

The alliance is being forged now, in a multiplicity of warring sects, endless bickering over aims and methods, and the copious use of abusive epithets: herrenvolk, quislings, Africanists, renegades, racialists. These enmities between persons who share a common destiny perplex and dismay many good-wishers; but they are typical of periods of great confusion and change. The process at work consists, in part, of the repudiation of White leadership, either from the Right or from the Left. The main drive comes, however, from the need to formulate policies and programmes which will unite the extra-parliamentary opposition.

Its main difficulty is to find suitable forms of mass protest and struggle. Lewin only touches on this problem in his reference to the need of a strong trade union movement, and I hope he will come back to it in further contributions. On the whole, the opposition has made skilful use of the meagre opportunities available within the framework of the law, and has avoided actions that give the governing class a pretext to crush it with the full power of the State.

It is an exacting situation, and calls for high standards of leadership, discipline, and organization. The errors of judgment made during the parliamentary elections and the abortive three-day strike indicate that the leaders have lost touch with the people. It is possible, as Lewin implies, that they are being guided by an incorrect appraisal of what is possible under existing conditions. If this is so, the discussion that he has initiated should be continued at all levels and without delay. Under a wise leadership, there is much reason for hope and

confidence.

One further observation is needed to fill in the picture. Lewin does not allow for any impact that events in the world at large may have on this country. This is not because he is indifferent, for I know of few people who follow them as closely or with as much insight. He evidently decided to treat South Africa as an 'isolate', and examine it without introducing complications over which we have no control. Now that this has been done, I feel that we should put ourselves back in the world scene.

The Government has earned the unenviable distinction of making the most enemies in the shortest time. By repudiating both liberal capitalism and socialist equality it has incurred the enmity of both camps. Insisting on being the sole surviving exponent of White supremacy, it has become the symbol of racialism and the main target of the anti-colonial front. Not even its imperialist friends can afford to defend it openly.

It is not likely that other countries will apply trade boycotts or other 'sanctions' to restrain South African vices. The country is 'safe' for trade and investment, and can be depended on to pay its debts. Capitalists prefer a strong authoritarian government that is on their side in the Cold War to a liberal, progressive but neutral or hostile government.

The climate of world opinion is, none the less, having a great and visible effect on opinion at home. Our White population, which plumes itself on belonging to the Western Christian Capitalist way of life, and to which Africa is as much a 'dark continent' as it is to Europe, is feeling isolated, humiliated and afraid, in spite of its defiant protests. The collapse of colonialism and the racial myth has stripped it of its ideological pretensions. There are many signs, such as the recent SABRA discussions, that influential intellectuals are finding it difficult to reconcile their ethics with race oppression. The moral basis of the system has collapsed, and no society can survive if those who control it lose faith in their claims to dominate.

More important is the effect on the subject peoples. They have seen the tide of colonial liberation spread through Asia into Africa; they feel that it is eroding the foundations of White autocracy in all territories. They may not get much in the form of material aid from abroad, but they know, and the knowledge will percolate through the masses, that the rest of the world is on their side.

AN AFRICAN DIARY

ROSALYNDE AINSLIE

The United Kingdom representative of 'Africa South', just returned from a three-month visit to Kenya, Uganda and Northern Rhodesia

ALVI HOUSE is in Victoria Street, an old and rather delapidated part of Nairobi where the buildings remind one that only a few years ago this was enough of a frontier town for the farmers to come in their broad felt hats, guns across their shoulders, to tie up their horses in front of the Norfolk Hotel. On one side of Victoria Street, the city has grown out of all recognition, sporting a fine new stone-faced City Hall, and a Legco (Legislative Council) building of daring but horrifying 'contemporary' design. On the other side, beyond the bazaars and bars of the River Road, it sprawls into the worst kind of African slums. At Alvi House the two worlds meet; the slums, and the Reserves beyond them, bursting in upon the 'White establishment' and the government. Here are the offices of the African Elected Members' Organization; of the Kenya Federation of Labour; the I.C.F.T.U.; the Railway Workers' and the Building Workers' Unions; Tom Mboya, Legco member for Nairobi; and the People's Convention Party, newly formed Nairobi District political party. It is said to be watched by the Special Branch day and night. Anyway, it was one of the first places I visited.

The bare cement corridors are always crowded. Kikuyu women in peasant shawls come in and out of the P.C.P. office on a Saturday morning; a queue of labourers waits continually outside Mboya's room, whether he is there or not, to consult him on any problem from a work permit to a marriage dispute; shop stewards crush round the desk of a Union Secretary; reporters from 'Baraza' or some other of the Swahili newspapers nose round for news. The editor of 'Uhuru' (*Freedom*), the duplicated P.C.P. weekly, hammers out his editorial on the party's only typewriter: "Show the imperialists that you will not tolerate domination, by positive action". He is demanding support for the "sacrifice day", called for the opening of the trial of the seven African Elected Members.

After the Emergency—the banning of the Kenya African Union (K.A.U.), the arrest of its leaders, and the detention of hundreds of trade unionists—Africans were left without any real representation, political or industrial. The Lyttelton

and then the Lennox-Boyd constitutions gave them a number of Elected Members of the Legislative Council, but mass organization is having to be rebuilt virtually from scratch. To command the support of a mass movement, vital, activist policies are necessary, so a new generation has overthrown 'moderate' leaders such as Mathu (defeated by Dr. Kiano in the March elections), who for years had been the only African member of Legco, and for some time a nominated one at that.

The P.C.P. is a small beginning in the rebuilding of a movement comparable with the mighty K.A.U. But in a few months it has gained 2,000 members, most of them since Tom Mboya identified himself with the party. "Freedom in Five Years" has become a proud slogan. The Emergency regulation forbidding political activity on any but a district level is still in force, however, and a national party is impossible. Special permission is needed for a Legco member to address a meeting in any constituency but his own. Even the 'pass' laws which apply to the Kikuyu affect the work of political organizers in unexpected ways, and advertisements like the following appear in 'Uhuru' from time to time:

"Dansi: This Party is to hold a colourful dance at the Akamba Hall on the 17th April 1958, from 8 p.m. to 12 midnight, to congratulate the newly sworn-in African members of the Legco. . . . Drinks and night passes will be made available."

Alvi House is owned by an Asian. So are most of the buildings and businesses in Victoria Street and Government Road. Bombay House and Rahimtullah House and Karachi House . . . Asian properties separate the African world beyond the River Road from the 'White establishment' of Delamere Avenue and the official centre of town, just as Asians tend to be cast in the unenviable role of buffer in social life. It is an Asian clerk on the railways who makes sure that Black and White are not booked in the same compartment; an Asian shopkeeper who hastens to serve the European customer in case he is kept waiting by an African. Far from thanking him for his pains, Europeans reserve residential areas round Nairobi for White occupation only, and the Asian has to pay higher prices for what land is left 'unreserved'. Africans, on the other hand, resent the Asians, because they monopolize trading and artisan jobs that Africans might otherwise be doing; and even when in April the Indian Congress offered some support to the African boycott

of the Lennox-Boyd constitution (Congress declared that if the demand for a round-table constitutional conference was not met by the end of the year, it would join the boycott), several African leaders concluded that they were only trying, rather late, to curry favour with the majority race and the government of the future. Yet, it was an Indian barrister who acted with Pritt to defend Kenyatta and, recently, the seven Elected Members; the only non-African to be detained under the Emergency was Pinto, a Goan; and Makgam Singh, the Sikh trade union leader, is, I believe, still banished in the Northern Frontier District.

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On the other side of town, overlooking the gracious bougainvillea fringes of Princess Elizabeth Avenue, stands Legco, and near it the grand new buildings for the Treasury, Police Headquarters and the Secretariat. "Government" looks rich and slick and secure. "Government" has changed indeed in the past six years, and we know what to thank for a great deal of the improvement—the desperate lunacy of Mau Mau! Gone are the days when settler mobs could crowd the lawns of Government House howling for vengeance on the Kikuyu. Kenya is multi-racial now, it is progressing, it is to be a model in multi-racial living to hold up to the race dictatorships of the South.

To meet White ministers in a White government in Africa who can talk calmly of an African electoral majority is refreshing: Mr. Vasey, for instance, the liberal who was too liberal to be elected to one of Mr. Lennox-Boyd's precious seats. It was hinted by a settler paper that he was "communistic". (I don't remember whether they suggested that he got his orders from the Soviet Consulate in Addis Ababa. That Consulate gives rise to much excited speculation in East Africa). He is certainly a realist where realists are at a premium, but I doubt whether he could even call himself a socialist, to judge by the criticism his last budget met with from the trade unions.

It was hard to believe, in Nairobi, that Mau Mau was only two years away. In the Highlands, within sight of the Aberdare forests where Kimathi's guerrillas stalked through the bush with leopards and rhinoceros for nearly four years, it was easy to remember. The memory of that time, of the fear and the tension, is deep in the consciousness of every settler, just as

no doubt is the memory of the horrors of a prison camp to the Kikuyu labourers now returning to the farms after months or years of detention. But where the government has done some drastic rethinking after the disaster, settler attitudes remain out of step and out of touch with what is happening in the outside world—the Highlands, a beautiful feudal little world of its own, seems unaware of even the changes that have taken place in Nairobi.

At a by-election meeting I attended, the candidates devoted most of their speeches to vying with each other in promises to “guarantee” exclusively European land tenure in the Highlands. The man who felt himself able to demand that the White Highlands be White “in perpetuity”, won the seat. Three of the four candidates were ex-army officers, for it is still advisable to have a title or, at least, be a brigadier, if you hope to be accepted in settler society.

But it would be unfair to suggest that nothing has changed. Settler influence has diminished, for one thing, and though the voices that once demanded extermination or deportation of the Kikuyu still shout occasionally, they now more often argue for “democracy”, as against “undiluted democracy.” This is a distinction apparently invented by themselves, for as far as can be determined “democracy” means, more or less, the *status quo*, or White domination; and “undiluted democracy” means Black domination, chaos and savagery.

One evening, the gradual Africanisation of the civil service was being discussed and deplored. A few African A.D.O.’s had been appointed, and, apparently, with disastrous results. The Africans should not be pushed, they were not ready for it. No one seemed actually to have met an African Assistant District Officer, so I said that I’d stayed in the house of one in Uganda. For a moment there was dead silence. Then an Englishman, now retired, who had spent nearly all his life in the service in Kenya and Tanganyika, turned to me and asked gently, “Did you really? What was he like . . . does he live—like we do?”

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After the fevered drama of Kenya politics, Uganda seems rather like a lotus-land. There are virtually no settlers, and therefore no urgent feeling among the people of being “threatened”. Practically everyone has a piece of land—and the land is so lush, fermenting with growth and fertility!—

which will not only produce enough food for himself and his family, but probably a cash-crop of coffee or cotton as well. Far from there being a 'land problem' to flood the workless upon the towns, it is necessary to recruit labour from Kenya and Ruanda Urundi for the new industries in Jinja, the mines at Kilembe, and even the public services. There has been no fundamental change in the peasant economy brought about by British rule, and perhaps, as a consequence, political demands that arouse strong popular feeling still tend to be for the preservation of traditional societies—the exile of the Kabaka of Buganda provoked the last full-scale political campaign—rather than for the transition to a new one, based on the more sophisticated concepts of universal franchise and national (not tribal) unity.

Once one has abandoned the fruitless search for a national liberation movement—not that political activity doesn't exist, of course; there are any number of political parties, and traditional governments agitating for one concession or another—one can begin to enjoy Uganda. The growth, I suspect, is beneath the surface, among young Makerere graduates, now probably government servants in some remote town, treasuring a good library and meeting occasionally for a study group on economics or politics or literature; in Makerere-run extramural classes in tiny villages, where the local schoolteachers (who have had perhaps only six or eight years of schooling themselves), clerks, shopkeepers, anyone who understands English, meet weekly with a tutor for a course on "Education and Religion", or "Elections in a Democracy"; in Makerere College itself, where English and African staff, trained in English universities, and boys and girls fresh from their village homes, may gather in their rooms at night and play records of Mozart, or dance, or talk politics.

One can discover Katwe, the decrepit, tin-roofed, Buganda-administrated township clinging to the skirts of Kampala. Here too is a seething beneath the surface of street-markets and scrap-iron. Here are the printing presses of what seem like dozens of ill-set, ill-printed and practically illegible vernacular newspapers, expressing at least as many points of view as the profusion of political parties, whose headquarters are here too, indicates. And the dance-halls, Kamulu's, the Mengo Blue Gardens, they have colourful names but most of them are bare as a barn, with a few wooden benches and a bar.

What matters is the music, and space to jive in. One can enter for a shilling. A few stray Europeans join in with rock-and-rolling African youth. Journalists, trade unionists, Buganda aristocrats, labourers and university lecturers hunch together over the bar, and shout above the noise of the band. The Special Branch man detailed to watch some young politician yawns over his drink, and hopes to get home by breakfast-time.

You can't really get away from politics, even on the intellectual eminence of Makerere hill. My first night there was the opening of a special extra-mural course to which clerks and union organizers, teachers and housewives, had come from all over East Africa. The opening address closed with the announcement, "Will all K.E.M. come up now to have their permits checked?" The K.E.M.—Kikuyu, Embu and Meru—were the three tribes involved in the Mau Mau uprising; and I was told that it was something of a triumph to have got them there at all. Makerere, I suspect, is watched with some suspicion by the three governments that support it financially. The very idea of an independent university is faintly subversive in a colonial territory, especially when the staff are ready to insist on this independence—the right to teach whom they choose, what they choose—and make their choice on academic considerations alone.

But in Mengo, at Makerere, one can forget that one is White in a Black man's country, and that is a great thing in itself. In Northern Rhodesia, to forget is all but impossible.

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It was very early when Harry emerged, bullied by an almost equally sleepy Steve, from his room. Wes had come to fetch him, for he was due to preside over a Congress executive meeting in Lusaka that very day, and we were hundreds of miles away, in Ndola. We'd all been up late the night before, listening to the Blue Morning Stars, six angelic-looking singers from a Congress youth group, who sang us Congress songs, their plaintive harmonies belying their militant political content. So Njovo found some dance music on the radio to wake us up. Mrs. Mwema hustled in to make us tea. I only discovered after I had been in her little house in Twapia two days that she and her husband had given up their bedroom for me, to move into a guest-room themselves, and I always wanted to say something to them, to explain that they ought not to honour

me so, just because I am White . . . but neither of them speaks a word of English, and we had to content ourselves with friendly gestures.

Wes had brought the morning papers. Sir Roy Welensky, it seemed, had made another attack on "extremists"; by which, of course, he meant the British Labour Party and the Africans.

"You know," said someone, when suitable comment had been made on this, "the White Paper Constitutional Proposals for Northern Rhodesia? The voting qualification is supposed to be Standard Six—he has a nerve! He's always boasting that he was an engine driver, and only passed Standard Four!"

"See you in Lusaka," said Harry. I was leaving later in the day, for Lusaka and Salisbury. Soon I was alone.

I looked round the sitting room, crowded with chairs as it had been crowded with visitors the last four days: visitors for the President of the African National Congress, or just curious folk wanting to greet this strange White woman who chose to stay in an African township rather than a smart Europeans-only hotel. Old women would pass the open doorway, and stop to bow and clasp their hands and murmur, "mitende mkwai" (if my spelling is right); and others, more sophisticated, would come in and join the company and ask me primly how I enjoyed my stay, and what I thought of their country, and would I come back, and would I please come to visit them in their homes?

