


Work In Progress

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1. political trials
2. winterveld
3. bantu education

when they enter the job market for the first time as school leavers, or recent migrants, they cannot find employment. These people excluded from unemployment are collectively referred to as the relative surplus population. They form a surplus group relative to the average needs of capitalism for labour. But because capitalism's needs in this regard are not constant, the size of the relative surplus population changes under different circumstances. We will return to this question below.

Forms of the relative surplus population.

The relative surplus population takes on a number of different forms. It appears in 1). a floating form. These are people who are pushed out of industry at certain times, and then re-employed during boom periods, only to lose jobs again. For example, during slack periods/cycles the age of retirement may be lowered, and incentives provided for scholars to remain at school. This effectively excludes certain people from employment. During periods of growth, the opposite would apply, thereby increasing the numbers of workers available for employment.

2). a latent form. People who have been engaged in labour-intensive agriculture can easily be forced off the land and into industrial employment with increased mechanisation of agriculture. Those who remain on the land in this form of agriculture are therefore a potential source of labour for capitalist production. Women engaged in domestic work may also be seen as part of this latent form of population that is surplus in relation to capitalist production, distribution and administration. The provision

of crèches and 'labour-saving' household devices can release many thousands of women for employment elsewhere, if the need should arise. When that need does not arise, these people join the ranks of the unemployed. 3). a stagnant form. These people are actively employed, but only extremely irregularly. 4). pauperism. These people form the 'hospital of the active labour-army and the dead-weight of the industrial reserve army'. They are the poor, the incapacitated, aged, criminals, orphans, and so on. This group tends to be permanently excluded from any employment. 5). It has recently been argued that a new form of the relative surplus population has emerged - one which did not exist in earlier periods of capitalist development. This is the marginalised labour force, and consists of people permanently excluded from employment in the dominant level of the economy.

This dominant level of the economy is formed by companies that have grown large through two processes: concentration (ie growth within one type of productive activity), and centralisation (growth through expanding into a range of activities, normally through taking over existing firms). Furthermore, the companies often compete with each other on an international level, have international financial links, and employ technology which has been developed in the centres of world capitalism (eg USA, Western Europe, Japan). In these centres, technology used is aimed at increasing productivity, primarily through the use of machinery. As explained earlier, this changes the organic composition of capital in favour of constant capital, against variable

capital. Because of this, the rate of growth of employment opportunities within this level of the economy is lower than the rate of growth in the labour force. Those members of the labour force consequently excluded from employment within this dominant monopoly level of the economy are said to have been marginalised. They may still find sporadic employment in the smaller, less capital-intensive, competitive level of the economy, although these opportunities decline as more and more of these firms are taken over, or forced out of business, by the dominant monopoly level of the economy.

Results and implications.

Part of the relative surplus population is referred to as the industrial reserve army when considered in its functionality to capitalism. This reserve army of labour fulfils a dual role within the economy. Firstly, it provides a reserve of people who can be employed when the economy expands rapidly (although in South Africa, even during the economic boom of the 1960s, the level of unemployment did not decrease). It also provides labour when new large-scale activities are undertaken (such as railway extensions, harbours, etc). Secondly, because of competition between employed workers and unemployed workers who constitute the reserve army of labour, capitalists are able to keep wages down.

The industrial reserve army is, therefore, functional to capitalism.

The marginalised labour force is not separable from the rest of the economy; it is, after all, a creation of that economy.

problem of over 2-million unemployed. They are, in most cases, solutions to the problem of how to maintain the present system which is itself responsible for the problems.

Responses of the working class (employed and unemployed).

There are a wide range of responses which the working class engages in to act against the effects of unemployment. The most widespread effect of unemployment is that wages and subsistence goods have now to be spread even more thinly than before. Along with this, it has been shown that wages are forced down for a large section of the working class in employment, because of competition for jobs.

A direct response by the working class would be to demand jobs and to act in support of that demand. This kind of response is infrequent and really only possible if the working class is organised politically.

However, indirect responses directed against increasing hardship is an everyday occurrence and a way of life for many. Theft is one response, and so is 'informal sector' activity (see the articles on Winterfeld and Soweto in this issue). There have been many reported incidents of stock theft in the rural areas, wherever scattered pieces of reserves/bantustans border on wealthier 'white' rural South Africa.

Indirect responses include issues where communities have mobilised strongly. Here one thinks of bus boycotts (see the article in this issue of WIP), and action against increased rentals. In the past, the working class has also mobilised in protest over food price rises.

Those in employment have their labour to withdraw as a weapon in attempts to improve their position and those who rely on their wages (immediate family as well as unemployed friends and relatives). This weapon, although surprisingly frequently used during the present crisis (see 'Labour Action' in this and previous issues of WIP) is blunted during periods of mass unemployment.

These are all responses by the working class to the manner in which the capitalist system develops. They are specific responses to the current situation in South Africa. They are real issues to the working class, but apparently sometimes seen as 'problems' by working class organisations. For example, some trade unions seem to perceive themselves as organisations of the employed working class only. Thus, the union involved in the Eveready strike (see WIP 7) spoke of the 'lack of dignity' of the unemployed women who gathered at the gates of the factory to apply for the jobs of those dismissed.

Unemployment is not a point of production issue; neither are transport cost increases, rent rises, exploitation in and of the 'informal sector', etc. But then neither are a number of the factors which determine the size of working class wages. The definition of the working class cannot be confined to the point of production and the factory floor; and neither can working class interests, activity and organisation.

A few practical comments remain to be made on the 'Work In Progress' project. WIP has thusfar managed to function on donations

received from those who have been able to contribute financially in return for each copy. These donations have been in the region of 60c per copy, with the exception of a few individuals who have been able to contribute considerably more. This has enabled us to distribute WIP free of charge to those who cannot afford contributions. However, because of increasing size and production costs, we have lost some money on the last two issues of WIP.

We are therefore going to have to ask for contributions of approximately 80c per copy from next year. For those who can afford to give more, we ask for a donation of R10,00 per year. This will enable us to increase distribution in those areas where we cannot expect to receive financial contributions.

Our next issue of WIP will be out in the first quarter of next year. Contributions are encouraged. An encouraging sign has been the number of contributions received over the past five issues, and we aim to solicit and provoke even more contributions for future issues. Please submit your material, test your ideas, and share your information.

We publish, in this issue, an index of the major material which has appeared in the first 10 issues of WIP. We hope that this will make it more accessible, and request our readers to make this index available to people who have not received any or all copies of WIP produced.

We thank our contributors and readers for their ongoing support which we believe is making WIP a successful and growing project.

-THE EDITORS.

But it is directly functional (in the way that the industrial reserve army is) only to the competitive, non-monopoly level of the economy. The marginalised labour force hardly affects the level of wages in the monopoly level of the economy: monopoly capitalism increasingly needs a stable, semi-skilled labour force with an income high enough to be able to consume some of the products made by this level of economic activity. Rapid turnover of the workforce becomes a threat to productivity in these circumstances, rather than a mechanism to lower wages. The education (albeit low and specific) invested in the labour force employed in the monopoly level of the economy cannot be 'wasted' by firing workers and taking on those at the factory gate, even if it can be done at lower wages.

The growing size of the marginalised labour force has implications for political stability within a society. Firstly, more and more people are competing for fewer and fewer jobs. While this may be of benefit to individual capitalists, the unrest and conflict that accompanies this competition is a threat to the functioning of capital over time. It is especially threatening to monopoly capitalism as this level demands stability - no riots at the factory gates, no blocking of roads, no boycotting of transport preventing 'their' workers from getting to factories and offices.

Secondly, an ever-growing number of people are realising that they probably have no chance of ever finding steady employment. This would be especially prevalent among the youth - those people with high expectations - and those workers being retrenched when their

jobs are taken over by machines. This would apply particularly to farm workers, who when displaced from employment by mechanisation in agriculture, have no qualifications for jobs in industry, especially not in monopoly industry.

These people form a threat to the reproduction of the capitalist system - to the ability to maintain the calm and belief in the system which allows it to function over a long period.

Responses by the state and capital.

The state, acting in the interests of the capitalist system as a whole, has a number of options. Some of these have apparently already been rejected in South Africa as either impractical, or not in the interests of the system of capital accumulation. One of these would be large-scale, labour-intensive activity, such as building, to be undertaken by the state itself. However, the state does not stand outside of capitalism, and the crises which affect the system also affect the regulator of that system. Much as sufficient capital is not available to the private sector for such activity, so the state faces the identical problem.

The local options are limited even more by the racial dimension of the conflict between capital and labour. It is so much more difficult for the state to convince the majority of the population that its actions are in their interests when that state is 'white', and whites are the major beneficiaries of state action.

Control and repression of the unemployed has, therefore, to become more and more direct.

In this, the location of the unemployed is of crucial importance. It can be expected that, as the Riekert Commission advised, those without jobs and accommodation will find it ever more difficult to remain in urban areas. At the end of October, all employers of 'illegals' will face stiff fines (up to R500), while the 'illegals' themselves will be subject to the same prosecution as before. Those who have managed to register will be only slightly better off in that they are now formally migrants with no urban rights. In other words, there will be 'benefits' for those in stable employment - mostly those in jobs with the monopoly level of the economy. On the other hand, reserves/bantustans await migrants and the unemployed.

This strategy will possibly make it easier to control the unemployed with the aid of 'homeland' governments, but will also create greater divisions within the working class between employed and unemployed.

Assisting in this policy of the creation of 'urban insiders' and 'rural outsiders' are a host of organisations engaged in 'improving the quality of urban life', providing housing for those in employment, offering the unemployed and homeless cheap solutions (cheap to capital) to the 'housing problem', soothing consciences with schemes providing employment for tens of people, etc. Some of these organisations were set up directly by capital.

This is not to say that some of these 'solutions' are in themselves bad. It is rather that they are offered as 'solutions', and as an end in themselves, when they are measures to alleviate, not solve, the overall

SAIC - participation or boycott

STATE POLICY towards Indians resident in South Africa was, until 1961, that they were 'foreigners' who should be 'returned' to India wherever possible. During 1961 this policy was altered, and government accepted, in the words of the then Minister of Interior, that "Indians are here and the vast majority are going to remain here....we must realise that the vast majority of them are South African citizens and as such they are also entitled to the necessary attention and the necessary assistance".

It was as a result of this change in policy that the Department of Indian Affairs was created in 1961, and the cabinet minister heading the department empowered to appoint a so-called National Indian Council to advise him on certain matters. The government claimed that it was necessary to appoint a council, as there were no identifiable Indian leaders with which it could consult. In adopting this attitude, they ignored the popularly-based Indian Congress, which had led Indians politically for generations; government claimed that Natal and Transvaal Indian Congress was communist led and without support; to the extent that it had power amongst Indians, this was held through intimidation.

The appointed National Indian Council was established at the end of 1963, when the Minister of Indian Affairs invited approximately 100 Indians to a conference held in Pretoria.

At the time, the formation of the Council was resisted by some, and several hundred Indian women gathered at the Union Buildings, Pretoria, to express their opposition to apartheid and apartheid-created organisations. When, in February 1964 the Minister of Indian Affairs announced the appointment of a 21-man National Indian Council, with the secretary for Indian Affairs as chairman, the scheme was totally rejected by the South African Indian Congress.

The South African Indian Council Act of 1968 gave statutory recognition to the Indian Council. The Minister of Indian Affairs was formally empowered to appoint 25 people to the SAIC, as well as the chairman of the council's executive committee.

An amendment to the act in 1972 empowered the state president to increase the size of the SAIC to 30, and also allowed for a certain number of members to be elected, rather than appointed. Later that year it was announced that 25 members would be appointed, and 5 members elected; the recently revived Natal Indian Congress (NIC) immediately rejected these proposals, and stated that it would boycott the election of the 5 SAIC members.

Then, during 1973, the Minister announced that at the end of the term of office of the appointed SAIC members, an 'election' would be held to vote in 15 new members; the remaining 15 members would be appointed. The election would not be held on the basis of a voters roll, but through 'electoral colleges' comprised of members of Indian local authorities, local affairs, management and consultative committees. A number of groups expressed their intention to boycott these so-called elections, including the Indian Management Committee of

Lenasia and the Natal Indian Congress.

An Electoral Act for Indians was passed by the all-white parliament during the course of 1977, which made it compulsory for all Indians over the age of 18 to register as voters. This was widely interpreted as a prelude to the inauguration of a wholly elected SAIC. During October 1977 talks were held between NIC and Transvaal Action Committee leaders, who agreed to co-ordinate their efforts in opposing the whole notion of a specifically Indian council, whether elected or not.

1978 saw the enactment of the expected law providing for an elected SAIC. 40 members would be elected on a voters roll, and a further 5 members would be appointed: 3 would be appointed by the leader of the majority party if it held 34 or more seats in the SAIC; if the majority party held 33 or fewer seats, 2 members would be appointed by that party, and 1 member by the opposition party. In addition to this mechanism, the State President was empowered to appoint 2 members on the advice of the leader of the majority party.

It was made clear that the government had formulated this act with the intended new constitutional proposals in mind, whereby a three-tier 'parliamentary' system involving separate 'parliaments' for whites, coloureds and Indians was proposed; africans were not mentioned in these constitutional arrangements.

Most progressive anti-government groups and organisations presumed that progressive Indian organisations would naturally adopt a boycott stance towards the proposed SAIC elections. This had been the consistent

position of the Indian Congress over the years, as well as a number of other Indian organisations. The influence of the black consciousness position, which had as a principle plank in its programme the non-participation in state-created, ethnically separate bodies, accentuated the conventional position of progressive opposition groups - non-participation in and boycott of Bantustan administrations, Urban Bantu Councils, Coloured Representative Council (CRC), SAIC and other similar bodies.

It was against this background that a group of Natal-based members and associates of the NIC called for a reassessment of the boycott principle, and thereby initiated a wide-ranging debate on strategy and tactics in contemporary South African politics. Early in May 1979 it was revealed that a series of meetings were being held between NIC leadership and a younger group of people who were keen to reassess the boycott strategy adopted towards the forthcoming SAIC election. This article attempts to outline the various positions taken on this issue. It is written not for the specific purpose of recording the conflict over participation in the SAIC election, but rather to raise some questions about progressive principles, strategies and tactics in South Africa. For while the specific debate about the SAIC election has been resolved, the issues involved retain a general importance for political struggle.

Broadly speaking, one can isolate four major positions on the SAIC question. The first involves the recently formed Democratic Party, which has grown out of the group nominated by the government to the SAIC. A

conservative group, it is prepared to work within the government-created system, and compromise in order to win limited gains for certain strata of the Indian Community. This party is quite happy to participate in the SAIC, and sees no problem associated with its position.

The second major grouping is gathered round the Reform Party, currently led by Y.S. Chinsamy, but recently joined by J.N. Reddy who is the state-appointed chairman of the SAIC executive committee. This group has previously contested SAIC elections, and recently gained a majority on the SAIC executive committee. The party was formed from amongst SAIC members in 1977, and joined the Inkatha-led South African Black Alliance (SABA) in January 1978. Backed by SABA, the Reform Party will participate in the SAIC election.

The third group has rejected participation in the SAIC totally, and is supported in its stance by a number of black-consciousness organisations. It is comprised primarily of the NIC, the anti-SAIC committee, and the Solidarity Front, which has its roots in the now-dissolved Anti-Constitutional Proposals Committee (ACPC), Transvaal. Some people within this group have rejected participation in the SAIC purely on principle, while others have argued that their boycott position is based on tactical considerations.

The fourth group rejects apartheid and all apartheid institutions, and sees the SAIC as a reactionary institution. However, they argued that, in the current state of 'Indian politics', there were good tactical reasons for participating in the SAIC elections; this

group suggested that a tactical advantage could be obtained for anti-apartheid forces by contesting the elections.

The groupings gathered around the Democratic and Reform Parties are not of major concern in this article. It is rather the third and fourth positions outlined above that are discussed and considered below. It must, however, be borne in mind that the pro-participation position discussed below has nothing in common with the position of the Reform and Democratic Parties, which also favour participation in the SAIC.

The position of the group which wished to reassess the boycott principle revolved around 3 basic propositions:

- 1). that participation in reactionary and/or dummy institutions does not necessarily imply acceptance of what those institutions stand for;
- 2). that boycotts of such institutions are a matter of strategy, not moral principle;
- 3). that in the current situation in South Africa, there are sound strategic reasons for progressive forces to participate in the SAIC elections.

In support of their first proposition, is that participation in an institution does not always imply acceptance of the functions of that institution, the pro-participationists outlined a number of instances where progressive and even revolutionary forces had participated in useless bodies for tactical gain.

For example, after the failure of the 1905 revolution in Russia, the militant Social Democratic Party (which under the leadership of Lenin took state power in 1917) participated

in the powerless Dumas (sham parliaments). It was argued at the time that boycotting the Dumas would distance the Party from the people, leading to the isolation of leadership from the masses.

Similar sorts of occurrences were referred to by the pro-participation group, drawn from the history of political struggle in India, Germany, western Europe and Zambia. In South Africa itself, members of the then legal Communist Party (CPSA) participated in the almost exclusively white-elected Parliament - at that time, certain 'qualified' Cape African males and 'coloureds' were permitted to vote in Parliamentary elections. According to a document issued by the pro-reassessment group, the CPSA in the 1940s

"put up candidates in Durban, Johannesburg and Cape Town for the City Council elections. In 1948 it had one of its members elected in the Cape western seat (on an African Communal roll). This Cape western seat was thereafter won by such people as Brian Bunting, Ray Alexander and finally by Lee Warden. Lee Warden was a member of the Congress of Democrats which...was part of the Congress Alliance. It was with the permission of the Congress Alliance that Lee Warden took his seat in Parliament as a representative of the Cape Western Africans.

The pro-reassessment group argued, secondly, that political boycotts are a strategic weapon, to be utilised and implemented where there is some gain for the oppressed and dominated classes. They rejected the suggestion that participation in reactionary bodies under all circumstances and situations is wrong. Specifically, they felt that boycott or participation was an issue to be decided in terms of the tactics and strategies of political struggle, and not by a rigid,

inflexible morality which implied that it is 'impure' or 'unprincipled' to participate in state-created institutions. The group then went on to explain why they believed that the objective position of the Indian community and its relationship to political struggle suggested that something could be won by contesting the SAIC elections. They agreed that when the NIC decided to boycott the SAIC in 1971, there were sound reasons for its stance. However, in the intervening years, the retention of a principled boycott had led to a growing separation between progressive Indian leadership and the majority of the Indian community. The NIC, it was argued, had not grown during the past few years, nor had it managed to create a mass base and following. The effect of the boycott policy led to a small, weakened body of progressive Indians.

They suggested that the process of contesting the SAIC elections could facilitate the building of a powerful organisation, with grass roots community support and participation. The election campaign would also allow certain ideas, programmes and policies to be put forward which would otherwise be difficult in the repressive South African context.

The reassessment/pro-participation position can accordingly be summarised in the following way:

- +participation in the SAIC election does not necessarily imply acceptance of the body;
- +boycott is a strategy, not a moral principle;
- +participation can assist in the building of a mass oriented, popularly based organisation;
- +the boycott policy has led to a distance emerging between progressive NIC leadership and the Indian masses;

+participation in the SAIC gives a certain degree of protection from state repression in the development and spreading of political policies, programmes and ideas;

+because of lack of organisation and participation in directed activity, the consciousness of the Indian masses is low. An election campaign run by progressive elements can go some way to raising mass political consciousness.

The responses of those who argued that the boycott position was the correct one can be conveniently divided into two main areas:

- 1). that boycott is a moral principle never to be broken or assessed;
- 2). that boycott of the SAIC is the correct strategy at present. This position differs from the above in that it accepts that participation in reactionary structures may be a correct tactic in certain circumstances.

Vice-president of the NIC, and chairman of the Natal-based anti-SAIC committee, N.J. Naidoo, responded to the reassessment initiative in the following way (report from Graphic newspaper, 1.06.79):

"Any participation by members of the Natal Indian Congress or their sympathisers in the forthcoming SAIC elections could cause irreparable harm and embarrassment to the sustained overseas campaign against South Africa.....In a statement....Mr. Naidoo pleaded with members of Congress to think again and avoid a split and warned that any attempt to opt for the elections would be seen by anti-apartheid campaigners overseas as working within the apartheid system and could deliver a body blow 'to our exiled leaders campaigning overseas..... I cannot concede that the entitlement of Indians to elect an

Indian Council or Parliament is really such a laudable dispensation as to hoodwink the oppressed peoples of South Africa into believing that it is anything but a fraud.... Nor do I concede that it is necessary for radical-thinking democrats to capture the SAIC in order to deny the Government the argument that Indians are participating in its system of government'.

Mr. Naidoo went on to say that the NIC was unequivocally opposed to participation in the forthcoming SAIC elections because it refused to make false promises to the people during the election campaign...and operate the apartheid system and the entrenchment of Black poverty and suffering.....

'The NIC readily concedes that the protagonists of participation intend participation with rejection, and to this end will accept their bona fides. It is essential to know what campaign promises will be made, what the manifesto will contain and what the ultimate purpose of participation is. If there is going to be a demand for one man one vote for all people including Africans, Coloureds and Indians, if there is going to be a demand for a unitary state based on recognised democratic principles, if there is going to be a demand for the release of political leaders in prison and under restriction orders and if there is going to be a demand for the repeal of discriminatory and repressive legislation then it must be made clear that this is the policy of the group and they must also make it clear how they intend to carry out their mandate once they enter the Indian Council or Chamber'. Various other arguments in favour of boycott, and criticisms of the participation position,

were canvassed in the press and at public meetings. Some of the areas dealt with by those opposed to participation were as follows:

1). Boycott: principle or strategy?

It was suggested that it was over-pragmatic to argue that boycott of state-created institutions was nothing more than a flexible tactic, to be instituted or ignored according to the political climate or the direction taken by a political organisation. This implied that, at least in South Africa where state and para-state institutions are not subject to an elective principle based on universal suffrage, it is important to accept the general idea of boycott and non-participation. However, some people in favour of boycott suggested that it was also important to accept that in very specific circumstances there may be an advantage to be gained for the oppressed by participating in a state-created structure in order to achieve specific objectives. For this group, the question over the SAIC election became whether there were good enough reasons to deviate from the general strategy of non-participation and boycott - and they answered the question negatively.

2). Discipline of candidates contesting the election.

It was argued that if the participation group went ahead, one of the problems they would face would be how to ensure that their group of candidates submitted to group or party discipline both during the election campaign, and subsequent to being elected. The possibility of running for SAIC with anti-apartheid support could attract opportunists who did not accept or fully understand the arguments for participation.

This could lead to them making election promises in an attempt to ensure election which could not be fulfilled, or which ran counter to the programme of the group; it could also create confusion once elected to SAIC in terms of voting patterns on issues, statements and speeches made, etc.

3). Campaign promises.

Related to the above criticism was the question of election campaign promises. While it was understood that a major plank in the pro-participation campaign would be one of minimum demands over issues like one man one vote, release of political prisoners, etc., some nonetheless feared that the average voter might still expect that the candidate was undertaking to improve or further the community's immediate needs (housing, roads, facilities etc). If this happened, expectations amongst voters would be raised, and if those expectations were not met, a process of apathy, disillusionment and rejection of those who stood for office might set in. They could become associated in the minds of the voters with opportunists who ran for SAIC for considerations of prestige, personal gain, or to further the interests of the wealthy Indian trading class only.

4). The ability to succeed in the election campaign.

It was of great importance whether the pro-participation group could actually win the election, defeating the Reform Party backed by the South African Black Alliance (SABA). The question was raised by the boycott group whether sufficient resources could be gathered to run a high-profile, effective election campaign in all constituencies. Might the

state not interfere to hamper their campaign and covertly support that of other candidates. There was concern raised about the effects of participating in the election, and loosing to another political party.

5). The 'black middle class' strategy.

It was noted that the SAIC fitted into a wider state strategy related to the constitutional proposals, and the attempt to create a black 'middle class' with a vested interest in society much as it currently is. The strategy seems on the one hand to create a relatively privileged african 'labour aristocracy' in the urban areas, and on the other hand to gradually involve 'coloured' and 'Indian' leadership in decision-making (but to exclude the mass of coloured and Indian workers). The SAIC seems to be a state-chosen vehicle for one part of this strategy, while Koornhof's regional councils, community councils, Wiehahn and Riskert proposals form another aspect. While most progressive forces are critical of Wiehahn and Riskert, and while most urban african leadership rejects Koornhof's committees, it might be difficult to explain why progressive sections of Indian leadership are adopting a different position, ie the utilisation of the structures, rather than their total rejection. This could serve to render difficult any alliance between progressive Indian groups, and other interests.

A large number of the objections raised to the pro-participation position revolved around the practical dynamics and difficulties involved in actual participation in SAIC functions, business and meetings, as opposed to participating in the elections themselves. It was partially in response to these criticisms that the pro-participation group

proposed a 'compromise strategy', whereby they form a political organisation to contest the elections, but boycott the actual business of the SAIC itself. It was suggested that these 'boycott candidates' could facilitate the raising of mass consciousness, the building of a stronger organisation with close links with the community, keep collaborators out of 'leadership' positions on SAIC, while not having to actually take up a seat on the council.

The debate, however, was not confined to 'Indian politics'. Because of its general importance, a large number of groups and organisations intervened in one way or another. Gataha Buthelezi, chief minister of the Kwa Zulu Bantustan, warned that the anti-Indian Council campaign was aimed not only at the SAIC, but also against "our South African Black Alliance, at Inkatha and at those members of our Indian and Coloured communities who offer out their hand of friendship". Buthelezi also warned that if the boycott campaign of the anti-SAIC groups was successful, it would imply that co-operation with other blacks was being rejected by Indians, and violence endorsed.

On the other hand, various groups partially or wholly associated with the ideology of black consciousness, rejected involvement in the SAIC totally. The Solidarity Front, a primarily Lenasia-based group which includes AZAPO president Curtis Nkondo, was formed in mid-August with the express intention of opposing any participation in the SAIC elections. Nthato Motlana of the Soweto Civic Association (ex Committee of Ten), speaking at a meeting called by the Lenasia Peoples Candidates group, opposed the idea of blacks working within

government-created institutions.

"Whatever concessions black people have gained came as a result of activities outside the ridiculous Government-created institutions. You can't quote me a single example of an achievement by people working within these institutions,"

he told the 750 people present at the meeting. Leader of the Peoples Candidates group, Dr. Rashid Saloojee, endorsed Motlana's position, adding that his group, which dominated the Lenasia Management Committee until it withdrew, would not participate in the SAIC elections.

In terms of its general policy, the South African Council on Sport (SACOS) made it clear that it rejected participation in any government created institutions, including SAIC, CRC, Bantustan administrations, etc. The positions of CRC member Norman Middleton who is also president of the SACOS-affiliated South African Soccer Federation (SASF), and Gataha Buthelezi who is patron of the SASF, have been considered at SACOS meetings; a recent speech by SACOS president Hassan Howa made it clear that unless Middleton and Buthelezi were removed from the federation, or resigned their positions in government-created bodies, the SASF faced permanent expulsion from SACOS. There are indications that some of the pro-participation group in Natal were linked to SACOS, which must have made their position difficult and sometimes contradictory.

There was clearly rather limited ground for debate between those who rejected participation in SAIC on the grounds of morality and principle only, and those who argued for participation on the basis of tactics. The most interesting and productive debate tended to take place between those who

agreed that the question was one of tactics, but disagreed over which line was the more advantageous to implement in the current situation. As mentioned, it was partially as a response to this interaction that the reassessment group proposed the idea of 'boycott candidates' contesting the SAIC elections, but boycotting the body itself. At the same time, the pro-participation group indicated that they were unhappy about contesting the elections unless they obtained agreement on their revised strategy from NIC leadership as well as other groups. They felt that to go ahead without the backing of such groups both split the Indian left, and allowed for the possibility of defeat in the elections because of lack of solidarity and support on the left.

It was presumably within this context that, at the end of September, people prominent in the pro-reassessment group issued a statement aimed at restoring unity. Signed by Yunus Mohammed, Krish Govender and Pravin Gordhan, the statement said that

"After due consideration we firmly believe that the SAIC elections should be boycotted and in this regard we commit ourselves to the NIC programme.....The Indian community is being subjected to divisive manoeuvres by the state to further separate the community from the other Black communities, to divert it from participation in the national democratic struggle and to establish as spokesman of the community elements such as the Reform and Democratic parties who would follow closely state policies. In view of this onslaught it is imperative that all progressives unite under the banner of the NIC. We commit ourselves to working towards this objective. We are grateful to our president, Mr. George Sewpersadh whose open, honest and mature approach has contributed tremendously to the resolution of the

differences within the NIC and we pledge our support to his leadership.

This new-found unity between all groups opposed to the SAIC was due to have found expression at an anti-SAIC convention in Durban in mid-October. Some 200 delegates and observers representing 29 organisations, including NIC, AZAPO, SACOS and COSAS gathered to launch a campaign of active boycott against the SAIC elections, due to be held in March 1980. However, the convention was postponed when a large group of blacks - some allegedly members of Buthelezi's Inkatha movement, although Inkatha has denied responsibility - tarred and feathered a representative of the Transvaal-based Solidarity Front. Motlana was due to have spoken at this convention, but was unable to attend. The person tarred and feathered was mistaken by the attackers for Motlana, who was their target.

The basis of the groups attack seems to have been

- a). that Motlana should direct his efforts at leadership towards africans in Natal before speaking to Indians, and
- b). that if Indians considered themselves to be blacks, they should join the SABA led by Buthelezi, and incorporating Inkatha, the Coloured Labour Party, and the Indian Reform Party.

The issue of whether progressive democrats should participate in the SAIC election is now resolved. Agreement has been reached to launch an active boycott campaign amongst the Indian electorate. A large number of important questions have been raised, dealing with issues of strategy and tactics in the South African struggle. Some of these questions remain

unanswered, despite the current unity around the boycott of the SAIC. The most important point remains: is it ever legitimate for oppressed groups to participate in structures created by the oppressors in order to win a tactical advantage in the struggle? And if the answer is positive, in what circumstances is it correct to participate, and when is boycott the weapon of the masses? The way in which these questions are discussed, and the answers formulated, will have an important bearing on future political struggle in South Africa.

Glenn Moss.



