


PROGRESS



MANDELA De Klerk's next move

INSIDE

- * JOE SLOVO'S 'HAS SOCIALISM FAILED?' EXTRACTS AND COMMENTS
- * THE LAND: WEIGHING UP THE OPTIONS FOR REDISTRIBUTION

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EDITORIAL

Nelson Mandela walked through the gates of Victor Verster prison just hours before this edition of WIP went to the printers.

As the symbol of the struggle against apartheid, his release was clearly seen by millions in this country and throughout the world as a signal that 'change' is indeed under way.

Huge rallies, spontaneous street marches and the mobbing of the Mandela home in Soweto were powerful evidence of the degree to which the hopes and victories of the people are seen to be embodied by Mandela.

Standing before half a million people in the centre of Cape Town shortly after his release, Mandela emphasised that his personal fortunes were but a partial measure of change. He referred to president FW de Klerk's integrity and boldness in going further 'than any other Nationalist president to normalise the situation', but pointedly lined up the NP leader's concessions against the demands of the Harare Declaration - and found them wanting.

In his first speech, Mandela sought to establish firmly his position as an African National Congress member, under the discipline of his organisation and subject to the normal strictures of democratic organisation.

He echoed the message emanating clearly from the ANC and other sections of the democratic movement: What De Klerk currently has on offer is insufficient to entice them to the negotiating table.

Within the ANC there are strong suspicions that De Klerk has initiated the process towards negotiations precisely to pre-empt liberation forces and 'stop us half way'. There is some basis for the ANC's suspicions: The National Party has yet to entirely abandon the idea that it can entrench itself in the post-apartheid government in order to block any attempt at major political or economic reforms.

But there is also an increasing confidence in the ANC that by legalising it and other opposition formations De Klerk has changed the political terrain sufficiently to make the process towards a democratic South Africa quite irreversible.

And while the process may be a long one, there is a pressing need for the democratic opposition to prepare not only for the attainment of state power but for its exercise. On the complex issue of land, for instance, it is necessary to progress beyond the ritual calls for its 'return' and also beyond the general assumptions about the process of 'redistribution'. Attempts to do so are examined in this issue of WIP.

So too is a major contribution to the debate on socialism from South African Communist Party general secretary Joe Slovo. Titled, 'Has socialism failed?', Slovo's paper appeared shortly before the legalisation of his party and is probably the most widely read SACP document in decades.

It is worth reflecting that less than a month ago publication of the extracts from the Slovo document carried in this edition could (and probably would) have been punished harshly by the state. WIP's reporting of the comments of Chris Hani, chief of staff of the ANC's Umkhonto weSizwe, would have carried a similar penalty.

It is now legal to publish these as a result of the limited liberalisation introduced by De Klerk, who reasoned that the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe had suitably weakened the ideological threat from the ANC and SACP.

Quite the reverse can be argued: Eastern Europe saw the collapse of unpopular governments in the face of popular revolts - revolts not dissimilar to that De Klerk himself is facing.

In addition, the destruction of the Stalinist heritage has revitalised progressive movements, affording new latitude for debate and a sharp spur to rediscover the bedrock of their thought and action.

All this may colour the future with promise, but there are immediate and weighty problems.

Even if Mandela's release is followed by the lifting of the state of emergency and some accommodation on security laws, there is no guarantee that political violence will abate. The past decade has demonstrated the practical impossibility of distinguishing between official and unofficial repression.

The fact that the state might, for tactical reasons, change its attitude to violence does not mean that those it has trained in exercising violence will forsake such methods.

Contents



Debating Socialism ...
Page 18



New tactics for new times...
Page 8

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BRIEFS

Sebe's secret document
Malibongwe Women's Conference
Jesus and Marx in Zanu (PF)
SADF: Leaner but mean
NSC's tour de force

2

APARTHEID'S LAST PRESIDENT

De Klerk's bid to deny his successor the power he had

8

ANC OPTIONS

Hani and Zuma on ways to win the political initiative

9

UDF OPENS UP

Popo Molefe assesses popular pressure for change

12

HIT SQUADS

Can agents of repression be brought to heel?

14

DEBATING SOCIALISM

Extracts from and comments on Joe Slovo's 'Has Socialism Failed?'

18

RETURNING THE LAND

The ANC weighs the options for land redistribution

23

PAM PUTS ITS CASE

Benny Alexander outlines the movement's policies

29

ZIMBABWE CAMPUS TURMOIL

Students claim to be a voice for the nation

32

NAMIBIAN UNIONS

Constitutional guarantees fall short of workers' demands

34

RAIL STRIKE REVIEWED


Both parties give their views of a bloody dispute

36

LABOUR TRENDS

Strikes and Disputes
Repression Monitor

40



Sebe seeks federal insurance

The Ciskei homeland is seeking rapid re-incorporation into South Africa to enable it to negotiate terms with a sympathetic administration in Pretoria, rather than awaiting what homeland officials believe will be enforced incorporation under an ANC-MDM government.

Ciskei president-for-life, Lennox Sebe, is arguing for the rapid establishment - either before or during president FW de Klerk's negotiations with the ANC - of a federation of the four 'independent' homelands and of South Africa, with entrenched clauses to prevent a new government unilaterally scrapping the homelands and establishing a unitary state.

And while he and his officials believe a 'mass-based party' including both the ANC and its internal allies will fairly easily gain the two-thirds majority it needs to overturn any constitutionally-entrenched protection of homeland autonomy under a federal system, 'international pressure and the need for a new government to appear democratic' could provide sufficient defence against such an action.

Sebe's remarkably frank proposals are contained in a confidential document given by Sebe to South African President FW de Klerk last month.

Titled *An independent Ciskei and a future democratic South Africa*,

the 12-page document examines options open to the 'independent' homelands in the run-up to a phase in which 'a negotiated settlement and universal franchise ... is now largely beyond doubt'. Startling in its implications, the document was apparently drafted by senior Ciskei civil servants - many of them white bureaucrats seconded from Pretoria - and probably reflects De Klerk's thinking on the role of the homelands in negotiations.

'It is becoming very urgent for the present leadership in all the national states (the 'independent' homelands) to press for a dispensation which is not likely to be easily undermined in the pressure politics likely to emerge after negotiation commences ... It should be possible for the federal autonomy of states like Ciskei to be guaranteed in South African law and placed above the political process or whatever is negotiated later', the document argues.

The five options for the Ciskei's future are:

*** Complete dismantling of the homeland state structures.** The document rejects this, arguing that regional interests are served by partial retention.

*** Retention of the status quo.** While asserting that if a future democratic government were to accept this the homelands would be entitled to international recognition, the document recognises that this will be entirely unacceptable to the political trends it expects to inherit De Klerk's position.

*** Re-incorporation as a semi-autonomous region**



Sebe: Seeks re-incorporation into South Africa

or province. This would, like the four provinces, be run by an administrator and an executive council. As with total incorporation and for similar reasons, this 'is not acceptable', the document argues.

*** Establishing a confederation of South African states including all the homelands.** The document notes that the homeland government has already stated its support for the option, but recognises that, like maintenance of the status quo, it is unlikely to be accepted by an incoming administration.

*** Establishing a five-member federation of South Africa and the 'independent' homelands (the 'TBVC countries').** This would give the TBVC areas a status roughly equivalent to the states in the USA, with 'the head of state, whatever his new designation, (enjoying) a status equivalent to that of a state governor'.

And, highly attractive for Sebe and the patronage-wracked Ciskei civil service, it would enable the homeland administration to continue levying taxes and leave the civil service in place.

The document recognises

the need to defend against mobilisation by the MDM and the ANC of support in the homelands for straight incorporation, and frankly acknowledges that such mobilisation has a good chance of succeeding. It therefore argues that the option chosen must afford 'the kind of participation in the affairs of a post-apartheid RSA ... likely to be popular among the people of the Ciskei as developments in the RSA proceed'.

A federal structure, it argues, will go some way to providing this.

Time, however, is of the essence.

'The commitment of the (Pretoria) government to negotiation, at least in theory, makes it possible to envisage a new relationship being forged *before* the very complicated process of negotiation between the RSA and its major extra-parliamentary opponents. It will be strategically simpler for the TBVC-RSA negotiations to proceed before the "final" negotiations', Sebe's document adds.

Any delay could see the homelands divided among themselves 'if one or another of them has opted to support the programme of the ANC-MDM'. This is a clear reference to Bantu Holomisa's Transkei government and to the heads of non-independent homelands such as QwaQwa's PK Mopeli who argues for the total eradication of the homelands.

In addition 'the rank-and-file people of the TBVC countries may become ... divided among themselves

if they are presented (sic) simultaneously by their present leaders and those of the parties seeking to secure maximum support among blacks'.

Additionally, agreement to a federal structure prior to actual negotiations would exclude the ANC and its allies.

The document also argues strongly against the direction favoured by the Transkei and KaNgwane governments: talks with the ANC prior to its negotiations with Pretoria. Describing this route as a 'high-risk venture', the document argues that the homelands 'may find that they are able to secure a more favourable deal in final negotiations than the ones they might informally secure from the ANC'.

'The least risky approach would be for the Ciskei, preferably with the other TBVC states, to negotiate and establish an improved relationship with the RSA as soon as possible. This would then be a fait accompli, less likely to be disrupted or undermined by later negotiations'.

A federal structure would in addition be 'more likely ... to be defensible against (political) attacks from movements committed to a unitary South Africa'. - *David Niddrie.*

Looking towards the future

The Malibongwe Women's Conference - held in Amsterdam in January - provided the first occasion for South African women from inside and

outside the country to meet and discuss their role within the national liberation struggle and their struggle as women. The conference, which brought together a broad range of women, emphasised the need for a broad-based national unity. Malibongwe occurred in a context where women who have contributed at great cost to the liberation struggle still lack adequate organisational structures and participation in the mass democratic movement. Thus the programme of action drawn up at the conference attempted to provide a basis for addressing the position of women, both now and in the future.

Held under the banner, 'Women united for a unitary, non-racial, democratic South Africa', the key objective of the conference was to build and broaden the unity in action of women against apartheid and to explore questions around the oppression of women and strategies for their increased participation and emancipation.

The preamble to the programme of action states clearly that although these two processes are linked, 'national liberation does not automatically guarantee the emancipation of women. The emancipation of women requires national liberation, the transformation of gender relations and an end to exploitation. We believe that our emancipation can only be addressed as part of a total revolutionary transformation of South African social and economic relations'.

Since the collapse of the

Federation of South African Women (Fedsaw) in the 1950s, women have been without a national co-ordinating structure and programme of action. Malibongwe directed itself particularly towards resolving this problem and to paying attention to women in rural areas. The objective of national unity and co-ordination is to strengthen resistance to apartheid.

The conference also resolved to draw together as many women as possible, particularly those in the rural areas as well as organised groups in other sectors. For these reasons, the emphasis was towards broad-based unity and further discussions on the question of structure will need to take this into account.

In 1985, women's organisations began processes towards the revival of Fedsaw. Committees were set up but were substantially harassed by repression.

However, the conference did stress the importance of analysing new conditions and setting up appropriate structures to meet them. The conference did not attempt to reach conclusion on the question of structure but noted 'the necessity to continue within various



organisations the process of clarification and discussion of objectives and form (whether alliance, federation, assembly or other) of the new structure'. Also included in the same resolution on women's unity were clauses dealing with:

- * the empowerment of women at all levels in organisations;
- * the need for organisational codes of conduct and disciplinary procedures to address sexual misconduct, abuse and exploitative personal relationships;
- * the need for political education on women's issues in organisations;
- * the need for women to initiate programmes which address community issues to mobilise women and encourage greater participation.

The conference also addressed the obstacles to the participation of women and looked at issues that women can and must organise around.

Commissions took resolutions on different sectors - rural women, the unemployed, mothers, working women while also examining areas of culture and tradition, the family and education.

The conference noted that 'women's emancipation depends on the transformation of all aspects of our culture which are oppressive to women, whether these are manifested in language, the media, the workplace, home and family life or performance culture'. The conference also noted that traditions need to be understood within an historical context. 'Many

traditions initially served as a means of protection and security for women in pre-capitalist and pre-colonial times. However, we find that in practice civil law overrides traditional law and in our present capitalist society many of these initially protective customs have become oppressive to women', reads a paper presented by women at the conference.

Criticising the practice of lobola, one paper argued that 'women are reduced commodities'. This subjects women to various forms of harassment by their husbands who can 'use and disown them like objects, claiming that they have bought them'. In response, it was argued that traditionally lobola had the function of cementing families brought together through the marriage of their children and had provided a status and security for married women.

Women believe that the traditional customs must be addressed through raising the consciousness of women on a mass level and through extending and building organisation.

The family was also an important area around which it was agreed much more discussion and research needs to take place. The conference noted that because the family is the prime seat of socialisation and women's oppression, it is a crucial institution for the transformation of society and in particular, for the emancipation of women. In the realm of the family, some areas of change that a paper suggested include:

- *full social protection of women's rights to motherhood, equal distribution of housework among all household members, socialisation of housework and childcare, equality within marriage and divorce laws, the promotion and enhancement of family life and equal status for all types of alternative families including single parent families;

- *education to enhance the emancipation of girls and women and to effect appropriate socialisation of boys and men within the family. Organisations should embark on affirmative action to develop support structures to free women of domestic chores and encourage them to take up responsibilities and leadership positions within organisations and society at large.

The resolution also called on the MDM and the national liberation movement to educate both men and women in their structures and the community at large about the specific role played by the present social system in the oppression of women and to eradicate and challenge oppressive attitudes and practices within organisations. A major obstacle to the participation of women on a mass level is illiteracy which keeps women dependent and vulnerable to exploitation. Over 50% of women are estimated to be illiterate. It was resolved to initiate literacy programmes with a clear political content aimed especially at black, working-class and rural women.

The discussions on education focused both on the need for informal education and consciousness-raising to advance the position of women as well as developing an overall critique of the formal education system from a non-sexist perspective. A non-sexist education system would have the effect of equipping women to play an equal role in all aspects of society, and education in a post-apartheid society would need to be geared towards consciously redressing the imbalances caused by women's oppression.

Affirmative action was identified as one of the ways in which this could be done both now and in the future. A concrete step towards this taken by the conference was the creation of the Malibongwe Bursary Trust to raise funds for rural women's training and development programmes. - *Wip Correspondent.*

Mugabe's goats and sheep

The continued attempts to bind together Jesus, Marx and Lenin at Zimbabwe's Zanu-Zapu congress in December were instructive on the level of ideological understanding and debate in the country. Speaker of Parliament Didymus Mutasa hoped President Robert Mugabe would 'act like Jesus' and sort out the sheep from the goats in so far as socialism was concerned.

But, writes political



Mugabe: 'Act like Jesus'

scientist Jonathon Moyo in the popular, probing monthly magazine, *Parade*, the reference to sheep and goats didn't go down well — at least among some delegates. One grumbled privately that goats were not bad animals, adding that as a pastoral farmer he knew it was better to have many different kinds of animals than just one. Fortunately for the congress, it was Mugabe who gave the 5 000 or so mostly rural delegates an impromptu one-hour lecture on Marxism-Leninism before the ideology was adopted as the party's lodestar — rather than Mutasa who had previously suggested in the local press that the capitalist-based Swedish political model constituted one form of socialism.

But, speaking to a deeply religious audience, Mugabe too found it instructive to call on Jesus to help elaborate socialist ideals. He said Marx and Lenin were like Jesus, except they preached a different message about the exploitation of workers,

according to *Parade's* article.

After Zimbabwe's independence honeymoon, the socialist debate largely fell silent until the build-up to the December 18-22 congress, which brought together the country's two main political parties into a single party, under the name Zanu(PF). But today's debate deviated from yesterday's in at least one important respect: With the expectations of independence replaced by experience, there is a growing perception that to believe in the party's capacity to build socialism requires a leap of faith. Socialism without a socialist leadership is not possible. This point was pertinently put in the renewed ideological debate. Former President Canaan Banana said in the state-owned *Sunday Mail's* pre-congress series that the leadership lacked ideological commitment and therefore the party needed to revise some of its strategies.

Less diplomatically, MP Lazarus Nzarayebani said: 'You don't talk about socialism in a party that is led by people who own large tracts of land and employ a lot of cheap labour'.

These comments beg one question: Why were apparently non-socialist leaders rooting for Marxism-Leninism? The answers have tended to be found in the personality of Mugabe who, some observers say, has a strong emotional attachment to socialism.

At the congress, Mugabe certainly stood out as the

prime proponent of socialism. But his comments suggest that he was not unaware of a lack of commitment to socialism.

However, in his view, the reason for this lay in a lack of ideological understanding. And hence the decision to set up Chitepo Ideological College.

The experiences of Eastern Europe probably provided some basis for a more confident outspokenness. Aware of an international political climate ranked against the one-party state and the Western media perspective — which dominates in Zimbabwe — that socialism has been proved wrong, the party could not fail to address Eastern Europe. However, its contribution was more defensive than instructive. The party constitution affirms a commitment to socialism guided by Marxist-Leninist principles, but based on Zimbabwe's own historical, cultural and social experience.

A sensitivity to national conditions is a basic tenet of Marxism-Leninism, but it appeared as if the party felt it necessary to emphasise this in a bid to neutralise the Eastern European debate and experience. In addition, the



Marx: The same as Jesus, only different

old anti-Soviet sentiments of Zanu (PF) were resurrected.

Eastern Europe had imposed regimentation on its people, said Mugabe. Socialism was failing there because it had been imposed from the Soviet Union. That was not Zimbabwe's way. Vanguardism was another source of Eastern Europe's problems. Again that would not be Zanu's way. But, said Mugabe, at least party members should adhere to 'social democracy' if they could not stand by Marxism-Leninism.

However, whether the delegates were convinced by this is an open question. A lack of democracy in the congress proceedings, according to some observers, undercut the Zanu leadership argument that it stood against imposition.

Delegates may well have felt imposed upon in the light of what observers say was an endorsement of the draft resolutions and the constitution rather than an open debate on them. According to one source, some of the leadership felt if democracy was allowed to rule in the congress, the old Zanu/Zapu party divisions could emerge and damage the new unity. Zanu's commitment to a one-party state stood, without any new contribution to the old justification for such a political system. But — had the peasant farmer who thought animal variety made better farming spoken out — perhaps there would have been. -Wip Correspondent.

Preparing for peace?

Anyone who assumes that last month's cuts in military spending means preparations for peace should take note of acting SADF chief Kat Liebenberg's suggestion that it will mean 'leaner and meaner' armed forces. As former head of the SADF's special forces, Liebenberg knows all about mean forces.