The room was tiny, but full of things—the paraffin lamp on the table; a radio; a photograph of the Queen, a faded print of a Botticelli madonna, an old A.N.C. calendar with Harry's face on it, and a huge portrait of Mr. Mwema, on the walls. The dining room was even smaller. Through the back window, I could see Mrs. Mwema in the 'kitchen', a little clearing behind the house where smoke-blackened pots are stirred over open wood fires. The sun poured down on the mud walls and thatched roofs of Twapia; and the old cripple sat as usual under his tree, eating the porridge brought to him by a little child who squatted at his deformed feet.

Suddenly the window was full of faces—white faces. What on earth could they want here? I got up to call Mrs. Mwema, and they must have thought I was trying to escape, because one rushed to the front door and one to the back. They handed me a piece of paper: "Prohibited Immigrant . . . no appeal against this notice." That was all I could take in. It was no

use asking why, they could or would tell me nothing. Mrs. Mwema didn't understand, but she sensed disaster, and took my hand affectionately, and as I drove away with them to the police station, she watched the car go in sadness and bewilderment.

Fingerprints, photographs. Someone asked me: "Do you know Doris Lessing?" They didn't seem to want any other information, and—to judge by two young newspaper reporters who interviewed me that night, and who already had quite an accurate idea of my movements for the last few days and my connection with '*Africa South*', obtained, it seems, from the Special Branch itself—there wasn't much more I could have told them.

I was to leave for Nairobi next day. The Immigration official took my passport away, and said I was "free". Then he added: "I think you'd better stay in a hotel tonight."

"But—why? Is *that* why I'm being prohibited? For staying in Twapia?"

"Well, that has something to do with it, hasn't it?" He didn't look at me.

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To return to Kenya, after Northern Rhodesia, is like returning to freedom. The Immigration officials are actually anxious to help. In Nairobi, Africans are sitting in cafés, hotels, cinemas. And there is confidence and laughter in the air . . . later, of course, you remember that you'd better mind your step, because Basil Davidson was banned from Kenya after he was banned from the Federation. And then there's the case of the Marles, who were contesting a deportation order when I got back to Nairobi. They left a few weeks later, their only offence, according to those who knew them well, their taste for friends of all colours and races . . .

POLITICAL TRENDS IN KENYA

Dr. GIKONYO KIANO, Ph.D.

Elected Member of the Kenya Legislative Council

ON Friday, June 27, 1958, two events which clearly reflect the current political moods in Kenya took place in Nairobi. One of these incidents was a meeting of delegates from various European political associations. The other was the publication of a document entitled "Our Pledge, Our Aims and Our Constitutional Proposals" by the African Elected Members of the Kenya Legislative Council. At the meeting of the European delegates, it was very evident that the White community is concerned about its future, its economic security and its political status in a rapidly changing Kenya. Already, Africans have gained substantial political influence in the territory. There is also talk of Africans occupying some portions of the Kenya Highlands, currently reserved for Europeans only. And there are signs that Kenya is producing its home-made class of poor whites. These three factors made the meeting into a convention of worried, insecure, and self-pitying Europeans, in search of some form of permanent reassurance.

The mood typified by the African document published on the same day was precisely the opposite, for it was one of calm and confidence. Kenya, geographically, historically and popularly, is an African country, the document stated. Consequently, it must be ruled by the majority of its inhabitants, namely, the Africans. Its authors (and this writer is one of them) appear to have been so confident of this that they could afford to be generous and make suggestions as to how they would provide for minority safeguards in the democratic self-government which, they declared, was their cherished goal.

What has led to this feeling of insecurity on the part of Kenya Europeans, and a great sense of certainty on the part of African leaders at the tumultuous heart of their political struggle?

The 1954 Constitution, popularly known as the Lyttelton Constitution, marked the first major break with traditional Kenyan politics. Prior to this period, Asians and Africans possessed representatives (Asian elected and African nominated) on the non-governmental side of the legislature. But the government front benches occupied by members responsible for various portfolios contained no African or Asian—only European Civil Servants and Europeans nominated from the

local White community. Such was the nature of the so-called 'Member-system', by which persons responsible for portfolios were known as Members for specific departments—Agriculture and Natural Resources, or Education, etc.

The Lyttelton Constitution introduced the Ministerial System which, among other things, introduced one Muslim and one non-Muslim Indian and one African in the newly created Council of Ministers. It was during the height of the Mau Mau Emergency, and the African community was not in a position to make its attitude toward this constitution too vigorously felt. Mr. Eliud Mathu, then the leader of African members of the Legislative Council, was very lukewarm to the Lyttelton Constitution. But an advance had been made, and for the first time, European politicians and government officials had to share with an African and two Asians the task of governing Kenya at the highest level.

When the first African elections were held in 1957, the successful candidates immediately declared the Lyttelton Constitution null and void, and campaigned so vigorously against it that, within a period of seven months, they precipitated a situation which ended in the imposition of the present Lennox-Boyd 'reforms'.

Africans, by this feat, set another landmark in Kenya's constitutional development. Until the downfall of the Lyttelton Constitution, a system known as 'parity' safeguarded European mastery in the legislature. By this system, Asians and Africans representing their separate racial groups were not to exceed the number of elected Europeans in the Council. This meant that the European elected politicians dominated the other groups in the Legislative Council. But with the advent of the new constitution, there are fourteen elected Europeans and fourteen elected Africans.† Thus the old 'parity', safeguarding European supremacy in the Legislative Council, has been broken.

African elected members have made it clear that they are out now to break the Lennox-Boyd Constitution, and will not ease their efforts until they dominate the legislature. They have asked for twelve more African seats in the legislature, without corresponding increases for the other racial groups. They

† These 14 elected African seats, an addition of six to the number under the Lyttelton Constitution, do not, of course, include the four 'specially' elected African seats—a constitutional change against which the leaders of the African community organized a boycott. See "The Lessons of Libel" by Alan Rake, in this issue.

want, at this stage, no less than fifty per cent. of the ministries to go to Africans. And, as a first step towards responsible government, they ask that all ministries, except those reserved for Colonial Office appointees (e.g., Finance and Defence), be filled by persons recommended by the elected members of the Legislative Council sitting together and thus responsible to them. This in practice could only mean that no one would take the ministries concerned without possessing a large measure of support from the African people. Such demands, of course, make the European community extremely uneasy. The Europeans fear that those who brought about the downfall of the Lyttelton Constitution might precipitate another political crisis and so cause the break-up of the Lennox-Boyd Constitution—a programme which, in their view, has already weakened the European position too far. Hence their demands for security now, before such eventualities occur. They believe that Africans in power might re-distribute the land, thus adversely affecting the present unduly extensive European holdings; might abolish protective economic policies designed to prevent the development of a poor white class in the country; and may even remove the Whites from the political arena altogether.

But, is the situation so very favourable for the African people in Kenya to-day? And the road to their realization so clear? On the credit side, there are a number of factors which lead one to believe that Kenya will, within the next ten years or so, come under primarily African rule. But, for such a situation to come about peacefully, fundamental changes in British colonial policy, in the economic organization within Kenya, and in the Government's attitude toward the Africans, will have to be effected. Let us, however, regard the factors on the credit side first.

To start with, the stage of constitutional development already reached in Kenya makes self-government under a White minority completely out of the question. White supremacy, politically speaking, can only be revived by a deliberately planned retrogressive step on the part of Her Majesty's Government. While this is not impossible to visualize, the fact that a large number of Kenya Europeans are crying for minority safeguards and the security of their property rights indicates that they have, at least implicitly, given up the will to fight for White supremacy. A few Europeans still believe it is their right to dominate Kenya perpetually, but a very large number recognize that this would

be a losing battle for them to fight. For Europeans to be concerned about minority safeguards is to admit, albeit implicitly, their recognition of the possibilities of majority (African) rule in Kenya. Indeed when this writer said so in the Kenya Legislative Council, not one European rose to contradict him. What was even more telling was that, throughout that particular debate, on a motion calling for a constitutional conference with a constitutional expert to recommend a new constitution for Kenya, not one European elected member of the legislature chose to speak at all. This is hardly fitting for a community that used to say it should 'lead' the other races in Kenya.

The second factor is the talk there has been of introducing a form of common roll electoral system in Kenya. Now, no form of common roll, regardless of how high the voting qualifications, can have results in Kenya similar to those in Southern Rhodesia. If the qualifications include university education, a large portion of the Whites would be disenfranchised, while many Africans and Asians would qualify. If completion of high school education becomes one of the qualifications, Africans and Asians would form the largest group of voters. High income or property qualifications would favour the Asian more than the European community. And it would be only a matter of time before there were enough Africans voting to make the African vote effective. African leaders are opposed to all forms of qualitative franchise, but even if a qualitative common roll is imposed upon Kenya, it will constitute no more than a temporary set-back in their campaign for true parliamentary democracy.

Even if the common roll is not introduced in Kenya, and representation in the Legislative Council remains on a communal (racial) basis, the chances are that African members will exceed European members in the very near future. The African community, which forms some 96 per cent. of the total population, is so aroused on this issue of representation that the Kenya Government, together with its British prop, would only be risking serious trouble, albeit non-violent trouble, in rejecting demands for more African members in the Council.

On the question of leadership, the fourteen elected members have succeeded in maintaining a united front, while the Europeans form a disunited group. There is, for example, Group Captain Briggs, representing the old school which continues to struggle for European leadership. Then there are those who tend to

follow the thoughts of Mr. Blundell, an advocate of some form of multi-racial government and some degree of African farming in the Kenya Highlands. And Shirley V. Cooke often crosses swords with his European colleagues on major political issues. Being a relatively small community, the Kenya Whites make their opposition to African nationalism weak and increasingly ineffective by subscribing to so many conflicting aims.

While the African advances and the European retreats in the struggle for political power between these two communities, the context within which this struggle is taking place favours the European and seriously hinders the Africans. Restrictions laid down during the Mau Mau crisis have not, as yet, been lifted. African leaders are forbidden to form national political unions which would aid them in their political struggle, and the small district associations permitted them have, so far, proved weak and insufficiently active. One of the reasons for this weakness, of course, is the Emergency Administration under which they carry on their political activities. Speeches by African elected members or other leaders in these associations are tape-recorded by the police. Meetings have to be held indoors, and often the halls available are too small for a good mass meeting. Guest speakers are discouraged, and an African elected member is not, as a rule, allowed to address meetings in constituencies other than his own. The collection of funds is restricted, and permits must be obtained from the District Commissioners before such collections may be made.

In the face of growing political consciousness throughout the country and the acceleration of nationalist activities by the African elected members, the Kenya Government does not seem inclined to relax the rules. Indeed, the fear exists that some of these rules, though designed to control the activities of the Africans during the Emergency, may now be made permanent as weapons against the rise of African nationalist movements.

An equally strong fear is that these restrictions, with those that apply to the members of the Kikuyu tribe alone, can very easily result in the development of subversive organizations—which would then provide the Kenya Government with an additional reason for not ending the current Emergency Administration. I do not suggest that the Government would deliberately create situations fertile of subversion in order to find new excuses for continuing its highly restrictive methods of African administration. The point, however, is that extreme restriction

of a people's speech, movements, activities, and organizations, cannot but lead to the formation of subversive or secret societies. The situation in the Kikuyu areas is a case in point. To combat Mau Mau activities, the Government hedged about the lives of the Kikuyu with numberless restrictions. Curfew regulations force every Kikuyu to be in his village before 8 p.m., and no Kikuyu may move from district to district without possessing a 'pass'. Only those with 'loyalty certificates' (a small minority) may attend political meetings. A Kikuyu may not go to Nairobi, the major employment area, to look for work, and only when a job is found for him by someone else already in Nairobi may he enter the city to take it. Many of these people were financially ruined by the Emergency; others are unemployed and cannot make an adequate living on the land, since the Kikuyu area is one of the most over-crowded in Kenya; and nearly all of them, like any other people anywhere, have political grievances which they would like to air. So long as violence existed in the area, restrictions were reasonable. But the Mau Mau movement was crushed in 1955, and to-day only some 120 active Mau Maus are suspected of being still at large—in the forests of the Aberdare mountains. The restrictions, however, remain. Consequently, signs of subversion and secret organization have recently been evident among the Kikuyu, and a group called 'Kiama kia Muingi' (K.K.M.) has been detected in some districts.

The movement is really nothing to worry about at this stage. The point, however, is that its growth is a result of frustrations brought about by the closely ordered life that the Kikuyu people are made to lead. The way to discourage such organizations is to attract the Kikuyu away from subversion by showing that good citizenship pays. The Emergency regulations must go. Collective punishment in the form of movement restrictions and curfews only make Kenya more vulnerable to secret societies, and the Emergency Administration is itself largely responsible for the difficulties encountered in fighting against the poverty now widespread among the Kikuyu. It is not sufficient to denounce the K.K.M. For until restrictions are removed to allow for a genuine and open nationalism, subversive nationalism is likely to develop, not only among the Kikuyu but in other parts of Kenya. If, as is suspected, these restrictions are being used to curb so-called 'extremism', the Kenya Government will have to realize, and realize soon, that it may be preparing the way for worse extremism in the form of rabid secret societies.

The African leaders have pledged themselves to peaceful political activities; they have denounced violence and all forms of subversion. But how are they to wage an open political struggle in the face of what resembles martial law?

What, then, is the right road for Kenya to follow? First, the Kenya Government must accept the consequences of introducing elections in Kenya. Having conceded to the Africans the right to elect their own representatives to the Legislative Council, it must learn to treat those elected as the genuine spokesmen of their people, instead of viewing them as irresponsible agitators to be persecuted by the Special Branch and hurled into court for uttering unwelcome words. The Asian and the European representatives speak anywhere in Kenya without restrictions. They can form national political unions. The same treatment should be accorded the African leaders.

The present policy of multi-racialism, with its government by group representation, will have to be abandoned. What is required is a definite statement of the goal towards which Kenya's constitutional development is leading. The current concern with the question of minority safeguards will be sensibly settled only when the context of majority rule is clearly defined. As the Africans form the majority in Kenya, the road to democratic self-government must, therefore, be the road that leads to a Kenya ruled by the African people. This is the harsh truth that Her Majesty's Government refrains from telling the European community in Kenya. It is surely time now that the truth were told. For only when it is, will those European politicians who now talk of permanent European leadership lose their influence, and those politicians who show their people how to live advantageously under African rule be strengthened.

Certain immediate constitutional steps are necessary to break the deadlock precipitated by the uncompromising opposition of the African elected members to the Lennox-Boyd Constitution. The first thing to clear is the anomaly created by the introduction in Kenya of a ministerial system of government without responsibility to the elected members of the legislature. While the ministries of Finance, Defence, Justice, and Economic Affairs (to be created) remain reserved for Colonial Office appointees, non-civil service ministers should be made responsible to the elected members of the Legislative Council as a collective body. This in practice would mean that all elected members together would hold a caucus to recommend to the

Governor the list of ministers, and that, if the racially-mixed caucus could not agree, then those who obtained majority support in the caucus would be selected. This would be the first step in establishing responsible government in Kenya. With fewer Europeans than non-Europeans among the elected members of the Council, the country would be assured against White domination in government and the Africans would get no less than 50 per cent. of the relevant ministries.

The next essential is the elimination of discrepancies in representation and elections. Mr. Tom Mboya represents the whole of the Nairobi African population, while the European population in the same city has three representatives in the Legislative Council. My own constituency has a population of 628,000 people, while some European representatives have 2,000 or 3,000 constituency members. This is grossly unfair. African representation in the Council must be immediately increased if Her Majesty's Government does not wish to admit that it is playing racial favouritism for the benefit of the Europeans. And this must go hand in hand with immediate abolition of the qualitative franchise applying only to Africans. Universal adult franchise for African communal elections, as is already the case for non-African communal elections, must be introduced.

