

PROGRESS



An ailing ANC

Does Nelson Mandela have the cure?

INSIDE

What Bantu Holomisa thinks of FW



What an ANC organiser thinks of the movement



What the Tembu king thinks of Mandela



FOCUS ON THE REEF VIOLENCE

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Editorial

The ANC is going through a transformation that presents its biggest crisis since it was banned 30 years ago. The immediate problems — negotiations with the government, and the violence in the townships — are more complex than almost anything confronting the organisation in the past. The resources available to the organisation are small. There are not enough funds, not enough offices, not enough full-time staff.

Those people that are at work are in many new relationships. People from prison, people from exile, and people from internal organisations like Cosatu and the UDF are learning to work together and deal with different styles of making decisions.

In this critical time, ordinary ANC members and branches are finding it very difficult to communicate effectively with the organisation. They complain about the way that decisions are taken and communicated.

In the midst of this crisis, there is a war on. Supporters of the ANC and Inkatha are dying, as well as people caught in the crossfire. The assassinations squads in the security forces have not been openly and publicly disbanded. Elements within the security forces are the most likely source of the 'third force' playing a mysterious role in the fighting. People need a lot from the leadership right now. They are making demands that relate to their minimum physical safety, and so they ask for weapons. While it would be suicidal to give untrained people guns, people need to see a lot more evidence that their cries for help are being answered tangibly. Instead, they see the cabinet ministers and the police taunting the ANC for not providing 'evidence' of police partisanship and abuse.

In fact, the ANC is out every day collecting evidence, writing up affidavits, and much of its evidence has already been presented to the government. The government seems to have done little with this evidence so far. There seems to be considerable reluctance to investigate.

But when people see the ministers go on television and blatantly claim there is no evidence before them, then those with the evidence must act — in public. The press must be given copies of evidence, and briefed in detail, regularly. Claims that there is no evidence must not go unanswered, or answered so vaguely that it appears that they have no case.

Newly formed ANC branches that write to head office rejecting the choice of Winnie Mandela as head of the social welfare department must be answered. That she is an unpopular choice in many ANC circles is perhaps less important than whether her appointment can be democratically debated within the ANC.

This issue of *WIP* includes some of the evidence that is available about police failure to pursue investigations. It also contains some of the comments of an ANC organiser helping to build the ANC from the bottom up.

The ANC is facing its biggest tests ever, and it is not passing them all. The great goodwill in much of the nation is still there for the Congress movement, and that will remain.

But the terror of recent weeks has taken a toll. It has left people wondering why the ANC gave so much in suspending the armed struggle and saying that the police would change their ways, when they haven't.

People wonder why the government was able to obtain the Pretoria minute without conceding real dates for the release of more political prisoners and the return of exiles.

If the ANC concedes the government's right to exclude negotiators like Chris Hani at this early stage, what will the government get later? The decision to meet Gatsha Buthelezi with all the other homeland leaders makes good sense. Why did it take so long to reach a decision? The ANC has to speed up its response time.

There are changes taking place inside the ANC on the ground — bantustan bureaucrats and securocrats are joining, in the rural areas, while on the Reef, ANC supporters face the crisis that their organisation cannot adequately protect them — either from jail, if you are Mac Maharaj or Ronnie Kasrils, or from bullets and pangas, if you are an ordinary resident or commuter. Yet in the midst of this, people have to prepare for a future. There have to be people preparing for a time when the ANC will be associated, not with violence or even self-defence committees, but with security and literacy campaigns and democratic debate and economic growth.

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E.G. Maitland
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The South African War

Close on 1 000 people have died in Transvaal townships, and there are very few signs of peace. An ANC regional organiser questions the organisation's ability to communicate with its members on the ground, and we look at the patchy peace pact being put together in Natal after four years of war.

Mandela's King

Meet Buyelekhaya Zwelibanzi Dalindyebo, heir to the Tembu throne, and a member of the ANC.

As Tembu leader, Buyelekhaya is Nelson Mandela's king — 'something I cannot run away from', he says laughingly.

Dalindyebo admits to being reluctant to assume his position as leader, but concedes: 'If we must not have a king in order to build one nation, then I think it's the best thing to do, and I would feel happy about it.'

Pages 5 - 23



Worker power

Workers take to the streets in protests around the development of a Workers' Charter.

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The Labour Relations Amendment Act is going back before parliament, and the joint Cosatu/Nactu/Saccola accord is back on the government agenda

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PICTURE CREDITS

Afrapix: Pages 14, 17, 26, 27, 29 & 32

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Kevin Carter: Pages 5 & 8

Justin Sholk: Page 7

The Star: Pages 1, 2, 7, 9, 18, 19, 21, 23 & 38

Another privatisation scandal

THE world of broadcasting is being given to understand that more radio licences will be granted soon, and that M-Net will be able to broadcast news and current affairs.

That will be a change from M-Net's present policy of stealthily introducing news, especially on its Carte Blanche programme.

But granting new radio licences and M-Net new freedom now smacks of privatisation — the same policy the government has stopped because the ANC and others argued that privatising state-controlled industries looks like another attempt to move the goalposts further away from black people.

That's not the only white man's trick up the broadcasting sleeve: The government has set up a task force to investigate future broadcasting needs and a controlling structure for broadcasting matters.

Some of the subjects in its terms of reference are technical, but a 'controlling structure for broadcasting' clearly has policy implications.

It will specifically investigate privatisation, according to a press release.

So, just in case you thought the new South Africa was ready for you, here are some facts about the people appointed to the task force: 12 out of 12 are male, and white at least as far as can be judged from their names.

But doubt seems misplaced given some of the other salient facts about them: There is one general, one brigadier, one National Intelligence Service agent, five other government



The march against privatisation of the SABC earlier this year

department officials, on professor from Potchefstroom, a mysteriously described 'well known educationalist and academic' named Professor Pieter de Lange (the news release did not see fit to describe him by his other, more important title: head of the Broederbond), one person from M-Net, a film producer and an advertising executive.

In case you had doubts that it will reflect your interests, home affairs minister Gene Louw assures us that these members do not represent a specific interest group.

The government would like us to believe that broadcasting will be increasingly run on Western, democratic lines.

In fact, the government's policy of setting up M-Net with the existing newspaper publishers as its owners, and its policy of allowing those radio stations not under government control to be part-owned by newspaper companies, is just the opposite.

The practice in Western countries is to restrict individuals or companies from controlling different media in the same area.

That's why Rupert Murdoch has to choose whether he will own a TV station or a newspaper in each town he tries to enter in the US.

He is not allowed to own both.

The Campaign for Open Media (Com) and the Film and Allied Workers' Organisation (Fawo) held a march protesting the composition and secrecy of the task force.

'The future of broadcasting should be decided by public debate, and not behind closed doors by a task force appointed by the apartheid state', said Willie Currie, Fawo co-ordinator.

'All South Africans should be able to participate in decisions regarding the restructuring. It is unacceptable for a tiny white elite to be doing so'.

Fawo says that with the participation of M-Net, it

looks like big business is preparing to to a deal with the government to carve up the broadcast sector before a new democratic government is elected.

MEDIA

We all want fairness and balance

IT seems that important people in the mainstream press have discovered they have had a bit of an unfair advantage because of all those years when black people were being forced out of business.

Harvey Tyson, editor-in-chief of *The Star*, and soon to be member of the board of directors of the Argus Publishing Company, has a lot of suggestions for how existing newspaper companies like his can help 'historically disadvantaged interest groups' to launch their own media.

Tyson gave his strictly 'personal opinion' at a

media policy workshop at Rhodes University, in which he recommended an impressive list of things that could be done to help.

Any historically disadvantaged group which wants to start a newspaper should, he says, have:

- Full use of the mainstream presses at the same rate that those newspapers charge themselves for printing.
- Equal use of all existing distribution resources, at the same rates as present.
- Training in editorial skills and advice on newspapering techniques.
- Secondment of managerial skills.
- Management and circulation expertise.
- Advertising advice, to be volunteered free by ad agencies.
- Newspaper Press Union and Media Council membership.

- News agency and other syndication services.
- Sharing of communication technology.

The purpose of assisting new media would be to ensure fairness and balance, equal opportunity, and diversity of opinion and news analysis, Tyson said.

This could be a useful proposal, and it should be studied.

But it does sound a lot like a violation of the 'free market', doesn't it? One wonders why such holy grail should be open to amendment.

Surely not because the Argus Company feels just a little bit uncomfortable about the arguments that it is a monopolistic press? The fear is, of course, that someone will say, wait, the major media in every town in South Africa should not be in the hands of the Argus, especially because Argus is

controlled by Anglo American, which controls so much of the economy; because how can the public feel confident that the share of the economy that Anglo controls will be covered objectively in its own newspapers? Or, someone could say: only four specific companies designated by the government were allowed to own M-Net, the only private TV channel.

Two of those four companies are controlled by the Argus.

Future media policy will be intimately tied up with national economic policy on monopolies.

Besides establishing a rule that no one company can have shares in more than one medium (radio or TV or newspaper) in a particular market, other distortions in the South African economic system will have to be looked at.

For example, on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange there are many pyramid companies, through which a parent company controls many others with a smaller share than would give control on the London or New York Stock Exchanges. The most obvious example is Harry Oppenheimer and Anglo American's control of a vast portion of South Africa's public companies.

Changes to these rules might loosen control of a fair section of the economy, including the media. Of course, the monopolistic press also bought out some of the black newspapers started in the 19th century.

At the time they sold out, they were not exactly competing with white business on a level playing field. How will all this be redressed? — *WIP Correspondent*

Vacancy

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THE VIOLENCE



A view from the ground

The war in Reef townships has posed many challenges to the ANC - both to its structures, and to individual members. In this paper, presented to a recent consultative conference for ANC branches in the PWV region, regional organiser Andrew Mapheto looks at how the organisation is coping with some of these issues. Mapheto, a former political commissar in Umkhonto we Sizwe, has spent most of the last two months travelling from township to township trying to help restore peace

In many ways, the violence that has engulfed the PWV region is more tragic than was first thought. It may be too early to begin to grasp the full implications of what these events mean for a future democratic government.

One may be comforted by the fact that the sensibilities of many decent people were offended by the violence, irrespective of their political persuasion.

However, we need to ask if South Africans are ready to move in the direction of a new society. Are we ready to think in a new way? Is it possible for us to talk of a new South Africa? Or is it still too early?

How was the recent violence understood by South Africans?

The media divested the violence of any political meaning; for them, it was sufficient to call it 'black on black violence'. That explained

THE SOUTH AFRICAN WAR



Mapheto ... collective perspective of leadership needs to be reviewed

speaking. These are comrades who appear more often than any others in the media. This has, in some people's minds, become the African image of the ANC. Aside from its implications for the 'tribal war' formulation, this is unfortunate because it gives people a footing to criticise, belittle, or even dismiss our organisation.

But what has the characterisation of the violence as a Xhosa-Zulu war meant for people on the ground?

In some areas there was a call for Inkatha to disband. Elsewhere, all people who were Zulu-speaking were seen as being responsible for the mayhem. In one area, sectors of the youth felt every home with Zulu-speaking inhabitants had to be burned or demolished as a punishment for deaths in the hostels.

In Kagiso, about 11 shacks were burned on this principle. As one shack stood burning, we asked people milling around why the shacks burned. The answer was because the inhabitants were Zulu-speaking.

Another incident occurred when we met a man who asked if we were going to Natal, as our car had ND license plates. He wanted to travel with us to Durban, where he was taking his family. 'I can't believe it. My neighbours, whom I thought I knew, are now hostile towards me'.

Earlier that evening we been confronted by a crowd of about 20 who surrounded our car, shouting that we

were Zulus. Only when they recognised us did the danger recede.

I overheard one youngster say that if he could kill one Zulu he would feel he had avenged all the deaths.

But the saddest story was of a family who had their home petrol-bombed, leaving two children dead. On the day of the funeral, taxi drivers refused to transport the mourners and the township youth let it be known that the local cemetery 'wasn't open for Zulu-speakers'. The family was told to bury its dead in KwaZulu.

These events raise serious questions for a movement like the ANC. We have to ask if all hostel inmates are Inkatha supporters, or for that matter if the sentiments expressed above would be acceptable even if all the inmates were Inkatha supporters.

On the other hand, how does all this appear to hostel dwellers? To many on the Inkatha side, the conflict was portrayed as a fight to prevent the extinction of the Zulu people. They saw themselves as a threatened minority in a totally hostile environment.

'Inkatha' hostel inmates would say there is a war 'between the Zulu nation and the Xhosa nation': 'We aren't fighting the Sotho or the Shangaan. Why then do township residents get involved on the Xhosa side?'

At one point during the negotiation of a ceasefire, in the midst of bullets and teargas flying about, an Inkatha warrior wanted to know why the ANC was intervening on the Xhosa side.

And their biggest worry was the township youth whom, they said, harassed them for being Zulu. They threatened mayhem if the youth were not restrained.

In some instances, hostel dwellers on different sides of the spectrum asked each other questions. 'My friend we stayed together for such a long time, why do you do this against me?', they would ask. The answer would often be: 'My friend, it can't be helped ... you see yourself how things stand now'.

During a visit to the hostels by the Congress of Traditional Leaders of South Africa (Contralesa), we arrived at one hostel with Prince Mcwayizeni, who comes from Natal. There was serious division among the inmates as to whether he should be allowed in the hostel. It is disturbing that in some areas the 'ethnic conflict' view almost gained acceptance. That it did not succeed, despite the high level of emotional agitation, is a credit to

everything.

Another disturbing feature was describing the violence as simply a Xhosa war. On a cynical level, this might be due to the medieval weapons used.

But more seriously, are we to understand that the ideals which inspired the ANC founders in 1912 have yet to be shared by the majority of black people in this country?

We may be justified in asking ourselves how the formulation that this violence is a Xhosa-Zulu war feeds into the politics of apartheid. Does the regime benefit in any direct way if the Xhosa-Zulu perspective triumphs? How does this formulation relate to the debate on a constituent assembly?

But these are only part of the explanation for why the violence has been mischaracterised as a black-on-black, Xhosa-Zulu war. Other reasons concern Inkatha and the ANC itself.

• Inkatha: 'It's in Inkatha's interest to address its violent image'.

The violence that has convulsed Natal has been a matter of national concern, and has badly damaged Inkatha's image. No less so in the PWV region. The name Inkatha is, in many people's minds, synonymous with violence. Inkatha has come to mean families wiped out, children orphaned, lovers lost, and homes without mothers or fathers.

The mention of Inkatha has led to enormous fear in many townships, almost a siege mentality. Women and children were packed and sent to areas away from hostels. In some instances, houses were left unlocked as residents made haste to avert death or injury. Sometimes whole blocks became ghost areas.

It is in Inkatha's own interest that it addresses itself to this issue. Not only does its image as a bringer of mayhem lend credence to the 'tribal war' formulation, it also totally obscures Inkatha's credibility as another political organisation. Inkatha alone can change people's perception of it. This may not be easy, but it is vital if the process of negotiations is not to be sabotaged or delayed.

• The ANC: 'Exile and prison have distorted our views of the leadership'.

Recent events have made it easier to appreciate how years of life underground, in exile and in prison have distorted certain features of the movement. This narrow view of leadership has made it possible for the ANC to be seen as a Xhosa organisation. The ANC's most visible core, even if not necessarily the leaders on the ground, is predominantly Xhosa-

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the people on the ground and the ideals on which the ANC was founded.

At this point it is worth asking: Just who 'drives' the violence? Generally, what seems to happen is that special squads of killers or provocateurs move into a hostel or township, cause friction and then move away.

Once this squad has done its job, the bulk of the hostel dwellers are duty-bound to be on a war footing as they believe their lives are in danger. The same applies to township residents.

It is clear there is a sinister and organised plan behind this violence.

Inkatha provides an umbrella under which lies a more disturbing phenomenon. Rumours abound of people speaking foreign languages; some say they are Renamo members, others speak of Koevoet. On the other hand there are also rumours of members of KwaZulu paramilitary units moving into hostels and then withdrawing as soon as the conflict has started.

We are thus compelled to be wary of claims that this violence is spontaneous. There is nothing spontaneous about it.

Another fact worth noting is that the violence was launched at about the same time as the Pretoria Minute was signed. This raises questions about the intent of those concerned with respect to the question of negotiations. Was it an act of desperation when some people realised there might be forward movement without them being on the national stage?

On the other hand, was there a plan to undermine the building of the ANC in such a manner that it became virtually impossible to act?

There are well-founded suspicions that one of the main intentions was to incite a general tribal war in the PWV region; failing this to undermine the ANC by portraying it as a custodian of one ethnic group, thus no home for all people.

This brings us to the police. We have no doubt that the violence was well-planned, co-ordinated, and effected with military precision. Bringing information to the police's attention in order to prevent loss of life was not enough to induce



A Phola Park mother feeds her child amid the ruins of her shack, which was attacked the previous night. Corpses are piled into a police truck outside KwaThema hostel

THE SOUTH AFRICAN WAR

them to act. Why aren't they telling us exactly who is behind the violence, where it is planned, who is financing it, or, more importantly who provides the guns and moves the killer squads from one spot to another?

Are we to conclude the police are capable of uncovering the SACP's Tongaat meeting or Operation Vula, but not of discovering the sources of this violence. There are reports of incidents in which police not only aided but actually attacked residents while pretending to be Inkatha. One Dobsonville woman put it this way: 'There is no Inkatha here. Our Inkatha is white policemen'.

What emerges is that the police regard Inkatha as an ally. In many instances, when in the heat of the battle they were asked to disarm Inkatha warriors attacking people in their presence, the police response was chilling: 'Why does Mandela not come to disarm them himself?' Sometimes it was: 'Go tell your Mandela to come and disarm them himself'.

As the violence spread and intensified we increasingly had to ask ourselves if the Pretoria Minute had taken certain pertinent realities into consideration. Was there sufficient consideration as to how its provisions were to be implemented on a day-to-day basis at ground level? Was consideration given to the fact that the SAP is an undisciplined political entity. Unfortunately, the more reports of police misconduct reached us, the more we urged our people to work in consultation with them. The result was that we were often booed. So the recent violence has reinforced our people's mistrust of the police.

During our visits to the townships, a desperate call for arms became deafening. And at meetings, unless a speaker said something very specific on the question of self defence and arms, his message fell on deaf ears.

Frankly speaking, our people missed the presence and guidance of our national leadership at the height of the crisis.

As I stated earlier, to many of our people 'leadership' means top leaders, and when they are not seen to be there in a crisis people feel abandoned. Thus people began to think the leadership was insensitive and did not care. An example

was the unruliness the crowd displayed during Archbishop Desmond Tutu's visit to Kagiso. The desperation reached levels where even Tutu and Reverend Frank Chikane were asked to provide arms. Often Tutu was interrupted in mid-speech by questions like: 'Where were you when we were getting killed?'

Some ANC workers even became reluctant to come face-to-face with comrades from conflict-ridden areas. They had no answer to the demand for arms.

Generally speaking, the image of un-

said here that our members were in the forefront in providing guidance in almost all the areas. But that was not enough. The biggest obstacle in our attempts to interact more meaningfully in most situations was the lack of an organised base upon which we could rely in most communities. The result was that in most meetings many participants had come as individuals - lacking a perspective on what was happening. In some instances the youth demanded that no peace be entertained with Inkatha and the police, and the civics were seen to be selling out or acting without a mandate. Even though the youth were genuine there was clearly an erroneous analysis of the situation. This made them easy targets for agents provocateurs.

