

## **NAMIBIA**

**A NATION  
IN WAITING**

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# Editorial

**A**rmed struggle as one component in the fight against apartheid is a reality. The issues it poses cannot be reduced to approval or condemnation. It exists, and has influence and support as a strategy for change. As such, the questions raised by armed struggle are a legitimate area for debate.

Umkhonto we Sizwe, military wing of the African National Congress, is the largest and most active of those involved in armed opposition to apartheid. But there have been recent indications of attempted infiltrations by guerillas from the Azanian Peoples' Liberation Army of the Pan-Africanist Congress - although thusfar no proven incidents of PAC military missions.

Pious condemnation of armed forms of struggle serve little purpose. Neither, for that matter, do noisy protestations of support from those too inexperienced to know that there is nothing romantic in any war - even a just one fought in the name of progress.

If war is one aspect of politics, then armed struggle is presumably waged by politicians who believe it is a necessary component of the struggle to rid South Africa of apartheid and the repression involved in maintaining minority rule. But progressive politicians wage war out of necessity, not because of any romantic beliefs about violence, death, guns or bombs.

Indeed, many who have taken up arms against tyranny have done so reluctantly and sadly, knowing that violence in any cause can be awesome in its destructive and unintended consequences.

Umkhonto we Sizwe's armed struggle against apartheid - an integral part of the ANC's political programme - is 27 years old. Over that period, sabotage and guerilla campaigns have generally been conducted with the care and thoughtfulness that one would expect of progressive politicians reluctantly forced to take up arms. Symbolic attacks involving terror aimed at 'forcing the government or whites to change' - like the Johannesburg station bomb blast of 1964 - were committed by people who had nothing to do with the ANC or its armed wing.

It is true that there have been contraventions of ANC policy on 'soft' and 'civilian' targets - even before its 1985 Kabwe Conference indicated that MK guerillas would no longer be under instruction to take the same care as before over avoiding civilian casualties when attacking 'hard' targets.

But the general thrust of ANC military activity has been consistent with its view of armed struggle as part of a more general political process, which includes winning support from the white 'middle ground' in South Africa, and from Western powers internationally. ANC endorsement of a protocol to the Geneva

Convention on the conduct of wars of national liberation was one indication of this concern.

Whether MK has taken action to discipline or redirect armed cadres operating in contravention of stated policy is not clear. Few armies undertake such disciplinary action publicly - although it would not necessarily be a bad thing.

It is also true that the South African state and its supporters have increasingly blurred the distinction between 'hard' and 'soft' targets, between military activity and political initiative. Massive troop activities in townships; long-term detention of civilians; raids into neighbouring states in which civilians and political refugees have more often than not been the victims; assassination of anti-apartheid activists and vigilante violence. These strategies, together with a trend of growing 'militarisation' within both government and society, have raised the temperature of anti-apartheid tactics, and increased the angry impulses of all those fundamentally opposed to the current structure of society.

It is not yet clear who has been responsible for the car bomb aimed at civilians leaving a rugby match; for limpet mines at a restaurant, sports club, amusement arcade and art gallery. White right-wingers, MK cadres operating in defiance of discipline, PAC guerillas and unaffiliated activists with access to explosives have all been mentioned.

Part of the difficulty in debating the issues of armed struggle is the lack of information available. And good journalism - something Stoffel Botha and his 'media hitmen' in government have no interest in - necessitates giving ANC leaders the right to comment publicly on these issues.

But having said that, one expects of the ANC and its army a cool head and calculating politics in this context. They, after all, act in the name of progress and a new society. One does not expect the same of a minority government which rules in the name of reaction and fear.

And one does not have to adopt a pious moralism to suggest that the attacks described above - no matter who was responsible - form no part of the progressive politics of transformation in South Africa.

*Correction:* The WIP 54 article on Cosatu's May congress ('It's testing time for Cosatu') contained a blatant error: in the final column of page 12, the positions attributed to a 'workerist bloc' and a 'populist bloc' were transposed. The offending sentence should have read: 'The "populist" bloc pushed for emphasis on non-racialism, and the "white sector" to draw in liberals and weaken the ruling bloc, while the "workerist" bloc pushed for an alliance of "organisations of the working class...and of the oppressed".'

## Waiting for Godsell?

With just over a month to go before the expected promulgation of the new Labour Relations Amendment Act, there seems to be little progress in attempts to present a joint position from organised labour and employers.

Talks aimed at formulating this position were initiated after the three-day worker stayaway at the beginning of June. After the first series of talks, two of the country's major union federations agreed to

prepare a joint position with the employer body, the South African Co-ordinating Committee on Labour Affairs (Saccola).

Minister of Manpower Pietie du Plessis postponed the implementation of the new legislation to give the different parties time to prepare their arguments, which are due to be presented to parliament when it reconvenes in August. But this process seems to have become bogged down.

The joint proposal from organised labour - prepared by the Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu) and the National Council of Trade Unions (Nactu) - has been completed. But according to Cosatu press officer Frank Meintjies, Saccola is now holding things up.

Meintjies says Saccola has not

worked according to a timetable put forward by Cosatu's legal advisors at a meeting with Saccola.

According to this timetable, the Cosatu/Nactu objections were to be sent to Saccola on July 6; Saccola was then to forward its written response by July 12, which would be followed by discussions on July 13-20. Cosatu and Nactu were a day late keeping to their side of the proposals - but at the end of July were still awaiting stage two: the Saccola response.

The unions are concerned about this delay, Meintjies says, as it could hamper their attempts at changing the labour legislation.

Saccola spokesman Bobby Godsell insists, however, that the employer body is still '100% committed to the process of discussing the law with the unions and working out a solution'. He also insists that no timetable was agreed upon at the meeting with Cosatu's legal team, saying: 'We do not perceive any delay'. Nactu's Piroshaw Camay said 'Saccola was unable to get a proper mandate and was not in a position to respond on the issues that Cosatu and Nactu brought to its attention'.

In the interim, the unions are planning to continue with campaigns and protest action against the Act. Cosatu's resolution on a broad anti-apartheid front, taken at its special congress earlier this year, is in the process of implementation, and the proposed conference of anti-apartheid organisations is expected to take place within the next three months.

Given management and labour's divergent interests in the Act, and the limited time available, it seems unlikely that Saccola and the labour movement will be able to prepare a draft Labour Relations Amendment Bill in time for the August sitting of parliament. And with provision having been made for parts of the proposed legislation to be put into effect at different times, chances are that the minister of manpower will not postpone the promulgation of the Act for a second time.

Shareen Singh.



Free to organise: NUEPFOCAR members at their launch

## A union for ex-prisoners

Ex-prisoners have a new service organisation and trade union.

The 'service organisation', the Prisoners' Welfare Programme (Priwelpro), and the 'union', the National Union of Ex-Prisoners for Crime Prevention and Rehabilitation (NUEPFOCAR), were both formed within the last nine months.

Priwelpro serves ex-prisoners, relatives of sentenced and awaiting-trial prisoners, and even banished people - arguing that 'those banished by the government are in a similar position to prisoners'.

The organisation is rooted in the Transkei and was formed inside an Umtata prison by two political prisoners: Vuma Ntकिनca, who was serving a four-year sentence for Pan-Africanist Congress activities, and MM Mbetse, who

\* Please turn to Page 4

was serving five years for furthering the aims of the banned African National Congress. They held several clandestine meetings while 'inside', and started organising full-time on their release in 1986. Ntकिनca now serves as Priwelpro publicity officer, Mbete as co-ordinator and general administrator.

Priwelpro caters for the general welfare of prisoners and their dependants. It has set up self-help centres in the Transkei offering dress-making, brick-laying and poultry-raising and is considering training volunteer workers to serve in different parts of South Africa, particularly the rural areas.

NUEPFOCAR, too, places a lot of emphasis on helping ex-prisoners get back on their feet. 'We organise jobs for our members, negotiate with welfare societies to accommodate ex-prisoners with mental problems, challenge unfair prison sentences and pressurise the prisons department to play a greater role in the rehabilitation process', explains organiser Jerry Ngxjola - a former organiser for the SA Allied Workers Union (Saawu).

Apart from functioning as an employment agency, NUEPFOCAR runs a literacy scheme for members, and has courses on legal rights.

The organisation is based in Natal, where it already has 2 500 members in ten branches. There is 'close contact' with other trade unions - in particular, affiliates of the Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu) - and projects are often undertaken in consultation with other progressive organisations, according to Ngxjola.

Although the union is fairly heavily funded, it has been able to help some of its members become self-sufficient. Says former prisoner Michael Nzimande: 'We have been kept busy since joining the union. We earn approximately R300 a month, depending on the number of projects we undertake'.

A major problem in organisation has been the resistance towards common-law ex-prisoners - even among some community

organisations. 'Ex-prisoners battle to be accepted back into society', Ngxjola said. 'They frequently resort to crime. They are also used by organisations with murky backgrounds - such as the Chesterville vigilantes, the A-Team or the Crossroads Witdoeke. And the only way to fight exploitation by these groups is to act collectively.

'People must be realistic and encourage ex-prisoners to join democratic organisations. Ex-criminal prisoners must join forces with ex-political prisoners and not allow themselves to be used by the forces of oppression'.  
*Rafora Rangongo, Concord.*

## Marching from Pretoria

**Y**oung white South Africans may not be lining up at Johannesburg's magistrate's court to join David Bruce in his six-year prison sentence for refusing to do national service.

But Bruce is not alone in his opposition to military service: one white South African male in ten is not reporting for his two-year compulsory national service. And one young white South African in four - having tasted the questionable joys of military life - is not reporting for his subsequent three-month army camps.

The South African Army Non-Effective Unit, an SADF unit responsible for tracking down call-up dodgers and objectors, is on record as saying that up to 2 400 people a month fail to report for duty to both national service and three-month camps.

And according to figures released by Defence Minister Magnus Malan in 1985 - the last time he gave figures, complaining afterwards that they were misused by 'those campaigning for the termination of compulsory military service' - more than 7 500 conscripts did not report

for the January call-up in that year out of a probable total of 18 000. Malan later said that 6 000 of the 7 500 were students whose automatic deferment had been delayed. The real absentee-figure was closer to 1 500, he said - still almost 10% of the total.

There is some reason to doubt the accuracy of Malan's claims; a year earlier, by his own admission, the stayaway figure was almost 1 600, and the 'township factor' had not yet come into play. Alister Teeling-Smith, national secretary of the End Conscription Campaign (ECC), the major anti-conscription grouping, explains: 'The townships are a major factor for many people. They are quite prepared to serve on the border against "the terrorists", but are unhappy patrolling the townships'.

Military occupation of the townships after the introduction of the state of emergency was the main reason for the growth of the ECC, Teeling-Smith says. With 90% of township residents opposed to the presence of troops in the townships, according to a Women for Peace survey, this is hardly surprising.

Even before the emergency ushered in township duty, a large number of people left the country to avoid having to serve in the SADF. The Committee for SA War Resisters, a British-based anti-conscription group, says 8 000 draft-dodgers sought refuge in Britain in the previous seven years. The United States, France and the Nordic countries also provide refuge for substantial communities of South African war resisters.

Their motivations range from David Bruce's 'stand against racism' and moral objections to serving in an army 'which upholds racism by violence' to what his defence lawyer called 'self-interest'.

Bruce, jailed on July 25, was the first objector imprisoned for refusing on political grounds to undergo his initial two-year national service, rather than his subsequent 'camps'. Others have



been jailed for refusing to attend three-month 'camps' - Ivan Toms, a Cape Town doctor currently serving 21 months behind bars, is the latest.

Opposition to military service is, however, not new: before the Board for Military Objectors was created in 1983, the ECC has records of 13 court cases in which non-members of the 'Peace Churches' (Jehovah's Witnesses, etc) were jailed for refusing to undergo military service for moral or political reasons. Since the 1983 revision to the Defence Act ushered in the board, more than 1 200 objectors' cases have been heard. At least 20 have been rejected - most of them on political grounds. Others have been ordered to undertake alternative community service, many in government departments prescribed by the department of manpower.

The upsurge of refusals - and an increase in increasingly-public defiance - does seem to have forced the SADF into re-assessing its views on compulsory service for all white males between 18 and 55.

When the SADF introduced 'Dad's Army' in 1985 to cover white men past the age of national service and camp call-up, 100 eligible men - among them Alex Boraine and Andre Brink - publicly

announced that they would not serve.

A year later the 'Cape Town 23' - 23 young Cape Town men eligible for national service or camps - announced that they would refuse to serve in the SADF. Of this group, only Toms has been prosecuted. Like Bruce, Toms actually presented himself to a call-up point.

Amid increasing signs of military sensitivity to the issue of compulsory military service, both men had to wait almost a year before they were prosecuted. Several other cases have been recorded of anti-conscription activists being granted deferment they have not asked for, or facing the lesser charge of 'failing to report for duty' rather than actual refusal to undergo military service.

Early this year SADF officers agreed to meet ECC officials to discuss 'alternative service' - community service in, or independent of, government departments, the ECC suggests. The ECC was surprised that the meeting took place - and even more surprised when 'Colonel Burger' and 'Captain Smart' agreed to a joint statement on the meeting, in which the officers undertook to consider the ECC proposals.

Anti-conscription activists speculate that the sudden military softening on the issue could be linked to the massive outflow of skilled professionals from the country. A recent survey at Rhodes University established that 52% of students planning to leave South Africa after completing their degrees were doing so primarily to avoid military service.

The seriousness with which Pretoria regards the issue can be judged by law and order minister Adriaan Vlok's description of the 1 000-member ECC as one of South Africa's major enemies - along with the African National Congress, the SA Communist Party and the United Democratic Front. 'It has a status way beyond its size or even potential influence', laughs Teeling-Smith.

'If I were Malan, I'd agree to

alternative service - punitively, with six years service. It would take the wind out of ECC's sails by granting the right to chose', he says. 'If he could withstand the short-term propaganda loss, he'd come out on top'. Maybe. But as Teeling-Smith himself acknowledges 'there is more to conscription resistance than the ECC'. There are one in ten white South Africans dodging their first call-up, and one in four their subsequent camps.

*WIP correspondent*

## Behind the bars

Cell number 2, armed robber Shadrack Themba Nongoma's home for the past few months, is about the size of a four-room township house. It currently houses 120 common-law prisoners.

Things haven't always been as cramped at Umtata's Wellington Prison, however; Nongoma's previous 'home', cell number 1, only housed 117 prisoners - even though, like cell number 2, it should hold a maximum of 40.

Nongoma himself sleeps in the cell's toilet area, along with eight other inmates. 'Arguments and physical fights between prisoners are commonplace, as are incidents of sodomy and indecent assault', Nongoma said in an affidavit presented to the Transkei supreme court recently.

The affidavit forms part of an application brought by five Wellington inmates against conditions in the prison. In their application, they plead for basic rights such as:

- \* an end to overcrowding;
- \* daily exercise;
- \* a slice of bread each day;
- \* mattresses, sheets and pillows;
- \* cutlery and toiletries.

More specifically, the prisoners have urged an end to assaults by prison warders which, they say, have resulted in the deaths of at least two prisoners in recent

months.

The deaths occurred during a full-scale battle between prisoners and at least 60 policemen and warders on January 26 this year, after one of the prisoners asked for a second helping of food.

'The prisoner, Norman Fihla, was given his seconds. Then a warder, Wakaba, assaulted Fihla with a rubber truncheon. When Fihla grabbed the truncheon, the warder assaulted him with a knobkerrie. One Sergeant Sithseke also attacked Fihla with a truncheon', Nongoma said.

'The prisoners threw their empty dishes at the warders. There were many other warders present - none of them was touched'.

In retaliation, Nongoma said, the warders attacked the prisoners.

'About 60 policemen and warders led by Colonel Gaga and Lieutenant Mazui armed with iron bars, pipes, rods, hunting sticks, brooms, table legs and sjamboks launched a full-scale attack on the prisoners. Sergeant Nteyi was armed with a knife. A teargas cannister was thrown in the yard and, when prisoners scuttled into the cells, more cannisters were thrown into the cells. We were rushed out of the cells and assaulted in the prison yard. We were then told to go back into the cells and strip naked'.

Nongoma said the prisoners were assaulted by several warders. 'One Mandondo was assaulted on the lower parts of his body by Sergeant Sithseke who remarked, "Hau, this dog is still alive".'

Both Mandondo and Fihla died in the incident and two other prisoners were hospitalised. Two days later the prisoners were refused exercise. 'Since 28 January 1988, we have been locked in our cells for 24 hours daily. We are allowed neither sunshine, fresh air nor exercise. (Before this) we used to have at least one hour of exercise every day. We are not allowed to perform any labour at all'.

Nongoma argues in his affidavit: 'To deprive prisoners of all opportunity to work and exercise constitutes cruel and unusual

punishment. There can be few greater hardships than for active human beings to be locked in congested cells day and night, week after week and month after month in enforced idleness'.

The plight of Nongoma and his cell-mates is even more severe than that of their counterparts in jails in the rest of South Africa. It is almost impossible to obtain information on prison conditions, and even the International Committee of the Red Cross is barred from Transkei jails.

Prisoners also seldom see visiting magistrates, according to the five who contributed affidavits, and not one of them had ever been visited by a judge.

The five applicants are serving sentences ranging from three to 20 years for crimes including car theft, assault and terrorism. The respondents are the minister of justice and prisons and the commissioner of prisons.

The application contains six pages of demands: the first part calling for the court to recognise certain basic rights for all prisoners, and the second part calling for specific changes for the applicants. The five are hoping not only to improve their own conditions but also have the court define certain conditions as a right for all prisoners.

The very basic nature of these demands shows the absolute power which prison authorities wield over the inmates, many of whom have been sentenced to lengthy terms of imprisonment.

Nongoma's affidavit forms the basis of the application. In it, he said he had frequently complained about conditions at Wellington. 'Whenever complaints and grievances have been raised, I have been threatened and told, in the words of Warrant Officer Cembali, "You want to make yourself Mandela when you know you've robbed a bank". I was told that I was transferred from cell number 1 to cell number 2 because I was making my co-prisoners conscious of the denial of basic rights and liberties by the prison authorities'.

Nongoma outlines the conditions

under which he lives, saying that he believes conditions are the same throughout the prison: 'The cell in which I am confined measures approximately four by five metres. In my estimation, this cell can house a maximum of 40 prisoners. There are approximately 120 prisoners housed in this cell.

'There is only one toilet per cell. The toilet in cell number 2 has a door but it has no door handle. The handle to flush the toilet is inoperative, so one has to pour water into the cistern in order to flush the toilet. Once a month, the prisoners in each cell receive about a dozen toilet rolls to last until the next month. There is no bath in the cell, and only one shower. The pipes in the cell are leaking, resulting in the floor being damp.

'If we obtain any fresh facecloths, they are seized by the warders as "unauthorised articles". We are not supplied with hairbrushes or combs at all. One razor blade is given to four prisoners to share.

'For the purposes of sleeping, two prisoners share a mat in flagrant violation of (the law). We are given two new and two old blankets per mat. The old blankets are little more than rags. We are given no pillows at all. After washing blankets, we are forced to throw them into the yard for drying as the cells have no washing lines. The prison yard has no grass nor cement, merely soil. The result is that the blankets are again dirty when dry.

'We are not supplied with handkerchiefs, thus we have to use our shirts to wipe our faces and to blow our noses. We are supplied only with a shirt, a pair of trousers and a jacket on admission to prison. We are not supplied with any underwear, pyjamas, overcoats, socks, jerseys or spare clothes. Whenever clothing is washed, that part of the body which it covers has to remain bare. We are not supplied with any cutlery for eating. We are, therefore, compelled to eat with our fingers. The application is due to be heard in the Umtata supreme court on August 18.- *elnews*


# NAMIBIA

Independence for Africa's last colony may be in sight. But as in the past, Namibian representatives were absent from the latest talks aimed at ending South Africa's illegal occupation of the territory. DAVID NIDDRIE reports on the situation in Namibia and, in the following article, on the implications of the peace talks in neighbouring Angola.

**A** Namibian political legend recounts that, when asked some years ago how Namibians would achieve independence, Swapo President Sam Nujoma replied: 'When President Mandela gives it to us'.

Officials in Namibia's major nationalist movement deny the story, but it illustrates much about Namibia. A country of just over a million

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people - enough to be comfortably swallowed whole in South Africa's bigger cities - most of the major decisions in Namibia's history have been taken outside its borders by foreigners, usually South Africans.