To settle the other issues, such as the workability of a common roll in Kenya, constitutional safeguards for minority groups, and a Bill of Rights for individual citizens, an impartial constitutional expert should be sent to Kenya to study the situation and make recommendations. His recommendations would then be the subject of a round-table conference of Kenya leaders, government officials, and select advisers. By this method, a plan for developing Kenya into a self-governing country, with a parliamentary system of government, could be chartered in the shortest possible time. If the conference fails to agree upon anything substantial, at least ideas will have been expressed, and nobody will be the worse because of it. What is more, there would be a thorough airing of the fears and suspicions which are at present sensed, but not clearly voiced or understood.

Whatever may happen this year or next year in Kenya, however, the trends indicate that within the next ten years Kenya will probably be governed predominantly by Africans. Only ruthless suppression of African political activities or the eruption of grave international conflicts could change that.

THE LESSONS OF LIBEL

ALAN RAKE

East African Correspondent of 'Drum'

NAIROBI'S Senior Magistrate had said his final word. He picked up his 13-page judgement and slipped quickly out of the courtroom. Seven tired African elected members of the Kenya Legislative Council followed him to face the press cameras, the reporters' questions, and the sad-faced crowd still bravely waving its banners and placards in front of the law-courts.

They walked past the police who stood idly cracking jokes about the behaviour of the crowd, and towards their people. Mr Tom Mboya raised his hand in the freedom salute, and the crowd cheered.

The legal struggle had left Kenya's African elected members £525 poorer. Even the brilliance of the Colonial people's veteran champion, Mr D. N. Pritt, Q.C., had not been able to acquit them of criminal libel. Legally they had lost, but the political victory was undoubtedly theirs.

A few weeks before, when seven of the eight elected African members† had been charged with criminal libel and conspiracy to commit a misdemeanour against the newly passed electoral ordinances, official circles had denied that the trial was a question of politics. But the African elected members, pointing to the press statement in which they had vigorously attacked their political opponents, asked why none of these victims had brought civil actions and why the Government had immediately brought charges of its own accord. If the trial was not a political stunt, why had the non-European papers that had used the statement also been charged with libel, while the *'Kenya Weekly News'*, the only European publication that had published it in full, escaped.

The African elected members gave world wide publicity to their trial. A fund was started in England to raise funds; the United States A.F.L.-C.I.O. sent \$2,500, and contributions were raised by Tanganyika African National Congress (£250), Zanzibar Nationalist Party, and the Northern Rhodesian African National Congress.

Mr Tom Mboya's Nairobi People's Convention Party organized

†Under the Lennox-Boyd constitution, there are 14 African elected members, but at the time the statement was issued, the six new elected seats had not yet been filled, and the eighth sitting member was away.

two "sacrifice days" on which buses, smoking and drinking were to be rigidly boycotted. Banners, placards and slogans appeared everywhere . . . at the airport a crowd flourished a sign "Welcome Mr Pritt", while at the Nairobi lawcourts, other boards proclaimed: "Six million Africans on trial".

On May 28th, the day the trial started, the African leaders arrived on foot. Other symbolic gestures went as far as Tom Mboya's American tee shirt and Ghanaian robes, and the fur costume and beaded accessories of Central Nyanza's father-figure, Mr Oginga Odinga. It was obvious that both sides were determined to make as much political capital out of the trial as they could.

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Inside the wood-panelled courtroom, Mr Pritt, nodding over his notes like an elderly university don, had started the legal disputation with Mr D. W. Conroy, Solicitor-General, who sheltered, slow and sure, behind an old school tie and an old school voice.

Tom Mboya, Oginga Odinga, Masinde Muliro, Ronald Ngala, Daniel Arap Moi, James Muime, and Lawrence Oguda had been charged on two counts—on criminal libel and on "conspiracy to commit a misdemeanour"—by the Attorney-General of Kenya following the press statement they had issued on 25th March.

Their statement was aimed at the six Africans who had announced their intention to stand for the "specially elected" seats under the Lennox-Boyd Constitution, and had described them as "stooges, quislings and black Europeans" and as "self-seeking opportunists who must not be allowed to stand in the way of political development". These unnamed special-seat candidates had, according to the statement, "identified themselves with those who seek the perpetual domination and suppression of the African people, and consequently must be treated as traitors to the African cause".

This strongly worded statement cannot be understood except as the climax of united African opposition to the Lennox-Boyd plan and the "special seats" on the Legislative Council it established. For the twelve "special seats" (four European, four Asian and four African) were to be elected not by voters on the different racial rolls, nor by universal adult suffrage, but by the Legislative Council sitting as an electoral college. This was the

prize exhibit in Mr Lennox-Boyd's bag of constitutional conjuring tricks, a scheme by which twelve additional members would be elected to the Council as possessing "the confidence of all races", but in reality owing their seats and authority to a White-controlled Assembly. The device won support from European liberals and multi-racialists, taking in even members of the British Labour Party. But it was quickly discarded by the Kenya Africans, who could not see how a European majority combining White settlers and government nominees could return even middle-of-the-road candidates.

The African elected members accordingly boycotted the elections, which saw Kenya's outstanding liberal, Mr Vasey, defeated for one of the European seats, and a host of good government servants, ex-nominated members and friends of the administration (all of whom had acquired the habit of jumping to the crack of the government whip) coming forward to fill the African seats. At the time they issued their press statement, the opposition of the African elected members to the Lennox-Boyd Constitution had already become a question of principle.

Ingenious explanations have been offered as to why responsible political leaders should have used such strong language in attacking those whom they regarded as their enemies. Some maintained that they had deliberately challenged the Government, so that the Government would charge them, and that this would result in some form of martyrdom. Some political commentators even suggested that it might give them their opportunity of becoming "prison graduates"—an essential qualification for any African nationalist. Others said it was a way of demonstrating the unity of the African people behind them, by promoting an effective boycott and by letting the living-legend, Mr D. N. Pritt, handle another big Kenya trial.

At the time they were charged, however, the African elected members seemed totally unaware of the laws of libel. They merely thought the Government had picked upon a normal, if rather strongly worded, political statement as a means of punishing them for their opposition to the Lennox-Boyd Constitution.

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Every day before the trial started, long queues formed outside the courtroom. Only 90 were admitted to the public gallery, and throughout the trial a frieze of black faces, broken only by

an occasional Sikh or Arab turban, looked down in puzzlement at the legal proceedings below.

At lunchtime, a crowd several thousand strong cheered their members and waved placards.

Mr Pritt started the defence by immediately objecting to the conspiracy charge. He held that the seven accused could not have "unduly influenced" the members standing for the special seats, because, at the time the offence was alleged to have been committed, there was no constitution, no election regulations, in fact, nothing his clients could have conspired against. He claimed that the whole thing was a "conspiracy in the air", for one could hardly conspire to break a law not yet in existence.

At first the Magistrate merely registered his objection. But a week later, when Mr Pritt raised the matter again, the conspiracy charge was dismissed.

Throughout the next five days of the trial there was little dispute about the facts of the case. The defence accepted that all seven members charged had agreed to the statement, and that it had been widely disseminated to the press.

Once the conspiracy charge had been dismissed, the case revolved around the meaning of the words and phrases used in the statement and the question of whether or not they were defamatory. If shown to be defamatory, the defence had to prove the statement privileged or a true statement of fact.

The statement had declared: "The composition of those who have already declared to stand for these seats is both revealing and significant." And Mr Pritt tried to draw out what had been meant from the "special seat" candidates who climbed into the box as witnesses for the prosecution. Everyone of them admitted that when standing for a seat he was totally dependent upon European, or occasionally Asian, support. In fact, almost the only African who had been prepared to nominate candidates—and he had nominated practically all of them—was Mr Wanyutu Waweru, who was himself a candidate. Mr Waweru had been a nominated member of the Legislative Council for $3\frac{1}{2}$ years and had never tried to stand in a direct election.

The flashily dressed Mr Musa Amalemba, the first candidate to announce his intention to stand for a special seat and now Minister of Housing drawing £3,500 a year, agreed that he had been "kicked out" of his tribal Association long before the African elected members had published their statement.

Ex Court-President Gibson Ngome found some difficulty in

understanding Mr Pritt's English, but admitted that he informed the authorities about political meetings called in his area, and was therefore "an informer".

In his judgement the Magistrate said: "Mr Amalemba was said to be shiftily and muddle-headed. He was subjected to a long, relentless cross-examination and emerged a simple, frank and engaging person, of gentle courage. He volunteered the information that he had been 'thrown out' by his association and said that he had accepted loss, degradation and ridicule for the sake of his country and his people's cause. Mr Waweru, who also endured a long and searching cross-examination, emerged as a simple, reasonable person of quiet dignity and pride in his personal achievements". The Magistrate added that "I cannot say that I like the idea of a Court President-cum-Informer".

The statement had contained a paragraph:

"These stooges whom we have been telling you about should be treated with the contempt that they deserve." Mr Pritt's definition of "stooge" was someone who preferred to serve the interests of another community against the wishes of his own. Mr Conroy for the prosecution said that he would have had no objection to the use of the word "stooge", if it had been used alone. But the Magistrate, Mr. Rosen, defined it according to the dictionary as a "butt or foil". In his judgement he said, "the point is made by the defence that by reason of there being a European majority, or conversely an African minority, in the Legislative Council, the seeking of support by Africans from non-Africans must directly lead to the conclusion that any African seeking such support must be a butt or foil. That does not follow".

The Magistrate also objected to the expression "traitors to the African cause", because "there is all the world of difference between betraying a cause and failing to support the policy of a particular group". He did not add that the "particular group" happened to consist of the chosen representatives of the African people whose popular backing had been so convincingly demonstrated by the boycotts.

The defence had suggested that the word "quisling" meant a person who supported people other than his own to rule his country. "This" said Mr Rosen "presupposes that only Africans are of this country". He didn't think that any one of the six persons was a quisling, and he believed that each had the good of his people and the country at heart.

And so the minute examination of the statement continued, revealing real differences in interpretation of the words used. Finally the Magistrate found "that the words in their natural meaning can be, and undoubtedly are, defamatory, being likely to injure the reputation of the six persons concerned by exposing them to hatred, ridicule and contempt . . . indeed defamation was a calculated purpose of the publication." Mr Pritt's case had largely rested on the view that the words and phrases used had been matters of opinion and not of fact, and that they could not therefore be proved to be true or untrue.

The Magistrate said that justification rested on proof of truth or privilege. A statement such as "Be it known this day to the African community that now we all know the stooges, quislings and black Europeans in our community" was an apparent statement of fact, but it was untrue and therefore could not be used in justification.

In conclusion he said that he thought the African members had gone far beyond the normal bounds of fair comment in order to restate their policy of non-cooperation with the Lennox-Boyd plan.

The Magistrate said that he had no desire to end the political careers of the African elected members, which he could have done by ordering prison sentences of six months or more. Instead he imposed fines of £75 upon each of the accused, a total of £525. The various trial funds came to well over £1,500.

During the trial the African elected members had learned a great deal about the law of libel, and they had seen how far the Kenya Government was prepared to press its challenge. Most important of all, however, they had shown that it was they who had the united support of the vast majority of the African people, and that the "specially elected" members were a small group standing alone. No doubt it is this lesson which will endure the longest.

THE CENTRAL AFRICAN LIBERALS

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The peculiar problem facing liberals in Central Africa is to devise a procedure whereby the European minorities can progressively share power with the African majorities in a way that maintains the standards of government and the confidence of the racial groups in one another. In the past the favourite device has been communal electorates, the theory being that if minorities were guaranteed representation in the legislature, and eventually the government, it should lead to a reconciliation of conflicting viewpoints. However, experience of the working of communal electorates has not supported this theory. So far from easing communal fears, separate representation seems to have had the effect of emphasizing the individuality of the different communities and of hardening their attitudes.

The selective franchise on a common roll is the new approach to this great problem. The mechanism of the common roll is a rigid sieve that, in the first instance, lets through Europeans and Africans (and Asians) in proportions corresponding roughly to the existing balance of power; but, at the same time, the franchise qualifications provide a slow-working, but automatic, device by which the dominance of the European minority is progressively diminished. In theory, the Europeans will gradually reconcile themselves to their reduced position during this transition period. But the scheme poses a crucial question: will the European community really carry through a policy which reduces it to a political minority? Or, to consider it from an African viewpoint: will the process proceed far enough and fast enough to satisfy African aspirations? It is my view that, left to themselves, the Europeans will stop short of the final step which puts them in a minority, and might even refuse to concede any substantial powers to Africans; instead they will attempt to consolidate a liberal oligarchy. It seems to me that this is essentially what is happening in Central Africa today.

Let us review the evidence for this interpretation. The first significant fact is the range in the political spectrum of European political opinion. With the possible exception of the Capricorn groups, whose influence is negligible, all political leaders subscribe to the doctrine of European leadership and control into the foreseeable future. The differences between them revolve

round the question of how Africans are to find political expression within this overall framework. The trials of Mr. Garfield Todd give point to this argument. His quarrel with the United Federal Party turned on nuances of paternalism, with the difference that he tried to make his paternalism acceptable to Africans and to breathe some life into the concept of partnership. When the electorate was finally allowed to pronounce a verdict on this policy, it erased utterly Mr. Todd and his party from the political scene, and not content with this, greatly strengthened the Dominion Party opposition, who consider even the Welensky brand of liberalism irresponsible.

The detailed provisions of the Southern Rhodesian and Federal franchises are by now well known; some of the implications are perhaps less well appreciated. Although the franchise qualifications are so similar, the Southern Rhodesian scheme is more liberal in its immediate impact, since the special roll electors vote for the same candidates as the general roll electors, and so have an opportunity to exert some electoral influence sooner (though only up to 20% of the general roll). In the Federal scheme, by contrast, the special roll electors can merely vote for reserved African seats (in the enlarged Assembly: 2 in each of the Northern Territories and 5 in Southern Rhodesia), with the whole general roll voting concurrently. Now the striking feature of these franchises, and particularly of the Federal one, is that they concede no political influence to Africans now, but instead make an offer for 15 or 20 years hence, when a significant number might be expected to have acquired the necessary income and educational qualifications. The urgent political problem of winning co-operation of the current group of African leaders—especially before the constitutional review of 1960—is being met by the offer of a long post-dated cheque. It is not uncommon for politicians to claim advance credit for their forthcoming electoral programmes, but the self-congratulation of the United Federal Party on its promise to share power in 20 years time is surely unique in this genre. Sceptics might be pardoned for holding that if the United Federal Party is afraid to share power now, it will find equally valid reasons for not doing so in 15, 20 or 40 years time; especially when Sir Roy in his public expositions of the scheme has laid such emphasis on the fact that the European two-thirds majority will enable the franchise to be modified at any time before it is threatened, should his “kindergarten in democracy” not be accounted a success. Meanwhile, if African

co-operation is lost now, can it be won again in 20 years time?

The conclusion must be that not even the liberal wing of European opinion, which happens to be in power in both the Southern Rhodesian and the Federal Parliaments, has any intention of sharing power now, let alone sponsoring franchises that will automatically eclipse its ascendancy, however gradually. A deliberate plunge over the borderline would have to be taken, and this can only happen if liberal opinion grows stronger than it is today. In the Union the trend has been in the opposite direction, with the progressive restrictions to the Cape franchise as milestones along the way. In Southern Rhodesia before federation there was a similar trend of narrowing the basis of African political representation. It is unnecessary to go so far as to label this the 'natural' direction for an independent race-defined oligarchy, but it is evident that this tendency exists. The liberals in the Federation are proposing to open their oligarchy wider than has ever been contemplated in South Africa or the old Southern Rhodesia, but there is no attempt to entrench this liberalism in the Constitution while they are in the mood and they still have the power, and the way is left clear for an easy retreat when the cheque falls due for payment.