The nature of the cuts, intended as a contribution to a targeted 25% reduction of the R10-billion 1989 defence budget, bears out Liebenberg's assertion. Coming in the wake of the halving of the two-year conscription period, the cuts have been hailed as proof of De Klerk's commitment to peace. But it is clear they will have little or no impact on Pretoria's continued ability to militarily control events within South Africa's borders and will only marginally decrease its capacity to interfere militarily with its neighbours.

Most of the cuts affect the navy, which plays little direct military role.

Air force cuts affect mainly the sea-lanes around South Africa's coast. The easing of Cold War tensions had, in any event, rendered its largely-symbolic patrolling role militarily redundant. Its rationalisation will be felt mainly by ships in trouble off the coast.

The cuts include the scrapping of a R250-million combined-forces defence

headquarters in Pretoria. Coming under the axe are:

- * the navy's Marine Unit - a land-based combat force. Most of those serving in the unit will be transferred to the army.

- * two naval commands - Naval Command West at Silvermine in Cape Town and Naval Command East in Durban - and five naval bases. In addition two navy bases, at Walvis Bay and Simonstown, and several naval units are to be scaled down.

- * 2 000 navy positions, 8% of the full-time force.

Although Liebenberg said the seagoing capacity of the navy - its ships - will not be reduced, earlier reports suggested that several craft would be 'mothballed' - a form of long-term storage. The air force too is facing major cutbacks. Three air force bases will close, three squadrons using outdated aircraft will be scrapped, and five types of aircraft withdrawn from service.

Air crews will, however, be absorbed into surviving units, so staff cuts are small.

Armcor, the government-owned armaments production company, has also been hit. Eleven major weapon and equipment projects, due to launch next year, have been canned and 49 others cut back or delayed. Among those scrapped are plans to develop a main battle-tank. Even scrapping plans for a locally-produced tank does not so much inhibit Pretoria's current capacity as it reflects a shift in South African military tactics.

It would take several years for the first tank to roll out of Armcor's factories. By

then it would be well behind international developments in tank technology. And, as Cuito Cuanavale demonstrated at such great cost to South Africa's military planners, out-of-date South African tanks are no match for their state-of-the-art Soviet cousins.

Rather than dropping the idea of improving its battlefield strike capacity, however, Pretoria has simply opted to move into what officials call 'the third dimension'.

Just five days after the cuts were announced, Armcor unveiled a prototype combat helicopter, the Rooivalk, which air force operations chief James Kriel claims is as good as the Soviet Mi28 Havoc. Weapons systems on the Rooivalk include sensors on its muzzle with both night-vision and target-tracking systems. These can be linked into anti-tank missile systems that can be fitted to the Rooivalk or sold separately - as seems likely - on the international market.

At the unveiling, air force spokesmen said the Rooivalk was the first aircraft to give them access to the 'third dimension of the battle-field' - the air-space between the ground and 30m up. This would enable the new craft to provide far better support to ground troops than fixed-wing planes.

And although air force officials say they have no immediate plans to order any, Kriel said it was important that the aircraft is available 'should circumstances change'. - *WIP Correspondent*.

NSC's tour de force

Ali Bacher, who readily concedes that 'the politics of the day will determine the return of South African cricket to the international arena', clearly had no idea what the coming-of-age of a mass-based sports body would do to rebel tours.

Having organised six other rebel tours in the last decade without arousing significant protest, Bacher probably assumed that the 1990 tour would be no different.

He might also have reckoned that the township coaching scheme of his South African Cricket Union (Sacu) would rally township support - or at least secure a tolerant response from that quarter. What Bacher certainly did not know was that the United Democratic Front (UDF) and the Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu) had got to 'item 10' on their agenda some months before the tour. 'When the South African Council on Sport met the newly-formed UDF and Cosatu we were told that sport was item 10 on their agenda and would be tackled in due course', recalls Sacos official Mike Kahn.

With the launching of the National Sports Congress (NSC) last year, this item was finally addressed. The NSC clearly benefitted from the established working relationship between Cosatu and the UDF.

And the NSC, with a large and politicised constituency to draw on, was to become the key player in the anti-tour lobby, which pledged itself to 'peaceful yet effective action' against the rebels.

Sacos Transvaal chairperson Reggie Veldman comments that 'today labour and community organisations are much closer to non-racial sports organisations than before. That accounts for the mass anti-tour protests'.

With huge anti-tour demonstrations and meetings, scenes reminiscent of 1986 flared in townships on the tour route. Burning barricades, exploding teargas canisters and running street battles between police and youths marked its progress.

At the grounds before each game pitches have been covered with razor wire to discourage saboteurs, while snipers patrolled surrounding rooftops. Demonstrators referred to the match venues as 'the killing fields'.

The NSC employed a two-pronged strategy to counter the plans of the rebels and their hosts - protest action as well as the presentation of an alternative to the rebel course.

'This ensured that Sacu could not say "we had no choice"', NSC general secretary Krish Naidoo explained.

Meetings were held with the rebels in London, with potential sponsors, with the management of the Southern Suns (the hotel group) booked to accommodate the rebels, with Sacu's organisers and its township coaches and

with prospective Springboks.

The fact that no sponsor could be found for the tour was in itself a victory for the anti-tour lobby.

Players Peter Kirsten and Kepler Wessels were among those prepared to listen to the NSC. Kirsten is believed to have admitted that he would not be unhappy if the tour did not go ahead.

In addition Southern Suns group MD Bruno Corte undertook not to prevent hotel workers and other protestors demonstrating on their premises. He agreed that the tour was 'tainted with a degree of immorality'.

Sacu's own coaches opposed the tour. Some, like Zenzele Mobekwe and Pappie Monate of Soweto, foresaw that it would lead to suffering by township children.

UDF structures in Atteridgeville and Alexandra have recommended that Sacu's schemes for the areas be terminated and replaced with an alternative. Even participants in the coaching

scheme like 13-year-old Tebogo Malinga from Alex viewed things with a critical eye. 'I don't see the point of it - because they do not provide facilities for us but make us go and play in the white areas. Gating is not welcome here'.

The NSC was scathing of Sacu's decision to proceed with the tour. 'Sacu failed the acid test for white sport.

Their rebel tour has sided them with the racist minority', an NSC statement declared. But the NSC admitted that Bacher had made some progress in the townships with his coaching scheme.

Naidoo explained how the NSC intended to ensure that the coaching scheme itself would not be destroyed.

'The NSC has been in touch with the black coaches employed by Sacu as well as with the sponsors, Bakers. The scheme will soon be brought into the hands of those it is meant to serve'.

Dan Moyo of the NSC outlined plans to incorporate more than 2-million children at Department of Education

and Training (DET) schools into the non-racial sporting movement. He said the aim was to take coaching beyond a few selected townships. Student and youth congresses as well as teachers' organisations and the National Education Coordinating Committee were working with the NSC to achieve this objective, he said.

Naidoo, commenting on growing divisions within Sacu, stated that 'the NSC sees no future for Sacu in its present form in a post-apartheid society and predicts a split in its ranks. After the tour discussions will continue with the genuine elements in Sacu about normalising cricket in South Africa'.

The NSC has argued that abandoning rebel tours is the kind of down-payment white sporting bodies must make in order to begin negotiations to unify the different codes and to develop non-racial structures from school level upwards. Then - and only then - will international sports contact be considered, it asserts.

The South African Road Runners Association and the government-linked South African National Olympic Committee both condemned rebel tours, realising they actually delay renewed international links. By contrast, rugby's Danie Craven supports the tour.

'Before integration we had all the tours imaginable. Now after we have normalised sport, there are no tours', is his reasoning. Dr Willie Basson, president of the South African Sport Confederation, would disagree. He still sees South

African sport as 'riddled with apartheid', but points to the positive feature that for the first time sports representatives are being forced by pressure from inside the country to get to the negotiating table.

Rebel captain Mike Gatting shows little sympathy for the complex issues triggered by the tour: 'I'm here to play cricket and talk about cricket. If you want to discuss politics then talk to the politicians'.

The protestors' views were put to him immediately he landed at Jan Smuts Airport in the form of a memorandum, which read: 'You have said publicly that you want to see apartheid for yourselves ... Why do you have to be paid to see apartheid?'


'Our children are still forced to learn their sport on the dusty streets of the townships ... Thousands of our people are living in shacks in all parts of the country.

'You will return to your country in about seven weeks from now. Your bank balances will be able to keep you in the lap of luxury for the better part of your life. South Africa will be poorer by R15-million and nothing would have changed in cricket'. - *Ibrahim Seedat.*

On 28 February WIP will be moving to new offices in Auckland House, cor Smit and Biccard Streets, Braamfontein. Our telephone and fax numbers and postal address are unchanged.



Vacating the corridors of power



What we are trying to do,' explained former police spy Craig Williamson, 'is make sure that no future government has the power we did'.

He was outlining to a United States radio audience the objectives of president FW de Klerk's 2 February reform package and of future reforms which he said were inevitable.

A sitting National Party president's councillor and still a ranking party expert on the African National Congress (ANC), Williamson's statement carries real weight.

And its implications go beyond De Klerk's opening address to parliament. They indicate that for De Klerk the issue is no longer whether a democratically elected government will replace his own, nor even when.

The only remaining issue, Williamson's comment suggests, is what limitations the National Party will be able to entrench in a post-apartheid constitution as it vacates the corridors of power.

De Klerk himself has already indicated that these will include a bill of rights which would protect the country's former rulers from precisely the kind of abuses to which they subjected their former citizens.

The role of Britain and the United States in the process suggests that the most contentious of these limitations will be directed at the economy: Entrenching existing property relations and hobbling future governments' attempts to restructure, or even intervene in, the

economy.

More directly, political limitations, particularly the notion of racial 'group rights' - which would give the country's 6-million white citizens a perpetual political veto - are no longer a non-negotiable element of a post-apartheid constitution, as they were for the National Party during last October's election campaign. 'Group rights' are now downgraded to a more modest status as part of what the party will lay on the negotiating table, constitutional affairs minister Gerrit Viljoen suggests.

As a fall-back, the party will take to the negotiating table a complex proposal of voting by geographical unit, with votes in different units worth differing amounts. Unsurprisingly, the value of a vote cast in Soweto would be less than one cast in Randburg. More surprising, however, is that elements in the government believe this will pass muster at the negotiating table.

Even the Group Areas Act may be less of a stumbling block than at first appears. From Viljoen comes the explanation that it cannot logically be scrapped under the existing constitution. The implication is thus that its retention is a practical consideration, not a principled one.

Another element to consider is the suggestion from Viljoen and law and order minister Adriaan Vlok that the National Party sees for itself a post-apartheid role, possibly even as a minority partner in a governing coalition by the turn of the century.

This willingness by senior cabinet ministers to predict so far into the future, a future which from other perspectives seems uncertain, indicates either: * that De Klerk's men have accepted that they must surrender power - and will therefore in due course meet the pre-conditions outlined in the Harare Declaration, then sit down and agree to the introduction of a democratic constitution.

* or that they are supremely confident of their ability to force on the ANC and its allies a series of compromises.

The latter is an extremely risky bet, even taking into account the international pressure on the ANC to settle. Yet the ministers appear confident.

A small but significant pointer to the government's seriousness is the speed with which it responded to the ANC's objection to an initial assertion that the release of Nelson Mandela was being delayed by 'security considerations'. This was not a unilateral issue, ANC president Oliver Tambo stated, and its resolution must include the ANC. Government officials have since referred to it as a matter of joint concern.

There is thus evidence that De Klerk has taken the decision to settle.

In private, government officials even explain the key omissions from the changes De Klerk has so far offered (the state of emergency security measures, the Internal Security Act and other restrictive legislation remain untouched) as part of an inevitable round of pre-negotiations horse-trading.

New tactics for new times

Umkhonto weSizwe's Chris Hani characterises the ANC's response to De Klerk as: 'Firm in principle and flexible in tactics'. Jenny Cargill reports

Recognition by the African National Congress (ANC) of the need for tactical flexibility could not be more appropriate than it is now.

The ANC leadership, however, has reasserted that the movement will not be swayed by the current political fluidity into making any broad strategic changes. As Umkhonto weSizwe chief of staff Chris Hani put it earlier: 'We must be firm in principle and flexible in tactics'.

The ANC has yet to make a substantive response to president FW de Klerk's February reform package.

But recent interviews with senior ANC officials and statements from the movement provide some pointers to the organisation's likely course in the short term and the options it believes worth serious consideration.

Even before De Klerk's speech, the ANC had examined some of the questions the government's reforms would pose. The agenda of its extended national executive committee (NEC) meeting in Lusaka in January included examining the implications of unbanning the ANC. It looked specifically at the implications for the movement's internal underground and for the return

This is entirely sensible for a party about to negotiate away its power and eager to save what it can. The less it gives away in advance, the stronger its hand when negotiations begin.

After the 2 February announcement and the unconditional and carefully stage-managed release of Nelson Mandela from Victor Verster prison, De Klerk has in any event won himself previously unimaginable international credibility.

If he lifts the state of emergency before the end of the month as planned, the cudors from foreign powers will grow even further.

He will therefore have every incentive to wait before dealing his next card.

None of this, however, should disguise the fact that De Klerk is throwing in the towel. He will go down in history as the last apartheid president.

Why?

Although De Klerk has managed to construct himself a reformist image since taking on the acting presidency after PW Botha's stroke last year, he had previously been known as the leading conservative in Botha's cabinet.

Partial settlements, involving power-sharing, white vetoes and other variants, have been thrown around in senior government circles for several years.

Even the idea of an interim government, proposed by the ANC and opposed publicly by the government, was put forward in a detailed document to Botha three years ago by a squad of senior civil servants. It was rejected by Botha but given cautious and unofficial approval by several ministers who are still in the cabinet.

Several factors appear to have combined to persuade De Klerk to take the next step.

The first of these De Klerk himself referred to in his SABC television interview after opening parliament - the fact that by delaying too long the Rhodesian government had lost even the little it could have salvaged.

The guaranteed white seats in the subsequent Zimbabwean parliament were a gift from Britain's Margaret Thatcher, not a concession won across the table at Lancaster House.

The second was the stunning realisation, as Namibian election results came

in last November, that Ovamboland had voted 97% for Swapo.

Shocked government officials rapidly did their sums and came to the conclusion that 'their' Namibians - the troops of the territory force, the police and even the fighters in Koevoet - had voted in massive numbers for Swapo. They had fought the liberation movement and killed its combatants for more than a decade, but in the secrecy of the ballot room they voted it into power.

For Pretoria it was a disturbing thought. And NP leaders turned a jaundiced eye on voluntary black participants in 'the system' at home. In Umtata, Bantu Holomisa helped confirm their fears.

Those on whom they had counted to prevent an ANC walk-over (should it come to that) might not be theirs at all. Even the Ciskei's Lennox Sebe, their most loyal ally after Lucas Mangope, warned them that an ANC-led alliance was likely to romp home with more than a two-thirds majority should they risk an election (See Briefs).

The third and decisive element for De Klerk's men has been the chilling sight of the toppling dominoes of Eastern Europe.

A government article of faith for the past decade has been that reform from above is possible; that an illegitimate regime can gain legitimacy through a process of selective, carefully-timed and rigidly-controlled reforms.

In Eastern Europe they saw that theory kicked aside as government after government tried it and fell - toppled by the very forces their limited reforms had unleashed.

The South African Communist Party's Joe Slovo described the process as 'popular revolts against unpopular regimes'.

In parliament De Klerk attempted to turn this to his advantage, saying the weakening of international communism had correspondingly weakened the threat posed by the ANC and SACP.

In fact, the message of Eastern Europe was an entirely negative one for Pretoria, graphically symbolised by the television pictures of the corpse of Nicolae Ceausescu, who had waited too long and offered too little.

of exiles.

But now, with De Klerk's actual offer before it, tactical planning can take a more concrete form.

The movement starts from a recognition that its unbanning alone does not constitute democracy in South Africa. There is no question, says Hani, of 'stopping half way' although the movement believes that, for De Klerk, getting the ANC to do just that is a key objective. ANC sources say that this aim underpins his reform package.

Consequently the ANC has been particularly vocal in asserting that all its forms of struggle will remain in place - and in fact need to be intensified.

This is the only logical response, the movement believes, given the omissions from De Klerk's package.

The Harare Declaration calls for the creation of equal political opportunity before negotiations could get underway. That, in summary, is the meaning of the ANC's preconditions for talks.

But De Klerk's failure to lift the state of emergency and his government's determination to keep key security legislation in place means he can still decide on the political conduct of others.


Thus an essential tactical objective for the ANC is to keep 'the people' focused on the need to continue to struggle.

It has already drawn on some political sloganising to achieve this, emphasising the positive role of struggle in creating the current political climate - and scoffing at any notion of De Klerk being the initiator.


An earlier interview with NEC member Jacob Zuma gives an insight into the ANC's strategic approach towards sustaining anti-apartheid pressure - and the kind of tactics worth considering. Judging by initial ANC responses to De Klerk's package, Zuma's comments appear to retain their relevance today.

In Zuma's view, 'the question of power should be brought to the centre so that no tricks can be used to derail' the struggle.

And if the people are clear on that, says Zuma, 'you cannot say to people "stop the struggle now", when they haven't yet got power in their hands'.



Hani: 'No question of stopping half way'



disbanding its underground.

Zuma argues that as long as 'the regime is poised to continue with restrictions the underground factor in our organisation remains key, remains the only area where you can guarantee operating and deepening the struggle outside the framework of legality put there by the regime'.

A return of exiles at this stage would be impossible since negotiations have not even started, nor guarantees been provided.

And from the ANC's perspective Umkhonto needs to be maintained as a coherent force as insurance against the National Party reneging on its reforms or undertakings.

De Klerk will also find his chief antagonist uncompromising about the return of exiles being conditional on the nature of their ANC activities.

But one option the ANC leadership may consider is returning a small number of its exiles to both legal and illegal existence within the country to assist in internal organisational work and in communications between internal and external arms of the ANC.

Hani argues that the ANC, not De Klerk, will decide how and when exiles return. But whatever the conditions of returning, he says, it will be conducted in an 'organised and systematic manner'.

'We are not going back as returning refugees. The movement will map out the tasks of each and every one of us, where we go ... there will still be a need to leave people to service our organisation, to be in touch with the international community', he says.

The leadership may even consider sending into the country a high-level delegation for consultations with other democratic formations. This idea was

first mooted during the Commonwealth Eminent Persons' Group initiative, abruptly aborted by the SADF's attacks on three Frontline states in 1986.

What of the ANC's approach to De Klerk himself?

Leading ANC sources say De Klerk is keen to add issues to the negotiations agenda which the ANC has locked into pre-conditions for talks. The Group Areas Act is one such issue.