The result was that report-back meetings had to incorporate educational input which was not appropriate for that forum. We were expected to support views such as, 'Give us guns and we will kill the Zulus'. Clearly, there is a great deal of ignorance around some crucial ANC policies. Unless attempts are made to provide an organisational reference point, the possibility exists that vigilante groups may emerge to fill in the vacuum.

In conclusion, I would like to make a few points:

- The collective perspective of leadership needs to be seriously reviewed, since there is no evidence to support the notion that it has reached people on the ground.
- We must acknowledge that the ANC is transforming its entire operation from being an exile movement to a legal entity within the country. This has its own limitations, which are often transferred into criticism about our ability to lead.
- ANC branches should focus on the role they can play to ensure adherence to the Pretoria Minute. This will include structures to monitor police behaviour on the ground, to ensure the police do not ignore the views of the local community. This paper has not exhausted the serious issues that surround the recent crisis. Its main intention has been to focus discussion on these issues. There are certainly more views than this. The recent crisis has emphasised the need to end white domination. We should spare no effort in working towards this goal. Amandla! •



An armed hostel dweller outside Merafe hostel

breakable strength the movement had nurtured and earned over the years was dented. Instead people felt the ANC was displaying a political paralysis and had fallen prey to De Klerk's sweet talk.

There was no clear, well thought out response from the national leadership. As the crisis grew, activists on the ground developed responses which strengthened their own ability to deal with matters directly.

This raises serious questions about our level of organisation on the ground and our ability to cope with an emergency situation.

A perfectly legitimate question is whether the ANC provided the necessary leadership during the crisis. It should be

'We are here to maintain law and order'

Picture this: A small group of journalists gather around the commissioner of police for the Witwatersrand region, Major-General Gerrit Erasmus, in the midst of the mayhem that is Thokoza.

At least 140 people have been killed in three days of attacks by hostel dwellers, and journalists want to know what the police are doing to stop the killing.

Rumours abound that police are providing cover to hostel dwellers during their raids on township homes; that they are refusing to disarm hostel dwellers; and that they have threatened to demolish the homes of those still living in the Phola Park squatter camp which has borne the brunt of these attacks.

The journalists pose their first question...

What kind of operation is planned for this evening? Some of the people say police have made it clear that they are going to bulldoze these shacks this evening. Is that correct?

The general: That's absolute nonsense. We don't bulldoze, we don't evacuate anybody. If people leave the shacks, they leave of their own free will. We are not

going to do anything like that, we've raided the shacks today, and this hostel, and another hostel. And there's no such thing of us bulldozing any shack.

So what were the raids for?

The raids were to unarm or disarm the people and to collect all dangerous weapons, firearms, whatever we could find.

General, are you one of the people on President FW de Klerk's list of 96 police officers to liaise with the ANC?

I'm not, I don't think I am on that list, I didn't notify him. I liaise with the people on the ground here. We liaised yesterday with these people and from the shacks, the ANC side, and from the Zulu side, the Inkatha side, or from the Zulu and the Xhosa side, whatever you want to call it. And these people pledged that they won't fight. That was yesterday round about 12 o'clock and nothing came of that agreement.

Could you tell us why these people are fleeing with their clothing and furniture?

I think these people are leaving because they feel unsafe. Mostly if you talk to them yourself they might be Xhosas, or they might be Zulus, for that, I don't know. But I think talk to them yourself

and ask them.

They have told us the police said they are going to pull down their shacks tonight.

Ja, then they talk nonsense. There's no ways that the police are going to pull down any shack. And you can come and have a look later on or tomorrow - if these guys who are enemies of one another, don't pull down the shacks, we're not gonna do it.

How do you explain the newspaper pictures which show police vehicles travelling alongside heavily-armed Inkatha people and clearly not taking away their weapons?

My answer to this is - these people were taken from inside the township. They were brought out there. We took them out there and brought them to the hostel here, where we could control them. If you can take weapons from 5 000 people with a few policemen, then my friend, you just chase these people into the living area there and then you will have a real slaughter. I am not prepared to do that, we rather take them out, escort them out, into a place where we can handle them.

So which people were they and



A police fire-fighting vehicle turns its attention on a group of comrades in Kagiso

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where did you move them from?

Well, it was a crowd of people. They could have been anybody.

You didn't ascertain who they were?

No, well, mostly they might have been Zulus. But I don't know whether there are so many Zulus in this area. That we don't know.

There have been accusations by eyewitnesses that people died in clashes while the police stood by and did not take any action...

I think that accusation comes from Sebokeng. That is the origin of that. Now, what could have happened there ... there was a meeting and there was a lot of people running to the hostel and on the way, there was a clash. And it was hit and run and off they were. That is what happened, so there is no way the police can act - who do you act against? A lot of people fighting, a thousand, two thousand people running - and there's a clash. Who do you act against? And they just vanish, and if you ask them who was involved, nobody comes forward with any information.

You have a huge force here. What is the purpose of it?

The purpose is to maintain law and order and to keep these groups apart, these fighting groups.

Are police going to patrol Phola Park?

You can't go into the squatter camp and I don't think the people would like to have people present there. No vehicle can go through there. I wasn't in there myself, but that's what I ascertain from these people, that a vehicle can't move there.

Enter a community leader

Leader: We have asked the police to maintain law and order. We have also asked that they should go into Phola Park. I just want to express that, that we feel that they should go in ... because yesterday whilst we were standing here four people were killed and we were with the police. Something has to be done.

General: Yes, we know. But please don't put the police in the centre of this. You people, we asked you yesterday to restore law and order. To keep the calm among your people. Because who is causing this problem? Are the police causing this problem? No ways. It's the Xhosas and the Zulus causing this problem. We are here to maintain law and order.

You people, the so-called leaders, agreed yesterday that you would go to

your people ... we have given you a van with a loudhailer and you called a meeting there to talk to your people and the other people, the Zulu people went to their people and what happened? Last night, they just started killing one another.

Leader: Yes, and we went back to our community and addressed it very carefully and I promise you that the people took up their weapons and nobody had weapons. And what actually happens is that after we left, within two or three hours, even the police can bear me out on this: whilst we were here with the police, nine shots were fired, and that is why people started defending themselves. This is exactly what happened. I am not arguing the point that - we didn't reach the point of peace ...

General: Ja, alright that's history now.... Do you agree that we don't have any control over your people ... that you..

Leader: We do have control. I am convinced. But what happens is that the Zulus came up and started firing: nine shots were fired at the people and that is why people started defending themselves. What would you expect people to do when people start firing at them?

General: What do I expect? I expect both groups to behave themselves, that is what I expect from you people - the so-called leaders here, must get their people together and get their act together and bring calm and peace to this township ... you are the people who live here and you are the people we will support to bring peace and calm back.

Leader: I am glad to see a lot of police around here today. This is the first time I saw a lot of police around here. Today, they started doing their duty - today - this afternoon. I must say it.

General: You know my friend, can I tell you this much, that is for you the press from Canada and from America, that the police force can't just serve the black community, there are other people too that we must serve. We have all the people available from the surrounding districts pulled together to come and assist here today. Understand?

I have a duty to everybody living in this big city of Johannesburg, as far as Vanderbijlpark and as far as Delmas; I have a duty to every citizen - not only to Thokoza - but I agree, we have the people here and now you people, the leaders, must assist us to get this place in order.

Leader: Ja, I ... I promise that we will do that - we'll explain that to the people; and what we expect from the police side

is that they must also do their proper duty and we also ...

General: What do you mean by that?

Leader: I mean they must be impartial.

General: We are impartial. We have searched all these hostels and there is a cross-section of people living in these hostels, that's Xhosa and Zulu. Don't run away from the fact that this fight is between the Zulus and the Xhosas.

Leader: I am not running away from that, General Erasmus, because I know it - I live here and I am aware about that and ...

General:.. and, and - in these hostels there lived Zulus and there lived Xhosas and there lived other tribesmen. Is that correct?

Leader: Yes, that's generally ...

General: I don't think I want to get into a further argument with this chap. I know him very well...

Exit the community leader. The journalists resume their questioning.

General, how many suspects do you have? You have got 140 dead now, how many suspects do you have?

Well, you know, if you know our people here, we gonna have to investigate this. We just pick up a body, there's nobody in the vicinity. It's a man's head cut off - defaced, and there's nobody in the vicinity.

Investigations must start. We will ask people to come forward to give evidence, but it's very hard to get anybody in a clash like this, when something like this happens, it's hard to find witnesses ... for fear - you know, as they come forward and give evidence - intimidation, fear of life. You know, somebody might kill him afterwards - give evidence against somebody else.

Do you have any figures on who was killed by Inkatha, who was killed by the ANC and who was killed by the police?

Eh! No! Look! - we haven't killed anybody so far. We have only used bird-shot here, not to kill - because we are not involved in this fight. It is not a matter that the police will attack. It's only here and there there that a few shots fired and a handgrenade, I believe, was thrown to us. But we haven't killed anybody.

Can you say that tonight there will be peace here?

It will depend on the people living here. I can't say that. It's quietened down quite a lot. I'm glad to say that. The people are calming down. •

Poor De Klerk. He's not a security man - he's just a politician



Major-General Bantu Holomisa is far from Pretoria's favourite bantustan leader. The head of the Transkei military council was reprimanded by South African foreign affairs minister Pik Botha recently for challenging the police's role in township violence.

In this interview with John Matisonn, Holomisa assesses the state of play in Pretoria, and concludes: FW de Klerk is being led up the garden path by his security advisors

You recently met Chief Gatsha Buthelezi and the South African government in Pretoria. How do you understand what's been going on in the East Rand townships?

We received numerous complaints about the South African police supporting people who are allegedly Inkatha impis and are wielding sticks. We have also seen this on TV. The police were doing this under the pretext that there was ethnic violence - Zulus v Xhosas. But we know this (fighting) has been going on in Natal for a long time, and was never based on ethnicity - there are Xhosa-speaking people working there.

We feel there might have been a change of strategy by the architects of this violence ... it has the symptoms of a third force whose aims, I'm sure, includes derailing the process of change in South Africa.

So I went to Pretoria and told the South African government this is not based on ethnicity. It is just a ploy to make people believe it is a Xhosa-Zulu issue. No war was announced, no war was declared.

If you look at this thing broadly, it was not there before February 2. It is a new concept, and one can conclude that either (President FW) De Klerk doesn't have control of certain right-wing elements of his securocrats, or it's a government strategy to inflict a severe political defeat on its opponents.

I say this because the violence started just three days after the announcement of the suspension of the armed struggle, and it spread like wildfire in Soweto. It put the ANC in a difficult position: whether to retaliate or to be subjective to the authorities, to say please protect us. It's a complete strategy.

After that central members of the ANC were targeted and arrested. Now again, surely it is also directed to the followers of that organisation to question the wisdom and the decisions of the leadership. Why did they suspend armed action?

This exercise is not right. It is a clear exercise to derail the whole process.

We were worried that maybe De Klerk would just announce that 'in the light of the violence going on, I'm pulling out,' but it didn't go that far. It seems De Klerk is committed (to negotiations), but I don't know whether he has good people around him to support him. Until he becomes firm and doesn't appease his security forces ... they have misled him twice now: in Namibia, on the eve of the elections, and again on the Tongaat issue.

On both those occasions, when the security forces were faced with the facts, they had to retract certain information. I mean, poor De Klerk, he's not a security man, he's a politician ... he's a professional in the political and in the legal fields. If they're going to mislead him like this, I don't know where we are going to.

How many victims of this violence are from the Transkei?

We have not been told of so many Xhosas, Sothos, Zulus, whatever. This was aggravated by the fact that the bodies which were found were piled up like bags of mielie meal at the back of a mortuary - exposed to the sun. These bodies had decomposed.

There were allegations that policemen had shot some of these people, and one can see that this exercise (leaving bodies in the sun) was intended to destroy the evidence. This is a difficult thing. How can a country which prophe-sises christianity allow their people to expose bodies to the sun in their state mortuaries ... it is unheard of.

So you're saying that allowing the bodies to decompose was a deliberate way, at least by some members of the police, to destroy the evidence?

Definitely. It is clear.

Is there a tradition of hostility between Xhosa-speakers and Zulu-speakers?

No ways. Here in Umtata I have taxis which are driven by Zulu-speaking people of Umzimkulu. I have people here who

have run away from the violence in Natal, Zulu-speaking people. We have them all over, even in the government departments.

We have people working in the security forces who are Zulu-speaking. So the Zulu-speaking people here are free. I've issued a statement telling people: 'This (hostility) is a lie. You must live in peace together in the Transkei as we have in the past'. We have our people working in Natal. They are living there nicely, nobody is harassing them. But when that violence was transferred from Natal to Johannesburg, they used the ethnicity to sort of buy ... They thought it would be popular.

I notice you avoid saying who 'they' are.

The third force. Anyone who feels it is referred to him - he can take a cap and wear it.

But you're not going to say who you suspect...

Even after the Pretoria and the Groote Schuur minutes, and the suspension of the armed struggle, you still see them in battle preparedness as if South Africa is at war.

A man who has been oppressed for years is going to draw a lot of inferences from this. Is De Klerk genuine in this? Why can't he disarm his policemen? They should carry a baton and pistol - not an assault rifle, we are no more at war. In townships we are not at war with you. Mandela is staying in that township. (Zeph) Mothopeng of the PAC is staying there.

I think for South Africa to be above board, they will have to tell Mr Vlok to disarm them. They must not fire shots or teargas anymore. They must use other tactics which are used in other western countries like Britain - we've seen on TV how they control crowds. We need some professionalism on their part. I think this judge (Richard Goldstone, who headed the probe into the shootings in Sebokeng during March) has revealed that.

What's your relationship with Chief Buthelezi?

The relations between myself and Chief Buthelezi, on a man to man basis, when we chat and exchange views, are good. But you'll forgive him, he's a politician. Sometimes I think if he is on a platform, he gets out of hand and starts to attack me personally. But I always avoid that because in terms of my custom I'm like his son to him. Fortunately his eldest son is my personal friend, so I always try to run away when he is attacking me



'Why can't De Klerk disarm his policemen? They should carry a baton and pistol - not an assault rifle'

personally.

Even in Pretoria, he was strong on attacking me, but I avoided that. I think that is the type of man he is - I'm not going to fall into the trap of mudslinging based on personalities. I respect him for what he has done for his area, developing his region, and I expect that in the not too distant future he will also respect what I have done here, no matter how he views me personally.

What role do you see for yourself in the negotiating process?

If they are in a conference room then I will guard that conference room by virtue of my profession!

No, I'm joking. In the negotiating process it will depend on whether Transkei is invited or not because technically or constitutionally this country is an independent state. So really it would depend on an invitation from them. And if, for instance, we were to hold a referendum to test the views of Transkeians before negotiations start then it would be different.

If people say we want to go back then

we would tell them that by virtue of the decision taken by our people, we would like to be part of the negotiation process. But for now I think we would rather rely on an invitation to come not only from the South Africans but from all the key players.

I don't think that they will not invite us - more especially ANC and PAC if they agree the method is going to be 'we'll invite leaders, we'll invite homelands' and so on. They will invite us because they are against the homeland system, and leaving us out would be tantamount to giving us independent political recognition.

A statement was released after the meeting in Pretoria between yourself, Pik Botha and Chief Buthelezi, which you said had been written beforehand and so it was meaningless...

With due respect to those who drafted it before the meeting - it lacked a programme of action. That's what I said to them: 'Gentlemen, at this level we can't be involved in rhetorical statements. Many people have appealed to the leaders that this violence must come to an end. Now we must address certain issues, like the disarming of people, like asking the police: don't fire teargas, don't fire anything...'

There were counter-accusations - 'no we get people from the township firing at us, that is why we are firing' - forgetting why they came to the township in the first instance.

So the statement lacked a programme of action. Even a handwritten amendment - I had to force this, that 'various proposals which were made have to be followed up'. They didn't want to change it at all.

I said that in the light of the evidence brought by Buthelezi, accusations against the ANC, we should broaden the forum to include them, so that they could reply on their own behalf.

They refused flatly. But I think they had a certain goal: that a meeting between Mandela and Buthelezi must take it in a certain direction. They didn't seem to want everyone involved.

What was the reaction of the government to your point about the police siding with Inkatha?

Of course they denied that. I referred them to the South African television who had been showing this. They said, 'no, there is no truth there'. I also referred them to the sworn statements taken from people running from Johannesburg, and to the fact that we have empty cartridges

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from South African weapons like R4s and R1 automatic rifles. Vlok didn't reply. I said, 'conduct a commission of inquiry - a well-represented commission of inquiry, then you won't be in a position to deny these things'.

What is your relationship like with Nelson Mandela?

Mr Mandela is from Transkei. We fall under the same king. Our royal areas makes us almost neighbours. We respect him as a spokesperson in this country ... We have pride in him, in that he is a son of the soil.

Did he play a role in trying to get the royal houses (Xhosa and Zulu) to meet to try and diffuse this crisis?

I don't think so. He was away when our meeting was arranged. Not as far as I know. This meeting was arranged by our paramount chief.

Does the king control the land?

Yes, the land belongs to him. It depends from one area to another. There's a land tenure system which differs from area to area. In Transkei the land is still entrusted to the traditional leaders and I think the same even in KwaZulu. And the king also has delegation powers to certain chiefs. They can give land to the needy people on his behalf as well as the

governments.

In the case of Transkei, would you say political power is in the hands of you and the military council and the government?

That's executive power. But the kings and the chiefs have a traditional and a symbolic and a unifying power...

That's true.

Similar to the British queen?

The British system is better because the British people protect the rights of the queen - unlike here. The white government relegated the powers of the kings to nothing in the past and I think that's something which will have to be looked at during the post-apartheid South Africa: the role of kings, their status and so on.

The best is not to involve the kings in the executive but still to allow them to play a prominent role.

Are things in the Transkei working since you took over?

The role of the present government is to expose corruption. Financial corruption - we've done it successfully; political corruption both here and in South Africa - we have exposed it, if there is such a thing as political corruption. I'll

leave that to the political analysts. I'm not a political science student.

If the ANC says we are going to have a rally and would like to have a platform, or the PAC wants to hire state-controlled buses at a reduced fee, we give them, for funerals and rallies. Now if there was a political party here it would be threatened and say no. We don't have that problem. We are facilitators.

What's in your future when the political situation has settled down?

As a result of the arms embargo targeted at SA and her satellites, we couldn't further our military careers. I've done courses here and in South Africa, and I think if there is a new dispensation we will be exposed to international military academics or the military instructors will come down this end. And the language problem will be addressed in the South African military academics, with Afrikaans. I'm sure we'll be taught in English. So at least if you were to say that within 18 months there will be a new political dispensation in this country, I think I'd dedicate two or three years to upgrading my military courses and finishing those new courses which I still owe. Politics is not Holomisa's game. I'm not interested in it. •

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Mourners at King Sabata's reburial in October 1989

Of 'tribalism', Mandela and Xhosa tradition

By John Matisonn

The Transvaal township violence has been manna from heaven to the proponents of ethnic or 'tribal' conflict theory in South Africa.

Police officers now routinely refer to 'the Zulu/Xhosa conflict', and many people repeat it like Pavlovian dogs.

A recent column in the East London *Daily Dispatch* referred to '200 years of bloody warfare between Zulus and Xhosas'.

One would have thought that the frequency of the repetition would have sparked someone to ask about the history of 'Xhosa-Zulu conflict'.