A noteworthy feature of this policy of selective enfranchisement is the implicit theory about the Africans who will thus be absorbed into the oligarchy. The aim of the franchise is to select the more responsible (and civilized) elements in the African population who, it is hoped, will behave in a non-racial manner by joining in the existing party system. The experiment will be accounted a 'success' if the enfranchised Africans identify themselves with the oligarchy in this way, but a 'failure' if they form an African group of their own which challenges European supremacy. The present African representatives in the Federal Assembly have been branded in this way by Sir Roy Welensky, and on these grounds he has justified his refusal to take any of them into his ministry.

Such a reaction reveals the basic flaw in the present policies of the Central African liberals. They are orientated towards the European electorate, and all their efforts are bent towards winning White support for their liberal paternalism. Such an emphasis is misdirected, for they are trying to mould the shadow and not the substance. On this question the European electorate is like a puppet: it dances to the drums of African politics. The existence of a strong body of liberal European opinion depends on

the way in which African politics develop. If African leaders can be induced to co-operate with the liberals, the very success of such a policy will win for them more White converts; but if they reject the tenets of European liberalism, then its White supporters will take fright and adopt more extreme views of racial dominance. Liberal leaders do not appear to have seen this connection. Neither in their policies nor personally have they gone out of their way to win African support. It is open to doubt whether African acceptance can be won for the political system envisaged by Central African liberals; but it is surely foolhardy not even to make the effort. The condition on which a European dominated oligarchy might win acceptance from the bulk of Africans is the vigorous social and economic integration of the two races, not merely in petty matters like the removal of discrimination in public transport and hotels, but on fundamental issues like integrated schooling and the removal of all colour barriers in industry. It is conceivable that by working actively for equality in these spheres Africans might become reconciled to a junior partnership in the political sphere. Yet in their speeches the leaders of the United Federal Party emphasize their belief that the two races could live together economically and politically without integration. If the preceding analysis is valid, this attitude cannot fail to react disastrously on the prospects of the liberals: intransigent African leaders will frighten and harden the European community, and the liberals will be replaced by a tougher breed.

This is a gloomy conclusion. It has been argued that although the main liberal strain of European opinion in Central Africa is only aiming at the establishment of a White oligarchy with African support, it is likely to fail even in this endeavour through a failure to understand properly its own position. It is acting a fallacy in trying to win support only from the European community, whereas success depends fundamentally on obtaining African agreement for its view of society. But for the optimists two imponderables should be noted. First, the multi-racial Constitution Party, though not daring to contest the Southern Rhodesian elections, may still conceivably become a significant force. Secondly, a British Government is still in a position to play a crucial role in the affairs of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland—should it be so minded.

SOUTHERN RHODESIA ELECTS

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EVER since the Central African Federation was launched in 1953, the unacknowledged but chief task of all political parties has been to define "partnership" between the races. As defined in daily attitudes and practices, the word is slowly taking on a meaning which places the Federation far ahead of the Union in some aspects of racial affairs. As defined in law, it bears a meaning not very different from that of apartheid. As defined in the recent territorial elections in Southern Rhodesia, it will probably mean an even slower approach to the granting of African advance and opportunities than the slow approach that has existed to date.

To understand these all-important elections, a piece of recent political history must be mentioned. In November of last year, the Federal Party under the Federal Prime Minister, Sir Roy Welensky, united with the United Rhodesia Party (U.R.P.) under the Southern Rhodesian Prime Minister, Mr. R. S. Garfield Todd, to form the United Federal Party (U.F.P.) At the time this seemed like the sensible beginning to a federation-wide "middle of the road" party. However, trouble began almost immediately, since the newly "united" party contained within it men of vastly conflicting views towards the African problem. After the fusion had taken place, a group of political leaders led by Sir Patrick Fletcher and other members of the Cabinet, began to seek ways and means of ridding the party of Mr. Todd. Undeniably, the reason for this revolt was Mr. Todd's liberalism in racial affairs. During his tenure as Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia, he increased aid to African schools and hospitals. He raised the basic minimum industrial wage from £4.10.0 to £6.10.0 per month. But above all, he had personally forced through the Southern Rhodesian Legislative Assembly a franchise law creating a special voters' roll with lower qualifications. This roll, it was estimated, would enable some 8 to 10,000 Africans to become voters in Southern Rhodesia, and since there are only 54,000 European voters on the rolls, it can be seen that Mr. Todd's definition of "partnership" was likely to frighten many Rhodesians. Certainly, the

rebels within his own Cabinet and Party felt that he had become a definite political liability. Since a General Election was due in 1958, it seemed to them axiomatic that in the interests of the Party he had to go.

The political manoeuvring against Mr. Todd was persistent from December onwards, culminating in the following specific events:—

On *January 11th* his entire Cabinet resigned, hoping to force him to do likewise. He did not. On the contrary, he found enough supporters to form a new Cabinet and continue to govern, in spite of the fact that he had support from only 11 members of his Party's 24 out of an Assembly of 30. It is important to note that in the quarrel Sir Roy Welensky refused to come to his aid.

On *February 8th*, at a Party Conference, Mr. Todd, while exhibiting remarkable convincing and staying powers, was forced to bow to the demands of the rebels and accept Sir Edgar Whitehead as a compromise Prime Minister and territorial leader of the Party. Sir Edgar, Federation Minister in Washington, flew home to take over Mr. Todd's portfolio and to face two pressing tasks. The first was to heal the breach in his Party, and the second was to win a seat so that he might take his required place in the Legislative Assembly.

On *April 16th*, in a by-election in the "safe" Hillside (Bulawayo) constituency, Sir Edgar lost to the Dominion Party candidate by 604 votes to 691. Thus a General Election became an immediate necessity.

On *April 23rd* a caucus of the territorial Party, with Sir Edgar supporting the rebels against Mr. Todd, forced the latter out. Todd and 6 followers had to resign. They at once set out to revive the recently interred U.R.P. Further, they had to seek candidates, funds and to begin the election campaign, all in 45 days.

A badly shaken U.F.P., now "united" with nothing but what was left of itself, faced the rapidly reviving U.R.P. and a strong Dominion Party (D.P.). The Confederate Party, Constitution Party, and the African National Congress put up no candidates. There were 55,029 eligible voters, including 1,246 Africans, on the rolls, and the manner in which the three contestants fought the election campaign gives a most important clue to the current pattern of Southern Rhodesian politics.

Under the slogan "*Not Left, Not Right, but Straight Ahead*",

the U.F.P. fought the campaign as a moderate, realistic Party of political experience. Lord Malvern was brought out of semi-retirement to use his great prestige in favour of the Party's candidates. He was at his best in vigorously attacking the D.P. as being "the same old gang I have been fighting for 25 years". Sir Roy Welensky and other Federal office-holders found no difficulty in intervening, this time, on behalf of the U.F.P. candidates, and a great deal of political capital was made out of the value of sending Sir Roy and Sir Edgar to London as a team for the 1960 Constitutional Conference.

According to Party orators, the African would be artificially pushed along too fast by Mr. Todd. U.F.P. speakers frequently alleged that although African Nationalism could not be stopped, it had to be guided by those political leaders who for the past 30 years have shaped the destiny of Southern Rhodesia. The Party stood by the franchise bill and its lower special roll, put through when Mr. Todd was Prime Minister. In so doing, it alleged firmly that the franchise standards were not in reality lowered by the new qualifications. It cast angry and frightened eyes on the policies of the Colonial Office in the two northern territories. And, above all, it spent a great deal of time attacking the D.P. as a Party of fear and inexperience. Sir Roy frequently assured audiences that the D.P. was actually the Party of apartheid, while Sir Edgar Whitehead, taking a moderately active role in the campaign, promised job reservation and protection for those Europeans who could never become sufficiently skilled to meet competition from the African. The American school system was pointed out by Sir Edgar as proof of the failure of educational integration. All achievements since Federation, were, of course, credited to the wise management of the U.F.P. (before the split!).

This type of campaign, veering from right to left and back again, tended to make the Party appear to be all things to all people, and, as in political contests the world over, this was described as being "middle of the road". Doubtless this type of campaign was politically necessary, since many of the U.F.P. candidates were just as frightened of African advance as candidates of the D.P. Indeed it seemed, as the campaign progressed, that the U.F.P. was incapable of taking an imaginative and constructive stand on the basic issue. It is probably fair to say also that dropping Todd did strengthen the Party with the electorate. The danger remains, however, that such an amal-

gamation of points of view and policies as are held by the U.F.P. can become meaningless and aid only the political extremes of the right or the left.

The D.P.'s campaign was likewise so great a mixture of conservative and moderate positions that only time can tell what the Party's actual policy would be if ever it were voted into power. It received the support of the Afrikaans farmers of the rural areas, aristocrats recently fled from the British welfare state, and lower income groups frightened by African competition. The Party is the direct heir of the old "Liberal Party" of pure apartheid policy. It further profited greatly by the Confederate Party's convenient unwillingness to place candidates in competition with it. However, the Confederate Party, by its speeches and publications, strongly stated a great many of the apartheid concepts, and by so doing, allowed the D.P. to forego such propaganda and present itself to the electorate as a moderate Party. Accordingly, a great deal of D.P. support came from people in urban areas who were convinced during the campaign of its basic moderation and decency towards the African.

From its platforms the D.P. candidates frequently stated that "we will not be swamped" by the "debasement" or "Africanisation" of Mr. Todd's franchise. The Party pledged itself to eliminate the special roll and to stop the "nibbling process" whereby European standards were being lowered to meet African standards. "The government must be kept for all time in civilized hands", was a most frequent campaign comment. In the rural areas, Africans were prevented from attending meetings of the Party. The famous word "partnership" was to be eliminated from the Constitution and "co-operation" put in its place. Franchise qualifications were to be placed high in terms of education and income. Mr. Todd's special roll allowed the vote to anyone who (1) has an income of £150 p.a. and ownership of property worth £500, or, (2) an income of £120 p.a. for two years and Standard 8 education. The D.P. would have eliminated this roll and set the qualifications at: (1) an income of £750 p.a. or ownership of property worth £1,500; or (2) income of £480 p.a. or property worth £1,000 plus primary education; or (3) income of £300 p.a. or property worth £500 plus four years of secondary education. These are the qualifications of the general roll now in existence; and the D.P. promised in addition to apply a "civilization test" to Africans who might obtain even these high qualifications. Influx control

was promised to rid Rhodesian cities of loafers, and labour camps for Africans who would not work or go back to their Reserves. Poor whites, unable to meet skilled African competition, were to be protected in their jobs.

During the campaign, the D.P. came up with a solution for the increasingly vexing problem of what to do with Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia. Strongly attacking Colonial Office influence in the two northern territories, the Party pledged itself to press in 1960 for independence for Southern Rhodesia and a Northern Rhodesia minus Barotseland. The latter, along with Nyasaland, would be established as a Protectorate under joint Federation and Commonwealth Relations Office control, and the Colonial Office, allegedly far too liberal in its racial attitude, would be removed from the scene.

As has been noted, the D.P. posed in urban constituencies as yet another "middle of the road" Party. It tried desperately to produce African members (indeed it did find one, who needed police protection whenever he got near an African crowd!). It alleged that it would never stand in the way, and indeed would aid, African advance. It frequently stated that it would not forbid the establishment of inter-racial schools by any private or religious group. It promised not to interfere with the African National Congress, unless it became subversive. It even tried, unsuccessfully, to hold meetings for and speak to African audiences. One D.P. speaker went so far as to state that after 5 years of D.P. rule, there would be more Africans on the electoral roll than now.

Frequently the Party stated that it did not believe in discrimination because of colour. It denied vehemently that it was pro-apartheid: that it wished to take Southern Rhodesia into the Union. It was very sensitive about charges that it would make Afrikaans a second language and denied them vigorously. Often from the platform it denied receiving funds from the Confederate Party or receiving policy directives from Pretoria (!). How much of this moderation was the result of the Party's assessment of the U.R.P.'s strength is impossible to ascertain.

To sum up the aggressive, strong and yet contradictory D.P. campaign is most difficult. Again one should be reminded that its support came from many different groups of people. One may hazard a guess that the Party, particularly in the urban areas, attracted so many voters on the basis of its moderation and

decency towards the African, that it could not afford to turn its back on those newly found, moderate adherents. Because it does contain such diverse elements, it may have a difficult time remaining united. Further, having no strength at all in Nyasaland and little, so far, in Northern Rhodesia, the chances are heavily against its ever winning a Federal General Election. In conclusion one may say that the D.P., should it ever obtain power, might not be able to set the clock back even if its conservative wing should wish to do so.

Mr. Todd's Party, the U.R.P., fought the campaign under the banner of liberalism and morality. "*We mean what we say!*" and "*Forward without Fear*" were its Party slogans. During the campaign, Todd alleged that it was his group alone which supported cautious African advance, and he and his 23 candidates frequently voiced the hope that the Southern Rhodesian public would understand and approve of such a moderate policy. Needless to say his organization was amateurish and weak. He had a very difficult time in getting able candidates, although he did have enough funds. It is probably also true to say that in reality he entered the campaign hoping only to be able to hold the balance of power at its conclusion.

He was clear in calling apartheid a fraud from the public platform. He stressed the need for confidence between African and European, and hammered hard at the D.P. for its policies based on fear and at the U.F.P. for its meaninglessness. He was quick to stress the importance of the word "partnership" and, as well, world opinion of the Federation and its conduct of racial affairs. His support came not only from many earnest and thoughtful people, but from a good number of old Rhodesians of impeccable pioneer stock as well. The U.R.P. was the only Party to talk "democracy" in the racial climate of Africa. Todd frequently tried to prove that he, too, was a moderate. He went so far as to suggest that Africans should be required to pay increased income taxes, and, while stressing the absolute necessity of giving the African a stake in the country and of guiding him sympathetically as he enters industrial life, he also stated that the government should be kept in the hands of responsible people. For these reasons he was labelled by the African National Congress as the least of three evils.

The function of Mr. Todd and his Party in this campaign was, of course, a long-range educational one. He awoke a good many people to the inevitability of African advance and its creative

political and economic possibilities. He certainly helped hold the heterogeneous U.F.P. on a more moderate course than it would otherwise have pursued, and he probably affected the D.P. campaign in a similar way. The choice he provided between a cautiously liberal policy and "discrimination with justice" (more or less) was certainly the most important one ever offered in Southern Rhodesian politics since responsible government was voted for in 1922.

The 39,712 Southern Rhodesians who went to the polls on June 5th recorded their total rejection of Mr. Todd's Party, which did not win a single seat. As a matter of fact, if it had not been for the workings of the preferential (single transferable) vote system, the D.P. would have won. As it was, the U.F.P. won 17 seats to 13 for the D.P. In five constituencies, the transfer in the second count of the eliminated U.R.P. votes was responsible for giving to the U.F.P. a victory which would otherwise have gone to the D.P.

The tabulation is as follows:—

			<i>votes</i>	<i>percentage</i>
U.F.P.	16,840	42.5
D.P.	18,142	45.7
U.R.P. (eliminated)	..		4,663	11.8

In 1954, the last territorial election, the Confederate Party and its like-minded allies gained 44% of the total vote.

African reaction to the defeat of the U.R.P. was quick. Congress leaders made the following statements—'Europeans have shown themselves determined to keep the Africans in subjection. They have no intention of implementing a policy of partnership. After Dominion status the country will have a South African form of government, if it does not become a fifth province of South Africa. The days of the African looking to the White for salvation are gone for ever. The White electorate has slapped the African in the face.' Applications for membership of the Congress have reportedly risen rapidly.