For Hani, there can be no question of altering the pre-conditions package. 'We don't want the enemy to choose within that package issues which it prefers. We demand the whole package'.

However, there is room for more flexibility than Hani's statement seems to imply.

On the armed struggle, Hani suggests that the leadership could instruct the army to unilaterally suspend its actions for a month or two. This would be an effective demonstration of the ANC's goodwill and would throw the ball back at De Klerk.

Hani has hinted that this option is already in place in the Transkei. 'Why should we attack a man like (General Bantu) Holomisa, when he is actually articulating good positions?'

But for the armed struggle to effectively influence the balance of forces - so important to both sides as they prepare for negotiations - it will need to demonstrate its capabilities.

At its January meeting the NEC itself cast doubt on Umkhonto's capacity to intensify its actions. But Zuma says the obstacles to this were considered 'very deeply' and the leadership was confident they could be overcome.

Another possible ANC response would be to agree to some direct contact with Pretoria before all pre-conditions are met. In other words to engage in some tentative pre-talks. But this would certainly not happen before Nelson Mandela's release.

Thus the tactical terrain offers much room for manoeuvre. Says Zuma, the ANC is unlikely to respond to De Klerk with slogans. Rather it will look to the kind of political footwork that is geared to keep the National Party leader on the defensive, forced to react to the ANC rather than to initiate action on his own.

The need to focus on the question of state power underlies this year's ANC slogan: People's action for a democratic South Africa.

'The slogan is very much related to us trying to centralise the question of power, that every action which people undertake must be understood to be actions related to bringing about a democratic South Africa', says Zuma, also a member of the ANC's national Political Military Committee (PMC) which directs operations inside South Africa.

At a tactical level, Zuma suggests targeting mass action at the symbols of state power - marching on parliament is one example - as well as taking up the issues of the day.

With the unbanning of the ANC this kind of activity is likely to receive a considerable fillip, as the ANC moves in to take full advantage of the extra political space De Klerk's reforms have afforded.

Hani believes the unbanning of the organisation will in fact 'unleash an avalanche in the sense that the ANC will have at its disposal most of its experienced leaders at a number of levels'.

There is little doubt that the ANC will now want political organisation to take place under its name - instead of through proxies.

The course of the South African Youth Congress - by which an organisation simply declares itself an ANC structure - is one obvious option.

But added to that the ANC is likely to consider bringing some of its underground units into the open, particularly those which have been involved in strictly political work.

These units would provide a necessary core of cadres with a working understanding of the ANC and its policies. Combining their input with that of released political prisoners and unbanned activists, the ANC could realistically think of its own organised, political base throughout the country before liberation - a factor missing in liberation struggles such as that in Zimbabwe, and sorely felt after the achievement of independence.

But despite possible tactical adjustments, there is no question of the ANC

Five years' removal from the struggle - and years of emergency rule at that - give United Democratic Front general secretary Popo Molefe a special 'before and after' perspective on the democratic movement.

Emerging from jail in December, after the Appeal Court overturned the Delmas trial convictions for treason and terrorism, Molefe has been particularly struck by the pervasiveness of political awareness.

'What has excited me most clearly is the way in which our people seem to be all the time ready for action. The way they seem to have come to acknowledge the leadership of stalwarts of the movement like Walter Sisulu, Mlangeni, Mkwazi, Motsoaledi - and Mandela. Virtually singing about them. Almost every home I go into in Soweto I find posters with pictures of these people'.

It is a stunning change from when Molefe last walked the streets of Soweto in 1985. But he makes it clear that heightened consciousness is far from an automatic recipe for liberation.

Molefe is candid in his assessment that the structures of the UDF are presently unequal to the task of coordinating mobilisation. He is harsh in his assessment of the National Party's concessions and emphatic that negotiations will be a battle all the way.

And he places great emphasis on the fact that material conditions are deteriorating dramatically, even as the prospect of settlement remains remote. The potential for spontaneous and violent resistance on a far greater scale than that which seized the country between 1984 and 1986 remains an ever-present possibility.

'Since my coming back I have been able to discern a number of problems. Firstly while there is a lot of enthusiasm our structures are not as organised as they were, our coordination is not as effective as it used to be.

'But there is a lot of enthusiasm and in fact we can say that ideologically we have established our hegemony over the masses of our people. People are more prone to listen to the UDF, the Mass Democratic Movement and the African National Congress than to government policies. To that extent we are powerful.

Deploying forces for freedom

'But in respect of actually building and consolidating the organs of people's power on the ground - that we have not been able to achieve in this period. Of course, by and large, this is a result of the state of emergency during which a number of activists have been in detention, many on trial and some assassinated by the murder squads.

'The task I see for myself and my comrades Terror (Lekota) and Moss (Chikane) and other comrades in the democratic movement in these coming weeks and months would be to begin to tighten up our structures, to consolidate our organisation and our unity'.

He continues: '(We must) begin to build new structures, new organisational formations. Democratise our structures to allow greater mass participation in our struggle to ensure that the struggle that is being conducted in our country is not a struggle of the leaders who take decisions over the heads of the people.

'(We must ensure) that the people themselves begin to determine their own future, beginning to place themselves in a position where they can defend those decisions that they have taken - because they are their own decisions.

'In that way we would actually be in a position not only to build and consolidate our structures but also to allow greater participation by individual people in our own organisations'.

No optimist about negotiations running on a painless, well-oiled course, Molefe pushes home the point: 'In the next few years, if the regime should revert to greater repression as it did in 1984/8, we should be in a position where the skills in our own organisations and the participation are so widely spread that the regime should never, ever again cripple our organisation'.

Molefe agrees with the view of the UDF national executive committee at

its January meeting that there is now greater potential than in the past for mass mobilisation. He bases this assessment in the gap between the government's talk of reform and its failure to deliver rapidly and without equivocation - a failure which is deeply underscored by a real deterioration in living standards.

Fresh from jail, the pot-holed roads and growing housing queues strike him. Unblunted by the gradual nature of deterioration, Molefe is clear that physical decomposition of communities is advanced and has far-reaching social and political implications.

'One looks around - meetings called by organisations are normally packed. People are singing everywhere in the streets. People are shouting slogans of organisations. Every time they meet they discuss the political situation. These are the conditions under which they live.

'In the township virtually every day there are meetings held to discuss the problems of the community - be it the problem of education, the problem of the threat of evictions, high rentals or problems of electricity and low wages'.

The responsibility of leadership is to coordinate this activity and to encourage well-directed rather than impulsive responses, says Molefe. Although the leadership would have a responsibility to prevent an explosion which would see the country caught up in flames, 'this must never be understood that we are saying that the role of leadership is actually to dilute the militancy of the masses'.

Taking it as axiomatic that all material problems must be addressed in relation to the question of political power and that the fundamental demand of the people remains universal franchise, Molefe ranks political education as one of the priority tasks.



advantage we have is that an increasing number of homeland leaders is now seeking ways of making a break with the apartheid system'.

Molefe argues that the government will have to take certain steps before negotiations can begin - steps amounting to the freeing of the political process.

With such unknown freedom to organise on their side, and with the opportunity to combine UDF and ANC organisational potential, liberation forces ought to be able 'to actually deploy massive manpower of the kind we have never had the opportunity to deploy in the history of this country'.

In line with the UDF NEC, Molefe would like to see Natal subjected to the same political programme as all other regions. His argument is a complete negation of the view that the violent subjugation of Natal by either the UDF or Inkatha will be a key factor in determining the kind of constitution South Africa will eventually have - providing for a unitary state based on universal franchise, or a federal structure in which group rights could be accommodated.

Violence stands a much greater chance of losing Natal for the UDF than winning it, Molefe reasons. Unlike Inkatha - which has access to government media - violence and repression combine to remove the UDF from the people.

'In violent conditions our organisations are not able to consolidate and build structures. We do not have the opportunity to express our views openly and thereby persuade the ordinary people to see and understand our position and ultimately join our organisations. Nor are we able to persuade them that the South Africa that we envisage is one that holds a lot of good for them in the future'.

Furthermore, by making violence and the supposed UDF/Inkatha clash the focus of the region, the real political questions of the day are obscured. 'Within that climate, the South African government is able to develop and consolidate its own strategy against us'.

Molefe acknowledges that Buthelezi has a base, but a distinctly regional one. And he can comfortably contemplate Buthelezi as a legitimate but minor player in a constituent assembly.

Molefe: 'We must build and democratise our structures'.

'We have to deepen the political consciousness of our people. That means proper political education, dealing with questions of negotiations, determining whether the Nationalist Party at this point in time is ready for real negotiations. If not, precisely what sort of game are they playing? What is the likely effect of that game on the liberation movement?'

For his part Molefe believes that the NP is intending to 'drag its feet' on negotiating. 'It has been dragging its feet for a long time. It is hoping that in the process it will disorganise the organisations of the people, cause disunity and a situation of apathy in the ranks of the masses. It is also hoping that it will woo a lot of people over to the side of the NP and thus narrow the social base of the ANC and the UDF'.

Molefe reasons that the nature of the NP's five-year plan, its failure 'to say precisely when negotiations are going to start and what are the key issues that the negotiations will address' are indicators that the process will be prolonged and initiated for ulterior motives.

'They continue to talk about group rights which essentially means that whites

must continue to retain the monopoly of power, the monopoly of economic and social privilege'.

If the pace of negotiations were forced, Molefe readily admits that it would render the UDF and other liberation forces less effective at the negotiating table'.

Having conceded that they do not wish to be hustled to the negotiating table, Molefe nonetheless argues that liberation forces could fall back on certain established strengths.

He argues that, compared with Namibia, there is already a high degree of cohesion among major representative groupings. 'Whereas in Namibia the government was able to create a lot of splinter parties with the effect that Swapo support was greatly eroded, in our situation we are better positioned to deal with the situation leading to elections. Whereas Swapo had no mass organisation inside the country, we have that. We have the trade union movement on our side ... and we have fairly progressive business people who are aligning themselves with us at this point in time. We have a significant section of the white community which supports our political views. Of course, one other

Hit squads: Can they be tamed?

President FW de Klerk's intention to release only a narrowly defined group of political prisoners has drawn a sharp response from the democratic movement - a demand for blanket amnesty, including the guerillas of Umkhonto weSizwe.

The amnesty call raises the question: If freedom fighters are to be pardoned, no matter what acts they have committed in the course of the struggle, should not the violence of apartheid's agents be allowed to slip quietly into the past at the same time?

The question is aggravated by the fact that the much-repeated call for a judicial commission of inquiry into hit squads was conceded by De Klerk only a day before the prospect of amnesty arose.

Has the Harms commission been created only to be discarded in the bargaining around political prisoners? Many would insist that this cannot be.

Some would argue that justice demands retribution against those who acted violently in the name of apartheid, a declared crime against humanity. Although their thoughts might run to a South African equivalent of the Nuremburg trials of Nazi war criminals, the priorities of reconciliation and national unity in a post-apartheid era make such an event unlikely.

But a second historical precedent has greater resonance for South Africa and also argues for the retention of the Harms commission: Algeria in the years preceding its liberation.

The Algerian experience compels the South African government and the democratic movement alike to ask whether agents of state repression can be curbed to suit the new political imperative of negotiation - or whether they have a devious life of their own and will find new outlets.

Among other things, this demands that the authorities confront the question of hit squads within the armed forces.

The last years of French colonial rule in Algeria witnessed the particularly violent tenacity of the pied noirs, the French settler minority about to lose power in the face of president Charles de Gaulle's decision to grant 'self-determination' to the people of Algeria.

The Algerian experience also demonstrated how armed forces, deployed for political purposes, do not easily bow to the defeat that is brought on their heads by the changed direction of their political masters.

And they demonstrated the explosive results of an unholy alliance between two disaffected forces, the pied noirs and the soldiers.

After a dramatic speech on radio in September 1959 in which he declared his intention to solve 'the bloodsoaked problem of Algiers' by granting 'the free choice of what the Algerians themselves want to do with their future' De Gaulle faced concerted resistance from the right.

In January 1960 there was the insurrection of the civilian 'ultras' in Algiers, who held soldiers of dubious loyalty at bay across the barricades for a week. This was followed in April 1961 by the abortive Algiers coup led by four French generals, defeated essentially by De Gaulle's ability to retain the loyalty of most of the conscript rank and file.

That year was followed by escalating terrorism of the Organisation Armee Secrete (OAS), an underground combination of the ultras and disaffected military men.

De Klerk is not a De Gaulle. And it certainly seems far-fetched to suggest that key military and police officers would launch a concerted revolt against De Klerk's initiatives in the way that De Gaulle's generals turned scorpion-

like against him.

But the stark developments of Algeria point to grey areas here at home. To the evident malcontent of an ultra-rightwing constituency. To the shadows where formal and informal repression meet, and where the question of who directs the violence, and to what end, becomes crucial.

Violence from the right is highly unlikely to consolidate sufficiently to undermine a negotiated political settlement - unless it is firmly rooted among those who have in the past killed freedom fighters or undertaken acts of sabotage against the 'ANC/UDF/Cosatu enemy'.

Among other things, the Harms commission is charged with identifying these agents and those who command them. Legally the judge's job is specific. Historically it has a potentially broader meaning - sifting the soil, testing how fertile it might be for a campaign of rightwing terror or insurrection.

That there has been widespread use of deadly force against anti-apartheid activists and freedom fighters is self-evident. Scores have been killed inside the country and in cross-border raids targeted at the ANC. Many more assassination attempts have been made in the bombings and burnings of activists' homes. Hundreds of supporters of democratic organisations have been killed in rightwing vigilante terror. An unknown number of 'unrest' deaths, supposedly a simple by-product of crowd dispersal, might better qualify as political killings.



Die makabere moord op Griffiths Mxenge opgelos - 2

BLOEDSPOOR



Ontmoet kaptein Dirk Johannes Coetzee, bevelvoerder van 'n moordbende van die SA Polisie. Hy vertel eksklusief die volle grusame verhaal van politieke sluipmoorde, gifkelkies, buitelandse bomaanvalle en briefbomme.

VAN DIE SAP

Vrye Weekblad, November 1989: Coetzee confesses

days - he and the other three death squad members were barracked at Durban police headquarters, CR Swart police station.

Like Coetzee, Nofomela states that each of the Askaris who helped kill Mxenge was rewarded with R1 000.

In subsequent statements to lawyers, Nofomela alleged that he had watched as Major Eugene de Kock shot the brother of a suspected ANC assassin in the head after a fruitless interrogation of the man. Earlier Nofomela had kidnapped the man, allegedly on De Kock's instruction, from near the Krugersdorp building society where he worked as a security guard. Investigations by the Independent Board of Inquiry into Informal Repression (IBIIR) found that Krugersdorp security guard Japie Maponye had actually disappeared

without trace in 1985, at about the time Nofomela indicated and that he was the brother of ANC man Odirile Maponye, killed in a bomb blast in Pretoria in 1988.

In many cases circumstantial evidence strongly supports the substance of the Nofomela and Coetzee confessions. Why then should the constant claim of official sanction for their actions be a fabrication?

Further substantial evidence of high-level sanction for pro-apartheid violence comes from the Parsons commission into the causes of conflict in kwaNdebele in 1986. Much of the testimony was given by police and army officers who served in the homeland in 1986/7 under police commissioner Brigadier Hertzog Lerm.

It has become usual in human rights circles to refer to this violence as 'informal repression', simply because - unlike detention, the search of homes, house-arrest, crowd control - there are no laws that govern it.

But the concept of 'informal repression' is misleading. The evidence suggests that many operations falling under this heading are officially sanctioned from within the command structures of the armed forces and effected with resources available only to those acting in official capacity.

From the recent confessions of former security police captain and self-confessed death squad commander Dirk Coetzee come a string of names of officers - from brigadiers down - who either ordered him to organise killings (as in the case of Durban lawyer Griffiths Mxenge), or participated in the assassinations, as in the killing of a 'tall thin detainee' abducted from Lesotho and brain-damaged during his stay with the Port Elizabeth security police. Coetzee alleged the detainee was shot on a farm near Komatipoort by a Port Elizabeth police major who now holds the rank of brigadier.

In the run-up to the Mxenge assassination, says Coetzee, 'the security police in Durban pointed out Mxenge's house to us and provided us with information about his movements'.

Almond Butana Nofomela, one of the men operating as an 'Askari' in the special police unit headed by Coetzee, stated in affidavit to the Pretoria Supreme Court that as a member of the security police 'I served under station commander Brigadier Schoon (and) in 1981 I was appointed a member of the security branch's assassination squad and I served under Captain Johannes Dirk Coetzee, who was my commanding officer in the field'.

Nofomela, already on death row at the time of his confession and now on trial for the Mxenge murder as a result of his statement on death squad activities, stated categorically that 'I was briefed by Brigadier Schoon and Captain Coetzee to eliminate a certain Durban attorney, Griffiths Mxenge'.

He adds that throughout the Mxenge operation - which took a number of

It was a period of intense conflict over the question of the homeland's independence. Seeking to force through independence were the kwaNdebele Cabinet with the support of the Mbokotho vigilante group and the armed forces. Opposing independence - and at the receiving end of intense state violence and repression - were a range of community groups, including the youth and tribal chiefs. It is estimated that more than 150 people were killed and over 1000 detained in the conflict.

Few officers who testified spoke favourably of Lerm.


Colonel Stephanus van Loggerenberg, a former army officer now serving the chief minister of the newly elected kwaNdebele government, reportedly testified that Lerm 'told the kits konstabels they should shoot at any radical throwing stones at them' and promised they would be decorated for their actions. Van Loggerenberg also stated that most kits konstabels were supporters of the Mbokotho.

The former deputy commissioner of police in kwaNdebele, Colonel Daniel Malan, told the commission that Lerm's predecessor, a Colonel van Niekerk, had also sided with the Mbokotho. When Malan had disarmed one of the Mbokotho leaders, Majozi Mahlangu, during the run-up to an attack on the village of Tweefontein, Van Niekerk had instructed him to return the firearm. Later that day, said Malan, 'six bodies of youths were found'.

Former secretary for justice OJ Buys said he had been dismissed after he discovered about 40 murder and assault dockets which had been kept from normal investigation on the instructions of Lerm. Buys sent the files to the attorney-general in Pretoria - and got the sack.

According to evidence, among the cases which Lerm kept from effective investigation was one in which nine youths were shot dead with an AK assault rifle while sleeping and their bodies set alight. Indications were that the killings were linked to the Mbokotho.

There was also evidence that Lerm, together with other policemen, had engaged directly in violence - from beating up schoolboys breaking the



Sicelo Dhlomo: Not known to the white community

curfew to a half-hearted necklacing attempt on Collins Mahlangu, brother of an opposition MP. He survived the attempt. 'They put the tyre around my neck, poured the oil over my head and used a cigarette lighter and matches to set me alight - but only my clothes caught fire', Mahlangu testified.

