

# AFRICA SOUTH

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Special Feature:

## CENTRAL AFRICA CRISIS SECTION

Articles by: M. W. Kanyama Chiume, Kenneth Kaunda,  
Joshua Nkomo, Barbara Castle, M.P., and others



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EDITOR: RONALD M. SEGAL

JULY-SEPT. 1959

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## DEAR SIR ROY,

It is six years now since the British Government collaborated with Central African settlerdom in forcing Federation upon some six and a half million clamorously hostile Africans. And for six years now a government geared to the 'maintenance of civilized standards' and pledged to a policy of racial 'partnership' has had the chance to dispel that hostility, to prove its dedication to those principles of Western culture that it sanctifies so strenuously in its speech. Do you, the head of that government, believe that it has done so?

Nyasaland survives in the Federation today as occupied territory, its allegiance as sure and as lasting as the guard at your detention camps and your army of occupation can forcibly ensure. You claim the existence of a Congress-sponsored massacre plot as the excuse for the violence that you yourself have employed to retain the territory. And surely you must grope at an excuse, for no settler in Nyasaland has been killed; though underneath the interminable explanation that you have piled high upon them, lie the bodies of fifty Africans shot by your security forces. The evidence you have offered for the plot so far is flimsy enough, but doubtless you will supply the Commission of Inquiry with less fragile furniture. Do you think that that is likely to acquit you? A people must be driven by suffering headlong beyond hope before it surrenders itself finally to violence. Would a campaign of murder satisfactorily illustrate the loyalty that the Federation has earned from its subjects since its inception? Dominion status should wait upon somewhat more convincing proofs of African allegiance.

Experience of your conspiracies in the past, however, promotes a sedulous scepticism. There have been too many Soviet plots that you alone have been able to discover; whenever African leaders confer, you eavesdrop on a take-over bid by the Kremlin. Does it not seem infinitely more probable that the campaign sponsored by Congress in Nyasaland was no more than a programme of civil disobedience? And who should be blamed for that? Can you say that you ever provided the people of Nyasaland with constitutional passage-ways to political advancement? Six years after your policy of partnership was born, some seven thousand settlers in the territory possess more power than its two million seven hundred thousand natives.

Having seen the strident career of white supremacy receive no

even temporary check during its years of trial, the Africans of Nyasaland may be forgiven for having wondered what constitutional protest was likely to accomplish for them. And as the 1960 Constitutional Conference approached, their distrust must have turned rapidly to terror, as they foresaw themselves sacrificed finally to settler rule. How would you and the members of your government have acted in similar circumstances? Your public admiration of the Boston rebels under George III would seem to commit you clearly enough to the principles of civil disobedience. Is it reasonable to abuse your subjects for drawing encouragement from your example?

Your associates in Southern Rhodesia have followed their leader and thrown themselves head over heels into a riot of repression. They too claim a conspiracy of violence against the State, though it must be admitted that they are either less aware or much less able than yourself, for they have produced no evidence at all and been unable to promise any. Having outlawed the Congress movement and detained its leaders, they have busied themselves in disfiguring the statute book with the most repressive measures that have ever mocked the principles of parliamentary rule. Outdoing even the Nationalists in mutilating the rule of law, the governing party you control has provided itself with powers of arbitrary arrest and made the most elementary African opposition into a criminal offence.

If its objects were to terrorise African sentiment into submission and break the hold that the Congress has upon African allegiance, it has failed ludicrously in both. For far from stilling African hostility, it has inflamed it; while by arresting moderates and radicals alike, it has offered its opponents the obduracy of extremes and united them on the rack of Congress martyrdom. Above all, by preventing the Africans from organizing themselves peacefully for change, it has left only the avenue of civil disobedience open to opposition, and stimulated the very violence against which it now pretends that it was obliged to protect itself. When even boycott is banned as a political weapon, revolution remains the only recourse left the oppressed. Can that be what you and your accomplices actually want?

What in all this have you gained? The shooting of Africans by white territorials from Southern Rhodesia has infuriated Nyasaland beyond the possibility of compromise, and made it difficult for the most sympathetic British administration to

concede the ultimate authority over the protectorates that you demand. Can you really expect to wring dominion status from the Constitutional Conference? When Britain will be standing trial before its Commonwealth? No doubt you can go it alone for a little while, governing Central Africa by the gun till the gun cannot govern any longer and hostility spills over at last into revolution. No doubt too you can postpone that calamity by abdicating to Dr. Verwoerd in a Nationalist-dominated union, a wild final fling of white supremacy. But the price of that postponement would be surrender to a double violence with all escape-hatches locked.

Consider yet, in the few months left of choice, the agony that shadows your present course. It is not only yourself, but the three hundred thousand settlers who fumble after you that you are committing to calamity. But then perhaps one must stare calamity in the face, as you are surely doing now, to recognize its features and find in them the courage to escape. Then indeed the savage stupidity of what you have done will no longer matter, as a new society grows out of the rubble of the old, covering it over in time as a Troy upon Troy, Africa leaving its blood once again on the step below. But however you choose, Africa will endure and advance by its very endurance, a continent climbing slowly on its knees. In the end, it is only your own part of it and the part that should belong to those who follow you that you can destroy.

## EMIGRANT SHIP

The Pilgrim Poppa, grilling manly torso,  
 Sprawls on the deck in Port-Said-purchased hat;  
 Here, by this floating Serpentine (but more so)  
 The Pilgrim Momma chides her Pilgrim Brat.

They talk of Wogs and Niggers, trash and treasure  
 And bargaining. The urgent wail of sex  
 And Tin Pan Alley stirs in strident measure  
 The unfulfilment of our lower decks.

They sense no lure in the Arabian magic  
 Vast, to the East, across the narrow sea,  
 Nor know the Western shore where, bright or tragic,  
 There swells a continental pregnancy.

The tales of Sinbad, scimitars and raiders  
 And of strong, silent Englishmen—each ghost  
 Is lost upon this lido, like the traders  
 Who still hawk bodies from the evening coast.

Tonight the dance, the celluloid emotions,  
 Bingo and cards and couples in the dark,  
 Where burning limbs (smothered in soothing lotions)  
 On passion's frail, synthetic tide embark.

I am alone. No destiny indentures  
 My foot-loose fortune to the Southern Cross;  
 Unlike the true adventurer's adventures  
 Mine is some phantom ship or albatross,

Or world of ancient mariners, whose histories  
 Still haunt such seas from the abyss of Time,  
 And out of Africa the ancient mysteries,  
 Old hopes, old fears, the Nemesis of crime.

For here, where once the seas were rent asunder,  
 I hear the bondsmen moan and Pharaoh boast  
*Before those cliffs of water fall in thunder*  
*Upon the chariots of the mighty host.*

REGINALD REYNOLDS

# THE SENATE FARCE

STANLEY UYS


*Political Correspondent of the 'Sunday Times'*

No tour of the Houses of Parliament is complete without a visit to the famous enlarged Senate. The guide escorts his party to the public gallery and they peep down into the Chamber. He explains that there has been a big change. In the old Senate—the one which expired with the passing of the Senate Act in 1955—the 30 Government Members used to sit on one side and the 18 Opposition Members on the other. Now the Government has 78 Members, and they stretch up one length of the Chamber and down the other, leaving only a tiny corner on the President's left for the remnants of the Opposition—12 men clinging on valiantly, like the man in the cartoon dangling over a precipice and clutching at a stem of edelweiss.

The first meeting of the enlarged Senate in January, 1956 was a gala occasion. One of the newcomers was Senator Louis Weichardt, former leader of the Greyshirt movement in South Africa. "The Greyshirts," he explained, "were liquidated for something far superior to take their place." This tribute, presumably, was directed at the Nationalist Party of which he had now become a respected spokesman. Another newcomer was Senator Jan Grobler, one-time member of the Nazi-type "New Order," started during the war years by Oswald Pirow (now prosecuting in the treason trial).

Of almost every enlarged Senator it could be said, "thereby hangs a tale": Senator H. A. de Ridder, notorious for his anti-Semitism; Senator J. J. McCord, English in name only and author of "The South African Struggle," sometimes distributed free to visiting newspapermen to give them a proper perspective of South African history; Mrs. Mathilda Koster, the Nationalist Party's only woman parliamentarian—a solitary and reluctant concession to the emancipation of women; "Mussolini" van Wyk, etc. . .

The enlarged Senate costs £220,000 a year. At the last full-length session (lasting nearly six months), 4 Government Senators made no speeches at all, 7 made only one speech each, and 8 made only 2 speeches each. One Senator, beginning "I would like to congratulate the Minister . . .", spoke about 600 words in 7 minutes, and nothing else for the rest of the





session. He could calculate his emoluments at £3 the spoken word, or £285 the speaking minute. Commenting on an increase of £400 in the free trunk-line telephone calls made by Senators, the *'Cape Times'* said: "This raises the query whether some Senators perhaps talk more on the long-distance telephone than they do on the floor of the House."

In January this year, at the start of the Senate session, Senator J. M. Conradie, the United Party leader, moved: "That this House is of opinion that the Senate Act, 1955, be repealed and a new Senate constituted on a recommendation to be made by a Speaker's conference."

The motion crystallised the feelings of the entire Opposition, and of many Nationalists too. Introducing the motion, Senator Conradie quoted 'Dawie', the political columnist of the Nationalist newspaper, *'Die Burger'*: "No one is in love with the Senate Act. Clearly, it is abnormal machinery necessitated by an abnormal situation. When the deadlock has been resolved, naturally, it will be possible to return to normality." That was written in 1955. In September, 1958, 'Dawie' was still writing: "It is no secret that, although I am a friend of various Senators, I am no friend of the Senate in its present form. As far as I am concerned, the sooner it can be reconstituted, the better."

Not only 'Dawie,' but Nationalist M.P.s too, have sniped at the Senate. At a meeting of the Nationalist parliamentary caucus this year, the Government Leader in the Senate, Senator Jan de Klerk (Minister of Labour), protested that Government Members of the Assembly were referring to their brother-Nationalists in the Upper House in "contemptuous" terms. The reason for this friction is well-known: having achieved parliamentary status through the medium of the enlarged Senate, the Senators have been casting covetous eyes on the more treasured Assembly seats.

The debate on Senator Conradie's motion was illuminating. Rejecting the motion, Senator de Klerk explained that the Opposition had "compelled us to make use of this remedy for the sake of the continued existence of a European civilisation, for the sake of this great and holy calling of a nation." If any change was necessary in the composition of the Senate, added Senator de Klerk, the Government would effect it "in its own time, in its own way and . . . when it may be considered necessary."

Even more illuminating, was the exchange between a Government Senator and Senator Leslie Rubin, one of the four Senators elected by Africans.

Senator Rubin: "I am going to tell this House what I know supporters of the Government are saying, and have been saying since 1955. They say it even in this House, Mr. President, quietly, over a cup of tea. What they are saying broadly reflects an attitude towards this Chamber which varies from a feeling of uneasiness about it to one of downright shame . . ."

Senator J. I. de Wet: "Israel calls the hon. Senator!"

Senator Rubin: . . . "they have failed miserably to do their duty as members of the highest House in the land."

Senator de Wet: "May I ask the hon. Senator a question?"

Senator Rubin: "Yes, Mr. President."

Senator de Wet: "Can the hon. Senator tell this House how much money he and his three colleagues here have made out of the Coloured races?"

Senator Rubin: "That remark, Mr. President, will bear out something I have to say a little later about the degrading depths to which the standards of this House have been lowered since the Senate was enlarged."

On a previous occasion, Senator Rubin had been the object of an adolescent Nationalist boycott because he had criticised certain members of the police force for their lawlessness. A Government Senator, H. J. van Aarde, had reacted by calling upon the Government side to ignore Senator Rubin for the rest of the session. When next Senator Rubin stood up to speak, the Government Senators rose in a body and marched out, scowling and muttering. Senator Rubin brought them hurrying back, red-faced and angry, by causing the quorum bells to be rung. The farcical boycott collapsed.

Then it was Dr. Verwoerd's turn to renew the boycott. He was then Minister of Native Affairs and Government Leader in the Senate. This boycott was sparked off by a remark of Senator Rubin's that, although some Government Senators were still walking out on him, he was pleased to see that Dr. Verwoerd was not among them. Flushed with annoyance, Dr. Verwoerd exclaimed: "If that's your attitude, I shall leave the Chamber immediately." And dutifully followed by a host of enlarged Senators, the future Prime Minister stalked out of the Chamber. This boycott did not last long either.

The passing of the Senate Act in 1955 was a significant event in

the regime of the Nationalist Party. It marked the end of one chapter in the constitutional deadlock over the Coloured vote (the Malan chapter), and the start of another chapter (the Strijdom chapter).

Malan had tried, from the time of the Nationalist Party's accession to power in 1948, to secure the removal from the common voters' roll of the remaining handful of non-Whites—some 40,000 Coloureds of mixed descent living in the Cape Province. The obstacle confronting Malan was the two-thirds majority—of the Assembly and Senate sitting jointly—required by the South Africa Act. Malan never overcame this obstacle, and he went out of politics leaving a legacy of failures in the ensuing constitutional struggle.

His Bill to remove Coloured voters from the roll, passed by an ordinary sitting of the Assembly with a simple majority, was ruled invalid by the Appeal Court. So was the fanciful High Court of Parliament Bill, designed to constitute Parliament as a court of appeal superior to the Appeal Court (for the purpose of revalidating the Coloured vote Bill). Malan then sought the help of Opposition Members, but the South Africa Act Amendment Bill, to repeal the entrenched clause affecting voting rights and to validate the Coloured vote Bill, lapsed when the two-thirds majority was not forthcoming. Later, the Appellate Division Bill, to split the Appeal Court into two, was withdrawn by Malan when the breakaway Opposition group, the Conservative Party, failed to solicit sufficient votes among the Opposition for a two-thirds majority. Finally, in 1954, the Separate Representation of Voters Act Validation and Amendment Bill was defeated at a joint sitting, in spite of the energetic efforts of the Conservative Party to procure the vital extra votes.

On this note of failure, Malan resigned from the Premiership. The significance of his methods was that, as he blundered from failure to failure, he gradually abandoned the sledgehammer for compromise.

Mr. Strijdom's particular contribution to the settlement of the constitutional issue was to cut the Gordian knot. He thereby performed the first wholly totalitarian act of the Nationalist regime. The Senate Act was not simply undemocratic: it was fantastically, brazenly so. It was more an act of violence, a physical assault, than a legislative step. Malan had retreated before this decision, but Strijdom had no qualms. He enlarged the Senate to provide the required two-thirds

majority; and, to be on the safe side, he thought, he also enlarged the Appeal Court. Strijdom's right-hand man in those days was Verwoerd.

When the Senate was constituted by the Act of Union in 1910, it was intended as a house of elders and review. Senators had to be at least 30 years of age, and elected (not nominated) Senators had to own immovable property in the Union worth £500 over and above any special mortgage. Strijdom foresaw that these qualifications would prove restrictive and he abolished them. A wild scramble followed among Nationalist Party supporters for the Senatorships, and with 48 extra seats to dole out, the Nationalist Party, faithful to the spirit of the Senate Act, charged £20, win or lose, for anyone entering the Senatorship stakes. Thus the enlargement of the Senate was not only politically profitable for the Nationalist Party: it was plain profitable!

Originally, the Senate consisted of 48 members: eight elected by each province, eight nominated by the Government, four elected by the Africans, and two elected and two nominated to represent South-West Africa. The election of the 32 Senators by the provinces was on a basis of a proportional representation. When the Senate was enlarged from 48 to 90 Members, the system of proportional representation was also changed to one under which the majority party in a province took all the Senate seats for that province. By this "winner-take-all" system, the Nationalist Party emerged with 57 of the 65 seats allocated to the provinces.

The present composition of the enlarged Senate is: Government-supporting Senators of various kinds, 78; United Party Senators, 8; Senators representing the Africans, 4.

One of the changes brought about by the Senate Act was to double, from four to eight, the number of Senators nominated by the Government to represent the non-Whites. The official phrasing, taken from the Act of Union, was that they "shall be selected on the ground mainly of their thorough acquaintance, by reason of their official experience or otherwise, with the reasonable wants and wishes of the Coloured races in South Africa" (by Coloured is meant non-White). Senator Rubin took the trouble to examine the Hansard report of the last Senate session (1958) to see how these four nominated Senators had executed their duties. He found that one of them had not spoken once during the session; and that two others had spoken

a number of times, but that neither took part in the debate on one of the most vital Bills, namely, the Bill to increase African taxation. Senator Rubin also found that two of the nominated Senators avoided speaking on another highly contentious measure, the Native Laws Amendment Bill.

"My point, Mr. President," said Senator Rubin, "quite simply is that Hansard shows quite clearly, certainly as far as that aspect of their work is concerned, that far from these three hon. Senators having done their work, they have failed miserably to do their duty as members of the highest House in the land."

It should also be noted that a Nationalist who stood as an apartheid candidate in the African elections to the Senate, and was defeated overwhelmingly, is today a Government nominated Senator—"representing" the non-Whites.

The enlarged Senate is Parliament's constant embarrassment. Extra benches had to be fitted in the Senate Chamber, the dining room had to be enlarged, extra office accommodation had to be found in a building already bursting at the seams. Yet in their four years of office, the enlarged Senators have performed only two noteworthy functions: they provided the two-thirds majority required to give South Africa a pure-White voters' roll, and they helped to elect their former leader, Dr. Verwoerd, into the Premiership. Some say that the vote of the enlarged Senators was decisive in Dr. Verwoerd's election. Noteworthy, but not notable, functions.

The term of office of the enlarged Senate expires next year, and agitation for its reform is starting up again. Next year, too, the four Senators representing Africans will be abolished under the mis-named "Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Bill." This will reduce the Opposition in the Senate to eight—all United Party Senators from Natal.

The United Party, therefore, has a remedy in its hands. If the Government fails to abolish the enlarged Senate next year, it can walk out and leave this grotesque institution to the Nationalists. If it fails to do this, it will no longer have the moral right to refer to the enlarged Senate as a farce, because it will have become part of the farce itself.

## REVOLUTION: FURTHER REFLECTIONS

JOE MATTHEWS

*Former National President of the African National Congress Youth League*

It is extremely difficult to conduct a really profound and comprehensive discussion on revolution in South Africa today. Frank, open and unrestricted analysis is just not possible. The participants in the discussion who are fully aware of all the inhibiting factors tend to leave much unsaid that could be said, especially if they do not themselves believe in the permanence of the Establishment. And the Statute Book is so strewn with broken glass, one must walk carefully not to cut one's feet.

Certainly it would seem as if the first essential in the discussion is to make an attempt to attach a more precise meaning to the word 'revolution'. Briefly a revolution is a rapid redistribution of power which is caused by the growing disproportion between the real strength of a new and rising class, and the amount of political power allotted to it. And it is a change in economic conditions (a change in the methods of production, that is) which first shifts the balance of strength in favour of this new force. Thus a revolution always involves the displacement of a ruling class by another class which does not have its rightful share of power.

Furthermore, the new class that is destined to replace the old one in authority unites around it all other classes and interests, constituting the vast majority of the population, that have an interest in the replacement of the ruling class. The revolution, in other words, must be in the interests of the mass of the people.

The above description would exclude such phenomena as the fascist dictatorships in Germany, Italy and elsewhere. These dictatorships left the fundamental economic structure intact and sought to preserve the existing relationships between the classes. Their purpose was counter-revolutionary.

Examining the South African situation in the light of the above definition of revolution, what do we find? What classes are competing for power in South Africa? What are the prospects of revolution? Is it round the corner?

In considering revolution in the South African context, we should beware of the racial approach—no matter how difficult this may be. In other words, the blithe assumption that the

revolution will be a simple Black versus White affair must not be accepted without much more thorough research. History knows of examples where White persons fought one another under the compelling pressure of economic forces despite the presence of a huge depressed non-White group in the same country. One example that springs immediately to mind is the American Civil War. There is also our own 1922 rebellion. In both the above instances it must be admitted that the oppressed racial groups played a negative, neutralist role. Still, this should serve as a warning against the simple racist thesis of revolution. Racism *per se* cannot be the main vehicle of revolution. It can only be one of the objective factors that might have to be borne in mind.

It is true that looking at the situation to-day it is hard to see how any sizable section of the European group will side with the oppressed. But there—at the moment—conditions are “normal”. Revolutionary situations are not normal.

I have not had an opportunity to study the work by Prof. Brinton, “The Anatomy of Revolution”. Nevertheless I think that, with a few qualifications, the features of revolution which he regards as essential can be conveniently used, even if just as a basis of discussion.

It may be a complete misunderstanding of Prof. Brinton, but from glimpses of his work gathered in the article by Julius Lewin which began this series,<sup>1</sup> my impression is that the characteristic features of revolution are not treated dialectically.

To say that certain well-defined circumstances must be present in combination before an attempt at revolution is likely to succeed is not enough. The circumstances may not for instance be contemporaneous. The factor of economic development takes generations, and revolution may mark its climax. On the other hand, the factor of armed force may play no direct part during revolution and a great part in the consolidation of the changes that result. Furthermore, there is the question of the vital relationship between the factors that constitute a revolutionary situation. They interact, each affecting the other, and the role of each will not be equal. It is thus not simply the coming together of four or five factors that produces a revolutionary situation. It is a complex, many-sided phenomenon.

In our country the industrial revolution has considerably accelerated the growth of those classes that will eventually have

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1 “Revolution round the corner?” *Africa South*, Vol. III No. 1.

to struggle for mastery. True enough the whole country has benefited from the prosperity of industrialisation. But in what proportions have they benefited? Has the percentage share of the wealth of the country risen uniformly for all classes? No one can deny that the actual earnings of African workers, for instance, have increased during the last ten years. Yet, when considered in relation to the wealth produced and the contribution they have made to its production, their position is worse than before. It is equally true that developments in the last ten years have created tremendous potential opportunities for the middle and working classes among the oppressed people, but these classes have been shut off from sharing in and utilising those opportunities.

One very wealthy African medical practitioner, on being asked why he was so fond of buying expensive American cars every year, replied, "a car is the only real home of an African which belongs to him". What he meant, of course, was that this was the only way of utilising the money available to him. The facilities for investment in real estate hardly exist for an African in South Africa. The aspiring African middle class cannot accumulate the capital necessary to develop an entrepreneur class. And it must be remembered that real estate is fundamental to the development of a middle class.

And a middle class must be distinguished from the comprador stooge class that the Nationalist Government is trying to bring into existence. Servile chiefs in the employ of the Government, civil servants, traders whose progress depends entirely on Government favours, patronage and hand-outs from the Bantu Corporation, these can hardly be said to constitute a middle class.

Similar frustrations afflict the working class. The bulk of this enormous group consists of Africans who produce more *per capita* than their brothers elsewhere on the continent. But their advance into skills is taking place in spite of, not because of, the policies of the South African ruling class.

The proletariat and other labouring classes, together with the middle class, are broadly speaking the classes that are emerging and destined to combine for the ousting of the present ruling class. Examination of trends will indicate this, although it must be admitted that pressure from them has not reached dimensions that present any immediate challenge. And yet pressure is daily building up. This fact is not altered by pessi-



mism, or the failure of this or that campaign conducted by the liberatory organisations of the oppressed. To base the prospects of revolution on the outcome of a single strike or campaign betrays a clear superficiality of outlook.

It is worthy of mention that the Freedom Charter adopted by the Congress Movement reflects precisely the aspirations of all the striving classes for democratic change. That is why it is so ridiculous to describe the Freedom Charter as a Socialist or Communist programme. As to which of these classes will be the leading force in a democratic revolution, it is difficult to predict.

In the typical colonial situation, members of the foreign imperialist nation do not settle in large numbers in the colony. A small caste of officials and businessmen take up temporary residence; and much of the actual administration of the country, with its coercive machinery in the army, the police, and the courts, is manned by the indigenous peoples. Naturally as the clamour for independence grows louder, the imperialist power finds a vast section of the machinery of rule in its colony becoming increasingly unreliable.

In South Africa, on the other hand, the "foreigners" settled in large numbers and made the country their home. Because of this, it is possible to establish a complete monopoly of government, including all the machinery of coercion, in the hands of the settlers. This appears to place the South African ruling class in an unassailable position as long as the Whites are united. And it is this factor which causes Julius Lewin to rule out revolution indefinitely.

Closer scrutiny will show that this circumstance is only partly an advantage. A metropolitan power has generally a secure home base. Any difficulties in the colony do not result in direct disturbances at home. The enemy—the colonial people—remain a danger at a distance. Let us take, say, the situation in Algeria, which is not necessarily the best example. There, the metropolitan power has poured in half-a-million troops to suppress the freedom struggle. The war is financed by the French from a relatively undisturbed economy in France itself.

In South Africa, however, the situation is totally different. A single integrated economy dependent on the labour of what may be called the colonial people has been erected. The colonial people rub shoulders with their local imperialists to an ever-growing degree; they are everywhere and in everything.

The imperialists have no base from which operations can be conducted in relative security.

And that is the nightmare of the strategists of White supremacy. One can almost see the general staff of apartheid arguing in favour of the creation of secure White bases in which there are no Africans present; which do not depend on the Africans for labour; which are not part of a mixed society. Is not this perhaps the real reason for the suggested balkanisation of South Africa into White and Black areas, despite the clearly fantastic nature of the whole concept?

The close juxtaposition of the imperialists and the colonial people they rule within the bounds of a single state poses problems as much for the adherents of freedom as for those of oppression.

Inefficient government as a revolutionary factor can only mean one that ceases to obtain the co-operation, willing or unwilling, of the population. It cannot mean inefficiency in a merely technical sense. It is probably best expressed in the word "disintegration" used by Prof. G. D. H. Cole in his article on this subject.<sup>2</sup>

The question still remains as to whether or not revolution in South Africa is round the corner. In the life of a people ten years is a very brief period. Is that what is meant by the expression, "round the corner"? Or is it fifteen years?

No date can be fixed for a revolutionary outbreak, nor is it profitable to speculate on when it is likely to occur. Revolutions are not made to order.

The true task of the democrat is to analyse the main features of our socio-economic structure and to trace its development. For from this will emerge the changes needed in our society; and this in turn will raise the question of the forces that will have to co-operate in order to make possible the re-organization of society on a different basis. Only from such an analysis will flow the tasks and activities of the democratic forces in the country today.

Faithful participation by all democratic forces in those tasks and activities which face the freedom movement now is more profitable than idealistic speculation as to whether or not revolution is around the corner.

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<sup>2</sup> 'The Anatomy of Revolution', Africa South, Vol. III No. 3.

# THE PLACE OF BOYCOTT

STANLEY TRAPIDO

*Lecturer in Native Law and Administration at the University of Cape Town.*

THE discussion conducted in 'Africa South' on the mechanics of social change have assumed that the tactic of boycott will play an important part in the struggle for emancipation in South Africa. Non-Europeans have a long tradition of waging boycott campaigns; and in attempting to discern the course of future political activity, it might prove profitable to investigate this history.

What do we mean by boycott? It is generally defined as a concerted effort to withdraw, and to induce others to withdraw, from political, economic, or social relations with offending groups or individuals. It is a practice that has been resorted to, in one form or another, for many centuries, though the term itself is of comparatively recent origin. Captain Boycott, an Irish landlord agent, had reduced the wages of his tenant farmers and compelled them under protest to complete the harvesting of his crops. On rent day, Boycott sought to evict his tenants, who reacted by calling a mass meeting where Boycott's own employees were persuaded to desert him. In addition, the Irish Nationalists launched a campaign to ostracize Boycott and his family, the action being designated a "boycott" by Father John O'Mailley.

Boycott was often the only means by which the Asian peoples could reply to the assault upon their countries by the Western powers. In 1905 the Chinese launched a boycott of American goods as a protest against the treatment of their countrymen in the United States; and after the Nanking incident in 1929, a similar boycott of British products was organized. The part played by economic boycott in the struggle for Indian freedom is well enough known.