COMMITTEE of TEN

THE MOOD OF Soweto in June 1977 was militant and demanding. For the past 2 or 3 months part of this militancy had been focussed on the Urban Bantu Council (UBC) and the related issue of rent increases. In April 1977, after receiving the go-ahead from the UBC, the West Rand Bantu Affairs Administration Board (WRAB) announced rent increases for Soweto - in some instances of 80% or more. The announcement was met with an explosive response. Thousands of students marched on the UBC Chambers in protest against the rent increases. The building was stoned and the militancy continued into the night with the stoning of buses and the setting alight of two beer-halls. The Soweto Students' Representative Council (SSRC) called for the immediate resignation of members of the UBC, saying that since its inception the UBC had consistently been used by the authorities to oppress their own people. This demand grew in the weeks that followed; finally on 2nd June 1977 the UBC collapsed with the mass resignation of 14 members; this brought the total number of resignations to 23.

This was the context of the emergence of the Committee of 10. Shortly after the demise of the UBC, the Black Peoples' Convention called on Soweto to form a civic body representative of every black man's aspirations in the township, amidst speculation as to who was going to take over leadership in Soweto. On 27th June 1977 the Committee of 10 was formed at a meeting held in the World

newspaper offices and attended by members of different committees and associations in Soweto. Prominent amongst these were black consciousness organisations such as SASO, BPC, SSRC and the Black Parents Association (BPA). Such was the context in which the Committee of 10 was formed - a context typified by a period of high militancy and mass mobilisation, with the Black Consciousness organisations as the main driving forces. The backing that these organisations gave the Committee served to legitimise and give credibility to this new creation born out of the turbulence of Soweto at that time.

Surprisingly, the Committee turned out to be much milder in tone than one would have expected in the circumstances. Its first move was to announce that it was developing a blueprint for local government in Soweto, which would be delivered to the 61 black leaders who had been present at the Committee's formation. It was reported that this would be a meeting of 'professional people and representatives of organisations'. Once the blue-print was approved, this new municipal body would be formally introduced to the people of Soweto at a public rally. Thereafter, representations would be made direct to the Government which would be presented with an 'alternative body that they will not be able to refuse'.

The blue-print was presented on 26th July 1977. It proposed that an autonomous city be created for Soweto with a council comprising 50 elected members. The council would be a policy-making body and would be structured along the lines of other municipalities in South Africa; it would have a management

committee which would have powers to: pass legislation, control the budget, approve proposals and delegate powers to a town clerk and heads of departments. Provision would be made for the election of a mayor and deputy-mayor. Revenue would be derived from rates and taxes, fines, fees, license duties, charges for electricity and other money which the management committee would be empowered to recover. For these purposes the blueprint proposed the establishment of freehold rights. In addition, a five year development programme to improve the quality of life in Soweto was outlined with the sum of R5,000 million as the basic financial target needed to undertake the project.

The response of the white establishment to the blue-print was, on the whole, one of relief and approval. The Nationalist press advised the government to take heed of the proposals as the "structure envisaged is not entirely beyond the bounds of current debate in Nationalist Party circles" (Transvaaler 28.07.77). The stated willingness of the Ten to speak to the government about their plans reinforced the conviction that this was a moderate and reasonable body. The Deputy-minister of Bantu Affairs, Mr. Cruywagen, expressed approval that the Committee had restricted itself to local affairs and was not addressing itself to national matters.

A hostile response came from the hard-liners in the Nationalist Party. Mr. Carel Venter, deputy chairman of WRAB, said that the proposals were 'impractical' and that the Committee of 10 was looking for confrontation, not for solutions; this sentiment was echoed

by Manie Mulder, chairman of WRAB.

However, after an initial period of vacillation, the state tightened the screws. On 29th July, the mass rally planned for 31st July at which the blue-print was to have been put before the people of Soweto, was banned. On 2nd August the Transvaal issued a vicious attack on the Committee of 10 claiming that the latter propagated confrontation with the government and that it was predominantly a Black Consciousness movement, using the World as its mouthpiece. The next day, Community Council elections were announced. The same day, the Afrikaans newspapers challenged the Committee of 10 to prove its leadership by bringing the 'unrest' to an end and by persuading students to return to their class-rooms. On the 6th August a second mass-meeting of the Committee was banned, and a clampdown on school-children to make them return to school was reported.

On August 10th, Cruywagen refused to meet with the Committee of 10. Two weeks later, Manie Mulder attacked the Committee, calling them 'puppets' under the control of 'newspapermen'. All these actions took place in a context of an on-going militant mood in Soweto, with students still boycotting schools and with continuous incidents of 'unrest' taking place. The Committee of Ten were not in a position to defend themselves: they announced that they rejected the Community Council elections and met with student leaders in a bid to bring the situation back to 'normal'. This they later abandoned when the students proved to be determined to carry on their boycott. Motlana issued pleas to the Prime Minister to consult with the Committee of

10 on the future, which fell on deaf ears. Having failed to act as mediators, the Committee was slow in making any headway in actually organising the civic body which they announced would be formed. Finally, on October 19th, 1977, various Black Consciousness organisations were banned and their leaders, together with Committee of 10 members, were detained.

Let us pause here a moment and reflect on what happened in this first phase of the development of the Committee of 10. Basically, the mass militancy and mobilisation of the people of Soweto led to the destruction of one of the forms of political control in Soweto, viz the Urban Bantu Council. The latter was never a source of power in Soweto; it served only to offer a pretence at power sharing. Thus, its dismantling did not lead to an effective weakening of control over Soweto because it had never had that power or control. It had always been a fraudulent sham and was recognised as such. The centre of power, on the other hand, was WRAB, a target still standing. And it was not only the existence of WRAB which led to the oppression of the people of Soweto: it was the whole grand apartheid system, including 'homelands', pass laws, etc. which was the source of oppression. So although the people of Soweto had got rid of the UBC, they were still subject to the national system of oppression. This is not to say that the mass uprisings of people in 1976/77 did not lead to certain gains for the oppressed, and defeats for the oppressors (the present restructuring of the state is certainly in part a response to 1976/77); rather, the battles of that period constituted one moment in the process of

resistance which will lead eventually to defeat. In other words, Soweto '76 did not signify the seizure of state power, but it was still highly significant in that it laid the foundations for a new and more forceful assault on the system. Thus the destruction of the UBC did not signify the final liberation of Soweto. And it is in this context that one must analyse the emergence of the Committee of 10 and its proposals for the municipal autonomy of Soweto.

The emergence of the Committee of 10 was perceived at the time as an emergence of a political organisation "as a catalyst for the political and social aspirations of township residents" (Star 13.07.79). The first task they set themselves was that of producing a blue-print for the governing of Soweto, which was later to be ratified by the people of Soweto. In drawing up this constitution they did not create the means whereby the people of Soweto could actually participate in the drawing up of the constitution. Instead of playing a participatory role, the people of Soweto were asked to play a ratifying role. Calling a mass meeting of people to approve of a plan already drawn up is very different to the establishment of support groups at grass-roots levels who would have the democratic right to submit proposals, approve and disapprove of the actions of the leadership of the political party via various methods and structures. Although the Committee of 10 had a political significance, they did not act as a political party, in the sense of mobilising, organising and educating people at grass-roots levels thereby changing their support base to an active rather than

a sympathetic membership.

Moreover, as was pointed out earlier on, the battle for the liberation of Soweto had not yet been won, so that if a blue-print for the future was to be drawn up, the people of Soweto would have to be informed as to how that goal of municipal autonomy would be attained. The impediments to municipal autonomy would have to be pinpointed, and a programme of action obviously requiring the support of the people, devised. In other words, the blue-print for Soweto was only a political demand, not a political reality, given that the struggle to achieve it had only reached the stage of the abolition of the UBC.

The Committee of 10, emerging as it did within that context, had the potential of transforming itself into an active force in the local politics of Soweto, especially as it emerged with more credibility than any other civic grouping in Soweto. But it failed to consolidate its base by not actively setting up democratic structures at grass-roots levels whereby policy decisions and the election of leaders could be undertaken; moreover, it did not set up a programme of action to achieve the political demands it outlined. Instead it resorted to being a 'spokesman-type' body, with no active organisational backing; it relied at that period on public statements and mass meetings as the corner-stone of its programme of action. This tendency to become a voice rather than a force was to increase in the second phase of their existence, ie the period after their release from detention to approximately the beginning of 1979. But before going on to analyse this second phase

of their existence, it is important that reference be made to the concept of 'municipal autonomy'.

It is interesting that a year after the demand for municipal autonomy for Soweto was made by the Committee of 10, various Indian and Coloured communities were engaged in a battle to resist the government policy of autonomous municipalities for them. The Labour Party called for one municipality for all citizens of each town and city, saying that "autonomous councils would not be feasible unless the rates of white and coloured people in the areas concerned were pooled, or unless facilities in coloured areas were first developed to match those of white areas" (SAIRR: Survey of Race Relations, 1978). This feeling was widespread throughout coloured and Indian areas; a representative of the residents of the Indian township of Phoenix was quoted as saying that "autonomy is just an extension of the apartheid policy where the various race groups are forcibly separated to 'develop' on their own" (Leader, 9.06.78). An idea central to this thinking was that the poverty of these areas could not be overcome unless the resources of white areas were shared with black areas, which would not occur if autonomous councils were set up.

It would appear that the Committee of 10's justification of municipal autonomy (blacks ruling themselves) does overlook the fact that genuine self-government can only occur when the people have control over the wealth of the community, and where that wealth is evenly distributed. The initially positive response of those in power to the proposals of the Committee of 10 is itself

an indication that the demand for local self-government does not present a serious threat to the status quo, and is a demand which can be met. It is not possible to go into a detailed analysis of the pro's and con's of self-government here; it is worth noting, however, that there are serious problems surrounding the idea, which need to be worked through and thrashed out.

The release of five of the more conservative members of the Committee of 10 was not coincidentally linked with the Community Council elections in Soweto. In fact, the state tried desperately to get the backing of members of the Committee for the elections, but failed, as did the elections which polled a low 6%. This attempt at the co-option of the Committee was the first in a series of concerted initiatives by many forces in South Africa to draw the Committee of 10 into their folds; this second phase of the Committee's existence is characterised by a period of a dizzy whirlwind courtship of the 10 by liberals, big business and verligtes in the Nationalist Party. That the Committee was allowed to exist, whilst all other militant Black Consciousness movements were banned, is an indication that the powers-that-be saw in the Committee a potential moderate and reasonable force which could serve a useful purpose.

The character of the Committee of 10 changes. No longer is it involved in issues primarily related to Soweto, but is treated as a consultative body and spokesman for black people. We find the '10' commenting on PFP policy, organising commemoration services, meeting with the Broederbond, with the PFP,

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This issue of Work In Progress edited and published by an editorial collective, and printed by Central Print Unit, all of 1 Jan Smuts Avenue, 2001 Johannesburg South Africa.

Thanks to Paul for cover illustration, and to contributors for articles.

If you do not receive WORK IN PROGRESS regularly, and wish to subscribe, send your name and address to the editors. Costs per issue differ, depending on whether the subscription is for single or multiple copies, postage rates, etc. From next year a minimum donation of 80c per issue (excluding postage) will be requested from those who can afford it. For costs outside of South Africa, bulk orders, special rates, etc., contact the editors.

The nature of WIP, which is to stimulate debate and present controversial views, ensures that the opinions expressed do not necessarily reflect the views of the editors.

editorial

UNEMPLOYMENT AND underemployment in South Africa currently stands at more than 2-million people, the vast majority of them being African workers. This situation is of capitalism's own making; it is nonetheless of grave concern to those involved directly in the South African economy, as well as those who ensure that society remains fundamentally the same. Businessmen are expressing fear that social unrest may accompany the present level of unemployment, and are calling on the state to implement programmes to alleviate the position. The state, on the other hand, is calling on capitalists to use labour-intensive techniques in production. This involves the use of more workers in relation to machinery and raw material (means of production) employed.

But not many people are looking for the causes of unemployment, and laying blame where it should be: with the development of capitalism in South Africa and in the relationship between South African capitalism and the world capitalist system.

Why unemployment?

It is the nature of capitalist accumulation itself which creates unemployment. The motive force of capitalist production, which is the creation of profits in order to accumulate more capital, is at the root cause of growing

unemployment in South Africa and other capitalist countries. Put simply, there is a tendency for capitalism to utilise more and more productive machinery in order to increase the surplus produced by workers. This tendency means that the organic composition of capital changes as more machinery is introduced, and fewer workers are employed relative to the means of production used. The organic composition of capital refers to the ratio of means of production to living labour in production. It denotes the way in which the money capital advanced by the capitalist is split between buying means of production (machinery, tools, raw materials) and labour-power (the capacity of the worker to produce, which is what capitalists buy from workers). The capital advanced to buy means of production is constant capital; that which is used to buy labour-power (the potential or capacity to work) is referred to as variable capital.

One of the ways in which capital can increase productivity is to use more constant capital in relation to variable capital, ie to replace workers with machinery; (this is, of course, not the only way in which productivity can be increased. The organic composition of capital can remain constant while the working day is made longer, or labour can be organised to work more rapidly. But these methods do not concern us here).

With an increase in constant capital relative to variable capital, people are excluded from employment in two ways. Some are directly excluded in that they are 'replaced' by machines and lose their jobs; others are indirectly excluded, in that

Black Sash, Urban Foundation and Oppenheimer, participating in symposiums on Black Education, expressing views on the relationship between urban and rural blacks, attacking community councils and Inkatha, making frequent comment on issues in the press etc. etc. It cannot be denied that quite often the 10 played a progressive role in articulating opinions other than those of the Buthelezi's and Thebehali's, as well as maintaining some kind of political momentum in a period when mass militancy had died down and the major political organisations banned. But the social forces shaping South African history were changing, a fact which was to have an effect on the character of the Committee of 10.

The most significant force was the growing impetus to absorb and co-opt a black middle-class as a buffer between those in power and the masses. The most effective way of resisting this kind of onslaught is to establish a democratic grass-roots organisation which, by the demands it makes and the action it undertakes, serves to highlight the moderate compromises that middle-class elements are likely to make in the process of co-optation. The militant mood of the masses in 76/77 kept the Committee of 10 from taking on any mediatory role ie of restraining the militancy of the people. Once this militancy died down, the '10' was left on its own, subject to the imperialist overtures of social forces advocating a middle-class co-optation. Having failed in an earlier period to embody the militancy of the masses in an organisational form, the Committee of 10 became increasingly distanced from a grass-roots base. Without this organisational base, the Committee

dissolved into a "newspaper/public platform" party. And this kind of political party is ideal for the purposes of co-optation in that it does not mobilise and organise people at a grass-roots level in a democratic fashion, thus providing a force behind the voice of the party. In other words, part of the process of co-optation is increasing the voice of the middle-classes whilst silencing the voice of the oppressed majority. Of course, the Committee of 10 can never be put in the same class as the so-called 'puppets' of the South African government; on a conscious and vocal level they were opposed to the co-optation of the middle-class, but this position was undermined by their political practices which were eminently suitable for the processes of co-optation.

The refusal to participate in Koornhof's committees on urban blacks marks the beginning of a third phase in the Committee's history, viz the new era of the Black Consciousness movement, marked by exclusivist nationalist positions in general, and by a refusal to participate in government institutions in particular. The decision to set up a Soweto Civic Association and the emphasis which Azapo places on the mobilisation of workers was a tacit admittance that the Black Consciousness movement and its organisations needed to establish grass-roots support, a support which had gradually diminished after a brief flowering in 1976/77.

The historical significance of this new era of the Committee of 10 is difficult to assess at this stage; moreover, it would be inadequate if one were to analyse it outside of an analysis of the strength, ideology and

tactical positions of the exclusivist nationalist movement presently emerging. What is of critical strategic significance is whether this movement is adopting the correct response to the present re-structuring being undertaken by the state and big business. Obviously, the strong middle-class content of the movement, i.e. doctors, teachers, lawyers, intellectuals, petty traders, students, etc., is going to prove problematic for the forging of alliances with the masses. Moreover, as their ideological position crystallizes, it is going to accentuate the differences between the various political groupings. In this way, the battle-lines are going to be drawn more sharply and with more precision.

BANTU EDUCATION

SOCIALISATION FOR DEPENDENCY.

INTRODUCTION

EDUCATION does not operate autonomously in any society. In Durkheim's terms, it cannot be understood apart from its cultural context, and it is that cultural context which determines the focus and ideal of the educational system. Education functions to socialize people about the way things appear to be, rather than how they are, or could be. It treats appearance as reality, and in so doing, reflects and reproduces the social relations of production in a particular economic system. Thus, Bantu Education is an

aspect of the reproduction of the capitalist division of labour in South Africa. In itself it is not the cause of repression and inequality - that lies in the structure and functioning of the capitalist economy (Sarup, 1978:167) - but it is dominant among what Althusser (1971) refers to as the ideological state apparatuses. In other words, it functions not only to reproduce skills, but also to reproduce "submission to the rules of the established order" (1971:127), and it does this by ideology rather than violence. Any analysis of Bantu Education must, therefore, look not only at facilities and statistics, but also at form and content, and at the needs of the economic system which it serves. Williamson (1974:8) writes that "Marxist writers such as Althusser, have never entertained the illusion that a capitalist society is capable of sustaining an education system which promotes equality". According to Bowles and Gintis (Sarup, 1978) schooling is the essential mechanism of the integrative function which allocates individuals to economic positions. It produces a stratified labour force for the capitalist enterprise.

What, then, are the specific needs which Bantu Education is designed to meet in the South African economy, and how does it go about meeting them? Most of this paper will deal with the second part of the question. I shall attempt briefly, now, to suggest some answers to the first part.

The Eiselen Commission of 1949-51 reported that "... education has the effect of making the native more intelligent, more civilised and more loyal and of increasing his wants" ('Rebusoajoang', 1979). This covers, broadly,

the two main aspects of education which relate to the needs of the capitalist economy in South Africa: that it "discipline them (young Africans) so they can play a meaningful role in the South African economy" (from a report on proposed youth work camps for Africans - Weekend Post, 79.08.18); and that it increase the dependency of potential workers on the commodities of capitalist production - this is a double dependency, both as consumer and wage-earner, the former role necessitating the latter. According to 'Rebusoajoang' (1979:235) "the economy needs a stream of literate, computing workers, comprehending and articulating at least one language spoken by their white superiors. The best way to obtain this is to increase their 'wants' in part through education. At the same time, to satisfy the white electorate, these skills should not lead to expectations."

In what follows I try to show how Bantu Education functions to satisfy "the need for blacks to play an increasingly important role in providing skilled manpower to sustain economic growth in South Africa" (Bantu, Department of Information publication, July, 1976), and, at the same time, the need to maintain a compliant, passive labour force, unaware of its own strength. To explain this, however, it is necessary to have some understanding of Gramsci's concept of 'hegemony' and how it operates.

HEGEMONY

ACCORDING to Gramsci, class domination is exercised as much through popular 'consensus' in civil society as through physical coercion by the state apparatuses (there is an

obvious link here to Althusser's Ideological and Repressive State Apparatuses). Beliefs, values, cultural traditions, function on a mass level to perpetuate the existing order, and this is the meaning of 'ideological hegemony'. Williams (1976) sees hegemony as supposing "the existence of something which is truly total, which is not merely secondary or superstructural, like the weak sense of ideology, but which is lived at such a depth, which saturates the society to such an extent, and which, as Gramsci put it, even constitutes the limit of commonsense for most people under its sway". In other words, those who live under a particular hegemony experience the dominant ideology as reality. Those who are not part of the dominant group accept the group's definition of them as reality. Steve Biko (1972) put it this way: "Who can resist losing respect for his tradition when in school his whole cultural background is summed up in one word - barbarism?" Educational institutions are important agencies in the transmission of the dominant culture. They stipulate the parameters of 'reality' and prevent the development of an alternative framework from which the hegemonic culture can be questioned. They define that which is worthwhile and, in capitalist societies, at any rate, channel potential challengers into individualistic competition and aspirations while submerging the majority in passive acceptance of their own inferiority.

When cracks become apparent in the hegemonic rule, the repressive apparatuses of the state have to be used, as happened in Soweto in 1976. Recent changes in legislation

affecting Bantu Education have been aimed at covering those cracks rather than at any significant change of direction. What remains unaltered is a commitment by those in power to a system of differential education, based on race which, on the whole, articulates conveniently with class.

DIFFERENTIAL EDUCATION

DURKHEIM believed that education should be both common and differentiated - common for social consensus and to reinforce homogeneity; and differentiated so that the child might be prepared for the function he would have to fulfil as a member of a particular social class. Coleman (1966) sees the differentiated system as allowing "the community's collective need for a trained labour force, and the middle class individual's interest in a better education for his own child" both to be met, while at the same time, being "designed to prevent a wholesale challenge by the children of the working-class to the positions held for children of the middle-class." There appears to be an assumption that the class structure is immutable, and this assumption is fueled by the vicious cycle effect of providing an education which trains people according to their 'opportunities in life'. "This concept of differentiated curricula uses the expected future to match child and curriculum" (Coleman, 1966:219), and takes as given the problematic notion that working class children, or black children, or minority group children, have restricted futures. By accepting this without question, and providing a limited education to match that restricted future, differential education ensures the continuation of the cycle. Bantu Education is an example par excellence

of this. But it is worth noting that the removal of differential education does not automatically imply equality of opportunity or of achievement, if it is not accompanied by the removal of differential socio-economic conditions and values given to background and culture, ie you can't have equality of opportunity without a good deal of equality of condition.

HISTORY

AT this point I would like to take a necessarily brief look at the history of African education in South Africa, for, although Bantu Education is a product of Nationalist Government, differential education and the debate over African education long predates 1948. Until 1850 African education was a purely missionary endeavour (Havighurst, 1968). My interest here, however, lies with the latter period.

The South African Native Affairs Commission of 1905 stated that what was desirable was an education which placed heavy emphasis on industrial training because it had the particular advantage to the Native of fitting him for his position in life (Rose and Turner, 1975).¹ The Commission did not add that it also had the particular advantage to the whites of providing a dependent and useful labour force.

The Phelps-Stoke Report of 1922 (this was an international commission composed of Americans, Englishmen and Africans) came to the following conclusion: "In view of the obvious need for relating education to conditions of life, it may seem surprising that some educated Natives have been opposed to any

departure from the existing conventionalised school systems. Intimate knowledge of the nature of those protests reveals their origin to be fear of any movement for segregation of the black people. Past experience has convinced some of the educated Natives that departures from the white man's methods have too frequently meant an inferior provision for the black people. They are therefore naturally suspicious of adaptations as the entering wedge for educational segregation." In 1936 the Welsh Commission (an inter-departmental committee on Native education) reached the following conclusion: "From the evidence before the Committee it seems clear that there still exists opposition to the education of the native on the grounds that (a) it makes him lazy and unfit for manual work; (b) it makes him cheeky and less docile as a servant and (c) it estranges him from his own people and often leads him to despise his own culture. Those who bring forward such criticisms in some cases add that it is not to education as such that they object, but to the wrong (present) type of education. While these criticisms of the present system are not without foundation, the aim that most of such critics have at the back of their minds is that we must give the Native an education which will keep him in his place" (Rose and Turner, 1975:231-2). The commissioners go on - "The education of the white child prepares him for life in a dominant society and the education of the black child for a subordinate society."

While acknowledging differences in life opportunities, the commissioners asked: "Should education lead or follow the social

order?" Unfortunately their wisdom went unheeded.²

When the Nationalist Party came to power in 1948 it appointed a commission on Native education in South Africa (known as the Eiselen Commission). While the Commission concluded that "The Bantu child comes to school with a basic physical and psychological endowment which differs so far as the commissioners have been able to determine from the evidence set before them, so slightly, if at all, from that of the European child that no special provision has to be made in educational theory or basic aims" (quoted in Hartshorne, 1953), by accepting a positivist and functionalist approach to education as given, the commission willingly laid itself open to being used as the foundation of the 1953 Bantu Education Act which entrenched the practice of differential education for blacks and whites in South Africa.

The Act provided for the establishment of government schools for Africans; for the transfer of the administration of native schools from the provinces to the union; and for these schools to be administered by the Native Affairs Department, rather than the Department of Education. An amendment to this Act, passed in 1955, pegged the general taxpayers' contribution to African education at R13-million, with further increases in expenditure to be financed by the Bantu themselves, thus giving statutory force to the myth of the dual economy in South Africa. (According to this myth there is a 'developed' and an 'underdeveloped' economy in South Africa, the two being independent of each other. In fact, underdevelopment is the reverse side of

development, the one occurring at the expense of the other - they are inextricably linked.

LEGISLATION: aims and changes

Aims

WHAT were the declared aims of the Act? According to Dr HF Verwoerd, the then Minister of Native Affairs, "Education must train and teach people in accordance with their opportunities in life, according to the sphere in which they live" and "Native Education should be in accord with the policy of the State.... Good race relations cannot exist when the education is given under the control of people who create wrong expectations on the part of the Native himself" (SA Outlook, 1953). Further, he said: "It is abundantly clear that unplanned education creates many problems, disrupts the communal life of the Bantu and endangers the communal life of the European" (quoted in Jones, 1970). "The Bantu must be guided to serve his own community in all respects. There is no place for him in the European community above the level of certain forms of labour" (Verwoerd, 1954:24).

There is no attempt in these statements to disguise the fact that Bantu Education is meant to fit the African child for an inferior, subordinate role in South African society. More recently government spokesmen have denied this, but Verwoerd's notorious words have not been forgotten by black South Africans. The Soweto Teachers' Action Group sees Bantu education as "a Broederbond controlled political weapon used by whites to ensure their continued dominance of blacks" and as being "geared to indoctrinate blacks to despise

themselves and bow down to white people" (Sunday Post, 79.07.25).

Changes

IN 1972 an Act was passed removing the financial provisions of the 1955 amendment. This amendment (mentioned above) had made increases in public expenditure for Bantu Education contingent upon Bantu economic productivity and tax revenues, themselves dependent on the general level of Bantu educational achievement. The result was an increasing backlog and deterioration in African educational facilities, which, despite the Act of 1972, and particularly given the differential spending on black and white education (see later), have been, and will be, hard to eradicate. At the beginning of 1978 there was a backlog of 700 classrooms or 40 schools in Soweto alone. (Kane-Berman, 1978:185). (This is further compounded by the emphasis on building secondary schools only in the 'homelands', although, since Soweto 1976, this has, apparently, been somewhat relaxed).

The Education and Training Act which was passed earlier this year replaced the Bantu Education Act of 1953. (Since the beginning of 1978 the Department of Bantu Education has been renamed the Department of Education and Training. Is this as cosmetic and unconvincing a measure as some of the provisions of the new Act - or does it have symbolic significance?) The Act allows for a more flexible application of the medium of instruction provisions of the earlier Act. While this may be the result of the lesson learnt at Soweto, the language issue was obviously only the 'last straw' rather than the cause of the 1976 uprising. The Act

declares as its aim and objective the introduction of compulsory education in all areas, but does not couple it with free education, which casts grave doubts on its viability.

The Act provides for the matriculation or senior certificate examination to be that of, or the equivalent of, either the Department of National Education or the Joint Matriculation

Board, but, given the minute fraction of African students (0,3%) who reach matriculation level and given that differential education but equal examination can only result in high failure rates among the African students, this hardly seems an important concession.

The government, from the statements of its spokesmen, has, since the second half of the

1950s, seen itself in the role of noble and misunderstood benefactor in the realm of African education.³ The basis of its claim to have done so much for African education must be questioned. Certainly the numbers of African children at school have risen both absolutely and proportionately, but from 1955 to 1971 the pupil/teacher rose from 45,5 to 57,6

LESSON 10.

THE COMING OF THE 1820 SETTLERS.

English, starving, Government, strange, party, drought, farm, settlers, leader,

When the fighting against Napoleon was over, the English soldiers returned to their homes in England to find that they could get no work. Meal, bread and most other food cost much money. Men, women and children were starving.

In South Africa there was much land and few people to plough and sow it. The Dutch farmers along the Great Fish River lived far from each other. Often men who were looking after their cattle were killed by the Ama-Xhosa who stole the cattle and burnt down the houses. There were not enough soldiers to punish the Ama-Xhosa and bring back the cattle.

The Governor, Lord Charles Somerset, thought that it would be a very good thing if more White farmers lived along the Great Fish River. They could then help each other and the Ama-Xhosa would be afraid to cross the river and steal. He knew that many people were starving in England; so he wrote a letter to the English Government asking that some of these people should be sent out to South Africa. He said he would give them big farms and help them buy food, oxen, waggons, ploughs and seeds the first year.

When the English Government promised to give tickets to those who wanted to go to South Africa, many men sent in their names and said they would like to take their wives and children to a new land and make new homes where there would be enough food to

eat.

At last the day came for them to leave their own land. They were put into parties of ten. Each party had a leader, one of whom was William Shaw, the great missionary. They were not very happy on the small sailing ships that took three months to reach South Africa. There were so many people on the ships that there was not much room to move about. Sometimes the sea was rough and many were sea-sick. All were very pleased when the ships sailed into Algoa Bay and landed at the place where Port Elizabeth now stands.

How strange it must have been for those new settlers to stand on the land and see not a house for miles around. Dutch farmers were waiting for them with waggons on which were long white tents. Never before had they seen waggons pulled by oxen, never before had they seen little black boys leading oxen over the veld. It was strange at night, when the waggons were outspanned, to sit beside the fire and eat mealie-meal porridge. They had never seen mealies growing!

When each party reached the land that had been given it by the Government, the few things they had brought from England were taken off the waggons and they were left on the wide open veld. Often there was not a house to be seen.

The Dutch farmers living along the Fish River were very good to the new settlers

They helped them to build their houses and plough their lands. They showed them what to plant and when to plant.

Many of these settlers had never been on a farm but had lived and worked in big towns. Some had never before had a garden or held a spade in their hands. Some buried their seed two feet under the ground and waited for them to grow! Drought came, the rivers dried up, the grass became brown, the animals starved and the plants died.

After the drought came heavy rains which filled the rivers, drowned their sheep and cattle and washed away their gardens. The Ama-Xhosa crossed the Great Fish River and stole their cattle and set fire to their homes while they were sleeping. Some wished they had stayed in England to starve and many left their farms and went to the towns where they found work.

More stayed. They were too brave to run away and had learnt to love the land with its bright sunshine. Year by year they learnt

(Troup, 1976), while the drop-out rate at African schools is exceptionally high. Many of the reasons for this can be found by looking at hard figures.

