WORK IN PROGRESS
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WIP 82 JUNE 1992

Special Bumper Launch Edition

ANC Camps: Hani opens up

Reconstruct: Local government special
CODESA: What is De Klerk up to?
Special Focus: World Bank

WORK IN PROGRESS
WIP 82 JUNE 1992
NEW ERA

MAY-JUNE 1992 NO 82

Published by the Southern African Research Service (SARS)
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Braamfontein 2017

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We would like to express our gratitude to Lore Watterson of Desklink Systems for her excellent training, dedicated support, invaluable assistance and considered advice.

EDITORIAL

Welcome to the first edition of *WIP* and *New Era* combined! As you can see, our look has changed — but we still strive to maintain that critical, in-depth coverage of issues that our readers are used to.

We continue to believe that, if we want to build a thoroughgoing democracy, *all* abuses of power need to be exposed — whether from the government, or from any other organisation (even if we support their goals).

In this issue we look at the foxy maneouvres of the De Klerk regime. Whether De Klerk has any 'integrity' or not, his government has, once again, been rocked by scandals involving fraud, corruption and murder. We all know that it is only the tip of the iceberg.

Such a morally weak government ought not speak so loudly about 'democracy'. Their strategy is very transparant: ensure that a future government has no power to fundamentally alter the status quo.

But to succesfully out-maneouvre a morally bankrupt regime, you have to make sure that there are no skeletons in your cupboard. Unfortunately, the ANC's moral high ground has been diminished by its own scandals.

The 'camps chapter' in the ANC's history is a source of increasing embarrassment for the organisation. While we are aware of charges that we may be 'playing into the hands of the regime', we have decided to look closely at that dark episode, both in the interests of the ANC itself, and in the interests of democracy in the long-term.

With increasing intensity, questions are being asked, by friends and foes alike, about the ANC security's abuse of power in exile. The organisation has instituted a commission of inquiry. However, the commission is not seen as 'independent', and there is no indication that its findings will be made public — two crucial demands made of the government when its security forces run riot.

The ANC-led alliance still carries the hope of millions of people, who long for an end to government corruption and gross abuses of power. The movement cannot afford, come election time, to have its image tarnished by theNational Party, who will not hesitate to exploit to the maximum any weaknesses it can find.

The ANC must come clean on it 'camps chapter', and soon.

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ANC Camps in exile

HEIN MARAIS looks at a darker side of ANC history, and speaks to former MK chief-of-staff CHRIS HANI about his role in the episode — PAGES 14-19

What is De Klerk up to?

What did De Klerk achieve in Mitchells Plain, and what is he up to at Codesa? — PAGES 7-11

Do we need the World Bank?

The World Bank is coming with millions of rand to lend — but not everyone is impressed — PAGES 31-36

Philemon Mauku and the right to self-defence

WITH ALL the recent violence in the PWV region, it is hardly surprising that the case of Philemon Mauku has received little attention. Mauku, who was arrested and charged with the illegal possession of firearms in September 1991, could have been just another 'victim' in the ongoing violence that has rained down on the Alexandra community.

Like many former residents, Mauku was driven out of Alexandra's Nobuhle hostel at the hands of Inkatha's marching impis in March 1991. At Mauku's trial in May, civic leader Mzwanele Mayekiso testified that about '200 Inkatha supporters from all over Johannesburg, but mainly bussed in from Natal, drove out 2,000 permit-holding residents on 10 March 1991'.

Like others Mauku was forced to find shelter in the already overcrowded Alexandra community, where he experienced the daily onslaught of violence which residents maintain was instigated by Inkatha and the riot police. Mauku's response was only logical, say local leaders — he tried to 'defend the community'.

Defence campaign controversy

But what might otherwise have been a routine arrest, trial and conviction has now turned into much more. After his arrest his R5,000 bail was raised by the community, with the active involvement of supporters of the Marxist Worker's Tendency of the ANC (MWT), which has been involved in the struggles in Alexandra.

According to sources, a top ANC lawyer who visited Mauku in prison at the time of his arrest, left without making any follow up. Three weeks later, after an intensive search by the community with the assistance of the Independent Board of Inquiry into Informal Repression, he was traced to Modderbee prison.

After this, evicted residents from Nobuhle and Madala hostel, and residents from the woman's hostel, formed an organising committee to launch the Philemon Mauku Defence Campaign (PMDC). This was to rally support and to raise funds.

It is no secret that many Alexandra ANC leaders are against the involvement of the MWT, which has caused them to be distanced from the PMDC. The Alexandra Civic Organisation, although formally supporting the campaign (having endorsed it at its December Congress and one of their central committee meetings) had until recently given little practical assistance. To paraphrase the words of one of the ANC leaders, 'We support Philemon as an individual, but not the PMDC'.

Armed self-defence

Such politicking is difficult to understand, given that one of the central demands of the campaign is the right to armed self-defence of the community. Mauku's defence has not only been built around the legal case of necessity, but has implicitly thrown a challenge to the state and the signatories of the National Peace Accord.

As quoted in the petition, which was read out in court by the prosecutor, 'The National Peace Accord recognises the right of all individuals to defend themselves and their property, and to establish voluntary associations or self-protection units in any neighbourhood to prevent crime and to prevent any invasion of the lawful rights of such communities. This shall include the right to bear licensed arms and to use them in legitimate and lawful self-defence.'

But as pointed out further by the PMDC petition, the government makes self-protection for the township virtually impossible by refusing licences to ordinary black residents, as opposed to whites in rich suburbs who can easily obtain firearm licences.

Given the conditions in Alexandra and in most townships, Mauku's trial is a test case for the right and the necessity for armed self-defence units.

Campaign wins support

The campaign has more recently enjoyed the support of both the ACO executive, and the local branch of the ANC. Before the continuation of the trial, on 11 May, three prominent Alexandra leaders agreed to testify in Mauku's defence, which focused on exposing the collaboration of the riot police with Inkatha vigilantes, and the community's lack of confidence in the police force and its ability to bring about peace in Alexandra. ACO leaders Moses and Mzwanele Mayekiso and Alexandra ANC branch secretary, Obed Bapela, were willing to take the stand.

Interestingly, the print press, which has previously ignored the trial — with the ironic exception of the *Citizen* and the *Beeld* — began to give some coverage around the same time.

The campaign has won support across a broad section of the community, as well as nationally and internationally. The main demands of the campaign have been that the state must:

* drop all charges against Philemon Mauku and others on trial for organising community self-defence;
* immediately release and indemnify all those presently being held for organising self-defence;
* issue firearm licences to all members of genuine community defence units.

The Philemon Mauku Defence Campaign has raised about R11,500 and collected over 5,000 signatures, mainly in Alexandra. The trial continues on 25 May. ■

— *Own Correspondent*

PAC gains ground in Transkei

THE PAC'S revolutionary greeting 'Izwelethu - i Afrika' is being heard more loudly in the Transkei, an ANC stronghold. The PAC has been able to exploit growing frustration with De Klerk's 'one step forward, three steps backwards' strategy in Codesa, say local observers.

According to PAC regional secretary Zingisa Mkabile, at the time of the organisation's national conference at the University of Transkei in April, it had 32 branches in the region, as well as 'interim structures'.

The PAC also has a 'very powerful' students' organisation, Paso, which has units and branches in all teacher training colleges and high schools, and 'absolute

PIC: *THE STAR*

In some areas, people disillusioned with Codesa are turning to the PAC

control' of the historic Clarkebury Institution in Engcobo, and Arthur Tsengiwe in Cala. In other institutions students are split between Paso and the ANC-aligned Sasco.

There is also a strong PAC presence at the University of Transkei. This, says Mkabile, is because many lecturers at Unitra are PAC returnees. Among them is Sipho Tshabalala, the organisation's secretary for economic affairs.

According to Mkabile, membership is also high in the rural areas. He attributes this to the organisation's activists and Radio Transkei, which runs educational programmes of the PAC.

There is, however, a dispute raging between the Transkei Broadcasting Corporation and the PAC. Employees of the TBC have alleged that they have been physically harassed by the PAC, while the PAC has accused the TBC of bias in favour of the ANC. The TBC's offices were occupied by PAC members in May, in protest against this alleged bias.

Transkei leader Bantu Holomisa told *WIP* that his government supported the goals of the PAC, ANC and Azapo, and did not give preferential treatment to any one over the others. 'Both the PAC and ANC are aware of our concern to promote the unity among all forces of change', he said.

Meanwhile, PAC president Clarence Makwhetu, on his return from an OAU meeting on Southern Africa recently, reaffirmed the need for a neutral convener and a neutral venue in political negotiations with the De Klerk government. This, he said, is necessary because the regime is 'untrustworthy', and is directly involved in the violence.

Recent events, including the government's slippery performance in Codesa and mounting government scandals, have moved the ANC to accept the need for the international community to be involved in the transition process. ■

— *Mbulelo Mdledle*

ANC policy conference promises to be a stormy affair

ANC BRANCHES have expressed concern at the late notice they have been given to discuss policy, and mandate delegates, for the crucial national policy conference at the end of May. There is a strong feeling amongst activists that policy should come from below, and not be decided by experts only.

But while few disagree that ordinary members ought to be involved in policy formation, there is no agreement on who is to blame for that not happening. The national office claims that many policy drafts — including on the economy, land, constitution — were available since the December 1990 conference, and since the July 1991 conference branches were aware that a policy conference was due. The regions and branches should therefore have taken the initiative and held regular policy forums over the past year.

Others blame regional leaders for not keeping branches informed on a regular basis. 'Delegates are sent from branches to regional and national forums, and we took it for granted that they were reporting back to their branches. Unfortunately, we have found that this has not always been so', complained one national official.

PWV conference

Despite the lack of discussion at branch level, regional policy conferences were held, in preparation for the national conference. At the PWV conference, the ANC's draft policy guidelines were put under scrutiny, and severely criticised on a number of counts. Numerous amendments were proposed on a range of areas, including the constitution, economy, land, and health and social welfare.

While consensus was reached on most issues, the PWV region could not agree on, amongst other things, whether there should be a second legislative house (senate), which would ensure regional representation, and which would act as a safeguard against abuses of power, in particular attempts to change the constitution.

There was also a deep divide over whether an ANC government should legalise abortion. Most men at the conference argued that abortion was 'murder', while most women felt that they had the right to choose whether to have an abortion or not. The matter was referred back to branches.

Despite disagreements, the PWV region were united in their concern to see that ANC policy reflects the democratic aspirations of its members. This

feeling permeated discussion in all the commissions.

For example, there was a unanimous view that an electoral system should ensure that those elected to parliament are accountable to those who elected them. The simple list system of proportional representation, while it ensures a fair distribution of seats according to the number of votes each party gets, does not allow for direct accountability to any specific constituency, as in the Westminster or winner-takes-all system. It was proposed that there be a mix of the two systems.

Despite the lack of branch participation in policy formation, the interests of ordinary people were put to the fore. The ANC, at the same time, is under enormous pressure to ensure that, in the interests of 'reconciliation', existing (white) privileges are not tampered with too much. These two sets of interests cannot always be combined harmoniously.

Whatever takes place, the national conference promises to be a stormy affair. ■

— Devan Pillay

STAFF CHANGES

SARS welcomes Hein Marais onto our editorial team. Hein was the editor of *New Era* until the merger with *WIP*, and now heads our Cape Town office.

Glenda Daniels leaves SARS this month, and we wish her well in her future career.

CORRECTION

In *WIP* 81, Mzwanele Mayekiso was mistakenly identified as a member of the Alexandra Civic Association, instead of the Alexandra Civic *Organisation*.

WIP is an independent publication oriented towards stimulating debate and discussion around the political and socio-economic future of South Africa. As such the views expressed in individual articles do not necessarily correspond with those of ***WIP***'s editor and advisory board.

A BEAUTIFUL young girl, who should be wearing a school uniform rather than a sequinned dress, walks into a hotel and heads for the bar.

She orders a soft drink and sits alone, sipping her drink slowly. At some point a man will come up and offer to buy her another.

Mita Sesa (16) is a 'freelancer', the local euphemism for prostitute. Like 69% of women in Malawi, Mita is illiterate. Freelancing is the only way she can earn a living.

According to official statistics, of the 31% of six-year-old girls who are enrolled in schools here every year, only 15% finish lower primary. By the final higher primary year (Standard 8), girls represent only 25% of the total student population.

This makes the drop-out rate one of the contributing factors to the high female illiteracy rate nationwide. Of men, 48% throughout the country are illiterate.

MALAWI

Staying alive as whores and dancing mamas

Young women freelancers are as depressing and stereotypical a feature of Malawi as the women who popularise

Banda — donors have suspended aid

Life President Hastings Kamuzu Banda's regime. It would be difficult to say which is more oppressive: being forced to rent out one's nubile body in order to stay alive, or having to wear the image of an unpopular tyrant across one's maternal breasts and buttocks in order to keep in with the party.

The dancing women are a common sight at Kamuzu International Airport in Lilongwe whenever Banda travels or meets a state guest. Large numbers of women, wearing chitenges (cloths) bearing Banda's portrait, turn out to dance and ululate enthusiastically.

During the recent riots in Malawi the chitenges played a symbolic role, as protestors challenging the Banda regime stripped women of them.

Banda's tyrannical rule, long supported by the West, looks like finally coming to an end — to be replaced, hopefully, by a democracy that will give women a better chance in life. — *(AIA)*

SWAZILAND

Opposition demands free political activity

THE MUZZLED voices of Swazi opposition parties are gradually becoming stronger, as they call upon King Mswati III to free the democratic process by removing the powerful King's Order-in-Council decree of 12 April 1973.

The 19-year-old decree declared by the then King Sobhuza II, repealed the independence constitution, banned all party politics, and allowed sweeping powers for the monarch and a few individual advisors serving as the King's Council (Liqoqo).

The leader of the oldest and unofficial opposition party, the Ngwane National Liberation Congress (NNLC), Dr Ambrose Zwane, says: 'Underground political parties in Swaziland are like parties in exile. The king needs to come out to the open and invite them to participate fully in the country's democratic process.'

Similar calls have been made publicly at meetings and in the media by leaders of the People's United Democratic Movement (Pudemo) and the Swaziland Youth Congress (Swayoco).

Pudemo secretary-general Dominic Mngomezulu says there are reasons why democratic forces inside Swaziland have waited 19 years to demand political freedom. Those who opposed the repeal of parliament, he says, could not publicly condemn King Sobhuza because they supported his stand against the Pretoria government.

In addition, he says, the king's charismatic leadership and a stable economic climate were enough to keep all dissenting voices contained.

Problems seem to have come to a head following the king's death, and the rise to power of autocratic governments before Mswati's installation in 1987, culminating in the present economic crisis.

Mngomezulu asks why the king and government are failing to lift the state of emergency. He says Pudemo and other progressive forces are calling for pressure groups, organised labour and the church to form a national forum or convention to decide the future of Swaziland — *Nonceba Levine (AIA)*

ZIMBABWE

Jobs threatened

AS ZIMBABWE'S crucial mining sector braces for water shortages and power cuts in the wake of the deepening drought, unionised mineworkers express fears of severe labour cutbacks and the introduction of reduced working days throughout the industry.

The Associated Mineworkers of Zimbabwe, which has a paid-up membership of 33,000 in an industry employing nearly 59,000, is anticipating a tough negotiating stand by mining houses in an upcoming round of collective bargaining.

In an 8 May letter from the Chamber of Mines to the union, the employers' association served notice that it would apply for mineworker concessions on flexible working hours, as a means of 'saving jobs and protecting companies'.

But Mineworker president Jeff Mutandare is concerned that any concessions could be used as a blanket excuse by mining houses to further control labour, in violation of the industry's standing collective agreement. — *Richard Saunders (AIA)*

The world of Babes Mabida







What is De Klerk up to?

Fresh from the deadlocked Codesa 2, the SACP's ***JEREMY CRONIN*** *argues that the government has a single zig-zag strategy to prolong its stay in power, and frustrate democracy*

ALL THE SIGNS are there. Since the whites-only referendum the regime has definitely launched itself on a zag. The latest evidence for this, as I write just a few hours after its ending, is Codesa 2.

The first day of Codesa 2 saw the progressive forces seize the upper hand, with, as Chris Hani put it in his plenary speech 'the blame for the deadlock' being 'laid firmly at the door of the principal deadlocker — the South African government'. But this firm stand was somehow allowed to dissipate on the second day.

After a fine opening speech by Mandela, the second day droned on, with a few brief exceptions. There were all the ritualistic incantations about 'the spirit of Codesa', about us all being 'part of one large family', about our 'duty to our grandchildren's children' and our 'tryst with destiny' (whatever that means). There were the endless incantations about 'hope from despair', until it became impossible to tell where the political interventions ended and the prayers began.

All of this psycho-babble served De Klerk very well. The balm of 'hope' repeated a thousand times, and the appeal to 'great leaders' and the 'need for vision' nearly made the deadlock fade away.

The regime had come to Codesa wanting to slow down the progress of negotiations. But they could not afford to be seen doing this too blatantly. I think, at least partly on the second day, we allowed them to slip off the hook. They came close to getting what they wanted — prolongation without pain.

But if we allowed the regime to escape some of the public punishment it deserved at Codesa 2, the broader truth is that the regime has been strategically outmanoeuvred within the wider negotiation process. This is a point I will return to in a moment. But first the present deadlock.

The deadlock

In much of the media commentary on Codesa 2 attention has now focused on technicalities. Should there be a two-thirds, a 70% or 75% majority for passing the constitution in the constituent assembly? What powers over constitution-making, if any, should an upper house enjoy?

But important as these questions are, the focus upon them misses the point. If these had not been the issues of deadlock, the regime would have found others. The truth is the government came to Codesa seeking deadlock and delay.

In Working Group 3, where I have been a delegate, the regime caucused its allies some three weeks ago. Some of them leaked this to us. They were told by the regime that De Klerk needed a 6 months delay.

There are a number of reasons for this. The first is that De Klerk feels he needs more time to run a National Party election campaign in the black areas. He cannot afford to lose his private army, the one at SABC headquarters at Auckland Park, quite yet.

Double agenda?

Joe Slovo was one of the first, back in 1990, to warn that De Klerk had a sinister double agenda. Slovo has lately modified his view:

'If you look at the government's constitutional proposals presented to Codesa, you will see that there is no hidden agenda. The government quite simply and unabashedly wants to frustrate democracy, and it wants to cling on to an inordinate share of power, regardless of how South African voters may feel in any future non-racial election.'

It's exactly for this reason that comrade Joe is impatient with those who practice, in his words, 'Sunday newspaper analyses' of the situation. These are 'analyses' that seek to uncover hawks and doves on the other side, and which pin hopes and strategies on doing everything, from our side, to strengthen their doves.

I think comrade Joe is fundamentally right. But then again, the regime does seem to zig-zag. There do seem to be personalities on the other side who are rather more proponents of either the zigs or the zags.

What are we to make of all of this?

In a recent Centre for Policy Studies paper ('The Shapers of Things to Come? National Party choices in the South African Transition') Steven Friedman offers some interesting reference points. His paper is based on interviews with key (but unnamed) National Party decision-makers.

Friedman's basic proposition is that the NP 'knows it cannot win a non-racial election, and so its hopes rest on a power-sharing arrangement with the "liberation" movements. But it also wants maximum influence in a joint government and believes it can achieve this only if it wins significant black voter support. This means that it must compete with "liberation" opponents at the same time as it seeks to share decisions with them.'

Zig-zag strategy

In short, the NP has a *single* strategy, but with potentially conflicting dimensions. It seeks to woo the ANC into co-responsibility, into accepting the advantages of negotiations for power-sharing; but at the same time, partly in order to achieve the former objective, and especially to achieve it on its own terms, the NP constantly seeks to weaken, divide and compete with the ANC.

To assert that there is a single strategy is not to deny that there are also divisions on the other side. Obviously, we need to understand personality differences, such as they are, and exploit them to our advantage if possible. But even more importantly, we need to grasp that both the ziggers and the zaggers are part of a single, anti-democratic agenda designed to forestall, forever if possible, majority rule in our country.

As for the present, everything points to the regime emphasising the second (the weakening, dividing and competing) wing of its agenda. There has, for instance, been another horrific surge in violence, which fundamentally destabilises the ANC-led alliance, and favours the regime and its friends. There is the NP's venture into Mitchells Plain. There is FW's summit (the first since Inkathagate) with Buthelezi. And, above all, there is the regime's deliberate deadlock at Codesa.



PIC: ABDUL SHARIFF

Hani: government is to blame for deadlock

One site of struggle

As I have said, this deadlock is partly because De Klerk wants time to try to run an election campaign into the black areas. But there is a second reason for the Codesa deadlock.

Now I am not one of those desperately in love with Codesa. Men on pharmacy motor-bikes are productive workers. They deliver. Waiters and waitresses deliver. Mid-wives deliver. I am not sure if Codesa is remotely as useful as these professions.

Those who are passively waiting for Codesa to deliver, or who reject it 'because it can't deliver', are missing the point. Codesa is one among several sites of struggle. It is the combination of effects of many different struggles that will either result in democratisation of our country, or a reversal.

To win the initiative from the regime at Codesa is, therefore, not to defeat it overall. But nor is success at Codesa simply irrelevant.

It is my view that the regime has not been able to use Codesa in the way that it had hoped. Yet, on the face of it, this is strange. The PAC and other critics of Codesa are certainly not wrong when they say it is unrepresentative in character. Every delegation is of equal size regardless of real support. Sixteen of the 19 delegations are either tricameral participants or the products of the bantustan system. Yet the regime has shown itself to be relatively inept on a terrain that could have been so favourable for them.

Again, why?

I think there are several explanations. Going into Codesa we knew we were up against an opponent seasoned in negotiations. The regime had certainly shown tactical cunning and expertise in its earlier bilateral negotiations with the ANC (the Groote Schuur, Pretoria and DF Malan meetings). These bilaterals were similar to the kind of diplomatic brokering of which Pretoria already had considerable experience, amongst other things, from the Namibian and Angolan settlement.

But Codesa is rather different. It has public plenary sessions. With so many delegations, even in its closed working group meetings, it functions more like a parliament (a hung parliament), than like tight diplomatic wheeling and dealing.