Indeed the first non-Europeans to employ the boycott in South Africa were the Indians. In 1907, the Transvaal Indian community, under the leadership of Gandhi, refused to register under the pass law regulations introduced by General Smuts. Ten years later, the first big African boycott took place, when African mineworkers protesting against rising prices directed their anger against the concession store-keepers with whom they traded. White reaction was to set the pattern for later

movements towards African economic advancement. The *'Natal Mercury'* wrote of "the sinister influence of the Industrial Workers of the World notoriously financed by Germany".

The first major attempt by non-European organizations to launch a political boycott came in 1935, at the time of the disenfranchisement of the Cape Africans, when Africans responded to the Hertzog-Smuts legislative programme by calling a series of conferences that culminated in the summoning of an All African Convention.

This gathering, probably the most representative of non-European leaders yet assembled, rejected the Government's proposals that a Native Representative Council be established as a substitute for the Cape African franchise. On this score the conference was adamant. Yet within a short while an African delegation, many of whom had been the leading spirits in the All African Convention, was surrendering the common roll franchise for the parliamentary seats (three in the House of Assembly and four in the Senate) provided under the Representation of Natives Act, and accepting the advisory Natives' Representative Council. For the next thirteen years the question of boycotting this differential representation was to haunt the non-European political scene since, for a variety of reasons, the African National Congress chose to accept the concessions.

Then, in 1943, the Smuts Government created a Coloured Advisory Council. The Coloured community, led by the Non-European Unity Movement, an offshoot of the All African Convention, successfully boycotted this advisory body, reopening in the process a vituperous debate on the advisability of supporting differential institutions.

The polemics in support of boycotting the "dummy institutions" insisted that the African leaders were playing the "heren-volk's" game. They were deceiving the African people into believing that they were represented in the Councils of State, thereby blunting their potential militancy. The N.E.U.M. demanded the boycott of all inferior institutions in the strategy of total withdrawal. Such a policy, however, was diametrically opposed to that of the African National Congress which was, quite unlike the N.E.U.M., committed to a policy of frontal attack on authority. The parliamentary representatives and the Native Representative Council, it was therefore argued, provided additional platforms for the political activities of Congress. The clear result was that the All African Convention and its

allies, in conformity with their policy of withdrawal, spent most of their energies in denouncing the African National Congress and its supporters.

The political boycott tended, therefore, to peter out in a series of destructive and sterile diatribes. Yet the militant language, if not action, of the Unity Movement was to have some small effect on the A.N.C. The Congress Youth League, influenced by some of the radical conceptions of the Convention, provided an important pressure group within the African National Congress; and as a result of its activities and influence, the Congress adopted its now famous Programme of Action. This set out a series of tactical weapons that might be employed by the A.N.C., including the organization of boycotts, campaigns of civil disobedience, non-co-operation movements, and one-day stoppages of work.

Clearly it was necessary that the Congress put its house in order. Just previous to this it had defined its attitude to the visit of the British royal family. "As a protest", they declared "against the barbarous policy of the Union Government" in denying elementary rights to Africans, and "in view of the fact that these injustices were perpetrated in the name of His Majesty, George VI", the Congress proposed to boycott the activities that surrounded the royal visit. Very little effort was made to organize the boycott, and in the end it was a miserable failure—so much so that the President-General of Congress travelled to Eshowe himself to meet the royal family.

At much the same time, however, the potential of the boycott was being demonstrated by the Natal Indian community. In 1946, the Smuts Government introduced the Asiatic Land Tenure and Indian Representation Act, which set out to deprive Indians of the unrestricted right to own land. In an attempt to sugar the pill, two White "Indian Representatives" were created; but the Indian community rejected both aspects of the legislation, and not one of the thirty thousand persons entitled to register did so.

The best known, and probably the most successful, application of the boycott tactic by the African people can be found in the innumerable bus boycotts, the first of which took place in 1943 when the price of bus fares between Alexandra Township and Johannesburg rose from 4d. to 5d. The poverty-stricken Africans retaliated by walking the nine and a half miles from their homes to the centre of the city where they were employed, and after

ten days the bus companies restored the old fares. In November 1944, the companies again raised the fares, and before a boycott could be organized, the police placed a ban on all gatherings of more than twenty people. Nevertheless the word got round, and for six weeks the people of Alexandra Township refused to use the bus service. Ultimately the companies gave way again, and the fares were restored to 4d.

When, at the beginning of 1957, the fare was raised once more, the people of Alexandra recalled their resounding slogan "Azikhwelwa" (we shall not ride), and were joined by the people of Sophiatown, Western Native Township, and Lady Selborne in Pretoria. A little later Eastwood, Germiston and Edenvale were boycotting their bus services, till finally the commuters of Jabavu and Moroka, whose fares had not risen, came out in a sympathy boycott, together with Africans in Port Elizabeth, a thousand miles away.

The Nationalists hastened to change an economic boycott into a political show of strength. The Minister of Transport, Mr. Ben Schoeman, returning from a visit to Europe, declared, "If they want a show-down they will get it. The Government will not give way, no matter whether the boycott lasts a month or six months." Throwing every weapon of mass intimidation they could muster into their campaign, the Nationalists tried to break the back of the boycott. But in the end the boycotters won, and Parliament voted a subsidy for the bus company.

And it is not only bus boycotts that have been staged. Commercial and industrial firms who chose to victimize strikers found the non-European community boycotting their products.

The Transvaal Chamber of Industries, in a confidential memorandum, referred to a strike of Indian workers in a textile factory during May, 1957. The strikers were *locked out* (a term which is easily interchangeable with boycott) and replaced by African workers at lower rates of pay. The memorandum noted that the company was confronted by a deputation from the A.N.C., the Natal Indian Congress, the Congress of Democrats and the Liberal Party, urging the company to enter into negotiations with the Textile Workers' Union. According to the memorandum, the A.N.C. then wrote to the company and accused it of employing African labour below the normal rates of pay in order to break the strike. "The letter threatened", so the Chamber of Industries claimed, "that unless this practice was immediately ended, a boycott against the firm's products would

be organized.”

The Chamber was obviously perturbed by the “intervention of non-European political organizations in a workers’ strike . . . and more specifically the use of the boycott of products as a weapon to achieve settlement of an industrial dispute.” The Chamber of Industries could see the writing on the wall; it was evident that the non-European population was learning that “its purchasing power can be used as a weapon in its general political struggle.” The Chamber found itself conceding that boycotting was a fairly common weapon used in commercial circles, and that there were also historical precedents where “the boycott has been used in South Africa by Europeans against Europeans, and by Europeans against non-Europeans.” The latter reference was to the vicious boycott of Indian traders led by leading Nationalists, current as recently as July, 1957, when the Nasionale Jeugbond conference “viewed the support given to Indian traders by Afrikaners as a great danger to the Afrikaans people.”

To date the leading exponents of the economic boycott have been the totalitarian clique who bring conformity to Afrikaans political, economic and cultural life. It is an axiom of the sociology of nationalist movements that they are closely associated with, and are in fact channelized by, an entrepreneurial class. And Afrikaaner nationalism is no exception. In 1939, an *Ekonomiese Volkskongres* brought together Nationalist politicians, financiers and ideologists. Politicians like Drs. Verwoerd, Dönges, Van Rhijn and Diederichs were present, while financier M. S. Louw played an important part with I. M. Lombard, reputedly secretary of the *Broederbond*. The Nationalist machine set to work eagerly. Every effort was made, to quote the leading Afrikaner Nationalist financier M. S. Louw, to channelize “Afrikaner savings in Afrikaans financial institutions.” The Afrikaner Nationalist was induced to insure only with Afrikaner insurance companies, to bank only with Afrikaner banks, to build his home through Afrikaner building societies. It was Dr. Diederichs, now Minister of Economic Affairs, who told the *Ekonomiese Volkskongres*: “As regards the relationship between business and sentiment, it has been our standpoint that business could not be based purely on sentiment, but that an Afrikaner business could in no way exist without sentiment.” To this end large sums were set aside for propaganda purposes, the racist Nationalist press put in harness, and the innumerable cultural organizations that lead to the Nationalist machine busily

employed. From the pulpit and the classroom the call went forth to urge Nationalists to buy Afrikaans and not to purchase from firms hostile to "the Afrikaans way of life". If there were still any doubts as to the relationship between Nationalist business concerns and the Nationalist political ideology, a recent pronouncement by M. S. Louw must have dispelled any remaining illusions. "If we (the Nationalists) want a republic", he stated, "we must see that our economy is more independent."

It is clear that the Nationalist political machine and Nationalist capitalism are very closely related. The police state created by the Nationalist Government has left very few legal channels open to the opponents of apartheid, but, for the time being, boycott remains. Because the Nationalists have in the past made no distinction between their economic and political objectives, they are now in a particularly vulnerable position. As the Chamber of Industries noted, "the non-European population is learning that its purchasing power can be used as a weapon in its general political struggle." And this purchasing power is enormous. The 1957 president of the Association of Chambers of Commerce, Mr. W. P. Rousseau, stated that African purchasing power for the year of his term of office was £365,000,000, or a quarter of the total national income.

In the past, whilst Nationalist capital was still in its embryonic stage, it needed only to call upon the "volk" to support its business and financial institutions. This, however, is no longer the case. If these institutions are to progress, they must have a wider appeal and they are now engaged in attempting to capture the non-White market. The macabre irony of the non-European population paying for its own subjection may not have occurred to the Nationalists. It has certainly occurred to the leaders of the Congress movement. Hence their call for a nation-wide economic boycott of business houses that are dominated by leading Nationalists. In the past other pressures have failed to convince the Nationalists of the malignancy of their ways. It is possible that an economic boycott will go a long way to creating the environment in which social change will take place. Michael Harmel has put the point well. "There have been", he notes, "plenty of examples in history where a combination of factors have been compelling enough to make a ruling class give way for urgent and overdue changes, without dragging the people through the agony of civil war." Boycott alone will not achieve this end—but it could very well provide one of the factors.



## THE AFRICANISTS CUT LOOSE

PETER RODDA

*Our special correspondent at the recent Africanist Conference.*

WHILE White South Africa celebrated the Van Riebeeck weekend (4th—6th April) with volkspele, sport and sun-bathing, the Africanist movement, which had broken away from the African National Congress five months previously, held its inaugural conference in Johannesburg's Orlando Township.

Although the conference answered some important questions about the nature of the movement, a number of important problems remain unresolved. Perhaps its most significant event was the virtual repudiation of the movement's semi-articulate wildman, Josias Madzunya, who failed to gain a place on the executive of what now calls itself the Pan-Africanist Congress. Madzunya's hysterical pronouncements on "God's apartheid", (Africa for the Africans, Europe for the Europeans, Asia for the Asians), and his overt racialism had severely embarrassed his less bitter colleagues. Madzunya pledged himself to the movement he had helped to forge, unilaterally appointing himself its "watchdog", but it is certain that his star is at least temporarily very much on the wane. And with the shelving of Madzunya, the new leaders of the movement have moved to the fore from the shadows of theory. Passionate but restrained, young, fluent, sophisticated and well-educated, the first president, Robert Sobukwe, a lecturer at the University of the Witwatersrand, appears the embodiment of the reigning group in the movement.

Sobukwe delivered a weighty theoretical address to the conference at its opening session, but in the events leading up to his address clues to the less philosophical elements of Africanism had been revealed. First, an emotional and sometimes eccentric and exclusive Christianity. Three ministers graced the platform, and in prayers and addresses they referred to "the hooligans of Europe who killed our God and have never been convicted" and the legend of Christ's education in Africa, while cheers greeted the salute to "a black man, Simon of Arabia, who carried Jesus from the Cross". A rather sinister post-conference article in *The World* discusses the formation of an African national church which "would play a leading role in Africanist affairs, just as the Dutch Reformed Church did in Nationalist Party affairs". The movement's religious overtones

obviously tie up with its anti-Communism: "In our conferences and meetings there is no place for God . . . The younger generation is turning away from God . . . Because of ideologies many people have been led away from God," said the ministers.

Then there is the Africanists' claim to be more in tune with events throughout the rest of Africa than the A.N.C., manifested in their invitations to Dr. Banda and then Kenneth Kaunda to open their conference. The recipients of the invitations, being in "detention" at the time, could not be present, but the delegates were assured that they were there in spirit. Manifested, too, in the obviously sincere pleas that appeared in banner form and decorated the conference hall—"FREE BANDA, KENYATTA, KAUNDA," "IMPERIALISTS QUIT AFRICA," "AFRICA FOR AFRICANS, CAPE TO CAIRO, MOROCCO TO MADAGASCAR," and the triumphant reading of telegrams of good wishes from Dr. Nkrumah and Sékou Touré.

And then the conference took some time to shake off the feeling that the movement's disapproving elder brother, the A.N.C., was watching over its shoulder; and the turbulence of its break-away led to a feeling that the A.N.C. might attempt to disrupt their conference in return for the torrid time the Africanists had given the A.N.C. leadership last year. So when a group of singing delegates arrived late there was a scramble to man the defence barricades. The A.N.C. had proved its point.

It was only when Sobukwe began his long address that the Africanists appeared to attain an independent status. In elaborate political terminology he put forward the Africanist creed, with former treason-trialist, A. B. Ngcobo, interpreting into Zulu with great mental agility and gesticulatory acrobatics such expressions as "epoch-making achievements", "employ brinkmanship stunts", "the false doctrine of African exceptionalism."

The Africanist stand on contemporary international politics, said Sobukwe, was that of positive neutralism, borrowing the best from East and West; believing in political democracy as defined in the West, but favouring a more equitable distribution of wealth. He refuted racial myths, and cheers greeted his statement that no race was superior or inferior. However, "in South Africa we recognize the existence of national groups which are the result of geographic origin . . . The Europeans are a foreign group with exclusive control of political, military and economic power . . . True democracy can only be established when the African group comes into its own. Freedom of the Africans

can only be established when the African group comes into its own. Freedom of the Africans means freedom of every one, including Europeans in this country . . . People will live and be governed as individuals, and not as sectional groups. We reject apartheid and so-called multi-racialism. Multi-racialism is pandering to European arrogance, a method of safe-guarding White interests. The logical meaning of multi-racialism is proportional representation, and implies basic differences between national groups . . . and that the best course is to keep them apart in a form of democratic apartheid . . . We believe that everyone prepared to accept and give loyalty to Africa is an African."

The few important gaps in the theory of the Pan-Africanists had been provided in an earlier address by Mr. Zack Mothopeng, later to be elected to the organization's national executive. He said there could be no co-operation at this stage between the Africanists and Whites until the contradictions between the national groups had been resolved by the Africans. The Africanists, he said, wanted a non-racial democracy in which the African majority would rule. They did not believe in race, only in humanity.

Many have encountered, but few have commented on, the semantic revolution that accompanies the political revolution we are living through in Africa. Sometimes one feels sheer anarchy is loosed upon the world of language. The Africanists import the derogatory connotations of the term 'multi-racialism' from other parts of Africa, where British colonial practice has turned it into a swear-word, and use them against the Congress Movement. So to them the term means "racialism multiplied", while to White supremacists it means miscegenation rampant.

And herein perhaps lies the Africanist's greatest responsibility: to resist the temptation to manipulate language and encourage words like "African" to mean all things to all men. If they are sincere in their refutation of "race", then they should encourage Africans of Indian, English, Dutch and other extractions to join them, instead of vigorously discouraging them as they are doing now. It is disquieting that there are men in their ranks like Madzunya, who is on record as saying "no White man is sincere." Their present policy sounds dangerously like the statement of Blundell, who once justified the policy of a party he led in Kenya which preached multi-racialism, but was only open to Whites, by saying, "The Party may open its membership to

Africans and other non-Europeans when the multi-racial nation has been achieved." The Africanist line implies somehow first- and second-class Africans, with skin-colour being a factor in classification. In other words: "All who give their allegiance to Africa are Africans, but some Africans are more African than others." And their substitution of group generalizations—that are surely equally fallacious—for racial generalizations appears still to over-simplify the South African situation. There can be no short-cuts to democracy.

On political commentators, too, lies a heavy responsibility—that of deciding whether the new movement can become the purveyor of a "nationalism" unique in the world's history, a "continentalism" with an ideological foundation, or writing it off as the mere chauvinism into which it could, of course, degenerate. And if it should fall between the two and prove to be a virile inclusive black nationalism, it will be necessary for these commentators to come to terms with it and help others to do so. Fatal to this would be the confusion of majority nationalism with threatened, vicious, exclusive minority nationalism, a misunderstanding which would encourage black nationalism to take on the trappings of the Afrikaner variety.

The Pan-Africanist Congress is still in its formative stages, and has yet to become a serious force. Policy on means remains uncertain; if those Africanists who refuse co-operation on common grounds with other organizations have their way, then the movement seems bound to end up in negative, isolated theorizing, a nuisance to all except the supporters of the *status quo*. They plan a mass recruiting campaign, for at present their numbers are negligible. (Controversy raged at the conference as to the number of delegates present, and how many they represented, but it was largely a splitting of hairs).

The history of the A.N.C. reveals the constant failure of dissident and splinter groups to effectively challenge it, and its ability to tighten up in the face of criticism. Something that should be seriously considered by all of us in Congress is the elimination of the movement's internal colour-bar. This bold move, however difficult to implement, would be a mighty blow against racialism, and would also cut the ground from under the feet of the Africanists who claim that we subtly bolster up apartheid. The historic reasons for this structure have clearly disappeared.

## CONGRESS AND THE AFRICANISTS

WALTER SISULU

*Former Secretary-General of the African National Congress. Now banned from holding office and standing trial on a charge of High Treason.*

IN recent months much has been published in the South African press about the 'Africanists' and their attempt to capture the leadership of the African National Congress. The struggle reached a climax at the Transvaal Provincial Conference of the A.N.C., held under the auspices of the National Executive on the 1st and 2nd November, 1958. The Africanists attempted to "pack" the conference, but most of their supporters failed to qualify as delegates. They then tried to break up the conference by force, and, when this attempt was defeated, they withdrew, announcing that they were leaving Congress and intended forming a new organisation.

The whole affair has been much exaggerated in the newspapers, especially in the so-called 'Bantu' press. Newspapers tend to thrive on sensations, and some of them were obviously motivated by malice towards Congress and a desire to emphasise and add to its difficulties. In reality, the Africanists were never able to muster much support or gain much influence in the A.N.C. Their departure has greatly pleased the great majority of Congressmen, who regarded them as a noisy and disruptive clique, and who consider all the talk of a "major split" in Congress as absurd.

It is unlikely that the Africanists will make much progress or maintain much cohesion among themselves now that they have left Congress. They appear to have little or nothing in the way of a constructive policy or original programme to offer to the public. They have had a lot to say, it is true, but so far it has been exclusively destructive and critical of Congress leadership. All the leaders have shown themselves to be quarrelsome, unruly and ambitious; one doubts whether they will ever achieve much agreement on aims and leadership.

Yet it would be wrong for any student of politics in this country to ignore the significance of this development. Even though the Africanists have not evolved any definite programme and policy, the general trend of their ideas is manifest: it lies in a crude appeal to African racialism as a reply to White arrogance and oppression. The principal target of their attacks is the broad humanism of the African National Congress, which

claims equality but not domination for the African people, and regards South Africa as being big enough and rich enough to sustain all its people, of whatever origin, in friendship and peace.

This broad outlook of Congress finds its clearest expression in the opening sentence of the Freedom Charter, which boldly declares that "South Africa belongs to all who live in it, Black and White". It is precisely this formulation which is most strongly attacked by the Africanists. In their letter of secession from the A.N.C., they declare that "the Kliptown Charter" is "in irreconcilable conflict" with the 1949 Congress "Programme of Action", "seeing that it (the Freedom Charter) claims that the land no longer belongs to the African people but is auctioned for sale to all who belong to this country". Leaving aside the inflated polemical language of this statement (characteristic of all "Africanist" writings), the intention is clear: it is a denial that any section of the population other than the descendants of indigenous Africans have any rights in the country whatsoever.

There are several other issues used by the Africanists in their attacks on A.N.C. leadership and policy. They bitterly denounce the Congress Alliance—the working partnership which has developed between the A.N.C. and the Indian Congress, the (White) Congress of Democrats, the Coloured People's Organisation and the Congress of Trade Unions. They say that the alliance "waters down African nationalism", and charge that it is dominated by the Whites of C.O.D. and the Indians of the S.A.I.C. They say that the Whites in the alliance are not sincere and cannot be relied upon in the struggle to end White supremacy. They say that the A.N.C. leadership is Communistic and out of step with the nationalist movement in the rest of the continent, which has no alliance with other racial groups. They say that the Congress leadership has abandoned traditional Congress policy "as it was formulated in 1912", and that they, the Africanists, are "launching out as custodians" of that policy (Letter of Secession, November, 1958).

In the first place, it should be stated as emphatically as possible that the Africanists' principal charge—that Congress has departed from its traditional purpose and policy—is untrue and unfounded.

The constituent Conference of 1912, at which the African National Congress was established, set forth the following objectives:—

- (1) To unite all the various tribes in South Africa;
- (2) To educate public opinion on the aspirations of the black man of South Africa;
- (3) To advocate on behalf of the African masses equal rights and justice;
- (4) To be the mouthpiece of the African people and their chiefs;
- (5) To represent the people in government and municipal affairs;
- (6) To represent them in the Union Parliament, and generally, to do all such things as are necessary for the progress and welfare of the African people.

Within the framework of these broad general objectives, Congress has continued steadily, up to the present day. It has consistently demanded "equal rights and justice". It has never advocated the replacement of exclusive rights for Whites, as established by the Union's Constitution, following the precedent of the two Boer Republics, with exclusive rights for Africans as now proposed by the "Africanists". In putting forward this conception, it is they who are departing from the original objectives and purposes of the founders of Congress; it is the present Congress leaders who are the true continuers and custodians of those purposes and traditions.

An important policy statement, known as the "Bill of Rights", was drawn up in 1943 by a committee composed of leading Africans from various parts of the Union. It was issued by the A.N.C. at the time, in a pamphlet entitled "African Claims", as a formal statement of Congress policy. It declared, *inter alia*:

"We, the African people in the Union of South Africa, urgently demand the granting of full citizenship in South Africa. We demand abolition of discrimination based on race, and the extension to all adults regardless of race of the right to vote and be elected to Parliament, Provincial Councils and other representative institutions. We demand the right to an equal share in all the material resources of the country. We demand a fair redistribution of the land as a prerequisite for a just settlement of the land problem."

Finally, I may cite the Programme of Action of 1949, which the Africanists continually declare to be inconsistent with the Freedom Charter, and which they claim as "their own" programme. "In 1949 we got the African people to accept the nation-building programme of that year," declares the Afri-

canists' letter of resignation of last November. Actually the 1949 Programme of Action was a regular Congress document, adopted at a national conference on the initiative of the Congress leadership and issued over the signature of the present writer. Only one or two of the Africanists had any hand in it.

The 1949 "Programme" was really a plan of work, dealing mainly with proposed methods of struggle, such as strikes, civil disobedience and boycotts, but it opened with a short political preamble. This preamble consists primarily of an endorsement of the "Bill of Rights," cited above, and emphasised the demands for the immediate abolition of all discriminatory laws and the participation of Africans in all Councils of State.

The Freedom Charter of 1955 is in a direct line of succession to the various documents cited above, and to the many other statements of Congress policy and principle down the years. Beginning with the statement that South Africa belongs to the people who live in it, but that our people have been robbed of their birthright to land, peace and liberty by an unjust form of government, it goes on to claim that every man and woman shall have the right to vote and to stand as a candidate for election to all bodies which make laws, and that the rights of all people shall be the same, regardless of race, colour or sex. The Charter goes on to demand equality in every sphere of life, in its ten famous chapters, which are identical in spirit and closely parallel in content to the eleven points of the "Bill of Rights", as published in "African Claims", and specifically endorsed in the 1949 "Programme of Action".

The above, of course, is no more than a brief sketch of the evolution of Congress policy down the years. Nevertheless it is sufficient to demonstrate amply that, while A.N.C. policy has naturally evolved down the years, in changing circumstances at home and abroad, becoming more detailed and clearer in formulation, it has retained throughout a fundamental continuity and consistency which is striking and remarkable. Tested against the facts, the Africanists' accusation that Congress has departed from its traditional programme cannot be sustained.

Nor is it true that the African National Congress has ever pursued a line of exclusive "Black chauvinism" and hostility to other racial groups, as now advocated by the Africanists. From its earliest days, Congress has rejected the whole ideology of "master races" and "servant races" as expressed in the



Constitution and structure of the Union. It has repudiated the idea of "driving the White man into the sea" as futile and reactionary, and accepted the fact that the various racial groups in South Africa have come to stay. It has consistently sought the co-operation of other political groups and other races, of religious, liberal and leftist groups and organisations, in its struggle for freedom and equality. Indeed there was a time when the Congress leadership, contrasting the relatively enlightened policy of the "liberal Cape" with the blatant "inequality in Church and State" of the northern republics, placed too heavy a reliance upon the goodwill of White leaders, and tended to react to such early manifestations of 'apartheid' as the 1913 Land Act by sending futile deputations and appeals to Whitehall.

In the disillusioning years that followed, the African people and Congress have learned to put their trust not in aid from others, but in their own strength and organisation. Nevertheless Congress has at all times welcomed and taken the initiative in achieving co-operation with other organisations representing different population-groups, provided always that such co-operation was on a basis of equality and disinterested adherence to mutual aims. It is this consistent Congress policy of unity and anti-racialism which has borne fruit in the present-day Congress alliance, which is continually broadening its scope and winning the support and allegiance of increasing numbers of South Africans, and which has won the A.N.C. world-wide admiration and respect. This policy enjoys the support of the overwhelming majority of the Congress membership, who recognise it as being in the best traditions of the organisation. Every attempt by the Africanists to reverse the policy of alliance and replace it with one of narrow sectionalism and exclusiveness has been crushingly rejected by the membership in provincial and national conferences.

Thus, the co-called "African nationalism" of the Africanists turns out to be a mere inverted racialism, foreign to the spirit and traditions of the African people, and more in line with the Afrikaner Nationalist Party than with the progressive liberationist nationalism of Congress. This type of racial exclusiveness has been condemned the world over, and not least by the progressive African national movements of this continent. The recent All-African Peoples' Conference at Accra roundly condemned, in a formal resolution,

"the practice of racial discrimination and segregation in all its

aspects, all over the world.”

The fact that, due to differences of historical development and present conditions, African liberationist movements in many other parts of the continent have not found allies in their struggle among other population groups, unreservedly accepting equality, self-government, independence and democracy as their programme, is unfortunately misunderstood or distorted by the Africanists to imply that they oppose such alliances on principle. Nothing could be further from the truth. Africa and its peoples have suffered too much in the past from racialism and the “master race” ideology to adopt any such dangerous doctrines. Nothing has brought greater credit to the A.N.C. in the eyes of Africa and the world than its steadfast refusal to respond to the vicious persecution of the Nationalists and their predecessors in the Union Government by a blind and irrational “anti-Whiteism”. It has shown the African people to be larger-minded than, and morally superior to, their oppressors; it strikingly refutes the ridiculous claims of “White South Africa” about alleged African “immaturity” and “unreadiness for self-government.”

The isolation and repudiation of the Africanists became more complete with their open sabotage of the Congress cause after the National Workers’ Conference of March, 1958. The A.N.C. and the other Congresses had decided to demonstrate during election week against the undemocratic travesty of a “General Election” which debarred the majority from any participation. All the forces of oppression were mobilised against the proposed demonstration. The Prime Minister threatened retaliation “with the full might of the State”. The United Party called upon the Government to take firm action against Congress. The police force, the Native Affairs Department, and the army were called into action against the proposed general strike. Newspapers, ranging from the Nationalist and United Party dailies down to the so-called ‘Bantu’ press, preached continually and vociferously against Congress. Employers of labour and Verwoerd’s “loyal chiefs” added their threats and warnings.

