Work In Progress

9 AUGUST '79

FATTI'S & MONI'S

COURTS

Zephania Mothopeng (66), John Ganya (48), Mark Shinnera (37), Bennie Ntoele (39), Hamilton Keke (42), Michael Khala (24), Alfred Ntshali-Tshali (47), Julius Landingwe (30), Zolile Ndindwa (26), Moffat Zungu (44), Goodwell Moni (24), Jerome Kodisang (26), Michael Matsobane (36), Johnson Nyathi (32), Themba Hlatswayo (21), Mothlagegi Thlale (22), Rodney Tsoletsane (20), and Daniel Matsobane (31).

Charge: Terrorism, alternatively furthering the aims of the PAC. The trial, which began in early 1978 in the Eastern Transvaal town of Bethal, involved allegations of recruitment for military training, undergoing of such training, conspiracy on Robben Island and elsewhere to revive the PAC, utilisation of front organisations to further the aims of the PAC, involvement in the urban revolt of June 1976 in Kagiso, near Krugersdorp, and various other matters.

At the conclusion of the trial, Ntshali-Tshali was found not guilty, Keke was found guilty under the Interal Security Act of furthering the aims of the PAC, Mothopeng was found guilty on two counts of Terrorism, and the remaining accused were all found guilty on one count of Terrorism.

In passing sentence the presiding judge noted that none of the accused had claimed to be political martyrs, and had in fact denied their involvement in PAC activities. He therefore declined 'to cast over their acts a cloak of respectability which they do not claim for themselves'.

Ironically, the trial reached its conclusion as the organisational conflict in the exiled PAC reached its height with the assassination of David Sibeko by a rival PAC faction. The trial also saw the death of PAC leader Robert Sobukwe.

Santence:
Mothopeng: An effective 15 years.
Ganya: 11 years.
Shinnera: 12 years.
Ntoele: 10 years.
Keke: 5 years, fully suspended.
Khala: 7 years.
Landingwe: 8 years.
Ndindwa: 7 years.
Zungu: 7 years.
Moni: 7 years.
Kodisang: 5 years.
Michael Matsobane: 15 years.
Nyathi: 10 years.
Hlatswayo: 8 years.
Thlale: 8 years.
Tsoletsane: 5 years.
Daniel Matsobane: 12 years.
(Supreme Court, Bethal, 26.06.79).
16 of the accused applied for leave to appeal against conviction and sentence. on 16.06.79 trial judge Curlewis refused this application in the Pretoria Supreme Court.

John Sakete (24), Tladitsegae Molefe (23), Jeffrey Legoabe (23), Thibe Ngobeni (27), Andrew Mapheto (22), Benet Komane (46), Titus Maleke (25), Sydney Choma (23), Vusumuzi Zulu (28), and James Mange (24).

Charge: High Treason, alternatively Terrorism, conspiracy to commit murder, and contravention of the Riotous Assemblies Act. The charges cover allegations of undergoing military training, the establishment of arms caches in a number of districts in Natal, the Cape and the Transvaal, and various othe unlawful activities on behalf of the ANC.
(Maritzburg Regional Court, 16.07.79).

Mandlenkosi Christopher Hadebe (27) and Mandla Jack Mthethwa (22).

Charge: High Treason, Terrorism and contravention of the Riotous Assemblies Act. As with the trial outlined above (Sakete and 9 others), the charges related to the undergoing of military training, possession of arms, ammunition and explosives and other acts in conspiracy with the ANC. The two trials appear to cover approximately the same set of activities. These are the first charges of Treason in South Africa since the famous Treason Trial of 1956-61, in which all the accused wrre acquitted.
(Maritzburg Regional Court, 15,18 and 27.06.79).

Quayum Sayed (29).

Charge: Quoting of a banned person, namely Robert Sobukwe. The quote allegedly appeared in a BPC pamphlet printed by the business of which the accused is a director. The accused was previously charged under the Terrorism Act, but charges were dropped after state witnesses refused to testify against him.
(Cape Town Regional Court, 4.07.79).

Sithembiso Ernest Ngobese (26), Themba Patrick Nxumalo (26), Eric Fanavele Mlaba (22), Nhlanhla Victor Ngidi (25), Kwenzakhe Elijah Mlaba (26), Penuel Mpampa Maduna (26) and Ms Sibongile Albertina Kubheka (27).

Charge: Terrorism. All the accused are charged with recruiting 21 people to leave South Africa for military training between

May and December 1977. Ngobese, Nxumalo and Eric Mlaba face a second charge of attempting to leave South Africa during November-December 1977 for military training.

The trial first began in July 1978, but after a considerable amount of evidence had been led, the first accused (Timothy Nxumalo) was separated from the other accused and charged alone. He was found guilty and sentenced to 22 years. The remaining 7 accused were recharged in the Durban Regional Court. At the end of the state case in June 1979, the defence applied for the discharge of all the accused. The application was granted in the case of Maduna and Elijah Malaba, but both were immediately re-detained by security police. Eric Malaba and Victor Ngidi were discharged on the count of recruiting people for military training, but still face the second charge of attempting to undergo training themselves. The remaining applications for discharge were refused. The trial continues in the Durban Regional Court.

Ds. C.F. Beyers-Naude (representing Zenith Printers), Joe Thloloe, Mike Norton, Juby Mayet and Reuben Nkadimeng.
Charge: Production of an undesirable publication, namely the bulletin of the Union of Black Journalists (UBJ), alternatively publishing a statement by a listed person. The offence allegedly took place in June 1976.
At the beginning of July, charges were withdrawn against all the accused. (Johannesburg Regional Court, 2.07.79).

James Masekwameng (20), Paulos Vilakazi (19), Ms Julia Babsy (18), and Ms Salamina Mabote (18).
Charge: Malicious damage to property. The accused were charged with stoning the house of a Mamelodi school principal on the evening of June 16th, 1979. A party was in progress at the house involved. A crowd marched there and stoned it, causing damage of R250.
Verdict: Masekwameng and Vilakazi - guilty.
Babsy and Mabote - not guilty.
At the time of writing, sentence imposed could not be ascertained. (Mamelodi Magistrate's Court, 28.06.79).

Motsidisi Kate Serokolo (28), Martha Matshediso Legoabe (56), and Komiki Elizabeth Gumede (57).
Charge: Terrorism. The accused were alleged to have harboured and rendered material assistance to a number of PAC-trained guerilla fighters operating in South Africa.
Verdict: Serokolo and Gumede - guilty.
Legoabe - not guilty.
Sentence: Both accused: 5 years.
(Johannesburg Regional Court, 29.06.79).

Norman Vusi Thusi (29), Mthunzi Columbus Mazibuko (25), and Prince Dube (20).
Charge: Terrorism. The state claimed that the accused underwent military and ideological ideological training in China under the guidence of the PAC, that on their return to South Africa they attempted to set up PAC cells, and that Thusi and Mazibuko possessed arms, explosives and ammunition. There was a cerain overlap of activity and state witnesses between this trial, and the trial detailed above (Serokolo and 2 others).
Verdict: All 3 accused guilty of undergoing military training in China;
Thusi and Mazibuko guilty of possession of explosives and arms.
All 3 not guilty of setting up PAC cells.
Sentence: Thusi and Mazibuko: 7 years.
Dube: 5 years.
(Krugersdorp Circuit Court, 14.06.79).

Churchill Luvuno (23).
Charge: Terrorism. The accused gave evidence for the defence in the Bethal PAC trial, and was immediately thereafter charged with perjury. Shortly afterwards, he was charged with Terrorism. The state claims that he left South Africa and underwent training at the hands of the PAC in Swaziland. It is further claimed that he set up a PAC cell in South Africa called 'Triangle Battlefield Organisation'. The trial is taking place in the Bethal Regional Court.

Ezekiel Molefe (22).
Charge: Perjury. In November 1978 Molefe, an ex student of the Morris High School, Soweto, was called as a state witness in the trial of 11 Soweto students in Kempton Park. After giving evidence, in which he claimed that he had been electrically tortured by police to make a statement, Molefe was charged with perjury.
After a number of remand appearances at which state witnesses were not present, the presiding magistrate refused to postpone the case again, and acquitted the accused.
(Kempton Park Regional Court, 12.06.79).

Ethel Wauchope (52) and Washington Mlauzi (36).
Charge: Terrorism. The state alleged that between the period January to August 1978, the accused assisted 8 people to leave South Africa to undergo military training.
Verdict: Not guilty.
(Johannesburg Regional Court, 13.07.79).

Fatima Meer and Baptiste Marie.
Charge: Contravention of their respective banning orders by attending a social gathering.
Verdict: Guilty.
Sentence: 3 months, suspended for 3 years.
(Durban Regional Court, 12.06.79).

Lazarus Lelelwane (18), Mokgotle Marumo (18), Ezekiel Seakgwa (19), Molefi Nhlapo (19), and two 16 year-olds.
Charge: Sabotage. The state alleges that, on 7.12.78 the accused petrol-bombed the Sebokeng house of a Vereeniging security policeman, Jeremiah Matsolo. The state is relying on confessions allegedly made by the accused while in custody. The accused alleged that members of the security police assaulted them to extract the confessions.
The trial is continuing in the Vereeniging Regional Court.

Welamazwe Bango (29).
Charge: Public Security Act (applicable to the Transkei region only). The Transkei administration claimed that the accused called Matanzima 'a dog', and suggested that real leaders fighting for the nation are on Robben *Island*.
Verdict: Not guilty (as it was not proved that the accused uttered the words in question.

Appeal: Rev. Dick O'Riordan (34), Rev. Wesley Mabuza (36), Rev. Samuel Hlapezulu (57) and 37 others. The 40 were all originally convicted under the Riotous Assemblies Act arrising out of a service held to commemorate those who died in the 1976 uprising. The serv service, held in Gugulethu during August 1977, was attended by some 500 people.
On appeal, sentence and conviction were set aside as the state had not proved that those present had a common object other than to mourn the dead.
(Cape Town Supreme Court, 4.06.79).

Ilona Kleinschmidt and Jackie Bosman.
Both of the above were convicted in the Bloemfontein Magistrate's Court for refusing to answer questions relating to an alleged visit to Winnie Mandela. They were sentenced to 3 and 4 months imprisonment respectively. They appealled to the Bloemfontein Supreme Court, and in November 1978 their appeal was refused. In May, the Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to the Appellate Division.
(Bloemfontein Supreme Court, May 1979).

Ameen Akhalwaya (33), Mike Norton (40), Shirley Lue (29), Samuel Pop (48), and Stephen Young (51), and Alice Jacobus (42).
Charge: The accused are alleged tho have entered an African area (Soweto) without permits. All journalists, they were arrested on April 29 with Norwegian journalist Ole Johan Eriksen, who was subsequently released. The trial continues on August 20.

Johannes Khumalo (18), Michael Molala (18) *and 7 minors*.
Charge: Public violence, assault and robbery. The charges to relate to activities in Atteridgeville after the execution of Solomon Mahlangu, when two schools were stoned and pupils were ordered from their classrooms. The trial is being heard in camera.
(Pretoria Regional Court, 10.07.79).

James Beaumont (20).
Charge: Official Secrets Act. According to the state, the accused had various documents in his possession relating to military affairs, which he handed to a journalist of the same newspaper he worked for (Deon du Plessis).
Verdict: Guilty. (The accused pleaded guilty).
Sentence: 3 years, suspended for 5 years.
(Johannesburg Regional Court, 24.07.79).
The other journalist involved, du Plessis, faces charges in the Rand Supreme Court under the Official Secrets Act in August).

Bhekizitha Oliver Nqubelani (26).
Charge: Terrorism. The charges relate to the planting of a bomb in the Cape Town Supreme Court on 15.05.79. The trial is due to begin in the Cape Town Supreme Court early in August.
(Cape Town Magistrates Court, 5.07.79).

Appeal: Joyce Mokhesi, organiser of Young Christian Workers. The appellant was found guilty in the Vereeniging Regional Court of possession of banned literature, and sentenced to 12 months, suspended. She appealled to the Transvaal Supreme Court, and conviction and sentence were set aside..
(Transvaal Supreme Court, 21.06.79).

Simon Sampson Bhengu.
Charge: Terrorism. The accused, a 73 year-old diabetic, is alleged to have assisted two men undergo military training with the purpose of disrupting law and order. (Johannesburg Regional Court, 18.06.79)

Sheila Weinberg (33).
Charge: Contravening her banning and house arrest order by leaving her house for 2 hours on May 13th. Weinberg admitted that she had gone out to visit a friend, and that when she returned she was confronted by a member of the security police.
Verdict: Guilty.

Sentence: 3 months, suspended for 3 years.

Linda Mogale (18) and Elias Jimmy Mabaso (22).
Charge: 3 counts of murder, 3 of attempted murder, one count of Terrorism and various alternative charges. The accused are alleged, inter alia, to have fire-bombed the home of a Soweto principal and thereby been responsible for the deaths of those killed in that attack, and to have accepted the revolutionary aims of the South African Revolutionary Council (SAYRC). The accused were both either members of the SSRC or the Soweto Students League (SSL). The trial has been marked by the numerous allegations of assault against the police by the accused, state and defence witnesses. The state has submitted alleged confessions made by the two accused, but the defence has claimed that they were made under duress, and has led a number of witnesses who claimed that they were forced to make false statements in connection with the matters involved. One of the state's main witnesses subsequently repudiated his earlier testimony, claiming that he was forced to make a false statement.

At the time of writing, the defence had closed its case, and the state was about to lead evidence attempting to rebutt defence contentions of assault and coercion by the police investigating.
(Special Supreme Court, Krugersdorp).

Rose Kunene (18), Gideon Nkutha (20), Lydia Dakile (20) and Jefferson Lengane (22).
Charge: Murder. The state alleges that the accused were responsible for the death of a West Rand Bantu Affairs Board Official, H.B. Esterhuizen, on June 16th, 1976. He was one of the first killed when the rioting broke out in Soweto on that day.
(Johannesburg Regional Court, 24.07.79).

Robert Wilcox (41).
Charge: Contravention of his banning order by not reporting to the police. Wilcox was recently released from Robben Island after serving six years.
Verdict: Guilty.
Sentence: 1 year, suspended.

David Russell (40).
Charge: Contravention of banning order, and possession of unlawful literature. The case was postponed until August 7th.
(Wynberg Regional Court, 16.07.79).

Aubrey Mokoena (31).
Charge: Contravention of his banning order by not notifying the police of a change of address. The case has been postponed to August 13th.
(Johannesburg Regional Court, 25.07.79).

Two youths aged 15 and 17.
Charge: Malicious damage to property. The state alleged that the youths set fire to 6 railway carriages near Hollywood siding.
Verdict: Guilty.
Sentence: 6 lashes.

M.B. Pikashe, organiser of the Democratic Progressive Party in the Transkei region.
Charge: Public Security Act. The relevant section deals with protecting the 'dignity' of the holder of the office of 'state president'. The accused was due to appear in the Umtata Regional Court at the end of July.

H.E. O'Conner and Ms. J. Joubert.
Charge: Contravention of the Prisons Act. The accused, editor and reporter of the Eastern Province Herald respectively, are charged with falsely publishing information about a prison without taking reasonable steps to verify it.
(Grahamstown Magistrates Court, 11.07.79).

Johnson Vusumuzi Nyathi (33).
Charge: Attempting to escape from the police while held in terms of security legislation. The accused, recently convicted in the Bethal PAC trial and sentenced to 10 years, previously alleged that he was thrown from a window while being interrogated in Krugersdorp. It is not known if this incident is the escape attempt alleged in this trial.
(Krugersdorp Magistrate's Court, 15.07.79).

Sidwell Mosiwa Cukulu (20).
Charge: Perjury, alternatively defeating the ends of justice. The accused was a state witness in the trial of Linda Mogale and Jimmy Mabaso, but subsequently repudiated his evidence claiming he had been forced by police to make a false statement. He was immediately arrested and charged.
(Krugersdorp Magistrate's Court, 30.07.79).

Sabata Dalindyebo, leader of the opposition Democratic Party in the Transkei area.
Charge: Public Security Act. It is believed that the accused will be charged with subverting the sovereignty of the Transkei's 'Parliament' or the constitutional 'independence' of the Transkei region.

Vusumuzi Mcongo (19), Zuko Camagu (18), Mncedisi Siswana (22), Jeffrey Klaas (22), Khumbelele Mnikina (29) and Lawrence Mvula (20).
Charge: Attempted murder, alternatively public

violence. The accused, all political prisoners on Robben Island, were alleged to have been involved in an incident in which the second-in-command of the prison, Captain Harding, was attacked on 9.02.79.
Verdict: All except Camaqu were found guilty of public violence.
Sentence: Mcongo: 3 years.
Siswana: 2 1/2 years.
Klaas: 3 years.
Mnikina: 4 1/2 years.
Mvula: 4 years.
In the case of Mcongo and Klaas, one year will run concurrently with their sentences with they are already serving.

Hector Ncokazi, former leader of the Democratic Party, Transkei.
Charge: Public Security Act (2 counts). The prosecution alleged that Ncokazi propagated a view repugnant to the 'independence' of the Transkei, and made a speech at at Democratic Patry congress which was intended to interfere with the authority of the 'state'.
Verdict: Guilty on both counts.
Sentence: Count 1: R500 or 18 months, with a further 3 years, suspended.
Count 2: 18 months, suspended.

(Transkei Supreme Court, ± June 1979).

Penrose Mthuthuzeli Phobane (26).
Charge: Being a member of BPC or ANC, taking part in their activities, and possessing books or documents indicating association with the BPC or ANC.
Verdict: Not guilty.
(East London Regional Court, 25.05.79).

Mongezi Tennyson Ngaba (22).
Charge: Unlawfully possessing books or documents which indicate an association with a banned organisation, namely the ANC or BPC.
Verdict: Not guilty.
(East London Regional Court, 23.05.79).

5 youths, aged between 16 and 17.
Charge: Intimidating others in an attempt to force pupils to leave classes at the Henry Nginza school, New Brighton.
Verdict: Guilty.
Sentence: 3 accused: 1 year, suspended.
2 accused: 5 lashes.
(Port Elizabeth Regional Court, 28.05.79).

Maxwell Siphiwe Mtimkulu.
Charge: Internal Security Act. The state claims that on 5.02.79 the accused had a shirt indicating that he was associated with SASO; that in March he possessed a document indicating an association with the PAC; and that he obstructed a policeman by refusing to enter a cell and assaulting the policeman with his flat hand.
(Port Elizabeth Regional Court, 30.05.79).

Wellington Vukile Gumenge (23), Fikele Ernest Mohali (19), Vusumzi Kenneth Zebonda (18) Lizo Swelinzima Kula (18), Wanile Goodman Geakazi (19), Abe Xhago Dayile (18), Paul Khumalo (32) and Wandile Abia Dayile (24).
Charge: Terrorism. The first six accused are charged with attempting to leave South Africa to undergo military training. The last two accused are alleged to have assisted them in planning to leave South Africa and travel to Botswana.
(Port Elizabeth Regional Court, 19.06.79).

Zongezile Saphola (19), Sebezile Madikana (19), and Lulama Njoda (19).
Charge: Arson. The state claimed that the accused set fire to the Ernst Skosana and Tamsanqa schools, Kwazakhele, in October 1978.
Verdict: Not guilty. (The state was able to bring only one material witness, and she claimed to have been assaulted by security police).
(Port Elizabeth Regional Court, 26.04.79).

Tembisile Kenneth Simka (18), Tembinkosi Toto Maizi (18), and 5 youths aged between 16 and 17.
Charge: Arson. The state alleges that on 6.02.79 the accused set fire to 3 schools in New Brighton. Certain of the accused have alleged that statements they made to the police were extracted from them through assaults.
(Port Elizabeth Regional Court, June 1979).

39 black youths, from the Welkom and Bethlehem areas.
Charge: Public violence. The charges arose from an incident in July 1978 in Bethlehem where buses, houses and business premises were stoned by a crowd of black youths.
Verdict: Guilty.
Sentence: 6 accused: 6 months, suspended.
32 accused: Corporal punishment ranging from 7 to 4 lashes.
(Bethlehem Regional Court, 19.06.79. It is not known what sentence the remaining youth received).

Zwelakhe Sisulu, president of the Writers' Association of South Africa (WASA).
Sisulu has been called in front of a Pretoria Magistrate to answer questions about two telephone calls he allegedly had with detained Post journalist, Thami Mkhwanazi. The questions

relate to alleged conversations about people leaving the country for military training, and attempts to disrupt the Tate-Knoetze fight recently held in BophuthaTswana.

4 black youths.
Charge: Public violence, malicious damage to property, attempted murder and culpable homicide. The charges emerge from a series of incidents in the African township outside Bethlehem in the O.F.S. on the evening of 29.07.78. After a song contest held in a community hall between schools from Welkom and Bethlehem buses were stoned, businesses and houses were damaged and a person was knifed to death.
Verdict: 2 of the youths, who pleaded guilty to public violence were found guilty on that charge. They and the other 2 youths were acquitted on all other counts.
Sentence: 7 lashes each.
(Bethlehem Regional Court, June 1979).

RIEKERT
a preliminary investigation

THE late 1970s is a period of capital restructuring in South Africa. On an economic level, the state has had to deal with changes in the labour process resulting from the development of monopoly capitalism. These have been on the one hand an increasing demand for semi-skilled labour and on the other a rapid exclusion of the working class from access to employment because greater mechanisation in industry has led to a proportional decrease in the demand for labour. This has resulted in revisions in the policies of labour allocation and control. It is in the light of the need of capital to restructure in a period of crisis that the Riekert Commission Report must be interpreted. At the same time similarities between this Report and previous policies must be stressed. The Riekert Commission Report and the White Paper which followed it represent the latest development in a policy of labour recruitment and allocation implemented by the South African state from the development of the diamond mines and capitalist agriculture until the present day.

The origins of the system of labour coercion and recruitment can be found in all 4 of the South African colonies prior to Union. During the 1880s and 1890s the African peasantry in the Transkei, Zululand and Pondo-land were to a large extent engaged in successful agricultural production for the capitalist market. They were therefore not interested in working either on the mines or in agriculture where they were paid far less than they could earn through private production. Under the circumstances, a number of Acts were passed to make provision for labour recruitment in the colonies prior to Union. These measures were coordinated under the 1911 Native Labour Act which made provision for the licencing of labour agents to recruit labour for the various sectors.

It also made provision for the drawing up of contracts between the labour agent and the labourer on his recruitment which had to be approved by the magistrate. A breach of this contract on the part of the labourer constituted a criminal offence. This Act did not make provision for a state department to supervise labour recruitment, it merely aimed at introducing uniform recruitment laws.

From this period onwards, however, the organisation of recruitment and allocation of the labour force fell increasingly under the state's jurisdiction. Gradually a policy of labour bureaux evolved which aimed to establish a situation whereby all workseekers registered with their local bureau in order that they could be placed in work where they were most needed. This policy aimed to do away with the old haphazard system which permitted workseekers to look for work independently and resulted in a labour shortage in some sectors while there was an oversupply in others.

The Native Laws Amendment Act (54 of 1952) established labour bureaux in the reserves, at Native Commissioner's offices and in the urban areas at magistrates' offices. The

establishment of labour bureaux in the reserves introduced the principle of efflux control which ensured that the black worker did not leave the reserves unless there was a job already waiting for him. In 1957 there were 234 urban bureaux and 278 rural bureaux. By 1964 this number had grown to 334 and 353 respectively.

The examination of the Riekert Report and the White Paper which follows aims to stress the similarities rather than the differences between the proposed and accepted recommendations and previous policies adopted by the South African state. It will be argued that the differences exist more between statutory legislation and actual policies, than between the recommendations and measures presently operating. Thus, the Riekert Report must be seen not as innovative or reformist, but as an attempt to bring legislation in line with current policy. To implement this various clauses of the 1964 Black Labour Act are to be repealed and a standing technical committee will be established to regularly update this Act. In the preamble to the White Paper, the government makes it clear that the two cornerstones of apartheid policy, namely influx control and separate development (sic) will remain. However, at the same time, it explicitly states a recognition of the fact that the South African social formation is dominated by the capitalist mode of production and that state policy will in no way hamper capitalist development. "It follows that measures and regulations that hamper the effective functioning of the common economic system without contributing towards the achievement of other objectives cannot be justified".

To demonstrate the basic similarities between Riekert and previous policies, three main areas will be concentrated on in this article. The first relates to the system of labour bureaux, the second to training the labour force, and the third to influx control.

As has already been mentioned, the system of labour bureaux has been in operation in South Africa since the 1920s. However, changes in the labour process and in the demand for labour have necessitated certain changes in the system. There seem to have been two main points which come out in the report concerning labour bureaux. The first is related to the fact that black workers are registered for work at different labour bureaux and under a different act from white workers. In the White Paper it is recommended that the Registration for Employment Act, 1945, should be made applicable to blacks. This would mean that blacks would register for work under the same Act as Whites, Coloureds and Asians. The administration of the Act would be vested in the Department of Labour, and this Department would use the Administration Boards as its agents to implement this policy. Whether this measure will eliminate both statutory and institutional racial discrimination as the government claims in its acceptance of these recommendations, is not the point. The point is rather that the labour bureaux fulfil a function of controlling the working class as well as allocating employment. As such it is immaterial who implements the policy - whether it be the Department of Labour or the Department of Cooperation and Development is merely a matter of window dressing.

More important for this article is the evidence which the Riekert Commission received, evidence which indicated that the labour bureau system was not functioning as efficiently as it might. In order to solve this problem the Commission made two recommendations. The first related to improving the labour bureaux themselves, and the second to facilitating private recruitment by employers.

Says the Report:

> Substantial evidence was received that in certain areas labour bureaux do not play an important role in connection with the canalization and placement in employment of workers and that work-seekers and employers avoid labour bureaux. Among the reasons were adduced ... that labour bureaux were identified with control rather than the provision of employment ... The agricultural sector in particular was critical of labour bureaux and contended that it cost much time and money to travel to labour bureaux ... According to certain witnesses one reason why district bureaux cannot provide a proper service in non-prescribed areas is that the registration of unemployed Blacks is not compulsory in such areas.

Riekert's attitude was that certain red tape had to be dispensed with; this related particularly to the attestation of contracts. Three improvements were suggested:

+ That contracts should be simplified and abridged
+ That contracts could in future be made for more than one year
+ That it was no longer necessary for both employer and employee to go to the labour bureau to register the latter. The employer would fill in a form for the worker which would be posted to the labour bureau.

On the other hand, Riekert was not prepared to make the registration of workseekers compulsory. This should not be interpreted as a liberalising measure, but as an attempt to cut down on bureaucracy in a time when workseekers exceeded demand for their labour - a recent survey in the Rand Daily Mail

estimated that there are at present 1,9m blacks unemployed in South Africa (79.06.15). What Riekert did suggest was that the image of labour bureaux had to be improved so that employers and workseekers would want to make better use of their facilities:

> A program of action should be initiated to ensure the efficient functioning of the labour bureau system and particular emphasis should be laid on the improvement of the quality of the services rendered, the training of the labour bureau staff, and the establishment of separate service points for different categories of workers, for example for professional and clerical workers and for unskilled workers.

This latter function is of significance in the light of the changing labour process in South Africa and will be returned to later when 'training services' are discussed.

The second provision which Riekert allowed for in his report was the facilitating of private recruitment by employers. The Commission pointed out that this was necessary, particularly in the reserves, where the labour bureaux were not functioning adequately. Says the Report:

> In all quarters mention was made of the fact that the tribal labour bureaux in the black states were not functioning as desired, among other things because of a poor communication and transport network, inadequate office facilities, inefficient administration, untrained staff, poor selection of labour, and ignorance on the part of employers regarding the related legislation in force in the black states.

In the light of this Riekert argued that the labour agent played a very valuable role in the canalization and utilisation of African labour from the 'black states':

> The major part of the evidence received by the Commission was essentially to the effect that salaried labour agents in the service of large employers (or recruiting organications, for example, TEBA, which recruits for the affiliated gold and coal mines) fulfilled an essential role in regard to the canalisation and allocation of labour, for the very reason that the labour market mechanism in certain regions, including the Black States functioned so poorly and because the official labour bureau system in its present framework did not succeed in supplementing the labour market mechanism effectively enough.

Two suggestions were made for improvements in African areas: firstly to encourage Administration Boards to recruit labourers, and secondly for labour agents to be given licences to recruit workers, provided they were recruiting for a particular group of employers and not recruiting on a freelance basis. In white areas, individual employers and groups of employers could be given permission from their local labour bureau to recruit labour should the bureau be unable to fulfil their needs. Riekert suggested that a similar system be implemented for farmers, but the government while accepting the other recommendations pointed out that farmers had a seasonal need for labour and it would be inconvenient for them to continually approach the labour bureau for permission to recruit. It was suggested instead that they should continue to be given licences valid for one year permitting them to recruit labour.

