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
WIP 87 • MARCH 1993

JOE SLOVO speaks personally



# PROGRESS

incorporating NEW ERA



## Who's in? Who's out?

The post-apartheid economic hangover

THE ART OF BEING BLACK • THE GENDER AGENDA

Reconstruct: What you should know about the IDT



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# *Editorial*

Change is in the air. South Africa, at last, seems to be entering the last lap towards an elected constituent assembly. The major players — the ANC, NP and Inkatha — seem to have arrived at a workable understanding about the way forward, despite the real differences that continue to separate them.

It is difficult to believe that, only six months ago, differences between the ANC and the government seemed irreconcilable. Inkatha was seen as a puppet of the government, with the two locked firmly into their conception of an ethnically-based regional dispensation.

But now, following the ANC's 'sunset clause' compromises, the government seems willing to move forward with breakneck speed. It has unveiled its own charter of human rights. It is prepared to open all schools to all people. It is seriously considering the integration of MK into the SADF. And most importantly it is talking, albeit unrealistically, of South Africa's first non-racial elections this year.

These are momentous steps. But is it too good to be true? Time alone will tell. This government is not known for keeping its word, and who knows when Inkatha's Buthelezi might go off the rails again. In any case, while consensus on the process towards democracy is being reached in the centre, at the right and left extremes there are still mumbles and growls of discontent.

As this issue's focus on the economy shows, even if the economy picks up — as some economists are now predicting — there has to be an equitable distribution of the wealth that is created. If only a few black faces join the ranks of the privileged, discontent will deepen and the successes at political level will be in danger of being wiped out by renewed, and possibly fiercer, waves of socio-political instability.

But whatever happens, this year is likely to be even more momentous than last year. Change, definitely, is in the air in this country.

Change is also in the air here at WIP. This is my last editorial after two exciting and challenging years. I leave to become co-ordinator of the new Social Policy Unit at the University of Durban-Westville, and leave WIP in the capable hands of Chris Vick, an experienced journalist and until recently co-ordinator of The Other Press Service (TOPS).

As the new South Africa progresses, so will your favourite magazine as it enters another new era!

DEVAN PILLAY

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PIC: PAUL GRENSON, SOUTHLIGHT

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## WHO'S IN? WHO'S OUT?

Are we headed for 'Two Nation' society, where a non-racial minority enters the magic circle of economic privilege — and the rest are locked on the margins? *Mike Morris* says it's highly likely unless the left wakes up.

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Are township artists painting for a white world? *Ivor Powell* taps the mind of the black artist



PIC: STEVE HILTON-BARBER, SOUTHLIGHT



## letters



### WIP is too intellectual

I am a graduate and a subscriber to *WIP*. Frankly, most of the paper is over my head — far too intellectual. In the last edition all I could read with enjoyment and understanding was *Left Alive*, *Personally Speaking* and the *Abortion Pill*.

I had hoped that the incorporation with *New Era* would have resulted in a more 'grassroots' and readable publication. It seems *New Era's* style has been squeezed out. I am not happy with this. I don't know how your other readers feel.

*Su Groves*  
*East London*

### Zionism is not monolithic

I picked up your September issue, and came across your interview with Rita Giacaman. I wish to question the glib generalisations and misinformation marketed in a wrapping of iconoclastic frankness, which is the hallmark of your magazine's examination of the Israeli-Palestinian-Arab nightmare.

Whilst the above-mentioned interview assumes as understood that the Palestinian experience is pluralistic, and contains fundamentalist, nationalist, and pan-Arabist elements, for some mysterious reason Zionism is treated as one monolithic entity.

We are regaled with monochrome definitions of what Zionism is — racist, non-democratic, exclusivist (Hein Marais frames conveniently suppliant questions, so that all the interviewee has to do is purse her lips and mouth: "of course") — which ignore the historical and contemporary divisions within Zionism.

Historically, labour Zionism was dominant in the years preceding the state, and during Israel's first two decades. The nationalist right was marginalised, as were religious fundamentalists. Zionist organisations like 'HaShomeyr HaTsair' (The Young Guard) were sufficiently leftwing to be banned in South Africa by the apartheid regime.

Marais mentions some nameless Israeli historian who wrote of eliminating the Palestinians as contenders for the same territory. He might just as well have mentioned the Zionist thinker Yehuda Magnes, first Rector of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, who proposed limiting Jewish immigration to Palestine, so that a binational state could be maintained without one group dominating the other.

In Israel today there are two Arab parties in the Knesset (Israeli Parliament), a Communist party which has a mixed Jewish-Arab list and constituency, a Citizen's Rights Party and a United Workers Party (which both have Israeli Arab Members of Knesset). All of these want withdrawal from the territories and a long term negotiated settlement.

Then there is the Labour Party in the centre, the Likud on the right, and the ultra national, religious and fascist parties on the far right. The ideological distance between the Citizen's Rights party and the Techiya (Rebirth) Party is huge — certainly as vast as that between George Habash's Marxist PFLP and fundamentalist Hamas (in the PLO) — yet both call themselves Zionist parties.

In addition there are strong extra-parliamentary movements like Gush Emunim (The Faith Block) on the right, and Shalom Achshav (Peace Now) on the left. While Peace Now looks to the establishment of a non-belligerent Palestinian state alongside Israel, it is an undeniably Zionist movement. It asserts the non-negotiable right of the Jewish people to self determination, and accepts there is only one piece of land the Jews have a historic claim to — Israel.