Has there always been hostility between these two groups? Where is the history of battles in townships or in rural areas over the generations? Did it start in pre-colonial times among savages in desperate need of whites to pacify them?

These questions might have been asked, but they weren't. The result is a sudden tribal conflict that emerged in a vacuum and, like so much of what passes for public discourse in South Africa, will disappear unexamined and unlamented, to be replaced by new myths to serve new times, myths equally unsullied by historical analysis that might provide troublesome conclusions.

According to Professor Jeff Peires, head of the department of history at Transkei University and winner of the 1990 Alan Paton nonfiction award for his latest book on the Xhosa, *The Dead will arise*, there has only been one recorded clash between the Zulus and the Xhosas.

It occurred in 1827, at a time when the Zulu King Shaka was attacking a wide variety of ethnic groups. But even then, the battle against the Xhosa was one of the least significant of his conflicts, and only a small part of the Xhosa people were ever involved.

Shaka's troops invaded Pondoland and stayed for two or three months. It is not clear whether there was much fighting, but the invasion ended when the king of the Mpondo, Faku, agreed to pay tribute in the form of cattle, and Shaka's forces withdrew.

So if this were an authentic ethnic conflict, it would be more likely to involve other contestants than Xhosas and Zulus. Xhosas and Zulus are both Nguni, with similar languages and, in an ethnic row, would be more likely to join each other against others rather than pursue an intra-Nguni feud.

Even the term Xhosa is not commonly

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used by those considered members of that group, when at home on traditional land. People refer to themselves as Tembu or Pondo or Hlubi, for example, until they leave for the cities, where they are Xhosa in relationship to Sothos, Shangaans or Vendas.

But the debate about 'tribalism' — now widely regarded as a derogatory term — has arisen because of the violence. And for many that will never go away, because it's so easy to explain different customs when you don't have the slightest idea what they're about.

But now in the townships, there is such confusion that new explanations for the violence are mushrooming, and one of the common explanations is ethnic.

Unfortunately, the apartheid compulsion to divide and conquer has discouraged government opponents from exploring and writing about their customs and differences without feeling as if they are betraying the cause of non-racialism.

Yet we South Africans have a fascinating history, which one day we may be able to look at with enthusiasm.

For example, the transformation of Transkei from the model bantustan to what some describe, slightly extravagantly, as the first liberated zone.

Chris Hani, chief of staff of Umkhonto we Sizwe, stays in KD Matanzima's old house, in the government ministers' compound on the edge of Umtata; Mandela's name is revered, and Major-General Bantu Holomisa, chairman of the military council, is able to see beyond the short moment in history that is the Republic of Transkei, perhaps even enthusiastically.

People are taking pride in reminding themselves that this area is a cradle of the liberation movements, boasting such names as Mandela, Tambo, Sisulu and Mbeki.

Of course, most of that generation of ANC leadership is Xhosa, which to some is 'proof' that the ANC represents Xhosa, and somehow refuels the uninformed 'tribal' conclusions.

It's as well to remember that it was not always so, nor will it be in the future. Luthuli was Zulu, so is Zuma. Ramaphosa is Venda, and Terror Lekota is Sotho-Zulu.

So it will go in the future.

But this present generation is used to being seen in caricature.

To the outsider, Mandela was modern, therefore his royal family background was ignored. He was somehow related to former president Kaiser Matanzima, yet

unlike him.

Matanzima was a 'paramount chief', a term that somehow fitted with his pro-government image.

Yet what has been obscured all these years is how this history was cynically distorted by successive white governments.

The real story is so perfectly full of courage and betrayal and drama and blue blood that one fears for the inevitable day when someone puts it into a TV mini-series.

Many will remember that Sabata Dalindyebo was king of the Tembus, and that it was his funeral that was so shamefully handled by the authorities in 1986 that he had to be reburied. And that Winnie Mandela flew in to attend the services because she was part of the family.

Yet little background was conveyed outside of Transkei.

It is true that Mandela and Matanzima and Dalindyebo are part of the same royal family. These men are descended from the progenitor of the Madiba clan, King Ngubengcuka.

Sabata Dalindyebo was the rightful king of the Tembu until his death in exile in Lusaka four years ago, because he was descended from the Great House — in other words from the line of the senior wife of King Ngubengcuka.

Kaiser Matanzima is in Tembu law an important chief, because he descends from the right-hand house, in other words the designated second wife's house.

Mandela too is regarded as a chief, and part of the royal family, being descended from another wife of Ngubengcuka.

King Sabata's main claim to political loyalty arises out of his consistent rejection of the homeland system. He would not be the puppet Pretoria needed to create what was intended as the prototype homeland.

The government needed a more compliant head. And so, as it was to do with Lucas Mangope in Boputhatswana, and others, it changed the tribal hierarchy to advance those who would go along with its theory that tribal tradition could not be tampered with!

KD Matanzima was a powerful chief, but one of several, and no king. Pretoria needed to promote him, so they created not only a new king, but a new kingdom.

In this case, however, the word 'paramountcy' (regarded as a colonial term) fits perfectly, because he never was a king in the eyes of Tembu tradition.

What the government did was to divide the Tembu kingdom, and establish a second paramountcy. Matanzima was created Paramount Chief of Western Tembuland, a position that had not existed before and that gave him the rank he needed to become first chief minister of Transkei.

But the legislative assembly was composed of 65 chiefs and 45 elected members, and the elected members were all against him. So he needed almost every chief on his side to control the parliament.

To win all the chiefs, he needed an alliance with the next-biggest group, the Mpondo. Enter Botha Sigcau, king of the Mpondo, the ethnic group that includes Oliver Tambo and Winnie Mandela.

Sigcau became the first president of Transkei. He also acquired a new palace.

To this day, the Botha Sigcau Building houses the civil servants of Umtata, including Holomisa's own office.

After Matanzima fell out, in came Tutor Ndamase. He became, and remains to this day, president of Transkei, and he tried to play a constructive role in resolving the current Transvaal violence by touring the affected areas with Zulu King Goodwill Zwelithini, to send a message to those who respond to kings, that the two ethnic groups are not at war.

But the president's ancestors were not always scrupulous with the interests of their people — one was promoted by the British to his own paramountcy in Western Pondoland in the 19th century, in return for Port St Johns! Like Matanzima's, this paramountcy had not existed before.

So Pretoria's cynical ethnic sleight of hand in Tembuland was not original; it learnt its tricks at the British knee.

Sabata Dalindyebo never accepted the Transkei homeland, even when he was arrested by then State President Kaiser Matanzima.

During the reign of fear that was KD Matanzima's, the Dalindyebo family was regarded as the only group of people still willing to speak out against Transkei independence.

But after his arrest, Dalindyebo went into exile, where he had a respected place in the ANC and was occasionally invited to National Executive Committee meetings in Lusaka.

In his absence from Transkei, his brother, Bambilanga Mbirara, acted as regent. He was close to Matanzima, who began dropping the 'Acting' from his

The man who would be king

Buyelekhaya Zwelibanzi Dalindyebo, or 'Khaya', is 25.

He's the rightful heir to the Tembu throne since the death of his father, King Sabata, and a member of the ANC.

'I've lived half of my life around South Africa among relatives, away from home, because my father had to keep me away from people who might be enemies to the throne,' he says.

'Khaya' left South Africa in 1978, for Botswana. Since then he's lived in Zimbabwe and Zambia, returning to South Africa recently for a formal Tembu initiation ceremony. He's expected to return to Zimbabwe to continue his studies, before returning for his coronation.

The young king says his father did not believe in choosing sides between progressive movements, because his subjects might be supporters of different ones.

But he says that since the ANC was the most important organisation, and his great-grandfather was a founder member of the ANC, it was the right place to go to.

The people in the ANC were the people he trusted: 'My father called Nelson Mandela uncle,' he says, 'so Mandela is my granduncle'.

Buyelekhaya is Mandela's king, and laughs at the thought.

'Well, maybe it's something I cannot run away from. But on the other hand, you should always remember he's my deputy president and my leader, because his position is more or less an umbrella to even paramount chieftainship. So he is far greater than a lot of traditional leaders.

'Although he recognises that fact, it's only because of respecting his background. But he's our leader, and that's one fact we cannot dispute'.

On his future as king, he says: 'I support the progressive movements, and it will depend on what they feel when freedom has been achieved. Whatever we do, it will have to be a national feeling.

'Then I can say what my position is. Right now, I really can't'.

On the 'ethnic' violence: 'The mo-



Dalindyebo ... rightful heir to Tembu throne

...tive is to make people aware of the fact that they are divided by their tribal positions, and uniting them means really not to have separate development. So if that kind of tribalism is instilled in our people, it will give us problems as far as unity is concerned.

'Although people are proud of what they are, people refer to their traditional backgrounds... but a way of uniting people has to be established'.

What if the democratic decision was to do away with kings and chiefs?

'I'd feel okay, because that would be progressive; it would actually meet the goal of uniting and building up one nation.

'If it emerges that we must not have a king in order to build one nation, then I think it's the best thing to do, and I would feel happy about it.

'If the people said they want a king, then it would be very difficult for even the ANC to say no. I cannot take a personal decision. In fact, in my position there are very few things that I decide for myself... even though some people might think it's a wonderful position to be in, it's not at all.

'It's very difficult. Sometimes I wish I was someone else'.

title of 'Paramount Chief'.

After the death of the usurper, Bambilanga, his son, Zondwa Mtirara, tried to succeed him — encouraged by Matanzima.

Councillors of the Dalindyebo tribal authority took Zondwa to court to fight the case on behalf of Sabata's son, Buyelekhaya, who had joined his father in exile.

They won the case and Zondwa was ousted.

When Sabata died, his body was returned to Transkei for burial.

Matanzima had it secretly buried, but the family had it disinterred and reburied.

It was that reburial, amidst cries of 'Viva Comrade King Sabata' and the display of the ANC flag, that marked the turning point in the public fortunes of the ANC in that region.

It was at that funeral that a nervous new chairman of the joint military council, Major-General Bantu Holomisa, spoke and was booed.

It took forceful support by Dalindyebo loyalists to quieten the crowd, and he decided for the first time to suggest a referendum.

Holomisa appears always to have been more independent than his position in the Transkei Defence Force might have implied.

The South Africans, and Matanzima, were not unhappy when Holomisa took over in a coup — but they must regret it now, as Holomisa has moved closer to the liberation movements.

The rest is history, but with a sting in the tale.

Matanzima has lost his grip, though his name still strikes fear into some Transkeian hearts.

But there are already moves to end his paramouncy. They may reach fruition before he dies.

Right now, kings and chiefs still have power when it comes to land.

It was a decision of chiefs, for example, to allocate Mandela a place to build a house.

That, of course, raises the question of land policy under a post-apartheid government.

It's one of the many items to be resolved, as the people weed through the distortions of colonialism and apartheid so that they can examine what people want from traditional leaders, and what they want from politicians. •



A scene so familiar in Natal — now Transvaal township residents are having to come to terms with death at the hands of Inkatha supporters. This photograph was taken on the way to a mass funeral in Kagiso

Keeping a watchful eye on the peace-keepers

After almost four years of violence which has killed more than 4 000 people, destroyed more than 30 000 homes and ripped to shreds the fabric of social life in Natal, the search for solutions to end the ongoing carnage continues. And the spread of similar violence to the Transvaal has made the search for such solutions more urgent, especially in the present context of negotiations.

The latest attempt to end the violence was a meeting on September 11 between an ANC-led delegation and President FW de Klerk, held in line with a decision taken at the Conference for Peace and Reconstruction held in Durban in early August.

The ANC-led delegation had hoped the meeting with De Klerk would lead to agreement on concrete proposals, but this was not to be: the meeting lasted about two hours and government representatives did not commit themselves to proposals put forward by the ANC/Cosatu/UDF Joint Working Committee.

The ANC and the government have held their first meeting to discuss ways of restoring peace in Natal.

A WIP Correspondent looks at the development of this process, and in particular at attempts to monitor the role played by the police

The meeting itself took place in the context of further attempts to strengthen the hand of Inkatha:

- A government amendment on August 30 to the Natal Code of Zulu Law which authorised the carrying of 'traditional weapons'.
- The introduction of the KwaZulu Police Amendment Act, authorising cross-border operations.

The ANC/Cosatu/UDF delegation, led by ANC deputy president Nelson Man-

dela, included John Nkadimeng, Gertrude Shope, Jacob Zuma, Thabo Mbeki (all from the ANC's sub-committee on Natal), Harry Gwala (ANC Midlands Convener), Siphso Gcabashe, Alec Erwin, Diliza Mji (all from the ANC's Southern Natal Interim Regional Committee), Thami Mhlomi (Cosatu Southern Natal Regional Secretary), Jay Naidoo (Cosatu General Secretary), Jay Naidoo (Cosatu/ANC/UDF Joint Working Committee), Linda Zama and Fink Haysom (both lawyers). On the government's side, De Klerk, Adriaan Vlok and Kobie Coetsee were present.

De Klerk's initial response to allegations of police misconduct and the government's role in the Natal conflict was to say that the government should be impartial. He said he could 'see promise' in the proposal for a joint working group, as proposed by the ANC/Cosatu/UDF, but this should include Inkatha. The government, he said, would play the role of referee or chairperson in this joint working group.

The basis for discussion at the meeting was a memorandum prepared by the ANC/Cosatu/UDF Joint Working Committee.

Reiterating the view that the current violence has reached its present proportions and scope not simply because of political conflict, but also because of actions by the security forces, the memorandum proposed a two-pronged approach to its solution.

On the one hand, there needed to be a political resolution of the conflict, involving continued talks with representatives from Inkatha. The mandate to continue such talks was reaffirmed at the Conference for Peace and Reconstruction.

On the other hand, the democratic movement proposed that the ANC and government agree jointly upon steps to ensure the security forces play a neutral peace-keeping role and are perceived to be doing so by the affected communities.

In its memorandum, the ANC allege that security forces in Natal have:

- Behaved unlawfully.
- Failed to act impartially.
- Failed to protect communities and individuals against attacks.
- Assisted perpetrators of violence.
- Failed to investigate complaints.
- Failed to apply statutory provisions relating to dangerous weapons.
- Failed to prosecute offenders speedily and effectively.

The memorandum contains detailed instances of the alleged police misconduct (see separate article).

Two inter-related proposals in this regard are raised in the memorandum. The first is for a response to demands which were submitted to police stations around the country during marches in July this year. These called for:

- The disbanding of the KwaZulu Police and its replacement with a neutral force.
- Lifting the Emergency in Natal.
- Warlords to be arrested and charged.
- A judicial inquiry to be held.
- Security forces to play an effective and impartial peace-keeping role.
- Guaranteed freedom of association and political activity to all in Natal.

The second proposal is to establish a Joint Working Group made up of high-level representatives from the ANC and the government. This Joint Working Group's tasks should be to examine the security situation and to carry out monitoring.



'A downturn in the violence will mean the ANC can be built more rapidly'

toring.

One of the most important demands in terms of the security situation is for the KwaZulu Police to be stripped of its independent command status and for the South African Police to exercise its authority in KwaZulu areas to ensure effective and impartial policing occurs.

At present, the KwaZulu Police Commissioner is appointed by the South African law and order minister; and in terms of Section 5 of the Police Act, No.7 1958, the SAP have legal authority in KwaZulu. In addition, the National States Constitution Act of 1971 provides for the law and order minister to set conditions for the control, organisation and establishment of police forces in self-governing territories such as KwaZulu.

Monitoring would involve:

- The conduct of the security forces in dealing with complaints of misconduct.

The security forces have been accused of failing to protect and assist communities, acting unlawfully against individuals and communities, failing to take effective action to disarm people displaying dangerous weapons, acting with partiality towards Inkatha and being unable to investigate themselves effectively.

- Ensuring that security forces respond rapidly and correctly to situations of

violence or impending violence.

The working group's proposal is for:

- A common command structure for security forces.
- Monitoring offices set up by the ANC in strategic towns, such as Pietermaritzburg, Durban and Empangeni, which would have direct radio contact with the security forces.
- The establishment of a review system to investigate complaints against the police and their failure to respond to prevent acts of violence.

In addition the Joint Working Group should look at the possibility of creating special courts and for procedures to monitor police investigations.

To an extent, joint monitoring has already begun, with committees set up in Durban, Empangeni and Port Shepstone in mid-August.

According to Southern Natal ANC Interim Convener Terror Lekota, these joint monitoring committees are intended to ensure that police officers and ANC supporters do not breach the Groote Schuur and Pretoria commitments to peace.

There is regular contact between people appointed by the ANC in Natal and police officers at CR Swart police station, he said. So far, there have not been major problems and the intention is to set up similar communication channels in all major centres in Natal. Several meetings have been held with members of the police force and, according to Lekota, the ANC is satisfied that cases are being addressed.

Discussions are continuing about how to deal with KwaZulu areas. A meeting has been held between the ANC and KwaZulu Police representatives, but Lekota says nothing definite has emerged.

The proposal for a Joint Working Group may lead to an alleviation of the violence, which has hampered the rapid organisation of grassroots structures in the province. A downturn in the violence, while obviously making life tolerable for the people who bear the brunt of its consequences, will also mean that grassroots organisation of the ANC and other mass-based structures will be built more rapidly.

The instability which the violence causes, and the difficulty people have in openly expressing their support for the ANC, are major problems which the organisation must solve if it is to effectively influence the direction of change in South Africa. •



'KwaZulu Police are a danger to our well-being'

A special section of the dossier presented to President FW de Klerk is devoted to acts by the KwaZulu Police (ZP), and lists several incidents, including:

• **KWAMAKHUTHA**
 Hundreds of people fled the township in April to escape from ZP action, and residents brought an urgent application in the Durban Supreme Court to prevent further 'unlawful behaviour'.

Joseph Kabanyane, a member of the SAP since 1958, said in his affidavit: 'Through their conduct in attacking and shooting residents at random and for no apparent reason, the ZP have shown themselves to be highly reckless ... they are a real danger to the livelihood and well-being of local residents'.

• **ISITHEBE**
 In April, KwaZulu Police were ordered to stop assaulting or threatening to assault people carrying out trade union activities in the area.

• **NEWCASTLE and DUNDEE**
 ZP members are accused of working with local vigilantes, and have been seen escorting convoys of vigilantes in their search for activists. Police stations in the area refused to accept complaints lodged by activists who had been assaulted.

• **ESIKHAWENI**
 Residents alleged in affidavits that the ZP have assisted in attempts to drive activists out of the area. One allegation relates to an attack during which a youth was shot dead. When police arrived, most of their questions were about the political affiliation of the inhabitants.

• **UMLAZI**
 The KwaZulu Police commissioner and the Umlazi station commander have received a final order restraining them from assaulting certain residents. •

The police: Here to serve, but not to protect

The 50-page dossier presented to President FW de Klerk by the Joint Working Committee details numerous allegations of police misconduct in Natal, including:

- A failure to protect township residents during attacks.
- A failure to investigate cases.
- A failure to protect quickly, effectively, or at all.

'What is of concern is the fact that these allegations do not refer to only a few atypical policemen who have acted criminally', says the memorandum.

Rather, the allegations concern units which have repeatedly and persistently acted against communities which they saw as sympathetic to the ANC and its allies.

In March 1989, a special section of the riot unit was set up in the Pietermaritzburg area to help the CID to make arrests. Soon afterwards, several allegations were made about its members unlawfully assaulting youth in nearby Imbali township. One youth, Bonginkosi Zondi, was

able to get an interim interdict against the police. Zondi alleged that he and some of his friends had, on a number of occasions, been assaulted by the police. Although the court ruled that the matter be properly investigated, allegations of assault by police attached to the unit continued to come in.