Recognition of the role of private recruiting represents a legal acceptance of a policy which had been in operation for a very long time despite the attempts of the labour bureau system to take over its functions. It also allows for individual interference with the system of labour allocation on a micro level in order to eradicate minor technical hitches. The government was prepared to accept this provision provided that it would not disrupt the overall system. It does not allow for the abolition of the system on a national scale, nor is it indicative of any move towards a 'freer' labour market.

The second important area dealt with by the Riekert Commission relates to the training of the labour force. While the agricultural and mining sectors may still place primary emphasis on the role of the labour bureaux and private labour agents to provide an adequate labour supply when and where it was needed, secondary industry has different needs. Since the mid-1960s foreign investment in manufacturing industry has led to the development of highly mechanised industries. This development has done away with the old skilled - unskilled division in the labour process and replaced it with a new category of workers, namely semi-skilled workers. It is also possible to suggest that this process has resulted in the need for a number of white-collar clerical workers who need a certain degree of literacy.

The implications of this for the black working class is that industry requires workers with a higher level of skills than that required by the unskilled job category. It seems that it is in terms of these demands that the recommendations relating to training of the labour force must be understood.

Evidence of this in the Riekert Commission is to be found in the emphasis laid on the establishment of training facilities for African workers and the abolition of section 20A of the Black Labour Act of 1964 which made provision for statutory job reservation.

In order to facilitate training programmes the Commission advocated the establishment of a National Council for Manpower matters.

This Council would be integrated with the Department of Labour and would include the Apprenticeship Committees of the National Apprenticeship Board. It would also be involved in supplying the Minister of Labour with advice on all policy matters arising from, or in connection with, the administration of the Employment and Training Act. The Commission also recommended that the private sector should be encouraged to provide in-service training for its employees. To supplement this, the state should subsidise public training centres which were not being adequately supported by the private sector. The state accepted all the recommendations pointing out that they were in line with current policy. The Commission also stressed the importance of the Department of National Education in implementing labour training policies.

The third area with which the Commission is concerned is the revamping of the influx control legislation. Once again the recommendations seem to indicate a desire to conceal a measure which is obviously designed as part of the mechanism of controlling the working class. As with the case of registration of workseekers discussed earlier, Riekert misses the boat. He suggests four measures to do away with what he terms the racial discrimination implicit in the influx control system:

+ To place responsibility for influx control with the Department of the Interior rather than with the Department of Cooperation and Development, in order that the same system be applicable to African 'aliens' as it is to white aliens.
+ To tighten up efflux control to prevent 'illegals' from leaving their 'place of origin' unless there is a job waiting for them in the 'white' areas.
+ To make employers who employ 'illegals' solely responsible for the offence and to fine them heavily.
+ To make the repatriation of all 'illegals' to their 'homelands' compulsory.

At the same time there were some changes suggested in the influx control legislation which were definitely designed to make the system operate in a beneficial way for the employer - namely that workseekers with permanent urban residence qualifications could be moved from one company branch to another within the same urban area and from one branch *to another in different urban areas.*

The Financial Mail interpreted these recommendations in the following way:

> pass arrests must be taken off the streets and influx control monitored instead in the seclusion of personnel managers' offices. This is the importance of Piet Riekert's proposals, on this the most explosive of all racial issues in South Africa (79.06.22)

While this may be true, as important in interpreting the new provisions is the stress which Riekert places on the implementation of influx control being in relation to the availability of employment and housing. Allowing for the number of unemployed quoted earlier in this article, it is evident that this very large number of jobless represent a threat to the process of capital accumulation and the status quo. For this reason, provision has been made for exporting the unemployed to the rural areas. Once again this is not new policy. It is merely a restatement of a previous policy in harsher terms to deal with a crisis situation.

In the White Paper, the government makes it clear that it is not at all sure how efficiently Riekert's proposals will work. Furthermore, the government is not prepared to place the sole burden for employment of 'illegals' on the employer as it feels both parties are guilty. The government's wait and see attitude is well exemplified in the White Paper on the question of the 72 hour period allowed to workseekers to find a job in an urban area. In the White Paper the government says:

> The government has taken note of the evidence submitted to the Commission that the 72-hour provision discriminates against blacks, leads to large scale arrests and short-term imprisonment, creates considerable human relations problems and comes nowhere near completely effective control of unlawful entry of blacks into urban areas... On the other hand, the government wishes to point out that repealing this provision will place the burden of influx control entirely on control at the place of employment and the place of residence... Achieving the same degree of control without the 72-hour provision may, therefore, require exceptionally strict application of these other controls.

This attitude seems to support the view that influx control is not primarily a system of racial discrimination but is increasingly being used as a system of relocating the surplus work force beyond the urban areas where it is hoped they will pose less of a threat to the status quo.

By way of conclusion I would like to suggest certain areas in the Riekert Commission Report which require further research. This

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The nature of WIP, which is to stimulate debate and present controversial views, ensures that the opinions expressed do not necessarily reflect the views of the editors.

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WE WISH TO DRAW OUR READERS ATTENTION TO THE CONSUMER BOYCOTT OF FATTIS AND MONIS PRODUCTS IN SUPPORT OF WORKERS DISMISSED FROM THEIR BELLVILLE PLANT FOR TRADE UNION ACTIVITY. DETAILS OF THIS LABOUR ACTION ARE TO BE FOUND ON pp 46-7 OF THIS ISSUE OF WIP. FOR THOSE WHO WISH TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE UNION FUND WHICH IS SUPPORTING THE DISMISSED WORKERS FINANCIALLY, WE PUBLISH BELOW THE ADDRESS TO WHICH SUCH CONTRIBUTIONS MAY BE SENT:

Food and Canning Workers Union,
P.O. Box 2678,
CAPE TOWN.

editorial

RECENTLY the question of what relative importance to give "racial" and "class" factors in South African society has again received some attention in a number of areas. According to press reports, Curtis Nkondo of the Teachers' Action Committee (TAC) told a June 16 commemoration service at Regina Mundi, Soweto, that the struggle in South Africa was not a racial one but an economic conflict over ownership of the means of production. One of the last SASO policy statements before it was banned argued that the racial monopoly over essential means of production was the real source of white political domination, and that the structure of society ultimately rested on capitalist relations of exploitation in which racial policies were rooted.

On the other hand, a Progressive Federal Party Member of Parliament, H. Suzman, was recently quoted as saying that those who said South Africa was a class-based society, rather than racially divided, were "silly".

It is not always clear what is meant when people refer to class, neither is it necessarily obvious what sorts of questions the notion of class is supposed to answer or explain in a South African context. At the heart of this debate is the problem of whether conflict and division - wealth and poverty, power and impotence, oppressor and oppressed, exploiter and exploited - are caused by racialism or by the division of society into antagonistic classes.

Those who suggest that a class-based analysis is the way of explaining the nature of South African society go on to argue that

In this issue of WIP, we carry an article on the Glenmore resettlement camp in the Eastern Cape. As the article makes clear, this is not to suggest that there is anything unusual or specific about Glenmore, but rather that it is part of the totality of the ongoing process of 'grand apartheid' in South Africa. Recently a certain prominence has been given to rural areas and resettlement, specifically in the commercial press. While one must welcome the fact that the press is showing some interest in this area, the danger exists very strongly that the dramatic news and crisis orientation of the commercial media will, as the article on Glenmore suggests, make 'an ongoing process into an unusual event, thus indirectly and incorrectly suggesting that conditions at resettlement camps are worse than at established slums long existing in the Bantustans'.

In this context one can only express concern at the interest shown by the Urban Foundation in rural areas, and note that it is likely to follow a two-pronged strategy in regard to these areas: the 'dramatic expose' of certain camps and areas, which has the effect of suggesting that they are unusual, rather than being part of the total development of South African capitalism and its political structures; and the setting up of small-scale capitalist ventures combined with charity in depressed rural areas as 'solutions' to the miserable poverty and disintegration of the Bantustans.

Two further points remain to be made about this issue of Work in Progress: both concern language and terminology.

The editors are aware that the language of one or two of the articles carried is of a complex and technical nature. This is a problem continually faced by WIP: many of the issues dealt with are of a complex nature, and often the language used tends to reflect this complexity too directly. We are aware that it is a crucial task to 'dejargonise' and make more accessible various debates thusfar held as the preserve of academic institutions: to the extent that we have failed in certain articles in this issue, we apologise to our readership. However, the material contained in both articles referred to is of such a valuable nature that it was decided to run them without delay. Any attempt to edit or re-write aspects would have rendered it impossible to include the contributions in this issue.

The second point relates to the use of the descriptive term 'black'. WIP policy has been to utilise 'black' when referring to the group subject to specifically racial oppression and domination in South Africa (ie 'africans', 'coloureds' and 'indians'). However, certain of our contributors have slipped into the trap laid by the dominant ideology, which is to refer to 'africans' as black, and other groups as 'indian' or 'coloured'. We have attempted to correct this wherever possible, but it has sometimes not been clear from the context whether only africans, or all blacks, were being referred to.

We urge future contributors to bear both of these important points in mind when writing articles.

paper has tended to concentrate mainly on the Commission's recommendations concerning labour bureaux, influx control and the changing demand for labour. However, equally important would be an examination of the recommendations concerning the rights of African businessmen, proposed changes in legislation relating to urban African administration and housing policies. *A possible framework of analysis would be an* examination of the extent to which these measures indicate attempts to incorporate a section of the African petty bourgeoisie and the African working class within the power structure of the South African social formation.

Barbara Creecy



This drawing shows a loaded slave-ship in the 1800s.

DISCUSSION PAPER ON EDUCATION AND DEVELOPMENT

I AM GOING to look at two areas where education can play a role in development. The *first of these areas is the education of* people interested in engaging in development work, more especially that of university students interested in such work. The second involves some thoughts on the role which educational work can play in the development process.

The university basically serves the needs of bourgeois society. The university produces people with the technical skills needed in the capitalist economy. It also helps to reproduce the culture of capitalist society. By and large the people who emerge from the universities accept the class structure of South African society and expect to take up their position in the dominant classes. The needs of society places constraints on the university while academics are constrained by their own class position.

This means that there are limits to which the university as an institution can provide the sort of education needed for development work. Faced with these limits people have often opted for courses which they feel have more relevance than others for development work despite their overall orientation. Usually these courses are of a technical or professional nature. I am thinking of people who do medicine with the intention of doing community medicine, or those who study architecture or town planning intending to turn their skills to the provision of low-cost housing. The problem with this approach is that it often corresponds with a view of underdevelopment as essentially a technical problem.

I would argue that community medicine or housing don't of themselves constitute development. The reason for this is that *development work is not primarily concerned* in the short term with providing services to poverty stricken groups in society. The primary concern of development work is to enable people to challenge the social structure which exploits and underdevelops.

This challenge can only come from the understanding and organisation of people in the underdeveloped regions. This challenge proceeds on ideological, political and economic levels. The role of the development worker is to act as facilitator, providing resources for the action of these people. Certainly technical skills play an important role in the process. A technical solution to a problem facing a community can have great mobilising effect and provide a focus for organisation and political awareness. An inappropriate technique can easily lead to increased dependence and the further fragmentation of a community.

For this reason it is important that the development worker understands the forces acting on and within a community. This understanding is essential to the ability to

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This article is a slightly abridged version of a speech given by the author to a recent conference on 'Education and Development', held at the University of Cape Town during July 1979.

work with people and to realistically assess what action is possible. To proceed where the chances of failure outweigh those of success is at best shortsighted and at worst self indulgent.

Let's turn now to look at the role university based education can play for the development worker. I mean to include in this not only coursework for degree purposes, but also the other learning opportunities through student activities which a university offers.

An understanding of how the process of underdevelopment took place and the structural constraints imposed on underdeveloped regions and the people in them is necessary. Along with this goes an understanding of the development of capitalism in South Africa, for these are two sides of the same coin. This entails the ability to analyse a social formation at a theoretical level. It also requires an understanding of the specifics of the southern African situation and its place in the capitalist system as a whole. While the theoretical outline of southern African underdevelopment has advanced rapidly over the last few years there is still a great deal of fleshing out that must be done to concretise this analysis. This is particularly true for the contemporary period if development workers are to have a clearer understanding of where and how to engage. Joanne Yawitch's paper on the position of African women are examples of the type of research that is needed on a much wider scale **(pp 35-44 in this issue).**

The present situation of the 'homeland' underdeveloped regions and the forces acting on them needs to be placed in a cleared perspective if we are to understand the possibilities of development work at present. We need to know more about what is going on in the name of separate development, and the effects it is having in these areas.

What follows is a brief outline of some areas into which research could be directed. One of these areas is the role of the state in homeland areas. This involves state agricultural development policies such as betterment schemes, state run plantations and other agricultural schemes. One way of looking at these is to trace their effects on class structure and increasing landlessness. Often all control is exercised from the top with farmers tied to the schemes by credit facilities and performing the functions of an agricultural labour force.

The industrial decentralisation policy and 'homeland' industry in general is another area. This has bearing on the question of the functioning of the reserve army of labour. Resettlement schemes are often located near industrial growth points to supply a captive labour force. The whole question of the extensive resettlement of population taking place also poses many problems, as do informal sector activities.

Researchers could take a look at the relationship between political influence in the 'homelands' and the accumulation of wealth in, for instance, land and cattle. There may be connections to participation in development schemes and the acquisition of trading and other licenses.

Then there is the question of the extent of penetration of large scale enterprises based locally and overseas, into these areas. This may take place through participation in joint ventures such as tripartite agreements or directly as in the case of tea estates in the 'homelands' of the northern Transvaal.

Studies of South African capitalism and the nature of its labour and capital needs have particular relevance for people interested in working with workers' organisations. It has been pointed out that social scientists have played a role in aiding capitalists. The periods of dramatic expansion in the social sciences coincided with crises in South African capitalism, particularly crises affecting the supply and nature of labour. It has been pointed out that there is the possibility of doing research at the universities which would reverse this relationship, research which would be relevant to the interests of workers rather than those of capitalists.

It is only from studies like these that we can understand the specific nature of the class struggle at present taking place in the underdeveloped regions and in South Africa as a whole. Much of this research can probably be done within the existing structure of the university curriculum.

To do this research is not enough in itself. It is also important that the analysis and critical perceptions do not remain the exclusive preserve of academics. One of the problems with the present radical academic debate is that it is generally couched in terms that make it quite inaccessible to people without higher education, and even difficult for many of those at university who are not directly involved in those debates. Equally as important as theoretical analysis and empirical research is the communication of this material to people outside the universities. This is

a much neglected field to which more attention needs to be paid.

There is another area which the universities don't touch on, and that is the training of development workers in the skills they need. These revolve around communication, organisation and the ability to work with people without overpowering them. The actual content of these skills will not be dealt with in this paper.

What I would like to mention is that at present these skills are developed in a fairly haphazard and empirical way by students involved in various kinds of development and community work. There are a number of such student organisations on the various campuses. Often this approach has led to the initial failure of projects and the need to totally rethink and re-orientate them. Student organisations have a number of problems which limit their effectiveness. These include the part-time nature of involvement and yearly changes of personnel, amongst others. A more systematic approach might go some way towards ensuring greater effectiveness and a more realistic selection of where and what to do. How to work is more important in most cases than what to do.

The role education can play in development work is in many ways a far greater problem. Bantu education monopolises the school system in the underdeveloped regions of South Africa. I don't think there is much argument that it has little relevance for development. This is also the case for the educstion given to white South Africans, which by and large fits them for their position of privilege. Attempts to implement a development oriented education in neighbouring countries dominated by South African and metropolitan capitalism have met with little success. Given these difficulties one alternative at the moment seems to be to look at educational possibilities outside the formal structures.

One of the fields people have turned to has been that of adult literacy training. The imparting of reading and writing skills does not of itself have dramatic implications for development. But literacy can be seen in a wider way as promoting a better understanding of people's position in society and the history and structures which determine that position. Along with this there usually goes an expressed intention to heighten community consciousness and organisation. Unless there is some practical level on which this can find expression it is not likely to survive very long. It is at this point that technical solutions can help to reinforce and give content to organisation.

Worker controlled enterprises also offer educational opportunities to those involved in them. The hierarchical control exercised in conventional capitalist enterprises can be set aside in such enterprises. This offers people involved the opportunity to develop a wide range of skills that the worker in a conventional enterprise never learns.

Finally, I would like to point out that whatI have said is not meant to be prescriptive or comprehensive. People probably have many more ideas and I hope that they will raise them in response to this paper.

Dick Cloete

THIS MAN IS CLEANING THE RED CARPET LAID ACROSS THE RUNWAY AT BLANTYRE AIRPORT.
THE BRITISH QUEEN IS GOING TO WALK ACROSS THIS CARPET FROM HER AEROPLANE TO
HASTINGS BANDA, THE HEAD OF THE MALAWIAN STATE.

The ABORTION of The INTELLECT:

LITERARY CIRCLES AND 'CHANGE' IN SOUTH AFRICA TODAY.

This article was to have been presented to a conferance on 'The State of Art in South Africa', which was held in Cape Town from July 16 - 20, 1979. However, after the nature of the conference had become apparent to the author, he withdrew the paper, and a brief statement was read on his behalf to the conference delegates. That statement read

"In the country in which I work, Namibia, the struggle for and of cultures is a serious business in which ordinary men and women, of whatever political persuasion, are involved. I have therefore learned that debates about cultural expressions cannot be the privileged domain of any one social group or class.

....I believe....that this conference has fallen short of a real conception of the problems inherent in discussing 'The State of Art in South Africa'. It is difficult to visualize how the Soweto oral poets (who opened the conference) were supposed to have performed in this social milieu, or for what reasons the Renoir and Riesling set were suddenly going to listen to them.

I must admit that further aspects of the organization of this affair have worried me; but none so much as the exceptionally high registration fee which (for whatever reasons it was done) has served as an effective form of ideological selection of those who may now express their points of view. This has, moreover, been reflected in some of the work forthcoming.

I have therefore reluctantly decided that the nature of the participation allowed is such, that it cannot serve to provide a forum for discussion of the subject matter of my paper.. I do not believe that any satisfactory argument or self-evaluation can be forthcoming at this conference, and wish to declare that I have withdrawn my paper from discussion."

It is in this context that we publish the article below, and invite response to the ideas contained in it, as well as contributions on the question of art, literature, ideology, culture and struggle in a South African context.

-The ditors.

Every coin has two sides. The bad side of the ideology of "Black Consciousness" is that it is not founded upon scientific thinking. Its starting point is reactionary. It is an effect rather than a cause....An effect of black consciousness that is not good is that it provides a smokescreen behind which the "non-white" middle classes hide; classes such as the black petty capitalist merchants in the "homelands", the middle class wage earners in the towns, the "coloured" supervisors and employers of black labour, and most important perhaps, the private landowners....One point about the good side of black consciousness is of course that it is a tactic of mobilization within an overall strategy of revolutionary struggle.

- Namibian Students' Organisation pamphlet, 1977.

Black people seek for intellectual freedom

The right to think to inquire and to learn
the right to hold opinions
the right to practice art freely
to evaluate and to criticize
the right to listen, to discuss and to publish and to read.....

- Zoli Kota.

Radio Bantu reaches 4.8 million Blacks in seven languages. which makes it the most effective medium in Black advertising.
Radio Bantu - where your money talks loudest.

- Recent advert in South African business journal.

THE PRESENT CRISIS of South African 'society' can be seen not only with regard to the economic face of society but also as it effects politics and ideology. At the same time as the resistance of the dominated groups within the country has increased markedly, the state has swung between incorporationist (co-optive) stages (such as detente) and the use of its direct and violent repressive mechanisms in quick succession. This has to some extent been a result of struggles taken place within the state power bloc itself. In this period of confusion and crisis, it is a difficult task to even begin to tease out the direction of those active in the interlinking ideological, political and economic struggles which continue daily (1).

In the shifting and complex scenarios which emerge from this crisis, those who study the literature coming from Southern Africa will be aware of an inescapable fact: that critics are beginning to show an interest in literary expression which springs from the dominated and oppressed sectors in society. This new trend has by and large emerged because of the cultural and other activities of the various groups forming part of the oppressed and dominated, rather than from any democratization of thought from within the spiritual power positions of South Africa's literary establishment. In particular, the work of black literary performers, writers and intellectuals as mobilized through the organisations of the Black Consciousness movement in the early and mid-seventies bears closer scrutiny. The latter half of the decade has, moreover, provided a host of political and economic struggles which literary considerations cannot ignore. Among these are

the liberation of the former Portuguese colonies; the Soweto revolt of 1976; the banning of the Black Consciousness cultural and political organisations as well as the World newspaper; the Information scandal; the growing military confrontation in Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa; and the ongoing fragmenting and polarizing of experience within the country.

. Writers have not been exempt from problems and pressures in a climate where most forms of dissent are seen as hostile by a state structure which started off the 1970's in an aura of confidence and is likely to end the decade as brittle, fractured and severely repressive. Removal or refusal of passports, harassment, bannings, exile and imprisonment have been part of the life of our writers during this period (2).

I.

For a while after the bannings of the ANC and PAC at the start of the sixties and the effective silencing within the country of most of the talented black writers involved in the development of an English-language writing during the previous decade, most visible cultural effects of South African origin were the product of white writers such as the Sestigers, and English-speaking individuals such as Jack Cope and Nadine Gordimer. Even at its most political (the Sestigers with one or two exceptions had other concerns) the writing tended towards a plodding realistic mode of expression and a fairly modish 'relevance' which sought to expose the iniquities and attitude of racism and apartheid in South Africa without ever seeming to delve satisfactorily into the dynamics of either the social structure or the attitudes involved(3). The individualism of the characters in these books and plays was generally stressed as a necessary defence against the creeping conformity and lack of empathy caused by the apartheid regime; where a community of feeling was drawn from, as in the Afrikaans li.erature of the time, a type of existential rebellion was the fashion. Publishing was regarded as the height of a young writer's success, and the idea that the book was the ultimate in literary expression was not challenged. The tendency of the time was, if anything, towards the further academicization and class stratification of literature, and the literary and academic cliques who 'knew their literature' had a powerful effect on aesthetic/cultural norms and their continuation. This sharp division between the small group of the 'artistically knowledgeable' and the masses was adhered to by both white writers and artists, and the few survivors of black literature who remained to be touted and shown off in literary magazines.

However, at the same time as the rise of the Black Consciousness movements in the late sixties and early seventies one noticed cracks starting to appear in this structure of literary and artistic circles. The voices of black playwrights and actors, and, slightly later, black poets, began to be heard in the townships again. These literary performers began to make striking use of a powerful (and relatively unrepressed, though economically exploited) tool of township expression: music. Music groups such as Dashiki, Malombo and Hararí flourished as well as a theatre combining dance, drama and music. This theatre varied from the commercial and popular work of Gibson Kente and Sam Mhangwane to the more serious and politically conscious work of Mihloti and other radical theatre groups (4). Theatre, pop and jazz festivals spread. Stylistically an important influence on the young, angry poets who emerged was the poetry of the Black Power movement in the United States, particularly poets such as Robert Hayden, Langston Hughes, Imamu Amiri Baraka, Gwendolyn Brooks and others. With this influence went a shifting away from standard English towards a feeling for language as spoken in the townships, thus being outside of the experience of white literature and academia. A concern for the language and rhythms of everyday speech can be seen in a racy 'slang' poetry which started to emerge from certain of the poets (5).

Thus in the period of time preceeding and during the 1976 riots, a resurgence of cultural activity from the black community and its filtering through to a rather wider spectrum of people is noticeable. In line with the doctrines of black awareness, the focus of concern of black writers and performers shifted radically to a black listening audience in place of a white liberal or overseas one. A lot of the work which issued forth had an urgent political function. As much of the literature was used as a means to express social discontent, the value of the utterance was seen by some writers as temporary and more useful in spreading ideas than a European 'art for art's sake'. Indeed, one of the foremost groups in this literary resurgence, the journalists, appear to have used literature in the absence of any degree of freedom in their profession. Thus a type of artistic production emerged which used any medium

malleable or appropriate to the situation at hand.

Multi-media shows and a type of urban oral poetry using drum and other musical accompaniment reached a high quality of performance: Dashiki's rendition of Cesaire's 'Return to My Native Land' and the performances of Medupe Writers' Association come to mind. This shift from a reading audience to a listening one means that much of the important work which was heard at the time remains relatively unknown outside of its environment: at least two of the most influential figures in this poetry, Molefe Phetoe and Lefifi Tladi (both now in exile), are still almost completely unpublished (6).

The reasons for the use of this new form of dissemination are many. To some extent theatre and oral poetry are forms less vulnerable to censorship, due to the compression of language involved which allowed it to be a hiding place for meanings more accessible to the audience than to the censors (7). Furthermore, a concern for appropriate literary techniques was given voice to. These poetry workshops and readings point to the fact that poets were now concerned to use literature as a means of direct communication rather than desiring publication as the way to circulate their work; indeed, there was a tendency among some of the younger Soweto poets during and immediately after 1976 to see all who published as suspect. This participatory and performed art emphasised the feeling in some circles connected with black consciousness that collective experience could enrich individual effort and enhance a degree of cultural unity. This emphasis on new techniques was coupled with a growing awareness of the control exercised by white liberal and overseas elements in most of the institutions and businesses connected with artistic output - publishing houses, the record industry, art galleries and so on. Gwala, for one, expressed a dislike for the limitations of books and saw the problem of control as not only one of white expertise, but also "methods of operation that are based on white expertise" (8). This desire to break away from commercial enterprises aimed at exporting literature or influencing its suitability for audiences comprised of liberals and the educated black elite was at one stage discernible right from the educated and more politically articulate intellectuals involved to 'popular' entertainers and recording artists such as Mahlathini and Mahotella Queens (9).

This rehabilitation and restructuring of African culture and creative impulses - in short, a cultural reaffirmation' - was made manifest in a situation where the dominant white culture was constipated and individualistic. A black ethos as challenger instead of challenged came into being and began an assault on the claims of relevance of the white literary establishment as a whole. It is informative to note, however, that whatever shifts in the degree of tolerance towards this new cultural initiative took place within the dominant classes, any attempts at control of the economic means of dissemination by black intellectuals involved has been suppressed (10). Attempts to break away from white patronage often found problems with venues and finances as well, as no proper facilities existed for black theatres, art galleries or other venues.

Despite a temporary break caused by the banning of World, UBJ, Medupe and the organisations of the Black Consciousness Movement in October 1977, the evolution and power of cultural and literary activity by black artists has continued: in this sense the destruction has not been as great as that caused by the crackdowns and extention of censorship in the early 1960's. This can of course partly be explained by the fact that the political bannings against the artists and writers themselves was less pronounced than in the earlier period: but in my opinion it also points to a possibility that techniques not wholly dependent on the printed page had allowed the habit of literary activity to sink in far deeper roots than before, with a possible filtering of the uses of literature from the educated elite down to petty-bourgeois and even working class elements not previously involved in literature (11).

The final effects of the aftermath of the Soweto revolt and the bannings and detentions have nevertheless been damaging enough. The flight of many young and promising poets and playwrights into exile, and the prolonged detention of others are phenomena which still have to be properly assessed. This has resulted in rather less emphasis having been placed subsequently on theatre and dramatic performances, while some of the poetry has moved to a slightly more conservative approach. Many of the most impressive music and dramatic art performers have been driven into exile (12). Other developments have perhaps been more encouraging: the formation of a P.E.N. branch on the Witwatersrand far more representative than earlier attempts of the cultural milieu

generally (13), the rise of magazines more concerned with a South African than simply a white-inspired literature (14) , and a situation in which it is now definitely the literary output of the dominated classes which is more vital and arresting, as far as the more 'serious' literature is concerned at least: this can be seen in the grudging acceptance of at least some African literature into university courses and discussion.

Most interesting, perhaps, is the tendency of a far less exclusivist approach forthcoming recently from black writers, added to the adoption of slightly altered distribution and dissemination techniques. A general consensus of opinion has come into being that publishing is again an acceptable way of spreading literary output. A far greater and growing emphasis on prose writing is also discernible, most striking in the recently published short stories of Ahmed Essop and the influential Mtutuzeli Matshoba. It must be pointed out that prose in its production is a far more individualised form than either theatre or participatory poetry. However, there are growing signs that the lessons learnt about technique during the past decade have not been totally lost. Small literary groups are again being formed (CYA, Madi, Bayajula to mention but a few) and multimedia performances are taking place. Dramatic performances of Matshoba's stories are also apparently being planned (15).

Interestingly, some of these groups can be found in the heavily populated rural slums of the Bantustans (such as Guyo Book Club in Sibasa) or are beginning to use a vernacular poetry far removed from the dictates of tribal culture or the segregated universities (Mpumalanga Arts in Hammanskraal). One can say that, although a 'community' cannot be brought into being by a literary organisation or magazine, the linking of artistic groups into these forms of publishing and forms of discussion has its encouraging side (16).