Success at Codesa means constant broad front work with allies, potential allies and the downright wavering.

Negotiating styles

Related to this is the question of negotiating styles. The power that the ANC and its allies bring to Codesa is mass support plus the general justness and democratic character of our proposals. The power that the regime brings to the table is state (undemocratic state) power. These two very different kinds of power impact directly on negotiating styles.

The ANC and its allies have to negotiate more or less



PIC: ABDUL SHARIF

ANC (left) and government (right) at Codesa 2

transparently. We have to try to take our constituency with us every step of the way. (Whether we are being entirely successful in this is open to question). But this is both the key to success for us, and the key pressure that operates upon us.

We cannot negotiate with hidden cards up our sleeves. We cannot suddenly and abruptly change tack from one day to the next. Of course, there are matters of detail on which we may have to be flexible.

But we cannot and should not be flexible on the overall scenario. This means that we are unlikely to catch our opponents by surprise. By contrast, the regime is able to negotiate with relative cynicism. It can feint in one direction, only to change direction the next day.

Now that looks like an advantage, and in tight, elite diplomatic bargaining this poker card-game style would certainly have the edge.

But in the multi-party context of Codesa this style is completely inappropriate. In a situation which is all about winning friends and making allies, the poker game style simply confuses your own allies, let alone a broader constituency out there.

Consider lunch-times on days when all five working groups were meeting out at the (pompously named) World Trade Centre. On a busy day there were some 380 delegates and advisers. It was self-serve and then you sat yourself down as you pleased at any one of 40 odd tables.

Remarkably, you would hardly ever see NP and SA government delegates and advisers sitting with anyone but themselves. This was in stark contrast to virtually everyone else.

The example is anecdotal, but it illustrates my point. The regime is highly uncomfortable in the hurly-burly, give and take world of Codesa. Its own immediate allies are deeply suspicious of its zig tendencies. They are constantly fearful that they will be outflanked by what they imagine are regular bilateral contacts between the regime and the ANC.

The regime's natural allies are also highly resentful and extremely sensitive about their own origins in various puppet, third-class structures.

For a number of reasons, then, the ANC and its allies at Codesa have, in my view, emerged as politically dominant (I mean within Codesa, within this specific site of struggle). Notwithstanding the second day of Codesa 2, the fundamental reality is that it is the ANC-led alliance's negotiations scenario which has become absolutely hegemonic in the process. As late as last year the regime, Inkatha and others were rejecting outright any thought of an interim government or an elected constitution making body.

Now the Codesa consensus scenario is the two-stage transition process first publicised in the Harare Declaration, and since elaborated by the ANC-alliance. The regime and others have been forced to accept this framework. Their own scenarios have been swept off the table. But it is one thing to accept a framework, and another to accept its implications and its implementation.

The hoop is in place.

Whether, and when, De Klerk jumps through it is not particularly a function of Codesa processes. In fact, what is required now more than anything is all-round pressure on the regime, on both its ziggers and its zaggers. ■

Beyond the 'Plain - the ANC takes stock

FW de Klerk's recent visit to Cape Town's 'coloured' township, Mitchell's Plain, may have injected new life into the ANC locally. ***HEIN MARAIS*** *reports.*

MOST SCORECARDS SHOWED a draw. De Klerk stormed into Mitchell's Plain, ducked a hail of gravel and one angry beer bottle ('Is that a Lion or a Castle?' asked a nonplussed reporter as it sailed towards the President's gleaming dome), and called it quits — and 'a victory'.

The ANC countered with a full-throated protest that silenced De Klerk in mid-sentence and drove him off to the more tranquil pastures of Tuynhuis.

The task now is to tally the lessons of the Mitchell's Plain blitz — the National Party's first shot at rounding up the hearts and minds of an oppressed community.

PIC: ERIC MILLER (SOUTHLIGHT)

De Klerk's visit has spurred a sobering assessment of 'where the movement is at'

Foxy tactician

The stopover erased the NP's old image of toe-stubbing, veldskoen politics. On view was a foxy tactician and a party apparatus that's getting the knack of politics as spectacle or, if you like, theatre.

South Africa's first modern election campaign began with the March referendum. And De Klerk rode the wave of media (and public) sympathies generated there all the way into Mitchell's Plain town centre. The populist trappings of the event (a marquee tent pitched on an open field, the balloons, buttons and embraces) and De Klerk's 'humble', forced retreat belonged to a homely melodrama, staged for an audience way beyond Mitchells' Plain residents.

'He was trying to do a Ventersdorp,' says ANC-Western Cape leader Ebrahim Rassool. The aim was not to engage the coloured community, but to score points: 'I think he could have spoken, but chose not to. In Ventersdorp he emerged with enormous public sympathy and he was doing the same thing here.'

The establishment media — still dippy after the referendum triumph — did its bit by piping out the 'oohs' and 'aahs'. At this level, the real meaning of the event lay not in the reality of that bustling tent, but in the perceptions it produced elsewhere.

Mitchell's Plain reminds one that a feature of the ANC-NP contest is the increasing importance of applying particular angles and spins to reality. Whether you call it 'inventing reality' or plain stunt politics, De Klerk's team is by far the classier in this department.

Grassroots realities

Out in the field, though, it is not just a matter of smoke and mirrors. De Klerk's visit has spurred a sobering assessment of 'where the movement is at'.

Constitutional and transitional models or demands, packed with jargon and shifting nuances, tend not to ignite the hearts of most humans. Yet these have been the centre-points of ANC campaigns over the past 18 months. There is a drone of discontent about the virtually impenetrable character of the national political debate.

Something of a rupture appears to have occurred between the national level and the communities of current and potential supporters. 'Because we've been wrapped up in prosecuting the negotiations process and in reorganising ourselves,' says Rassool, 'we've lost — hopefully not irretrievably — the art of connecting national political demands grassroots realities.'

'It's at the grassroots level that we must be linking up the issues that affect people's lives with what's going on na-

tionally,' says veteran Cape Flats activist Wilfred Rhodes, one of the founders of the Cape Areas Housing Action Committee (Cahac).

The national debate, he says, 'is a bit beyond the ordinary person's grasp, but there must be effective communication with the community again — we're not stupid, we will make the connections.'

'Coloured problem'

The fault lines sprung into view at Mitchell's Plain. Some ANC activists claimed that a fraction of the 7,000-odd residents milling about the roadshow were NP supporters. Politically, much of the crowd might have been of no fixed abode, but this, of course, also meant they are not automatic ANC votes. 'It's a constituency which traditionally was ours,' admits Rassool, 'but there's nothing natural about it anymore—that's a lesson.'

In some circles, this is being referred to as the 'Coloured Problem'—shorthand for a view that Western Cape coloured communities retain a deep-rooted conservatism. The implication is that coloured people are easy pickings for a beguiling NP election campaign.

The phrase is coming under fire—and not only because it folds a complex phenomenon into an apartheid categorisation. It obscures the fissures that run within the coloured community (urban/rural, youth/'adult', settled/transient, etc.) and across it (like class).

'ANC lacks attractive policies'

It also deflects the possibility that a lukewarm attitude towards the ANC is not restricted to coloureds. 'It's an unfair portrayal,' argues Nomonde Ngumane.

An ANC member and former trade union organiser, she sights a deeper — and wider — predicament: 'If you look around you'll see that the problem is not simply that coloureds are not joining, but that generally there's not a massive growth in membership.'

So, what is the problem? 'In trade unions, offers Ngumane, 'people join because they want X, Y and Z.' But the ANC lacks clear, attractive policies. 'We have to sell ourselves as the solution to the problems people experience.'

'We're no longer seen as people fighting for basic things,' says Rassool, referring to perceptions of the ANC in coloured communities. 'We've been pitching the debate at a theoretical level, but what we should be doing is showing clearly that when the NP says it doesn't want redistribution, it's saying it doesn't want to address homelessness, unemployment and the need for equal social services.'

It does not take a trained eye to notice that Mitchell's Plain, like all coloured townships, is still knee-deep in the muck of apartheid.

Its 550,000 residents have no general hospital (but a psychiatric one!), 15 high schools with high pupil-teacher ratios (and only two have a hall), the highest crime rate in the Cape Peninsula, and an unemployment rate hovering (according to Nicro director, Norman Jantjes) around the 20% mark. Apart from three discos and two cinemas, there are no night-time recreational facilities for the youth, and gangsterism is rampant.

Yet, one of the topsy-turvy ironies is that Mitchell's Plain NP supporters swoon over De Klerk as the giver of all things good. As elections approach, De Klerk is sure to trade on that perception.

Awkward position

The ANC, meanwhile, finds itself in an awkward position, says Rassool. 'We're not in the position to deliver services and houses and pensions, because we're outside the realm of power, but people are beginning to weigh the ANC and NP in terms of who can deliver'. On the day of the NP circus, the line 'De Klerk gave us houses!' bounced about persistently — and it did not wilt when challenged in those later debates and arguments.

The trick lies in mobilising around the demand for socio-economic reforms on the ground and reconnecting the national debate to local concerns. 'We should be marching, demanding a hospital in Mitchell's Plain,' urges Rassool. 'De Klerk must be seen as the person who is forced to dispense at our behest.'

It is not going to be easy sailing. Mitchell's Plain used to be in the forefront of political struggle in the Peninsula, with students in a spearheading role. Rassool reminds that 'at certain moments we were able to galvanise general solidarity, but we can't assume it was permanent.' Many of the structures which rose during the 1980s have indeed shrunken dramatically. Some have become moribund.

Historian Colin Bundy has commented before on the difficulty of student- or youth-led movements 'to sustain continuity of action, organisation and ideology', and Mitchell's Plain seems to confirm the point.

'A lot of the youngsters have become gangsters, but the political organisations are ignoring them,' complains Nicro's Jantjes. 'We're losing a lot of potential leaders — they're still leaders, but leaders of gangs maybe, and that's a pity.'

Regaining lost ground

The vacuum produced by such developments has opened a space in which affinities are being reshaped and some morbid leftovers of apartheid are uncoiling. On the day of De Klerk's visit, virulent racism tumbled from the tongues of coloured NP supporters, betraying a deep fear of majority rule within sections of the community.

Part of its origins can be traced to the coloured labour preference policies applied during the apartheid era. An antidote is yet to be found.

At the moment, it is anybody's guess how quickly the lost ground can be recovered. Rhodes admits there is cause for 'a little panic', but adds: 'If we revitalise our structures we will regain the little we might lose in the first election ... the key is to anchor ourselves in the community'.

One should also distinguish, as Rassool does, between transition and transformation. The latter is a drawn-out process that requires the active participation of various sectors of the community.

'We have to start strengthening the civic movements, welfare structures, the churches and so on,' says Rassool, 'so that they can keep pushing and challenging a future government to deliver the goods.'

Unwittingly, De Klerk seems to have done progressive forces in Mitchell's Plain something of a favour by 'dropping in'. 'I'm quite happy it happened,' chuckles Rassool. 'People are waking up, taking stock, looking at how we move on from here — it's just the kind of injection we needed.' Time will tell how well the patient responds. ■

personally

PIC: ABDUL SHARIFF

Bennie Alexander

General Secretary of the PAC

Your first thought this morning?
What day is it?

The second thing you did this morning?
I woke up.

Who cooks and cleans in your home?
I cook but there is a househelp who does cleaning.

Your favourite meal?
Fish. I prepare it in many different ways.

Tell us your favourite Alexander joke.
They are so many I can't think of one.

Any addictions?
Coffee and tea.

What or who would you die for?
I would die for the struggle.

What do you no longer believe in?
I no longer believe in Christmas and a Eurocentric worldview.

What animal best characterises you and why?
A black panther because it always hides itself and tries to act with precision.

What is the best thing about living in Johannesburg?
I live in Ennerdale (just outside Johannesburg). It's a quiet place, something between a city and a farm.

Your favourite city and why?
Kimberley. Maybe because I grew up there but otherwise because of the people, who are still close to one another in a city environment.

Your biggest regret?
Having been unable to complete my education on a full-time basis.

Your favourite pop artist?
I go for jazz, gospel and anything that is not pop.

One song that gives you goose flesh?
'Messiah' written by Handel.

What physical exercise do you do?
I hardly have time due to my hectic schedule. I watch my diet, anyway.

Complete this sentence: If I were a dictator for a day...
... I would immediately dismiss all the chiefs of the security forces.

Is it difficult being general-secretary of the PAC?
Yes, it is. I work up to 16 hours a day.

Your least favourite politician?
George Bush.

Favourite TV show?
The Cosby show.

What would you change about yourself?
I have come to terms with myself.

What do you miss most about your childhood?
A sense of innocence. And the open veld where I used to play.

What makes you feel secure?
When people around me are happy.

Your biggest fear?
Will the sky fall on my head? No. My biggest fear (more seriously) is that imperialists will succeed in bribing African countries.

Favourite cliche?
'My position is very clear'. I am trying to rid myself of that.

And South African idiom or expression?
'Just now'.

Complete this sentence: I think Madonna is...
... a pretty good imitation of a famous actress, but bad on public morality.

What is the worst job in the world?
To stamp labels on bottles.

A secret desire?
To be fluent in all indigenous languages.

Your happiest moment?
When I left school. Being at an education institution is like being in wedlock. Those outside do everything to get in and those inside do everything to get out.

What do you feel about green issues?
They are very important. It is difficult to give them high priority right now, at this stage of the struggle.

If you were not a political leader, what would you be doing?
I would be an architect or a lawyer.

What do you feel about homosexuality?
It is un-African. It is part of the spin-off of the capitalist system. We should not take the European leftist position on the matter. It should be looked at in its total perspective from our own Afrocentric position.

Who is the apple of your eye?
If I mention 'her' name, I will close my doors in other respects [laughs]. But it definitely is a 'she'.

Your favourite place in Africa?
Victoria Falls in Zimbabwe. Rumour has it angels stop by just to admire the beauty of the scenery.

If hell were a place, where would it be on a South African map?
There is place in the northern Cape called Hotazel and it is very warm. I think it should be renamed 'Hot as hell'.

And if heaven were a place?
Ennerdale.

How did you feel when the West Indies beat South Africa at cricket?
I felt good because that was the old South Africa the West Indies beat. Therefore I feel we were not beaten.

Something that for you sums up SA?
I think a caterpillar. It is no longer what it used to be and not yet what it is supposed to be.

Who do you reveal your secrets to?
My girlfriend. By the way I am not married.

What chore do you dislike most?
Maybe polishing my shoes.

Should employers be allowed to have workers tested for Aids?
No. Unless workers are allowed to have employers tested for Aids.

When was the last time you used public transport?
Other than aeroplane, three months ago.

What makes you feel guilty?
Under-achievement.

And accomplished?
When my desk is clear.

Complete: At the end of the day, I...
But there follows another day...

Do you smoke?
No. And I am afraid if I smoke in bed, the ashes that fall on the ground might be my own.

Should there be censorship in a democratic SA?
Anything that goes against public morality and values should be censored.

What do you think of WIP?
I think it is a good, easy reading and educational journal. And we need more journals of that nature.

A music instrument you'd most want to play?
Piano.

The person you most want to meet?
The honourable minister Louis Farakhan, a successor to Malcolm X.

Why?
Because he was able to give to diaspora African people a sense of cultural identity, and in this way completed the work of Malcolm X. And his communication style — it is just fantastic listening to his speeches.

Who should answer this questionnaire next?
Mohammed Valli Moosa. ■

Mosito Raphela asked the questions.

What happened in the ANC camps?

***HEIN MARAIS** takes a look at a darker side of ANC history — allegations of gross abuses of power by ANC security in exile — and asks whether it represents an aberration, or a deeper authoritarian tradition that may resurface again.*

THE INSTRUCTION TO 'forgive and forget' has become one of the more familiar incantations of our 'new' South Africa. One hears it issued not only by erstwhile supporters of the carnage we have collapsed into the word 'apartheid', but even by sections of the oppressed — as conversations at De Klerk's recent Mitchell's Plain blitz reminded.

Ironically, there is also a temptation to consign episodes of ANC history to the slagheap of bygones. And understandably: allegations of beatings, torture and killings meted out in ANC camps and detention centres sit uneasily beside a history that pivots on a commitment to democracy and human rights.

The tension between what may be called the 'underground' and 'official' histories of the ANC in exile sparks troubling speculation and misgivings. From among the left it has drawn warnings that a current of authoritarianism which allegedly swept through the organisation in exile has not yet spent itself — and that it might resurge if an ANC government finds itself besieged by instability, discontent and an inability to deliver on its promises. British Marxist Hillel Ticktin expressed this fear cogently at last year's Marxism conference in Cape Town when he wondered aloud whether 'three years from today such a gathering will be possible'.

ANC admits torture

The fount of such fears is a period which may be dubbed the 'camps chapter' of ANC history. It stretched (in calendar terms) from 1979 (when Quatro prison camp was built and the security apparatus beefed up) to late 1988 (when the Angolan camps were closed) and was characterised by what Chris Hani calls a climate of 'paranoia and hysteria'.

Shortly after a British newspaper in April 1990 published allegations that the ANC security apparatus had tortured and killed dissidents, ANC president Nelson Mandela admitted: 'Unfortunately, it is true that some of these people who complained were in fact tortured.'

A month later Albie Sachs told students in Pretoria: 'We did do bad things then. We beat up people.' Other confessions are still surfacing periodically, coinciding with recollections and allegations by former detainees who have returned home.

This candour stands in stark contrast to Swapo's damaging decision to flatly deny a hand in atrocities which, by all accounts, far exceeded anything that can be laid at the ANC's door.

The statements, however, have remained cryptic and ambiguous. In an overlooked passage of his opening address at last year's national conference in Durban, Oliver Tambo summed up the camps episode. 'In 1984 enemy agents managed to start a mutiny in our camps,' he told delegates. 'We could not allow the enemy to destabilise us with impunity. We strengthened our Department of Intelligence and Security and sought to contain the dangers posed by infiltration.'



As with South African reality in general, there exists beneath the realm of public discourse, caverns of knowledge and experience that seldom bubble to the surface. The camps episode remains

largely submerged, and the pruned accounts thus far have done little to reconcile official history with the swirl of personal experiences and anecdotes which over the past decade have made the rounds amongst ANC cadres as a kind of 'alternative', oral history.

Thanks to admissions by Mandela, Sachs, Joe Slovo and Joe Nhlanhla, it is now clear that ANC members were detained without trial by Mbokodo, the ANC's security department, and tortured. ('Sometimes we used the word 'torture',' Sachs told UCT students in 1990, 'other times we used the term 'intensive interrogation'.') Chris Hani (see interview) now admits that, in a frenzy of 'overall suspicion ... the innocent and the guilty were sometimes lumped together'.

It does not take a cynic to note that one is hard-pressed to name a liberation movement or state which, when pressured or embattled, has not succumbed at some point to similar practices. But, as a last word on the matter, such an observation ranks with the tiresome announcement that 'politics is dirty'. The issues at stake are too grave to deserve flippancies.

Neither is it possible to construct some kind of moral equilibrium between the ANC and the apartheid state. The scale and ferocity of apartheid's outrages prevent a curse on both houses.

Ellis and 'Sechaba'

The most detailed public account of the camps chapter to date appears in Stephen Ellis and Tsepo Sechaba's *Comrades Against Apartheid*, described by historian Tom Lodge as a 'cracking yarn' that 'contains a great deal of information which we didn't have before'. The SACP's Jeremy Cronin (in *WIP* 81) has acknowledged the book's 'rich factual information', but slams it for squandering 'an otherwise fascinating story on a conspiracy theory'.

Ellis, former editor of *Africa Confidential* newsletter, is not well-loved by sections of the ANC and SACP and is shadowed by gossip that he is linked to British intelligence — which he denies. Central to the book's argument is the SACP-Hijacks-ANC theme, which has drawn flak from historians and political actors.

Assessing the book's stock of facts, however, Lodge cautions that it relays largely one set of perceptions, but says that 'broadly speaking ... the story is right as far as it goes'.

In the two chapters devoted to the ANC camps, *Comrades* relies, but also substantially expands, on a personal account by five former mutineers (Ketelo and others), published in the British-based Marxist journal *Searchlight South Africa* (vol 2, no 1). The source of Ellis's elaborations is 'Tsepo Sechaba', the pseudonym of a well-placed ANC and SACP official (who is apparently known to SACP leaders).

Spy scare

When Albie Sachs confided in Pretoria University students two years ago, he set the abuses of the ANC security apparatus, Mbokodo, in this wider context: 'People were being sent to kill us ... It was said at the time that we were paranoid ... We were anxious and untrained and did not know how to respond.'

By all accounts, the spy-scare of 1981 knocked the ANC, and especially MK, for a loop. By accident, in March of that year, ANC intelligence stumbled across 'Piper', a leading official and SACP member, who confessed under interrogation that two major spy rings were operating within the organisation. One had the task of penetrating MK, the other had targeted the NEC. 'Piper', who studied at the Lenin School in Moscow, had been elected to the internal committee of SACTU and had NEC membership within his sights.

The names dropped by 'Piper' shocked ANC security. They included the commander of MK's Quibaxe camp in Angola (Kenneth Mahamba), the head of MK security in Angola, and a rising young star working with MK security in Maputo — all of whom, says the ANC, admitted to being spies. The spy ring had infiltrated every stage of MK fighters' passage from Angola to SA.

Inside SA, local MK networks were deeply concerned about the state security's high kill- and capture-rate of guerrillas and the possibility that the infiltration was occurring at their end.

Faced by severe state repression, they lacked, however, the means to track possible points of infiltration. The resources for that task lay outside the country.

Paranoia and panic

It was under the ensuing cloud of paranoia and panic that Mbokodo sprang into action and began dredging the ranks for spies and infiltrators. 'The camps,' according to Ketelo, 'were literally run by the security personnel,' who appear to have operated closely with the political commissars under the command of Andrew Masondo, the national commissar in Angola. The search for infiltrators cut a wide swathe. Mbokodo acted as a law unto itself, particularly when it was entrusted (in April 1981) to also enforce basic 'codes of discipline'. There are claims that cadres complaining about the food in camps were interrogated, that dagga-smokers were tied to trees for weeks and grilled about their political opinions, and that criticism of organisational and strategic matters bought many cadres tickets to detention centres in Angola, Zambia and Mozambique. Former inmates have recounted harrowing experiences of torture and killings.