In December 1989, a member of the unit, Willem de Wet - a respondent in the Zondi case - allegedly assaulted a young woman, Lydia Mazibuko. She immediately laid a charge and pointed out De Wet at an identification parade a week later. He was also identified by a second witness.

To date, De Wet has not been charged or arrested. Lawyers acting for Mazibuko were told the matter was referred to the Attorney General only in June 1990.

In March this year, a Slangspruit youth was assaulted by members of the SAP inside their mobile police unit. Although a complaint was made, the policemen have not been arrested or charged, despite the police being able to discover the

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identity of the policemen by checking their log books.

In December 1989, an interdict was granted restraining the SAP from assaulting or harassing Mpumalanga residents. Despite this, the Joint Working Committee has more than 20 affidavits testifying to such unlawful action continuing during February and April 1990. During this period, about 70 houses were destroyed. The allegations include:

- Preventing a person from leaving a burning house.
- Making no effort to stop looting.
- Shooting into people's homes.
- Throwing petrol bombs into people's homes.

In many of the incidents, it is alleged, members of the security forces were accompanied by people who are Inkatha members.

• Failure to assist to protect

On February 27 this year, refugees from Table Mountain returned to their homes on the understanding that the SADF would provide them with 24-hour protection. The SADF did not do this and the refugees were again attacked in early March.

In March, Edendale and Vulundlela residents were attacked by impis, made up of thousands of fighting men. These men were able to move without hindrance over long distances and had access to a substantial number of vehicles, weapons and ammunition. It is alleged that the security forces turned a blind eye to these attacks. When the Kwazulu interior minister announced he was going to hold a meeting in Mphophomeni on July 7, the Mphophomeni Residents' Association wrote to the regional police commissioner asking to meet with him. They also asked him to take steps to ensure their protection. These included searching all vehicles entering Mphophomeni and filming the meeting called by the Kwazulu minister. The commissioner replied that he was unable to attend such a meeting, and he did not implement any of the steps requested. Instead police allowed about 500 armed men to march into the township and allowed the meeting to proceed. No permission had been granted for the meeting.

During July, residents of Enseleni suffered repeated attacks by criminal elements led by local warlords. The only action taken by the police before the most serious attack on July 8 was to search the houses of victims for danger-

ous weapons. The police conducted these searches at the request of one of the warlords who led the attacks. After the attack, the police addressed a meeting of these who had carried out the attack and allegedly guaranteed their safety.

• Bias

Since May 1990 there has been a significant increase in the number of complaints against members of the SADF about harassment of ANC supporters. The allegations include:

- Unlawful assault of people perceived to be ANC supporters.
- Stealing of food and valuable items from houses during searches.
- Destruction of personal items during house searches.
- Aggressive and discourteous behaviour during house searches.
- Failure to disarm people on a consistent basis - the tendency is to allow Inkatha supporters to carry dangerous weapons.

According to Defence Force statistics, 10 complaints were lodged with the SADF during 1989 regarding the actions of troops in the townships. According to the Joint Working Committee, 50 complaints were made in 1990. To date there has been no response from the SADF about these.

There are also reports of collaboration between the police and Inkatha members. Among these are:

- Inkatha members are used to point out individuals and even to identify whether someone is an Inkatha member or not.
- Inkatha members are used by police to threaten 'comrades' and some individuals are taken to Inkatha houses so that they can be insulted and intimidated.
- Inkatha members assist police in carrying out the arrest of non-Inkatha people.

Of the 1 859 people detained in the Natal Midlands from 1986 to 1989, about 30 have been Inkatha members or supporters.

• Failure to investigate

In KwaMashu, local warlord George Vilikazi allegedly opened fire on a group of people on June 6. One person was killed and several others wounded. When parents of the deceased and wounded went to the police station to report the incident, they saw Vilikazi being congratulated by ZP members. The police refused to accept the complaint.

Lawyers handed a detailed statement to the head of the SAP, who handed the

matter back to the ZP. No arrests have been made and there has been no further communication from the police.

In May, unrest monitors attended an Inkatha meeting in Ndwedwe. They later made affidavits alleging that Chief Mzonjani Ncgobo had called for stronger action to be taken against youth. The action was elaborated upon during question time, when it was suggested that parents should kill their children if these were 'comrades'. The chief qualified this by saying that the killing should be left to those 'further removed'.

Soon after the meeting, marauding impis searched for youth in the area, killing many. Affidavits were lodged with the head of the SAP unrest unit, who referred the matter to the Kwazulu Police. Two months later, not even the monitors who were present in the meeting had been spoken to by police.

In March, the house of Umlazi resident Thandi Hlatshwayo was attacked by vigilantes, and her husband was murdered. Although the Kwazulu Police were telephoned, they failed to help. The matter was also reported to them. But after 40 days they had still not taken a statement from Ms Hlatshwayo. In an affidavit, she identified the leader of the attackers as Gimpiwe Shozi, son of a prominent warlord in Umlazi. Lawyers handed the matter to the SAP, but no arrests have been made.

• Failure to prosecute

In December 1988 an Inkatha meeting was held in the Mphophomeni Community Hall and Inkatha supporters were bused in. During the meeting, vigilantes abducted the chairperson of the MAWU shop-stewards council and two other people. The three were brutally murdered. An inquest magistrate found that certain Inkatha members were responsible for their deaths. However, no arrests or prosecutions have been made since.

In February 1989 an inquest magistrate found that David Ntombela, a member of Inkatha's Central Executive Committee, was responsible for the death of Angelica Mkhize and her young daughter. Ntombela has not been arrested or charged.

In November 1989 an inquest magistrate found that certain policemen, including a New Hanover station commander, had 'possible complicity' in the murders of 11 Trustfeeds residents in December 1988. No arrests have been made. •

Trying to piece together peace in Natal

Has the war in Natal been 'exported' to the Transvaal? Can tentative attempts at peace in Natal be 'exported' too? Researchers Doug Hindson and Mike Morris look at these and other questions relating to the Natal violence, and suggest ways of moving towards a lasting regional and national peace.

TWO main arguments are emerging in attempts to explain the violence in Natal — both polarised along political lines.

One view, associated with researchers aligned to the Inkatha movement, is that the violence is caused essentially by poor socio-economic conditions in the townships; the second, identified with supporters of the ANC/UDF/Cosatu alliance, is that political rivalry is the primary cause.

Polarisation along these lines and the use of research findings to rationalise present political agendas inhibits understanding. It also provides a poor guide to action in resolving the conflict.

This is because the violence has both political and 'socio-economic' dimensions - the political determinants of the violence are rooted in and sustained by underlying social and material conditions.

To end the violence it is necessary to deal with the immediate problem of political conflict; but long term solutions will not be found unless the underlying social and material factors which sustain violence are also addressed.

We see four levels of determination of the violence in Natal, each of which needs to be examined if the violence is to be explained and coherent and effective action taken to bring it to an end:

- The conflict and power balance nationally in South Africa.
- Rivalry between political organisations within Natal.
- Antagonisms between local power structures in the black residential areas.
- Social divisions within and between black residential communities based on different levels of material deprivation.

The conflict in Natal cannot be understood purely in terms of factors operating within the boundaries of the province. It is influenced by and interacts with the conflict that has been playing itself out in



Township residents (left), police (centre) and Inkatha supporters: looking for ways to resolve their problems

the rest of South Africa since the late 1970s. And certain issues relating to this larger conflict need to be considered.

Firstly, it is widely believed that the ultimate cause of violence is the system of apartheid. This view can be misleading, for it is in the context of a weakening of apartheid - not intensified racial oppression - that the violence has escalated. Liberalisation and deracialisation in the context of economic decline since the late 1970s has led to the resurfacing of class, ethnic and other divisions.

It is the struggle for new economic and social positions within shifting and uncertain social and economic contexts that is at the root of the conflict.

State reforms have accentuated rather than dampened this conflict, partly because deracialisation and liberalisation have opened opportunities for some and given vent to aspirations long suppressed

under apartheid. It is also because the reform strategy has been divisive, yielding limited economic and political concessions to new middle strata of the population while excluding or marginalising the impoverished and dispossessed majority.

Much of the political conflict has centered around the question of the incorporation of Africans (or sections of the African population) into city life and government.

Under classical apartheid township residents were firmly controlled by a battery of rules, regulations and laws governing every day life. Influx control and forced relocation policies displaced aspirant migrant families into the far peripheries of the cities or into the ban-tustans.

The breakdown and abandonment of influx control has released pent-up pressure for urbanisation. The numbers

moving to the cities or moving out of overcrowded townships to squat on vacant land far outstrip the capacity of either the state or the private housing market to supply even basic urban amenities. Intensified competition over land, housing and basic urban resources has sparked off conflict within and between urban communities along lines of relative wealth and poverty.

The state's incapacity to reimpose local government and political order in the townships, and the incapacity of the township organisations to effectively take on the superior power of the state, has resulted in the creation of semi-autonomous centres of local power in the form of youth, civic and defence organisations on the one hand and vigilante and warlord structures on the other.

In some places the existence of competing local power structures has led to the conversion of political opposition to the state into internecine struggles for hegemony within the black residential areas.

These localised centres of power within the townships have provided a major focus of political contestation in South Africa since the mid 1980s. In the 1980s, under the State of Emergency, the state sought to erode or destroy local organisations allied to the UDF/ANC and to strengthen ones sympathetic to it, such as Inkatha.

Since February this year a change of approach has taken place. Branches of the state such as the Department of Development Aid have begun to draw local competing organisations into common forums to negotiate with government over urban development. At the same time elements within the repressive branches of the state continue to act in terms of established practices, intervening in local conflicts to support old allies, thereby perpetuating and intensifying internecine conflict.

There can be no question that political rivalry has and continues to play a major part in the violence. But why has the rivalry in Natal taken the form of a conflict between the ANC and Inkatha, rather than as elsewhere between the mass organisations and the local organs of the central state?

In the rest of South Africa the community council system, as the local representative structure of the apartheid state, was the immediate object of attack; in many instances, this system was destroyed or seriously weakened during

the uprisings of the 1980s.

In Natal local governmental power structures were linked to the administration of the KwaZulu homeland and tied into the highly organised and relatively powerful Inkatha movement.

Inkatha claimed - and undoubtedly for a time had - considerable membership both in Natal and the Transvaal. Thus the youth uprisings in Natal from 1985 did not confront merely a fragile and compromised local expression of the central state - they confronted local governmental structures backed by a powerful political movement, linked into and supported by the considerable administrative and repressive machinery of a homeland government.

These circumstances help explain why the urban uprisings came late to Natal. They also help account for the intensity and duration of the conflict thereafter.

However, the roots of the violence and the factors which sustain it go far deeper than political affiliation and the conflict between Inkatha and the ANC/UDF/Cosatu alliance.

In Natal the existence of relatively evenly matched rival political movements led to the formation of competing local centres of power within the black residential areas: the youth structures allied mostly to the ANC and the warlords allied, for the most part, with Inkatha.

Squatter communities have become the major bases of Inkatha support in many of the black residential areas. Since shack dwellers have no 'de jure' rights to the land on which they squat, 'de facto' control is established essentially through their own internal organisation and capacity as a community to defend a piece of ground. In these circumstances shack-dwellers turn readily to local squatter leaders and warlords with whom they trade obedience and levies for residential security.

Given their vulnerability to removal by the state authorities, many of these warlords have turned to Inkatha and the KwaZulu authorities to uphold their rights to the land. They have also sought aid from the homeland structure to provide amenities and services in their areas. However, shack-dwellers have gained little material support.

In many of the shanty-towns squatter leaders/warlords enforce quasi-military discipline. Families supply conscripts for impis. Strict control is exercised over all community resources: shack sites, shops, liquor sales and water supplies. A hierarchy of warlords, lieutenants and area

headmen is supported by sometimes extortionate levies, tributes and other payments. The warlords depend on sub-lieutenants to exercise control, ensure community discipline, stifle dissent, and extract payments. The warlord authority structure is susceptible to internal rivalry, intrigue, disloyalty and putchism. Lieutenants constantly fight for favour or attempt to hive off to form their own squatter communities. Many of the shanty towns are constantly involved in violent internal power struggles.

Internal power struggles and the chronic incapacity of the warlords to meet the basic material needs of their communities leads them to deflect internal dissent into attacks against relatively better-off neighbouring formal townships.

In these formal townships and in some squatter areas, ANC-aligned youths have formed civic defence organisations receiving levies from residents. These structures act as armed units in times of conflict with neighbouring squatter communities. The youth organisations vary from politically disciplined community defence and security organisations to outright criminal gangs; from comrades to 'com-tsotsis' to tsotsis. With the weakening of Inkatha in some urban areas, for example in Inanda, youth organisations have emerged within the squatter areas and overthrown the power of the warlords and, in some instances, established more democratic forms of local control. However, since the youth and civic structures face similar obstacles in addressing their communities' needs, they remain vulnerable to reversion into warlordism.

Within both the youth and warlord structures violence has become institutionalised. The structures perpetuating the violence are also those which maintain internal social cohesion and attempt to meet basic material needs.

These structures also establish vested interests among the leadership in the perpetuation of violent conflict. Thus attempts to dismantle the warlord and youth power structures are strongly resisted by their leaderships. Only the most politically informed, disciplined and those most fully integrated into the larger political organisations can be rapidly brought under control by Inkatha or the ANC. Others are impelled by dynamics which are likely to continue even after national and regional peace settlements are achieved.

Part of the reason why the Natal vio-

lence has become endemic is that the relative autonomy of competing local power centres creates a relation of mutual dependency between the local and regional or national structures. To gain power locally the major political organisations have to operate through the local power centres. In their local conflicts, local power structures draw on the resources and support of regional and national centres of power.

This has a number of significant implications for both national and local politics. At the local level it means no side can on its own win conclusive victories because their powers and capacities lie partially outside, in their relationship to regional or national political and administrative centres.

But the problem is equally grave from a national perspective. Agreement at the national level, for example between the Nationalist Party and the ANC, is repeatedly undermined by the outbreak of violence at the local or regional level.

Thus a highly unstable situation prevails, the national and local forces and initiatives often working against each other.

New social divisions have begun to emerge within the black population based on differences in employment opportunities, income and access to urban residential resources. The old racial divisions of the apartheid period have been overlaid by increasing class differentiation within the black urban residential areas.

Labelling the conflict 'black-on-black' is not helpful. It deflects attention from the income and wealth differences within the black residential areas which are at the root of the violence. In the first upsurge of violence in Inanda in 1985, for example, the main targets were Indian and African traders, councillors and the visibly wealthier. Since then the antagonism has been recast in many places as a fight between communities that differ in terms of their access to the resources of residential life: housing, water, services. It has become a conflict between townships and squatter camp; between the poor and the impoverished.

The state's urban strategy of fostering social and economic differentiation within the African urban community without abandoning racial residential segregation has proved an explosive combination. The government's orderly urbanisation strategy encourages residential differentiation: new suburbs for the middle classes, privately owned



'Police impartiality is crucial for any agreement to hold'

township housing for the more affluent workers and ordered shack settlement for the remainder. A small emerging black middle class and a privileged group of workers benefited materially. Most of the working class and all of the unemployed and marginalised gained little. They have been the main victims of the deepening social antagonisms in the urban peripheries where the conflict has been between the poor and the very poor.

While violence rules every day life, attempts to address its socio-economic foundations through state-initiated urban development strategies are bound to fail. The immediate causes of political violence must be dealt with first and this can only be done if the major parties in the conflict - Inkatha, the ANC and the government - come together and agree to put an end to it.

The peace process has already begun at the national level through agreement on the part of the ANC and the government to negotiate a peaceful route to constitutional change, though this agreement remains fragile. Regional initiatives are also necessary, including the long overdue meeting of ANC deputy president Nelson Mandela and Inkatha leader Gatsha Buthelezi.

Any agreement reached between the ANC and Inkatha should also involve the government since its repressive agencies have been centrally involved in conflict,

often supporting the actions of Inkatha-aligned aggressors. Police impartiality is crucial for any peace agreement to hold.

But lasting peace cannot be assured merely at the leadership level, nationally or regionally. The extent of support for peaceful negotiation from their bases remains unclear.

It is necessary to mount peace initiatives at every level where semi-autonomous and violent power structures continue to operate. An important precedent has been set in Lower Umfolozi where a peace accord was reached among representatives of Cosatu, the ANC and Inkatha. It is significant that the agreement included representatives of the SAP, the KwaZulu Police and also the mayors of Enseleni, Ngelezane and Isikhaweni. All efforts should be directed at replicating this kind of achievement elsewhere.

It is not enough for the parties in conflict to cease hostilities. Violent power structures will need to be dismantled or converted into local political or civic organisations which contend for power through democratic means. The dismantling of local power structures should be undertaken as part of the construction of new local government structures which are democratically accountable to their communities.

Finally, the underlying material and social conditions which breed violence must not be neglected. Peace accords should provide for or lead to the establishment of forums within which community needs can be identified and development programmes formulated. Such forums should include all the parties able to contribute to development within an area.

The major parties to the violence in Natal - the South African state, the ANC alliance and Inkatha - face a choice: whether to continue along the violent road to power or to negotiate a peaceful route to political democracy.

The upsurge of violence in the Transvaal in recent weeks indicates that it is not possible to resolve the struggle for political hegemony in Natal by violent means without reestablishing the primacy of violence on the national political agenda.

The alternative is to strengthen the national process of peaceful negotiation by replicating this approach at all levels in Natal and elsewhere. *

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**Everyone must
enjoy
human rights**



The same political home for the hunter and the hunted

You people want to nationalise everything, but you don't want to use a public call box,' retorted a Gazankulu businessman when the ANC organiser had asked to use his phone.

The young activist had not identified himself. But obviously there was something about him which triggered the garage owner's suspicions - perhaps his youth, confidence and white companion. When told we were in the area on Catholic affairs, the businessman was satisfied. 'Oh, they also like this non-racialism', was his response.

With Gazankulu's Hudson Ntsanwisi still clinging to the past, it is doubtful that this particular businessman has broken ranks and crossed over to the ANC. But it is not inconceivable that at some stage he will.

Just next door in Venda, for instance, the ANC leadership's first journey to the north was at the invitation of local entrepreneurs.

The massive convergence on the ANC, by social and class formations largely absent from its ranks before its unbanning, is to be expected - and is certainly not particular to the Northern Transvaal. But what is peculiar to this vast area is the high concentration of some of these groups.

Spanning four bantustans - KwaNdebele, Lebowa, Gazankulu and Venda - the bulk of formal black employment is inevitably in the civil service and security forces. There is a multitude of tribal administrations, which until now have been securely locked into a well-developed system of state patronage. And under the wing of 'separate development', black entrepreneurs have to some extent found succour.

The shift within these groups towards the ANC has a number of implications. For one, it has already had an effect on the face of the organisation - although it

is still too early to predict the full impact on its character.

Secondly, it presents the ANC with the tricky issue of combining and balancing all these interests in a way which strengthens its hand at negotiations while meeting the aspirations of the people.

In the past, the most militant formations in the north - the ANC underground and the South African Youth Congress (Sayco) - completely dominated political activity. Parents, as one young activist put it, 'just watched from the grandstand'.