Last month's three-nation agreement of 'principles for a peace settlement in south-western Africa' - agreeing to the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 435 - was no exception. Resolution 435 calls for South African withdrawal from the territory, and UN-supervised elections before independence. South Africa, Angola and Cuba signed the agreement and left it to South Africa and Angola to work out the exact date of 435's implementation. Not a Namibian in sight.

The accord is the third agreement South Africa has signed in the last ten years undertaking to quit Namibia. All have been signed and sealed - but never quite delivered.

Not surprisingly, Namibians have responded with caution this time round. 'We put little faith in these talks', a Swapo official said shortly before South African, Cuban and Angolan officials hammered out the details in New York. Afterwards Swapo thawed only slightly, describing prospects for 'progress' as 'reasonably brighter'.

**E**nding South African rule is the main dynamic in Namibian politics. Even members of the country's South African-sponsored Transitional Government of National Unity (TGNU) - which has the most to lose through 435's implementation as it must be dissolved as part of Pretoria's illegal administration - acknowledge that most Namibians support 435.

And as earlier rounds of the three-way settlement talks took place in London, Brazzaville and Cairo, Namibia was shaken by the most extensive mass opposition to South African rule ever. This included a four-month school boycott by an estimated 40 000 scholars and students, and Namibia's biggest-ever national strike - backed by well over half of the country's 150 000 formally employed workers, according to the fledgling trade union movement.

This upsurge in resistance followed three years of rapid growth in support for Namibia's student and trade union organisations, the National Namibian Students Organisation (Nanso) and the National Union of Namibian Workers (NUNW), both of which acknowledge a debt to the experience of South African student and labour organisation.

'We are a colony of South Africa; whatever happens there is heard here', says Ben Uulenga, general secretary of the Mineworkers Union of Namibia, NUNW's biggest affiliate. 'We're good friends with Cosatu (South Africa's major union grouping) - they've advised us'.

**T**his year's political convulsions began during March in Ponghosi Secondary School, which lies in heavily-populated Ovamboland, a traditional Swapo stronghold on the border with Angola. The school itself is just six kilometres from the border, heavily defended by South African soldiers and the South African-lead South West African Territory Force (SWATF) against incursion by guerillas of Swapo's military wing, the People's Liberation Army of Namibia (Plan).

These incursions are frequent, and resulted in almost 500 'incidents' last year alone, according to military figures which are probably conservative.

Opponents of South Africa's presence charge that to discourage Plan attacks, South African military strategists build their bases near black schools.

'The children at these schools are the brothers and sisters of Plan fighters', says Uulenga, himself a former guerilla, wounded in a clash with South African troops in 1976 and jailed for ten years on Robben Island. 'The South Africans build their bases alongside the schools, or wherever the people gather - hospitals, clinics or community centres - so the guerillas will be reluctant to attack and risk killing people in the cross-fire'.

This claim is widely believed among scholars throughout Namibia. 'They do it so people will be killed in the cross-fire and Swapo will be discredited. Then they can say Swapo is fighting the people not the South African army', says Ignatius Shihumani, of Nanso.

Of Namibia's 40 secondary schools, government officials acknowledge that three have military bases directly alongside them. Ponghosi, a boarding school which before March housed 600 pupils, is one of them. Its pock-marked walls and gaping roof bear testimony to the regularity of the 'cross-fire'.

## United Nations Security Council Resolution 435

Adopted by the Security Council on September 29 1978

The Security Council, reaffirming the legal responsibility of the United Nations over Namibia:

1. Approves the report of the Secretary-General of the council for the implementation of the proposal for a settlement of the Namibian situation, and his explanatory statement.
2. Reiterates that its objective is the withdrawal of South Africa's illegal administration of Namibia and the transfer of power to the people of Namibia with the assistance of the United Nations in accordance with resolution 385 of 1976.
3. Decides to establish under its authority a United Nations Transition Assistance Group (Untag) in accordance with the report of the Secretary-General for a period of up to 12 months in order to assist his Special Representative to carry out the mandate conferred upon him by paragraph 1 of Security Council resolution 431 (1978), namely to ensure the early independence of Namibia through free and fair elections under the supervision and control of the United Nations.
4. Welcomes Swapo's preparedness to co-operate in the implementation of the Secretary-General's report, including its expressed readiness to sign and observe the ceasefire provisions as manifested in the letter from the President of Swapo dated September 8 1978.
5. Calls on South Africa forthwith to co-operate with the Secretary-General in the implementation of this resolution.
6. Declares that all unilateral measures taken by the illegal administration in Namibia in relation to the electoral process, including unilateral registration of voters, or transfer power, in contravention of Security Council resolutions 385 (1976), 431 (1978) and this resolution are null and void.
7. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council not later than October 23 1978 on the implementation of this resolution.



David Nidrie

**Mineworkers Union of Namibia general secretary Ben Uulenga: 'We are a colony of South Africa; whatever happens there is heard here.'**

Headmistress Hishidimbua Ndeyapo says she has often visited the military base to complain of the attacks and to ask them to collect unexploded mortar bombs. She says some soldiers have admitted firing mortars at the school 'in error'.

In the early hours of March 10 last year, Plan attacked the military base. Half-an-hour after the attack, mortar fire hit the school, ripping through the girls' dormitory. Fifteen-year-old Albertina Nghikon-gelwa died instantly and Victoria Nghikofa died some days later.

TGNU officials in Windhoek, which nominally controls SWATF, concede that the bombs came from the direction of the military base, but maintain they were probably fired by Plan and overshot the base, hitting the school instead.

Andreas Shipanga, a former Swapo official who returned from 19 years exile to head the TGNU's economic affairs ministry, admits there are many civilian casualties in the campaign against Plan: 'We are accused of perpetrating atrocities when Casspirs overrun homesteads in the north and hurt people, but Swapo fighters run into the homesteads and keep firing. What alternative is there?'

Although many Namibians believe

the Ponghofi attack came directly from the base in retaliation for the Plan raid, it provoked no immediate response. But this year Ponghofi's students and teachers held a commemoration on March 10. A week later Mrs Ndeyapo awoke to find the school deserted and a note pinned to her office door saying the students had left and would not return until the base had gone 'even if it takes ten years'.

**T**he boycott spread, first to other schools in the north - bringing out 30 000 scholars and students from teacher and agricultural training colleges - then southwards to Windhoek, the country's capital. By April more than 40 000 were out. Police began detaining student leaders and breaking up parent-pupil meetings, raising the political temperature sharply.

With the boycott at its peak in early June, 'and under strong pressure from our members', say NUNW officials, the union movement threatened strike action unless the bases were moved, detainees released and South Africa's military presence ended within a week.

The Namibian interim government and South African administrator-

general Louis Pienaar both attempted to unload the issue onto the other. Pienaar maintained it was a TGNU issue, while Shipanga and other officials responded that they had not put the bases there in the first place. And anyway they could not afford the R6-million the SADF said it would cost to move the Ponghofi base.

After a week of hectic organising, during which police raised the political temperature even further by detaining NUNW education officer Richard Pakleppa and several other key figures - among them Gwen Lister, editor of the country's major opposition paper, *The Namibian* - the unions called a two-day strike.

The strike - the first national strike since the 1971 World Court ruling that South Africa's presence was illegal sparked a stayaway by 20 000 workers - was the biggest in Namibian history. With union officials claiming that up to 100 000 workers responded, even TGNU Manpower Minister Moses Katjuongua admitted that 30% of the 150 000 workforce had heeded the NUNW call. In the Rossing uranium mine and the Oranjemund open-cast diamond mines - engine-rooms of the Namibian economy - employers conceded that the walk-out was

almost total.

The strike won the release of several detainees, but the military bases remained. In late July, at the recommendation of Nanso, students began returning to school. But they have threatened to come out again if the bases have not been moved by the last week in August.

**T**hese actions, initiated by organisations which make no secret of their support for Swapo, sent a surge of confidence through the embattled organisation, with youth secretary Marten Kappewasha claiming that Swapo enjoyed the support of 70% of Namibians.

The figure is important: Resolution 435 provides for an election to a national constituent assembly charged with the task of drafting a post-independence constitution - with all decisions requiring a 66% majority approval.

TGNU officials tacitly concede that Swapo's estimate of its support could be accurate. But they suggest that the problem may not end if Swapo gains an outright 66% majority. Says Shipanga: 'If Swapo wins, will the other contestants accept it unless they are forced to at the barrel of a gun?'

Ironically the TGNU, formed in 1985 as the basis for an anti-Swapo alliance with the endorsement of Pretoria, has helped Swapo and its opponents in the trade unions and student movement turn latent sympathy into active support.

'The TGNU was told by the South Africans: go out and win 35% support so you can block Swapo in the constituent assembly', says a Windhoek-based journalist. 'They did, but not as Pretoria intended'.

To win support, the TGNU began a cautious liberalisation campaign, successfully urging the release of Namibian political prisoners - among them Ben Uulenga - and heading off attempts by South Africa to extend its harsh state of emergency rule to Namibia. It also attempted to restructure the country's second-tier administrative structures - highly unpopular because of their division into 11 ethnic and racial authorities.

Last year Pretoria sharply slapped down this attempt. Early this year the TGNU went to the Namibian supreme court, winning an advisory ruling that retention of ethnic authorities was incompatible with the bill of rights written into Proclamation AG8 by which President PW Botha had signed the TGNU into being. A month later Botha flew to Windhoek with four South African cabinet ministers to bring the TGNU into line, expanding Pienaar's powers so that he now exercises effective veto rights over all important TGNU decisions.

Recognising that its support - never high - is dwindling further, the TGNU continues to push for de-racialisation of its administration. In June it sent a revised version of its draft Namibian constitution to Pretoria for approval, but with little

hope that Botha would relent. 'The new proposals are our last attempt to change this country; we've tried everything in our power', says Katjuongua.

It's a slim hope. Katjuongua has already given notice to the tenants of his Katutura home in the expectation that he will soon be ordered out of the house allocated to him as TGNU minister of manpower.

'It started out well. The first year was okay - Botha promised to allow Namibians to decide on the future of Namibia. But then he went back on his word', laments Katjuongua.

**S**wapo officials believe that the TGNU initially had some support among the local populace. It was launched at a time when Swapo was militarily trying to recover from South Africa's occupation of southern Angola - thus blocking its traditional infiltration routes - and legal restrictions had prevented it from operating internally. The presence of figures such as Shipanga and Katjuongua, both recently returned from long years in exile and with past ties to Swapo or the smaller South West African National Union (Swanu), also helped.

But, the Swapo officials add, this support was short-lived. Prevented by Pretoria from changing the apartheid structures it inherited, the TGNU could also do little to revive a stagnating economy, which shrank steadily from 1980 to 1986, and demonstrated only a tiny increase the



Editor Gwen Lister and her newspaper's battle-scarred doors

## A vibrant press - and

If Namibia is regarded as little more than an international negotiating issue by most of the world's media, and its inner workings virtually ignored, the reverse certainly doesn't hold.

Namibia's capital, Windhoek, supports eight separate newspapers - more than any other Southern African capital - for a population of around 100 000.

And you don't have to read them to know where they stand in the spectrum of Namibian politics. A glance at the front doors of their offices spells it out explicitly.

The bomb-proof glass doors of the offices of *The Namibian* are dotted with round cracks the size of one-rand coins - whether the result of bullets or

ball-bearings shot from catapults, editor Gwen Lister doesn't know. The attacks took place at night when the offices were deserted.

Across town, on the wall alongside the front door of the *Windhoek Observer*, a sign in angry red type carries the warning: 'These premises are patrolled by armed men at night who will shoot trespassers on sight' - something of an exaggeration (a late-night knock at the door gets no response). The sign indicates that its author, *Observer* editor Hannes Smith, has also suffered some of the consequences of critically covering South Africa's occupation of Namibia.

A former editor of the daily *Windhoek Advertiser*, Smith was sacked for his outspoken criticism of

next year.

Workers in the relatively highly-paid mining sector earn as little as R80 a week. And almost 60% of the country's 310 000 potential workforce is unemployed, according to NUNW's Uulenga. Government figures - suggesting without much conviction that one in five adult Namibians are fully employed in the informal sector - tend to support Uulenga's claims.

Since 1979, employment on the mines - the major contributor to Namibia's economy, accounting for 36% of gross domestic product (GDP), and 70% of foreign earnings - has shrunk from 36 000 to 22 000. Agriculture, mainly stock and karakul sheep farming, is the major employment sector with almost 50 000 workers - but it too has suffered, and provides just 8% of the GDP.

Namibia's only growth industry is the business of government, providing 17% of GDP and employing 42 000 people, half of them in the ethnic, second-tier administrations, and many of them South Africans seconded to Namibia. This makes government the second largest employment sector.

Most of the country's economy is, in any event, outside of direct Namibian control: Namibia's mines - particularly the diamond operations which produce more than 1-million carats annually as the biggest single contributor to the country's mining income - are owned mainly from outside Namibia. The opencast dia-



Swapo youth secretary Marten Kappewasha: 'We have the support of 70% of Namibians.'

mond operations in Oranjemund on the Namibian coast, for example, are owned by De Beers' Consolidated Diamond Mines and sold through the De Beers-controlled Central Selling Organisation. More than half the beef output is butchered in South Africa. And Namibian government publications describe the fish processing factories of Walvis Bay - a South African enclave covering the major harbour on the Namibian

coast, which will not be surrendered on independence - as 'the centre of SWA/Namibia's fishing industry'.

Even within the limited scope available to it, the TGNU delivered little - allowing the extremely unbalanced labour relations legislation inherited from South Africa to stand. The writ of South Africa's 1979 Labour Relations Act, enforcing employer recognition of unions able to demonstrate majority support among their employees, does not run to Namibia. NUNW unions won their first recognition agreement only in June this year - from South African-owned Consolidated Diamond Mines, one of the higher-paying employers.

In other areas, too, the TGNU lost ground by failing to break with Pretoria: having been granted control of the SWATF, it did nothing to end the widely-resisted compulsory two-year conscription. Instead, it expanded the service into a 24 000-strong force which South African military spokesmen say bears the brunt of the fighting against Swapo.

In the fighting around Cuito Cuanavale in southern Angola from October last year, the SWATF reportedly lost 300 troops, compared to a Pretoria claim of just 31

## plenty of it, too...

South Africa's attempts to pilot an 'internal settlement' without Swapo participation, and started the *Observer* with Lister as a trainee.

Three years ago Lister broke away to establish *The Namibian*, an openly pro-Swapo weekly staffed by Lister and a handful of inexperienced trainee-reporters. By the end of 1985, the paper was the second-biggest seller in Namibia, second only to *Die Republikein* - a pro-TGNU daily reportedly funded from Pretoria and which other journalists claim sells many of its copies 'down south' (in South Africa).

With a circulation of just 8 500 (*Die Republikein* sells 9 000 and the *Observer* around 4 500), *The Namibian* is unique in that almost half

of its print run is bought in the north which, although it is the home of more than half Namibia's 1,2 million people, is generally disregarded by the Namibian press.

Unrestricted by the emergency regulations which the South African government has imposed on the press at home, *The Namibian* regularly reports on atrocities carried out by the military. But Namibia hardly enjoys untrammelled press freedom. And when Lister published a story on South African plans to introduce legislation modelled on Pretoria's own state of emergency, police detained her and, on and off until her release five days later, demanded to know her source - widely rumoured to be a TGNU cabinet member.



**Namibian students at a Nanso rally in June: Looking south for direction.**

South Africans. This disproportion reportedly led to several mutinies among black Namibian troops, many of them complaining at having to don Unita uniforms and fight (armed only with rifles) against the increasingly-sophisticated Angolan forces.

Wisely, however, the TGNU did not attempt to enforce conscription in the heavily populated north - Ovamboland and Kavango together account for well over half Namibia's population - recognising, as one potential black conscript says 'they would be training us for Swapo'.

The bulk of the SWATF is made up of full-time volunteers, attracted into the force by a potential private's salary of R800 a month, vastly higher than the average income of Namibians lucky enough to get work elsewhere.

**S**wapo activists released from Robben Island thus found fertile ground as they fanned out into the almost-defunct trade union movement and back into Swapo itself - only just beginning to enjoy a revival, with the strong backing of the churches, which claim the allegiance of nine out of ten Namibians.

After winning a court action in 1986, granting it the right to hold its first public meeting in seven years, Swapo succeeded in attracting a crowd of 15 000 supporters to a meeting in Katutura - the biggest political meeting in Namibian history.

Never banned by South Africa,

whose officials recognise that by formally suppressing Swapo they would be acknowledging permanent rejection of 435 to the world, Swapo enjoyed a resurgence of support. The organisation was backed by an increasingly-confident student movement which looked south to the burning townships of 'the colonial power' for example and direction, and from a labour movement which divided Swapo's red, blue and green colours among its three industrial unions to win worker support.

'We couldn't organise without Swapo colours. The workers are suspicious of anything else', says NUNW education officer Pakleppa.

'The union movement could have started years ago', adds Uulenga. 'The workers are highly politicised and recognise the link between their poor working conditions and the South African presence. Long before the unions they were prepared to rally together to demonstrate their opposition' - most vividly during the 1971 national strike.

Swapo itself is possibly more vividly rooted in Namibia's working class than any other liberation movement on the continent. It was formed in 1957 (as the Ovamboland People's Congress) specifically to oppose Namibia's contract labour system. In this system, 50 000 workers from Ovamboland were shipped out every year to work, under prison-like discipline, in the industrial centres of the south, or on the mines. Elements of the system remain to this day, with older

workers recalling how Swapo president Nujoma was smuggled into their compounds nearly 30 years ago to address secret meetings and organise strikes.

Militarily, too, Swapo has recently reasserted itself, staging dramatic attacks on military targets in Windhoek itself in the last month. Its war in Namibia remains, however, less intense than its peak in 1980 - a level which prompted South Africa's invasion of southern Angola. But its army, Plan, has - according to Cuban sources - tripled in size from the 7 000 estimated by South Africa in 1977.

Fighting alongside Angolan troops and their Cuban allies - although not as integrated units - Swapo now has 20 000 soldiers. Many of them have experience both in conventional fighting formations and as penetration forces behind enemy lines.

If the current agreement on Namibian independence collapses, Plan's strength - much of it present alongside Angolan and Cuban forces only a few kilometres from Ovamboland - could lay the foundation for a massive upsurge in guerilla activity.

Despite their caution, many Namibians still hold out hope for an internationally-enforced end to South African rule.

'We may be Africa's last colony', says Thomas Gideon, a third-generation Swapo supporter and one of the 40 000 students boycotting classes, 'but by September 29 (the anniversary of Resolution 435's enactment) we will be free'.

# KEEPING PRETORIA ON THE RIGHT TRACK



Cuban politbureau foreign secretary Jorge Risquet: Havana has good reason to feel satisfied

**H**aving herded a reluctant South African government safely past the highly-sensitive 'settlement principles' last month, Cuban negotiators believe they have enough momentum to keep Pretoria tied into the talks aimed at peace in Angola and independence for Namibia.

They believe they can do this despite attempts by US assistant secretary of state for Africa, Chester Crocker, nominally the man keeping the talks together, to re-write several of the principles.

The Cuban military presence in Angola, in fact, appears to be the major reason why the talks have survived so long, when so many past initiatives have stumbled - although the looming presence of Michael

## What are the chances of success for the parties involved in the Angolan peace talks, brokered by the United States?

Dukakis as the man to replace Ronald Reagan in the White House has also helped.

The issue keeping the talks on track, suggests Jorge Risquet, Cuba's politbureau foreign affairs secretary, is fairly simple: South African military strength, which dominated the region from the invasion in 1975, has been successfully challenged for the first time.

This is despite the fact that, only nine months earlier, South Africa had moved in heavy armour, artillery and a powerful aerial strike force to repulse Angolan attacks on Unita's Jamba headquarters. In

doing so, it succeeded in doing what it had done since 1980 - using its more sophisticated weapons to maul the Angolans and force them to retreat.

It was the last time it succeeded in doing so.

Fapla forces retreated to Cuito Cuanavale and, with powerful backing from elements of the Cuban force in Angola (at the time around 35 000, since enlarged to almost 50 000), dug in for a fight.

When South Africa's ageing fleet of French Mirage III fighter bombers arrived to root out the Angolans again, as they have done so often in the past, they flew straight into a combined Cuban/Fapla air force spearheaded by Soviet MIG 23s - faster, newer and more manoeuvrable than the Mirages.