FACILITIES

LIBERAL critiques of Bantu Education have tended to concentrate on facilities rather than on form and content. Thus, equalisation of expenditure is seen as crucial, covering compulsory free education, teachers' salaries, removal of double sessions, reduction of pupil/teacher ratios, provision of laboratories and libraries, school feeding schemes, improved teacher qualifications, rather than what is actually taught or how it is taught. Auerbach, speaking at the 1969 SAIRR Conference on Bantu Education, concluded that, on the whole, shortcomings were not of the curricula "which are reasonably balanced, nor of syllabuses which, generally, are educationally sound." Obviously the reforms suggested by liberal educationalists are important, and some of the actual figures involved are given below. Nevertheless, the problems of Bantu Education go far beyond expenditure as I shall attempt to show in the following section.

Undoubtedly, differential education in South Africa has meant differential access to resources. This has been partly excused by the dual economy myth, and partly by the 'homelands' policy, in terms of which all African South Africans are citizens of a 'homeland' and so their education should be 'homeland' centered and ultimately 'homeland' controlled.⁴ In figures this means that in the 1976/7 period the average per capita expenditure on the education of a white child

was R654, on an African child in the 'common area' R48,55 (all figures taken from the 1978 SAIRR Survey of Race Relations, and Africans referred to are from the 'common area', unless otherwise stated).

In 1978 the pupil/teacher ratio at white schools was 1:19,7, in African schools 1:49,2. Whereas in African schools only 12% of school-going children were enrolled at secondary school (0,9% in the final two years), in white schools 36,6% were enrolled at secondary schools (5,6% in the final two years). In 1978 only 2,3% of African teachers had university degrees; 81,3% had only a junior certificate or less. On average, African teachers earn 67% of the salary of a white teacher with the same qualifications. During 1977 there were 19 183 African student teachers enrolled for teacher training courses, compared to 13 167 whites, serving, respectively, populations of 19 369 500 and 4 365 000 (this covers the whole of South Africa, including the Transkei region). The bias towards white education is obvious. The accumulative effect is both vicious and self-perpetuating.

Most revealing of all, perhaps, is the drop-out rate among African school children. Out of a total school population of 4,5-million only 2% get to Std 7 (Financial Mail, 77.12.09). In a study done by Prof R Tunmer (Rhodes), he found that one out of two children had dropped out by Std 3, one in five in the first year (EP Herald, 77.10.18). A writer in the Bantu Educational Journal (Department of Information) in April, 1976, had this to say about the drop-out rate: "There are various factors which contribute

to this phenomenon. The parent or the school may be at fault, or possibly the opportunities for work which present themselves may cause the child to leave school. However, here I wish to concern myself solely with the child as factor." In the light of the preceding figures, and in the context of the socio-economic conditions in South Africa, such an emphasis on the child must appear wilfully blind.

According to Mr Fanyana Mazibuko, Secretary of the Soweto Teachers' Action Committee, "From the financial discrimination all other inequalities flow" (RDM, 78.01.12). This is, however, questionable. The difference does not lie only in money and numbers. The form and content of Bantu Education are geared towards the reproduction of an obedient, dependent workforce, particularly at the junior school level. As 88% of African school-going children are enrolled at junior school, the curriculum, syllabus and text-books at this level are particularly significant.

FORM AND CONTENT

BOWLES (1977:137) sees mass education as ensuring social control and political stability. It instills discipline, punctuality, acceptance of authority and individual accountability, all of which are needed by workers, particularly in a capitalist society. According to Postman (1970), "If you cannot read you cannot be an obedient citizen", and "an important function of the teaching of reading is to make students accessible to political and historical myth." Bantu Education syllabuses and text-books are geared towards training obedient

citizens and workers and propagating convenient myths. Blacks must be taught to respect the values of white, technological society; to equate progress and civilisation with the coming of the white man to South Africa. Intrinsic to this is the acceptance of the necessity and sacredness of law and order,

the work ethic, and a negation of the role of blacks in South African history (Adler, 1973). The myths that come through are (a) that black is bad and white is good, (b) that apartheid is natural and given, and (c) that obedient submission is the 'natural' role of the black man.

Black is bad; white is good

This myth is particularly prevalent in the teaching of history, where the emphasis is on "the white man who carries truth to savages - all-white truth" (Fanon, 1967:147).

According to the Bantu Education (BE) Social Studies syllabus for Std 5, "The aims

LESSON 21.

CECIL JOHN RHODES.

born, digger, diamond, college, donkeys, war, member, Parliament, Prime Minister, done.

Cecil John Rhodes was born in England in 1853. He was not a very strong boy so when he was seventeen years old his father sent him to South Africa where he hoped the beautiful sunlight would make his boy strong.

Cecil's brother was a farmer in Natal and to him the boy went to live an open-air life. Soon after he arrived, diamonds were found on the Vaal River and hundreds of people from all over South Africa left their farms, their offices and their shops and went to dig for diamonds. Among them were Cecil Rhodes and his brother.

On their waggon these two young men loaded spades, picks, buckets, food and clothes.

Then they inspanned their oxen and, taking with them some Zulu servants, set off on their long journey over the Drakensberg to the Vaal River. When they reached Kimberley, they bought a small piece of ground and began digging

Hundreds of other men were digging too and soon the ground was covered with deep holes. Every bucket of earth was brought to the top and carefully washed to find the heavy white shining stones that would make the diggers rich.

Life was not easy for these men. They had no time and no money to build houses in which to live. Most of them slept in their waggons or in tents; a few built small iron huts which were too hot in summer and too

cold in winter. The country was dry and bare with few trees and gardens. Meal, mealies, sugar, tea and other food were brought on waggons from the Cape and cost much money—a bag of meal cost five pounds.

The farmers who had water on their farms sold it to the diggers. So much water was wanted for washing the earth that there was very little for bathing, cooking, and washing clothes. It cost one shilling and sixpence to have a shirt washed and ironed.

This hard rough life did not kill Cecil Rhodes, who found many diamonds and became rich. When he had enough money, he went back to England to college with boys younger than himself. He wanted to learn more and more. In the long holidays he came back to Kimberley to work on his diggings.

When he left college, he returned to South Africa and worked hard to make more money. He did not want to buy large houses, fine clothes and rich food. He wanted money so that he might help to make his country great.

At that time the country North of the Limpopo River was called Zambesia and the Great Chief was Lobengula. Rhodes paid many visits to Lobengula and begged him to sell some of the great land. At last the chief said he could send some White settlers into the country.

Khama let Rhodes build a railway through Bechuanaland to the North and on this railway he spent thousands of pounds.

The men he sent into the new country which he called Rhodesia were brave and wise. After they left the railway they found no roads. The country was covered with thick forests and trees had to be chopped down to make

roads for the waggons; lions roared round the tents at night and sometimes carried off donkeys; oxen were stung by poisonous flies and died; wild animals had to be killed for food; but on and on went the brave men slowly until they reached the place where Fort Victoria now stands. Here they outspanned and began farming and looking for gold

The Matabele were brave strong men who did not like to see the White settlers in their land. They stole and murdered until some soldiers were sent to punish them. The Matabele attacked and killed a small party of soldiers and war began.

Rhodes came from Cape Town to see what could be done to put things right. He and a few men without guns rode out to the Matoppa Hills where the Matabele had collected in thousands. The soldiers could easily have killed Rhodes and his men but not one threw a spear; they were brave themselves and liked to meet men who were not afraid. Rhodes put up his tents, then he sent messengers to call the chiefs to come and talk things over. He waited many days before one old chief came, then another and another.

When all had come the great talk began. Day after day it went on and the great man listened to all that the chiefs had to say. He made them many promises and when at last he asked, "Is it to be peace or war?" they all shouted, "Peace, Nkosi."

In the Cape Rhodes was a member of Parliament and became Prime Minister.

He died in 1902 and was buried on the top of a mountain in the Matoppas near the place where he had had his great meetings with the African Chiefs.

of the teaching of History are: to show the pupil, through the study of the past, how man has reached his present stage of development" and "to foster an appreciation of the ideals, achievements and historical characters that can influence his own personality for the good." The South African history studied in Std 5 covers "(1) Jan van Riebeeck and his work as founder; (2) Van Riebeeck's successors."

A Form 2 and 3 Social Studies textbook (Van der Merwe et al, Bona Press, 1973, quoted by Adler, 1973:122) tells the African student that "If the white man did not intervene (in the Zulu ward), there probably would have been a much smaller number of Bantu in South Africa today", while a Std 4 supplementary reader (the Govan English Readers for Bantu Schools, 1974), is filled with Wolraad Woltemade, Pieter Retief and Cecil John Rhodes. In "The Coming of the Dutch" chapter the African school child can read how "The Hottentots killed their herdboys and stole their cattle" but "These brave men did not give up."

In the section on the 1820 Settlers: "The Ama-Xhosa crossed the Great Fish River and stole their cattle and set fire to their homes while they were sleeping." In the chapter on Moshesh: "At last in 1870 after there had been much fighting, murdering and cattle stealing Queen Victoria said she would protect Basutoland and let the chief govern his own people with the help of a wise man sent from England." God is always on the white man's side; white men are always "brave and wise"; black men, until they accept christianity and commerce, always steal and burn. The History and Geography syllabuses are generally very limited in scope, particularly in the lower

standards. Thus, according to JW Macquarrie (1969), "the child who passes Std 6 will have learned no history other than that of South Africa...he will have learned, however, about such useful and exciting things as the reference book, the labour bureau and control measures in urban areas." While the environment of the white child is seen as the world of man, for the African child it is his magisterial district and his homeland.

Apartheid as natural

Apartheid and the 'homeland' policy are treated throughout the syllabuses as natural and god-given, rather than as a particular government's policy. Anything opposed to the policy is seen as 'wrong'.

Thus, in Schoeman and Prior's 'Social Studies Std 5: a Junior Secondary Course' (Pretoria, 1957 - quoted in 'Rebusoajoang', 1979) the writers tell the student that "the tribal system, which is part of the life of the black man in South Africa, remains" (p 99); that "experts (people who know - sic) tell us that by 1980, 9,3-million people will be living in the homelands" (without any reference as to how they will get there). Van der Merwe et al (op cit) tell the reader that "the function of pass laws is to protect the people who are already permanently resident in the cities and to see that the work of our people is not taken away from them by foreigners from across the borders." (p 174).

The Environmental Studies syllabus for Stds 1 and 2 gives as its aims: "1) The pupil should realise that he is a member of a particular community and that he is bound by various ties to particular groups of people in the community, as they are represented, for

example, in his home, his school, his church, his residential area and his tribe. These groups serve him directly or indirectly and he in turn owes them loyalty and co-operation. At a later stage larger loyalties can be developed."

In the Std 5 Vocational Guidance syllabus there is a section on the "Physical aspects of the occupation" which asks teachers to stress "The social and economic value of employment near one's place of abode rather than having to travel to work", while the Std 4 Reader quoted earlier has two chapters on the advantages of going to work on the gold mines. The section on "Political Development" in the Std 5 syllabus deals exclusively with Homelands, functions of the Department of Bantu Administration and Development and Bantu Education, Tribal and Community Authorities and Bantu Administration Affairs Boards (BAAB).

Obedient submission

In the Std 5 Vocational Guidance syllabus teachers are told they must emphasize the importance of loyalty to one's employer; of punctuality, neatness, honesty, politeness, quiet behaviour, etc. The Environment Studies syllabus for Stds 1 and 2, gives as one of its aims that the African child must "realise that laws are necessary to the people of any community for harmonious living together. Consequently teaching should lead the child to do naturally, and therefore willingly, what society has prescribed as correct, good and commendable." In the Sub A Religious Instruction syllabus we find as part of a sub-theme: "God also loves little girls: he used the obedient little girl, Miriam, to look after her brother" and "God also used a

little girl carried away as a slave. He loves children like this too."

Textbooks interpret the syllabus for the teachers and children. Thus, in Schoeman and Prior (op cit:92), "We have seen that one must have certain basic characteristics such as honesty, trustworthiness, honesty (twice), etc to make a success of life and job." In the Std 4 supplementary reader (op cit): "If a man shows that he is hardworking, brave and wise, he is put in charge of a small party and paid more money" (this is re working on the gold mines, where the work is described as - "some drill holes in the hard rock; into these a European miner puts fuses").

The African child is being prepared for his/her role in the South African economy, a role which in terms of money, status, and potential, is inferior to that for which the white child is prepared. An interesting point here is the way in which the role for which the black girl is prepared combines elements of both the sexist and class stereotypes. Thus Bantu (July, 1976) in an article on "Education for South Africa's black peoples", included the following passage on vocational training for girls:

There are a number of courses available to girls who have completed at least a primary school education. Most of these courses serve a dual purpose: They prepare the girls for their future task as homemakers and also train them as workers, particularly in the textile and clothing industries.

Form

I have discussed, so far, the content of Bantu Education. Mention should also be made of the form. This is linked to the previous section on facilities, for the lack of

resources, the size of the class, and ill-trained teachers lead to an authoritarian ethos and rote-learning, with a high premium on obedience and punctuality rather than on creativity and independence. This slots in well with the aims of BE. According to Barbagli and Dei (1977) authority learned in the class leads to an attitude of complete subordination to the political authorities.

The sum total of the effects of BE is the acceptance of the status quo and the hegemonic definition of it:

LESSON 28.

THE GOLD MINES (Part 1.)

mines, taxes, million, helmet, miners, cages, drill, fuses, trucks.

There are about three hundred thousand Africans working on the gold mines in the Transvaal and of these about one hundred and eighteen thousand come from the Cape Province. They first began working there in 1901 and go to get money to pay their taxes, to buy cattle and to send their children to college. In times of drought they work to get money for food.

For their wool the Africans in the Cape Province get about two hundred and fifty thousand pounds but from the mines they bring back two million pounds a year.

If a man wants to go to the mines, he sometimes tells the trader, who sends him to the mines' office in the nearest village. Here the doctor looks at him to see if he is strong enough to work on the mines. No one who is not well may go; for gold digging is hard work. When a man has passed the doctor, he travels by train to the Transvaal. There he chooses which mine he wants to work on. Some men return again and again to the same mine, others go to different mines. Those who go up for the first time like to go to places where they have friends. Each man promises to work from nine to twelve months. At the end of that time he may return home or he may stay for a longer time if he wants to do so

What is called 'underdevelopment' is at its deepest root a state of prostration of the spirit, objectively a situation so defined by an overbearing culture and, subjectively, the condition of a mind which has meekly internalised its prescriptions (da Veiga Contintio, 1972).

Part of this 'underdevelopment' involves the incorporation of an elite group into the white, privileged, middle-class culture.⁵ For the few who reach matric, and for those who teach within the BE system, there is the possibility, at least, of integration into middle-class values and life-style. This

Before he goes down the mines, he must see another doctor. Sometimes the doctor says he is not strong enough to work under the ground, then he is either given work above the ground or he may be sent home again.

Work on the mines begins early in the morning, but first each man is given a piece of bread and something warm to drink. In the mines he must wear strong boots to keep the sharp stones from cutting his feet and a helmet to protect his head from falling stones.

There is a big hole in the ground down which the miners must go in cages. They go down, down, down into the earth. Sometimes they go down six thousand feet, before they reach the place where they will work.

What do these men do under the ground? Some drill holes in the hard rock; into these a European miner puts fuses. When all is ready he lights them and every one is told to get away. If foolish people stand near, they will be killed by the pieces of rock which fly in all directions.

When the noise is over and the dust has settled, the miners return to the place with their spades. They load the broken rock on to trucks which, when full, are pulled up above the ground.

Trunks of great trees are put into the mine so that the roof may not fall in and crush those who are working underneath.

possibility, limited though it is, of social mobility operates as a form of social control. Social mobility, or possibility thereof, requires the acceptance of the parameters already established by those who have power. There is certainly no question of challenging the status quo at a structural level.

CONCLUSION

BANTU Education operates at many levels to enforce dependency. It takes as given the subordinate role of the Africans in the labour force. It reinforces the notion that what Africans have they owe to whites. It teaches that the present economic and political dispensation is right and good and that the African is in the white man's land on sufferance. It emphasises passive obedience. Above all, it teaches that the African's role in the South African economy is as worker and consumer. BE opens Africans to the influence of mass media which entices them with the commodities of capitalist production, and it teaches them that the way to get these commodities is through being a good (=obedient) worker. To this end it offers basic literacy, numeracy and job-related skills within a framework of values that denigrates what is black and eulogizes what is white.

"...the most potent weapon in the hands of the oppressor is the mind of the oppressed."
Steve Biko (1972)

FOOTNOTES

1. The 1992 report of an educational commission on education in the Cape Colony (Rose and Turner, 1975:215) contains the following memorandum from a certain Mr Levey: "as far as possible, I would at these schools teach every occupation that a servant is required to do in the colony... The present system of education is not only a waste of money..., but money spent in raising up an army of discontents, who sooner or later would become a serious danger to the country." The final report of the commission concluded (p 217) that: "There should be a definite regulation that one half of the school time required of those in attendance shall be devoted to such manual training as can best be followed in the local ... The 'literacy' instruction sanctioned in native schools should be purely elementary."

2. By contrast, Fick published a treatise on, "The Educatability of the South African Native" in 1939 in which he states: "The inferiority of the Native in Educatability... limits considerably the proportions of Natives who can benefit by education of the ordinary type beyond the rudimentary." In 1949 the Federation of Afrikaners Cultural Societies (FAK) wrote of Bantu Education: "We believe that any system of education of the native should be based on these three principles (guardianship, no levelling, and segregation), with this proviso... that the financing of native education be placed on such a basis that it does not take place at the cost of European education" (Jones, 1970:54,5).

3. The Bantu Education Journal of October 1975 (Department of Information publication) talking of a "new orientation in industrial subjects" course, says: "The Department meets the costs, for it accepts this service as part of its educational task in the general development of the black man in the Republic of South Africa". The implication here is that the government does not owe the black man anything, but, nevertheless, contributes towards his education in a spirit of service and altruism. Moreover, comparisons are made between black South Africans and the rest of black Africa, rather than between black and white South Africans, between whom, apparently, there is an unbridgeable ontological distinction. Thus Prof JJ Fourie, a member of the National Advisory Education Council,

could write in 1966: "Why pick on the South African Nationalist government which has done more for the education of its non-white masses than most other governments in Africa can boast of?" (quoted in Hunter, 1966:310), while Eric Louw, then Minister of Foreign Affairs, speaking in 1961 (quoted in Biermann, 1963), declared that: "The great progress made in Bantu Education in South Africa is considerably in advance of that made by most other African countries. The success obtained is due to the fact that an educational system has been evolved which recognises that educational methods designed for European and American children with different background habits and behaviour patterns cannot simply be grafted on to the methods used for children that have grown up under entirely different circumstances. In most cases these children are acquainted only with values, interests and behaviour patterns learned from a Bantu mother, and are more often than not living in surroundings appropriate to an early stage of civilization."

4. Thus we have the then Minister of Education and Training, W Cruywagen, saying he could foresee "developments leading to a situation where the homeland governments would have a full say in the education of their subjects in white areas" (Rapport, 78.02.19).

5. Black teachers are susceptible to this mode of incorporation. The April, 1979, editorial of Educamus (Department of Education and Training publication) was devoted to the "Image of the Department", and had this to say: "There are... methods and ways by means of which teachers can air their grievances without harming the image of their department. Members of family do not denigrate each other in public." Soweto 1976 showed that this social control does not always work, that sometimes the limited rewards are not seen as being worthwhile by all teachers and students. Nevertheless, where BE is the only education available, it is, on the whole, accepted; and for those who do manage to matriculate, the temptation to despise that which they have been taught is inferior, and to respect those who have "given us all that we have" (black 1st year sociology student) must be great. Even among those who reject this image of the white, there is an acceptance of white standards. The Financial Mail (79.02.16) reports a "youngster in Soweto" as saying

"we want an education which will be fundamentally the same as the whites'" and the Soweto Students' League (SSL) tells students to "carry on with Bantu Education while the struggle for its abolition continues". There is an assumption here that education per se is good, that the problem with BE is not that it is negative, but that it is not good enough. This is not to suggest that there is not and has not been resistance to BE, from the ANC boycott of 1955 to the present. This is an area that needs further investigation.

Another factor should be mentioned under social control: that of fear. There is not only fear of losing potential membership of the black elite, but also that if one does not toe the line in the classroom, whether as student or teacher, there will be someone to inform on you. According to a 1st-year student at Rhodes who has been both a student and a teacher within the BE system, one is always very careful about the questions one asks and how one answers them. The result is the fostering of an illusion of consensus based on white magnanimity and black humility.

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LESSON 29.

THE GOLD MINES (Part 2.)

surface, separate, blown, ounces, melt, games, charge, thrown, large, half, nurses.

When the trucks are on the surface they are taken to the mills where the pieces of rock are crushed into fine dust. In this dust is the gold which must be separated from it.

At one time when the gold had been taken out, the fine white dust that was left was carried in trucks along a railway line and thrown on to the veld. In the last fifty or sixty years so much dust has been thrown out that there are now many white hills near Johannesburg. On these hills nothing grows and when there is a wind the dust is blown about and covers everything.

The gold is melted in great pots and made into bricks, most of which are sent away to other countries.

The miners work underground for about eight hours and then come to the surface again in cages. They go to their rooms where those who want to do so may have a hot bath to wash off the dust.

All the cooking is done by steam in fine large clean kitchens and dinner is ready when the men come in from work. Each man gets twenty-four ounces of mealie-meal, six ounces of bread, three ounces of beans, half an ounce of fat, five ounces of vegetables and about half a pound of meat every day.

After they have finished eating, the men do as they please. Some play games in the fresh air to keep themselves well and strong, some lie on the grass and smoke, rest and talk, others read books or write letters home. There is a night school for those who want to learn. If a man wishes to go away from the mines to do some shopping or to visit his friends, he must get permission first.

The men get free bedrooms and beds but must bring their own blankets and pillows. Some like clean white sheets and pretty covers

on their beds. Everything in these rooms is kept very clean.

If a man shows that he is hard-working, brave and wise, he is put in charge of a small party and is paid more money.

Many men send money to their parents or wives every month. Sometimes they draw only ten shillings of their pay each month to buy clothes and any other little things they want and leave the rest to take home when they have finished working.

At each big mine there is a hospital where those who are sick or hurt are looked after carefully by doctors and nurses.

Boxed inserts are extracts from 'Govan English Readers for Bantu Schools'.

Angola : 1961 rebellion

THE ANGOLAN REVOLUTION and subsequent civil war has been one of the longest and bloodiest conflicts ever experienced in modern African history. In this paper I am going to examine in some detail one of the insurrections which occurred during the initial phase of the revolution, in March 1961, in the coffee growing region of Northern Angola. I have three reasons for wanting to attempt an analysis of this event. First of all, the Northern revolt is in danger of being written off historically as being of little consequence to the development of Angola's national revolution. The events of the insurrection did not substantially involve the political party which has subsequently become the government

of Angola, the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA). The MPLA was in 1961 an urban-oriented movement, with its base in the musseques of the Angolan capital, Luanda. For the MPLA, the significant event in 1961 was an uprising in Luanda, when in February, 500 badly armed men, apparently organised by MPLA cadres, attacked Luanda prison. According to an official MPLA account:

"This date, which profoundly touches the heart of our people, marks the beginning of the phase of our national liberation struggle which is inevitably leading to complete independence...."

Whereas the March insurrection in the North involved

"....the most backward elements of the Angolan people in a desperate struggle without determined objectives, which could only lead to defeat and failure." (1)

However, notwithstanding the emphasis early MPLA ideologues placed on the role of an African petit bourgeoisie of civil servants and intellectual workers in conjunction with the urban working class in being the main driving force behind the revolution (2), by and large the Angolan war has been a peasant war and any analysis of it that does not include an appreciation of the dynamics of peasant societies in Angola in the 1950s and 1960s is bound to be superficial.

My second reason for looking at the Northern revolt is that I sense that there is a very real deficiency in the available literature on the war. I will be referring to

this in more detail below; here I will just briefly outline my misgivings. There are four standard works on the war: two of them are open in their political commitment to the cause of the Popular Movement - the works of the British journalist Basil Davidson, and the Canadian writer Don Barnett. Their work represents a considerable achievement: at a time when little attention was being paid to a conflict in a very remote and inaccessible part of the world, both Davidson and Barnett were active in the field, in the front line of historical research, interviewing participants in the conflict and collecting oral material from those who had lived through the colonial experience. And it is done with historical sensitivity and considerable sympathy (a quality which certain literature sadly lacks). However, their first hand experience was limited to the relatively isolated and sparsely settled districts of the Eastern theatre of the war, where the MPLA found its initial rural base. This region was in certain ways the least affected by the impact of Portuguese colonialism and the incorporation of Angola into the international capitalist economy: it did not provide conditions which would be easy to generalise from with regard to the other theatres of conflict. If we are talking about a peasantry in terms of the definition given to that group by John Saul and Roger Woods, that is "small agricultural producers who with the help of simple equipment and the labor of their families produce mainly for their own consumption and (my emphasis) for the fulfilment of obligations to the holder of economic and political power...." (3)

then in terms of the following, and to an extent

their middle ranking leadership, UNITA and FNLA/UPA, (the two other nationalist parties involved in the revolution), were peasant-oriented in a way that the MPLA was not: the Eastern regions did not produce a significant agricultural surplus for the capitalist market as was the case elsewhere.

Of the other two main studies, one by American academic Professor John Marcum is more concerned with the development of political parties as such, rather than the details of the socio-economic environment they operated in; that of the French commentator Rene Pelissier is marred by an uncritical acceptance of official Portuguese accounts of the revolt as well as a tendency to look for explanations in psychological features and ill-defined concepts like 'tribalism' (4). What is lacking is a study which attempts to look at the political movements within specific regional contexts giving due consideration to the way local economies and their societies can shape and determine the political movement. In a very modest way, this paper attempts some suggestions as to how this can be done.

My third and main reason for writing about the 1961 insurrection is that a couple of years ago during a period as a research worker at the University of York's Centre for Southern African Studies I met someone with an intimate knowledge of the region who generously provided some very valuable source material for me. This was the Baptist missionary, David Grenfell, who worked in Northern Angola for thirty years before his expulsion by the Portuguese authorities. He knew many of the political leaders, especially those of the Union of the People of Angola (known today as the FNLA), many of

them having been educated at Baptist schools. In the ten years following the initial explosion he ran a refugee settlement in Zaire and through this was in constant and intimate touch both with the exile political leadership in Kinshasa but also with conditions within Angola. It is on his unpublished manuscripts, notes and memorandums that many of the remarks in this paper are based.

Let us start with a brief outline of the events of the revolt in the North. I am basing this very bare chronology on the most ample source: that is, John Marcum. During February 1961 young activists of the Union of the People of Angola were sent over the Congolese border into Northern Angola to organise and make preparations for an uprising. The UPA claimed an overwhelming popular response, citing revolutionary rallies held in certain villages, attracting over 3,000 people. On March 12th the first small scale isolated attacks on coffee plantations began: these reached a crescendo of violence three days later with the revolt in several places of plantation workers who killed managers and white personnel, a loosely co-ordinated strategy of independent assaults on farms, stores and government offices, accompanied by the disruption of communications. Portuguese casualties within the first few days amounted to about 250, and at the end of three months this figure had swelled to 750. In addition, a large unspecified number of plantation workers on contract from Southern Angola were killed, though there is considerable conflict between the various sources as to whether these

people were killed by UPA insurgents or as the result of Portuguese-inspired reprisals. Where there is agreement is that the Portuguese countermeasures which followed the initial attacks massively enlarged the arena of the conflict. A Corpos de Voluntarios (voluntary force) was created: a loosely disciplined civilian auxiliary to the armed forces which was able to exact the most terrible retribution on the African community: 20,000 were to die as the result both of white settler action and the efforts of the military which included the destruction of villages with bombs and napalm that had up until then been unaffected by the conflict. In this initial phase elements of a crude UPA strategy had been based on the belief that, as in the case of the Belgian Congo, one massive sudden general uprising would shock the Portuguese administration and the settlers into withdrawal; and as in the case of then recent events in Tunisia, a general uprising would mobilise the force of world opinion and in particular that of the United Nations, into acting against Portugal.

These expectations were to be disappointed: in late April a 'second guerilla phase' was proclaimed by the UPA leadership, which concentrated in the following months on attempting to destroy the coffee crop - which initially they had hoped would be harvested by African farmers in a liberated Angola. The Portuguese began a counter-offensive in August. Refugee communities and guerillas withdrew from the areas of settlement and main lines of communication to form temporary villages - Sanzalas - in accessible mountain ranges and forests. Then began a long and savage war of attrition as the

Portuguese went along trying to flush these people out of the UPA 'liberated zones'.

It is with this initial general uprising that this paper deals with. Why did the revolt take place when it did and why did it take on this particular form: an initial insurgency generating a massive popular response? What was the social crisis that these events reflected?

A description of the region and the people who inhabited it will be useful. The revolt took place in the two Northern districts of Angola, once known slightly confusingly as the Congo district, now divided into the Zaire and Uige districts. It is an area which is bisected by rivers including tributaries of the great River Congo, marked by heavy rainfall, dense vegetation including tropical rain forest, generally low relief save for the Malange plateau in the centre of the two regions which contains the headwaters for the main rivers. The terrain creates considerable difficulties for communications, and despite relatively large population many areas are fairly inaccessible. Combine these features with a border (with Zaire) that represented neither significant geographical nor ethnic/language divisions and it is not difficult to see natural factors which could favour the existence of a sustained guerilla movement.

The Northern Angolan region is inhabited by the Bakongo peoples, a cluster of tribes speaking closely related languages and sharing a past tradition of political unity under the Kongo kingdom at Sao Salvador. There were in 1960 approximately one and a half million Kicongo speakers settled on both sides of the Angola/Zaire border: of these about half a

million lived in Angola. The Bakongo were the first group to come into contact with the Portuguese when explorers arrived at what is now called Sao Salvador in 1482. The Kongo king was baptised in 1491 and since then there has been a tradition of Kongo kings assuming Portuguese/Christian names. During the sixteenth century the Kongo court was restructured along Portuguese lines and the royal family was to embrace Portuguese culture. However, the initial relationship between the two kingdoms, which in the beginning was based on an acceptance by the Portuguese of the equal sovereignty of the Kongo kingdom, was to deteriorate with the development of the Portuguese slave trade.