Such literary development has been paralleled by the increasing rationalization and extention of censorship control to cover wider areas of concern - and the urban oral poetry has suffered from a growing awareness on the part of the authorities after 1976 of its effectiveness as a medium - in some cases poets have been banned when their poems are not accessible to control. In addition, several issues of Staffrider have already been banned, while the multi-lingual Donga was declared a prohibited publication in 1978. Despite the fact that black writers are according to the censors allowed a greater 'pain threshold' than their white counterparts, and the grudging concessions made about 'protest literature' and 'literary merit', it is difficult to see what criteria of judgement are actually being used (17).

II.

One of the effects of the expansion of capitalist production in South Africa, and the related massive urbanisation of blacks since the 1930's and 1940's has been a growth in the numbers of the black petty bourgeoisie. (This class is neither directly of the capitalist class, or bourgeoisie, nor is it part of the working class. Because of its intermediate position between the two great classes of capitalism, it often displays unstable interests and positions over crucial political, ideological and economic conflicts.As is explained below, certain groups in the petty bourgeoisie are defined mainly by their relationship to political or ideological aspects of society. This differs from the classes of capitalists and workers, who are defined mainly, but not only, by their position in the economic structure of society - editor).

The petty bourgeoisie in South Africa now includes wage earners in civil, commercial, educational, health and media work as well as professional people and small-scale traders in both Bantustans and urban areas (18). The African petty-bourgeoisie in this country is extremely diverse and heterogeneous, and fragments of it exhibit a range of fluctuating positions and attitudes under different conditions, although the racism of the white power bloc often serves to negatively unify this class. The individuals placed within the petty-bourgeois class are in a relatively insecure position economically compared to their white counterparts. The same insecurity holds true politically and (until recently) ideologically as well. In the face of continual harassment of their attempts at organisation, they present no unified political position; indeed, the narrow stance adopted by some segments of this class in the Bantustans shows their dependence on and ultimately vested interest in the functioning of the state which created their position. In urban areas their grievances are expressed in a number of ways, from the desire for the removal of specific blocks to their betterment, to more radical demands.

As the apartheid system has proved by and large unable to accommodate their interests,

the black petty bourgeoisie has in various forms attempted ideological and political alliances with both urban and rural lower classes over the years. However, the insecurity of their position and the often short-sighted nature of their demands have, when met by coercion and refusal by the South African state, resulted in the frequent destruction of their attempts to organise a mass base for themselves during the last thirty years.

It has been pointed out that the petty bourgeois individual poses his or her conflict or contradiction with the state power bloc more easily in terms of ideology and politics, rather than in terms of the nature of the economic system of the society, and especially the nature of ownership and control of the material means of production (19). Moreover, a powerful stratum of this class - intellectuals teachers, journalists and artists - have a mainly ideological role in society. This group tends to have a common unity in its thought and ideology, mainly because of the importance of education in the groups formation and continued existence (reproduction).

The key role of students and intellectuals in the rise of the Black Consciousness movement and the importance of black consciousness as a reaction against the denigration of European cultural norms this decade is obvious. The end of the 1960s marks the end of the coalition with white liberals and the beginning of new forms of organisation among blacks given a cultural focus but effecting all fields of activity. In the vacuum created by the banning of the previous major political organisations inside the country and the exile and imprisonment of its leadership, the students of the urban elite on the segregated campuses and schools were instrumental in setting up organisations such as SASO and SASM and later on the BPC, the BCP, BPA and SSRC.

Linking significantly to the thought of the Black Power movement in North America, black consciousness ideology based itself on an emotional rather than a theoretical appeal for tackling such issues at hand as the white man's stereotype of 'blackness', a rejection of assimilation, a retrospective pride in African cultural heritage and a psychological emancipation and affirmation of colour (20). Due to the parameters and the forms of control employed by the South African state, such as the artificial maintenance of the Bantustans and racial barriers against economic parity, the struggle for freedom by the oppressed is often expressed in racial, ethnic or national terms. The idea of racial or national difference in South Africa is fostered by the state; and various sections of the black petty-bourgeoisie have sought to utilise this as a populist element in their political and ideological forms of action, as well as in their manner of interpreting and explaining reality. The cause of oppression is thus not perceived to lie in the political, economic and ideological structures of control within the country, but to be a factor of 'white' against 'black' (21).The black consciousness initiative in South Africa, although its leadership was undoubtedly petty bourgeois and most of its initial demands reformist and elite oriented, had relative success because in the absence of traditional popular movements or a continuity of effective political organisation, it took up some

demands which affected the great majority of black people, such as the colour bar. Furthermore, because of a lack of theory or clear objectives it appeared at first manipulable in its ethnic/racial aspect to both white liberal and Afrikaner nationalist elements (22).

While to some extent oppression and exploitation are the common lot of all those with a black skin in South Africa, it cannot be assumed that at any one time the opposition to this oppression will be uniform (23). It must be stressed that black consciousness began mainly as a cultural and ideological expression and has in the final analysis been accepted as a mantle of legitimation by individuals and organisations with widely differing goals and stances (24).No clear answer has yet emerged as to how to sustain an economic and political struggle using this means of cultural mobilisation in the absence of workers' organisations and in the face of increasingly severe state suppression, especially recently (25). In addition, the principal failure of the black consciousness impetus as it stands today seems to be that, now that its organisations have been banned, *its orientation for a purely ideological and* cultural core have been strengthened in some quarters. It has become a rallying cry for both radical and conservative elements in the black community and has, in certain instances, become simply a mirror image of the ideas it is opposing (26).Cultural movements are important elements of the struggle of any people for advantage but cannot, strictly through their own impact on the ideological level, create any permanent change in the society at large (27); and there has been a tendency among some writers attracted to the doctrines of black consciousness to avoid material reality and set up absurd connections based on supposedly psychic or other racial characteristics (28).

III.

Although all literature need not be overtly political, it cannot be free of ideological and sometimes political implications and will, because literature is usually an individual or group activity, not only express those implications but also form and reform them anew. What subsequently emerges is not so much an expression of ideology as a production of ideology, often full of conflicting and contradictory meanings, gaps and silences (29).

The relative importance of minor forms of ideological mobilisation such as art, literature, journalism etc. can fluctuate according to circumstances: as the ideological struggle becomes more acute in South Africa, for instance, the absence of direct political organisation means that ideological effects can become 'free-floating', and 'activist' or 'committed' stances in art need to be subject to a closer analysis before their potential can be measured. In this country, the continual smashing of organised opposition to the government has led both to writers not referring to a sustained active base, and to them being regarded as a significant source of anti-government attitudes by the state. Situated in a society where popular discontent against the ruling regime is rife, disaffected intellectuals and artists, even when possessed of highly personal motives, may see a mobilizing role for themselves in their art. Where overt political expression is suppressed, their utterances can take on added relevance to those oppressed by the system. In many countries of Africa artists and writers are more connected, willy-nilly, to the political events of the day (even if they choose to try withdrawing). The relative shakiness of the state apparatuses and the discontent of large numbers of people make their work more potent than in Europe, where it is contained more easily by the 'tolerance' of the society for individual artists (30).

It is never acceptable for the critic to accept literature on the level at which it itself operates (31): 'committment' and 'relevance' have indeed become almost obligatory and unwieldy terms in South Africa today. To see any literary activism (or 'relevance' - ed) in the context of moral or reflective imperatives, where it is believed literature should project/construct an ideal world and agitate men on to fresh values, is to miss or ignore almost all of the elements that go up to make a directed activist literature.

All too often value is awarded to works which fill certain categories selected and presented beforehand in the social and artistic milieu; Gwala, for one, has pointed to the way Doris Lessing was ignored by liberal South African purveyors of literature for many years (32). The ideological presuppositions and concerns of publishers and critics, dependent on the dominant aesthetic (and indeed political) ideologies active at their time, tend to inflate and disparage the works they come accross in a haphazard way. The manner in which an eminent white doyen of literature in this decade rejected the early stories of Mango Tshabangu for supposedly inferior

quality is indicative and illuminating, as is the awarding of prizes overseas to the strident yet unconvincing André Brink.

Objections made by African writers about the culture-bound judgements of western critics of African literature are fully justified (33). However, all too often criticism from African critics has appeared to follow the formal and subjective techniques of the very same Western critics who are dismissed (34). The type of comment which does not realise that the 'committed' stance put forward in a work of literature cannot merely be accepted in a superficial manner but must be subjected to other considerations of an historical, social, ideological and technological nature, can assure no exact placement of the work in the complex ebbs and flows of thought and action of its time.

The devotee of South African literature must therefore reckon with the techniques and forms specific to the literary actualization under study as well as the historical and social parameters of the work. We are surrounded today with favourable prejudices towards dominant literary modes and tastes inherited in this country from Europe and disseminated by the ideologically controlled places of learning. It cannot be accepted that literary formulations and their relationship to society are identical the world over, even when individualised and imported forms like the novel and published poetry are used (35). Moreover, in such a situation the relative separation of writers from a public used to other forms of cultural expression, difficulties of education and language and the influence of traditional and oral forms all bear consideration (36).

Ideas change meaning as the historical context changes meaning: in fact, the 'angry' poetry now emerging in South Africa seems to bear little relation to the vitality of black theatre and poetry of the period up to October 1977: and a certain amount of posturing is now evident. Literature is at all times an <u>activity</u>, and the writer is part of a living social context, and the bearer of the weight of its beliefs, conformities and rebellions (37).

The stance of the literary establishment and its criticism when faced with these types of problems is indicative of its shortcomings (38). One finds a predominantly textual criticism which can neither explain change nor see beyond its obsession with individual literary objects in the field of numerous cultural activities from which art or literature emerge. Thus, Cyprian Ekwensi is to them a worthy object of study but Onitsha Market literature is not; <u>King Kong</u> rates critical reviews while mbaqanga does not.

Neither is it easy to find such evidence of more complex (if also text-bound) projections such as linguistic or structuralist methods of criticism. Elize Botha has admitted that "die groter teksgerigtheid wat die Afrikaanse letterkundige kritiek van die vyftigerjare nagestreef het, is nie deur enige 'nuwe rigting' of 'nuwe metode' oorstem nie" (39). When literary criticism is seen in such a light, as a mirror ex lting literature and reflecting its moods, analysis of any but the most culturally acceptable of the dominant class' literary productions becomes difficult. Couzens' view is harsh but exact:

> ...the average South African literary critic is white, is middle-class. Unaware of its own parochialism, it must create South African literature in its own image. South African literary criticism is in a state of original ignorance. This manifests itself in at least three ways: the ignoring of the field, the paucity of in-depth research, the narrowness of vision (40).

The rhetoric of this type of criticism is remarkably uniform. The naive sensuous empiricism of its practice protects itself by legerdemain (the references to 'universality') from any critical discourse at the same time as the split between high and low culture is nurtured and pronounced. Work based on different premises is not analysed in concrete terms but is dismissed with reference to 'buite-literêre oorwegings' (41).

What has eventually emerged from this established criticism is a passive stance to a bewildering and alienated century. In South Africa, this way of avoiding social concerns has usually resulted in an implicit affirmation of the status quo (42).Politically it has kept faith with universality only by straining to remain uncontaminated by any sort of ideology, despite the fact that all literary theory issues forth from the dynamic relationships and interactions which constitute the ideological. Instead, a sterilized criticism is put forward wherein the critic is not aware of the boundaries and limitations of his or her own point of view; and the concern with a present meaning empty of historical and social perspective blurs the very fact of the subjectivity of the critic's response (43).

Without a dynamic critical and cultural basis all reflections about literature are doomed to sterile debate and class-bound

stasis (lack of movement and development). Ideological censorship through patronage and selection and suppression of literature not part of the standards of dominant culture has historically often been the case in South Africa, resulting in the destruction of much that was valuable, particularly in the cultural crucible of the townships (44). Furthermore, the transposition of European critical standards without thought onto a country where differing cultural experiences and literary traditions have always influenced each other, has been especially retroactive to finding methods of approach suitable to cultural and literary study. Even if European formats are used by the writers themselves, these will be altered in changed circumstances (45). The adaptation of European langauges by black writers to express fresh concerns poses a problem for the Western-trained critic, as does the expectations and position of South African writers vis-a-vis their society and the overtly political role accepted by many. The different divisions within South African literature have always emerged from a common economy and body politic, and the complex influences between different 'streams' of this literature are only now starting to be appreciated. For instance, the Soweto revolt had a powerful effect on the white literature of the time, and the literary standards and values of the established critics only then began to look tattered around the edges. The rise of the 'betrokke' Sewentigers as well as English writers such as J.M. Coetzee, who seek to explore new modes of prose expression, is implicitly underpinned by an awareness of the necessary politicalness of individual experience in South Africa today, even when writers are (as Coetzee) exploring psychological and mythical foci.

It is necessary for artists from the dominated culture in South Africa to take the next step beyond this abortion of the intellect, this emotional self-involvement in the literary work itself and a 'relevance' connected to moral imperatives rather than analysis: in this connection the recent interest shown by some black writers towards literary conceptions and historical perspective can only be helpful in releasing them from the negating, back-slapping approval of the South African literary establishment (46). An awareness of the actual possibilities of cultural opposition to the dehumanising effects of the existing system is now clearly essential, as is a calculating of the parameters of the struggle of the cultures involved.

IV.

The word 'culture' has, in the African context, always been used as a weapon: originally as a means for the European powers engaged in the scramble for the continent's wealth of justifying this violence by pretending a civilizing and philanthropic mission. In order to facilitate the flow of raw materials out of the continent with as little expense as possible, ideological as well as political and economic means of control were used - the denigration of traditional oral literature and art, the use made of newspapers, an education system geared to fostering the values of the colonial power and to train individuals for service, a powerful new religion, and so on. Colonial ideology informed the structures of colonialism as made manifest in the trader, the soldier, the administrator and the missionary: those bearers of 'light' to 'darkest' Africa.

Because of the use made of it by conflicting groups, it is more easily apparent in Africa that 'culture' is best situated as a strategical term, used as a means of mobilization and placement of the individual into a wider social group in terms of identification (47). Culture has no meaning apart from the social organisation of life into which it is built (48). That is not to say that general references to culture are empty: as an expression of social order and difference it is experienced by individuals and groups as a whole way of life, and both unites and divides people in their beliefs, actions and values. There is a strong reciprocal and dependent relationship between this vigorous manifestation on the ideological level and the economic and social reality involved; the history of cultural formation exhibits plainly the attempts and initiatives undertaken by specific classes and groups to change, correct and project their ideological conceptions of the world to inform their practical activity and material existence.

Historical experience always plays a large role in determining culture, which is a formative and flexible process. "Culture is simultaneously the fruits of a people's history and a deteminant of history" (49). Any society will contain several different, conflicting points of cultural focus; one matrix of which is usually dominant through its linkages to the dominant power structure and the diffusion of its interests through ideological state apparatuses such as the

school and media.

In order for a ruling group to develop ideological control over a society as a whole, (including the extention of its ideology to the dominated/oppressed classes), it needs to include and incorporate various types of differing conceptions and ideologies into its general activity, practice and terminology. In South Africa the great flaw of apartheid ideologically is that it does not have in its organisational manifestations this ability to incorporate ideologically those of the oppressed/dominated classes; a great majority of people are excluded from the ideological structures which attempt to legitimate the nature of society, and the result has been a concomitant increase in the role of directly repressive and coercive mechanisms of control of the dominated classes (50).

In a period of generalized social crisis such as the country is now undergoing, ideological contradictions have been made greater at the same time as a retreat of certain elements of the dominant culture has been noticeable. I would suggest that many urban groups experienced a type of 'identity crisis' during the 1976 riots: and such ideological flux assumes great importance for both black and white petty-bourgeois strata. Until well into the seventies the liberal establishment active on the literary scene defended itself against black cultural activities by reference to ideals which stressed the primacy of European views and models of literature; but in the last few years a recognition has emerged, even if based on the same faulty principles, that black art is a subject to be taken account of. The stage has been reached when agents of the establishment are seeking to assimilate members of township cultural movements into the sphere of 'art' acceptable to the cultivated - witness the commercial success of Oswald Mtshali's first book of poetry a few years ago, and the rave reviews of shows like Ipi Tombi and Umabatha. There lurks the ever-present danger however that such cultural products will be assimilated in the dominant culture's own terms (protestations of 'ethnic innocence') or distorted to fit its digestion (the reduction of the nuance and skill of dancing in many commercially successful shows to that which is most provocative and spectacular, such as ukufenda movements).

There is, in my opinion, a danger in regarding with too much complaisance at this stage this partial retreat by the dominant culture. It has so far tended to be restricted to that portion of the dominant classes which is artistically more knowledgeable. So, while such retreat and assimilation might be the case in verligte or liberal literary and artistic circles, it cannot be claimed for most of those under the sway of the ideology emanating from the power bloc. Along with the proliferation of state apparatuses and large monopoly conglomerates over the last decades, an attempt has been made to harness all spheres of social and cultural life to spheres of domination. The ideological structures of the state and the private sector continue to generate a widening variety of artificially created needs from Lux Soap to Kung Fu films. The state control of the press and other media in this country is awesome: educational books, the mass media, and products of mass culture (comic books, advertising, records and magazines) are used for purposes of directing and controlling consciousness, even when their subject matter is not ostensibly politics (51). Indeed, the names of newspapers and both black and white magazines have featured in the Department of Information exposés (featuring also an unsuccessful attempt to buy Drum magazine). Efforts have been made to control the burgeoning black film industry (52). These attempts at control have been matched by the overtly political platitudes of 'popular' ideologues of the ruling class, evident in patriotic songs, the 'terrorist' stories of Tippette, Carney, Early and Stiff and a plethora of films from Captain Caprivi to Grensbasis 13. Neither is it tenable to sneer at the artistic ineptitude of much of this propaganda; it is, for a certain section of the South African public at least, effective enough.

It must be noted that the petty-bourgeois groupings, while rejecting a political and educational system which denies achievement of their interests, are susceptible to commercial imperatives which are potentially rewarding; while the power of mass media is such that both petty bourgeois and working class elements have accepted, perhaps, attitudes thrust upon them which are not so obviously political. In terms of art and literature nevertheless, most efforts to systematize state control up until now have relied on censorship and bannings rather than subtler means of diffusing politically dangerous utterances.

In such circumstances of dependence and control, the stance of the politically committed artist and the way in which he or

she mobilizes the artistic medium available assumes great significance in any effects such art might have. While activist art can be used as a means of psychological support for those disaffected and dominated, it also implies future concrete action - if not on the part of the artist, then on the part of the recipient. It is not correct to imply that the committed artist in Africa or anywhere else need make no decisions past the acceptance of a few slogans, and simply throw these around in the relative sanctity of poetry readings or on the printed page.

There is a danger that if too much attention is paid to the creation of an isolated and elitist literature of opposition in such a situation, the struggle for a viable popular culture to underpin and inform this literature will be lost by default. Thus, an illuminating comparison can be made with the cultural initiatives accepted by the dominated in the African Lusiphone countries (the ex Portuguese colonial territories), and in particular the use of culture by the African nationalist organisations. While the importance of culture as a factor of liberation has been emphasised in a similar way to South Africa, it has been stressed as only one ingredient in a total campaign for liberation which includes military, social, political and economic initiatives as well (53).

It has moreover been especially informative that this emphasis on the cultural aspects of liberation has been away from the cultural renaissance and 'rebirth' of intellectuals, and onto the use of those aspects of culture least distorted by colonial rule: the rural and urban peasantry and proletariat which the colonizing power had least interest in acculturating and assimilating.

> ....a distinction must therefore be made, at least in Africa, between the situation of the masses, who preserve their culture, and that of social sectors which (are) more or less assimilated, uprooted, and culturally alienated (54).

Although, in distinction to the petty-bourgeoisie, these people have no need to reassert their identity to become aware of its value (55), it is insisted that the divergent popular and traditional cultures found in any country are necessarily altered and forged into a 'national' identity during the period of struggle itself. A highly regarded part of cultural life in these countries after independence has been the use of linguistic expression, music and dances as well as pageants to build a culture transcending both colonial and tribal forms of identity (56). This process undertaken aims also at a destruction of colonial state structures and the reharnessing of education to serve, not just an elite, but the society as a whole (57).

In South Africa the extent of urbanisation and proletarianisation is so wide and has gone back so far in history that it is impossible to talk of the mass of people as having been unaffected by the state structures. Despite the cultural complexity found, the class character of culture is extremely evident both in urban areas and in the so-called 'Homelands' (58). In such a social situation cultural assimilations and transformations have been the order of the day, despite the attempts of the state to reconstruct a synthetic, artificial 'traditionalism'. Furthermore, due to the increasing control exercised by the power bloc over the techniques and technology available to cultural 'industries' such as advertising and the media, the dominant groups have attempted both to use culture as a profitable enterprise for themselves and a divisive and controlling factor:

> The urban South African situation.... illustrates what happens when the means of production and distribution of expressive culture pass out of the community of origin and into the hands of interests anatgonistic to, or at least seperate from, the social development of that community. Africans in early Johannesburg had access to a variety of cultural resources, which could be blended to express the dynamics of cultural identity and social change affecting various groups. Before long, a class-oriented, self-conscious urban African community had developed, in which performance events played an important organisational, recreational and symbolic role (59).

Partly because of its ephemeral nature and partly because the dominant culture has always repressed and ignored it, the culture of the great majority of people in this country is a virtually unknown area. Much of this working-class and peasant activity has also been crushed when its means of existence was destroyed - such as the decline of the marabi with the removals from Marabastad, Doornfontein and Prospect Township in the 1930s; and the disintegration of the doggerel poetry and pamphleteering of the diamond- and gold-diggers with their absorption and destruction as a stratum of society (60).

It is instructive to look at the <u>forms</u> of these complex cultural activities. Writing has not been a means of expression much favoured by the lower classes in South Africa up until now: during this century other forms such as music, broadsheets, dances, speeches

and protest songs have been preferred (61). Instead of a use of literature, the growth of literacy in South Africa has resulted so far in the most popular written artifacts being Drum in the fifties and, since its transformation into a newspaper appealing to a mass readership in 1960, World and later on Post. Thus journalism has been until recently a more rewarding form of dissemination than relatively expensive books, and has been used by writers as such (62).

It is perhaps difficult in these circumstances to talk of a 'traditional' culture at all. What traditional elements have remained have tended to have been artificially preserved for the tourist trade, such as the Ndebele villages near Pretoria. The stratification and class-oriented social networks in existence in the townships have resulted in a number of diverse artistic and cultural tastes evolving, bound in a mediated way to the social identity and aspirations of their participants (63). It must be stressed however that an implicit or explicit element in many of these different styles is resistance to the status quo. Musical and other performances, as well as the published work of the petty-bourgeoisie, can be seen as a means of orientation and resistance in the urban environment through a stress on shared identity and values.

It has always been the case that cultural and ideological aspects have played an informing role in the struggles for advantage and control over the means of production in Southern Africa: the cultural organisations set up by Afrikaner nationalism in the 1930s and 1940s, the protest songs of African nationalist movements, the recent 'terrorist' war novels and films, and many of the expressions of black consciousness itself. It is thus on the political and ideological levels that the struggles between classes and races are usually most identifiable. In these struggles, the concept of 'the people', though varying in subject, has been used time and time again as a principle of identity through which differing groups attempt to rally support, using a variety of values and symbols to gain relative advantage of a popular-democratic kind. These popular-democratic ideological initiatives are, however, always articulated with class interests, even if these latter are deliberately blurred over.

Due to its lack of precise class content, the claim for popular legitimacy is the domain of ideological class struggle par excellence: each class tries to present its objectives as the consumation of popular objectives. Thus, ideologies are taken up and transformed by various organisations and groups in participating in the conflicts of their time, and it has happened that political movements with divergent aims have appealed to similar ideological symbols.

It therefore follows that the literary critic must refer symbols back to their concrete situation to recognize the actuality of these divergent meanings, as well as how they will function in changed contexts. Such is the case with the urban 'oral' poetry popular in Soweto among certain groups this decade: one finds an urban elite using peasant and traditional symbols and techniques which express, at this particular stage, a confrontation with the power bloc. In this urban setting, symbols will be transformed by losing reference to their concrete social base and transferred into a new confrontation (64). Furthermore, this type of poetic dissemination has been relatively successful with other sections of the population, but this success cannot be attributed to the 'Africanness' of the symbols themselves.

The historical context and class nature of all forms of artistic expression and dissemination are informative. What is presented on the surface as radical and popular literature can in actual fact present the very antithesis of any conscious placing of the work in the struggles of the time: there have emerged a series of novels from both Africa and Afro-America which are opaque, past a few generalities, to any deeper exploration of the structures of oppression and control which underlie so much of the reality of contemporary life in Africa (65).

Intellectuals in South Africa in the 1970s have, in their attempts to forge an art and identity of 'blackness' or 'commitment', been unsympathetic to the overriding commercial orientation, political innocence and vulgarity of truly popular entertainers such as Kente and Mhangwane (66). I would suggest that this is not only a failing of the content of such entertainments, but also as partial failure of the more radical writers and intellectuals themselves. Their lack of recognition of their own class discourse and placement in society and acceptance of various generalized and sentimental ideological facets has lead to the very area which is now important for literary artists - an awareness of their own contradictions with the people

they claim to speak for and the need for their work to aim at overcoming these contradictions to forge a genuinely popular culture - being largely ignored (67).

The use of publishing by writers opposed to the state in South Africa today would, in the absence of other forms of literary realisation at the same time, ignore much of the valuable advances in literary expression made by the black poets and dramatists of the seventies. Published literature is perhaps the most class-divided of all art forms because of its reclination in language, its ignoring of the predominantly semi-literate sectors of South African society and its methods of production (68), a tendency which the burgeoning price of books can only complement. The committed artist, then, must of necessity become aware of the limitations and control imposed by some literary techniques at the same time as participating in the ideological and cultural conflicts of the time.

A literature supposedly dedicated to political change can, without a sense of its own actualisation and audience, become trapped in sentimentalizing populist myths (69). To withstand the present onslaught against it, South African literature needs to dig its roots in deeper than an elite audience and self-propagating group of devotees. It needs to experiment and finds forms and techniques which will make it a more potent weapon of individual and social resistance. And stress must then be placed on the fact that 'culture' can never be meaningfully transformed into a prescriptive and unchanging, immutable goal. There is a complex and shifting set of relationships between the popular and the avant-garde, between 'high' and 'low' culture (70). The process under discussion is not so much being popular as becoming popular, analogous to the way a writer does not so much deal with meanings as alter them through their activity (71).

Whether the writers and artists who identify with the dominated classes can widen the scope of their work from its present existentialist and elitist preconceptions and tendencies is a moot point at this time. During the early seventies especially, as has been shown, there was a movement in this direction. Yet it can still be stated that the cultural expressions propagated by our writers will become progressively weaker critiques of the status quo if the duality of 'real culture' and 'popular culture' is not comprehensively overcome (72).

There is no inevitability in art and culture, no matter how much they are finally determined by the social context and struggles of their day. Neither has culture, despite its mass aspect, developed evenly through all sectors of society. The attitudes and behaviour of social groups, classes and individuals towards the present are clearly mediated by cultural, political and ideological aspects which explain differences among people who are in the same social category towards change.

Art and literature change in nature and context through practice, and are frozen into immutable forms only when their vitality of formations is denied or wastes away. How literature is forged, how meanings are reclaimed and altered, and the manner in which elements of technique and ideology are interwoven in works of literature can never be fixed beforehand. The problem of how individuals and small groups of literary activists can link into and influence the growth of a popular and dynamic culture appealing to as many people as possible is therefore now a crucial one. The unanswered questions of a committed literature lie in a discovery of how best to use it in the dark times and gathering conflicts ahead.

+ Facets of this paper have already been discussed at greater length in my 'Problems of creative writers in South Africa: A response' Work In Progress 1, 1977; 'Class, continuity and change in Black South African literature 1948-60' in Bozzoli (ed) Labour, Townships and Protest (Johannesburg, 1979); and 'Criticism, Activism and Rhetoric (or: Armah and the White Pumpkin)' Inspan 1,1 1978.

1. P.G. Maré 'Ideology, Liberation and Revolution' Mimeo n.d. p 1. For instance, in June 1976 what started out mainly as an ideological protest - heavily influenced by the black consciousness of the previous years - later attempted to link into economic issues such as strikes and rent boycotts. The response from the state shows that these protests were seen as a political threat to the status quo.

2. Some names: Breyten Breytenbach, Mongane Serote, Mafika Gwala, Athol Fugard, Sipho Sepamla, André Brink, Jopko Jensma, Molefe Phetoe, James Matthews, Welma Odendaal, Lefifi Tladi, Mandlenkosi Langa, Khaya Mqayisa, Gibson Kente, Johan van Wyk, Dumakude ka Ndlovu, Don Mattera, Andries Oliphant, Mathese Diseko, Vuyisile Mdleleni, Strini Moodley et al.