At least three Mirages went down, Cuban sources claim - a major loss

for South Africa, unable to replace its planes on the international market, and forced instead to revamp its existing force.

South Africa had lost its aerial superiority - and thus its ability to trump any ground threat by bombing it into defeat.

Unrecognised, the first step had been taken down the bumpy road towards negotiations.

The South African Defence Force then brought to bear its powerful, long-range G5 and G6 cannons, pounding 40 000 of their 135 mm shells into the town in the months until the unofficial, semi-ceasefire ushered in by the July 21 three-way agreement. The Fapla force survived both the artillery pounding and, according to Risquet, five major assaults from January to April, in what rapidly escalated into the biggest land-battle in Africa since World War Two.


For South Africa, it was a major defeat - not in the sense that its troops were compelled to scramble back to the relative safety of Namibian soil, but because, for the first time, its military forces had been stopped.

**W**ith the two armies deadlocked around Cuito, both sides began probing elsewhere for military and political advantage. This process was complicated by increasing impatience from Crocker, eager for a settlement favourable to Unita's Jonas Savimbi before the Reagan administration left office in January 1989. Having put his faith in Pretoria's ability to force Angola to settle with Savimbi or, at best, to put him in Luanda, Crocker now had to look elsewhere. He rejected a South African suggestion that they bypass Cuito, take large areas of eastern Angola, and that Savimbi then declare himself head of an alternative Angola seeking US recognition, according to the London-based *Africa Confidential*.

Instead Crocker began wooing Savimbi from Pretoria, offering Zaire as an alternative source of military backing. The US plan required that Savimbi quit Jamba in

the south and set up new headquarters at Jimbele in the far north, to be supplied with US military aid from Matadi in Zaire. At the same time he began pushing both sides to meet and talk settlement.

Fapla, meanwhile, taking advantage of South Africa's immobility at Cuito and backed by a steady influx of fresh Cuban forces, opened a second front. A combined force of Fapla and Cuban units and Swapo fighters began probing south to-



South African Arms & Armour

## For the South African Defence Force, Cuito Cuanavale was a major defeat. For the first time, Pretoria's military forces had been stopped.

towards the Namibian border, reclaiming terrain that had for almost a decade been a no-go area. Less than 100 km from the Namibian border the 11000-strong force set up sophisticated radar and anti-aircraft equipment and began construction of an airfield capable of launching MIGs deep into Namibia.

**S**tep Three took place in the US, with Crocker increasingly aware that, whoever won the Democratic nomination, it wasn't going to be anyone sympathetic to his aggressive hands-on policy towards Angola, nor to his insistence on 'linkage' between the Cuban presence in Angola and Namibian independence. It was this issue that had enabled the South Africans to scuttle the last serious negotiations on Namibia around 1981.

Even likely Republic candidate George Bush, as Reagan's vice-president theoretically a Cold War crusader and in reality by no means a liberal, was beginning to look distinctly doveish. Under the glare of Gorbachev's glasnost grin, the Rambo-like foreign relations of the Reagan presidency was rapidly losing popularity. And Bush had an election to win. Crocker thus twisted arms and got the first round of talks underway in London.

**C**uban negotiators set the tone of the talks, broadly hinting to SA Defence Force chief Jannie Geldenhuys that their presence in southern Angola, backed by many of the 20 000 Swapo fighters operating in Angola and just north of a powerful South African force, might overflow into Namibia. Risquet mildly suggested that the presence of two military forces so close to each other 'could have unpredictable consequences'. Geldenhuys, say the Cubans, took the point.

The Cuban negotiators, eager for a permanent end to the conflict in the region, also turned Crocker's insistence on 'linkage' to their advantage, demanding that Namibia be granted independence as the only guarantee that the southern Angolan conflict end.

The talks moved on to Brazzaville in the Congo, and, after a long and uncomfortable pause, to Cairo. The delay, says Angolan deputy foreign minister Venancio de Moura, was caused by Pretoria attempting to seek a path out of the talks. These it was finding distinctly uncomfortable in the face of an unlikely diplomatic combination of Washington and Havana.

The South Africans, led by Defence and Foreign Ministers Magnus Malan and Pik Botha, went into the talks demanding the closure of African National Congress bases in Angola, an indefinite delay in granting Namibian independence, and an Angolan agreement that the SADF should control a strip of southern Angola to prevent Swapo incursions into Ovamboland.

Outraged, the Angolans and



South African Arms & Armour

**The SADF's G6 cannon: 40 000 shells were fired on Culto Cuanavale in a bid to root out the Cuban and Angolan forces**

Cubans readied themselves to end the talks and settle the issue in southern Angola itself. 'We are not the losers and made a strong statement in response', De Moura told journalists in Harare recently. Crocker and Soviet diplomats hastily intervened, smoothed ruffled feathers, and got the talks going again.

Cuban bitterness over the issue remains, however. Although Havana's diplomats talk warmly of Geldenhuys as 'an honest man', and a 'plain-speaking soldier', they refer with obvious hostility to 'Pretoria politicians'.

This hostility was reinforced when, within hours of the talks (during which Pretoria saw several of its demands thrown out the window), Fapla and South African troops clashed near Calueque, a dam just north of the Namibian border which Pretoria has occupied for 'humanitarian reasons' since 1975.

South African spokesmen characterised the clash as a Cuban ground attack followed by an aerial bombing raid in which 12 South Africans died for the loss of 300 Cubans - a version rejected flatly by all other parties to the talks, including the US.

Risquet described the clash as a South African military bombardment followed by a ground attack. The Fapla/Cuban force, he says, complained to the US and the Soviet Union about the artillery bombard-

ment, repulsed the ground attack, then hit back at South Africa's most visible target in the area, the force occupying Calueque.

Other sources compare the Calueque clash with the May 1986 South African attack on ANC offices in Lusaka which effectively destroyed the Eminent Persons' Group (EPG) initiative to end white rule in South Africa.

If the purpose was to scuttle the talks, it backfired badly: the Cuban/Angolan force came out looking militarily tougher and diplomatically cleaner than the South Africans.

**A**gainst this background, the July stage of the talks opened in New York.

A set of principles - containing not one of South Africa's demands - was hammered out, to be released in Havana, Luanda, Washington and Pretoria simultaneously on July 21 at 5 pm South African time.

Foreign Minister Pik Botha indicated something of South Africa's attitude by urging that none of the parties 'rub each other's noses in the technical points'.

The principles include:

- \* as a first stage, South African withdrawal from southern Angola;
- \* implementation of UN Resolution 435. This involves the arrival of a UN Transitional Assistance Group (Untag) to oversee Namibian transi-

tion to independence, and the withdrawal of all but 1 500 South African troops into a military base.

Simultaneous with this is the start of a 13-month phased Cuban withdrawal from southern Angola;

\* a gradual withdrawal of all Cuban troops from Angola - which Risquet argues could take up to four years;

\* superpower guarantees both of Angolan security and Namibian independence.

But if Havana has good reason for feeling satisfied with the peace process so far - they have, after all, achieved their major objectives - it is not necessarily a clear run through to implementing the principles.

The main stumbling block is Unita; while the settlement would theoretically end South African aid to Unita, the guerilla movement is in any event relocating northwards.

The far north is not particularly friendly territory, with the local population reportedly hostile to the influx of Unita and quite happy to report rebel movements to the authorities. But with US aid and Zaire's support, the movement could establish itself as a major thorn in Luanda's side, preventing it from turning its badly-depleted resources from war to reconstruction.

Cuban negotiators have urged an end to all foreign support for Unita: 'We believe it would then become a purely domestic matter which could be settled peacefully between

Angolans', says Risquet. But the question of Unita is not a Cuban issue, being the subject of separate bilateral US-Angolan talks.

The issue is potentially a major stumbling block - and the subject of Crocker's attempts to re-write the principles. Since the New York talks Angolan sources have complained that US officials have set up a second 'linkage', demanding that the Luanda government begin negotiating with Unita as a pre-condition to implementing the main settlement plan. And throughout the talks Crocker has said repeatedly that US aid to Unita 'is not a negotiating chip'. He also rejected as 'silly' the major plank in Luanda's negotiating position - that it was willing to consider talking to Unita, if the movement dumped Savimbi.

Crocker, however, is working under severe time pressure, gambling on the Angolans' desperate need for South African withdrawal to push through a Unita-Angolan government settlement (and, ideally, a Unita role in government) before the next administration comes in and either whittles down or ends US aid to Unita.

The official Cuban position is that 'it is not our issue'. But Risquet has held out the possibility of just such a Unita-Luanda accord, conditional on the withdrawal of US aid - an offer Dukakis appeared to acknowledge when he was formally endorsed as presidential candidate shortly after the New York talks.

**A** second potential stumbling block - if indeed it exists, and none of the parties to the talks have yet acknowledged that it does - is the persistent rumour of a secret South African demand for the closure of African National Congress bases in Angola.

In Harare, Risquet flatly denied the issue had been raised either formally or informally at the talks, adding, however, that it was not a Cuban issue but one for 'the sovereign government of Angola' to address.

His careful answer, repeated almost word-for-word to different journalists in the space of an afternoon, seems to suggest the bases could have been discussed either in the US-Angolan talks or separately,



**Jorge Risquet: South Africa's military strength has been successfully challenged for the first time.**

between Pretoria and Luanda.

De Moura later flatly rejected the idea of closing the bases, saying 'the liberation movements (Swapo and the ANC) are not on the negotiating agenda' and that nothing in the negotiations 'so far' affected the camps. At his July 21 press conference, Pik Botha made no comment on the issue, saying it was 'not the time' to discuss Unita or the ANC.

The principles, however, contain an agreement that neither Angola nor South Africa would allow their territories to be used for 'acts of war, aggression or violence' against the other.

South Africa's major strategic reason for going into Angola in the first place was to prevent Swapo and the ANC from operating out of there. Its image as the regional superpower has been muddled on the battlefields of southern Angola. But it is not so desperate for a settlement that it will give up, without a powerful fight, what both political and military

strategists believe is a vital element of the defence of minority rule: denial to the ANC of direct, cross-border access to South Africa.

On the process of Namibian independence, Pretoria has several barriers it can throw up in the way of a settlement.

Since destroying the last Namibian independence initiative, it has established a 24 000-strong 'South West African Territory Force', and a 'Transitional Government of National Unity'. While Resolution 435 requires that all institutions created under Pretoria's illegal occupation be dismantled, Pretoria is likely to work hard to have both SWATF and the TGNU included in the structures of a new Namibia.

If Pretoria can string out these issues beyond Reagan's departure from the White House, a new chair will be required for the talks: Crocker will have departed from the department of state, and South Africa will have won itself some time to plan.

# NAMIBIA UNDER COLONIAL RULE

**1884:** Germany annexes South-West Africa. Britain incorporates Walvis Bay into Cape Colony.

**1903:** Start of Herero rebellion against colonial authorities. In the next four years German troops defeat rebels and massacre an estimated 65 000 of the 80 000 Herero population. Namas suffer a similar fate.

**1915:** South African troops conquer 'German South-West Africa'.

**1920:** League of Nations (forerunner to United Nations) grants South Africa mandate to rule SWA - full legislative and administrative authority. Mandate includes South African agreement that any dispute over its rule be resolved by the International Court of Justice (ICJ).

**1924:** Rebellion by 'Bondelswart Hottentots' against South African rule. South Africans respond by bombing Bondelswart villages, with considerable loss of life.

**1925:** South Africa creates a white-only SWA Legislative Assembly, which promptly demands incorporation of SWA as South Africa's fifth province.

**1933:** League of Nations rejects 'fifth province' status.

**1946:** South Africa revives 'fifth province' option for SWA - rejected by United Nations (UN).

**1949:** National Party grants white SWA population direct representation in Cape Town parliament, and changes SWA constitution - deleting references to UN Mandate.

**1950:** ICJ rules mandate still in force.

**1953:** UN general assembly establishes Committee on South West Africa to supervise mandate, with or without Pretoria's approval.

**1955:** ICJ endorses UN decision.

**1956:** UN general assembly votes to negotiate end to Pretoria control of SWA, but attempt fails.

**1957:** Ovamboland People's Congress (OPC - later renamed Ovamboland People's Organisation and finally South West African

People's Organisation) formed by 40 SWA students and workers in Cape Town with major focus on SWA contract labour system.

**1958:** Herman Toivo ja Toivo and Sam Nujoma begin organising OPO branches throughout SWA and initiate a successful go-slow in Walvis Bay.

**1959:** South West African National Union (Swanu) formed with backing of Herero chief's council in May. Five months later merged briefly with OPO.

**December 10:** Joint OPO/Swanu resistance to forced removals from Windhoek 'Old Location' - police fire on demonstrators, killing 13 and wounding 52 in 'Namibia's Sharpeville'.

**1960:** OPO reconstituted as national liberation movement and renamed Swapo.

**1961:** First Swapo congress held in secret inside SWA - idea of armed struggle mooted.

**1962:** First 200 Swapo recruits travel to Egypt for military training.

**1963:** Swapo and Swanu form SWA National Liberation Front.

**1964:** Pretoria initiates the idea of bantustans for black SWA population, part of a R260-million five year plan to restructure SWA in South Africa's image.

**1966:** By one vote, ICJ throws out a joint Liberian-Ethiopian challenge to Pretoria's right to rule SWA. UN general assembly revokes Pretoria's right to rule SWA in June.

Two months later Swapo begins armed struggle - first clash on August 22 at Ongulumbashe. August 22 becomes 'Namibia Day'. Pretoria imposes a state of emergency.

**1967:** UN creates 'Council for SWA' to take over administration from Pretoria - which rejects the idea. Swapo internal leadership arrested, tried in Pretoria under Terrorism Act (made retroactive specifically for the trial) and jailed for 20 years on Robben Island. Other Swapo officials in SWA

banned.

**1968:** SWA renamed 'Namibia' at suggestion of Mburumba Kerina (petitioner to UN from Herero chief's council).

**1971:** June 21 - ICJ rules South African presence in Namibia illegal.

June 30 - Namibian churches back ICJ ruling and condemn South Africa for depriving Namibians of human rights.

**1971/72:** National strike by 20 000 Namibian workers. Pretoria reforms migrant labour structure in response.

**1972:** Rural revolt in Ovamboland savagely suppressed. Swapo organises highly-successful boycott of Ovamboland 'homeland elections'. Swapo initiates National Convention as first of several attempts to unite opposition to SA rule.

UN secretary general Kurt Waldheim visits South Africa and Namibia to discuss independence from Pretoria.

**1973:** SA Prime Minister John Vorster initiates discussions with 'ethnic leaders' in Namibia on constitutional future and establishes Ovamboland, Kavango, Caprivi, and Rehoboth as 'self-governing territories' (bantustans). Ovambo 'homeland' authorities introduce public flogging of political opponents - local Swapo leaders become the first victims.

August 12: Mass rally in Katutura leads to three days of riots and street fighting, one death and 300 arrests. Police crack down on Swapo.

**1975:** Independence in Angola opens up second military front for Swapo, into Ovamboland, and guerilla war - previously contained to the Zambian front into Caprivi - escalates.

Vorster commits South Africa to allowing 'the people of SWA to determine their own...future' - then sets up Turnhalle talks as first step towards 'internal settlement'.

Assassination of Ovambo 'homeland leader' Chief Philemon Elifas

leads to further massive crackdown on Swapo.

South Africa invades Angola in unsuccessful attempt, backed by USA, to prevent MPLA taking power as Portuguese colonial forces withdraw.

1976: UN general assembly recognises Swapo as 'sole and authentic representative of the Namibian people'.

Andreas Shipanga and 51 other Swapo members jailed in Zambia, accused of plotting to overthrow Nujoma.

Swapo activists form National Union of Namibian Workers (NUNW).

1977: Pretoria and Swapo accept offer by UN security council 'Western Five' (USA, Britain, France, West Germany and Canada) to negotiate on Namibian independence. Most participating parties walk out of Turnhalle talks and establish Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA). Pretoria dissolves Turnhalle talks, transfers Walvis Bay back to direct SA rule and abolishes several 'petty apartheid' laws in Namibia.

1978: Swapo and Pretoria agree to UN-supervised elections leading to independence on December 31. Ceasefire agreed - but never implemented - and UN peace-keeping force prepares to move into Namibia.

May 4: South African troops, backed by bombers, attack Swapo base and refugee camp at Cassinga in southern Angola, killing 314 adults and 298 children, and capturing 200 (finally released six years later) - the first major incursion into Angola since 1975.

August 26: SADF hits Swapo bases in Zambia - which responds by banning Swapo military operations from its territory.

September 29: UN security council votes in Resolution 435 (see 'box'), a day after PW Botha replaces Vorster as SA prime minister, signalling a far tougher policy on Namibia.

October: Pretoria rejects details of 'Waldheim plan' for implementing 435, rejects plans to hand Walvis Bay to independent Namibia and organises its own 'internal' elections. Swapo leaders detained and the movement forced to close its Windhoek headquarters.

1979: Talks between Western Five, Frontline states, Swapo, South

Africa and internal parties fail to achieve independence, although Angola agrees to a demilitarised zone along Namibia's northern border.

Swapo's People's Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN) intensifies armed struggle in Ovamboland and Kavango and in the white farmlands to the south. Units of up to 100 guerillas at a time cross into Namibia from Angola and SADF acknowledges more than 800 'incidents' for the year. Pretoria bans Swapo meetings in the north.

1980: South Africa pushes ahead with 'internal settlement', granting a 'national assembly' of local party representatives limited executive powers, establishing a 'South West African Territory Force' (SWATF)

### South Africa has occupied Namibia since 1915

and a SWA police force. National assembly votes in new constitution (AG8).

June: SADF strikes at Swapo bases and camps up to 150 km inside Angola - but Swapo maintains military pressure, recording 1 175 'incidents'.

November: Pretoria organises elections for ethnic and racially-defined 'second-tier' authorities.

1981: January: Swapo meets South Africa and 'internal parties' in Geneva in UN-initiated 'pre-independence conference'. Talks collapse when Pretoria challenges UN impartiality.

Newly-installed Reagan administration backs Pretoria's demand that Namibian independence be linked to withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola.

August: South Africa invades Angola again, taking control of much of southern Angola. Swapo meetings banned throughout Namibia.

1982: July: UN security council adds clauses to 435 - leading to SA endorsement of the resolution.

December: Swapo meets SA officials in Cape Verde.

Plan incursions into Namibia drop, with SADF recording 620 'incidents'.

1983: Internal 'government' quits over Pretoria's refusal to move to

independence. DTA and other internal parties form 'Multi-Party Conference'.

December: Pretoria offers to withdraw troops from Angola in exchange for withdrawal of Angolan support for Swapo.

1984: Lusaka agreement signed by US, Angola and Pretoria. SA begins troop withdrawals in February. Swapo says it will honour agreement. Agreement collapses a year later after repeated Angolan charges of SADF incursions.

March: Herman Toivo ja Toivo released from Robben Island.

May: Zambia hosts talks between Swapo and several internal parties supporting it and Pretoria and MPC. Talks collapse.

1985: MPC wins Pretoria agreement to form 'Transitional Government of National Unity'; established June 17 with legislative and executive powers under Proclamation R101 as interim government of Namibia. Namibian political prisoners on Robben Island released at 'request' of TGNU.

1986: Council of Churches of Namibia (CCN) calls 'Ai//gams' conference to form common front against continued SA rule 'in whatever guise', and in support of 435. Accepts programme of action including civil disobedience and mass mobilisation. Ten political groupings, including Swapo, and five churches sign the 'Ai//gams declaration'. NUNW relaunched, with three industrial unions.

1987: Combined Fapla, Cuban and Swapo force moves south towards Unita headquarters at Jamba; repelled by South African forces, the Fapla-led force retreats to Cuito Cuanavale where heavy fighting continues into 1988.

Heavy SWATF casualties lead to mutinies among black troops. Pretoria expands military installations in the north, as opposition activity increases.

1988: March: School boycotts begin in the north, and spread rapidly countrywide - 40 000 scholars and students involved.

April: Botha rejects TGNU proposals to end racial structuring of local government.

June: NUNW calls biggest national strike in Namibian history - more than 60 000 workers respond.



Inkatha's Buthelezi (left) and Dhlomo (right). Can there be fair elections while their organisation controls many of the townships in Natal?