The slave trade involved wars between the neighbouring peoples and the Portuguese Bakongo client state as well as internecine conflict, and this was to slowly erode the power and moral authority of the Kongo state. By 1800, 14,000 slaves were being exported from this region every year. Attempts by Kongo kings to resist Portuguese influence culminated in their defeat in 1665 at Ambuila. From 1665 until the time of formal annexation into the Portuguese empire which took place in 1883, the Kongo kingdom, increasingly demoralised and disunited, was dependent on Portuguese goodwill rather than popular acceptance of its legitimacy for its continued existence. The relative earliness of colonial penetration and the blatancy of the incorporation of traditional authority into colonial culture by the metropolitan power point to a state of ideological crisis in Bakongo society: a state of crisis that was well developed by the middle of the nineteenth century when

the establishment of plantation agriculture to the South of the region demanded a new intensity in the exploitation of the region's labour resources. This took place first under slavery, and then from 1878 in terms of a forced labour code which the traditional authorities were powerless to resist.

This crisis found its expression in a series of rural uprisings and millenarian movements, as the Bakongo masses, despairing of finding solace, security and happiness within the subverted old order, sought the dawning of a new age. (Millenarian movements usually involve a response to the undermining of traditional security as a society, or a particular class or group in that society, is undermined and gradually destroyed. Such movements usually emerge in response to the processes of colonialism and underdevelopment, and the initial emergence of capitalism in one of its forms. Usually involving rural, peasant-based societies, millenarian movements often include a mystical, semi-religious character, and are characterised by a belief in the coming of a new period (the millennium, or thousand year period of happiness)-editors). In Northern Angola these movements took a violent form in the period 1860 to 1914, during which time the Portuguese undertook a series of military campaigns to bring the North under their effective control in terms of the 1885 Berlin agreement. However, the ending of this primary period of resistance by the Bakongo masses did not end the influence of millenarianism: rather it gathered a new intensity, first with the Mafulaists, then the Kimbanguists, then the Tocoists, then the

Lesayists and finally the Tonsi movement, which like its predecessors proclaimed the coming of a new millennium

"...in which the ancestors would be resurrected and bring with them the riches of Europe; whites would be destroyed by fire and water; the black kingdom of the negroes would be established; and the blacks would become whites." (5)

This millenial tradition, I am going to suggest, conditioned and affected the nature of the insurrection of 1961. A millenial movement proclaims the dawning of a new age, and is often based around the religious leadership of a prophet claiming to have special powers of vision and healing. Its prevalence in Bakongo tradition is not accidental: first of all there was a heritage of a form of Christianity which involved reverence of ancestors, which dated from the initial period of colonial contact; secondly, we have the early breakdown of traditional authority and its moral order, a process actively encouraged by the Portuguese who destroyed those chieftaincies that showed any independent authority: by 1933 no genuine chiefs any longer existed (6); thirdly there was the long-term disruption of the social structure as a result of the impact of the slave trade; fourthly there was a strong folk memory of a once united and strong political kingdom: certain movements like the Kimbanguists sought its resurrection; and finally there was the problem of land alienation - this was the region most seriously affected in Angola. We will look at the detail and complexity of the land question in a moment: here it is sufficient to state that the loss of land represented not

simply a material loss but also contributed to the disruption of the moral foundations of traditional beliefs and feelings of self identity among the Bakongo: land was not simply the site of the living representatives of the clan, but also of their ancestors (7).

Millenial movements are often associated with classes in decline, with societies which have little hope of preserving their integrity and cohesion in a changing economic order: a millenial movement thus often questions the foundations and nature of the new order which is undermining old values. It is in these terms that, in 1958 the Angolan Prophet, Simao Toko, was to write to his Bakongo followers:

"There is no reason to fear the white man, because he has already lost the power previously given to him by God. God is angry with him, because he has committed several great sins. A new Christ, a black Christ, shall come, and Toko is his prophet. To him God has given the power which before he had given to the white man.

The land is ours and it was the white man who stole it. Now, we are very strong, and besides we have the help of our ancestors. Already we have occupied the North and the South; now we have only to build up churches in the East and the West. Within a short time we shall command all Africa. The white shall submit to us and will become our servants. Within a short time, Simao Toko shall return as our liberator."

Toko was to find the greatest number of his followers amongst displaced elements of the population, especially among those who were literate (the fact that the Baptists, the main Protestant influence in the region, were the only Angolan mission to provide literature in

the vernacular language, is significant). It was this group who tended to openly defy the authority of tribal elders who had been discredited for their complicity with whites in the recruitment of contract labour (8).

The participation of such people contradicts the MPLA analysis of the Northern Revolt, which argued that the revolt found its main constituency among the 'most backward elements of the peasantry'. Other analyses, including that of Marcum and the Baptist missionary, Thomas Okuma, argue that the main focus of the revolt is found in the aspirations and concerns of a small educated Bakongo elite. I would argue that this is also misleading. To fully understand the events in Northern Angola during 1961, we need to know something of the impact of capitalism on rural economic life.

The first attempts to develop Angola as a plantation economy came in the 1830s, with the establishment of coffee and sugar plantations worked by slave labour just north of Luanda. In the following years these plantations gradually extended northwards with the extension of the area of effective Portuguese authority. In 1858 the Portuguese announced that slavery would gradually be phased out over the next twenty years. In its place a system of forced labour was introduced. A labour code was drawn up which specified that people defined as vagrants could be put to work. This was extended in the 1899 regulations which were centred on the 'moral and legal obligation to work'. In 1914 all Africans save those defined as 'civilados' ('civilised ones') were required to enter into wage labour (or have some means of cash production) for a specific

period each year.

The movement and flow of labour was regulated and controlled through a 'cardeneta' or passbook system. In 1928 the system was fully elaborated with the institution of the classification of the African population into 'indigenatos' and 'assimilados'. (ie those classified as not fully 'civilised', and those whom the Portuguese felt were 'civilised' enough to be assimilated into the ruling elite - editor) Indigenatos were all those who did not fulfil rather rigorous criteria and tests of education, wealth and absorption of Portuguese culture. They were placed under a system of native law which subjected them to labour requirements, and an indirect rule system in which the chiefs functioned as labour recruiting agents and petty administrators, under the close supervision of Portuguese officials. Apart from other disabilities, the indigenatos could not hold landed property under individual tenure (ownership). To comply with the requirements for membership of the assimilados group was very difficult - and even by 1960, the numbers of this privileged minority were tiny.

Coffee cultivation only began contributing a major proportion of Angolan exports after the depression of the 1930s, and in the years up to and during the second world war. The first phase of the development of coffee as a major export crop in this region was dominated by a few huge companies with concessions to grow coffee from the Portuguese. However, this initial period also provided an opportunity for African producers to respond to the new world demand: African farmers had been growing

coffee in the region to supplement their subsistence production for nearly a century. Even during the 1960s, after a decade of encroachment on African landholdings, nearly a quarter of the acreage devoted to coffee cultivation was farmed by an African peasantry. (9). That it remained a peasantry and did not evolve into a capitalist farmer population employing labour was at least partly attributable to the regulations regarding African land tenure. Under a communal system of traditional tenure it was difficult for individuals to acquire large plots of land for their own or their families' use. Only those who qualified for assimilado status could buy or sell land in competition with other Portuguese citizens. Given the cultural requirements of full Portuguese citizenship, it was unlikely that such people would remain within the agricultural sector. Consequently, despite the positive response of the Bakongo peasantry to coffee growing for the market, we do not find the emergence of large-scale social stratification (eg the emergence of rich peasants employing poor peasants as labourers, etc - editor). Coffee planting rather remained a source of supplementary income, and confirmed Bakongo agriculturalists in their status of small farmers producing mainly for subsistence, and to fulfil obligations to the holders of political and economic power (ie the definition of a peasantry quoted from Saul and Woods at the beginning of this paper - editor). Despite this, the region enjoyed relative prosperity when compared to other areas of Angola: this was reflected in the wages of the plantation sector in Uige, which were nearly three times

greater than those paid in the central plateau region of Benguela (10). As will be seen, the plantations were to experience considerable difficulty in local recruitment from the Bakongo.

However, developments after the second world war were to cause a sharp decline in the position of the Bakongo peasantry. The colonising power, Portugal, began a programme of extensive resettlement of its rural population. This was aimed at offsetting the rising social tensions of a swiftly growing population which could not be provided for by domestic (ie Portuguese) economic growth: in European terms Portugal was and remains a desperately poor country with a per capita income during the 1950s which was not much larger than that of Ghana. Between 1955 and 1960 the government encouraged 50,000 peasants from metropolitan Portugal and the Cape Verde islands to settle in Angola; in the whole decade the white population increased from 79,000 in 1950 to 175,000 in 1961 (11). The settlers from Portugal were expected by the authorities to develop a peasant-small farmer mode of existence. Though these plans were not altogether successful - many of the settlers moved into towns to compete with Africans for low-skilled jobs - nevertheless the effects of settlement on the livelihood of Bakongo peasants were severe: 360,000 acres were granted during the 1950s to white immigrants in the coffee-growing areas of Zaire and Uige with the result that by 1960 nearly half the African population which had previously enjoyed access to land suitable for the growing of coffee, had been forced off that land (12).

This process of resettling Portuguese peasants in Angola was to involve widespread abuse of African land tenure. African communally-held land was, by virtue of the 1933 constitution, part of the public domain. The right of access to land customarily occupied by the community was in theory guaranteed by the Native Statute of 1954. Indigenatos were forbidden to sell or donate land to non-Africans. Land could only be parcelled out to settlers if it was held to be vacant and unoccupied. Before such land was handed over to settlers, they were supposed to go through an immensely complicated bureaucratic procedure. Inevitably this administrative system broke down: it was too complicated to cope efficiently with the requirements of over a thousand new applications for land by settlers. Consequently, settlers tended to bypass the legal process and on their own initiative occupy land regardless of its actual status. David Grenfell noted in 1961:

"The indigena has no rights to his own land, or even that on which his village is built. I have known several villages ordered to move because a Portuguese wanted that and an adjacent land for a coffee garden....many more cases of where a Portuguese had taken a coffee garden of an African because it was 'neglected'. On some occasions the owner was away on contract labour working in the coffee garden of a Portuguese.." (13).

In 1956 the Bakongo king warned his subjects that if they did not cultivate their coffee holdings intensively and efficiently they would have them expropriated by the authorities. (14) Certain administrative officials had the power to declare gardens neglected (15).

The settler presence effected the Bakongo economic existence in other ways too.

Traditionally the division of labour within Bakongo households had left subsistence activity to women while men were engaged in more ambitious cultivation, livestock rearing and trading. Petty trade was widespread among the Bakongo and with the initial coffee boom, trading could provide the initial capital required for coffee farming. However, trading could provide the same function for the new Portuguese settlers: the 1950s saw not only the taking over of customarily African-held land by Portuguese farmers and companies, but also the opening up of hundreds of small settler-owned trading stores in the Zaire/Uige region. Traders would operate in the following fashion: Producers would take their harvest of beans, coffee and groundnuts to the nearby trading store. The trader would allow them credit (usable only at his store) for part of the value of the goods. Credit would be advanced before harvest and would be recovered by the trader when crops were harvested; consequently their value was relatively low. The trader would then store the coffee, beans etc. and sell them for higher prices later (16). Towards the end of the 1950s it seems that the traders were increasingly exploitative in their practices. This reflected and was caused by difficulties in their own situation. With planters taking over the best coffee lands from African producers, and the increasing demands of planters made on African labour, there was a decline in agricultural activity in the villages: less land was being independently cultivated by Africans and so there was less surplus to exchange for goods at the store. In other words, there was a decline in African purchasing power. The solution, in the short

term, was for the trader to extend the terms of credit, and make them more demanding. Progressively the African community was finding itself trapped in a cycle of indebtedness. Nor was the situation made any easier by the blatant price discrimination practised by shopkeepers: traders in Bakongo towns had two different price scales. A kilo of sugar, for example, would cost a white purchaser six escudos and an African eight escudos (17).

With the extension of European landholding in the area there was a sharp rise in the demand for African labour. The vast majority of workers on coffee plantations were contract workers. Plantation owners and other employers would submit their labour requirements to the administration which would then request so many men from each white local administrative officer (Chefe de Posto). He in turn would demand a quota from his sobas (headmen) who would then be responsible for recruiting the men needed. The contracts, which would be legally enforceable, would last for anything from between six months and three years. They would impose certain minimum obligations on employers and generally set very low rates of pay. Not surprisingly, if Africans had any other way of meeting their cash requirements, they would avoid labour contracts. Accordingly, in the Bakongo areas, the labour on the coffee plantations had for a long time to be drawn from southern and central Angola; this recruitment took place from amongst the Ovimbundu people, for whom economic opportunities were rather more limited, where land settlement was considerably greater, and who did not enjoy the option open to the Bakongos of

migrating over a friendly border to escape coerced recruitment.

Nevertheless, by 1960 there are signs that the Kikongo speakers were increasingly being pressed into contract labour on the plantations. Grenfell mentions as an example the people of Muingula village who were forced to work on a nearby coffee fazenda. The workers were not paid for five months, at which stage the men refused to work and went into hiding. Significantly, this village was one of the first to join the revolt.

There are also indications that the use of child labour drawn from local sources for work on the plantations was on the increase. There was an increase in taxation obligations in the area: the tax age was lowered from 18 to 16, and in 1960 the sobas (headmen) were given the responsibility for its collection. All those who could not pay were arrested and held for contract labour. By the end of the decade people were confronted with a choice: migrate over the border to the Congo (where there were better economic opportunities and educational and social facilities) and leave their land; or submit themselves to a particularly hopeless form of proletarianisation (ie the process of being forced off the land and turned into a wage-labourer working for someone else - editor). Grenfell reports that by 1960 the practice of men going away on contract had become a 'recognised system', although Bakongos made up only 14 per cent of the region's labour force.

Another source of disruption resulted from the Government resettlement schemes. Starting in the 1930s, but increasing in pace and intensity in the 1950s, the administration

began to force people to move from their traditional village sites, and to build new villages at administratively convenient places alongside new roads. This was often highly unpopular. The old villages were naturally situated in places where fertile land was most abundant. In new sites, chosen and decided upon according to non-economic rationality, land was short. What people tended to do was to go on quietly planting their gardens in the old sites - often in fairly inaccessible forested regions remote from modern networks of communication. This was to have an obvious significance for the development of guerilla struggle. But the destruction of the old villages also hastened the collapse of the traditional system of markets and trade.

There were various other petty restrictions on independent African economic activity which increased the weight of the obligations imposed on them. For example, in the late 1950s, people were forbidden to burn grass burning was an aid to hunting as well as an easy way to clear ground. The measure was widely seen as just one more way in which the Chefe de Posto could increase his income by enforcing fines.

A final blow to small scale African coffee producers came after 1958. During that year Portugal agreed to a quota system being imposed on coffee production to counter the effects of world overproduction. Angolan coffee production was rather higher than the quota set. Consequently 1959-1960 was a bad period for coffee farmers. World prices fell dramatically - by 75 per cent in that period - and producers had to restrict production. The effects on the plantations were reflected in wage cuts

and the withholding of wages. But for the African producer, without the privileged access to markets enjoyed by large scale concerns and without the facilities for storing his crops until prices rose again (coffee beans in their raw state can be kept for quite a long time), the situation was considerably worse.

There were of course other factors conditioning the outbreak of the revolt in 1961, and the ones listed below are those which have been paid most attention to in published accounts of the war:

- 1). The frustrations experienced by Africans of assimilated status when they discovered growing restrictions on upward mobility and advancement in an increasingly race-conscious society;
- 2). Competition at the bottom end of the job market in urban areas between desperately poor recent Portuguese emigrants and recently urbanised Africans.
- 3). The unwillingness of the Portuguese administration to provide political safety valves or outlets for the aspirations of educated Africans at a time of rapid de-colonisation elsewhere in Africa.
- 4). The influence, especially among the Bakongo, of nationalist movements operative in the Belgian Congo; this refers especially to those like ABAKO which appealed to pan-Bakongo sentiments.
- 5). An economic environment which, because of Portugal's own inability to generate capital for large overseas investment and her unwillingness to allow other foreign capital to invest in her colonial territories, could not provide the employment and educational opportunities for an increasingly urbanised

Jet pilot bales out

A South African Air Force pilot successfully ejected from his Impala jet aircraft which crashed in the operational area.

He is Captain A Bell of No 4 Squadron, Lanseria.

Captain Bell suffered an ankle injury when he parachuted to the ground.

A SAAF spokesman said today the Impala crashed yesterday while on a training flight in the operational area.

A board of inquiry has been appointed to investigate the aircraft's crash.



The Star: 79 10 19

SA plane shot down — report

LISBON — A South African fighter bomber was shot down and a helicopter hit by Angolan anti-aircraft batteries yesterday, the Angolan news agency Angop said yesterday. An SA Defence Force spokesman in Pretoria refused to comment on "this propaganda onslaught." — Sapa-Reuters.

The Star: 79 10 20

and educated population. Some of the urban population, because of a tradition of migration to other colonial territories such as the Belgian Congo, were able to make comparisons that were highly unfavourable to Portuguese rule in Angola.

All of these were important factors, and go a long way to explaining the emergence of a political leadership in Angola, both in Luanda and in the North (the Southern group giving support to UNITA emerged somewhat later in the 1960s). We have, then, in the Bakongo region the foundation of a party in 1954 that initially dedicated itself to the revival of the old Kongo kingdom, which

at that time was in the middle of a succession dispute between a Government-backed Catholic, and a Baptist candidate. The Union of the People of Northern Angola was founded by a group of minor civil servants and other functionaries, petty bourgeois elements, shopkeepers, bookkeepers and the like, most of them from a Baptist mission background, and many having taken advantage of economic opportunities available in Leopoldville, Belgian Congo. The Union was to drop its regional connotations in 1958 in the light of pan-African disapproval of separatist movements, and become the Union of the People of Angola. It was presided over by Holden Roberto, who acquired considerable business interests in the Congo and was close to the Congolese political leadership.

But here I am not especially concerned with political leadership, which in one form or another has been a constant factor in African politics since the Second World war: what has been far more decisive than the emergence of leaders in any one country's history has been the popular mood: the degree and nature of mass response to leadership calls and appeals. It is only by looking, as we have been doing here, at the undermining of the economy in peasant society — which had initially responded progressively to Angola's incorporation into the capitalist economy — that we can understand the nature of the response of the people to the insurgency of UPA (Union of the People of Angola) in 1961.

For this was a revolt that, whatever the intentions of the petty bourgeois leadership, was shaped by the emotions, concerns and the desperation of a peasantry facing the prospect

of destruction as a class. According to missionary sources, the first emissaries of revolt came not in the form of sophisticated political cadres, but as prophets, Ngunzas. They held services in the main villages and everybody was required to attend a simple ceremony in which all had to drink a cup of water and pay 2.50 escudos. The authorities found one fund collection register in which 30,000 escudos had been collected. Speeches at such gatherings had a millenarian character: the use of water was very similar to that of the Lassyist movement which laid great emphasis on the power of holy water to remove the curses of witchcraft. In February 1961, schoolchildren around Bembe, an area where the use of child labour on plantations was notorious, refused to buy textbooks and went on strike, standing outside their schools and shouting 'Kimpwanza' (Independence). When the killings began, it was obvious to observers that many of the whites who died (administrators and Roman Catholic priests were especially singled out) were not killed as a result of the actions of organised groups of UPA insurgents, but rather by the villagers in the locality (19). Whatever the class nature of the UPA leadership (and to call it a party of the businessmen seems an accurate assessment of its higher levels), when we look at local leaders it is not surprising to find them drawn from the African coffee farming group (20). The development of the revolt into its protracted guerilla phase again followed the logic suggested by the economic experience of the peasantry: whole villages withdrew into the forests to recolonise their old villages:

for them the revolt was a homecoming, a restoration of the old order - a peasant utopia.

Frantz Fanon, ideologue of the Algerian revolution and a friend of Holden Roberto, professed a belief in the peasantry as 'rebels by instinct', as people who could in no way profit within the social framework imposed by colonialism, and as a group which stands outside the class system. Not surprisingly, he closely identified himself with the Bakongo insurrection. In strict terms, Fanon's arguments make sociological nonsense: as we have seen this was not a backward population isolated from the currents of colonial culture and economy, but rather one which attempted to respond positively to fresh economic influences. There is, however, a grain of truth in his claims. For while an urban working class can increase its potential power as it expands with the emergence and growth of capitalism, the Bakongo peasantry was doomed as a class: as capitalism penetrated the rural areas, there could only be a return to the past for the Bakongo peasantry - an attempt to destroy the present order and replace it with its negative inverted image: to make black white and white black.

But such limitations should not make us ignore the historical importance of the 1961 northern insurrection. It created a major crisis for colonial society, initiated a long and terrible struggle, and massively widened the arena of conflict. It also provided a period when other movements with different constituencies could regroup and reorganise themselves while Portuguese energies were occupied in suppressing the northern revolt:

this process was really only completed in the second half of the 1960s. It seems appropriate to conclude with a thought from Barrington Moore:

"...one may well conclude that the well springs of human freedom lie not only as Marx saw them in the aspirations of classes about to take power, but perhaps even more in the dying wail of a class over whom the wave of progress is about to fall (21)."

In these terms the Angolan revolt of the north was tragic not only because of the human suffering involved.

Notes:

1. NPLA The Road to Liberation. Liberation Support Committee publications 1975.
2. Eg. de Andrade and Olivier The War in Angola Dar es Salaam 1975 p.54
3. T. Shanin (ed) Peasants and Peasant Societies Harmondsworth 1971 p.240
4. Basil Davidson In the Eye of the storm London 1972.
Don Barnett The Angolan Revolution.
John Marcum The Angolan Revolution: anatomy of an explosion M.I.T. 1969.
Wheeler and Pelissier Angola London 1971.
5. American Universities Area Handbook for Angola Washington 1967 pp.158-159
6. David Grenfell Papers University of York Library (henceforth Grenfell ms.)
7. Alfredo Magerido 'The Tokoist Church and Portuguese Colonialism' in R Chilcote (ed) Protest and Resistance California 1972 p.33
8. Ibid. p.45
9. American Universities op cit p.288
10. de Andrade and Olivier op cit p.45
11. Thomas Okuma Angola in Ferment Westport 1974 p.8 and American Universities op cit p.45

12. See American Universities op cit pp 279-288.
13. Grenfell ms.
14. Wheeler and Pelissier op cit p.141
15. Grenfell ms.
16. Grenfell ms.
17. Grenfell ms.
18. American Universities op cit p.322
19. Grenfell ms.
20. John Marcum op cit p.141
21. Barrington Moore The Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy Harmondsworth 1974 p.505

This paper is based around a talk given to the Gubbins Society, University of Witwatersrand, on 15th May 1979.

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labour action

Technical Officials' Association: (see WIP, 9) The Association backed down in its confrontation with and threatened strike action against the Chamber of Mines. Some mines were said to have suffered large losses (R1-million on one mine) due to a 'go-slow' by the officials, but this was probably compensated for by the amount saved on postponed salary increases.

The settlement was reached after the association had lost an unspecified number of its members to the other mine officials associations which accepted

the Chamber's pay offer... (Star, 79.07.20).

Motor Industry: (eastern Cape) (see WIP, 9) The unions representing these workers won across the board increases of an average of about 8% with further increases due in March, 1980.

The wages were negotiated between employer representatives (Ford, GM and Volkswagen), the 'coloured' National Union of Motor Assembly and Rubber Workers of South Africa, the white South African Iron and Steelworkers' Union, with attendance by the African United Automobile, Rubber and Allied Workers' Union. The negotiations took place after workers had threatened strike action.

The amount of nonsense that is presented on the unemployment position in the columns of the commercial press in South Africa, and then put forward as scholarship, seems to be on the increase.

Prize-winning report of the month must be that of the Star (79.10.16) in its reproduction of the neo-Malthusianism of the latest Volkskas Economic Review:

If South Africa does not succeed in lowering the birth rate, there can be little hope of a satisfactory solution to the problem of unemployment.

Billions of rands may be squandered on social plans, which will have a reduced economic impact with little hope of getting to the root of the problem.

But what must be avoided is an emotional approach to this solution (?) ...

VOLK, WHICH VOLK?

Greater impetus should be given with everyone's co-operation to the recent decline in the high rate of population growth.

....

A lower birth rate will lead to higher per capita welfare, and in turn to better nourishment, health, housing and education. It will also relieve the pressure on the provision for housing, food subsidies, transport, education and medical facilities.

South Africa has reached a stage in its industrial development where future growth will emanate increasingly from the more capital-intensive sectors.

The last paragraph is, of course, closer to what it is all about. But no mention of who is to benefit from the "future growth"; why it will "emanate increasingly from the more capital-intensive sectors"; or why the working class (overwhelmingly African) should decrease their numbers in the interests of the beneficiaries of capital-intensive growth (mainly large-scale local and foreign capital).



Elite Upholsterers: (Babelegi, BophuthaTswana) On the 30th August, 1979, 200 workers from this factory went on strike, demanding higher wages. The factory is situated in the notorious exploitation growth-point in this 'homeland' (see WIP, 8).

Manager, Henry Velkof, told workers that those who wanted to leave should do so, and that they were automatically dismissed. Only one report appeared on this strike (to our knowledge), namely in Post, 79.08.31.

Further information required.

Clover Ice Cream: (Pretoria) A sales driver employed by this firm was reported to have been dismissed in August after a disagreement with Herman, a mechanic, over a scratched vehicle. Herman then fetched a pistol from his home, accused Johannes Remokgopa of trying to "become a white man" and threatened to shoot him. Remokgopa was fired by manager Viljoen when he laid a complaint against the mechanic.

Wolpert Coal Merchants: (Booyens) Four workers were fired after a newspaper exposé of the non-existent cleaning facilities at the firm - workers had to wash themselves from drums in full view of passing trains.

Most of the workers fear dismissal as they are migrants and live in hostels - their presence and accommodation in urban areas, therefore, being dependent on employment.

Wolpert denied that the workers had been fired, and said that they had "left the company because they were not registered" (Post, 79.08.10).

Royal Dairy: (Salt River, Cape) Post, 79.08.31, carried the only Transvaal report on the refusal to work by some 120 workers employed by this firm. Department of Manpower officials were called to settle the dispute over the non-payment of promised pay rises.

Further information required.

Doreen's Transport Cartage: (Johannesburg) Police watched while some 30 African workers struck for an increase of R10,00 on the \pm R20,00 a week they were earning. They returned to work after winning a R4,00 increase (Star, 79.08.17).

South African Railways, Kaserne Depot: (Jeppe, Johannesburg) Post reported that about "1 000 railway cartage drivers" stopped work after being told that they would not be paid on the 27th of the month (August) as was usually the case.

"Wives of most drivers who are migrant labourers came to collect some money from their husbands but were forced to return empty handed" (79.08.28).

The Star (79.08.28) reported that an SAR spokesman said that the "stoppage affected about 100 men..." Work continued the next day.

Carborundum-Universal SA (Pty): (Benrose, Johannesburg) Five despatch clerks were fired for alleged theft and were joined by seven colleagues who resigned in sympathy. The seven said that the liaison committee had not been involved, as it should have been, in the

case of the dismissal of the five other clerks (Post, 79.08.18).

DTB Cartage Company (Pty) Ltd: (Durban) About 200 African workers went on strike in protest at wages (wages between R15 and R22 a week) (79.08.27). They said that they needed "at least about R50,00 a week to keep our heads above water".

The dispute also prevented about 40 'Indian' drivers from going about their own work. While not actively supporting the strike by their African fellow-workers they said that the wages paid to the strikers were a disgrace. The drivers earn between R45,00 and R50,00.

Security Police arrived on the day the strike started. A director, Geoff Tasker, asked the men what they wanted, returned 30 minutes later, and fired a number of them.

It was reported that Tasker took on 47 of the dismissed workers the next day and engaged 38 new workers from the Labour Bureau. He denied the workers' accusations about wages and increases.

Rainbow Chicken Processing Plant: (Hamarsdale, Natal) On the 29th August about 400 workers had teargas thrown at them by police. The police said that this was to disperse them ("the mob"). 55 people were arrested. Armed "riot police" attended the incident.

The events that led to the strike started a few weeks earlier when a woman worker was dismissed from the plant. Workers demanding her re-employment stayed away from the plant and were subsequently also fired.

They were then re-employed, but at "beginner's wages".

This further dispute over wages gave rise to the large-scale action by the workers and the police action against them.

Members of FOSATU (the Federation of South African Trade Unions) and a FOSATU affiliated union (the Transport and General Workers' Union) became involved when requested to do so by workers. They were to have met with management.

The TGWU was reported to have had contact with the factory's liaison committee since early 1979. The TGWU said that the strike related more to refusal to negotiate with the committee than with the firing of the woman worker.

Production returned to normal on the 30th of August. Police still escorted workers to and from the Mpumalanga township that serves the border industrial area of Hammarsdale (also the scene of one of the spate of bus boycotts in Natal during the past few months).

The 55 workers arrested appeared in the magistrate's court in nearby Camperdown on the 27th September on charges of public violence. They pleaded not guilty and were reported to have been remanded in custody until 28th October (other reports have it that the Union paid their bail).

Balmoral Mine: (Germiston) About 300 miners at this privately owned small gold mine stopped work and demanded an increase in daily wages from R2,65 to R5,00 on the 14th September, 1979.

"Security policemen and officials from

the mine and the Department of Co-operation and Development are agreed that the strike is illegal", is how the Star put it (79.09.14). Riot police were on stand-by at the mine and the workers were given the choice of returning to work or being fired.

The mine, a member of the Boshoff Group (not affiliated to the Chamber of Mines, as was quickly pointed out), resumed work on the 15th. Ten miners "chose to leave" (according to the Star) or were "discharged for instigating the strike" (according to a mine official, quoted in the RDM).

Mine management gave no increases as the R2,65 they earn is "more than what is stipulated in their contracts".

Raleigh Cycle Factory: (Springs) On the 17th September about 600 workers employed by this firm downed tools for about five hours. This followed rumours that foremen's wages had been secretly increased by 42c an hour "to upgrade (their) standard".

African Commerce Developing Company: (Benrose) Yet another sordid scene of victimisation played itself out at this firm, involving unskilled workers complaining about working conditions. The firm manufactures staples.

Eight women workers lodged a complaint about working conditions to managing director Chain: They stand from 06h00 to 18h00 with a 30 min break for lunch - during which time they are not allowed to leave the factory premises; they are not allowed to receive phone calls despite the fact that many are mothers with small children at home; they are always threatened with dismissal; etc.

A week later the person who wrote the petition out was fired. A woman who went to find out why was also fired. The other six then walked out.