3. Despite Cope's uninformed and generalised comments (see Donga 6, 1977 p 1), realism is merely one among many models for the representation of reality, and is not the only form in which 'committed' literature can be expressed.
Adorno's criticism of Brecht: "By thinking of Fascism as an enterprise belonging to a band of criminals who have no real place in the social system....you strip it of its horror and diminished its social significance" applies here. Aesthetics and Politics (London, 1977) p 157.

4. D. Coplan 'The African Performer and the Johannesburg entertainment industry: the struggle for African Culture on the Witwatersrand' in Bozzoli op. cit. p 210. Other radical groups active in the early seventies include Mdali, Culcom and so on.

5. See M. Mzamane 'The 50s and Beyond: An Evaluation' New Classic 4, 1977 pp 30-2, and J.D. Ngcepe's 'Extent of Foreign Acquisitions: Northern Sotho and Zulu' quoted in Elsa Joubert's 'Afrikaans het baie tonge' Rapport 17/9/78.
For those who are interested in these poems, I would refer them to Sepamla's 'Statements: the dodger' and 'Mnta kazibani-bani'; Mutloatse's 'Don't lock up our Sweethearts'; Mlapolosa's 'Platform High-Heeled Walker' and some of the work of Christopher van Wyk, Gwala, Patel and Johennesse.

6. It is informative to note that both are jazz musicians, and knew very well the creative strength of both rehearsed and impromptu performance.

7. There is no doubt that this was consciously done by the poets and performers of the time: it was suggested, inter alia, that the microphone was a difficult instrument to censor.

8. M.P. Gwala 'Towards the Practical Manifestations of Black Consciousness' in Thoahlane (ed) Black Renaissance (Johannesburg, 1975) p 29, and the differentiation made between 'black drama' and 'drama produced by blacks' in Gwala (ed) Black Review 1973 (Johannesburg 1974) pp 105-6, 111-2.

9. Criticism of entertainers such as Kente and Credo Mutwa and plays such as Ipi Tombi for their apoliticality and pandering to and control by whites or the commercial instinct by the more radical black intelligentsia is commonplace in the seventies. However, entertainers were not necessarily more malleable to control - not only did Dashiki reject commercial attempts to record their music, but in 1971 about 50 mbaqanga artists staged a protest against white interference in their recordings. See Coplan op. cit. p 211, S'ketsh' Summer 1973 pp 8-10, Summer 1974/75 p 9, Black Review 1973 pp 206-8, 212.

10. BLAC publishing house in Cape Town is a case to point.

11. For a discussion of elitism in previous black literature see my 'Class, Continuity...' op. cit.

12. One thinks of Dashiki and Jabula, theatre such as Molefe Phetoe's Azanian Singers and Dancers, the literary organisation Pelculef started by Serote and Langa in Gaborone, and the show performed by Ipi Tombi members who refused to return to South Africa after their overseas tour, Sounds of Soweto.

13. Despite a certain amount of political naivety at its inaugral meeting in August 1976, when the various merits and demerits of several large business concerns and foundations were earnestly discussed as a source of sponsorship: naive in that it seeks to define in a simplistic moral manner the position of the writer in society.

14. I am thinking of New Classic, Staffrider, Inspan and the now banned Donga.

15. The Creative Youth Association (CYA) in Diepkloof, for example, staged a Free Art Festival late in 1978, and has already given rise to an accompanying music group (Bapupi) and a play Egoli.

16. The effective non-editing policy of Staffrider has at the same time meant that much uneven work is printed while a fairly comprehensive picture of general literary activity is brought to light. It is interesting to note that the burgeoning number of groups affiliated to P.E.N. cannot affiliate as a group - as Mike Kirkwood has observed "an interesting case of an 'atomized individual' type of membership structure conflicting with a practice based on concretely organised groups". (personal letter to the author).

17. See Publications Directorate letter Staffrider 2,2, 1979 p 2. A significant section of this letter claims that "the probable reader would mainly include persons interested in the development of Black literature" in tones which would seem to say that this is regarded as a fairly small and ineffectual clique (???). I also have a notion (which I cannot substantiate) that the more stringent steps taken against Donga was a result of the fact that its multi-racial policy involved far more Afrikaans writers. On the subject of small magazines generally, see 'Is It Now Pointless to Carry On? Star 2/5/78.

18. H. Wolpe 'The Changing Class Structure of South Africa: The African Petit-Bourgeoisie' Mimeo, 1976 p 18.

19. E. Laclau Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory (London, 1977) p 114 and E.O. Wright Class, Crisis and the State (London, 1978) pp 87 - 102).

20. P. Horn ' "When it Rains, It Rains": U.S. Black Consciousness and Lyric Poetry in South Africa' Speak 1,5 1978 pp 7-8. Other factors, of course, influenced the development of Black Consciousness: the image created of further employment opportunities for the educated and semiskilled operatives in urban and 'homeland' areas had by the early seventies virtually disappeared, and resulted in this group being more open to radical demands. The defeat of the Portuguese colonies and the policy of detente, along with an economic recession after the boom of the sixties, had forced the South African state onto the defensive. The early seventies were marked by worker unrest (the Durban strikes, etc.) and growing discontent in places of learning.

21. Maré op. cit. p 12.

22. P. Horn 'Soweto 1976' Mimeo, 1978 pp 5-6.

23. Wolpe op. cit. pp4-5

24. In terms of literature, one can point to the difference between Gwala's powerful materially-based arguments and idealist or existential statements such as Moodley's "And what is blackness? It is not a matter of the colour of the skin, it is a matter of the projection of the beingness" (SASO Newsletter May/June 1972 p 18) and the work of N.C. Manganyi.

25. It is interesting to consider, as Horn suggests, that the initial cause of the 1976 riots was the issue of Afrikaans, an issue which could only be significant to an educated elite. It was two months before the SSRC first called a three day strike. Despite the initial reaction of the hostel-dwellers, the strikes in August and September of that year were very successful indeed, with absenteeism as high as 80-90%. The lack of

penetration of these demands into the mines and Natal show, however, that the gap between workers and students was not fully bridged. Horn, 'Soweto' p 7.

26. A quote by Regis Debray is of interest here: "One need only consider the fate of the Black Panthers. The system against which they were protesting contaminated their protest by transforming it into a show, thus reabsorbing it and finally treating it as entertainment. A number of Black Panthers ended up by showing the dominant white world a mirror image of itself, its own reactions, reversed but in substance the same: hence both the ease with which they captured the world's attention, and their inevitable evanescence. The world of the show is the world of the moment. Permanence means boredom."

27. see L. Althusser 'The 'Piccolo Teatro': Bertolazzi and Brecht' in For Marx (London, 1969) p 143.

28. A Cabral 'The Role of Culture in the Liberation Struggle' Mimeo n.d. p 24. An example of this: "South Africans who are in this category are actually people whom Mbella Sonne Dipoko, the poet from the Cameroun, would call "lost souls".... How many of us have ever heard of Ali Mazuri or John Mbiti, whose writings reflect our souls as Africans?" M.Mzamane 'The Study of Literature in Africa' Donga 4, 1977 p 1.
It is possible therefore for the individual to justify a variety of actions as potent politically. Witness Tsietsi Mashinini's reported statement on his marriage to a Liberian beauty queen: "This is a bold pan-Africanist act." The Voice 2, 20 1978

29. "Ideology is not, prior to the work, like a system which can be reproduced: it is resumed, elaborated by the work..." P. Macherey A Theory of Literary Production (London, 1978) p 232. Although ideology in literature is always mediated by the ideologies articulated by various groups and classes and is, finally, a minor terrain of ideological class struggle, the uneven relationship of art with the economic infrastructure of society assures that aesthetic and biographical considerations must play their part. The individual is the bearer of the accumulation of ideological considerations, not all of which are class contradictions, and it is impossible for a work to produce the totality of an ideology. Laclau op. cit. p 163.
Ideological considerations can remain, in a dislocated state, once the material conditions which brought them into being have altered. A prevalent example in South Africa today is the unshakeable faith in 'free enterprise' in some quarters in these days of monopoly: For an amusing example of this see 'Do SATV choices reflect a bias to the economic left?' Sunday Times 27/5/79.

30. The developed world absorbs its ideological crises through its complex mechanisms of ideological and technological control, but the dependent 'Third World' structures are brittle under popular manifestations and pressures. One could point to the rigidity of many state structures in Africa, the frequency of coups, etc.

31. T. Eagleton Marxism and Literary Criticism (London, 1976) pp 48-54.

32. Staffrider 2,2 1979 p 52.

33. A.K. Armah 'Larsony, or Fiction as Criticism of Fiction' New Classic 4, 1977.

34. Such as Abiola Irele's statement that the critic has the choice between judging 'the aesthetic value of the finished product' or get involved in 'legislation for the writer about his raw materials'. 'Negritude - Literature and Ideology' in Middleton (ed) Black Africa: Its Peoples and Their Cultures (Toronto, 1970) p 390.

35. Dan Izevbaye in T. Vincent (ed) The Novel and Reality in Africa and America (Lagos, 1973) pp 17-20

36. Oral literatures often use rather than are superseded by written literature in Africa. The developments of oral and written literature in such a setting are not independent or parallel, but constantly interactive (through radio, newspapers, etc). See R. Finnegan 'How Oral is Oral Literature?' Bulletin SOAS 37, 1 1974.

37. One notes that technical advances in art are in a sense neutral, and their effects depend on how they are utilized and referred. It is not possible to deduce political positions from the formal or technical properties of a work of art, Benjamin notwithstanding: such technical progress can also mean increased specialization and lack of participation past a select few.

38. Isabel Hofmeyer shows that this criticism has actually not changed much in universities for some 100 years. ' "Problems of Creative Writers": A reply' UJP 2, 1977 p 36.

39. Standpunte 133, 1977 p 9.

40. T. Couzens 'Sebokeng, Doories and Bra Jigge: Research in South African Literature' in New South African Writing 1977 (Johannesburg 1978) p 29.

41. The phrase is Malan's. Further propaganda of this position is common: work based on different premises is dismissed as 'indoctrination' (Ullyatt), or with reference to 'politieke oorwegings' (MOller) and 'the simplicity of the left and the right' (Abrahams). These are weighed against such admirable self-explanatory concepts as 'die literêre gehalte van 'n werk' (Smuts), 'the old concept of universality' (Ricci), 'authenticity' and 'intrinsic poetic merits' (Ullyatt), 'belesenheid en leeservaring' and *'voortdurende opskerping van norme' (Botha)* etc. Criticism is there 'om die literatuur te dien' (Smuts). Quotes from Standpunte 133, 1977 and Contrast 44, 1977 among others.

42. In an atmosphere of increased repression and bannings, witness H.C.T. MOller's desire to keep literature 'free' from political prescription! Rapport 6/8/78.

43. Thus, a cogent criticism of Jameson's about structuralist criticism ("It cannot perform the most basic function of genuine self-consciousness, which is to buckle the buckle, to reckon the place of the observer into the experiment") is applicable. The Prison-house of Language (Princeton, 1972) p 208.

44. See Couzens/Dikobe 'Nobody's Baby: Modikwe Dikobe and Alexandra 1942-6' in Bozzoli op. cit. pp 95-6.

45. John Updike has pointed out that even American novels cannot be seen as having the same 'form' as their European equivalents. This is, of course, much more the case where the European influence is weaker - an immediate example is Amadi's The Great Ponds from Nigeria, where no individual protagonist appears in the story.

46. See letter from Guyo Book Club, 'Profile of the Historian Walter Benson Hubusane' by Risimati Jamathonsi and Gwala's review of Honwana's We Killed Mangy-Dog, all in Staffrider, 2,2 1979 pp 21,31,52.

47. 'Culture' is generally used by the layman in South Africa today with two distinct meanings. One refers to the 'cultivated' pretensions of the middle classes and makes the distinction between the civilized few and the ignorant masses who are not the recipients of its blessings: the second, as popularised by social anthropologists, refers to the totalised social effects of any pre-selected and distinct society. Both uses have become the tool of the dominant sections of society; what was, in the first case, originally conceived as a defensive aestheticism reacting against the subordination of mankind to commodity production, has been transmogrified by the cumulative weight of literary and cultural theorists into an element of ideological control and implicit celebration of the status quo. Anthropological uses have generally been unable to deal with social contradictions (other than in terms of 'sublimation') and were often linked to colonial and neo-colonial endeavours. See R. Williams Culture and Society 1780-1950 (Harmonsworth, 1958); J. Fekete The Critical Twilight (London, 1978) pp 3-36; T. Eagleton Criticism and Ideology (London, 1976) pp 11-21; F. Jameson op. cit. pp 161-2, 196-9, 209-11; P. Anderson 'Components of the National Culture' New Left Review 50, 1968 pp49-56. It emerges clearly that all cultural debates must be inserted in their specific situations.

48. I would suggest that the terms 'culture' and 'ideology' differ from each other but are often used to denote many of the same factors. Ideology has a more specific definition and tends to be used where the functionality of the social organisation of beliefs and thought is concerned. The term 'culture' seems to appear where the focus is on the content of such beliefs and thought.

49. R. Williams Marxism and Literature (Oxford, 1977) pp 128-9; A. Cabral Return to the Source: Selected Speeches (New York, 1973) p 41.

50. The use of 'culture' by the ideologues of the power bloc is informative both in their specific discourse of legitimation and their manipulation of the term: "....die werklike kultuurmens sidder wanneer hy moet luister na die maklike taal van die rewolusionêr....Die rewolusionêr wil lewe van verandering, van verbreking van die verlede. Hy ken geen langtermynbeplanning wat op progressiewe opbou gegrond is nie." Die Republikein (Windhoek) 6/9/78.

51. It is generally conceded that SABC and SATV are powerful monopolistic means of cultural dissemination. One thinks of magazines such as Bona and Pace (it is interesting to note that Pace's primary target is the literate, urban higher-income bracket of blacks in the 16-34 age group resident in the Soweto/ Johannesburg complex), the recordings of 41 Batallion in Namibia, etc. For a look at the use of comic books see A. Scholtz 'Mirror of Real Life: The World of Photo-Comics' Speak 1,4 1978.

52. See Rand Daily Mail 13/12/78 and 26/12/78; Sunday Times 8/10/78 and 12/11/78; Sunday Express 10/6/79.

53. Cabral 1973 p 101.

54. Cabral n.d. p 17.

55. Due to their better education and recurring ideological interests, the radicalization of many black petty-bourgeois elements in Africa has historically been marked by a reaction against the inherited European cultural imperatives and towards identifying with their African heritage. A relatively alienated stance therefore precedes this search for 'roots'. It is not strange that movements such as Negritude were often started by African intellectuals overseas, nor that such expressions are based on the premise that all Africans are culturally identical and little emphasis placed on the divisions which had emerged due to colnialism. Indeed, a nostalgic communalism and classlessness in African history is insisted upon, even though divisions existed before colonial times (Soyinka and Armah have given voice to this tendency).

56. One thinks of the revival of traditional dances such as the Mussitoro in Mocambique (suppressed by the Portuguese), and the use of popular forms of dance, theatre and poetry in factories, schools and villages by cultural groups like Grupos Culturais Polivalentes and the Grupo Scenico. Spectacles such as the Mueda pageant - commemorating the shooting of 600 people in 1960 by the Portuguese - the Mussitoro and the National Dance Festival held in late 1978 were expressly aimed at overcoming tribalism. One critic has remarked on the striking mixture of borrowed, traditional and impromptu styles in these performances. See New African August 1978 pp 72-3; R. Salutin 'The Culture Vulture in Mocambique' This Magazine 13,1 1979 and Development Dialogue 2, 1978 p 36.

57. At the same time the separation of mental and physical labour - a powerful force in the creation of professional intellectuals - is de-stressed. Carlos Dias: "it would be impossible to conceive of work apart from education as though it were something to which we aspired or which we were preparing ourselves to do in the future instead of understanding it to be the very centre of the formative process."

58. A. Mafeje 'The Role of the Bard in a Contemporary African Community' Journal of African Languages 6,3 1967. Illustrated with the example of the mbongi Melikhaya Mbutuma, in the struggle between the chiefs Sabata and Matanzima in the Transkei in the 1960s, Mafeje shows that in such cases the bard can no longer play the traditional mediative role and is forced to take sides.

59. Coplan op. cit. p 208.

60. See T. Couzens 'Sebokeng, Doories....'; Criticism of South African literature' WIP 2, 1977 and I. Hofmeyer 'The Mad Poets: An Analysis of an Early Sub-Tradition of Johannesburg Literature and its Subsequent Developments' in Bozzoli op. cit.

61. Couzens/Dikobe op. cit. pp 97-8.

62. The continuity of writers who are also journalists in South African history is remarkable; right back to the days of William Gqoba in the last century. One thinks of Plaatje, the Dhlomo brothers, Ngubane, Themba, Matshikiza and Motsisi and recent writers such as Mothobi Mutloatse.

63. Coplan p 188.

64. Laclau pp 104, 171-2. Among groups who are seperated from the dominant relations of production (such as the petty bourgeoisie) the evolution and conflicts of the present crisis they experience will be most discernible on the ideological level.

65. I am thinking of Ayi Kwei Armah and Jacqueline Pierce. Compare this existential posturing to, say, the work of Ngugi, Ousmane, and Mwangi (or closer to home compare Brink's output to Yvonne Burgess or the recent work of Etienne Leroux).

66. Coplan p 211. He suggests that the mode of their performance assists their popularity - satire, use of music, and a strongly visual impromptu art.

67. And this is not only a problem in South Africa: the two recurrent poles of 'popular' and 'advanced' art bedevils many writers who are more politically inclined.

68. Aesthetics and Politics pp 108-9; Eagleton Criticism and Ideology p 167. The literary text is, moreover, always selected, deemed readable and deciphered by certain conventions deeply embedded in educational and aesthetic practice: and the act of reading is similarly ideologically controlled.

69. One thinks of the work of Miriam Tladi, despite its political and social pretensions. Her work shows clearly the danger of these myths. See 'New Horizons' Staffrider 1,4 1978; 'You can't just sit back' Rand Daily Mail 19/6/79 and her story 'The Point of No Return' Staffrider 1,2 1978. ("He unclasped his thumb slowly from the baby's instinctive clutch, stroked it tenderly for a moment. He walked slowly towards the dim dusty window. He looked through into the barely visible yard, over the roofs of the nearby buildings, into the clear blue sky above. He said: 'It is because I have the belief that we shall meet again, Bongi; that we shall meet again in a free Africa!' The music rose in a slow crescendo. 'That song, it is so sad. It sounds like a hymn'" etc etc.)

70. There is a need to lay to rest forever the fable that complex techniques are comprehensible only to the elite few. On different levels, one can point to the Mueda pageant in Mocambique and the popularity of Wole Soyinka's extremely difficult play 'The Road' among lorry and taxi drivers in Lagos and Ibadan a few years ago.

71. The Lukácsian equation of 'experiments in demolition with a condition of decadence' is unacceptable - one would have to dismiss, for instance, the immature but brilliant young Zimbabwean Dambudzo Marechera; whose highly idiosyncratic and personalised stories project most forcefully the fragmentalisation and schizophrenia of a society at war with itself. In our situation the opposite effect can be dubious: witness Watson's accurate criticism of the white Anglophone South African poets of the seventies: "In general one would think that the separation, division and alienation would be themes literally haunting the work of these poets...The English, however, have always evaded this fact through a wadding of dinners and ideas; anything but that radical ultimate, pain itself". S. Watson 'Palefaces - Some Comments on White English South African Poetry of the Seventies' WIP 4, 1978 pp 33, 36.

72. H.M. Enzensberger 'Constituents of a Theory of the Media' New Left Review 64, 1970 pp 8-11.

Kelwyn Sole.



gold

GOLD - An Adventure Story (published by Perskor) is a compulsory Bantu Education setbook studied by African students in 1978. It was written by Leon Hugo (presently a Professor at UNISA). Another Blanket is a report published by AIM (the Agency for Industrial Mission) of an intensive investigation into migrant labour, carried out by theological students in June 1976.

Gold begins in Malawi where Bimbo (son of Sambo?) Masawali and a friend are discussing their future. Both have finished school, and Bimbo feels he wants to study further to help the people of Malawi find the 'gold in their heads'.

While rowing, a barge innocently named Wenela, bore down on them carrying workers down south to the mines. One of the workers fell into the water and Bimbo heroically saved him. He discussed recruitment with the barge captain and, within a week, had joined another cheerful band of hopeful workers, whose song went:

Travellers, travellers
On travelling, on travelling
Going are the Malawi men
Going are the Malawi men.

Good-bye, good-bye,
We are gone, we are gone
We are gone in search of riches
Good-bye, we shall meet again...

AIM: We are going to be rats there
We are no longer going to be monkeys
Because monkeys are always found here
We are becoming little men there
We are now becoming rats

The white men are going to make us rats
We are going to be made rats
Where we are going to be chased

Whereas here we are monkeys going by
the mountains?

On the way Bimbo and the other recruits stopped in Blantyre, where they were met by a smiling recruiting officer:

He led his party to a large dormitory and indicated the twin rows of beds. 'This is your dormitory for the night. Leave your things and come with me. I guess you are all hungry'... They went into another room, at one side were huge shining pots presided over by a fat cook. A delicious smell of stew rose steamingly from them. Bimbo's mouth watered.

'Take a plate and line up,' the officer said. Bimbo did as asked and in a few minutes he received a big helping of stew and porridge. He finished it quickly.

'Want some more?' It was the fat cook asking him.

'Is there more?'

'Don't ask silly questions. Come on.'

... He sighed when he had finished. It had been a good meal and he was more than satisfied.

AIM: These men looking for work contact the labour recruiting agencies in Lesotho. The men sign a contract which varies from 6 to 12 months, generally. The recruiting offices pay a levy of R10,00 per migrant to the Lesotho government.

These offices pay an advance to the recruits, which will be deducted from their wages... There are several such agencies in Maseru. Once a man is recruited these centres offer accommodation and food. The students observed that at the Native Recruiting Corporation (NRC) office in Maseru the conditions were unbearable: beds without matresses, rooms full of bugs and lice, food inedible, at times overcrowding (The NRC recruits on behalf of the Chamber of Mines).

That evening Bimbo and another man, Mausa, went to Blantyre. They became involved in a smash and grab robbery. Bimbo (naturally) chased the thief, who got away. Bimbo was arrested but let out after proving his innocence. He also received a R50 reward for saving a diamond necklace.

On the final train journey Bimbo noticed the force of Evil - a man with dead eyes and a deadly knife. At Shebe mine, where Bimbo, Mausa, and the Nasty One were recruited to work, Bimbo found Athiri, the man he saved.

AIM: They are given some polish, tablets, biscuits and a pass book cover. This cover contains glowing advertisements (and the address where to get easy terms) for Supersonic Radios.

Induna and/or the mine security men show the new recruits their rooms and beds. 'In our case there was lack of space and my colleagues and myself had to share a bed for a few days'. At certain mines in the Transvaal the workers sleep on cement beds.

He first had to be medically examined:

The doctor pushed and prodded him, made him open his mouth and say 'Ah,' told him to breathe deeply while he listened to his lungs, his heart, through a stethoscope, told him to jump up and down on one spot and then listened to his heart again. He scibbled notes on a form,...., handed the form to Bimbo.

...

'Am I all right?' Bimbo asked.

'Perfect.'

He felt rather pleased with himself.

AIM: The medical examination is only physical, ie standing in a group, arms and/or legs raised to show the muscles. 'The whole show ran like the examination of slaves - a landowner looking at the muscles of slaves to see if they are big enough'.



Training began. The miners learnt Fanakolo and the importance of accident prevention.

'It must be very dangerous down in the mine if we have to learn all these things,' someone said.

'No, its not. It's less dangerous than in a motor car on a busy road. But we on the mines are very conscious of safety and we try all the time to avoid accidents...'

AIM: At home I was secure
But now that I am on this side
I am in the place of danger
Where I may lose my life at any time
So prepare me for death

In addition to Fanakolo the men receive an induction into their new life situation.

'Most men were indifferent to the induction process which consists mainly of the enumerations of the rules and regulations which miners are expected

to follow at the particular mine. Some rules and regulations are not very popular among the miners, especially those governing the relations between black and white miners. The instructor pointed out that under no circumstances should a black miner fight a white miner. If the white miner seems ready to fight one should run away.'

Finally they were ready to go down the mine.

They trooped to the shaft head, the great concrete and steel tower that dominated the mine, standing above all the other buildings and seeming to keep watch over them like a big brother.

Everything was going peacefully and according to plan when Athiri began receiving threatening letters. Bimbo and Msusa took it on themselves to guard him. They traced the threats to Longwe Mayo, a cattle thief sentenced by Athiri's father (a chief). One afternoon while Bimbo was hurtling round an athletics track to preserve the glory and honour of his fatherland, and Msusa was guarding Athiri, who was Decidedly Depressed, disaster struck. Athiri was stabbed (fortunately not to death) and Msusa knocked unconscious. After a thorough investigation the mine detectives arrested Msusa. Bimbo was now alone against the enemy and he waited for him to strike. This he did - he dynamited a digging Bimbo was working on, killing 8 men, injuring 7, but leaving Bimbo (miraculously) untouched. Bimbo, before the rescue team arrived, managed to extract all those injured from the debris, break through a wall of solid rock to rescue someone and, finally, chase Longwe/Dead Eyes through the mine until he threw himself into a shaft.

Bimbo's heroic feat did not, naturally, go unnoticed. At his farewell ceremony the manager spoke:

He said: 'Our work here in the mine is to get gold from the rock. It is important work - the whole world wants our gold. I have often thought when looking at the yellow bars that are the product of all our work that this gold is not the only kind there is.' Here the mine manager turned to Bimbo. 'The other kind of gold is found in people like you, Bimbo Mazawali. In what you recently did you showed the gold I am speaking about - presence of mind, courage, loyalty. We at the mine, and the world outside, think that this kind of gold is more important than all the yellow bars in all the mines of the world.'

...'We are proud of you,' he said. 'Your country is proud of you.' Finally he asked Bimbo to step forward and he handed him a cheque...

It was a cheque for R600 and Bimbo knew that his luck had held. This money, plus savings from his wages, plus the reward money waiting for him in Blantyre, made his future secure.

He knew that he could further his studies to become a teacher.

AIM: 'We only ask for those things (ie more money and justice) that labouring people fight for in every country of the world - so that we can be like the whites in bringing our families, as decent men should'.

The Department of Mines annual report tabled in parliament in April said that accident prevention measures had not come up to expectation. This is an enormous understatement if one looks at the figures supplied by the Department:

Mineral production was a record
R6 376-million

577 deaths occurred on the mines, 654 of these on gold mines, during 1978

24 772 injuries occurred on the mines, 20 781 of these on gold mines

Ron Miller, NRP MP, industrial psychologist and former miner commented on these figures:

> "Annual totals of mineworkers killed underground have increased by nearly 20% over the last five years...
>
> "To take advantage of the prevailing record gold prices our mines are going into unstable areas and deeper levels - not worth the risk and the expense at the old gold prices.
>
> ...
>
> "Mining technology is reaching the point where it cannot cope with the extreme pressures and instabilities encountered at the deeper levels."

This article (Sunday Express, 79.05.06) ended on the reassuring note that while rockbursts had not been eliminated for two reasons, viz "Technology was not yet available for the introduction of measures discovered to reduce the hazard"; and "It was increasingly clear that not all the reasons for rockbursts were yet known", research was continuing".

The Bimbos of the world must be breathing sighs of relief.

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readers are also referred to two articles (Star, 78.03.25 and 77.10.18) on industrial accidents, and the SA Labour Bulletin, 4,5&10 on industrial health in South Africa.

DEFINING THE ISSUES - TOWARDS A METHODOLOGY OF women

THIS paper is a sketchy attempt to pose some of the problems faced by those seeking to analyse the position of women in South Africa from a materialist rather than a radical or even bourgeois problematic. Much of the concern in what follows will be with working class women and particularly with black women. This is not because it is deemed to be the only relevant area of research, but because (a) it is what I am most familiar with, and (b) because of the lack of any coherent analysis into the position of white women.

The strength of the feminist movements and of the struggles which they have waged over the past decade or so, has as one of its integral elements research, both theoretical and empirical into the situation of women. These women's movements have their genesis in the advanced capitalist nations - in Western Europe, Australia and the USA. It is here that many of their major battles have been fought. It is here too that much of the literature that is available has its source. Yet, not entirely so. 'Feminism', 'the women's question' - whatever one may call it, has not left the peripheries untouched, and while both its struggles and its literature may be less obvious they do nevertheless exist. More specifically, one can find in South Africa over the past few years the development of a substantial body of literature on women (unfortunately much of it academic and unpublished) - it is this, or rather its premises, which is the concern of the rest of this article.

Much of the research that has been done is historical in content. Most notable examples are those of Cherryl Walker (1) on the Federation of South African Women, and on the political struggles and anti-pass campaigns of the 50s; that of Cynthia Kros (2) on urban women's organisations, and my own (3) on rural protest in the 50s. All of these share one fundamental fault - that they do not, or do not go far enough towards establishing coherent reasons as to why it is necessary to analyse women at all. For if one rejects a radical problematic then charges of androcentrism+ are simply not sufficient justification for research into the situation of women.