Chris van der Merwe

Chris van der Merwe

# DEMOCRACY AND THE INDABA

**Progressive extra-parliamentary groups feel the Kwazulu-Natal Indaba process is 'loaded' against them: designed to tame or exclude, not accommodate them. But, argues DARYL GLASER, restructuring in Natal as a result of the Indaba needs to be combed for the strategic opportunities it opens up, rather than treated as uniformly incompatible with progressive advance.**

**S**ome reformists have hailed the Kwazulu-Natal Indaba proposals as a pragmatic blend of majority rule and group rights. These proposals are, on this argument, capable of meeting the black majority's demands for

political power, while also satisfying the white minority that its rights and privileges will be protected in a future multi-racial dispensation.

A defender of the Indaba proposals addressing a sceptical radical audience might argue that the Indaba is a

pragmatic and realistic compromise solution. It may not fully satisfy the aspirations of all (or even any) of the main contending parties in the South African conflict. But the Indaba process does take into account the enormous concentration of economic and military might in the hands of a white minority opposed to more

radical changes. It thus has more chance of achieving change than insurrectionary strategies aimed at overthrowing white rule.

The present rulers, this argument goes, have demonstrated their capacity to withstand sanctions, armed insurgency and civil revolt. The high hopes brought about by the 1984-6 uprising have been dashed by massive state repression backed up by wider regional destabilisation. And even if a revolutionary momentum capable of shattering such a state did develop it would succeed only at the cost of huge death and destruction. In such a struggle, the South African regime would take the whole of Southern Africa down with it, leaving the sub-continent burdened with a lasting legacy of famine and economic paralysis.

Any political settlement with a chance of success must be attractive to the white minority, the Indaba defender could argue. It must not require sacrifices greater than whites are willing to make. The pragmatic Indaba option is able to reconcile the starkly polarised positions of the white minority and black majority where the balance of forces rules out any more radical resolution.

The left has tended to dismiss such arguments out of hand, pointing, with considerable justification, to the terrible costs of continuing white rule for the country and region, and insisting that even the most basic political and social aspirations of the majority cannot be satisfied without radical and thorough-going changes in the political order.

Many in the extra-parliamentary opposition have noted that their opposition is not to negotiation or compromise with the ruling groups as such: but they cannot contemplate either while apartheid is still on the statute books, black leaders unable to participate freely in political processes, popular organisations banned, free speech and assembly restricted, and the present regime strong enough to dictate the terms of any negotiating process.

But recently, some on the left have begun to reconsider opposition to negotiations under existing circumstances, and have, in some instances, been prepared to contemplate compromises going beyond those outlined above. The ANC has been tentatively reaching out to whites

with a more conservative position (as at Dakar), while the United Democratic Front has given cautious endorsement to organisations like the National Democratic Movement and the Five Freedoms Forum. A number of left intellectuals have proposed 'negotiation politics'. And the Soviet Union, which backs the SA Communist Party and the ANC, seems eager for a political settlement in the region - even one that accommodates group rights.

These developments suggest that the kind of pragmatic arguments used to defend the Indaba might, in future, carry more weight in the left. Acceptance of the Indaba initiative as it stands seems unthinkable in the context of the present bloodletting between Inkatha and UDF, and given the exclusion of more radical groups from the formulation of the Indaba proposals. But the principles underlying the Indaba and its constitution might be less quickly and uniformly dismissed by the left in future, and a circumspect stance may become more appropriate.

### Democracy as a yardstick

Whatever stand the left takes must proceed from a clear recognition of the elitist way in which the KwaNatal initiative was conceived, and the undemocratic content of the Indaba proposals.

However defensible the Indaba may be on pragmatic grounds, it cannot be defended on its intrinsic democratic merit. An understanding of this should be the starting point of any left critique or tactical response.

The Indaba was conducted undemocratically. It involved a small grouping of delegates meeting behind closed doors, insulated from the scrutiny of their followers or the public at large. Its only public feature was a mass meeting of 720 people, whose purpose was principally symbolic.

The process of the Indaba was an attempt to bring about agreement between elites at the summit of the political order, with the hope that these leaders would then 'deliver' their followers (a process that might be sealed through a referendum). The masses were earmarked for an essentially passive role, leaving little room for any conception of negotiation that stresses grassroots mandates or accountability as an intrinsic part

of the process.

It excluded radical groups, including some (like the ANC) with a recognised large following. Indaba defenders will reply that they invited the ANC, UDF, Cosatu, Natal Indian Congress, Azapo and others to join the negotiations.


But the ANC, PAC and other radical groups are outlawed, and extra-parliamentary leaders are detained, imprisoned, banned, listed, in exile or on the run. Indaba defenders showed no sign of being able to deliver any promise from the central government that these restrictions would be lifted. And it was the explicit intention of the Indaba to reduce groups like the ANC to simply one equal negotiating partner among many.

Future negotiations should not necessarily be a two-sided affair between the government and ANC. But the Indaba format poses serious problems of representivity. If the ANC represents at least half of Natal's black majority, it cannot be expected to accept relegation to the same status in negotiations as groups with much less or negligible popular support.

### Group rights

The Indaba proposals themselves are insufficiently democratic. They do represent an advance on earlier proposals for the KwaNatal region made by the Lombard and Buthelezi Commissions, granting fuller recognition to the majority principle as a basis for political representation. But it remains to be seen what the relative distribution of power would be, in practice, between the proposed lower house (based on majority rule) and the upper house (based on quasi-ethnic or group representation). The more constricted the scope of the upper house, the more genuinely democratic the system of representation would be.

Nonetheless, the very entrenchment of group rights in the upper house, in the cabinet, in standing committees, and in extra-parliamentary cultural councils, detracts from the proposals' democratic content. This is not because it is undemocratic, in principle, to give special representation to particular groups out of proportion to their numbers. Where particular groups are especially politically or economically



**Mpoyo youth member's funeral. Neither the Indaba, nor any other proposal for Natal is possible while UDF/Inkatha hostilities continue**

underprivileged, granting them disproportionate representation can serve as a form of redress. Political over-representation can partly compensate for 'under-representation' in economic power outside the state. And it can lessen economic disadvantage by building into the system a bias in favour of redistribution. In such cases modifications to the majority principle improve, rather than detract from, the democratic credentials of the system of representation.

But this is not what the Indaba has in mind. It seeks to over-represent a privileged minority, reinforcing rather than limiting the disproportionate informal power which that minority already holds in the economy, state bureaucracy and other social institutions.

The Indaba proposals entrench a continued inequality between Africans and whites in the distribution of formal political power. In treating whites as one minority among many

the Indaba is not being entirely frank: whites are a special, privileged minority who dominate the social and economic order under the existing dispensation, and will probably continue to do so in any envisaged period of political transition. From a point of view of democracy and equity they need no special group protections.

Whites do have legitimate rights, and any democratic dispensation will have to protect these. But the rights concerned are applicable to all citizens, irrespective of colour, and can be fully entrenched under the colour-blind rubric of individual rights (as is the case in the Indaba's own Bill of Rights). These include the right of all to freedom of expression, press, association, assembly, equality before the law, protection from arbitrary search, seizure or arrest, and so on. It also includes the right of individuals to affiliate with or practise any religion

or culture of their choosing.

Other 'rights', like protection from nationalisation of property, are much more contentious; a future socialist-oriented government would, with justification, be reluctant to entrench such a principle. It is to the credit of the Indaba constitution that it affirms the individual rights outlined above without giving explicit protection to capitalist property.

But it remains a possibility that the constitutional empowerment of 'group' representatives in the upper house and cultural councils could serve as an additional brake on any alteration of existing terms of private ownership. This would then amount to, or at any rate be perceived as, de facto restraint on the freedom of a majority-supported government in the field of economic policy.

There are absurdities in the Indaba proposals: in the elections for the upper house only one person might choose to vote as a black while millions might choose to vote as non-racial citizens. This would leave the one 'black' person with as much formal political sway in the upper house as most of the rest of the citizenry combined! And the Indaba constitution entrenches notoriously corrupt traditional authorities within the envisaged system of local government.

### Keeping Natal for the West

There are also problems with the prospective implementation of the Indaba proposals, from a democratic point of view. Would the central government allow the ANC (or UDF) to campaign freely in regional elections, or to govern Natal if it won a majority in a non-racial legislature? Few things seem less likely. And many of the black rural and residential areas of Natal fall under the sway of Inkatha's huge machinery of patronage and coercion. Given Inkatha's record of vigilantism and restriction of opposition groups in areas under its control, it is possible that the organisation would harass electoral campaigners for radical black groups, and use coercion or crude patronage to influence voters.

Since there is a connection between political democracy and economic equity, it is important to see what Indaba proponents have in mind regarding the redistribution of wealth.

Some of the economic thinking and

debates surrounding the Indaba proposals are revealing. Organised capital has explicitly ruled out any large-scale redistribution of wealth to create a welfare state or bring about parity between black and white in the provision of services. Representatives of capitalism - and the Association of Chambers of Commerce (Assocom) in particular - have argued that this would require a degree of taxation that would rule out overall wealth creation.

Markedly higher taxation to achieve parity, claims Assocom, would lead to a flight of capital and skills away from the region to other parts of South Africa.

The principal purpose behind the Indaba is to lessen pressures for radical change and to preserve the basis of the capitalist order. Indaba proponents may not always say this explicitly; they might even invite radical participation in their project. But it is clear from the Lombard and Buthelezi Commissions, and from the statements of many of the initiative's business backers, that the not-so-hidden agenda of the Indaba is to neutralise radical extra-parliamentary groups and confine the scope of socio-economic changes within conservative parameters.

It is also clear that many Indaba proponents want to promote Buthelezi and Inkatha as a 'moderate' force to interpose between white intransigence and black radicalism. The Buthelezi Commission openly said as much. Radical extra-parliamentary groups thus have more than enough reason to suspect that the whole Indaba process is 'loaded' against them: designed to tame or exclude, not accommodate them.

All this points to a further sinister possibility: if the Indaba proposals are not reproducible in other regions, and the momentum for more radical change eventually proves irresistible in other parts of South Africa, imperialist and pro-capitalist forces might conspire to carve Natal out of a future majority-ruled South Africa, and to save it for the West.

Natal secessionism, while it has a long history, is at present a dormant current; but its revival at some future point is not inconceivable. Such a project would face major internal resistance from radical-supporting elements inside Natal itself, and would probably mean open and

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**This article points to the undemocratic ways in which the Indaba was conceived and in which it deliberated; to the limits of the constitutional proposals it generated; and to the factors restricting any attempt to implement the proposals in a democratic fashion.**

**At the same time the article cautions against any hasty response to the KwaNatal initiative by its opponents on the left. The plan for a future regional government in Natal needs to be scrutinised for its democratic elements and potential, rather than automatically dismissed as a reactionary and undemocratic manoeuvre (which it is in part). Whatever restructuring takes place in Natal in coming years needs to be combed for the strategic spaces and opportunities it opens up, rather than treated as uniformly incompatible with progressive advance.**

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protracted civil war. But even if it does not come to secession, Western support for armed conservative elements in Natal could be used to destabilise a future majority-ruled South Africa. Here the analogy is with Matabeleland or Unita-held parts of Angola. The left needs to take full account of these kinds of dangers.

### Political decentralisation

Meeting such dangers does not, however, imply that every aspect of the Indaba process should be dismissed out of hand and that no quarter should be given, now or in the future, to its proponents. That response would be neither strategically profitable for the left nor advance the cause of democracy. The demand for regional political decentralisation, which lies at the core of the KwaNatal initiative, is not necessarily reactionary. It can be a progressive demand, with democracy-enhancing

potential. It offers a way of removing some elements of decision-making from a distant capital, bringing it closer to the people affected; and it makes possible fuller accommodation of a region's specific interests and preferences.

But the demand for regional decentralisation should come from the region's own population, rather than be imposed from the centre, as is the case with Pretoria's bantustan policy. Decentralisation should not be designed to preserve regional inequalities by insulating particular regions from redistribution measures coming from the centre. And regional decentralisation should not be framed around, or exacerbate, ethnically-defined regional differences.

Does the KwaNatal initiative fulfil these conditions? That must still be tested. But so far there is little evidence that Natal's masses are demanding regional autonomy. And it is possible that regional autonomy for Natal could exacerbate ethnically-based divisions in the country as a whole, notwithstanding the apparently non-racial provisions of the Indaba proposal, and their formal neutrality as regards ethnic differences within the black population.

On the other hand there is no evidence that the KwaNatal demands intend to preserve any position of privilege for Natal vis-a-vis other regions of South Africa.

Whatever the case, the demand for regional autonomy needs to be taken seriously - to be scrutinised for its democratic potential - rather than automatically rejected.

### The demands of Natal's elites

Another reason for not dismissing the KwaNatal initiative out of hand is that it is a reality: it expresses the politics of a substantial bloc of political and economic elites of all races, some of which command considerable popular following or economic power. To ignore or suppress these actors might reduce the representivity of any prospective majority-based government in the region or country as a whole, with negative implications for democracy. It could also trigger unpredictable economic consequences - like capital flight or sabotage - that would seriously endanger any fragile transitional government. And it could deliver these elites into the hands of counter-

revolution, persuading them to support a regional insurgency against a majority-based central government or to back a movement for secession. This is a prospect that few could contemplate with equanimity in the light of recent Southern African experiences.

The key question is how to accommodate these elites. Their demands should be scrutinised, the democratic and legitimate ones separated out from those of more nefarious purpose, and accorded due respect; moreover, those demands should be made to face the test of popular support (by referendum or other means) in conditions where uninhibited campaigning for and against them is guaranteed. No elites should be granted a free hand to install a dispensation in a particular region in the name of their followers, or in the name of a majority of the region's population, without such claims of representivity being subject to popular arbitration.

Such a test of mass support is clearly not possible in the present context of open internecine civil war and brutal repression in black townships of Natal. In this light it is difficult to see how the currently

proposed referendum to gauge support for the Indaba in Natal could be accepted as a legitimate test of popular opinion. More stringent tests will have to be devised in future.

### Responding to the Indaba

Apart from the question of how the Indaba movement should be accommodated in a future majority-ruled South Africa, there is the more immediate question of how the extra-parliamentary opposition should respond if some facsimile of a non-racial legislature is set up in Natal in the near future. The historical traditions of the far left and, more recently, of the congress tradition, will provide a strong impetus to boycott such elections. Any decision to enter Indaba-inspired structures could be seriously divisive in the extra-parliamentary camp, even if it is accompanied by a commitment to forcing parliamentarians to be accountable to extra-parliamentary popular bases.

The overwhelming hold of Inkatha in black townships in Natal, a hold reinforced by brutal coercion, would be a further disincentive to 'strategic participation', since it would rule out a 'free and fair' campaign of

electoral mobilisation.

On the other hand, some might argue that going into the Indaba process, once it is a reality, could offer a measure of legal protection from Inkatha and state repression. Arguments in favour of participation might be strengthened if extra-parliamentary spaces become even more limited by a combination of vigilantism and state terror. And even if the climate for extra-parliamentary mobilisation improves, this could add weight to arguments for participation: for this would permit grassroots organisation to monitor and control parliamentary representatives.

Staying out of the Indaba process seems the most plausible response at present. Whether that will continue to be the case depends on a whole variety of factors needing constant assessment and analysis.

But it would shut off a wide range of strategic possibilities to rule out such participation in advance. Whatever decision is reached on 'going in' should be the subject of open debate in the extra-parliamentary camp; and it should be flexible enough to respond to changing circumstances on the ground.

Background to the Indaba initiative can be found in: Daryl Glaser, 'Behind the Indaba: the making of the KwaNatal option', *Transformation*, 2, 1986; Gerhard Maré, 'Regional rule for Inkatha? The Kwazulu-Natal Indaba', *Work In Progress*, 46, February 1987; and Gerhard Maré, "Mixed, capitalist and free": the aims of the "Natal Option", in (ed) Glenn Moss and Ingrid Obery, *South African Review* 4, Johannesburg, 1987.

**The Kwa-Natal initiative is a reality which expresses the politics of a substantial bloc of political and economic elites. But it is fundamentally undemocratic, and the interests of the majority of Natal's masses are unlikely to be served**





Gisele Wulfsohn / Altrapix

**Forever in chains: Lekoa mayor Esau Mahlatsi in official garb. How much is to be gained from participation in structures such as his town council?**

**W**ith the nationwide October 26 local elections approaching, debate over the appropriate strategic and tactical response is of immediate practical significance. For a number of years, collaborative elements have argued in favour of participating in the political structures of the state, and have usually dressed up their arguments in 'anti-apartheid' clothing.

However, more recently a number of writers from the left have been advocating participation. Given legal restrictions on this debate -

**Can electoral participation in state structures strengthen anti-apartheid forces? Some writers on the left believe so. GUY BERGER takes a critical look at some of their arguments for participation.**

especially the emergency regulations on boycotts - any critique of the left participation argument will have to be severely constrained.

This pro-participation position has been articulated with different degrees of tentativeness by Swilling, Lodge and Sarakinsky, writing in

*Work In Progress*, and by Friedman, writing in the *Weekly Mail* and in *Transformation*.\* These interventions represent a spirit of 'new realism', with its stress on attempting to transform apartheid through its own institutions

According to this 'realism', the present period is one of retreat for the mass democratic movement. In the face of repression, there is a danger of losing the gains made in the period of intense mass resistance (1983-86). According to Friedman, Swilling, Sarakinsky and Lodge, this new period requires a new strategy. All four criticise the boycott of government-created political structures on the grounds that this is a tactic

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# THE GREAT PARTICIPATION DEBATE

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that has mistakenly been elevated to the status of a strategy, which has obliterated any area for manoeuvre.

Friedman uses his interpretation of the black trade union movement to argue by analogy that the rest of the mass democratic movement must use the structures the government concedes, however limited, in order to secure advantages and transform those structures. Sarakinsky has a similar formulation arguing that 'national and community-based organisations' can only negotiate with the government from a position of strength if they have made a 'strategic intervention in state structures'.

In his version, participation in government-established political structures enables the mass democratic movement both to transform those structures into instruments of empowerment, and to force concessions from the state.

Swilling argues for participation and negotiation from the local level up. He suggests that the government is divided in its higher echelons, and that participation in local elections by the mass-based democratic movement would swing the balance back to the reformers in the cabinet. This, in turn, would have medium-term spin-offs.

Lodge is the most tentative of all four advocates of participation. He calls for the issue to be debated because it will move the mass democratic movement away from positions which he terms 'moral and emotive'.

Despite his apparent tentativeness on participation, Lodge detects very little viability in alternative strategies. As a result, the option of election participation, in effect, carries considerable weight within the logic of his argument.

There are three major areas of weakness in these arguments: the writers' conception of the current period; their notion of the potential available for transformation through participation in the structures being made available; and the question of the tactical advantages to be gained from such a major shift.

### **Misreading the present**

A major feature of the generally bleak outlook of this 'new realism'

that advocates participation is its misreading of the present situation. The present unstable equilibrium in South Africa is a moment within a general period of development that goes back, not to the end of 1985, but to the mid-1970s.

The main features of this period have been a heightening of economic problems within world capitalism and the specific structural problems of South African capitalism; the collapse of South Africa's frontline cordon sanitaire; the development of mass protests and subsequently mass

## **A major feature of the generally bleak outlook of this 'new realism' that advocates participation is its misreading of the present situation**

organisation; and the emergence of waves of semi-insurrectionary struggle.

Within this general context, there have been shifts over the past 13 years. The insurrectionary struggles have fluctuated in intensity and duration. The state has had considerable, if partial, success in regional destabilisation. Internally, the ruling forces - co-ordinating through the National Security Management System - have been able to dislocate, and to some extent contain, the challenge facing them.

But the basic features of the general period remain. The unstable equilibrium is characterised by the relative military and economic power of the government on the one hand, and its considerable political weakness on the other. This weakness is characterised by its lack of a broad and viable support base and the absence of popular legitimacy.

The terms of this basic equation are not static. Even the obvious military superiority of the state is relative. In the last six months, for

example, the SADF has lost its air superiority in southern Angola. Since 1985, there have been signs of military over-extension, including mutinies by black troops and police. There are also major political, economic and physical constraints on the military deployment of the SADF within a civil war situation. Nevertheless, the ruling group's relative military strength is a major factor in perpetuating the current unstable equilibrium.