Professor Abram Viljoen, chairman of the Elandsrivier Boerevereniging, submitted: 'The homeland government had mercilessly tried to neutralise its political opponents. In the process of political eliminations some high-placed South African police officers, such as Brigadier Hertzog, played a great role'. Some witnesses were not content to let the buck stop with the homeland government, and pointed a finger at Pretoria. Gerrie van der Merwe, dismissed commissioner-general of kwaNdebele, related that after he sent a warning to constitutional affairs minister Chris Heunis that the chiefs were against independence, he (Van der Merwe) was dismissed and Lerm - the man in charge at the Mamelodi Massacre just six months earlier - was appointed.

Attorney Nic de Villiers of the Legal Resources Centre argued: 'The kwaN-

debele police practice of violent actions against residents was elevated to a policy. It was openly practised and condoned by senior police. It was encouraged by the issue of pick handles (which were used as police weapons) and the recruitment of the Mbokotho members as special constables. Violence was seen as necessary for the political ends of the kwaNdebele executive'.

But, he added, there was always an SAP intelligence presence in the homeland. 'They retained control over the kwaNdebele police force not only because the senior officers were seconded from the SAP, but because the SAP continued to retain primary responsibility for the security of the area.

'However, the South African authorities failed to intervene and the minister of law and order consistently denied all responsibility for kwaNdebele in the South African parliament'.

While both the Askari confessions and the kwaNdebele inquiry argue very strongly that officially sanctioned violence was routinely employed against apartheid's enemies, neither example says much about whether such forces are as amenable to official restraint as

they are to deployment - and how changed political conditions might affect this.

The death squad of which Coetzee and fellow Askaris speak appeared to be concerned mainly with attacks on ANC members and others with links to the ANC, although Nofomela mentioned operations against Northern Cape UDF leader Hoffman Galeng (stealing his car) and youth activists in Lamontville near Durban.

Clearly, however, there was a much wider network of hit squads in operation against activists of mass-based organisations from late 1985 onwards.

Not only do many murders - for instance those of Cradock leader Matthew Goniwe and his three comrades - bear the stamp of hit squad activity, but the sheer number of attacks on the homes of activists and the spread of such attacks indicates some degree of national organisation.

In the space of about four months in early 1986, for instance, more than 50 activists' homes in the Pretoria townships alone were petrol-bombed, grenaded or blasted with home-made bombs.

During this same period there were bombings and attacks on homes and organisational offices in Kimberley, Brits, Krugersdorp, the Vaal, Soweto, Witbank, Middelburg, Pietersburg, Johannesburg, Grahamstown, Durban. No-one has been arrested for any of the attacks.

The Askari defections have done little to throw light on who was responsible for the campaign of terror against local activists. But the outpourings of former SAP detective Barend Petrus Horn suggest that it might have been undertaken by police on patrol in the townships.

Speaking of his experience in Uitenhage soon after the Langa Massacre of 1985, Horn stated in an affidavit: 'We were also shown how to make petrol bombs when we were visited on a rest period by two strange men who may have been military police. They weren't from our camp. They were both white and Afrikaans-speaking. They were dressed in civilian clothes and wore canvas combat boots'.

Horn described in detail the petrol bomb-making exhibition they were given.

The next day, he said, the two men



Nofomela: 'I was briefed by Brigadier Schoon and Captain Coetzee to eliminate a certain Durban attorney, Griffiths Mxenge'.

had led a convoy around the township of kwaNobuhle 'to show us which houses to petrol-bomb'. They would simply stop outside the targetted house and point.

'I do know that some of the houses identified to us were later petrol-bombed by police. This was done by the vehicle which relieved us at 10pm. The men who had been on that night spoke openly in the mess about how they had petrol-bombed two houses. When I began patrolling, I saw two newly petrol-bombed houses in kwaNobuhle which had been whole on my earlier patrol'.

Horn's statement should be set against the spate of attacks by men in blue clothing in Alexandra township in the course of a single night, and against the many allegations that these were preceded by police threats.

The case of Leah Mokaba, recorded in the Sunday Star in May 1986, was not unique: Mrs Mokaba of Diepkloof Zone 4 said that when her son Matthew was detained the men who took him 'said he was being taken to Orlando Police Station, and because he was a "comrade" who burnt other people's houses they would return to burn down his home. The following night the threat to burn our home was carried out'. She said she woke to find bricks and stones raining down on the house, which was then set alight. 'I tried to bolt from the house but one of them cornered me. He

told me that policemen also knew how to beat and burn people like our kids did'.

Occasionally a hit squad member has been caught or betrayed by his associates. This happened in 1986 when two alleged hit squad members from Thokoza were captured and one told a press conference that he had been enlisted as a stone-thrower by police who orchestrated attacks on homes.

Despite these fragments of information, the precise nature of the township-focused hit squads remains clouded.

But it is quite clear that civilian white rightwing groups were not capable of this spread of infallibly undetected violence.

Victims such as Sicelo Dhlomo, Fabian Ribeiro, Joyce Mabhudafhasi, Morgan Montoedi, Brian Mazibuko, David Modimoeng were highly-effective local leaders - but their significance was not known to the white community at large. They would be unknown to white fanatics, unless the latter had access to intelligence sources.

Secondly, the dearth of arrests in the scores of attacks is quite remarkable. Whites unfamiliar with the townships would not be able to operate faultlessly on such alien terrain. And it is difficult to see how they would escape detection in areas that were subject to heavy military occupation and often restricted by emergency law to residents only.

Thirdly, there is a evidence that assailants are sometimes black, or that the attacking party group has both black and white members. White die-hards are unlikely to solicit black partners.

And finally, the timing is out. Activities of hit squads in the townships peaked in '85/6 and began to tail off in '87. Only then did the Afrikaner rightwing even begin to assert a militant presence, with emphasis on its paramilitary force. And the establishment of splinter groups to the right of the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging appears to be an even more recent phenomenon.

While present police claims of the existence of rightwing terror organisations need to be seriously - especially in terms of future potential - the trail of assassination and arson of the mid-80s can hardly be laid at their doorstep.

Debating Socialism

Socialism is undoubtedly in the throes of a crisis greater than at any time since 1917 ... If socialists are unable to come to terms with this reality, the future of socialism is indeed bleak'.

This is the context in which a lengthy discussion paper, authored by the South African Communist Party's general secretary, Joe Slovo, asks whether socialism has failed. While publication of the Slovo article was authorised by the SACP's leadership 'as a launching pad for further critical thought', it represents 'the first reflections of the author only'.

Slovo's intervention in the debate on socialism's future is not only a response to the collapse of most communist party governments in Eastern Europe. Nor is his reassessment of the SACP simply a reaction to the changes in Soviet communism associated with the leadership of Gorbachev and the emergence of glasnost and perestroika in socialist terminology.

As early as 1985, Slovo publicly criticised aspects of the SACP's past record, and admitted to a deep shame concerning the Stalinist past. From at least 1986, observers became aware of a debate within the party over the nature of vanguardism, the dictatorship of the proletariat, the relationship between democracy and socialism and other associated issues. This debate - sometimes aired more openly than previous SACP discussions - culminated in a new party programme adopted at its 1989 congress. This committed the party to a post-apartheid society based on multi-party democracy, and guaranteeing the freedoms of speech, thought, press, organisation, movement, conscience and religion.

'Has Socialism Failed?', published in January 1990, is part of a reassessment of communist theory and practice which Slovo began some years back. The current crisis of socialism - dramatically illustrated by what Slovo calls Eastern Europe's 'popular revolts against unpopular regimes' - provides the immediate context for the question he poses. But the nature of the analysis which underlies his latest paper, shows a high degree of continuity with the position he has been developing since at least 1985.

'Has Socialism Failed?' is a longish document - some 27 pages - which ranges over many important issues, including the nature of Stalinism, Marxist theory and the crises of existing socialism, democracy, the dictatorship of the proletariat, the vanguard party, and the one-party state.

In this discussion only a few of the issues raised by Slovo are mentioned: limits of space and time prevent a fuller exploration of all the questions contained in a complex and thoughtful document.

On Stalinism, Slovo says:

‘The term “Stalinism” is used to denote the bureaucratic-authoritarian style of leadership (of parties both in and out of power) which denuded the party and the practice of socialism of most of its democratic content and concentrated power in the hands of a tiny self-perpetuating elite.

While the mould for Stalinism was cast under Stalin's leadership, it is not suggested that he bears sole responsibility for its negative consequences. The essential content of Stalinism - socialism without democracy - was retained even after Stalin in the Soviet Union (until Gorbachev's intervention), albeit without some of the terror, brutality and judicial distortions associated with Stalin himself.

Among a diminishing minority, there is still a reluctance to look squarely in the mirror of history and to concede that the socialism it reflects has, on balance, been so distorted that an appeal to its positive achievements (and of course there have been many) sounds hollow and very much like special pleading. It

As a contribution to the South African debate on socialism and in response to events in Eastern Europe, the SACP's Joe Slovo has produced a discussion paper titled 'Has socialism failed?' Glenn Moss discusses central features of the document

is surely now obvious that if the socialist world stands in tatters at this historic moment it is due to Stalinist distortions.

Vigilance is clearly needed against the pre-perestroika styles of work and thinking which infected virtually every party (including ours) and moulded its members for so many decades. It is not enough merely to engage in the self-pitying cry: "we were misled"; we should rather ask why so many communists allowed themselves to become so blinded for so long. And, more importantly, why they behaved like Stalinists to those of their comrades who raised even the slightest doubt about the "purity" of Stalin's brand of socialism.

There are still outposts which unashamedly mourn the retreat from Stalinism and use its dogmas to "justify" undemocratic and tyrannical practices ... Those who still defend the Stalinist model - even in a qualified way - are a dying breed; at the ideological level they will undoubtedly be left behind.

(Elsewhere in the document, under a section entitled 'Marxist Theory Under Fire', Slovo raises some further arguments pertinent to a discussion of Stalinism:)

'... The fundamental distortions which emerged in the practice of existing socialism cannot be traced to the essential tenets of Marxist revolutionary science. If we are looking for culprits, we must look at ourselves, and not at the founders of Marxism.

In some cases, the deformations experienced by existing socialist states were the result of bureaucratic distortions which were rationalised at the ideological level by a mechanical and out-of-context invocation of Marxist dogma. In other cases, they were the results of a genuinely-motivated but tragic misapplication of socialist theory in new realities which were not foreseen by the founders of Marxism.

The fact that socialist power was first won in the most backward outpost of European capitalism without a democratic political tradition, played no small part in the way it was shaped. To this must be added the years of isolation, economic siege and armed intervention which, in the immediate post-October



'Socialism is undoubtedly in the throes of a crisis greater than at any time since 1917'

(1917) period, led to a virtual decimation of the Soviet Union's relatively small working class. In the course of time, the Party leadership was transformed into a command post with an overbearing centralism and very little democracy even in relation to its own membership.

Most of the other socialist countries emerged 30 years later in the shadow of the cold war. Some of them owed a great deal to Soviet power for their very creation and survival, and the majority, for a great part of their history, followed the Stalinist economic and political model ... They correctly saw in Soviet power a bulwark against their enemies and either did not believe, or did not want to believe, the way in which aspects of socialism were being debased.

All this helps to explain, but in no way justify, the awful grip which Stalinism came to exercise in every sector of the socialist world and over the whole international communist movement. It was a grip which if loosened either by parties (eg Yugoslavia) or individuals within parties, usually led to isolation and excommunication ...

... The strength of this conformism lay, partly, in an ideological conviction that those whom history had appointed as custodians of humankind's communist future seemed to be building on foundations prepared by the founding fathers of Marxism. And there was not enough in classical Marxist theory about the nature of the transition period to provide a detailed guide to the future.

The development of Stalinism was based on an extremely complex interplay of factors: historical, political, economic, theoretical, ideological and even the personal. Slovo's article analyses many of these interlocking relations and structures, and elaboration of them can only serve to deepen and develop the debate about socialism's past and future.

It is probable that Stalinism needs to be characterised as more than bureaucratic authoritarianism, draining communist parties of their democratic content and concentrating power in the hands of an increasingly unaccountable and diminishing elite. Politically, that was the most striking feature of Stalinism, and allowed for the barbaric abrogation of human and civil rights which many - incorrectly - see as an inevitable consequence of socialism and/or communism.

But Stalinist theory and practice involved other important facets:

- * a defence of the Soviet Union to the neglect and detriment of other socialist struggles and experiments. Internationally, this involved the subjugation of all other revolutionary struggles to Soviet foreign and domestic needs, and drained socialism of the internationalism that had marked its origins and theory. This belief in the necessity - and later the desirability - of defending 'socialism in one country' at the expense of other socialist struggles, is an important facet of Stalinist practice and policy;
- * a particular trajectory of industrialisation, 'primitive accumulation' and economic development;
- * a concept of the ownership of economic property (the means of production), which in practice asserted that juridical ownership of economic property by a state claiming to represent direct producers on its own implied that

National liberation and socialism

Does the SACP char-
terise the relationship
between the masses in the current
struggle in South
Africa, particularly those
which are nationally
dominated?
The present phase of the revo-
lution in the country is one of
the oppressed people.
This does not mean the
people can be
a homogeneous
entity. The masses are made up of
various strata whose
interests do not nec-
essarily coincide, and whose
development and commitment
to the immediate objec-
tives of the democratic revolu-
tion vary.

In its alliance with the
African National Congress,
and as an independent
organisation, the South
African Communist Party
has influence in the struggle
over South Africa's future.
The role and policy of the
SACP will inevitably have a
bearing on future political
developments. In the inter-
ests of understanding the
SACP's policy and position
on a number of important
issues, GLENN MOSS
submitted questions to
senior members of the party.
The responses are those of
a senior SACP official whose
identity was not revealed to
WIP.

Common aspirations of all the classes
which make up the domina-
ted people is the Freedom
Charter. But this document is
not, in itself, a programme for
socialism.

role of the
its mass a-
sations. For
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Charting the debate: WIP's 1987 interview with senior SACP members

the development and perpetration of Stalinism. One need not look to the fundamentals of Marxism for explanation; but looking to human agency independent of the material conditions which underpinned the dogmatic practices of 'millions of genuine socialists and revolutionaries' who became Stalinists will not assist in answering the question Slovo poses. The behaviour of socialists who became Stalinists has to be explained by more than an analysis of individuals, their failings and responses.

On socialism and democracy, Slovo says:

“Marxist ideology saw the future State as “a direct democracy in which the task of governing would not be the preserve of a state bureaucracy” and as “an association in which the free development of each is a condition for the free development of all”. How did it happen that, in the name of this most humane and liberating ideology, the bureaucracy became so all-powerful and the individual so suffocated?

To find, at least, the beginnings of an

answer we need to look at four related areas:

- * the thesis of the “Dictatorship of the Proletariat” which was used as the theoretical rationalisation for unbridled authoritarianism;
- * the steady erosion of people's power both at the level of government and mass social organisations;
- * the perversion of the concept of the Party as a vanguard of the working class; and
- * whether, at the end of the day, socialist democracy can find real expression in a single-party state.

The concept of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat was dealt with rather thinly by Marx as a “transition to ... a classless society” without much further definition ... (It) was elaborated by Lenin ... in the very heat of the revolutionary transformation in 1917. Lenin quoted Engels approvingly when he said that “the proletariat needs the state, not in the interests of freedom but in order to hold down its adversaries, and as soon as it becomes possible to speak of freedom the state as such ceases to exist. In the meantime, in contrast to capitalist democracy which is “curtailed, wretched, false ... for the rich, for the minority ... the dictatorship of the proletariat, the period of transition to communism, will, for the first time, create democracy ... for the majority ... along with the necessary suppression of the exploiters, of the minority” ...

Rosa Luxemburg said, in a polemic with Lenin: “Freedom only for the supporters of the government, only for members of one party - however numerous they may be - is not freedom at all. Freedom is always and exclusively freedom for the one who thinks differently ... Its effectiveness vanishes when freedom becomes a special privilege”.

These words may not have been appropriate as a policy ... in the special conditions of the phase immediately after the seizure of power in October 1917 ... But Luxemburg's concept of freedom is surely incontrovertible once a society has achieved stability ...

The term - Dictatorship of the Proletariat - reflected the historical truth that in class-divided social formations state power is ultimately exercised by, and in

the means of production were socialised. This severely limited the development of an economic democracy within production that is a crucial component of socialism;

* Stalinist economic theory - in contradistinction to some previous socialist thought - assumed that the development of society's productive forces (often crudely assumed to refer to technology only) were the motor force of change. This emphasised technological development and relations, to the exclusion of the conditions under which production took place. This led to the prioritisation of technological development in industrial production, to the exclusion of changing the relations between direct producers, the means of production and non-producers (ie those who control the surplus generated in production). Non-Stalinist socialism views changes in this last set of economic and social relations as central to the building of socialism and/or communism;

* an acceptance that the imposition of communist rule from above - as a result of international treaties or conquest - could create conditions favourable to the building of socialism and/or communism. Non-Stalinist socialism would tend to argue that the nature of class formation and class struggle, the balance of forces between various contending interests, the development and organisation of the working class and its allies, the nature and development of productive forces and relations, and various other material factors determine the potential for a change in existing power relations, and the building of a socialist or communist alternative.

Slovo leaves open the difficult 'question of why so many millions of genuine socialists and revolutionaries became such blind worshippers in the temple of the cult of the personality', which is one hallmark of Stalinism. But he does suggest that if one is looking for culprits in the creation and development of Stalinism, 'we must look at ourselves and not at the founders of Marxism'.

The final laying of the Stalinist ghost will necessarily involve explanations of the practices of the millions of socialists, Marxists and revolutionaries who actively participated or acquiesced in

the interests of, the class which owns and controls the means of production. It is in this sense that capitalist formations were described as a "dictatorship of the bourgeoisie" whose rule would be replaced by a "dictatorship of the proletariat" during the socialist transition period. In the latter case, power would be exercised in the interests of the overwhelming majority of the people and should lead to an ever-expanding genuine democracy - both political and economic. On reflection, the choice of the word "dictatorship" to describe this type of society certainly opens the way to ambiguities and distortions.

The abandonment of the term by most communist parties, including ours, does not, in all cases, imply a rejection of the historical validity of its essential content. But the way the term came to be abused bore little resemblance to Lenin's original concept. It was progressively denuded of its intrinsic democratic content and came to signify, in practice, a dictatorship of a party bureaucracy. For Lenin the repressive aspect of the concept had impending relevance in relation to the need for the revolution to defend itself against counter-revolutionary terror in the immediate post-revolution period ...