The major question that I am then posing is that of 'why women' - why should women be abstracted as a significant social strata/fraction/category, and what validity do the consequent analyses have. This article explicitly rejects a radical feminist problematic and denies that one can situate a major societal contradiction as being one that exists between men and women as two separate and antagonistic groups. It also denies any neo-geneticist claims for universal female solidarity. For while it may be an immutable fact (or relatively so) that women have babies, this biological feature does not mean that women have babies in similar conditions, or that these babies and these mothers will have similar relationships to each other.

While this may sound trite, it is in fact not so. For the fact that all women do or may have babies, but under significantly different material conditions and social

+androcentrism: women-centred, or revolving around women.

relations, is in reality the genesis of what I consider to be a more coherent starting point for the analysis of women, for it is located in the material conditions of human life.

At this point some kind of definition of materialism is useful. Wolpe and Kuhn say:

> The materialist problematic is based on a conceptualization of human society as defined specifically by its productivity: primarily of the means of subsistence and of value by the transformation of nature by work. Linked with this is a conceptualization of history as the site of transformation of the social relations of production and reproduction. As far as an analysis of the position of women is concerned, materialism would locate that position in terms of the relations of production at various moments in history. (4)

In these terms then, women, before they can be analysed as women, have to be placed within a social context and within history. To do so means firstly and most crucially to locate women in terms of their relationship to the means of production, ie to define to what social class they belong. Implicit in this is a rejection of radical feminism for it has as its assumption that women, because they belong to different classes have vastly differing interests, rendering cross-class solidarity and mobilisation extremely difficult. It also means that women as an analytical category have to be defined in terms of class struggle, not only at the level of what has been stated above, but in terms of inter-class conflicts and divisions. As the Labour Bulletin editors (5) make clear,

> ...sexism like racism, is a divisive force amongst workers. As long as discrimination exists in the factories, shops, offices and homes and as long as we have unequal pay or job reservation along the lines of sex or race, the working class remains divided and manipulated.

Here they are stating it at the most obvious level. What has to be explained is how this division and manipulation operates; what its effects are; as well as what constitutes its material basis. All of these are issues that are not simply theoretical or academic but of vital strategic significance. For as both Innes and O'Meara and Yawitch (7) show, the capitalist division of labour which often relegate women to privatised reproductive labour before allowing their participation in social and collective labour, when overlaid by the effects of migrant labour (as the historical form of the exploitation of labour power in South Africa), has crucial implications.

Women in the reserves may perceive the focus of their struggle as the chiefs and 'homeland' functionaries who have power to allocate land and other means of production, while men and women engaged in capitalist production in the urban centres may regard the seizure of means of production here as the focus of theirs. Again, as Yawitch shows (8) the so-called conservatism of black women has its basis in their increasing marginalisation and exclusion from production in certain areas, while any analysis of male chauvinism must also have its material basis.

Thus, on the level of ideology, a class analysis of women that is grounded in materialism makes nonsense of many of the claims that women's oppression is universal. For while the category women, like that of race, does undeniably have profound material effect, this is not experienced in the same way by women of all classes. To expect working class black women in South Africa, exploited on the basis of their class, oppressed in terms of both race and sex, to share the experience of bourgeois women is ludicrous. Indeed, while many of the forms of oppression may be similar, their content is not. The chauvinism of black men needs to be explained here not as irrational and excessive, but once more materially and historically. What was the nature of pre-capitalist society and its sexual division of labour, what was its ideological expression, how did colonialism and imperialism distort this, are but a few of the possible starting points. On a more contemporary level, the inter-relationships between the oppression of black women by their men, and often the inability of these men to exercise any control over their labour, needs to be defined. Tentatively it can be suggested that the inability to effect changes in working conditions, wages, etc because of the weak position of the black working class with regard to collective bargaining and its exclusion from political power may mean that conflicts and antagonisms which cannot be expressed or resolved within the workplace are subsumed within the soakpit of the family and find their expression, if not their resolution, in wife- and child-beating, rape, drinking, etc - all of these being elements which serve to divide and weaken the working class on one level or another.

The preceding outline is sketchy and incomplete. The issues it deals with are each in themselves a vast area for research. Within the context of this article all that their mention is intended to do is to show that to abstract women as an analytical

category is validated only if their categorisation can be shown to exist as a material force within class struggle and on economic, political, ideological, ... levels.

Having accepted that women as a significant social category exist only in terms of class and class struggle it becomes possible to shed light on innumerable and complex issues. At the most fundamental level a reworking in terms of the methodology outlined above would make much of the historical data far more intelligible. To pose my earlier analysis (9) of women's 'riots' in terms of state intervention to secure a new form of division of labour and to entrench a new division of land and wealth in the reserves, as part of an overall change in the role of the reserves in the late 1950s, would have far more explanatory value, than does my rather empiricist account with its unquestioning acceptance of women as a logical starting point for analysis. So too would Cherryl Walker's (10) earlier work on the Federation benefit from a similar reworking.

For before analysing the anti-pass campaigns and the nature of the organisations that both grew out of it and mobilised them, one needs to look at passes themselves. This means looking at labour allocation and at the sexual division of labour historically. It means locating in terms of capital's needs and in terms of state strategies why at that time passes should be extended to women. The ferocity of the ensuing struggle and the difficulty experienced by the state in actually carrying out its intentions needs to be assessed in terms of wider political economy rather than some form of nebulous 'women's militancy'. For this is all part of a wider process of restructuring of capital that in certain senses provides a foundation for the penetration of monopoly capital and the processes of mechanisation and capitalisation that take place from the 1960s.

Implicit in the above critique is the second major methodological point I want to make. This is that the analysis of women in terms of class and class struggle needs to be broadened and deepened by looking at them historically and in relation to the needs of capital accumulation and to state interventions and actions to facilitate those needs. Here what has to be accounted for is the form of accumulation as well as that of the state at specific moments in history. The accumulation process in the centres of advanced capitalism differs radically from that in the peripheries. So too will the place and significance of women within this process differ. Thus it is not possible to simply transfer analyses of women in advanced capitalist formations however sound they may be, to those of women in the peripheries. And while it may be possible to utilise similar concepts and analytical categories this cannot be done unquestioningly and is always subject to an analysis that is grounded in history.

The use that has been made of the concept of the reserve army of labour as well as the dichotomy between reproduction and production with reference to South Africa have often suffered from this weakness. The reserve army function of women, as well as their supposed confinement to reproductive labour, is all too often flung around ahistorically and unquestioningly as a means of explaining away a multitude of issues (11). The reasons for this brings us to the major problem with research into women in South Africa at the present time.

For although it is by now clear that black women are concentrated in agriculture, domestic service and border industries; that they do constitute a large and vulnerable section of the reserve army; that in certain areas they are becoming marginalised; that white women, much in the same way that Braverman analyses American women, are becoming concentrated in the service and particularly clerical sectors; it is trite to simply restate this over and over again. The crying need now is for research, and although the apparent lack of resources, the androcentrism and chauvinism which mean that women are often not accounted for separately from men, may render this a fragmented and frustrating task, it is nevertheless possible.

What is also needed is research of a specific type. What has never been attempted is the formulation of a general theory of women in South Africa. By this I mean the provision of a historical analysis in terms of class struggle and capital accumulation that would go some way towards both defining and integrating women within the wealth of literature on southern African political economy. This is obviously not a task for one person. What it does however require is that all those interested in such work make available the resources that they gather. All too often the isolation within which people work means not only constant duplication of what has already been said, but also the retardation of any progression. It also requires that much of the marxist and neo-marxist research that is available needs to be worked through again and again so that it is possible to define exactly

what problems and what gaps in analysis its hitherto androcentric tendencies have meant.

Lastly, while this does not mean that work on women must be carried out only on a high level of abstraction, it does mean that what is too specific does have severe limitations. For while work like my own on women in Winterveld may in itself be valuable, it does mean that its very specificity and its form as a case study, limits its usefulness. Such case studies do need the background of some more general work against which they can be tested. It is this which is one of the major tasks for those working on women in South Africa.

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Joanne Yawitch

African WOMEN and Labour Force Participation

The following paper by Yawitch was presented at the conference on Education and Development held in Cape Town last month. Although the author and the editors would have preferred to have had the article rewritten for inclusion in WIP, this has not been possible. (See comments in the editorial)

THIS paper is an analysis of the position occupied by African women within the labour process in South Africa over the last 20 years. It will, however, start by explaining briefly the centrality of migrant labour in coming to an understanding of the position of African women and in elucidating the differences between their position and those of women in advanced capitalist formations (the countries such as the USA and Canada, and the countries of western Europe).

Before I start my analysis I should also clarify the assumptions which I believe underlie a materialist analysis of women, for I do not think it is possible to take women as an analytical category and isolate them from their social context without establishing clearly the basis on which this is done.

Women as an analytical category do not exist unproblematically unless one is working within a radical feminist paradigm, which I reject outright. Having accepted that a major societal contradiction cannot be between men and women (the radical feminist position) one has to redefine one's understanding of 'women'. The starting point for this materialist redefinition of the concept 'women' as a category in themselves is that of class, of the relationship between antagonistic social classes, and of the differing nature of access to the means of production. Having accepted that women exist within classes, what has to be explained, analysed and researched is the relationship between men and women within a single class, the relationship between women of different classes, the relationship of each of these to the state.

The issues that one is forced to confront then are those of divisions within the working class, the material basis of those divisions, the nature of the sexual division of labour, its relationship to, and effects on, the technical and also social division of labour. It also means that the issue of female oppression has to be recognized, as do the problems that are situated around calls for universal feminine solidarity, for it means that these will be forced to take cognizance of the factors of class, race and national oppression. Politically such an analysis also goes some way towards providing the potential for women's movements to develop strategy which is located historically and specifically. Lastly, it should be remembered throughout this paper that the women I am dealing with are African and working class.

Although my major concern is the position of women within capitalist society, some preliminary comments about the nature of the pre-capitalist society need be made. The family within pre-capitalist society, like that of the feudal family, was a productive unit within itself. As such, whatever the nature of the sexual division of labour that characterised it, women were involved in both productive and reproductive labour. The history of the process whereby the feudal family was destroyed and its members thrown into industrial employment as proletarians (the working class, those who have to sell their labour to others who control the means of production - machinery, land, raw materials) has been well documented.

It has been shown how women were initially incorporated in industrial employment at the lowest levels and wages, and then thrown out when it became clear that reproduction of the working class was potentially threatened. This meant the institution of a fairly rigid sexual division of labour - the capitalist form of which assigned women primarily to reproductive and private rather than productive (in the sense of the production of value) and social labour. This is not to say that all women were confined to their homes, or that they did not work - the putting-out and piece-work systems in particular were

extremely prevalent - but rather that in terms of capital's needs it was women's reproductive role which was dominant and which defined and set the limits for her involvement in other spheres of production.

In South Africa and in many of the peripheries, this separartion of the direct producers from the soil and the destruction of both the form of family and position of women which arose out of this, was neither so dramatic or immediate, but nevertheless comparably destructive. The process of primitive accumulation can assume more than one form - either, "the domination of the law of value (capitalist relations of production) is accompanied by the establishment of capitalist relations in the immediate process of production" (This is what happened in the case of the feudal family) or, "producers can be separated from the soil as a result of the impact of capitalist production... on continuing forms of non-capitalist production."

Here, migrant labour, the creation of a cash nexus, and commoditisation of agricultural production, reduces the value of subsistence production on a progressive scale. Thus in South Africa, the entrenchment of migrant labour as the historical form of the exploitation of labour power has meant that the process of proletarianisation is significantly different to that in the centres of capitalism and so too the relationship of women to the process of capital accumulation and to the labour process.

Here the implications of the migrant labour system for women need to be explained in more detail. One of its fundamental premises is the assumption that the wives and children of migrant labourers will remain in the reserves and secure familial subsistence off the land. That the ability to secure familial subsistence is, in view of the decine in the productive capacity of the reserves, constantly diminished, does not enter this formulation. It is on the basis of this rationale that South African capital sets the value of labour power (the value of the commodities produced by the worker during necessary labour time, or the value of commodities necessary to keep worker and family alive over time), at the level of the single worker and thus exclude maintenance of his family from this.

Initially, and in the earliest years of capitalist penetration, the reserves were able to provide the products necessary for the subsistence of the family. Yet, not for long. Capitalism, unlike dual economy theorists would have it believed, does not confine either its operations or effects to a single 'modern' sector of the economy, and nor does it eventually absorb the so-called 'traditional sector'. Rather, it penetrates the entire social formation ('society') although its effects and manifestations are contradictory - leading to the dissolution of existing modes of production in some areas and the conservation of their forms, although in a stunted and distorted manner, in others. In the case of the reserves it soon led to impoverishment and a rapid decline in their productive capacity.

Following from this background there are several issues related to women that need to be explained. These include the nature of the changes in the material conditions of women in the reserves, the responses of women to them, and the reasons why the system could be maintained for so long.

What the entrenchment of migrant labour meant for African women was (a) that they were not incorporated into surplus value production (the form that surplus product takes under capitalist production); (b) the pre-existing division of labour was distorted in specific ways; (c) because of the nature of the dichotomy between production and reproduction women's access to specific skills was limited; (d) the fact that it is women alone who bear ultimate responsibility for reproduction has significant implications for the nature of their political action.

I shall now explain each of these in turn.

The dependence of capital on maintaining a high rate of profit through the exploitation of cheap labour power rather than through the revolutionisation of the means of production and the consequent increase in the social productivity of labour in South Africa until recently, is at base the reason for the centrality of migrant labour. Its relationship to the extraction of cheap labour power has been explained earlier. Here a fundamental and crucial assumption is that women stay in the reserves, for if they move to towns full proletarianisation occurs and the rationale for the payment of labour at a level set in terms of the necessity to secure the reproduction of the single labourer only, falls away. African women in South Africa historically then , have never been incorporated into manufacturing and industry in significant numbers at all. Where they have been wage labourers it is in domestic service and also farm labour, the net effect being to isolate them from participation in

the production of value and from being collective labour.

This is not to say, however, that they do not serve vital functions, or that they are unproductive. What it rather means is that reproductive labour, particularly reproduction of labour power, is intended to take place within the reserves. Here the capitalist sexual division of labour assumes a new dimension in that added to the dichotomy between reproductive and productive, private and social labour, is a geographical and physical division of the areas in which this is carried out.

Women here are also responsible for production to secure familial subsistence. However, this subsistence production now takes place under the aegis of the capitalist mode of production and in a distorted form. While ostensibly women may have seemed to be doing the same work as under pre-capitalist relations of production, the actual content of these activities is vastly different. This is particularly so with the nature of the changes in the sexual division of labour.

Innes and O'Meara provide a useful explanantion and summary of this when they argue that rural production is now the almost exclusive concern of women, with the workload of older women being particularly heavy (younger women are often also migrants). Because men of two generations are migrants the work carried out by women has changed both quantitatively and qualitatively: The amount of labour they perform has doubled and its nature has changed because the reproductive labour traditionally assigned to them now takes on a dual dimension. They explain this by saying that the penetration of capitalist relations of production has destroyed the independence of the subsistence-based economy and has meant that it is now a 'servant of capital'. Thus women, because of the payment of their husbands' wages at a level set below the value of labour power and their consequent inability to purchase commodities that would facilitate reproduction, have to both perform normal reproductory labour (cooking, childcare, cleaning), but also have to reproduce the commodities that facilitate this,(ie they have to grow food, cut firewood, prepare mud and thatch for their dwellings).

Because women's labour is assumed to be predominantly reproductive and because her involvement in wage labour (domestic service, laundry, etc) is structured in terms of their reproductive function, women often have no access to the kinds of skills that would facilitate their movement into industrial employment, even were this possible. At this point a comment about education would be apposite. Assuming a significant function of education in capitalist society to be a means of training potential labourers and non-labourers to assume their places in the social division of labour it becomes clear immediately why it should be that 22,6% of the African female urban population of the RSA and 60,5% of the African rural female population should have no educational qualifications at all. The respective figures for white women is 1,1% with no educational qualifications at all, while that for African men is 39,9% urban and 65,4% rural with no qualifications (1). These figures have got nothing to do with racial discrimination, with unequal facilities, etc, but fundamentally reflect the fact that it is the place assigned in the social division of labour which determines access to education.

Moreover, the lack of access to education reacts back to prevent women from ever gaining access to new skills. And often, because of their inability to speak English and Afrikaans well, because of their illiteracy, women generally only look for work as domestic servants.

There are two last issues related to migrant labour and its effects on women which have to be explained. The first is the issue of exactly what the decline in the productive capacity of the reserves means, in terms of the continued ability of people to survive there. The second is that of the effect of their material conditions on women's consciousness. For if the collapse of the reserve economy can be set at some point in the 1920s, what has to be made understandable is how and why so many women and their families have survived there for so long. To an extent the answer is to be found in the long-term deterioration of the standards of living and in the increased reliance on remittances. The collapse of the reserves in concrete terms would thus be perceived as a process involving the constant devaluing of the means of production as well as the forcing down, over a long period of time, of the level of necessary subsistence, which is partly historically and morally determined.

Accounts of material life in the reserves are extremely rare, which is why Liz Clarke's study (2) of 150 families in the Nqutu area of Natal is so invaluable: The nature of the decline in the quality of life in the reserves can be seen in the following conclusion.

> Traditional well-being in a rural Zulu family would require a sufficiency of amasi (curdled milk), grains and vegetables in season, a minimum of 5 huts or rooms per family - one for the grandparents, one for the parents, one for the boys, one for the girls and one used as a kitchen and common family room ... The 150 families investigated in Nqutu are barely subsisting on an average income in cash and kind of R14,87 per month... They exist without the security of family or the comfort of religion and ritual. They cannot conceivably express any semblance of social graces or 'ubuntu'. Materially they are underclothed and undernourished; they cannot hope to achieve any meaningful educational standards or indulge in any luxuries even of the smallest kinds, like making a trip into town or purchasing a box of cigarettes or a drink without seriously impairing their own rudimentary diet of starches.

The study estimated the average income of a Nqutu family to be R14,87 per month, broken down as follows:

Remittances from migrants.....	R9,00
Earnings from home industry and agriculture.....	R2,37
Income from pension and disability.....	R2,60
Total	R14,87

At the same time it is said that R103,99 a month is the minimum needed to allow families to live in 'human poverty'.

An additional important point, but one that cannot be discussed in detail here,.is that the 'traditional' redistributive kinship/household based economy is transformed and diversified. The cash sent home by migrants is circulated within this economy. It is here that the origins of the 'informal' sector is to be found. A marginal economy develops at low levels of productivity and with minimal possibilities of accumulation, that is intended to provide a market in commodities for the poor. A major implication of this dependence on remittances is that women in the reserves are in fact proletarians, but proletarians who exist in a state of isolation and with increasingly less access to the means of production, either as labourers or as non-labourers. This has significant effects on their consciousness. Their lack of economic independence, combined with the fact that it is they alone who are made responsible for the reproduction of the family can mean that in certain circumstances rural women can be extremely conservative. The most common example of this would be the brake put on working class action and militancy by women because of the fear of men losing their jobs through strikes, etc, actions that would obviously render women extremely vulnerable.

Having set migrant labour and the effects of it on women as the context within which this paper is set, the analysis that is to follow will look at the effects of the accumulation process on women from the 1950s to the present day, albeit in general terms.

It is argued in this section that the state legislation and interventions of the 1950s have to be seen in terms of changes in the accumulation process at the time, and in terms of state attempts to deal with these in the face of the militancy and strength of both the working class and national liberation movements at that time.

In these terms the extension of passes to women can be seen as an expression of the need to control the mobility of women because of the fact that for the first time their influx to urban areas was posing a serious threat to stability and to the conditions which would allow accumulation to continue uninterrupted. The struggles of the 1940s around the issue of squatting and the refusal of capital or the state to assume a significant portion of the costs of reproduction of working class families was an important factor here.

It is in this context that one can understand the legislation of the 1950s as being directed towards a restructuring which would allow increased control of the working class and which would control their mobility - particularly that of women. Thus, the extension of passes to women facilitated control over their mobility and the ability to sell their labour power freely; the Native Laws Amendment Act divided the country into urban and rural, prescribed and non-prescribed areas, fulfilling the same role. In the reserve areas Betterment Schemes and the Bantu Authorities Act meant a new allocation of land, wealth and power which removed from some (especially women) possession (in the sense of being able to put into operation) of means of production, and created the basis of a new system of social control.

It is now that the reserves are reconstituted as South Africa's dumping grounds - as the areas in which the aged, sick, unemployed, marginalised - all those redundant to capital's needs are kept. The 1950s also saw the beginnings of the dramatic rise in the organic composition of capital.

The process of primitive accumulation and the forms that it can take have already been discussed. In the second case (ie where capitalist relations of production are not established in the immediate process of production) what happened was the creation of a surplus population, in latent form. This

has been explained in the following way: that it was the penetration of agricultural and other commodities, ie goods produced under capitalism, competing with forms of domestic production, which produced the major repulsion of people from the land (in absolute numbers). And that in South Africa this process was structured by the policy of segregation which meant that two racially separated sectors of agriculture emerged. The one capitalist in the white sector, and in the reserves the development of a process which inhibited the development of capitalist relations in the immediate process of production. It is further argued that, "(i)n both sectors, therefore (white and black) there was a tendency towards an absolute repulsion from the land, but a tendency for this repulsion to remain latent ... the extent to which the agricultural population actually passed over into an urban or manufaturing proletariat was inhibited by the specific conditions under which it was formed." In capitalist agriculture this was because of the dominance of labour tenancy, in the reserves because of the preservation of new forms of non-capitalist relations.

The movement of women out of the reserves in increasing numbers over the years is an expression of the transformation of this latent surplus population into a floating one - but a floating one whose hopes of incorporation into the economy except as migrant domestic servants became increasingly limited over time. This process was compounded by the effects of a rise in the organic composition of capital tending to the creation of a relative surplus population, a process which Marx explains in the following terms (3):

> With the growth of the total capital, its variable constituent or the labour incorporated in it also does increase, but in a constantly diminishing proportion ... This accelerated relative diminution of the variable constituent that goes along with the accelerated increase of the total capital, and moves more rapidly than this increase, takes the inverse form at the other pole, of an apparently absolute increase of the labouring population, an increase always moving more rapidly than that of the variable capital or means of employment. But in fact, it is capitalist accumulation itself that constantly produces, and produces in direct ratio of its own energy and extent, a relatively redundant population of labourers ie a population of greater extent than suffices for the average needs of the self-expansion of capital, and therefore a surplus population.

Here capital accumulation itself creates its own reserve army of labour. The overlapping of these two processes has in the case of women meant that thier historically peripheral involvement in the capitalist economy has not changed. The reserve army of men is in most cases sufficient for capital's needs and it is still their reproductive role and their position in the migrant labour system that determines the nature of female economic involvement.

The vast inflows of capital into the South African social formation from the 1960s corresponds to an industrial boom throughout the peripheral formations at this time. This has been explained in terms of the desire by imperialist capital to exploit the periphery on the basis of the extraction of relative rather than absolute surplus value. The revolutionising of the means of production and of the labour process that this involves, implies an increased organic composition of capital, and hence of capital intensity. This in turn generates a need for a specific kind of labour force, one that incorporates semi-skilled and skilled black operatives.

In the case of South Africa, as elsewhere, the abrupt insertion of monopoly capital as an advanced sector of production into the social formation displaces not only competitive capital which exhibits a tendency to be absorbed by it, but also large sectors of the working population. This is because of the vastly increased organic composition of capital which characterises the monopoly sector and which is also a result of its technology and technological innovations. Here it is important to note that an increased organic composition of capital need not displace labour in absolute terms, but rather that relative to the rate of capital accumulation less labour is needed. This process may manifest itself in many forms, including a slow-down in the rate of absorption of labour.

It is in terms of these types of processes that the dramatic rise in African unemployment in South Africa, from 1 236 000 in 1960 to 1 758 000 in 1970 and 2 306 000 in 1977 (4), becomes comprehensible - as does its increasingly structural rather than cyclical nature.

The concrete analysis of the position of African women in agriculture, domestic service and industry, which constitutes the rest of this paper, is set in terms of this analysis.

As a general statement it is asserted that for women the effects on employment of changing labour processes and methods of production are worse than for men. For the

ideology of the family which situates women's dominant concern as the reproductive rather than the productive sphere, functions to conceal unemployment, underemployment and sheer boredom. The rise in the organic composition of capital tending to the creation of a relative surplus population (and in South Africa ultimately to the formation of a marginalised labour force), does not affect only manufacturing and industry, it also has significant effects on both agriculture and domestic service, and thus on the women who are concentrated here.

The prevalence of labour tenancy in the capitalist agricultural sector has been explained above in terms of the creation of an absolute surplus population in latent form. Following from this it can be argued that the rise in organic composition in agriculture from the 1960s had the effect of freeing this latent surplus population. Thus the elimination of labour tenancies and squatting on white farms in the 1960s meant that vast numbers of people were pushed off the land. Baldwin (5) estimates that between 1960 and 1970 340 000 people were moved through the elimination of labour tenancies and 656 000 through the eviction of squatters. This was in order to facilitate the 'rationalisation' of the labour process in agriculture. (Migrant workers are now the preferred source of farm labour) Also to make available increased areas of land for cultivation using capital intensive techniques. One element of this policy of labour rationalization was the refusal to continue supporting the families of their farm labourers.

Information that clarifies, historically, the position and activities of black women on white farmlands is almost non-existent. Yet, from oral evidence (6) it is possible to state that women were involved in normal reproductive labour, seasonal labour on the farms themselves, cultivation of their own plots if they were squatters and labour tenants, and finally domestic service, often unpaid, in farmhouse kitchens. Wives of squatters and labour tenants would also often work as domestic servants or do laundry in nearby towns. Thus it was likely that women living on white-owned farms were economically active in some way. The demand for 'single' migrants as farm labourers, the unwillingness of farmers to continue to have the families of their labourers living on their lands, and the change in the nature of domestic service on white farms - from a rotation system where work was shared over the period of a year between many women, to that of employing a small number of full-time servants - all hit women especially hard.

The move from farms - whether as victims of 'GG' (7) resettlement, or after having been given a 'trek pass' by farmers meant that women were placed in an extremely vulnerable position. For, in most cases the only areas to which they could legally go were 'homelands' - areas where, as has been seen, even minimal subsistence is difficult to obtain. The only skills these women possess are those related to agriculture - which is not viable given the state of homeland agriculture; or domestic service, often not available to them as a 'legal' option, because it is increasingly difficult to register themselves.

What I would now like to discuss is a fairly recent development in agriculture, a development related especially to unemployment amongst women. This is the increasing use by farmers of women as casual and seasonal labourers. This is for a number of reasons: The low wages paid for agricultural and especially for casual labour often means that men, although unemployed, prefer to wait at the labour bureau to be recruited. In Pongola, for instance, a Natal area, wages for casual labour average R15,00 cash, or R8,00 in cash and the rest in kind (8). Another reason given for the preference for female labour is that women often bring their children with them because they have no-one with whom to leave them, thus meaning extra unpaid labour. Women, because of their inability to get legal work are most susceptible to illegal and low paid employment. In this sense they fulfil the classical reserve army function of depressing the wages of the working class.

It is in this sense too that one can understand the employment of women on vegetable farms (extremely badly paid), also the use of women to clear and scrape timber in paper-mills. Another reason given by farmers for using women instead of men is that "men don't do the work", and also that because women will work 'illegally' the R1,00 registration fee does not have to be paid. The above examples, although fragmented and incomplete, do provide some useful indications as to the nature of the processes that are affecting women. When seen in conjunction with the fact that in the reserves women are performing heavy manual labour - digging roads, building dams; that in areas of the country women drawn from resettlement camps and closer settlements are being used to dig irrigation trenches, build fences, and in

the Eastern Transvaal to work in the quarries, it becomes clear that women's exclusion from industrial employment and the attempts to keep them out of urban areas renders their position very different to that experienced under advanced capitalism.

Before the exact nature of the differences here are analysed, the nature of the situation of women in domestic service and industry needs to be outlined. Domestic service in South Africa can on one level be understood as the commercialization of reproductive labour. In terms of the 'white' women, its fundamental economic function is to free her for involvement in the service sector, but on higher levels than black women, as sales-workers, typists, office-workers, etc. It also frees her from her 'domestic duties' and allows her to fulfil a 'consumer' function (shopping, entertainment, etc). Black women then, perform domestic labour on a dual level and in a double sense. For not only are they responsible for the reproduction of their own families, but also for the families of the dominant classes. Again, in so doing, not only are they reproducing labour power in a material sense, but they are also reproducing the existing relationships of domination and subordination, exploitation and oppression. Nowhere else in the South African social formation, can one see so clearly how exploitation is facilitated and intensified by the factors of race and sex.