The victorious Sir Edgar rushed, in all sincerity, to promise the Africans that there would be no reaction, stressing that his most important task was to prepare for Dominion status in 1960. Perhaps the gravest casualty of the election was that small group of conscientious Africans who have participated in the U.R.P. and U.F.P. organizations. They are thoroughly dis-

couraged by the election result and will increasingly find it difficult to avoid the label of "stooge". Sir Edgar will have to go a long way to prove to these and all other Africans that he understands their attitude and is willing to look with favour upon their legitimate demands.

Searching for crumbs of comfort from the election results, one may say that the total of first votes given to the U.F.P. and the U.R.P. together produces a majority of Southern Rhodesian voters opposed to the D.P.'s conservative and frightened colour policy. The fact that 11.8% of an almost wholly White electorate, in Africa, voted for a liberal racial policy is too important to be ignored. One may also point to the African voters already playing a normal political role in a number of constituencies. Both the U.F.P. and the D.P. pledged themselves not to remove them from the rolls. Pressure of public opinion in the United Kingdom and the world at large may keep the U.F.P. true to its more moderate elements. Its constructive record, even though written under the rejected Mr. Todd, will not be erased. The dangers are that the Party will stand still while events hasten to overtake it; or will find it difficult to attract able young leaders to replace the well-worn triumvirate of Malvern, Welensky and Whitehead; or, finally, in an effort to buy off what it feels to be an increasingly anti-African wave of public opinion, may move gradually towards that opinion. It contains many who would favour such a move. If it does so, it will automatically produce just that African extremism which it does not wish, and will not placate the extremists within the D.P. Between June 5th and the Federal elections in September or October, the U.F.P. will have to labour very heavily in the vineyards. Not only liberalism, but moderation as well, has been placed on warning by the elections. The ability of the Federation to hang together as a political unit remains an unknown factor.

When all is said and done, elections do not solve basic human problems such as those that confront Southern Rhodesia. Nor, for that matter, can they stop the inevitable march of affairs. Even though the Southern Rhodesian electorate has firmly rejected a moderately liberal approach to African issues, there still remain in that young country vast areas for constructive public and personal actions. These, alone, can lay the foundations for a harmonious multi-racial community in the future. Southern Rhodesia still has time.

MEDDLERS FROM ABROAD

Lord Malvern (formerly Sir Godfrey Huggins) has spoken of "certain woolly-headed gentry—particularly meddlers from abroad—who want to hand the government over to an African population." He asked: "Do they really think you can pronounce upon the eternal verities by counting noses?"

There are some caves across the veld
Full of the Illustrated Gnus;
But meddlers from the sluggish Scheldt
With guns and Calvinistic views
And tally-ho and syphilization
Performed some swift extermination. . . .

The Bushman and the Hottentot
Knew nothing of religious creeds;
Of land they had an awful lot
Without the proper title deeds;
Meddlers with Bibles as their warrants
Regarded this with some abhorrence.

The English came to meddle next
(Converted slavers, bent on wrecking);
The Dutch, considerably vexed,
Decided on a spot of trekking;
But first they swelled the population
By meddling in miscegenation.

The British, not to be outdone,
Though suave and naturally urban,
By further meddling had begun
To build a little place called Durban,
Where some of their indentured meddlers
Became quite prosperous as peddlers.

And Cecil Rhodes, who thought it wrong
The Bantu shouldn't share their mealie,
Went round about and up-along
To meddle with the Matabele
Who, in some fit of strange amnesia,
Were sold along with South Rhodesia.

With so much meddling it is queer
 That some should now resent the entry
 Of further meddlers, who appear
 As "certain woolly-headed gentry",
 Now treated with extreme revulsion
 Or—like Miss Ainslie—with expulsion.

This meddling (it has been agreed
 By those who've made a tidy packet)
 Ought now to end—because, indeed,
 Those who once owned the land now lack it;
 To meddle with the Upper Crust meant
 Uncomfortable re-adjustment.

And Huggins (who is now a Lord)
 Wangler-in-Chief of Federation,
 Deplores all meddlers from abroad
 Lest Blacks should lose their Proper Station.
 The Whites are (in their own opinion)
 Ripe for another White Dominion,

In which Eternal Verities,
 As Godfrey Huggins now discloses,
 Will not—as in democracies—
 Be voted on by counting noses:
 Well . . . not exactly . . . just the *right* ones—
 Sir Roy and Co. will count the *white* ones.

REGINALD REYNOLDS.

ALGERIA AND DE GAULLE

NEVILL BARBOUR

Author and Journalist, Expert on Arab Affairs and Former Assistant Head of the B.B.C. Eastern Service

WHEN the European settlers in Algeria rose against the Paris government on 13th May last, they were taking part in the fourth rising of this nature which has occurred since the occupation of the country in 1830. They had made similar demonstrations in 1848, 1870 and 1898.¹ The fact is that they have never been satisfied with the way in which Paris has governed the country. They would have liked to set up a government and rule the country themselves; but never being strong enough to face either the metropolitan government or the Muslim inhabitants, they have always sought, with a considerable measure of success, to use the forces of the former to impose their own will on the latter. For over a hundred years the plan worked, but it has finally led the mother country into a dead-end.

On this last occasion, there had been premonitory signs on 6th February, 1956. It was then fifteen months since the start of the rebellion, and it had become plain that the French government had to choose between two courses. One was to negotiate with the rebels; the other was to send an army of half a million men to Algeria and to incur all the expense, the odium and the risks which such an undertaking would imply.

Meanwhile a general election in France brought into power, at the beginning of 1956, a socialist government whose election programme included making peace in Algeria. The new Prime Minister, M. Guy Mollet, decided to prepare the way by naming General Catroux as Governor-General; but also to visit Algiers himself first. Greeted by a hostile demonstration and bombarded with tomatoes, he yielded to this pressure, allowed General Catroux to withdraw without even taking up his duties, and appointed instead the "strong man" of the party, Robert Lacoste, as Resident Minister in Algeria. Instead of negotiation a policy of "pacification", similar to that followed earlier in Indo-China, was adopted. This implied the forcible suppression of rebellion, to be followed by elections for some unspecified body and, finally, discussions with the Muslims elected, but only with the provision that any idea of independence was to be ruled out. The result of this policy was the extension of

¹ "Rien de nouveau sous le soleil d'Algérie." *Le Monde*, 12-6-1958.

the rebellion and a political deadlock which has continued to this day.

Early in the current year, there were indications that a new French government, the third to take office since M. Mollet's comparatively long-lived regime of fifteen months, was considering the possibility of negotiations. Settler alarm at this news was increased by the disastrous results, from the French point of view, of the bombing of Sakiét; by the retirement of the protagonist of pacification, M. Lacoste, from the post of Minister for Algeria; by the execution by the rebels of three French prisoners in reprisal for the killing of rebel prisoners; and by the Conference of Tangier at the end of April, which promised the rebels the firm support of the Tunisian and Moroccan governments. This combination of events was sufficient to set off a rising which the politically active settlers had long been meditating. It had the sympathy of senior army officers and the tacit approval of the outgoing Minister, M. Lacoste, though he had not supposed that it would be directed against his own former headquarters and against the high officials who had worked with him. This, however, was only one of the lesser oddities of this most paradoxical of revolutions. A more important one was the participation of Muslims in the demonstrations. It has since been acknowledged by the official spokesman of General de Gaulle's government that this participation was originally organized by the settlers and by the army and paid for in cash. Later, however, there was undoubtedly a substantial measure of spontaneous adherence to the welcome given to General de Gaulle when he visited Algeria. This "fraternization" was hailed by official spokesmen as a miracle, though it was in fact perfectly explicable by non-supernatural causes.

The slogans used by the revolutionaries were two: "*integration*" and "*de Gaulle to power*". These had one thing in common; they meant quite different things to different people. For the settlers, integration meant the abolition of any institutions which suggested that Algeria was different from an exclusively European portion of France; from which it followed that there would be no more concessions to Muslims on the grounds that Algeria had something specifically Muslim about it. As one settler put it to Muslims whom he was inviting to fraternize, "Integration is very simple and very good. It means no more fighting and everyone friends again—everything just as it always

has been."² For army officers, who often regarded the self-interestedness of the settlers with distaste, it meant better conditions for the Muslims together, of course, with the defeat of the rebels. For the officers of the Special Administrative Services, whose duty it was to conciliate the Muslims by raising their standards of living, it meant greatly increased attention to this aspect of their work. For General de Gaulle himself, to judge from his utterances, integration meant a kind of mystical identification of the two communities within a French mould, as a result of which all material differences or causes of dissension would disappear, or at least lose all significance. For most Muslims, on the other hand, integration was just another of the fine phrases by which their ears had so often been tickled before, without any great change subsequently occurring in their material circumstances. As long ago as 1865, they had been solemnly assured that "the native Muslim is a Frenchman"; and again, in 1947, the Statute of Algeria had laid it down, rather more long-windedly, that "all holders of French nationality in the Algerian departments enjoy the rights attaching to the quality of French citizens without distinction of origin, race or religion." But while the new formula was of little interest, there was for the moment a notable material change for the better. Muslims were being flattered instead of harried; a number of their relatives were being released from detention; the symbols of the Lacoste regime, under which they had so long been suffering, were being removed, the buildings of the Governor-General had been sacked, and Lacoste's prefects chased from their offices.

As for the second slogan, "de Gaulle to power", this too had a different signification for Europeans and for Muslims. For the former, de Gaulle was the symbol of an assertive French nationalism and of scorn for the parliamentary system, to whose shortcomings both settlers and military attributed the failure which was really the result of a mistaken policy. For the Muslims, on the other hand, de Gaulle was an exceptionally honest and liberal-minded idealist who was known to believe in transforming the French empire into an association of free peoples. He had shown goodwill when he introduced the Statute of 1947; it was not his fault that his successors had failed to implement it honestly.

This failure of the European population and of French states-

² *Le Monde*, 1-7-1958.

men to grasp the motives of the "fraternization" has created a situation of political make-believe which must be without parallel in history.

And meanwhile the guerrilla war continues, with five hundred Algerians announced as killed in one week (as well as an unspecified number of Frenchmen) and six hundred the next. Terrorist outrages are on the increase again. The French army is once more complaining of rebel attacks from Tunisian territory. The only women who have been truly emancipated are those who are serving with the rebels. The problems of disease, illiteracy and poverty are no more tractable now than they were in the past. In these circumstances, measures of clemency based on the supposition that all is now well—the release, for example, of over 11,000 detainees since 13th May—and the agreements with Tunisia and Morocco can serve no purpose but to strengthen the rebel cause. Nothing could have been more revealing than an episode which occurred during the celebrations of 14th July. As a symbol of the future, 2,000 Algerian boys, carefully selected, were brought to Paris to march in the parade. As the group passed the saluting point, four boys produced and unfurled Algerian rebel flags and shouted "Down with French Algeria!"; and when parachute officers and police came to arrest them, the flags were passed from hand to hand until they disappeared.³

It is against this background that General de Gaulle announced in general terms his ideas for the future of Algeria. "We are emerging," he said, "from the period of doubt about our future relationship. We are moving towards a vast and free community. During 1958 . . . we must establish the links of our Union on a federal basis. . . . I cannot let slip this opportunity of saying that Algeria, with the metropolis and the overseas departments, with West and Equatorial Africa, with Madagascar, with Jibuti, with New Caledonia and the French establishments in Oceania, has a place reserved for it among the others—and it is a choice place."⁴ In this reference to Algeria two points are to be noticed. One is that the settler cry of "One France and 53 million Frenchmen from Dunkirk to Tamanrasset" (in the far south of the Sahara) was by implication rejected; Algeria was clearly to have a place and a personality of its own. Secondly, it was assumed that in future Algeria would take its place in a free federal community and remain

3 *Le Monde*, 16-7-1958.

4. *Ibid.*, 15-7-1958.

there without compulsion. In other words, it was taken for granted that "fraternization" has influenced the overwhelming majority of Muslim Algerians and signifies that they are willing to form part of a French federation.

It would be impossible to accept the latter supposition, even if a majority were secured by an administratively controlled referendum, with all known members of the nationalist parties excluded from the voting. Consider the development of the rebellion. When it began on 1st November, 1954, it was an affair of some 500 men, armed with a few rifles, a good many shotguns and some stolen explosives. To-day the Front of National Liberation is an organization carrying out many of the functions of a government. It controls a force of at least 100,000 uniformed and armed men, and has carried on an armed struggle against French forces of over half a million for almost four years. It has voluntary charitable organizations affiliated to it which look after 60,000 penniless refugees on the Moroccan side of the Algerian border and as many again in Tunisia. Its budget is collected partly by its own underground tax-collectors in Algeria and partly from the Arab states. It maintains representatives in most of the principal capitals of the world and at the United Nations. It has been recognized as representative of the Algerian Muslim people by the Governments of Tunisia and Morocco. A refugee diaspora of professional men from Algeria exerts a powerful political and social influence in the two sister countries. The events of 13th May have not enabled the French government to produce any new Algerian of standing to make a declaration in their favour. It appears to have proved impossible to find an Algerian who could be given a post in the French Cabinet, though this had been announced as imminent. One or two Muslims of importance, who on the first coming of de Gaulle had expressed their hopes for a new deal, have now given utterance to bitter disillusion.

No other deduction is possible from these facts but that the policy of General de Gaulle's government towards Algeria is based on one of the most remarkable pieces of self-deception which any government has ever inflicted upon itself. It is alarming to try and picture what French reaction will be when the grim reality finally breaks through the fog of illusion. Many of those who brought the General to power have already shown their alarm and disappointment at the policy which he is following with regard to Algeria and with regard to the

other territories which he hopes to associate with France in a freely accepted commonwealth. When the French public realize that the result has been the strengthening of secessionist tendencies throughout the French Union, it seems probable that the same elements which brought the new regime into power will turn against it and overthrow it. Things might have been different if General de Gaulle could have had the patience and the skill to carry such a policy through ten years ago. But his temperament seems to be such as to lead him to hope to achieve difficult political operations by the mere force of personality. The wearying and often sordid task of turning a political ideal into reality seems to be so abhorrent to him that he prefers to retire disdainfully and cherish his dream in solitude.

The prospects of a compromise solution for Algeria are small. It is unlikely that a people as tough as the nine million Muslims of Algeria have shown themselves to be can be ruled indefinitely against their will; while it is equally hard to see how they can assimilate the European population of a million so long as the latter has the backing of the French army. In so far as reforms can be realized, they are likely to strengthen rather than weaken the sentiment of nationality in the Algerians, just as corresponding British reforms did in the Irish at the beginning of the present century.

On the other hand, there is a faint hope that some form of association might be accepted. Tunisia and Morocco look with horror on the prospect of being gradually drawn into the armed struggle against France. If they could, by a form of association with France, induce the latter to grant Algeria a similar status to their own, it is conceivable that they might accept a proposal of such a nature. The Muslims Algerians themselves have suffered terribly, and there is still no prospect of negotiations. For the moment, however, there is little evidence that General de Gaulle would consider such a solution; if he did so it is obvious that his difficulties with his own supporters would be immense. The Muslim leaders of North Africa are not optimistic; it is doubtful whether the position can be better put than it was by President Bourguiba in a recent interview with an American journalist: "During the next six months or a year," he said, "anything may happen—including the worst."

THE ART OF AFRICA (II) GOLD AND THE AKAN OF GHANA

EVA L. R. MEYEROWITZ

Sculptor, Author and Ethnologist

THE economy of the Akan kingdoms of the past in Ghana, christened the Gold Coast by early European traders, was based on gold, and the prosperity of the various states and the advanced civilization of the people depended through the centuries on their export of the metal. Although their methods were primitive, the Akan prospectors nevertheless discovered in the course of time all the deposits now worked by European companies.