Samson Selepe

Pallo Jordan: detained by Mbokodo

'The discovery of the spy network,' writes Ellis and Sechaba, 'provoked a suspicion so general as to cast doubt on the loyalty of any ANC soldier, notably those who publicly called for an ANC conference to discuss questions of strategy and to air a range of grievances in the camps.'

That the ANC had been thoroughly infiltrated is beyond doubt. But did the Mbokodo dragnet gather only spies and agents provocateurs?

In June 1983, Pallo Jordan was detained for six weeks after criticising the security apparatus in a private conversation (see Hani interview). It is conceivable that many other innocent members

How is it that the abuses proceeded apparently unchecked (barring periodic interventions by individuals) until 1988, according to Pallo Jordan, when there was a shake-up in the security apparatus?

Hani now says that he raised the issue of detention without trial repeatedly at NEC level, suggesting that the leadership was at least partially aware of the abuses being committed by Mbokodo.

The appointment of the Stuart Commission indicated, at the very least, some ambivalence about the motives of the mutineers and the activities of Mbokodo. Some of its recommendations were apparently covertly introduced by the NEC.

Samson Selepe



Albie Sachs — his findings are still under wraps

Yet, when the Kabwe conference was finally held in 1985, neither the mutiny or the activities of the security service were discussed — for 'lack of time', according to Hani. Despite sustained criticism of some leaders by rank-and-file, notes Lodge, 'an entire leadership gets re-elected' — not a single one of them 'from outside the list of suggestions drawn up' by the president, according to Ellis.

In the mid-eighties a human rights code was drafted, but 'there are repetitions that one can trace of undemocratic and repressive behaviour by the security', reminds Lodge. As late as 1989, Thami Zulu, head of the ANC's Natal military command was held for eighteen months on suspicion of spying; he died, apparently of poisoning, two days after his release. The findings of an inquiry headed by Albie Sachs have not been made public.

More than aberrations?

Some critics view these episodes not as aberrations, but as an extreme expression of a robust authoritarian tradition that may revive somewhere in the future. Is that conclusion a-historical?

It is worth noting some subsequent developments. Upon their release, some leading mutineers were elected by rank-and-file to ANC structures in Tanzania. There were attempts to foil these expressions. But, says Lodge, 'it suggests that there were areas of intense repression and brutality, and there was a culture that permitted that. But there were also areas where things were fairly open, which suggests a movement that was beginning to change'.

Has an indelible imprint been left on the ANC, now that it has meshed with the more democratic tradition fostered by the internal movements? The answer appears to be 'Yes'.

Yet, a feature of the 'camps chapter' is that it occurred within the framework of popular legitimacy constructed by the liberation struggle; presumably, the argument that 'the end justified the means' carried some weight during that traumatic period. And, as history suggests, such arguments are resilient, especially in trying times.

The commission of inquiry recently appointed by ANC president, Nelson Mandela, signals a determination to 'come clean' on the issue. Its terms of reference are businesslike and unambiguous, demanding a probe into the 'conditions of detention, allegations of maltreatment, and complaints of loss or destruction of properties' of detainees. There is widespread anticipation that its findings will be made public, though the ANC has not confirmed this.

Exorcising this ghost will be a distressing affair. Still, fingering the wrongdoers is only part of that process. The more exacting challenge lies in examining how and why systematic abuses could occur with virtual impunity for so long. The ANC owes itself and its supporters the answers. ■

The mutinies

Much of the overt drama of the camps' saga occurred in 1984 when MK fighters in Cangandala, Angola, mutinied.

Mid-January: MK cadres rebel, demand to fight inside South Africa and that Oliver Tambo address them and hear their grievances. Tambo declines. Mutiny spreads, up to 90 per cent of the personnel join (Ketelo and others). Mutineers commandeer trucks, depart for Luanda 'to put their demands to the ANC's top brass' (Ellis).

Late-January: Mutineers turn Viana transit base outside Luanda into headquarters. Some ANC members in Luanda join, ranks swell to 900 (Ketelo), elect Committee of Ten, with Zaba Maledza as chairperson. Demands are: suspend security department, investigate their activities and those in Quatro prison near Quibaxe, assess reasons for 'stagnation' of armed struggle, hold 'democratic conference to review development of struggle, draw new strategies and have elections for new NEC' (Ketelo). Joe Modise, Mzwai Piliso and Andrew Masondo — are severely criticised .Early February: Modise refused entry into camp. Angolan Presidential Guard goes in, suffers two casualties. Hani enters unarmed, gives 'one of the finest speeches of his life, persuading the rebels to surrender' (Ellis). Rebellions in nearby Malanje, new mutineers try to reach Viana. Angolan and ANC troops take over Viana, capture mutineers.

Mid-February: ANC sends commission of inquiry, headed by stalwart James Stuart, to investigate. Includes Ruth Mompati, Aziz Pahad and Sizakhele Sigxashe (Ellis). About 30 mutineers taken to maximum security prison in Luanda where Stuart commission visits them; rest go to Pango and Quibaxe camps for 'reorientation'. Mutiny leaders separated from others. 'Mutiny had to be understood as the work of enemy provocateurs ... while others had just been blind followers who had fallen prey to their manipulation' (Ketelo).

Mid-March: Hunger strike by Luanda prisoners to protest beatings and squalid conditions. Eleven (including Maledza) are moved to Quatro prison; 'some survivors remained in Luanda prison until 1988' (Ellis).

Mid-May: Some mutineers in Pango resist 'reorientation', kill several guards, demand release of other mutineers and new conference. Hani and Timothy Mokoena assemble crack unit, attack camp, many casualties. Military tribunal set up, seven mutineers publicly executed (see Hani interview).

Early June: Mutineers kept naked, beaten, at least two die in Pango. Gertrude Shope arrives from Lusaka, orders end to torture and executions (Ketelo). Maledza dies in Quatro, officially suicide.

ran foul of a security service that was answerable only to the Security Directorate in Lusaka, and which operated without any oversight mechanisms and within a climate that not only discouraged, but actively repressed, critical voices. That climate, argues Ellis and Sechaba, 'was used by some in the ANC for blatantly personal and political purposes, and to rid themselves of rivals'.

Culture of intolerance

A rift opened between rank-and-file and leadership, with the administrative and security sector bottling up — viciously, according to *Comrades* and *Searchlight* — genuine grievances and criticisms fermenting in the camps.

What about Albie Sachs's claim that the abuses stemmed from the fact that the security apparatus was 'untrained'? Personnel had undergone training in East Germany and the Soviet Union — learning their trade from apparatuses whose record and methods, as Tom Lodge observes, could hardly be squared with the ANC's commitment to human rights.

By the time disgruntlement amongst MK cadres exploded in the 1984 mutiny, the Mkatashingo (see box), a culture of intolerance had become concretised in the systematic abuses by Mbokodo, operating, if not with a nod from ANC leaders, certainly within an organisational vacuum created by insecurity and adverse conditions.

The Mkatashingo did not spring from the blue. In 1979, MK cadres in Fazenda camp in Angola demanded to be sent into SA to fight the 'boers', rather than languish in the camps. Criticism of leaders accused of corruption and inefficiency circulated openly in MK ranks, as did calls for a democratic conference (the last having been held in 1969 at Morogoro, Tanzania).

In this period the security service was overhauled and restocked with personnel fresh from training courses in East Germany and the Soviet Union. Quatro prison camp was also constructed, its first inmates being three Fazenda cadres who tried to resign from the organisation. According to Ketelo, two of them were selected by the Luthuli and June 16 MK detachments to present to leadership demands for a review of organisational strategy and a conference.

As Lodge notes, the *Comrades* and *Searchlight* accounts are just that: 'accounts'. As such, they have to be verified and tested against other perceptions and versions of a traumatic episode in ANC history. But, for now, they remain the most detailed 'underground' history at our disposal.

Unpleasant questions

At the moral level, the reasons for concern are obvious — as the 'confessional' tone of some leaders' statements confirms.

But a perhaps more important enquiry has to occur at the political level, and it bristles with unpleasant questions.

NP's election trump card

The detainees issue is likely to be one of the trump cards the government will play in an election campaign.

So far, it has held its tongue on the matter — perhaps mindful of the Namibian experience where it bankrolled an effective, 'privatised' propaganda campaign around abuses in Swapo's camps. One tactic was to 'assist' structures with a seemingly bona fide interest in the issue — such as the Detainees' Parents Support Committee.

A similar outfit, the Returned Exile Co-ordinating Committee (Recoc) was formed locally in 1990. It has left a few puzzles in its wake.

The *New Nation*, in a December 1990 report, claimed to unearth a possible link between Recoc and state security services. Letters sent in the name of Recoc to families of former MK cadres were traced to a postbox in Melville, registered under a false name. There has been no follow-up, though, and the 'link' remains a presumption.

In August 1991, 32 former detainees returned, among them Patrick Dhlongwana, who became chairperson of Recoc which set up base in Durban. Dhlongwana and the others were initially holed up in a Springbok hotel for a while, and then made their way to Ulundi, presumably with Inkatha assistance. An official of the ANC's National Intelligence and Security department says Recoc 'is linked with Inkatha', but has declined to back up the claim.

Recoc operates out of the office of Thomas Tshabalala,a member of Inkatha Freedom Party's central committee, in Lindelani outside KwaMashu. According to Kim Hodgson of the Inkatha Institute, there is 'a shared interest' between Recoc and the IFP 'in relation to the release of political prisoners and violations of human rights'. To his knowledge, however, 'there is no working relationship' between the two organisations.

Mandiso Mjo (Dynamic Images)

Recoc spokesperson Rodney Twala

On 8 February, 150 protestors joined a Recoc march in Durban. They called for an independent commission of inquiry and, interestingly, echoed a central negotiations demand of the government: the disbandment of MK.

Also on the bandwagon is a small German-based group, the International Society for Human Rights (ISHR). In March it claimed that 500 people 'were killed or disappeared under the ANC in exile'. The ISHR is a rightwing pressure group drawing financial support from hardliners in the Christian Democratic Party, according to a former ANC official based in Germany, who also alleges links between it and the World Anti-Communist League.

Some former detainees are being drawn into organisations that claim to represent their interests, but seem to be tainted by suspect links and ulterior motives. But, the disconcerting fact remains that abuses did occur.

Hani opens up

PIC: ABDUL SHARIF

Ellis makes the allegation that within the military and security structures of the ANC there developed a culture of 'intolerance' and 'repression'. He ties this to the SACP's role in those structures.

That's sheer, ridiculous anti-communism. Yes there was a culture of intolerance, but those who were critical of that culture were leading Communist Party members: Joe Slovo, Ronnie Kasrils, myself.

A time will come when we shall sit down, when this is all over, and give an account of how people like ourselves were in the forefront of criticising that culture, of pushing forward positions of justice.

It is an open secret that the most vocal critic of detention without trial was Chris Hani. I was a member of the politbureau -- people who challenged the detention of Thami Zulu and others were leading members of the SACP. We discussed it at our own central committee meetings and within our politbureau. And a person like Pallo Jordan (who was arrested by the security department) was actually released because people like Slovo and others intervened.

Up to the time people were released from Quatro I led a campaign at every meeting of the NEC of the ANC, saying that we cannot call upon the regime to release our political prisoners and continue detaining people for long periods without trial. I accept that there was a time when our security actually dealt with detainees in a way I never accepted. I tried to understand how they behaved like that.

This was a period — I'm not condoning it — when our people were targets of assassination in Lesotho, Swaziland and Botswana, when the security branch in our country was sending dozens of agents to poison people, to destabilise our camps, to create a situation where our struggle would be neutralised. There was a need for us — and I will never dispute this — to set up an efficient security system.

But it is important in any movement, in any government, that security forces should be given clear guidelines and they should be accountable to a leadership. They should never use methods that are not acceptable in any democratic country. Communist leaders tried to change a situation where harmful and negative methods were used against those who were suspected of working for the South African regime.

Did the regime's ability to infiltrate the movement create conditions where innocent dissenters could be targeted and drawn in under the same dragnet? Did this happen?

Yes, it happened. This climate, where the regime was destabilising the ANC, killing its leaders, assassinating commanders of MK, created a situation of overall suspicion. In other words, if for instance we had sent people into the country and 60 percent of them were either arrested or killed, sometimes the wrong conclusion would be drawn that those who handled the operations were working for the enemy.

And in my own view, people like Thami Zulu were victims of that situation of paranoia and hysteria about the ability of the regime to send in agents. People began to lose a balanced approach in terms of combatting the infiltration of the ANC by the regime.

And that situation actually caused problems where, in my own view, the innocent and the guilty were sometimes lumped together.

What happen to Pallo Jordan?

Cde Jordan, who apparently has a very big mouth [laughs], had said something derogatory about the security department, about its methods — he had criticised it openly in an impromptu discussion with some other people. And that critical voice reached the ears of the security, and because the security was a law unto itself, Cde Jordan was picked up and detained for a few days.

There was an investigation into such events — particularly into the mutiny — led by James Stuart. It was apparently never filed at the Kabwe conference (in 1985).

Because Kabwe was a critical and crucial conference for the ANC, it was lumbered with lots of items which had to be discussed in the specified time.

When the time came for the security to give a report, it was felt that time was not available, and that time would be made available for that report to be tabled. But that report was never tabled.

Never afterwards?

No. But the report was tabled to the NEC, and some of the recommendations — in all fairness to the Stuart Commission — were actually implemented.

So the report never became 'public' knowledge to the members of the ANC?

No, no. It was never made available to members of the movement. It was made available to members of the NEC. And certainly, there was an improvement in the conditions of detention as well as the accountability of the security department.

You were central to trying to sort out the crisis of the 1984 mutiny. What went through your mind when you went into the camp to negotiate with the mutineers?

I was summoned to come and try to solve a mutinous situation. And you must bear in mind that when the Angolan camps were established I was not in Angola, I was in Lesotho doing internal work. I only proceeded there in 1982-3. So, I never had a role in terms of establishing a foundation for our camps. In other words, I got into a situation where there was already a Quatro. I didn't have the benefit of the background in terms of even the detainees. I began to meet people who where already in detention, and I had to try and update myself about each and everyone of them.

Before the mutiny, I had been given the responsibility of fighting with our comrades against the incursions by Unita which were threatening our very survival. It was becoming very difficult to move even between Luanda and the camps because of ambushes. And it was clear that, if we were to survive as a movement, in terms of retaining our ability to train in Angola, we had to participate in flushing out Unita, especially in areas around our camps. So, I participated in that fight, around the Kwansa river.

That fight led to a situation where we began to suffer casualties. Some elements began to say: Look, we are dying in Angola, why are we here, why are we fighting here and not fighting at home. And that began to stir a feeling amongst our comrades into questioning our very role in fighting Unita, which impacted on some people. There was a mutiny and they refused to take orders. They actually said they were fed up with going back to Luanda. And they took their weapons, took

Former MK chief-of-staff CHRIS HANI, in a remarkably frank interview with Hein Marais, speaks about his role in putting down a mutiny among MK soldiers, on the culture of intolerance in exile, and why all security forces should be kept on a short leash . . .

trucks, and virtually took over our transit camp in Viana, in Luanda.

It was at this point that I was called upon to persuade them to stop. And they refused, and we had to appeal to the Angolans to come, to help us disarm them. They were disarmed. After that, they were sent back to camps of the ANC.

The mutiny did not take place in Viana. It took place months later when we thought the whole thing was over. Now, I was in favour of a dialogue with the mutineers. But I reached the end of my tether when they killed several key commanders in one camp called Bango, and took over the camp. We had no alternative but to go and recapture the camp and assert authority.

The loyalists (if I may use that term) overran the camp. Lives were lost on both sides. Very sad, because these were all members of the ANC, fellow South Africans. And that was the end of my role. I was never a member of the tribunal which tried them. A tribunal was set up by the ANC to try them, and some of them were sentenced to death. And executed — it was a big number, about 18 or 19, I can't remember. I rushed back to Lusaka and said to the leadership: Stop the executions.

Was this done with the knowledge of the NEC?

I think ... those who were on the tribunal were given terms of reference — I don't know what the terms were because I was busy trying to bring about the solution to this problem when the tribunal was set up. I was not part of the tribunal, some other people were brought into the tribunal. I went back to Lusaka and said to leadership: Stop the executions, do anything, sentence them, but don't execute them. The leadership, in all fairness, intervened and stopped the executions, but by that time a few of those comrades had been executed.

I have never in my life been in favour of executions and capital punishment. I'm against capital punishment. So, had I been part of the tribunal, I would have been against the executions. I'm a soldier. I think we must fight, but once you defeat an enemy, I've never believed you must execute them. Do something else, punish them, because they're already defeated, at your mercy, if you like.

Never again in this country should we give (unchecked) powers to the security

I'm not criticising that decision. I'm just coming with my own personal attitude. We had a duty to defend ourselves and recapture the camp, but once it was over it was my view that we should try them, sentence them, but not execute them.

But this, apparently, was not necessarily a widely held view within the security apparatus?

It was an isolated one. My view was a minority view. But when I presented it to the NEC, the leadership intervened and stopped the executions — I must point that out.

If we look ahead: we know what the regime's security apparatus is capable of, what it has done to the opposition. These are people capable of great cruelty, 'good' at their jobs. And we take the experience of the security apparatus of the ANC, the PAC, who have people capable of equal cruelty perhaps, also 'good' at their jobs. Is this the kind of combination that we want to serve a democratic South Africa?

No. I think a new democratic state in this country will have to sit down and draw up a code of conduct of a security force to serve a democratic SA. I'm not convinced that those who served the National Party government in a brutal manner would be the best sort of people to continue the role of serving a democratic country.

Within the ANC, there are certain people — in my own view — who I would oppose as part of a new security force. I have my own experience, I know my own movement, I know their roles and their attitudes, and I would like a situation where a security apparatus is answerable to parliament. I would favour, for instance, a parliamentary committee to oversee the security apparatus.

Never again in this country should we give (unchecked) powers to the security. Because we know, in a number of countries, even the advanced bourgeois countries, how the security can stifle democracy. Those are not the best examples of democracy.Yes, the state should be defended against subversion, etc. But we should never allow a situation with a group of men and women only answerable to an individual minister, for instance. I would never accept trite answers like 'No, no, we are not going to answer in the interests of national security'. We know that sometimes this does happen, including in African countries like Zimbabwe and Mozambique. In Mozambique, the security services degenerated and became feared by citizens.

I'm saying that organs of civil society and parliament should have the right to question the activities of the security. The security must not hide behind the president or the prime minister and refuse to be accountable to parliament and to the public. I'm aware of the fact that elements of the ANC, PAC and government will serve in a new security apparatus, but there must be clear guidelines to avoid the sort of thing that happened to a very small extent in the ANC and a very large extent within the security forces of the regime. ■

PIC: ABDUL SHARIF

The newly-elected head of the National Women's Coalition, ***FRENE GINWALA****, an outspoken champion of women's rights, speaks to GLENDA DANIELS about feminism in South Africa today.*
Dr Ginwala, 60, returned from exile in 1990 after 31 years away from home. An active member of the ANC in exile, she now heads the ANC's research department and is deputy head of the ANC's Emancipatory Commission for Women.

Frene on feminism

What does it mean to be a feminist in South Africa today?

Feminism means a lot of different things to different people. To me, anyone who addresses the structured subordination and oppression of women in society is a feminist. I am a feminist and don't deny it. I don't think it is a bad thing. I am not ashamed of it.

Can your trace your own development?

For many years I didn't do much to address the oppression of women, except in a general way, in the liberation movement. I think that my consciousness didn't go beyond knowing that african women were at the bottom.

It developed with discussions with western feminists, when I was forced into answering questions about why I was in the ANC, when I should be fighting for women's liberation. I had to ask myself: 'Is being in the ANC enough to address the question of women's liberation?'. Then, it was easy to give an answer to the accusative by answering: 'Do you want us to be equal to black men and still be oppressed on the basis of race?'

But I was lucky to be exposed to different debates which took place, especially between 1980-1985, which led to the Nairobi Conference. It was the time of the very rightwing approach by the Reagan administration to women's issues, which were perceived as social and not political issues.

Amongst Third World women it was a major battle because women's issues are political issues. The US tried to keep the issues around Palestine and South Africa off the agenda in the Women's Decade Conference. So we had to fight in Nairobi.

During that period, I got a greater understanding of what the subordination of women meant. There was also a conference on development and women by the Non-Aligned Movement, where I began to see how women were not benefiting, because development for women was seen as setting up cottage industries only!

I then began to do more reading and saw how the IMF and the structural adjustment programmes disempowered women. Those kinds of things developed my understanding further.

Lastly, ANC and Cosatu economic policy outraged me. They said that women

needed to get involved in economic activity. Women have always been involved in the economy. This made me begin to study the economy.

Most important in my development was that the ANC was putting forward advanced political positions on women but these were not being implemented. Certainly they have been raised for serious consideration, but not implemented. We see this now in Codesa.

What is the level of consciousness around feminism in the liberation movement?

A lot of people still see feminism as a dirty word. If you say 'I am a feminist', you get assaulted verbally. The negative feeling is around the word. It seems to be used as a slogan. Organisations like the ANC Women's League have not actually given any education on this, nor have they had any significant campaign about women's liberation. I hope the national commission on women will make an impact. It has a specific focus and does not have to prioritise.

How does the gender struggle articulate with the race and class struggle?

I don't think in South Africa we have come to terms with the interaction of gender, class and race. Internationally there have been attempts, but more needs to be done. I think the starting point has to be an acknowledgement that we are addressing gender oppression. It's not just about discrimination and rights. As we debate, our understanding of this will increase.

Is the stigma attached to the idea of feminism as 'just a middle-class white women's issue' still prevalent today?

I don't think the objection is that it is a middle-class, white woman's concern, but rather that it is alien and foreign. Even among white, middle-class women there is hostility to feminism.

But we have noticed a real increase in the development of the consciousness of the women we have been working with on the National Coalition.