But, unfortunately, practices justified by the exigencies of the earlier phase became a permanent feature of the new society. As time went on the gap between socialism and democracy widened, the nature and the role of the social institutions (such as the Soviets, the Party and mass organisations) which had previously given substance to popular power and socialist democracy, were steadily eroded ...

The single-party state and the guiding and leading role of the party subsequently became a permanent feature of socialist rule and was entrenched in the constitutions of most socialist states. Henceforth the parties were "vanguards" by law and not necessarily by virtue of social endorsement.

This was accompanied by negative transformations within the party itself. Under the guise of "democratic centralism", inter-party democracy was almost completely suffocated by centralism ... With no real right to dissent by citizens



'We remain protagonists of multi-party post-apartheid democracy, both in the national democratic and socialist phases ...'

or even by the mass of party leadership, truth became more and more inhibited by deadening dogma; a sort of catechism took the place of creative thought. And within the confines of a single-party state, the alternative to active conformism was either silence or the risk of punishment as "an enemy of the people" .

It is sometimes forgotten that the concept of the single-party state is nowhere to be found in classical Marxist theory. And we have sufficient experience of one-party rule in various parts of the world to perhaps conclude that the "mission" to promote real democracy under a one-party system is impossible...

Our party's programme holds firmly to a post-apartheid state which will guarantee all citizens the basic rights and freedoms of organisation, speech, thought, press, movement, residence, conscience and religion; full trade union rights for all workers including the right to strike, and one-person one-vote in free and democratic elections. These freedoms constitute the very essence of our national liberation and socialist

objectives and they clearly imply political pluralism We remain protagonists of multi-party post-apartheid democracy both in the national democratic and socialist phases

We also believe that if there is real democracy in the post-apartheid state, the way would be open for a peaceful progression towards our party's ultimate objective - a socialist South Africa. This approach is consistent with the Marxist view - not always adhered to in practice - that the working class must win the majority to its side: as long as no violence is used against the people there is no other road to power.

It follows that, in truly democratic conditions, it is perfectly legitimate and desirable for a party claiming to be the political instrument of the working class to attempt to lead its constituency in democratic contest for political power against other parties and groups representing other social forces. And if it wins, it must be constitutionally required, from time to time, to go back to the people for a renewed mandate.

The alternative to this is self-perpetuating power with all its implications for corruption and dictatorship.

From a strictly democratic perspective, there are dangers in forms of vanguardism, and the notion of the dictatorship of the proletariat, even in their historically specific Leninist definitions. These notions may not necessarily stand at variance with democracy. But there is at least a possibility that the practices which they give rise to may threaten the democratic content of socialism, depending on specific historical circumstances, and the particular phase a society is passing through in its political, economic, cultural and ideological life.

The dictatorship of the proletariat refers specifically to a period of transition from class-based to classless societies. In some socialist thought, this coincides with the transition from an intermediate phase of socialism to communism. But regardless of the specifics of the transition, the analysis underlying the dictatorship of the proletariat implies an active suppression of certain social interests (broadly-speaking, those

of the bourgeoisie) as a means of strengthening other social interests (those of the working class). This poses problems for democracy, and a commitment to democratic socialism or communism.

This is, of course, the manner in which the state operates in capitalist society - although mechanisms to advance the interests of the capitalist class against those of the working class differ enormously in form and content. This involves major differences in the nature and intensity of direct suppression of working-class interests.

In much the same way, a transitional state ruling in the interests of the working class and its allies - the majority - has a variety of mechanisms available to strengthen the interests it represents, and weaken those of other social forces. These may not necessarily involve the suppression of class interests through direct coercion implied in the notion of the dictatorship of the proletariat, which appears to contradict a commitment to democracy and its rights and freedoms.

The notion of a vanguard party is not, in itself, at variance with democratic principles. In a 1989 interview with *Work in Progress*, SACP leaders argued that 'the party's claim to represent the historic aspirations of our working

class does not, in itself, give us inherent leadership rights either now or in the future; it merely imposes leadership obligations ... A communist party does not earn the title of vanguard merely by proclaiming it.

'Nor does its claim to be the upholder of Marxism-Leninism give it a monopoly of political wisdom or a natural right to exclusive control of the struggle. We can only win our place as a vanguard force by superior efforts of leadership and devotion to the revolutionary cause.

'The concept of vanguard remains in place. It is indispensable for the working class to have an independent political instrument which safeguards its role in the democratic revolution and which leads it towards a classless society. But such leadership must be won rather than asserted'.

While this formulation is not necessarily at variance with a commitment to democracy, there are implicit dangers. The leadership role associated with vanguardism, and its protection of working-class interests, risks falling into the political authoritarianism associated with the 'false consciousness/true consciousness' dichotomy: the day-to-day lived experiences of the working class can give rise to interests and approaches

which may contradict a vanguard party's notion of the working-class interests it is protecting and advancing. In this situation, the danger of an intellectually and organisationally sophisticated vanguard (assuming it represents the 'true interests' of the working class, as opposed to 'false interests' which are a result of temporary error or being misled), is high.

It may be that the best democratic guarantee against the dangers implicit in vanguardism are to be found within the structures of the party itself, depending on the relationship of its leadership to membership, whether its vanguard role precludes membership of all who accept party policy or not, regularity and structure of congresses, openness of debate, etc.

Discussions of socialism and democracy can be broken down into a number of areas. These include questions concerning:

- * democracy within socialist and communist parties;
- * the democratic content and practices of socialist and communist parties functioning legally in opposition, but within a democratic society;
- * socialist and communist parties in opposition, but functioning illegally or underground in a repressive society;
- * socialist and communist parties functioning, or holding state power, in transitional periods, including transitions involving national-democratic revolutions, socialism and communism.

It might be helpful if future debates on socialism and democracy specify which of these - or other - contexts are under discussion.

'Socialism', concludes Slovo, 'can undoubtedly be made to work without the negative practices which have distorted many of its key objectives. The way forward lies within a socialist framework guided by a genuine socialist humanitarianism and not within a capitalist system which entrenches social inequalities as a way of life. But mere faith in the future of socialism is not enough. The lessons of the past failures have to be learnt. Above all, we have to ensure that its fundamental tenet - socialist democracy - occupies a rightful place in all future practice'.

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THE LAND



*How do you take
the demand,
'return the
land', beyond
a rallying cry?
Jo-Anne Collinge
reports on some of
the answers*

The Freedom Charter's declaration that the 'land shall be owned by those who work it', has held out the promise of an eventually-just response to a long history of dispossession by violent conquest and forced removal. It is seen as the salve to bitter suffering, such as that endured by the Mfengu of Humansdorp, who were removed at gunpoint to Elukhanyweni in the Ciskei. One of the victims from this area put the answer to his problems this way: 'If they can return me back to Hu-

THE LAND

mansdorp to stay there I will be like a fish in the river'.

But as liberation draws closer and the debate on post-apartheid policies gains sharpness, the complexities of implementing this unqualified promise of repossessing the land become closer.

While land reform will undoubtedly be a major element in the policy of a post-apartheid government, just where this programme will shake down in the priorities of national development and stabilising the economy is an open question.

At a recent conference in Amsterdam, African National Congress legal affairs chief Zola Skweyiya summed up: 'Land reform is not conceived as a single policy objective to the exclusion of all others, but multiple objectives would be combined in varying arrangements of priority'.

Tensions between the political imperative for land redistribution and economic constraints were highlighted by Tessa Marcus, another ANC contributor to the Amsterdam debate. 'Land reform has frequently fallen victim to political expediency', she observed. 'Measures have been devised to deflate political and social unrest and/or to win the support of key social forces in the countryside without, however, taking into consideration the broader economic and political implications these carry'.

When such ill-founded plans failed, she suggested, the reaction was often to revert to an 'economic' approach, which involved tinkering only with the most obvious injustices while actually retaining the status quo. 'Disregarding national and social grievances in the interests of narrow economism generates considerable political discontent and social disruption and invariably fails economically as well'.

The sense conveyed by Marcus that land and agrarian reform is a tightrope walk, a delicate balancing act, is echoed by others contributing towards formulating ANC policy in this area.

Economist Helena Dolny has cautioned: 'The repossession of the land may take various forms over an extended period. Land claims made for the

repossession of land will be tempered by the need to maintain agricultural production'.

But, she adds: 'There are certain demands of those who have participated in rural struggles for decades whose needs must be immediately addressed. Those who have more recently struggled against removal from so called "black-spots" should regain their land without delay. Labour tenants who have worked the land for generations should receive legal rights to the land'.

Bold intervention by the state in both land and agrarian reform remains a cornerstone of thinking within the ANC. While the principle of nationalisation of land is not in question, there is much debate about how much land the state could or should acquire, where it should be located and to what degree white farmers should be compensated.

Both political and economic factors shape this debate. Setting the overall ceiling on possible intervention by the post-apartheid state, is the political dimension. If, in a negotiating situation, forces representing apartheid land owners impose their will on the settlement, the possibilities for land distribution are likely to diminish.

In Zimbabwe, for instance, the terms of the Lancaster House agreement caused the Mugabe government to fall far short of its targets for resettlement of the landless. The undermining feature was the provision in the Bill of Rights for a particular form of compensation for the owners of lands to be nationalised. It made land reform unbearably costly and in nine years the Zimbabwean government resettled only 50 000 families — while it had aimed to relocate 162 000 families in three years.

Present ANC thinking on compensation is shaped partly by the fact that present ownership patterns rest firmly on what Dolny calls a 'a violent process of dispossession ... sanctified and given legal status'.

She adds that confining the compensation issue to white farmers 'overlooks the feeling of African communities that they have a right to be compensated for decades of dispossession'.





'It is in principle unacceptable that the repayment of former land owners should become a national burden on the labouring population'

If the outside limit on nationalisation still remains vague, there is no doubt that ANC thinking firmly rejects the market as a mechanism for redistributing land. It is repeatedly pointed out that under the market mechanism of apartheid rule, a process of intense concentration of land took place even among white farmers. The figures compiled by David Cooper, showing a decrease in the number of farming units during the years 1960 to 1985 from 116 848 units to 59 088, are cited as evidence.

Implicit in the foregoing is the perception that eliminating racial restrictions on land ownership is a necessary but completely inadequate feature of post-apartheid land policy.

The Constitutional Guidelines of the ANC provide, in addition to the lifting of racial restrictions, for 'implementation of land reforms in conformity with the principle of affirmative action, taking into account the status of victims of forced removals'.

Skweyiya elaborated the underlying objectives of the land provisions in the guidelines. They were:

- * to stimulate economic development;
- * to increase agricultural production;
- * to increase employment on the land;
- * to increase incomes of the rural population;
- * to bring democracy to the rural population;
- * to maintain and strengthen to a certain extent the institution of the family farm.

When these objectives are brought to bear on the question of nationalisation,

the most conservative option — that of merely making 'unoccupied' white-owned farms available to landless rural people — hardly fits the bill.

Marcus argues that it is 'highly contentious to suggest that this land is "abandoned" or "disused" because whites have ceased to live on or work it'. Such land is often still heavily populated and worked by black people — although it is often under-utilised due to over-crowding and lack of resources.

The second question Marcus poses is what purpose it would serve to expropriate only the least fruitful land, which even heavily-subsidised white farmers had been unable to put to profitable use. 'The state would have to divert large amounts of limited resources into these areas with very little gain, while the richest land areas would remain untouched, firmly in the hands of private, mostly-white, highly-capitalised farmers'.

Even partial nationalisation, she insists, 'must make inroads into the heart of power in this sector'.

Paying for this is the problem — economically, politically and, finally, morally.

Dolny highlights the moral poser. 'It is in principle unacceptable that the repayment of former land owners should become a national burden on the labouring population. South Africa's agrarian and industrial capitalists have for decades enjoyed wealth exclusively produced by exploitation of the South African labouring people'.

She dismisses as probably-impracticable the idea of divesting land of its marketable value and nationalising without compensation. Instead, she proposes a way of establishing a land valuation committee to re-value land, basing its calculations on both the productive capacity and the profitability of the land.

The Land Bank presently operates such a system, she points out. But actual land prices are more than double the value at which the Land Bank assesses them.

A further proposal by Dolny is that compensation for nationalised land need

THE LAND

not be made in cash payments (a method which would severely limit the pace of redistribution), but in government bonds.

One of the conventions that the ANC land debate scatters on the wind, is the notion that freehold tenure is necessarily superior to other forms of tenure or that it ensures the security it is taken to guarantee.

It is proposed that, where individual farmers desire to work the land, they should be leased state land and given the guarantee that their descendants would be entitled to inherit this leasehold.

Even in the case of commercial white-owned farms, proprietors might not be averse to their land being nationalised while the farming enterprise remained in private hands. Instead of owing huge amounts to banks - and paying heavy bond instalments - such farmers would be able to plough their money more directly into improving production.

The ANC is far from prescribing a predominant form of organisation of agricultural production in post-apartheid South Africa. No dogmatic positions have been taken on the relative productivity of small units versus extensive farms.

There is no explicit bias toward cooperative farming over family enterprise. The realistic pros and cons of state farms are weighed up against the more conservative employee share ownership schemes (esops) in agriculture. The available skills, the attitudes of participants, their resources and their histories are factors to be taken into reckoning.

Underlying the debate is an awareness of the complexity of interests in rural South Africa and the material transformation that huge sections of the population have undergone since removal from their land or ejection from the white-owned farms.

Few rural households do not overlap with the urban working class through the practice of migrant labour. The fruits of this overlap vary widely — some households are forced to subsidise the wages earned in the cities by working their land or renting it to others to work. Other households, with surplus cash from wage labour, are able to reinvest in ag-

ricultural production.

There are tens of thousands of labour tenants who have lived for generations on land they do not own and who regard the white owners as temporary usurpers of their property. There are hundreds of thousands who were forcibly removed from their own freehold land and have been without a corner to plough.

There are some whom the patronage patterns of the bantustans have deprived of their land. And there is a small group favoured by the bantustan authorities who have consolidated quite large farms.

All of these have an interest in getting their hands on secure land. But, without affirmative state action, some have a much better chance of succeeding than do others. Those who have skills and capital also have a much better chance of turning their land to productive use.

ANC researchers see land reform within the context of agrarian reform. To share out the land is scarcely ever sufficient to redistribute the means of agricultural production. A range of material forms of assistance and extension work would be necessary to turn South Africa's poorest into farmers once more.

The South African state has long poured huge amounts into (white) farming. Experts expect that any post-apartheid government will do likewise, making its aid more varied and targetting disadvantaged groups.

Never far from the surface in the sketching of this vision of development is a political tension. There is the sense that differing class interests and the tension between urban and rural demands are never far from the minds of those who contemplate land reform.

Marcus cautions in particular against viewing constitutionally guaranteed rights in isolation from political mobilisation.

'Constitutional protection on the land question obliges the national democratic state to act on it ... (but) it is not a substitute for political and social organisation in the countryside. Strong rural organisation is essential to ensure that popular constitutional rights to the land materialise and are given their broadest and deepest interpretation'.

Your life, your land, your dignity

No matter the government in power, its land policy will only work if it responds to land struggles and to rural people's ideologies and perceptions of land.

This is the central tenet around which Transvaal Rural Action Committee field worker Aninka Claassens ranges her proposals for a post-apartheid land policy.

After nearly seven years of work with communities resisting forced removal, she says: 'What I've seen in rural land struggles is that people fight for their notion of land rights, a notion which is much stronger than anything this present government has managed to impose.

'I think it'll be the same under any future government. The system of land tenure has to be brought in line with what people believe their right to be'.

What Claassens proposes is that the post-apartheid state adopt a land policy that is both radical in its break with the past and its racial patterns of ownership, but gradual in implementation, paced essentially according to the claims made by organised rural people.

It is a proposal that combines decisive and continuing state intervention with a repudiation of centralised planning of land allocation.

It rests on a radical redefinition of land rights, stripping away the myth that property rights, expressed as private ownership through title deeds, are an objective relation and therefore entitled to be regarded as the overwhelming claim to land.

And it depends for its execution more on the exercise of state mediation than state planning; on a process whereby contending claimants to the land could stake their claims in terms of the range of rights acknowledged in the new code of law — and a state commission would adjudicate.

'What I'm basically talking about is a situation where land is seen in historical context and the state develops a set of parameters to mediate peoples' claims



Aninka Claassens (above): 'What I've seen in rural land struggles is that people fight for their notion of land rights, a notion which is much stronger than anything this present government has managed to impose'.

to land — going right back to all the different groups that have lived on the land and balancing peoples' claims in terms of birthright, in terms of occupancy of the land, in terms of their productive

usage of the land. The system would acknowledge the right of inheritance'.

These rights (which do not purport to be a comprehensive list), observes Claassens, are respected in many Afri-

can cultures and have a resonance in other cultures too.

Similarly, although private property and trade in property is foreign to African tradition, it is a notion which has gained currency among black people who 'by entering into the conqueror's terms' have hoped to gain 'some flimsy protection against white dispossession'.

Claassens reasons: 'So private property is one of the rights that must be put alongside the others and mediated against a set of criteria. I think as long as there is a very strict set of criteria and a very formal way of mediating those claims — and it is seen to be fair — then this transfer of land can be non-racial. It won't always be white to black, although in most instances it will'.

To illustrate, she sets the case of a white farmer, born on the land and farming it productively, whose claim would probably be viewed as 'very legitimate', against that of a white absentee farmer, who owned his land in title only. The latter's claim, weighed against those of his black tenants (whose families had occupied the land for generations and worked it — although not so productively) would be weak.

Just as the final award of the land would depend on the weighing of various rights to it, so the amount of compensation should be made proportional to the rights to the land the present legal owner could establish. Under such a reckoning, an owner who had virtually abandoned his land might be found to deserve little, if any, compensation.

Tying the pace of land redistribution to the way in which people are able to mobilise and organise to lay claim to the land would have a number of positive features, Claassens imagines.

First, the mobilisation of land claims is unlikely to occur so suddenly and widely as to cause dislocation in agriculture and adversely affect total food production. Maintaining the nation's capacity to feed itself is likely to be a priority for any new government.

Second, it contains some guarantee of productive results. 'New forms of agricultural organisation are only going to be as viable as the people who are going

THE LAND

to be the actors in them. And that means you've got to have people who want the new form of organisation, who have the basic skills and experience to maintain it'.

Third, Claassens reckons, that the process may be gradual but it should be incremental. 'In areas which are less organised there won't be destabilisation, but the kind of potential those people will see in terms of other groups laying claim to land and using it will generate more and more organisation to take over land'.

And fourth — it is a bulwark against planners imposing inappropriate measures on a reluctant population.