When the Africanist leaders Madzunya and Leballo joined in this all-out campaign against the people, they were hailed in the daily papers as “the most responsible and powerful Native leaders”. Overnight they had become heroes to the upholders of White supremacy. And overnight they forfeited whatever

small respect or confidence they might still have enjoyed within the ranks of Congress.

Congress is a broad and tolerant organisation, firmly wedded to democratic principle and refusing to impose any single ideology upon its members. But, at the same time, the A.N.C. is not merely a debating society, and cannot tolerate open sabotage of its struggle. The National Executive promptly expelled Madzunya and Leballo for their treacherous activities, and it is notable that this action was warmly applauded by branches throughout the country. It was the end of the Africanists' noisy career in Congress. True, ignoring his expulsion, Mr. Madzunya announced himself as a "candidate" for the position of President of the Transvaal at the November conference in Orlando. And true to form, his clique, attended by a number of armed supporters, came to Orlando hoping to repeat its tactic of smashing the conference. But this time the Congress membership was ready for him, and in no mood to tolerate any further mischief. When they saw they were outnumbered, the Africanists suddenly withdrew, and, as we have seen, announced their "secession". It was a damp squib.

For a few days some newspapers tried to build up the "major split" in Congress as a sensation. It soon became apparent, however, that the departure of this faction had strengthened the organisation, not weakened it, and that they commanded no support inside or outside Congress. The "sensation" petered out. The national conference of Congress in December proved to be a remarkable demonstration of the confidence of the people in the present leadership, the Freedom Charter, and the Congress alliance.

For however much free publicity the Africanists may receive in the anti-Congress press, they are not likely to succeed in building any stable organisation or win much support for it, still less offering any serious challenge to the leadership of the people by the African National Congress. Many of them are not really serious; they handle "politics" like professional browsers, as though the South African struggle will be resolved in a study. They use Africanism as a sort of escape from the discipline, the hard slogging day-to-day work, and the possible personal dangers which face the ordinary Congress member. Pride or conscience will not allow them to withdraw from politics altogether, so they think the best thing is to play safe, become sofa critics of Congress, and use revolutionary language occasionally at Con-

ference, safe in the knowledge that the Government will not take any action against them.

Yet, these truths should not blind us to the fact that there are men and women amongst them who genuinely believe that the salvation of our people lies in a fanatical African racialism and denunciation of everything that is not African. And such a policy is not without its potential mass-appeal.

It would be unrealistic to pretend that a policy of extreme nationalism must, in the nature of things, always be unpopular. The people are quick to detect the insincerity of the mere demagogue, and they have confidence in the courage and wisdom of their tried and trusted leaders. But in a country like South Africa, where the Whites dominate everything, and where ruthless laws are ruthlessly administered and enforced, the natural tendency is one of growing hostility towards Europeans. In fact most Africans come into political activity because of their indignation against Whites, and it is only through their education in Congress and their experience of the genuine comradeship in the struggle of such organisations as the Congress of Democrats that they rise to the broad, non-racial humanism of our Congress movement.

With a State policy of increasingly barbaric repression of the African people; with the deliberate destruction of every form of normal human contact between people from different population-groups; and with the systematic banning and isolation of the convinced and fervent anti-racialists among the Africans from political activity, there is no knowing what the future will hold.

The Africanists have thus far failed, but their mere appearance is an urgent warning to all democratic South Africans. The Africans have set a wonderful example of political wisdom and maturity to the rest of the country, but they are not perfect, any more than any other community of men and women sorely beset. In certain circumstances, an emotional mass-appeal to destructive and exclusive nationalism can be a dynamic and irresistible force in history. We have seen in our own country how—decade after decade—the Afrikaner people have followed yet more extreme and reactionary leaders. It would be foolish to imagine that a wave of Black chauvinism, provoked by the savagery of the Nationalist Party (and perhaps secretly encouraged and financed by it too), may not some day sweep through our country. And if it does, the agony will know no colour-bar at all.

## SPORTS TEST FOR SOUTH AFRICA

D. A. BRUTUS

*Hon. Secretary, South African Sports Association.*

SOUTH AFRICA, it is generally admitted, is sport mad. The extensive daily press and radio coverage, the interminable arguments in bus and bar, and the thousands who flock to the sportsgrounds all testify to this. There are some who say that this is just an escape for the masses from the pressing problems of a multi-racial society, that the electorate can play, because the professional politicians get on with the dirty work. Certainly, South Africa has succeeded very well in expelling the race-problem from sport—up to now. But there are ominous signs that all this is changing, and leading sports officials are suffering “big match jitters”. The news that the International Olympic Committee is to discuss South Africa’s colour-bar in sport has only added to the unease they previously felt.

For sport in South Africa means ‘white sport’, something peculiar to the country and vastly different to the meaning given to the term elsewhere. Selection on merit—the fundamental of sport—is meaningless in South Africa, except in relation to the 3 million White South Africans. No one of the 12 million non-Whites is ever considered for a national team, no matter what his ability or how clearly he merits selection. And so our sport is a fraud, and our international reputation for sportsmanship acquired by deceit.

The rest of the world is not unaware of this, and the South African violation of the principles of the Olympic Games, as embodied in their fundamental article—“No discrimination is permitted on grounds of race, religion or politics”—has already been challenged. But the big test lies ahead.

For almost every South African national sporting body which admits only White South Africans, and which is recognized by the international bodies, there exists a parallel non-White body, generally with a non-racial constitution, which is doomed to play its matches in the locations and denied all chance of ever providing national representatives. Some 200,000 non-Whites participate in sport every week, but not all of them are still content to be excluded from sport as they are excluded from other spheres of civilised living. And some sharp clashes have taken place in various branches of sport.

The most notable, since it resulted in a victory for the non-White body—on the grounds that its constitution is open to all South Africans—was that in Table Tennis. After some six years of negotiation, the non-racial Table Tennis Board was granted membership of the International Table Tennis Federation, and the Europeans-Only Table Tennis Union was expelled. In 1957, for the first time, a team took part in a World Championships (at Stockholm) which did not represent White South Africans alone.

For four years the non-racial Soccer Federation, with a membership of 50,000 members, has challenged the recognition granted the White body by the international association. Thus far the White body (20,000 members) has retained its seat in F.I.F.A., mainly because of strong support from Britain, but its position is becoming increasingly precarious.

The national non-racial bodies for Athletics, Boxing, Cycling, Lawn Tennis, Netball, Softball, Baseball and Weightlifting, all have the same aspirations to be recognized as national sporting bodies, or at least be enabled to provide candidates for national teams. All of them encounter the same frustrations. And so last year a super body was set up, the South African Sports Association, to co-ordinate their work, both internally and externally, and with special reference to international recognition. It was this body—now supported by eight national bodies and with a still-growing membership of about 70,000—which influenced the International Olympic Committee to investigate the colour-bar in South African sport, and which cabled the President of Brazil to stop a segregated soccer match between a bleached Brazilian team and an all-White South African one.

Apart from these internal pressures, there has also been some overseas interest. At the time of the Commonwealth Games at Cardiff last year, a protest was organized by Mrs Gladys Griffiths of Penarth, and more than a thousand signatories protested at the exclusion of non-Whites from the South African team. The Campaign Against Racial Discrimination in Sport, a permanent body headed by Fenner Brockway, organized a letter of protest to the London "*Times*" which was signed by 20 leading British sportsmen, and the Movement for Colonial Freedom held a meeting in Cardiff on the eve of the Games. Through the valiant efforts of Welsh sportsmen, the matter was placed on the agenda at the meeting of the Federation, but London officials suppressed it in "the interests of harmony",

and the absence of representatives of four-fifths of the South African population was ignored at this meeting of the "great family of nations."

Recently there were statements by Mr Reg. Honey and Commandant-General Klopper, Chairman and President respectively of the South African Olympic and Commonwealth Games Association, that non-Whites would be allowed to represent South Africa if they were fit, but that there had been none capable enough in the past. Yet Ron. Eland, a Coloured weightlifter who was clearly the best in the country and was unable to find a place in his country's team, qualified to represent Great Britain at the 1948 Olympics and Empire Games and did well in his events. More significantly, in the S.A. team to the Melbourne Olympics in 1956, there were non-Whites who made the team by "passing for White". This has been admitted by a leading Nationalist paper, which added that when their origins were discovered, they were persuaded to go into "voluntary retirement". This apart from our non-White soccer players who are winning laurels in Holland, Britain, and Portugal, and the many fine boxers—Jake Tuli was never able to challenge the White South African champion, but succeeded in winning a British Empire title.

The superiority of non-White table tennis players was demonstrated when a match was arranged during the visit of the Egyptian Judge, Abou Heif, Vice-President of the International Table Tennis body. When the best of the non-racial and White bodies met, the result was a resounding defeat for the practitioners of apartheid.

The White bodies can, of course, use all the resources of a society designed to protect their interests and to preclude non-White development. Dissident non-White soccerites were promptly awarded control of a location stadium by the Johannesburg City Council (perhaps as a reward), and this may lead to other soccer bodies hiving off and accepting control by White officials. An exclusively Bantu Athletic Association, which is prepared to accept affiliation to the White body under "conditions of trusteeship" effectively able to keep their aspirations in check—their representatives, for instance, must be White, and the body is itself directly under the control of the Chamber of Mines,—has been offered many facilities, including free accommodation for 600 from the Durban Municipality during its championships. Perhaps the most revealing instance has been

in weightlifting. For more than 10 years the non-racial federation has sought recognition for its lifters, only to meet up with a blank wall from the two White bodies. Recently the secretary of a small non-racial union, piqued at criticism, resigned. He applied to the White body for the affiliation of a society yet to be formed, which would accept the colour-bar. Needless to say, he was given immediate consideration, and the frustrated federation was told that it would not be possible to consider its affiliation until this matter was cleared up.

The sports bodies can also rely on the resources of the State, and have made good use of them. Most of the White-controlled press, including papers with a largely non-White circulation, are unsympathetic to non-White aspirations in sport. The Government press has a stock response: these demands are the work of "political agitators". Apparently it is unthinkable that any outstanding sportsman should aspire to represent his country, if he is a non-White. But then it is rarely conceded that the country also belongs to the non-Whites: they are at best awkward aliens who must be rapidly transported to some Bantustan outside the civilised territories. White politicians, even when in opposition to the Government, are solidly united on this question: they all agree that sport must be kept White, and that the Black must be kept in his place. And all remain blissfully unconscious of the nonsense which their political hysteria makes of the whole concept of sport.

The thirty standing trial for High Treason and the Congress movement startlingly erupted onto the sports field on the recent issue of a tour of South Africa by a team of West Indian cricketers, vigorously opposing it. This tour, under conditions of apartheid, has received the blessing of the Government "because it is in conformity with the policy of the country", but has been strenuously opposed by sportsmen, including cricketers, led by the South African Sports Association. The West Indian Board of Control has recently decided that it is also opposed to the tour because of the conditions of racial discrimination required.

When the White soccer body was challenged at the World Federation, it was able to produce a letter from the Government stating that it was opposed to any mixed sport in South Africa. The Government also refused passports for non-White spokesmen, both in 1956 and 1958, which may explain why, though superior in the field, they were outplayed in the conference



room. The most blatant example of State interference in sport occurred in March of this year. On the eve of their departure for the World Championships, the Table Tennis team of non-Whites had their passports seized. This may yet prove to be a fatal blunder. The International Olympic Committee is severe on government interference (Peron had hurriedly to dismiss his State-appointed Olympic Council on the eve of the 1956 Games or face exclusion from the Olympics), and this clear evidence of interference may yet lead to South Africa's being ordered off the international sports field.

The resolution of the West Indies Cricket Board not to accept invitations to South Africa as long as there is racial discrimination in sport here is a lead that might well be followed. And the President of Brazil is to be congratulated on ordering a Brazilian soccer team to take no part in segregated sport in South Africa. But while Australia, England and New Zealand tour South Africa, they are conniving at the imposition of apartheid in cricket. Worse, in inviting racially exclusive teams, they are condoning the export of apartheid to their own countries. And the countries which compete with South Africa at international events, knowing well that no non-White South African, however worthy of selection, can become a member of the team, are accepting a particularly distasteful form of racial prejudice.

White South Africa must, of course, do everything in its power to seal up this small crack in the grim edifice of apartheid. Once this fissure grows, the entire indivisible structure of racial rule is threatened by collapse. For once White South Africans can be influenced in their judgments by merit, they will certainly come to think seriously of White and Black sportsmen alike. And in a country which eats, drinks, lives and sleeps sport, the entire mental climate of the country could be changed.

Sport dramatizes their dilemma and exposes the anachronism of apartheid as few other things do: White South Africans must not only succeed in imposing their racial lunacy on the entire population of the country, they must also succeed in selling it to the entire world at international sporting events. The sporting world is, in conscience, bound to reject it eventually, and apartheid may well face its severest test then. For South Africa's sport-mad White population will either have to conform to the principles of international sport or be doomed to dispirited games of jukskei in its own backyards.

## ORLANDO REVISITED

ANTHONY SAMPSON

*British Author and Journalist*

"REMEMBER the rule here," said my companion in the car: "just keep on driving. Never stop. It doesn't matter if a car's broken down, or someone's dying. Just keep on driving. It's probably the beginning of some sort of trap."

We were driving into Orlando, nine miles out of Johannesburg—the beginning of the great black metropolis that serves the white city. It had grown still bigger in the two years since I was last there: the new location of Meadowlands, next door to Orlando, which houses the families evicted from Sophiatown, had spawned right over the hill; Meadowlands, the segregator's dream, with the houses split up into groups according to tribes—a little residential Zululand, Swaziland, Basutoland, and so on—and the tall brown-coated police moving all over it, to make sure there are no strangers in the ethnic paradise.

But Orlando, the older part of the city, built in the 'thirties, is still relatively accessible, too big and untidy to be properly disciplined: whites are still to be found there from time to time. I was on my way to a party at the house of the jazz composer and commercial traveller, Todd Matshikiza.

We drove through the rocky dip that marks the beginning of Orlando—speculating vaguely on that favourite African topic: whether Orlando could be sealed off by troops if necessary, and deciding that it would be difficult—and were back once again in the vast bungalow encampment, with the little rudimentary houses, like the wooden models that you put on a monopoly board. Everything is horizontal, as if a great wind had blown off the tops of everything, leaving only the huge vertical hoardings advertising soap and cigarettes, staring over the location like big-brother placards.

We reached Todd's house, past five ditches and six boulders. The neat little room inside, with its small tables, low roof and miniature Utrillo reproductions on the walls, seemed like a scale model of a white man's room—so that when it filled up with thirty guests, lying on the floor with faces pressed close to one another and profiles looming everywhere in the flickering lamp-light, the people looked like Gullivers in Lilliput.

I was asking Todd how it was, if things were getting as bad as he said they were, that Africans were still so polite and happy-

looking in the streets of Johannesburg.

"Gee! The African Iron Mask! He says one thing, and thinks another: when he nods," said Todd, nodding wisely, "you think he's agreeing with you, when actually he's saying 'Yes, I'm hearing what you say, white man.'"

"Ya, it sometimes leads to some unfortunate misunderstandings," said a large African professor sitting on the sofa, talking very slowly. "You see the Africans don't just *like* saying no: they find it easier just to agree and avoid argument with the whites or Indians: and then, of course, they go back to their own people and say the opposite. So, of course, the other people are rather puzzled, and rather think they've been let down."

The room filled up to squeezing-point, and a noisy contingent from Sophiatown, sounding as different as Frenchmen from Swedes, arrived and introduced themselves in fulsome terms, and the whole party loosened up. Elaborate cocktail snacks were handed round and balanced on knees.

Zeke, the doyen of African writers, was leading a discussion on the floor about the need for an African artists' circle. There was some opposition to the idea. "But I find my position as a writer is so lonely, so isolated," he said in his fine deep voice, so that his loneliness seemed to echo round the room: "I know that there must be hundreds of people scribbling in backyards who don't know where to start—running like rivers in the desert."

"Ya—rivers in the desert," said Dam-Dam softly from the corner, in a black suit with huge cuff-links and a carnation buttonhole. He was the leader of the Manhattan Brothers, the most famous singing troupe in black Africa. And his approval, coming from that tall, suave body, gave finality to the idea.

"We don't just want to be writers," said Zeke, "we want to be *non-white* writers"—using the word in the proud way of people who are used to being non-everything—non-Europeans, non-voters, non-travellers, non-drinkers, non-starters.

"But not like in Russia," somebody chirped in: "we don't want to be told what to write."

"No, not like Russia," said Zeke: "like Africa."

In the corner where I was sitting, Leslie, a Coloured carpenter-intellectual inclined towards Trotsky, was telling how that morning he and Todd had gone to buy a *salami* at a shop in town. Leslie was one of that small number of Coloureds who,

fed up with the colour snobbery of their own people, prefer to go about with Africans—partly for principle, partly for fun. They wanted a big, fat *salami*: “The white girl just wouldn’t believe it,” said Leslie: “‘You don’t want *that one*,’ she screamed so that you could hear her the other side of the street, man! ‘The native boy can’t want *that one*.’”

Then Leslie became involved in an argument with the quiet round-faced teacher next to him—one of the teachers who had reluctantly accepted the new Government “Bantu Education” and was presiding at a school where house-cleaning and digging were taught as school subjects. He was a meek-seeming, very polite little man. Leslie, who had been telling a string of anecdotes about his bitter encounters with the white world, began talking about what would happen “when we have our freedom.”

“I don’t quite see how we Africans,” said the Bantu teacher, “after all the humiliations that have been heaped upon us by the white man, can allow whites to have votes in our country.”

“No, we must remain *human*,” said Leslie, dropping the “h” and giving the word an urgent stress: “Whatever happens, we must stay as *human* beings. We mustn’t treat the whites as they treat us. The most important thing we have is that we’re human beings. We mustn’t lose that in the revolution . . .”

Then, just as all the talk in the room was in danger of becoming whisked into the old vortex of race and bitterness, the little jazz pianist Salisbury Klaaste slumped to the piano in the corner and began rather drunkenly dragging his thin pointed fingers over the keys. Sal had taken his B.Mus. at the university two years before and, after refusing a job helping a white man study primitive African music, had become pianist to the “Jazz Dazzlers”. His small and nervous body, hunched forward, with his huge sad eyes staring out above his turned-up nose, seemed to fit the piano exactly, like a working model. He played with a few tunes, muttering angrily while people advised him, and then began a lurching, sentimental ditty. Immediately everyone in the room began shouting “Dam-DAM-Dam-DAM-Dam-DAM,” until the tall and elegant figure rose from the floor, scraping the ceiling, his white cuffs shining from the darkness. His huge mouth opened like a flower, curled round at the edges, so that it seemed that some bellowing sound would come out: and then very softly, in an extravagant brogue, he sang:-

“Did your mother come from Ireland?

For there’s something in you Hirish . . .”

There was tremendous applause, and then Sal, looking indignant and hurt, began playing a simple tune on single notes: "The Xhosas always economise in their notes, you see," he said, pointing a menacing thin finger at Leslie: "Just using the dominant and tonic, like this . . ."

"You're not a white lecturer: *you* don't need to economise," shouted Todd. "There's no shortage of notes *here*."

Sal, looking very cross, went on playing tribal chants for a while, and then very suddenly switched to a caricature of a wobbling Indian love-song, such as you hear coming out of the juke-boxes in the Indian part of town. At once another man stood up from the corner—Gwigwi, the saxophonist, composer of the African hit tune, "Fish and Chips." He stood very primly, gazed haughtily round the bodies draped round the room, and then abruptly, with a quick flick of his head, threw himself into a crazy Indian warble, shaking his fingers to play an imaginary snake-charmer's pipe.

After a minute Sal stopped, Gwigwi folded on to the floor with a thump, and the room shook with clapping. Then Sal and Gwigwi did a quick tour of the world, crooning a preposterous Italian lament, gurgling some Russian nonsense, and squeaking a piece of Chinese cacophany; together they romped happily over the 2,000 years of civilisation from which they are supposed to be so mysteriously excluded.

Sitting almost on top of me was a contented drunk—a veteran African double-bass player of the 'thirties. He was trying, with a good deal of dribble and splutter, to explain that this was not altogether a normal African party, and to make himself polite to the white face which was evidently conspicuous in his cloudy vision. I was brusque and uneasy with this attention; and then I noticed guiltily, when he turned his attention to an African beside him, how much more courteously and effectively he was received, his incoherencies being countered with reassuring flattery and congratulation: "That's it, Willie—have a good time, boy—quite right, boy."

Sal at the piano, conducting a fitful history of jazz, touched on a melancholy repetitive tune which sounded like the insistent questioning of a child; there were cries all over the room of "Marabi! Marabi!"—the nostalgic old backyard jazz of the 'thirties, which still emerges from crackling records in the servants' huts. Willie the drunk, at the first sound of the Marabi, raised his body from the sofa and began shuffling to and

fro, his shoulders shrugging up and down to the rhythm, and his mouth fixed in a faint and happy smile, dreaming of the days when he plucked his double bass to shuffling African dancers, up and down the cities of the Union. Almost everyone began shuffling at one another, as if they had suddenly been caught on one of those shaking platforms at a fair-ground. "Gee, those Marabi days," said Todd, whose life had been measured by jazz styles: "we just went on, boy—on and on!"

Todd, Gwigwi, Dam-Dam and the rest shuffled along, advancing and retreating like tentative courting couples, wrapped in their own memories of Marabi. We slipped away, leaving the shuffling and singing to go on through the night and all through the next Sunday morning, the party guests trapped together by the talk and music like ship-wrecked people in a boat.

As I drove out through the steep valley where the edge of the straggling location looks over the stony veld, a torch waved frantically at the car. "Remember the rule, never stop". And then I made out the tall brown helmeted figures of African police: I slowed down, looking to see if there was a white man there who could stop me. And then the black sergeant gave a grunt of "Aaaah! *Umtungu*"—white man—with that ambiguous emphasis, and waved me on to the open country beyond.



## THE NYASALAND CRISIS

M. W. KANYAMA CHIUME

*Member of the Nyasaland Legislative Council and Publicity Secretary of the now banned Nyasaland African Congress.*

TALES of a massacre plot in Nyasaland, the declaration of a State of Emergency there and in Southern Rhodesia, the arrest of hundreds of African leaders throughout the Federation—all this following upon reiterated threats by the Federal Prime Minister of a “Boston Tea Party” to force dominion status in 1960—have suddenly brought about a crisis in Central Africa which has already been described as the worst in the Commonwealth since the Indian independence struggle. Its repercussions for South and even East Africa must be enormous . . . yet the focus is one of the smallest and most neglected territories in Africa.

About seventy years ago, when the European powers rushed to parcel out Africa into their respective “possessions,” Nyasaland became a British protectorate. The agreement took place with “the consent and desire of the chiefs and people,” as the proclamation phrased it; and this free consent was possible principally because of the faith which the people of the territory had in the missionaries of the Church of Scotland, who had been working among them since the 1860’s.

Since Nyasaland is a protectorate and not a colony, her people naturally aspired to and expected political development towards self-government, an ultimate abdication of British rule. Nothing before Federation led them to believe that this was a hopeless ambition; and their trust in Britain was so great that they willingly sacrificed themselves in the last two world wars to defend what they were told was freedom for all. Victory promised them the right to decide their future and develop their own form of government.

When Federation was imposed on Nyasaland, therefore, and power over the destiny of some seven million Africans in the countries of Central Africa surrendered to less than three hundred thousand Europeans, the people of Nyasaland did not have to be persuaded to oppose the scheme. They recognized a betrayal of the very principles of self-determination to which Britain had subscribed in signing the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, an end to all their hopes for democratic government. For the architects of the Federation, Sir Roy Welensky

and Lord Malvern, made no secret of their distaste for 'Ghanas' in the vicinity of White Southern Rhodesia. Sir Roy has stated often enough that he does not envisage equality between the Africans and the Europeans of Central Africa within the foreseeable future, and his attitude was accurately reflected in the constitution of the new State.

Federation offered too a frustration of their longing to live with decency and dignity in their own country at least. For the people of Nyasaland saw—and still see—no difference between Southern Rhodesia and South Africa; except perhaps that the Union is outspoken about her oppression of Africans, while Southern Rhodesia imitates the oppression and not the outspokenness, hiding its hands behind a smoke-screen of words. The people of Nyasaland do not need to be told of conditions in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia, there is hardly a family left that has not sacrificed a member to work on a farm or in the home of a Southern Rhodesian White, or in the gold mines of South Africa. Their knowledge of settlers is deeper and far more personal than that of those who read up race relations in books or propaganda pamphlets. It is because of their determination that what they worked under and saw in Southern Rhodesia and the Union should not be allowed to spread into their own country, that they give to the Nyasaland African Congress their unswerving support in its opposition to the Central African Federation.

Developments during the six years since the imposition of Federation have given Nyasaland no cause for complacency. The Federal Constitution Amendment Act and the Federal Electoral Act gave the settlers of Central Africa further opportunities to entrench White dominion. That the African Affairs Board, which was established to safeguard African interests, named both bills as discriminatory, did not appear to matter to the British Government. Then, early in 1957, the British Government entered into an agreement with Sir Roy Welensky under which the Federal Prime Minister was given direct access to the Queen; the Federal Prime Minister was granted a permanent seat at the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference; and the Federal Government was given powers to create its own civil service and appoint its own diplomatic representatives abroad. In the words of Sir Roy Welensky, the effect of the agreement was to "rule out the risk that a future Labour Government in Britain would try to inflict some of their half-



baked ideas on the Federation". In fact, the effect was to give the Federation virtual dominion status by the back door. How mad that our African neighbours in Tanganyika and Uganda should be given repeated concessions towards self-rule by the same British Government which expects us to accept a permanently inferior status in Central Africa!

One of the main arguments in favour of Federation has always been economic. Nyasaland is reputed to be relatively poor, the one member of the Federation whose resources have been least exploited. It has no major industries, and its people are peasants or labourers upon the tea estates. Some 300,000 of the able-bodied male population are employed outside the territory, in the mines of Northern Rhodesia and South Africa, on the farms of Southern Rhodesia. And the total Nyasa population is only 2,700,000. Can Nyasaland exist on its own economically? And how is it to solve its migratory labour problem? Exponents of Federation ask these questions as if economic development and national independence were mutually exclusive. It is the belief of the Nyasaland African Congress that the very reverse is true—that only with freedom will a permanent solution to the country's economic problems become possible.

In any case, whatever happens, Nyasaland Africans would prefer freedom in poverty to plenty in servitude, though it is not yet our experience that servitude brings plenty. Nyasaland, however, is not as poor as the world is made to believe.

The Financial Secretary said in March, 1958 during a Legislative Council debate that before Federation was imposed the country was viable, could balance its own budget, had a surplus, and indeed could have developed on its own. And this statement was confirmed by the Governor of Nyasaland when he was in Britain in the same year. Of course, those who support Federation reply that development would have been slow. But the Africans of Nyasaland would prefer slow, ordered development to the sort of lunatic lavishness characterised by the group hospital in Blantyre—which harbours an official colour bar!

Nyasaland could stand on its own feet if the civil servants, who are now administering the country without the mandate of its people, began concentrating on the development of the country for its own sake, rather than moving up and down the territory as if they were paid agents of Sir Roy's Federal Party. The very agricultural policy of the Administration inhibits any

full-scale agricultural drive by the people. Instead of hoeing their gardens in peace and producing more food and more cash crops, villagers live under the terror of agricultural instructors and police who have the power to arrest them on the flimsiest of pretexts. The Co-operative Department, which in a country like Nyasaland should provide an opportunity for poor people and peasants, through their pennies and farthings, to participate in the economic development of their country, is the most primitive department in Nyasaland. Headed by a Commissioner who has never seen the inside of even a Co-operative Summer School, it has a European staff holding senior posts equally uneducated in co-operative techniques. Paradoxically, the African staff-members, who have greater experience and better training, all occupy inferior positions in the department and cannot influence or help to initiate policy. The violent contrast with similar departments in East Africa, where proper staffing and techniques have resulted in increased earnings and a marked improvement in the standard of living of the Africans, suggests that Nyasaland is being deliberately looted of its able-bodied men.