What are the crucial questions related to women in South Africa that have to be addressed with urgency?

The coalition is trying to make it an explicit constitutional principle that any law, custom or practise in South Africa undermining the equality of women, becomes unconstitutional.

We must engage in education programmes to change attitudes. Part of this would be to address the material base of women's subordination. We have to look at rural development to empower women.

What issues cut across race and class that are crucial to women?

Issues like equal pay for work of equal value, unpaid labour and how this pays for the wealth of the country. We have to get away from the notion of: 'I'm just a housewife'. For too long, women have devalued themselves.

We need to find a system of accounting for the monetary value of unpaid labour. We also have to look at bad health, water supplies ...

Is the ANC Women's League a truly progressive women's organisation? Are they going to make South Africa a place of sexual equality for women?

I can't speak for them. They have got prioritise the emancipation of wome The League has, to some extent, falle into the trap of spending too much tin on dealing with the broader issues of t national struggle.

When you prioritise, it does not ne essarily mean that you have to make a li of everything and try and do it all. Yo have to say this is what we can, and th is what we cannot do. They have to de with literacy programmes and the en powerment of women.

Why does the League have a reputation for gossiping, backbiting and being very disorganised? Does the League not perpetuate stereotypes?

I think every women's organisation acros the world gets this kind of reputation Maybe there are individuals who gossip but it's not the organisation as a whole There are many women in the ANC, an not in the League, who trivialise wom en's issues. They feel the League is no necessary.

These women have skills and posi tions, but they are failing women.

It is important that we work in th ANC, but do not forget that we are wome too. The problem with many women i the ANC is that when it comes to priori tising issues, they drop the women's is sues first. They tend not to use their skills to promote women and get engaged i women's issues.

Women who criticise the League should go in there and put it right. If you take up women's issues, it is not the way to popularity. But if we are sincere about women's emancipation then it is some thing we have to cope with. ■

Women at Codesa — but only as advisors

The ANC Women's League's appeal to Codesa to form a Gender Advisory Committee (GAC) has paid off. The committee has been set up and is composed of women from wide-ranging political affiliations, including Inkatha, NP, DP, PAC, ANC, and Black Sash.

The GAC was formed after women protested that they were not adequately represented at Codesa. But the committee is advisory, and is no substitute for women's full participation, said Frene Ginwala. It has a rotating chairperson and is made up of women only; the ANC's Emancipatory Commission on Women comprises men and women.

The ANC's commission is headed by Oliver Tambo. It includes men to show that the responsibility for gender equality lies with both men and women. Other members are: Ginwala, Kader Asmal, Uriel Abrahamse, Jackie Cock, Baleka Kgositsile, Thenjiwe Mthintso, Bongiwe Njobe, Wally Serote, Thutukile Radebe, Bangumzi Sifingo and Arnold Stofile.

Meanwhile, the National Coalition of Women has concluded its conference to finalise how to take the Women's Charter campaign forward. It was attended by about 250 women from 56 different organisations and eight regions.

'The graves of our ancestors are our title deeds'

In part II of his article, ***HARALD WINKLER*** *points to different concepts of land ownership, and argues that the struggle for the restoration of land must be broadened to include farmworkers and labour tenants.*

THE STRUGGLE FOR the restoration of land by the dispossessed people of South Africa raises crucial questions not only about the economic impact of restoration, but also about the different ideologies underpinning the restoration debate. The communities' return to their land can change economic realities and challenges western conceptions of land ownership and productive agriculture.

It also raises questions about the sustainability, both politically and economically, of the redistribution of land. But the restoration campaign is limited, and needs to be broadened to include farmworkers and labour tenants.

Different concepts of land

The struggle for the land is not only to gain political and economic power. It is also about establishing a different understanding of the land. Many claims to the land are based on title deeds. But often they are not. There are other values in African society which give rise to claims to the land.

African people claim the land because they were born on it, because their ancestors are buried there, because they have farmed the land productively for many years, because they know a particular piece of land well and regard it as their home, and because the wrong that was done to them in the name of apartheid ideology must be reversed.

These factors give every person the right to access to land, but do not make them owners of the land in the western sense, of having an absolute right to do anything with your property, including selling it. In contrast to white farmers who want their title deeds guaranteed by the white government, African people say that 'the graves of our ancestors are our title deeds'.

Black rural communities are not saying they want all the land for themselves. Despite three centuries of dispossession, black farmers are still prepared to share the land with white farmers. It is only when the white farmers refuse to share that they forfeit their right to be part of a new distribution of land in South Africa. What they are saying is that the concept of the right to land must change.

The demand for land raises the question of whether that land will be used well. If land is to be given to black farmers, it must be done in a way that is both productive and sustainable. Questions about sustainability are serious and must be asked, but the way in which they are asked is crucial. The debate about property rights is shaped by the different conceptions of land and rights to land. If they are imposed from above, they will be rejected. If the community's own interest

Goedgevonden — the community has a right to return to its land

in creating a sustainable future is developed, it may succeed. This can be illustrated by looking at the Goedgevonden case.

Goedgevonden

In the negotiations that followed their re-occupation, the community has argued they have a political right to return to their land. The starting point to any solution is a return of the community to Goedgevonden.

The government has an entirely different starting point. The committee they have set up is composed of agricultural 'experts', headed by an ex-chairperson of the STK, the SA Development Trust's technical arm. Their starting point is the carrying capacity of the land. They want to divide the land into 'economically viable' units. They say that their technical studies reveal that no more than 21 farmers (with their families, and two families of workers each) can be accommodated on Goedgevonden. In the name of economic viability, people are thus prevented from returning to their land.

The government has tried to shift the debate onto a technicist basis, seeking to determine land distribution on agricultural, economic grounds, with the decisions to be made by committees of 'experts'.

They want the historical issues to be forgotten, and to start with a clean slate. This is impossible. You cannot wish away unpleasant realities which you yourself have created. As Geoff Budlender, a prominent land rights lawyer, put it, the question the government asks is:'What is the least we have to give these people in order to satisfy them, so that we can get on with building the future?'

The community is not opposed to considering issues such as the carrying capacity of the land. Their own farming practices in the past included limitations on the new people moving onto the farm. The committee used to check annually, at dipping time, the number of cattle in the community. If the total number was deemed too high, those with too many head of cattle would be asked to sell off the surplus to the agricultural cooperative.

In the process of negotiations, the community demonstrated a commitment to limit themselves to make farming sustainable. They did not express this in the same technical terms as the government, but said they would use a maximum of 400 hectares for residential use, and keep most of the farm (another 6,600 ha) for farming.

Clearly, the community knows that it cannot allow unlimited numbers of people to farm at Goedgevonden. In the past, there were clear criteria for new people moving onto the farm. These criteria were administered by a committee of *'voorsitters'*, responsible to the local commissioner.

Nor did the community allow overgrazing of the farms. They want to hand over the farms to their children in as good a state as they found them, if not better. They need neither agricultural extension officers nor environmental experts to teach them the basics of farming — they know from working the land. They are open to hearing outside advice, but in the end they believe that they are the ones who put their hands to the plough, and they will make the decisions.

Subsistence production is critical for the rural population's health

From racism to 'rationality'

The Goedgevonden negotiations show two fundamentally different approaches to questions of agricultural productivity. One approach makes productivity an obstacle preventing the people from returning to their land. Serious questions regarding sustainability become illegitimate in the eyes of the community (and thereby politically unsustainable) because they are yet another set of imposed criteria. All that has changed is that the terms which prevent them from having access to land are no longer outright racism, but economic rationality or environmental concern.

This approach makes 'productivity' the only and absolute value to be considered. Taking a more balanced macro-economic perspective would lead one to consider other values too.

Rural land is crucial in providing a place to stay for people. The agricultural economy has the capacity to provide many jobs. Subsistence production is critical for the rural population's nutrition and therefore their health.

Land provides a social 'safety net' for rural people. All these are important macro-economic goals which should be balanced against the aim of productivity (as in producing for the market). No one can be considered to the exclusion of the others, especially in the South African context with its high ratios of unemployment, homelessness and malnutrition.

The other approach is to look for practices in the community that promote sustainable development. If 'agricultural productivity' and 'carrying capacity' are truly in the interests

of the community, there must be ways of getting the community to see its own interests. It is only in this way, drawing on the local knowledge of the community, and appealing to their self-interest, that debate about sustainability will take root in black farming communities.

Restoration and landlessness

The campaign for restoration is a specific, narrow campaign, aiming at restitution for victims of forced removals. In a sense, this group of communities represent the 'easy cases' — they were obviously the victims of recent injustice. In many cases, their land is still owned by the state and can be handed back; people are not occupying arbitrary pieces of land, but are returning to land that is theirs, that they lived on before; and the number of communities is limited. It is crucial, however, that this 'spearhead' is not separated from the long stick following it: the millions of landless people in South Africa.

This is not to deny that the return of victims of forced removals to their land has been ground-breaking. It has challenged the National Party government's willingness to change, and put the question of restoration on the agenda in a most direct, physical way. It is not harking back to ancient conflicts; its aim is to undo the injustices of the last 40 years.

As Paul Lepee, a black farmer who was removed from Magogoane in the Western Transvaal said: 'I haven't had a chance to plough since the removal. My children do not know how to plough... Just because of the removal, we don't have an idea to plough.'

These first struggles are aimed at a most obvious target: the racist denial of land to black people. The demand is for political justice, a reversal of recent historical wrongs. But the question of landlessness goes further than that.

Farmworkers and labour tenants

There are millions of black people living in 'white' rural South Africa -- farmworkers on white farms, labour tenants, and communities living on company land. Farmworkers also want access to land. They too were deprived by apartheid laws and economic disadvantage from access to land. If a Land Claims Court were set up, families of labour tenants would want to apply. There are differences in their demands; in many cases, farmworkers want better working conditions, and labour tenants might want security of tenure, not necessarily a title deed.

But there are many similarities. Farmworkers and labour tenants too can show that they occupied the land for generations, that they have historical rights to the land. They too were removed by the harsh laws of the apartheid government, most often in terms of the Prevention of Illegal Squatting and Trespass Acts.

It is crucial that the demand for restoration includes the right of access to land and security of tenure for farmworkers and labour tenants too. There is a real danger that the government might concede the demands of the 20 communities presently engaged in the restoration campaign, then close off the process.

Those fighting for the rights of the landless should ensure that the campaign for restoration of victims of forced removals broadens out into a campaign for land rights for all South Africans.

Limits of the campaign

It is critical that those supporting the restoration campaign realise its limits. Only a few communities are involved. The majority of landless people, in particular farmworkers and labour tenants, are still left out. The campaign can only benefit them too, if it is a process that opens up the issue of land claims, rather than closes them down. The campaign and a Land Claims Court can only win back land for communities that have become symbolic of dispossession in South African history. It must widen its scope to include all those who need access to land and security of tenure. ■

Harald Winkler is an environmental fieldworker for the Transvaal Rural Action Committee. Part I of this article was published in WIP 81.

'One union, one federation' is no longer a dream

GLENDA DANIELS reports on moves to unite South Africa's two biggest union federations into one of the strongest union centres in the world.

Following on the successful joint May Day rallies throughout the country, a Workers' Summit at the end of May is set to finalise arrangements for a merger between Nactu and Cosatu after years of bitter rivalry.

The federations have been making great strides towards unity in recent months and a merger would result in the biggest federation in Africa, and one of the strongest federations in the world.

Political necessity

Cosatu assistant general secretary Sam Shilowa says there is a definite understanding in both federations that unity is a political necessity.

'When we talk of a merger with Nactu, we are talking of merging the industrial unions, not office bearers. The process must be guided by the office bearers and supported by the workers,' he emphasises.

Shilowa reveals that, after a number of meetings between Nactu and Cosatu office bearers, a Permanent Committee of Trade Union Unity made up by office bearers from both federations has been formed. The committee's brief is to prepare for the Workers' Summit; ensure that meetings of affiliates take place at industrial level; and to implement a programme of joint action.

'The Workers' Summit will be finalising a programme for trade union unity. The committee will also formally approach individual unions outside the federations to bring them together with the others for the sake of unity,' he says.

Nactu general secretary, Cunningham Ngcukana, lauds the process of unity, but says the Summit will make the final decision about a merger. What will also be decisive, he feels, is co-operation on the ground.

Ngcukana says that experiences in countries such as France, Italy, Spain, Portugal have shown that political fragmentation results in a poor level of unionisation. South Africa, he feels, can learn from these experiences.

PIC: ANNA ZIEMINSKI

Cunningham Ngcukana

One stumbling block still to be overcome is the question of politics and unions. Cosatu is committed to its alliance with the ANC and SACP, while Nactu — certainly at leadership level — inclines towards the PAC.

'We will have to look at various mechanisms to address this question,' says Ngcukana. 'I can't elaborate now, but I am confident that one large federation will cater for all political and ideological differences. Unions in France, for example, have resulted from political splits.'

The advantages of a merger would be far reaching. 'It will help to stop violence and ideological and political fights in the factories, and it will strengthen the hand of the workers,' argues Ngcukana.

Transport unity

Meanwhile unity talks among Cosatu's transport unions have finally drawn to a close. The South African Railway and Harbour Workers Union (Sarhwu) and the Transport and General Workers Union (TGWU) are set to merge into an 80,000-strong union in December.

Although 'one industry, one union' has been Cosatu policy since the federation's formation in 1985, it took some time for the process of unity in the transport sector to get under way.

In April 1991, there were resolutions taken at TGWU and Sarhwu's respective congresses that a merger had to take place soon. A Merger Facilitating Committee (MFC) was set up last year to oversee the process.

TGWU's Randall Howard, a member of the MFC, says unity in the transport sector within Cosatu is a political necessity. 'We need to build a strong new vehicle with massive organisational clout to effectively challenge the employer and state strategies in a co-ordinated manner,' he feels.

'Our bargaining power will also be enhanced as a consequence of the unity

process. Unity on an industrial basis needs to be pursued vigorously by the trade union movement to build a stronger working class movement,' adds Howard.

Sarhwu's national education officer, Vanguard Mkosana, says the transport sector was strategic, and unity between the unions would mean attention could be paid to building a future transport policy for the country.

Mkosana feels the new union would be able to draw on the varied experiences of Sarhwu and TGWU. It would also be advantageous financially, he adds. 'It will mean that there will be one head office, one general secretary, subs will flow in and staff will be reduced.'

As with any merger, there are problems that still have to be ironed out. One is the name of the new union. According to Mkosana, there are 'sentimental attachments' to the name of the respective unions by the workers.

'Sentiments will have to be put aside to be replaced by proper thinking. If this is understood properly by workers it won't present a major problem,' he feels.

The second and more serious problem, he says, is the 'general' part of TGWU. 'Security and cleaners are not really transport workers and this will have to be addressed. Perhaps they could be homed somewhere else in Cosatu, but this will have to be properly discussed. There is a sub-committee that has been set up to look at this issue.'

Howard says both unions are being 'open and frank about problems and addressing them constructively, should they arise. We have ensured the involvement of workers on the ground and will continue to do this so that unity will be deep rooted amongst our respective members'.

Interestingly, there do not seem to be any ideological barriers to the merger, although TGWU and Sarhwu come from different traditions. Sarhwu comes from the ANC-UDF tradition, while TGWU — a former Fosatu affiliate — has been labelled a 'workerist' union.

Today, according to Mkosana, these divisions do not exist. 'There is no political or ideological difference between both unions. We belong to the same federation and are guided by the same principles,' he says.

Fawu and Saccawu

The South African Commercial, Catering and Allied Workers Union (Saccawu) and the Food and Allied Workers Union (Fawu) also come from different political traditions.

Despite a recent newspaper report that the two were to merge, Saccawu and Fawu officials say this has never been discussed.

'The article created problems for us because workers thought the leadership was involved in clandestine activities,' says Kaiser Thibedi, assistant general secretary of Saccawu.

He feels that while unity is a good thing, it is too early to talk of a merger between Fawu and Saccawu. In the meanwhile, there is 'a joint committee where solidarity is being concretised,' he says.Thibedi says one of the reasons why a merger was not on the agenda was because 'Fawu is retail and Saccawu is distributive'.

Saccawu's priority as far as unity goes, is building unity with the Federation of Commercial, Retail and Allied Workers (Fedcraw), Natal Liquor and the National Union of Distributive Workers (Nudaw), he adds. Fedcraw has shown an interest in unity but Natal Liquor and Nudaw, both conservative unions, are apparently reluctant to unite.

Fawu's general secretary, Mandla Gxanyana, also feels that while a merger would be a good thing, it is not on the immediate agenda. 'There are discussions but whether that will develop into a merger is another issue.'

He says a merger would mean that the new union would be very strong with close to 300,000 members. 'But while a merger would mean a stronger union, all we are doing at the moment is building solidarity committees and working closer together.'

Union mergers, and particularly a merger between Cosatu and Nactu, will obviously be a huge advance for workers. It will also strengthen civil society, acting as a watchdog to ensure that worker rights are upheld by any future government.

The real challenge — particularly for those leading the unity process — is whether Cosatu and Nactu can rise above narrow political interests, in the interests of the country's exploited and oppressed people. ■

PIC: ANNA ZIEMINSKI

United action around the LRA — finally bearing fruit

Economics comes alive for workers

Almost 300 delegates at Cosatu's Economic Policy Conference in March debated economic issues ranging from a growth path to job creation, taxation, nationalisation and, significantly, a code of conduct for investors in a democratic SA.

***GLENDA DANIELS** reports*

As the economic agenda is being set for the New SA, Cosatu is the first alliance partner to come up with a coherent economic policy. It is bound to have an impact on the ANC's economic policy, which will be finalised at the end of May. The SACP, in the meantime, is circulating economic proposals among its key activists.

Debates at the conference were introduced by papers prepared by different affiliates. These included: Nationalisation by the South African Commercial, Catering and Allied Workers Union (Saccawu); Trade and Tariff Policies by the South African Clothing and Textile Workers Union (Sactwu); Job Creation by the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) and Investment Code by the Chemical Workers Industrial Union (CWIU).

What was significant about these papers, according to delegates, was that they were presented by workers, as opposed to the usual officials and economists.

Discussion was also facilitated by affiliate caucuses. Ebrahim Patel, deputy general secretary of Sactwu, says the caucuses were 'vigorous, constructive and productive debate ensued, with very little rhetoric'.

Jane Barrett, Transport and General Workers Union (TGWU) national organiser, feels that the participation of all affiliates was most important for her. Previously, she says, discussions had been dominated by a few affiliates. In addition, 'it was possible for the first time to link the overall growth debate to concrete issues — and economics came alive for people'.

But Saccawu's education officer, Darlene Miller, disagrees. 'Debate was dominated by officials in most unions,' she feels, adding that the mood was 'sober', possibly because 'a gloomy pseudo-realism prevailed. I say pseudo-realistic because the assumption is that the only economic transition possible is one which has the blessing of capital'.

Strategic nationalisation

In contrast to what most mainstream newspapers have suggested, the conference sprouted little rhetoric and came up with concrete and practical proposals.

Cosatu has now endorsed as policy, growth through redistribution, to be achieved by some state intervention in the economy.

The federation requires that industries providing basic goods and services be under public control. These include Eskom, public transport, the Post Office and Telkom, state forests, Iscor, roads, health and education.

But Cosatu is concerned that the government might privatise the entire public sector before a new government comes into power. Cosatu general secretary Jay Naidoo said after the conference: 'We do not trust this government not to go ahead and try to privatise some of these sectors, even in the next few months. It has "commercialised" some for this very purpose.'

In the mining and financial sectors, the federation felt there ought to be 'strategic' nationalisation to stimulate economic growth, enable 'working class control of the strategic direction of the economy' and enlarge the resources available to a future democratic state.

PIC: ELMOND SIYANE (DYNAMIC IMAGES)

Jay Naidoo

The conference identified four 'keys' to job creation:

* investment in sustainable jobs in a growing economy;
* reviewing government contracts and promoting labour intensive methods;

* a public works scheme for mass employment and the creation of useful assets;
* a special programme of public works for unemployed youth;
* considering co-operatives and how to promote community-based self-employment enterprises.

Investment code

Extensive discussion was held around an investment code. Cosatu felt that, with the phased lifting of sanctions, a code of conduct for investors was needed. This would deal with 'how much profit can be sent overseas, where investors may raise loans to finance a business, the sort of tariff barriers that can be introduced to encourage new factories to start, "decentralisation" incentives and so on,' resolved the federation.

A code of conduct for investors would not be statutory, according to Cosatu. The code, which would be monitored by an independent body, would cover issues such as working conditions, affirmative action, training and care for the environment. Investors would be required to disclose information to workers, communities and code monitors.

Most terms of the code are basic. They include that companies:

* abide by all International Labour Organisation (ILO) conventions as the minimum standard;
* provide jobs and promote security of employment;
* carry out training and adult basic education;
* maintain the highest standards for environmental health and safety.

According to Patel, Cosatu accepted that the sanctions agenda was not under the control of labour. 'Restrictions are being lifted', he argues, 'and the best thing is not to resist the pressure of the lifting of sanctions.' Instead, Patel feels that one has to 'think about the interests of the people and to engage the government; to put our efforts not into stopping sanctions from lifting but to address a labour code'.

Incentives to exploit

He says Taiwanese employers have begun operations recently in Botshabelo, Newcastle and other decentralised areas.

'They get incentives from their government to come to South Africa with obsolete machinery, and try to locate incentives with this government. They pay shockingly low wages. We discovered that, at Botshabelo, workers were earning R7.50 per fortnight!

'The South African government can do with foreign investment, but not at any cost. We need foreign investment if it genuinely improves the economy and improves worker conditions,' asserts Patel.

He added that the labour movement wanted to avoid a situation where there were no worker rights or training, and the economy relied on cheap labour and disregarded the environment.

This view was also underlined by Naidoo: 'We are not prepared to accept investment that abuses trade union and human rights, or the fly-by-night investors who come in on a concessionary basis and invest nothing in research and provide no technological transfers.'

IMF and World Bank

One of the shortcomings in the discussion on an investment code was that the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank were not properly discussed.