Manager Benson said that it was a coincidence that Khanyisile Sibanyoni was fired after the letter - "She was unsuitable for the job". He continued: "An agitator has been at work - that's what we call it in the UK" (Post, 79.10.11).

Toyota: (Wynberg, Transvaal) Confusing reports appeared relating to a strike and dismissal of workers from this firm. Apparently four workers were called to the office of the warehouse manager (Brits) at Toyota on 9th October, to sign "warnings for not having reached production targets". Two of the workers affected would not do this - and when they had returned to their work section they were joined by other workers in demanding an explanation for the warnings - a new measure.

Fourteen workers insisted on seeing Brits but were escorted off the premises. They were supported by about 80 other workers who then stopped work.

A meeting of all workers, with management, police and an inspector from the Labour Department, was then called. The workers were told to return to work on the 11th October. All but 25 of them were taken back into employment. The 25 were paid on Friday, 12th October, and dismissed.

Many of the workers are members of the Metal and Allied Workers' Union (a member of FOSATU). At the meeting at the factory the issue of a constitution for the liaison

Heinemann Electric Company: (Elandsfontein, near Johannesburg) This company is owned by the Barlow Rand Group. In 1976 events related to recognition of the union (the Metal and Allied Workers' Union) and the rejection of by the workforce of liaison and works committees. (The events and the issues are covered in some detail in South African Labour Bulletin, 3,7 of 1977)

Trade Unionists: The banning orders imposed by the government on some trade unionists in 1976 were lifted recently. They are those on Loet Douwes-Dekker, the Tyackes (connected with the Urban Training Project before their bannings) and also those on Charles Simkins (economist at the University of Natal) and John Frankish (who had had connections with the labour movement in Cape Town).

In Cape Town an African trade union organiser from the Western Province General Workers' Union and his family were nearly killed in a petrol bomb attack. The bomb was thrown through the window of Howard Marawu's house in Gugulatu on the 17th October. The family managed to escape through the back door and windows.

During the same week as the fire bombing Dave Lewis of the same 10 000 strong WPGWU, received four death threats, some referring to the incident involving Howard Marawu. Dave Lewis also had the tyres of his motor car slashed.

committee also came up. Workers wanted a different constitution, but this was turned down by management.

MAWU is said to be contemplating legal action against the firm over victimisation, as 18 of the union's most active members were amongst those dismissed.

BOYCOTT BITES


Lekka Pasta!

...Robin Alexander shows you how

Despite recent negotiations between representatives of Fatti's and Monis, and striking workers, a settlement of the conflict has not as yet been reached. Accordingly, the consumer boycott of all F & M products continues, amidst growing signs that the company is being hard-hit by the boycott campaign.

F & M's after-tax profits dropped by almost half in the first six months of 1979 - from R363,000 in the period January-July 1978 to R186,000 in the corresponding period for this year (1979).

The company has denied that the drop in profits has been caused by the boycott campaign. However, their unusual promotional activities suggest that this is not so. Special offers on their products, the employment of extra salesmen, and expensive newspaper advertising all imply that the company is having serious difficulties in coping with the boycott of its products. An example of recent Fatti's and Monis advertising in a Johannesburg newspaper, no doubt prompted by the dramatic drop in their profits, is shown below:



"Come along and find out just how 'lekka' pasta is for summer and the holiday season. Yes, ma'am - Fatti's & Monis' pasta in salads and cool snacks is well and truly in these days. You'll be surprised and delighted when you taste and see these new ways with Fatti's & Monis' famous pasta!"

See you at the **FATTI'S and MONIS TASTE TREAT**
 HYPERMARKET, NORWOOD, from 09h30 and BEDFORD CENTRE,
 BEDFORDVIEW from 11h15.
 SATURDAY 27 OCTOBER 1979.



These events culminated in a baton charge by the South African Police on workers and trade unionists in which 24 workers were taken to the Natalpruit Hospital for treatment. In a trial after the events two trade unionists were found not guilty of inciting the strike, but the magistrate in one of the trials following the baton charge found that

There is also evidence to show that the complainant firm was not blameless in the march of events, and there must be more

than a suspicion that the events were in fact engineered by the firm. In order to reach a show-down with their workers.

On Friday, 19th October, the state reached an out of court settlement in the case brought against them by 19 African workers and a white trade unionist for compensation for the injuries received. The state has agreed to pay out a total of R21 359, including an amount of R6 000 to Ms Christine Molokele who has lost effective vision in one eye.

GOOD NEWS VENDA CIVIL SERVANTS!!! SALARY INCREMENTS ON INDEPENDENCE DAY!

The Cabinet (of Venda) has decided to increase the salaries of officials of the Venda Public Service from the date of Independence (13 September 1979) with an average of 15%. This increment, on the one hand is to compensate officials for the great responsibility which they will have to carry after independence and on the other hand this is to make the young improve in education, which is regarded as one of the highest priorities in the development of Venda.

Examples of what salary increment embraces for certain ranks are as follows:

Secretaries (Head of Departments)	R17 400 to R19 200
Deputy Secretary	R16 800 to R18 600
Chief Inspector of Education and Chief Education Planner	R16 800 to R18 000
Circuit Inspector	R15 000 x 600 — R16 800 to R15 600 x 600 — R17 400

Furthermore salary increments for Chiefs and Headmen have also been approved for the 13 September as follows:-

3 Chiefs	— R1800
22 Chiefs	— R1200
379 Headmen	— R 600

STRIKES in SOUTH AFRICA

IMPLICATIONS FOR WORKING CLASS STRATEGY.

THE QUESTION WHICH this paper attempts to answer is whether there is something essentially different between strikes in 'Third World' countries (ie South America, Africa, Middle East, Asia Minor and South East Asia) and those in the so-called 'rich' countries (ie North America and Western Europe). The importance of the question is that strategies of working class action depend on the answer provided. This paper will show how strike action by the working masses in South Africa (as a 'Third world' country) implied a certain understanding of the objective social conditions at different stages of South Africa's development.

This contribution is part of a longer paper on strikes in South Africa. The second part, dealing with the 1970s, will appear in the next issue of WIP. The paper attempts to explain and understand the difference between strike activity in so-called 'Third World' countries and the developed centres of capitalist power (Western Europe, North America, etc). In doing this, the argument is advanced that there are important features which distinguish the stronger parts of the capitalist world system (the major imperialist powers) from the weaker or peripheral capitalist societies (the 'Third World'). One of these features, it is suggested, is the nature of the state, which is far more repressive, and intervenes more directly, in the weaker links of the world capitalist system.

In a South African context, the paper also looks at a situation where a large part of the work-force is migrant, and retains links with family structures in the reserves/bantustans (or what the ruling classes call 'homelands'). The paper shows how the enforced retention of this migrant relationship allows the capitalist class to pay wages which only have to take account of the individual worker, and can ignore his families subsistence needs. In doing this, the paper explores the nature of the relationship between urban and rural production in South Africa, and the way in which this relationship has historically affected the working class.

-The Editors.

In answering the question posed, this paper will at the same time implicitly criticise two other arguments about the specific differences between strikes in 'Third world' and 'rich' countries: one argument sees this difference in terms of the 'immaturity' or 'backwardness' of capitalist development in the 'Third World', while the other sees the difference in terms of the co-existence of two different 'economies' (ie a capitalist and a pre-capitalist economy existing within one country). The criticism of these arguments implies that they are at fault because they are dualistic: they divide the society into two isolated 'economic systems' without adequately analysing the complexity of the total system, both within the country, and within the capitalist world.

The argument of this paper will therefore start from the point of view that to understand the uniqueness of strikes within the 'Third World', it is first necessary to understand the workings of the capitalist system on an international scale. It will conclude that there is indeed something specific about 'Third World' countries - something which differentiates them from 'rich' countries. This difference lies in the specific functions of the state. In the 'Third World', the state constantly intervenes in the rest of society to actively suppress conflict between social groups and classes; whereas in the 'rich', highly developed capitalist countries the major role of the state is to institutionalise and contain this conflict rather than actively suppressing it. One indication of the difference is the presence in the 'rich' countries of

'economic freedom in the labour market' and bourgeois democratic rights concerning civil liberty and freedom of association. Clearly, these rights do not exist in most 'Third World' countries.

It is necessary to understand the specifically repressive role of the state in 'Third World' countries within the context of the production of goods and commodities. This entails understanding the capitalist way of producing commodities, and analysing the relationship between production and the repressive state. More specifically, it involves analysing capitalist production and development on an international scale, and understanding the way capitalism develops differently and unevenly within specific societies. The specific nature of the 'Third World' and therefore of 'Third World' strikes can only be grasped and understood within the context of the accumulation of capital on a world scale (including imperialist expansion from 'rich' countries). Specific capitalist socio-economic relations (ie labour repressive laws, the absence of political rights for workers and, in some cases, the growth of ideologies like racism) developed in such a way as to make the 'Third World' differ in important ways from the 'rich' societies. The starting point for any analysis of the 'Third World' strike lies in the particular way in which direct producers were separated from their land and forced to work in capitalist production. This forms the historical origins of labour-repressive economies.

From approximately 1894 onwards, capitalist production (and hence capital accumulation) on a world scale expanded

rapidly, leading to a rising rate of profit. The origins of this expansion lay in the export of capital to the colonies by imperialist countries, and the setting up of productive industries in those colonies. This involved a particular form of exploitation of workers in the extractive (mainly mining) industries of the 'Third World': the payment of workers in these industries only sufficient wages to cover their own survival costs, but not those of their family members who were forced to support themselves in 'reserves', 'native lands', etc. This was the origin of the migrant labour system whereby the worker was not totally separated from the land he owned. While he worked as a migrant in the areas of industry, his family remained on the land. Because the family of the worker was in theory self-supporting through peasant and subsistence agriculture, low wages could be paid to the worker which only had to cover his own physical needs, and not those of his family. The state intervened in a repressive fashion to maintain the migrant labour system, especially when subsistence production in the 'reserves', 'homelands' or 'Bantustans' became incapable of supporting the inhabitants any longer.

In the case of South Africa, the migrant labour system particularly suited the needs of mining capital. Initially, labour was obtained from the steadily collapsing pre-capitalist economies, where more and more people were forced to eke out an existence on ever-diminishing land. By 1902 the point was reached in areas like Pondoland where many people were migrating to the mines in search

of work. However, because this process was itself not happening fast enough, the State stepped in to coerce people in these areas to become migrant workers. Examples of this type of action taken by the State include the introduction of hut taxes (1907), and the implementation of the Glen Grey Act (1897).

At the same time, the interests of mining capital were usefully served by the separation of workers from their families. On the one hand mining capital needed only to pay the worker enough to cover his own needs and not the needs of his family which was supposed to subsist off the land it owned in the reserves; on the other hand, by forcing workers to return periodically to their 'home areas', mining capitalists were able to weaken the strength of the working class by preventing the creation of a stable, settled work-force. Another form of strict worker control was embodied in the housing of workers in fortress-like compounds.

It must be emphasised here that the existence of a migrant labour system does not mean that here exists, in addition to the capitalist economic system, a pre-capitalist system. On the contrary, the migrant labour system as it developed in South Africa was and still is based on the needs of a capitalist system which pervades the entire society. Even when strikes take place because declining subsistence production in the reserves places strain on the resources of the urban worker, the strikes must be understood as occurring wholly within the capitalist economy and not be explained in terms of a relationship between a pre-capitalist and capitalist economy.

This is in fact the case in South Africa, although not all strikes in the history of South Africa can be explained and based on the migrant labour system. (The growth of secondary manufacturing industry, giving rise to a stable non-migrant working class, must be taken into account when analysing certain strikes). The rapid decline in subsistence production in the reserves increased both rural impoverishment and urban poverty as there was no corresponding increase in real wages. This resulted in militant action by workers. Strike action can therefore be seen as taking place within the context of the failure of capitalism in the reserve areas to provide a share of the goods necessary for the satisfaction of the subsistence needs of workers and their families. Conflict between black workers and mining capitalists reached a peak in 1920 and again in 1946, with the African Mineworkers Strike. It is to an analysis of the latter event that we now turn.

The mining sector has always been crucial to the South African economy. Mining relied totally on migrant labour, this being due to the peculiar cost-structure of the industry. Its inability to pass on increased costs to the consumer, because of the internationally-fixed price of gold, and its low level of labour productivity (the low degree of mechanisation of the mines) meant that substantial profits could only be made by paying mineworkers as little as possible. As explained above, this was done through providing for the worker's individual needs, but not those of his family.

In the past this had been rationalised by the particular capitalist relations established

in the countryside (ie the supposed ability of the worker's family to subsist off the land on which they lived in the Reserves). However, by 1930 these relations had been almost totally undermined. The Native Economic Commission Report for 1930-2 showed that problems in the Reserves stemmed from over-population, overstocking, soil erosion and ignorance on the part of the population of modern farming methods. In 1940 the Landsdowne Commission noted both the existence of the reserves to supplement the miners' income and the increased cost of living with which the family within the Reserves had to cope. The Commission also noted that:

"whereas in the past Blacks (workers) had come to urban areas to satisfy definite short term financial needs and had returned home as soon as they were satisfied, they were now returning continuously to the mines and only went home for a holiday visit".

This was said in reference to migrant workers from the OFS, Natal, Zululand and the Transvaal (O'Meara 1978:69). The Commission also suggested that the bulk of the recruits from the Transkei and Ciskei (ie 40% of the total labour force in 1936) were landless (O'Meara 1978:69).

Further indications of the rapid decline in the ability of the Reserve areas to partially meet the subsistence requirements of workers' families are the settling of the urban African population between 1921 and 1946, and the rapidly increasing ratio of African women to men in the cities (from under 1:5 in 1921 to 1:3 in 1946) (O'Meara 1978:65). The exact state of the migrant labour system at the time has been specified because all the strikers in

the 1946 strike were migrants.

It is a particular feature of South Africa's 'racial capitalism' that laws which are directed specifically against the working class (ie the laws underlying the whole migrant labour system of control) affect not only workers but also people from other classes who happen to be black. In other words, racial laws repress a section of the petty bourgeois class, ie the black petty bourgeoisie (traders, intellectuals, professional people etc). Working class strategy from early on in the forties seems to have taken the form of some sort of loose alliance with the black petty bourgeoisie. From this there seems to have developed a strategy which entailed the total abolition of the way in which capital was accumulated in South Africa, rather than a mere struggle to adjust wages.

This is indicated by the fact that the African Mine Workers Union (AMWU) was established in conjunction with the ANC and the Communist Party. One therefore had the involvement of people in working-class action who were unconnected with the work situation, and who organised workers to demand concessions not directly related to the place of work. Relatively better off workers also associated themselves with the AMWU. "The Native Mine Clerks Association affiliated to the AMWU when they were excluded by the Chamber (of Mines) from the statutory cost of living allowance payable to all industrial employees" (O'Meara 1978:68).

An explicit indication of the strategy is seen in the February 1943 AMWU demands from a government commission: in addition to bread and butter issues, they called for an end to

migrant labour and the compound system (O'Meara 1978:68). Naturally these demands were by and large not met. Nevertheless, they implied the makings of a particular strategy which confronted the system not only on bread and butter issues but also at its foundation: the migrant labour system.

There seemed to be developing amongst workers the growing realisation that their interests as workers could best be served in an alliance with elements of the black petty bourgeoisie. Given the barrage of legislation which oppressed workers doubly - as workers and as blacks - and also discriminated against the black petty bourgeoisie, it was inevitable that at some or other time both workers and petty bourgeoisie would ally themselves in a common cause. The latter were making little, if any, headway by attempting to work within the system to exact reforms which could co-opt them. More than anything else, they lacked a mass base.

The 1946 mineworkers strike was not simply a mirror of the general state of the labour movement during this period. Due to the expansion of hitherto small-scale secondary industry (a specific factor which differentiates South Africa from many other 'Third World' societies) there was a rising tide in working class activity which reached a peak in 1945 when the Confederation of Non-European Trade Unions (CNETU) claimed a membership of 158,000 in 119 unions (O'Meara 1978:65). During the war years (1939-45) the strength of the settled urban working class involved mainly in secondary industry increased markedly; this was due to the importance for capitalism and the state of the smooth continuation of

production as part of the war effort. The relative lack of unemployment because of the rapid growth in this secondary sector added to the strength of the working class. (In a period of low unemployment the working class has far more bargaining power). For these reasons the state took no blatantly repressive measures against the labour force involved in secondary industry. At the same time it is equally important to bear in mind that there was no attempt made to co-opt this labour force by institutionalising conflict (eg through the recognition of trade union rights, collective bargaining processes, state-run conciliation mechanisms, etc).

It would be too simple to argue that the state's response to the crisis which the migrant labour system faced, was merely more and more naked repression. It did, of course, appear to be this. However, underlying this appearance was a far more subtle adjustment of the migrant labour system. The immediate needs of capitalism in the post-war period centred around the control of the unemployed section of the working class, and the distribution and allocation of labour between the three sectors of mining, agriculture and manufacturing (secondary industry). The state set up apparatuses, such as the labour bureau system, to allocate labour on a more efficient basis between the three major sectors of the economy.

Given the rising tide of unemployment during this post war period (and this must be situated within the general post-war depression), this state used this labour allocation system to ensure stricter control of the unemployed fraction of the working class.

The relatively weakened position which the dominated classes found themselves in because of high unemployment also enabled the state to act decisively in the interests of capital in general, and smash any threat from organised resistance. That such organised resistance was showing increasing militancy was fast becoming evident.

After 1948 the trend towards an opposition front embracing a broad multi-racial nationalism was realised. The black petty bourgeoisie was subject to the restrictions of repressive race laws, while conditions for black workers were worsening; this was the basis for an alliance between them. The considerable dangers facing trade union leadership, the decline of purely working class organisations with the resultant decrease in the mobilisation of workers, together with the futility of the constitutional protest strategy pursued by the ANC led to the latter being transformed into a mass nationalist movement. Working class discontent was increasingly channeled into the ANC, and prominent trade unionists moved into important ANC leadership positions.

Communists joined the ANC, and militant Congress Youth League, which was locked in struggle against the old guard, played an important role in transforming the ANC into a mass-based organisation. The strategy was clearly one of popular resistance, which was a response to both the repressive role of the state, and the economic conditions of South Africa at that time.

In response to the militancy of working class action in the late 1940s, the state acted to smash the power of the workers and of the national liberation movement represented

by the Congress Alliance. In 1950 the Communist Party was banned; 1953 saw the Native Labour Act set up works committees, this being part of a strategy aimed at continued non-recognition of black trade unions and the encouragement of the committees as a substitute for unions; influx control was tightened up, especially in Cape Town during 1950.

By 1954 the refusal of the state to legally recognise the African trade unions drove the more militant ones to political action. In the same year the South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU) was formed as the trade union wing of the Congress Alliance. The latter was in fact taking the lead in utilising working people's grievances as part of an overall strategy of popular resistance. This does not mean that no factory-based action took place, but rather that it did not predominate. For example, the Food and Canning Workers Union, a SACTU affiliate, combined political activity with shop-floor organisation and met initially with a remarkable amount of success. However, by 1959 repressive action by the state and employers had undermined the effective organisation of this union.

The SACTU strategy has come in for some criticism. One of two assumptions underlie these criticisms: firstly, that if the working class enter into an alliance with any other class (eg the petty bourgeoisie), it will inevitably be sold down the river and therefore has nothing to gain from such an alliance; alternatively, if the working class is in a very weak position and unites with another oppressed, non-working class group, it must only do so on its own terms to avoid being

sold down the river. At the same time, it must concentrate its actions at the point of production so as to build up and consolidate its strength before taking on broader struggles. These assumptions underlie some of the criticisms which have been levelled against the SACTU position that there could be no fight for higher wages without a fight for national liberation.

Webster, for example, argues that this strategy led to the trade union struggle being subordinated to the national liberation struggle. Worker energies were continually diverted into politically-based stay away campaigns. This, he says, is what happened in 1958 when the essentially worker-based slogan of 'a pound a day' was taken over and turned into the 'fake' slogan of 'the Nats must go'. According to Webster, members were signed up for SACTU after 1958 without being properly organised; when the unions failed to improve material conditions, support fell away. Webster concludes that SACTU "failed to locate the struggle on the battle ground where workers could establish viable intermediary institutions to win the confidence to take on wider struggles" (Webster, 1979:13).

It would be oversimple to regard this critique of SACTU's strategy in the 1950s as the final statement. This is the case, even if the critique is valid. What one has to take into account when subjecting a strategy to criticism, are the social conditions at the time, which were both independent of, and gave rise to, the particular strategy adopted. Webster is aware of the need to locate SACTU within its historical context:

"faced with...deteriorating conditions, black workers responded through a groundswell of popular resistance such as bus boycotts, and SACTU had to choose either to let this wave of opposition sweep past them or respond positively by trying to direct it into a more viable and sustained opposition. Not surprisingly they chose to try and capture it, but lacking any adequate organisational base they were forced to use the limited tactic of the stay-away - a tactic as we have seen, that is most effective when some form of factory organisation existed" (Webster 1979:13).

We can conclude that the 1950s and early 1960s saw the development of an increasingly violent form of state repression of working class activity, and a refusal to institutionalise conflict in any way by granting legal recognition to the trade union movement. Working class strike activity soon became incorporated into a broader strategy aimed primarily at the liberation of the popular masses. By the 1960s the state had successfully crushed the labour movement.

PART II OF THIS ARTICLE, DEALING WITH THE 1970s, WILL APPEAR IN THE NEXT ISSUE OF WIP. Works referred to:

O'Meara, D. "The 1946 Mine Workers' Strike and the Political Economy of South Africa" in Contemporary Southern African Studies: Research Papers, Kallaway and Adler (eds), Wits University, 1978.

Webster, E.C. "Stay Aways and the Black Working Class since the Second World War - The evaluation of a strategy". Mimeo, 1979.

THE TREASON TRIAL

FOR THE first time in nearly two decades, the charge of High Treason has been levelled against a group of accused in South Africa. Between 1956 and 1961, leading members of the Congress Alliance (comprising the African National Congress, Congress of Democrats, South African Congress of Trade Unions, Indian Congress and South African Coloured Peoples' Organisation) stood trial in Pretoria, charged with treason. But subsequent to their acquittal, the state preferred to charge its political opponents under the so-called Sabotage, Terrorism or Suppression of Communism (Internal Security) Acts. A change in this pattern was noticed when 11 Soweto students were charged with sedition in the recently concluded Kepton Park trial. Subsequent to them being found guilty on that charge, 12 men were charged with the more serious offence of high treason in Pietermaritzburg. The 12 accused in this treason trial all face a main charge of treason, with 43 alternative counts framed under the Terrorism Act, and further charges of conspiracy to commit murder.

The state has set out a series of acts allegedly committed by each of the accused, which it claims renders them guilty of the charges. All of the accused are alleged to have been acting in conspiracy with the banned African National Congress (ANC). The acts alleged against the accused are as follows:

- accused number 1: John Mofokeng Sekete (24).
- Between November 1976 and August 1978, he underwent military training in Angola, Russia and East Germany.
 - Between November 1976 and November 1978, he had access to and control over a cache of arms, ammunition and explosives near Witkleigat, Bophuthatswana.
 - Between July and November 1978 the accused, together with others, undertook a mission to reconnoitre the Transvaal and Bophuthatswana. He carried arms in Bophuthatswana, and on August 1st 1978 he engaged members of the South African Police and the Bophuthatswana Home Guard in armed conflict.
 - During November 1978, at Phokeng in Bophuthatswana, Sekete attempted to recruit



people for ANC activities.

a). On November 22nd, the accused possessed a Makarov pistol and ammunition in the Koster township.

accused number 2: Tladitsagae Moses Molefe (23)

a). During the period October 1976 to October 1978, Molefe underwent military training in Angola, Russia and Zambia.

b). During October 1978 he was part of a group which intended to establish bases in South Africa to conceal men and arms, and which also intended to attack police stations near Vryburg and Mafeking. During this mission, he carried arms in Bophuthatawana. On 27th October 1978, near Madimola, he engaged members of the Bophuthatawana Home Guard in armed conflict.

accused number 3: Jeffrey Ramasaka Legoabe (30)

a). Between December 1977 and December 1978, the accused underwent military training in Angola.

b). During January 1979, he attempted to recruit a person in Soweto.

c). On 8th March 1979, in Dube, Soweto, he was in possession of a Makarov pistol, ammunition, 2 handgrenades and a detonator.

accused number 4: Thibe Jimmy Ngobeni (27).

a). Between November 1976 and March 1978 the accused underwent military training in Angola, Russia, and East Germany.

b). During March 1978 he made trips to Mamelulele and Tshikundu areas, Gazankulu, to find places where arms and men could be concealed.

c). Between November 1976 and December 1978, he had access to arms caches in Duiwelskloof and Elim areas, Transvaal.

d). During December 1978, together with a

group including Andrew Mapheto (accused number 5), he entered South Africa to reconnoitre places in the Transvaal.

accused number 5: Andrew Mapheto (20).

a). Between June 1976 and December 1978, Mapheto underwent military training in Angola and East Germany.

b). During December 1978 he entered South Africa with a group including accused number 5, to reconnoitre areas in the Transvaal.

accused number 6: Bennet Pantese Komane (46).

a). Between June 1976 and August 1978, the accused underwent military training in Angola and Russia; he was an instructor at the Benguela guerilla training camp in Angola.

b). Between July 1978 and July 1979, he entered South Africa to locate places where arms and men could be concealed.

c). Sometime between November 20th and December 20th 1978, he attempted to recruit a person in Soweto.

d). During the period July 1978 and January 1979 he was in possession of a Tokarev pistol and ammunition.

accused number 7: Titus Mogaletcoe Maleka (25).

a). Between December 1975 and February 1979, the accused underwent military training in Angola and Russia.

b). During February 1979, together with a group including Sydney Sekwati Choma (accused number 8), he returned to South Africa to investigate places near Dennilton, Groblersdal district, Transvaal, where arms and men could be concealed; there he had access to and control over a cache of arms and ammunition.

c). On 8th February 1979, near Dennilton, he was in possession of a Makarov pistol and

ammunition; on 9th February he was in possession of an AK 47 rifle, ammunition and 2 hand grenades.

accused number 8: Sydney Sekwati Choma (23).

a). The accused underwent military training.

b). During February 1979, together with accused number 7 and a group of men, he returned to South Africa to investigate places in the Groblersdal district where men and arms could be hidden; in that area he also had responsibility for an arms cache.

c). During February 1979, near Dennilton, Groblersdal district, he was in possession of arms and ammunition.

accused number 9: Mandlenkosi Christopher Hadebe (27).

a). Between January 1976 and March 1979 he underwent military training in Angola.

b). During January 1979 in the Njando area, Msinga district, Natal, he made enquiries about places where arms and men could be concealed; in this area he also recruited people to kill others.

c). On 11-12 March 1979, together with Mandla Jack Mthetwa (accused number 10), he brought 2 AK 47 rifles and ammunition into the Msinga district.

d). On 12th March 1979, together with accused number 10, he attempted to recruit a person in the Msinga district.

accused number 10: Mandla Jack Mthetwa (22).

a). Between May 1975 and March 1979, the accused underwent military training in Russia.

b). During the period May 1975 to March 1979, he had access to and control over arms caches in the Ndumo and Nongoma districts of Natal.

c). On 11-12 March 1979, together with Hadebe

(accused number 9), he brought arms and ammunition into the Msinga district of Natal. d). On 12th March, with Hadebe, he attempted to recruit a person near Njando.

accused number 11: Vusumuzi Nicholas Zulu (28).

a). Between October 1976 and June 1979, the accused underwent military training in Angola and Russia.

b). Between November 1977 and June 1979, he returned to South Africa to investigate pipelines near Merebank, Natal, with the intention of sabotaging them.

accused number 12: James Daniel Mange (24).

a). From September 1976 to October 1978, the accused underwent military training in Angola and Russia.

b). During July-August 1978, he returned to South Africa; he investigated the police station, magistrates court, and magistrates home at Whittlesea, Cape, with a view to attacking them, and killing or injuring those employed or resident at those places.

c). During August 1978 he attempted to recruit a person in Soweto.

d). During October 1978 he made arrangements for a gang to attack the police station, magistrates court and home at Whittlesea, and to kill or injure those employed or resident there.

THE TRIAL THUSFAR:

On 15.06.79 two young men appeared in the Pietermaritzburg Magistrates' Court, charged with High Treason, 3 counts of Terrorism, and 2 counts of conspiracy to commit murder. Mandlenkosi Christopher Hadebe (27) and Mandla Jack Mthetwa (22) were detained by security

police on the night of March 12th 1979 in the Njando area of Msinga district. Both allegedly members of the African National Congress (ANC), the state claimed that they crossed into South Africa from Swaziland on March 11th, carrying parcels of arms and ammunition.

Neither of the accused were legally represented at this preliminary court hearing, and there was considerable surprise when both pleaded guilty to the charges, which carry a possible death sentence. Hadebe told the presiding magistrate that "I was fighting for freedom...What I have done is something which anyone fighting for freedom would have done".

The arms cache which the accused were alleged to have been in control of in Msinga contained 2 AK 47 machine guns, several rifles and pistols, a 9mm Vzoz-25 sub-machinegun, ammunition, bayonets, Pomz-type mines, hand-grenades and 31 blocks of TNT.

A few days later the accused re-appeared in court, this time represented by legal counsel, who informed the presiding magistrate that the original pleas of guilty should be reversed. Counsel pointed out that the two men had only been given their charge sheet 2 hours before they had pleaded guilty, and had not had sufficient time to understand the allegations made against them by the state. At a later hearing, Mthetwa told the court that police had threatened him with assault if he denied the charges, and had promised that he would only be sentenced to 5 years imprisonment if he pleaded guilty. At the conclusion of these preliminary hearings, the magistrate altered the pleas tendered to not guilty, and the matter was remanded for trial to the Supreme Court.

Just over a month after Hadebe and Mthetwa's initial court appearance, ten further alleged ANC members or supporters were charged with high treason, terrorism, and conspiracy to commit murder, and the two trials were joined together. When the ten accused first appeared in court, security was extensive; the men were chained in leg irons, and the court was heavily guarded by security police. When, at the beginning of August, all twelve accused appeared in the Pietermaritzburg Supreme Court, armed police patrolled the area outside the court, and the accused were seated in a specially constructed shatter-proof glass cage, which according to the state prosecutor was designed to prevent the accused from addressing the public gallery, and to "uphold the dignity of the Court". On the opening day of the actual trial, armed police were stationed at every door and gate to the court-house, while security police mingled with the crowd.