Many of the advocates of participation argue that it is precisely because of this relative military strength that anti-apartheid forces should engage the government on the terrain of its maximum vulnerability - namely, by participating in political elections. This narrow approach forgets that the strength of the broad liberation movement derives precisely from its character as an all-round struggle, occurring on numerous fronts and several terrains. Politics is in command in all this, but this is very different to arguing that struggle should concentrate solely on the political terrain in general and on participating in state structures in particular.

The arguments advanced by the writers under discussion fail to analyse why the ruling group is politically weak. This weakness is related directly to the government's inability to stabilise the collaborative structures it has constructed (bantustans, tricameral parliament, community councils/black local authorities), and thus its inability to stabilise a reliable and relatively extensive bloc of black support. The principal reason for this failure has been the wholesale rejection and boycotting of these structures.

While the government has a crisis management programme, it has no workable strategy to move out of the impasse. Instead, the political initiative remains with the broad liberation movement.

But discussion of the general conjuncture is not *on its own* sufficient to decide a position on participation. Electoral participation may, in principle, be a viable strategy in moments of both advance and retreat. It is also necessary to consider other factors. Primary amongst these are the strategical limits and possibilities in each specific instance

allowing for participation.

There is often a confusion between the exploitation of space that is opened up by restructuring initiated by the state on the one hand, and transformative participation within the new structures on the other.

Use of space opened up for progressive forces may, or may not, involve actual participation. The UDF, for instance, skilfully and imaginatively exploited the political space opened up in the 1983-4 period, but this took the form of rejecting participation.

It is possible that participation can transform certain facets of the political terrain. But the nature of the institutions available for transformation at the present moment must be examined carefully.

Lodge points to the history of the Labour Party's use of political institutions to advocate a policy of change. Not only is the history of this, in the case of the Labour Party, unhappy, as he concedes. It is also a demonstration of how the institutions in which the Labour Party participated, particularly the tricameral parliament, helped to consolidate reactionary tendencies within the Labour Party. Taking part in state institutions in effect meant changes within the party, not vice versa. The Labour Party now, partly through its participation in the tricameral parliament, has a virtually insignificant base. Not only has it lost any broader anti-apartheid constituency, but it has been rejected by the overwhelming majority of even the coloured middle strata.

It is true that the Labour Party is hardly a reliable yardstick. The class character, the wavering and reactionary character of its leadership, and its lack of mass democratic roots, all mean that the possibilities of participation have hardly been tested to the limits in this case.

A more favoured example of the fruits of exploiting space for transformation is that of the trade union movement. Most of the left proponents of participation cite the creative exploitation of the Wiehahn reforms by the progressive trade union movement. But in the first place the space forced open on the trade union front has limits: it exists primarily with regard to private - as opposed to state - capital; it excludes

agriculture; and it exists under severe threat, most recently by the Labour Relations Amendment Act.

More importantly, a cursory review of the labour space reveals a fundamental difference between it and the present election issue. In the first place, the government is not proposing the registration of democratic township and village committees, street committees or people's defence committees. It is precisely these structures that the state is trying to smash to make space for collaborative election

### **If the UDF took part in community councils, it would be implicated in the very things it is dedicated to opposing - such as setting rents**

participation. In the words of Information Minister Stoffel van der Merwe: 'It is no use trying to get the National Council off the ground unless there is a climate conducive to participation... By restricting these groups, we have freed the people to participate... It is a move to get reform going...to normalise the political climate'.

A more accurate analogy on the labour front for community councils and the tricameral parliament involves the old works and liaison committees - and they were largely bypassed and rendered redundant by the emergent labour movement in the course of the 1970s.

There is also a difference between what is entailed for unions to take part in the state's labour institutions, and the preconditions attached to participating in councils or local authorities. The functionalist view that assumes all structures the state puts up will necessarily fulfil their intended functions must certainly be avoided. But at the same time, the opposite assumption - that structures

are endlessly and all equally manipulable, that they can be transformed in any direction - must also be guarded against. A local authority, for instance, is not a neutral structure available for steering in any chosen direction.


There is a world of difference between a relationship of government involved in participation in black local authorities or the tricameral parliament, and progressive trade union structures. A progressive trade union does not, at least in principle, collaborate with bosses in the management of the company - although management constantly endeavours to tempt unions into this role.

A progressive trade union is not dependent for its funding on management. It is answerable to its membership only, and is not constitutionally under the authority of higher organs over which its membership has no democratic control.

By contrast, if an organisation like the UDF took part in community councils, it would not simply represent the views of the masses in this forum. It would also be implicated in the setting of rents, the allocation of housing, the actions of township police. It would be implicated in the very things it is dedicated to opposing. In addition, it would be restricted to a role in a body that is increasingly a cog in a broader white-controlled regional services council network, as well as being a tightly controlled element of the National Security Management System and associated joint management committees.

It may be argued that the rationale for participation in these structures is to sabotage them, as the Labour Party claims it did in the Coloured Representative Council during the late 1970s. However, as the history of the uprisings from 1983 and the rent boycotts show, these structures have been undercut in other ways that do not lay the mass democratic movement open to the dangers of co-option; nor of only selectively undermining the system, as was said of the Labour Party, when executive members of the CRC accepted the perks of office, like motor cars and salaries, while claiming they were destroying the system.

A characteristic error in the left



The olden days: Until its restriction, the UDF was able to campaign openly against participation in government structures such as the tricameral parliament.

arguments advanced for election participation involves conflation between the strategies of negotiation and participation. This is most evident in Sarakinsky's contribution to this debate. He argues from the incorrect (and, incidentally, defeatist) theoretical premise that 'the state determines the arena in which the extra-parliamentary opposition operates'. From this he argues that 'there is no reason for the state to negotiate in good faith, unless national and community-based organisations have institutionalised bargaining power through their strategic intervention in state structures. This could be done by, for example, putting candidates forward for tricameral and local authority elections. To negotiate without an institutionalised or any other power base means negotiations occur directly on the state's terrain'.

It comes as a surprise to discover Sarakinsky's belief in the regime's 'good faith'. It is not without irony that precisely the same phrase is used to confer legal immunity on its security forces under the state of emergency. But apart from this,

Sarakinsky's argument is contradictory. In essence, he says that unless you participate on the government's terms, you will not be able to negotiate on your own terms!

Wherever negotiations have been a component in the victory of progressive national liberation movements (Algeria and Vietnam, for example), the major power base for the liberation forces has not been political structures institutionalised by the enemy, but alternative dual power structures, including a liberation army. Participation, a parliamentary road, can in some cases be the route to major transformation. But this has been the exception in twentieth century struggles.

Even with situations in South Africa's recent experience, negotiating and participating were separate issues. In the Eastern Cape, for example, consumer boycott community-based organisations entered into negotiations with local business groups. The National Education Crisis Committee negotiated with educational authorities and even with the SADF. But in the the recent

period, the JMCs have sabotaged these negotiations in an endeavour to create 'a climate for participation'.

The advocates of participation under discussion have misunderstood the present balance of forces and social context, and are badly mistaken about the nature and transformational possibilities of participating in the October elections. But could participation offer some organisations breathing space, a tactical respite for the mass democratic movement, or a platform at a time of news black-outs and restrictions?

### Tactical advantages to participation?

Even in terms of these more modest tactical objectives, the left arguments for participation, as advanced so far, are flawed. While the proponents of participation *underestimate* the positive features of the present strategic conjuncture, they also *overestimate* the organisational and tactical flexibility of the mass democratic movement at this period in time.

Given the dislocation currently experienced by the mass democratic

movement, with so many leaders in detention, and so many organisations struggling to re-build in difficult semi-underground conditions, could a major about-turn in policy realistically be debated and democratically adopted? Rather, such debate would increase the confusion and dislocation. The major challenge undertaken by the mass democratic movement at the moment is deepening the unity between its different constituencies, broadening the anti-apartheid front and improving the operation of its structures. A tactical participation in the tricameral parliament, the national council, or community councils would divert attention away from these objectives.

The ruling group, ever anxious to exploit divisions among liberatory forces, would seek to destabilise the mass democratic movement even further on the basis of disinformation in this debate. It is the government that would benefit from the divisions that would open up on this question.

Advocacy of participation sometimes rests on a 'platform' argument. Lodge believes that participation provides a space that itself gives a platform to advance the cause of the forces of liberation. This may be the case if the structures in which the mass democratic movement participated had some legitimacy, or if this legitimacy was still a matter of dispute.

But government-imposed political structures have had no mass legitimacy since the late 1940s. There has been a long history, nearly 40 years, of non-participation: bitter struggles were waged in Pondoland and what was to become Lebowa when participation in bantustan structures was enforced. After the miners' strike of 1946, the ANC explicitly refused to participate in the Native Representative Council or the other limited platforms that were available for participation. Given this long history of challenge to the legitimacy of the structures that are available, par-



Sandy Smit / Afrapix

## The forces of resistance do not lack a platform at present, despite controls on the press

ticipation could be a backward step for the liberatory forces. While it might provide a platform for leadership, that platform would itself lead to their rejection by the masses.

The forces of resistance do not lack a platform at present, despite controls on the press. The culture of liberation is deeply entrenched, and this culture is given organisational form in a myriad of anti-apartheid organisations and associations which the government has not, and cannot, destroy.

### Non-racialism and electoral participation

Despite all obstacles, the dominant liberation tide in South Africa has achieved a remarkable non-racial unity. What the left advocates of participation ignore is one of the most central features of the October elections and the tricameral parliament - the racially divisive character

of these institutions. Perhaps they feel that it is too obvious to mention. But this misses the fact that non-racialism in 1988 is not merely an abstract goal to be striven for, but a reality of the struggle.

Non-racialism represents the putting into practice of an ideal that runs directly against apartheid's ethnic and racial divisions. It is not only a guiding principle of struggle, but also an immediate source of unity and strength to the liberation movement. Non-racialism is a strategical necessity in the struggle today, and it is difficult to consider how tactical participation in intrinsically racist institutions of government can avoid jeopardising this hard-won non-racial unity.

In the view of all four advocates of participation discussed, the rejection of this strategy is a 'kneejerk' reaction, an emotive position arrived at without reflection or analysis. There should be serious and objective analysis of strategies.

And electoral participation is not unthinkable under every circumstance. However, a careful examination of the broad conjuncture, of the

strengths and weaknesses of both the government and the liberation forces, and the limits and possibilities of participation, shows that the writers considered are seriously mistaken in their arguments.

\* See, for example,

1. Steven Friedman, 'Reform: Greek gift or Trojan horse?', *Transformation*, 5, 1977; 'Hotting up: the debate which isn't happening', *Weekly Mail*, 19-25.02.88; 'If Stofel likes it, does that make it all bad', *Weekly Mail*, 03-09.06.88;

2. Tom Lodge, 'The politics of negotiation', *Work In Progress*, 50/51, October-November 1987;

3. Ivor Sarakinsky, 'The state of the state and the state of resistance', *Work In Progress*, 52, March 1988;

4. Mark Swilling, 'The politics of negotiation', *Work In Progress*, 50/51, October-November 1987.



A parental rights agreement between Pick 'n Pay and Ccawusa tackles the very nature of relations between men and women. INGRID OBERY reports.

**M**en and women should enjoy equality at work, at home and in society. And female and male workers have the right to combine employment with equal responsibility in family life.

This is the thinking behind a recent parental rights agreement signed between Pick 'n Pay and the Commercial, Catering and Allied Workers Union (Ccawusa).

Previous negotiations between the union and retail employers have involved maternity rights, including paid leave, employment of pregnant women and leave for fathers after the birth of children. But according to

Ccawusa national organiser Jeremy Daphne, the Pick 'n Pay agreement tackles the very nature of relations between men and women.

The parental rights agreement, signed with Pick 'n Pay on June 27, is 'an important step towards fully including the question of gender roles and gender discrimination in the struggle against exploitation and oppression', argues Daphne. 'It represents the first step in establishing progressive attitudes on equality between women and men at all levels of society'.

In the agreement, Ccawusa and Pick 'n Pay:

- \* commit themselves to the elimination of discrimination based on

sex and gender;

- \* acknowledge the right of men and women to hold a job, lead a normal family life, work under safe, healthy conditions and give their children necessary care and attention;

- \* undertake to ensure that women are not unfairly discriminated against because of pregnancy, and that both men and women employees are able to exercise parental responsibilities;

- \* agree that the company has a social responsibility towards the support and healthy maintenance of parents and their children;

- \* agree that parents have the right to decide freely and responsibly on

# COMBINING EMPLOYMENT AND FAMILY LIFE

how many children to have, and when to have them;

\* accept that women and men should have equal opportunity to combine gainful employment with family life.

### **Rights for parents, not just mothers**

Parental, rather than exclusively maternal rights, have been negotiated by European and British trade unions for some time. But it involved a long process before a South African union could raise parental roles in child-rearing as part of negotiations. At core, this involves gender role definitions, which determine how men and women are allocated different and unequal functions in family life, work and society.

Demands for parental - rather than maternity - rights involve a redefinition of women's rights, where mothers are no longer seen as primarily responsible for the raising of children.

The Cawusa-Pick 'n Pay agreement recognises that until this aspect of family life is re-organised and shared by both parents, women will have no chance of social emancipation. Equal responsibility for child-rearing involves changes in gender relations, and the radical alteration of male roles in the home and family.

Childbirth and child-rearing are often relegated to the realm of 'women's issues', even by organisations struggling for fundamental change in society. Sometimes regarded as secondary to the 'primary' aims of national liberation or socialism, 'women's issues' have been separated out from other areas of transformation. The Cawusa agreement places gender relations firmly in the arena of working-class organisation and worker rights.

The Cawusa-Pick 'n Pay agreement includes health needs of pregnant women, care for adopted children, provisions for miscarriages, paid leave for mothers and fathers, social security and contraceptive advice.

\* Eleven months' parental leave for mothers are provided for. Nine of these are paid at 75% of wages earned (six months at 30% while the state's Unemployment Insurance

Fund pays the other 45%; and three months at 75%). The other two months involve unpaid leave.

\* Mothers adopting babies up to 12 months of age may have ten months' leave, eight of which are paid.

\* Mothers adopting children aged between one and 12 years may have one month's paid leave and two months' unpaid leave.

This provision challenges the traditional view of the family as a small unit of biologically-linked parents and children. It recognises that the majority of black families are extended, and that parents often take responsibility for bringing up and supporting other children,



### **Childbirth and child-rearing are often relegated to the realm of 'women's issues', even by organisations struggling for fundamental change**

whether they be nephews, nieces or more distant relations.

Children do not have to be legally adopted for this benefit to be applicable. As Magdalene Buthelezi, a shopsteward at the Randburg Pick 'n Pay and member of Cawusa's negotiating team, puts it, 'I brought up my sister's two children; I did not legally adopt them, but I fed, clothed, and educated them and they had everything my own children had. So in fact I adopted them'.

\* Parents may defer some of this leave for occasions up to a child's fourth birthday.

If both parents are employed by Pick 'n Pay, they may share this parental leave, deciding themselves how to allocate proportions between the mother and father.

\* Fathers have eight days' paid leave during the mothers' confine-

ment or at the time of adoption, 18 days' unpaid leave until the child is 12, and one day's paid leave a month to take the child to a clinic during its first six months. This enables fathers to accept some responsibility for child-care and development.

These provisions hold for all new fathers, but if their partners do not work for Pick 'n Pay they are not entitled to the 11-month parental leave.

The union believes the extended leave periods available for fathers are an important step in sharing family responsibilities more equally. Given entrenched views of the men's roles, particularly around caring for

babies, this may take some time. But Cawusa negotiator and shopsteward Johnson Mhlayivana argues that 'women are gearing themselves to push men into recognising that they must take responsibility in the home'. Paternal leave should not force women to care for 'two babies' - the newly born, and a man used to his spouse cooking, cleaning and caring for the children.

\* Job security is guaranteed. No employee will be dismissed or disciplined because of pregnancy, retrenched while on parental leave, or turned down for employment because of pregnancy.

\* Service is regarded as continuous during parental leave, and the company covers medical aid and pension contributions during these periods.

\* In the event of stillbirth or miscarriage, female employees are entitled to paid leave in accordance with a doctor's recommendation. This is in recognition of the physical and mental trauma associated with such experiences.

\* If there are problems with the child's health, mothers may take up to 18 days' unpaid leave until the child reaches three.

\* Dangerous areas for pregnant and nursing mothers on the shop floor will be identified by health and safety committees.

\* Pregnant women may arrive at work ten minutes later and leave ten minutes earlier than other employees, will be provided with suitable uniforms and will not have to work overtime or nights.



Fathers and mothers should be equally responsible for bringing up their children.

\* There will be regular health and safety education sessions at the place of employment, as well as contraceptive advice for all employees.

Parents need not be married to qualify for parental benefits, and the term 'spouse' is used in the agreement, rather than 'husband' or 'wife'. This, argues Daphne, is to ensure that traditional western middle-class notions of family are not imposed on union membership.

Many of the ideas in the agreement were drawn from legislation and practices in Sweden. An equal opportunities programme has been actively pursued there for many years, intended to improve the quality of life for both men and women.

Sweden first introduced maternity benefits for working women in 1937. Paid parental leave for both parents was introduced in 1974. It allowed parents a shared total of 12 months' leave at approximately 90% of wages. Many unions subsequently negotiated with companies to pay the remaining 10%.

In 1979 legislation was passed allowing parents of infants to work a six-hour day at pro-rata wage rates. Both parents can take advantage of the benefits, even if they work for different companies.

Swedish legislation presumes that every adult should be economically responsible for his or her own support; that marriage should be a 'voluntary form of cohabitation',

and that parents should accordingly not have to be married to qualify for benefits; and that because the emotional needs of children ought to be satisfied both within and without the family, good child-care for working parents must be provided.

The legislation encourages men to take their share of responsibility for child-care, but does not make this mandatory. However, a 1986 Swedish ministry of labour report argued that 'there must be a change in the role of the man: a possible avenue of approach is to change life through the child. It is not merely a question of the need of the child for a father, it also involves the need of men for their children'.

These provisions are some of the most progressive in the western industrialised world. But changing the way society is structured and the roles men and women play is slow and difficult. Practical and financial problems often make equal gender participation in child-care difficult. Although unemployment in Sweden is around 3%, many working women are employed part-time, often in the traditionally-defined female jobs like child-care, food preparation and nursing. Where the male partner has a 'more central' job in the economy, and his removal from the labour market for any period of time is more difficult, women usually take on the bulk of child-care.

### Union education

Ccawusa's leaders stress that legal agreements over parental rights are only one part of the process of changing gender relations. Union education is vital in confronting gender inequality.

At a recent Pick 'n Pay general meeting, a senior Ccawusa shopsteward argued that fathers and mothers should be equally responsible for bringing up their children. He suggested that fathers should have the right to paid leave to be with their partners over the period of birth, and to share the duties caring for their children.

For many of the members at the meeting these were new - even threatening - ideas. But they listened intently as the shopsteward explained the principles underlying the parental rights agreement with Pick 'n Pay.



**The high proportion of women in the commercial catering industry forced 'women's issues' onto the agenda**

As Magdalene Buthelezi explained: 'Women should not parent alone. Until now men have often been neglected when it comes to child-care. They have no special role in bringing up their children, who often see their fathers as just another member of the family. They have no special relationship. This new agreement gives men a chance'.

But many members of the union - both male and female - accept traditional gender roles, and resist changing patterns of child-rearing. 'In the process of counteracting unenlightened attitudes on the roles women and men play, a number of steps have to be taken', states a union document. 'Firstly to negotiate the necessary rights, and secondly to actively promote progressive thinking through union education'.

Buthelezi suggests there is a changing attitude among younger people: 'The new generation of parents seem to share child-care much more than when I was having children. The women really do want to have their spouses around during confinement. And men seem more willing to

participate'.

But Daphne admits that extensive work still has to be undertaken in the union rank-and-file to instil full understanding of the guiding principles behind the Pick 'n Pay agreement.

Mhlayivana explains that many shopstewards have already had some education around the issues. 'Men in particular need to be "mentally liberated"', he argues. 'In order to get to the rank-and-file, we are holding workshops where shopstewards discuss the agreement, workers give their views and we try to provide some direction'.

Both parties to the agreement accept that its provisions are open for ongoing negotiation. Ccawusa believes there is much room for improvement, most importantly in the areas of the length of paid leave, child-care, and health and safety provisions.