Yet, domestic service is no longer an expanding sector of employment: Although there are no figures available for the 1960s, the figures from 1970 (9) show a constant drop in employment in domestic service. Although it is possible that this drop in employment may be due to cyclical recession and to the fact that in periods of cutback white women are being pushed out of employment and into 'the home' - thus renedring domestic servants a 'luxury', it also has important long-term implications. Katzman (10) in an analysis of domestic service in the USA between 1870 and 1920 characterises it as a non-industrial rather than pre-industrial occupation, and as such, one that is able to co-exist with the development of capitalism and of a consumer society. Katzman also shows that with industrialization and with the consequent increase in the productivity of labour in industry, 'labour-saving' machinery became cheaper than human labour. In the domestic service sector in America there was thus a constant decrease in the numbers of those employed, a shift to the employment of black rather than white women, because of the cheapness of their labour, and a shift to live-out-work and charring.

In South Africa, precisely because of the extreme cheapness of human labour, this does not occur and domestic service remains a substantial sector of employment until at least the penetration of monopoly capitalism. As I said earlier, it is still too soon to tell whether the decline in the numbers of domestic servants is structural rather than cyclical. Yet what is possible is that the short-term decision, in a period of recession, to reduce the numbers of servants that one employs, may become permanent as over time the white housewife relies more and more on labour-saving devices. (Here it would be interesting to be able to see figures relating to either increases or decreases in the purchase of such consumer goods as washing machines, vacuum cleaners, etc) For while human labour in South Africa, especially female labour, is still cheap, increases in productivity in manufacturing on an international scale may have in fact outstripped that cheapness.

I should like to discuss briefly the effects of the decrease in the numbers of domestics employed on these women themselves, and also to look at the forms that this process assumes. (The concrete evidence that I present here is drawn from fieldwork in Winterveld)

Live-in domestic work is most preferred. Because subsistence is provided for at the place of work, women can save as much of their cash-wages as possible. Yet, in a situation where the extended family has broken down, and where no strong community exists, women with children are forced to stay in the home to care for them. It has been shown with reference to Britain that the presence or absence of day-care centres, crèches, etc, can be linked directly to the pace of capital accumulation. The absence or inadequacy of these facilities is related to the need to keep women in the home, but as an industrial reserve army with the potential for re-incorporation into production. In South Africa a very different situation obtains: unlike advanced capitalist nations the state takes minimal responsibility for reproduction. The provision of free compulsory public schooling, pensions, national health, etc... is largely absent. The need to maintain the cheapness of the labour which is the source of the high rate of profit that characterises South African capitalism means that the working class is responsible for most aspects of its

reproduction (although this seems to be changing with the perception of the need to incorporate and buy-off sections of the working class and petty bourgeoisie with skills relevant to capital's needs).

Women thus take on day-work - extremely low-paid because of the high transport costs involved - or else piece-jobs (laundry and charring). These are said to be better paid, but their temporary nature means that they are characterised by extreme job insecurity.

Lastly, before concluding, I shall delineate briefly the position of women in industry.

As an introduction some figure might be useful. In 1946 African women were 1% of the total labour force in manufacturing. By 1951 this had not changed. By 1960 it had doubled to 2% and by 1970 they constituted 7% of the total manufacturing labour force (11). Moreover, where women are employed in manufacture it is often in sectors that are in some way thought to be related to the production by women in the home (eg, garment workers, textiles, canning, processing, etc)

In many cases the above forms of production are labour intensive and in South Africa it is these industries which are the focus of the government's decentralisation policy. This attempts to remove industries which are highly labour intensive to areas just outside 'homelands' (border industries) or to areas just inside them ('growth points') where the labour supply is said to be abundant and is often female.

All sorts of incentives - tax concessions, loans, government aid, are granted to industrialists willing to move to these areas. The policy is widely held to be a failure. Yet, this is not our major concern: The absence of wage board determinations in many of these industries renders them highly exploitative. A recent exposé by Post revealed that in the Babelegi industrial area near Hammanskraal, characterised by labour intensive industries and a high percentage of female workers, wages are on average R5,00 to R7,00 per week. The huge reserve areias available to these enterprises means that the way is open to them to treat their workers in whatever way they wish. In Durban, the entire area in which the textile industry is situated has been proclaimed a border area. Something which coincided with the introduction of large numbers of female workers in the early 60s, largely through a process of deskilling. Here female workers are also paid at a lower wage rate than men. In the case of the Transkei Innes and O'Meara have shown that manufacturing within this reserve region employed only 4 050 workers (end of 1974), mostly women. Most of these labour intensive industries (such as the production of matches, furniture, textiles) are concentrated in Umtata and Butterworth (12).

Finally, as a conclusion, I want to look at the nature of female unemployment in South Africa. Here I do not intend to discuss the theoretical issues in detail, but rather to present what I perceive to be the dominant trends and tendencies.

As the discussion above has shown the rise of the organic composition of capital and the creation of a relative surplus population, both of which are features of the inner logic of capitalism, have tended to change the position of women in both the agricultural sector and in domestic service. Historically, women in capitalist society and particularly African women in South Africa, are subject to a sexual division of labour which assigns them predominantly to reproductive rather than productive labour and which situates them firmly in the context of the family. It is this soak-pit which has both made possible and justified the nature of their employment, its intermittent and insecure character, its low wages, and which has situated them predominantly as an element of the reserve army. Saffioti (13), amongst others, has characterised this in terms of a concept of the economic marginalisation of women under capitalism. In the case of South Africa I would use marginalisation as a broader concept to make understandable the effects on the working class of changes in the accumulation process due to the penetration of monopoly capitalism. This then provides openings for an analysis not only of the situation of women, but also of such features as youth unemployment, 'informal' sector activities, etc...

In these terms, the always tenuous position of Africans within the South African economy is under the conditions outlined above made far worse. The bureaucratic and legal limitations on their mobility means that having lost their jobs and unable to subsist off the land they are often not in a position to get another job, except illegally and in the conditions of vulnerability to exploitation and low wages mentioned above. Should they not be able to do even this they are forced to take refuge in the informal sector. In the case of women an activity that often means little more than basic survival as the

following example of the Winterveld situation shows:

> The high cost of transport - particularly if one does not have a weekly bus or train ticket - means that most people cannot make the journey to town to buy food cheaply. The only alternative is to buy at roadside stalls. Here, prices are low, but quality is poor. The stallholders are almost without exception women, and often women who are the sole supporters of their families. The poverty that characterises an occupation such as this is described by one seller. She is a widow, the sole supporter of her mother-in-law, her own three children and three orphans. Because she has no pass, the only means of making money available to her, is to sell fruit. "We buy these peaches from the market and sell them to make a living. We are selling them at 2c each and at a profit of R2,00, after having bought the stuff for R1,00. This profit is earned after two days. (This *gives her an income of R30,00 per month*) At times we have nothing to eat. At times then, when I have old porridge I mix it with water and give this to the children so that they have something in their stomachs".

Often in both rural and urban areas the most desperate and poverty-stricken families are those that have no male providers at all. The structure of society and the family which assigns women a subordinate place, means that there is always a man somewhere to provide support. A man thus becomes more than anything else an economic necessity - a factor which renders women's attitudes towards them often extremely resentful and ambivalent. In Winterveld and other squatter and resettlement areas it is women without men who are the road-side sellers, the water carriers and the prostitutes. In the rural areas it is they who smear dung, collect firewood, are share croppers, etc.

In conclusion, this paper does not provide a coherent analysis of African women. What it does however do is to indicate some of the directions that further research and analysis should take, as well as make clear that women have to be analysed in terms of the specificity of their historical situation, rendering comparisons and extrapolations from the position of women in advanced capitalist countries to those under peripheral capitalism ludicrous.

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5. Baldwin, Alan - "Mass Removals and Separate Development" in Journal of Southern African Studies, 1,2 page 5.
6. This oral evidence is drawn from my own work in Winterveld and also from that of various other people doing field work.
7. Here is an example of how this process is perceived by the people involved. "We left Delmas because we were reluctant to work on the whiteman's farm. Now the CC evicted us. Now why is the CC interfering in the whiteman's farm? When we failed to move away immediately the whiteman seeked help from the government". Again. "It is already 16 years that I have been in Winterveld. I came from Witbank-Cullinan. We left as we were told to move where other Africans were residing. We were working at a whiteman's farm, we were evicted by the government and we came to Winterveld. When we were evicted we were told to come to Bantoe plek at Makanyaneng".
8. Personal interview with A Claassens (79.07.09) Much of the information on farm labour is from this source.
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For further bibliographical references see the other article on women in this issue. Also Africa Perspective, July 1979 - special issue on women, and the bibliography contained therein.

FOR TABLES SEE NEXT PAGE.



TABLE 1 —Economically active female population in the RSA as a percentage of the Labour Force, 1951-1970.

Year	Total labour force	Whites	Coloureds	Asians	Blacks
1951	19,8	21,8	29,4	7,0	18,2
1960	23,1	25,7	32,2	9,2	21,6
1970	33,6	29,7	35,3	19,0	34,9

Source: Based on figures from the Department of Statistics.

TABLE 2. —Females as a percentage of the labour force in certain occupations in the RSA, 1970.

Occupation	Total labour force	Whites		Coloureds	Asians	Blacks	
		All women	Married women			White area	Black states
Professional and technical	42,7	34,4	16,3	59,5	19,0	63,1	57,6
Administrative	6,0	6,2	3,8	6,3	31,2	10,7	0,4
Clerical workers	46,9	60,2	33,9	28,2	5,3	7,4	7,1
Sales workers	30,3	36,3	23,8	39,3	11,9	21,1	25,2
Service workers	68,5	24,8	11,4	82,2	13,1	72,8	65,9
Farm and forestry workers	35,1	4,0	0,9	8,4	22,4	26,8	49,4
Production and transport workers	7,5	4,3	2,4	23,2	6,8	4,3	7,7
Not classifiable	55,2	39,4	7,7	45,6	17,3	59,6	57,1
All occupations	33,6	29,7	15,9	35,2	19,0	31,2	43,1
Number of females econ. active (1 000)	2 721	448	240	252	35	1 242	744

Source: Based on data from the Department of Statistics.

Table 3 - Employment of African Women in South Africa, 1970

	Homelands	RSA	Total Pop.
Service workers	85 543	730 345	815 888
Farm & Forestry	588 903	871 968	1 460 871
Production and Transport	23 296	85 340	108 636
Not Classifiable	41 949	218 144	260 093
Not economically active	3 334 633	5 811 452	9 146 085
Professional & Commerce	34 664	80 150	114 814
Total	4 108 988	7 797 399	11 906 387

(From the 1970 Census)

Table 4 - Average number of fulltime Domestic Servants per White House on the Witwatersrand, in Pretoria, Durban and Pietermaritzburg, 1971-1975

Date	RAND	PTA	DBN	PMB
1971	0,64	0,57	0,97	0,81
1972	0,63	0,59	0,93	0,73
1973	0,63	0,57	0,89	0,71
1974	0,58	0,53	0,84	0,62
1975	0,54	0,52	0,75	0,60
% drop 71-75	16	9	23	26

Figures from Simkins, C - "African Unemployment in Rural and Urban South Africa" in Simkins, C and C Desmond (eds) South African Unemployment: a black picture (Development Studies Research Group and Agency for Industrial Mission, 1978. Page 82).

TABLE 5 —Percentage distribution of the working population of the RSA by educational level, 1970.

Educational level	Whites	Coloureds	Asians	Blacks	
				Urban	Rural
Male					
None	1,1	24,7	6,7	39,9	65,4
—Std 3	—	—	—	16,8	13,3
Std 3-5	—	—	—	25,3	13,6
—Std 6	3,3	43,3	34,7	(42,1)	(28,9)
Stds 6-7	25,4	22,4	36,0	13,0	4,1
Stds 8-9	29,7	6,5	13,8	4,9	1,0
Std 10	23,1	1,7	3,4	0,7	0,2
Diploma with					
Std 10	7,5	0,9	1,8	0,1	0,1
Std 9 or lower	1,5	0,4	0,4	0,2	0,3
Degree only					
B. degree	4,3	0,1	0,9	—	—
M. degree	0,5	—	—	—	—
D. degree	0,3	—	—	—	—
Diploma and					
B. degree	1,0	—	0,3	—	—
M. or D. degree	0,1	—	—	—	—
TOTAL	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0
Female					
None	1,1	18,1	16,1	22,6	69,5
—Std 3	—	—	—	14,3	15,2
Std 3-5	—	—	—	33,7	16,4
—Std 6	1,7	48,9	40,9	(48,0)	(31,6)
Stds 6-7	17,6	22,1	22,9	20,9	5,4
Stds 8-9	37,2	7,1	11,5	6,7	1,6
Std 10	26,9	0,9	4,0	0,5	0,1
Diploma with					
Std 10	10,0	0,6	2,3	0,2	0,1
Std 9 or lower	1,9	2,3	1,7	1,9	0,7
Degree only					
B. degree	2,4	—	0,6	—	—
M. degree	0,2	—	—	—	—
D. degree	—	—	—	—	—
Diploma and					
B. degree	1,0	—	—	—	—
M. or D. degree	—	—	—	—	—
TOTAL	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0

TABLE 6 -Employment in the Clothing Industry in the Transvaal by sex and population group, January 1968 and July 1977.

Population group	January 1968			July 1977			Increase or decrease		
	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total
Whites	237	1 928	2 165	148	475	623	-89	-1 453	-1 542
Coloureds	527	8 253	8 780	354	3 066	3 420	-173	-5 187	-5 360
Blacks	3 176	11 006	14 182	1 825	12 496	14 321	-1 351	+1 490	+139
TOTAL	3 940	21 187	25 127	2 322	16 037	18 364	-1 613	-5 150	-6 763

Source: Industrial Council for the Clothing Industry (Transvaal).

labour action

Stuttafords Van Lines: (Wynberg, Johannesburg) The entire staff went on strike for a few hours (79.05.09) in protest at the firing of six fellow workers, "for allegedly being agitators". The fired workers were not members of the workers' committee "but employees who stood firm for the rights of everybody", according to fellow workers.

The employees went back to work in response to a call from the workers' committee.

The police were called in to the strike. (Post, 79.05.10)

Mineworkers: (Cooke 2 Shaft, Randfontein) African mineworkers dropped material hoppers down a shaft on the weekend of the 2-3 June. The mine's public relations officer, WD Rowe, said:

> We thought production might have been seriously disrupted, but at this stage it looks as though the month's total output will not be affected.

The workers' action was in response to being brought to the surface later than usual. (RDM, 79.06.04) Also see report on the TOA go-slow in this section.

Mineworkers Union (MWU): A conciliation board could reach no agreement over the forfeiting of benefits by MWU members who had participated in the strike in March. The white miners turned down arbitration or mediation at the meeting late in May, leaving a strike ballot as the only option.

On the 25th July the executive council of the MWU decided on whether to hold the strike ballot, but have kept the decision secret until later. A commentator said that "a strike ballot will be a critical test of support for the union's militant leadership following the dramatic collapse of its illegal strike when most members returned to work" (RDM, 79.07.26)

Motor Industry: (eastern Cape) Workers belonging to the National Union of Motor Assembly and Rubber Workers (the NUMARW, the union that has been involved in the Eveready strike - see WIP,7 and 8, and South African Labour Bulletin, 5,1) demanded better wages and job security (eg, improved over-time pay, short-time benefits, termination of contract benefits). The union members reacted to increases offered with shouts of "Let's down tools, let's show we're no weaker than the women of Eveready", at a meeting on 79.07.11.

The workers are employed by General Motors, Ford and Volkswagen. Hundreds of workers have recently been laid off by the motor industry in the eastern Cape.

Frametex Mill: (New Germany) Nearly a thousand wokers were reported to have walked out in support of wage demands on 79.06.29. They returned to work on the 2nd July after being threatened with dismissal - workers said they could not afford to lose their jobs. Three workers were said to have been dismissed "for being the ringleaders of the strike".

SM Goldstein & Co: (Wynberg, Johannesburg) 131 workers employed by this company, and recruited from such places as Durban and the 'homeland' of QwaQwa, were all fired after asking for higher wages. They had been engaged in building hostels at the Amandelbult section of Rustenburg Platinum Mines near Thabazimbi (Star, 79.07.03). As migrants they had to immediately leave the area once their passes had been signed off. 19 workers were said to have been immediately reemployed.

25 men stranded at the Johannesburg station without train fares were reemployed after negotiations on their behalf by the Building, Construction and Allied Workers' Union.

Set of film 'Botsotso' (producer Ronnie Isaacs): Four extras were reported to have walked off the set in protest at the R5,00 per day they were paid. (RDM, 79.06.14)

Corobrik: (Edenvale) Workers went on strike after, they said, they had written four letters to management and getting no reply. They returned to work on the same day after management had promised to "look into the matter and do something about their pay".

Police had been called in. (Post, 79.06.20)

Technical Officials Association (TOA): Some 2 150 members of the TOA at gold mines covered by the Chamber of Mines wage agreement decided to embark on a go-slow in protest at a 10% increase (this occurred at the end of May). The general secretary of the association said that they would 'withdraw cooperation' until granted a 16% increase. The members involved were mainly hoist drivers and reduction workers.

On the 20th June Randfontein Estates Gold Mining Company (Witwatersrand) and Vaal Reefs Exploration and Mining Company were granted an interim order in the Pretoria Supreme Court preventing the TOA from continuing with the go-slow.

In the hearing it was claimed that the go-slow had "...caused losses of nearly R1-million at one mine and led to incidents involving black miners... There was also a possibility that if black miners were kept underground excessively there could be riots

or damage caused. This had already happened" (RDM, 79.06.20) (See report elsewhere in this section on African mineworkers' action)

Nel's Dairy: (Victory Park, Johannesburg) This strike was reported on in the last issue of WIP. In May 13 workers who had been sacked by the dairy (in a dispute over the previous dismissal of four of their colleagues) claimed that it had been partly because they had refused to accept a liaison committee imposed by management. The 13 are all members of the Sweet, Food and Allied Workers Union.

Management replied that it had been because they had incited other workers to strike, and that they had refused to talk to management even when asked to do so. (Post, 79.05.08).

24 dairy workers brought an urgent application in the Rand Supreme Court against their employer for fear of dismissal "after they supported the establishment of a works committee" (RDM, 79.05.11). The workers won the case:

> Mr Acting Justice Goldstone ruled that the dairy employees were entitled to apply for an interdict against wrongful dismissal for forming a works committee.
>
> ...
>
> *"In future workers who are being threatened* with dismissal for engaging in trade union, works committee or liaison activities will be able to prevent their unlawful dismissal", commented a Johannesburg labour lawyer. (Star, 79.06.18)

Precision Tools: (Johannesburg) On the 19th June 26 African workers were given a final order by the Rand Supreme Court restraining the company "from victimising the workers by firing them or changing their conditions of employment because of trade union or works committee activities" (RDM,79.06.20)

Tony Hahme (Pty) Ltd: Some 85 women employed by this packaging firm at the City Deep market were dismissed by management after demanding a pay increase. "Most of them had been paid between R11 and R12 per week. and they had demanded the pay rise (to R17) to offset increased transport costs" (RDM, 79.06.14).

On the 14th about 50 of the women got their jobs back:

> They eventually decided to return after fruitless negotiations between the firm, the Department of Labour and officials of the Industrial Aid Society (IAS), who have been representing the workers. (RDM, 79.06.15).

Nurses at Coronation Hospital: (Johannesburg) The nurses refused to eat meals at the hospital because of the quality of the food offered. The food served in the dining room used mainly by white staff was said to be much better. The Transvaal Medical Society expressed solidarity with the action by the nurses. (RDM, 79.07.05 and 06)

Du Preez Transport Company: (Vereeniging) 39 transport workers employed by this firm were found guilty in the magistrate's court in Vereeniging on July 17. They had gone on strike for higher wages. The workers had been earning R20,00 per week and demanded R10,00 per week extra. Managemnt refused and offered R4,00. Mr Nel, manager of the company, "admitted that some of the workers (had) not been registered by his company, because of some passbook difficulties" (Post, 79.07.18)

The workers were each fined R60 or 60 days.

Jig Bend sugar mill: (Swaziland) 4 000 striking sugar workers stoned police cars, burned down sugar cane fields and shouted down cabinet minister Bhekimpi Dlamini after a pay dispute. Workers were admitted to hospital and several policemen were said to have been injured. About 90 workers were arrested (Post, 79.07.29; Star, 79.07.26)

A few days later a second 'riot' broke out at the mill and also at a citrus estate at Thambuti. Police were sent to the scene. This action also related to a wage dispute (Star, 79.07.31)

Fattis and Monis: (Cape Town) (We are reproducing material from a pamphlet issued by the Projects Comm at Wits University)

Despite the fact that a union existed which represented their workers, the management of Fattis and Monis (F&M) at Bellville South decided to impose a liaison committee in their mill. Workers were told to choose between the liaison committee and their union.

While management were in the process of informing their workers of this 'choice', union members were busy organizing a petition calling for a minimum wage of R40 per week (at present some workers receive only R23 a week). One week prior to the strike management warned the workers that they would have to choose between their jobs or. their union.

Then, on the 23rd April, 5 workers were fired. All were union members and thus active in organizing the petition. When five of their colleagues requested reasons as to why their fellow workers had been fired, they too were dismissed. Management subsequently claimed that the dismissals were due to retrenchment following mechanization and reorganization.

Seventy eight other workers in this Bellville South mill, however, believed that the ten had been dismissed because of their union activities.

On 25th April all 78 joined their ten fellow workers outside the factory gates in protest against the actions of F&M management.

Soon the Department of Labour was on the scene and warned the strikers to return to work or face fines and imprisonment. Then, a traditional attempt to divide workers,

they ordered that 'African' and 'Coloured' workers separate. The workers, however, remained united, because, as one worker put it "We were all there for the same purpose".

And now, 99 days later, they are still there with the same purpose:
- despite a management offer to re-employ 23 'Coloured' workers, none went back and they remained united
- despite the fact that the children of two of the strikers have died during the strike they remain united
- despite the fact that they now receive no pay from F&M, they remain united and meet every day to discuss their plans.

After a few weeks groups started to come out in solidarity with the strike and the boycott of Fattis and Monis products began.

After 3 months F&M made a final offer and gave the workers an ultimatum to apply for reinstatement on the condition that they will forgo all previously earned benefits and start on the bottom rung of the payscale. Only 18 workers re-applied for jobs and 70 remain on strike, receiving only R15 per week from their union on which to eke out an existence.

But they remain united, despite management and Department of Labour attempts to divide them on ethnic lines, despite the threat to many of them of being endorsed out to 'homelands'. And as they remain united, thousands have come out in solidarity by boycotting Fattis and Monis products and aiding the Food and Canning Workers Union financially.

These groups support the workers:
UWC; Hewat College; Peninsula Training College; Bellville Technical Training College; Western Province Traders Association (2 100 members); SACOS (SA Council of Sport); NAFCOC (Cape Town); 14 000 strong Union of Teachers Associations of South Africa; Cape Teachers Professional Association; Harold Cressy High School; Livingstone High School; Heathfield High School; Grassy Park High School; Spes Bona High School; Labour Party; A large Cape Town bakery, the Silverleaf Bakery, has also suspended all purchases of flour from F&M; UCT SRC, and over 15 clubs and societies. It has been reported that the boycott campaign is spreading to the Witwatersrand;

And boycott the following products:
Record Flour products

Fattis and Monis
ice cream cones
cake cups
macaroni
spaghetti
large and small shells
ribbon noodles

Also noodles and spaghetti under the following brand names:
Pot o' Gold
Princess
Checkers
Roma

Philadelphia Flour

Koeberg Mills pick mealie meal.

This list would not include all F&M products on sale in the Transvaal.

glenmore resettlement

A FOCUS solely on the Glenmore resettlement camp can be misleading. Firstly, it obscures equally massive resettlement schemes in the eastern Cape at Keiskammahoek, Seymour, Chalumna, Peddie and still more places. Secondly, it has dangers in that it can parallel the commercial crisis-oriented media (see Sunday Post, 79.07.08), making an on-going process into an unusual event, thus indirectly and incorrectly suggesting that conditions at resettlement camps are worse than at established slums long existing in the Bantustans.

Glenmore is, however, a particularly useful resettlement scheme to focus on because it is fairly well documented and the information gives some insights as to the general process of marginalisation in the eastern Cape. Most information here comes from newspaper cuttings, with the Eastern Province Herald giving by far the best coverage. Abbreviations of newspapers cited are:
EPH - Eastern Province Herald;
DD - Daily Dispatch;
EP - Evening Post;
WP - Weekend Post;
SP - Sunday Post;
GM - Grocott's Mail.

Historical Background.

Glenmore is a farm on the South African side of the Fish River, although recent government maps already bend the border to include it in the Ciskei. It is opposite a small settlement called Committees Drift - the original place planned in the early seventies to resettle 6 000 residents of Grahamstown's Fingo Village.

"It would be the finest black town in South Africa," said Koornhof in 1972. But even the Bantu Affairs Administration Board was dissatisfied with the site and in 1976 Glenmore was chosen as a replacement.

In November, 1977, the Department of Bantu Administration and Development informed the Town Clerk of Grahamstown that "in view of the fact that Grahamstown is less than 50 km away from the Ciskei, policy dictates that Bantu families residing there should eventually move to the homelands concerned".

Although the threat of removal applies to all three of Grahamstown's black townships, it has always been of more relevance to Fingo Village. This is because this specific township has freehold tenure dating back to the mid-19th century when Queen Victoria "gave" it in return for services rendered to the British by the Fingos against the Xhosas. Consequently, removal has always first concerned the fate of Fingo Village, and this township has now been declared a Coloured location.

Recent years have seen a modification of government stance towards the Fingo Villagers, and the plan is now to build 200 new houses in the Makanaskop location (ending a very long freeze on housing in the townships) for property owners displaced from Fingo Village.

In 1977, however, the township was estimated to house 6 000 people, mostly lodgers in shacks locating themselves for economic reasons in Fingo Village which is the closest of the three locations to the white area (20 minutes to walk).

It is now expected that government will ship these lodgers to Glenmore at some stage. A corrugated-iron shack town ("Silvertown") developed in 1976 as a transit camp. But the move was 'shelved' during the nation-wide struggles of that year. Instead of Fingo Villagers, rent defaulters from the other townships, and some local squatters moved into Silvertown. It was from here that the first group of families from Grahamstown have "voluntarily" been moved to Glenmore.

Fingo Village, nevertheless, will have to go somewhere, and deadline for its removal is now set for 1981. It will be important for resistance what position is taken by the Fingo property owners and Community Council (dominated by this group). Will they oppose the threat of removal in order to safeguard their rent incomes, or accept being moved to another Grahamstown location? In the past, while eloquent in rhetoric about opposing the removals, two such characters have been exposed as double-dealers: one having applied for shop rights at Committees Drift, and the other who has already sold his house to a Coloured buyer. Question marks therefore hang over the fate of the black townships as regards government intentions and people's responses

The present government stance is to say that Glenmore is not designed for Grahamstown's African population. In May, 1978, Connie Mulder said it was not intended as a dormitory suburb for Grahamstown, but "would be a normal town incorporated into the Ciskei".

Chief Director of the Eastern Cape Administration Board (ECAB), Mr Louis Koch, has also denied the Grahamstown-Glenmore connection. "This was never the intention. Glenmore will house people from all over the Eastern Cape. I believe that many families will go there voluntarily. In some cases unemployed squatter families will be moved there... We want to build houses which will be attractive enough to induce people to willingly leave their squatterd shacks to live there".

Glenmore.

Work began at Glenmore in about September 1978 constructing 500 temporary houses made by the Ciskei Sawmills factory based at Keiskammahoek. They are wooden dwellings with asbestos roofs, and mud floors.

According to a report by the project engineer dated 78.07.26, temporary African workers would be hired to build the temporary houses at a rate of R5,00 a day. The report also mentioned that initially the permanent houses would be speedily built by a big contractor, but groups of ten houses would later be tendered to African contractors. It contained a rather naive hope that building the temporary houses would train African workers on the job who could then become independent contractors.

On 78.07.01 the EPH reported that Glenmore would take 5 years to develop at a cost of R26-million. Despite noises about irrigation schemes and agriculture-oriented industries like canning, the money is solely for the creation of the town, and makes no provision for long-term development. Further, on 79.06.09, the EPH reported that only a portion of the R6,1-million to be spent at Glenmore over the year ending August 1979, had been spent. It quoted KoornHof as now saying in Parliament that R875 127 had been set aside for this period. It appears then that development is proceeding slowly and at far-reduced budgets. At the time of writing, the 500 temporary houses are occupied, but the construction of the permanent ones has not begun. At present pipes are being laid.