Gold was probably discovered at an early date by the primitive peoples living in the heart of the forest region, where in some places small pieces of gold can be picked up after the rains.† As far as we know, gold was first properly mined and traded by the Akan, who had founded the Bono Kingdom (c 1295) in the savannah country north of the forest. Being immigrants from the Sudan, they knew about gold and exploited the auriferous river beds when they discovered them in their new country. Under Bono's second king, Akumfi Ameyaw I, an embassy, headed by Prince Obunumankoma, was sent to the courts of the great Sudanese kings to advertise his country's wealth and acquaint himself with the prevailing conditions of the trade. He also, it is believed by his descendants, travelled to the 'White Man's Country', possibly Egypt or North Africa, which was then in the hands of Arabs and Selchukian Turks. When Obunumankoma himself became king in 1363, he established a gold dust currency with standard gold weights for the weighing of gold dust. This system was in use in India and was presumably introduced by Rhadanite Jews from Persia into the first Ghana state situated in the western Sudan (c 800-1240). The Rhadanite Jews travelled widely in the Near East, Europe and Africa, spreading the techniques of commerce wherever they went. After 1500, when the Portuguese had settled on the coast of Ghana for trading purposes, the Akan incorporated Portuguese weights into the Indian system.

During Obunumankoma's reign (1363-1431), the gold trade started to flourish in Bono. A new town came into being near

† At Akropong in south-western Ghana my interpreter showed me where, as a child, he had picked up gold from the gutter, and pointed out stretches of earth, bordering the streets, where gold dust sparkled.

the capital, Bono-Mansu, to house the foreign traders, many of whom resided there permanently. A market was built solely for the import and export trade, and, in later centuries, this expanded considerably in order to accommodate the trans-Saharan caravans from North Africa. These visited the capital once a year in the dry season, laden with silks, Italian brocades, wines, and other luxury goods. That this is not a fairy tale we know from the account of a traveller in Tunis who, in 1792, heard of such a caravan setting out for the Gold Coast. Were the site of the great market, now overgrown with bush, to be excavated, further evidence of the close trade connection between North Africa and the Gold Coast of the past would undoubtedly be revealed.

The method of gold-digging among the Akan developed into a complex system. Every man and woman was permitted to stake a claim in a gold-field, either along a river or stream, or in the hills. The simplest method of obtaining gold was the panning of river gravel. The earth was collected in different sized calabashes, which were gyrated till all the impurities were washed away and the heavier gold remained. The gold dust was then dried in the sun and stored in vessels ready to be used as money.

In the dry season, pits of about two to three feet in diameter, and often as much as 30-50 feet deep, were dug in the thick beds of auriferous gravel in the main channels of the gold-bearing rivers. A man squatting at the bottom of the pit filled wooden bowls with earth, which were then hauled to the top by means of ropes, and the women or boys washed it in different-sized calabashes (by the same process as before) till pure gold dust was obtained.

Apart from these simple pits, upright or steeply sloped shafts were sunk in hilly regions. These shafts, like the pits, were neither timbered nor reinforced at the mouth, and varied in depth to an extent of 180 feet. The miner cut the ore loose with a hoe, iron chisel, or gouge, working all the time by the light of a palm oil lamp, and descended by means of a rope ladder, or by foot holes cut in the side of the shafts. The gold-bearing rock, after it had been hauled up, was pounded by the men with hammers till reduced to a coarse powder. Then, having been finely ground, it was washed by the women till the particles of gold were freed from all impurities.

In Bono, and later in other Akan states, all gold collected

by individuals had to be presented periodically to the Chief Treasurer. His assistants weighed it and retained one-third as a state tax, returning the rest to the owner, who then also split it into three portions, sending one-third to his clan chief and retaining two-thirds for himself. In the case of slaves, however, all gold had to be surrendered to the master, who would retain two-thirds for himself and return a portion of the rest to the slave as pocket money. In the case of marriage, or other circumstances, the slave owner was obliged by law to give him his remaining gold; though in most of the Akan states of the forest region, particularly in Asante (Ashanti), no such humane law regarding slaves existed. There the slave was entirely dependent on the whim of his master and had no legal right to the gold he dug.

All the gold dust collected by the State Treasury in Bono was stored in large vessels up to five feet in height. Gold nuggets were not allowed to be circulated as money, but were cast in the form of yams and stored similarly—being pushed through loops of ropes fastened to poles, so closely packed that they formed a long wall. The Golden Wall, as this Treasury was called, was erected at Akyinhatai, not far from the capital, and it surrounded the large flat rock on which gold dust was dried and bottled like wine. The police force in charge of the treasure was so great, that a village sprang up to house its members and their families.

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The Akan king was regarded as the Son of the Sun-god and personified the sun on earth. Indeed, the Akan minstrels still sing: "The King is (the manifestation of) the Sun". His main duty therefore was, like the sun, to give life in the sense of prosperity to the state, and in order to do so, he had to strengthen his life-giving *kra*, his solar soul, with gold, the metal of the sun. All the great Akan kings therefore slept on a bed, which was placed on top of a truncated seven-step pyramid, so as to be as near as possible to the Sun-god; the mattresses and pillows were stuffed with gold dust, and the bed cover was made of imported gold brocade, or of woven yellow silk which was sometimes embroidered with gold thread. Each step of the pyramid, which ascended to the bed, was covered with one or the other colour of the rainbow, since the rainbow was believed to be the bridge between heaven and earth.

The Bono king, on waking in the morning at sunrise, used to dip his hands in a bowl filled with 'fresh' gold, which a messenger on horseback brought each night from the nearest goldfield. When the king had risen he went to the *Nyame Dua*, the altar to the Supreme Being that stood in the courtyard near to the entrance of his palace. This consisted of a tree trunk, or post, with three branches cut short which were covered with a layer of thick gold sheet and which supported a golden basin filled with rain water. The king would dip aromatic *adwera* leaves into the water and sprinkle some of it into the sky, and then some over himself, in order to bless his life-giving soul. In this way he thanked the Sun-god for his good health and prayed for long life and prosperity for himself and the state. The golden *Nyame Dua* was one of the many objects which the Asante took from the Bono after their conquest of that country, and it still existed in 1749, when it was seen and described by a Danish envoy, a mulatto from the coast, who was sent to the King of Asante on a diplomatic mission. The Danish envoy also saw the 'Golden Throne' which was cast in the form of a big 'lump of gold'. This throne had only been used by the Bono kings at the close of the rites on New Year's day, the day of the autumnal equinox, when the sun rises due east and looks on both hemispheres equally. The king, personifying the sun of the new year, would be clad solely in a loin cloth woven of gold thread, his whole body dusted with gold which adhered to his oiled skin, and would wear a profusion of gold ornaments.

Apart from his throne shaped in the form of a gold nugget, the King of Bono sat on a low golden stool, carved and covered with a layer of gold sheet, or on a throne chair (*asipim*), decorated with gold. The 'Golden Stool' of the Asante kings was believed to contain the soul of the Asante people and symbolized their power, health and riches. It was never sat upon, except on rare occasions when its power was invoked, and the king then made a mere pretence of sitting upon it three times before resuming his seat on his own stool. The 'Golden Stool' was created when the Asante nation was born in 1701 and was almost entirely destroyed at the time of the last Anglo-Asante war. From its remains, however, a new golden stool was made, which the people are permitted to see, lying on its side on its own throne chair, when the king sits in public after the *Adae* ceremony.

All the insignia of the Akan kings were made of gold, and many are still in use to-day. The 'Golden Triangle', a breast-plate, is still worn by the King of Asante, and the 'Golden Axe' and the 'Golden Drum' are carried before him on ceremonial occasions, together with the 'Golden Lutes' and *Ntchera* horns, an orchestra of seven horns, made of elephant tusks covered with gold in which celestial symbols are engraved by the repoussé technique. These musical instruments belonged originally to the kings of Bono, but were looted by the Asante in 1740.

To the insignia of office also belong the golden-hilted state swords decorated with the representations of animals—such as the lion, crocodile, snake, dove, fish, a hen with four chickens, and so forth. All are cast in gold, are fairly large in size and usually of exquisite workmanship.

The staves of the royal spokesmen are carved and encased in gold, as are the ornaments which surmount them. Originally these consisted of the animals emblematic of the clans in the state; but in later times whole proverbs, having reference to the contents of the speech of the royal spokesmen, were depicted. Staves of both kinds are still in use. The bodyguard of the King of Asante still have rifles, each decorated with a royal emblem cast in gold; and over their chests and abdomens they carry miniature shields, decorated with an assortment of knives and a variety of symbols in gold.

In addition to the king's insignia and emblems, all the ornaments worn by him on ceremonial occasions are made of gold—the necklaces, armlets, finger rings, leg ornaments and toe rings. Gold ornaments also decorate the king's head-dress and sandals. And not only in his lifetime is the king surrounded with gold. His corpse is dressed in precious cloth and adorned with the gold ornaments he wore during his lifetime. The seven openings of his body are filled with gold dust, and his head and hands rest in bowls filled with gold. When, after one to three years, his body is taken out of the coffin, the bones of his skeleton are joined together with gold wire, and when this has been done, the skeleton is dressed in the king's regalia. In Bono, eyes made of gold used to be inserted in the sockets of the skull, while in Asante, there is a tradition that during the last century a gold portrait mask of the king covered his skull. The royal skeleton was then placed in another coffin, which in Bono and Asante in the past was encased in gold—the gold

sheet being engraved with the symbols of the divine kingship in the repoussé technique. The coffin was then removed to its final resting place, the royal mausoleum in a sacred grove outside the town.

The gold weights and gold weighing apparatus, the gold dust spoons and small gold dust boxes of the kings of Bono were cast in gold. They are said to be still in existence and in the possession of an Asante chief, the head of the Juaben State, whose ancestor received them as loot for services rendered in the Bono-Asante war of 1740. The golden weights of the Asante kings were lost during the Anglo-Asante wars, in 1896 or 1901.

The gold weights of the ordinary people were cast in brass by the *cire perdue* technique. A set consisted of 60-80 weights, and there still exist hundreds of different designs, which may be divided thus:

- (a) Weights decorated with geometrical designs, of which many are religious symbols.
- (b) Weights depicting animals, which symbolize deities. An interesting example is the so-called *sankofa* bird, which is the same as the *bennu* bird of the ancient Egyptians—the names of both meaning ‘that which revolves’, namely, the eternal sun. The *sankofa* bird is used by the kings as a royal emblem.
- (c) Weights illustrating men and women in various occupations, such as making a sacrifice, nursing a child, hunting an animal, riding on horseback, and exchanging ceremonial greetings.

Unlike the stylized statuettes and expressionistic masks which are the familiar objects of African art, the Akan gold-weights are by contrast unique, in that they deal with themes which are taken from daily life and treated realistically. The forms of men and animals are simplified, the men modelled with particular vividness and the animals made to represent deities. The latter are usually recognizable by the signs with which they are decorated and which symbolize divine powers—the spiral representing birth and creation; the lozenge or diamond, procreation; the triangle, ruler over sky, earth and underworld; the zigzag line, life-giving fire; and so forth. The gold weights are delightful objects and are much in demand by collectors, particularly as each single weight bears the stamp of the individual personality of the artist who created it.

WEST AFRICAN POTTERY

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POTTERY plays a conspicuous part in the daily life of West Africa. One sees it even in the cities; out in the country, it is almost ubiquitous. But if he goes into a country market to buy specimens, the visitor will have to search for them. Going past the stalls of food and drink, beyond the array of imported goods, past the work of blacksmiths, weavers, and basket makers, behind the stalls of the sellers of firewood and charcoal, he will perhaps find the pottery near the market's extreme margin, where the vultures are doing their useful and necessary work.

Pottery making is probably the lowest in the hierarchy of native handicrafts. The raw materials cost little, the tools and equipment almost nothing. Fuel is needed only in small quantities, and is of a kind which would not otherwise be used at all—grass, brushwood or palm sticks. The products, indispensable for daily life but breakable and difficult to transport, are correspondingly cheap. For the same reasons perhaps, it is very largely a woman's trade. Rattray was informed in Ashanti that "it was not worth the while of the men to make them".

Why, therefore, does it make so strong an appeal, even to people who are not generally interested in native handicrafts? It is perhaps partly a tribute to the technical skill needed to achieve such perfect symmetry, on such a large scale, without the help of a wheel. The chief interest, however, is simply the beauty of the pots themselves, especially when seen in their natural environment and in the context of actual use. All pottery, even the simplest, is a humble form of art. Industrialization has made art expensive, civilization has made it conscious—or so we are in the habit of saying: what exactly we mean by it is another question. The peasant potters of West Africa, like all other artists, are unconsciously affirming something about their own character and, more significantly, something about the nature of the world—that beauty is not an illusion of the senses, but an aspect of reality. Whether the art is conscious or instinctive, cheap or expensive, as permanent as obsidian or as fugitive as a movement of dance or music, makes no difference to its ultimate meaning, which is its beauty. The traditional

pottery of West Africa is as worthy of attention, and as significant for the future, as folk music or as any other popular art form anywhere else in the world.

Technique

The methods of making are at least as old as the Bronze Age, and were used everywhere in the world (except in Australasia) at some stage of history or prehistory. In some places (e.g. parts of North Africa) they still survive side by side with later techniques. The essentials, which persist through all minor variations, are that the pots are not thrown on the wheel but hand built by coiling, beating, or modelling. Secondly, they have no true ceramic glaze, the shiny surfaces seen on many modern West African pots being obtained by other means. Thirdly, they are fired, not in kilns but in open "clamps", or within a circular mud wall so rudimentary that it can hardly be called a kiln. A description by René Caillié shows that the technique has not changed since the beginning of the nineteenth century, and in fact can hardly have changed much since pre-historic times. Shards and pots associated with the Nok Terracottas of Central Nigeria prove that the same methods were used about 2,000 years ago. This "Archaic" pottery shows variations of style from one world region to another and from one district to another, but it has no consistent history of technical evolution and progress.

The word for pottery making in some West African languages is "building", and it does in fact grade imperceptibly into building in the ordinary sense. The logical boundary between the two is perfectly clear; a 'pot' only becomes a ceramic product if it is fired. But in finished appearance, the large granaries made in the Savannah Belt are in fact huge unfired pots. The finest examples are to be seen in the corn-growing country north of Sokoto, where they are made to a height of over fifteen feet, with corresponding girth, and are finished, just like a pot, by polishing with white micaceous clay. These gigantic specimens of "potters' architecture" were described by Clapperton in the early nineteenth century, and are still being made in the same way today.

At the other end of the scale, the potters easily and naturally cross the dividing line between potting and free modelling in the round. This style, as might be expected, is especially favoured for ritual pottery; examples are the jars made in the Ivory

Coast, of which the entire upper half becomes a portrait head and shoulders; or the peculiar and sometimes grotesque funerary urns of the Dakarkari tribe of Northern Nigeria.

There are many variations in the style of decoration, but only the barest mention of one or two of them is possible here. Tiny roulettes, made of wood or string, are impressed into the clay by rolling in the palm of the hand. Besides producing very charming patterns, they consolidate the surface, strengthen the pot and assist evaporation by increasing the surface area. Cooking pots, in which porosity is a disadvantage, are given a handsome black lustre by embedding them, red hot, in a heap of damp leaves, so that the pores are filled with carbon. Another method is to baste the pots as they are taken hot from the fire, with a decoction of locust bean pods.