That's changed now (although the youth still kicked off the current wave of mobilisation), and identification by par-



As the ANC develops into a mass-based political movement, the nature of its membership is changing. In the Northern Transvaal, for example, militant youth and the bantustan police who used to be their jailers are now members of the same organisation.
Jenny Cargill reports

ents with the ANC is no doubt being made easier by the presence of many older activists in the interim leadership structures.

The launch of ANC branches is well underway in the area, with a regional conference set for October, and civic and village committees - drawing representation from right across the communities, including policemen and tribal chiefs - have mushroomed. As a result it was possible to put a regional civic body in place in August.

Teachers are grouped into four new progressive associations, with a regional umbrella body in the pipeline, and Contralesa is finding tribal chiefs increasingly receptive to its message. Recently, an ANC recruiter was surprised to find as many as 100 headmen and chiefs at a Contralesa meeting in a remote area of Venda. A substantial number took out ANC membership.

The Police and Prisons Civil Rights Union (Popcru) has representation in remote rural villages, with the ANC reporting a growing interest among members of the security forces to join either its ranks or mass democratic movement structures.

As elsewhere, black expectations have exploded into militant action. Pietersburg, for instance, now reports the highest number of industrial court hearings in the country. A strike wave in Seshego in July/August highlighted the political context of the labour militancy. 'We have joined the cause', was the succinct explanation by one worker for downing tools. The unbanning of the ANC, many said, had given them the 'courage' to challenge their poverty wages - sometimes as little as R25 a week.

But the pitfalls for the ANC are many. People remain deeply suspicious of the bantustan leaders and the chiefs who identified with the past regimes, and acceptance of ANC policy to win them

ANC



Flying high ... the ANC flag was displayed at the funeral of UDF leader Peter Nchabeleng

over to their side is by no means automatic. When ANC national organiser Steve Tshwete went to open a Venda Chamber of Commerce conference in June, a joint rally with new military ruler Brigadier Gabriel Ramushwana attracted just a handful of supporters. It was a salutary lesson to the ANC on the need for local consultation.

A Venda activist also reported some instances of villages trying to keep their chiefs out of their emergent committees. 'Many people feel chiefs need to pay for past sins', he said.

The regional ANC structure is liaising with all bantustan leaders except Ntsanwisi - but even he has not been ruled off the consultation list. In Venda, a working group was set up when the ANC and mass democratic movement representatives first met Ramushwana soon after his April takeover. But so far it has not met.

Contact with Lebowa's Nelson Ramodike has some history now, but activists complain of him trying to straddle the fence, pleasing both Pretoria and the ANC.

ANC activities in the region are also complicated by the new and varying forms of state control over the changing political dynamic. Lebowa police appear to have all but withdrawn from visible security tasks, and in their place has stepped the South African Defence Force (SADF). In July, soldiers moved into at least two villages in the Sekhukhuneland area, apparently at the request of unpopular chiefs worried about being usurped by ANC-aligned formations. And returned ANC leader John Nkadi-meng addressed his hometown watched over by the military.

In Venda a more sophisticated political approach appears to be coming out of Defence Force headquarters - one of pre-

empting radical action. The first of this kind was Ramushwana's government takeover in April. His denial of SADF involvement in the 'military coup' is a bit difficult to believe, with the seconded SADF brigadiers at Ramushwana's HQ undoubtedly having some hand in pulling the political strings.

At a more mundane level, local activists point to Ramushwana pre-empting a protest against an untidy township by launching his own clean-up campaign. He himself headed a clean-up team of the streets of Shayandima.

With resentment growing over the tribal councils blocking the efforts of village committees, Ramushwana has promised to disband them. He hoped the chiefs could hold ex officio positions in the new structures so they could 'learn about democracy'.

But the apparent drop in repression in Venda is being counter-balanced by the rise of a new Inkatha-lookalike, Maanda Nga UPfana (unity is strength). Many of the old faces of the ousted Venda National Party (VNP) are in it. The facilities and organisations involved in training predominantly VNP youth in the past have been resuscitated - and reports of weapons-training are already filtering through.

Perhaps because white conservatism is so notorious in the region - where 97 percent of the population is black - the few efforts of white intervention of a more liberal flavour are particularly notable.

Some tentative reaching out to the ANC has already taken place. The Pietersburg Chamber of Commerce chief Jannie Moolman talks of chats with 'Thabo', the ANC's regional convenor, Thabo Makwenyane. Moolman's executive has approved a business trust to promote education and free enterprise within the black community.

And Northern Transvaal business is looking at bringing all business associations - black and white - into a regional grouping.

So the influences and interests impinging on the ANC and the region's political character are complex and many. While predictions are possible, it is too soon to know how the political situation will pan out. But for the moment, despite all the political energy, the Northern Transvaal gives an impression of a people holding its breath, waiting to see how volatile white fears feed off the new black militancy. — *Africa Information Afrique* •



The human chain ... 24 000 clothing and textile workers participated in the event

Taking it to the streets

On the last Tuesday of August, a demonstration with a difference took place in Durban's industrial areas when some 24 000 clothing and textile workers linked arms to form 'human chains' running from factory to factory.

The workers were members of the South African Clothing & Textile Workers' Union (Sactwu) and they sacrificed a portion of their wages to give physical expression to the concept of working-class unity.

Some 27 000 Sactwu members in Cape Town participated in a similar action on 18 July. These and other activities which will take place in coming weeks form part of the Sactwu's programme around the Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu) campaign for a Workers' Charter (WC).

The campaign has not attracted much media attention thus far. But it is one which is assuming ever greater importance in the run-up to negotiations be-

The campaign for a workers' charter is being taken out of meeting rooms and into the factories and streets by trade unions determined to ensure workers' rights are entrenched in a new South Africa.

Robyn Rafel reports

tween the government and the African National Congress (ANC) following the signing of the Pretoria Minute. For it is Cosatu's intention - and that of its partners in the revolutionary alliance, the ANC and the South African Communist Party (SACP) - that the demands articulated in the WC form part of the constitution of the 'new' South Africa.

The WC campaign was formally initiated at Cosatu's 1989 congress. And,

like the process which led to the adoption of the Freedom Charter in 1955, organisers are hoping for the greatest possible participation in formulating it. This applies both to workers within the federation and those outside it, as the charter is regarded as a working-class issue and not something exclusive to Cosatu.

The campaign has fallen a little behind schedule; a WC congress to adopt a charter was originally expected to take place in mid-1990. A WC conference is now scheduled for November. This will be followed next year by a WC congress which will probably coincide with Cosatu's congress.

It was Sactwu, or rather its two forerunners - the Amalgamated Clothing & Textile Workers' Union (Actwusa) and the Garment & Allied Workers' Union (Gawu) - which proposed the motion leading to Cosatu launching the WC campaign. Actwusa had drawn up its own draft charter in April 1989. Gawu's decision to join forces in proposing the

WC campaign was made in talks held shortly before the 1989 Cosatu congress.

Their original idea was that the federation should adopt Actwusa's draft WC. However, during the debate on the motion, it became clear that Cosatu's other affiliates needed time to discuss the matter in their own structures. Accordingly, the resolution was amended to read that Cosatu should initiate a WC campaign which would culminate in a special congress where organised workers and their allies would adopt the charter.

The demands in Sactwu's draft WC are not confined to shop-floor issues. A call for economic restructuring and the role of organised labour in politics are critical components of the document. The demands are undeniably ambitious. But Sactwu is convinced they are not only reasonable, but attainable, in the post-apartheid period.

According to Sactwu national education secretary Ebrahim Patel, the union believes basic legal rights have to be accorded in three areas if the working class is to flourish in the new order:

- The right to trade union organisation.
- The right of industrial democracy.
- The right of trade union independence.

The basic aim behind the demands around trade union organisation has been to identify the measures required to ensure that South Africa has strong worker-controlled trade unions. The draft WC, therefore, demands that all workers have the right to join a union without fear of victimisation. It also calls for all workers to have the right to bargain collectively at local and national level, to strike and to picket. All workers should also have the right to be protected against unfair dismissal and the right to reinstatement. Furthermore, employers should be duty-bound to afford majority unions reasonable facilities.

The demands around the right to industrial democracy are directed at employers and the state. In what amounts to a call for the introduction of a totally new dispensation involving real power-sharing, the draft charter starts by demanding that the trade union movement have the right to negotiate on the drafting of all laws affecting workers (with the right to strike in the course of such talks).

It then demands that workers have the right to participate in the running of companies through the involvement of worker delegates elected, and subject to recall by, the workforce. And it also calls for workers to have the right to veto the

appointment of judges of industrial disputes and the right to require the termination of the services of any worker or manager on fair grounds.

Until recently, the notion of workers in Cosatu and the National Council of Trade Unions (Nactu) having a meaningful say in drafting legislation would have been inconceivable. But the Cosatu-Nactu-Saccola Accord on the Labour Relations Act (LRA), signed in May, has already demonstrated that capital and labour can see eye-to-eye on the law. And even if the government does not accede to the demands Cosatu has since tabled in the joint working committee on the LRA established after it and Saccola met with President FW de Klerk on 26 June, that does not detract from the fact is that the state is also already engaged in the process.

The demand that workers have a say in the management of enterprises is unprecedented in South Africa. Traditionally, because of the close link between capitalist exploitation and apartheid, the relationship between capital and labour is highly antagonistic and companies have always jealously guarded management's prerogative to manage. Yet there are many examples of countries where management and labour exercise joint control with great success.

Patel says Sactwu does not have a fixed blueprint for how companies should be operated in the future, but feels it is important to start debating the issue: 'In our view, there are a number of different ways in which greater worker control in the economy can be asserted. As a starting point in the debate we can cite a few possibilities. In state-owned enterprises like Eskom, Transnet and SAA, for example, we ought to be able to secure substantial power for workers in controlling and managing the enterprise.

'In privately-owned enterprises, on the other hand, restructuring will be required at at least two levels. First, workers ought to have access to the decision-making boards, through delegates elected on the shop floor. The primary objective is to ensure worker access to managerial strategies and planning. Second, unions ought to expand the issues of collective bargaining to more than the fight over the rate for the job and the length of the working week. We must challenge the managerial prerogative over prices, markets, growth, employment and products. 'We also feel there is a lot of potential for various collectively-owned

What do employers think about the notion of workers participating in the management of enterprises as demanded in Sactwu's draft WC?

WIP asked Anglo American industrial relations and public affairs director Bobby Godsell for his views:

'I welcome Sactwu's initiative because it develops the debate about a new economic order for South Africa. The debate is essentially about how you create wealth and how you distribute it.

'Hopefully we have now moved beyond the the broad generalisations which have characterised it up until now.

'South African law is essentially Anglo Saxon law and is in important respects a reflection of 19th century perspectives because it is based on the idea that the only important stakeholders in a company are its shareholders.

enterprises in a future economy. We need to look at new forms of collective ownership of enterprises and greater worker control. For instance, although workers generate hundreds of millions of rands in provident fund incomes every year, control of investment is firmly in the hands of big capital - Old Mutual, Sanlam and others. Our efforts must be directed at gaining control over this investment pool'.

Explaining the demand on the appointment of judges as industrial court officers, Patel says there is a strong feeling in the union that the present system, in terms of which the state appoints such people, is wrong. 'Our experience of the industrial court is instructive. The judgments of the court often show that the presiding officers do not understand the concerns and aspirations of workers. In a new South Africa workers need to have a say over appointments in the industrial court. Sactwu's resolution proposes a trade union veto over the appointment of such people'.

Is the demand for workers to have a say in managing companies a call to adopt the West German system of co-determination? Not specifically, says Patel: 'In the past any model of democratic worker participation in industry was always dismissed as co-option. Out of the developments of eastern Europe, however, we have all come to realise that

debate begin

'In West Germany, France, Belgium and the Scandinavian countries, on the other hand, there is a more complex view. The company is seen as having a plurality of stakeholders and the role of these stakeholders - employees especially - has been institutionalised. The origins of this approach go back to the beginning of the century.

'A third approach has been the centrally controlled economy as practised in eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. But today in eastern Europe and the Soviet Union all people talk about is market socialism and liberating the enterprise from the dictates of central planning agencies.

'There is an interesting convergence of ideas occurring. I think we are beginning to ask the same questions about the creation of wealth and how it should be distributed: whether we have the same answers is



Godsell ... welcomes debate

a different matter.

'What we need to debate is the principle of joint decision-making at enterprise level. Then we should design appropriate structures for South Africa'.

the struggle is not just an issue of ownership. It is very much an issue of control.

'What we have to look at carefully is the best means of getting workers to have greater control over their lives. Certainly there is space to learn from the experiences of other countries. But at the end of the day we have to find a formula that will work in South Africa.

'The traditions of democracy in our trade unions are much stronger than in many other countries where co-determination has been introduced. Therefore, when we enter into debate about democratisation of factories we can go much further than the German model or another one. If we become involved there must be adequate structures to allow workers to have a greater say in decision making. The key danger is co-option on the terms and programme of capital. We must avoid that'.

The demand for workers to have the right to require the termination of the services of any worker or manager on fair grounds is motivated by two concerns - to give workers a weapon to deal with 'anti-worker' managers and the closed shop.

Says Patel: 'Today management has the sole prerogative to hire and fire. In a new South Africa, unions ought to have a say in this. We want workers to be able to take action against managers who are

particularly anti-worker in practice, action or utterance.

'Racist or anti-worker attitudes are not things which workers have the right to take strike action to remedy. Therefore, it is important that they have the right to demand dismissal when managers adopt attitudes fundamentally hostile to the interests of the workers, or behave in a blatantly racist way'.

On the face of it, the demand for workers to be able to demand the dismissal of fellow workers to enforce a closed shop seems unfair. But Sactwu's logic is the following: the union supports the notion of the closed shop. However, it does not want closed-shop arrangements enshrined in the law. Instead, it feels unions must earn the right to a closed shop by winning majority support. The important thing, therefore, is that unions should have the right to enter into closed-shop arrangements.

The demands around the right to trade union independence reflect important lessons from eastern Europe and indeed many African countries.

'We believe the trade unions must not only be independent of the state, of employers, but also from political parties. And the way to pursue this independence is through the right of workers to join a trade union of their choice with the right to determine the union's constitution. We don't want a system where the

state prescribes what the official unions are - even if we are the beneficiaries of that policy', says Patel.

'We also seek the right to engage fully in politics. This would include the right to establish political funds and to bring out newspapers to promote the unions' political views. In short, we don't want the state to stipulate what constitutes bona fide trade union business. That prerogative belongs to the members of the union'.

A related demand is for workers to have the right to be represented on all bodies of state involved in planning industrial and residential areas and services.

All the demands in the WC must be read and understood in conjunction with the resolution on political policy Sactwu adopted at the same time as the draft worker charter (see separate article). The crucial phrase in the resolution is Sactwu's decision that the union should not affiliate to any non-worker organisation.

There are several reasons why Sactwu believes this would be unwise. The prime reason is the fact is that workers are politically divided and its credo that all workers and union officials have a fundamental right to belong to any political and other organisation of their choice.

That does not, however, mean the union believes its struggle should be confined to the shop floor. On the contrary, Sactwu holds that it has a duty and responsibility to act in the community - both on its own and in alliance with other organisations, provided such alliances are based on the principles of:

- Proper mandates.
- Maintaining unity among workers.
- The independence of union structures and decisions.

Significantly, unlike both the SACP and Sactu WCs, Sactwu is not calling for a national minimum wage. The union was one of several Cosatu affiliates which argued against such a measure at the federation's recent Campaigns Conference in Johannesburg. On the table for discussion there was a proposal from the federation's Living Wage Committee (LWC) recommending a national minimum wage of R700 a month. The issue has now been referred back for further consideration.

Sactwu is opposed to a national minimum wage for several reasons:

- It undermines trade union and collective bargaining. Rather than engaging

unions in the business of determining a fair wage for a particular job, Sactwu believes employers would tend to fight for the right to pay the state-regulated minimum. The power play between workers (whose ultimate weapon for attaining their aims is the strike) and employers (whose weapon is the lock-out) would not occur if a parliamentary committee determines minimum wages.

- It undermines the bargaining power of higher-paid workers. In South Africa the wages of workers in the motor assembly and chemical sectors and at companies like SAB are much higher than in other sectors. Sactwu argues that a national minimum wage that is lower than what is paid in these sectors would give employers a valid excuse to depress wages; and they would be able to occupy the moral high ground in doing so because they

would be able to say the wage was determined by a democratic government.

- It undermines the job security of lower-paid workers. Different industries have different cost structures and differing abilities to pay. Sactwu fears an across-the-board national minimum determined without proper consideration of the unique characteristics of each sector could jeopardise certain sectors' short-, medium- and long-term well-being. It may also discourage entrepreneurs from establishing new businesses.

- It does not take regional wage disparities into account. Wages in the rural areas, for example, are generally far lower than in the urban areas. The union is concerned that a national minimum may have the effect of wiping out all industries in the rural areas.

In Sactwu's view sectorally-deter-

mined minimum wages make much more sense as they circumvent the problems raised above. Says Patel: 'We don't believe there should not be minima, but to the extent that there are minimum standards in industry these must be achieved through negotiation. Something like the present industrial council system would be best. Let the state give sanction to private agreements, but don't let it set the standards.'

'Exceptions should, however, be made in sectors such as the agricultural and domestic sectors where unions do not have a strong presence.'

Sactwu's draft charter differs from the draft WC adopted by the SACP in several respects. (It is also markedly different to Sactu's draft WC; but as Sactu has since been disbanded and merged into Cosatu, this is only of academic interest).

According to Patel, the key difference between Sactwu's document and that of the SACP is a difference of approach as regards the role of a charter.

'Our demands are intended for inclusion in the laws and constitution of a post-apartheid South Africa. It does not appear as if the party's demands are intended for the immediate period ahead since they include long-term demands such as worker control of the key means of production. In other words, the SACP charter is a general vision or manifesto of where workers would want to go in the long term. The rights we articulate are achievable in the transformation phase of a post-apartheid South Africa.'

'The second difference is in the character of the demands. We have taken demands which can be put into law, while the SACP charter gets out some general beliefs. For example, the SACP charter calls for "one union one industry" as the basis of trade union organisation. We support this important principle of Cosatu - in fact our union was one of the sponsors of the resolution at federation's inaugural congress. But we do not think the law should be prescriptive in these matters. Each union must earn the right to be the sole representative of workers in their industry through action and struggle'.

The SACP charter also demands certain substantive rights such as the right to a living wage, the right to child care, the right to family life and other social facilities. These are important demands which workers have fought for for decades, but Sactwu feels they are not things which can be easily realised by passing a law.

Summaries of resolutions

Worker Charter Resolution

The right to trade union organisation:

- to belong to trade unions without victimisation
- to negotiate with bosses
- union facilities (shop steward recognition and time off, access for organisers, notice boards and stop orders)
- to strike
- to picket
- no unfair dismissals

The right to industrial democracy:

- take part in management of factories
- help choose judges in industrial courts
- negotiate labour laws with the state
- demands the dismissals of anti-worker managers
- demand a closed shop

The right to trade union independence:

- independence from the state, political parties and bosses
- workers alone to decide the union's constitution, decide its policies and choose its leaders
- bring out newspapers and use funds to promote workers' political interests
- membership open to all

Political Policy Resolution

- the union will remain independent and will not affiliate to any non-worker organisation
- the union will act both inside and outside the factories to defend the rights of its members and advance the interests of workers and will work with all other organisations if such co-operation furthers these interests
- union leaders and officials must not compromise the political independence of the union through their actions outside the union and may not speak on any platform on the union's behalf without a clear mandate.