The very fact that the Government is not prepared to cease issuing licences to recruiting agencies is sufficient proof that it is those who recruit rather than the recruited who benefit from this detested and detestable traffic in human beings. The argument that Nyasaland Africans would still go to South Africa and Southern Rhodesia, whether recruited or not, should make unnecessary a commerce which for years now has corrupted the minds of the young and completely destroyed ordered family life. As it is, powerful recruiting agencies are allowed by the Government to entice teen-agers into believing that the best way of earning their money is by migrating to Southern Rhodesia or the Union, so that the youth grow up believing that manual work can only be done in the mines and farms far away from home. The rottenness of such a system cannot be overemphasised; it places the burden of maintaining families on those least able to bear it, the women, the aged and the sick, corrupting communal and personal relationships alike.

This wastage of human resources, and the untold harm that it does to the social and economic development of the country, can be prevented by adopting a creative approach to the problem. A better agricultural policy, the giving to the Co-operative Department of the place and the staff it deserves, and a vigorous campaign to reorientate the people in and outside the school-

room, would help to maintain the bulk of the able-bodied population in the country. Such a policy would include the abolition of recruitment and would ensure that the best use possible was made of the available labour. On many occasions the existing industries and agricultural undertakings have complained of lack of labour; and the Government itself, when work started on a secondary school in the Northern Province, found itself in similar difficulties.

With its labour properly used—on the co-operative basis upon which churches, schools, clinics and postal agencies are built and roads constructed even now—and with a creative drive on agriculture, co-operatives, and secondary industries for the benefit of the country rather than absentee landlords, the country could produce the capital needed for ordered development. Patriotism for this is there in abundance; and under an African government enjoying the confidence of the people, the capacity for faith and sacrifice will be a powerful economic factor. The Shire Valley project, for instance, to provide power and reclaim a large tract of land for agricultural development, will be welcome under an African government, as there would then be no question of the uncontrolled influx of Europeans, and the danger of the land's being accordingly alienated.

Indeed, the agricultural potential of the country is immense, its fish potential inadequately exploited, and its geological wealth not even fully surveyed. Thirty-eight economic minerals have already been found in the territory, including coal, copper, gold, lead, iron ore (of 60-70% extraction compared with a British average of 30%), manganese, mica, platinum, titanium and thorium, the last an especially important discovery as thorium is a radio-active material used as an alternative to uranium. The unwillingness of the concession-holding companies to exploit these minerals on any large scale can only be explained by their wish to retain Nyasaland as a reservoir of cheap labour for their other African enterprises.

Even before Nyasaland was forced into the Central African Federation, there was trade between the territory and adjoining States; and experience in other places has shown beyond any shadow of doubt that political unions are not the prelude to economic associations. An independent Nyasaland would trade with her neighbours because such trade would be of mutual benefit; though doubtless the territory would look more to the East for education, trade and economic associations, in the wake

of political sympathy.

Independence can only benefit Nyasaland's economic development. But independence is essential too, for her political advancement. Despite the professed aim of the Governor and the British Government to advance the country constitutionally, there has been so little political progress in the past seventy years that of the 23 members of the Legislative Council, only 5 are—or were before the arrests—Africans. These are elected indirectly, through local councils, and not one of them is a member of the Executive Council, which is nominated in its entirety by the Governor. This position can hardly be regarded as an advance on the position that existed before Federation.

The Africans of Nyasaland intend to escape from Federation, however long and bitter the struggle; they are determined to have self-government. They no longer believe that Britain can protect their future; they have come to realize that they alone can safeguard their interests, through their own freely chosen government.

In their struggle, they have found in Dr. Banda the leader for whom they had so long been looking. Leaders indeed they had had, but men less experienced and vital, so that Congress was riddled with government spies and informers, and lacked an efficient and expanding organization. Dr. Banda has brought no new policy to Congress—its aim has always been secession and self-government—but he has certainly brought new leadership, new inspiration; and within a short time of his arrival, Congress was taking shape as a modern, militant, political organisation. Our 83 branches swelled to 200 within five months. His sincerity and courage brought a new and virile consciousness to the people, till he became the talk of every household in Nyasaland. At every step he took outside his home, there were thousands to cheer him and wish him luck and long life.

It is against this background, and against the background of avowed settler intentions to force a showdown with the Africans, that one must view the actions of Sir Robert Armitage and Mr. Lennox-Boyd on the one hand, in proclaiming a State of Emergency and deporting Dr. Banda and his colleagues; and the reaction of the people of Nyasaland on the other, who recognize in the repression a clear Government attempt to destroy their only means of opposition to settler domination. Seeing their hopes fade, their leaders deported, the people rose up in their despair to show their indignation.

Much has been said of a "planned massacre" of Europeans, Asians and "moderate Africans". It is a crude fantasy, and publication of the miserable evidence contained in the White Paper can only reinforce this opinion. The Congress has never been anti-White or anti-Asian; Dr. Banda has proclaimed this himself over and over again, and demonstrated it by living among Europeans at Limbe. When he toured the country, he often visited or stayed in European and Asian homes.

The core of the accusation set out in the White Paper is contained in the report of a meeting of 150 Congress delegates held in Blantyre on January 25th. It is to be noted that Dr. Banda is said not to have been present, although the Governor claims to have some unspecified reason for believing that it was held at his direction. The evidence of the meeting did not reach the police for three weeks; and one wonders what inducements were offered during that period to the informer, which would overcome the 'oath of secrecy' and the 'threats of death'. It is more likely that, in a country where spies and informers are so commonly employed by the police, it took those three weeks to decide upon exactly what story it would be most politic to invent.

On page 8 of the White Paper, it is reported that the murder of European and Asian men, women and children was ordered. And yet no European or Asian has been killed throughout Nyasaland, while 50 Africans, including a woman and a child, have been shot dead by the security forces. Whose, indeed, was "the massacre plot?" In February, Dr. Banda actually handed over firearms, taken by individual Africans from the security forces, to the police. Is this the action of an organisation contemplating massacre?

The appointment of an independent commission to investigate all these allegations is to be welcomed; but no lasting peace will follow until the constitutional question is settled, and the future of the people of Nyasaland properly assured. Immediate steps should be taken to end the State of Emergency and thus remove the atmosphere of tension and distrust; and to release the Congress leaders, so that they can take part in talks on a new constitution, based on universal suffrage and territorial self-government. The right of Nyasaland to secede from the Federation must be recognised, for only then will her people be free to develop their resources, economic and human.

## RIDER AND HORSE IN NORTHERN RHODESIA

KENNETH KAUNDA

*President-General of the banned Zambia African National Congress, now rusticated to a distant district of Northern Rhodesia.*

'PARAMOUNTCY of native interests' was the political sign-post of Northern Rhodesia up to 1948; and this was interpreted to mean ". . . if and when the interests of the indigenous people conflicted with those of immigrant races, those of the former should prevail." This, however, proved too much for those settlers to swallow whose unyielding ambition was the amalgamation of the two Rhodesias and a freer hand with the Africans. And so in 1948, this policy was arbitrarily replaced by one of 'Partnership', which was later to become the foundation stone of the new Federal State.

Lord Malvern, Welensky's co-principal architect of this Federation, has, just like his friends, never hidden his crude scorn for African opinion. As the Federation's first Prime Minister, he described partnership as "the same as exists between rider and horse"—the settler, of course, being the rider and the African the horse. In March this year, he told the House of Lords, in London, "Africans are all liars, until they are very much advanced." (*Northern News*, 26/3/59).

It is to these prophets of apartheid posing, circumspectly, as believers in partnership, that the British Government sold us when they imposed Federation upon us in 1953. They make high-sounding declarations that hoodwink the world into believing that they are liberals, while they quietly manipulate constitutions that in effect place all political power in their hands.

It is one of these constitutions that the Zambia African National Congress, which I was leading, was challenging when it was declared illegal by Governor Benson. Before and up to the time of Federation, the constitution provided a qualitative franchise for all British *subjects*, provided they

- (a) earned a minimum of £200 per year, or had property to the value of £240;
- (b) could fill in a prescribed form in English before a magistrate;
- (c) were of or above the age of 21 years, and were not criminal or insane.

Africans being British *protected persons* were, through this arrangement, debarred. Let it be noted however, that British citizenship was on sale at the profitable price of £5 each—in a country where the average wage of an African was as low as 15/- per month. Africans did not buy this “precious” political commodity, not only because it was too expensive, but also because they believed, as I do, that there is no need for anyone anywhere to buy foreign citizenship in his native country. Thus, up to 1953, only 3 Africans had considered it worthy to invest in this extraordinary debenture.

Fantastically too, in a territory where Blacks outnumber Whites some 30 to 1, the Legislative Council consisted of 12 elected European representatives, 4 Africans strained through all the most obliging meshes, 2 Europeans nominated to represent African interests, and 8 officials.

It was in such a political context that Mr. Nkumbula and I (president and secretary of the African National Congress respectively) presented our proposals to Governor Benson in February, 1958. We demanded 21 elected Africans, 14 elected Europeans and 7 officials, with an elected Speaker. There was to be universal adult suffrage, but Africans were to elect Africans and Europeans were to elect Europeans, with officials holding the balance of power. We also proposed an Executive Council of 3 Africans, 3 elected Europeans, and 3 officials, with the Governor retaining his seat as president.

I must confess here that I thought our proposals so moderate, it seemed to me difficult for the Government to dismiss them. But it didn't take me long to discover how wrong I was.

I remember Governor Benson asking me—“Mr. Kaunda, don't you think Europeans could paralyse government if we accepted your proposals?” In reply I said, “Are you implying, Your Excellency, that for our demands to be met we have got to be in a position to paralyse government?” My question was never answered. Instead, a new constitution was concocted.

The current one provides that there shall be a Legislative Council of

Elected European members (ordinary seats ∴ necessarily European)	.. .. .	.. .. .	—	12
Elected European members (reserved seats)	.. .. .	.. .. .	—	2
Elected African members (special seats)	.. .. .	.. .. .	—	6
Elected African members (reserved seats)	.. .. .	.. .. .	—	2
Nominated members	.. .. .	.. .. .	—	2

Officials	..	..	..	..	..	..	—	6
								—
								30
								—

It also provides for an Executive Council, presided over by the Governor, of

Elected European members	..	..	..	..	..	—	4
Africans	..	..	..	..	..	—	2
Officials	..	..	..	..	..	—	4
							—
							10
							—

The Federal franchise arrangements, which Northern Rhodesia has adopted, divide people into three categories—the *Ordinary*, *Special* and *Ungraded Human Beings*.

- (a) *Ordinary Human Beings* are those who earn £720 per year, or own buildings or land worth £1,500; or earn £480 per year, or own buildings or land worth £1,000, plus a primary school education of a certain standard; or earn £300 per year, or own buildings or land worth £500, plus four years of secondary education of a certain standard.
- (b) *Special Human Beings* are those who earn £150 per year, or own buildings or land to the value of £500; or earn £120 per year, plus a two years' secondary education of a certain standard.
- (c) *Ungraded Human Beings* are those who cannot qualify under (a) or (b).

Note should be taken of the facts that Africans by law may occupy land, but not own it; and that, in any *ordinary* constituency, *special* voters can only count one-third of the *ordinary*. In other words, if in a particular constituency 300 ordinary human beings and 1,000 special human beings voted, the latter could only count as 100. Western values, I believe!

Of the 8 African seats, 6 are called special seats, and are rural. Candidates contesting these rural seats must each get *two-thirds* of the chiefs of the constituency to sign certificates approving their candidature; and, further, each one of these chiefs must approve of the candidature in the presence of a representative of the Crown duly appointed by the Governor. It should be noted that apart from the travel difficulties involved



in these wide-flung constituencies, chiefs are no longer on "chiefs by the people and the people by the chiefs" terms with their people; they are on the government pay-roll, just as are the required representatives of the Crown. Chiefs who show an independent rhythm when the tune is called are soon enough danced out of office.

In view of this, candidates who succeed in obtaining these certificates are, quite naturally, suspected of being in the government's good books, are considered "yes men". In other words, African voters, after qualifying on so expensive a franchise roll, have in rural areas no one but a government-approved candidate to vote for; they do not have, and are not intended to have, real choice.

Equally monstrous is that in practise it is not possible for an African to contest and win any of the 14 "European" seats, or to influence the election of a European, because only a handful of Africans have qualified as *ordinary voters*. On the other hand, however, European pressure-groups have found stooges among Africans to stand on their party tickets.

So far, two of the six special constituencies have not polled, because candidates could not get the necessary two-thirds of the chiefs there to approve their candidature. The Governor has been caught in one of his own political traps. And the results in the six African constituencies that have polled are simply appalling. What we in Zambia feared has come only too true.

Welensky's United Federal Party	..	..	..	—	2
Moffat's Central Africa Party	..	..	..	—	2
African National Congress	..	..	..	—	1
African Independent	..	..	..	—	1

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6

In fact, in the one instance where the A.N.C. has won, the whole show is being challenged by Mr. Beckett of the U.F.P. He alleges he has evidence to show that Mr. Nkumbula was supported by District Commissioners on instructions from above.

According to the constitution, the Governor had to consult Mr. Roberts, leader of the majority party, when making his appointments to the Executive. The '*Northern News*' of 27th March reported an unnamed prominent U.F.P. member as saying, "The Governor has met our demands most satisfactorily. In fact we might say 99½% of what we wanted has been granted."

Of the 10 seats, 5 have gone to the U.F.P.—4 Whites and 1 African. Of the nominated African Minister, the '*Sunday Mail*' of 29th March, 1959, says, among other things, "As the caucus of the United Federal Party has unanimously endorsed the new appointments, the only conclusion possible is that Mr. Roberts is satisfied that Mr. Mwamba (African Nominated) is sympathetic towards the aims and ideals of the U.F.P." The remaining 4 seats have been filled by government officials whose past records show that on all major issues—including the establishment of Federation—they have voted with the settlers.

Africans who have been trapped by the new constitution now stand flabbergasted. Even Mr. Nkumbula of the pact-hunting, bargain-striking Congress, who agreed to give this constitution 'a fair trial', has expressed his "extreme disappointment" with the result of the elections. ('*Central African Post*', 23/3/59) On the other hand, settlers are jubilant, and are now busying themselves in preparing another and perhaps final assault on the Colonial Office, in their mad drive to make over Central Africa in the image of the Union.

These are only some of the many reasons why we of the banned Zambia African National Congress chose to oppose and boycott the elections, drawing down upon ourselves as a result the wrath of Governor Benson and his satellites. He has accused us of planning mass intimidation, disorder and violence. I can say no more here than point out (in view of the fact that a commission has been appointed to probe into the banning of Zambia) that if he had evidence to prove his allegations, he certainly would not have hesitated to prosecute us in the public courts.

In view of his failure to do so, I conclude that the banning of Zambia, the arrest and rustication of all its leaders, issue from fear of its policies and demands for *self-government now* based on *one man, one vote*. I might add here that the banned Zambia's cry of "Africa for Africans" was no more than the legitimate cry for *majority rule*. We had, and still have, no desire to drive away Whites from here. Time and again we have said what we still say now, that those Europeans who are willing to work in peace and harmony under a democratically elected African government are more than welcome here.

For us, rustications or no rustications, Zambia or no Zambia, our demand is *home rule and secession* from this fraudulent and abominable Federation now!

## THE CRUCIBLE OF PRIVILEGE: SOUTHERN RHODESIA

JOSHUA NKOMO

*President of the banned Southern Rhodesia African National Congress.*

THE Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland is experiencing a political storm which has taken the lives of over 50 Africans, and sent many hundreds to gaol or detention, most of them with no charge of any kind preferred against them. Sir Roy Welensky has found reasons for the crisis outside the territories—he blames the Accra Peoples' Conference; he talks of Communists, plots and agitators.

But he deliberately passes over the real reason for the crisis—his policy of 'White supremacy,' which springs from Southern Rhodesia and from South Africa. For it is this that has brought tension and disorder to the once tranquil land of Lake Nyasa. And Britain too must bear her responsibility for this. She, as guardian of the two Protectorates, has refused to listen to the pleas of the African people not to hand them over to a clutch of power-hungry settlers in Southern Rhodesia. Her Government devised a policy of "partnership", and without defining it, handed it over to Lord Malvern and Sir Roy Welensky to shape into the crucible of White privilege and African repression that it is today. I must emphasize that the British Government knows this, and that, knowing it, it denies to the Africans in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland their right to secede. Clearly 'protection' would seem as capable of conflicting meanings as 'partnership.'

The dominant partner in the Federation, and the source of most of our present troubles, is Southern Rhodesia. It is a self-governing colony, self-governing that is as far as the two hundred thousand settlers are concerned. When this status was attained in 1923, the settlers immediately formulated a land and property policy which became the basis of political power. A franchise based on high property and educational qualifications was introduced; and by raising the qualifications from time to time, and by denying the Africans adequate opportunity for education and economic advance, the settlers have been able to retain political power for themselves to the almost total exclusion of the African majority.

The present franchise qualifications, for the Ordinary roll, are

- (a) citizenship of Southern Rhodesia or the Federation;
- (b) age over 21 years;
- (c) continuous residence of 2 years in the Federation;
- (d) adequate English to fill in a voting form without assistance;
- (e) one of the following educational and financial qualifications:
  - (i) income of £720 p.a. or £1,500 worth of immovable property;
  - (ii) income of £480 p.a. or £1,000 worth immovable property, plus primary school education;
  - (iii) income of £300 p.a. or £500 immovable property, plus 4 years secondary education.

There is also a lower roll, for which the qualifications are (a), (b), (c) and (d) above; plus either £240 p.a., or £120 p.a. and two years' secondary education. When the number of voters on the lower roll reaches 20% of the other voters, however, the roll must be closed. In effect, therefore, these sets of qualifications are even more restrictive than those for the Federal vote, even the 4 African members of the Southern Rhodesian parliament being elected by an almost wholly *European* electorate.

The centre of the struggle for a share in the political control of Southern Rhodesia, therefore, pivots upon the question of the franchise. The property qualifications detailed above are so high that the fiction of the Common Voters' roll can no longer be maintained. For the wage structure of the colony is deliberately designed to prevent Africans from getting onto this roll. Most skilled jobs are jealously reserved by the European trade unions for Europeans only, and the minimum wage for an African unskilled labourer is £6—£7 per month. The Native Land Husbandry Act is ostensibly intended to produce a middle-class of African small farmers, holding land in freehold instead of communally. But so far, its main result has been to force thousands of Africans off the land—providing a useful float of labour for European enterprise.

The path to advance through education is blocked almost as surely as that through economic development. In 1956, 355,651 African children attended school.<sup>1</sup> Of these, 91% were in junior primary schools, and only 1% in secondary schools (i.e. in a position to gain one qualification for the *lower voters'* roll).

And most important of all, Southern Rhodesian land policy stands in the way of African advance, and remains one of the

<sup>1</sup>Faith Raven, 'The Constitution and Race Relations in Central Africa', Africa Bureau, 1958

main grievances of the African people. The history of how the Africans of the territory were robbed of their land goes back to Rhodes' fraudulent treaty with Lobengula, and the massacre of the Matabele following their rebellion in 1896. And the Land Apportionment Acts of 1931 and 1941, ostensibly passed for the protection of what land had been left under African control, have been used for the purpose of dispersing and impoverishing the African population and retaining political and economic power in the hands of the settlers. Under these laws, some 2,150,000 Africans (2,070,000 according to the 1953 estimate) have rights to only 56,980 square miles of land<sup>2</sup> while 200,000 Europeans (160,000 in 1953) enjoy some 76,128 square miles. It should further be remembered that most of the European inhabitants of Southern Rhodesia are town dwellers; so that of all the "European" land, only a small proportion has been actually developed. This is all the more galling in view of the dispossession of thousands of Africans under the new Husbandry Act.

The Apportionment Act and the Urban Areas and Accommodation Act have, of course, also been used to enforce segregation of living areas in the country and in the towns; so that there had to be amendments recently to allow even a few inter-racial clubs to be established, and a hotel where "foreign" non-Whites visiting the Federation might stay. Since the consent of the local authority has to be obtained before an inter-racial club is legal, and it must concern itself purely with cultural, religious and welfare activities alone, the value of this relaxation of the colour bar may be seriously questioned. So might the concession that certain "civilized" Africans may be exempted from carrying a pass. Is a pass exemption, after all, not just another kind of pass?

It was the increasingly oppressive pattern of Southern Rhodesian legislation, combined with the inadequacy of a number of small African organizations who had no right to speak on behalf of the African people as a whole, that led to the reconstitution of the African National Congress of Southern Rhodesia in 1957, incorporating the Southern Rhodesian Youth League. We based our policy on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, especially the right of adult suffrage and the rights of individuals to property; and we gained—for all Sir Edgar Whitehead's picturesque contradictions—the clear support of the African masses.

<sup>2</sup> Lord Hailey, *An African Survey*.

Our aims were—and, for all the arrests, remain—

1. To recapture human dignity for the Africans, which has been destroyed over a number of years;
2. To restore the land and property rights of Africans; and
3. To gain universal franchise so that the African may play a full part in the political life of the country.

Congress has never restricted membership on racial grounds—there were several European members, and one was arrested for his pains.

Our programme brought panic to the settlers. Hundreds of our supporters were brought before the courts almost throughout the whole of last year, but in 98 cases out of 100 they were acquitted. Realizing their weak position in the courts of law, the Government arbitrarily declared a State of Emergency on the 26th February, 1959, banned our organization, and arrested and detained officials and many members without bringing any charges against them. No satisfactory reasons have been given for these stern measures. Sir Edgar Whitehead says that the situation in Nyasaland warranted them. In the same statement, he reveals that preparations were under way before Christmas 1958, or months before any crisis in Nyasaland gave him his shabby excuse.

We have, in fact, no alternative but to conclude that the present situation, with all the repressive measures in Central Africa, was planned by the Southern Rhodesian and Federal Governments for the purpose of crushing African organizations and eliminating the African leadership. The Bills before the Southern Rhodesian parliament are proof of this. But the Government will discover that bannings, imprisonment and terrorism will never crush African resistance to oppression. If there is to be any hope of peace and prosperity in our country, we are more convinced than ever that the time for a fundamental revision of the political, social and economic system, is *now*. And by a fundamental revision, we mean the immediate concession of real participation in political control to the Africans, not just the removal of specks of discrimination here and there.

We are aware that the Rhodesian settler politicians have been very much encouraged by the apparent success of South African apartheid policies. They have largely copied the disgusting pattern, substituting for apartheid the label of partnership, as if to say that the African must be a willing partner in his own subjugation. But the events of the past two months have

so far exposed the partnership myth that even some of the leading settler politicians have had to make shame-faced admissions of the failure of their policies. In this connection, the formation and general drift of the Central African Party is not without significance.

There is still time for Southern Rhodesia to retreat from disaster, and with dignity. We of the Congress, by the very nature of our policy, offer the settlers the opportunity of beating a retreat in time. We ask for the reconsideration of discriminatory laws—the Native Affairs Act, the Urban Areas and Accommodation Act, the Pass Laws, the Electoral Act, the Unlawful Organizations Act, the Preventive Detention Act. This would lead to a tremendous reduction in tension, and leave the way open for the peaceful evolution of democracy. What we are asking for immediately is therefore direct participation in the territorial legislature and government. And we ask not as suppliants, but as a people who know that their rights cannot indefinitely be withheld from them. The door is still open. Who can tell if it will be open forever?



## AN IOTA OF DIFFERENCE

MOSES MAKONE

*One of those arrested during the recent Southern Rhodesian round-up of African leaders.*

ON the night of the 26th February, I was asleep in my house at Mabvuku, 12 miles from Salisbury, when at about 2.30 a.m. I heard a knock at my door. I woke up, switched on the light, went to the door, and unbolted it with my right hand, resting my left hand on the door frame. When I pulled the door back, my left hand was immediately handcuffed and a European policeman entered into the house and proceeded to handcuff my right hand without uttering a word. I was shocked. After a few seconds I asked, "What's wrong"? Two European and three African policemen, who were all in uniform, had by this time now entered my house. They left me standing alone. The two European policemen went into my bedroom, woke up my wife and children, and turned the house upside down in search of books and letters. These they bundled together and threw into a bag.

They then told me to come with them. I was taken to a truck while my wife was asking, "What have you done"? "What is this all about"? I said, "I don't know". My wife was upset and terrified, to say nothing of my children.

The truck then went around and picked up two other people—the Reverend Katsande and Mr. Chikore. We were then taken to a big lorry, around which were four other trucks. These trucks unloaded fifteen people, and we were all thrown into the lorry and driven to the Police Depot in Salisbury.

When we arrived at the Depot, it was still dark. We were taken before a group of plain-clothes men who sorted us into groups of "Stars". Some were told that they were "One Star" men, others Three or Four and so on. I was almost the last to be classified in this way, because the police officer several times called for Savanhu Makoni and no one responded to this name. I was asked what my name was, and I told them that I was Moses Makone. I was then told that I was a "Two Star" man and sent to this group. The seven groups were put in separate open-air enclosures. Here the handcuffs were removed. We remained standing around until daylight came and one saw where one was and with whom. We still did not know what it was all about and nobody told us anything. We then



began to tell each other how we had been arrested.

Abel Dube said that he had been told that he was being arrested because he was a Congress man. This was the first time I realised I had become a political prisoner.

We remained in the Depot until 12 noon, when we were handcuffed again, now in twos with the other hand handcuffed to a bar in a lorry, and taken to Kentucky Gaol near Salisbury. On arriving there we were thrown into four cells, fifty to each. Each cell was about 21 feet by 6 feet.

About 3 p.m. we were given our first meal—very rough mealie-meal porridge and beans—served in enamel and tin plates. We were also given three blankets each—no beds, no mats, no pillows or sheets. None of us had any pyjamas or change of clothes. We just lay on the cold cement floors, but found it difficult to sleep.

The following morning members of the C.I.D. came and pitched their tents in the prison. The next day they began interrogating us. Again it was quite some time before I could be questioned because the name they called was Savanhu Makoni. I did not answer to that name. They ultimately asked me what my name was and then interrogated me. I told them that I had never been a member of Congress, but had been Chairman of the Mabvuku branch of Mr. R. S. Garfield Todd's former United Rhodesia Party. They asked me all sorts of things—virtually my life history—and whether my wife was a politician or not.

Our first difficulty was that of not having sufficient fresh air and exercise. We were allowed only 30 minutes in the morning and afternoon in the open air. The rest of the time we spent locked up in the cells. This led to several complaints being lodged to the authorities, until three of our spokesmen were removed from the prison and sent to Khami Prison. The bad food of the prison, overcrowding, and stale air began to tell on the health of the men. Several of them fell sick. I also fell sick and informed the authorities. They thought I was putting on a show and were preparing to send me to Khami. Medical examination, however, showed that I was really sick.

At this time my friends had made representations on my behalf to Sir Edgar Whitehead, the Prime Minister. They successfully showed that I had been wrongly imprisoned and that I had never been a member of the African National Congress. I was finally released after spending 38 days in prison.

## PORTRAIT OF A FAILURE: SIR ROY WELENSKY

FRANK BARTON

*Former Editor of the "Central African Post", Northern Rhodesia*

WHEN Roy Welensky succeeded Lord Malvern as prime minister of the Central African Federation, destiny placed in the burly ex-engine driver's hands a chance given to few men of few nations. For, although it was Malvern who became the Federation's first prime minister, it was Welensky to whom the real task fell of forging the three territories of Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, with their conflicting loyalties and widely different ways of life, into a new nation. During Malvern's two years in office the task was essentially one of ironing out the manifold administrative kinks in the new Establishment, of constructing a civil service and a pattern of development. Everyone knew that once Malvern had supervised this, he would hand over his power and his opportunity to the younger, more imaginative and better equipped Welensky. How has his successor handled his inheritance?