TGWU pointed to the institutions' bad reputation in the developing world, with their structural adjustment programmes, and wanted policy to be developed on their role. CWIU and Saccawu also pushed for this discussion, but no decisions on the IMF and World Bank were reached by the end of the conference.

According to Barrett, the TGWU wanted the discussion to be more specific. 'But all the policies adopted can be seen as an alternative to IMF proposals. What is needed is more debate and the need to get better informed about what their policy proposals are,' she says.

Capital not impressed

Meanwhile big capital did not find the idea of an investment code attractive. Anglo American found Cosatu's list of demands out of touch with the reality of the world economic situation.

'It is only countries which have an unattractive investment environment that seem to go in for such investment codes,' says Anglo's Michael Spicer.

'This code as it stands, is very lopsided. It is a list of duties and obligations without any mention of incentives. It's about what capital must do to get in through the door, rather than what we must do to tempt investors through the door. The assumption is that there is a whole queue of people knocking on the door.'

Sam Shilowa

Spicer feels that the real world situation is that capital is scarce, mobile and had many alternatives about where to go, so it is in a position to be 'quite choosy'. South Africa's investment environment at the moment is not attractive and it will require active steps from all parties to render the environment more friendly before investors will consider coming here, he argues.

But Sam Shilowa, Cosatu's assistant general secretary, says: 'Investors are presently coming to South Africa and this process is not controlled. We have no say in what happens to profits. We don't want to be spectators, but social partners.'

Cosatu believes that the proper place to debate the investment code — and all economic matters — is in a national economic negotiating forum with labour, business and the state. ■

Socialise the insurers

By ***PATRICK BOND***

PAPER CHASING PAPER is the ANC epithet used to denigrate the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) and the parasitical yuppies who play financial games there.

But will this captivating slogan share the sad fate of the near-forgotten Freedom Charter? As the liberation movement is preparing for a major policy conference, key progressive positions on the economy -- increase corporate taxes; hold the fort against the IMF; break the power of monopoly capital -- are being unilaterally abandoned.

Why not rather use the occasion to propose a major redistribution of capital in a manner even the bourgeoisie must concede is rational? The JSE and its main backers should be Target No 1.

The world's fastest-growing major stock market from 1989-91, the JSE is finally showing signs of bearishness. No surprise, given the ongoing depression in the SA manufacturing sector (camouflaged by last year's obscene 56% rise in the JSE industrial share index).

What with the disintegration of Tokyo's stock market by more than 50% from its 1990 peak, Diagonal Street stockbrokers now predict a forthcoming JSE 'correction' of 30%. Comrade readers, your pension, provident and insurance funds stand exposed. Not even the new Cosatu/Nactu Community Growth Fund for 'socially responsible blue chip investments' is safe.

It is in this context that an attack on the financiers' freedom of investment would be welcomed. And here's a surprise: the best strategy comes from *Business Day's* conservative editor Jim Jones.

'Taking over Sanlam or the Old Mutual should, in theory, be easy,' Jones warns the ruling-class in a recent column. 'It must be obvious to any opposition politician that nationalisation would be unnecessary if the boards of Sanlam or Old Mutual were packed with government appointees.'

In other words, simply replace the old white guys at the helm of the two largest insurers, with progressive cadres who would invest R130 billion worth of assets more rationally.

This sort of *socialisation* of investment funds could potentially be much more effective than classical nationalisation of selected industries (even if power relations permitted, which is debatable at this stage), since the two insurance giants own huge, and in many cases controlling, stakes in so many other firms.

ANC economists, meanwhile, are negotiating with the Life Offices Association (LOA) for a much smaller piece of the pie. According to *The Financial Mail*, the figures currently being bandied about are an annual flow of R5 billion — or 15% of total premium and investment income — into low-income housing, education, and the like.

No details are available on whether the LOA will demand from poor people full free-market 'cost-recovery' on such basic needs items, but pessimism is likely appropriate here. The *FM* reports that the LOA is 'fending off direct intervention. The ANC indicates that the LOA initiative is likely to find favour.'

In point of fact, the more radical approach, *Business Day's* suggestion, could be a relatively simple and cost-free exercise, since both huge financiers are regulated by their own special legislation, and since insurance asset socialisation would not cost the state a cent, given the mutual (not equity) ownership structure of the institutions.

Moreover, this sort of intervention might accomplish a dual goal: firstly, draw investment funds out of the JSE ahead of its near-certain rupture, thus limiting the height to which speculative share buying might yet reach; and secondly, arrange the sorts of flexible, partially-subsidised financing mechanisms for development that LOA members currently will not touch.

One such investment outlet, *long-term municipal bonds* (the main tool, aside from taxation, that cities use to raise money), could earn a return sufficient to protect pensioners and widows from the ravages of 16% inflation (though would not match the untenable growth rate that crazed JSE speculators are used to).

In a functioning capitalist economy, insurers expand their government bond portfolios when corporate and consumer financing demand shrinks. In South Africa, however, even the richest and largest municipality, Johannesburg, can no longer attract insurance company money for long-term capital projects.

Progress toward combining Johannesburg and Soweto as a single non-racial city is thus threatened, due to the lack of long-term capital required for the big infrastructural projects which black townships and shack settlements in the Central Rand have long been denied. *Old Mutual will not even provide short-term bond financing for Johannesburg.*

Municipal democracy poses an unacceptable financial risk, it seems.

Perhaps a good dose of ANC socialisation rhetoric would alter these and other criminal financial practices. ■

Can the Bank be stopped?

*By **MARK SWILLING and PATRICK BOND***

The World Bank is on its way to South Africa, and already finding the going rough:

* Frank Chikane of the SA Council of Churches recently issued a warning about the 'universal outcry and misery' in Third World countries that applied World Bank structural adjustment medicine. 'We cannot believe that the salvation of our country lies in an uncritical and undemocratic subjection of our country to IMF and World Bank policies.'
* The next day, white municipal government officials in the (now-dormant) Central Witwatersrand Metropolitan Chamber were blasted by the Soweto Civic Association's Laurence Boya for dealing with the World Bank behind closed doors.
* The same week, the World Bank's chief economist was attacked by progressives across the world including SA environmentals in the Group for Environmental Monitoring because he supports 'more migration of the dirty industries' to the Third World.

What these news events indicate is that the World Bank will come to South Africa with just as much political baggage as its sibling, the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

'Gang of thieves'

The IMF was responsible for designing VAT, and its recent report on the SA economy concluded that redistribution should not precede growth, which pleased big business and the state enormously. IMF officials are widely hated across the Third World. Julius Nyerere calls them 'a gang of thieves.'

Since the early 1980s, the World Bank has prescribed 'structural adjustment programmes' nearly identical to the IMF's, alongside tough conditions applied to Bank loans for projects such as dams, roads, housing and rural credit programmes.

However, in South Africa the World Bank was expected to make a smoother entrance, for unlike the IMF, the Bank refrained from granting the apartheid regime loans during the previous twenty years. The IMF pumped in more than a billion dollars between the Soweto uprising and 1983, when it was finally prohibited to lend any more money to SA.

The Bank kept clear of SA during this period, and after 2 February 1990 embarked on a clever strategy to get back into SA. Bank officials met secretly with Nelson Mandela when the ANC leader visited Washington, DC in June 1990.

'Just between you and me, shouldn't the World Bank be encouraging more migration of the dirty industries to the Less Developed Countries?'
Confidential memo by Laurence Summers, World Bank chief economist, December 1991

The Bank even went to the trouble of allowing a former member of the South African Communist Party, Geoff Lamb, to guide a 1990 mission aimed at breaking the ice with the democratic movement. Lamb, who was a left-wing scholar at the Sussex Institute of Development Studies in the 1970s, is an expert on making structural adjustment programmes appear to be 'home-grown.'

Great sophistication

With personnel like Lamb, the Bank is showing great sophistication, and most progressive South Africans who have met with Bank missions have been impressed with how willing Bank staff appear to work with what might be viewed as an ANC government-in-waiting.

What of the medium-term? John Chettle is a US-based advisor to some of SA's biggest companies. He writes: 'It is not far-fetched to conclude that, within a decade, South Africa could well exceed Nigeria as the largest single recipient in Africa of World Bank funds, currently more than R17 billion in that country.'

He continues: 'The current thinking would involve an annual infusion of funds into South Africa amounting to more than 1% of the gross national product. It is intended to be a massive kickstart to the SA economy, and World Bank officials are talking about making as big an impact as possible immediately.'

If Chettle is right, SA can expect to see R25 billion a year in loans from the World Bank. SA's foreign debt, currently R55 billion, would grow the first year by nearly 50%. That debt would be extremely expensive to repay, since the value of the rand is declining against the dollar.

The fear of SA becoming another desperate Third World debtor remains strong. Chettle concludes that 'South Africa is almost tailor-made for such a collaboration with the World Bank.'

Yet this is not necessarily true, for in South Africa, unlike most Third World countries, there is a democratic mass movement aiming at increased worker and community control of development.

The Bank is now adapting to this challenge, but it will not be long before the contradictions in its policies become apparent. Progressives are already beginning to assess where those contradictions will appear, and how then to respond. ■

Swilling and Bond work at Planact, a Johannesburg urban service organisation.

Debt, development and democracy – the IMF/World Bank in Africa

Visiting economist **FANTU CHERU**, currently Development Studies Professor at American University in Washington DC, advisor to the new Ethiopian government, and author of, amongst others, ***The Silent Revolution in Africa*** (Zed Press, 1991), talks to DALE MCKINLEY about the lessons to be learnt from the African experience.

You identify three major interlinked problem areas that have afflicted Africa: debt, development, and democracy. What are the main features of these?

The debt crisis is really a development crisis although some like to look at it as a temporary balance of payments problem. Debt is a symptom of the failure of the type of development that most African countries have followed since independence. Unfortunately, the debt that has been incurred for prestige projects, increased militarisation, and elite consumption, is now being paid for by ordinary people through enforced austerity measures.

So, in a sense the debt crisis is directing enormous amounts of resources away from development to meeting the needs of creditors. Under these conditions, there won't be any development that is geared to meeting basic human needs and consequently no real prospects for genuine democracy.

You argue that the main culprits behind these problems are the IMF/World Bank and undemocratic African regimes. Are the prospects any brighter here?

The Bank and Fund are now arguing that South Africa should follow the model of the Asian tigers—Taiwan, Korea etc. This means a further upgrading of its technological development. That kind of model in a country with 40% unemployment is simply unacceptable. Where are you going to place all those people? The whole idea of increasing your ability to compete on the world market comes into conflict with employment generation. It is a question of allocating resources for employment generation or employment minimisation. There is going to be significant conflict and that is what disturbs me most.

By bringing out various documents, they have been directly influencing the direction of economic policy. They are going to use policy documents and their overwhelming financial assets to shape the development debate in this country.

Are ANC cadres equipped for this sort of onslaught?

This is a crucial question. From every piece of information I have, there appears to be a convergence of opinion on economic policy between the liberation movements and advocates of the IMF/World Bank line.

Does that convergence reflect a political alliance?

This is really the issue. If you look at the transition period in any part of Africa the entire process leads to accommodation between certain groups. Coalitions arise that begin to legitimise certain economic

philosophies. Then you begin to hear people saying that we cannot redistribute without growth — or if we do we will alienate foreign capital. This is beginning to emerge here already, and I think it is dangerous because you cannot give in so early in the negotiations process. Once you do so the establishment — with their arms, and their economists — ensures status quo policies with a little redistribution here and there, but no attack upon the fundamental contradictions and constraints in the society. A new class emerges in those circumstances.

Does the strategy of growth with redistribution neccessarily lead to development or is it just another case of what you have called 'the progressive modernisation of poverty'?

Given the ownership of resources in this country, it does not mean that if De Beers does well next year people in Soweto are going to benefit. Redistribution of assets is very vital, it is assets that generate economic growth. The economy can grow in many different ways, through speculative finance, the stock market, etc which do not neccessarily generate wealth or income. The vast majority don't own shares in capital. The whole idea of saying — let the economy grow and then the process of redistribution will begin — does not measure up to the practical experience of many countries.

In Zimbabwe the very people who were critical of the white regime have now become partners in the social clubs, the golf clubs, and members of the board of various corporations. They have been rewarded! Society must intervene to rectify the gap that will grow out of such a strategy, because the market system is not going to redistribute equitably.

Many on the South African left have adopted a 'pragmatist' approach to dealing with the IMF/ World Bank, arguing that it is naive to completely oppose them. How would you respond?

The pressure of international capital is always going to be there regardless. The question is do you have your own homegrown ideas and programs? You must be in charge so that when you negotiate you have a program with a clear rationale. However, mostly you find the agents of international capital writing the economic plans for you.

In Ethiopia for example, the Bank and others want to impose their programs. We have said no! Our circumstances have to give priority to reconstruction and rehabilitation. We are trying to keep the priorities of social justice, without allowing the recolonisation of our economy. South Africa is not Ethiopia, there are enormous resources here — just think of the amount of capital being used for speculative purposes. There is no need to borrow money from the IMF/ World Bank. It is a matter of priority in using the amount of resources that are available.

To what extent do the options of delinking from international capital and reneging on debt repayment apply here?

It all depends on the political outcome of these negotiations. Because of the strength of the social coalitions and their ability to coopt, I don't see official disengagement taking place. The question then becomes to what extent the civic organisations are able to influence these negotiations. If the grassroots movements are sidelined in the negotiations, then the economic debate for the future is already lost. People have to make demands now rather than wait for the expert negotiators to dictate. Whoever has the upper hand in the political discourse is going to define the future of South Africa.

You highlight the absolute necessity of popular participation in the decision-making process. Is this happening here?

It is not! In fact I am very pessimistic, and I think it is time for the civics/liberation movements to begin making demands now rather than later. The process doesn't appear to be encouraging dialogue within these institutions. I have a feeling that the debate is taking place at a macro-level far removed from the grassroots organisations. In that sense I have been disturbed because here are organisations that have survived years of repression and yet the current process does not seem to have a vision of a two-way approach to decision-making. If these organisations are bypassed there will be no genuine democracy.

What is the best we can hope for?

There is the emergence of a global apartheid system. Transformation is going to be difficult under such circumstances. The best one can do is to critically assess how to minimise your vulnerabilities.

This means rethinking domestic and regional integration that is consistent with basic needs and a process of democratisation.

Fantu Cheru PIC: ABDUL S

This not so brave new world creates a host of problems, but we must never lose sight of local-level organisation, because that is where we can either make it or break it. ■

Dale Mckinley manages Pambili Books in Johannesburg.

The piper calls the tune

- World Bank education policy for Africa

***BEN TUROK** looks at the World Bank's education policy in Africa, and argues that its positive content has been undermined by the Bank's macro-economic objectives.*

THE WORLD BANK has deployed impressive professional expertise in generating educational policy for Africa. However, this policy has been forced to fit into the general pattern of Bank policy, which has effectively undermined its positive content. Educational considerations have been subordinated to macro-economic objectives with regrettable results.

In its major 1988 report, 'Education in Sub-Saharan Africa: Policies for Adjustment, Revitalisation and Expansion', the issues of education and population control are constantly brought together in the most obnoxious way.

It is well understood that educated people have fewer children, but to press for the extension of educational provision for this reason is pernicious.

Worse, the World Bank's education policy is driven by the macro-economic considerations which now govern all policy for Africa. These include reduced government expenditure on social provision, cost recovery, privatisation and reliance on market forces. These principles are now wreaking havoc with Africa's social services of all kinds.

These policies are being pursued under the general umbrella of Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAP) which have been imposed on practically every African government. Governments which resist are denied credits by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and, by extension, by other institutions such as the European Economic Community and some private banks.

The report quoted above sets out some laudable perspectives: 'Without education, development will not occur. Only an educated people can command the skills necessary for sustainable economic growth and for a better quality of life.'

It also argues that providing education is better than transferring income directly, a sentiment wholly acceptable to educators who know how transient income adjustments can be, while education is an investment for life which cannot be taken away.

Education expansion discouraged

On the basis of this argument alone, we could reasonably expect a positive report which would lead to the serious expansion of educational provision by government and external funders alike. But this is not to be. Expansion across the board is not World Bank policy nor is the Bank very positive about Africa's education system.

True, recognition is given to the 'remarkable progress' made in Africa after independence. Between 1960 and 1983, the number of students enrolled quintupled to the impressive figure of 63 million. This was double the rate for Asia and triple that for Latin America.

In tertiary education the expansion was even more impressive, rising from 21,000 students in 1960 to 473,000 in 1983, with a total of 70,000 graduates. The only disappointing aspect was that there were also 100,000 Africans studying abroad.

This rapid expansion of provision naturally brought several problems in its wake. The Bank believes that there are now an abundance of institutions, and that they produce graduates of 'low quality and dubious relevance' (p5).

There has also been an escalation of costs, which is one of the Bank's main preoccupations. It is worth noting that India also followed the path of rapid educational expansion after independence and there was a decline in standards in many cases. But India now has a large industrial sector staffed by Indians, not expatriates, and is now a major exporter of professionals and technicians.

The report sets out four main objectives: to improve quality; increase efficiency; move to smaller enrolments where necessary and relieve the public burden of educational costs.

Furthermore, the Bank intends to bias its future funding in favour of those who show greater susceptibility to Bank policy preferences. This is a polite way of saying that the piper calls the tune and Africa's educational priorities must be determined by the Bank.

Decline in education spending

The increased propensity to exercise greater leverage lies in the growing weakness of Africa's economies. Early increases in investment came to a halt

around 1980, since when spending has declined steadily.

The median African country's budget allocation to education was 17.6% in 1970 and 15.3% in 1983. This was largely due to substantial downturn in economies across the continent, arising especially from rising external debt and direct pressure by the IMF and the World Bank. The result was that only some R1.20 was spent per pupil on educational materials.

The squeeze on expenditure has indeed brought about a crisis in education. Schools are run down, books are shared on a wholly unacceptable scale, classes are far too large and standards have declined.

At university level, conditions are quite intolerable. Buildings are in dreadful disrepair. Worse still, libraries have ceased buying books and journals. Students trying to write essays are woefully short of reference material, leading to theft of scarce books.

One cannot but wonder how it is that all the funding agencies in the world who find money for myriads of bizarre projects, are so unfeeling about Africa's book needs.

There seems to be no understanding that, while a weakened industry can be refurbished by installing new machinery and new investment, lost intellectual capacity cannot be replaced. A whole generation of African students have undergone a deprived educational experience which will never be made up.

Graduate unemployment

Yet the World Bank complains about the overproduction of graduates in Africa and suggests that graduate unemployment is now at the level of 50-70%. This is controversial in a continent so starved of skilled human resources. If Britain can adjust its job descriptions to match steadily rising educational levels, how much more necessary is this in Africa?

The notion of graduate unemployment is even more bizarre, considering there are now 100,000 expatriates working in Africa. This is more than at independence.

The reality is that the macro-economic targets of SAPs are deeply corrosive of Africa's own development. They have led to cutbacks in government spending in every direction. A country like Ghana has had job losses of 60,000 in the public sector alone. As the report itself notes, 'structural adjustment programmes in the short run exacerbates graduate unemployment' (p71).

But how long is the short run? Many Africans argue that its end is not in sight, given the appalling record of these programmes across the continent.

Contradictory proposals

That the general approach in the education report was no passing phase becomes clear from the even more extensive report, 'Sub-Saharan Africa: from crisis to sustainable growth — a long-term perspective study', produced in November 1989.

This also insists that Africa needs 'institutions of higher learning ... at an affordable and sustainable cost and well-trained people in academic and professional disciplines' (p81).

But these declarations are shown to be unrealisable in the given context. We are told that 'the quality of higher education is low and possibly declining'. The reasons given are poor primary and secondary education and shrinking non-salary inputs (plant and equipment) 'on which only 2% of total recurrent expenditure on tertiary education is being spent (ibid)'.

Yet on the very next page, the report argues that radical measures are needed to improve quality, reduce costs per student, constrain output 'in fields that do not support economic development' and relieve the burden on public finance.

These propositions appear to be contradictory and reinforce the impression that World Bank staff have yet to come to grips with the implications of their reports and come down for a position that will be defensible. We can now try to put together what these proposals amount to.

Poor must pay

In line with the general philosophy of the IMF and World Bank, the solutions offered are based on 'liberalisation, privatisation and the free market'.

In practical terms, it means cost recovery for social services. We now find that across Africa poor people are paying for health services, education and the like.

The World Bank is now insisting that parents contribute to school and university costs, with the effect that there is rapid polarisation of society into those who can afford education and those who cannot.

This undermines the vital principle adopted by all African governments at independence: that education should be based on merit alone. My experience at the University of Zambia was that student intake was broad, bringing in entrants from remote rural communities as well as urban slums. Fee paying will end that system and entrench class-based selection.

The Bank also urges the increase of private education, and we shall soon see the emergence of a large number of private schools and colleges, where education is provided for profit.

It is also proposed that parents must be made more responsible for the costs of food, lodging and other expenses, while students should take on tasks now performed by non-teaching staff such as care of teaching facilities, 'upkeep of the



Source: New Internationalist (Nov. 199

grounds, clerical and secretarial assistance and other administrative support' .

In principle, such activities by students is unobjectionable, but students who are hard pressed academically to maintain the standards which the Bank itself complains about, may find these tasks a serious impediment to learning.

Skewed aid policies

The crisis in African education also draws attention to the inadequacies of aid policies over the years. The report highlights the unbalanced character of aid to the point of incredulity.

Of direct educational aid, only 11% goes to local operational costs like local salaries, consumable and instruction materials. A further 17% goes to fund students abroad, while 44% funds foreign experts.

In the case of French aid, 80% goes to fund French teachers in Africa, thus constituting a major provision of employment for French nationals — though in the name of supporting Africa's education.

The figures are immensely disturbing. If Africa is to be assisted to achieve sustainable educational development, surely the greatest proportion of aid should go to local costs? Surely far more should be directed to students studying in Africa than to those abroad? And should not expatriate staff be kept to a minimum? What has bank policy been in this respect?

There are no grounds in this report that funders like the Bank are intent on supporting a process where Africa can develop its own intellectual capital that is sustainable, self-replenishing and expanding.