Winning worker rights in the bantustans

Says Patel: 'We hope to achieve those demands through the power of trade unions. What we seek in the charter are those rights which strengthen unions so that we may fight for them. It is akin to the difference between recognition demands and wage demands. In the charter we largely seek recognition - or power - rights. These will then be used to secure the bread and butter needs of our members.'

'It all relates to the kind of society we want to see in the "new South Africa". We hope a democratic state will also be one where we have a strong and vibrant civil society, with strong unions checking the state. There must be a clear separation of powers. And that should be extended into other areas. Unions and strong civic organisations must help to shape housing policy and social services. Student organisations must shape the education struggle. We have powerful actors that together can ensure the democratisation of South African life'.

Right now Sactwu's primary concern is to conscientise its members about the WC campaign. The union is aware that constitutional debates are not the priority of workers earning low wages. But it is determined to make the issue alive for them. The 'human chain' demonstrations were part of that process.

Another method it is using to popularise the campaign is 'red headband days' in which workers wear headbands to give visible expression to the notion of a WC. It is also demanding that employers allow special WC notice boards - which would be under the exclusive control of workers - to be erected in factories. 'The struggle around the notice boards will serve to inform them that the struggle for the WC is happening now,' says Patel.

'Mr Worker Charter' and 'Miss Worker Charter' competitions are a further element of the programme; during lunchtime workers are encouraged to stage short plays illustrating the various demands in the charter. Voting then takes place to determine who best portrayed the issues. •

Remember the adverts with the yellow beach umbrella and a deckchair on a dazzling beach cordially inviting investors and industrialists to set up shop in sunny Ciskei?

By dint of the repressive regimes of Lennox Sebe and the Matanzima brothers, coupled with South Africa's decentralisation programme, Ciskei and Transkei used to be places where employers could not only be spared the horrors of dealing with militant trade unions, but would also have their wage bills subsidised - not to mention standing a chance of operating a few fiddles on the side.

Times have certainly changed in the two bantustans. Following widespread strikes and negotiations between lawyers representing the bantustan governments, employers and Cosatu, the military councils of both bantustans have been forced to ignore the threat of driving investors away and have issued decrees which lay the basis for rapid unionisation in the industrial sector.

A commission under chairperson Professor Nic Wiehahn, architect of the labour reforms introduced in South Africa after 1979, was responsible for the Transkei decree which was issued in June. Ciskei issued its decree the following month: it saved itself the rumoured R700 000 cost of appointing a commission, and the order borrows heavily from the Transkei decree.

And while the results are far from ideal - compromises were made - unionists say the decrees do offer workers a far better deal than they have had up to now and are, in some respects, more enlightened than South Africa's current Labour Relations Act (LRA).

Public servants are excluded from the ambit of both decrees. Ciskei also excludes farm and domestic workers and all those employed in small businesses (less than 20 workers).

The major difference between the systems that have been introduced in the two bantustans is that the Transkeian

The fight to entrench worker rights is not only being fought in South Africa's urban areas - in the Ciskei and Transkei, the right to organise is now entrenched in decrees issued by the bantustans' military councils. Louise Flanagan reports

decree makes provision for centralised bargaining through an industrial councils system - and the possibility of establishing legal minimums for the various industrial sectors - while the Ciskei decree does not. WIP understands that Cosatu's National Union of Metalworkers (Numsa) has already submitted a constitution for a motor and metal industrial council in Transkei for approval.

Both decrees cut out a lot of the detours and complicated procedures of South Africa's current Labour Relations Act (LRA) and reveal clear influences from the Cosatu-Nactu-Saccola Accord on the LRA which was signed in May.

'We want a cheaper and more efficient system than the one in South Africa and tried to make the document as simple as possible so that it could be understood and used by everyone - not just people with law degrees', says Peter Williams, lawyer for the Ciskei Chamber of Industries.

Features common to both decrees are:

- Workers have the right to join a union of their choice without fear of victimisation.
- Participation in a prohibited strike or lockout is no longer a criminal offence.
- Provisions for the registration of trade unions and employer associations (Cosatu has indicated that its affiliates will register).
- Companies are obliged to grant unions

recognition once they prove they have signed up 50% plus one of the workers at a plant. It's probably this clause, rather than a change of heart, which resulted in Da Gama, a Ciskei company notorious for union-bashing, consistently refusing to recognise the SA Clothing and Textile Workers' Union (Sactwu). It finally allowed union officials through the gates after a march earlier this month.

- Provisions for works councils to be established in plants where there is no union organisation. Once a union is recognised, work councils can only continue with union agreement. Any agreements concluded between management and the works councils also have to be endorsed by the union.

- Unfair Labour Practice (ULP) definitions identical to the provisions of the pre-September 1988 amendments to the LRA.

In terms of the definition, virtually anything (except legal strikes or lock-outs) which prejudices workers or their bosses can be ULP.

- Measures against unfair dismissals which make it harder to fire workers. Employees may only lose their jobs due to incapacity, misconduct or retrenchment, but only after a fair hearing in the case of the first two reasons, and 'consultation in good faith' with the union or worker representatives in the case of the latter.

- Dispute procedures far simpler than the those applicable in South Africa. In Transkei all disputes must be either be referred to an industrial council or a conciliation board (applications must be lodged within a 'reasonable time'); in Ciskei application for conciliation boards must be lodged within 180 days of a dispute being declared. If the dispute has not been settled within 30 days of a board being appointed or a dispute hearing at an industrial council, unions cannot call workers out on strike unless 50% of workers vote in favour of downing tools in a strike ballot. Similar restrictions apply to lock-outs.

Disputes may be referred to mediation or arbitration if attempts at conciliation fail; if the disputing parties opt for arbitration, striking is prohibited.

In both bantustans unions and employers' organisations are indemnified against claims for losses suffered during legal strikes and lock-outs.

- Compulsory arbitration for all disputes involving 'essential services'.

- Provisions for the establishment of industrial courts to deal with disputes of



Oupa Gqozo after the coup which ended the repressive regime of Lennox Sebe

right. (Disputes of interest - for example, wage disputes - should be dealt with in terms of the normal dispute procedures). The courts have wide powers of discretion to decide what constitutes an ULP, but must take note of South African law and, in Transkei, of international labour standards as precedents.

The courts are to be composed of labour lawyers from boards nominated jointly by trade unions and employers' organisations.

The President of the Industrial Court in Ciskei is likely to be Isak Smuts. Smuts currently works for the military government but is a candidate both employers and unions are likely to respect. The Transkei industrial court president is Advocate Botha, formerly an additional member of the South African industrial court. He is regarded by employers as fair but by unions as conservative.

In Transkei appeals against industrial court decisions may be heard by an industrial court of appeal; in Ciskei appeals must go to the Supreme Court.

Employers' attitudes to these developments vary. On the one hand, many industrialists, particularly the most notorious employers, seem to favour a head-in-the-sand approach. Several seminars have been held to explain the new dis-

pensations, but none of the employers with the worst reputations - the Taiwanese, the Israelis, and sawmill owners - even bothered to put in an appearance. It is these companies, which pay around 45c an hour with little extra for overtime, that are most likely to be hit by demands for living wages and better conditions.

Other employers seemed overwhelmed. At one seminar in Ciskei where Numsa education officer Gavin Hartford delivered a lecture about shop-steward rights, employers were infuriated when he stated workers were likely to demand a minimum wage of R4,50 an hour, maternity leave, child-care facilities, a 40-hour week, and that Cosatu would probably be bringing the Workers' Charter campaign to their area.

They laughed at the idea of paternity leave and sneered when he told them labour relations started at shop-floor level. Those employers who managed to get beyond cursing said they simply couldn't afford such changes.

In the Transkei, a slightly different attitude prevailed at the seminars. While some employers seemed intent on learning the new laws as a method of survival and outwitting unions and workers, many welcomed them as a much needed set of procedures for dealing with industrial action. •

The state of socialism

*Sociology professor Michael Burawoy recently visited South Africa as a guest of the Association of Sociologists of South Africa. Burawoy, professor at the University of California, is the author of *The Politics of Production: Factory Regimes Under Capitalism and Socialism*, a seminal work on the relationship between production and politics. In this interview with Eddie Webster, he discusses the state of socialism and the future of socialist movements in South Africa*

Michael Burawoy's most significant contribution to Marxism has been to theorise the non-economic aspects of work, in which he has developed an analysis of the 'political and ideological apparatuses of production'.

His interest developed while he worked on the shop floor as a machine operator in Chicago in the early 1970s.

'I tried to understand why my fellow workers were working so hard, straining themselves to make rates that only marginally increased their earnings. From here I posed the broader question: How is consent organised in the capitalist workplace? 'My conclusion', says Burawoy, 'was that the American industrial relations system has a legalistic character which means worker struggles remain confined to the enterprise and do not spill over into other enterprises or the community.'

'In the unionised sectors of industry, there is what I call an "internal state" within the workplace which is constituted, on the one hand, of workers as individuals with individual rights and obligations (almost citizens of the workplace) and, on the other, of workers as a collectivity, a unit, for collective bargaining purposes.'

'Grievance machinery regulates conflicts over breaches of the contract of employment by workers as individuals, while collective bargaining alters the contract.'

'I call this internal state a "hegemonic" regime of production because it organises a class compromise in which the interests of capital are presented as the interests of all. Workers consent to managerial domination in exchange for material concessions linked to profit levels.'

'So what we find is that relations between production and politics under advanced capitalism are institutionally separated.'

In order to find out for himself what it is like to work in a 'workers' state, Burawoy has travelled to Hungary regularly since 1982.

'I have worked in champagne and textile factories and a machine shop very similar to the one in Chicago. Since 1985 I have spent three spells - about a year in all - as a furnaceman in a steel mill', he explains.

'The essential difference from capitalist societies is the

fusion of production politics and state politics. I call the production regime there "bureaucratic despotism". It is bureaucratic because the state appears at the point of production in the form of the triple alliance of management, union and party and despotic because there are no countervailing institutions for workers which would moderate the effect of the triple alliance. Workers' bargaining power depends, on the one hand, on their skill and position in production, and on the other, on the relationship between the enterprise and the state.

The latter is analogous to the relationship between the enterprise and the market under capitalism.

Q: Are there any other distinctive features of production under existing socialism?

A: In a centrally-organised economy enterprises operate under soft budget constraints. That is, they are protected against bankruptcy.

Their success is not measured by economic criterion of profits but the political criterion of expansion.

Enterprises therefore develop an inexhaustible appetite for investment goods as well as material and human supplies for which they bargain with central planners. This causes shortages. And shortages beget hoarding which leads to further shortages.


If an enterprise is to be effective, therefore, its work organisation must be sufficiently flexible to adapt to these shortages, or what you might call supply constraints - unreliable technology, scarce or deficient raw materials, and even inadequate labour supplies.

Self-organisation on the shop floor is therefore widely practised, particularly if it does not challenge the political interests of middle management.

This contrasts with a capitalist firm which faces demand constraints in a context of surpluses. Whereas deskilling and expropriation of control from the shop floor can enhance the effectiveness of the capitalist enterprise, it can create chaos in the socialist factory.

Q: How does this affect the consciousness of workers?

A: Shortages, combined with the fusion of production politics and state politics, leads workers to develop an unusually heightened consciousness of the systemic logic of state socialism.



Michael Burawoy

But they also develop a critique of that system for failing to live up to its ideals for the following reason: where exploitation and oppression has a visible perpetrator - the state - ideology is necessary to legitimate the socialist order as being in the interests of all.

Ideology socialism takes on a powerful reality of its own through rituals celebrating the supposed virtues of socialism. It pretends to be just, efficient and democratic.

Workers therefore become acutely conscious of injustice.

In advanced capitalism, ideology is more variegated, diffused and ultimately marginal to the reproduction of the economic order and workers don't develop the same critical consciousness.

Q: Has such a critique of state socialism led to a demand for a more democratic socialism in eastern Europe?

A: Although there are clear signs of such demands in the recent strikes by Soviet miners, the most obvious example is the Solidarity movement of Poland in 1981/2.

To be sure the discourse of Solidarity was anti-Marxist, anti-Soviet, but its project was socialist. That is, its ostensible goal was a democratic socialism, a society that would be run by workers in the interests of all.

It was no accident that the first nationwide working-class revolt in history took place in a state socialist society, a society which inculcated the values of socialism - justice, efficiency and democracy - through their non-observance.

Q: How would you explain the subsequent developments in Poland and Solidarity in particular?

A: After the generals took over in 1981 Solidarity went underground. It resurfaced seven or eight years later having lost the close connection between the leaders and the led.

The leadership sat down with the Jaruzelski regime to forge an historic agreement. During these talks there was no continual returning to the people with fresh proposals.

A complicated arrangement was hammered out in which elections would guarantee the continuing reign of the Communist Party. Solidarity won a landslide victory - although the rules still gave the majority of seats in the lower house to the communists.

What upset the applecart was the defection of two small parties from their traditional alliance with the Communist Party. This changed the balance of power in favour of Solidarity eventually, almost against its own will, Solidarity found itself in power.

In order to meet the acute economic crisis, Solidarity has pursued the most austere policies for introducing market capitalism.

This has been possible only because of the credibility it inherited from the past.

Even so it has faced considerable resistance from Solidarity groups which control many of the enterprises and now, not surprisingly, it is splitting up - inevitable for a working-class movement which assumes power with the object of destroying the social and economic guarantees of state socialism.

Q: Doesn't the experience of Solidarity - and developments

in eastern Europe as a whole - suggest that your argument is simplistic?

A: No, not simplistic, optimistic. I say the breakdown of state socialism could lead to working-class struggles for a democratic socialism.

I underestimated the way state socialism in general, and bureaucratic despotism in particular, atomised and demobilised the working class.

Contrary to popular wisdom and with the exception of Rumania, the regimes of eastern Europe did not collapse from popular struggles from below, although of course such events as the migration of East Germans precipitated changes.

In my view the regimes collapsed from above. The dominant class lost its self-confidence, its will to govern in the name of socialism.

Q: How did this happen?

A: The yawning gap between ideology and reality, between the promises of socialism and their actual non-realisation, not only led to distinctive working-class opposition but had a corrosive effect on the ruling class, particularly in the increasingly educated and professional fractions of the nomenclatura.

Instead of trying to bring reality into conformity with ideology, as they had done in the past through repression and then through reforms, they abandoned the old ideology of socialism and propagated the virtues of markets, profits and free enterprise.

You see this in all the countries of eastern Europe, but particularly powerfully in Hungary.

For example, during the March and April election there, anti-communism was the dominant discourse of all the parties - even the reformed Communist Party.

The outcome of those elections was a victory for two anti-communist parties - the ruling Hungarian Democratic Forum, which is a broadly national populist party, and the leading opposition party of Free Democrats which calls for the immediate transition to free market capitalism.

Q: So what is the basis for your optimism?

A: It is slender. But there have been some interesting developments during the last few months.

In Hungary the anti-communist discourse precluded the emergence of a working-class party and so workers have begun to organise themselves into workers' councils. These embody the radically democratic working-class consciousness inherited from state socialism.

Q: How many workers' councils are there and what is their significance?

A: At this point there are not many. When I was in Hungary in the middle of June there were about 160. But their importance lies in what they represent rather than in their immediate strength. Without a political party to represent their class interests, workers have drawn on their own resources, particularly in production.

They are organising themselves against official trade unions which have not supported their interests.

The councils also reflect the separation of production politics from state politics.

'The Communist Party would be more effective out of power. In an alliance with Cosatu, it could propel a government toward redistributive socialism'.

With the programme for the privatisation of state property enterprises are being encouraged to draw up their own privatisation plans. This turns the enterprise into a field of autonomous politics.

Q: How does this privatisation work? Who will be the new owners of state property?

A: There are not many buyers. The old bureaucratic class is turning its political capital into economic capital.

With the assistance of foreign capital it is trying to become a new bourgeoisie, very much along the lines to be found in other countries such as South Africa and Brazil. But it is far from clear that they will be successful.

As we see most vividly in East Germany, the transition to capitalism may prove to be a disaster. It is not simply a matter of socialist inefficiency because what counts as efficiency under state socialism leads to its opposite under capitalism.

Eastern Europe's much touted Third Road may be a Third Road to the Third World.

At the same time some of the workers' councils are demanding credit facilities to buy up their enterprises through 'employee stock ownership plans' (Esops), out of future profits.

Q: What implications does the collapse of existing socialism - or state socialism as you call it - have for the theory of Marxism?

State socialism is just one form of socialism. It arose in the Soviet Union under the most difficult of circumstances.

Its collapse does not imply the failure of all forms of socialism. Rather, we should take this up as a challenge, an opportunity to reconstruct Marxism.

Q: You are suggesting that existing socialism generated a particular kind of Marxist-Leninism and are offering an alternative, more democratic, Marxism. What kind of concepts or writers can one draw on?

A: Many branches of Marxism have been neglected and others need reinterpreting. Take, for example, Lenin. There is the Lenin of 'What is to be done?', and 'Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism'.

But then there is also the Lenin of 'State and Revolution'. This is often dismissed as the work of a utopian or, in its disdain for bourgeois rights, regarded as sowing the seeds of despotism.

But we should take it more seriously.

The radicalism of his democracy reflected his fear that a new bureaucratic class would emerge to replace the old dominant class.

Only by going beyond bourgeois democracy and dismantling the repressive apparatus of the state, subjecting elected representatives to instant recall and paying officials a worker's wage could a new class of bureaucrats be prevented from emerging.

Rosa Luxemburg applauded the courage of the Bolsheviks, but was at the same time critical of their failure to take bourgeois democratic rights seriously.

Trotsky offers some of the most powerful critiques of what he believed to be the degeneration of the Bolshevik Party into a bureaucratic caste.

Gramsci insisted that a socialist movement must conquer the trenches of civil society outside the state. For him socialism only arises when civil society subordinates the state to popular will.

Q: In South Africa we are entering a period of transition in which many believe socialism is the only alternative to apartheid-capitalism. What lessons can be drawn from the experience of eastern Europe and this democratic Marxist tradition you have identified?

A: State socialism systematically destroyed the independent power of the working class in the name of Marxism.

Democratic socialism has to continually institutionalise and rebuild the organs of an autonomous working class.

This is such an important lesson that I think Marxism should abandon the idea of socialism as a classless society. We have to reformulate the meaning of (democratic) socialism as a two-class society in which the subordinate class supervises and controls the leading class.

This would require a radical democracy which goes beyond but rests upon a bourgeois democracy.

The relationship between these two forms of democracy is not one of stages: first struggle for bourgeois democracy and then for radical democracy. For, by itself, bourgeois democracy systematically demobilises subordinate classes.

We have seen this in western Europe during the last 50 years and we see it in eastern Europe today.

In this regard South Africa is fortunate since lengthy struggles have created autonomous realms in civil society and in the workplace before the installation of bourgeois democracy.

It will be important to continue to consolidate and expand them during and after the formal democratisation process toward majority rule.

'Democratic socialism has to continually institutionalise and rebuild the organs of an autonomous working class'.

Q: Would this entail a mixed economy such as the New Economic Policy adopted by the Soviet Union in the early 1920s?

A: Certainly, that is one possibility. But I myself have not given up on the idea of nationalisation as a goal.

State ownership of the means of production in eastern Europe turned out to be the basis of a new form of class domination. That does not have to be the case, particularly if there are institutional mechanisms for society to supervise the ways in which surplus is centrally appropriated and redistributed.

Q: But has not the experience of nationalisation in Africa been similar to that in eastern Europe?