It remains for the historians to record—and some of them are already recording it—that in the three years since Welensky assumed political direction of the Federation, the racial situation has deteriorated to the point of despair; that the Federation has cried out, and still cries out, for a leader who will—even at this late hour—act with a vision and a drama which can save the situation and lead all the 7,500,000 peoples of the new State away from the rot of revolt and repression and towards the accomplishments of a genuinely shared society.

Why has Welensky failed? He had the courage to succeed; he had neither the vision nor the intelligence. A consummate politician who reached his peak and made his reputation in Northern Rhodesia without the responsibility of a portfolio, he has remained an eye-to-the-ballot politician at a time when real statesmanship is the crying need of Central Africa.

The thirteenth son of a Lithuanian Jew and his Afrikaner wife who trekked by ox-wagon from the Union to a Rhodesia that barred no holds, Welensky was born "on the wrong side of the tracks" in Salisbury. His family lived just above the borderline of poor whites. His first job, at 15, was as a storekeeper, but it was not long before, like his brother Ben, he was "on the rail-



ways", first as a fireman and later as a driver.

At 21 he married a good-natured, strong-willed Scots-Afrikaner girl who used to serve him tea in a Bulawayo café. For 30 years, all the way up the ladder, she has been his constant sheet-anchor. In a land not renowned for its happy home life, the Welenskys have remained the traditional devoted couple. Their circle of friends may have widened to include such places as Chequers and Clarence House, but it has not, since they reached the top, excluded so much as the humblest ganger they knew in the old days.

Bulawayo then, as now, was the railway headquarters of the Rhodesias, and it was not long before the young Welensky began to take an active part in the growing White railwaymen's trade union. He still believes it was this that made the railway bosses banish him to the "black north"—to Broken Hill, the bleak lead and zinc mining town in Northern Rhodesia. In those years of the early 'thirties, he did not fit easily into the life of the mining camp and railway club. There was a strong fascist element in the town, most of it made up from the South African Afrikaner miners. Welensky would have no part of them. Once he went to the engine shed to take his train out and found the cab plastered with anti-semitic obscenities—directed at his part Jewish blood. It is curious that a man who has endured such discrimination should be the main pillar of the discrimination practised against millions of non-Whites in the Federation.

Welensky's personality and organising ability, however, soon got the better of the rowdies. He revived the defunct branch of the railway workers' union, and soon the bosses 700 miles away in Bulawayo were wondering if they had done the right thing in ever sending him north. But it was too late. Welensky was on a road from which there was to be no return. His trade union was to send him to the Northern Rhodesia Legislature, which in turn was to become the springboard for a seat at the Commonwealth premier's conference table.

He was still engine driving and leading his union between parliamentary sessions. By the beginning of the war, he was accepted by all the White workers of Northern Rhodesia—i.e. the miners and railwaymen—as their leader; and chewing his nails in apprehension at the power the man wielded, the governor of the day made Welensky Director of Manpower. His main job was to keep the copper mines producing. Probably to coat

the bitter pill of a trade union leader working with the bosses, in 1941 Welensky formed the Northern Rhodesia Labour Party, and it immediately became the biggest group in the Legislature outside of the British Colonial officials. Characteristically, it was a labour party modelled on its South African counterpart, formed to fight competition from the Africans.

Now began the incredible seven year rule of power without responsibility. Welensky ruled the Council from the back benches. He gave portfolios to his subordinates, but though a member of the Cabinet Executive Council, he refused to accept a ministry himself. Nobody could understand what his game was. It soon became clear. Without a portfolio he was subject to no responsibilities, no questioning in the Legislature. If he had taken one, he would have by inference have aligned himself with the Colonial Office officials. And for the role he was about to play—flaying them at every possible opportunity—that would have been impossible. Far better to sit in the committee-roomed Executive where he could mould decisions in all the ministries, and then return to the back benches and berate the portfolio holders in his best gallery-playing style.

It worked like a charm. Between 1946 and 1953, when he entered the Federal Parliament, he built a reputation far beyond the borders of Northern Rhodesia as a champion of the settlers and the man who could be relied upon to give the Colonial Office better than he took. There is no doubt that, besides appealing to the public, these tactics paid off in practical results, for Welensky squeezed more and more out of a reluctant Whitehall until, although still in the minority, the unofficial members of the Executive Council could outvote the officials. When Federation was finally imposed, Welensky became second-in-command to Sir Godfrey Huggins and took, one fancies with a wink, the portfolio of transport, which gave him control over the Rhodesia Railways.

Certainly a part of his success has been due to his treatment of, and thus his treatment by, the Rhodesian Press. He is on first-name terms with dozens of Rhodesian, South African and English newspapermen. He has cultivated their friendship until it is a model of what the relationship of a politician on the make and the Press should be—always “good for a quote”, always “ready to play ball”. When his car breaks down on the way back from Government House and he accepts a lift from an unknowing motor-cyclist, he makes sure that this “human interest” tit-bit

finds its way into the eager hands of the reporters; when a flustered airport manager produces a cup of tea for him during a terminal building press conference, the busy eyebrows will rise, and Welensky will enquire about "tea for the gentlemen of the Press"? When none can be produced at short notice, he purses his lips and gently refuses to drink his own.

A great deal of his success, and the thing that may hasten his downfall, is the over-fine art he has developed of being all things to all men. To the Afrikaner he will recall his Afrikaans mother; to the ultra-Britishers, England becomes "home" for him; to the European trade unionist he is "one of you"; he even tried to tell the Africans of turbulent Nyasaland that he "was as much an African as you." It did not go down very well.

He has a rare, gracious streak which, unlike many of the other sides he arranges to catch the light, is genuine. His sworn enemy in the last Federal Parliament was Nyasaland's Wellington C. Chirwa, who needled him more effectively and more often than the rest of the opposition put together. But after returning from a Commonwealth Prime Minister's Conference in London, he confessed to friends that he considered Chirwa more capable than Nkrumah.

Though posing as a humble man, he does not like being humbled. Northern Rhodesia civil servants who crossed him, intentionally or otherwise, have counted the cost high. He has been known to have the Chief Secretary and another senior government official standing outside his office in Lusaka like guilty fourth-formers waiting to see the headmaster. His vanity is quick to rear at a slight.

He is capable of incredible inconsistencies which in a more mature political society would seriously handicap him. An example of this occurred during the recent Federal General Election when a thoughtless Dominion Party spokesman said that in certain circumstances his party might disregard the courts in the interpretation of the constitution if they were returned to power. Welensky, who badly needed an election gimmick, seized upon this and played it to the full, talking about the sanctity of law and British regard for it. Yet five months earlier, he had hinted darkly at another 'Boston tea-party' unless Britain played ball with him in 1960 when the Federation seeks more autonomy. What he actually said was that if the 1960 talks failed, "then I personally would not be prepared to accept that Rhodesians have less guts than the American

colonists”.

It was during the Garfield Todd crisis last year that the true worth and colour of Welensky emerged, and on this alone he can be condemned out of hand as a leader to whom words like partnership are no more than eleven letters in the alphabet. One word from Welensky during the Todd affair and the situation—for Todd—would have been saved. But Welensky chose to let the Southern Rhodesia premier roast on the spit and, when he was nearly done, declare that the issue was one of personalities, not principles.

For his relations with the Africans, there is little to be said. The simple truth is that, born and bred in the country though he is, he understands them no better than he does the Eskimoes. Only lately has the truth slowly broken upon him that he cannot carry them with him on the same tide of oratory, bluff and charm that won and keeps for him the bulk of European support.

He has been told by Whitehall that he has two years in which to produce evidence that the Africans can be won over to accepting Federation, and his dilemma is to accomplish this without antagonising the Europeans. Up to the Todd affair, he had the stature to have attempted and, perhaps, achieved this racial double. He threw away the chance, and his conduct recently has confirmed his failure. By his stern handling of the Nyasaland emergency, where as Minister of Defence he despatched European troops from both Rhodesias, he may have gained the support of the bulk of the European population of the Federation, but he has surely antagonised for all time the 2,660,000 Africans of the protectorate, and the rent in the Federal fabric that has appeared in its most picturesque corner is likely to spread that much more rapidly southwards.

What of his future? As the Black nationalists spur on the White nationalists, he is likely to lose more and more ground, and by the time the Federation's big hour strikes in 1960, when he will go to London to seek dominion status, the shaky foundations of the Federal State may be insufficient to support him any longer. As the racial situation deteriorates, the Dominion Party will gather strength.

Welensky was at his strongest and most effective as a leader of the opposition. The way things are going in Central Africa today, he may very well find himself in that position again.

## AN INTERVIEW WITH TODD

*Our Salisbury Correspondent, Mr. Denis Grundy, approached Sir Roy Welensky, the Federal Prime Minister, and the Hon. R. S. Garfield Todd, Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia 1954-58 and present Southern Rhodesian Leader of the Central Africa Party, with the following questionnaire. Sir Roy refused to reply. The answers of Mr. Todd appear below.*

- 1. Does Mr. Todd consider the prospects of the Federation—three disparate States of which two are constitutionally bound to the direct rule of the British Crown as long as the majority of their inhabitants wish—more sanguine than sanguinary?**

I consider that the prospects of the Federation are hopeful rather than fearful. It is in the best interests of all the people that the Federation should succeed. Seven million people wish to lead a happy and prosperous life, and the fact that there are differences between the races and between individuals within each racial group does not make it impossible to establish a wider unity based upon a firm foundation of mutual respect. If, however, any one racial group holds that success means dominance for its group, with demands for exclusive rights in the political or economic life of the country, and pursues this attitude with sufficient strength and determination, then the Federation may well disintegrate. As we know that there are significant numbers of people from each racial group who recognize the desirability of working together, of giving honour to individuals for their qualities regardless of their colour, then there is hope.

- 2. If the above position is acknowledged, what form or degree of enhanced status does Mr. Todd think the Federation is likely to achieve at the 1960 talks with the British Government?**

The Federal system allows for wide latitude in an approach to government. No two federal systems are identical, and each is designed in such a way as to make it able to deal with the problems peculiar to its own circumstances. In our case we have to concern ourselves with three States that are very different in their degree of political and constitutional advancement, in their levels of economy and in their racial structure. Under the terms of the Federal Constitution, each of the three States can look



forward to governing itself in so far as all territorial matters are concerned. By general agreement, a substantial proportion of the powers of government have been given to the Federal authority, which deals with such subjects as defence, public health, control of imports and exports, railways and meteorology, for the whole Federation. On the other hand, there are differences of attitude regarding some responsibilities, as to whether they should be Federal subjects or territorial ones. For example, while Southern Rhodesia agreed that the Federal Government should be responsible for National Parks, Northern Rhodesia was not prepared to relinquish control over her own. Under our Federal Constitution, it is possible to reconsider the divisions of responsibility and authority as between a State and the Federal Government, and the Constitution provides that, "Not less than seven or more than nine years from the date of the coming into force of this Constitution, there shall be convened a conference consisting of delegations from the Federation, from each of the three territories and from the United Kingdom, chosen by their respective governments, for the purpose of reviewing this Constitution". I hold that we should now give the most serious consideration to the desire of many Nyasaland Africans to break away from the Federation, a happening which might well lead to a similar demand from Northern Rhodesia and which could, in turn, drive Southern Rhodesia to seek admittance to the Union of South Africa.

In considering this desire for self-government for Nyasaland, it might be found desirable to restore to the State many of the functions of government which are now Federal, such changes to be made after full discussion and agreement between the Federal Government and the self-governing State of Nyasaland. At the 1960 Conference it will be necessary to consider a timetable for the grant of self-government to Northern Rhodesia and to Nyasaland within the Federation. If in 1960 it were agreed that Northern Rhodesia would become self-governing in 1965, she might be assured that at that date a full revision of the division of powers of government as between herself and the Federal Government would be made. A similar procedure would take place for Nyasaland if it were decided that she would be given self-government in, say, 1970. In suggesting the dates of 1965 and 1970 for Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland respectively, I hold that these dates will arrive before a desirable degree of maturity will be in evidence; but I am afraid that, as far as

Nyasaland is concerned, self-government will have to be granted earlier than 1970. As soon as the United Kingdom Government has assisted these two territories to their new positions as self-governing States, with agreement reached on what responsibilities of government will be transferred from the Federal sphere back to the Territorial sphere, then the United Kingdom should withdraw from this part of Africa.

If, for reasons of national pride, responsibilities of government were unwisely claimed by the new States, it would be hoped that the new Governments would soon learn by experience, and before too much harm had been done, that such responsibilities could be better shouldered by the Federal Government itself and that they would be returned. On the other hand, it might well be found that some subjects such as Public Health, which is now a Federal matter, can best be carried out by the State. Where changes of this type were to be made, appropriate financial adjustments would accompany them. A plan such as this would secure full status for the Federation and make it a self-governing nation within our Commonwealth by 1970 at the latest.

**3. Should the outcome of the 1960 talks prove unsatisfactory, would Mr. Todd conceivably favour a merger between Southern Rhodesia and the Union of South Africa?**

In 1923 Southern Rhodesia rejected a proposal that she should become of province of the Union of South Africa. There are far stronger reasons today why she should not wish to join a neighbour which moves towards the establishment of a republic, and which has a second official language. It is by no means sure either, that South Africa would wish to have us as a province. A large proportion of our European population would object very strongly to a move in this direction, and they would be joined in their objection by the great majority of our two and a half million Africans and our Coloured people and Asians. A Nationalist Government would ask its own terms and no one could object to that, but I cannot believe that the terms offered would satisfy more than a small percentage of our total population. In 1923 the European electorate made the decision; but if the proposal were to be made at this time, I believe that the whole population would have to be consulted and its consent obtained. In 1953 it was found desirable to broaden the economic

basis of the economy of Southern Rhodesia and a decision was made to turn to the north, not to the south, and we are now challenged to make a success of the Federation. As this question has been put to me personally, I would answer that under no circumstances would I favour a merger. If there are enough people who feel as I do, then we have no option but to make a success of 1960 and the years beyond also.

**4. Bearing in mind that Her Majesty the Queen is not sovereign of the Indian Republic, does Mr. Todd consider that a unilateral declaration of a Rhodesian Republic could be made without breaking constitutional ties with the British throne and the Commonwealth?**

If the Federal Government, by unilateral action, declared itself a republic, it would set itself against Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and would be refusing Her Majesty the Queen the right to continue to carry out her responsibilities in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. Such action would be condemned by the whole Commonwealth, with perhaps one exception, and I believe that our defiance of Her Majesty's Government and our refusal to permit Her Majesty to carry out her responsibilities to about four millions of her subjects would mean that we would be excluded from the Commonwealth. The self-governing countries of the Commonwealth are today most seriously concerned with the situation in Central Africa for, with only one exception, they believe that racial policies are not in harmony with the spirit of the Commonwealth.

**5. Does Mr. Todd endorse the political principle that "government should be with the consent of the governed"?**

I believe that government should not only be with the consent of the governed, but that eventually it *must be* with the consent of the governed. This consent may be a consent of acquiescence, as it has been in Southern Rhodesia for many years; but those who believe that as long as Europeans control the Federal elections and therefore the government and the army, they will remain happily in control of the situation, are deluding themselves. If seven million African people, although they have no vote, decide that they will not be governed by a European

government, then the situation could be made quite untenable and the resolving of it would only be a matter of time. I believe that in the case of our Federation, taking world influences into consideration, the time would be short.

**6. Would Mr. Todd care to comment on the published views of the Dean of Salisbury that the blame for the emergency must be laid firmly at the feet of the Europeans?**

I would rather say that the responsibility today lies with the European, for we have the power in government and as a people we have provided most of the leaders so far. The situation today calls for wise and sympathetic leadership, and the challenge is for us to provide it. If we allow the Federation to fail, then we are blameworthy. Of course we are to blame to a large extent for the mistakes of the past five years, for we have not succeeded in implementing the policy of partnership, simply because we have refused to face its implications.

**7. In contrast with those of Southern and Northern Rhodesia, the Federal franchise at present virtually excludes the African from casting a vote in an ordinary constituency. Does Mr. Todd consider this inequitable?**

I made my protest against the provisions of the Federal Electoral Act at the time it was considered in Parliament. It is true that there are African representatives in the Federal House, but it is also true that such special representation is not considered satisfactory by the African people themselves. Although it is estimated that 80,000 Africans could have registered on the "B" roll, fewer than 800 had done so at the time of the Federal election last year. In Northern Rhodesia the new electoral law has been gladly received by the African people, and 8,000 people registered in a short space of time. In Southern Rhodesia the response has been much less satisfactory, but the main difference between the two situations is that the Northern Rhodesia Government used its influence to encourage people to enrol, while in Southern Rhodesia no such encouragement is given. The Federal Government did try, by quite widespread propaganda, to persuade Africans to register on the "B" roll, but the "B" vote is recognized by Africans as being so inferior in

value to the "A" vote that they are not prepared to exercise their rights in this regard. I believe that the Federal franchise law is the largest single road-block on the way to partnership. It is a great pity that the Federal Government did not tackle its franchise problem in the light of the Tredgold Report, for it will now almost certainly be an item on the agenda at the 1960 talks and I do not believe that it is best considered at such a Conference.

**8. At the Northern Rhodesia elections last March the African vote for candidates of the United Federal Party was almost negligible. What significance does Mr. Todd attach to this?**

The United Federal Party, largely because of its Federal section, has become synonymous, in the minds of Africans, with a doctrine of European supremacy. The last Federal election was simply a call by the United Federal Party for support for a Government which promised to secure dominion status on the present almost entirely European Federal franchise. The Federal Party had already shown that it could persuade Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom to accept a Federal franchise law which was quite unacceptable to Africans. This law discriminated against Africans who were educated and responsible citizens and who wished to exercise their influence in government but who did not qualify on economic grounds. A large proportion of these people felt doubly aggrieved because, as teachers, medical orderlies, agricultural demonstrators, they were employees of one Government or another and their salaries were too small to allow them to qualify for the vote which they believed they were entitled to exercise. No Government which takes such action is likely to gain the confidence of this, the most important political group amongst the African people. The influence of this group is widespread and very great; and as the Northern and Southern Rhodesian sections of the Federal Party are so closely linked to the Federal section of the Party, they both share in the lack of confidence by the African people.

**9. In furthering the advancement of the African in public services and private industry, does Mr. Todd think that the principle of the "rate for the job" should be rigorously applied?**

There is no doubt that when the "rate for the job" can be applied rigorously, the Federation will be in a very much sounder position economically than it is today. Wealth cannot be created by legislation, however, and the economic growth of the country and the improvement of pay and conditions will have to march hand in hand. I believe that the conditions of pay and service which have been won by European craftsmen should be rigorously maintained, and that as other jobs can be shown to be worth higher rates of pay, these should be given. Now that the Industrial Conciliation Act has been passed, all workers will be able to concern themselves with the widest interests of labour. The last employer which will be able to come into line will be government itself. In Southern Rhodesia, if the present European rates of pay were applied to African school teachers, grade for grade, the wages bill would probably exceed £7,000,000 per annum, and with other costs in education the total account for African education would consume almost half of the total annual revenue. There will have to be a much greater domestic output before the principle of the rate for the job can be rigorously applied. It is to be hoped that the period of adjustment will be as short as possible, and during that time the present rates as applied to Europeans should be given to people of any race when they come to the same bench, desk or footplate.

**10. Would Mr. Todd favour legislation, Territorial or Federal, that enabled local authorities to set aside areas for unfettered non-racial occupation, residential, industrial and commercial?**

I would favour legislation to free the whole of the commercial and industrial areas of towns from racially restrictive clauses immediately, and I believe that it would be a sound policy to set aside "open" residential areas, but with sound town-planning policies including minimum-value building clauses.

# NATIVES NO LONGER KILL TWINS

COLIN LEYS

*Author of "European Politics in Southern Rhodesia".*

'SCRATCH a Rhodesian and you'll find a South African' was the suggestion offered me by a journalist soon after I arrived in Central Africa. It is a useful general prescription against being deceived by 'partnership' humbug. For this humbug plays a vital role in White Rhodesian attitudes.

Any group of people engaged—however reluctantly—in suppressing another needs a rationale, and the more guilty that they feel about it, the more this rationale consists of humbug. (Hitler felt no guilt, and the Nazi ideology, though full of obscene rubbish, contained little cant.) Most White Rhodesians put their 'Britishness' above everything, and most of them have been brought up on vaguely 'public school' values. Consequently they are not only very sensitive to criticism, but also unconsciously guilt-ridden, and the evidence for this is the breath-taking hypocrisy of the official 'partnership' ideology—breath-taking in scale and breath-taking in *naiveté*. (As a friend remarked recently, after reading Lord Malvern's speech to the House of Lords: 'You *can't* parody these people'.)

The edifice of systematic humbug which is the modern doctrine of partnership is getting widely known. For anyone who cares to study it in detail, it is paraded in all its pathos by B. G. Paver in his recent book 'His Own Oppressor', and brilliantly dissected by Cyril Dunn in his 'Central African Witness'. To grasp its full significance, it must be seen as emerging from the White Rhodesian's past, not merely as a shack-built affair hastily run up to satisfy a dubious Colonial Office in Westminster. It is true that the attempt to systematise the doctrine is recent. But its key elements are as deeply rooted in White Rhodesian psychology as those of apartheid are in the neuroses of the Volk.

Some elements of White attitudes are hangovers from the earliest period of settlement, the 'pioneer' phase. Central Africa was supposed to be full of undervalued assets, and Rhodesia was in a position to make a takeover bid. The pioneers, and the settlers who came after them, were there to realize the assets. A few of them shared the less material visions of Rhodes, and perhaps some could imagine a Southern Rhodesia transformed by investment and colonization into a new Cape

Colony. But the keynote of this period was, quite simply, gold. Bulawayo was a mining town, full of speculators and assayers. The settlers were mostly prospectors and farmers, largely amateur, whose approach to these jobs was to persuade Africans to dig for them on the sites of abandoned Bantu gold-workings, to clear the bush where they had pegged out farms, or to herd the cattle taken as spoils of war. Few had much capital, and from this early period dates the reliance (pioneered further south) on pressures other than wage-incentives to make Africans work for White men; exasperation with the labour thus procured; and phoney rationales for maintaining the discrepancy between White and Black pay-scales.

The 'frontier mentality' is often appealed to nowadays as a rather attractive explanation of some White Rhodesian attitudes. For instance, it is said to account for an individualism which is partly responsible for impatience with Colonial Office 'interference', and a self-reliance which makes Africans' lack of skills all the more incomprehensible and irritating to the average European.

The trouble with this view is that there really were some self-reliant White individualists in the 1890's and after, some of them men who had been roaming the country for years before the Pioneer Column crossed the Limpopo. Selous is the most famous of these, and he was followed by others like Chirupula Stevenson and Sir Stewart Gore-Browne in Northern Rhodesia. But that generation is all but extinct, and the new one is singularly lacking in the kind of individualism and self-reliance required by the 'frontier mentality' theory. There can in fact be few people with such a strong *collective* sense of dependence on the laws which shield them from (African) competition as White Rhodesians today. Even the physical reminders of the pioneer period in the towns—colonnaded stucco stores and swing-door bars—have almost all been superseded by the concrete and glass of a highly regulated and cosy partnership between White capitalists and White artisans.

But the frankly materialist attitude towards the land and its resources which dominated the pioneer period, and the sense of exasperated dependence on its African population, remain; these correspond to a continuing reality. The Africans were regarded as, in effect, sub-human. They were cruel and backward. They spoke no English. They had more cattle than was good for them, yet were surly and resentful when these were



taken away. They were dangerously numerous in relation to the settlers, and had to be kept in a state of intimidation after the conquest by periodic exemplary beatings and worse. That they rebelled in 1896, and nearly decimated the White population, confirmed the very worst of the beliefs about them.

These beliefs went unchallenged by any important voice in the outside world. The protests of the Aborigines Protection Society were dismissed as ignorant sentimentalism, while the British public at large was riding on the full tide of imperialism. And so the real legacy of this period remains the fact that the African population as a whole have never been accepted as possessing the 'full human endowment'. By too many of each succeeding influx of settlers they have been regarded chiefly as one of the liabilities encumbering a real-estate venture, which the White man hopes to turn into a going concern. And this, of course, is what the central distinction of the 'partnership' ideology—the distinction between 'civilized' and 'uncivilized' persons—is really about. The idea of an 'uncivilized person' is a modern (and very British) formula for talking about a form of life which is not really a *person* at all.

In the second phase of settlement, the incoming Whites were no longer strictly 'pioneers', but the kind of jobs they came to do remains significant today; gold small-working, railway building and operating, public works, mine engineering and management, building. In this society the foundations of job reservation were laid; because capital investment was being pushed ahead by the Chartered Company in order to get the mines and farms paying, and for this imported skills were needed. When the next phase of development proved disappointingly slow, White artisans began a long struggle with employers and government to get security against replacement by Africans.

The Company was the government. While Rhodes lived, Southern Rhodesia was really run, as far as the settlers were concerned, like one of the proprietary colonies of America, such as Penn's Pennsylvania. 'Mr. Rhodes' periodically toured the country, hearing grievances, making personal loans, promising a bright future; and even after his death, Jameson maintained something of this atmosphere for a few years. But after this the 'Chartered' was a more remote body with a fairly impersonal Administrator. In extracting from this form of government laws and development spending designed to make their living standards more secure, the settlers formed an attitude towards govern-

ment which has also survived. They had come into the country on 'patriotism plus 5%', and the government's job was to underwrite this proposition.

Here is another key element in 'partnership' thought. The reiterated desire that party political divisions should remain on the 'real' (as opposed to 'racial') issues is of course one way of expressing a desire to maintain the general *status quo* of European supremacy; but it also expresses a more particular desire to maintain what is really a *communal* (White) parliament, a responsive and informal (White) administration, the *family* atmosphere of the White Whiggery. Government has always been a friend to the White Rhodesian, no matter what party has been in office (and it is no accident that one party has in fact been in office since 1934). 'Partnership' means preserving this.

Yet another strand in current settler attitudes is traceable to this period; in the early 1900's the Company turned its attention seriously to European farming, and began the chequered chapter in settler experience so vividly evoked in Doris Lessing's 'The Grass Is Singing'. This was *real* settlement. There were (and still are) relatively few White farmers; but unlike, for example, miners working on wasting orebodies, they represent the White population's faith in its own permanence. Yet of all groups in the White population, this was until recently one of the most economically insecure, and even now the image of the prosperous tobacco farmer is a misleading guide to White farming as a whole. During the depression, the farmers required a particularly wide range of discriminatory measures and subsidies to keep them on the land; their insecurity and the remedies adopted for it epitomized the insecurity of the high-consumption White population as a whole.

Speaking generally, the depression years produced the apparatus of White supremacy in Southern Rhodesia as we know it—the Land Apportionment Act, the Industrial Conciliation Act, the Public Services Act, etc. Segregation was embodied in the law under the slogan of 'parallel development', without any interference from Britain. This was the work of settler government (responsible government was granted in 1923). And here, above all, is the key to the *humbug* in 'partnership' ideology.

Its major tenet is that sovereignty belongs to all 'civilized' persons, discovered by criteria which take no account of colour. Yet there can be few electorates with so clear a notion of the

way in which a White monopoly of political power is essential to White social and economic privileges.

From the 1930's also dates the settler bugbear of 'outside interference'. As everyone knows, it was Lord Passfield's famous 1930 declaration on the 'paramountcy' of native interests in Northern Rhodesia which touched off the settler pressures which eventually led to Federation. But the settlers' morbid sensitivity to the new criticism is of more general interest. It betrayed some of the guilt which underlies White ideology in Central Africa. And it illustrated an already well-developed tendency to project blame for internal difficulties onto scape-goats. 'Outside interference' began to replace 'big business' and 'monopolies,' and take its place alongside the Africans' backwardness, irresponsibility and idleness, as a general cause of difficulties which, in reality, were due to the high standard of life which the settlers required an impoverished country to provide.