State witness Sgt. Stephanus Adrian Oosthuizen told the court that on 2.08.78 he had been on border patrol along the South Africa-Bophuthatawana 'border'. The patrol encountered two armed black men, who opened fire on them. When members of the patrol returned the fire, the men ran off into the hills, throwing a hand grenade at the patrol. Police pursued the men, and Major Marthinus Ras of Zeerust police gave evidence on finding a haversack containing AK 47 rifle magazines nearby.

Ras testified that the first accused, Sekete, was arrested by Bophuthatawanan police in November 1978. He was handed over to Ras on November 24th, and detained under

section 6 of the Terrorism Act. Under cross-examination, Ras admitted that it had crossed his mind that he might be kidnapping Sekete from Bophuthatswana, as he had not gone through the legal formalities of extraditing him from 'independent' Bophuthatswana.

Major Thomas Kgwele, who was at the time of Sekete's arrest in command of the Phokeng police-station in Bophuthatswana, told how Sekete had admitted undergoing training in Angola and Russia under the auspices of the ANC. Under cross examination, Kgwele admitted that when Sekete was brought into his office, he had been bleeding from a wound on his head. It was suggested to Kgwele that he had been part of a group which beat up Sekete at the police station; this was denied by the witness. After a district surgeon who had examined Sekete testified that the wound on his head was consistent with assault, the state ceased to rely on any statements allegedly made by Sekete to Kgwele, presumably on the grounds that it accepted that the statements were made after coercion (assault).

Major Ras also testified on a clash between South African police and guerilla forces in mid-January 1979. In thick bush near the Verdepoort border post with Botswana, Ras and twenty anti-insurgency forces came across 2 suspected guerillas. "I took aim at one of them with an R1 rifle before screaming at them. He turned round with a weapon in his hand - it was very quick. I didn't see what weapon it was. I shot first...I did not miss." Ras went on to describe the fierce gun-battle which followed, in which hand-grenades were thrown by the guerillas at the police. Next morning security forces searched the area, and

found a dead man with a bullet wound under his nose. A pass book containing his photograph gave his name as Patrick Opa Tawa, but fingerprints taken identified the dead man as Richard Mapetla. Two AK 47 rifles and 'trunks full' of military equipment were found nearby.

Warrant-Officer Christiaan de Wit gave evidence on a clash between police and guerillas near Mafeking on 27th October, 1978, and identified accused number 2 (Molefe) as one of the guerillas involved. Near Madimola, he found three men sitting under a tree, and ordered them to surrender. In the ensuing battle, one of the guerillas was shot dead, one killed in a grenade explosion, and the third arrested.

It was at this stage in the trial that the state indicated its intention of applying for certain evidence to be held in camera, with the public excluded from court. This sort of application has been made regularly by the state in political trials: the claim is made that particularly black witnesses who give evidence for the state are subject to intimidation, violence and even death. In recent years, the South African courts have become more and more willing to hold parts of political trials in camera. While in 1977 the late Justice Davidson refused to close his court to hear evidence in the trial of the 'Pretoria 12' (S vs Sexwale and others), by 1978 it had become common for judges and magistrates to accede to state requests for in camera hearings. It was this issue which was to increase tension and drama in a trial which already had unusual ingredients.

During evidence led to support the state application, presiding judge Mr. Justice

Hefer revealed that he had received a letter purporting to come from the ANC in Swaziland. The letter, on ANC letterhead, read:

"This is the voice of the oppressed people. We will be inside your court to see that our comrades are released. This is no threat but sound advice to you and your fascist regime. Amandla. Power to the people."

The letter, together with state evidence that it was ANC policy to kill state witnesses, convinced the judge to allow certain black state witnesses to give evidence in camera, with the public excluded from court. Quoting from the official ANC organ, *Sechaba*, Justice Hefer said that the aim of the ANC was clearly to 'eliminate' police informers, witnesses who testified for the state in terrorism trials, and the security police.

It was at this stage of the proceedings that the accused decided to effectively withdraw from further participation in their trial. Just before they dismissed their legal representation, senior counsel told the court that the accused had been charged as members of the ANC with treason; they perceived this as attempting to overthrow the government by all means including violence. They considered the courts as part of the government apparatus. They further considered treason to be a crime affecting society, and to exclude the public from the trial excluded the very people the ANC was trying to reach. The accused therefore saw no purpose in participating in the in camera trial, and had therefore dismissed their defence lawyers. They wished to take no further part in the trial, and did not wish to attend court

sessions.

As the defence team left the court, the 12 accused stood up and with raised clenched fists, sang and shouted 'Amandla' and 'Power to the People'. The judge ordered that they be removed from court, and the trial continued in their absence.

After further evidence had been led, the judge ordered that the accused be brought to court singly or in pairs, and be given the right to cross examine witnesses. John Sekete, the first accused, confirmed that he would not take part in the trial. "Before anything happens to me," he told the judge, "I would like to say this: it is against my will to be here and I am not prepared to talk or admit anything". When the judge told Sekete that he had the right to cross-examine witnesses who testified against him, he responded: "Are you doing me a favour?" He claimed that he had been attacked and assaulted by police in prison, and was in court against his will. "I would like permission to leave. I am not prepared to listen".

According to a state witness who the judge ruled could not be identified, Sekete was previously a student at Naledi High School, Soweto. After the June 1976 rebellion, he and a number of his friends disappeared. Sekete left behind a note saying "I am leaving for Russia, God is there". While the witness gave evidence against him, Sekete stalked up and down the specially-built dock, and subsequently refused to cross-examine the witness.

Tladitsagae Molefe, the second accused, told the court that he was prepared to participate in the proceedings if the trial was opened to the public. When this was

refused, he said that he would have nothing to do with the hearing. "Your worship can impose sentence on me now" he said.

Thibe Ngobeni and Andrew Mapheto, accused numbers 4 and 5 respectively, also refused to participate in proceedings while evidence was led against them. Ngobeni lounged back, resting his feet against the railing on top of the dock, while Mapheto stalked up and down as evidence was given about ANC pamphlets, guns and ammunition found near Duiwelskloof in the Eastern Transvaal.

A witness who gave evidence in camera said that he knew Ngobeni from High School at Louis Trichardt. Later Ngobeni had studied at Turfloop, the University of the North. During May 1978, at a house in Malamulele in the Eastern Transvaal, Ngobeni had described the training he underwent in East Germany, Russia and Mocambique. He returned to South Africa to look for places to hide guns and food. He had brought hand grenades with him for self-protection against the police.

Two of the accused, Sekete and Mandlenkosi Hadebe, were sentenced for contempt of court, after they ignored Justice Hefer's warnings to behave themselves in the dock. Sekete continually paced up and down the glass-encased dock while a witness was giving evidence, and then refused to acknowledge the judge when he was questioned. He was then ordered to stop pacing, and when he ignored the instruction, was sentenced to 6 months imprisonment.

Hadebe sat in the dock smoking a cigarette, and told the judge to "leave me alone" when he was ordered to stop smoking. "Tell him I am considering sentencing him for contempt

of court", Justice Hefer told the interpreter. "Tell the court to do as it pleases", Hadebe retorted. He was then sentenced to 6 months imprisonment.

Giving evidence against Hadebe and Mandlenkosi Mthetwa, a witness said that on March 11th 1978 he had travelled with the two from Swaziland on a trip past Vryheid and Dundee in Natal. Pineapples covered two parcels in the back of the van, and when Hadebe and Mthetwa were dropped off in the bush near Pomeroy, they took the parcels with them. The witness returned to Swaziland, but was arrested the following month when he crossed into South Africa to deliver money to Hadebe and Mthetwa. At the time of giving evidence, sixteen months after his arrest, he was still in detention.

A 12-year old boy testified that in September 1978 he and a friend were cutting grass at Mkwane's Drift near Ndumo, Masinga district. They uncovered a packet of weapons, and ran home to tell their parents. Shortly thereafter, the police arrived. Sgt. Thomas O'Connell of security police, Ndumo, testified that he found two more arms caches nearby, using a metal detector. Weapons in the caches included

- 6 AKM automatic rifles
- 3 Russian Scorpion pistols
- 1 Vzor sub-machine gun
- 31 blocks of TNT
- 1700 cartridges
- 31 hand grenades
- 10 packs of explosives..

The state claims that Hadebe and Mthetwa were in control of these arms caches.

On the day after Hadebe had been

sentenced for contempt of court, he complained that he was being fed inadequately in prison. Saying he was being starved, Hadebe added that he had been given only sugarless porridge which he would not eat. When the judge suggested that he should have thought of prison food before inviting the court to sentence him for contempt, Hadebe replied "Could you eat the muck supplied in jail?" He also said that he had been isolated from other prisoners, and was locked alone in a dark cell. Stalking up and down the glass-enclosed dock, Hadebe suddenly grabbed the door and tried to force it open. He then smashed his fist against the glass door a number of times. On several occasions he shouted at state witnesses, once saying to a woman witness "They are our enemies and are trying to separate us". The woman began sobbing before completing her evidence.

According to another detained witness who may not be identified, Vusumuzi Zulu, accused number 11, claimed that Tsietse Mashinini, first SSRC president, was a deceptive person who started riots in Soweto and then escaped, leaving the children in trouble. By contrast, Nelson Mandela was a brave leader who stood by his cause and did not run away. The witness also claimed that Zulu had wanted to know why Inkatha had not been banned like other organisations. He was angered that Inkatha used the same colours as the ANC.

Armed guards patrol the building round the clock; most major witnesses give evidence in camera, and the press has been totally excluded from court on a number of occasions. The attitude of the accused towards the

proceedings remains the same: James Daniel Mange, the 12th accused, recently replied to a question from the judge that "I told the court several times before that I am not interested in saying anything, and I am repeating this for the last time - please don't ask me again."

Just before closing its case, the state led evidence that slogans had been written on the cell walls of the accused. Inter alia, they read:

"There comes a time in the life of every nation - submit or fight - we shall fight with every means at our disposal. There is one way to freedom. Fight. Viva Umkhonto we Sizwe".

The last of the state's 144 witnesses, Lt. J.P. Van Rooy, then summarised the exhibits handed in to court by the state. They included 32 AKM assault rifles, 9,873 rounds of ammunition, 120 hand grenades, 57kg of TNT, 5 Scorpion sub-machine guns and 6 Makarov pistols.

At the end of the state case, the accused again reaffirmed their intention not to participate in the proceedings. Andrew Napheto read out a statement on behalf of the 12, which said "We brought to the attention of the court that we do not intend participating, but have been repeatedly brought here against our will". There will accordingly be no evidence for the defence, and the 12 will not testify themselves. After a brief state argument calling for the conviction of all the accused, the trial judge postponed the hearing to November 12th, when judgement will be given.

An interesting feature of the trial has revolved around activity in the so-called 'independent' Bantustan, Bophuthatswana. Prisoners have been handed over by the Bantustan administration to the South African police without even the formality of extradition proceedings, and activities within Bophuthatswana have been charged as acts against the South African state. The close co-operation between the South African Police and the Bophuthatswanan home guard in patrolling borders is also of interest.

This is by no means the first time that accused in a political trial in South Africa have rejected certain aspects of judicial procedure. At the beginning of the trial of 18 accused in Bethal who were charged with PAC activities (S vs Mothopeng and others), the accused refused to plead to the charges, saying that they did not recognise the right of the court to try them. Nonetheless, they engaged legal counsel, and eventually gave evidence in their own defence. It is the firmness of resolve of the 12 Pietermaritzburg accused, especially in the light of the serious charges they face, which makes their case so unusual.

COURTS

Vusumuzi Johnson Nyathi (33).

Charge: Attempting to escape from the police while in custody. The accused was charged in the Bethal PAC Terrorism trial, and on its completion was found guilty and sentenced to 10 years. While detained under Section 6 of the Terrorism Act, Nyathi fell from a window in the Krugersdorp Security Police offices. He claimed that he had been thrown out by police; the state claimed that he had jumped out in an attempt to escape. The accused was seriously injured in the fall.

Verdict: Guilty.

Sentence: 1 year. The accused will therefore serve an 11 year sentence.

(Krugersdorp Magistrates' Court, 1.08.79)

Sadecque Variava (29).

Charge: Contravention of his banning order. The state alleged that, but accepting a lift to his Lenasia home in a motorcar in which there

were three others, he had unlawfully attended a social gathering.

Verdict: Guilty.

Sentence: 3 months suspended for 3 years. (Johannesburg Regional Court, 6.08.79)

Smangaliso Patrick Mkhathshwa.

The accused, a banned Catholic Priest, was originally found guilty of possessing banned literature, namely Robert Taber's 'The War of the Flea'. He appealed against conviction, on the basis that he had not known that the book was unlawful to possess. The appeal was successful, and conviction and sentence of R50 were set aside.

(Pretoria Supreme Court, 7.08.79)

Aubrey Mokoena (31).

Charge: Contravention of his banning order in that he did not notify the police of a change of address.

Verdict: Not guilty. The presiding magistrate found that it was not proved that Mokoena intended to commit the offence.

(Johannesburg Regional Court, 13.08.79)

Babsey Mathabane (32) and Catherine Mathibe (29)

Charge: Possession of banned pamphlets. The offence, a contravention of the Internal Security Act, allegedly took place in Soweto between August 24th and 27th, 1979.

(Johannesburg Regional Court, 8.10.79)

Archibald Monty Mzinyathi (24) and Bingo Bentley (Mbonjeni) (46).

Charge: Terrorism. The state alleges that Mzinyathi underwent military training in the Soviet Union between March and July 1977. Bentley is alleged to have harboured Mzinyathi at his home after he returned from

military training, and transported him to a farm in the Eastern Transvaal to hide from the police.

(Krugersdorp Regional Court, 20.09.79)

Babini Pikashe (49).

Charge: Transkei Constitution Act. The accused, an executive member of the Transkei-based Democratic Party, is alleged to have violated the dignity of the Transkei 'State President'.

(Umtata Magistrates' Court, 3.10.79)

Njenga Bantu Sithole (21), Mandle James Sibisi (20), Ramatlotlo Moses (21), Christopher Sitembiso Nzuza (20), a 17 year-old youth, and two 16 year-old youths.

Charge: Terrorism. The state alleges that between July 1978 and August 1979 the accused conspired to, or attempted to, leave the country for military training with the intention of overthrowing the government; they are also alleged to have recruited 19 others to leave South Africa to undergo military training. The trial is to be held in camera because of the juvenile accused who are under 18.

(Durban Regional Court, 8.10.79)

Aubrey Mokoena (31).

Charge: Contravention of his banning order. No details of the alleged offence were available at the time of writing. The case is to be heard on November 29th 1979.

(Johannesburg Regional Court, 18.09.79)

Quayum Sayed (29).

Charge: Quoting a banned person, namely Robert Sobukwe. The quote allegedly appeared in a BPC pamphlet printed by a business which the accused is involved



in. The pamphlet was entitled 'Heroes of Yesterday, Martyrs of the Struggle', and dealt with a press conference given by Sobukwe on 18th March, 1960.

(Cape Town Regional Court, 14.09.79)

Mandla Jim Magudulela (41).

Charge: Terrorism. The state alleges that during 1976 the accused assisted Petrus Kgwadi and 5 others to undergo military training, and transported them to an ANC house in Manzini, Swaziland.

The accused alleges that while in detention at John Vorster Square, he was electrically shocked by security police in a room called the 'waarkamer' (room of truth). Police have denied this. The case continues on November 12th (Kempston Park Regional Court 11.10.79)

Lazarus Lebelwane (18), Mokgotle Marumo (18), Ezekiel Seakgwa (19), Molefi Nhlapo (19), and two 16 year-olds.

Charge: Sabotage. The accused were alleged to have petrol-bombed the Sebokeng house of a Vereeniging security policeman, Jeremiah Matsolo. While in police custody the accused made 'confessions' to the police, which they claimed had been made after being assaulted. Police denied this, and the magistrate found that the accused had lied about this.

Verdict: Guilty.

Sentence: Each of the accused: 5 years.
(Vereeniging Regional Court, 26.09.79)

Simon Sampson Bhengu (73).

Charge: Terrorism. The accused, a diabetic and heart sufferer, was alleged to have recruited 2 people for military training between July and August 1978. After a number of remand court appearances, charges

were dropped against the accused.

(Johannesburg Regional Court, 22.10.79)

Dilshad Cachalia, Ghaleb Cachalia, Moira Levy, Jenny Schindler, Anton Harber, Joachim Schonfeldt, Jeff Locks, Richard Chambers, Frank van Schaik and Harriet Gavshon.

Charge: Malicious damage to property and trespass. The accused, most of whom are students at the University of Witwatersrand, are alleged to have painted a protest mural on a wall in Vrededorp, Johannesburg. The protest was against evictions, and the declaration of the area as 'white'.

(Brixton Magistrates' Court, 11.09.79)

Rose Kunene (18), Gideon Nkutha (20), Lydia Dakile (20) and Jefferson Lengane (22).

Charge: Murder. The accused were alleged to have killed Johannes Esterhuizen, a West Rand Bantu Affairs Administration Board inspector, in Soweto on 16th June 1976. Esterhuizen was one of the first to be killed in the 1976/77 Soweto rebellion. After a number of remand court appearances, the attorney-general dropped charges against all the accused.

(Johannesburg Magistrates' Court, 9.10.79)

David Gase (51).

Charge: Contravention of his banning order. Gase is already serving a 20 month sentence for a similar offence. On July 23rd he was allegedly absent from his Umazi house between 6.05p.m. and 7.15p.m., which was a contravention of his banning order. Evidence in court told that during this period he was at a police station laying a charge of theft against a schoolgirl.

Verdict: Guilty.

Sentence: 6 months, to run concurrently with the 20 month sentence being served.

(Durban Regional Court, 4.10.79)

Sithembiso Ernest Ngobese (26), Themba Patrick Nxumalo (26), Eric Fanavele Mlaba (22), Nhlanhla Victor Ngidi (25), Kwenzakhe Elijah Mlaba (26), Penuel Mpampa Maduna (26), and Ma Sibongile Albertine Kubheka (27).

Charge: All the accused were charged with recruiting 21 people for military between May and December 1977. Ngobese, Nxumalo and Eric Mlaba faced a second charge of attempting to leave South Africa during November-December for military training.

At the end of the state case, in June 1979, Maduna and Elijah Malaba were discharged, but were re-arrested by security police. Maduna has subsequently been charged with assaulting a policeman. Eric Malaba and Ngidi were discharged on one count, but still faced a second charge of Terrorism. Judgement has been provisionally set down for the end of October.

(Durban Regional Court, 1.10.79)

Bhekizitha Oliver Nqubelani (26).

Charge: Terrorism. The accused is alleged to have planted a bomb in the Cape Town Supreme Court on 15.05.79. The accused is further alleged to have made a number of trips between Botswana and South Africa, carried ammunition in South Africa, and manufactured a bomb. The trial is now due to start on 8.02.80 in the Cape Town Supreme Court.

(Cape Town Supreme Court, 16.10.79)

Sabeta Dalindyabo, leader of the opposition Democratic Party in the Transkei.

Charge: Public Security Act. This is the

equivalent of High Treason, and carries the death penalty. Nelson and Winnie Mandela, both cousins of Dalindyebo, have been summonsed by the defence to testify in the trial, which is due to be heard in Port St. Johns. It appears unlikely that South African prison authorities will allow Nelson Mandela to leave Robben Island to testify.

Retired attorney-general of the Transvaal, Percy Yutar, who prosecuted in many of South Africa's political trials, including Rivonia, is to lead the prosecution for the Transkei Bantustan 'state'.

The trial may be related to the growing opposition in Tembuland to the reign of the Matanzima brothers in the Transkei, and it appears that a number of political and 'tribal' leaders have been arrested and charged by Transkei Security Police.

Thandisizwe Mazibuko (29).

Charge: Contravention of his banning order. The accused, a member of the Soweto-based 'Committee of 10' until his banning, is alleged to have attended two gatherings in Soweto, on March 30th and August 19th, 1979. The trial is to begin in the Johannesburg Regional Court on November 1st.

Ameen Akhalwaya (33), Mike Norton (40), Shirley Lue (29), Samuel Pop (48), Stephen Young (51) and Alice Jacobus (42).

Charge: The accused, 4 of whom are journalists and members of the Writers Association of South Africa (WASA), are alleged to have entered an African area (Soweto) without permits. They were arrested at a roadblock in Soweto on 29.04.79, together with a representative of the International Federation

of Journalists, Ole Johan Eriksen, who was subsequently released after being questioned for several hours by police. The trial is due to resume on November 1st in the Johannesburg Magistrates' Court.

Solly Mabitsela (19), Komane Marumo (19), Joseph Gcina, Jack Ledwaba (18), Richard Magobotlwane (18), Peter Phofu (20), and a 17-year old youth.

Charge: Public Violence. They are alleged to have stoned 4 buses belonging to the Lebowa Transport Company, as well as a school building on August 23rd, 1979. Damage caused was estimated at R5,300. The trial is due to continue in Seshego, Lebowa district, on December 11th.

A 17-year old youth.

Charge: Terrorism. Between 21st and 26th April, 1979, the accused was alleged to have incited Edward Buthelezi and Patrick Mzimkhulu to leave the country and undergo military training. The trial was held in camera.

Verdict: Guilty.

Sentence: 5 years.

(Johannesburg Regional Court, 21.08.79)

Ms. Thantisa Magungo (19) and Ms. Casserina Makhoere (23).

Charge: Both of the accused are political prisoners, serving 5 year sentences in Kroonstad Prison for contraventions of the Terrorism Act. They were now charged with assaulting a white prison warden, Amanda Smith. Magungo told the court that Smith had attacked her in a prison bath-room, and struck her with a set of keys. She had defended herself against the attack. Evidence was also led that the accused had earlier complained about the quality of

the prison food, which was not cooked properly. Another political prisoner, Joyce Mashamba, gave evidence for the defence, saying that relations between prisoners and officials at the Kroonstad prison were not good, and the type of food given to prisoners was unsatisfactory.

Verdict: Guilty.

Sentence: Magungo: R60 or 60 days.

Makhoere: R30 or 30 days.

Rev. David Russell (40).

Charge: Contravention of his banning order, possession of an unlawful publication, and producing a banned publication. Russell is alleged by the state to have been involved in the production of 'Crossroads Residence, to have possessed the book 'Biko' by Donald Woods, and to have been absent from his home on two occasions in contravention of his banning order. The trial is to be heard on November 12 in the Cape Town Regional Court.

Churchill Luvuno (22).

Charge: Terrorism. The accused gave evidence for the defence in the Bethal PAC trial, and was immediately arrested and charged with perjury. He was then detained, and eventually charged with Terrorism. The state claimed that he left South Africa and underwent military training at the hands of the PAC in Swaziland. It was further claimed that he established an organisation called 'Triangle Battle Organisation in South Africa, a PAC cell.

Verdict: Guilty.

Sentence: 5 years on the Terrorism Act counts; 9 months on the perjury charge.

(Bethal Regional Court, 14.08.79)

Mpondombini Sigcau (40), Ntsikayezwe Sigcau

(36) and Ms Tambani Voko (28).

Charge: Possession of unlicensed firearms and ammunition. The two Sigcau brothers are the sons of deceased Transkei state president, Botha Sigcau, and brothers to Ms. Stella Sigcau, dismissed Transkei cabinet minister. It is unclear whether this matter is related to the trial of Sabata Dalindyabo (see above). The trial is due to take place on November 27th in the Lusikisiki Magistrates' Court.

Alf Kumalo (42).

Charge: Photographing people who were in police custody at the time, and obstructing the police in the course of their duties. The trial relates to a series of incidents at a commemoration service at Regina Mundi Church, Soweto, on 16th June, 1977, where Kumalo was in attendance as a press photographer. After eight remand appearances, the trial date has been set down for November 6th in the Johannesburg Regional Court.

Peter Moll (23).

Charge: Contravening the Defence Act by failing to report for military service. The accused, a student at the University of Cape Town, is a conscientious objector. He believes that doing active military service in South Africa defends the indefensible.

Verdict: Guilty

Sentence: Moll had a previous conviction for a similar offence, imposed in a civilian court. Because this charge was brought in a military court, it was not taken into account. He was accordingly sentenced to a fine of only R50.

Jackie Seroka.(19).

Charge: Possession of the Freedom Charter,

which the state claimed was an unlawful document.

Verdict: Guilty. (The report on this matter is not clear. It is not certain that mere possession of the Freedom Charter constitutes an offence).

Sentence: 9 months, suspended for 5 years. (Kempton Park Regional Court, September 1979)

Elias Nkumbi (20) and a 17 year-old.

Charge: Terrorism. No details are available of the charges at present. (Johannesburg Regional Court, 15.10.79)

H.E. D'Conner and Ms. J. Joubert.

Charge: Contravention of the Prisons Act. The accused, editor and reporter of the Eastern Province Herald respectively, were alleged to have published information about a prison without taking reasonable steps to verify it. The report involved dealt with the refusal by prison authorities to allow certain ministers to see prisoners.

Verdict: Not Guilty. (Grahamstown Regional Court, 24.08.79)

Ms. Judy Favish (27).

Charge: Contravention of her banning order, by being out of the Cape Town magisterial district. Ms. Favish was allegedly arrested in Rondebosch. Shortly after a court appearance, in which her address was mentioned, the windscreen of her car was smashed outside her home.

3 boys and a girl, all under the age of 18.

Charge: Public Violence. The trial arises from an incident on August 30th 1979 when 300 people rioted and smashed buses, cars, shops and bottle-stores after a riot at a football match

in Sherpeville. The 4 accused are alleged to have been part of that crowd. Similar charges against 4 other youths were withdrawn. The trial continues on November 16th.

(Vereeniging Regional Court, 26.09.79)

Jane Barrett and Bill Gardiner. Both officials of NUSAS, the above-mentioned were subpoenaed to make statements in relation to student-produced publications. At separate hearings held in camera, both made statements. It appears that they have now been charged with producing undesirable publications. (Cape Town Magistrates' Court, September 1979)

Zwelakhe Sisulu.

Sisulu, president of the Writers' Association of South Africa, was summonsed before a magistrate to make a statement on dealings with then-detained Post reporter, Thami Mkhwanazi (who has subsequently been charged). Sisulu declined to answer the questions. The matter was held in camera, and at its conclusion Sisulu was sentenced to 9 months imprisonment. He is currently appealing against conviction and sentence. (Pretoria Magistrates' Court, 6.08.79)

John Phala, John Thabo, Letsie Ben Mashinini, Solomon Musi, Bafana Vincent Nkosi and Philip Khoza - appeal.

These six men were convicted and sentenced to lengthy terms of imprisonment in the Springs ANC Terrorism Trial in November 1977. After various proceedings in both trial court and the Appeal Court, all except Musi have been granted leave to appeal against sentence but not conviction. In the trial, the

following sentences were handed down:

Phala: 30 years.

Thabo and Khoza: 15 years.

Nkqai and Mashinini: 12 years.

Huel (who does not have leave to appeal): 5 years
(Appeal Court, Bloemfontein, 9.08.79)

Hlubi Keith Bityana (24) and Douglas Dalisile
Charge: Terrorism. Bityana is alleged to have incited Dalisile to undergo military training. Dalisile is alleged to have undergone training in Swaziland under the auspices of the ANC between April 1978 and April 1979. Both accused are members of the Soweto Students' League (SSL), which was formed after the banning of the SSRC in October 1977.

Verdict: Guilty.

Sentence: Bityana - 5 years.

Dalisile- 7 years.

(Kempston Park Supreme Court, 23.10.79)

Kedibone Christopher Mathabe (21), Colin Makgalo Kotu (23), Simon Mashigo (19) and Elias Modiga (19).

Charge: Terrorism. The accused, all members of the Soweto Students' League (SSL) are alleged to have set fire to a school on 16.08.78 in White City, Jabavu, incited others to set fire to the house of a school principal in Sebokeng, near Vereeniging, and organised riotous behaviour at the funeral of Robben Island prisoner Johannes Matsobane in Sebokeng. Inter alia, they are alleged to have incited others to burn the house of a Sebokeng security policeman, Jeremiah Matsofo. 5 men have already been convicted for this offence (see trial of Lazarus Lelelwane and others, above).

(Kempston Park Supreme Court, October 1979)

Linda Mogale (18) and Elias Jimmy Mabaso (22).

Charge: 3 counts of murder, 3 of attempted murder, one count of Terrorism, and various alternative charges. The accused are alleged, inter alia, to have fire-bombed the house of a Soweto school principle and thereby been responsible for those killed in that attack, and have accepted the revolutionary aims of the South African Youth Revolutionary Council (SAYRC). Both accused were members of the SSRC and the SSL; Mogale served as the last president of the SSRC prior to its banning, and Mabaso as an SSL president. Mabaso is already serving a 5 year sentence for Sabotage. The trial has been marked by quite remarkable allegations of assault against police by state and defence witnesses, as well as by the accused. A number of people confessed to the crimes involved when in police custody, only for it to emerge that their confessions could not be true. One of the state's chief witnesses subsequently repudiated his evidence, claiming that he had been forced into making a series of false statements. The trial judge accepted that Mogale had been assaulted by police, that his teeth had been broken off with a pair of pliers, and that he had been electrically shocked by police.

Verdict: Mabaso was acquitted on all counts. Mogale was found guilty of Terrorism, culpable homicide, assault, arson and malicious damage to property.

Sentence: An effective 7 years.

(Krugersdorp Supreme Court, 10.08.79)

Deon du Plessis (28).

Charge: Official Secrets Act and Defence Act.

Du Plessis, a journalist, was alleged to have been in possession of 35 military documents which had been passed on to him by one James Beaumont, who had been in the SADF signals corps. Beaumont was previously found guilty on similar charges and sentenced to 3 years, suspended.

The trial of Du Plessis was held in-camera, and few details are available.

Verdict: Guilty on 5 counts under the Official Secrets Act, and one count under the Defence Act.

Sentence: 6 months and R250, plus 2 years suspended.

(Johannesburg Supreme Court, 28.09.79)

Priscilla Jane (35).

Charge: Crimen Injuris. The accused, a banned Johannesburg attorney, was alleged to have called a security policeman 'a pig'.

Verdict: Guilty.

Sentence: R50 or 25 days.

(Benoni Magistrates' Court, 25.10.79)

Jeremiah Kgokong Majetladi (23), Thami Gerald Mkwanezi (28), Ronald Ephraim Mamoopa (18), Lebogang Christy Mokone (18), Petrus Karel Senabe (22), Andrew Moeti Phala (18), Deacon Sekibela Mathe (22), Cornelius Maphethi Leeuw (18), and a 16-year old.