While acknowledging the role of central intervention in certain aspects of agricultural planning, Claassens is implacably opposed to prescriptive centralised planning of land allocation and use. She sees a whole range of such interventions — from the ujamaa movement in Tanzania, to collectivisation in Eastern Europe and the betterment schemes of South Africa — as equally disastrous in their outcomes.

'One must look for the reasons in the kinds of imperialist notions that underpin that kind of planning. The critical problem has been that rural people haven't been properly consulted, or understood

and respected in terms of developing planning priorities'.

She acknowledges that the lack of a concerted rural political voice makes the incorporation of rural demands into the challenge for state power difficult. The urban bias of major political formations like the Mass Democratic Movement has compounded this lack.

'This doesn't mean that there aren't very active, militant rural struggles going on. We've seen from our work that these exist all around the country — but they're not widely known to urban people.

'In many instances they have been well organised, cohesive processes that have mobilised entire communities who've fought and gone to jail and even died for their land'.

Claassens argues that the variety of forms of struggle indicates the need for a diversified approach. 'And I think that there are enough different kinds of struggles to indicate the way forward.

'For example there are enough struggles of, say, tenants (on white farms) and bantustan peasants for the extension of family farming to show that that's a major demand and a productive course.

'There are other indications from people in more mechanised farming areas that they see the future resolution of the land problems in their areas to do with collective farming. And there are other instances, particularly in church land projects, where farm workers have not had the kind of confidence that they want to run the farms themselves. They see the issues as better wages, more security and better working conditions'.

Noting that South African agriculture is often referred to as dualistic — with a highly capitalised sector comprising mainly huge white-owned farms, with high productivity and marginal areas in which black occupancy is high, she reasons that the claims by black occupants will initially be strongest in the marginal areas.

'But I don't hold with the view that changes in the peripheral areas are a sell-out solution which does not affect the major inequity in the rich land because that's a very static view of re-

allocation that doesn't pay enough respect to the notion of struggle — of people getting land over time, through forms that are appropriate to them'.

Whether nationalisation of the land would be necessary or appropriate as a means of facilitating the awards made by a land claims commission, Claassens is uncertain. But she emphasises that even if the state is the nominal owner, the form of tenure granted the occupant should be irrevocable and completely secure.

'I think one's got to move away from the dichotomy between nationally- and privately-owned land and look more at the real issue of security of tenure and where that comes from'.

Finally, in counter-balance to her ideas of struggle-centred reallocation, Claassens concedes vital areas apart from the legalistic sphere to central planning. 'Where the state is going to have to intervene again on a major level is in terms of price subsidisation, taxation, marketing strategies ... The parameters within which production takes place must be moderated by the state to redress the major intervention in that area by the present state which favours white farms'.

She points out that the myth of the highly-productive white farmer has long stood exposed. In its place is the reality of many a white farmer who survives by the grace of state subsidy alone. Almost 20 years ago the Marais-Du Plessis commission calculated that state subsidies accounted on average for some 20% of farming profits.

It is this history of administrative racism as well as the conquest and treachery of land dispossession, that demands active redress from a post-apartheid state, Claassens acknowledges.

She grants this in terms of equity, the very evident land hunger and political realism. 'Land will always remain a flashpoint while it is so unequally distributed. Control over the land is a measure of independence and sovereignty and, as so many black political organisations and leaders, going back to Chief Albert Luthuli, have said: Unless you own your life and your history and your land, you can have no dignity in your society'.



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Africanism stakes its claim

Just two months before the legalisation of the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC), Africanism re-established for itself a voice in South African politics - the Pan-Africanist Movement (PAM).

Sharing many of PAC's policies and principles, for what appear to be largely tactical reasons linked to PAC's status as an unlawful organisation, PAM claimed no direct organisational link between the two.

This is despite the presence as keynote speaker at PAM's launch of PAC president Zephania Mothopeng and agreement between the two organisations on a joint approach to international forums.

With PAC's legalisation close links, or an actual merger, are likely.

In an interview conducted before De Klerk lifted the ban on the older organisation, PAM general secretary Benny Alexander outlined the movement's policies and plans. (He has not been available since PAC's legalisation).

WIP: How is PAM constituted?

PAM is quasi-federal. We have both affiliate organisations and card-carrying members.

The most important affiliates are the youth affiliate, Azanian National Youth Unity (Azanyu), the Pan-Africanist Student Organisation (Paso), the African Women's Organisation (AWO) and the African Labour Co-ordinating Committee (Alcoc). Those are the national affiliates, the four pillars represented on the national executive.

What is Alcoc?

That structure is a different kettle of fish. It is a purely workers' thing. It co-ordinates the activities of the workers politically. It does not do any trade union work, it does only political education with workers. It brings them towards the movement, informs them of events and of their role and things like that. The workers join directly as members of PAM, they do not affiliate through Alcoc.

What is your total membership?

We have card-carrying membership, we aren't talking of the political football fans here. But because we were launched on the eve of the Christmas break and people were moving out, it was difficult to launch the branches, so it is only now that the branches are being launched. Only once that has happened, will I be able to give exact figures.

We are all over the country, there is hardly an area which was not represented at our launching congress.

What are your policies?

The pillars of our policies are African nationalism, scientific socialism and continental unity.

The economic policy is of course socialism, a planned economy within the context of a political democracy. We believe that totalitarianism is not inherent in a planned economy.

And programme of action?

Launching the branches and regions is *the* item at the moment.

But we believe our programme of action should unfold step-by-step. We talk of an unfolding programme so that you have a long-term programme that you unfold as time goes on, with one action leading to another but in a set pattern which you only reveal one step at a



*Africanism regained
a voice in South
African politics in
December with the
launch of PAM.
General secretary
Benny Alexander
spoke to WIP*

time to the people.

After our special congress at the end of February we will be revealing the first step.

But what is it now?

We will continue where we have started, to popularise our own position ... not difficult because it is in line with the aspirations of the oppressed.

One of the most amazing phenomena is the fact that the Pan-Africanists are not just the fastest growing political tendency, they are the only ones actually growing. Others are just trying to keep what they have.

The whole question of collaboration, with homeland leaders in events such as the CDF, does not go down well with the young militants in the townships.

What is your attitude to other organisations?

We are a Pan-Africanist organisation. Pan-Africanism has adherents all over the world. We share an ideology with many organisations, including PAC.

Most of our affiliates have been legal organisations for some time - Azanyu since 1981, AWO since 1986 and so on.

Now we share an ideology with PAC.

The only difference between ourselves and PAC is the military. We don't have a military wing.

PAC believes that the armed struggle for the seizure of state power is the principal method of struggle. Ours is political struggle.


If PAC was legal there would have been no point in establishing PAM?

Not necessarily. If PAC was not banned, you could speculate on that, but at this point PAM is the only legal structure.

PAC has had no input on our formation. In terms of attitude, I think you can read that by the fact that PAC president Zephania Mothopeng consulted with the interim committee and opened the launching congress.

(Since then), the PAM executive has not had consultation with PAC. If they invite us, which we hope they will, we will meet them. The Zimbabwean government has established a special fund for that.

Nactu has defined us as an ally together with the Black Consciousness Movement and the New Unity Move-



'The Pan-Africanists are not just the fastest growing political tendency, they are the only ones actually growing'.

ment. We have accepted that from them.

We have not yet gone out to forge any alliances. But we have taken a decision at our launching congress that we will help to unite all forces which want to bring about fundamental social change.

And which are they?

We do not define the forces, we define the problem as the return of our land, self-rule and one-person, one-vote in a unitary state without checks and balances. Whoever feels they stand for these things, can join hands with us.

We regard the United Democratic Front and ANC as sister organisations, but their friends are not necessarily our friends.

What about negotiations?

We have never said we are against negotiations. We have put our positions, but because it is assumed by the media that these are not easily agreeable to the government, the journalists therefore say we are against negotiations.

We are prepared to negotiate two issues. One, the question of ownership of resources, of which land is primary.

Two, the question of liberty, one-person, one-vote in a unitary state without checks and balances for groups. Once the government is in principle prepared to negotiate on these items, we will be prepared to talk about them.

Unlike the ANC, we do not make a distinction between a climate, pre-conditions and an agenda. These two items constitute for us our climate, our pre-conditions, our agenda, our everything.

In all negotiated settlements, talks continued while the war was still raging - in Zimbabwe, in Namibia, everywhere.

Those other issues, like for example lifting of the state of emergency, the return of exiles, troops out of the township, do not have anything to do with the infra- or superstructure. One cannot negotiate measures of repression, it is very ridiculous.

We say that to reduce the measures of repression does not necessarily mean there is change in infra- or superstructure. The government can accede to those things and leave apartheid, land dispossession and oppression intact.



Let us talk about the real things and all these other things will fall into place.

But we have been informed by history that when an oppressor stares his doom in the face, it is then that he calls a face-saving conference to give you at the conference table what you are about to win in the context of struggle.

Such conditions do not prevail at the moment.

You refer extensively to 'the return of the land'...

The status quo came about because of the wars of dispossession in which the land was taken from the African people. There must be decolonisation, the land must be returned to its rightful owners.

But this is a fairly advanced economy, with a minority reliant on the land.

The land to us is not confined to a peasant understanding of the land. It implies the means of production, the totality of the resources.

Factories, financial institutions?

Everything. When the wars of dispossession were fought, they were fought over all resources, not just grazing.

So you are contemplating nationali-

sation on a large scale - for example of Anglo-American?

Definitely. All big business in this country. There will be room for private initiatives, people will be able to own a house, a car, even to engage in small family business, provided there is no exploitation accompanying such enterprises.

We are not going to nationalise the boerwors trolley on the street corner. But big industries which go to the heart of the economy and such things like that will have to be subjected to a planned economy so that everybody is benefited by that.

Subject to the dictates of a planned economy or owned by the state?

Owned by the state on behalf of the people as a whole.

And compensation?

We are having a special congress in February when issues like this will be debated, so I am not prepared yet to say whether we will compensate big business. But in broad terms, we are talking about the return of wealth to the people as a whole.

Your statements refer to 'settlers'.

We are non-racial, so we do not refer to people in terms of colour. To refer to people in terms of the alleged features of his person or group is violently repulsive and mythical nonsense. There is only one race, the human race.

We are going to build one nation, an African nation, where everyone who pledges allegiance to Africa, its development and its people will be an African, and the colour of a person's skin will be irrelevant.

But we are saying we are not yet there. It is obvious.

The whites who have come here as Europeans have in the meantime become settlers, they have settled here.

They are running the economy in the interests of foreign capital. An insignificant part of the economy is in the hands of the Afrikaners, most is in the hands of foreigners - operated for foreign countries' interests. That is a situation that needs to be redressed.

All the people in the country will have to work for Africa, its people, its development, in this way having a single African nation. We propose the Africanisation of all institutions - learning

and all other things.

The different mentalities that are there, divisions, groups, are a manmade creation for political purposes. They can be changed the same way they were introduced, through a programme of education and re-orientation.

Do you accept white members?

We do not accept in PAM any people who regard themselves as white or any people who regard themselves as black. We only take those who regard themselves as African in terms of our definition. An African is defined as someone who is indigenous or who pays his only allegiance to Africa and its people and its development and accepts straightforward democratic practices.

It is up to each individual to say whether he is an African.

International relations?

We took a congress decision to approach international forums with PAC. And because ideologically we are in the same camp, we would be working closely with PAC on international issues.

Our strongest allies would be in the Non-Aligned Movement which would include the Muslim countries.

Then we would in the West be looking at smaller organisations, leftist organisations and Pan-Africanist organisations.


In Britain, the City of London Anti-Apartheid Movement, the various Pan-Africanist movements such as the All-African People's Revolutionary Party, the Pan-African Congress movement of Britain, and the (Maoist) Revolutionary Communist Group. Also with the Marxist Workers Tendency, I think. And the black section of the Labour Party - we have met them already.

We would not regard the governments of the Western countries as allies. But Norway is quite open. They paid for the treatment of Mr Mothopeng when he was in Britain and financed our stay.

Where do you get your funding?

It comes from the pockets of the toiling masses. We have a subscription fee of R10 a year. If you have 100 000 people you have R1-million which can cover your costs.

But we are prepared to accept funds from outside organisations which our NEC has agreed to, provided that such funds come with no strings attached.



Zimbabwe University was closed in October after student clashes with police. A government commission criticised police but said students had been 'hotly involved in issues much wider than campus affairs'. Law student and former student leader Tendai Biti spoke to a WIP correspondent

Just a touch of class

WIP: At the moment, there are student protests going on across Africa, many of them against poor standards of living and chronic shortages at their universities. What is different about the Zimbabwe student movement?

TB: We are more explicitly political. In terms of living standards at the university, we have some of the best facilities in southern Africa. The meals are as good as any served in an average hotel. So it's not a question of the bad living conditions at the university, but of the bad living conditions in the country as a whole. The university has about 8000 students, and most of them come from a working-class background. They're a mirror of society at large. Students are voicing the complaints of the masses at large because of their unique position. The masses cannot

because of their repressed position.

WIP: How did the student movement develop?

TB: From 1980 to 1985, the student body was largely concerned with nationalist politics. The demarcations between Zanu and Zapu were very strong. The students' union as a union did not exist. Students were torn between parties and ethnic groups. But in 1985 there was a realisation that the nationalist government had sold out. There was the Five Year National Development Plan, and to anyone following economics, it was just a bourgeois blueprint. In the students' union, before 1986, there was apathy, and if you wanted to get into the Students' Representative Council you had to be strongly Zanu or from one of the leading tribal groupings. But the students began to look for alternatives, and the left alternative was



quite attractive. In the law faculty at the time, we had lecturers with international experience, lecturers who had been booted out of Kenya and Nigeria, so more radical ideas began to emerge. By 1987, to get into the SRC, you just had to be very anti-government, which was a reflection of the maturity of the student politics.

WIP: Was there any single event that helped shift student ideology?

TB: No, you can't point to a particular event, but there were seminars where we were able to discuss politics. The dominant line of thought was the Marxist line of thought, which, of course, offers the most thorough analysis of the neo-colonial regimes.

WIP: What are the current student complaints against the government?

TB: The most active group at the university is of Marxist persuasion. You

could call it a leftist line, but naturally it coincides with the complaints of the average Zimbabwean, the average peasant. The most important complaint is the failure of the government to address the land question, which was the whole basis of the national liberation war. The problem is actually being exacerbated by structural adjustment — economic liberalisation — which the government has embarked on. The government has just signed an investment guarantee agreement with multinationals. It is a guarantee to the international bourgeoisie that there will never be nationalisation.

WIP: But the government still calls its official ideology 'Marxist - Leninist' and says it is on a socialist road.

TB: Only on paper, it goes no more beyond that. In the whole Zimbabwean government there is no one who is socialist. In fact, if you want to find any group of people who are completely sceptical about socialism, just speak to any cabinet minister.

WIP: Some say the students are pushing for socialism a little too fast, given the conditions that exist here. What's the student response?

TB: That is a reformist argument. Anyway, one doesn't have to be Marxist to criticise the building of white elephants — the expenditures on unnecessary things like aircraft when you have a serious accommodation crisis and a serious transport crisis. If they can afford to build the national sports stadium, the Sheraton complex, a new civic centre — that misallocation of resources is wrong, when our people are starving. It's therefore incorrect to say students want to push too fast, because there are very basic things which the government is failing to do.

WIP: Is the government now in an ideological crisis because of the student protests?

TB: There's no crisis in the government, because there's no one supporting socialism.

WIP: But they do seem to take your protests seriously. They've closed the university, they've detained students, they've detained the head of the trade union federation for a month because he supported you. Why do you think they're reacting so harshly?

TB: The reaction is pre-determined. It's because of the class position they have taken. It's the reaction of any neo-colonial government — Kenya, Zambia, Malawi, Botswana, Uganda, — against its own students, against its people. So it's not surprising, it's just a reflection of the class struggle between the 'haves' and the 'have nots'. Between 1985 and the present there has been a significant increase in public expenditure on the police and army. This is just a recognition that the government has failed to address the issues — the land question, unemployment, inflation etc. So its only legitimacy can come through the gun, through the police, through detentions.

WIP: As advocates of socialism, how do you account for what are portrayed as its failures, in the East Bloc and elsewhere?

TB: What is happening in the East, and as it is portrayed in our national press, is very important. We as proponents of Marxist ideology, have been forced to look further, and we've come to develop our own answers as to why they've failed. What in fact has been happening in those countries is nothing more than state capitalism. We're trying to see through what our national media has tried to portray: that the failure of state capitalism in the East is the failure of socialism. Rather, it's just a reflection of the failure of capitalism in all countries at present, of the international capitalist crisis, of stagnation and debt. We are now trying to destroy the myth about the supremacy of the market. We are not fooled by these things.

Anyway, we recognise the difference of our neo-colonial environment. At least the East Germans can complain about their situation, because they have national control of their economy, something we don't have in Zimbabwe. Our economy is owned by multinationals. For every dollar earned here, eighty cents goes to feed the bourgeoisie on a beach in Miami or somewhere. At least in East Germany, even the bureaucrats there — the red bourgeoisie — is going to spend that dollar in the East German stores. So our conditions in neo-colonial Africa are very different from Eastern Europe.

Namibian unions: Not quite there

With Namibian independence due on March 21, the country's trade union movement is preparing for life under a constitution which substantially increases its muscle, but without the full range of 15 'fundamental rights and freedoms' it sought.

Namibia's equivalent of Cosatu, the powerful National Union of Namibian Workers (NUNW) federation, is thus looking to its own strength as its most reliable guarantee of workers' rights.

An NUNW central executive committee meeting is due this month to plan for the future in an independent Namibia - after almost a year of relative inactivity as key organisers and leaders threw themselves into the election campaign on behalf of the South West African People's Organisation (Swapo).

NUNW already represents about 100 000 workers in its six affiliates - one in seven of adults in Namibia's 1,5-million population. And the federation's president John Shaetonhodi says a major thrust will be for the establishment of bigger industrial unions as the best vehicle 'to challenge the power of monopolies' on the shopfloor issues of wages, retrenchment, mechanisation and rationalisation, and to campaign for the introduction of a socialist economic system to which NUNW remains committed.

'The importance of this is that it will put the workers on the road to worker unity and worker power in various industries', he says.

A key long-term objective is to maintain and develop a 'powerful and effective, unified, free and democratic

trade union movement ... independent of any internal or external domination ... and influence by political forces'.

With three senior NUNW officials in the Constitutional Assembly (CA) - among them NUNW general secretary John ya Otto and miners' leader Ben Ulenga - unionists initially feared that union leaders would be drawn into a direct role in the new government, thus jeopardising the labour movement's independence.