Building African capacities

The solution now being prepared by the World Bank itself seems highly problematic. A major study prepared on behalf of a group representing the World Bank, the African Development Bank and the United Nations Development Programme called the African Capacity-Building Initiative (ACBI) is about to be launched.

The report laments that the 'many different approaches taken to development in Sub-Saharan Africa... have all failed to support on a sustainable basis one essential dimension: indigenous African capacities — skills, knowledge, institutions' (p iii).

This is perhaps the most damning comment on the Bank itself, as it is the premier development agency in the world. But now the Bank feels that there is a dearth of capacity in economic policy analysis and development management, and they propose to confront this head on.

They are setting up an executive board for the ACBI, consisting of 11 members of whom four are from OECD countries, four from African countries and three from the sponsoring agencies. In this way, the project will be seen as a 'partnership' by Sub-Saharan Africa and the international donor community. Of course the bulk of the funds will come from the latter, particularly the World Bank!

The ACBI will undertake to:

* rehabilitate and improve selected national institutions (eg economics departments in universities, building small regional institutions for policy analysis and development management, creating government policy units in the office of the president etc.);
* provide fellowships;
* expand in-service training;
* strengthen local consultancy firms, etc.

Thus a wholly new infrastructure is to be built on World Bank initiative and biased by its philosophies of structural adjustment, all because Africa's indigenous intellectual capital and capacities have been sorely undermined.

Having failed to provide for and sustain the 'remarkable achievement' of post-independence growth in educational provision, Africa is about to be taken over by yet another foreign dominated enterprise.

If education is essential for development as the Bank says, it also needs to be emphasised that education, like development, cannot be imported. Sustainable development and sustainable education must be organic and indigenous. It cannot be imposed. ■

Ben Turok is director of the Institute for African Alternatives.

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El Salvador:
Can the left survive peace?

In El Salvador the agreement signed by FMLN rebels and government promises thunderous changes. But can they make it stick? ***RAUL LLARUL*** *surveys the odds.*

PIC KATHLEEN FOSTER (IMPACT VISUALS)

Land will be transfered from the state and private owners to the peasantry

IN JANUARY, THE government of El Salvador and leaders of the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) signed an agreement formally ending one of the bloodiest civil wars in the western hemisphere.

The peace accord brought enormous hope not only of peace, but of achieving far-reaching transformation in all spheres of life.

The agreement has dramatic implications in three main areas:

* *Armed Forces*. The army — the backbone of the decades of repressive social policies and a central force in political life — will be reduced by half. The three civilian police forces will be dismantled and replaced by a National Civilian Police with FMLN and civilian participation. The intelligence network is to be placed under civilian jurisdiction.

* *Social and Economic Transformation*. In a country where 75% of the population are peasants, the main cause of the war was the extreme concentration of land in the hands of oligarchic landowners.

The agreement rules that privately- and state-owned lands exceeding 245 hectares be transferred to the peasantry. In addition, peasants will receive property title to lands they occupied and tilled in the FMLN-controlled regions. There is also provision for loans and credit to be extended to the peasantry. These moves are of unfathomable importance; much more modest attempts at agrarian reform have, in the past, triggered several coups and countless army massacres. If successfully implemented, they will usher in a national model of social justice. El Salvador will be changed fundamentally.

The challenge, however, is to achieve national consensus around them. Other issues such as urban reform, consumer protection, the return and integration of exiles are to be addressed by a National Forum for Economic and Social Agreement.)

* *Political Reforms*. Constitutional reforms include the legalisation of the FMLN as a political force, the reorganisation of the judicial system, a new electoral code, the unprecedented creation of an official human rights attorney office, guarantees of basic rights, and the transfer of key defence decision-making powers to political institutions.

Responding to the accord, FMLN commander Schafik Handal observed: 'This is not the final victory, but surely it is an important triumph for the Salvadoran people.' If implemented as agreed, the accord will constitute nothing less than a 'revolution through negotiations'. The optimism is justified, but it remains overshadowed by enormous difficulties.

The Nicaraguan experience, and the negotiating processes underway in Mozambique, Angola and South Africa, remind us that the Left's greatest challenge is to implement radical changes under extremely harsh economic conditions and within the context of neo-imperialism.

Until the fateful signing of the accord a few months ago, revolutionary processes have been preceded by military victories. Generally, they came in the form of insurrections (Russia, 1917) or successful wars of liberation against colonial or imperial powers (Algeria, Congo, Vietnam, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Angola), or a combination of both (Cuba, Nicaragua).

But El Salvador presents a special case: its revolution has entered its decisive phase without a strategic military

A negotiated revolution

Since 1980, at least 75,000 Salvadorans have been killed, more than one million more (out of a total population of six million) have been forced to flee as refugees, and huge parts of this tiny Central American country have been razed by armed conflict.

The Reagan Administration designated El Salvador (and Nicaragua) the 'frontline' of America's backyard. By the end of Reagan's first term in office, El Salvador had become the fourth largest recipient of US military aid in the world. In the years following, it was transformed into a virtual laboratory for the US-sponsored Low Intensity Conflict strategy, which combined propaganda and military offensives with massive socio-economic programmes aimed at draining the FMLN's popular support.

Yet, during that nightmarish decade, the FMLN grew from an inexperienced and poorly organised military force into a powerful military and political structure.

By 1989 the conflict appeared intractable. Smoothened by public relations crash courses in the US, rightwinger Alfredo Christiani was elected president amid fears that the long-rumoured 'Total War' strategy would be unleased against popular forces. Death squad killings continued unabated, but it was only when six Jesuit priests were murdered at the Central American University that international outrage again focused against the Salvadoran rulers.

In late 1989, the FMLN moved to break the stalemate and launched its most powerful ever military offensive. It fought the army to a standstill in six cities, but was forced into retreat when the air force began bombing working class districts in the capital, San Salvador.

In the wake of the slaughter, international calls for a negotiated solution grew louder. The maneouvering for bargaining space and footholds began in earnest, with the UN last year stepping in as mediator. On 16 January this year, government and the FMLN finally signed a dramatic agreement which, according to many commentators, represents nothing less than a 'negotiated revolution'.

victory. This has opened new avenues for the inclusion of all sectors of Salvadoran society.

Challenges such as the entrenchment of national unity, civil liberties, human rights, socio-economic transformation, and a departure from authoritarianism and militarism now loom before the Salvadoran popular forces and the FMLN.Despite its relatively short history, the FMLN has developed a strong diversity of struggle forms — combining legal, illegal, violent and non-violent methods within an overall revolutionary strategy that has proved capable of rapidly adapting to changing local and international conditions.

But can it adapt to this new, unique phase? It now has to persuade wide-ranging sectors (including those which claimed 'neutrality' in the fight for these reforms) that the fate of the accord rests in their hands, that they are the legitimate masters of the agreement. It has to mobilise — within diverse social forces — the commitment to defend the agreement and to isolate those sectors bent on scuttling their implementation. Yet, the timing of the accord and the fact that the conflict was resolved through negotiations offer scope for the consolidation of the quest for peace and democracy.

The FMLN's political and military strategies reveal a constant reassessment of conditions and possibilities, and the determination to learn lessons from experiences elsewhere.

The Sandinista experience (with its painful counter-revolutionary war, its bureaucratic pitfalls and its failure to maintain the mobilised support of crucial popular sectors), the isolation of the Cuban revolution, the successes registered and the errors committed in Zimbabwe, Angola and Mozambique — all have been closely followed by the FMLN. Those lessons ought to benefit the Salvadorans. Indeed, the FMLN slogan 'To think with our own heads' appears to have been applied thoroughly during the two years of negotiations.

The war in El Salvador is over. After twelve years of brutality and destruction, reconstruction now begins. It is not merely the rebuilding of the old, but the construction of the new, rescuing the best values of the society and discarding the worst and the outmoded. Concerted participation by the society will be the only road to a safer future, cleared of authoritarianism, tyranny and injustice.



PIC: ADAM KINSLEY

Making Molotov cocktails — the FMLN used a diversity of struggle forms

That is the challenge for the future. If the forces which carried the battles against the old methods of ruling the country as a medieval estate can now promote the genuine participation of the people in the democratic modernisation of El Salvador, then this will not have been a war without victors.

The FMLN now has to forge fresh alliances, push firmly for implementation of the accord, and exercise the same flexibility which ushered in this new revolutionary phase. If it succeeds, El Salvador may yet become a ringing demonstration to revolutionaries and democrats around the world that the left cannot only survive war, but that it can also survive and flourish in peace. Such an achievement will reverberate beyond the borders of tiny El Salvador. ■

A Montreal-based researcher, Raul Llarul was in El Salvador to monitor the historic agreement.

People's power in El Salvador

*'Archetypes are no longer sufficient', argues **MARIO LOPEZ**, a member of the political-diplomatic commission of El Salvador's Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front .*

'People's Power' can have different meanings. What does it mean in El Salvador?
It is essentially a question of popular organisation and the limited exercise of power. There already exist instances of self-management at several levels: a broad independence of popular organisations and the exercise of certain functions with a larger autonomy.

We think it is necessary that the people exercise broader control. The national civilian police in the contested zones must be that of the people themselves. The joint employer-worker economic and social boards must become a mechanism which permits unions and popular organisations to participate in the elaboration of economic and social policy. This is part of popular power.

What is the state of the mass movement?
The peasant movement has been perhaps the most active and this has been in the zones under government control. There have been more than thirty land occupations recently, of which only four were suppressed (violently) by the authorities. The government has sought to negotiate with the peasant organisations on condition that they do not occupy other lands.

On the other hand, the response to the government's measures (privatisation, deregulation) has been insufficient, even if there have been some notable actions, especially among public sector workers. The neighbourhood organisations have not been very dynamic, but I think they will be in the future. These organisations and the most disadvantaged neighbourhoods will be part of the forum of consultation.

In some circles an idyllic conception of social democracy, along the lines of the Swedish model, is proposed.

The concrete conditions do not permit it, or the Costa Rican model. It is as if we wanted to make a revolution following the Cuban road without taking into consideration the current situation; it is impossible to repeat history.

Even the Nicaraguan model is today impossible to emulate. The international situation that helped the Sandinistas take power, not to mention the Cubans, is completely different today. We therefore cannot think of analogous models. It is one thing to dream of this or that model, but another to anchor it in reality. It is clear that the FMLN must find an alternative to the neo-liberal model. But as far as precise aspects of it are concerned, like the dictatorship of the proletariat, it seems to me that we must digest the lessons of the past in order to avoid repeating what has failed elsewhere.

What do these changed international conditions mean for El Salvador today?
On the theoretical level, we must reconsider our model for an alternative society. Archetypes are no longer sufficient. On the practical plane, the model that we can build will be determined by our place in the international situation imposed by the capitalist system. We cannot change that even if we wanted to. We must accept the international situation and accept that we cannot build an isolated model.

We also have to realise that the model that we develop will have to be achievable. We realise that it must have a strong social base. We therefore must be ready to modify our plans; if we refuse to do so, we will isolate ourselves from forces with different interests and opinions.

The national civilian police must be made up of the people themselves

PIC: LARRY BOYD (IMPACT VISUALS)

How will the FMLN participate in the 1994 elections, separately or as part of an electoral front?
We think it must participate as a party, but in the framework of a large left-centre coalition. We hope that there will be a broad regrouping, and we are already discussing with all political parties except the ruling Arena. We consider the participation of the Christian Democrats in this regrouping as essential.

*A longer version of this interview first appeared in the French-based journal **International Viewpoint.***

A social contract — an abstract evaluation

A SOCIAL CONTRACT — THE WAY FORWARD? A CRITICAL EVALUATION
By Bashier Vally, Phambili Books, Johannesburg, 1992 (R20.00)

JEREMY CRONIN

HOW DESIRABLE IS some kind of socio-economic accord between business, the trade unions and government?

Within Cosatu and the broader liberation alliance there is a growing debate. Some prominent and articulate voices within Cosatu (among them Geoff Schreiner and Enoch Godongwana) have pronounced themselves in favour of a social contract... well, not ANY social contract, but at least one which is able to serve as a platform for greater working class empowerment.

Vally's booklet is an intervention, then, in a critical debate. The concluding paragraph of the booklet begins: 'The social contract, like the capitalist crisis, must not be disengaged from the class struggle.' (p76). He is absolutely right.

Unfortunately, Vally doesn't understand his own advice. He seems to understand 'class struggle' only in the most abstract terms. He fails to engage his general observations about social contracts, with the specific South African class struggle in the specific situation in which we now find ourselves.

A balance of forces

Now, it is no accident that a debate has arisen in the present around some kind of socio-economic accord. We find ourselves in South Africa with a particular balance of forces, where the liberation movement has been powerful enough to plunge the ruling bloc into deep crisis, but not powerful enough yet to completely dislodge it.

Unless it is our intention to remain in permanent opposition, part of our objective must surely be to institutionalise our power, sooner or later. But at what point, on what terms, and how? Are we prepared to enter into institutionalised power arrangements that reflect the current balance of forces in order to deepen the process of democratisation, and in order to tilt that balance further in our favour? Or is that an illusion?

This is the strategic question that confronts us on a whole range of fronts — the question of interim government, of peace accord structures, to name just two. This is where the debate around a social contract in South Africa needs to be located. Vally fails to do this.

Abstract pros and cons

The body of the book is concerned with outlining the 'possible benefits' and the problems of a social contract for business, labour and the state (all conceived in the most abstract terms). Although he concedes that the booklet is 'short on prescription' (pix), it is relatively clear that Vally believes the disadvantages of a social contract for labour greatly outweigh any advantages.

He may be right. Unfortunately, the way he presents his argument ensures that he falls far short of clinching the point. What he does is to abstract pros and cons from three social contract experiments: Sweden, Britain between 1974-9, and the recent Australian experience.

There are admittedly many useful observations made in the course of the book. For instance, Vally notes the *national* character of social accords, and therefore their vulnerability to international pressures. A case in point is Sweden. Historically Swedish capital (compared, let's say, to its British counterpart) has been much more confined within its home labour market. This has compelled it to seek a more enduring accord with the Swedish workforce. Now that major Swedish companies employ as many workers outside of Sweden as in it, the long-serving social democratic pact has eroded.

Vally also underlines the tendencies to trade union centralisation and bureaucratisation, at the expense of shop-floor militancy, that characterise the accords that he studies. There is, then, food for thought. But the whole mode of presentation is flawed in a number of significant ways.

A one-dimensional contract

Notwithstanding the stated commitment never to 'disengage' the social contract from the class struggle, this is exactly what Vally does repeatedly. For instance, he continuously invests the social contract with a personality and unity of purpose.

'Given that the social contract is largely concerned with rescuing capitalism...' (p54) — given by whom and by what? Is this at least not a class contested objective, even if, arguably, it might always be its ultimate result? And again, 'the balance of economic power in the society does not alter in favour of labour. The social contract is not designed to achieve that.' (p55). Designed by whom?

Or, 'advocates of corporatism (ie a social contract — JC) remain hopeful that class conflict could be eliminated...' (p59). Do all advocates think this way? Is it not possible to conceive of a contract as

the pursuit of class war by other means? Or, at the very least, as a truce on some fronts, the better to pursue working class empowerment on others?

It is only by abstracting class struggle out of the picture that you can arrive at this kind of one-dimensional thinking, where the contract is 'given', where it is 'designed', where it has some kind of timeless and single-minded 'aim'. Needless to say, all of this reflects a profound sense of working class powerlessness. For Vally history is a script written by the bourgeoisie.

Related to this undialectical approach Vally continuously assumes that for all the parties involved, the contract is an end in itself. This may be a tendency, but does it have to be more than that? For example, he tells us that, 'The contract is bound up with the government of the day...This means that the trade unions have an interest in ensuring that the government with which they conclude a social contract is not replaced by one that refuses to acknowledge the contract.' (p49).

Vally (since he has mechanically locked himself into three case-studies involving contracts with social democratic governments -- Sweden, Britain and Australia) does not allow for the possibility of a more progressive government emerging after the contract has been concluded.

For example, let us suppose that Cosatu concludes some kind of interim social contract, perhaps of a largely defensive kind, with big business and the present regime, or with an interim Codesa-style multi-party government of national unity. Does that mean that Cosatu will be so much in love with its social contract that it will campaign tooth and nail against the eventual democratic election of a majority-rule government?

Certainly, those within Cosatu who see the social contract as a possible stepping stone to socialism, rather than a mere reform of capitalism, have a very different perspective to that of Vally. According to Numsa's Enoch Godongwana: '...a social contract reached should be seen not as an end in itself, but as a building block for further advance. The contents of the contract, therefore, should not preclude mass action on our part.' (*SA Labour Bulletin*, vol. 16, no.4, March/April 1992, p23)

Is socialism possible?

Reading between the lines I assume that Vally espouses, broadly, some kind of socialism. If he had approached the topic from a more forthright socialist perspective, he would have been forced to tackle honestly the big question: How DO we make the decisive breakthrough to socialism? And how do we build towards it, now? The logic of his argument comes very close to entirely excluding socialism as a possibility at all.

'It would be incorrect to assume that the trade unions enter the corporatist (ie the social contract — JC) structure as an equal partner to capital. The distribution of power between labour and capital is always unequal under capitalism; capitalism is by far more powerful than labour could *ever* hope to be.' (p52, my emphasis). If that's the case, how can workers *ever* aspire to anything more than reforms within an eternally perpetuated capitalist order? Without mounting greater power than the capitalists how can they break the vicious cycle of the capitalist mode of production which, according to Vally, endlessly reproduces their inequality?

Is he perhaps talking economically, and is the solution, therefore, perhaps not by way of a political breakthrough?

Alas, no, Vally seems to rule out that option too — *'In the longer term, the state is not an ally of labour'* is the heading to the relevant subsection (p55). (In the *longer term*, I had assumed that all socialists wanted to see a state that is, precisely, a state of working class power). 'As long as the mode of production is capitalist, the state is a capitalist state.'

Will a socio-economic accord benefit workers?

(p56) : 'The state is neither capable of, nor can it be expected to, usher in a socialist mode of production.' (p58)

The logic of the argument is: Until there is a socialist economy, the state is capitalist. But as long as there is a capitalist economy the working class will be powerless to change it. Inside the vicious cycle of this logic, a socialist breakthrough is either impossible or (and in my view it comes to the same thing) the breakthrough has to be a miracle.

Vally condemns the idea of a social contract on the grounds that, at its best, it only reforms capitalism. He may be right. But the logic of his own argument is that reforming capitalism is, in any case, all that we can ever hope for. He therefore stands condemned by his own condemnation.

The case against a social contract, not in general, not abstractly, but for the here and now in the real-life class struggle of South Africa, awaits a better refutation. ■

THE 1991 SOCIALIST REGISTER

Edited by Ralph Miliband and Leo Panitch, Merlin Press, London, 1991 (R75)

Reviewed by ***MOSS NGOASHENG***

THE TONE OF the 1991 Socialist Register is set out in the preface. The 'essays are an attempt to understand the aftermath of the communist regimes in terms of its global as well as local political, economic and ideological implications, including implications it has for the meaning and prospects of democratic socialism'.

With the exception of the essays by Saville and Vilas, the volume concentrates on Eastern Europe.

Saville makes three key points: first, that the socialist ideal has and still can inspire individuals and peoples; second, that the events of 1989/90 mark a 'major defeat of the socialist idea and ideal'; and third, the worrying 'widening gap between socialist theory and practice' in the west.

Along with other contributors Saville still concludes that democratic socialism remains the only alternative to the 'degeneracy' afflicting humanity.

Sandinistas

Vilas' analysis of the fall of the Sandinistas is more relevant to SA, as we stand at the threshold of major changes.

In the heat of the crisis, writes Vilas, the Sandinistas 'gave priority to strengthening alliances with employers and landowners at the expense of the organisational independence of the working masses, workers and peasants'. This tended to relegate social transformations and the central role of the masses to a secondary level. As a result, the Sandinistas denied themselves the very base which had sustained the revolution under extreme conditions.

The Nicaraguan experience underlines one thing: the need to maintain a dynamic relationship between the leading party and the mass organisations, as well as an uncompromising commitment to the centrality of the masses in the process of struggle at all times.

The possibility of the current negotiations in SA leading to a similar break with the masses is a constant and worrying threat.

Democratisation and marketisation

The other contributions point to the contradictory nature of the simultaneous process of 'democratisation and marketisation' in eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. The essays all ask the question: What are the chances of a democratic socialist renewal in what are now called the 'formerly existing socialist states'? The short answer seems to be 'Not very good' — at least in the medium term.

Kowalik and Bihari show that the privatisation process in Poland and Hungary faces major hurdles. On the one hand, this is due to the non-existence of a capitalist class with enough capital to purchase the state enterprises. On the other hand, there is the real possibility of a working class revolt in the face of

unemployment and declining standards of living as a result of privatisation and the transition to capitalism. However, this 'possible' resistance is not evident, leaving the rightwing free market regimes with more space to manoeuvre.

The situation in the former Soviet Union is not very different, but the rightwingers have less space. This is so despite the fact that the neo-liberals (free marketeers) seem to be 'in ascendance'. Part of the reason lies in the wide range of groups (formal and informal) unleashed by a reform process which has revitalised civil society.

As in Poland and Hungary, the Soviet neo-liberals, the 'priviligentsia, speak more and more as a 'class-in-the-making, fighting not only for privileges, but also for power and property'.

Workers uncritical

The essays observe, however, that the free marketeers appear to be bolstered by workers' uncritical acceptance of the market reform process as the only answer to the crisis.

'There is no alternative,' they argue. There is very little critical appreciation of the market relations and their implications for trade unions and workers. There is no consideration of whether the market reforms will lead 'to a system defined by market relations, ie in which the market dominates and dictates its logic to society, or to one where market relations are a mechanism of economic regulation and coordination subordinated to the collective, conscious will of society'.

I agree with the contributors that workers need to formulate a position which articulates the latter option.

Socialist renewal

Perhaps more importantly the essays by Panitch and Gindin, Schwaartz, D. Mandel, Flaherty, Singer, and Buzgalin and Kalganov correctly observe that perestroika has also given impetus to a vibrant movement for socialist renewal.