Charge: Terrorism. The state alleges that the accused attempted to recruit a number of people to undergo military training.

(Pretoria Magistrates' Court, 26.10.79)



WINTERVELD

WINTERVELD - a name that like those of Crossroads, Thornhill, Glenmore, is becoming more and more common in the liberal press, that is beginning to elicit cries of outrage from the Progs, attempts at social action by the churches... Why? The question is neither idle nor facetious, for the building up in the media of an area as an emotive issue is all too common, and as I hope to show later, all too destructive.

The history of Winterveld that is to follow will isolate specific trends and processes, and hopes to show that like so many of the resettlement villages, squatter camps and other varieties of dumping grounds, Winterveld is not important in itself as an area to be focussed on to the exclusion of all the others. Rather, the dynamics that go to make up Winterveld, those of unemployment and labour control, of repression and ethnic ideologies, render the place symptomatic of much that is happening in South Africa today. The information presented here should be

seen as an attempt to analyse and illustrate these dynamics and is not intended as an exposé of an isolated incident (or an "unusual event" instead of an "on-going process" - see the article on "Glenmore Resettlement" in WIP 9).

Winterveld is a vast area about 35 km to the northwest of Pretoria and within the 'borders' of 'independent' BophuthaTswana. The place is private and freehold land belonging to African landowners who had bought it as far back as 1938 from a land speculation company. The company had sold it off in 5 and 10 morgen plots when it was declared a released area under the 1936 Land Act. The land is zoned for agricultural smallholdings, yet today it has a population of anything between 300 000 and 750 000.

The history of the origins of the Winterveld population is at once the history of the vast population upheavals and resettlements that constitute much of South Africa's history in the 1950s and 1960s. The mechani-

ization and capitalization of white-owned farming at this time meant that the last vestiges of a semi-feudal agricultural labour force, labour tenants and squatters, were evicted from the land. The rural villages in which many of them were resettled were far from employment, and no agricultural land was made available to them. It is many of these people who constitute the Winterveld population.

The second large group is yet another set of victims of resettlement: This time those who were moved from 'black spots' around Pretoria. The approximately 30 000 population of Lady Selborne, as well as the inhabitants of Eastwood, Riverside and Eersterus are included here. They should have received housing in the 'villages' of Mabopane and Ga-Rankuwa, but because so few houses were built, the over-flow ended up renting plots from Winterveld landlords. The same with those evicted from mission land.

The third group is those people who have moved to Winterveld because of lack of accommodation, overcrowding, endorsements out, etc, from other areas on the Reef. The demolition of the small freehold plots and squatter concentrations near Germiston, Kempton Park and Benoni, in the late 1950s and early 1960s, means that many Winterveld residents still work on the East Rand and travel daily from one end of the reef to the other.

Winterveld as a whole comprises an area of about 80 km in diameter. Of this only the 5 morgen plots, those closest to Mabopane, are densely settled. This area, commonly known as Stakoneng - 'close together', 'shantytown' - is estimated to have a population density

of 185 per ha. The further away one moves from Mabopane the more sparse settlement becomes. Yet there are very few smallholdings where there are no squatters at all.

It is also probable that once a smallholder has allowed tenants onto her/his land a process has begun that is very difficult to limit. Tenant farming is in many cases

more profitable than agriculture, and at times of drought (as at present) there is an added incentive to allow tenants onto the land and to secure a steady cash income. This is, of course, on a more fundamental level one of the results of the erosion of reserve agriculture.

'Squatters' pay between R3,00 and R5,00 per month for a plot on which to build.

However, should they move into a vacant house, or one that has been built by a landlord, rents will be considerably higher. Houses very greatly in size - from two to seven rooms; the majority are built of mud or home-made bricks and have zinc roofs. There are also large numbers of tin and wooden shanties.

Apart from the main road running through Winterveld and an extremely efficient bus service (to transport labour) there is no infrastructural development whatsoever. Water is bought from pumps belonging to landlords at 2c for 20 litres, or about 40c for a 200 litre drum. The pit latrines that do exist are often very close to the boreholes rendering high the possibility that water is unfit to drink. There are only 4 doctors in the area, and while there are clinics at Mabopane and Klipgat and a hospital at Ga-Rankuwa, these are often not available to Winterveld residents. Diseases such as dysentery, gastro-enteritis, bilharzia, kwashiorkor, bronchitis and VD that are related to poverty, malnourishment and unhygienic living conditions are common in the area.

Winterveld hit the headline in 1973 when the Pretoria News did an exposé of conditions there. The flurry of publicity resulted in a Department of Health survey of the area (unavailable) as well as the tabling of parliamentary questions about conditions in the area. At the time it was said that at least 12 temporary schools were being planned for the area; that hostel accommodation was being made available; that 10 000 houses were to be built in Mabopane East. The Deputy Minister of Bantu Administration, Mr TNH Janson, was reported to have said that:



The establishment of a police station in the squatter areas would be an important step in plans to control the development of the slums.

Now, five years later, there are still no services; of all that was said to have been planned only the police station was built. The question that has to be asked is why? What, if any, are the reasons for the fact that a city of half a million people has been neglected for so long and in such conditions? Liberal indignation about the situation in Winterveld cannot provide any answers. Nor can exposés of overcrowding and diseases, as well as the resultant plans and demands for 'squatter upgrading' produce any indications as to why Winterveld exists at all.

The answers are rather to be sought in the history of proletarianization: in the need

to secure for industry a cheap labour force; in the need to control that labour force; and in an examination of the forms that this control assumes. It is in this context that it becomes explicable that of all that was promised to Winterveld, only a police station - an institution that has direct control functions - was built. It is in this sense too that the negotiations between South Africa and BophuthaTswana as to who is responsible for Winterveld, and the attempts to evict non-Tswana from the area become comprehensible. For this is one facet of the struggle between the South African state and its functionaries over delegation of responsibilities.

It is only in 1977 that Winterveld again becomes anything of an issue in the media. This time in the context of BophuthaTswana 'independence'. It was reported in the RDM of 77.12.07 that, "The South African and

produced 3 items, now 1 worker uses 3 machines to produce 6 items.

This means that workers are made redundant to the accumulation needs of capital. And new workers are unable to find jobs.

These unemployed people fulfil the role of an industrial reserve army for capitalism. They can be absorbed into employment during periods of rapid growth of the economy or when large projects such as railway lines, harbours, etc are undertaken. The industrial reserve army also serves to depress wages in that capital can always threaten those in employment with dismissal if they should strike for higher wages (see some of the cases discussed under Labour Action in this issue, and the Eveready Strike that was discussed in a previous issue).

It can, therefore, be seen that the surplus population or industrial reserve army is - functional to capital.

BophuthaTswana governments are to cooperate in the resettlement of thousands of blacks ...among the key targets are the squatters in Winterveld...and Thaba 'Nchu in the Free State". At the same time an agreement was made between South Africa and BophuthaTswana to the effect that South Africa would undertake to resettle all those who wanted to move, and that BophuthaTswana would let the rest stay there until provisions were made for them.

This agreement between the South African and BophuthaTswana (BT) authorities has at base two concerns. The one is the need to control and to remove an excessively large surplus population characterised by increasing poverty and rising unemployment, from too close proximity to the South African industrial centre. This is particularly so in the context of the dramatic increase in African unemployment in South Africa in the 1970s, and in the context

It has been pointed out that it is only by understanding the ultimate unity of interests between the employed and unemployed, and by combining in organisations, that the operation of this process of competition that is so useful to capital, can be counteracted.

The reserve army can, during periods of capitalist crisis, grow too large and pose a threat to political stability. The unemployed may even rise in a revolt of desperation and demand jobs, food and housing, or resist attempts made to remove and control them.

This process, originally written about in the nineteenth century is still occurring today. But a new factor has been added to the creation of a relative surplus population. Marx argued that the size of the industrial reserve army went through "violent fluctuations" as capital went through crises or expanded and grew. Recently, however, a new process has started, especially in

It has been argued that it is capitalist accumulation itself that constantly produces, in relation to its own energy and extent, a relatively redundant working population, i.e. a population which is superfluous to capital's average requirements for its own valorization, and is therefore a surplus population.

In other words, capital is only capital because it increases its mass (accumulates). This it does in that labour produces more than the value of its wages and this surplus goes to the capitalist. This surplus is then reinvested in more machinery and more labourers.

The surplus can also be increased in several other ways. For example, by increasing the length of the working day or by forcing labour to work harder for the same wages. However, increasingly capital is enlarging the surplus produced by the working class by introducing machines that allow each worker to produce more goods. Whereas previously 3 workers using 3 machines

of the threat caused to the state by the 1976 disturbances.

The second is the necessity for 'homeland' authorities to eliminate a population that is both non-Tswana (and makes a mockery of nationalist claims to ethnic purity) and that poses a threat to political stability.

The issue of political stability and the necessity to remove and control unemployment so as to achieve it, is a dominant theme of the Riekert Commission report (see WIP, 9) and many of its recommendations are aimed precisely at this. Going further back in time it can be argued that one of the key functions of the entire policy of 'homeland independence' is aimed at the decentralisation and the removal from direct South African jurisdiction of the control of the unemployed.

The BT government would like to withdraw from its function of control and statements such as the following by the BT Minister of the Interior (RDM, 79.05.29) are indicative of this: "The presence of squatters in BophuthaTswana was undesirable because the country was not a 'dumping ground'".

countries where a labour force for capital was rapidly and violently created (Africa, Latin America and Asia), and where the largest proportion of production is accounted for by multi-national corporations or very large locally-owned companies.

These 'monopoly' companies rely for their technology and machinery on what is being developed in countries such as the USA, Germany, etc, and, therefore, apply capital-intensive (machinery rather than people) techniques in the 'Third World' countries where they operate. When these companies expand they do not absorb/employ the industrial reserve army, or only absorb a very small section.

Yet the reality of the situation is precisely that: the country is a dumping ground, and all that the South African state as its responsibility is to move a section of the population from one dumping ground to the other in the interests of ethnic purity. It is in these terms that the setting up of the new Ndebele 'homeland', many of whose inhabitants are ex-Wintervelders, can be understood. Over the past year a process has been set in motion of pushing Winterveld residents out of the area through a variety of means. It is the details and dynamics of this process that will now be examined.

In August, 1978, BT police launched a series of raids on Winterveld residents. Plot owners and tenants who were arrested were fined R30 or thirty days for not having permits, and for thus being 'illegal squatters'. Two issues, that of squatting and illegality, as well as that of permits need to be examined in more detail. Firstly, the Winterveld population is in fact not illegal, nor are its inhabitants squatters. Winterveld people are living on rented land with the willing consent of the

Smaller, labour-intensive operations, could absorb the unemployed during periods of growth, but they account for an ever decreasing proportion of productive activity as they get squeezed out or taken over by the 'monopolies. Or else they are forced to employ exactly the same capital-intensive techniques to be able to compete with the very large firms.

The implications are that a section of the relative surplus population are not only unemployed but unemployable by the dominant large-scale, capital-intensive section of the economy. They have been marginalised.
- eds.

owners of that land. In no way is their occupation illegal. Why then are they stigmatised as squatters?

Legally, squatting in African areas is a phenomenon that does not exist. No existing legislation incorporates the possibility of illegal occupation of African-owned land. (The 1935 Land Act defines squatting on white-owned land only; while the proclamations relating to land tenure in the 'homelands' (R192/67, R188/69) contain no description of squatting. In a study of BophuthaTswana done by the Potchefstroom University Instituut vir Streekbeplanning it is finally decided, using the definition of the BT secretary for Internal Affairs, that squatting occurs

as gevolg van die vestiging van Bantoe wat van elders afkomstig is en nie volgens wetlike voorskrif geskied het nie, dit onmoontlik is om ordelike beplanning te handhaaf ("...because of the settlement of Bantu coming from elsewhere and not according to legal prescription, it is impossible to maintain orderly planning").

Winterveld then becomes a squatter area primarily because its residents moved there by themselves and were not settled by the state. This implies that those who are 'squatters' are evading attempts at control. It is in such attempts to escape bureaucratic control that the conception of Wintervelders as "illegal" has its origins. With these two ideological notions of "squatters" and "illegality" goes that of impermanence. The rationale goes thus: Because they are squatters they are illegal and because they are illegal they will have to be moved. Further, once they are only there temporarily there is no need to provide housing or

services.

However, the provision of Wintervelders with a stamped residence permit in their reference books, until at least half way through 1977 seems to belie the above. This is not in fact so. For while a residence stamp does mean a degree of official recognition of the existence of Winterveld, its importance lies more in its relationship to employment than to legal accommodation. For what the significance of a residence stamp is, is that it allows people to register as work-seekers. Once residence stamps are no longer issued people can no longer get legal jobs. It is in the refusal to issue residence stamps that the first indications of the process of exclusion of the people of Winterveld from access to jobs and the beginning of what I shall term their marginalisation can be seen.

The police raids on the Winterveld 'squatters' continued with increasing intensity from August until at least November, 1978. Press reports reveal that as harmful as the continual necessity to pay the R30,00 admission of guilt fines, was the degree of insecurity that resulted amongst the population as well as the institutionalisation of their 'illegal' status. Even today it is not clear whether the police action taken was in fact 'legal' - the poverty, isolation and insecurity of the people concerned as well as fears of victimisation meant that at no stage was the right to raid rent-paying tenants ever challenged. (An interesting aspect of the incidents, and one that still characterises Winterveld today, is the cooperation between the BophuthaTswana and South African police. For while the actual land raids are

a BT affair, the administrative aspect - charges, payment of fines, etc - all takes place in the South African police station at Mabopans. There could be no clearer indication that the fundamental function of control is crucial and that ultimately it makes no difference who carries it out).

There are a number of other issues that developed around the raids, as well as considerable confusion due to the unclear legal position.

Firstly, four landowners, instead of paying admission of guilt fines, allowed themselves to be charged. The charges were a) harbouring people who had no residential permits, and b) subletting plots without permission from the local chief magistrate (Post, 78.11.06). The case was postponed at least twice and there are no indications at all as to whether it was ever heard, or what the outcome was. At the same time it became apparent that the BT authorities were using "Catch-22" tactics to make the situation for Winterveld people an impossible one. Post (78.10.22) reported that "(Chief Lucas Mangope) had...given the assurance that his aim was not to throw people out of the country and that went for people in Winterveld no matter what their nationality. All he asked of landlords was that they should regularise the position of their tenants by getting permits for them." A local landlord's response to this reveals the cynicism of such a statement: "We tried to do that, but the local office is not cooperating. We have been told permits will no longer be issued" (Post, 78.10.22). The same strategy was used at the time of BophuthaTswana 'independence': It was

reported that all those wanting to stay legally in BT should apply for citizenship. Thousands of Winterveld people did so. They were not, however, informed that to qualify for citizenship they were to have lived legally in the area for at least 5 years, and that anyway the granting of citizenship was at the discretion of the local magistrate who certainly was not sympathetic to the applications from Winterveld people.

The raids culminated in December, 1978, with reports of eviction orders being served on thousands of people in the area. (The Nation, Dec, 1978). At the same time it was reported that people were fleeing Winterveld and settling on Trust farms in the vicinity (Post, 78.11.16); furthermore it is now that people start moving to areas such as Kwaggasfontein, Hammanadrift, etc, where resettlement camps had been set up by the South African state in the new Ndebele 'homeland'. The publicity that the raids had received (due mainly to excellent press coverage in Post) finally resulted in seven 'homeland' leaders sending a telex to Dr Koornhof, Minister of Plural Relations and Development, "appealing to him to stop the removals of non-Tswanas in areas in BophuthaTswana" (Post, 78.12.15). A moratorium was then declared until a meeting between South African and BT authorities in February to discuss the situation.

I have not been able to discover what the outcome of the February meeting was. Yet, an account of events in Winterveld since then reveals that there seems to be no intention either by South Africa or by BT to attempt any resolution to the situation. Squatters have not been raided since December, 1978,

but more subtle and insidious forms of pressurising people to leave the area have been devised.

The success of these measures is indicated by the statement in Parliament on 21st February, 1979, by the Deputy Minister of Plural Relations Dr Hartzenberg, that "the government had resettled about 6 000 families from the Winterveld area of BophuthaTswana", and that "...extra land is being made available for resettlements" (Post, 79.02.22).

The refusal to issue residential permits to Wintervelders has since 1978 extended to the exclusion from access to the bureaucracy in its entirety. The Dube labour office is to all intents and purposes closed. Winterveld people seeking anything from reference books to applications for driver's licences are told to go to Ga-Rankuwa. There they are turned away on the grounds that they are from Winterveld. This was told to me by numerous Winterveld people, but official confirmation was made in a report that appeared in Post (79.05.03) when an officer at the Odi magistrates court in Ga-Rankuwa said that, "A large number of people who call at the offices to renew their workseeker permits and contract endorsements are turned away unhelped daily". He added that, "This office does no longer cater for squatters". The article quotes at least three cases of people being rendered 'unemployable' because of such action.

The double-dealing and crooked talk of officials is again revealed with reference to this issue. G Nkau, BT's secretary for Internal Affairs, said that President Mangope had made it clear that "squatters would enjoy

the homeland's privileges (including the ability to seek work) only if they took out the country's citizenship" (Post, 79.05.07). The same article contains a report of a statement by the chief magistrate of Odi, PW van Niekerk, saying that "the BophuthaTswana government had deceived squatters by giving them an impression that the acquisition of the country's citizenship would help them". The refusal to actually grant the 'squatters' citizenship has already been discussed.

There are two, but inter-related, processes at work in Winterveld today. The one is the control of employment and the regulation of access to jobs - in the case of Winterveld, its population's exclusion from jobs. The second is the pressures used to physically remove people to more remote and less visible dumping grounds.

The 1978 raids were the crudest manifestation of this. Since then police pressure has taken two main forms: (i) raiding of illegal traders, and (ii) pressure to close down 'private' schools.

Raiding of traders: As unemployment in Winterveld has become worse and worse, more and more people have taken refuge in the 'informal sector'. I do not want to launch into a detailed discussion of the informal sector, merely to say that it consists of the self-employed and all those engaged in non-wage earning activities, ie all those occupied in the non-formal sector of the economy. It is by now fairly generally accepted that the informal sector with its low levels of capital accumulation, unprotected working conditions, illegal status and job insecurity is often the most exploitative sector of the economy. At

its base is the situation where the working class is providing goods and services for itself, out of its own meagre wages and with no subsidies by capital. Essentially it means that the working class is feeding off itself in an ever downward spiral of poverty.

Of course, not all of those engaged in informal sector activities are poor. In Winterveld, as I have said before, the informal sector is not uniform and its 'successes' are manifest in terms of those who have managed to monopolise scarce resources - water, land, building materials, education skills, etc. The majority of people however do not form a part of this relatively privileged group. They are the roadside sellers, the water-carriers, shoe-shine boys, etc.

The sellers, particularly, are often women. The others who scrape together meagre cents for their hard labour, often children. It is they, the poorest of all Winterveld people, whom the police have attacked the hardest. The fairly large roadside markets that were a common sight last year have disappeared. Today, only a few people will sell together, their wares exhibited on the ground so that escape may be swift should the police arrive. These people do not wish to be illegal, but their numerous applications for licences have all been dismissed.

The absurdity of the situation was made clear when a blitz on street vendors was reported in the RDM of 79.08.15: The officer in charge of Mabopane police station, Captain Molohe, said that "there were four licenced grocers serving about 500 000 people in the Winterveld district and that there were no licenced street vendors." Those arrested

paid admission of guilt fines ranging from R10,00 to R50,00, and it was denied that their goods were set alight.

It does indeed seem that the non-collection of rates from Winterveld residents is made up for by the creaming off of money in numerous fines and bribes, paid to secure the inhabitants' miserable existence.

The same situation exists with regard to schools: There is no formal schooling structure in Winterveld. Instead schooling has become part of the informal sector with individuals who have access to some education starting schools in corrugated iron shacks. The schools are expensive (up to R8,00 per year) and the education is often inadequate while conditions are horribly overcrowded. Often the teacher-pupil ratio is something like 1:100.

Yet in the consciousness of Winterveld people education is what counts. Parents unanimously believe that education will facilitate, if not for them, then for the children, movement out of the ghetto in which they are trapped.

I do not intend to discuss 'squatter consciousness' here, merely to state that an attack on schools is often the last straw that forces families to take a decision to move. In March this year four of the largest schools were raided and, in familiar style, the principals fined. An important issue here is the institutionalisation of ethnicity. The great majority of Winterveld population is non-Tswana, and the schools reflect the great diversity of language found. It is this, and the consequent attempt to force people to accept Tswana as the medium of instruction that is a prevalent feature of these raids.

Lastly, and most significantly, it would seem that attempts are being made by the BT authorities to devise a new strategy to deal with the 'Winterveld problem'. The squatters will not all move. For every one family who goes, thousands more remain. The recognition of this is reflected in the attempt to impose the responsibility for dealing with Winterveld people onto the landlords. In March this year (Post, 79.03.24) Chief Mangope told the plot-owners that "they had robbed the squatters of thousands of rands" and "they did not care about the welfare of the squatters who needed proper housing, roads, schools, fresh water and sanitation."

Since Winterveld's inception capital has abdicated any claims to responsibility for the welfare of the unskilled labour force housed in Winterveld. So too has the South African state and now BophuthaTswana. More serious are threats to expropriate landlords. Already the seeds of a serious struggle are developing, not only over issues such as that of compensation, but on a more fundamental level over the implicit attempt to move the function of control one step further away onto the shoulders of the landlords themselves.

It is impossible to predict the ultimate fate of a place such as Winterveld with any degree of certainty. It is not something that I would attempt to do. Yet, certain patterns, certain processes, certain structural constraints are becoming ever more clear. It is these that will be dealt with in the last section of this article.

In my introduction I tried to make clear that I considered it dangerous to focus too sharply on any one area to the exclusion of

others, or to fail to recognise the overall conditions which cause squatter concentrations and resettlement camps to emerge. I have tried to show that places like Winterveld are symptomatic of structural features of South African political economy. Here a major element is that of structural unemployment and underemployment. The increase in mechanization that characterized all levels of the South African economy in the 1960s and 1970s increasingly means that the large and unskilled reserve army who gather in such areas as Winterveld are increasingly redundant to the immediate needs of capitalism and become a threat to political stability which has to be controlled. Earlier I spoke of marginalization - on the most concrete level it refers to the process of exclusion from direct economic participation, to the gross under-employment of women, to the phenomenal rates of youth unemployment.

Yet it operates on a myriad of levels. The constant decrease in the amount of cash circulating in areas such as Winterveld means that in effect the informal sector is shrinking - the ability of a community to live off itself declines.

The deterioration in diet and health that I have witnessed over the past 9 months is testimony to this. Vegetables and fruit are the first to go, then meat, then tea... until families' staple diet is that of mealie meal and watered down milk. Obviously malnutrition is on the increase, but so is the level of resistance to disease decreasing. Another example, less children can afford to go to school - fewer and fewer are able to learn even the most rudimentary of skills needed

for an industrial labour force. Lastly, the neglect in the provision of any infrastructural facilities whatsoever, becomes a feature that is more and more harmful over time. The piles of rubbish do not go away, the water does not become less polluted with time.

The conclusion that can be drawn from the descriptions are not pleasant. Genocide is not a pretty word, not even if its effects are going to take 50 years to be felt. Yet one's conclusions can go beyond this. It is at this point that I return to my introduction, to the resurgence of interest being shown in Winterveld.

Calls like those of Mrs Suzman, for an 'urgent solution on the legal status of the area's people to be negotiated by the South African and BophuthaTswana governments' (RDM, 79.08.25) do not help anything, nor do health-education projects, at least not until people have the means to attain the material conditions (food and housing) that would allow such schemes some validity. So too plans for 'squatter upgrading'. For in the last analysis, until people have jobs, until they have the political and economic rights that will allow them to make their voices heard, there is no solution.

The solution to Winterveld is thus not a superstructural one, not a cosmetic one, not something that can be carried out in isolation, but is an integral part of the process of restructuring that will deal with the basic problems of the structure of South African political economy.

The POLITICAL ECONOMY of SURVIVAL

THE UNEMPLOYMENT CRISIS AND INFORMAL INCOME OPPORTUNITIES IN SOWETO.

"When you're out of luck and out of work, you can always go to Johannesburg."

Elvis Costello, 1979

"I've been in Jo'burg two years, and haven't got a job yet; I survive by relying on relatives and friends for handouts, and when things are really bad, I scrounge for food in dustbins ..."

Nqutu Migrant, 1979

THE tale I have to tell is not a dramatic one; it will not have the majesty of that unforgettable day when, on a murky smoke-filled morning, twenty thousand young Soweto school-children marched in anger against yet one more item of oppression, giving expression, perhaps even birth to, a whole new consciousness and spirit of resistance in Soweto and South Africa. What I have to tell is the more mundane story of how people, faced with the same material conditions as those school-children, being subject to the same conditions of oppression and exploitation, take the alternative, long-suffering path of resistance and, at rock bottom, survival. Many of the

causes, of which Soweto '76 was a symptom, are the same ones which structure political and economic life in Soweto today; not much has changed; indeed, much may be worse. So the story here told is both a simple and complex one; it is of how ordinary people, faced with awesome odds, eke out an existence in conditions of poverty and unemployment; how they help each other... and how they exploit each other.

But first, some primary information is necessary: Soweto is a compact, yet sprawling city, covering 88 sq.km. with 102 000 houses and 10 hostels (the latter housing 45 000 people). Officially, there are 800 000 people in Soweto; unofficial, and more accurate assessments put the figure at nearer 2 million. A Bureau for Market Research survey in 1977 showed there to be an average of 10 persons to a house (of which 70% are 51/6, i.e. 4 rooms in toto). The population density is 100 per hectare (Johannesburg is 23). BMR estimates that 350-400 000 people in Soweto are economically active (i.e. in some form of formal wage employment), and commute to work in Johannesburg each day. But this raises a problem,

for if we accept the population figure of 2-million, and assume that half of them would be potential workers, it means there is a shortfall of jobs of over half a million.

This huge disparity between 'formal' wage opportunities and the potential labour force raises serious issues, the most pressing being, how do those not engaged in regular wage employment survive? The State provides only meagre unemployment relief benefits, and has no effective system of social welfare to provide for those who are unemployed in the long term, or who have never been employed before, so neither appear in government statistics, nor can claim benefits. The mass of these unemployed people clearly cannot accept this state of affairs and, as any Soweto dweller or researcher can tell you, most of them are, in fact, economically active. The difficulty is that many of their activities are either legally proscribed, or at least not recorded by government agencies; the result is the same, for they do not appear in official records and are therefore 'statistically invisible'. A number of analysts have called these income-gathering activities the 'informal sector', and they include such pursuits as small-scale distribution (market operatives, street hawkers and petty traders), services (watch repairs, cycle and car repairs), small entrepreneurship, and other activities such as renting out lodgings, prostitution and crime.

To examine the roots of this problem, one must first comprehend the issue of unemployment, the causes of which lie deep in the social formation. The present statistics are appalling enough: It's estimated that in 1977

the unemployed and underemployed in SA stood at 2,3-million, a startling 22% of the Black labour force, and estimates from the conservative University of Pretoria, show that 14 000 have joined the ranks of the unemployed every month since then. Like every other calculation in this field, it is incredibly difficult to get clarity, especially when relying on government statistics - as Mares (1978:19) points out census enumerators were given instructions that:

- 1) A male who describes himself as unemployed, living in a rural area, was to be classified as employed in agriculture.
- 2) A man who indicated the occupation and industry of his last job, but was unemployed, had to be classified as employed in that industry.
- 3) All the females (age 16+) in rural areas and unemployed had to be classified as farm workers, unless the wife was the household head.
- 4) A woman who gave her occupation as domestic servant and who was unemployed, had to be classified as domestic servant.

However calculated, these are bleak figures. Let us suppose the unemployment/underemployment rate runs at 20%; compared with a place like Britain, an unemployment rate of 5% is considered a crisis, and governments begin to fear for their safety. What Simkins, Clarke, Mares and others all agree upon is that South Africa is plunged deep into an unemployment crisis, for not only are we subject to the usual capitalist cycle of boom and recession which alternately sucks in or expels workers, in what has been called cyclical unemployment, but we are also

subject to structural unemployment - unemployment which, despite cyclical fluctuations, is on an ever ascending gradient. Simkins argues that unemployment stood at 1,2-million in 1960 (18,3% of the labour force) and rose to 22,4% in 1977. Even in the period of uninterrupted boom, from 1960-1969, the rate of un- and underemployment stood at a steady 19% (while the economy grew at 5,9% per annum).

The causes of this malaise are to be found in the structure of the economy, which has historical antecedents. The reader doesn't have to be reminded of the mobilisation of labour supplies in South Africa - processes of proletarianisation were set in motion in the nineteenth century (cf Bundy 1972), the logic of which is still working itself out, so that more and more people still flow from rural to urban areas, as the last pretence of a rural, pre-capitalist economy crumbles away. But capital accumulation not only requires a labour force, it also needs a reserve army of unemployed to act as a disciplinary force upon the employed, keeping them in a position of insecurity, and keeping down wages; it also needs an i.r.a. (industrial reserve army) to be held in reserve in order to be available to develop new areas in which capital may wish to invest.

But our unemployment crisis in South Africa seems to be predicated primarily on the logic of capital accumulation and development. Here, as elsewhere, due to the tendency of the rate of profit to fall, and the concomitant ceaseless search for greater productivity, there is a trend towards mechanisation in industry. Capital intensity means the employment of relatively fewer

workers, and more and more workers are being replaced by machinery (Maree claims that 90% of SA technology is imported - from USA and UK, home of monopoly capital). Agriculture seems to be particularly badly hit where, for example, there has been an 800% increase in the number of tractors since 1945. Maree points to industrial decentralisation as blocking urban job creation, and the industrial colour bar as being further causes of structural unemployment - the latter now almost defunct, but replaced by the more sophisticated Wiehahn and Riskert recommendations which permit closed shop unions and tighten up influx control.