Firing

The firing is astonishingly simple, but as in all ceramic production it is the key to most of its useful properties. The method is to make a circle of stone or lumps of earth, lay a few small sticks across it, and to stack the dry pots, mouth downwards, on top of each other to a height of four, six, or more feet. They are then covered with dry grass or palm leaves. Over this the rest of the fuel—branches or more grass—is laid. The actual firing is usually completed in about two, and never more than four, hours. The inner layer of grass leaves a coating of soft white siliceous ash, which acts as a protective blanket to the ware. But for this "blanket", and the open texture of the clay itself, it would be impossible to fire these large pots so rapidly without serious losses.

The temperature reached in these primitive clamps is variable, but it is always very low, just enough to complete the dehydration of the clay, (i.e. at or around 600°C.). This rapid low-temperature firing is done not from ignorance of how to achieve higher temperatures, not simply from motives of economy or lack of fuel, but because in this temperature range the ware develops its optimum tolerance to thermal shock. It can be used for cooking on an open fire without cracking; and, in this respect, is superior to anything short of cordierite (flameproof) porcelain. This is because no glass phase has been developed in the body, which is an open porous structure held together by incipient *sintering*. In use, the thermal stresses are probably accommodated by some adjustment of the pore structure.

The Future of Traditional Pottery

On the future prospects of the native pottery industry, two questions naturally arise: is it amenable to technical improvement? and is it in any danger of gradual extinction?

As to the first, the potters themselves are for the most part resistant to technical innovation, at least in those areas where it is a woman's trade, (i.e. roughly all the country south of about latitude 11°). In this their instinct is probably sound. For making the large sizes which are characteristic of most native ware, the potter's wheel would have no particular advantage over the methods which are already employed with such consummate mastery. A clay of finer texture would also have to be used, and this would make it much more difficult to fire in the traditional way. Firing at higher temperatures gives better mechanical strength, but it would destroy one of the most valuable properties of the ware—resistance to the severe shocks encountered in cooking over an open wood fire. Any tampering with the traditional methods, even where its effect was not directly harmful, would raise the cost of the ware without any proportionate increase in its market value.

There are, however, a few cases where improvements can profitably be introduced, e.g. in areas where there is a demand for water coolers and horticultural ware. These articles are made better and more quickly on the potter's wheel, and can be fired in proper kilns without losing their porosity. This type of ware has established itself successfully in Ghana.

In some places, the native potters make careful but rather pathetic imitations of imported porcelain shapes. This is a "technical blind alley", unless the material can be glazed and properly fired. Their efforts seem to cry out for systematic training in more advanced techniques, but since the products would have to compete with those of mechanized mass production, development on these lines can only succeed where the ware itself has some special artistic or other merit.

Is the traditional pottery in any danger of dying out? It is sometimes suggested that film records of the processes should be made, "before it is too late". In the present writer's opinion, such fears are groundless. There are no statistics, and one can only judge by general impressions; but these indicate no visible falling-off in either demand or supply, not even in quality. Its imported competitors—buckets, kerosine tins, enamel saucepans—have made some inroads in the larger towns, but so



A beautiful gold head forming part of the treasure of King Kofi Kalkalli, who was defeated in the First Ashanti War in 1874 by Sir Garnet Wolseley's expedition. It is a hollow cast, made of unalloyed soft gold, weighing 3 lb. 6 oz.

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“The Executioner,” a goldweight from Ashanti, Ghana.

With acknowledgments to the British Museum.



Red and black vessel from South Eastern Nigeria, unglazed, 20th Century.

With acknowledgments to the British Museum.



Stylized portrait of a deceased, pottery; from Akim Swedru, Ghana.

far they have had surprisingly little effect. Some types may become obsolete, but for cooking and similar uses it is not likely to be superseded. Anyone who fears that urbanization will mean the end of native pottery should visit the market in Accra, a city which is growing and changing as rapidly as any in Africa. The pottery stalls, displaying jars, bowls and casseroles made in a village less than ten miles from the town centre, are as busy today as they were fifteen years ago. The reasons which led to the virtual disappearance of this kind of pottery in Europe do not apply nearly so much in the Tropics. The most likely evolution would seem to be towards a state of equilibrium between primitive pottery and glazed domestic ware, both kinds flourishing side by side.

There remains one other question. Is there a tendency for the artistic quality of the native ware to deteriorate as civilization advances? This is a danger which threatens popular arts and peasant industries everywhere in the world. It is not so much a question of whether they will survive, but rather of whether the quality of what survives will be worth having? Only in the remoter districts do the women still make pots not for sale but for their own use, not for their effect on the purchaser but for their effect on the maker—"the lineaments of satisfied desire".

Elsewhere there is a tendency towards standardization and for the potters to be concentrated in certain centres; but this is not necessarily to be deplored.

So long as the demand for their products remains strong, there is not much cause for pessimism. Pots are made and decorated not to be kept and looked at, but to be used and perhaps soon broken. This keeps the style healthy. "As so often is found in Africa, importance lies in the act of creation and not in appreciation of, or preservation of, the finished object" (Ulli Beier, *Nigeria*, No. 51). If a people's primitive art traditions have vitality, civilization and progress do not kill them. New kinds of beauty come into existence. New motives appear, not copies of a foreign style but firmly based on the culture, that is to say the character, of the people. In some markets you may find pots or bowls decorated with incised designs derived from the lines of motor lorries or aeroplanes—lively translations into clay technique of things seen in the mind, not copied from pictures or photographs. This kind of thing is not to be dismissed as childish. It is just as childish, and as genuine, as any other original art.

TOWARDS AN AFRICAN LITERATURE (VI): LITERARY STABILIZATION

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THE period immediately succeeding that of Ntsikana's disciples may be regarded as one of literary stabilization amongst the Xhosa-speaking Southern Africans. The Bible had been translated into Xhosa, and Tiyo Soga, one of its translators, had also translated '*The Pilgrim's Progress*' (Part I). These two books had profound influence on the thought and style of the writers. The idea of individual, as against communal, formulation had taken root, but writers did not abandon the traditional style in their expression, nor did they cast aside their folklore. New experiments in versification began to appear, but the traditional forms asserted themselves all the time. It must be remembered that this was a transitional period in every detail of the people's lives. While the missionary carried on his work as preacher and teacher, the soldier carried on with his own mission of conquest. While the missionary preached "peace on earth and goodwill towards men," the wars of dispossession were working towards a climax. The people had seen the disastrous effects of the Nongqawuse (Cattle-killing) Episode, which had impoverished them and driven thousands of their sons and daughters to seek work amongst their White conquerors; and the effects of the master-and-servant relationship between White and Black were beginning to be keenly felt. Those who had accepted the teachings of the missionaries were no longer blindly optimistic about the motives of the White man. All this, and more, is reflected in the writings of the sixties—eighties of the last century.

The dominant figures of this period were Tiyo Soga, who wrote essays and a few short stories, and William W. Gqoba, essayist, historian and poet. The novel was not yet born. Imitations of '*The Pilgrim's Progress*' were to come with the next generation.

Prose

The essay of this period was not unlike the English essay of the eighteenth century in content. It was serious and didactic. Soga's essays reflect the social changes of the time very clearly. He writes under such headings as '*Amakristu Neenkosi*' (The Christians and the Chiefs), '*Amakhoiwa Namaqaba*' (The Believers

and the Pagans). The former opens as follows: "It is said by outsiders that as soon as people follow the ways of the Word of God, they no longer pay regard to the earthly chieftainship and its authority. It is said that if a chief or other man of standing finds himself amongst the converted, he is lost, for he enjoys no recognition as a chief or man of standing. And so these outsiders, who still hold out stubbornly against the Word, go on to say, 'As for us, we still stand by the chiefs and the sons of the chiefs who have been deserted by their people, by those people who have accepted the way of God'." The writer goes on to say that the chiefs themselves have become so very much aware of this attitude on the part of the Christians that "as far as they are concerned, the Christians are a separate flock, a different tribe, that has nothing to do with them." The writer deplors this state of affairs, and warns his Christian readers that if the pagans are to be attracted to Christianity, the converted must never be accused of lack of respect for their chiefs. He quotes a great deal from the Scriptures to establish his point that "God recognizes earthly power. It exists at His bequest. And he who rejects the chiefs, rejects God's own bequest."

The essay on '*The Believers and the Pagans*' also shows that the gulf is widening between the converted and the pagan. The converted has lost *ubuntu* (generosity, respect for man irrespective of position). The pagan can no longer expect hospitality amongst the Christians. Soga gives an instance of a pagan traveller who spent a cold night in the open veld because none of the Christians in the village would admit him into their homes. Another essay of this type by the same writer describes the devastating effects of the White man's liquor: "White people brought us knowledge and wisdom in respect of many things. If we were willing that our young people should partake of that wealth of knowledge and wisdom, we should be lifted out of ignorance. For to the white people too, this wisdom and knowledge is not indigenous. It came at a certain time. There was a time when their progenitors were the laughing stock of their more civilized conquerors. To-day, the white people laugh at us.

"More than anything else, it was through the white people that we got to know about God, about Jesus, about freedom and about heaven. But although they have brought many things that are blessings to us in this life and even in the life hereafter,

there are some evil things which we wish that the white people had left behind. Even the blessings have lost their value and can no longer be praised as blessings, if we look at the work done by liquor amongst the black people. Liquor has produced abominations which were not known amongst the Xhosa people, abominations that we cannot discuss now. Liquor is going to destroy, whereas the other things came to uplift us. Liquor is like a firebrand thrown into dry veld grass."

Other essayists of this time dealt with similar subjects. Witchcraft, or belief in 'diviners', is tackled from all angles by several essayists, and all of them, of course, think that superstition is incompatible with 'true Christianity'.

But it must not be thought that the essayists of this period never wrote for entertainment. Soga, even in those essays referred to above, is very humorous. It is only a pity that most of the time he addresses himself to a Christian audience, so that a great deal of what he has to say would receive no sympathy from the pagans whom he himself refers to as 'outsiders'. In what perhaps is the greatest essay that has yet been published in Xhosa, Soga describes a journey by ox-waggon through a drought-stricken area in the Eastern Province. It is a ghastly picture of hunger and desolation. But even in this the man's deep sense of humour occasionally reveals itself, throwing into relief the barren journey between King William's Town and Adelaide.

Far more entertaining than the essay of this period is the short story, though only a few examples of it are to be found. The leading figure here is Kobe Ntsikana, son of the prophet. He deals mostly with scenes from pastoral life. But one of the greatest entertainers and humorists of this period is anonymous. The following is a sample of his writing:

"One day, while riding my father's horse, Stanley, I decided when passing near the great pond on the roadside to give the horse a slight thwack on the flank, in order that by the time I came in sight of the homesteads near the school, all the eyes of the village should be upon me, because I had an eye on someone fair in that village. But Stanley, instead of ambling gracefully as I had intended he should, got completely out of control and made straight for the pond. And the pond was full to overflowing! Imagine me sitting there on his back, a heap of death. But just when he reached the brink, Stanley suddenly stopped. I tell you I flew right over his head and went splash! into the

pond, sinking, and finally sat right on the mud at the bottom.

"Sitting down there, I began to think hard, realizing that I was as good as dead. I could not even swim, because my leggings were full of water. I was like one who had been bound to a heavy stone and cast into the water. Nevertheless, I began to struggle, remembering that God helps those who help themselves. But in vain! I could not move from the spot. . . .

"Then suddenly I caught hold of my hair and pulled it hard, and I realized that my body was rising. Ah! Now I remembered that bodies lose weight in water, so I pulled in earnest. Lo and behold! My body rose easily, and I pulled and threw myself right out of the water and onto the brink!"

And so the story continues in this humorous manner. The first person to see the narrator in his sad plight, covered with mud and all but dead, was the very schoolmistress whom he had hoped to attract from Stanley's back! But the story, of course, ends happily.

Poetry

Apart from one or two lyrical poems, the poetry of this period is didactic. The titles themselves indicate the subject matter—"The Song of the Cross," "Isaiah I", "Acts 28". Then there are Gqoba's long poems on 'Education' and 'Christianity'.

But while the literary poets were experimenting with new themes and new forms of versification, the tribal bards who 'stood by the chiefs and the sons of the chiefs' carried on with their compositions in the traditional style. It is most interesting to see this transitional period from the literary as well as from the social point of view, through the eyes of the Christian literary poet on the one hand, and through the eyes of the tribal bard on the other. Towards the end of this period we also find that some poets live fully in both worlds. It will be necessary to deal separately with the poetry of this period.



AZIKWELWA !

JAMES MATTHEWS

HE did not have to walk. He looked over his shoulder at the hundreds coming along behind him, all walking, and in front of him hundreds more, walking. It was the fifth day of their long walk to Johannesburg and it was his first. He was one of the few Coloureds who walked along with the mass of Africans. They were old and they were young, big and small, foot-firm and limping; mothers and sons, fathers and daughters, grandparents and schoolchildren; some dressed in neat clothes with horn-rimmed glasses and attaché cases; and many more in torn overalls and shoes with the soles paper-thin, feeling each stone they trod on. They were all walking the long walk to Johannesburg.

Nights before the boycott was due, the location's fast beating heart increased its pace. Wherever a man raised his voice, a group formed around him, and, as the hours passed, there were many such groups, until the location throbbed one great meeting-place. There were the wild ones whose eyes saw only violence and their cry was, "Burn the buses!" Then there were those, a few, who whispered, "Accept the terms." But there was also the many who defiantly said, "Azikwelwa! We will not ride."

When they started their walk the sky was still pulsating under the stars. He watched them from the inside of his room and after a time went back to the warmth of his blankets. Later, he had a bus to himself on the ride to the station. There were angry voices when he boarded the bus, but those who shouted loudest were restrained by others with rosettes pinned to their breasts. Then, when the bus passed the long firm line of walkers, he heard again their cry. His return from work found them homeward bound, a song travelling their length. A stone hit the side of the bus and he peered through the rear window. Four men were shaking a youth by the shoulders, and then they all disappeared from view as the bus turned a bend in the road.

As if by a pre-arranged plan, the location's streets swarmed with people who embraced each other and sang at the tops of their voices. In the backyards of the shebeen queens, skokiaan† flowed freely for those who had the money to pay for it, and even

† A drink made and sold by the 'shebeens' or illegal bars of the African townships.

those who came with empty pockets were given something for their throats. As they faced one another they cried, "Azikwelwa! My brother."

Four days he watched them walk the long walk and four nights he saw them dance and drink their tiredness away, and the spirit of their pride filled him. Their word was as good as that of the white man. They said they would walk the many miles before paying the extra penny the bus company demanded. There were many whites who scoffed at their determination, and there was their answer, in the line of empty buses. On the fifth morning, when the first wave of walkers passed his door, he joined them. From side streets poured rushes of walkers, and the mass of people flowed through the gates of the location.

On his left walked an old man who used a stick to help him along and in front of him waddled a fat woman with a bundle of washing balanced on her head. He looked around him. There were many such women and some had babies strapped to their backs, the heads of the babies joggling to the motion of their mothers' hips.

It was still early and the first mile was not done and they were in holiday mood. Bicycles carried two passengers. The ancient cars of the location, which always threatened to fall apart, were loaded to capacity and wheezed their way forward. One man, his boots tied around his neck, joked with his friend and said that it made for easier walking. All joined in the laughter. They were walking the long walk and they were proud.

The miles passed and the road was long and there was less laughter, but still they walked. The old, the sick, the weak, they dropped behind. The front of the column was wide, but behind, it tapered off to a thin line of stragglers.