The years just before Federation saw two final evolutions of settler ideology. One was due to immigration. Many of the newcomers were fugitives from Crippsian austerity in England, lower middle- and upper working-class people whose rejection of the Welfare State ethos was highly consistent with the inegalitarian values of White Rhodesia. There was also a new superstratum of the administrative and professional classes, and these furnished some of the more articulate propagandists called for by the final stage in ideological growth.

'Parallel development' had to be exchanged for a coherent new doctrine to form a basis on which the British Government would agree to federate the Protectorates with Southern Rhodesia. It is fascinating to trace Welensky's transformation from being a militant trade union leader, and frank champion of White interests, to being the oracle of 'partnership'. His ideological and tactical mentors in this process are typical of the astute new 'backroom' ideologists. (These are a kind of 'liberal realists' whose liberal object is to keep more reactionary politicians out of office, and whose realistic method is to ensure that the present government is always quick enough to take reactionary measures itself.)

And so the Central African Europeans confront reality with the doctrine of 'partnership', the doctrine that the whole of this area, with its 7 million inhabitants, can be run 'for the foreseeable future' by a government responsible only to a handful

of those who, in the eyes of the settlers, are 'civilized'—all the settlers, and perhaps a few thousand Africans; the doctrine that the 'real' issues do not (or must not) include the colour-bar; the doctrine that the 'average' ('uncivilized') African is ignorant and politically indifferent; the doctrine that the 'emergent' African is forming a new 'African middle-class' which will identify itself with the settlers and their regime.

Not a very convincing doctrine, objectively regarded, and this seems to be why it is often bolstered by mystical appeals to the historic civilizing mission of the White man, with his 2,000 years of civilization behind him; to irrelevant and dubious theories of Bantu racial characteristics, to time, and to anti-Communism; and why such phrenetic emphasis is placed on the theoretical differences between the doctrine of 'partnership' and that of 'apartheid'.

*For the doctrine of 'partnership' cannot be abandoned, however unconvincing it may be. Its essential tenets spring from deep psychological imperatives of the settlers' situation.*

Once we grasp that this ideology is indispensable, we can begin to understand the ferocity which its protagonists are capable of displaying towards African nationalism. The very phenomenon contradicts the 'partnership' ideology in a way that is not necessarily true for 'apartheid'. According to the former, most Africans are ignorant and politically apathetic; consequently manifestations of independent African mass organization must be the work of 'agitators', malevolent, and self-seeking corrupters of the uncivilized masses. Against these people partnership is engaged in a crusade. The champions of partnership look upon the ruthless imprisonment of 1,000 African leaders with the satisfaction of worthy policemen who have rounded up a gang of racketeers. It is even clear from White reactions to the emergency that the fifty obscure people who have been killed in Nyasaland are widely looked upon as victims, not of the troops, but of the African Congress! (In the same way Lord Malvern once spoke as if the people killed by the police in Nyasaland in the anti-federation disturbances of 1953, had really been killed by Michael Scott). And the police-state apparatus currently being rushed through to completion is not regarded as a grim necessity to preserve White control, but is welcomed by all White parties for the 'protection' it affords to the ordinary African.

In other words, there is a grim aspect to the 'partnership'

humbug. Its lack of contact with reality is appalling; yet since it purports to embody all the moral values of the 'British way of life', any challenge to it is treated as vicious, justifying rigorous repression.

It is no accident that the recent wave of repressive measures was justified as a response to a series of 'plots', alleged or hinted at (only the Nyasaland 'plot' charges were ever specified). Richard Hofstadter, speaking of the extreme right in the U.S.A., has aptly identified the readiness to believe in 'conspiracies' as the *paranoiac stage* of reasoning on the part of any group of people whose aims and beliefs have moved too far out of touch with the actual trend of reality.

Just how out of touch they are, Cyril Dunn poignantly reminds us with a Rhodesian newspaper headline whose fatuous ineptitude captures perfectly the ignorance, the doomed good intentions of 'partnership' liberalism: NATIVES NO LONGER KILL TWINS —THEY ARE PROUD OF THEM.



## LABOUR AND CENTRAL AFRICA

BARBARA CASTLE, M.P.

*Chairman of the British Labour Party.*

THE crisis in Central Africa, which many of us believed was bound to break around our heads in 1960, has come earlier than we thought. And the point of explosion has proved, after all, to be Nyasaland. When I was in the Federation fifteen months ago, I did not realize how imminent was the explosion there. Certainly there was restiveness in Nyasaland. Nearly all the people I met of all races—African M.P.s and members of provincial councils, chiefs, European missionaries and Asians, too—pressed upon me how genuine were African fears of Federation and how much the normally happy relations between Africans and government officials had deteriorated as a result. I remember, too, a hectic evening spent in the Ndirande Club at Limbe, being delightfully entertained by a large number of Africans who, after plying me with refreshments, drew their chairs round in a ring and argued with me for two hours excitedly, but always courteously, on the question of whether Nyasaland should secede from the Federation. They brushed aside my plea that it was far more constructive for them to back the Labour Party's policy of trying to liberalize and democratize the Federation as a condition of its continuance. They clearly thought I was living in a dream world, and in the end I was disconcerted when, after what I felt was an eloquent and unanswerable plea to them not to divide the African cause inside the Federation by contracting out, they cheered to the echo the simple and emphatic interjection by Mr. Wellington Chirwa (then a Federal M.P.): "We will never accept the Federation. We intend to secede."

The truth is that neither I, nor any of us in Britain, had realized the extent to which Federal (i.e. Southern Rhodesian) power was spreading through the Protectorates, robbing them of their traditional sense of security and bringing African fears to boiling point. Recent events, which have revealed the true intentions of the Federal Government, have proved that the Africans had a better assessment of the situation than we had. And that assessment has driven them to take action on their own behalf in the belief that no-one else is likely to take it for them. The challenge which faces us now is therefore threefold. First, how can we save Nyasaland from becoming another Cyprus, in which the

legitimate demands of the African people become lost to view in a vicious round of violence and counter-violence? Secondly, what are the principles with which we should approach the 1960 review of the future of Federation? And thirdly, how can we, as practical politicians, ensure that those principles are carried into effect?

None of these problems is easy to solve. If we are ever to solve them, we must get certain basic facts clear. To begin with, we must not allow our assessment of the Nyasaland situation to be bedevilled with talk of either Communist or Mau Mau plots. Of course, the return of Dr. Banda to Nyasaland last July has contributed to the flare-up of the crisis there, because he is a single-minded and effective exponent of secession. I talked to him in the House of Commons just before his return, and it was clear to me then that he was implacable on this issue. I tried on him, too, my argument that the Africans in all three territories in the Federation should concert their strength in order to improve the Federation rather than abandon it. He listened politely enough, but I sensed he was not impressed. He, like the Africans I met in Nyasaland, obviously believed that the encroachments of the Federal Government had already gone so far as to endanger the development of Nyasaland as an African State, and he was determined to save what he could from the spread of White dominance. Whether we agree with this approach or not, it is a perfectly legitimate political aim.

It is clear, also, that the Accra Conference has contributed to the developments in Nyasaland—but not in the crude way that Sir Roy Welensky believes. I know from the reports I have received from British M.P.s who were present at Accra that this was far from being a Communist-run show. On the contrary, Mr. Tom Mboya, as Chairman, was scrupulously careful not to let the Russian and Chinese fraternal delegates dominate the proceedings to the detriment of British or American representatives. No, Accra had a different significance from this. It was the symbol of the spread of African rights in an African continent. The presence there of representatives of African movements all over Africa, some of them in government and some still fighting for the barest recognition, gave a tremendous impetus to the claim of "Africa for the Africans". But from all the reports it would seem that this claim is still being advanced, not in the narrow sense of "Black racialism", but in the unanswerable form of the demand for full democratic rights for all peoples.

The net of African nationalism is steadily tightening round the last two remaining enclaves of rich, White settler privilege—Kenya and the Central African Federation—and inside these enclaves the Europeans are making a last desperate bid to apply different conditions for African advance than are now accepted in the rest of Africa. These areas with large European minorities, or with strong economic White interests, *do* present special problems which will need all our tact and understanding to solve without violence—on either side. But certainly there is no hope of solving them unless we first clear hypocrisy out of the way and face the realities. The worst enemies of multi-racialism or ‘partnership’ are those who elevate temporary political expedients like a qualified franchise into a permanent constitutional principle, and so make ‘partnership’ a synonym for the indefinite denial of African democratic rights.

It would appear that some of the Europeans in Kenya are beginning to realize this. For all its faults, the organization of moderates launched by Mr. Michael Blundell has produced a statement with one important virtue: it recognizes that Kenya is a state in which eventually the African majority must dominate. Once this goal is accepted by Europeans and the correct principles taken as the basis of discussion, agreement about the rate of progress towards the goal becomes much more feasible. Unfortunately, in the Central African Federation there is no sign yet of an equivalent recognition among the Europeans of this fact. If there were, the last thing they would be pressing for at this moment would be greater powers for the Federal Government and early independence from Westminster. If there is one thing which history makes clear (as events both in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia have proved) it is this: to grant independence to a territory while power is in the hands of a racial minority is not progress towards democracy, but a retreat from it. The very inability of even self-styled “enlightened” European leaders like Sir Roy Welensky to realize this simple truth proves that they are not fit to exercise the greater political powers for which they are clamouring.

Indeed, looking back at the behaviour of the Federal leaders over the past six years, the fears of those of us who doubted the wisdom of rushing through Federation so quickly have been fully justified. It pleases Sir Roy to attack the Labour Party as descending “to any level to damage the Federation”. But the Federation has been damaged, perhaps irretrievably, by those



who have used it merely as a stepping stone to dominion status, who have lost no opportunity of weakening Colonial Office control over the two protectorates and who have pressed greedily for bigger and quicker transfers of power to the politically entrenched White minority. In this way they have kept African fears at fever-point. The contempt they have shown for those fears, their refusal to modify their demands by one jot in order to allay them, show that their desire is not for a policy of partnership at all. And now they are reaping the harvest of African resistance in Nyasaland.

Equally tragic has been the folly of the British Government in supporting, and even encouraging, Federal ambitions over the past six years. The agreement signed in 1957 between the Colonial Secretary, Mr. Lennox Boyd, and Sir Roy Welensky as Federal Prime Minister was a gratuitous contribution to African fears. The agreement not only enhanced the status and prestige of the Federation by granting it increased responsibility for external affairs—at a time when the whole experiment was less than four years old and was still very far from being accepted by the Africans—it contained a more sinister element. This was the famous declaration that the British Government recognizes the existence of a 'convention' whereby the Government "in practice does not initiate any legislation to amend or repeal any Federal Act or to deal with any matter included within the competence of the Federal Legislature, except at the request of the Federal Government." The purpose of this 'convention,' the two statesmen declared, was to clear up any "doubts" about the purpose and effect of Article 29(7) of the Federal Constitution, which provides that "nothing in this constitution shall effect any power to make laws for the Federation or any of the Territories conferred on Her Majesty by any Act of the Parliament of the United Kingdom." Thus the aim of the "convention" was to present any critics of the Federation who might succeed the present British Government in office with the *fait accompli* of virtual Federal independence. And, indeed, Sir Roy went back to Salisbury to assure his jubilant European audiences that he had "dished the Labour Party."

Such a convention has not, of course, statutory authority. It cannot over-ride Article 29. Nonetheless it is an indication of the extent to which Sir Roy has been steadily mobilizing his forces to make political war on any British Government which did not give him his own way. It is an indication, also, of the

open way in which the British Government has sided with the present rulers of the Federation against the views of the African majority. Another example of this bias was, of course, given by the Colonial Secretary when he over-rode the objections of the African Affairs Board to the Federal Franchise Bill. Thus the stage has been set for the present troubles which arise directly from the growing African belief that the Colonial Office had no longer the will or the power to protect African rights and that their only hope was to organize to protect themselves.

Over the past eighteen months the British Labour Party has become increasingly alarmed about these developments. In the first few years of the Federation's life, despite the Party's strong objection to the imposition of Federation, there was a genuine acceptance inside the Party of the need to try and make it work, partly for economic reasons and partly, too, because the Party hoped that progressive racial policies operating in the Protectorates would help to liberalize the Federation as a whole. But, following the British Government's treatment of the African Affairs Board, the mood has changed. In March, 1958, the Party issued a statement which spelt out in precise terms the conditions on which alone it believed the Federation could endure. These included "an unequivocal statement that the objective of the Federation is complete democracy and equal rights for every citizen"; the revision of the Federal franchise "to ensure genuine African representation in the Federal Parliament"; and the rapid elimination of racial discrimination in social relations, industry and education. And it added sternly that: "It will be by reference to the progress made in these matters that the Labour Party will decide its attitude at the conference which is to review the future of the Federation in 1960."

The issue between the Labour Party and Sir Roy Welensky is, therefore, clearly joined. The Labour Party does not only (as the statement also points out) stand by the Preamble to the Federal constitution which provides that Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland shall continue as separate Protectorates "for as long as their respective peoples so desire." It has also laid down the principle that the very existence of the Federation is still conditional. This implies a power of interference by the British Parliament to ensure that those conditions are met, a right which Sir Roy Welensky would bitterly repudiate. Indeed Labour Members have also been sharply reminding the Southern Rhodesian Government that its self-governing status does not give

it *carte blanche* to treat its African population as it likes. For a long time the powers of the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations under Sections 28 and 30 of the Southern Rhodesia Constitution Letters Patent, 1923, to veto measures which unfairly discriminate against African citizens, have fallen into disuse. But Labour Members are now invoking them against the Unlawful Organization Bill, the Preventive Detention Bill and the amendment to the Native Affairs Act recently introduced into the Southern Rhodesian legislature. Although the motion calling on the Secretary of State to exercise these powers is an unofficial back-bench one, it has nonetheless been signed by a large and representative group of Labour M.P.s.

It is clear, therefore, that both main political groupings in the British Parliament are taking up their positions in readiness for the 1960 review. And it is against this background that the troubles in Nyasaland must be considered. The Africans there have launched a new and lively agitation for secession because they believe it is their only hope. Faced with this, the British Government had two alternatives: either to suppress African agitation and thus risk forcing it into patterns of violence and underground terror; or to seek to allay it by offering the Africans constitutional means of defending themselves. The obvious way of doing this was by speeding up the constitutional reforms already promised for Nyasaland. Indeed, Lord Perth, Minister of State for Colonial Affairs, was due to visit Nyasaland for constitutional talks at the very time that the disturbances began. If the British Government was ready to redress the balance of power between African and European in the Federation, and so allay African fears, it would have jumped at Lord Perth's visit as a heaven-sent opportunity. Instead, to the consternation of the Labour Opposition, it announced that Lord Perth's visit was to be postponed because it had decided that "against this background of violence and unrest . . . the proposed constitutional talks cannot at present be held." The Labour Party denounced this as the old, old imperialist tactic of refusing reforms until unrest breaks out and then using the unrest as the excuse for not introducing the reforms. Mr. James Callaghan, from the Labour front bench, reminded the Government that an all-party parliamentary delegation to the Federation had recommended unanimously as long ago as 1957 that "a bold increase in representative government in the Territories" was urgently necessary! But in vain.

Was the Government's action due to stupidity or something more sinister? In the debate on Nyasaland on March 3rd, the Colonial Secretary revealed that he had very different ideas about constitutional reforms for Nyasaland than either the Opposition, or the African representatives with whom he had had informal talks, had been led to believe. "I have repeatedly made it clear to the House," he said, "that the Nyasaland Constitution, which came into being in 1956, would have to run until May, 1960, when the life of the present legislature expires." Challenged as to exactly what that meant, he added: "We would agree well before May, 1960, on what the changes thereafter were to be." Labour M.P.s were quick to point out that this would be too late to give the Africans effective representation at the 1960 review. Only one interpretation can be put on this policy: that the Government is not sorry to see trouble flare up in Nyasaland, for the disturbances enable it to suppress the African National Congress just as it is beginning to grow in strength, to introduce sweeping emergency powers and to suspend constitutional talks.

Equally irresponsible and provocative was the Government's action (again taken in the teeth of Labour protests) of allowing Federal (i.e. Southern Rhodesian) forces to be drafted into Nyasaland. This was followed by a further affront to the British Parliament in the deportation by Federal immigration authorities of Mr. John Stonehouse, M.P. The fact that he had been deported from a British Protectorate, Northern Rhodesia, when on his way to visit another Protectorate, Nyasaland, brought home sharply the extent to which the powers of the House of Commons are being undermined. The Commonwealth Relations Office hurried out a document to prove that the Federal Government was within its legal powers, since the Federal constitution gives it sole jurisdiction over immigration policy. Again the Labour Opposition called on the Government to protest against this action, tabling a motion declaring that "the entry of a citizen of the United Kingdom into a British Protectorate should be not subject to the veto of the Federal Government." But in vain. The Government's determination to enforce the authority of the Federal Government at every stage has only strengthened the demand of the Labour Party (made in its statement of March, 1958) that in 1960 "there should be a review of the powers of the federal and territorial governments so that the position of the Protectorates is safeguarded."

It is because of the partiality persistently shown by the British Government that the Labour Party views with deep scepticism the stories of a "massacre plot," first revealed to an astonished Commons by the Colonial Secretary on March 3rd and later, under pressure from the Opposition for more facts, "substantiated" in a White Paper. But by now the Labour Party was thoroughly alarmed by the revelations of the Government's mood. We know from bitter experience over Cyprus how skilled this Government is at obscuring its own designs by drawing red herrings of "violence" across the trail. The Labour Party promptly, therefore, trumped the Government's card by offering to co-operate in sending a parliamentary commission to Nyasaland to investigate the background to the disturbances. The Government at first refused this out of hand, but, under the pressure of public opinion, was compelled to make some gesture of reasonableness. It therefore announced the appointment, not of a parliamentary commission, (which would have confirmed the responsibility of the House of Commons for Federal affairs), but of an independent inquiry under a High Court judge. On March 25th last, the Labour Party issued another statement, welcoming the setting up of this commission, but urging that it should have adequate powers. The announcement since then of the powers of the commission proves, alas, that they will be far from adequate. The commission will sit in private; it will not have the right to compel the attendance of witnesses; worst of all, those implicated in the inquiry will not be entitled to be present when evidence is being given against them and nor will their legal representatives. They will not even be allowed to know the specific charges brought against them. It is a parody of an inquiry. The only ray of hope lies in the chairman, Mr. Justice Devlin, a man of fearless judgment and formidable intellect. If any good comes of the inquiry, it will be because he has triumphed over the difficulties its limited powers put in his way.

What, then, of the future? Clearly, the position in Nyasaland will remain one of stalemate until the commission has reported. But, whatever the commission finds, the political needs of Nyasaland remain unchanged. Even if it can be proved that unrest there is beginning to take illegal forms, the solution is still the same. The African people must be allowed to organize politically, and the African National Congress is the obvious political instrument for this purpose. It is the wildest folly that it should be banned. Moreover, as the Labour Party points out in its recent

statement, the need for constitutional progress in Nyasaland is greater now, not less. Constitutional reforms, guaranteeing a majority of elected Africans in the Nyasaland legislative council and the appointment of African ministers equal in numbers to those of other races, must be put in hand immediately—before, not after, the 1960 review. Talks along these lines with African leaders should start at once. The “state of emergency”, advanced as an excuse for not holding them, must be lifted. Those against whom criminal charges can be advanced should be brought to trial; the rest must be released.

But, thanks to the folly of the British Government, even these measures may no longer be enough. The Africans no longer have confidence that dominion status is not going to be imposed on them, just as Federation was. The people of Nyasaland have the right to know that, if they wish to leave the Federation, the British Government does not intend to keep them in it against their will. Personally I still believe that the secession of Nyasaland from a Federation continuing broadly on the old lines would be a gesture of defeat—that what we must aim at is keeping our forces intact until 1960, when the whole position must be fundamentally reviewed. But our only hope of doing this is to assure the Nyasalanders *now* that when 1960 comes, secession will be on the agenda if by then they still insist on it.

On March 24th, the Government informed Parliament that it would be shortly putting forward proposals on the best way of preparing for the Federal review. And it promised that Parliament would be associated “in an appropriate way” with any machinery that might be set up. So far so good. Welcoming this news, the Labour Party has suggested that a parliamentary commission should be appointed immediately to examine the background of all the issues involved, and it insists that such a commission “*should consider every possible alternative for the people of the three territories.*” Stormy days lie ahead. The only way in which we shall weather them is if the British Parliament re-asserts its full authority and comes to this tragic situation with an open mind, ready to give due weight to the mounting anxieties of the African people and to take any steps that may be needed to set them at rest. It is for this that the Labour Party fights and it is prepared to face all the consequences.



"GUILTY UNTIL PROVEN INNOCENT"

## KENYA AT THE CROSS-ROADS

TOM MBOYA, M.L.C.

*Chairman of the All-African Peoples' Conference, Secretary-General of the Kenya Federation of Labour and Member of the Kenya Legislative Council.*

IN the turmoil of events, one may overlook the importance of the need for a sense of direction; and this, indeed, is the crux of the struggle in Kenya. Ever since the first African elections in March, 1957, the African elected members have demanded that Britain declare its ultimate objective in Kenya. For the absence of any positive policy of transitional development towards a known and accepted goal has resulted in contending forces laying emphasis on such development as will satisfy only those aims beneficial to their respective groups.

Kenya's political development cannot ignore trends in her neighbouring territories; nor the mood, atmosphere and pace set by events in Africa generally. There have been those who have attempted to isolate Kenya and to discover for it a unique solution. One European settler leader stated late in 1957 that Kenya could not develop into another Ghana—by which he meant attainment of independence on the 'one man, one vote' principle—or another Central Africa—by which he meant 'partnership' as defined by Sir Roy Welensky. But having stated that Kenya is different and denied to it this line of development or that, these critics steer sedulously clear of committing themselves to any definite declaration of their own. A handful of European settlers recently proposed that Kenya should develop towards self-government in pockets—that each of the provinces should become a near-autonomous state, so that the 'White Highlands' could remain White. But this idea was so patently ludicrous that the bulk of settlerdom either strongly attacked or ignored it.

What is Kenya to be? To the leaders of African opinion, the answer is clear—an independent democracy founded on universal suffrage, from which discrimination in all its forms is outlawed. Their attention is no longer focussed on what Kenya is to become, but on how and when they can attain this clear objective.

And Kenya must be seen in the context of the African awakening, as manifested in the All-African Peoples' Conference at Accra in December, 1958. How can Kenya hope to escape the consequences of the discussions there? The Conference adopted as



its programme the co-ordination of all efforts in the African struggle for freedom, by creating facilities for co-operative action and mutual help. It passed resolutions on the particular problems or circumstances of individual territories, including one on Kenya. But the constant theme was that Africa had to be freed from colonial rule and White settler domination, and governments responsible to the people established in their place. Without doubt, this has vastly increased the vigour and self-confidence of the Africans in their struggle—the Kenyans need no longer regard themselves as alone. Another development, equally important and much closer to home, was the establishment of the Pan African Freedom Movement for East and Central Africa at a conference of African leaders from East and Central Africa held in Mwanza during September last year. This too aims at co-operative action and mutual help. When, in May, 1958, seven African members were brought to trial on charges of criminal libel and conspiracy, many nationalist organisations in East and Central Africa sent contributions towards their defence, as did a number of individuals and organisations in Europe and America, while Ghana actually sent a defence lawyer—who was refused entry by the Kenya Government.

It is impossible that Kenya should be considered in isolation from events elsewhere in Africa, its development oblivious of the political mood of the Continent. And the inconsistencies of British policy in East Africa aggravate an already urgent grievance. While remaining silent on the future of Kenya, Britain has seen fit to pronounce that Uganda, Tanganyika, Somalia and Aden are to be developed towards democratic self-rule. Kenya cannot afford to remain for long without a sense of direction. For the uncertainty caused by this scrupulous silence is rotting patience and trust.

African fear and suspicion of White supremacy is justified and understandable. The African demands and must have a position of real effectiveness in the government as his only safeguard against a possible South African type of European domination in Kenya and Central Africa. Despite African opposition in 1953, the Central African Federation was imposed on the peoples of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. Since then the Africans have continued to plead for a reversal of this decision. They have petitioned, made repeated representations, argued and agitated. In vain. The British Government betrayed them—it rejected the African Affairs Board advice on the Central African

Franchise Bill and the Constitutional Amendment Bill, both of which were patent discriminatory measures—while Sir Roy Welensky has threatened and bullied them. And in 1960, the Federal Constitution is due for review. Welensky has publicly stated that he considers the grant of dominion status as the logical step to be taken next year; and, as if to give his subjects a foretaste of what such independence will mean, he has encouraged a situation in which the Congresses have been outlawed and their leaders detained for the impertinence of opposition to White supremacy. No further warning is necessary. Dominion status now would destroy all African hopes for development towards democratic government and lead to the disease of another South Africa. Small wonder then that the Africans in nearby Kenya fear for their future and demand an early proclamation of Britain's ultimate intentions towards the colony.

The last two years have seen an intensified constitutional struggle in Kenya. In March, 1957, the newly elected African members of the Legislative Council declared the Lyttelton Constitution void and rejected the two £3,500 a year ministerial posts offered to the African people. In July the African Elected Members' Organisation sent a two-man delegation to London, to explain to the British Government and public its case in rejecting the Lyttelton Constitution, with its White-dominated Council and Cabinet. In October of the same year, Mr. Lennox-Boyd visited Kenya; and without consulting, or even discussing his proposals with all the racial groups, decided to impose a new constitution.

The Lennox-Boyd Constitution conceded an increase of six more seats to the Africans, bringing their representation to parity with the European settlers. But despite this apparent advance, the Constitution still preserved European dominance in the Council of Ministers, and introduced twelve new Legislative Council seats—4 European, 4 Asian, and 4 African—elected by the legislature itself sitting as an electoral college. Since the legislature has an overwhelming European membership, a candidate for these seats must receive the majority support of the European members in order to be elected. No wonder then that the Africans chosen to fill the four special seats tend to reflect European political demands.

Unhesitatingly, the African elected members continued in their boycott of the Council of Ministers, and during 1958 pressed in the Legislative Council for the appointment of a

constitutional expert and the convening of a round-table conference. All their efforts, however, were defeated by a combination of European settler representatives and Government votes in the legislature. Since 1957, the Asians have publicly declared their support for the African demands, and their representatives have consistently voted with the African members on all these issues. Even one European member, Mr. S. V. Cooke, has boldly broken ranks and supported the Africans in their efforts, being censured as a result by some of his European constituents. Yet the coalition of settler and Government representatives has won the day. Mr. E. A. Vasey, Kenya's Finance Minister, failed to win one of the twelve special seats because Europeans disapproved of his public declaration that Kenya would one day have a predominantly African government.

In January, 1959, the Africans decided to carry their resistance to the Lennox-Boyd Constitution even further, by boycotting the sessions of the Legislative Council until their demands were properly considered; and the Indian members—in accordance with a resolution passed at their Congress meeting in April, 1958—decided to boycott the legislature indefinitely as well. In February, the non-European elected members of the Legislative Council, joined by Mr. Cooke, decided to send the first-ever joint delegation to the United Kingdom to press for a declaration of policy towards Kenya, the appointment of a constitutional expert and the convening of a round table conference. This delegation, which visited London in April, was historic and in itself fulfilled two important functions. It established once and for all that the Africans are not alone in their dissatisfaction with the present constitution, and illustrated that it is the European settlers who constitute the stumbling-block in any efforts to arrive at a settlement. All previous talk by the settlers that they alone are capable of leading the country has been made ludicrous by their obvious disunity and lack of any leadership or policy.