So we arrive at a position where, given the enormous mass of unemployed people, given the fact that it is largely structurally determined and therefore is unlikely to decline, and given the refusal of the government to provide social security for Blacks, we have to pose the question: How do all those unemployed and underemployed people survive? The state, of course, would argue that Blacks have access to alternative sources of income, notably from rural agricultural activities. However, a large number of Soweto dwellers are permanently urbanised, and the rural (homeland) economies have long been unable to support or even subsidise migrant earnings. Liz Clarke's study of Nqutu showed average monthly earnings to be R14,87 in an area where the PDL stands at R96,00: (Clarke and Ngobese, 1974:55); my own findings for northern Zululand were of a family income of R24,00, and in any event, rural agriculture is so weak that there is a mass of rural unemployed people - a report from Ekuvukeni,

near Ladysmith, detailed the case of a rural magistrate who advertised 100 jobs in a chicken factory. He had 5 000 applications, and refuses to advertise again because the crowd trampled his garden flat and ate all his vegetables.

Furthermore, employers in Johannesburg do not distinguish among their labourers as to whether they are migrant or not, all are paid the same wages. Employers don't calculate a 'just wage', based on a calculation of a subsidy from a pre-capitalist sector; they pay wages determined by class struggle, and the balance of forces have been on their side thus far. What is the case, is that wages are generally forced so low that families have to seek to supplement their appalling level; the 'informal sector' offers opportunities to do this.

The relationship between unemployment and the so-called 'informal sector' is a direct one. This mass of potential workers, many of whom will never find employment again in the sectors of monopoly, and perhaps even competitive capital, form a kind of marginalized labour force.

This marginalized group of workers is forced to engage in 'marginal' or 'informal' income gathering activities; the 'marginal pole' of the economy as it has been described by Quijano (1974) acts as a soak-pit which absorbs the surplus labour power of those who never gain 'formal' wage employment or who are thrown out of work by the increasing capitalization of industry. I shall shortly set out some of the theoretical problems regarding the so-called 'informal sector'; empirically however, there are clearly a

number of activities which have the appearance of informality, and which offer a modicum of subsistence to its practitioners.

It is more appropriate therefore, not to speak of unemployment, but rather to refer to underemployment, since it's rare that any person could survive for any length of time without regular employment and no State-provided unemployment benefits. The unemployed therefore, quickly seek strategies for survival in this situation, which can range from relying on family, friends or members of reciprocity-based voluntary associations, which are a short-term means of survival, but the longer term strategies must be aimed at a stable source of income, and 'informal sector' activities are the most accessible. The unemployed thus are frequently engaged in economic activities, but they often are less remunerative than 'formal' wage employment, people are frequently employed at levels below the skills they have to offer, or are employed only sporadically. It is this phenomenon which is best described as underemployment; in better circumstances, these people would be using their education and skills to the full, but failing that they would be totally unemployed.

The Social Organization of Poverty

'..... if the capitalist system does not provide adequately for old age pensions, sick leave and unemployment compensations, they have to rely on another, comprehensive socio-economic organization to fulfil these vital needs... in the absence of a precapitalist mode of production... once permanent settlement is allowed in the capitalist sector, these functions are fulfilled by urban mutual-aid associations.'

Meillessoux, 1972

I do not wish to resuscitate any form of 'the culture of poverty' here; the mutual-aid associations referred to above are forms of social organisation which can be seen as forms of resistance, defensive and offensive strategies for embattled people in a hostile social formation. Town dwellers organise around themselves networks of people on whom they can rely: self-help groups or social security networks, phrased in an urban idiom, and aimed at the goal of survival. Let us turn our attention to a handful of them, by way of illustration. There are many more than those enumerated below, but these will suffice to illuminate the issues.

At the core of any social network are those whom one can trust implicitly, those who will give assistance willingly, immediately, and without counting the cost. They are, of course, one's kinsfolk, with whom the idiom of reciprocity is paramount and who share in the crises and pleasures of one's life. Research evidence shows that in major calamities like losing one's job, or a death in the family, it is kin who rally to support first, and whose support lasts longest. Kin are also the people who help find employment, accommodation, and who bribe or bail one out of the clutches of the law. They are, in short, indispensable.

The migrant coming to town is faced with a further dilemma: frequently his kin are dispersed and few in number, yet a network of sympathetic individuals is ready-made in the form of his amakhaya, or home-people. Drawn from a locality in the rural area, the bonds of territoriality are remarkably strong when called upon to take the pressure of a calamit-

ous event in the life of one of its number. Amakhaya groups also have other uses as well, for, like kin, they aid people in finding employment and lodging, and generally act as a conservative force in keeping the migrant's allegiance firmly set on his rural ties. The makgotla is a broader, but equally conservative, response to the apparent lack of social control in deep Soweto. It is a sort of do-it-yourself form of justice, with appeal to migrants.

South Africa, like most Third World countries, pays its workers extremely low wages, which have to be carefully conserved and stretched. The poor respond in typical fashion; they create systems of redistribution, which help meagre incomes extend to the limits of their elasticity. These patterns of redistribution percolate through social networks to finally find their way into the pockets of those who are unable to find wage employment; it is above all a social form of redistribution, operating amongst friends, neighbours, workmates, acquaintances and friends of friends. The most common forms of this blend of economic redistribution with social commitment are the stokvels and mohodisano. Both are forms of rotating credit association, where members pool a portion of their weekly or monthly earnings, taking it in turn to scoop the pool.

The stokvel also has a very clear celebratory and recreational aspect for, when the money is pooled, the person whose turn it is to collect the kitty also throws a party, at which food and alcohol are bought by participants at inflated prices. Thus, the person holding the stokvel (most commonly a woman, as

she has cooking and beer brewing skills) not only gets a large lump sum of money, but will also make a profit on the party. An example of one such group has 30 members, each contributing R10 per month, which means one waits the lengthy period of two and a half years to reap the benefits of membership, but when one does, one gets a clear R300, plus about R50 from the party. This relatively large sum of money can then be spent on an item which one might not normally aspire to, like a refrigerator, or more pertinently, can be redistributed again to kin and others who have pressing social needs. It's not uncommon for people to throw a 'party' alone, where it is understood that food and beverages will be sold for profit. This is often practiced by single women (especially divorcees and widows) as a means of earning a sporadic income.

A number of urban social groupings are explicitly created as a means of coping with crisis in a society denied social welfare. They are known by evocative names, such as masibambane (hold hands) or matidisho (river in flood) and comprise a set of people who make regular financial contributions to a fund, which is used to tide one of their members over a calamity, and they also provide, both practically and ideologically, a sense of commitment and security. The most pervasive and effective of this form of defensive self-help organization is the funeral association (cf Kramer, 1975). There is in Soweto an ideal that one should die well, with dignity, and to be buried well is a major component of the belief, so that the self-respect so systematically denied on a day-to-day basis can, in the final irony, be achieved in the

grave. But the cost of dying is not cheap. A recent funeral in Soweto cost the widow R240 for a coffin, R120 to hire two buses and R150 for food and beverages for the mourners. The sum of R510 is far beyond the reach of a household whose monthly income was R80. If it were not for the funeral society to which her husband had belonged, which provided R400, the widow would have presided over a pauper's burial. Members of a funeral association meet regularly, contribute to a fund monthly, and are willing helpers in predicaments other than death as well.

Finally, the most visible and audible of the mutual-aid associations are the small separatist churches (usually Zionist) that abound in Soweto. There are known to be well over 2 000 of them, with an average membership of 30. With an obvious emphasis on spiritual, communal and social rather than material aspects, these small groups (much the same in number as stokvels and funeral societies) provide their members with a sense of belonging and respect through their colourful and distinctive uniforms and the abundance of status positions within each small church. The spiritual comfort tends to be a negative one, in the sense that the tendency is to preach a message of 'suffer now - and your reward shall be in the kingdom of heaven'. But these religious groups perform other important functions for, if many Soweto dwellers are poor, separatist church members tend to be poorer. A recent study in Kwa Mashu showed that by most indices of poverty, Zionist church members were worse-off - they had lower incomes on average, there were a preponderance of single women, their

children had a higher infant mortality rate, etc (Kiernan, 1977). In short, spiritual aspects aside, it appears that these churches represent the last network of survival for many urban black people.

All the forms of social organization mentioned above help construct a latticework of overlapping ties; they are means of spreading the risk in an environment characterized by scarcity, and they also help to build a platform from which the more successful can launch themselves into moderately remunerative enterprises.

The 'informal sector': its nature and the problem of theorization

We've all come into contact with the informal sector at one time or another: from the person who sells one an apple from her box in Rissik Street, to the man who knocks on your front door, selling home-made baskets and brooms, the women who make indigenous jewellery or clothing, or the person who helps you redistribute your wealth by dipping his hand into your pocket in a busy street or a football match. For many people in Soweto, the so-called informal sector is the sole source of income, for others, it is a supplement for low wages. It is common to find that, in one family, there is one wage earner, and as many as two or three who participate in informal income gathering activities. In Kenya, 28-33% of all employment is in the informal sector; preliminary indications from our survey in Soweto indicate that it is much higher here.

It was Keith Hart who first coined the term 'informal sector', and he provides a good indication of the conventional wisdom

on the subject in his typology of urban income opportunities in Ghana (1973:69):

Formal income opportunities

- (a) Public sector wages
- (b) Private sector wages
- (c) Transfer payments - pensions, unemployment benefits

Informal income opportunities: legitimate

- (a) Primary and secondary activities - farming, market gardening, building contractors and associated activities, self-employed artisans, shoemakers, tailors, manufacturers of beer and spirits
- (b) Tertiary enterprises with relatively large capital inputs - housing, transport, utilities, commodity speculation, rentier activities
- (c) Small-scale distribution - market operatives, petty traders, street hawkers, caterers in food and drink, bar attendants, carriers (kayakaya), commission agents, and dealers
- (d) Other services - musicians, launderers, shoeshiners, barbers, night-soil removers, photographers, vehicle repair and other maintenance workers; brokerage and middlemanship (the magida system in markets, law courts, etc); ritual services, magic, and medicine
- (e) Private transfer payments - gifts and similar flows of money and goods between persons; borrowing; begging

Informal income opportunities: illegitimate (illegal)

- (a) Services - hustlers and spivs in general; receivers of stolen goods; usury, and pawnbroking (at illegal interest rates); drug-pushing, prostitution, poncing ('pilot boy'), smuggling, bribery, political corruption Tammany Hall-style, protection rackets
- (b) Transfers - petty theft (eg pickpockets), larceny (eg burglary and armed robbery), peculation and embezzlement, confidence tricksters (eg money doublers), gambling.

The interest that the informal sector has generated among researchers and development planners is remarkable, but understandable,

when its positive qualities are examined. Hart emphasised that it was characterised by: ease of entry, reliance on indigenous resources, family ownership of enterprises, labour intensive and adaptive technology, small scale of operation, skills acquired outside the formal school system, and unregulated competitive markets. The 'formal sector' is the opposite of almost all these factors. The attractiveness of the 'informal sector' concept is also that the phenomenon is so visible and accessible - it's to be found on almost every street corner. It also has many apparent benefits, such as producing goods and services cheaply in a community of repressed wages (back street mechanics, watch repairers and home dress-makers do indeed produce articles and services cheaper than are obtainable in the city centre) and helps ward off the worst ravages of unemployment by opening up further income earning or job opportunities for the victims.

It would perhaps help to focus our attention to look at who is interested in the 'informal sector'. Two major organizations who are interested in the problem of Third World unemployment and the issue of underdevelopment, the International Labour Organization and the World Bank, have both conducted a series of major studies; neither organization is well known for being representative of the world's workers or unemployed, although to be fair, the ILO study of Kenya was a fairly radical document, which used a form of dependency theory to argue that the Kenyan economy had been stunted by neo-colonialism. Its solution however, was merely to attempt to support informal sector activities in the

hope of assisting the emergence of a class of small but indigenous capitalists, who would create wider job opportunities.

Within South Africa, the major agency which has expressed interest in this sector of the economy is the Urban Foundation. Intriguingly, the UF has embarked on job creation schemes, but by far its largest commitment has been to provision of better housing for blacks. The UF, in a pamphlet aimed at encouraging businessmen to support their objectives, writes, "There is also a great need for a variety of accommodation, from flats to elite houses, to allow for normal social progression according to status". It is monopoly capital which, in South Africa, is taking an interest in, and supports some aspects of the informal sector. They are mostly aimed at stabilizing a volatile working class, and embarking upon a policy of embourgeoisement. Bodies such as the UF perceive and portray the relationship between the formal and informal sectors as a kind of dual economy, and the relationship between them as essentially a benign one.

It is of interest that the State either ignores or actively harasses informal sector activities, while large scale private enterprise actively supports it. While the creation of a large industrial reserve army is necessary for capital accumulation, a starving and restless one is not. Soweto 1976 showed the State and capital the level of desperation to which the working class had plunged, especially those who were shortly to be thrown onto the job market, and both have responded, the State at first with open repression, then with the more subtle Riekert and Wiehahn

Commissions; private enterprise set up the Urban Foundation. The latter, in urging businessmen to participate in funding 'a prestige housing development in Soweto, make their final plea:

'Participation by employers in projects of this nature not only improve in-company employer/employee relationships, but constitute a sound investment in the future stability of South Africa's business environment. In this way companies can contribute towards a process of facilitating increased freedom of access by Black people to the free enterprise system'.

The goal of the UF has been echoed by Mr David Thebehali, a Soweto businessman, who said in a recent interview, 'conditions that would limit unrest and protect investment must be created. These conditions can only be created if the average dweller also experiences a change for the better in improved housing and services...' He went on to suggest that an investment of R500-million to develop Soweto would eliminate a recurrence of the 1976 upheavals (Rand Daily Mail Extra, 79.10.24). In a speech to the Afrikaanse Studentebond in July, Mr Thebehali also claimed that most urban blacks were 'apolitical and would support the political leader whom they believed would create the best financial and economic climate to fulfil their aspirations' (RDM, 79.07.12). A case, perhaps, not of black is beautiful, or even small is beautiful, but rather, petty-bourgeois is pretty?

Towards a critique of the informal sector concept

While it is true that many of the activities that have been broadly defined as belonging to the informal sector are essential to the

survival of people who would otherwise be unemployed, and to suppress or remove such activities would cause immeasurable suffering, and while at its sharper end some of these activities are genuine attempts at assistance to an impersonal economy and an uncaring State, there has, nevertheless, been a tendency to confuse the issues. As Bromley points out, the formal/informal dichotomy is too crude and simple. For instance, such diverse activities as petty capitalism and entrepreneurship are categorized with door-to-door offal sellers, street hawkers, prostitutes and criminals. And if one takes illegality as a definitional point, then both the pickpocket at the soccer game and Eschel Rhoadie are informal sector operatives. Furthermore, at a stroke of a pen, the illegality would be removed, but it would surely alter very little the way of producing that the informal sector operator uses.

A major fallacy that must be refuted is the dualism of the formal/informal dichotomy. Many scholars assume that the two sectors, while they interact, are nevertheless independent whereas, as can be seen, the one is created by and under the dominance of the other. Leys (1973) provides a useful insight when he points out that the informal is intimately tied to the formal sector, for smallholders provide cheap foodstuffs, pastoralists cheap beef, etc. In Soweto, old car tyres are turned into shoes that last for five years, at a cost of R2,50, while manufactured, shop retailed ones cost over R20 and last two years. Bicycle, car and watch repairs all provide cheap services geared to the spending power of an impoverished community.

The dualist view is also alluring to its supporters because it is portrayed as helping the poor while there's no apparent threat to the rich. Informal sector incomes tend to be very low, the reasons being suggests the ILO because (a) it is servicing a low income community, (b) there is official discouragement, because of officialdom's pejorative view, and (c) there's a lack of demand from the formal sector (Leys, 1973). The way to foster development, in this view, is to support the informal sector, as the ILO recommended for Kenya, and the UF encourages for South Africa. But, as will shortly be argued, the dualist myth obscures an important truth: that to the formal sector accrues most of the benefits of a viable informal sector. It is not two separate economies, but one and, by a process of unequal exchange, and providing a subsidy for low wages, employers can rely on the 'informal sector' to increase the amount of surplus value extracted from their labourers. Indeed, the lower the incomes in the 'informal sector', the greater the profits in the 'formal'.

It is theoretically more acceptable to argue that the 'informal sector' as a concept has no explanatory power, but is what Wittgenstein called an 'odd-job word', one which is useful as a general direction finder. Rather one should break down the various activities into areas that can be handled in a manageable form and which will also be theoretically informed. There are small capitalists, whose goal of production is to accumulate and expand; there are petty commodity producers, more concerned with subsistence than pursuit of large profit; there is the sphere of circu-

lation and services; networks of income redistribution, and finally, and very importantly, crime and lumpenproletarian activities. This last category, for want of a better term, refers to a gamut of activities, ranging from theft for subsistence (there has been an increase in thefts of food from supermarkets abutting onto Soweto), and other attempts at redistribution, such as the delivery driver for a sweet factory who supplements his low pay by loading more boxes of sweets onto his truck than was consigned, and later sells it, through prostitution to organised crime.

All the above activities, including petty commodity production, are not in a 'dual' relationship to capitalism, they are integral to it. As Banaji (1978) remarks, petty commodity production can only be a form of production (eg often using unpaid family labour, with a goal of subsistence rather than accumulation, etc), never a mode of production. Historically, it has always been subordinated to other modes, eg feudalism, and tends to be transitional. Thus, to speak of petty commodity production is not to posit a form of dualism. On the contrary, immanent to the concept is the notion of subordination. Followers of important feminist debates will notice a close resemblance between some of the issues raised here and the domestic labour debate. Both relate to the way in which capital benefits from the unpaid labour of many of whom they do not directly employ, those who service the working class and assist in lowering the cost of reproduction of labour power (vide, eg the CSE Pamphlet No 2: The Political Economy of Women)

The most important function of all those

economic activities that have been called 'informal', and the reason why agencies like the ILO and the interests of local monopoly capital in the form of the UF take such an interest in them, is that these social and economic activities are of direct benefit to them. Not just in the sense that it helps ensure a stable and docile labour force (and especially reserve army of unemployed, especially women), but rather there are direct economic gains. At their lowest level, these informal activities provide goods and services which capital or the State do not yet find profitable. Further, a system of subcontracting to informal sector operators works to the benefit of larger capitalist forms, as the subcontracted services are usually provided at well below the level that the capitalist could provide himself.

The major benefit the 'informal sector' passes to the capitalist entrepreneurs is its function of lowering the cost of reproduction of labour power. It's true that some commodities in the circuit of petty production and distribution are more expensive than can be bought in supermarkets, but for the most part, repairs are cheaper, savings are made on clothing, footwear and food. Also, since these activities are so closely tied to social groupings and redistributive networks, these activities are clearly forms of provision of social security; a direct saving to employers and State, as the former can pay low wages which employees are forced to accept, and to the latter, in that social welfare can be fobbed off as being unnecessary.

Petty production and distribution then,

is comparable to and should be viewed in conjunction with, rural subsistence (or rather sub-subsistence) cultivation, for both perform the function of social security: self help, kinship cooperation, caring for the sick, recuperating, the aged and unemployed, place of socialising the young and ensuring the reproduction of the labour force, etc. It provides a redistributive network, but this does not generate 'new' income, but merely redistributes that income which filters from formal wage employment. Both rural and urban manifestations therefore service the industrial reserve army, and contribute to the certainty that labour is sold beneath its value. A final point for those who lionise the informal sector as a panacea for unemployment and low wages: most available evidence shows that labour is more ruthlessly exploited by petty producers and small entrepreneurs than elsewhere. A 60-hour week is not uncommon, and remuneration is frequently unconsciously low - a Winterveld coal merchant pays his labour R1,00 per day for a 12-hour day, seven days a week, largely employing child labour.

.... stunned,
Magaica* lit a lamp
to search for lost illusions,
for his youth and his health which stayed
buried
deep in the mines of Johannesburg.
Youth and health,
the lost illusions
which will shine like stars
on some lady's neck in some City's night.

- Noemia de Sousa
*magaica = migrant labourer.

David Webster

Gold price

GOD was fixed lower at \$116 in London yesterday after erasing this morning's fixing gain, to \$116.25.

Reed Daily Mail, 76 10 02

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BUS BOYCOTTS

EZAKHENI: 20 000 houses, some 20 km away from Ladysmith in northern Natal - this is where many of the workers of Ladysmith industrial area live - running water, but no electricity - one high school and one technical school - two clinics. Ezakheni is in KwaZulu. It is a relocation township, the inhabitants (those who have jobs) are commuters.

They have had no choice as to where they are allowed to live.

It is not the worst relocation settlement. Other names immediately come to mind - for example, in the same area are those of Limehill, Mondlo, Nondweni, Msinga, Ekuvukeni, and many others. It is still so bad that it is said that the Madadeni Mental Hospital (outside the 'white' town of Newcastle) deals with the increase of cases from Ezakheni. Mental breakdown also characterises other relocation areas.

Let us first take a look at the settlement and its history, for this is where the latest in a long series of bus boycotts started on the 10th September, 1979. Then I will present a chronology of the events of the present spate of boycotts, and finally make some general points about this kind of action by the working class and the dynamics involved.

POPULATION RELOCATION: The history of Ezakheni may start further back in time, and the changes in the South African economy that 'necessitated' the events definitely do go back further, but in 1973 the MP for Kliprivier,

the district within which Ladysmith falls, took up the case of 'black spots' in the area. He led a delegation of farmers from Bergville, Elandelaagte, Besters and Ladysmith to Raubenheimer, the Deputy Minister of Bantu Administration and Development (BAD).

This delegation was to complain about 'tardiness in removing black spots'. 'Black spots' are areas of freehold tenure (African owned farms, in the main) within 'white' South Africa. These areas do not conform within the overall scheme of the state for separation and division. Some of these 'black spots' had and have been in African hands for many decades.

The farmers in the delegation were said to be concerned about overcrowding, overstocking and soil erosion. More accurately, they were concerned because these factors were occurring in the predominantly white owned farming areas. The delegation was told that a 'priority rating' for relocation had not yet been worked out.

In January, 1974, an ad hoc committee was formed by Val Volker, the MP for the area. It consisted of representatives of farming, commerce and industry. This committee compiled a priority list, with the Roosboom area heading the list.

Roosboom was an African-owned farm - a 'black spot' in the eyes of the drawers of maps in the offices of BAD. The first farm here had been bought in 1910 and extended through further purchases until it covered 2 000 ha. The residents of Roosboom had been fighting eviction orders since the passing of the 1936 Native Trust and Land Act. White farmers in 1974 added another reason to

agricultural complaints for the relocation of the inhabitants - "because it is harming South Africa's image in the eyes of tourists and is providing a 'golden opportunity to hostile overseas journalists'".

The concern with what overseas journalists would think was due to the location of the Roosboom farm - right next to the main road to the coast from the Reef, between Ladysmith and Colenso. Even the excuses, never mind the real reasons, stank.

At that time bus fares between Roosboom and Ladysmith cost 30c return and 75c for weekly tickets. The Bantu Investment Corporation (BIC, now Corporation for Economic Development, CED, about whom more later) bus service between Ezakheni and Ladysmith charged 48c for a return ticket.

As with other removals of people from 'black spots' only landowners with more than 20 morgen are entitled to compensation of replacement agricultural land. All others - those with less than 20 morgen and those who do not actually own land but live as tenants - are settled in 'closer settlements' or townships such as Ezakheni where land is available only for residential purposes.

The movement of Roosboom people to Ezakheni started in November, 1975, and ultimately 10 000 people had to be relocated from Roosboom alone. It was a forced removal.


But before that, in mid-1974, the people from Umbulwana (between 400 and 700 families) had been moved. The Drakensberg Bantu Affairs Administration Board (DBAAB), in charge of Africans in 'white' areas, reported that during May, June and July of that year (1974) nearly 4 000 Africans had been resettled in

Ezakheni. It appears that relocation had not depended on the availability of brick houses but that people were being moved into the approximately 3 square metre metal huts that mark nearly all relocation sites. These are available for some 3-6 months while the inhabitants are supposed to build their own houses.

By August, 1977, African 'squatters' at Umbulwene and N'Tombi were still an irritation to white farmers. Families who had been moved to Ezakheni had started moving back to these areas and "now constituted a health menace" - a devastating comment on life in Ezakheni!

Earlier this year (1979) it was reported that families from the Colenso area were also to be moved to Ezakheni. It would appear that most of the people living in Ezakheni originally came from 'black spots', were labour tenants or 'squatters' on white-owned farms, or from African townships outside KwaZulu (I have already said that Ezakheni is situated within KwaZulu). This is not to say that many of these people had not been in wage employment, either in Ladysmith or as migrants to the cities of South Africa.

The policy of 'urbanisation of the homelands' in effect dates back to the late 1960s. What it amounts to is the creation of townships just within 'homeland' borders, from where the inhabitants are to commute to their places of work in 'white' South Africa. These townships have no independent reason for existence but rely for income on industry situated 'across the border' - and then most of this income is in turn spent in 'white' South Africa.



Map 1.

The execution of this policy occurs wherever a 'homeland' border skirts a 'white' town or city. For example, in the Transvaal Africans from the 'white' towns of Nylstroom, Naboomspruit, Ellisras, Vaalwater, and Louis Trichardt are being relocated in Steilloop in Lebowa (see map 2, p70, Sunday Express, 79.07.29). Some 20 000 Africans are thought to be affected in this area. Another example is the demolition of the old Harri-smith 'location' and the removal of the inhabitants to Nondweni in Natal, but mostly to Witzieshoek in nearby Basotho QwaQwa.

Ezakhani would form part of this policy. It is offered as an example of the townships whose inhabitants participated in the bus boycotts right across Natal.

THE EVENTS: In Ezakhani the bus fare stood at R2,50 for a weekly ticket to the industrial area of Ladysmith, and to the domestic employment in the houses and gardens of the whites of the town.

(The chronology that follows is limited to the extent that reliance had to be placed on the commercial press in Durban and Johannesburg)

Monday, 10th September (1979): The boycott of Ezakhani Transport started. Only 40 of the 9 500 regular passengers between Ezakhani and Ladysmith made use of buses after a second fare hike for 1979 had been announced during the previous week.

Fares were said to be increasing by 70, 80 and 95c a week, and could mean that a weekly ticket could cost as much as R3,40 (six-day week).

Most workers got to work by walking, although some were late and firms reported

absenteeism of about 10%. Some workers bought bicycles during the boycott. What is interesting is even at this early stage workers refused the subsidies offered them by some employers - subsidies to cover the fare hike.

Police could find no 'intimidators', but both I Deshayes McCourt, manager of Ezakhani Transport, and some employers reported 'behind-the-scenes intimidation' - as evidence for the 'intimidation' was offered the workers solidarity in refusing even the free transport offered by some businesses.

McCourt claimed that the increase, approved by the Road Transportation Board after further subsidisation to meet fuel price increases had been turned down, would not be dropped in response to the boycott.

Tuesday, 11th: The vagueness of 'intimidation' as answer to the success of the boycott reached new depths in the commercial press - and this was only the second day! The boycott was said to have been even more successful than the previous day.

It was taking workers 3 hours to walk the 26 km from Ezakhani.

Dunlop factory in Ladysmith decided to shut down until the boycott ended. This firm was especially hard hit as they worked a night shift and workers, understandably, did not turn up for this shift. Other employers were reported to be allowing workers to sleep on their premises - illegal, but said to be temporarily allowed by the local DBAAB.

An Indian-owned bus service was reported not to have increased its fares in the district.

Wednesday, 12th: A meeting was held between the Economic Development Corporation (CED) and KwaZulu Development Corporation (KDC) - the CED and KDC are owners of the Ezakhani Transport Company - representatives of commerce and industry and the police. No statement was made, but McCourt said that fares would not be reduced.

Thursday, 13th: The KDC owned Mpumalanga Transport Company announced fare increases for Monday, effective on their service between Mpumalanga (a township outside the Hammarsdale border area) and Pinetown and New Germany (industrial areas from where many of the workers had been relocated in Mpumalanga). Mpumalanga residents threatened a boycott, and also complained about lack of sympathy and involvement from the KwaZulu MPs.

During the week a fire destroyed the offices of Ezakhani Transport in Ladysmith causing a reported R100 000 worth of damage.

Police were also said to have started harassing taxis (official and unofficial) and those giving lifts to boycotters. Police denied this. Riot police were present in the townships.

Elliot Mngadi, mayor of Ezakhani, said that the boycotts had followed appeals from himself to the transport company to keep fares down, and a subsequent residents meeting in the community hall. Mngadi said that many of the residents of Ezakhani earned as little as R8,00 a week.

Monday, 17th: The boycott at Mpumalanga started in response to the announced 50c a week increase. It was supported by the commuters to Hammarsdale, said not to have

been affected by the increase.

Workers at Marburg, near Port Shepstone on the Natal south coast, employed by the Marburg Manufacturing Company, held a sit-down strike in support of wage demands to meet a threatened fare increase asked for by the KDC-owned companies in the district.

The Marburg Manufacturing Company is a clothing firm. The minimum wage for a worker in the clothing industry in the area is set at R7,70 a week. Despite this 'minimum' wage the case of a woman worker was reported who was earning R7,00 a week - "Mrs Florence Gumede now has only R2,25 a week left to live on after she has put aside busfare, rent and money for paraffin for her Primus stove". The fare increase, set for October 1st, would mean that she would be left with 80c a week.

Tuesday, 18th: Teargas was used against some 300 workers who stormed the Marburg factory after refusing to work. Department of Labour officials had earlier warned workers to return to work or be dismissed.

In Durban a meeting was held between the various affected groups in the Ladyemith boycott and it was said that the Ezakheni Town Council would call a meeting of constituents over the weekend to discuss the issue. MP for Kliprivier, Volker, said that 6 500 workers had already been given wage increases to "cushion the bus fare rise". A bus window was smashed at Ezakheni.

At Mpumalanga workers started using the buses on the longer routes, but still walked to Hamersdale. The boycott was said to be 70% effective.

Wednesday, 19th: Chief Gatsha Buthelezi



warned that the boycotts in Natal could get out of hand - a matter of grave concern, no doubt, because of the KwaZulu government's indirect financial involvement.

Approximately 17 000 passengers would be affected by fare increases to come into effect on September 26 and October 1. This was to be on the routes between Elandskop and Pietermaritzburg. The service, Sizani Mazulu Transport, is also owned by the KDC and CED.

Thursday, 20th: Putco in Durban also applied to the Road Transport Board for increases within Umlazi and KwaMashu, and between the townships and Durban's industrial area.

Monday, 24th: A meeting at Ezakheni over the weekend had decided to continue with the boycott. Part of the reason was said to have been that the company was owned by whites and that the fare increases would give them higher profits. Volker said in reply that