And although Swapo president and future Namibian head of state Sam Nujoma solved the problem by naming none of the unionist in the shadow cabinet he announced in January, the unions say they will not allow the new government or any future administration to dictate to NUNW, insisting that workers' interests come first.

They are equally insistent that this does not mean a break with Swapo, with whom NUNW enjoyed a close alliance during Namibia's independence struggle and last year's election campaign.

Union officials deny South African media reports of an NUNW-Swapo conflict - general secretary Ya Otto says the first he knew of it was from Radio South Africa - saying the union federation will maintain its support for Swapo after independence next month.

This does not, however, mean that the unions are happy with the draft constitution due for final ratification by the CA as *WIP* went to press.

With 41 seats, Swapo is seven short of the two-thirds representation it would need to unilaterally author or change the constitution.

According to *Business Day* Swapo CA chairperson Hage Geingob made

Namibian unions prepare for independence with some of their political demands met - but several still to be achieved. Mark Verbaan reports



this point to an NUNW delegation after publication of its demands, saying NUNW should support Swapo and work hard for the next election (in five years' time) to ensure the party the 48 seats it needs to 'write the constitution it wanted'.

In the interim, however, the constitution falls short of the demands for entrenched workers' rights put to the CA by NUNW.

While the constitution entrenches the right of workers to form and join trade unions, and to withhold their labour without fear of criminal prosecution, several other rights and freedoms demanded by the unions - including the right to a living wage - are covered by the constitutions 'principles of state policy'.

The principles also include commitment to 'the active encouragement of the formation of independent trade unions to protect workers' rights and interests, and to promote sound labour relations and fair employment practices' as well as commitment to join the International Labour Organisation (ILO), and to adhere to its conventions and recommendations.

But the principles represent intent, not entrenched and legally enforceable rights - a point raised by NUNW following publication in the *The Namibian* of the draft constitution in early January, when it was still officially 'highly confidential' and due only for public release on 25 January after its presentation to the full, 72-seat CA.

The provisions for entrenched workers' rights in the draft clearly did not satisfy NUNW. In a strongly-worded statement on 10 January, the union body demanded that 15 'fundamental rights and freedoms' be included. Also in response to the leak of the draft to *The Namibian*, NUNW urged that the document be released for public scrutiny, debate and comment. This would give the public and organisations the opportunity to take part in formulating the laws which affect them, NUNW argued.

'These are legitimate demands in keeping with the fundamental principle of democracy', the NUNW statement said.

Under South African colonial rule, Namibian workers had no basic rights

and freedoms. Instead, there existed 'a system of colonial exploitation, oppression and suppression against which the NUNW and its affiliates fought and continue to fight', the unions added.

And while the statement acknowledged 'a fair number' of those basic rights appearing in the draft constitution under the principles of state policy, NUNW said it had fought for these rights to be included automatically 'and not dependent on the wishes of the state'.

'We find the inclusion of some of these rights under state policy principles (rather than among the entrenched clauses) problematic', the statement said. 'It implies that if the government does not have the political and ideological courage to promote and enforce these rights, then the workers are at a loss.'

'Furthermore, should the state be dominated by conservative forces there will always be excuses not to have any policy promoting such rights as those of union formation and living wage'.

Since last April when UN Resolution 435 was implemented in Namibia, NUNW activities have been virtually suspended, with most of the NUNW leadership absorbed into the Swapo election directorate to organise voter education activities and mobilise voters, while many union activists engaged less formally in Swapo's election campaign.

'All energy was directed at supporting Swapo to win the election, as the workers believed that only a Swapo government could bring about the necessary change in their lives', says Shaetonhodi.

Now union work can begin to get

back to normal, and NUNW's central executive committee will meet this month to plan for the future.

Shaetonhodi is optimistic that workers' rights will be respected under the incoming Swapo-led government (the CA will transform itself on independence into a national assembly), but adds that workers must be wary of an economic system which has always denied them their basic rights.

He believes a transition from capitalism is needed, but that 'for the Namibian economy to transform to socialism more work has to be done. The labour movement must contribute by way of working class programmes of action to rebuild this economy. Exploitation of workers can only end in a socialist dispensation where the means of production belong to the people'.

Only socialism, 'steady growth of the productive forces, free vocational and professional training, improvement of skills and development of system of vocational guidance and job placement' will finally guarantee workers' rights, he says.

'The trade union organisation is the one vital weapon that can help workers in opposing the system that exploits them', he says.

NUNW has still to decide on whether to affiliate to any of the world trade federations. Says Shaetonhodi: 'Those who want to impose a Cold War perspective on the Namibian workers' struggle. If someone suggests that NUNW could receive funds by affiliating, the NUNW would rather they keep their money. We don't wait aid with strings'.

- *Namibian News Service*.

NUNW's demands

Among the constitutionally-entrenched rights demanded by the NUNW are:

- * **The right of recognition of trade unions by all employers, including the state;**
- * **The right to strike;**
- * **The right of all to work;**
- * **The right to proper training and education for workers;**
- * **The application of United Nations' Decree Number One - that the natural resources of Namibia belong to the people of Namibia.**

Fragile bond to be tested soon

When a young union with fire in its belly challenges an organisation with an archaic and inflexible approach to labour relations, and which is moving only slowly into the post-Wichahn era, the sparks are bound to fly.

The recent confrontation between the South African Railway and Harbour Workers' Union (Sarhwu) and the South African Transport Services (Sats) vividly illustrates this.

The 1989/90 national Sats strike was said to be the bloodiest and most bitter in South Africa's labour history since the Rand Rebellion of 1922. Involving from 26 000 workers (management figure) to 40 000 workers (union figure), it lasted 13 weeks and saw the dismissal of about 23 000 workers. During its course, R38,5-million was lost in destroyed coaches, R44-million in wages and, significantly, there were about 24 strike-related deaths.

The strike was preceded by a series of regional strikes in 1987 and 1988 over, among other things, management's intransigence towards Sarhwu and intense worker dissatisfaction. After the successful 1988 Durban strike, management and Sarhwu signed an agreement opening the way for the union's recognition. Until then, management had been determined to prevent militant unions from gaining a foothold among black workers in Sats and had negotiated with the Black Trade Union (Blatu), a 'sweet-heart' union, established in 1981. Under the 1988 agreement Sarhwu undertook to register, after which talks would be held over recognition.

The trigger for the 1989 strike was management's refusal to deal with workers' grievances until the union had registered in line with the 1988 agree-

ment. Consequently recognition talks between Sats and Sarhwu between July and October 1989 broke down.


Management also refused to discuss the drawing-up of an interim recognition agreement. The union, however, argued that registration and discussions on substantive issues were two separate things, and that the latter process should continue while recognition talks were under way.

To break the impasse, a workers' committee from the union's Southern Transvaal branch sought talks with Sats in terms of section 19 (4) of the Sats Conditions of Service Act, which allows for a group of workers to make representations to Sats on their conditions of service. The committee presented a list of grievances to management, but Sats refused to talk to it, arguing that it was the union in another guise.

Workers downed tools on 1 November in protest against management's intransigence in discussing their demands. These included:

- * A R1 500-a-month minimum wage, adopted by the union's national executive committee in line with Cosatu's living wage campaign. Management found the demand unacceptable, firstly because it had already negotiated with Blatu in July, agreeing to increases of up to 27% (bringing the minimum wage to R600). Two wage negotiations in one year, it argued, would have set an unheard of precedent. Secondly, it said that it couldn't afford the 150% increase. The workers' committee argued, however, for the negotiations on the grounds that it had not been party to the July talks.

- * Discussion on the disciplinary code. Workers held that dismissals under both the old code and a new one introduced



on 1 September 1989 were unfair and racist. Although the new code was similar to some in the private sector, it gave a great deal of discretion to line managers, who abused this power, workers' representatives argued. Sarhwu's general secretary, Martin Sebakwane, also claimed that management was using the code to retrench workers in preparation for privatisation. Management denied this, stating that the 37% drop in the labour force - from 279 000 to 177 000 - over the last seven years was a result of 'natural attrition'.

- * Inadequate safety measures.

- * Privatisation.

Major support for the strike came from Sarhwu's stronghold in southern Natal, with a strong response in Kimberley, Bloemfontein, the Johannesburg depots of Kaserne and City Deep and on the East Rand. There was a moderate turnout in Cape Town. But workers in East London and Port Elizabeth failed to down tools - dismissals in East Lon-



The SATS strike was said to be the bloodiest and most bitter strike in South African labour history since the Rand Rebellion. Carole Cooper reports

don during the 1988 strike may have played a role in this. The continued operation of the East London and Port Elizabeth harbours greatly decreased the strike's disruptive effect on Sats' services. Opposition to the strike came from Blatu members and from those who felt the strike should not have been held at Christmas time.

Explaining its refusal to negotiate on the substantive issues until the union had registered, Sats stressed that the 12 unions on Sats' labour council had all registered in terms of the Labour Relations Act and that Sarhwu should do the same.

It was necessary, it argued, to structure its relationship with the union properly from the start and that there should be no short cuts.

There is little doubt that Sats was also anxious not to alienate the more conservative white unions which represented about half of its workforce (about 80 000 white workers). Sats also argued

that the union had made no progress in registering since signing the September 1988 agreement. Sats' rigid insistence on registration as a prior condition to recognition was a major factor in the continuing dispute.

The union's failure to register was partly a result of grassroots opposition to registration, backed by the new leadership which had emerged after conflict within the union. Workers argued that they received none of the benefits of the Labour Relations Act because they were excluded from it, so they should not be obliged to register under it. In addition, there was no legal compulsion on the union to register before obtaining recognition as this had been dropped from the Sats Conditions of Service Act when it was amended in 1988.

Sarhwu said that in any case it was unrealistic to expect workers to shelve 'burning' grievances while the union applied for registration - a process which could have been lengthy as Blatu was

likely to lodge objections.

Disruption within the union arising from the leadership struggle in the first half of 1989 also made registration difficult. After the 1987 strike membership of the union had mushroomed in many centres, but the revision of membership records was made difficult by the leadership conflict and because, the union claimed, it was denied access to compounds and workplaces or prevented from obtaining stop orders.

Frustrated by the union's refusal to budge on its demands, management moved to break the strike by dismissing strikers and evicting them from their hostels.

It also hoped that this would check strike-related violence.

The move backfired. Not only did it fail to break the strike, as workers stood firm, but the reinstatement of dismissed workers became a further issue in dispute. The strike was prolonged and conditions for further violence were



The settlement was finally signed on 27 January

created. The dismissals and evictions - many of which were successfully challenged in court by the union - merely reinforced workers' negative perception of Sats.

In late November Sarhwu stepped in directly once more in a bid to settle the strike. Talks between it and management on dismissals, recognition and wages deadlocked on 4 December, but resumed on 18 December. Management was then prepared to negotiate an interim recognition agreement if the union registered, a proposal similar to one which the union had already made in August. It is arguable that had Sats agreed to the earlier proposal, the strike could have been avoided.

Sats also offered to admit Sarhwu to its April 1990 wage negotiations and to allow it to represent members at disciplinary hearings.

It offered to re-employ 50% of the dismissed workers on set criteria, with cases of workers not re-employed being referred to arbitration for the settlement of a severance package.

The union acknowledged that Sats had shifted its position on the recognition and wage issues, but it was not prepared to accept the re-employment offer. The loss of 11 000 members would significantly weaken its position regarding recognition, it said.

As the deadlock continued, strike violence grew. A key feature was a series of attacks by vigilantes on striking workers.

A pattern emerged whereby non-strikers - dressed in Sats overalls to distinguish them from strikers - ambushed strikers at various stations and union meeting places. These attacks culminated in a bloodbath on 9 January when about 1 000 vigilantes attacked about 800 strikers arriving for a meeting in Germiston. In all eight people were killed and over 67 injured.

Management and Blatu both said that the attacks by non-strikers were in retaliation for their intimidation by strikers. While there is little doubt that intimidation took place, the growing confidence of non-strikers seems to have been a key factor in the increasing intensity of the vigilante attacks.

Most of these assaults occurred af-

ter the 4 December deadlock in talks, at a time when management had begun to dismiss strikers in large numbers. Non-strikers may have read this to mean that the union had been smashed, giving them the confidence to mount attacks. Lack of management action against vigilantes after a major attack at Braamfontein Station in December may have reinforced this feeling.

Vigilantes' confidence was given a major boost by the supportive role played by white supervisors and ticket collectors. White supervisors were allegedly present at a number of vigilante attacks in December and it is alleged that about 20 of them were present during the 9 January carnage.

It is also clear, despite management denials, that white supervisors condoned and encouraged the attacks by allowing non-strikers to take time off. Eyewitness accounts tell of workers leaving and returning to work after the attacks. Management admitted that workers from the Braamfontein depot had planned the Germiston attack with 'military precision'; it is possible that this was with the connivance of white supervisors.

Sarhwu said that non-strikers were allowed to fashion pangas and knives at Sats workshops. While top management probably did not have prior knowledge of the attacks, supervisors' complicity can be seen to be a product of Sats' failure to exercise adequate control over its regional managers, whose views seem to have carried much weight throughout the strike. Management, however, defended the decentralisation of authority to its regions, holding that the violence

was not a function of a lack of control on the ground.

Ticket collectors, who prior to the strike had been organised into squads with a policing function, were reported as being in the forefront of the attacks. The opposition of many of them to the strike is probably a function of their more privileged position within the Sats hierarchy.

There was widespread criticism of the police's role in the strike. Strikers reported that the police, in some attacks, including that at Germiston, stood by without attempting to stop the vigilantes. Police emphatically denied the allegation, but interestingly, no one was arrested after the attacks.

Police also broke up at least two union meetings at Cosatu offices, shooting and injuring workers.

Reasons for violence by the strikers are both political and workplace-based. Workers are intensely hostile to Sats both because it is seen as part of an oppressive government and because of its history of intransigence towards the union.

Low wages, job insecurity, and a lack of rights under the Labour Relations Act all fuelled workers' frustration. Police harassment of unionists, management's point-blank refusal to negotiate with the union over workers' grievances, and the strike's failure to disrupt rail services were also factors.

Workers directed their frustration at the two easiest targets: non-strikers who were regarded as traitors, and Sats premises which, unlike factories and mines, are easily accessible.

Prolonged discussions on the 18 De-

ember proposals were held during most of January. In this period, the union convinced its members to agree to a postponement of the wage demand until annual wage talks in April, in exchange for interim recognition. The main stumbling-block was the reinstatement of dismissed workers.

The Germiston conflict, however, seemed to convince both parties that settlement could not be delayed. The attack apparently strengthened the position of moderates over that of conservatives in senior management, and Sats agreed to mediation, an earlier union demand which they had turned down. The Mass Democratic Movement, which until then had played a behind-the-scenes role, also urged the parties to reach agreement. A settlement was finally signed on 27 January.

The agreement was a compromise for both parties.

Although the union had to give way on the registration, wage and reinstatement issues, the agreement allowed for its recognition and the re-employment

of dismissed workers on very favourable terms.

Sats agreed to grant the union interim recognition (allowing it collective bargaining and other rights) provided it registered, and showed it represented 40% plus one of all workers in the relevant area. If no agreement was reached on recognition within 14 days of registration, Sats would recognise the union for the purposes of collective bargaining, guaranteeing that the union would be able to bargain on wages at the April negotiations.

Sats also agreed that it would not extend any wage deal reached with Blatu to members of Sarhwu prior to recognising Sarhwu.

All dismissed workers would be employed in the same grades, jobs, and at the same wage as at the start of the strike. Workers lost their service records, however, and would be re-employed on a temporary footing, but this would not count against them for purposes of retrenchment and promotion.

In an important concession by Sats,

past disciplinary records of all strikers would be disregarded and workers would not be disciplined for striking. However, workers convicted in court of violence might face disciplinary action. Strikers forfeited benefits for the period of the strike.

The strike may be over, but the critical test of the agreement lies ahead. The Sats moderates have said that the organisation is moving into a new era of labour relations. Whether this becomes a reality will depend on their success in winning over top management as well as line managers to their way of thinking.

For Sarhwu, the challenge will be to consolidate its membership and achieve its goal of national recognition by the end of the year. It has already applied for registration in its stronghold of southern Natal.

The most immediate test of the fragile new understanding between the parties to this bitter dispute is no further than three months away: the wage talks in April.

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The three-month period under review was characterised by a number of long strikes involving large numbers of workers and by an increase in strike violence. Most notable of these were the Sats (13 weeks) and SAB (nine-and-a-half) strikes. Other long strikes involving more than 200 workers were Lotsaba Forests (7 weeks), IBL (12+ weeks), Astatas (10+ weeks), and Putco (6 weeks). The general trend in long strikes showed an uncompromising approach from management who consistently refused to meet demands for a living wage. A further example was the Mondi strike at four board mills which entered its fourth week with no new offers from management. Over 57 000 workers were involved in 51 strikes monitored over the three month period. Many disputes were carried over from the pre-Christmas shutdown period and most industrial action came from Numsa, Fawu, CWIU and TGWU.

Thirty nine percent of strikes were over wages. Twenty five percent of disputes arose from daily conflict in the workplace - disciplinary procedures, racial conflict, racist and abusive supervisors, victimisation over petty issues and demands for the dismissal of supervisors. Significant progress towards recognition agreements was made by Sarhwi; CWIU at two KwaNdebele plants and Fawu at Ohlssons in Transkei.

Companies responded to industrial action with lock-

outs, mass dismissals and interdicts. Casual labour was employed to break strikes and conflict between strikers and scabs was a major cause of strike violence. The level of violence experienced in the Sats strike - described as the bloodiest and most bitter since the 1922 Rand Rebellion resulted in 24 strike-related deaths, largely due to large-scale attacks by vigilantes on strikers.

Strike violence, which increased with the state of emergency, is often most intense in the most repressive sectors of the economy. The 1987 and 1989 Sats strikes are good examples. Sats workers were confronted by an intransigent management which refused to negotiate worker grievances and resorted to mass dismissals and casual labour to break the strike. In 1987 and 1989 violence intensified after strikes had lasted over a month, after mass dismissals and after workers had lost faith in the negotiating process.

Violence between strikers and scabs is a growing trend on the shopfloor; examples in the period under review being disputes at SAB, Sats, IBL (Bloemfontein), Welfit and Timber Industries. At IBL workers made strong allegations about management's supportive relationship towards scabs and vigilantes.

Police violence over the period was extreme. Police opened fire on workers inside Cosatu's Germiston offices; shot dead a Sats striker who clashed with a ticket controller and opened

fire on groups of railmen. Police were also involved in enforcing lock-outs and attacking and arresting strikers in a number of strikes over the period. Two issues currently facing the labour movement are the Labour Relations Act and centralised bargaining structures.