The agreement covers all permanent employees at Pick 'n Pay - full-time and part-time - but excludes casuals. Mhlayivana points out that there are a significant number of 'permanent casuals' who work up to three days a week (part-timers

work a number of hours every day). Ccawusa intends raising the issue of casuals in its August negotiations with Pick 'n Pay.

Ccawusa believes a central future task involves negotiating an adequate package for child-care. Union research shows that child-care facilities for workers in South Africa hardly exist, poverty and lack of facilities in most homes makes proper care difficult, infant mortality rates of black infants are very high, and many children who appear physically healthy suffer from impaired emotional and intellectual development due to lack of proper care.

### OK to Pick 'n Pay

The Pick 'n Pay paternal rights agreement is the 'logical outcome' of eight years of involvement in maternity and related benefit issues.

Soon after the union's formation in 1975, Ccawusa officials were alerted to the problems of female workers. The high proportion of women employed in the industry forced 'women's issues' onto the union's agenda. Specific difficulties faced women when they wanted to have children: there was no legislation to protect their jobs, companies were ruthless in dismissing pregnant employees, and those who were able to return to work had to do so very soon after childbirth, with little or no facilities available for adequate child-care.

A process of consultation with workers, overseas unions and women's organisations resulted in the recognition that women's problems on the shop floor had to be addressed. But it was agreed that maternity benefits should be negotiated as a package - not merely be tagged on to the end of annual wage negotiations.

In June 1983 the union signed a maternity agreement with OK Bazaars: it included one year's unpaid leave, a guaranteed return to employment after maternity leave, and health and safety provisions for pregnant women.

Similar agreements were signed with CNA, Woolworths and Makro. But by 1984 limitations in the agreements had emerged. Unpaid leave meant little if women workers earned low wages and were unable to save for maternity. And a high percentage of women employed in

the retail trade were sole breadwinners in the family, making any unpaid leave an unobtainable luxury.

Ccawusa examined the International Labour Organisation's set of standards for health and safety with regard to pregnant women. The provisions in the OK agreement fell far short of these. Specification of conditions, substances and activities hazardous to pregnant and nursing women were absent.

And the agreement was silent on rest periods for pregnant women; provision of a quiet rest room with a bed; adequate seating, uniforms and shoes; appropriate foods; tests for German measles; ongoing health and safety education; and exemption of pregnant and nursing women from night or shift work.

Many of these provisions were included in the agreement signed with Metro Cash and Carry in 1985 - which specified seven months' paid leave on one-third wages.

With unemployment benefits included, this effectively allowed for six months' paid maternity leave at over three-quarter pay.

The Metro agreement also allowed for three days' paid paternity leave at the time of confinement.

In this agreement the union succeeded - for the first time - in winning a clause that pregnant job applicants should not be turned down solely because of their pregnancy.

The union argued that the requirement of a qualifying period of employment before benefits would be granted involved sex discrimination.

But it finally agreed that women had to have been employed for at least one month prior to pregnancy to qualify for the pay during maternity leave. Those already pregnant at the time of employment could take the leave - but it would be unpaid.

The OK agreement had addressed the right of women workers to have children while employed. The Metro agreement implicitly acknowledged that both male and female workers had a legitimate role at the time of confinement and birth.

But by 1986 some union leadership

had started distinguishing between gender and sex discrimination. They concluded that their most advanced agreement, with Metro, was inadequate. It did not tackle the issue of gender discrimination. And the very notion of 'maternity' benefits excluded men from a role in child-care.

In the Metro agreement, fathers' rights were inadequately addressed. And the amount of paid leave was insufficient, particularly in the light of research which suggested that separating children from parents at six months could be emotionally damaging. And the real issues of adoption, miscarriages and stillbirths were not



### The very notion of maternity benefits in previous union agreements has excluded men from a role in child-care

addressed at all.

After a 1987 visit by two union officials to Sweden, 'we recognised that our agreements entrenched gender roles and the oppression of women, both on the shop floor and in the home', explains Daphne.

#### More important than the price of chickens

The choice to negotiate a more progressive agreement with Pick 'n Pay was logical. The company was financially sound, projected an image of liberal management, and had a high proportion of female employees.

Managing director Raymond Ackerman had written that 'as South Africa was thrown more and more into turmoil I realised that my role was not just fighting to get chickens at the right prices at the right stores'.

According to national human resources manager Franz van der Walt, Pick 'n Pay management believes 'we must be aware of the changing situation in South Africa. Today women work by necessity and not choice. Over the last few years we realised that we would have to provide for fathers' needs, particularly at the time of their spouses' confinement, when they need to have time to take their partners to hospital and look after their other children'.

Van der Walt said the company felt a responsibility to its employees: 'Pregnant women remain our employees: it is not a crime to become pregnant. These women deserve to have their needs recognised'.

Negotiations with Ccawusa over the paternal rights agreement had been 'tough, but since we agreed with the principles of the demands it was possible to reach agreement'.

Prior to this agreement, Pick 'n Pay had been involved in extensive benefit schemes for its employees. Its 'social responsibility' budget was around R2,5-million in 1987. But this included donations and pledges.

Bursary funds for employees and their children totalled around R100 000.

The company, active in promoting the abolition of group areas, has run housing subsidy schemes for 11 years, one each in the Western Cape and Natal and two in Soweto.

Further agreements similar to the one signed by Pick 'n Pay and Ccawusa are probably not in the pipeline at present. Checkers' management, for example, refuses to acknowledge the existence of gender discrimination, and will not consider negotiating paternity leave for fathers.

There have been adverse reactions from many other employers to the paternity rights agreement, both in the retail trade and elsewhere. 'They believe we are setting a precedent which will create problems for them in the future', explains Van der Walt. 'But we believe this radical change in thinking is a necessary step in setting the tone for future employer-employee relations'.



# CADRES IN THE CIVIL SERVICE

Extensive guerilla actions in the Transkei form the basis of a series of dramatic trials in the region. But it is not only trained guerillas who are causing concern to the Transkei administration - government officials are also alleged to have assisted guerilla fighters.

LOUISE FLANAGAN reports.

**D**etails of widespread guerilla activity in the Transkei are emerging in a group of largely unreported political trials.

At least half of the 12 African National Congress-related cases currently proceeding are linked in some way. And a further seven cases already concluded relate to these on-going trials.

Those on trial face charges of sabotage and terrorism, setting up 'cells', harbouring and transporting guerillas and possession of banned literature.

Most of the cases deal with activity

during 1985-86 - a period that saw a dramatic increase in incidents of sabotage and shootouts between police and guerillas in the Transkei region.

According to figures released by the Institute for Strategic Studies in Pretoria, there were five known incidents during 1985, nine in 1986, and five the following year.

Guerilla actions during this period included the dramatic attack on Umtata which destroyed the bulk fuel depot, waterlines and power station on June 25 1985; the April 18 1986 blast at the Mzamba Wild Coast hotel; a blast at the Cala post office on April 24 1986; and a shootout

between police and guerillas at Willowvale on January 21-22 last year.

Few of the accused brought to court are being tried for direct involvement in these acts - the majority are alleged to have aided guerillas involved in the attacks.

Key actors in guerilla activity continually appear in the different charge sheets. Mazizi Attwell Maqhekeza, for example, is mentioned in no less than five charge sheets relating to incidents spread over three years in different parts of the Transkei.

This might explain Maqhekeza's March 1987 assassination in a Maseru hospital, after being

wounded in a shootout with Lesotho police.

### **Terrorism trialists escape**

Most of the current cases are spin-offs from the notorious 'escape' terrorism trial of 20 accused, who included government clerks, a prosecutor and a medical doctor. Last October, the presiding magistrate struck the case off the role because the prosecution had failed to produce a charge sheet after six months of court appearances. The accused, some of whom had been in detention for up to two years, leaped over the dock as soon as they heard they were free, but police immediately re-captured seven and subsequently re-detained several more.

The magistrate hearing the case, Joseph Lukwago Mugerwa, was subsequently questioned by security police, who demanded to see his work permit. And those recaptured appeared again on the same charges - but before a different magistrate.

Those originally accused were: Ernest Ngxokolo Sotsu, Tobile Ndlaku, Justice Ndlangisa, Teko Mokhou, Mcebisi Mfo, Phumzile Mayaphi, Ndibulele Ndzamela, Leonard Mdingi, Dr Warren Nombe, Mhleli Mdaka, Max Jafta, Lucky Mgijima (all redetained), Sivuyile Bam, Malikolo Gantsho, Sandile Nogkina, Archibald Mliso, Mzukisi Gaba, Mbeko Mnyatheli, Pasika Ntshobane and Boy Mangaliso Jafta. They come from areas throughout Transkei, including Willowvale in the south east, Mt Ayliff in the north, Umtata, and Sterkspruit on the Transkei/Lesotho border.

The recaptured accused were subsequently separated into eight trials, all relating to activities of the ANC:

- Charges of terrorism against Max Jafta were subsequently dropped. Jafta is the owner of a store in Willowvale where a shootout involving a lone guerilla occurred on January 21-22 1987.

The guerilla escaped and is believed to still be free. The then second in command of the Transkei Defence Force, Major-General Bantu Holomisa, was detained the same day of the shootout and rumours at the time were that this followed his refusal to send in troops to aid police in the incident. Holomisa - who subsequently took power in a military coup in the

Transkei - subsequently said he had not been in a position to order in the army as it had been his day off.

After details of the shootout eventually emerged, Minister of Law and Order Adriaan Vlok claimed that alleged guerillas Attwell Mazizi Maqhekeza, Basil Kenyon Mafu and Zolile Ntlathi (whom he said was the commander of the ANC's military machinery in Transkei) had helped guerilla Khaya Khasibe to escape in the incident.

Jafta's son, Boy, was also one of the accused in the 'escape' trial - but was not recaptured.

For three years it seems that Maqhekeza, who is a common factor in several of the current cases, had been moving around different areas of the Transkei, and that his activities ended shortly after the Willowvale shootout.

- Dr Warren Nombe, of Sterkspruit, and Mhleli Mdaka, face charges of terrorism.

Mdaka, who has now spent three years either in detention or as an awaiting-trial prisoner, is accused of undergoing military training under the auspices of the ANC; Nombe faces charges of possession of arms and explosives and harbouring several guerillas in the Sterkspruit area between January 1985 and February 1987.

Those he is accused of harbouring include Mdaka and another identified in the schedule only as 'Mpilo'. Maqhekeza is believed to have operated under the name 'Mpilo'.

The state further alleges that Nombe transported 'Mpilo' and another guerilla fighter, Dumisani Mafu, from Willowvale to Sterkspruit in February 1987. Another vehicle travelled ahead to check for roadblocks. In a case believed to be related to this one, Dr Nombe's son, Lungisa, was charged with the illegal possession of curfew permits.

- Ngxokolo Sotsu and Pasika Ntshobane have been charged with organising for the ANC.

The state has alleged that between June 1985 and March 1986 they formed 'units' or 'cells' and recruited members in the Umtata area. They also allegedly attempted to organise students at the University of Transkei, identified targets for attack in rural areas of Transkei and arranged transport for guerillas.

A state witness in this trial told the

court that the cell aimed to translate and distribute the Freedom Charter, and attack informers, policemen, chiefs, members of parliament and government buildings with petrol bombs.

The prosecution alleges that the cells included students, government clerks, three of the other 'escape' trialists and Maqhekeza's brother, Dugard.

Sotsu and Ntshobane are also accused of providing assistance to 'Mpilo' and another guerilla named only as Zola.

One of the clerks mentioned, who worked in the prime minister's office, is alleged to have stolen sensitive documents from these offices. They gave details, according to the prosecution, of the June 1985 sabotage of the bulk fuel depot, power station and waterlines, and of 'ANC preparations' in Transkei rural areas.

Ntshobane faced separate charges of harbouring and recruiting for the ANC together with Tobile Ndlaku, one of the 'escapees' who was not recaptured. Charges were subsequently dropped.

The guerilla they were alleged to have harboured was identified as Zolani Mvuli, who died in a grenade explosion on February 2 1986. At the time of his death he was travelling in a Transkei government car assigned to the then minister of agriculture, EZ Boo. Other occupants, including Boo's sons, were injured in the incident, and subsequently detained.

The case against Ntshobane and Ndlaku was brought after this incident. Between October 1985 and February 1986, claimed the prosecution, they harboured Mvuli and several other guerillas in the Telle Bridge area at the Lesotho/Sterkspruit border.

- Following a bomb attack at the Mzamba Wild Coast hotel on April 18 1986, Ndibulele Ndzamela and Phumzile Mayaphi were charged with terrorism, murder and sabotage. Two people died in the blast. Charges against a third accused, Leonard Mdingi, were subsequently dropped.

On February 5 this year, Mayaphi's younger brother, Zonwabele, attended the trial. Later that day, he and two others were dead - allegedly killed by a police hit squad

Previous Transkei Defence Force second-in-command, Major-General Bantu Holomisa - was it really his day off?



in a shootout. Police identified one of the dead as an ANC guerilla. Zonwabele was at the time suing the minister of police for assaults he claimed took place while he was in detention.

● Mcebisi Mfo has been charged with terrorism relating to the harbouring of guerillas and possession of explosives. The state alleges that Mfo assisted Maqhekeza and Dumisani Mafu between October 1985 and February 1987. Further allegations are that Mfo either incited another man to kill two Butterworth security policemen or arranged for

them to be killed by Maqhekeza and Mafu.

● After a bomb blast at the Cala post office in April 1986, Teko Mokhou was charged with terrorism.

Mokhou, a clerk in the department of justice, is accused of acting as a go-between for ANC guerillas, functioning as a 'pilot' to check for roadblocks before guerillas were transported through the territory, forming ANC cells and possessing arms and explosives.

These offences are alleged to have taken place in areas as far apart as Cala (in the south west), Umtata and

Lusikisiki (in eastern Pondoland).

Mfo allegedly acted as a go-between for several guerillas during the period January 1984 and September 1986. They include Zola Dubeni and someone identified as 'Pieces' - believed to be a nickname of Maqhekeza, whose name means 'pieces of bread'.

Dubeni was killed in a Port Elizabeth shootout with South African police during March 1987.

Mokhou is also accused of undergoing training in Maseru, Cala and, under the instruction of 'Pieces', in Umtata's Ikhwezi township.

A state witness in Mokhou's trial told the court that the investigating officer in the case and another policeman had threatened that if he continued to give evidence the way he was doing he would end up in prison, and if he got out of prison he would be dead within a year.

The witness alleged that the police claimed the prosecutor in the case, David Sankey, was 'one of them', and that Sankey had called his lawyer 'a communist', telling him not to accept his advice. Sankey, who is also acting in several of the other political trials, has denied these accusations.

● Charges of terrorism were dropped against another 'escape' trialist, Justice Ndlangisa. Ndlangisa was originally charged with Mfo and Mokhou.

Numerous allegations of torture have been levelled against Transkei security police during these and other trials. State witnesses - some of whom the courts have ruled may not be named - and accused have described 'TV treatment', in which the victim is semi-suffocated with a bag over the head. 'The helicopter' or 'boeing' involves suspension of victims from a pole, with hands and legs handcuffed.

Other accounts include burning with open flames, sitting on bricks, being forced to eat cockroaches, and having pins stuck into the victim.

Several witnesses told the courts they had been threatened with death. And one accused testified that security police boasted of killing student leader Bathandwa Nondo.

### Transkei to Western Cape

Neo Zulu Mzimba, Mzimkulu Tukela and Sonwabo Mbekela face charges of harbouring Maqhekeza and

Mzwandile Vena between January 1984 and September 1985.

The prosecution claims they provided assistance to these two alleged guerilla fighters at Umtata and Libode (in the north east).

Vena is currently appealing against an order for his extradition from Cape Town, where he was recently arrested, to Transkei. In a statement Vena allegedly made to a Wynberg magistrate, he admitted blowing up the Umtata bulk fuel depot on June 25 1985. In the statement Vena identified four other guerillas - including Mpilo - who had been involved in this incident, and the sabotage of the Umtata water pipes and power station.

Vena also allegedly admitted being sent to Cape Town to replace recently-jailed Lizo Bright Ngqungwana as commander of the Western Cape branch of Umkhonto we Sizwe. And the South African state has accused Jenny Schreiner (currently on trial on charges of treason in Cape Town) of helping transport Vena from Botswana to Cape Town. Transkei wants to try Vena on charges relating to the Umtata bombings.

In another case, Zakade Buka was sentenced to seven years imprisonment last year on charges of terrorism. The charges related to the harbouring of guerillas, including two identified in the charge sheet as Zola Dubeni and 'Mpinga'. Buka was found in possession of a heavy-duty wire cutter, which the state alleged could have been used to cut the fences in the Umtata blasts. He also had a duplicating machine with a stencil of a pamphlet claiming the blasts were part of the ANC's anniversary celebrations of the Freedom Charter's adoption.

Several recent trials emerged from the Booi car explosion.

In addition to the Ntshobane/Ndla-ku case, the Booi brothers, Mlungisi and Bongani, and a third person were acquitted on charges of harbouring three guerillas (one of whom died in the blast). In another case linked to the incident, the accused absconded.

### Renewed PAC activity

- Lungisa Livingstone Matutu has been charged with terrorism, although no indictment is yet available.

Lawyers allege that Matutu was arrested in Bophuthatswana, handed over to South Africa and then to Transkei. They further claim that Transkei authorities tried to hold Matutu's trial in secret, and that they only discovered that their client was due to appear in a Mqanduli court by accident.

- Mhlanganiselo Mayekiso, a clerk in the department of the interior, faces charges of furthering the aims of a banned organisation and possession of banned literature.

- Mfanelo Matshaya and Pumlani Kubukeli were allegedly arrested in Bophuthatswana, handed over to Transkei authorities, and now face charges of terrorism. As yet, no charge sheet has been provided.

- Seven alleged Pan-Africanist Congress supporters face charges of membership and furthering the aims of the PAC, and harbouring PAC guerillas. The accused are Leo Kantolo, Salakaty Simuku, Siggiba Mpendulo, Synod Madlebe (currently in hospital after suffering a stroke), Nomtandazo Lusizi, Vivienne Swartbooi and Victor Zamela.

The prosecution alleges that the accused, acting with several others in Mdantsane near East London, attempted to set up a movement called the Patriotic African Front, to function as a front in a similar way to the United Democratic Front.

Further allegations are that the accused harboured Enoch Mabutha Zulu, alleged to be one of the PAC's Azanian People's Liberation Army commanders, Siyabulela Ndoda Ncanga (allegedly commander of the APLA field forces) and another guerilla between November 1985 and May 1986 in several different areas of Transkei.

Lusizi, a clerk in the department of the interior who gave birth while in detention, allegedly signed papers enabling Zulu to obtain false travel documents. Zulu was subsequently captured and is accused in a current Pretoria terrorism trial. An unnamed state witness in the Transkei case has admitted that he has already testified in two other trials.

The seven accused are currently suing Transkei's minister of police for unlawful detention.

Other current cases include two

relating to possession of banned publications, two of public violence involving 46 accused, and several perjury trials resulting from the major cases mentioned.

### Concerns over loyalty

These trials outlined above deal only with cases proceeding currently or which ended within the last year. But there have been numerous incidents of sabotage and shootouts between guerillas and police which have not resulted in court proceedings.

There have been indications of official concern over guerilla activity in the territory: in 1986 police spokesman General Leonard Kawe announced that three Transkei Road Transport Corporation officials had been detained in connection with allegedly channelling funds to the ANC. Some months later the then-prime minister, Chief George Matanzima, warned of the presence of ANC cells, and links between students and these cells.

Later the same year Commissioner of Police General RS Mantanga called on Transkeians not to expel 'suspicious people' but to report them so they could be arrested and Transkei defended 'against communists'. There have also been allegations by Transkei officials that bank robberies in the territory have been carried out by members of the ANC.

And the Transkei's consulate official in Johannesburg, Sibongile Dumalisile - a nephew of Nelson Mandela - was arrested by South African security police in Johannesburg and accused of providing illegal travel documents for ANC members. He was subsequently released and returned to the Transkei.

It is not only the scale of recent guerilla activity in the Transkei which these trials reveal. Nor is their focus of interest only on actors like Mazizi Maqhekeza who, according to Transkeian allegations, must have been one of the ANC's most successful guerilla operatives until his assassination in a Lesotho hospital.

The trials also reveal that loyalty to Umtata from those with much to gain from Transkeian 'independence' - government clerks and officials, professionals, sons of cabinet ministers - is not assured.