Recent activities by Europeans have consisted mainly in fruitless cries for leadership and a positive policy. A Convention of European Associations was held in Nairobi on 10th March, but all it was able to accomplish was a call for continued Colonial Office control of Kenya for the foreseeable future. This is a complete reversal of their 1956 policy, which sought immediate self-government under European control. It is obvious that European settlers are today caught between fear and

realism. They are afraid that democracy will mean an African government which will 'get its own back' by discriminating against them, and will tear down the fence protecting the "White Highlands". They are realistic enough to know—although they are afraid to say so publicly—that whatever they do, African rule in Kenya is on its way. They do not know how to adapt themselves to this new situation and especially how to become part of it. In this, Tanganyika will perhaps provide them with an urgently needed answer. Meanwhile they look to Britain for help, and find little comfort in Britain's refusal to speak out and give them a lead. After the recent events in Central Africa, the Kenya European cannot hope to look to Roy Welensky for ultimate rescue.

In all this confusion, it is necessary to restate the African stand. The Africans demand that it be recognized that Kenya is an African country. It has 6,000,000 Africans to 200,000 immigrants, and any democracy must inevitably and rightly lead to a predominantly African government. As against a racialist Black State, the African has accepted the only rational compromise—a democracy recognizing the rights of all citizens regardless of race or colour, guaranteeing individual property rights and equality before the law, and upholding the civil rights of all citizens through the functioning of an impartial judiciary. The Africans do not and cannot agree that the "White Highlands" should remain the prerogative of any one race, nor can they accept segregation in schools and hospitals. The African leaders guarantee just compensation to any persons affected in the process of reorganizing the country's economic structure when independence is attained. As against this, the settlers offer nothing but undefined partnership and a great deal of vague talk about government by people of integrity and civilized standards. This is the same language that was used in South Africa in 1910 and in Central Africa in 1953; and the evident results are painful reminders to the Africans of the consequences to be expected from any simple faith in words, however sweet they may sound.

The Kenya Government is currently in panic; and arbitrary arrests and detentions continue to hound the Africans in their struggle. But the fight for self-government cannot be stopped by bars or by bullets. History has shown itself a faithful and victorious ally.

## A SOUTH AFRICAN IN NIGERIA

EZEKIEL MPHAHLELE

*Author and Journalist, now lecturing at the University College of Nigeria.*

THE moment I stepped off at Kano airport in Northern Nigeria I felt a wonderful sense of release. Being here in Lagos feels like having jumped suddenly out of a nightmare. How else can it be? There I was, on the night of September 6, walking across from the giant KLM plane to the airport offices, to find immigration, customs and other departments all staffed by Africans. And then to be accorded such civility as I could never dream of in any government office in South Africa.

You leave Ikeja airport on the outskirts of Lagos and drive into the city. The headmaster next to you, who has come to fetch you in his car, says you are welcome. The daily form of greeting the Nigerian keeps to is "welcome!"—when you have been to town and have come back home, when you have been taking the air outside in the yard and re-enter the house. And more often than not, it is accompanied by a handshake. This man has the genuine self-assurance you will not easily find in an African headmaster in the South to-day. He doesn't live in terror of being sacked if he says anything the Government does not like. In any case, there is no Bantu Education for him to administer. He talks to you, and you—you are half-listening. Because you are trying to find your mental bearings. You see the beauty of Nigeria's national dress: not painted with dazzling colours, and yet bright and Oriental. The gestures of the people strike a familiar chord as they speak, because you too are African.

As you travel through the suburbs of Lagos, you are struck by the number of whites living among Africans; by the vigorous life of brisk trading; and by the lust for life that is not, as it is among my people in the South, brought into relief because someone is trying to beat it down, because it seeks to vindicate itself. And you cannot help thinking of the suburbs you yourself come from—drab and neurotic except on Thursdays, when African domestic workers are off duty and inject a new life into the streets.

You enter Lagos and there is the same feverish life you're used to seeing in other cities. But people are milling about in narrow streets, crowded to a constant jostle. There is the

island portion of the town, a vast lagoon caressing its shores. This is the metropolis, joined to the mainland suburbs by a long and sturdy bridge. It is a fever of trading and bargaining. Women sit in endless rows on the edge of the street, selling their lengths of cloth and groceries and haberdashery. And in the vast markets, again women predominate. And you wonder what is coming over Africa! In one respect women in South Africa are more emancipated, and then in another the illiterate and semi-illiterate women of the north reach an almost frightening stage of self-reliance. Then again you remember that African women in South Africa are at this very moment revolting against tradition and Government bullying.

Still more trading! Scores of bars and bottle stores, licensed to sell beers, wines and spirits to anybody. Several of these bars will carry slogans like "God be with thee" or "The Lord loves everyone." The African-owned buses running between Lagos and the provinces will carry similar slogans—"Thy will be done, O Lord."

The town is badly planned. Because there is only one bridge, lines and lines of cars and buses crawl like great snakes every morning into the business centre, flanked by swarms of cyclists who stream into town with a vengeance. There is not a single straight street in Lagos.

The Mosque is in the heart of the town. On Fridays you see myriads of African Moslems spill out of it. They cling to the walls outside, sandals off, listening to the big booming loud-speaker.

You drop in at any hotel or bar or club and you have to shake off any bravado you may be thinking of exhibiting, because it isn't needed! But as soon as you have been introduced as a South African, you are treated with something like special consideration or indulgence. A few come around you and want to know if it is true what they read about in the scanty news reports concerning South Africa; if things are as bad as Alan Paton paints them in the book which they heard read over the wireless. You fill in the details, but there are always too many for any one sitting. And you have now unleashed unending recitals about the grandness and virtues of emergent Nigeria. . . .

Some parts of the town are ugly slums, glorified Sophiatowns and Shanty Towns. But it has its beautiful sections, like the magnificently laid-out civil servants' suburb of Ikoyi. A place

until recently the preserve of the whites, now Africans have entered. And a number of blocks of flats here are occupied by both black and white.

A "Nigerianization office" is in existence. It promotes consciously the entry of Africans into government departments to displace white colonials. A few whites still retain their jobs, as in Ghana. A few whites own large departmental stores. But they don't get in the way, because they are here only on lease terms. Recently, I am told, a white man was charged with inciting a dog to bite an African. He was found guilty and sentenced to a large fine and a stroke with the cane by a black magistrate. The incident aroused indignation in the expected quarters. On appeal, the corporal punishment was scrapped.

Impulsively, I should applaud the former sentence. For I don't see anything in it that is disproportionate to the charge. But I have suffered too much and seen too many people suffer even more in South Africa to applaud. If I thought at any time that the magistrate was being vindictive, I'd understand. But I would not approve it.

And so you go from one experience to another. Yes, you're a foreigner; but then justly one, not a foreigner in your native land. Soon I shall be visiting Ibadan in the north, the centre of Nigeria's intellectual and cultural life. I know that I am in for more startling experiences. The contrasts are very sharp between the black man's life in South Africa and in Nigeria. They act violently upon me. Here I am, moving where I like at any time of day or night, without the fear of being stopped by a policeman who will shout at me for my pass; or a policeman who will rummage my pockets and bag in search of something illicit—that policeman whom I learned to fear and later to hate when I was twelve in the slums of Pretoria; that policeman whose shining badge and handcuffs have always spelt for me the terror of police stations, cells and prison forts, and the forbidding faces of magistrates and clerks of the Court—all ranged to destroy me. No, there is no fear of meeting that policeman of whom my youngest son, aged four, asks, "Is he coming to arrest me, Daddy?" when he sees him pass in front of our house. Here I am, breathing the ordinary air of freedom and testing its salty freshness as I stand on the bridge, looking out across the glistening ripples of the lagoon. I am in the midst of a friendly people whose temperament has nothing to do with

the romantic idea of the savagery, the torrid mood of the Equator.

It is a terrible thing, this importing one's prejudices into a community where they are even now already contraband, or have always been. For instance, when I am asked, as I often am, "are you natives in South Africa doing anything . . .?" my sensibilities are jolted. I find myself explaining the offensive use of "native" in South Africa (with a condescending capital 'N' in the white press). "We the natives of Nigeria" is a common phrase here, and an innocent one, too.

When I meet a white man I unconsciously get on my guard and over-emphasize my sense of independence. Many of the whites I have met here—on an intellectual level—don't encourage one to talk about South Africa. There is about them a mixture of righteous aloofness or indifference and a British dislike of anything that is regarded as distasteful or distressing. Not that it would matter one way or another what they thought about the South; they are such a small number anyhow. Still, their attitude cannot evade a foreigner.

Recently, I asked an African to do my laundry at his own fee. He also washes for a group of whites on the premises where I live. When they found out that he was doing my washing in the same bath he was using for theirs, they told him he must come and wash for me in the building I am occupying. When I was told of it, my temperature went skywards. It had touched the sensitized tissues of my response mechanism. I thought if it were a problem of soap and other things they would have given the washerman a hint. My intention was to say to them incisively if they ever broached the matter: "Being from South Africa, I understand." They haven't said anything about it yet. While I am about it, I want also to ask them and other whites if it is common in Britain to call men-servants "boys"—a word used freely here when a man is referred to. See what I mean?

I enter a European store, and, of course, I am confronted by a crowd of black assistants, placid, obliging, if rather non-committal, and all on their toes. Ah, what a difference—the whole atmosphere. But I'm itching for an encounter, such as is the lot of many non-whites when they enter a store in Africa's Deep South. There is a European manager in a cubicle there. Incidentally, I must see him about a radio I want to buy on a hire purchase agreement. I'm all keyed up. But there he sits



and talks to me, innocent as an egg, exasperatingly neutral!

Again, as I speak to the intelligentsia I notice the complacency and solid sense of security with which they say, "The mosquito helped us, they're on the move. Such things (South African "things") used to happen here. Now they're on the move. See Ikoyi, the civil servants' quarters? Only whites used to live there. It's all changed now. They're on the move. Nigerianization is working. Here you're free to move about, to work where you like. Pity your country is so healthy for them. . . ."

True, the emblem on the flag of the Action Group, the Government party in the Western Region, is the mosquito. Ikoyi is the pride of everybody. Nigerianization, in spite of many difficulties, is moving fast. It is estimated that over 1,000 Nigerians are studying law, medicine, nursing, dentistry, engineering, or are in other professions and trades in the United Kingdom, the U.S.A. and on the Continent. There is constant movement of students and qualified men and women between here and oversea countries. Against the vast population of some 36 million, this number is small. And then none of the four regional governments has yet initiated a high-powered literacy campaign or primary and secondary education with half the requisite intensity. This should be a priority programme in any progressive state.

There are problems like tribal and language divisions which run deeper than many people here care to admit. There are Yorubas, mainly in the Western Region; Ibos, in the East; Hausas, in the North; and quite a mixture in the Southern Cameroons. The North is the biggest region, with some 18 million, Islam being the predominant religion there. There are several dialects, much farther apart than our southern vernaculars. Again, West African communities are so feudal that one doesn't know what changes independence will bring in the distribution of the country's income. At present the wealth of the country is in the hands of a small minority. Government members are paid extra-huge salaries and plum allowances, while the rest of the civil service groans discontentedly. This is a legacy of the colonial system. The British Colonial Service has always been the curly-haired boy of British administration, and its members seem to have had their pockets well lined against mosquito bites. So the Africans have merely jumped into their shoes. It does not seem as if independence will better the lot of the average worker for a

long time after 1960.

Naturally, the politics of a black nationalist state do not have the turbulent clashes that characterize the South African scene. Government and opposition in each region here tend to quibble about vague differences. The fundamental thing with them is independence. Such a set-up produces a totally different leader from that we are used to among the South African oppressed. The African leader in the South is made by the very conditions that are ranged against him and threaten to crush him. He has (or should have) a more definite and uncompromising basis of struggle. Up here freedom of association, of negotiation, of organization and speech, are abundant. So there is time and place for orthodox politics and an appeal to people's overwhelming religious sense.

Nigerians, generally, are anti-Communist. Their trade unions and political leaders, their press, often speak of removing "Communist elements." A number of people I have met don't have the slightest idea what Communism is—or socialism. They simply have a religious belief that it is something to be rejected. Yet I am also told that people don't starve to death here, because communal living still exercises a powerful influence on Nigerian life, as it does in the rest of Africa.

The students I teach here are much more stable emotionally and mentally. Nothing like the pupils I taught in Johannesburg. They are not harassed by the police, by hunger, by a constantly disintegrating community about them. They are not members of unsettled communities which are forever moving with baggage and all, impotent of any cultural stability. I've taught pupils in Johannesburg who hadn't had a meal for several hours.

All these aspects of Nigerian life strike a South African like me most forcefully. The windmills don't cause me sleepless nights. Still, I do often feel a little impatient at the next fellow who has a more contented disposition than South Africa has ever given me reason to have. I know the therapy of being away from it all will do me good. And that smouldering anger I mentioned earlier: that will continue. In the meantime, what an exquisite sense of release! No policeman to frighten me; no white man to push me off the pavement; no one calling me "boy", or "Jim" or "John"; no reference book required; no influx or other controls. Just a little trembling after the nightmare. . . .

## THE UNITED STATES AT U.N.O.

WINIFRED F. COURTNEY

*Referent on Africa for the United States Division of the  
Women's International League for Peace and Freedom.*

MISS MARIAN ANDERSON, the great American Negro singer, is known across the world as one of the ablest and most popular cultural ambassadors the United States has sent abroad. In the newly independent nations she achieved both great personal success and warm affection. When Miss Anderson was noted by the *New York Times* of November 26, 1958, as having "dissented" from her Government's policy as its delegate to the United Nations Fourth (Trusteeship) Committee, she focussed brief attention on the sad fact that in colonial matters the U.S. protects the supposed interests of NATO and not those of Africans struggling for independence. NATO, says the State Department privately, must come first.

Now Miss Anderson did not, of course, say "I dissent," though she surely meant it, for she never took issue with the interpretation of her statement by the New York press. On the morning of November 25 she had, in her official capacity, proposed a delay on an issue concerning the Cameroons too complex for discussion here. NATO powers were on one side of the fence—hers. On the other were the former colonial dependencies led by Ghana and India—supported, as always, by the Soviet bloc. One after another the dark-skinned delegates and their friends had taken her to task: they were sorry indeed to hear such a proposal coming from so distinguished a representative of the United States.

Miss Anderson must have been stung by the implication that she stood opposed to the interests of dependent peoples. She had perhaps not understood what representing her country on Trusteeship would mean when she accepted the post as one of the distinguished citizens, annually replaced, with which the U.S. decorates the U.N. Committees, to be whispered to from behind by wiser heads, and given "position papers" and prepared speeches. But she has eyes, ears and a fine intelligence.

At any rate, in her firm and beautiful speaking voice and in full knowledge of what she was doing, she said, "There is no one in this room who is more interested in the people whose fate we are trying to determine than I. Like many of the representatives, I am a member of an instructed delegation, and we

are here to carry out what is wanted; otherwise we would not be here."

1958 was a strenuous year for African affairs at U.N. It might almost be called the "African year", said President Malik of the General Assembly. General de Gaulle had taken radical steps in Africa. Guinea was admitted to U.N. membership with everyone's approval and even France's grudging permission. Premier Olympio of Togoland, independence in his pocket, returned triumphant to a U.N. where he had been for ten years a humble petitioner. Independence for the Cameroons was announced: only Tanganyika and Ruanda-Urundi will be left of the original ten Trust Territories in 1960. Anti-colonialism was in the majority; not yet two-thirds for the touchy questions, but this was clearly round the corner.

The one important exception in the previous Assembly to the U.S. pro-NATO stand had been on the resolution concerning the treatment of Indians in South Africa, when the U.S. agreed that South Africa should negotiate with India and Pakistan—a position repeated in 1958, colonial powers abstaining.

In 1958 we went one step further. Early in the session George M. Harrison, an American Federation of Labour trade unionist, came out strongly in support of the resolution expressing "regret and concern" at apartheid in South Africa. This reversal of previous positions was noted as far away as the *Detroit Free Press*, a remarkable event in a provincial country such as ours.

This resolution, ably shepherded by India's A. K. Mitra, had been softened to achieve U.S. support, a concession for which Mr. Mitra said he had been much criticized. But it achieved, in plenary Assembly, the record majority of 70—5, with 4 abstentions. Speculation was rife among observers everywhere—was the U.S. at last joining the side of the angels?

She was not, as subsequent voting proved, and the most likely explanation of this happy but isolated aberration was the report (unconfirmed) that Mr. Harrison had declared that if the U.S. were to take any other position, he would not be its mouthpiece. A banner year, if this is true, for non-decorative temporary delegates.

The South West Africa debate this year was hot and heavy, the Fourth Committee being deeply disturbed that even the hint of partition and annexation had appeared in the Good Offices Report. Here there was first a long procedural debate on the question of whether items (a) the Good Offices Committee

Report, (b) social conditions, and (c) legal action to ensure the fulfillment of the Mandate, should be debated separately or together. South Africa, rather hopeful, one would guess, about partition and annexation, plumped for "separately": without, if you please, hearing from those untrustworthy, unrepresentative and ill-informed petitioners, Messrs. Scott and Kerina, on the subject of Good Offices. (Mr. Louw quoted *Africa South*, referred to as "a certain publication", to indicate Mr. Kerina's untrustworthiness.) NATO (U.S. included) plumped for separately, too, and without petitioners.

But the Fourth Committee was of another mind. Who was to present the reactions of the submerged South West African peoples if not their only authorized representatives? And were partition and annexation even to be remotely considered without reference to the appalling social conditions (described in the 1958 Report of the Committee on S.W.A.) which are maintained by the power that would administer and annex? The U.S. and NATO said privately, "Keep them talking, don't shut the door on them!" But keep them talking under such conditions?

The Committee, by a vote of 45—19 with 9 abstentions, said in effect to Good Offices: "You have not understood what we asked of you, and attempting to discuss your suggestion within the limits asked would be betrayal of a sacred trust and a helpless people." So it was decided to discuss the items inter-dependently and to hear the petitioners without further ado.

Mr. Louw, after suitable shock at the Committee's disregard of his warning of "serious consequences" should this step be taken, proposed an adjournment until he should hear from his Government. Four days and a week-end later he announced the Union's decision to withdraw from this debate only, somewhat less serious a consequence, one might add, than the previous departure from all debates.

Be it said to her credit, the U.S. joined the Scandinavian bloc against the other NATO powers in voting to hear the petitioners on item (b), a motion won 60—5, 9 abstentions.

Five other resolutions on S.W.A. were passed during the session. On the tricky ones (I: reject suggestion of partition while continuing Good Offices Committee for another year; III: express "deep concern" over social conditions) the U.S. (and friends) abstained, in part because of membership on the Good Offices Committee.

The remaining resolutions (II: transmit Report on SWA and observations of Fourth Committee to absent petitioners; IV: urge Trusteeship for SWA; V: resume discussion of possible legal action next session) were passed in plenary (as were all on SWA), and received U.S. support.

Michael Scott felt that the outcome—to have one more try at negotiation—meant only another year's delay. He would like to see the question of South Africa's possible violation of her mandate taken to the International Court for compulsory jurisdiction. Since the International Court cannot enforce its decrees, the Fourth Committee has preferred to exhaust all other avenues of approach. Meanwhile the *New York Times* of December 29, 1958, announced that the United States is hoping to help strengthen the Court "to help break the present trend toward making every international dispute a political crisis" and bring about arbitration.

I have dwelt in detail on South and South West Africa because these are complex and crucial questions in the U.N. to which much time was last year devoted. Algeria, an African question equally important, was less diplomatically complex, since no one really believed it would be solved in the U.N. The French Cameroons has been the scene of bloodshed for several years past, but such problems as exist for the banned U.P.C. party will probably achieve some kind of solution with the coming of U.N.-supervised independence. There is a border question between Ethiopia, and about-to-be-independent Somalia; but its solution lies largely between Italy and Ethiopia, and both countries agreed this session to find a mediator. Togoland's approaching independence was unanimously approved, as was U.N. attention to Togolese requests for aid.

One other problem, however, needs more than brief discussion. This item bears the innocuous title of "General Questions Relating to the Transmission of Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories," but behind it lie the vast African possessions of Portugal and those of Spain, as yet sealed against international scrutiny. Other colonial powers (Belgium somewhat erratically) submit annual reports to the U.N. (Sub-)Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories.

One can now read well-documented reports of forced labour and other indignities imposed on the great majority of Africans in Portuguese Mozambique and Angola, areas supposed to be

lacking a colour bar. Prof. Marvin Harris of Columbia University (New York), a reputable and scholarly visitor to Mozambique, has recently found the physical and economic restraints on Africans there similar to those in South Africa. Spain and Portugal deny that they have any non-self-governing territories, and claim that their African possessions are "integral parts" of their mainlands.

Since these nations became members of the U.N. in 1955, the Afro-Asian bloc has each year put through a resolution in Committee demanding a U.N. investigation of what constitutes a non-self-governing territory, on which reports should be rendered. Each year the resolution has been hung up on the two-thirds majority requirement in plenary Assembly for "important" questions. The same fate seemed certain for this year's resolution after frantic rallying of support by both sides, in spite of Guinea's admission to the U.N. just before the vote. Its sponsors thereupon withdrew it rather than suffer another defeat. Privately they feel that by 1960 the requisite majority will be theirs in added African membership.

*The United States has consistently voted against this resolution in company with NATO, claiming that nations should decide for themselves whether they have dependencies subject to report.*

Other voting (it should be remembered that, almost without exception, resolutions must have the support of the anti-colonial majority in order to reach the Assembly at all):

### **Trusteeship Council Report**

U.S. and NATO opposed the setting of target dates for the independence of Tanganyika and Ruanda-Urundi.

(Passed in General Assembly by 57—18, but the decision means little without U.K. and Belgian support.)

U.S. and NATO opposed the study of the effects of the European Economic Community on certain Trust Territories.

(Passed in General Assembly, 54—15).

U.S. and NATO voted against hearing from petitioner John Kale on Ruanda-Urundi. He was heard, 36—23.

### **Non-Self-Governing Territories**

U.S. and NATO abstained from a resolution which, considering that the European Economic Community was likely to affect the economic development of some Trust Territories, invited "Administering Members to examine the advisability of adopting . . . an investment policy which will ensure balanced economic development and the progressive increase of the per

*capita* income of the inhabitants of these territories.”

(Passed in General Assembly, 58—5).

U.S. and NATO opposed a resolution asking study of the effects of the European Economic Community on Non-Self-Governing Territories.

(Passed in General Assembly, 55—16).

The U.S. supported renewal of the Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories. The U.K. and three others abstained.

(Passed in General Assembly, 72—1).

### Algeria

On the resolution “recognizing the right of the Algerian people to independence” and seeking “negotiations,” the U.S. and four NATO nations abstained. This was considered by Algerian nationalists an advance for the U.S., since all colonial powers opposed the resolution. Of NATO, only Greece supported it. France did not participate.

The resolution failed by one vote (35—18; Guinea participating) to achieve the necessary two-thirds Assembly majority.

The U.S. did not speak in the debate.

This, then, is the United States record. Except for apartheid and the occasional mild shot at independent action, how firmly we stuck to our NATO friends.

An allegiance such as this does not go unnoticed. A delegation from the American Committee on Africa returned from the December, 1958, Pan-African Conference of political and labor groups (including many independence movements) at Accra, deeply disturbed at the waning influence of the United States on African thinking. In contrast, the U.S.S.R., which moves into newly independent countries with strong delegations and offers of economic aid, is a rising star.

“What can the United States do to help us?” was the question asked again and again by the not-yet-free.

The portent is clear, and one must speak the language that is understood. Is the alliance with NATO worth the loss of Africa? If Africa goes, what of NATO then? Is it really true that if the U.S. shakes NATO a little by a firm stand on colonial issues, France will go Communist, Britain Socialist? If NATO is synonymous with colonial oppression, is it a profitable alliance for the U.S. to possess in the modern world? It is very nearly too late—for the United States and her allies to face up to the African future.



# TOWARDS AN AFRICAN LITERATURE IX: THE TALE OF NONGQAWUSE

DR. A. C. JORDAN

*Lecturer in Bantu Languages, University of Cape Town.*

NONGQAWUSE is the name of the girl generally held responsible for the "National Suicide of the Xhosa People" in 1856-7. The story of her meeting with the "spirits of warriors long dead", of their enjoining her to tell the chiefs and the people to destroy all their livestock and food-stores, of the carrying out of this injunction, and of the consequent famine and deaths: all this is told in the records of missionaries and colonial officials who were working amongst the Xhosa when these things happened. And all those who are familiar with South African history know it either directly from these records or from ordinary history books. Yet very few people know that there is an account of this incident, written by an African who was living at this time, to be found in Rubusana's anthology, *Zemk' linkomo*, and that the author is no other than William W. Gqoba, the historian-poet who has figured so often already in this series.

Gqoba was born in 1840, so that at the climax of this calamity he was seventeen years old. At that age, a boy in African primitive society has many social responsibilities, and though he may not be a direct participant in tribal councils, he is very well informed as to what takes place there. With its details of people's names, clan- and place-names, Gqoba's account sounds very authentic, and for this reason we propose to give a faithful translation of its Xhosa original, as the finest of the renderings of a story that still lives in the emotions and thoughts of the Xhosa people today. We adhere to his own spelling of the Xhosa names, many of which are well-known surnames at the present time, spelt as they were spelt by him:—

## "THE CAUSE OF THE CATTLE-KILLING AT THE NONGQAWUSE PERIOD"<sup>1</sup>

(by W. W. G.)

"It so happened that in the Thenjini region of Gcalekaland, in the ward of headman Mnzabele, in the year 1856, two girls went out to the lands to keep the birds away from the corn. One was named Nongqause, daughter of Mhlakaza, and the other the daughter of a sister of Mhlakaza's. Near a river known as the Kamanga two men approached them and said, "*Convey our greetings to your people, and tell them we are So-and-So and So-and-So*" (giving their names). And the names by which they called themselves turned out to be the names of people who were known to have died long ago. They went on to say: "*You are to tell the people that the whole community is about to rise again from*

<sup>1</sup>*Zemk' lin komo*, pp. 218-225

the dead. Then go on to say to them that all the cattle living now must be slaughtered, for they are reared with defiled hands, as the people handle witchcraft. Say to them there must be no ploughing of lands, rather must the people dig deep pits (granaries), erect new huts, set up wide, strongly built cattlefolds, make milksacks, and weave doors from buka roots. The people must give up witchcraft on their own, not waiting until they are exposed by the witchdoctors. You are to tell them that these are the words of their chiefs—the words of Napakade (Forever), the son of Sifubasibanzi (the Broad-chested).”

“On reaching home the girls reported this, but no one would listen to them. Everybody ridiculed them instead. On the following day they went again to keep the birds away from the corn, and after some time, these men appeared again and asked if the girls had told the people at home, and what the people had said in reply. The girls reported that their message had simply been a thing of laughter, no one believing them. “The people simply said we were telling stories”. This happened in Gcalekaland, near the mouth of the Gxara.

“The men then said, ‘Say to the elders that they are to call all the chiefs together from Gcaleka’s, Tato’s, Ngqika’s and from the Gqunukhwebe, and they must tell this news to them.’

“On the following morning, Mhlakaza and some other men went to the lands, but these strangers did not reveal themselves. They were heard without being seen. It was only Nongqause and the other girl who heard them, and it was Nongqause who interpreted what was being said by the spirits. They said, ‘Tell those men to go and call the chiefs and bring them here. Only then shall we reveal ourselves.’

“Some men then went to Rili’s royal place at the Hohita, and there the strange news was related by Mhlakaza’s daughter. Then Rili sent out Botomani, a minor chief, to go and verify this thing. Botomani went, but the strangers did not reveal themselves. Then Rili sent messengers to tell the chiefs that there were people who had been heard by Mhlakaza’s daughter to say all the chiefs must be called together to meet the chief Napakade, son of Sifubasibanzi, near the mouth of the Gxara.