Then suddenly there were the police and the cars standing in rows and the people inside pulled out and forced to the side of the road. And the owners protested that the cars were not used as taxis, but yet were charged with over-loading. The harsh demands for passes, and the fearful swelling as they waited for the vans to take them away. Then the next block of police waiting with out-stretched hands and ready batons for those who had not the slips of paper which gave them the right to stay and the right to move. There were many who slipped down side streets to escape the police, for the police wanted them to ride and not walk, that there should be no strength of will and they should be without voice.

"Pass! Where is it?" he was asked. The owner of the voice not bothering to look at him and only when he made no reply, turning his eyes.

"I don't carry a pass," he replied.

"Then what are you doing here?"

"I am walking!"

"Are you a Kaffir or are you a Communist?"

"I am walking!"

He walked past the policeman who had already grasped another victim by the shirt front, demanding his pass.

A large car pulled to a halt in front of him, behind the wheel a young, white woman. She opened the doors on each side and cried aloud, "Come on. Women and old people." No one moved. Then a woman with a child on her back and a suitcase in one hand shyly approached the car and got into the back. Others followed, but one old man shook his head, saying that he was not too old to finish the long walk. More cars stopped and their drivers were white and they took those who wanted to ride.

A car was stopped and the driver asked the young policeman on whose orders he was stopping the car and demanding the removal of the passengers. He stood undecided and the car pulled away. He rushed to the nearest man and screamed, "Kaffirs! Julle dink julle is slim!"

Messages were relayed from those arrested to those free. Messages to tell a father a son was arrested, to assure an employer that an employee would come back to his job, to tell the children not to worry and to help each other.

And those who walked were still many and their hearts were heavy, but they walked, and soon the long walk was at an end, for below them was the city. At their entry to the city, the people of the city looked at them in disbelief, and their shoulders straightened and their heads lifted and they smiled. They had done the long walk one more day.

It was late when he entered the chemist shop where he worked as a delivery messenger.

"Jonathan. Why are you late?"

"I walked."

"All the way?" The white man in the white coat looked at him with surprise.

"All the way."

"But why? You're not one of them."

He could not tell the white man of the feeling inside him, that when he was with them, he knew it was good.

He joined them on the Square at mid-day. They sat with mugs of coffee and still-hot fat cakes bought from the vendors with their portable coffee stalls. Some sat around draught boards, using bottle tops as counters, but most were clustered around those with newspapers. There were pictures on the front page showing the many walkers, and the reports stated that the boycott would soon be over and that the leaders of the boycott had come to an agreement. There were angry murmurs amongst them, and some said aloud that they did not believe it. One man said what they all had on their minds. "Why is it that we were not approached? Are we not the people who walk? Does the bus company think because it has spoken to a few men, we, like sheep, will now meekly ride instead of walk?" The last question was directed at one who wore the colours of the boycott organization on his breast at night in the location.

He was a short, wiry man and his eyes blinked behind the thick-lensed glasses he wore. He took them off, wiped the lenses nervously with his handkerchief and replaced the glasses on the bridge of his wide, flat nose. He cleared his throat before speaking and then, in a surprisingly loud voice, said, "Do not believe it my brothers. It is not for our leaders to say we walk or ride before first asking the will of the people of the location. The men of the bus company must think our leaders are but children to be easily swayed by their words. Pay no heed to what is written in the newspapers because it is the words of the white man."

His words reassured them, but there were the few, already tired of the long walk, who said it was a good thing. "The white man has seen that the black man is also a man of his word." Now they would ride.

Jonathan was filled with doubt. Always he was with those who suffered without protest. Always he was with those without voice. Always he was with those who had to bear the many pains. Always he was with those unwanted, and always they lost.

He had secretly thought that the boycott would only last the first day, then the people of the location with their tired limbs would once more ride the buses and once more a purpose would die. But when it entered the second day, the third day and the day following, his hopes mounted that this would be the one

time they would prove themselves men. It had become a symbol to him. As long as they walked, his life would not be altogether meaningless. He would be able to say with pride that he too was one of those who walked the long walk, when they proved to the bus company that they had a will of their own and were not to be silenced into obedience by words.

All through his deliveries Jonathan was depressed and, when he read the afternoon paper, his despair swamped him, and he felt all cold in the afternoon sun. He felt betrayed. The paper stated that an agreement had been reached and that the following morning the buses would be filled. The boycott was over.

To forget, he busied himself with work and was relieved when given a stack of deliveries which would keep him occupied for the rest of the afternoon.

Work done with, he joined the lines of walkers ascending the first incline out of the city. They were a silent lot, and when some one asked if it was to be the last day of the long walk, he was answered with shrugs of the shoulders and the shaking of heads in bewilderment. The lines merged into one huge column of heavy hearts and dragging feet. There were no jokes, no laughter. Only doubt and uncertainty, the ringing footsteps turned into drumbeats of defeat.

The walk was long and the road without end. The cars stopped, and they looked at them without interest and at those who got inside. They passed with apprehension the first group of grinning policemen and when they were not stopped, their betrayal seemed complete.

A youth raised his voice and said in a loud voice, "Azikwelwa!" And he was cursed by some around him, but he would not be denied and repeated it louder, his voice carrying further, "Azikwelwa! My brothers and sisters!" Those who heard the youth's outburst turned their heads and stared at him and they buzzed with curiosity.

"Has news been heard?" . . . "Do we do the long walk, tomorrow?" . . . "What has happened?" . . . They shouted but there was no answer. Then a voice cried, "We will hear tonight in the location," and it was taken up and passed through the ranks. And the pace of the walkers increased, and Jonathan's heart kept pace with their footsteps.

They passed further blocks of policemen, and there were no stoppings for the demands for passes, and the cars loaded with

people passed unchallenged. And the miles slipped behind as they hurried to the location.

His supper ended, Jonothan walked with the others to the football field where the boycott organization held its meetings, and pushed near to the front. The field filled and when he turned his head, the back of the field was blocked-out by the bodies of the many people.

A speaker mounted an up-ended crate, his hands held aloft. It was the same man who spoke on the Square during the afternoon. His voice roared.

“The bus company has taken it on itself, after speaking to those who could never speak for us, to have it printed in the papers of the white man that the boycott is ended, is done with. That we have, like little children, agreed to their talks and will board the buses tomorrow. But they are wrong. This is our answer. Azikwelwa! Azikwelwa! . . .” The rest of his speech was lost in the clamour pouring from the open throats, and when other speakers tried to speak they met with the same result. The people of the location needed no further speeches, and the crowd spilled apart.

Again the backyards of the shebeen queens were flooded and skokiaan was to be had for the asking.

Jonathan sat on a bench with his mug of skokiaan untouched, a bemused smile on his face. Opposite, a drinker was slumped against the wall and his wife looked boldly at Jonathan. Looking at her, and the people around him, Jonathan felt a surge of love sweeping through his body and raised his mug to the woman. “Azikwelwa! My sister,” he said.



BOOK REVIEWS

The Cape Coloured People, 1652-1937 by Professor J. S. Marais. Published by the University of Witwatersrand Press, Johannesburg. 1939. Reprinted 1957. Price 25s. 293 pp. with index.

Now that one has re-read Dr. Marais' book some 18 years after its first appearance, one wonders why it has been allowed to remain out of print for so long. For Marais' **Cape Coloured People** remains the most authoritative work on this subject, and the 'subject' remains one of the most vital in South African politics.

A good deal of time is spent on investigating the origins of the Coloured people; almost too much, the reader might feel. It will always be a contentious question to what degree the different racial groups have contributed towards creating the Coloured people. Probably there is no single answer. Marais finds that slaves and Hottentots contributed chiefly, and the Europeans and Bushmen in lesser degree. As no records were kept of all early contacts, there can be no finality upon this.

Dealing firstly with the question of so-called racial characteristics, we should note Marais' remarks regarding laziness, improvidence and drunkenness. These charges have been levelled against the Hottentots and their descendants from the time of Van Riebeeck, coupled also with accusations of immorality and thieving. Marais' book serves to show us how these are by no means inherent tendencies; how utterly improper indeed is the application of these terms to the aboriginal peoples at all. In actual fact, these phenomena should be viewed and evaluated as the impact of a foreign culture on primitive man, and the matter described in the neutral terms of an objective science, rather than in the emotionally loaded language of everyday intercourse. The Hottentots did indeed drink the White man's fiery liquor and succumb to it, so that they wanted more. And why not? What standards did these people have to check

their indulgence? Why not, after all, get drunk?

And when it is remembered that the Hottentot did not *steal* the liquor but received it as a gift, was thereby encouraged, and was encouraged by people who were culturally more advanced, it is not difficult to see where the weight of opprobrium must fall if judgment must be passed in regard to the Hottentots' drinking habits.

When, further, it is recalled that the White man did not merely *give* the Hottentot liquor, but that there is ample reason to believe that he gave it with the motive of weakening the Hottentots' hold on their property—land and cattle—the part of the White man becomes all the more despicable.

One could deal with the alleged laziness and the alleged improvidence of the Hottentots in the same way. But when all has been said in defence of the Hottentot, one fact remains which it would be folly to attempt to deny or explain away: "The habit of drinking to excess, implanted from generation to generation, is still one of the besetting sins of the Coloured people" (p. 3.)

Anyone who wishes to assess the part played—or to be played—in South African history by the Coloured people would do ill to ignore this state of affairs. Whether the weakness is hereditary or not; whether it was acquired innocently or not; the Coloured people *do* drink too much, and their future progress is retarded by this fact. Let us not let the sins of the White man in the past blind us to the realities of the present and the needs of the future. If we do, then the White man's motive of undermining the non-Whites permanently will be realized.

South Africa is a young country, far too young to have forgotten the sins in its history. The Whites harp on the moral degeneracy of the Coloured people, while they sedulously forget their eradication of the Bushmen. The records quoted by Marais in this respect are of overwhelming authority, and leave a horrifying picture of the manner in which a so-called Christian people behaved towards other, less privileged persons.

"I heard one man declare," says Collins, "that within a period of six years the parties under his orders had either killed or taken 3,200 of these unfortunate creatures (Bushmen). Another has stated to me that the actions in which he had been engaged had caused the destruction of 2,700." (p. 18). Nicholson is quoted as saying that ". . . many Bushmen have been killed without any pretext whatever. The evidence I

have taken, states that parties were in the habit of going out to hunt and shoot any Bushmen they might find." (p. 28.)

The story of the Griquas, or Bastards, the first considerable group of Coloured people, makes interesting reading. Here we have a group already grown out of savagery and heathendom. In many ways Westernized, they spread to the Orange River and became the first true Voortrekkers. In both Griqualand West and Griqualand East these Bastards were the true pioneers, the carriers of Western ideas into the interior.

The contacts between these Griquas and the White men were typical. Time and again the Boers encroached on their lands and infiltrated into territory at first occupied by them. We see how they came with signs of their higher culture, brought churches, schools—and canteens. And in the end dispossessed the people they claimed they had come to save. An interesting feature of this process is the manner in which freehold rights for the Coloured people led in every instance to the loss of their land. This process has not yet ceased.

Partly, I feel, we must concede that the early Griquas had not sufficiently mastered Western civilization to have developed an appreciation of its standards, its economics, its values and its techniques, so that they could counter the wily Boers. They were as children in the hands of these hardened frontiersmen who soon took possession of their best watering-places, their land, and reduced them to servility. But also, we must beware of the inference that this is still the case. Unfortunately, as I have said, the process has not yet ceased. Yet intervening generations have had the benefit of education and of a much more thorough and intimate knowledge of Western civilization, and it would not be valid to draw facile conclusions about present-day Coloured people generally, any more than one could draw general conclusions about Whites on the basis of the poor-whites of fifty years ago.

Most enlightening about this whole process of Boer-Griqua contact is the mental attitude of the Boer to the Coloured people. "The Boers knew quite well that left to themselves the Bastards were no match for them, and the Bastards knew it too . . ." (p. 89.) The Boer thus entered into his relationship with the Griquas confirmed in an attitude of superiority. According to the Special Commissioner for the Northern Border, the Boers ". . . could not bear to see a Coloured man in any other position but that of a servant. . . ." (p. 89.) This

attitude, it would seem, has altered hardly at all.

One of the most valuable features of Marais' book is the telling manner in which he analyzes the Boer mentality. His appraisal of the frontiersman is typical and explains a great deal of the course of South African history. For instance: "The Graaff Reinet (White) colonists had had little experience of the rule of law. Each tended to be a law unto himself and resented any interference with his actions, especially his actions towards his servants." (p. 112.) This arrogance showed itself not only towards his actual servants, but towards all people of Colour and led to antipathy and hatred towards all who, like the London Missionary Society missionaries, sympathized with the people of Colour. These feelings have persisted to the present day.

Marais makes much of the effect the ever-pressing need for labour had on Colour attitudes, and rightly so. From the start, the aboriginals were seen as a source of labour. Slaves were introduced in order to supply labour. Hottentots, although 'free', were pressed into service; and many laws were made later to stop their 'vagrancy', but in reality also to bind them to their masters and to secure a constant and adequate labour supply. Even such well-respected institutions as Genadendal came to be looked upon with considerable hostility when it was felt that they were 'harbouring' the Hottentot servants.

Hence the passing of Ordinance 50 of 1828, which decreed the liberation of Hottentots, establishing their equality before the law and freedom to move from place to place, was not calculated to gain Boer support for the Government. On the contrary, it angered them greatly.

Marais links Ordinance 50 with the emancipation of slaves as the two great acts for which the Coloured people have to thank the philanthropists. He points out, though, how the social and racial prejudices and attitudes which had been built up prior to these events proved too strong for a spirit of real liberalism to take definite root. In actual legislation there was Colour-blindness after 1828, but social pressures continued to ensure that in practice the people of Colour received differential treatment. Yet, again, the very idea that things could go so far as to entrench rights in law for the Coloured and Black people was too much for many Whites. Hence the Great Trek: "In its most important and most distinctive aspects the

Great Trek was nothing else than the rebellion of the Boers against the ideas of the philanthropists"; and again: "... the Great Trek led to the establishment of two resentful Republics where the old Boer attitude to people of Colour, an attitude in utter contrast to the post-1828 'Cape Liberal tradition', took deeper root." (pp. 160-161.)

When it came to the construction of the Cape (elected) Legislative Assembly, we see how it was felt necessary to 'protect' the Coloured people against the Boer attitude. In the face of Britain's refusal (in 1853) to accept a differential franchise, we see the beginnings of a period of intrigue with regard to voting qualifications which has not yet ended.

The Masters and Servants Blue Book left no doubt of the intentions with regard to the Coloured people, and in 1850 the Governor expressed apprehension of the future and said that under an elected legislature "... the Coloured classes ... will, by means of compulsory contracts for lengthened periods, and vagrant laws with severe punishments and penalties, be reduced to a state of virtual slavery." (p. 210.)

Reading the history of the Coloured people again, one is filled with a feeling of sorrow, even despair. Here is the story of a trusting people exploited from the beginning, a people doomed to slavery and all its sufferings.

One redeeming feature is this—that Marais closes his narrative in 1937. Since then so much has happened by way of integration in industry and by way of achievement in avenues demanded by the growth of the country that one sees hope in this 20-year advance alone. On much of this progress, of which signs must have been very clear in 1937 already, Marais says nothing.

True, there has been oppression ever since, in both legislation and administration. And it is true that Marais' dismal prophecies about "the political segregation of Coloured voters, compulsory segregation in the towns of the Cape Province, Natal, and Coloured 'quotas' in industry" (pp. 283-4) have been proved correct. But Marais gives no clue that he anticipated a tremendous upsurge in the general economic strength of the Coloured people, in their political enlightenment, and in the strengthening of their bonds with other non-White groups. Perhaps it is because he failed to see this that he ends with the words "... as far as one can see ahead at present, the outlook for the Coloured people must remain dark."

Dr. R. E. VAN DER ROSS

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