*elnews*

# A WEB OF NATIONAL MANIPULATION

**A**t the heart of current state strategy lies the shadowy State Security Council (SSC). Making sense of current policy on extra-parliamentary opposition to apartheid must start with the structure of the SSC, the most important and only constitutionally formed of the four cabinet committees.

The other three cabinet committees deal with economic, social and constitutional affairs. And there is little doubt that the SSC co-ordinates their activities although it is unclear how, if at all, it influences their deliberations.

The SSC meets fortnightly, and includes the heads of military intelligence, security police and the National Intelligence Service (NIS), the ministers of defence, law and order, foreign affairs, the commissioner of police, the state president (who chairs the SSC), and various co-opted members.

Beneath the SSC is a working com-

**Stoffel van der Merwe: '...once the perception that a black government is obtainable in the near future has been thoroughly crushed...'**

The Star



**Conflicts within state institutions sometimes mask the high degree of consensus on policy.**

**IVOR SARAKEY**

**analyses government thinking on 'radical' extra-parliamentary politics.**

mittee consisting of senior representatives from the departments represented on it.

There is also a secretariat to the SSC usually headed by somebody from military intelligence.

The secretariat has four branches:

national intelligence interpretation, strategy, strategic communication, and administration.

The working committee and the secretariat co-ordinate SSC activities and ensure that its decisions are implemented. The secretariat, which is numerically dominated by NIS, is arguably the most important part of this structure as it links the SSC to the outside world.

Both the security police and military intelligence are supposed to give their intelligence to NIS for interpretation and the formulation of strategies for medium to long-term political stability, after which it filters up into the SSC itself.

However, in the light of institutional rivalry and competition, it is unclear whether NIS gets all the information available at a particular time. Strategies may

thus be formulated on the basis of inadequate information; and information gathered by the intelligence agencies may only reach the SSC via their representatives on the council - circumventing NIS and the secretariat.

# THE NATIONAL SECURITY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM




Diagram from Mark Swilling and Mark Phillips, 'Reform, security and white power: re-thinking state strategies in the 1980s', delivered at the 19th annual conference of the Association of Sociologists of South Africa, University of Durban Westville, July 1988.



Law and order minister Vlok: a three-phase response to unrest



Gen Johan Coetzee: strategy of containment

Inter-institutional rivalries are thus fought out in the SSC itself, with the different security apparatuses jockeying for influence. And this is important in analysing state responses to the extra-parliamentary opposition.

### Containing opposition

The 1983 formation of the United Democratic Front (UDF) and National Forum (NF) - partly in response to the tricameral constitution - caught the state by surprise. It had not expected a mass boycott of elections for the houses of delegates and representatives: coloureds and Indians were historically separated from Africans, and it was expected that they would participate in the new parliamentary system. But the UDF's rapid consolidation into a national social movement forced the state to respond. Towards the end of 1984 Louis le Grange, then minister of law and order, directly linked the UDF to the African National Congress and SA Communist Party, and even UDF leaders expected that the front would be banned.

But the UDF's continuously-stated commitment to peaceful change, office bearers' addresses to the United Nations and European governments, and the highly-publicised sit-in at the British consulate in Durban gave the front an international profile which made it difficult for the state to ban it.

More importantly, the SSC reportedly accepted the strategy of containment advanced by the then commissioner of police, General Johan Coetzee. He argued that by selectively removing leadership and exploiting tensions in the extra-parliamentary opposition, the opposition could be controlled and manipulated without forcing it underground, where control was more difficult.

By mid-1985 the situation, from the state's perspective, was out of control, and a partial state of emergency was declared in July. This marked a return to earlier methods of mass detentions and repression. Critics of Coetzee within the state allegedly argued that this situation could have been avoided if action against the UDF had been taken sooner. Some also argued that the Coetzee strategy was too elaborate, that action should have been taken

much earlier to smash the growing extra-parliamentary opposition.

The situation did not improve for the state after the first emergency was lifted, and a national emergency was declared in June 1986, one month after the Commonwealth's Eminent Person's Group mission was wrecked by SADF raids on Botswana, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

These raids and the new emergency marked the demise of Coetzee (he retired one year early), and the rise of the military in the SSC and national security management system (NSMS). Defence Minister Malan, and then SSC secretary General Pieter van der Westhuizen, allegedly assured the SSC that if the military, rather than police, enforced emergency rule, law and order would soon be restored. With the SADF effectively implementing this state of emergency, high-ranking military officers consolidated their positions in NSMS structures.

### Vlok's three-phase response

During October 1986, a new interpretation of the causes of widespread township unrest was advanced by Louis le Grange. He argued that socio-economic conditions were responsible for unrest, in that activists and 'radicals' were able to mobilise communities around legitimate grievances.

This interpretation lay behind the three-phase response to unrest outlined by new Law and Order Minister Adriaan Vlok - a strategy probably formulated by the NIS.

The first phase emphasised a return to law and order; in the second, socio-economic upliftment was to be the priority; and phase three would concentrate on constitutional development. Within this strategy, regional services councils (RSCs) and joint management centres (JMCs) were targetted to play an important role in co-ordinating the allocation of resources.

The intention here was to isolate militant community organisations from their support bases. This approach differed substantially from Coetzee's programme of containing and disorganising opposition.

Over the next few months, state strategy concentrated on re-establishing law and order. But changes of personnel in the SSC and NSMS suggest that new approaches

were being sought during the rest of 1987 and into early 1988.

*Africa Confidential*, for example, reported that General van der Westhuizen's transfer to Chile as South Africa's ambassador, and his replacement as SSC secretary by General Charles Lloyd, marked a temporary victory for those military officers emphasising socio-economic factors in unrest, and responding with a 'winning hearts and minds' (WHAM) strategy.

This was opposed by another influential faction within the military, emphasising more traditional counter-insurgency (COIN) tactics: a highly-visible security profile with the object of confusing, dividing and paralysing the opposition. The COIN faction is reported to include General K van der Waal, commander of special forces; General AJM Joubert of the reconnaissance commandos and, most importantly, the new head of military intelligence, General CJ van Tonder.

The WHAM faction apparently includes SADF chief Jannie Geldenhuys, SSC secretary Charles Lloyd, and air force head General Jan Petrus van Loggerenberg.

### February 24 restrictions

Despite these tensions within and between the security apparatuses, there remains a large degree of cohesion in the formulation and implementation of policy. This is illustrated in the February 24 restrictions imposed on 17 organisations. The effective banning of these organisations marks the re-emergence of the minister of law and order and head of security police as influential actors in state circles - because they and their followers had campaigned for firm action against the extraparliamentary opposition.

The restrictions also mark an awareness by security planners that boycotts are powerful mobilising tactics, and that organisations set back by the state of emergency should not be allowed to consolidate around a boycott of the October 26 municipal elections. While electoral

participation was being discussed in some extra-parliamentary circles the argument was, as information minister Stoffel van der Merwe put it, 'not winning the day in the UDF'. A boycott was expected, and the restrictions were an attempt to prevent it. This was confirmed in the most recent emergency regulations, which explicitly prohibit advocacy of any



**New SSC secretary General Charles Lloyd**

form of boycott.

The February 24 restrictions were an attempt to push the extra-parliamentary opposition into a corner, while at the same time making it possible for candidates and voters to come forward in the October elections. For the state, much rests on the success of these elections: not only the re-establishment of local government, but the fact that elected councillors will form an electoral college for the National Statutory Council - lynch pin of PW Botha's latest constitutional restructuring.

State strategists associated with WHAM reportedly believe that only 20% of Africans are politically militant, 30% moderate, and 50% undecided. WHAM proponents believe that by isolating 'radicals' - those committed to overthrowing the apartheid government and replacing it with one dominated by the ANC - and drawing 'moderates' and the 'neutrals' into the system via allocation of resources, restructuring associated with the National Statu-

tory Council and local government can be implemented.

The February 24 restrictions allow organisations to apply for their restrictions to be lifted to allow participation in certain activities. Rather than banning them outright, the state has attempted to place an onus on the extra-parliamentary opposition by defining 'politics' as participation in state structures. In effect, the state is saying that it will negotiate with any group or person - as long as they accept state-defined methods of bringing about change.

In this vein, Stoffel van der Merwe has stated that 'once the perception that a black government is obtainable in the near future - once that perception has been thoroughly crushed - it will become possible to speak again about a common future'.

Van der Merwe believes that 'in time', his government will 'get a sufficient number of prominent leaders to participate in the democratic game so that eventually those who still lust after revolution will

become as irrelevant in South Africa as they are in the US or Britain'.

It remains unclear whether the state can succeed in marginalising and crushing 'radical' opposition, enabling 'moderates' to come forward. Crucial to this is the accuracy of WHAM proponents' belief that only 20% of Africans can be classified as radical - questionable in the light of high participation in the recent three-day national stayaway. Equally uncertain is whether the state has the economic resources to upgrade townships socio-economically, while at the same time financing supportive patronage networks.

But what is clear is the state's resolve to make its latest proposals - what it terms 'reforms' - work. The February restrictions are similar to earlier attempts to knock out extra-parliamentary opposition. Only this time the state has tried to define politics in such a way that government can claim organisations themselves are to blame for their restrictions and exclusion from 'politics'.



Has the state succeeded in putting white South Africans on a 'war footing', ready to risk everything to defend a particular form of government?

**MF BLATCHFORD** looks at the extent to which white society has been militarised.

**S**outh Africa is often described as a highly militarised society. To support this, critics point to the immense size of the South African military machine, and the billions of rands pumped into its maintenance and development.

But by these standards, the Federal Republic of Germany is much more militarised than South Africa. Yet its armed forces only pose a threat to peace insofar as they are part of the NATO-Warsaw Pact flashpoint.

The key issue is really what the military machine is used for, rather than how large it is.

It is useful to distinguish between militarised states (which spend large amounts on armed forces), militaristic states (where the military has political power and prestige but aggression is not widely deemed virtuous - as in the USA) and bellicist states (where the idolised military often provides the state's legitimacy and aggression is publicly endorsed - as in Nazi Germany or Rhodesia).

South Africa is obviously militarised, but its militarism is ambiguous. The 'security forces' have dominated the nation's administration since the 1970s, but this has not been matched by social prestige. The SADF's Permanent Force is not an attractive option for school-leavers. Senior military officers go almost unnoticed by the public at large, and in the cabinet, 'doves'

# THE LAST DROP OF BLOOD

like Foreign Minister Pik Botha enjoy more public admiration than 'hawks' like Defence Minister General Magnus Malan.

In terms of bellicism, the position is clearer. White South Africans may 'enjoy a good raid', but these raids are generally presented and perceived in terms of warding off a mythical 'communist onslaught'. When they have consequences like death or injury on the South African side, the white public tends to develop misgivings. Recent deaths in Angola produced condemnation for the SADF, and demands that the Permanent Force do the fighting; in a true bellicist society - like that of Britain during the world wars - parents would take pride in their sons' deaths.

This public tenderness has influenced the government; the SADF's inability to capture the Angolan town of Cuito Cuanavale in March 1988 seemed to arise partly out of its reluctance to risk heavy losses.

### Human costs

The SADF and the government have probably been conscious of these feelings since 1976, when the human cost of the bungled intervention in Angola became public and, in part, forced the South Africans to withdraw from battle. Parents of the dead soldiers denounced the intervention and the secrecy surrounding it, and one parent brought an unsuccessful action against the government because of his son's death in battle.

The military embarrassment in Angola, and the subsequent crisis of white public confidence, was solved by exploiting a fear of black people following the Soweto uprising. But even this, coupled with the stirring of resentment towards the Carter administration in the United States, failed to solve the problem of indifference in the ruling bloc to the 'total onslaught'. And it may be that the 1977 Defence White Paper which produced the concept of 'Total Strategy' (the feeling of 'total war') was the state's way of addressing this problem.

The SADF invasion of Angola in May 1978 gave an idea of how the new policy was being pursued. The military staged an armoured attack on a Swapo base near the Namibian

border, and massacred hundreds of refugees at Cassinga camp, deep inside Angola. The Cassinga raid seems to have been designed as a publicity stunt to restore the myth of SADF invincibility. It involved killing hundreds of unarmed civilians while claiming that they were guerillas - military victory for public consumption at no human cost (for South Africa).

The operation was so successful that raids of this type, on smaller scales, have become fairly common throughout Southern Africa.

### See it on TV

The 1970s and early 1980s saw a major attempt to militarise South African culture. There was a plague of television programmes and films glorifying the military - 'Grensbasis

**The raid on Cassinga refugee camp seems to have been designed as a publicity stunt to restore the myth of SADF invincibility. It was a military victory for public consumption - at no human cost for South Africa**

13' etc - but they usually won little applause. Coffee-table books praising the armed forces appeared, but ended up in the bargain bins. The SADF formed civilian bodies supporting it, but apart from the older (and non-bellicist) Southern Cross Fund, these were poorly supported.

Perhaps in response to this campaign, media advertisements began exploiting military themes; but by the early 1980s these became less common, presumably because of unsatisfactory effects. Only within state structures was South African society effectively 'bellicised'.

This failure may have come about through contradictory propaganda. The SADF believed that, as in Vietnam, graphic revelations of war conditions led to public anger. It therefore excluded independent journalists from covering its activities, and provided only officially-sanctioned comment.

The SADF and its sympathetic journalists presented the force as being wholly victorious, and therefore the public believed that the war was being won. Hence there was no need for any special effort on their part.

To change this perception it would have been necessary for the government to admit that the war was not going well (as was indeed the case in the early 1980s) and that the SADF was not invincible. Rather than risk this, the government sought refuge in another area of conflict - the African National Congress.

### Reds under the bed

The ANC's Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) was at that time launching propaganda attacks on military and economic targets. These posed no immediate threat to the state's security, but a myth was created that MK 'terrorists' were attacking civilians, which was expected to arouse alarm in the ruling bloc.

However, MK was not generally striking at civilian targets, and few experienced its actions except through the media. Thus the public did not feel threatened, apart from a diminishing minority in northern Namibia and on the Transvaal border. Despite the efforts of bodies like Victims Against Terrorism and the National Students Federation, by 1984 the white public was still apathetic towards 'the war effort'.

In 1984, the SADF's move into black townships in an attempt to quell the uprisings defined a new set of ground rules: support for anti-conscription movements swelled and draft avoidance grew, and many people seemed to feel they didn't want to risk themselves or their loved ones in the government's wars.

By 1986, the government was on the defensive; criticism of the SADF's role was common in liberal media, in parliament and even among the Afrikaans intelligentsia, notably with the rise of 'grensliteratuur' (writings on the border wars).

In June of that year, a national state of emergency was imposed to crush resistance. This offered a golden opportunity to wreck the

anti-conscription movement, first by proclamation and detentions, then by disinformation. The government possibly felt that once this movement had been silenced, the public would support the SADF with confidence.

However, support for the government's campaign was weak. The organisation set up to lead the attack (Veterans For Victory) lacked any public profile and by 1987 seemed to count only one active member. So most 'anti-anti-conscription' media had to be disseminated covertly by the SADF itself.

The invasion of Angola in 1987 also revealed a lack of public bellicism. Many were indignant at the

unprecedented casualties, while the SADF clumsily denied any involvement in the war. Moreover, the press - even pro-government organs - ignored the SADF's disclaimers and printed foreign reports and Angolan press bulletins instead.

Bellicist propoganda had failed yet again.

This suggests one little-studied reason why the government is now attacking the press. While the attack currently seems focused on the 'alternative' press, another aim could be to force the surrender of the entire white-run press to the government's bellicist philosophy. Government may believe that once no voice challenges that of the

SADF, constant indoctrination will take full effect and the public will at last wholeheartedly support the war.

There is little, if any, guarantee that this will ever happen. Repression has not proved adequate in the past, and there are increasing signs that state propoganda is not being believed.

Nevertheless, the government evidently hopes its unchallenged expression of bellicist mythologies will give it an ideal instrument with which to manipulate the white public to fight to the last drop of blood.

\* *The concept of 'bellicism' versus 'militarism' is raised by Professor Michael Howard in his book The Causes of War, Unwin, 1983.*

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## Labour trends May 23 to July 22

In the wake of nine-million work days lost through strikes last year, South African employers appear to be exploring more sophisticated strategies and tactics. The organised labour movement in turn is also making adjustments to fit the changing terrain of industrial relations.

The declining number of strikes this year does not necessarily mean a similar decline in worker militancy - which has taken a different form and direction, with more overt political overtones. The three-day stayaway of June 6-8 was to some extent a manifestation of this.

With the effective crushing of popular political organisations, the labour movement has been thrust to the fore, and its decisions have great influence on opposition politics. A significant development is the move towards united front strategies, bridging ideological differences. These involve the Cosatu special congress resolution to form a front of anti-apartheid organisations and examine the possibility of joint stayaway action, joint negotiations, joint shopsteward councils, and solidarity action.

### Bargaining forums

After much debate in the early 1980s, unions recognised that there were benefits to industrial council membership. Unions in most sectors have either joined industrial councils or are seriously examining the issue. Ppwawu and Harwu are currently in dispute with the industrial councils in their respective sectors over the rejection of their application for membership.

On reflection, Mawu - now part of Numsa - made significant gains out of joining the industrial council for

the iron, steel, engineering and metallurgical industries. The most obvious of these were a rapid increase in membership and stronger organisational structures. Other advantages included stop-order facilities, access to factories and time off for shopsteward training - all of which gave the union room to mobilise metal workers on a national level.

### Dual strategy

After effectively succeeding in national mobilisation, Mawu campaigned for all-level bargaining, at plant and company level as well as the industrial council. The strategy seemed ideal. Workers at individual factories could continue the struggle for higher wages after the national wage settlement. But industrial council negotiations are far removed from the shop floor, and worker militancy is not as immediate a pressure. Thus the fight for plant-level bargaining is important in maintaining and using shop-floor militancy.

This dual strategy has, however, posed problems for the metal union. Some companies offer higher wages than the employer federation, Seifsa, does in the industrial council. Workers presented with these better offers no longer have a direct stake in national disputes.

In the current metal wage dispute, Seifsa's final offer is 41c an hour. Plant-level offers have varied from just over 41c to around 80c an hour. Barlow Appliances, arguing that Numsa has the right to bargain at plant level, obtained a court interdict restraining the union from balloting or participating in any strike action related to the Seifsa dispute.

Exact figures are not available, but a significant number of Seifsa members have made higher offers at plant level. In some cases management has asked workers to sign forms accepting Seifsa's 41c as a pre-condition to further negotiations at plant level.

This potential to split workers on the ground is an ongoing problem in the dual bargaining option. This is

bound to intensify as management seeks the most conflict-free and affordable strategy. Higher profit sectors like electronics will always offer more than the lower profit sectors. A counter strategy for unions may be to consider sectoral bargaining within the industrial council, but this has not yet been formally discussed in union structures.

At this stage a national metal strike initiative seems unlikely. Out of the 60% of IMF members who balloted, 87% voted for strike action. But, as well as the split offer problem, the union must consider that managements may react strongly to strikes after the heavy production losses suffered during the June 6-8 and June 16 stayaways.

In addition, workers lost earnings during the stayaways; this, coupled with the threat of dismissals, limits the chances of wide-scale plant-level action.

The major change in union strategy this year involved a move by the International Metal Federation (IMF) bloc of unions in the industrial council towards united action. The strategy has, for the first time in the metal industry, committed Nactu and Cosatu unions to decisions taken under one umbrella. This both strengthens their position in the council and lays the basis for future unity.

The IMF-bloc strategy did not significantly affect wage negotiations, but it poses a challenge to the minister of manpower in terms of gazetting the agreement signed by Seifsa and the non-IMF unions. Last year the minister re-promulgated the agreement on the grounds that Numsa was not the largest representative in the council. This year the IMF bloc represents 120 000 workers. The other unions, which accepted the employer offer, together represent only 80 000 workers.

### National shopstewards' councils

A number of unions are attempting to set up consolidated

structures representing workers employed by the same company in a particular sector. Sectors involved at this stage are food, commercial and catering, metal, chemical and paper and printing. An important factor, the unions believe, is the strong sense of worker solidarity these national shopstewards' councils can generate.

In a recent case, over a thousand Afcol workers at six Transvaal plants went on strike over the dismissal of colleagues at a Johannesburg Afcol company. More plants were expected to support the strike after a decision taken at the joint Afcol shopstewards' council.