“From Tato’s came Maramnco, son of Fadana, accompanied by Shwele, son of Zizi. From the Ndungwanas came Dlulaze, son of Qweshu, related to Ndarala. From the Tshatshus came Mpeke, son of Mfeneni. From the Ngqika section came Namba, great son of Maqoma. From the Gcaleka section came Rili and Lindinxiwa, sons of Hintsa, together with Ngubo, son of

Mlashe, and Nxiti, son of Lutshaba. From the Ndlambes came Nowawe, son of Ndlambe. From the Gqunukhwebe came Dilima, son of Pato. All these men made their way to the home of Mhlakaza near the Gxara.

“On arriving there, they were told that Nongqause desired that the numbers to go to the Gxara be reduced, and that those who were to go must be mostly chiefs. This in truth was done.

“As the people were rather fearful, it happened that as they drew near the River Kamanga, their throats went dry, and they felt thirsty. Meanwhile Nongqause, beautifully painted with red ochre, led the way. Then those who were thirsty were heard to say, ‘Is one who is thirsty allowed to drink?’

“Nongqause replied, ‘He who does not practise witchcraft may drink without fear.’

“Thereupon Dilima, hero-son of Pato, removed his kaross and stooped to drink. Then one by one the other men of *Nomagwayi wase Mbo*<sup>2</sup> followed suit.”

#### THE VISION

“Just at this time, there was a tremendous crash of big boulders breaking loose from the cliffs overlooking the headwaters of the River Kamanga, whereupon the men gazed at one another wondering, for they were seized with fear. It seemed as if some unknown thing on the cliffs was going to burst into flame.

“While they stood wondering, the girl was heard saying, ‘Just cast your eyes in the direction of the sea’.

“And when they looked intently at the waters of the sea, it seemed as if there were people there in truth, and there were sounds as if bulls were bellowing, and oxen too. There was a huge, formless black object that came and went, came and went, and finally vanished over the crests of the waves of the sea.

“Then it was that all the people began to believe.

“The army in the sea never came out to meet the chiefs, and even what they said was not heard by any one besides Nongqause. After it had vanished, she said, ‘*The Chiefs yonder say you are to return to your homes and slaughter all your cattle and, in order that the resurrection may hasten, you are not to rear any cattle. You are not to plough your lands, but make big new pits (granaries), and these you will suddenly find full of corn. Erect new huts and make many doors. Shut yourselves in your huts, because on the eighth day, when the*

<sup>2</sup>The Xhosa people's praise-name.

community returns in the company of Napakade, son of Sifubasibanzi, all the beasts on the land and in the rivers, and all the snakes will be roaming the land. You are also to take all the old corn out of the pits and throw it away. In order to survive, you are to use many doors to close each hut, fasten every door tightly, and abstain from witchcraft.'

'She went on to say that there was another chief, mounted on a grey horse. His name was Grey, otherwise known as Satan. All those who did not slaughter their cattle would become the subjects of the chief named Satan, and such people would not see the glory of our own chief, Napakade, son of Sifubasibanzi.

'That then was the cause of the cattle-killing of 1856 to 1857.

'In the midst of this, there appeared another young girl from the house of Nkwitshi of the Kwemta clan, in the Ndlambe section near the Mpongo. Her name was Nonkosi. The message of this girl was one with Nongqause's. She used to lead the people to a pond there at the Mpongo, and they used to see *abakweta* dancing on the surface of the water, and they thought that they heard the thudding of the ox-hide, accompanied by a song, to which the *bakweta*<sup>3</sup> danced. Truly, the people were so deluded that they went as far as to claim that they had seen the horns of cattle, heard the lowing of milk-cows, the barking of dogs, and the songs of the herdsmen at milking-time.

#### THE ORDERS OF THE CHIEFS

'On reaching their homes, the chiefs assembled their subjects and made known the news of the ancestors who were expected to return to life, fresh and strong, of the promised coming-to-life-again of the cattle they were about to slaughter and of those that they had slaughtered long ago.

'Nongqause had said that anyone who, on slaughtering his ox, decided to dispose of its carcass by barter, should nevertheless engage its soul, in order that on its coming back to life it should be his property. And she had said that all those who did not slaughter their cattle would be carried by a fierce hurricane and thrown into the sea to drown and die.

'The community was split in two. One section believed that the resurrection of the people would come some day, but not that of the cattle. Thereupon, father fell out with son, brother with brother, chief with subjects, relative with relative. Two names emerged to distinguish the two groups. One group was

<sup>3</sup>Boys at "initiation school", whose bodies are painted with white clay. Their spectacular dance (*umshilo*) is accompanied by a rhythmic beating of dried ox-hides and singing by women.

named *ama Tamba* (the Submissive), that is, Nongqause's converts. The other was called *amaGogotya* (the Unyielding), that is, those who were stubborn and would not kill their cattle. So some slaughtered their cattle, and others did not.

#### THE EIGHTH DAY

“As the killing of the cattle went on, those who had slaughtered hurriedly for fear of being smelt out began to starve and had to live by stealing the livestock of others. Then everybody looked forward to the eighth day. It was the day on which the sun was expected to rise red, and to set again in the sky. Then there would follow great darkness, during which the people would shut themselves in their huts. Then the dead would rise and return to their homes, and then the light of day would come again.

“On that day the sun rose as usual. Some people had washed their eyes with sea-water at the mouth of the Buffalo. Some peered outside through little apertures in their huts, while those who had never believed went about their daily outdoor tasks. Nothing happened. The sun did not set, no dead person came back to life, and not one of the things that had been predicted came to pass.

“Such then was the Nongqause catastrophe. The people died of hunger and disease in large numbers. Thus it was that whenever thereafter a person said an unbelievable thing, those who heard him said, ‘You are telling a Nongqause tale’.”

## BELLA

MARIANNE NORDFORS

FROM the day Bella first came to us we were struck by the irony of her name. Some Boer forefather had bequeathed to her her muscular, broadhipped frame, but everything else was exaggeratedly Hottentot: the full posterior, the heavy breasts bulging under the calico, the moonshaped face with its thick lips and nose all nostrils, the short, fuzzy hair. Her eyes turned on the world a liquid, vacant stare, and when she spoke it was in a piping treble that issued grotesquely from her great hulk. Most of the time she was pregnant, and we knew that she supported three illegitimate children, all by different fathers, who lived with her mother somewhere in Hottentot's Holland. Her fourth, a boy, was born one night in our backroom. For a few months he existed somewhere in the slums of Cape Town, a misshapen little creature with a huge, nodding head clothed in a dirty bonnet, and a weak, sickly whine. When to her relief he died of tubercular meningitis, it did not prevent her from straightaway being with child again. Sex was her only pleasure.

For a year she moved about our house, dusting, scrubbing, washing, cooking, her motherliness surrounding her like an aura with its smell of milk, its curves and bulges of comforting flesh. She served us with the same unquestioning faithfulness she reserved for her good-for-nothing boy friend and her children in the country. She spent all her wages on her dependents and never complained or asked for a rise.

Then one day her prospects altered. We took in a rich lodger from Johannesburg, an invalid lady, who moved into our front bedroom with all the fuss and ceremony becoming to her pampered state. She announced her arrival by telegram, then kept us waiting and finally descended on us with a battery of trunks, suitcases and bags, which we had great difficulty in storing in the attic. At our invitation she joined us in the parlour, where she sat taking small, reluctant sips of our best coffee and refusing the cake because of her diet. The whole family had gathered to see her, and I think we were all equally disappointed. She was a widow of about sixty-five with a large face but very little forehead. Her thick, rheumatic fingers sparkled with diamonds, but the rings a fond husband had given her in former

years had dug deep into the flesh and formed unwieldy creases there. Her whole body creaked with stays and it seemed as though the bulges had thus been painfully depressed into the legs, which were swollen as with dropsy, the feet being squeezed into black old ladies' shoes. She sat there and sipped and talked on and on in a voice that seemed to come through a pot of bubbling porridge and never changed its complaining pitch. As she had nothing else to do, it became her custom thus to bore us daily, discoursing about her health, the way she had been betrayed by her friends, her two dead daughters, paragons of beauty and virtue and very, very high up in society. Her name was Mrs. Norton.

Having so little to recommend her she had long ago picked up the trick of impressing people with her opulence and bribing them into friendship with promises of gifts and remembrances in her will.

"You're a likely young girl," she used to say when it was my turn to see to her. "If you'll be my companion you won't be sorry. I'm really quite easy to get on with," she added, "and I have no heirs."

And her crafty old eyes twinkled and appraised me.

Such blandishments she also used on my mother and my school-boy brothers, John and Harry. But her only victim was Bella.

The poor thing had of course been as excited as any of us at the prospect of having a millionaire in our midst and had with great, round eyes watched the arrival of the lady from the kitchen door. Once installed in her room, Mrs. Norton immediately pounced on her.

"And what is your name, my dear?"

"Bella," piped the giantess in her thin treble.

"Well, Bella, you just look after me nicely and you won't lose by me, you know. There's more for a good girl where that comes from."

And she pressed a pound note into the maid's bewildered hand.

This was only the beginning of a long series of presents and tips that flowed from Mrs. Norton's purse into the maid's room, and Bella, her simple human greed aroused, danced quick attendance. She did not neglect us, of course, but always kept an ear cocked for the slightest sound from Mrs. Norton. The old lady in her golden splendour was flattered by the dumb admiration, and Bella was in and out of her room, where she

kept her precious pound notes in stacks in an open cupboard and counted them and made them grow by clever manipulations on the stock market. It was strange that a woman so shrewd in financial matters should not believe in banks, but so it was.

"I like to keep my cash about me," she declared when we warned her. "It comforts me, you know."

But she did not know that Bella's eyes flew to the cupboard whenever she came in.

The sequel was, of course, inevitable. A change came over Bella, who began to look quite bold in a furtive sort of way. The boy friend gave up all pretence of looking for work and lounged all day in her room, smoking one cigarette after another. The children in the country came up to see their mother, decked out in all the pale pink finery her vulgar taste could invent. And Bella herself spent her afternoons off in town on all sorts of errands, revealed in the cloud of cheap perfume that hung around her and in the new silk undies and nylon stockings that decorated the washing line. She began to go to the pictures, and sang garbled versions of the latest hits shrilly and tunelessly as she moved about the house.

Mother had taken the children to the country for their holidays when the storm broke. Mrs. Norton discovered that ten pounds were missing from her hoard. Red and trembling she burst into my room.

"It's that girl!" she exclaimed, hoarse with unleashed hatred. "That's what you get from being kind to these people. Think of all the presents I gave her. Why, only the other day she got those woollen knickers that had shrunk in the wash! You know, the black ones. But they're all the same. No sense of gratitude. They bite the hand that feeds them. They ought to be kept short. Bread and water is too good for them."

She was so beside herself that I thought she might have a stroke, but actually she enjoyed the sense of injury that promised to give content to at least a few of her empty days. Naturally she went to the police at once and came back most disappointed when she was told that she had to provide evidence for her accusations.

"She's spent it all, of course," she complained, "but I'll get the better of her yet."

I advised her to put her money in a safer place, but with a sniff the irate lady sailed out of the room, pausing just long enough to say "Wait and see!" in a dark and foreboding tone



of voice.

For a long time nothing happened except that Mrs. Norton suddenly made friends with Mrs. Smith next door. This harmless, garrulous little woman was the widow of a post office clerk, who had left her with a pension, a tiny house and many children in various simple walks of life. She went about in slippers, brewed tea six times a day and knitted pullovers for her grandchildren. Her family, illness and a little gossip was the whole extent of her conversation, and she had formerly been quite below Mrs. Norton's notice. Now there were endless visits to and fro. Confidences were exchanged, knitting-needles clacked and on Mrs. Smith's black bosom there appeared a big jade brooch. I never bothered much about their chatter, and it neither surprised nor disturbed me that Bella's name so often figured in it. I could only not quite understand what drew the old ladies to each other. It was quite simple: Mrs. Smith had a telephone.

For in her sleepless, rheumatic nights Mrs. Norton had worked out the campaign that was to lead to Bella's downfall and give her the revenge her vanity so dearly craved. It was really quite straightforward, the stratagem of the baited trap, but it required an accomplice who could provide a lookout at a neighbouring window and instant access to the police.

Most of her money she now carried to the bank, but a substantial wad remained in the cupboard, all harmless and open to the view. No one could know that she kept a list of the numbers and checked it carefully whenever the maid had been alone in the room. Every morning when it was time to tidy up she would call out to Mrs. Smith in a voice that was intended to carry all over the house.

"Are you free, dear? Do you mind if I come over for a cup of tea?"

Then the two old women would take up their posts at the corner window just opposite her own and watch every movement behind the curtain with the twitching excitement of stalking cats.

After a few weeks of this pleasurable occupation their patience was rewarded. Bella was seen to open and close the cupboard door and to slip quietly out to the back. A check showed that a pound note was missing, the telephone rang and within a few minutes the police were there.

Following the first incredulous shock at this almost magic

appearance of retribution, the maid wept and gesticulated, shrilly protesting her innocence to God and an interested knot of gaping bystanders, her cries mingling with the furious accusations of Mrs. Norton, who, with arms akimbo, egged on the constables with all the fervour of a fan at a football match. Silence fell only when the servant's room was searched. The boy friend emerged, pale and slightly drunk on dagga, which dangerous and forbidden drug was found inside in considerable quantities. A close inspection of the bed brought to light the pound note, a yellow family snap and a tattered, rather garish print of Jesus blessing the poor. These were hidden under the mattress.

Bella realized that the game was up. She lifted her eyes and studied Mrs. Norton, standing on the doorstep like an overblown idol of justice.

"You dirty white bitch!" she said.

Then without another word she followed the policemen to the Black Maria, accompanied by a stream of triumphant vituperation from her conqueror, for whom this incident provided a subject for conversation for many weeks to come.

The last news we had of Bella was a few days later, when Mrs. Norton returned from the Magistrate's Court, where she had witnessed against her. She entered the parlour, her face flushed from the excitement of the day, and sat down without taking off her big, black hat with the ostrich feathers.

"She got three months," she pronounced with satisfaction. "Jail will take the kick out of her.—They shave their heads there, I'm told."



## BOOK REVIEWS

**Stride Toward Freedom** by Martin Luther King, Jr. New York: Harper, 1958. 230 pp. \$2.95.

**Conquest of Violence: The Gandhian Philosophy of Conflict** by Joan V. Bondurant. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1958. 269 pp. \$5.00.

It is paradoxical that on the very continent—Africa—where Mohandas Gandhi conceived his method of non-violent direct action, or satyagraha, there should be a debate today on its efficacy. Not only did Gandhi “discover” his method in the early years of the twentieth century while working for the rights of his fellow Indians in Durban and Johannesburg, but there has been recent wide-scale employment of non-violent resistance in Africa, especially against racism in Northern Rhodesia and colonialism in the Gold Coast. Most extensively in Africa the Gandhian method was used in the defiance campaign against the unjust apartheid laws during 1952-53; while a more successful effort in non-violent non-co-operation was the 1957 boycott of the buses from Alexandra to Johannesburg, during which 60,000 Africans walked—and won their limited objectives.

Gandhism has, of course, flourished in other continents. Its greatest success was in the liberation of India; and since 1947, Gandhian methods have been used within India by Indians against their own government, and by Indians against Portugal in the mass satyagraha on the border of Goa in 1954 and 1955. Satyagraha has also been used in an attempt to change the foreign policy of governments. The crew of *Golden Rule* sailed toward the Pacific nuclear testing area during the spring of 1958 in a Gandhian protest. In Nevada in August 1957, and in England in December 1958, pacifists participated in non-violent protests against nuclear tests and missile bases.

In America Gandhism was consciously used to lessen racial

discrimination in the northern states as early as 1941, through the Committee of Racial Equality (CORE). But the most spectacular American use of Gandhism has undoubtedly been the Montgomery bus protest, led by Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., in Alabama from late 1955 to early 1957. Dr. King has recently published an autobiographical account of this struggle.

Mohandas Gandhi was a voluminous writer and he composed a whole volume on "Satyagraha in South Africa" (1928). His various editorials on this subject have been collected in the two-volume work, "Non-Violence in Peace and War" (1944, 1949) and in "Satyagraha: Non-Violent Resistance" (1951). Gandhi was not, however, a systematic theorist, and others have assumed the task of evaluating his method. One of the first to do so was the American lawyer, Richard Gregg, in "The Power of Non-Violence" (1934). Another significant contribution is R. R. Diwakar's "Satyagraha: Its Technique and History" (1946). Recently Dr. Joan V. Bondurant, an American student of Indian affairs, in "Conquest of Violence", has written an important schematic account of the Gandhian technique, primarily as used during Gandhi's lifetime in India.

An analysis of Dr. King's campaign in Montgomery, using some of the insights suggested by Dr. Bondurant, may contain important lessons for the African scene. Gandhi used to say that a non-violent army, like a violent one, needed to pause occasionally before regrouping for the final battle.

The Montgomery campaign began on December 1, 1955, in an act of civil disobedience when a Negro woman without premeditation refused to move to the "Negro" section of a public bus, and was arrested for breaking the segregation laws. The Negroes in Montgomery responded by refusing to ride the buses and launching a one-day protest with three minimum objectives: to lessen discourteous treatment of Negro bus passengers; to lessen, but not eliminate, segregation of Negro passengers on buses; and to force the eventual employment of Negroes as bus drivers on predominantly "Negro" routes. The initial non-co-operation was surprisingly such a success, however, that the Negroes decided that they would stay off the buses until their minimum demands were fully met.

The Montgomery Improvement Association was formed and Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., a young Baptist minister, elected president. Holding weekly mass meetings in churches, partly in lieu of its own radio programme or other means of communica-

tion, the Association elicited the almost complete support of the 50,000 Negroes in Montgomery, and few, if any, Negroes rode the buses. While many walked long distances daily to and from work, the Association set up a parallel transportation system, first with Negro-owned taxicabs and later with 300 private automobiles arranged in a travel pool. The Association received no direct help or support from Montgomery's White community, but gained increasing support from Whites and Negroes around the United States (and the world), so that a large percentage of the total cost of \$250,000 for the transportation system came from outside Montgomery.

While the Negroes of Montgomery leaned heavily on non-co-operation, they also knew that federal law, if not local and state law, was increasingly on their side. Scrapping their initial demands, they went to federal court to challenge bus segregation directly, continuing to avoid the buses. They won the court test and their victory was sustained by the U.S. Supreme Court. In the meantime, the Montgomery segregationists used every method of intimidation: rumour, defamation, harassment by police, mass arrests (for conspiracy to boycott), and violence. Negro churches and the homes of Negro leaders, including Dr. King's, were bombed; though, fortunately, not a single White or Negro was killed. The Association constantly disciplined the Negro people never to use violence—and the Negroes almost never did. Dr. King told irate neighbours when his own home was bombed: "We cannot solve this problem through retaliatory violence. We must meet violence with non-violence." The Association on the eve of integration prepared its members, through role-playing techniques, for every eventuality, including violence, on the desegregated buses. And less than 13 months from its beginning, the campaign ended in success. The Negroes rode the buses, sitting wherever they chose.

The Montgomery campaign can be briefly compared to the 1952-53 defiance campaign in South Africa. The Montgomery effort was impromptu, not premeditated as the 1952-53 South African campaign. The Alabama objective was limited, even when the Montgomery Association changed its goal from semi-segregated seating in the buses to fully-integrated seating. The South African objective was greater—against the apartheid laws generally. The Montgomery campaign was limited to one city, with a population of less than 150,000 (of whom 50,000 were Negroes), while the South African campaign covered a whole

nation and involved, potentially, millions of non-Whites (and a few Whites) from a wide area. It was, however, more interracial than the Montgomery protest, with which only a single prominent White leader (the minister of an all-Negro church) in the whole city identified himself. The Montgomery Association was based on non-co-operation, but used the federal law which was on its side. The South Africa protest was based on civil disobedience.

In Montgomery, a single leader—Martin Luther King, Jr.—arose from the Negro clergy and almost overnight became a powerful and formidable symbol. In South Africa, the top leadership of the campaign was more diffuse and no one person emerged. In Montgomery, virtually all of the Negroes in the community participated in the protest—and could refuse to co-operate without grave sacrifices of job or risk of imprisonment. In South Africa, only a fraction of the non-Whites participated in the effort, and those who did were imprisoned and often additionally victimised. In neither campaign was there the equivalent of what Gandhi called a constructive programme during the civil disobedience or non-co-operation or alternating with it. In Montgomery, however, most of the Negroes did

## *Prejudice . . .*

"In order to hate collectively one has to have a simplified schema of the enemy; one has to keep away from any personal individual encounter with him, because that might humanise the relationship . . . .

No group can remain psychologically integrated by a mere sense of danger from the outside. The forces of hostility and fear, if added up, would parallel the force of the atom-bomb. There is only one thing that is stronger; that is love."

from *Group Psychology in the Atomic Era*, by KARL STERN, leading American Psychiatrist, in a contribution to

**WORLD CRISIS AND THE CATHOLIC**

**12/6 net**

"As a charitable and temperate plea for the revival of Christian Humanism, it reaches out beyond the critical times in which we live, towards a constructive future."

—THE TIMES

**SHEED AND WARD**

participate daily in the campaign, negatively by refusing to use the buses and positively by using parallel transportation facilities; there was no such opportunity for participation by the mass of the non-Europeans in South Africa.

In Montgomery the Negroes remained non-violent, despite great provocations of violence by White segregationists. In Port Elizabeth, East London, and other centres, there was occasional violence; and while the presumption is strong that this violence was instigated by the police and *agents provocateurs*, the picture is morally blurred. In Montgomery the police were not neutral; they harassed the Negroes, but they were not unusually "trigger-happy." There were few legal methods available to them in order to put the Negro leadership out of circulation. In South Africa, the police were also on the side of apartheid, but there were available to them laws for going beyond the harassment of the resisters. Thus imprisonment and lashing were constantly employed. In Montgomery, or more often, outside the area, scepticism wilted at the calm persistent suffering of the Negroes through disciplined non-violence. And the Montgomery Negroes themselves underwent a miraculous transformation. They became overnight new people with confidence and courage, despite nine previous decades of meagre progress against segregation since slavery. In South Africa, there is little evidence that the hearts of any great number of Europeans in the country were moved. In view of the sudden falling off of the campaign, the morale of the non-Europeans themselves was probably not permanently enhanced. However, the increased unity among many Africans, Indians, Coloureds, and a few Whites was no inconsequential by-product of the campaign.

Is non-violent resistance a technique which can only be successfully used by Indians, or can it be used by persons of various religious and cultural backgrounds? Is there something distinctively Hindu about it? Gandhi denied that there was, although he admittedly based satyagraha partly on the Hindu scriptures. He wrote that he was also influenced by the Christian scriptures, especially the New Testament, and by the writings of both Tolstoy and Thoreau. Martin Luther King admits the strong Christian element in the Montgomery movement: "Christ furnished the spirit and motivation, while Gandhi furnished the method." One can tentatively conclude that, in this shrinking world, satyagraha need not be confined to Hindus, but appeals to persons with the most varied religious back-

grounds, or none. This holds for persons who use the method and also for persons toward whom it is used. Thus there is no doubt that this method can continue to be used in Africa.

Do the participants in satyagraha have to believe in it as a way of life, or just as a political method? Gandhi, of course, hoped for the former, but many of his co-workers were attracted to satyagraha for purely pragmatic reasons. Even Jawaharlal Nehru believed in satyagraha more as a method than as an end in itself. Pyarelal, Gandhi's secretary, affirmed: "It is possible to run a satyagraha campaign with people who have no faith in non-violence as a creed provided they sincerely and implicitly follow the rules as a discipline and work under the leadership of unadulterated non-violence."

Were the campaigns in Montgomery in 1955-57 and in South Africa in 1952-53 Gandhian in the classical sense? A non-violent campaign which "fails" might well be Gandhian, while one that "succeeds" might not. Dr. Bondurant and Dr. N. K. Bose of Calcutta have suggested nine fundamental rules of satyagraha: self-reliance at all times, initiative in the hands of the satyagrahis, propagation of the objective and tactics of the

# *Encounter*

Edited by **STEPHEN SPENDER** and **MELVIN J. LASKY**

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campaign, reduction of demands to a minimum consistent with truth, progressive advancement of the movement, examination of weaknesses, persistent search for avenues of co-operation with the adversary on honorable terms, refusal to surrender essentials in negotiation, and insistence upon full agreement on fundamentals before accepting a settlement. Both the Montgomery and the South African efforts appear to fall generally within these rules. Gandhi in his lifetime also laid down a code of discipline for those participating in satyagraha: harbour no anger, but suffer the anger of the opponent and refuse to return assaults; do not submit to any order given in anger, even though severe punishment is threatened for disobeying; refrain from insults and swearing; protect opponents from insult and attack, even at the risk of life; do not resist arrest nor the attachment of property; refuse to surrender any property held in trust at the risk of life; if taken prisoner, behave in an exemplary manner; as a member of a satyagraha unit, obey the orders of satyagraha leaders, and resign from the unit in the event of serious disagreement; and do not expect guarantees for maintenance of dependents. Again, this code appears to have been basically adhered to by both leaders and participants in Montgomery and South Africa.

Dr. Bondurant also enumerates the steps of a satyagraha campaign. These are nine in number: negotiation and arbitration, preparation of the group for direct action, agitation, issuing of an ultimatum, economic boycott and forms of strike, non-co-operation, civil disobedience, usurping of the functions of government, and parallel government. These steps differ naturally with the differing objectives of various satyagraha campaigns. If there is a substantial modification of these steps, by omission or commission, the resultant method might not be true Gandhism, however non-violent. For example, the lack of a constructive programme during the South African effort and the appeal to the law courts during the Montgomery campaign may have been legitimate in themselves, but may have seriously taken both campaigns away from the Gandhian norm. The Indians have used the term, 'duragraha,' for a method of stubborn persistence which, because of principle or process, falls short of satyagraha. Bondurant observes that "duragraha, like violence, may well succeed in achieving limited objectives" and "not every movement is *ipso facto* satyagraha merely because it avoids physically violent resistance."

Is Gandhism effective under totalitarianism? Is this a method which can only be used under more or less democratic forms of government? Gandhi repeatedly asserted that satyagraha speaks to the best in all men, whether Nazis, Communists, or racists. He felt that the British were far from "democratic" in their treatment of Indians. He also suggested that the Jews use satyagraha against the Nazis. The method has been used, but so far without visible success, against totalitarian Portugal in Goa. Commander Stephen King-Hall, a British military writer, in "Defence in the Nuclear Age" (1958) has suggested that non-violent resistance—not nuclear weapons—be the principal means of defence of the British Isles against any invasion.

Certain aspects of satyagraha could be undertaken with extraordinary difficulty under totalitarianism. In Montgomery, as in Madras, publicity was possible during the campaigns. In Moscow, or in Durban, all sources of publicity could be cut off. But the virus of non-violent rebellion—and discipline—could surely spread without radio or newspapers as it did in parts of Scandinavia during World War II. In Montgomery, as in Johannesburg, only a few White persons seemed to be moved as the non-Whites suffered. Dr. King affirms: "The non-violent approach does not immediately change the heart of the oppressor. It first does something to the hearts and souls of those committed to it. It gives them new self-respect; it calls up resources of strength and courage that they did not know they had. Finally it reaches the opponent and so stirs his conscience that reconciliation becomes a reality." Certainly Gandhism even under totalitarianism can engender self-respect amongst the victims of injustice. But can it go beyond and effect the totalitarian hearts of the oppressors? No categorical answer can be given here. But what are the alternatives? Did the alternative of violence "work" for the Jews in Nazi Germany or for the Hungarians more recently under Russian occupation? Are there immediate alternatives for the non-Europeans in South Africa except satyagraha? Dr. Bondurant writes that "had the Jews offered satyagraha against the Nazi regime, their losses could scarcely have been greater; they should have, moreover, mobilized world opinion behind them much more rapidly than they did." She adds that the chances of success of non-violent resistance "are certainly as great as are the chances for violent revolution under the modern police-state system".

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*All correspondence to be addressed to the Editor, Ronald M. Segal,  
P.O. Box 1039, Cape Town, South Africa.*

### Branch offices:

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