Broadly speaking, the movement was located within the CPSU (ie the Marxist Platform), socialist intellectuals in the Socialist Party of Boris Kagarlitsky (see *WIP* 76) and — crucially — the new unions and the movement for workers' self-management.

Do these currents have the capacity to transform their societies along a democratic socialist path, towards a society of 'true self-government', a 'free society of associated producers, working with the means of production held in common'? In the immediate to medium term the answer is 'No'.

The overwhelming message of the volume is recognisable in the SACP's new manifesto: it is not possible to sustain and develop socialism in an authoritarian environment. In this context political pluralism (multi-party democracy), free and fair elections and a substantial role for civil society are regarded as central to the idea of democratic socialism.

It is interesting, however, that the SACP congress in December 1991 resolved to remove the adjective 'democratic' from its main formulations on socialism. Although the notion of democratic socialism is still contained within the general formulations in the manifesto, the debate and the subsequent removal of the adjective does indicate the continued presence of a strong orthodox tendency within the Party.

A clearer exposition of the original socialist vision of Marx and Engels (which indicates an unambiguous break with the East European model) would have been more encouraging.

While the emphasis on an independent civil society is most welcome, those at the helm of the socialist project the world over have to clarify the relationship, now and in future, between organs of civil society and the political party of the working class. For Saville this is a non-issue because 'a highly disciplined political party (of the working class) is no longer practical politics'. For parties and organisations like the SACP and Wosa, the issue is unavoidable.

Hegemony

The SACP advances the notion of 'earned vanguardism' as against the orthodox/traditional 'proclaimed' vanguardism. It seems to me that this notion can only be useful and sustained in practice if it is related to Gramsci's concept of hegemony, in other words if it refers to 'ideological leadership'.

The strategic challenge facing the socialist movement in SA is to begin to build and construct, through struggle, working class hegemony within civil society and the polity. Given the weakness and crisis of the international socialist movement, the hegemonic position of the neo-liberals internationally, and the character of the SA revolution as an essentially national democratic one, this implies engaging in a 'war of position' with state and capital.

It means that a frontal attack on the state and capital for socialist transformation is not on the immediate agenda. Perhaps the collapse of socialism in eastern Europe fundamentally questions the feasibility of the socialist project in 'backward' or developing countries.

At the economic level, the South African working class needs to pose the question of workers' control of enterprises and the economy. If the prospects of socialism are to improve, the trade unions must initiate a movement of self-management and worker control. In other words, a movement which goes beyond the traditional collective bargaining issues. The current moves to force the state and capital to establish forums to develop policy is an important development.

After reading the essays one is compelled to conclude, as the authors do, that socialism remains the only humane alternative to the tyranny of capital. BUT the struggle for socialism will be 'long and hard'.

Moss Ngoasheng is a former member of the ANC's Economics department, and now teaches economics at Natal University.

PIC DYNAMIC IMAGES



Left behind

FALSE CONSCIOUSNESS

Intellectuals who some might call 'ultra-left' have always argued that their policies are in the best interests of the working class. If only they could get past the 'petty-bourgeois' leadership of the ANC, and speak directly to 'the class', they argue, then the ANC will adopt more radical policies.

Unfortunately, things are not that simple...

At the ANC's recent PWV regional policy conference, one such (Wits based) intellectual felt certain that he could ignite the class instincts of the (predominantly working class) delegates. He argued, in articulate and passionate tones, that the ANC should commit itself to renationalising all privatised industries and services — *without compensation.*

Now no-one present really disagreed with such sentiments, except that the 'working class power' needed to implement such policies is light years away. But the workers' champion seemed convinced that, if put to the vote, the delegates would rally around him.

Mustering all his rhetorical skills, he appealed to the 'masses' and got..... *one* vote (his own)!

A case of 'false consciousness', or a sense of realism...?

RURAL BOER

The conference had some radical things to say about land reform and property rights. There was deep concern about the need to redress the wrongs of the past. A delegate proposed an amendment to make special provision for the landless and rural poor. To everyone's surprise, this caused a bit of an uproar amongst a section of the audience.

No, this was not another case of false consciousness — they thought the delegate had said rural *boer*!

ONE NATION ONE TOILET

With election preparations going on-stream, Left Behind is proud to present Part One in a series of creative ways to canvass support for your organisation or party.

Mitchell's Plain. After the Bald One has been driven off by pebbles, ANC and NP supporters buzz about for hours outside the marquee, arguing about everything but the cricket score in Jamaica.

In one of the groups stands a veteran Cape Flats activist, trying to sway an NP supporter with calm and frosty reason.

Sensing that things are going nowhere, a burly bra' politely elbows him aside, lodges a finger in front of the NP supporter's face and barks: 'Djy! Djy praat somma kak! As't nie vir Mandela was nie sal djy nie saam met 'n witman kon kak nie!'

(Polite translation: You are talking rubbish! If it was not for Mandela, you would not have been able to share the same toilet with the white man!).

End of the argument.

CANDIDATE CLINTON

Poor Bill Clinton, presidential hopeful of the Democratic Party in the US.

First he is accused of having sex with a woman not his wife. Then he finds himself playing golf at an exclusive (in the strictest sense of the word) club that restricts its membership to whites. When this is pointed out to him, he apologises and says he 'didn't know', but goes on to praise the 'integrated services' at the club (ie lots of black help in the kitchen).

Then some sleuthing reporter finds out — alarmbells — that Clinton tried to dodge the Vietnam draft, still a no-no in a nation that has itched for a rematch ever since 1975.

Next it turns out that, as governor of Arkansas, he authorised Ronald Reagan's request to send in the state's national guard to Honduras to provide back-up for the illegal contra-war against Nicaragua.

With Clinton on the ropes, his wife steps in and accuses George Bush — mistakenly — of having an affair with a woman called Jennifer.

Now comes the distressing news that Clinton once smoked marijuana. Clinton admits that he 'experimented' with the drug. That puts him in the company of about half the population.

But, instead of leaving things there, he fumbles on, saying that he 'didn't inhale' — prompting one exasperated commentator to ask: 'Can the man do *anything* right?'

LAPDOGS AT SEA

SATV reporter, Charl Pauw. There he was, maritime adventurer extraordinary, tracking the hapless descent of the tanker *Katina P* into the dark depths of the Indian Ocean off the Mozambican coast.

'How's the oil slick doing, Charl?'

'Well, at Catembe it's difficult to tell. There's a bit of a security hassle in this part of the world.' (Agenda, SATV. 26 April).

'Security hassle'! We're talking about a country which has been gunned, blasted and hacked back virtually into the stone age by a South African destabilisation campaign. Ten years' worth. Which we now find translated into a quaint bit of reporter's gibberish: 'security hassle'.

The bile rises.

SITUATION VACANT

Agenda again. Quizzed about the 28% rate of inflation on foods, a honcho from one of the supermarket chains came back with this answer, deadpan to boot: 'I can assure you that we are not profiting.'

Now, WHOA! As we've admitted before, here at Left Behind we're not exactly experts on free enterprise, but we're keen to understand the game. And we have it on good authority that it's all got a lot to do with making profits.

Which sparks this humble question: If the firm isn't profiting, why is the manager-type still in his job?

Reconstruct

A Work In Progress supplement issue no. 3

JUNE 1992



Civics must lead

ONE OF the key questions facing the new SA National Civic Organisation (Sanco) is whether to take part in the negotiations for a new constitution.

'The new constitution will shape the local government structures and may even demarcate South Africa into regions,' said Sanco president Moses Mayekiso.

'The civics have been in the forefront of negotiations for democratic municipalities so they have to lead discussion on future local government.'

At the same time, the government is moving fast in the field of local government. The minister of local government, Leon Wessels, recently announced that white councils may be penalised if they have not formed joint administrations with black townships by January next year. Agreements reached by joint administrations can be made law if the provincial administrator ratifies them in terms of the Interim Measures Act on Local Government (IMA).

'Wessels' proposals — like the IMA — are a non-starter. They won't solve problems,' Mayekiso says.

'There are national negotiations for a new constitution, and shaping new local government has to be the product of these negotiations. Wessels is trying to take a unilateral route that is undermining the negotiations.

'We have to ask why the hurry? Codesa is progressing well so far. The constituent assembly is where this should be hammered out, and the civics have to be there. This is undermining the Codesa process.'

Mayekiso believes that there is a 'sinister purpose' behind Wessels' proposals.

'We believe that the government is trying to regionalise power. We say no to that. While the decentralisation of power is important for democracy, there are big regional inequalities created by apartheid capitalism. The only way that we will address these is through a unitary forum. When they have been addressed, then we can later decentralise power to the regions.'

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Sanco – a community watchdog

KERRY CULLINAN speaks to **MOSES MAYEKISO**, president of the newly-launched Sanco.

Moses Mayekiso is a man of many hats. His most recent 'hat' is president of the SA National Civic Organisation (Sanco). Mayekiso has been active in the civic movement for a number of years. At present, he is chairperson of the Alexandra Civic Organisation (ACO) and chairperson of the Civic Associations of Southern Transvaal (CAST). He is also the general secretary of the National Union of Metalworkers of SA (NUMSA), and a member of the South African Communist Party central committee.

You probably wear more 'hats' than anyone else in the progressive movement. How are you going to manage your new task as president of Sanco?

That is a big problem. My election to this very important position means a rethink of how I operate, since I also have the most important position in Numsa, which is fulltime. Sanco is not fulltime until we have sorted out our constitution.

If Sanco decides on an executive presidency, which is a fulltime position, I would have to consider which position to take. The workers in Numsa will have to consider what the most important position is at this juncture; which structure needs a lot of organisational effort. It will depend on the workers. The civics are theirs and the unions are theirs.

Unfortunately I don't do much for the SACP, but the leadership understands that I am overloaded by civic and trade union work.

I divide my spare time between Cast and Alexandra, but this is also a problem as other responsibilities consume all my time.

Where will Sanco set up its head office and will it employ fulltime officials?

The congress resolved that the head office should be in Bloemfontein. For Sanco to be effective, it will have to have many fulltime staff. We have not yet employed anyone, but once we have resources we will put some manpower in key positions. There are projects like housing and development that need a fulltime person. The secretary is also fulltime.

Although the launch of Sanco is of great significance, it got very little media coverage. Delegates to the launch also complained that the launch was very disorganised. Why do you think this was so?

I think it was because of the inexperience of the organisers. It was the first time that the civics had organised a national launch. We don't have the experience that other organisations have and also we don't have resources.

The executive is dominated by people from one particular area — the Border, Eastern Cape and Transkei. Is that not a problem for a national organisation?

Yes, the executive is dominated by people from that particular region. But that was the resolution of the congress, which was fully represented by all regions, so that is what the people wanted. Maybe people think that the Eastern Cape has a track record of fighting apartheid and a strong civic movement, so they can help shake up the national civic movement.

When will Sanco be working out the details of its programme of action?

The NEC will be meeting in mid-May. That meeting was due last month, but resources are still a problem. The NEC meeting will shape up guidelines for a programme of action to be discussed by regions.

It will also set a date for the first national general council meeting. The council meeting will finalise the programme of action and adopt the constitution. The constitution will resolve issues such as whether Sanco will be a unitary or a federal structure.

Apart from deciding whether to be represented at Codesa, what other issues are priorities for Sanco?

The civics are grappling with issues around housing and development. Because of the shortage of housing, these issues are important. The civics are also grappling with who is genuine in these fields. Who are the IDT and the Development Bank? Who are the service organisations and what is their political agenda?

There is also a crisis in human development. The civics have to play a role in adult education, skills training for employment and education of children.

There is also a crisis in transport. The civic has to

guide the government on the kind of transport communities need and who should get subsidies.

You say that some government proposals, like the Interim Measures Act, may undermine Codesa. Yet the government pulled out of the National Housing Forum (NHF) because it said those discussions should only take place at Codesa. Do you see a contradiction in their approach?

The government's approach is not to lose power. The aim of their local government proposals is to promote regionalism. But the Witwatersrand Metropolitan Chamber has failed (to come up with a regional solution). And the government's plans will fail if they are made outside the main negotiating structure, especially as regards the constitution because it has to be decided by the constituent assembly.

But yes, there is a contradiction. They are pulling out of some forums like the NHF and saying these discussions must go to Codesa. But we are saying that those forums must have their own independent life, as they are dealing with socio-economic issues not constitutional issues. A future or interim government can then endorse the decisions made by such forums.

They want some issues to be decided inside Codesa and others outside. We are not going to accept that at all, as we did not accept the chamber initiatives.

PIC: VUYI MBALO (DYNAMIC IMAGES)

Moses Mayekiso, Sanco president

Some of your civics, such as the Soweto Civic Association (SCA), have gone into the chamber and believe it is doing valuable work. Do you see no place for interim local and metropolitan solutions?

What's the chamber for now? It was set up to talk about resources, services and future local government. But all the civics say the future of local government must be decided on nationally at the negotiations. Only the services can be dealt with locally. We say there can be joint forums to discuss the administration of township services before a non-racial constitution is in place.

We have been saying as Cast that you cannot start structures such as the metropolitan chamber before you develop interim structures on the ground. Only then can you think of the regional structures. And the regional structures will depend on how the national structures are sorted out.

In many local negotiations, there seems to be a real danger of civics being dominated by service organisations (SO). How do you see the civics over-coming this problem?

Sanco should concentrate on empowering people to handle negotiations independent of those outside the civic movement. It is not acceptable that SOs take over negotiations and become civics themselves.

Sanco has to have a meeting with them to sort out what their powers are. The civics must learn from the unions. The unions do use SOs, but these organisations do not take over the political role of the unions. So SOs must also realise that they have to empower people, not use their ignorance.

That's why the metropolitan chamber failed. People were not involved. SOs took over the whole thing and they were the main parties. They should have trained people to express them-selves and sharpen them to understand issues, not speak on their behalf and invite the World Bank into the country.

Is there any possibility of Sanco developing a structured relationship with the ANC ?

Sanco has to be independent of any political organisation or government structure. We must remain the watchdogs of the com-munity. But that does not mean that if a political organisation has a good programme, we will not support it. Sanco should immediately have meetings with all political organ-isations to discuss their programmes, especially on local government and developmental issues.

Each political organisation has to have its own policies. There is nothing wrong with that. But political organisations should also consult and inform the civics about what they are doing. Their task will now be easier with the formation of the national civic. I believe that Sanco should be closer to the trade union movement than to political organisations. The trade union movement is structured like the civics. They both represent everybody, regardless of political affiliation. If there is no close, tight, disciplined alliance with the trade union movement, both movements will be weakened.

Regional debate rages on

Politicians, planners, geographers and development workers recently came together to debate the regional government scenario proposed by the ANC. HEIN MARAIS reports on some of the dilemmas that were left standing long after the participants left.

THE REGIONAL government debate is not the simplest or the sexiest debate in the land, but it is certainly controversial.

When the ANC released its proposals for 'strong and effective regional government' earlier this year, it met with a drone of misgivings and murmurs. The debate has now heated up considerably. Workshops held in late April by the Development Action Group (DAG) in Cape Town, indicate that map artists might want to substitute pencil for ink when drawing in the outlines of the ANC's ten proposed regions.

It has become accepted wisdom that government's mind is set on a weak central government and extensive devolution of power to regional and local levels.

It made its commitment to federalism particularly clear recently after meeting old faithfuls KwaZulu's Gatsha Buthelezi, Bophuthatswana's Lucas Mangope and Ciskei's Oupa Gqozo.

The underlying motives seem transparent: to drastically limit the powers of a future government. But there is also a bit of a kink in this reasoning.

If the NP's main aim is to ensure a place for itself in a power-sharing government, then there is little sense in having a weak central government.

Regionalism necessary

The ANC also clearly accepts the principle of regional government. Its 'Ten proposed regions for a united SA' document states: 'Regionalism is necessary for effective organisation of everything from policing to the layout of electricity grids to the arrangement of sporting facilities'.

'Far from weakening the centre,' the document adds,'strong and democratic regions make for a strong and democratic centre. The problem is not to oppose regions to the centre, but to achieve a correct and active interaction between the two.'

It was this 'delicate balancing act', as visiting British geographer Doreen Massey put it, between the national and regional levels that exercised the workshops and led into some of the stickier areas of debate around the issue.

'There are no natural boundaries —they are all produced by social and political processes,' as Massey put it. The present provincial boundaries, drawn up in 1910, 'stemmed from the Boer-British conflict and had nothing to do with the majority of the population,' said DAG's Laurine Platzky.

In fact, the regional boundaries also disguise deeper realities—like the contest for the control and distribution of power and resources.

If the creation of boundaries, then, is a political act and not a scientific one, a question mark hovers over the ANC's assertion that 'objective criteria' were used to come up with the proposed ten regions.

This leads to a crucial point of debate: what are the criteria that should determine the creation of regional government?

Long term transformation

Platzky has proposed that 'our new regions should be defined on the basis of long-term criteria for future development which is accountable to the majority'. There seemed to be basic agreement that regional government must advance the process of fundamental transformation and enable even and equitable development in our land.

Pietermaritzburg based geographer Martin Wittenberg, in a recent paper, described as 'remarkable' that the concept of social transformation does not feature in the ANC's document. This led him to question whether the creation of regions was indeed 'something integrally linked to the creation of new society'. The input by members of the ANC's constitutional committee who participated in the workshops suggested, however, that this goal still underpinned the initiative.

If one assumes—and it seems unavoidable to do so—that political mobilisation and organisation will remain the driving forces behind long-term, sustainable transformation in our country, another question bobs up: will regional government strengthen or impede those activities and struggles?

In South Africa, as one speaker said, mobilisation has tended to be at a national and local level. Massey, drawing on her knowledge of

experiences elsewhere, warned that 'if you go for regional government, it means implanting a new level or arena for politics'.

This may look like a good idea. But, as Massey went on to point out: 'Regional administrations tend to be staffed by technical bureaucrats -- people who are not immediately responsive to grassroots politics and concerns'. Henk Smit of the Legal Resources Centre issued a more blunt warning: 'The regional level of politics is likely to become a kindergarten parliament for aspirant and declining politicians'.

Political pitfalls

This does not render regional government a folly. It can still be appropriate for a range of other planning, coordinating and development activities. But, as participants pointed out, there are political pitfalls.

Regional government as currently proposed is likely to introduce a new, bureaucratised level of politics. It threatens to link rather uncomfortably with political initiatives that tend to rise organically from the local levels. It is unclear how this level of institutional power will advance social transformation at grassroots.

Secondly, assuming that regional government will have a strong role to play in coordinating development initiatives, there is concern that the democratic participation by targeted communities may suffer.

There was concern that regionalism, in Platzsky's words, 'might become overlaid with ethnic forms of allegiance'. Given the chances that different regions would compete for resources, there is the danger that this competition might take on an ethnic and chauvinist character.

But, as one ANC constitutional architect pointed out, ethnicity is a reality in our country—and it might be wiser to let it express itself openly through formal institutions, than to allow it to take more dangerous forms by driving it underground.

Balancing act

Massey suggests that the biggest challenge is getting the balancing act right.

At the one end, specific needs and features of a region must be respected. These include language, political histories, types of economic activities, availability of natural resources and more.



The rich get richer... there is a fear that the ANC's 10 regions will reinforce the unequal distribution of resources

ART: JUDY SEIDMAN

At the other end, one finds a national agenda with a set of principles and policies designed to help achieve the goals of liberation and transformation, for example, a commitment to national unity, models for economic growth and redistribution and new education policies.

Just how delicately the two ends will need to be balanced is obvious if one takes the environment as an example. Nationally, there is a clear need for tough legislation to halt ecological destruction. But, as one participant pointed out, 'each region has different environmental features—some are bone-dry, some have waters, some forests and some swamps —and they'll require different types of environmental action'.

Sadly, as another participant pointed out, the issue of gender did not make it into the ANC document. Yet it offers an acute example of how tough this tightrope act might prove to be.

In rural areas, particularly the homelands, women are the engine of social and political life. How will the government structures reflect this, given the predominance of men in SA's institutional centres of power?

Before drawing up the regions, 'we have to look at how functional they will be for the different tasks we want this level of government to perform,' proposed Platzky.

While it appears that the ten proposed regions are a given—at least for the purposes of holding an election—'they are not set in stone', as one ANC representative said. 'They should be an interim arrangement and consultation around the issue should be started as soon as possible.

'Let folk move around the country, involve communities and then present a report to a democratic parliament. This thing must be debated by our first parliament, soberly and carefully. Only then can we make the big decision.'

The fight for local control

By **KERRY CULLINAN**

THE ANC is squaring up for a confrontation with the government over what it sees as attempts to undermine national negotiations by entrenching white minority rule at a local level.

A consultative meeting in late April of the ANC, SA National Civic Organisation (Sanco), Cosatu and the SACP, demanded 'a protocol agreement between the government, community and political organisations'.

In this, the government would have to commit itself to:

* immediately withdrawing the Interim Measures on Local Government Act (IMA);
* ending all unilateral restructuring on a local level;
* a moratorium on retrenchments (of municipal workers) until a negotiated process of (local government) rationalisation can be implemented;
* a national negotiations forum to draw up a temporary legal framework to replace the IMA.

The organisations also called for a 'multi-party commission on local government' to take over the executive functions of provincial administrators and monitor local government negotiations.



Can the unrepresentative councils bring down the barriers?

State rejects demands

But the state has rejected the demands. Instead of the 'multi-party commission', it has proposed a 'preparatory council for local government' to be set up under Codesa to discuss the restructuring of local government.

The civics and unions would be kept out of such a council as they are not at Codesa. The ministry of local government accused the ANC of using the IMA as 'a smokescreen behind which to hide their internal differences, amongst others with civic associations, with regard to the negotiating process towards an interim and final dispensation for local government'.

It urged local communities to go ahead with negotiations 'to achieve local government structures that meet their requirements'.

Anticipating this response, the meeting also drew up a programme of action which is being discussed within the ANC, Sanco, Cosatu and the SACP. But the ANC-led campaign to ensure that a future government is not locked into racist local agreements controlled by powerful, conservative local bodies may be too late for some areas.

Since the minister of local government and housing, Leon Wessels, announced in March that local authorities would be penalised if they had not established 'joint administrations' by 1 January 1993, there has been a flurry of activity.