According to the EPH, "A big work force, mainly unemployed squatters from areas like Port Alfred, will be moved in within about a month to build 500 temporary wood and asbestos houses which will house the labourers employed in the building of Glenmore". The town is to have 5 000 houses and include land for "an elite suburb where plots will be made available to owners on 99-year leases and where they may build houses of their own choice." The permanent houses will, according to Mr Koch (chief Director of ECAB) be built

with wiring, with individual tenants deciding on whether or not they wanted electricity. There would also be running water, water borne sewerage, three rooms, a kitchen, shower and indoor toilet.

The New Targets.

The first Africans to be threatened with removal to Glenmore were 35 families of the Kenton-on-Sea Bantu Emergency Camp which housed about 900 people altogether. The removals might have gone unnoticed by the media and wider public were it not for the fact that (mistakenly) included in the 35 families were several domestic workers, whose employers for moral and economic reasons (how compatible!) complained to the press.

A statement to the DD (79.03.30) by an ex-Kenton resident, motivated by the former reason, read:

> From what I know of the locality (Glenmore - author), a hot barren and inhospitable wilderness founded on shales which yield scanty water from underground and likely brack at that, it seems that they will have to wait till the Orange-Fish scheme is extended to that area before the water becomes something of a sinecure.

This expectation has however been dismissed by Koch of the ECAB who has emphatically stated that no Orange River water would be available as this is strictly for the white population. (EPH, 79.06.18).

The statement to the DD continues:

> Large numbers of the helpless are being moved in 40 ten-ton trucks at very short notice (ten days notice was given - author) from the Kenton-on-Sea Bantu Emergency Camp... The majority are women, old and young (many of them gainfully employed in domestic employment at Kenton) and their children, many of whom, on a lesser scale are also gainfully employed. Some of the males who are affected may well be employed as gardeners and caretakers... This source of money for the maintenance of themselves and their families will immediately be cut off and can never be replaced."

The statement further asks "Why has the fate reserved for the Grahamstown Fingo Location suddenly been visited on them?" The answer was soon to become obvious.

The Kenton location was established in 1956 and since 1963 has been declared an emergency camp "for the purpose of accommodating homeless Bantu" (GM, 79.04.03). Many of the residents have Section 10(a) and (b) rights. The reason why the location has remained a "temporary" emergency camp is because it stands in the way of the white Kenton. This factor, however, was not the cause of the threatened removal since not all families are affected, and the location will probably remain where it is for quite some time yet.

The rationale for the removals was explained by an ECAB official in 1978 who said that the move was intended to reduce the black Kenton population "to the barest minimum necessary for the labour needs of Kenton and Bushman's River".

To do this however, required the destruction of another black settlement in the area, a squatter camp of 1 200 people, at the Klipfontein farm across the river from Kenton. As the Black Sash pointed out, the 35 Kenton families to be removed had been "selected from the Kenton emergency camp residents to make way for an equal number of fortunately employed residents presently living at Klipfontein." (EPH, 79.03.31).

An ECAB spokesman explained of the Klipfontein squatters, "It was planned to remove only the unproductive and unemployed squatters to Glenmore. Unemployed people would also be moved. The remaining employed squatters families would then move the (Kenton - author) camp". (EPH, 79.04.02).

The plan was thus to completely clear Klipfontein, transfer 35 families of workers to Kenton (most, if not all, were municipal employees living at Klipfontein), and shunt the "surplus population" in both areas to Glenmore. An ECAB man, whose administration board covers 1,5-million Africans, put it very morally, "We have a responsibility to the permanent African population which is indispensable for our economy." (EPH, 79.04.03)

Why start with the Kenton area, why remove Klipfontein?

Klipfontein's origins, which unfolded bit by bit through the media, help explain why it was in line for destruction. Some of the residents moved there 30 years ago, when they rented land from the owners (Coloured people). At present no squatters there pay rent and one big objection to Glenmore was the fact that rents there would be R6,11 a month in the temporary houses. The other squatters are fairly recent arrivals, but the whole community was fairly cohesive, and a school functioned there. The new arrivals came from various sources:

+ It has always been a practice amongst Eastern Cape farmers to turf off the farms, retired workers whose children have not hung around to take over from their parents their jobs. This, of course, is quite logical: the farmers feel cheated for having paid to reproduce their labourers and their replacements, and losing out on the latter. Coupled with this tradition has been the effect of the slump on the chicory crop - a major eastern Cape product. In February this year, for example,

the manager of the Chicory Control Board informed farmers that there was a surplus of 15,4-million kg on the current crop which would supply 70% of the 1980 demand. This meant that only 4-million kg would be needed from the 1979/80 crop - at the most 8-million kg. Cutbacks in production are swelling the numbers of evicted farm labour families. Three families squatting on the Kenton rubbish dump, for example, were evicted and dumped there, when the farm on which they lived changed hands.

+ Workers attracted by work on the coastal road remained in the area after the job was completed.

The squatters at Klipfontein it seems had an ambivalent nature for white farming interests. On the one hand they served as a nearby pool from which to tap seasonal labour on the chicory and pineapple fields, without farmers having to take on the permanent reproduction of this labour. Instead, squatters at Klipfontein maintained themselves through seasonal shifting employment in domestic labour, and small-scale agriculture. On the other hand, it seems to have been this latter aspect which irked farmers who complained that "valuable grazing land was being destroyed by stock kept by more than 1 000 squatters" (EPH, 79.04.02).

Squatters were further accused of trespassing on white farms for water and firewood, and were probably also involved in petty theft from them. These grievances by local white farmers were contributing factors leading to Klipfontein being first in line for removal. Other factors mentioned in the press included the desire of the Alexandria town council to use Klipfontein for a Coloured township; that the Coloured people were being terrorised by African squatters and wanted help (source - the Nat MPC for Albany), and, of course, the allegation that the settlement was a health hazard.

All this could have been sorted out without "public" fuss, had ECAB not erred in threatening not only the unemployed with removal, but some of the local labour force too. The problem, however, was soon resolved from this point of view, when ECAB announced that those facing removal at Kenton and at Klipfontein who could prove registered employment would not have to move to Glenmore.

In the light of this clear working out of class interests, contrast an action group formed in Grahamstown at the time of largely liberal academics. The group, although it did much to publicise the removals, remained entirely within a liberal idealist paradigm, seeing the removals as the working out of bigoted racial ideology. The group's paramount concern was, of course, with the 'irrationality' of the move and especially with the threats to employed people.

<u>The removals get under way</u>.

At Kenton, where 180 employees are registered with the Administration Board, the community appeared split between stayers and leavers. As pointed out earlier, many have Section 10 rights, including some of those threatened with removal.

Those affected by the removal received <u>handwritten</u> notices dated 79.03.22 that they were to be moved, and that their site permits were cancelled. "Take notice that you and your family are being moved to Glenmore, district Peddie. The move takes place from April 2, 1979", read the notice.

One man who received a notice is a blind pensioner who has lived at Kenton since 1956, working for one employer for 15 years. Two other pensioners told to move said they did not want to, and a number of residents said they would refuse to board the trucks. A 66-year old woman who had lived there for 25 years said "They make us work like donkeys and then they throw us out." (DD, 79.04.03)

The Black Sash became involved at this point and considered a court order on the grounds that Kenton 'removees' had received less than 14 days notice. The Sash said that 35 families in Kenton were effected, though ECAB said the number was 17. The Sash saw the removals as the start of a process which would effect up to 10 000 people in the eastern Cape, the Kenton removals involving 350 individuals. These individuals were "the old, disabled, unfit, unemployed and their dependents and their families." Next on the list, said the Sash, were 1 200 people at Klipfontein and then families from Bathurst and Port Alfred.

The ECAB has always claimed that those moved to Glenmore would form the workforce there to build the rest of the township. Reporting the Sash's statement, the EPH read: "Contrary to official assurances, it appeared that a large number of these retired people to be resettled at Glenmore would be unable to serve as the professed labour contingent in the construction of further houses in site" (79.03.31). As it happens, the workforce will probably be mainly those workers who built the temporary housing. In any event, it is somewhat strange that squatters were moved into temporary housing, if the plan is really to provide

permanent dwellings.

Finally, the Sash noted that because Glenmore was not in the Ciskei, the removal could not even be justified in terms of a "grand apartheid plan". This argument carries little weight, however, and the Ciskeian Chief Minister, Sebe, has agreed to incorporate Glenmore, provided it becomes a "model town", whatever that may mean. Sebe did stipulate, however, that agricultural projects should be established before resettlement of people and that water supply from the Fish River be guaranteed.

When the first settlers arrived in Glenmore the following week, neither of these conditions were met, not to mention the non-existence of permanent housing with piped water and indoor toilets.

Despite all the positive media reports about the proposed expenditure and five-year development plan for Glenmore, when these settlers arrived things were rather less glossy. There was no new tarred road, despite the earlier report in DR that "All main roads and bus routes will be tarred, and if enough money is left over the steeper roads will also receive tarring attention in case of erosion problems." (78.09.01). There were no clinics or shops, although an African Ciskeian shopkeeper was later given temporary facilities, and two hawkers were allowed to operate. Naturally, there were no public telephones or electricity. The only transport is an occasional railways bus which costs R1,80 return to Grahamstown.

What was the position at Klipfontein? Squatters there had a history of fighting removal through the courts. In 1976, 161 were told to move, but were allowed to remain after a successful court case. Charged with illegal squatting in March last year, charges were deferred on the grounds that there was no alternative housing available. Koch of ECAB said that the charges against the 173 were deferred at the time, pending their removal to Glenmore (an interesting pointer to the long-term strategy of ECAB). Those who moved to Glenmore, he said, would not be charged.

The Klipfontein squatters received no written notice, but were informed by a sergeant that they would be moved in 1 week. As part of the pressure put on the squatters to move, the school was closed and teachers (and pension payments) transferred to Glenmore. A pensioner at Klipfontein said "If they want to take off the roof they will do it themselves. If they try to force us to leave, we will telephone our lawyers" (DD, 79.04.02).

ECAB's response to this was that if Klipfontein people resisted removal they would be prosecuted. "As far as we are concerned there has been the necessary consultation over the move. We met them and so did the Ciskei Minister of the Interior, Chief Lent Maqoma. The Klipfontein people indicated they were in favour of the move" (DD, 79.04.02).

It was late reported that the head of the Kenton police had also been present at this occasion, and also that Maqoma denied that Klipfontein squatters wanted to move. What is interesting here is that some Klipfontein residents were indeed consulted about the removal and taken to visit - not Glenmore - but the nearby prestigious Tyefu agricultural project, a political showpiece on irrigated land.

Before going into the actual removals, for historical record purposes it is worth recording the comments of the ex-MP for Albany, Mr Bill Deacon, of various fames, besides being an east Cape farmer, and now Town Clerk at Bushman's River. "Although he felt sorry for people being moved without being given any choice, he felt the removal of Klipfontein squatters was a good thing. 'The settlement constituted a health hazard to both its occupants and to whites in the vicinity'". Deacon further confirmed that registered employees from Klipfontein would no longer have to go to Glenmore but would replace the unemployed who would be moved out of Kenton.

<u>The removals begin</u>.

Following outcry by various sectors, and the need to check if unregistered but still employed workers were included in the families to be removed, the Kenton removals were temporarily halted after PFP representations to Koornhof. The Klipfontein removals were, however, to go ahead.

Koch of ECAB said that if anyone refused to board the trucks, they would not be forced and would not be treated in an undignified fashion. "There were other ways of dealing with these things", the EPH reported him as saying (79.04.03). He was probably referring, inter alia, to the charges deferred from the year before.

At this stage, both Glenmore and Klipfontein were sealed from the press. Police said they received a request from one of the Coloured usufructuaries of the land not to allow reporters on the farm, and the man when interviewed confirmed this. (There are 4 usufructuaries on the farm, one of whom does not mind the squatters, who are largely

on his section of it. It was one of the others who banned reporters.) The Chief Plural Affairs Commissioner of the eastern Cape, when asked about the press bans, said "There is nothing to hide", but he did not want photographs taken because there "was too much interference at that stage". (DD, 79.04.04).

Koornhof, according to the PFP, had instructed ECAB to only move people willing to be moved from Klipfontein. Reports that emerged however painted a different picture. Squatters claimed that officials and police had threatened to bulldoze houses of those who did not want to go. They said that women had stood by weeping as their houses were dismantled, and one woman, the family breadwinner as a registered employee at Bushman's River arrived to find her home levelled and her family gone. (WP, 70.04.07). Squatters further claimed that in at least six cases people had to agree to board trucks when, despite opposition, their furniture was removed from their houses and loaded onto trucks. They were told they would not be able to get transport later to where their furniture was going.

ECAB's response to these allegations was firstly that they had no bulldozers, and by implication couldn't threaten to bulldoze houses! The regional manager said that some people who said the day before they did not want to move, had "changed their minds when the facilities at Glenmore were explained". "All we used was persuasion," he said. "How six whites can force 1 400 people to board trucks is beyond me. If we had tried that there would have been incidents and I assure you there were no incidents yesterday." (EPH, 79.04.05).

Legal battles.

The basis for state eviction at Klipfontein was an order from an Alexandria magistrate against 150 people, on the grounds that the settlement was a health hazard. On the first day of the removals 200 squatters met an attorney to discuss getting a court order preventing the removals. The bid achieved a temporary halt when ECAB undertook to suspend removals until the case was settled. The squatters' case rested on the argument that the eviction orders were irregular and should be declared invalid.

In an affidavit before the court, a Klipfontein resident said he was chairman of a committee representing all the families on the farm. He denied that the removals were voluntary, and also said the families had the consent of the owner to live there - a fact confirmed later in court by one of the four usufructuaries. Counsel for the squatters argued that the way things were handled was a clear erosion of the rights of the squatters to their right of notice and their right to protest.

By this stage, however, as an ECAB spokesman said in court, 96 out of 180 Klipfontein families had arrived at Glenmore already. This was confirmed the following day by the Deputy Minister of Plural Relations and Development (Vosloo) when he visited Glenmore and had what he described as "fruitful talks" with the full Ciskeian Cabinet about removals to Glenmore. According to WP 79.04.07, what emerged from the meeting was an agreement that ECAB officials would have to get letters of consent from Klipfontein squatters before their removal. It quoted Sebe as saying, "We have had enough of this phraseology about 'voluntary' removals. Now we insist that officials have a letter of consent before squatters' possessions are removed." This 'great victory', however, served merely to add legitimacy to the removals, and indicates the extent to which the Ciskeian government had reneged on its earlier stipulations about accepting Glenmore into the Ciskei.

By 79.04.09, it was reported in the EP that 125 families had been moved. On the following day, the DD reported that since the start of the court case, 50 families had shifted voluntarily to Glenmore raising the population there to 148 families. Left at Klipfontein were 30 families headed by registered workers, scheduled for Kenton, and 20 families who refused to move to Glenmore. On 79.04.12, the day the court case resumed, GM reported that 185 families were at Glenmore; 5 of which were recently evicted from farms, and 155 from Klipfontein. It said there were 12 resisting families still at Klipfontein, and 20 waiting to go to Kenton. The paper added that six teachers were running the school at Glenmore, and that "a number" of squatters were already working there.

When the court case resumed, the removals stopped when the Supreme Court set aside an allegedly irregular eviction order and ordered the magistrate who issued it to pay part of the costs of the application. The state's case was to argue that legislation prevented the courts from issuing interdicts to halt evictions. The Supreme Court, however, said that what was at stake was not an interdict to halt evictions, but whether the eviction order had been irregular or not.

The squatters' lawyer said after the case that families already at Glenmore were free to return to Klipfontein, but added that there was nothing to prevent officials from making an application for another eviction order. Not surprisingly, this latter is what happened. The charges under the Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act deferred from the previous year were threatened against them if they would not move. At the same time, those squatters who had moved had charges withdrawn.

Meanwhile, a new development had taken place, however, since the setting aside of the eviction order, when 17 families scheduled for Kenton joined with the 11 remaining families resisting Glenmore removal, in refusing to leave Klipfontein. All 29 families were expected to appear in court on 79.05.02. ECAB strategy seemed, however, to be to charge squatters one at a time, in order to minimise bad publicity, and also to create a demonstration effect on remaining squatters forcing them to leave without the publicity of a court case. On June 8, it was reported, however, that a squatter evicted to Glenmore in April had moved back to Klipfontein. "Glenmore is not a happy place. They can shoot me if they want, but I won't go back. I'd rather die."

The first court case, however, was not on the basis of the previous year's charges but under a more watertight Act. Thus on 79.05.02, a <u>78-year old</u> resident was found to be living on the farm illegally because he was not a <u>bona fide registered fulltime worker</u> on the farm, and nor did he have permission from the Department of Plural Relations to be there. The man was sentenced under the Bantu Trust and Land Act to a fine of R90 or 100 days, suspended for three years, and was ordered to leave Klipfontein before June 2. Evidence in this trial was that he had lived at Klipfontein for 29 years, and had worked part time for one of the usufructuaries of the land. The state's request for an order that he be moved to Glenmore was not granted at the time when the accused said he did not want to go there. But while appealing later against his conviction and sentence, a warrant for his removal to Glenmore was issued on 79.06.06 by a Bushman's River magistrate - before the appeal had even been heard in the Supreme Court.

On 79.05.19, the squatters were served notice of an application to an Alexandria magistrate for their eviction under the Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act which provides that squatters may be moved from an area if the health or safety of the public is endangered. On the same day this notice was served, 10 squatters were fined for trespassing on Klipfontein, and paid admission of guilt fines. The trial took place on the 23rd, where the application was dismissed by the magistrate who said that evidence did not allow for finding that Klipfontein posed a health hazard. Counsel for the squatters accused the Alexandria police station commander of misleading the magistrate by saying that Klipfontein had no water for domestic use, that there were no sanitary facilities, and that crime was prevalent there.

ECAB's response was to use the Bantu Trust and Land Act again. On 79.06.06 another Klipfontein squatter, aged 34, and married with two children, was found to be living illegally on the farm, fined R100 (or 90 days) and ordered to leave within a month. At the trial, it emerged that the accused was a registered employee of a Kenton building contractor. According to this employer, when people from Klipfontein were moved to Glenmore, he got the Board to make land at Kenton available for his workers. "However, Nkamla had been influenced to stay on the Klipfontein farm," he was reported as saying.

<u>More removals</u>.

The focus on Kenton and Klipfontein removals had, however, obscured what was happening in different parts of the eastern Cape where other people were also being moved to Glenmore. It emerged that ECAB had a fairly well worked out and comprehensive plan to rid the eastern Cape of as many 'economically inactive' people as possible. On 79.04.14, Koch confirmed that ECAB was focussing on Ciega squatters (about 50 families), and notices of removal were served on 27 families at the Hillside location near Fort Beaufort, and families at Middledrift. He added that ECAB would be considering "a number of depressed areas in the Eastern Cape in turn and examining the living conditions of black squatters and the unemployed". (WP, 79.04.14). Koch is also on record for prohibiting an unemployment survey in Grahamstown's townships.

It was later reported that the squatters on the Fort Beaufort commonage would not be moved to Glenmore, but rather to "new sites a short distance away in the Ciskei and in townships close to Fort Beaufort" (EPH, 79.04.19), a very vague alternative.

At any rate, the EP reported that 30 squatter families living in the Colchester areas near Port Elizabeth on private land "in unsatisfactory conditions" had given their consent to be moved (79.04.18). The newspapers

the following day said 20 of 32 families had already been moved. On the 79.04.23, the ECAB said it would begin removing 180 families from Coega, where 100 had signed that they were willing to move, 15 had refused, and "the rest had not been contacted yet". Illustrating class interests similar to those in the Kenton-Klipfontein removals, it was reported from Colchester that the owner of one of the properties squatters were on, wanted to build a motel there, while a white resident of the Colchester village complained that the removal would cost many employers, including himself, their servants.

By 79.04.21, the EPH could report that 300 families had been moved to Glenmore, although 50 were keen to return to Klipfontein, following the setting aside of their eviction notices on 79.04.12, even if they had to face prosecution again. It was also reported that 10 families at Thornhill in Alexandria were moved to Glenmore on 79.04.20. Articles dated 79.04.24 said that 10 families in Grahamstown agreed to be shifted. Finally by the 79.04.25, it was announced that 489 families were at Glenmore, and an ECAB official said that "except for a few stragglers", all removals under the current operation would cease. "He explained that nearly all the 500 temporary houses built at Glenmore were full and large-scale squatter removals could only begin when the first permanent Glenmore homes came on line - still some time in the future," read the EP (79.04.25).

Residents at Glenmore later said some of them did not know what they were doing when they signed consents to removal. A 50-year old man said he put his fingerprint on a piece of paper, but did not know what it was. PFP MP Lorimer who visited Glenmore, weekly said that if there were further solid proofs besides affidavits that removals were involuntary, he would present them to the Minister, whom he thought would be angry.

One group of squatters not removed were 40 Rhodes University students who staged a symbolic protest by erecting a mock squatter camp in the University quadrangle. Camped in colourful tents, with icecreams in hand, the student squatters said they wanted to focus attention on the removals and question the relevance of South African education in dealing with such problems. The one night squat ended in an open air meeting attended by about 400 students. A counter demonstration at the time was put on by five law students who, in boaters and striped blazers, played boule on the lawn and reclined in deckchairs sipping tea brought by an obsequious African in white clothing. One student later said he was trying to show how good colonialism was.

Conditions at Glenmore.

On the 79.04.12, journalists were taken on an official tour of Glenmore. A senior ECAB official translated that two women interviewed were very happy at Glenmore. Koch commented "We believe that in moving the squatters here we have succeeded in bringing dignity to the lives of people who have been living in very unfavourable conditions." (EPH, 79.04.13).

Glenmore residents certainly did not all agree. Several claimed that without jobs or crops, some families were starving. Only about 30 men had jobs at that stage. A number described how they had earned money hoeing chicory on farms near Klipfontein, but were now "asking and borrowing". Residents also said that the water was making people ill. There were complaints of diarrhoea, vomiting and bloody stools, and about pustules on children.

Renewed claims of hunger later emerged again and residents said no rations were being issued. Some parents complained that children had swollen feet and stomachs. A spokesman for the clinic said that no residents had complained there about hunger, and that there was only one case of kwashiorkor, but it was chronic and couldn't have started (sic) at Glenmore. Lorimer also said he had gathered from officials that the health of the people was reasonable.

There were now 2 500 people at Glenmore and only 60 jobs at R3 a day. It was reported that only 10% of 507 men who asked for work were given jobs.

A survey done by a Grahamstown academic, written up on 79.08.16, found that in 25 households there were 30 work-seekers, but only one case of a family member employed at Glenmore. It also found that the average income of 25 households had fallen from R60 a month to R27 a month, and that several households had no cash income at all.

The fall in income, said the report, was mainly because women who worked part-time had lost their sources of income, while men had also lost employment and were having to migrate. Recruitment for migrant labour for Port Elizabeth had been significant in June, but wages would leave little for unskilled workers to send/bring "home". Interestingly, the report noted that some families where a member had found employment in Glenmore with ECAB were better off than before. At an Anglican synod at this time, the archdeacon

of Ndanteane said that some people were satisfied at Glenmore, and said they had lived under worse conditions on farms.

The academic survey report added that many families had come from rural areas where they had supplemented their income with livestock and crops, and some had lived entirely by this. It should be added that earlier reports in the newspapers said that stock deaths at Glenmore were averaging two a day, from eating the deadly tulp plant, common in barren areas. On 79.06.18 it was reported that 25 of the 100 cattle had died, and officialdom had ruled out compensation.

Settled squatters began to cultivate gardens at Glenmore but it was reported that the archdeacon of Ndanteane, mentioned above, noted that the chief at Glenmore was not in sympathy with a church agricultural project on nearby land and accused chiefs in general of greed, a lying nature and possessiveness.

More reports of begging came in, and the survey report mentioned above said that neighbours were sharing what they had. Rations were provided in the first few days, but dried up to small portions of mealie meal for only a few beneficiaries. Some of the 240 old age pensioners, it was reported in the survey, had obtained credit, while some had to travel to their old homes to collect pensions. This paralleled the 200km round trip that six Klipfontein residents had had to make at a cost of R66 to collect their pensions (R45 every two months) which were being paid out at Glenmore (79.06.08).

At the time when the Glenmore population reached 3 000, residents began to complain of the cold, let in by gaps between the asbestos roofs and the tops of the walls. The total of all these conditions materialised on 79.06.07 when newspapers reported that there had been 11 deaths at Glenmore, 9 being children, who had died of gastro-enteritis, kidney inflammation, kwashiorkor, and bronchial pneumonia.

ECAB immediately said that the deaths could also have occurred at Klipfontein (this clashes with the official statements to Lorimer that the health of the people was reasonable on 79.05.10). They further said that the deaths were not the responsibility of the Department of Co-operation and Development, but of the Department of Health and the District Surgeon. The PFP's reaction was that they were investigating whether the deaths were alarming! They had "no way of knowing whether the deaths are usual for this type of rural community". (If it's the norm, it's OK - author) The Black Sash, however, said the deaths were the price of resettlement.

The response of the academic committee in Grahamstown, the Glenmore Action Group, was to organise the World Vision religious group to sponsor 2 000 kg of food each week for four weeks, to be distributed to 200 Glenmore families.

The white farmers' association in the Glenmore area then began to react, asking for Glenmore to be moved to Victoria East. Koch of ECAB reacted in Pontius Pilate fashion, saying, "If you want the site changed you must act now. I've no authority to change the site. I'm just the Government's agent. But if you hope to achieve this you must not delay". (EPH, 79.06.18). A spokesman for the farmers said they had received little information on the resettlement but now understood that "Glenmore has become indirectly a dumping ground for people removed from other problem (sic - author) areas." Another alternative was then suggested in the press by a Rhodes Agricultural Economics academic whose recommendations, if implemented, would have rid the Glenmore farmers of other farmers' problems they had inherited. He noted that farmers north of Grahamstown needed casual labour to work jointed cactus, while to the south seasonal workers were needed to pick chicory and pick pineapples. His answer then was to propose Grahamstown as "the better centre from which to draw seasonal workers. In my opinion Glenmore is just not." For obvious reasons, the state however prefers rural to urban slums and it is unlikely Glenmore will be moved. Of interest to note is that despite their reluctance to accept Glenmore, local farmers are benevolently offering employment to some unemployed at the town. One particular farmer was particularly annoyed because he could get only 20 of 50 vacancies filled at Glenmore for a job which involved picking cabbages at 2c a kg for a 10-hour day (which at most could earn workers R1,20 a day), and which also involved starting at 05h00 in the middle of winter.

(This latter incident predictably led to a great argument on the liberal Glenmore Action Group committee. Some (liberal) members argued that the food handouts organised by them were making Glenmore residents lazy and choosy).

<u>No conclusion</u>.

When the full-scale removals will begin probably awaits the erection of the rest of the town, which to date has hardly got under way. Indications are, however, that ECAB has a long-term removal plan, and the chop will

probably fall first on those areas where class interests demand removal, where resistance is lowest, where removals can proceed in relative secrecy.

In a surprisingly insightful feature article in the EPH, dated 79.06.08, an historical explanation of squatting was given in terms of the South African political economy and its corresponding legislation. The article quoted a 1967 government directive which read:

> It is Government policy that Bantu are only temporarily resident in European areas of the Republic for as long as they offer their labour there. As soon as they become no longer fit for work or superfluous in the labour market they are expected to return to their country of origin or to the territory or national unit where they fit in ethnically.

The article noted finally that 'unproductive Bantu' include the aged, unfit, widows, farm workers who becaee superfluous and squatters. With the current system of production and class relations in South Africa 1979, this is likely to be the future pattern of the eastern Cape.

CONSCIOUSNESS, CLASS STRUGGLE AND 'BLACK' PERIODICALS IN SOUTH AFRICA

THE ISSUE in left-liberal debate about the English-language press in South Africa is usually whether this media legitimises the system, or whether it acts as a watchdog.

At a basic level, these opposing views have certain uses, but their "either/or" character, and the vagueness of words like legitimiser and system, serve to limit rather than advance understanding. And it is an in-depth understanding which is required for analysing English publications aimed at a black audience. It is here that specific questions of exactly what is being opposed, what is being legitimised, and from what standpoint, all raise themselves most forcefully.

This article, however, is not an in-depth analysis of the 'black' media. It is only a brief guide to, and review of, some black periodicals. It raises, nevertheless, some issues about the theoretical and political significance of these journals. If security trials point to aspects of resistance in SA, then black periodicals are indicators of some counter-strategies of state and capital for managing the conflict. In general, and between them, black periodicals reflect in microcosm the struggles for the consciousness of the masses: struggle waged at this historical juncture which has several important features:

1) The first aspect of the present conjuncture is the nebulousness left by the banning of black consciousness as organised ideology. Cut short in its organised development, black consciousness - precisely because of its petty bourgeois origins and major stress on <u>black</u> liberation - has not yet formed a definite line on women's or class liberation. It is with regard to these issues that the consciousness contest is being waged, with the black periodicals constituting a major weapon in the arsenal of class domination.