The government's proposed amendments to the LRA have been seen as minor concessions to the labour movement. Prior to the news of amendments, Cosatu and Nactu stated their intention to intensify opposition to the LRA, through a programme of stayaways, marches in working hours and occupation of factories. They also recommended that workers defy industrial court interdicts against strikes and blacklist companies using controversial LRA clauses. Worker rallies are planned throughout the country to discuss the proposals. The amendments include the scrapping of most of Section 79 (2) which placed the onus of proof on unions facing damages claims arising out of illegal strikes. Time limits for dispute settling procedures through legal channels have also been relaxed while the 'cooling-off period', between the referral of a dispute to the industrial court and strike balloting has been extended from 30 to 45 days.

Cosatu has warned that consensus on labour legislation requires the full participation of the labour movement and to ignore this will lead to further conflict. Cosatu and Nactu have urged employers to

clarify their views on other aspects of the act around which the labour movement has proposed changes. These proposals include: the granting of union rights to the public sector, domestic and farm labour; one labour law for South Africa and the homelands; immunity from interdicts during a legal strike and the redefinition of an unfair labour practice to exclude sympathy strikes and intermittent strikes on the same issue.

A second major objective of the labour movement in the coming year will be to defend and strengthen progress towards centralised bargaining. This could mean industrial action to pressurise employers to participate in industrial councils and not to apply for exemption from council agreements.

Six Cosatu unions have met to plan action against Barlow Rand - a leading opponent of centralised bargaining. In the past year more than ten Barlow companies have withdrawn from Seifsa and other Barlow metal companies could follow. The threat to the metal industrial council follows the collapse of the printing industrial council due to the withdrawal of the main employer body. Disputes, during the period monitored, which named centralised bargaining as a demand included Numsa's strike at GEC (a Barlow subsidiary) and Fawu's wage negotiations with FNP (a Nestle company). Fawu has been attempting to establish regional bargaining structures as a move towards centralised bargaining.

STRIKES & DISPUTES

Transvaal

Company	Union	Workers	Date	Events
Astas Benoni	Numsa	213	13.11.89-	213 workers were dismissed after a strike protesting the disciplining of union members who participated in a stoppage on 13 November. The dispute arose from racial tension at the plant and unfair implementation of disciplinary procedures. Fired workers were interdicted and ordered to keep at least 500m from the factory gates. The company was considering re-employing all workers except for 46. The union was proposing arbitration on the 46 and on another 11 workers who intimidated strikers.
Boerstra Bakery Pretoria	Fawu	1000	29.11-18.01.89	A strike over the rate of commission for drivers turned into a protracted battle when police arrived, attacked and arrested workers while negotiations between workers and management were underway. Workers then demanded the dismissal of members of management who had allegedly assisted the police. The dispute was settled through arbitration. No members of management were found guilty of assaulting workers.
Chubby Chick Potchefstroom	Fawu	400	23.11.-14.12.89	The entire workforce was sacked after workers downed tools in an illegal strike demanding a living wage and the reinstatement of a dismissed worker. After lengthy negotiations between lawyers, management agreed to reinstate 180 workers. An interim agreement was made whereby the union was to get recognition and then negotiate a comprehensive procedural agreement to cover all members.
Colgate Palmolive Boksburg	CWIU		18.01.90	A one-day strike to demand the refund of tax deductions ended when management agreed to refund incorrect deductions pending explanations to workers from an expert.
Consol Plastics Germiston	CWIU	200	11.01.90	Workers staged a one-day stoppage over retrenchments. Management agreed to postpone retrenchment but subsequently sold the company.
Department of Post and Telecommunications	Potwa	18 000	10.89 -	Potwa and the Department of Post and Telecommunications were engaged in annual wage negotiations. Potwa demanded the doubling of the minimum wage to R1 100 a month and a R400 across-the-board increase. Other demands included racial parity in pay, the scrapping of apartheid practices in the postal sector, the scrapping of post office privatisation and permanent status for about 4 000 temporary workers. Management intended consulting with other staff associations and was expected to respond to demands by early March.
Department of Post and Telecommunications North Rand	Potwa	4000	19.12 & 21.12.89	Workers downed tools demanding that management provide them with an alternative to rail transport. The dispute ended about a week later when demands were met.
Dions Randburg	Ccawusa	75	06-09.11.89	Dions management agreed to re-employ 75 dismissed workers who had failed to heed a return to work deadline after a three day strike. The workers were striking to demand the dismissal of an assistant manager.
Dolphin's Cartage Vaal	TGWU	34	14.11.89-	Workers were dismissed after an illegal strike demanding the dismissal of two workers who had arrived at work drunk. Industrial council discussions deadlocked and the dispute is headed for the industrial court in March.
Dunlop Benoni	CWIU	420	November	A two-week overtime ban in solidarity with a shop steward forced to work Friday overtime ended after negotiations in a return to the status quo. The issue was being dealt with through the company's dispute procedures.
FNP Germiston	Fawu	160	28.11-07.12.89	A ten-day strike over wages ended after settlement was reached between management and Fawu.
FNP Germiston, Isando	Fawu	160	08.01-15.01.90	Workers in Germiston went on a four day strike demanding the removal of a supervisor from the plant. They were joined by the Isando factory and depot in a one-day solidarity action which forced management to meet their demand.
FNP Isando	Fawu	290	19-21.12.90	Workers returned to work after a two-day wage strike. The dispute was referred to the conciliation board.
FNP Transvaal & Cape	Fawu			Wage negotiations between Fawu and FNP deadlocked and the dispute was referred to the conciliation board. Fawu's attempt to establish regional bargaining structures as a step towards centralised bargaining is being resisted by FNP.
GEC Benoni	Numsa	500	04-22.11.89	Management locked out workers after negotiation failed to resolve a wage strike. Numsa demanded an hourly increase of 60c, a 15% housing subsidy and centralised bargaining with GEC. When mediation broke down GEC were offering 25c increase, a housing loan of up to R10 000 at 11,25% and had refused centralised bargaining. The dispute was resolved after workers accepted a better pay offer.
GFB Johannesburg	BCAWU	311	29.11.89-	Workers were dismissed after a six-month deadlock on wages and working conditions which resulted in numerous strike actions. Work on Old Mutual's new city centre office block came to a stop until management replaced strikers with scabs and put armed police protection on the premises. The union was demanding the unconditional reinstatement of all workers.
Haggie Rand	Numsa	232	23.10.89	Workers were fired after an illegal strike during which they occupied management's offices, over a dispute concerning the overtime ban. Hostel dwellers were expelled by a court order from management. Management refused to negotiate further. The remaining workers were put on short-time as a result of produc-

				tion slow down owing to the dismissals.
HLNH Mining Timber White River	Ppwawu	42	09.-15.01.90	The workforce downed tools demanding the reinstatement of an employee. The employee was reinstated and all strikers received full pay for the duration of the strike.
Industrial Council for Goods and Motor Transport Sector	TGWU	1600	12.12.89	Employers and unions in the goods motor transport sector reached settlement on wages and working conditions for 1990. Industrial council minimum wages was increased between 16% and 19% against T&G's original demand of between 30% and 65%. The package includes 16 June as a paid holiday and new maternity rights.
Lotsaba Forests Tzaneen	Ppwawu	818	7.12.89-	The first -ever industrial action taken by workers at Lotsaba Forests over annual wage negotiations resulted in deadlock and a lock-out. Workers were demanding a R120 increase against the current minimum of R197,34. Management was offering R31. The union has proposed mediation.
Mondi Springs, Belville, Felixton, Piet Retief	Ppwawu	1000	09.01.90-	The wage strike at four of the five Mondi board mills entered its fourth week with no compromise on wages from either party. Management has refused the union's proposal for mediation. The union is demanding a R1,15 hourly increase to the minimum wage of R4,29 against Mondi's offer of 64c. Mondi refused to negotiate hours of work and paid holidays.
Natex KwaNdebele	CWIU	150	7.12.89	After a one -day stoppage and a mass dismissal, workers were reinstated and management agreed to recognise the union.
Plastop KwaNdebele	CWIU	200	29.11-04.12.89	After two one- day stoppages management agreed to recognise CWIU. Most of the dismissed workers were reinstated and the union was negotiating for the rest.
Prestige Vaal	TGWU	20	15.12.89	A one -day stoppage was held against the disciplining of a shop steward by a supervisor.
Prevanda Vaal	TGWU	52	22.11-06.01.90	Dismissed workers who downed tools to protest against abusive language by a director were reinstated. Management and the union were to discuss the issues that led to the strike.
Putco Springs	TGWU	200	5.12.89-18.01.90	A six -week strike over disciplinary procedures ended after management agreed to a commission of inquiry to investigate worker grievances. Over 40 complaints were tabled against the depot's management.
Putco Pretoria	TGWU	400	15.11.90	Drivers downed tools in a one -day sympathy action with Springs depot strikers.
SAB	Fawu	6000	11.10-01.12.89	The national strike at seven breweries and transport depots ended after a violent nine -and -a -half weeks, during which at least 12 people lost their lives. Workers accepted a 16% across- the -board increase. The settlement also included a better long service allowance for workers with less than five years service, in the form of a cent an hour. However, workers conceded ground on their legal right not to work compulsory overtime. The union was obliged to give notice of their intention to take collective action on the overtime ban. The settlement also provides for a joint industrial relations initiative which will deal with issues such as a revision of the national agreement and the LRA. In formulating its wage demand of 32% Fawu pointed to the super- profits and monopoly of the SAB. However, Fawu failed to consistently mobilise or sustain community support for the beer boycott particularly since an estimated 20 000 people are employed in liquor outlets in the townships. In the aftermath of the strike Fawu reported that SAB in some cases were using the settlement to discipline workers on petty issues. The union is also taking up the issue of monthly paid workers who were dismissed during the strike. SAB did not recognise these workers as strikers and claimed that they absconded during the strike
SA Cynamid Isando, Witbank	CWIU	212	16.10-17.11.89	Workers fired in a dispute concerning the control of provident funds were re-employed on condition no further strikes are staged on the issue of the provident fund for a set period.
SATS	Sarhwu	26 000	01.11.89-27.01.90	The violent 13 -week confrontation between Sats and Sarhwu ended and all dismissed workers were reinstated. The settlement entailed the reinstatement of workers at the same rate of pay, the loss of service records and an agreement that workers would not be penalised for striking. Sats granted the union interim recognition provided that the union registers and is able to show a 40% plus one support in the relevant sectors. The union will be able to participate in wage bargaining at the April negotiations. (See full story)
Sneller Cleaning Contractor Lenasia, Durban	TGWU	2000	24.11.89	Cleaners contracted to clean House of Delegates offices and schools won their demands against retrenchment through the active support of their communities who marched on HOD offices.
Sunripe Transport Johannesburg	TGWU	24		Workers were dismissed after a strike against a unilateral wage increase by management. Wage negotiations were still underway when management paid workers out.
TPA HF Verwoerd Hospital		150	31.01.90	A strike involving administrative, cleaning and kitchen staff started with workers demanding the payment of annual bonuses.
CAPE				
Aberdare Cables 2 plants PE	Numsa	700	15.01.90-	Management responded to a legal wage strike with a lock-out and workers were met by police at the factory gates. Workers were demanding a 75c increase and full-time shop stewards. Management offered 13c. After the lock-out negotiations broke down.

African Hide Trading Corp	Actwusa	24	17.11.89	An industrial court ruling ordered the reinstatement of workers dismissed in the three day stayaway in 1988 against the LRA Bill.
Cape Province Textile Manufacturers Association,	Sactwu	3000	November	Five one-day stoppages at 9 plants and isolated plant-level stoppages hit the cotton industry, in a dispute over the CPTMA's sick fund. The union's proposals regarding the rules of the sick fund were eventually accepted by management. The period was also characterised by interdicts to prevent industrial action by management. Workers also won a 70c across-the-board increase in separate wage negotiations.
Crosscape Express Port Elizabeth		30		A brief sit-strike was staged in protest against the dismissal of the chairman of the worker's committee, who was dismissed with immediate effect and removed from the premises.
EH Walton PE	Ppwawu	56	11.89-	Industrial action was taken after two workers on maternity leave were dismissed. Workers slept in for three days after which they were locked out. The company's offer to pay-off workers was refused and the dispute was referred to the industrial court.
Firestone Port Elizabeth	Numsa	1600	10-16.01.90	A week-long illegal strike ended after a security guard, who had assaulted an activist, was dismissed. Workers argued that the disciplinary code was being used unfairly. On two days during the strike, workers marched through the industrial area.
Goodyear Uitenhage	Numsa	17	16.01.90	Seventeen workers were dismissed following a work stoppage. The union was challenging the action arguing that the dismissals were unprocedural.
Iscor Grootgeuk, Sishen, Thabazimbi	NUM		11.89	NUM and the three Iscor plants negotiated a settlement through the Conciliation Board after a lengthy dispute. The settlement raised Iscor's minimum monthly wage to R461 - a 23,6% increase. The working week was set at 48 hours, with any additional work considered overtime.
Jungle Oats Maitland	Fawu	70	21.11.- 5.12.89	Ninety per cent of the workforce were locked out for a two-week period following the breakdown of wage negotiations. The union took the company to the industrial court arguing that the lock-out was unfair. The judgement ruled that the company should withdraw certain aspects of the lock-out and following further discussions workers were reinstated and a wage settlement was reached.
Mercedes East London	Numsa	3000	10-20.11.89	A wildcat work stoppage by 3 000 workers, took a week to resolve despite new industrial relations procedures agreed on by Numsa and Mercedes in July. According to Numsa, workers downed tools after a fight between a worker and a foreman. Management described the cause of the dispute as disciplinary action taken against workers who had begun a go-slow.
PE Tramways Port Elizabeth	Tawu, TGWU	100	10.11.89	A work stoppage by more than 300 drivers and mechanics in protest against the laying-off of 67 bus cleaners was brought to an end after union representatives were presented with a court order declaring the stoppage illegal. The stoppage was called after the two parties had failed to agree on terms of reference for an arbitrator. The dispute was headed for the Industrial Court.
Repco PE	Numsa, EAWUSA	300	25.01.90-	Workers on strike in support of wage demands were locked out and interdicted to stop industrial action or face dismissal. Workers were demanding R3 on the Seifsa increase. Management offered 25c on wages and 25c on the end of year bonus.
SA Bottling Company	Fawu	100	12-18.12.89	Work resumed after a strike over what workers considered the unfair dismissal of a driver. The agreement between the two parties was made an order of the industrial court.
SA Dried Fruit Co-op	Fawu	27		Workers dismissed over a dispute concerning working hours and overtime were reinstated and an agreement reached on working hours between the union and management.
Steiner cleaners Western Cape	TGWU		22.12.89	A short stoppage over wages led to a dispute being declared by management.
Timber Industries Port Elizabeth	Ppwawu	150	11.89- 12.01.90	Sleep-in legal strikers involved in a wage dispute were ordered to leave the plant after police were called in by management. An ultimatum to return to work was accepted by workers, who also won their wage increase. Two workers facing intimidation charges were not re-employed.
Weiff Oddy Motor Body Engineering	Numsa		09.01.90	A dispute over full attendance bonuses for workers who participated in the September '89 stayaway resulted in a strike in which management dismissed the entire workforce. The week following the lock-out, police arrested strikers and charged them with public violence, intimidation and damage to property. The union and the company were locked in negotiations to end the strike.
				FREE STATE
Interstate Busine Bloemfontein	TGWU	500	October -	A strike over disciplinary procedures and suspicion of corruption in the pension fund resulted in mass dismissal. Union members were also attacked by vigilantes and arrested.
				TRANSKEI
Ohlssons Butterworth	Fawu	300	18.12.89	Dismissed workers were re-employed after industrial action forced the shutdown of the brewery. Management also appeared open to recognising the union.
				NATAL

Mondi Richards Bay	Ppwawu	400	15.01.90 -	About 400 workers were involved in a wage strike. The union was demanding R1,10 -an -hour increase on the minimum rate against management's offer of 66c. The union's proposal of mediation was rejected.
Richards Bay Bulk Storage	CWIU	31	19-21.12.89	A strike over a safety competition (that workers were not informed of in advance) ended when the workforce were interdicted to return to work.
MINES				
Sasol Brandspruit	CWIU	800	21.11.89	450 dismissed workers were reinstated after a wildcat one-day strike by 800 workers. The strike was sparked off by the arrest of a worker who was allegedly found in possession of explosives. Workers believe the explosives were planted on the man. Racial tensions increased since CWIU's successful strike over food allowances last month.
Secunda Collieries	CWIU		15.11.89	A one -day stoppage was called over a production bonus that had not been paid out.

Repression monitor: November-January

November - Police attacked workers inside the Boerstra Bakery plant while their representatives were involved in negotiations with management. 200 workers were arrested and 204 injured. Workers were treated for broken limbs and hands. In another incident after the dispute had been settled, police allegedly attacked workers who were leaving the premises.

November - A clash between 800 workers and police was averted when the Acting President of the Industrial Court in Cape Town negotiated with police. The workers had marched to hear the case of Sactwu vice-president Bert Pitt who had been dismissed for allegedly obtaining a medical certificate to attend the Cosatu congress. The company

had hired private investigators to tail Pitts. He was subsequently reinstated.

January - The conflict between Numsa and Uwusa members at Haggie Rand is unresolved and it is likely that more attacks will take place. Already, four Numsa members and two from Uwusa have been killed and others who were attacked or feared that they were on the hit list have left the plant. Management have employed private investigators who have been questioning Numsa members, while three Uwusa members - on bail for assault charges - have not been investigated or disciplined. Although Numsa had last year requested management to convene a meeting between the two parties, the union has changed its

proposals to request a meeting to discuss the security of its members. A meeting, called this month by management, was called off when Numsa argued that its shop stewards had to attend the meeting. It is likely that Numsa will call a meeting with Uwusa.

January - Gunmen launched a grenade and machinegun attack on the Mdantsane home of Sactwu organiser Jeff Wabena. The house and the room in which he was sleeping was riddled with bullets and the tyres of his car shot at. He escaped without serious injury.

January - TGWU members at Interstate Busline were attacked by vigilantes and the union kombi burnt out when representatives arrived at the

company's office for a meeting. The representatives were warned to leave immediately or they would be attacked by scabs. Workers allege the vigilantes were transported around the township in management buses. Two workers were arrested and charged with arson following the burning of buses in the community, but these charges have since been dropped. A further two workers were taken in for questioning.

January - Twelve workers involved in a strike at Welfit in Port Elizabeth have been arrested and charged with public violence, intimidation and damage to property. Bail was set at R500 for each charge.