Many local authorities have seen 'joint administration' simply as a merger between black local authorities (BLAs) and white councils.

In smaller towns in Natal, local authorities are using the IMA to incorporate the black local authorities (BLAs) and indian and coloured local affairs committees (LACs) into white councils to give the appearance of non-racialism.

This has happened—or is in the process of happening—in Glencoe, Vryheid, Louwsberg, Mooi River-Rosetta and Stanger. While in Pietermaritzburg, indian LAC members have accepted half a vote each on the city's white council!

'The government has an unashamed political goal in bringing in the BLAs and LACs,' said Vish Sewpersadh, from the Centre for Community and Labour Studies. 'These are the structures that the National Party is going to use to gain access to the black community.'

A similar thing is happening in the Western Cape, where coloured management committees are being incorporated into white councils in the smaller towns (see p12).

Restructuring

But even in some areas where civics have been included in negotiations, restructuring is taking place.

In Kimberley, the local council and civic have already decided to hold non-racial municipal elections this year. This is despite opposition from the local ANC branch, which says the new municipality is premature.

Critics of the Kimberley agreement point out that the municipal elections will entrench white domination as the demarcation of the 12 municipal wards ensures that councillors representing white areas are in the majority.

This applies to Citrusdal in the Cape, which also plans to hold municipal elections this year. The ANC's NEC member for local government, Thozamile Botha, described the town's agreement as being 'based on townships and suburbs created by apartheid planning'.

The eight civic associations taking part in the Central Witwatersrand Metropolitan Chamber have also been accused of running ahead of national negotiations.

But these civics argue that while the chamber is looking at future models, it will not adopt a model until the issue is sorted out at the national negotiations.

In most areas—particularly where a civic is strong and linked to a regional body—civics have tried to limit negotiations to services, saying that they cannot negotiate about the future form of local government.

But civics are often unable to restrict discussion once the negotiations have started. Many civics have particularly been drawn into planning initiatives, which are looking at redefining municipal boundaries.

But the ANC has made it clear in its policy proposals that 'in order to avoid gerrymandering, it is essential that the boundaries are drawn up by a national body'.

Retrenchments

A hidden by-product of local negotiations has been the retrenchment of municipal workers in preparation for council mergers.

In Port Elizabeth alone, 800 municipal workers have lost their jobs.

It is hoped that the new closer cooperation between Sanco and Cosatu's SA Municipal Workers' Union (Samwu), will ensure some job protection for municipal workers.

The success of the campaign against unilateral local restructuring depends to a large extent on:

* the liberation movement, civics and trade unions developing a common vision of local government, for which they can then campaign;
* local organisations being strong enough to ensure that the authorities keep to agreements and residents understand agreements;
* training organisations to handle local negotiations.

A common understanding is particularly essential to ensure a directed and successful campaign and to defuse the power plays that have developed between the ANC and civics in some areas.

The ANC's local vision

The ANC is on the brink of making policy at a conference at the end of May. Its draft policy on local government (LG) is as follows:

Principles of local government

Cities and towns will be unified under a single municipality with one voters' roll and one tax base. Votes must be of equal value. LG should also be:

* non-racial and non-sexist;
* democratic and accountable;
* redistributive and redress the legacies of apartheid;
* effective and efficient.

Residents should have the right to information affecting them, and an ombudsperson will be appointed to investigate complaints such as corruption.

Role of local government

Local councils will be central in development, allocating services fairly and building democracy.

LG should bring government closer to the people and involve them in decision-making and planning.

The local level will be complemented by regional government, which will mainly coordinate local development, support councils and provide regional services.

Structures

Two tiers of LG — local and metropolitan or district— are envisaged.

In cities where the townships are far from the city centre, the local tier will ensure that local needs and problems are dealt with.

A metropolitan tier would set a framework for the local level tiers. It would control and distribute urban finance, allocating money for services and development. It would collect and distribute taxes.

In rural areas, district councils would operate in the same way as the metropolitan tier in urban areas. Local tiers could also be set up if there was a need.

Civil society

While elected LG structures would hold power, there would also be room for civil society to influence local government through people's assemblies, commissions and appeal boards. Some organisations could also be given certain powers. For example, a residents' association could administer a housing scheme.

LG would also promote civil society, particularly bodies representing the disadvantaged. Support and resources could be allocated to such structures.

PIC: ELMOND JIYANE (DYNAMIC IMAGES)

Soweto residents protest against their inefficient council

Chamber may collapse

By **KERRY CULLINAN**

THE COUNTRY'S most sophisticated local government negotiating forum, the Central Witwatersrand Metropolitan Chamber, is fighting for its life. And some civic activists believe that the government wants the chamber to collapse as it has grown too powerful.

After the Soweto Civic Association (SCA) announced on 1 April that the townships rent boycott would be resumed, the Transvaal Provincial Administration (TPA) demanded that the chamber be suspended until the Soweto crisis was resolved.

Chamber chairperson Frederick van Zyl Slabbert is in the process of mediating the dispute. The mediation is reported to be going well, but at the time of going to press, the problems had not been resolved.

Civic activists admit that the TPA's insistence that the chamber be suspended was unexpected. Although the chamber was set up after negotiations between the SCA and authorities over Soweto's rent and service boycott, it now extends far beyond Soweto.

The TPA is thus trying to hold the other parties involved in the chamber to ransom over the Soweto crisis. But the SCA is determined to make sure that the chamber survives. SCA general secretary, Pat Lepunya, told a recent SCA workshop that the civics have the most to lose by the collapse of the chamber.

Civics marginalised

'If the chamber collapses then the issues around service delivery, housing, local economic restructuring, etc will be carried on unilaterally by the local state agents and the civics will be marginalised.'

At the same time, the SCA is questioning the motives behind the TPA's decision to place the chamber in jeopardy.

'It would be naive,' said one SCA official, 'to believe that the TPA had not had any discussions about the chamber with central government.

'The TPA's reaction suggests that there is some anxiety in the government that the chamber is moving too fast. The government may find itself forced to follow examples that do not suit them. Whereas perhaps they are more confident of being able to hold the initiative at Codesa negotiations.' Lepunya adds that: 'The state can afford to delay any meaningful restructuring at the local level, and try to push everything to Codesa, where further delays can be expected.'

The Chamber has become the de facto metropolitan authority in the sub-region. It even advises the Regional Services Council on how to allocate its budget. But the state is not the only party against the chamber. Some civics and elements of the liberation movement are also against it.

The Alexandra Civic Association (ACO) has refused to take part in it until the black councils have been disbanded. ACO and some in the ANC believe that it is premature to set up a sub-regional structure until the country's new constitution has been drawn up.

'It is impossible to separate so-called "bread and butter" issues from developing into constitutional issues because electricity, for instance, is provided in terms of legislation which has been constitutionally derived. The same applies to local government itself,' says Lepunya.

'Simply stated, our view is that progressive structures in civil society have a right to represent their constituencies in the initiatives which are aimed at restructuring the local political economy. This is not the monopoly of political organisations alone.'

But some within the civics who are anti-chamber, may feel that the deadlock vindicates their position that there can be no talks with black councillors. At the heart of the Soweto deadlock is the councillors.

According to the SCA, the Soweto, Diepmeadow and Dobsonville councils have failed to deliver improved services to residents, despite agreements having been reached.

SCA official Kgabisi Mosunkuthu told the chamber at its last meeting that the deadlock would not be

resolved unless the councillors were removed.

But it now appears that the SCA will be prepared to ignore the councillors if an agreement can be struck that by-passes them. They are presently negotiating for the Johannesburg City Council (JCC) to take over Soweto services.

JCC management committee chairperson Ian Davidson has already made it clear that the council is 'ready and waiting to address Soweto's problems'. But the details still have to be worked out.

Problems

Another criticism of the chamber is that the government, with its expertise and resources, could out-manoeuvre the civics. It is already apparent that the civics do not have enough skilled people for all the chamber's technical committees.

Also, the technical nature of many of the chamber's committees means that it is hard for the affected communities to be kept informed of what the chamber is doing.

But Lepunya believes this can be overcome if the civics in the chamber develop a common strategy and consolidate their policy positions. The process of consultation and reportback mechanisms also have to be improved.

For the chamber's chief executive officer, Vic Milne, a key problem is the representivity of the chamber's members.

'The chamber cannot be representative until you have elections. The need for an election, for example for a metropolitan constituent assembly, is becoming increasingly evident to resolve the question of representivity,' says Milne.

'At least there will then be clarity about who is going to decide on issues. The black councillors are not representative of the majority of the people ... and the civics concede that they do not represent all—possibly not even the majority—of the people. So it is possible that the majority of the people are not represented.'

But for Lepunya, the credibility of the chamber depends mainly on its ability to deliver to the residents.

What is the metropolitan chamber?

The Central Witwatersrand Metropolitan Chamber was set up a year ago. At present, 20 organisations belong to the chamber. These include eight civics, the TPA and eight local councils.

Aims, powers and scope

The chamber's chief executive officer, Vic Milne, describes the chamber as 'a negotiating forum, aimed at transforming this region and improving the quality of life of its people by negotiating and establishing non-racial, democratic structures for local and metropolitan government'.

But the chamber is an interim body and the final form of new local government 'would have to be provided for in the final constitution of the country', says Milne.

'We are dependent on the national constitution, but would like to institute interim measures and move as quickly as possible towards final models.'

The chamber operates on the basis of consensus. Membership is voluntary and it has no statutory powers. Any agreements reached at the chamber have to be implemented by the local government structures.

The chamber agreed late last year that both local and sub-regional negotiating forums should be set up. The local bodies could be consulted about the budgets of the local authorities.

Working groups

There are nine working groups (WG) that fall under the chamber.

Milne explains that three of these — Constitutional Development, the Greater Soweto Principal Parties (GSPP) and Membership — are where the politicians are represented, and these bodies report directly to the chamber.'

The constitutional development WG is looking into models of interim and final non-racial, democratic metropolitan and local government.

The GSPP deals with problems related to Soweto, while the membership committee deals with issues such as representivity.

The remaining seven WGs fall under the Joint Technical Committee (JTC), which Milne chairs.

'The JTC deals with the technical aspects. This is where the officials and advisors to the political organisations are,' explains Milne. The JTC reports to the chamber.

The WGs under the JTC are:

* *Institutional development.* This looks at the administrative and operative aspects of the major services. It has task teams looking into water and sanitation; cleansing (refuse removal) and electricity.

There is also a local government training, team which is developing people — on the basis of affirmative action — to administer local government.

* *Physical development.* This looks at the physical side of implementing urban development. It too has five task teams: planning, land, housing, transportation and engineering.

The emphasis is on housing and land. It is also looking into coordinating a development plan for the greater Witwatersrand area.

* *Social development.* This has set up health, environmental and community facilities and services teams.

* *Economic development.* This WG is attempting to draw together local government, community organisations, organised business and organised labour. It may lead to a sub-regional economic negotiating forum being established.

* *Financial.* It's purpose is to look at a fiscal base and financial systems. It is trying to define affordable tariffs and the financial viability of services.

* *Disaster management.* This Working Group coordinates responses to disasters.

Uniting the reluctant rich and their poor neighbours

Alexandra is one of the country's poorest and most overcrowded townships, while Sandton and Randburg house some of South Africa's wealthiest citizens. Is it possible to unite such extremities?
KERRY CULLINAN reports.

BUILDING ONE municipality for Sandton, Randburg and Alexandra is going to take a long, long time. That much is clear from the drawn out negotiations in the Northern Joint Negotiating Forum (JNF), set up in October 1990.

Although Sandton bounds Alexandra on three sides, the areas are two different, and perhaps irreconcilable, worlds.

In Alexandra, the area surrounding the Alexandra Civic Organisations (ACO) offices has been taken over by armed Inkatha supporters. While interviewing ACO secretary Richard Mdakane, ACO members eyed the windows, expecting an attack at any time.

Interviewing Sandton management committee chairperson Willem Hefer was completely different. The Sandton Town Council (STC) has its own block overlooking Sandton City. The corridors are decorated with original artworks, and outside the foundations of new civic offices are being laid.

Agreements coming out of the JNF have brought some short term relief to the Alexandra community, says Mdakane.

'Shackdwellers have been provided with water and toilets, for example. The electricity supply has also been transferred to Eskom, and pre-paid meters have been accepted by the community.

'Some emergency repairs have also been done in the hostels, but staff are now afraid to enter the M1 and M2 hostels because they have been occupied by Inkatha.'

Mdakane believes that 'the formation of a single municipality is unavoidable, yet it is quite clear that it will take time'.

ACO believes the next step towards a single municipality is to extend the assistance agreement the township has with Sandton and Randburg to an agency agreement. This would mean that Sandton and Randburg would manage Alexandra directly.

'Indications are that the white councils will help with technical skills and human resources as long as the TPA pays,' says Mdakane.

'They are concerned with defending white interests. They will agree to anything as long as it does

PIC: KERRY CULLINAN

Alexandra residents picket Sandton's Town Council offices

not touch their pockets.'

Hefer is in favour of an agency agreement as long as that means that the two councils manage Alexandra directly, and not through the Alexandra City Council (ACC). But he does not believe that this means a single municipality for the Sandton-Randburg-Alexandra area is inevitable.

'We strongly suspect we have a common destiny, but there are complicating factors, which basically revolve around money,' says Hefer.

'The Alexandra City Council has a loan debt of R295-million and a R40-m accumulated loss. That has got to be cleared before we go into anything.

He stresses that his council will not enter into a new local authority structure with Alexandra if it is not going to be financially viable.

'You cannot start a new South Africa on a bankrupt basis. If you look at the financial statements of Alex, it has a budget of R65-m and income of R8-m. The difference is borrowed.

'We are giving attention to constructing an operating account that is viable. But some harsh things will have to be done. We've got to reconstruct the staff.'

	Alexandra	Sandton
Population	250 000 - 300 000	111 000 - 145 000
Area	4.6 square km	142.4 square km
Population density	60 000 per square km	1 000 per square km
Operating expenditure	R50m	R176m
Current monthly expenditure per resident	R10 - R12	R100 - R130
Council expenditure 1991/2 **Water** **Sewerage** **Refuse removal**	 R3.8m R1.2m R1.6m	 R28m R14m R19m
Libraries	one	six
Clinics	two	six
Council Staff	680	1 886

SOURCE: PLANACT

Retrenchments

This has recently been one of the sticking points of the JNF. Mdakane says the ACC workers cannot be blamed for being poorly trained.

'We don't have a say in the restructuring of the staff of Sandton and Randburg, yet they say ACC staff must be retrenched. We don't want a situation where white officials deliver services to Alexandra without empowering the community.'

But Hefer sees the retrenchment of ACC staff as the most obvious area to cut costs.

'For example,' says Hefer, 'there are 50 people registered to collect night soil, but there are actually 60 people doing that. A report shows 27 people can do the job. There's also a swimming pool attendant but there is no pool.

'We have got to come to an agreement at the JNF about restructuring the staff.'

Although neither Mdakane nor Hefer believe that the possible retrenchments will derail the JNF, it is not yet clear how the issue will be resolved.

But Mdakane is clear that his constituency will resort to mass action if the white councils delay for too long.

'We can boycott products bought in Sandton, organise sit-ins, stayaways and other mass actions to put pressure on them to form one municipality.'

Another sore point is the hostels. For over a year, residents have demanded that the illegal occupants responsible for violence are removed from the hostel. Yet the STC pays R17,138 a month to the ACC to rent 658 hostel beds, although its municipal workers have long been chased out of the M1 and M2 hostels.

The STC seems to have little understanding of how hated the hostels are by the Alexandra community.

'It would have been very silly on our part to give up our claim to that accommodation. That income has also been useful to the council of Alexandra, so I've got no regrets,' says Hefer.

A third area of tension is that the STC and Randburg are exploring a merger with the indian area of Marlboro Gardens.

For ACO, this is 'an act of bad faith' that could jeopardise the JNF. But Hefer says the move is part of an investigation to save the white councils money. It may anable them 'to take Alexandra on board without them having to pay a cent'.

But Alexendra residents are losing faith in the white councils' promises. At a May Day rally, they resolved that if the STC had not stopped paying rent for the hostels and the illegals had not been removed within a month, they would go back to the rent and service boycott.

Unilateral restructuring or pragmatic reform?

By **DEVELOPMENT ACTION GROUP**

THE NATIONAL Party's (NP) restructuring of local government in the Western Cape's platteland under the Interim Measures for Local Government Act (IMA) has been trumpeted by some as symbols of change towards a new South Africa.

These 'successes' are painted against similar media claims to NP support in 'coloured communities'. The NP hopes that this region will become a significant Nat base.

Western Cape has a significantly different racial composition to the rest of the country: african - 13%; white - 26%; coloured - 61%.

Many platteland towns have small african populations consisting largely of male contract workers living in hostels. Relatively few Black Local Authorities exist. The platteland areas also do not yet have strong ANC branches or civics.

The ANC, civics and Cosatu have rejected negotiations in terms of the IMA. The Cape Town City Council has heeded the call that local restructuring should be part of a national process, and stalled metro-talks.

The Cape Municipal Congress, made up of all authorities in the province, recently formed a special committee to develop a uniform response to one city/one tax base initiatives.

At regional and national levels, progressive elements have tended to be cautious about engaging with government on the content of interim local government arrangements.

'Single authorities'

During the last year we have witnessed white town councils inviting the coloured management committees (CMC) to sit jointly as single councils in many Boland, Karoo and Southern Cape-

PIC: ERIC MILLER (SOUTHLIGHT)

FW—showing his true colours?

Towns. Such arrangements are now being formalised under the IMA.

In the past two months, such agreements for Citrusdal, Clanwilliam and Riversdale have been approved by the administrator. More, such as Wellington, Willowmore, Groot Brak, Middleburg and Heidelberg, are waiting approval. There appears to have been little local resistance to these 'single authorities'.

In certain larger towns such as Paarl and Stellenbosch where the civics and ANC are stronger, negotiations have not come to fruition.

In George, the white and coloured authorities tried to exclude the african local authority of Thembalethu. However, the administrator rejected the proposed charter. The white city council and the Thembalethu Town Council have since resolved to work towards an interim structure, and wooed the Thembalethu Civic Association to participate in negotiations.

Typically, agreements ratified by the administrator provide for:

* the dissolution of the existing racial councils;
* the composition of a 'council for a single authority';
* appointment of members of the new council by and out of members of dissolved councils;
* a ward system often demarcated along racial lines, giving majority representation to white wards in new councils;
* elections to be held either once a common voters roll has been compiled, or in 1994.

The Cape Provincial Administration (CPA) is encouraging adoption of the single authority option rather than the racial joint administrations allowed under the IMA.

It remains to be seen whether these negotiated agreements will bear immediate advantages for disadvantaged communities. The pro forma agreement prepared by the CPA provides for upgrading of services and declares certain racial legislation invalid. Yet it does not suggest mechanisms to achieve these aims.

It is not clear how such agreements will overcome problems created by the costly and unworkable 'own affairs' administrations.

For marginalised rural communities, the question of participating in local government negotiations, whether outside or under the IMA, thus remains confusing.

Initially, the administrator undertook not to ratify local charters if community support could not be shown. Then he approved agreements such as the one in Citrusdal, which was reached solely between the white council and the local CMC.

The recently promulgated agreements consolidate white domination. It is unclear whether white councils and the administrator will agree to truly non-racial, democratic arrangements with no safeguards for whites via racially based ward systems.

The 'new democracy' created by the NP's opportunism in the platteland is so like the old South Africa. Is De Klerk finally revealing his vision of democracy?

GLOSSARY

WIP strives to communicate with as diverse a range of readers as possible. To this end, we give the meaning of some of the more difficult words found in this issue.

aberration — defect, abnormal
analogous — similar to
anecdotes — stories
antidote — remedy, cure
archetypes — models
austerity —harshness

bandied (about) — thrown around
bearishness — period of decline on stock market
beguiling — cunning, sly
behest — command
blatantly — offensively noticeable, obvious
bona fide — real or genuine

camouflaged — covered up, disguised
candour — openness
clandestine — secret
cogently — forcibly, convincingly
concessionary — exclusive right to market product
corrosive — tending to erode, waste away
cryptic — hidden, obscure in meaning

dearth — inadequate amount
de facto — in fact
degeneracy — corrupt, decline to lower state
demarcate — mark out boundaries
denigrate — put down
disgruntlement — dissatisfaction

emulate — copy
epithet — description
equity — interest of ordinary shareholders
erstwhile — previous, former
exacerbate — make worse
exorcising — getting rid of evil

fermenting — brewing
flak — barrage of criticisms
flippancies — treating serious matters lightly
fissures — cracks or splits
fount — source, spring
foxy — sly

gerrymandering — to manipulate to one's advantage

hegemony — leadership, dominance of particular ideas
helm — position of control

impediment — hindrance, obstacle
impunity — with no care
incantations — chant, spell
indelible — cannot erase
infusion — instil, introduce
irreconcilable — incompatible
irretrievably — unable to get back
intractable — difficult to solve

laudable — admirable, praiseworthy

minimisation — reduction
moratorium — agreed suspension of activity
morbid — unnatural gloom
moribund — at the point of death

nonplussed — taken aback, confused
nuance — subtle difference in meaning
obscures — hides
obnoxious — vile, disgusting
obsolete — disused, old, discarded
oligarchic — elite
ombudsperson — official appointed to investigate public's complaints against authorities
orthodox — conventional, traditional

paranoia — abnormal tendency to mistrust or suspect
parasitical — living off something else
pernicious — destructive, fatal
polity — state, process of civil government
pragmatist — practical, realistic
provocateur — person provoking or stirring trouble
pseudonym — fake name
pseudorealism — false realism

quintupled — five fold

realm — region, area
recipient — receiver
relegate — demote
resilient — able to recover
reverberate — echo
statutory — by law
stigma — bad name
susceptibility — ability to survive
swathe (cut a wide) — covered a large area

tainted — stained
tranquil — peaceful

undialectical — one-sided, simplistic
unfathomable — cannot be measured
untenable — cannot be maintained or defended

vindicates — justifies
virulent — bitter or violent
violate — break a law or code

Let all know peace