2) The second aspect of the present conjuncture, is the state's interest in black media besides the traditional Radio Bantu. Besides its association with Pace magazine, Nationalist MP's have recently been emphasizing the "urgent need" for a black television service to which the government should give "high priority" (Daily Dispatch, 79.05.26). Further, the Erasmus Commission recently found that films made by Hayne Films - a major source of films aimed at blacks - were part of projects undertaken on behalf of the Department of Information by the notorious Jan Van Zyl Alberts (Sunday Post, 79.06.79).

3) The third important contextual factor is the change in recent years in the urban political and economic situation. As evidenced by the Riekert Commission, the 99-year leases, the Urban Foundation, etc, there are now strong pressures for the creation of an African urban labour aristocracy which would provide the skills and markets needed by manufacturing capital. One merely has to look at marketing publications in SA like Clarion, and the Market Research Bureau papers, to see the stress commerce is placing on the "black" market. A black marketing counsellor for the

McCann-Erickson advertising agency, for example, notes that blacks account for 75% of the country's soft drink consumption, 60% of beer, 54% of tobacco, 50% of detergents, 40% of clothing and footwear, and 40% of expenditure on food. He adds, "We know that more and more Blacks are shopping in the supermarkets, more aspire to own cars, and that in lifestyle many aspire to emulate that of the Black American". He has similarly added on another occasion that there is an enormous black market waiting on marketeers who had the power of giving blacks "a new social outlook" by raising their cultural standing through the products they made available, and the way these were sold to blacks.

The J Walter Thompson agency similarly notes that there are more black whisky drinkers than white, more blacks use deodorants. Their Black Communications Unit "links the housewife in Tembisa to the copywriter in the Carlton Centre". "If you want to sell me anything,

white man, you'd better know what you're talking about," is their aggro, consumerist, black consciousness line.

"We think she's looking more attractive every day", is the appeal of SSC&S:Lintas. "She" is "just one of the millions of black housewives in South Africa. Who together command an annual purchasing power of nearly five thousand million rand".

General remarks about the media in capitalist society.

Media theory has always stressed how the media influence ideology and hence society. So much so, that it has tended to verge on idealism. In this, it is akin to sociology in seeing attitudes, values, roles, norms, etc, as primary causal factors, without looking at the more general concommitants of these. But while it would be wrong to stress the media as causal agency without considering the forces that shape the media itself, it is this first aspect which must be studied to see the role of the media in society.

Against idealism, many have stressed that behind ideology lie material forces. Material here is often (erroneously) equated with economic. One should note, however, as Raymond Williams points out, that ideology itself takes material forms in language, images and print, and cannot exist without these. Obviously, these ideological material forms will be related to economic material forms, but they are not the same thing. At most basic level, the ideological material forms are conditioned by the development of technology. Further, of course, the ideological material forms are conditioned by the economic social relations within which they

are located. But because neither ideology nor economy is static, there is a dialectical development within each, and between them.

All this allows us to investigate two points which are central to understanding of conflict in South Africa.

1. Despite the dogmatic assertions of some marxist analysts, the structural contradiction between capital and labour is not enough to produce immediately class conflict and struggles. Rather, economic social relations and experience must be mediated by ideology. Thus, objective contradiction only becomes subjective conflict when set in relation to some ideology, and particularly a moral code about what is good, desirable and fair. The interesting thing about capitalist social relations is that they seem to 'create' subjective aspects of ideology which contradict with reality. One could point, for example, at the contradiction between the ideology of equality of commodity owners on the market place and the reality of the dependence of owners of labour power on owners of capital (the means of production). Another example of an aspect of ideology which capitalism creates but cannot fulfil (thus generating dissatisfaction and conflict) is evident in advertising.

The necessity for capitalism to keep on selling, requires making the market perpetually dissatisfied with its current consumption. Yet at the same time as doing this, advertising promises a new satisfaction - which, again, it can never permanently fulfil. This can work on two levels. On the one hand, for those whose structural location limits their capacity to consume, dissatisfaction is set up as people are prevented from achieving what is held to be socially desireble. The moral standard here is taken as satisfaction through consumerism. On the other hand, many who experience consumerism directly or at close hand discover that satisfaction is not achieved. The moral standard here is still that satisfaction is desirable, but the means of consumerism may be rejected. (Of course these two alternatives are not distinct or mutually exclusive in reality).

This rather simplistic example demonstrates both the interconnections between economy and ideology, and the centrality of ideology for the existence and type of class conflict.

2. The second major point in understanding conflict in SA is where the media fit into the remarks made above. It is in the systematic formation and dissemination of basic moral codes and aspects of ideology that the media are relevant. It has always been a basic scientific proposition that human consciousness is determined by human praxis and material environment. Bearing in mind that this material environment is not only economic, but contains ideological material forms, it is this latter aspect of the

environment which becomes extended with the growth of communication. Real life experience becomes interpreted into meaning in a cultural and moral consciousness far wider than localised group values. As C Wright Mills observes, between consciousness and existence now stands the media. Class conflict then must not only be seen in terms of the ideology associated with the factory floor, but against a far wider ideological background. Without the media, consumerist aspirations and concommitant struggles would hardly be able to develop as strongly as they do. In the advertising example mentioned above, the media enables the workings of capitalism as a whole (ie, the effects of competition between its parts), to be represented in ideological material forms which permeate each individual, uniting him with others in a common subjectivity. The interaction of this common subjectivity with a shared objectivity (eg involvement in the market as a worker) is what gives rise to class consciousness and forms of conflict.

The media, then, bring the ideology of the whole to its individual parts. In doing this, it creates what Gramsci termed "abstract consciousness" which mixes with an individual's "situational consciousness" - often in a contradictory way. In this role, the media's definition (not arbitrary, but also not the result of a conspiracy) of what is, what is important, what is right and what is desirable, is central to the direction of dissatisfaction into reformist and revolutionary channels of various types. If one believes that class liberation and human fulfillment in SA does not equal middle class consumerism, and uses this as a dividing line for conservative and revolutionary, then certain seemingly radical black periodicals (as in their attitudes to women's liberation) are profoundly conservative. The evaluation of the periodicals in the next section, is in the final analysis

based on this criterion: middle class consumerism. Racial aspects of apartheid, and treatment of women will, however, also be looked at.

The black periodicals.

In their squabble over which is the more authnatic representative of "black South Africa's" aspirations, the running battle between Pace and Drum has overshadowed the existence of other members of the spectrum. I shall not deal with the numerous soccer magazines aimed at blacks, nor photo comic books or newspapers like Voice and The Nation. Drum, Bona, Hit and Pace are the magazines analysed, but there are others like True Love with circulation of 50 000 which shouldn't be ignored.

Bona:

This is the highest circulation black periodical (latest figures are 184 391 per issue for July-December 1978). It appears in English and also in vernacular editions. Its sales are increasing rapidly, gaining 52 000 during the above period. It is published by Republikeinse Pers, who also publish Scope. The thickest of the black periodicals on the market, it costs 20c.

In terms of almost all criteria, it is a very conservative publication - against which Drum and Pace appear far Left. Letters to the editor almost uniformly criticise the breakdown of traditional discipline and the behaviour of the young black generation. A representative issue (June, 1979) had an article on tradition in Bantustan politics, and a feature on Venda, "Land of Magic". This letter read:

> It is not surprising, therefore, that the Venda people are such a happy nation: always singing and dancing, their music filling the air. They are glad to be alive and living in their beautiful land... These people are preparing for their independence in such a way that their reward can only be a success.

There is also a feature on the father of Radio Bantu.

On glamour and consumerism, there is a feature on a black singer, a gambling trip to Maseru, and a Stellenbosch Farmers Winery outing for some of Soweto's shebeen owners. "My fight for freedom" is a dramatised (and allegorical) story about a Namibian exile working non-violently for independence (Shipanga?), which is presented as semi-factual. Read these two extracts for a fascinating bit of blatant propaganda:

The huge man walked towards Kuaima menacingly. He stopped only a few inches away, so close that he could smell the raw whisky on the man's breath.

"I have orders from our country's president, that you are to resign from NUDO and join SWAPO immediately!"

"SWAPO", thought Kuaima. The South West African People's Organisation. A political group dedicated to violence and Communism. A group determind to seize power by force in South West Africa. Kuaima knew they cared nothing for the feelings of the people. He knew there was only one answer he could give.

"My fight is for my people's freedom. Not for their enslavement! I will never join SWAPO ... never!"

The governor poured himself another whisky, then turned to face Kuaima. His face was twisted in fury.

"Then, my friend, you are going to spend the rest of your days right here. You will never see the light of day again!"

Soon he had passed his university exam and got his degree, but even more exciting news was that he had heard how fast his land was moving towards full independence. What he had been striving for was at long, long last seemingly about to really happen.

Tragedy was still to strike, however. The violence of the SWAPO terrorists was still to shock the entire population of South West Africa, and civilised people throughout the world. Chief Clemens Kapuuo was brutally and cold-bloodedly murdered by a cowardly gang of SWAPO terrorists in the little shop which he owned. It was a brutal and disgusting act. In New York, Kuaima could not believe it. His old schoolmaster, friend and leader, dead! His blood boiled. "SWAPO", he thought, "Here I come. I'll show you where you belong!"

Times had changed drastically in South West Africa by now, and Kuaima applied to return home. Judge M. T. Steyn, the Administrator-General of South West Africa, told him he could come back with pleasure. The country needed people like him. So, with determination in his heart Kuaima climbed aboard a fast jet, and soon he was, after so many, many years, back home in the country he loved so dearly. It was good, very good, but he had work to do. A long road still lay ahead.

The Herero's, his own tribe, were overjoyed to see him home again. They knew of the terrible struggles he had gone through, and had no doubt in their minds as to who was to follow their beloved Clemens Kapuuo... none other than Chief Kuaima Riruako. They elected him as their new leader and chief, knowing that they could safely place their future in his hands. A proud moment!

All this is not very subtle and is unlikely to fool or appeal to black consciousness elements, but Bona's large readership can not be forgotten.

Thandi, a women's supplement features elite women, recipes, etc, as well as clothes priced between R90 and R200.

Hit:

Hit is 50 pages long on non-gloss paper and costs 21c. It is owned by Afri-comics (a Van Zyl Alberts company), and has a circulation of 86,000.

A recent editorial slams Motlana for complaining to newspapers but refusing to serve on Koornhof's urban black committee. "We have been calling for a voice so it seems ridiculous to gag ourselves when we get the chance to use it!". Not unexpectedly, letters are also conservative, much in the Bona vein. There are articles on soccer, glamour and music, but the major thrust seems to be 'educational'.

"Webster Mahlangu gives advice on your chosen career" deals with careers in the SAP

and showbiz. Webster agrees with one Abel Mashiloane that the latter's friends are jealous when they try to discourage him by saying he doesn't know what he is doing.' "....if you have made up your mind that a career in the police is your ideal then press ahead with it." Webster goes on to list another six correspondents who are interested in joining the police. Requirements for recruits are outlined, and they are informed that they spend six months training at the Hammanskraal training centre featured in an earlier issue of Hit.

"Black breakthrough - What Wiehan means to us" is written by a black "public relations expert". The article compliments the Commission for opposing the "pinpricks and illogical concepts", the "trappings of racial discrimination which....stifled the natural progress of the nation's economy". On the Riekert report, "yet another breakthrough", the writer says it "sets out to end racial discrimination and improve the day-to-day lives of the Blacks". An interesting point for the article to mention is "Influx control regulations as at present constituted have caused frustration not only for Black workers but also for employers in various sectors. The enormous amount of red tape led to wasted manpower hours and frustration." The article, ostensibly about the Commissions' recommendations, is written in a tone which already accepts these as fact. Thus: "....means it will now become mandatory for owners to provide facilities such as toilets..."; "It will now also become possible for black businessmen to trade....", and "white-by-night curfew regulations are to be scrapped....". All a fait accompli.

Finally, an article on a multi-racial Swazi-radio programme is hailed as a symbol that the "times they are changing" and begins "Black and White youth is drawing closer together all the time - on the soccer fields, at other sporting occasions and in show business too."

Drum:

Drum costs 30c and has a falling circulation of 86,000 per issue. It is published by SAAN, and averages 120 pages. Famous for its courageous exposés of farm labour and prisons in the 50's, most copy is now light-hearted sport, showbiz personalities, immorality act cases and unusual occurences. Some stress is placed on social mobility stories ("Kallie the scrap-dealer swops his horse for a Rolls-Royce", "Lionel Morrison: Journalist who made the big time"). Drum Wheels is a section catering for car owners. With all this is combined copy such as "Regina Mundi - we remember" (commemorating Soweto resistance), and for example an article on Dr. Moroka, pioneer president of the ANC. In response to an appeal for more about "the old guard who blazed the trail", the Editor replied "The new leaders can only build on the *solid foundation of their predecessors*". In contrast to Hit's treatment of Wiehan, Drum reports the doubts "several prominent people" have about the report. These people, however, include a black priest, Prof. Ezekiel Mphahlele, Ben Nteso of the Black Social Workers Association, and of course Nthatho Motlana - not a single black worker or trade unionist. Although most of those interviewed did criticise the report's position on rural blacks, they praised Wiehan for advancing urban black trade unionism.

Drum has been competing with Pace to present itself true representative of black readers. Drum chairman, Jim Bailey, in an article in Drum, has openly accused Pace of being an Info Department magazine set up to counter Drum when he refused to sell the latter to front organisations for the Department. According to Bailey, Drum's staff, proprietors and readers have built a measure of trust that "we are all totally honourable and work for the good of our readers as best we may." By contrast, "the magazine Pace was dreamt up by the Bureau of State Security, master-minded by General van den Bergh, as part of a continent-wide plot to tamper with the free press across the continent of Africa, leading trusting readers to believe that private business was honestly conducted by the papers.." This theme runs into a caption to a photo of Biko appearing on the same page: "The man who died that we should have an honest and compassionate country and not a counterfeit one". "Drum - Voice of the People" is a reader's poem in the following edition which includes gems like "You do not discriminate, you do not pretend, You're just the plain truth which Africa is eager to hear,...Drum, you are justice, you shoulder to every needy race's burden...".

Pace.

Pace's managing editor, Jack Shepherd Smith (former Scope editor) replied to Bailey's accusations in an article "Why is the owner of Drum magazine so worried about the success of Pace?" The answer supplied to this question was that the March issue of Pace sold 103,000 copies (the Mashinini wedding one), while Drum was averaging 85,000. (Pace's average circulation is in fact 82,725). Smith

goes on to accuse Bailey of White paternalism in Drum and says "Drum does not reflect the mood of the people and it has no sympathy with their aspirations for equal recognition and a dignified and equal place in the sun". Pace, of course, according to its adverts, is "The new magazine that moves with the times"; "Now there's a magazine that's truly in touch with you and your life-style. Pace, Africa's great new magazine, holds up a mirror to Black aspirations and the future".

More interesting, however, were Shepherd Smith's responses to Bailey's allegations about control. The basic theme of defence is "Jim Bailey must think the readers of Drum are very stupid because anyone of intelligence only has to glance through Pace to see that our outlook on life is vastly different to the Government's". Shepherd Smith also remarks "Mr. Bailey makes the incredible statement that Pace was 'dreamt' up by General van den Bergh and the boys from BOSS. What a nerve! A policeman dreaming up a magazine like Pace? If it wasn't so laughable, I would be most upset." A paragraph later he continues "What really makes me cross about Mr. Bailey is that he knows very well that Lucas (Molete - the editor of Pace) and I are totally opposed to the Nationalist Government and we loathe its racial policies". He then goes on to say that if, "purely for the sake of argument", Bailey's allegations were true, then Pace has backfired on Boss and Info. "....bad luck boys, because we're not giving you your ball back. We're running it our way, NOT the Government's way." For added effect, Pace is compared to the "dreadful Citizen and the even more dreadful To The Point magazine". While these "two travesties of independent journalism have

oppression and exploitation are rooted in the capitalist nature of the economic system. They further argue that there has been and remains a similarity of interests between apartheid, racism and capitalist production. Where there have been conflicts between the apartheid system and the capitalist class, these have been of a relatively minor nature, and have been or can be resolved without fundamentally altering the structure of society. It has been further argued that apartheid, segregation and racism have functioned primarily to maintain and allocate a cheap labour force, and to control and repress the militancy of the working class.

On the other hand, various liberal academics, white opposition politicians in the Progressive Federal Party, ideologues for monopoly capitalism and certain commentators on South Africa have suggested that racialism and apartheid are in direct opposition to capitalist economic development, and that the 'rational' operation of capitalism will erode racial conflict.

However, in spite of the argument, in spite of decades of black opposition appeals to whites to recognise the 'rationality' of non-racialism, and despite the years of propaganda from the moderate commercial press (SAAN and Argus), apartheid and capitalism continue to comfortably co-exist.

The use of the concept 'class' is central to a more adequate understanding of the complexities of South African society. But what are classes? How are they identified, and what importance do they have in understanding conflict in South Africa? The first important point to note is that classes are not defined solely in terms of the position and function of their members (agents) in the economy. Other factors, including political, ideological, cultural and legal systems and relations go up to define a class in full. However, the position and function of a group in the economic system is seen as the most important in a number of factors which constitute the definition of a class.

Capitalist society has two main classes which can be partially identified in terms of the position of their members in the economy. (as explained below, there are other secondary classes in capitalist society apart from the two major ones). These are capitalists and workers. Capitalists are those who own and control the <u>means of production</u> in the economic system. Means of production include machinery, tools, raw materials, land etc. Workers, on the other hand, own no means of production, although they work with them to produce commodities.

Thus, the first great division in capitalist society is between those who own the means of production, and those who have been dispossessed and therefore do not own any means of material production.

The second great division is based on the first: because of this different relationship of ownership and power over the means of production, all products produced by the workers are owned and hence controlled by the class of capitalists. The products produced (which are called commodities under capitalism) incorporate a surplus added in production by workers, and this surplus is the basis of capitalist profit.

This second division on which the two main classes of capitalism are based, then, is as follows: workers produce a surplus over which they have no control, while capitalists own and control a surplus which they do not themselves produce.

The basis of the division of society into conflicting classes is therefore rooted in the structure of the capitalist economy, and that conflict cannot be removed without a transformation of that economic system. For example the formal decolonisation process in Africa rarely involved a transformation of the economic base of society, and the intensification of class conflict in the formally independent (but neo-colonial) countries of Africa continues.

However, economic relations and structures are not the only factors which constitute the two main classes of capitalist society. Political factors (including the state and its organs), ideological structures like media and education, the legal system etc., all serve to maintain and reproduce the basic division of society into workers and capitalists.

Classes are therefore social structures which are based importantly, but not exclusively, on the divisions within the economic production of commodities. Because other non-economic factors play a role in the formation of classes and the interests which classes have, it is always necessary to look at practices like literature, newspapers, films, educational bodies, political parties, etc. to see precisely which class they support and reproduce within society. They cannot be neutral in the struggle between classes, because every major social force in society is one of the factors which constitute a class. One of the aims of social analysis is to identify precisely which class any given

class. Where there is an attempted alliance between the classes, as for example in the black consciousness movement, it becomes most important to assess whether the movement is under the dominant influence of working class or petty bourgeois interests. For example, it is of far greater importance to the black petty bourgeoise to have rights of ownership of homes, than to the working class, members of which are generally unable to save enough to own property even if this was legally possible. The fact of owning property or the potential of owning such property does influence the political orientation of the petty bourgeoise. On the other hand, pass laws and the migrant labour system affect workers far more than black doctors, lawyers, traders, etc, and any campaign to end migrant labour would be in the interests, primarily, of the working class.

This is a very brief summary on the questions of race and class in South Africa. Most importantly, it is suggested that classes are defined by the position of their members not only in the economy, but also in the political and ideological reality of society.

Secondly, it is suggested in terms of the classes outlined above, that, while there is not as yet a fully developed black capitalist class in South Africa, all blacks are not workers; there is clearly a black petty bourgeoisie, an intelligentsia, a peasantry as well as a working class. While racial oppression may serve as a limited unifying factor, objective class positions and interests give rise to significant conflicts and differences. A progressive working class movement is always on its guard against being used by other classes for the attainment of non-worker interests; at the same time, progressive members of the petty-bourgeoisie may attempt to identify with and further proletarian (worker) interests by carefully criticising and assessing their own interests, ideology, individualism and activity in society, thereby placing their resources and organisations in the service of working class interests.

A number of articles in this issue of Work In Progress explore the question of classes in South Africa - Kelwyn Sole's in the area of ideology (and especially art and literature), while Joanne Yawitch explores the class position of certain groups of women in society. Whatever conclusions are drawn from these discussions, one thing is clear: important differences in strategies for change in South Africa are involved in the acceptance of either class or race as the key factor in understanding the way in which oppression and exploitation occur in South Africa, and the way in which that conflict can be resolved in the building of a new type of society.

For example, those who accept that 'apartheid is dead' (Piet Koornhof), or at least that it is dying (commercial English-language press, South African Institute of Race Relations, etc), have as their presupposition that if a spirit of multi-racialism can be fostered in the urban areas, if officials can be persuaded to talk to 'blacks', and if the demands of the black 'elite' can be met, then oppression will end in South Africa. Viewing conflict in South Africa in racial terms only, they are able to argue that any 'consultation' or 'incorporation' of blacks into decision-making is a progressive move.

Those who are more influenced by a class-based perspective would want to assess how these activities furthered the interests of the working class - whether questions of 'home-ownership', limited urban rights, extention of trading licences etc. improved the condition of the majority of blacks who are members of the working class, or unemployed.

It is in this context that one can assess the recent call of Harry Oppenheimer for an end to the politics of 'protest', and the beginning of the politics of 'power'. By this, he seems to be suggesting that political activity outside of the 'system' should be replaced by an active involvement with those so-called 'verlig' elements in the state and in government. (One might note in passing that neither Mr. Oppenheimer nor the group he made this call to, the South African Institute of Race Relations, have exactly excelled themselves in the 'politics of protest' over the years).

In this context in which liberal and moderate conservative opposition is being incorporated into power structures, and in which there is an attempt to co-opt certain black 'elite' demands by the state, a clear understanding of the objective differences and distinctions within the black population becomes more important than ever before. Only this understanding can allow an assessment of precisely whose interests are being served by the 'new direction' the state is taking, by the activities and statements of Piet Koornhof and his Regional Committees, and by other government and opposition groups.

organisation, ideology, culture or activity supports or is part of. For example, the Inkatha organisation, and the ideology of nationalism are both important realities in South Africa, which have to be assessed in terms of their class basis and interests.

But as mentioned earlier there are other secondary classes in any capitalist society apart from capitalists (or the bourgeoisie) and workers (or the proletariat). These secondary classes, while having an independent existence of their own, tend to form alliances with one of the major classes. Some of these secondary classes are also defined principally, but not exclusively, in terms of the position of their members in the economic structure of the society, eg. the traditional petty-bourgeoisie (small scale capitalists involved in activities like trading and owning small retail shops). The traditional petty-bourgeoisie are also, however, defined importantly in terms of their political and ideological organisations, structures and practices.

Another secondary class is the peasantry, which may have limited access to land as a means of production, but does not farm on a scale large enough to involve itself in capitalist agriculture. The peasantry, unlike the capitalist farmer, does not employ wage labour, but bases production around the use of unpaid family labour.

There are also classes marginal to production itself in a capitalist society like South Africa - the landless in Bantustan areas, the permanently unemployed in towns, etc.

Another important secondary class includes those involved in the ideological and <u>reproductive</u> aspects of society, especially teachers, intellectuals, students, lawyers, doctors. By reproductive functions is meant those forces which tend to maintain the basis of the society through the socialisation and training of people to fill certain roles in the economy. This class, like other secondary class formations, tends to form alliances with either large-scale capitalists or the working class, although it often attempts to use an alliance with the working class to further its own basically bourgeois interests at the expense of worker interests. In any progressive alliance between this fraction of the petty (small) bourgeoisie and the proletariat, it is essential that working class interests have primacy over petty bourgeois interests.

Even the two major classes of capital and labour have certain divisions within them, although conflicts <u>within</u> classes are always less important than the conflicts <u>between</u> classes. Thus, the class of capitalists has fractions involved in agriculture, mining, industry, finance and banking, as well as fractions classified as monopolistic or competitive, and these fractions have their own forms of political and ideological organisation. These fractions have their conflicts, but they are contained or managed by the state to ensure that conflict between capitalists does not assume greater importance than the conflict between capitalists and workers.

The working class also tends to develop fractions, often based on skilled and unskilled differentials, rural and urban differences, employed and unemployed status, etc. One of the functions of progressive working class organisation, activity and ideology is to attempt to unify the working class in its struggle against the bourgeoisie in the same way as the state unifies the capitalist class in its conflict with workers. Both the state and capital tend to reinforce and engineer splits in the working class in an attempt to keep it weak; the legal differentiation between 'african,' 'indian' and 'coloured' workers is just one example of this sort of activity.

To emphasise the formation and conflict of classes in South Africa is not to deny the importance of race as a factor in the oppression of blacks. Firstly, the legal system, while containing a class 'bias', expresses itself in racial categories; this means that all blacks are oppressed in a way that whites are not. Secondly, there has been and remains to some extent an identity between 'blackness' and the composition of the working class in South Africa. This is not because of racial factors themselves, but because of complex historical processes which determined that the largest and most exploited section of the working class is black (and specifically African). Because of this, workers in South Africa invariably <u>experience</u> their exploitation and oppression through a racial ideology, even though the major cause of it is not because they are black but workers. This is one of the specific features of South African capitalism.

What all of this means is that while racial factors play some role in giving the appearance of a common interest to blacks in South Africa, there are very important differences of interest between, for example, the black petty bourgeoisie and the black working

'Government Issue' stamped all over them... Pace is quite the opposite."

Indeed, Pace's content is clearly a species of black consciousness. In an advert aimed to attract advertisers in Clarion, September 1978, the magazine had a picture of a black power salute - the fist clutching R10 notes and the caption reading "BLACK POWER. Grab your share with Pace." The smaller print read "We're not going to bore you with details of the immense spending power of the Black Market". In terms of the content, the advert explained that "Pace's unstressed, underlying theme is: Black man be proud, have dignity, know yourself. Hold on to your aspirations for a greater acceptance in an ever more integrated society". The power behind Pace, it boasted, was Nortors - a company since exposed as part of the Information Department's links.

So compared to Bona, and spurred by competition with Drum, Pace is now the furtherest left Black magazine on the open market. Beginning with a feature on Buthelezi visiting the mines and hobnobbing with Maponya (Soweto millionaire), it moved quickly to identify with more radical opposition to apartheid. This included a feature on Mashinini (although in disco-dancer, de-politicised form). While student exiles in Botswana alleged Tsietsi was tricked into giving the story for Pace, a criticism of him in a letter was flooded by replies along the lines of "Yes, the true leaders like Nelson Mandela are on Robben Island...what are these true leaders doing for us on Robben Island. Are they still fighting for us? These leaders are doing nothing for us on Robben Island, but Tsietsi is still fighting for us. Monrovia!!! "

Pace's "left" coverage also included a colour photo scoop of the Soweto Eleven trial, with the accused giving clenched fist salutes. A caption noted that permission for their publication had been granted by the appropriate judicial and prison authorities. The moral attached to the story is that the Eleven were misguided children, and that "violence and wilful destruction is not the path to a better way of life in the future." Finally, it even carried a letter from 'Pace supporter', East London, which read "Do you know the meaning of Pace? Well, it means Pan African Congress is for Everybody".

It should be noted, however, that there are some token gestures towards real opposition. One is an article about Luthuli's widow, another is a letter which reads: "One can wonder why most of our parents, leaders and brothers, although they see how bitter the situation is, so strongly condemn violence. The answer to this is simply because they are rich and they oppose violence in order to secure their wealth."

Despite all the overtly anti-apartheid copy, Pace has also carried features criticising BophuthaTswana independence, and deploring the plight of some Natal squatters. Naturally, there is no analysis of either: two respective examples are "...The citizens of BophuthaTswana are abetting the principle of apartheid" (as if it is a principle!), and "Then one day the finger of Authority pointed at them."

If it is radical on racial issues, and calculated to win support for this, Pace is profoundly conservative on issues like women's and class liberation. The general theme is glossy black middle class with an ideal of American consumerism. A six-page explanation of the 99-year leasehold system is introduced, believe it or not, with the words "Pace magazine does not necessarily support or align itself with the 99 Year Leasehold scheme". It might try to underplay its blatant middle class bias in a case like this, but the general contents announced on the cover of the first issue gives the lie to this: "Fashion and Fast Living, Pretty Girls and Politics, Music and Laughter, Sport and Adventure, Violence and Beauty, Love and Sex. "

A close look at Pace shows that, contrary to some liberal responses, it is not "better than nothing." It represents the latest response to resistance in South Africa, and indicates a growing sophistication on the part of those who stand to lose by an overthrow of the whole system. It, and the other black periodicals, are an important element in the ideological battle in South Africa, and for that reason require a more rigorous study than this article has provided.