A: In the case of Zambian copper industry, which I studied some 20 years ago, nationalisation was clearly a tool of class domination.

I remember vividly how President Kenneth Kaunda used nationalisation to lambast the miners: 'The mines are now yours', he told them. 'You are no longer being exploited and, therefore, you must work harder. Drinking, absenteeism and strikes will not be tolerated'.

By itself nationalisation is not unambiguous in its class implications. The political context within which it takes place is obviously critical. The Zambian context did not favour it as

a socialist measure, although it was presented as such.

When, however, nationalisation takes place in the context of a powerful and independent working-class movement, organised across industry in the workplace and in the community, then the implications of nationalisation are very different.

Q: Aside from what you have just said, there must be other obstacles which have to be overcome in any nationalisation exercise. I'm thinking of the question of skills and the international economy.

A: This is precisely where my interest in production and politics began.

Between 1968 and 1972 I studied how the multinational copper corporations, particularly Anglo American, were responding to the new Zambian government.

I became very interested in the two questions you've raised - Africanisation and vulnerability to the global economy.

The legacy of colonialism was stark. At the time of independence the mines were owned and controlled by whites who were mainly expatriates. The government was committed to Zambianisation of managerial personnel but there were only 100 Zambians with university degrees and 1 200 with secondary school certificates. It also depended on copper for 90% of its foreign exchange and therefore treated the mines, and the white managers in particular, with kid gloves.

Zambians were nevertheless promoted into higher positions. But the whites they displaced were often also promoted into new positions created for them.

To accommodate the white interests for the retention of the colour bar, that is, that no black have authority over any white, and at the same time create the impression of successful Zambianisation, huge irrationalities were introduced into the organisational structure.

The ranks of managers increased and tensions developed between blacks and their new black supervisors who lost the authority of their white predecessors.

Q: What about the dependency on the international price of copper?

A: To be sure the international context posed considerable external constraints on the Zambian government.

But I should also like to stress that the ideology of 'neo-colonialism' was used to mask or deflect attention away from the continuing internal class domination. Still, dependency on the price of copper which was outside the control of the government proved disastrous.

Soon after nationalisation the price of copper plummeted and the government was saddled with compensation on an industry which no longer guaranteed profits.

Q: Does that mean that in a country like South Africa, where two-thirds of our foreign exchange is drawn from gold, a commodity which is subject to international control by the capitalist system, that the prospects for successful nationalisation are equally unlikely?

A: Based on my limited knowledge of the South African mining industry I can only suggest that rather than nationalise the mines one should bleed them - taxing them and using their resources to build a national economy less dependent on the world economy and in that way move toward a collectively controlled society.

Still, there is the question of whether the mining houses, so long as they are in private hands, can be relied upon to improve the appalling conditions in the mines - the antiquated system of migrant labour, compounds and racial despotism - and if they

did so whether they would continue to be profitable.

Without getting into a discussion of CST (colonialism of a special type), I would characterise them as 'colonial despotism'. They are despotic in that management has arbitrary power over workers. They are colonial insofar as the basis of that power lies in the unequal distribution of rights by race, enforced through specific racial apparatuses of production.

The longevity of these apparatuses has organised a structural dependence on a racial division of labour and a racially-organised labour market, that racial despotism will outlive the abolition of colonial apparatuses of production.

It appears that the structures of apartheid are being abolished precisely when they are superfluous to the reproduction of racial inequalities.

As a goal 'non-racialism' is of incontestable virtue, but there is a danger that it will discourage the introduction of powerful countervailing measures necessary to destroy the continuity of racism into a post-apartheid society.

Q: Is there anything about politics and production in South Africa which makes socialism more likely?

A: Well, as I've just been saying, I believe that racism is and will continue to be an indelible part of South African capitalism even without apartheid.

Because racial identity is such a powerful mobiliser of collectivities, the recreation of capitalist domination as racial domination can forge solidarity across workplaces.

There is another factor. South Africa is relatively unique in that its relatively advanced economic base has engendered powerful working-class struggles before democratisation.

In this context democratisation can further escalate demands which capitalism patently cannot meet.

The jury is still out on whether there is a feasible South African socialism - 'socialism of a special type' - that could address these demands without falling into anarchy.

Certainly, in South Africa there is a history of a close connection between intellectuals and the working class movement, necessary to forging alternative visions of the future.

Q: In Poland there was also a close connection between workers and intellectuals in the formation of Solidarity. What makes you think that the liberation movement in South Africa will not fall into the same trap as Solidarity, assuming office but then being unable to engage with state power effectively?

A: Solidarity developed a theory of the self-limiting revolution in which the object was not to seize state power but to direct the state from below.

While there were pragmatic reasons for such a theory, namely, the threat of Soviet intervention, there was also the genuine fear that seizure of power would set in motion dynamics which would undermine control from below.

Events in Poland have overtaken the vision of a self-limiting revolution, but in South Africa the situation is more auspicious. An ANC government could deliberately institutionalise a socialist opposition to itself in the form of the Communist Party and Cosatu.

In this view the Communist Party would be more effective out of power. In an alliance with Cosatu, it could propel a government toward redistributive socialism by mobilising pressure from civil society, from the community and workplace.

Moreover, with socialism in opposition, destabilisation by international capitalism or a coup from the right would be less likely. •

Pensions, paternalism and power

The Chemical Workers' Industrial Union (CWIU) campaign around the Chemical Industries National Provident Fund (CINPF) has exposed a number of disturbing trends in management attitudes to basic worker rights.

The CINPF was launched in 1987 by CWIU and a group of employers, amid growing dissatisfaction from members with existing pension funds. They felt a provident fund was a way of achieving a more appropriate form of retirement benefit for low-income workers, who have tenuous job security.

The important thing about the provident fund is that it gives workers greater control over their own money; unlike most pension funds, the provident fund's board of trustees has an equal number of employee and employer representatives who decide on investment and the general allocation of funds.

It is this fact that some companies in the chemical industry have found difficult to stomach. For years, by using the compulsory pensions savings of their workforces as investment capital, business has been able to enrich itself at the expense of workers.

Pension fund trustees are free to change the rules of the fund at any time, and do this in ways that suit them. Employers have been known to reduce their contributions to adjust their profit levels. And in multinationals it is not uncommon for the local subsidiary to use the pension reservoir as a slush fund in which to stash surplus profit out of sight of parent companies.

CWIU's demand for equal representation between employees and employers on a board of trustees to control the provident fund is a modest one. In most Western countries it is considered reasonable for the members of retirement funds to have at least a say, if not total control, over their pension monies and to use them in the members' best interests. After all, retirement benefits are not 'benefits' at all, but a form of deferred income. They are an integral part of the workers' struggle for a living wage.



*British multinational
Reckitt & Colman has fired
350 workers who
went on strike in an attempt to
compel the company to join
the chemical industries'
provident fund.
CWIU media and publicity
officer Gareth Coleman
outlines the issues*

But in this country, old habits die hard and some companies are battling to move beyond the paternalism of the Verwoerdian era. They feel entitled to have total control over the investment of the 6% or 8% of wages accumulated in a retirement fund. Racism and paternalism are, however, only part of the issue. Vast amounts of money and potential power are vested in pension and provident funds — at least a third of the value of shares on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange and the gilt market are attributable to retirement fund investment, according to some estimates. If workers were to manage this money they would control a considerable chunk of South Africa's wealth.

A number of companies have refused to participate in the fund, with resistance spearheaded by a group of multinationals — in fact, despite the heavy concentration of multinationals in the chemical industry, there are more local companies in the CINPF than multinationals.

Last year the South African subsidiary of US-based Cyanamid fired the entire work-force when they went on strike demanding that the company join the

fund. Cyanamid went so far as trying to get the workers' demand declared an unfair labour practice in the industrial court. The company accepted a settlement early on in the proceedings, and all the workers were reinstated — but they have still not succeeded in getting their employers to participate in the CINPF.

Earlier this year, workers at Rolfes, a South African chalk manufacturer on the East Rand, spent eight weeks on strike in an attempt to get the company to join the CINPF. When they returned to work and pursued the issue, the company was forced to back down.

By contrast, the 12-week strike at Swiss multinational Ciba-Geigy ended in a stalemate despite mass mobilisation and international pressure on the company. Workers have vowed to continue their fight.

The British-owned company Reckitt & Colman has been the strongest opponent of the CINPF. In May, 350 workers downed tools because management reneged on an agreement to join the fund, and were fired a month later.


Throughout the dispute the company has made full use of the legal and repressive state apparatus to try to smash the union.

It has also employed 'coloured' and Indian scab labour - which can only exacerbate racial tensions with the predominantly African strikers.

And when the union questioned why police were called in to arrest workers 'trespassing' on the premises after the company had obtained a court interdict, the general manager replied that Reckitt & Colman supported 'law and order'.

Community organisations have responded to the plight of the workers by launching a consumer boycott of Reckitt & Colman products - Cobra floor polish, Jik/Javel, Purity baby food, Disprin, Touch furniture polish, Sunbeam furniture polish, Nugget shoe polish, Dettol, Mr Min and Blitz firelighters.

Their demands are simple: unconditional reinstatement of the dismissed workers and the participation of Reckitt & Colman in the CINPF. •



Cosatu's Jay Naidoo: The acid test will be whether the process of discussion on the LRA leads to consensus...

LRA: Workers win the first amendment

Planned mass action in protest against the government's June decision not to enact the Cosatu-Nactu-Saccola accord on the Labour Relations Act (LRA), will almost certainly be called off: On 20 September manpower minister Eli Louw announced that the cabinet had accepted proposals drawn up by the tripartite working group on the LRA, established after Cosatu and Nactu met with President FW de Klerk on 26 June.

The main terms of the document, which will only come into effect if rati-

fied by all the parties, are:

- A draft bill incorporating the Cosatu-Nactu-Saccola accord — as modified by the National Manpower Commission (NMC) and the working party — will be submitted to parliament before the end of September for the standing committee's urgent consideration, so that the bill can be placed on the parliamentary order paper in February next year. In the interim, Saccola, Cosatu and Nactu have agreed to prevail upon affiliates and members to comply with the provisions of their accord.

- The definition of an unfair labour practice will be amended to revert to the pre-1988 definition. In future a strike or lock-out will no longer be judged by the industrial court on the basis of whether the action is fair or unfair, but rather on the basis of whether it is legal or illegal. There will still be guidelines for the industrial court to consider. They will, however, no longer be compulsory but at the court's discretion.
- The NMC will publish the working group's proposals regarding the Labour Appeal Court for comment and submit

recommendations by December.

- Government will address the position of agricultural and domestic workers and state employees as a matter of urgency.

Negotiations on a new deal for the public service under the auspices of the Commission for Administration and the Department of National Education are proceeding. Until that process is complete, it is proposed that disputes over the exercise of organisational rights in the state sector be referred to a third party for adjudication.

The NMC will undertake an investigation into how to give effect to basic labour relations rights for farm and domestic workers and report by June next year. In the interim, the minister has instructed the NMC to recommend before the end of November whether the LRA should be extended to industrial undertakings in agriculture. (The minister has promised that the Basic Conditions of Employment Act and the Unemployment Insurance Act will be amended next year to apply to farmworkers.)

- Cosatu and Nactu will call off their planned stayaway.

- Cosatu and Nactu will participate in a restructured NMC.

Cosatu has welcomed the cabinet's decision, but has issued a warning that the whole process could revert to square one if the parliamentary standing committee tampers with the proposed changes in any way. 'The document constitutes only the beginning of a set of processes. The acid test will be whether these processes lead to consensus', the federation said in a statement. 'The labour laws still fall far short of international standards and rapid steps need to be taken to ensure all workers have full rights to collective bargaining and to strike'.

Thirty-six industrial actions were monitored in the review period, involving at least 79 636 workers and the loss of 512 033 mandays. Of these, 28 were strikes (three of them national actions), three were sit-ins and another three were lock-outs.

In line with a long-established pattern, wages were a trigger in 21 of the actions. Conditions of service were a trigger in nine cases, dismissal in six cases and demands for union recognition in five cases.

The worst-hit sector was the chemical industry. At least 1 266 workers were involved in industrial action, with the loss of at least 15 473 mandays. Mem-

bers of Cosatu's Chemical Workers' Industrial Union (CWIU) were involved in nine of the actions. Two of these actions - the Ciba Geigy and Reckitt & Coleman disputes - centred on demands for the company to participate in the Chemical Industries' National Provident Fund. (For more on these disputes see page 37.)

The possibility of a strike by Numsa members in the engineering industry seems to have blown over, mainly because of the violence on the Reef. According to the union, its members were not totally satisfied with the deal struck with the Steel & Engineering Industries Federation of South Africa (Seifsa) on 3 September, but decided to settle because they felt a strike could have sparked even more violence.

The union says the violence was also the reason for the relatively low poll in the strike ballot it conducted before the settlement: there was a 53% poll with 63 000 workers voting in favour of strike action and 6 000 against.

The only union which had not settled with Seifsa at the time of going to press was Nactu's Metal & Engineering Workers' Union (Mewusa). There have been suggestions that Mewusa's stance has more to do with trying to appear more militant than Numsa than any serious intention to down tools.

Even if Numsa had persevered and embarked on a strike, it is not certain that it would have made any gains — Seifsa also balloted its members on the possibility of industrial action, and the result was a 53,3% vote in favour of a national lock-out. Seifsa says it believes this was the first time in labour history that an industry-wide lock-out ballot has been conducted. Employers have threatened to implement a lock-out should Mewusa members opt for a strike.

The terms of the settlement are:

- Wage increases of between 19% and 15,5% for the lowest- and highest-paid workers respectively, with a new minimum rate of R4,18 an hour. In the cable sector, the new minimum is R4,48 an hour. Both increases will be back-dated to 1 July. According to Numsa, the increases are the highest yet achieved.

- A reduction in the working week to 44 hours. Numsa has hailed this as a breakthrough. The union says workers will make up any loss of earnings this year by working one extra hour at overtime rates. This will automatically fall away in July next year when new rates

are negotiated.

- An increased leave bonus which will effectively mean that workers receive a 13th cheque in their third year of service.

- Drastic improvements to the living-out allowance for workers living on site.

- 16 June will be treated as a public holiday. On 21 March employers will follow a policy of 'no work, no pay, no disciplinary action.'

- Major improvements to workers' job security. Employers are now obliged to give notice of any plans for retrenchments, redundancies, plant closures or transferrals. Employers are, in addition, required to consult unions with a view to reaching agreement on reasons for retrenchment or redundancy and the way such exercises will be implemented.

- Seifsa has undertaken to work for the removal of all discrimination in training and education.

- A special committee will explore ways of increasing permanent employment opportunities in the industry.

- Free pap smears will be provided for all women workers who want them.

- Employers who apply for exemptions from the metal industrial council's main agreement will have to first consult with representative workers. This is particularly important for workers in the rural areas.

- The last obstacles to the formation of an industry provident fund have been removed, and administrative mechanisms will be put in place by December. Expectations are that a large proportion of the members of the metal industry pension fund will transfer their entitlements to the new provident fund, which will be the largest in South Africa.

The Chamber of Mines and the National Union of Mineworkers (Num) reached accord in their negotiations on wages and working conditions at coal mines on 10 August. In terms of the settlement, colliery wages have been raised by an average of 17,3%.

As reported in *WIP* 68, Num had previously accepted a chamber offer to increase wages on gold mines by between 14,5% and 17%.

Num also clinched a deal on wages and working conditions with De Beers for the group's diamond mines.

Wages for unskilled workers have risen by 17%, while the union's most skilled members received a 16% increase. The minimum wage is now R765 a month, compared to R653 a month previously. •

STRIKES AND DISPUTES

National

Company	Union	Workers	Date	Details
Metro Cash 'n Carry	Saccawu	5000	26.07 - 31.07	Workers went on a legal strike at 150 stores nationally when management offered a R135/month increase in response to their demand for R150. Sit-ins and pickets were held. The strike was settled when the union accepted a R140-a-month increase, bringing the minimum wage to R765.
OK	Saccawu	7000	04.06 - 25.07	Workers demanded a R160-a-month increase, a minimum wage of R800 and other service improvements after OK offered a minimum of R710 a month. At its peak, the strike, which received strong community support, involved 7 000 workers at 131 stores. The strike was characterised by a high level of violence. At least 213 strikers were arrested and management tried on three occasions to get court interdicts against picketers. All three issues were settled out of court. During the strike management also threatened to close down stores. Settlement was reached in mediation when Saccawu accepted OK's offer of across-the-board increases of between R125 and R145, with a further R10 from 1991. OK also withdrew its threat to retrench 587 workers, although it reserved the right to raise the matter again in the future.
Retail, catering hotel industry	Saccawu	40000	27.07	Protest action followed widespread police harassment of Saccawu members during the OK Bazaars and Southern Sun strike and the companies' refusal to allow strikers to meet at the workplace. 40 000 Saccawu members throughout the country stopped work between 2.00pm and 3.00pm, setting up pickets demanding: a living wage; the right to picket without interference; the right of strikers to have access to their workplace during strikes; and an end to police and right-wing harassment. In Johannesburg hundreds of workers marched through the city centre. The demonstrators were severely dealt with by police - the union said there were hundreds of incidents which included baton charges, teargassing and arrests.

Transvaal

Advance Hostel Cleaners	TGWU	160	27.07	Cleaning workers at Elandsrand Mine hostels in Carletonville, who earn R370 a month, objected to the deduction of R99 a month from their pay, ostensibly for transport. During negotiations, management decided to reduce deductions to R75. Workers responded by downing tools.
ATC Brits	Numsa	600	14.07	The dispute started in May when six Numsa members, 3 of them shop stewards, were fired. Demanding their reinstatement, workers began preparing for a legal strike. On 9 August, management obtained an industrial court order interdicting them from striking. On 14 August management instituted a lock-out. ATC says it remains prepared to submit the dispute to arbitration.
Ciba Geigy Brits and Spartan	CWIU	200	09.05 - 01.08	A 12-week strike was staged in an attempt to force Ciba Geigy to participate in the Chemical Industries' National Provident Fund; workers returned to work on 1 August having failed to win their demand.
Ciba Geigy	CWIU	130	30.05 - 01.08	Workers downed tools in an effort to get the company to join the Chemical Industries National Provident Fund. The strike was called off on 1 August.
Duvha Opencast Services, Witbank	Num	300	27.09	Workers went on strike when management offered a 14,5% increase in response to their demand for 29%. Mediation took place on 20 September. More talks were due to follow.
Home Care Potteries Vereeniging	Cawu	69	27.09	Workers struck because management hired casual workers after retrenching 33 workers on 27 July. Workers demanded the reinstatement of all retrenched workers. Management responded by imposing a lock-out.
Kamillen Products Robertsham	Sacwu	31	05.07 - 03.09	Management offered R95-a-month increases in response to workers' demands for a R150 increase; a 40-hour working week; a 13th cheque; and 21 March as a paid holiday. Workers went on strike after the company reneged on an agreement to allow union auditors to examine its books. Workers accepted a R90 increase from September to December, followed by a R30 increase in January 1991 and another R10 in September 1991.
Lovasz Chemical Corp, Midrand	Sacwu	110	30.07	This legal strike started after a deadlock over management's increase of between R150 and R160 in response to workers' demand for a minimum of R180 a week. Other demands included four weeks' paid leave in December, hours of work from 7.30am to 5.00pm and a transport service. On 1 August the company obtained an interim court order interdicting strikers from gathering within 1 km from the factory premises. On 2 August police approached the strikers, who had gathered close to the factory, pointing firearms and threatening them with assault.
Meyerton Municipality	MSFAWU	202	30.07	Workers downed tools after the council offered to increase wages by R395 a month in response to their demand for a R900 increase. On 1 August they were all dismissed. The council has offered to re-employ 89 of the strikers, but says the others' posts have been made redundant.
Modderfontein Gold Mine, Brakpan	Num	1500	25.07 - 08.08	Workers went on strike demanding wage increases, recognition of Num, a service increment after every year's service, a production bonus for all workers, the reinstatement of 30 dismissed drillers, improved food and kitchen conditions and the removal of a security gate. The dispute was resolved when the union and management met. Management agreed to recognise Num and to reinstate the dismissed workers unconditionally.