In another development, the CWIU set up a petroleum shopstewards' council which united workers from different companies in the same sector. Although the union conducted wage negotiations separately at Shell, Mobil Oil and BP, the settlements reached were very similar. The union has recently proposed to employers that one negotiation should cover all workers in the sector.

A logical development after sector-based shopsteward councils is cross-sector councils. And the obvious starting point would be the large conglomerates which own companies throughout the economy. Unions from different federations would have to co-operate on the ground in such a development. Initiatives in this regard are still in embryonic stages, but their potential impact is substantial.

Earlier this year, the South African branch of the International Union of Foodworkers set up a joint shopstewards' council for all organised factories owned by the giant SA Breweries group. The SAB shopstewards' council represents over 40 000 workers from Fawu, Ppwawu, FBWU, Nusaw, Ccawusa/Harwu and CLTU. Approaches were also made to Fedcraw and Nudor. The companies involved include Coca-Cola, Afcol, OK Bazaars, Southern Sun and Holiday Inns.

Immediate issues for the joint council are mass dismissals and the

broad disparity in wages in SAB companies. For example, Afcol workers get R550 a month compared to Coca-Cola's R800.

But the issue of wage disparity will be difficult to challenge. Mine bosses, for example, are unlikely to pay miners the same wages their subsidiary companies pay employees in the retail sector. However, solidarity and action over issues like mass dismissals and a shorter working week may well be possible.

Fawu and FBWU have held discussions on joint negotiations in the beer division of SAB, but no decisive steps have yet been taken.

Another giant which will no doubt be challenged in this way at some time is Anglo American. While an Anglo shopstewards' council was in the pipeline last year, the initiative collapsed after one meeting. The giant corporation has a stake in almost every sector of the South African economy, yet solidarity among Anglo workers is rare. The NUM strike was a lesson in this and the stark absence of solidarity for the miners was one of the contributing factors to the failure of their strike last year.

### Management strategies

In addition to dismissals, court interdicts and lockouts, employers have been exploring strategies ranging from co-optation attempts to outright union-bashing. The high level of industrial action last year and the major stayaway action this year have hardened management attitudes.

Although the number of workers dismissed as a result of the June stayaway was not as high as unions expected, the threat of dismissals and lockouts in subsequent strike situations was greater after the stayaways. A number of unions reported that members received final warnings after these actions.

Four thousand one hundred and forty-one Cosatu and Nactu members were dismissed as a result of the three-day stayaway, and 33 337 were subjected to warnings or disciplinary action. As a result,

large numbers of workers were dismissed after the June 16 stayaway. Union sources say a significant number of those dismissed have got their jobs back.

The lockout strategy is still being tested. The latest development involved Seifsa's attempt at an industry-wide lockout. The employer federation conducted a ballot among members to determine the extent of support for the strategy. A number of metal employers rejected the strategy as destructive to industrial relations and it is unlikely to be implemented, even though it could effectively curtail a national strike. But it has highlighted the possibility of joint management actions in the face of joint union demands.

From May 23 to July 22, there were three cases of lockouts involving 2 017 workers. This figure excludes lockouts due to the stayaway.

Cases of companies declaring disputes with unions are on the increase. Also on the increase is the incidence of employers and unions declaring disputes against each other at about the same time. In the period reviewed Southern Sun and the Carlton Hotel each declared a dispute with Ccawusa/Harwu, and SA Breweries declared a dispute with Fawu.

Another management strategy evident at the moment is that of 'racial substitution' of workers. A survey conducted by a management consultancy, PE Corporate Services, revealed that employers would in future employ more coloureds and Indians because they were less likely to participate in strike action or stayaways.

The organisation of coloured and Indian workers in large numbers, as well as potential scab labour, is under discussion in both Cosatu and Nactu. Historically, the majority of coloured and Indian workers were organised in conservative Tucsa-type trade unions. Some entered Cosatu and Nactu structures through affiliation and mergers after Tucsa disbanded. But neither federation has concentrated on



**Metal workers unite: The IMF delegation discusses tactics during a break in negotiations.**

organising these workers, although Cosatu has made a statement on the necessity to organise white workers.

### Inter-union rivalry

In the period under review, there were two incidents of inter-union rivalry - at East London's Mercedes Benz plant, and at Afcol in Johannesburg. The unions involved - Saawu and Numsa at Mercedes and Ppwawu and Nufaw at Afcol - are reluctant to discuss the actions. However reports suggest that a bloody clash occurred at Mercedes between Saawu and Numsa members during a Numsa strike, leaving nine workers injured. In the Afcol rivalry, the incident was more serious - with five Nufaw members thrown off a train and killed while on their way to work. Ppwawu members were on strike at the time. Eight people have since been arrested, while Ppwawu has distanced itself from the killing. An aspect of the Afcol dispute has been the racial division: Nufaw, an ex-Tucsa union affiliated to Nactu, represents coloured and Indian workers.

### Esops

Although unions have expressed strong reservations about employee share ownership programmes (Esops), offers from managements continue. With the exception of the Mono Pumps and Samcor share

schemes, most do not entitle workers to any participation in decision-making. In rejecting the ABI share offer, Fawu said 'the sale of shares advances and protects the interests of profit-makers while dividing united action by workers. Clearly, the labour movement's prerogative is the collective interests of workers while share ownership schemes thus far are aimed at individual interests'.

Many in the labour movement view Esops as a concerted strategy aimed at capital's interests. In a speech delivered at an Institute for Personnel Management seminar, Adrienne Bird, Numsa's regional education officer, said: 'Neither individual workers nor their unions asked for shares - it was management who proposed the scheme, and if their motive is to get workers to work harder and strike less to maximise profit, we believe they are offering far too little in a context of repression that completely discredits any ideological gains they may have hoped to win'.

### Facts and figures

In the period May 23 to July 22, 18 720 workers went on strike and 2 017 were locked out: this figure excludes those locked out as a result of the June 6-8 stayaway. Approximately 19 360 workers were involved in disputes with

management, and this again excludes disputes declared as a result of the June stayaways. The metal industry experienced the most strikes. And the numerous disputes declared in the food and commercial catering industries may indicate significant strike action in that sector in the near future.

### Repression and attacks

26.05.88: Four Ccawusa members arrested in Johannesburg during a picket demonstration against the proposed labour bill.

04.07.88: Potwa assistant general secretary and two members arrested under emergency regulations. Assistant general secretary released on June 15.

08.07.88: Ppwawu report-back meeting held under siege. Armed police occupied the hall in Klipspruit, took photographs and fingerprints of all workers present. Eight workers were detained under emergency regulations.

14.07.88: TGWU head office burnt. Office furniture and equipment destroyed.

16.07.88: Potwa offices in Wanderers Street broken into. Nothing was reported missing.

16.07.88: Police dispersed about 1 000 Numsa members at the Katlehong local office. Workers were waiting for transport to go to an IMF meeting.

*Shareen Singh.*

COMPANY	UNION	WORKERS	DATE	EVENTS
<b>Strikes and Disputes: Transvaal</b>				
Amalgamated Beverage Industries	Fawu	2 700	May 1988 - 24.05.88	ABI obtained court interdicts declaring the strike at five company plants illegal and giving strikers an ultimatum to return to work. Workers returned to work while management and the union discussed the proposed new distribution system which initially sparked off the strike.
Afcol Transvaal	Ppwawu/NUFW	1 117	31.05.88	At six Afcol plants management locked out striking Ppwawu members, but allowed NUFW members access. Workers had gone on strike after the Furniture Industrial Council failed to resolve a dispute over the dismissal of 340 Star Furniture workers. During the strike, five NUFW members were fatally attacked on their way to work at the Transvaal Mattress and Furniture Company. Ppwawu dissociated itself from the attacks and rejected the use of violence. The dispute was referred to mediation (see Trends).
Alberton Steel Windows and Alex All Alberton	Numsa	200	14.06.88 -	Management locked out workers after they refused to sign forms which declared their June 14 stoppage to be illegal. The workers stopped work after management refused to discuss the issue of June 16 as a paid holiday. Although workers agreed to a management ultimatum to return to work the next day, they were locked out when they arrived at the factories. The union obtained a court interdict declaring dismissals as a result of the lockout were unfair. Management was in the process of challenging the interdict in the supreme court.
Barlow Appliances Alrode	Numsa	700	29.06.88	Management obtained an interdict restraining the union from embarking on a strike over its wage dispute with Seifsa. The company is not a Seifsa member and management said any ballot or strike around the wage dispute with Seifsa contravenes the existing plant-level recognition agreement. The union challenged the interdict but the court had not reached a decision at the time of writing.
Carlton Hotel Johannesburg	Harwu	245	27.05.88	After a demonstration outside the Carlton Hotel, 245 Harwu workers were fined R100 each, which Carlton management paid. Workers were protesting after Westin, an international hotel group, disinvested from the country without paying severance benefits.
Carlton Hotel Johannesburg	Harwu	600	May/June 88	Carlton Hotel and Harwu were involved in three separate disputes, two declared by the union and one by management. The first union dispute concerned wages and working conditions, the second was over management's failure to provide an adequate venue for worker meetings. Management offered a room that could accommodate about 30 workers for a meeting involving 600 workers. Management's dispute was over the union's refusal to stop workers participating in stayaways.
Coronia Hotel - JHB	Harwu	14	09.06.88	Workers were dismissed after the June 6-8 stayaway and one worker was charged with intimidation.
Frys Metals Wadeville	Numsa	120	03.06.88	Workers held a stoppage because management wanted to test for lead content in their blood. They resumed work after management agreed that no one would be dismissed, even if the lead content exceeded the legal limit.
Gallo Industries Transvaal	Ccawusa	400	15.07.88	Gallo workers went on strike after a conciliation board failed to resolve a wage dispute. The union had demanded an across-the-board increase of R262 a month while management offered R108. Other demands included a 40-hour week, a 13th cheque, recognition of traditional healers for medical treatment, and Sharpeville Day and June 16 as paid holidays. Music groups involved with Gallo - including Stimela and Volcano - have refused to work until the strike has been resolved.
Haggie Rand Jupiter	Numsa	1 200	14.05.88	Workers refused to work overtime after management refused to allow them to accumulate time to qualify for a long weekend in May. Management argued that the long weekend would affect production, and obtained a court interdict against an overtime ban. Numsa intended challenging the interdict.
I&J	Fawu		July 1988	Fawu threatened to call its members out in major strike action if I&J management did not meet wage demands. Workers demanded an increase of R45,51 a week. I&J refused to offer more than R27,06 on its current weekly minimum of R121,44. The dispute was referred to conciliation.
Iscor Vanderbijlpark	Numsa	130	June 1988	Iscor's 7 000 workers were threatened with dismissals after the June 6-8 stayaway. Management began dismissing selectively. Showing strong solidarity, workers challenged management to dismiss all of them. However, after signing a wage agreement with Numsa and CMBU, Iscor agreed to re-employ 130 dismissed workers. Iscor offered a wage increase of 11,8% for skilled workers and 17,9% for unskilled workers; a uniform wage bonus of 8,5% of employees basic salary; and one week's paid sick leave to be taken with maternity leave.
Karos Hotels	Harwu	1 000	01.07.88	The union declared three disputes with Karos Hotels: two over stayaway-related issues and one over wages. The union demanded an annual wage agreement, as opposed to negotiations every two years.
Masana Northern Transvaal	Satawu	400	19.05.1988	This Anglo American-owned company dismissed 400 workers following a strike where workers demanded union recognition and wage negotiations. Present wages are between R68 and R200 a month.
OK Bazaars	Ccawusa	10 000	June 1988	OK workers settled for a wage increase of R105 a month and a minimum wage of R500 a month. In terms of this agreement, no pay will be deducted from workers who stay away on June 16, and long-service benefits will be improved. OK also agreed to look into the

COMPANY	UNION	WORKERS	DATE	EVENTS
				issue of recognising traditional healers for medical treatment.
Perskor	Mwasa	4 000	26-30.06.88	Mwasa and Perskor reached a wage settlement, ending a strike by close to 4 000 workers at ten plants. Both parties agreed on a minimum wage of R118 a week for drivers and R109 for factory assistants.
SAB	Fawu	500	23.06.88	Workers staged a work stoppage to protest the dismissal of security workers who had stayed away on June 16. Management said the company had granted May Day and June 16 as paid holidays providing certain essential services were maintained. SAB said those workers who stayed away on June 16 breached this agreement.
SAB	Fawu		20.07.88	SAB beer division declared a dispute with Fawu after three rounds of wage talks. Management offered a 16% wage increase amounting to a minimum wage of R940 a month for the lowest paid shift worker and R1 280 for the lowest paid continuous shift worker. Fawu demanded the following: a minimum wage of R7,75 an hour, a 12 week bonus, six to nine weeks' annual leave, a 35% shift allowance and five times the normal hourly rate for working overtime on Sundays.
Southern Suns	Harwu	8 500	21.06.88	Southern Suns management declared a dispute with Harwu regarding public holidays. The company said the union had not ensured that workers worked on May 1 and June 16.
Soweto City Council	Samwu	5 000	21-24.06.88 20.07.88	Council employees including police, street sweepers, clerks, office cleaners and other labourers went on strike demanding union recognition, wage upgrading and dissolution of the staff association. A government regulation states that when a township has been upgraded, salaries of municipal workers should be upgraded accordingly. Soweto has been upgraded from grade 11 to grade 12. At a shopstewards meeting, municipal police undertook not to evict rent defaulters. Workers returned to work while negotiations continued - but on July 20 they deadlocked and workers went on strike again.
Woolworths	Ccawusa		14.07.88	Workers at 24 Woolworths stores organised a work stoppage to pressurise management during wage negotiations.
<b>Strikes and Disputes: Natal</b>				
Highway Mail Durban	Mwasa	60	June 1988	Highway Mail and Mwasa were in dispute over the company's new sub-contracting system. Mwasa said the company had acted in bad faith. Management asked the union to defer wage negotiations for six weeks while a feasibility study was being conducted. After the study was completed, the company decided to dismantle the distribution department. Mwasa claims that the deferment proposal misled the union.
Republican Press Durban	Mwasa		June 1988	Mwasa declared a dispute after Republican Press failed to negotiate as agreed on March 1. The negotiations were due to include substantive issues as well as wages. Management failed to negotiate but went ahead with unilateral increases.
<b>Strikes and Disputes: Cape</b>				
Goodyear Uitenhage	Numsa	900	13.05- 13.06.88	The month-long strike at Goodyear's Uitenhage plant ended after agreement was reached between Numsa, Goodyear management and the tyre and rubber industrial council. Subject to the agreement, workers had to return to work by June 15 and those workers allegedly involved in violence at the plant on May 13 would have to face a disciplinary hearing.
Juicy Lucy - CT	Ccawusa	15	09.06.88	Workers were dismissed after the June stayaway but re-instated following negotiations between management and the union.
Karos Hotel Cape Town and JHB	Harwu	3	17.06.88	Two workers at Karos in Cape Town and one in Johannesburg were dismissed for staying away on June 16. They had received final warnings after the earlier June stayaway.
Karos Wilderness Hotel George	Harwu	120	June 1988	Wilderness Hotel workers given final warnings after the June stayaway were dismissed and evicted from their hostel after again staying away on June 16.
Mercedes Benz East London	Numsa/ Saawu	400	27.05.88	Rival unions Saawu and Numsa clashed in a confrontation involving 400 workers during a strike. Nine workers were seriously injured. Management obtained an urgent interdict restraining Numsa from holding any meetings at the factory. Numsa members were on strike in solidarity with workers at Kromberg and Schubert which supplies Mercedes. Mercedes workers demanded that management intervene in the dispute at the supplier. Numsa accused Mercedes of instigating violence. A member of management personnel was seen talking to unidentified persons and appeared to be giving them instructions. Shortly afterwards Numsa members were attacked as they entered the truck assembly plant. Mercedes's parent company Daimler Benz intervened, threatening to pull out of South Africa if the large number of strikes and the recent violent situation did not end. After several discussions, Numsa and Mercedes reached agreement: management would withdraw all disciplinary actions including the dismissal of several shopstewards as well as an interdict application; Numsa agreed to have two senior officials available at all times to intervene should any stoppage or dispute arise (see Trends).

COMPANY	UNION	WORKERS	DATE	EVENTS
Mount Nelson Hotel - CT	Harwu	12	09.06.88	Workers dismissed after the June stayaway were re-instated.
Southern Suns Cape Town	Harwu	60	May 1988	Management at Cape Town's President Hotel dismissed 44 workers, and the Newlands Sun dismissed 17 following a sympathy stoppage.
Spur - CT	Harwu	30	09.06.88	Workers dismissed after the June stayaway were re-instated after their union intervened.
Townhouse - CT	Harwu	70	10.06.88	Workers were suspended for a week after the June stayaway, and dismissed following an enquiry. The union applied for mediation.
Vineyard Hotel - CT	Harwu	80	10.06.88	Workers were briefly suspended after the June stayaway and subsequently dismissed. The issue was referred to mediation.
Volkswagen Ulitenhage	Numsa	4 500	09-13.06.88	In solidarity with Goodyear workers, Volkswagen workers refused to handle Goodyear tyres, bringing production at the plant to a standstill. Workers returned to work after four days.

### Strikes and Disputes: Mines

Anglo American	NUM	20 000	07.07.88	NUM lost its dispute with Anglo American over the issue of severance pay for 20 000 workers dismissed during the wage strike last year. Advocate William Schreiner ruled that payments should be based on basic wages rather than the value of wages plus fringe benefits which NUM had demanded.
Chamber of Mines	NUM	140 000	04.07.88	After the quietest wage negotiations in years, NUM accepted a Chamber wage offer involving increases of between 13,5% and 16%. Last year the union rejected an offer of 17% to 23,5%, and embarked on a major strike. NUM's initial demand was 40% compared to their demand of 55% last year. Most union demands were rejected with the exception of the establishment of a provident fund, which prompted the settlement. Both parties agreed that the details of the provident fund would be negotiated, with arbiters brought in if necessary.
Duvha Opencast Witbank	NUM	500	June 1988	NUM and Duvha Opencast agreed on wage increases from 12% in the lower categories to 14% in the higher categories. The minimum wage increased from R561 to R628 a month.
De Beers	NUM	9 000	June 1988	NUM declared a dispute after annual wage talks deadlocked. Management offered a 12,5% increase on the current minimum of R481 against the union's revised demand of 20%. However, the parties agreed on May Day as a paid holiday and June 16 as an unpaid holiday.
East Rand Gold and Uranium Company Springs	NUM	800	26.05-June 88	NUM and Ergo were locked in dispute a day before the union commenced annual wage negotiations with the Chamber. The union initially demanded a 27% increase but settlement was reached on 13%, raising the minimum wage for shift workers to R741 a month and R694 a month for non-shift workers. Annual leave was increased from 21 to 24 days.
Escom	NUM		July 1988	Escom threatened to withdraw its wage offer of 12% if the union did not accept it by August 22. The current minimum is R520 a month.
Rand Mines Milling and Mining	NUM	600	15-18.07.88	Pending negotiations, the Crown Mines miners returned to work after a strike sparked off by the dismissal of a chief shopsteward for intimidation during the June stayaway. NUM and the company were also in dispute over wages.
Rand Refineries Germiston	NUM	150	18.07.88	Wages at Rand Refineries were to be increased by 16%, raising the minimum from R567 to R658 a month. Management also agreed to reduce working hours from 48 to 42 hours a week without loss of pay, and granted one extra day's leave.
Rietspruit Opencast Witbank	NUM	850	June 1988	Rietspruit Opencast miners will receive increases ranging from 12% to 14%, bringing the minimum wage to R518 a month. The settlement also included May Day as a paid holiday and June 16 as an unpaid holiday.
Samancor Maganese N-Eastern Transvaal	NUM		June 1988	NUM and Samancor settled on wage increases of 17% for lower-paid workers and 20% for higher-paid workers and May Day and June 16 as paid holidays. The minimum wage prior to settlement was R290 a month.
Winterveld Chrome Mine Lydenburg	NUM	1 000	June 1988	According to a wage settlement between NUM and the mine, wages for surface workers were to increase from R327 to R373 a month and underground workers from R393 to R448. The agreement also provided for income security for injured persons, 100% holiday leave allowance and the establishment of a provident fund.
Zincor Springs	NUM	700	19.07.88	NUM declared a dispute with Zincor demanding a wage increase of 20% on the current minimum of R361 a month. Management offered 12%. Despite the low wages, management wanted to increase hostel fees from R70 to R78 a month.

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