Mokopane Hospital Potgietersrus	Nehawu	540	12.09	Workers went on strike following claims of intimidation and victimisation by the hospital superintendent, Dr E Buthelezi. Workers are calling for Buthelezi's removal, recognition of Nehawu, and for the Lebowa government to adopt labour legislation that protects workers.
Post Office Boksburg, Ravensklop Schapensrust	Potwa	720	07.07 - 13.08	Postal workers at three East Rand engineering yards went on strike over the alleged unfair dismissal of a colleague. The worker was reinstated after negotiations between management and the union.
Pretoria Glass & Pretorium	CWIU	52	09.07	Workers went on strike in protest against the dismissal of a fellow worker. All were dismissed on 16 July.
Reckitt & Coleman Elandsfontein	CWIU	350	29.05	Workers embarked on a legal strike in an effort to force the company to participate in Chemical Industries' National Provident Fund. All were dismissed at the end of June. The union has called for a consumer boycott of the company's products.
Sabta Vaal	TGWU	300	15.06 - 20.08	In the first strike by taxi drivers organised by Cosatu's TGWU, 300 cabbies in the Vaal refused to work leaving 24 000 commuters stranded. The drivers demanded: that the various taxi-owner associations in the region merge to form one employer organisation; recognition of TGWU; a wage of R250 a week; a medical aid scheme; roadworthy tests on taxis and an end to threats to dismiss drivers if they do not bring in a quota of R200 a day. According to TGWU, drivers' earnings range from R80-R150 a week. They work 6-7 days a week, often having 16-hour days, and many have back and kidney problems or spinal damage as a result of the constant vibrations of their vehicles. The largest employer body in the region - the Vaal Taxi Association - has agreed to refer the wage demand to its members and to recognise the union.
S.A. Druggist Reuven	Sacwu	30	25.07 - 31.08	Workers embarked on a legal strike when management rejected their demand for a R400-a-month increase, offering of R180 instead. Other union demands included a paid holiday on 21 March, 3 working days a year paternity leave and a country allowance of R45 a night for workers who have to spend time out of town. The strike ended after strikers accepted an increase of R182 a month and a country allowance of R20 a night.
Samancor Witbank & Meyerton	Numsa	2000	30.08 - 19.09	Workers embarked on a legal strike when management offered to increase wages by 15% in response to their demand for increases of between 15% and 36%. The dispute was settled when workers accepted a 16% increase which raises wages for unskilled workers to R4,55/hour and R10,92/hour for skilled employees. Other improvements include time off for shop-steward training and an undertaking by management to abide by job security clauses in the Main Agreement for the metal industry.
Sasoor Johannesburg	TGWU	11	25.07 - 27.07	About 11 shop stewards of the 350 workforce staged a sit-in at the company offices to back their demands of a R850 minimum and 26% increase. The company is offering R700 plus 15% across the board. Following these wide differences in demands and offers, the two parties deadlocked. After further negotiations with the company the workers won R850 and a 20,5% across-the-board increase.
Sun Couriers Bedfordview	TGWU	18	23.07 - 25.07	Shop stewards staged a sit-in in the boardroom of the company's head office demanding a R450 per month across-the-board wage increase after the company offered R117. They returned to work after management agreed to raise labourers' wages from R650 per month to R925 per month. Drivers' wages were raised from R850 per month to R1090.
Transnet Braamfontein	Sarhwu	350	09.09 - 14.09	Workers went on strike following the dismissal of 3 workers for allegedly assaulting two foremen. The foremen, members of the in-house union Blatu, had worked at other Transnet depots before being transferred to Braamfontein where they displaced Sarhwu members. According to Sarhwu, the transferral contravened the agreement it reached with management at the end of last year's strike that workers who participated in the action would retain their previous positions and not be demoted. The dispute has been referred to the regional manager.
Wella SA Wynberg	Sacwu	32	25.07	Workers downed tools when management rejected their demand for a R200-a-month wage increase, offering R140 instead. Prior to the strike management acceded to the workers' other demands for a 13th cheque, 21 March as a paid holiday, and for the company to adopt a non-discriminatory recruitment policy. The dispute was settled when workers accepted a revised offer to increase wages by R170 a month.
Zebediela Citrus Pietersburg	NUFW	1500	08.09	In their second strike this year, workers at this state-owned farm downed tools demanding a 50% increase and a minimum wage of R400 as well as recognition of NUFW. Management has refused to have any dealings with the union, citing the fact that the agricultural sector does not fall under the LRA. The union alleged that the workers' compounds were dilapidated and that they are forced to use communal toilets. The union accused security of harassing strikers. Workers are demanding a 50% increase and a R400 minimum wage as well as recognition of NUFW.

OFS

Harmony Gold Mine Virginia	Num	3000	01.09 - 05.09	Workers went on strike in protest against the continued incarceration of 11 fellow workers. The 11 were among 14 workers arrested after a confrontation at the mine which resulted in a mine official losing his life. Charges against 3 of the workers were subsequently dropped. The strikers resumed work after negotiations between Num and management.
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Sigma Colliery Sasolburg	Sacwu	2000	29.09	Workers at this Sasol mine went on negotiations on wages and working conditions broke down. Workers were demanding a minimum wage of R1 299 a month; a R400 across-the-board increase; more paid holidays; an improved shift allowance and reduced hours of work. The colliery had offered to increase the minimum wage by between 20% and 30% (which would have brought the minimum for underground employees to R500 a month and R454 a month for surface employees) and to increase the number of statutory paid holidays from 7 to 8. On 3 September 8 union members were arrested, charged with malicious damage to property and allowed bail of R200. On 13 September all strikers were dismissed. Sasol has indicated that strikers may apply for re-employment.
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Natal

Durnacol Newcastle	Num	1500	23.09	Num was not recognised at Durnacol for the purposes of this year's wage negotiations with the Chamber of Mines. On 1 July management implemented wage increases of between 14,5% and 17% in accordance with the chamber's offer to the union in those talks. For the lowest-paid Durnacol workers this represented an increase of only R52 a month. Workers staged a 12-hour underground sit-in protesting against the increase and calling for recognition of Num. In talks, the union accepted an improved offer of between 17,5% and 31%. Talks on recognition were due to follow.
Indian Ocean Fertiliser Richards Bay	CWIU	250	13.09	Management imposed a lock-out after workers voiced their dissatisfaction with wages and working conditions.
Kynoch Chemicals & Fertilisers, Umbogintwini	CWIU	270	21.09 - 24.09	Workers struck in protest against anti-worker behaviour by a white foreman, but returned to work when the foreman was suspended indefinitely.

Cape

Clinimed East London	CWIU	95	13.09 - 14.09	Workers staged a work stoppage in solidarity with strikers at Pharmador. They returned to work pending the outcome of an inquiry at Pharmador.
Mossgas Mossel Bay	Numsa Cawu	9000	02.09 - 06.09	Mechanical engineering and instrumentation workers at the Mossgas project went on a wildcat strike demanding accommodation for more than 500 workers not housed on the site and improved attendance and project allowances. They resumed work when management agreed to negotiate on these issues with trade unions. In terms of a deal clinched on 17 August, the attendance bonus was raised from 23c/hour to 25c/hour and the project allowance from 42c/hour to 72c/hour retrospective to 6 August. These adjustments bring the minimum wage for the lowest category workers to R5,16/hour. It was also agreed that Bateman Davy, the chief mechanical engineering contractor, and Numsa would establish a committee to deal with all grievances and disputes which are not settled amicably by the various sub-contractors and shop stewards at plant level. The parties agreed to 'double bunking' (two workers sharing a single room as opposed to one in each room) as an interim solution to the demand for more accommodation.
Pharmador East London	CWIU	160	09.09 - 14.09	Workers went on strike demanding the dismissal of the MD because he allegedly assaulted some of their workmates. They returned to work after it was agreed that an inquiry would be held.
Steeledale FBE Cape Town	Numsa	120	16.07 - 24.07	Workers downed tools when management retrenched 28 union members before negotiations were concluded. The matter was referred to the industrial court.

Transkei

Transkei Road Transport, Butterworth Umtata	TGWU	2000	06.09	This dispute began in July when 7 workers at the company's Butterworth depot were suspended and later dismissed. When shop stewards asked for an explanation for the dismissals, management allegedly called in the Transkei army. On 6 August the army started running the Butterworth service. Workers at the Umtata depot reacted by downing tools. In response the company called in the army; soldiers allegedly forced the workers off the premises and began operating the buses. Throughout the strike management refused to have any dealings with TGWU. The company also obtained a supreme court order interdicting workers from molesting, intimidating or disturbing those running the services at both depots. This was subsequently extended to all depots in the bantustan. Management also insisted that workers sign a pledge not to engage in action against the company as precondition for their re-admittance to the depots - a move the union says constitutes a lock-out.
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Ciskei

Ronber Pharmaceuticals Dimbaza	CWIU	36	14.09	Workers went on strike demanding recognition of CWIU. All were dismissed on 17 August.
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Can business manage change without a change in management?

Jeremy Cronin, a member of the Central Committee of the South African Communist Party, reviews two new books on the state of South African society — John Kane-Berman's South Africa's Silent Revolution (SA Institute of Race Relations/Southern Book Publishers, R20,00), and Jan Steyn's Managing Change in South Africa (Tafelberg, Human Rousseau, R24,95)

We are now substantially into a phase of struggle ('a war of position', to use Gramsci's term) which is likely to be more or less protracted. It is a phase that John Kane-Berman captures well when he speaks of a 'violent equilibrium' that has developed and deepened with the rolling wave of mass struggles that began back in 1976.

The liberation movement has not been strong enough to overthrow the regime, but the regime has not been able finally to crush the revolt.

In the course of 1990 there has been a shared strategic recognition of this from the side of both the regime and the ANC-led liberation movement - hence February 2, hence the Groote Schuur and Pretoria Minutes. That there must be major structural change in our country is a widely shared perspective.

But what have been the prime underlying causes for this reciprocal siege? How you answer that determines how you begin to look forward. So what is the primary agency for future change? And what does this change consist in? In their sometimes diverging ways Kane-Berman and Jan Steyn both address themselves to these central issues of our time.

I must admit to a sense of mild irritation in opening Kane-Berman's book. On the back flap he is described as 'South Africa's leading authority on apartheid'. He is also the 'author of the definitive book on the Soweto upheavals in 1976' and the author of 'the definitive essay on Inkatha'. All this personal monopolisation of the commanding heights by the executive director of the Institute of Race Relations is a little difficult to stomach. All the more when you remember that in the current issue of *Race Relations News* there is a sustained attack on the ANC for its supposed aspirations to what Kane-Berman calls 'political monopolisation'.

Well, without necessarily being THE definitive whatever, in many respects, Kane-Berman's latest book is not that bad. Its central theme is that the present, irreversible crisis of apartheid is the result of profound objective socio-economic developments and of a tide of silent, often individual struggles. Pass laws, labour legislation, group areas, the grand bantustan scheme - all have crumbled in the face of objective realities and of popular 'disobedience on a massive scale' (p.28). It has been a 'spontaneous grass-roots erosion of apartheid which) has been almost self-propelled - by people looking for jobs or

housing'. (ibid).

Although he would disavow historical materialism, Kane-Berman is in essence agreeing that the dynamic movement of the economic infrastructure has been finally determining, that the masses - not individuals, not leadership collectives - make history.

Nor does Kane-Berman invoke this 'silent revolution' to make the point that, until half-way through the book, I was nearly sure he was intent on making. He does not, in the end, claim that deliberate political strategies and campaigns (the armed struggle, sanctions or consumer boycotts) were insignificant. Insofar as they worked in tandem with objective realities and the silent mass revolution, they contributed significantly to the all-round crisis of apartheid.

Where the book is much more limited is in some of its other major assumptions. For example, the fact that the grand apartheid plans of the National Party, its whole social engineering project, are in irreversible crisis is absolutely correct. But this is far from marking the demise of the accumulated effects of three centuries of colonial dispossession and oppression, and one century of industrial capitalism in the context of this national oppression.

These accumulated effects are deeply structured into our society and they are nowhere near being redressed. Although a specific mode of bourgeois domination, refined by the NP, is now no longer

workable, apartheid in the broader sense of national oppression of the majority remains solidly in place. Negotiations, a new non-racial constitution, an ANC-led democratic government - these will only begin to lay the basis for a protracted struggle for national democratic transformation.

But Kane-Berman has a much shallower perspective on apartheid, and so the silent revolution that he focuses upon is also less fundamental in its effects than he implies. For Kane-Berman the Population Registration Act is the centre-piece of apartheid (p.40). But when the act goes, do the four white-controlled monopolies (that have developed their unprecedented strangle-hold over our economy precisely in the context of the national oppression of the majority) just evaporate? Does the demise of the act end black joblessness, homelessness and illiteracy in our country? These are questions not tackled by 'our leading authority on apartheid'.

Nonetheless, the basic point that the masses make history provides a strong backbone to Kane-Berman's argument.

For Jan Steyn the principle agency for change is something else. It is the incumbent government with plenty of friendly, whispered advice from the side of business. Indeed, in Steyn's conception of things business occupies roughly the same functional position as the Prussian bureaucracy in Hegel's *World Historical Dialectic*, or the Virgin Mary in Catholi-

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cism. They are mediators between heaven and earth, called upon by destiny and placed disinterestedly, innocently as the main actors in the birth of the new world to come.

According to Steyn, 'businessmen were the category of whites who would inevitably be the first to become aware of the genuine problems in the black communities. Other whites were kept insulated by all-evasive segregation. White managers were one of the segments of society at the black-white interface'. (p.4). How about white foremen, white pass officials, prison warders and police constables? Being at the 'black-white interface' is no guarantee of farsightedness or neutrality. It is surely, at least in part, a function of what you are doing at that interface - harassing, oppressing, screwing the last drops of labour out of underpaid workers? All of these have prime reasons for whites being at that particular interface.

But Steyn persists: 'The most crucial agency in reform and change is a "broker" agency, which can establish alliances and networks which can reach into black and white communities, and which can influence and interpret events for decision-makers on both sides. The South African business community is well positioned to perform this role. Its activity in the marketplace establishes as much credibility on all sides as is possible in our highly stressed society'. (p.19). Credibility? Steyn must be dreaming!

Nevertheless this particular dream has recently acquired a certain value. In fact, it is possible to place a very precise price-tag on it - no less than R2-billion. Jan Steyn has, of course, recently been appointed to oversee the regime's special trust fund for 'redressing some of South Africa's socio-economic ills'. So what Steyn says in this collection of his speeches and articles from the last five years gives you some idea of the agenda behind that R2-billion.

The agenda is fairly transparent, even if its logic becomes twisted. It rests on a few premises. In the first place, the present form of bourgeois rule (Steyn wouldn't use that term of course) - white minority rule - can no longer secure the survival of existing property relations. Hence the need for major restructuring. This will require a new coalition of forces - to the 'free market'.

This bloc of forces will create a new hegemony, with 'among whites, a greater acceptance of non-racial economic, so-

cial and political arrangements and among blacks, a reorientation of attitudes towards the free enterprise system'. (p.44). In other words, amongst other things 'there needs to be an uncoupling of black nationalism and socialism'. (p.47).

In Steyn's view the 'free market' is the panacea for all things, a great and powerful ju-ju. (And by 'free' as in 'free market' he doesn't mean freedom from domination by monopolies - they are never mentioned once). The 'free market' is 'a fundamental human right' (p.44). In a 'free market' we are told, 'funds flow to where they can most usefully be employed' (p.47). The 'opposite' of the 'free market'-socialism, is 'unacceptable, indeed it is non-negotiable' (p.47), etc.

But - and here the awkward shuffle creeps in - although the free market is a great panacea for all things, Steyn is forced to admit that in South Africa it cannot even begin to secure basic stability. For instance, on housing he concedes that: 'In terms of strict market criteria less than one-quarter of urban black families can afford bond repayments on the cheapest standard houses'.

And so, enter the R2-billion Steyn fund. Despite all the hymns to the free market, and despite all the invective against the throttling, undemocratic nature of state intervention in the economy, Steyn has to say that without 'MASSIVE STATE (my emphasis) and private sector development funds' (p.102) the market will come nowhere near redressing some of the most immediate problems in our country. (But haven't we just been told that in a free market situation money flows spontaneously to where it can most usefully be employed? Perhaps 'usefully' should be pronounced 'profitably'?)

The essence of the struggle at present lies in a war of position, a contest in siege for the high ground, for hegemony. On the one side the ruling bloc, retreating from its previous and now unworkable mode of domination, is seeking to consolidate a new bloc of forces. This strategic retreat has certainly been imposed by objective factors and by mass struggle, and is already something of a victory for the oppressed majority. But retreats can be turned into strategic victories.

In this situation the relation of piecemeal reforms to overall change is a highly complex and entirely topical issue. On this question Steyn is transparent and Kane-Berman is less than satisfactory. For Steyn's reforms, like those for which the R2-billion fund is earmarked, are desperately needed: '...we dare not leave

it to the political processes only. We cannot place representatives of the disadvantaged communities in a position in which they feel obliged to challenge the interests of advantaged South Africans'. (p.101).

And let's not forget, Steyn adds, in South Africa we don't quite have the happy situation of Namibia where 'the population had not become radicalised by widespread internal struggle. Swapo has not had to face highly mobilised internal civilian constituencies'. (p.98). This happy Namibian situation has paved the way for what Steyn regards as an 'excellent start with a democratic constitution' (ibid). (In my naivete I had always thought highly mobilised internal civilian constituencies were the bedrock of democracy - not the opposite.)

For Steyn, reform is designed to take the sting out of mass mobilisation and action. Reform is there to pen the national democratic struggle within very confined limits. Reform is designed, ultimately, to enable those presently in economic power to retreat to a new position of secure dominance.

For all these reasons Kane-Berman is less than helpful when, for his part he portrays piecemeal reforms as uncomplicated building bricks for a post-apartheid South Africa.

In our present situation reforms are entirely dialectical in character. The identical reform measure can mark either an advance or a retreat for the popular forces. Much depends on the manner of its winning, and on who emerges with the protest momentum. Through active, purposeful mass struggle and democratic organisation reforms can be turned into platforms for democratic advance. But this will not happen if the masses, as Steyn hopes, are seen but not heard, if change comes softly, softly, brokered and dispensed from above.

Nor will a substantial democratic breakthrough be achieved if the broad working masses of our country remain locked into Kane-Berman's silent revolution, where they are inchoate, formless, unorganised, where each more or less pursuing his or her own immediate interests produces a collective good.

Unless the broad working people of our country organise themselves still more effectively, unless their voices are heard (by ALL sides at the negotiating table) - others are going to 'manage the change'. That is, they will manage to change without changing the management. *