Whether peace and territorial compromise will be reached depends not only upon the Palestinians and upon Israel, but upon the surrounding Arab states, whose economic boycotts, invasions, blockades and missiles have militarised Israeli society, and created

a climate of fear and suspicion.

Israeli socialism has been remarkably creative, although its golden age is now over. Besides inventions like the Kibbutz and Moshav (collective farms), it created one of the most representative trade unions ever, the Histadrut. Almost all Israeli workers are members of the Histadrut or one of its affiliates.

Progressive workers' movements in South Africa could learn from the way the Histadrut organised and empowered its grassroots support. They could also learn from the structures established in the state when Israel was still a British Mandate. These included Kupat Cholim (the socialist health care system), the Haganah (the future Israel Defence Force), and the ORT network of vocational schools.

*Immanuel Suttner*  
*Yeoville*

*Rita Giacaman replies from the West Bank:*

Immanuel Suttner takes issue with what he sees as 'Israel bashing' or, more specifically, the alleged treatment of Zionism as 'one monolithic entity'. Hein Marais and I were not engaged in a discussion on Zionism. Nonetheless, and despite his interchangeable use of 'Zionism' and 'Israel', it should be said that he is right: Zionism is extremely diverse in its various tendencies and political projects, much more so than he or I could reflect in a single letter. Yes, Zionism is a human phenomenon.

But Suttner is not just saying that "Zionists are people too". He is implying that it is progressive as well. He admits that the "golden age Israeli socialism" is now over. But for Palestinians its passing was no great loss. Israel has long depended on cheap Palestinian migrant labour, the tens of thousands of workers who travel to Israel every day from the West Bank and Gaza Strip to earn substantially less than Jewish Israeli workers do for the same work.

About 90% of the construction industry work force in Israel is





Palestinian. Yet, an organisation that Suttner calls "one of the most representative trade unions ever, the Histadrut" has yet to coherently defend its systematic neglect of tens of thousands of Palestinian labourers. For Palestinians, 'Israeli socialism' never even began. In fact, it was the cadres of Labour Zionism, Kibbutzniks and all that expelled Palestinians from their land in 1948 and occupied the West Bank and Gaza in 1967.

I think Suttner would agree that the fact that there is a political opposition in Israel (democracy), that some in Israel want peace and others war (diversity), does not impart to the state any particular monopoly on morality. He is confused by conflicting impulses: his objections to Zionism being slagged off in a general way and his apparent unwillingness to grapple with the nastiness for which Zionism is and has been responsible. Which is quite considerable.

Zionism — for all the requisite progressiveness with which he endows it — manifests itself in the form of intense militarisation, fundamental national/religious segregation (racism), a belligerent and expansionist nationalism and no small degree of colonialism.

The fact that Israel presently holds close to 15 000 Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza Strip as political prisoners (several thousands of them in a desert detention camp), that the state and courts have consistently upheld house demolitions and expulsions as forms of punishment, that torture is routine, that security forces regularly assassinate activists, that the airforce regularly bombs refugee camps in Lebanon, that settlements continue to be constructed in occupied territory, or that I could go on listing the violations of human rights and international law until I turned blue in the face ... all this is more than enough to suggest that Zionism must be based on some serious leaps of faith.

In Suttner's words, the Zionist common denominator is "the non-negotiable right of the Jewish people to self determination ... (on) ... one

piece of land the Jews have a historic claim to - Israel".

Early Zionism — the last in a series of European colonial movements of the previous century — took as one of its lasting slogans the catchy phrase "A land without people, for a people without land". In both formulations the obvious contradiction is wilfully ignored: the land is not and was never empty. It was and is full of non-Jews: Christian and Muslim Arabs, Palestinians.

In short, his portrayal of Zionism and Israel is incomplete. No real consideration of Zionism can be complete without an acceptance of its principal accomplishments: the establishment of the State of Israel and the dispossession - ongoing dispossession - of the Palestinian people.

Still, criticism of Israel is for him an "age and stage thing". Presumably one day South Africans will all grow up (i.e. rid themselves of Third Worldist tendencies) and embrace Israel as the pluralistic, democratic and basically progressive place they secretly knew it was all along. They will learn to ignore Israel's pole position near the centre of US strategic interests in the Middle East, nor will they mention that deep, bipartisan and long-held relationship between Israel and the apartheid regime in SA.

Of course, Palestinians will have no such freedom. We long ago came to terms with the fact that the conflict is between two peoples who claim the same land: Palestine. I do not doubt the legitimacy of our claim to our land. I cannot say the same about Zionism, but then again, I am not a Zionist. I have accepted Israel. I have sought, for years, to find common ground on which to build a just and durable peace. Some Israelis have done the same; many have not.

As South Africans know very well, it is your enemy with whom you must seek peace. And it is from our enemy that we seek to win a measure of justice.

## Cronin is a charlatan

How nice for Jeremy Cronin (*WIP* 86) that he is white and not subject to the corruption that tempts his poorer black comrades. He is very concerned in his article to promote subjectivity and personal morality in the 'leadership ranks' lest 'we' become Romans before entering Rome.

A very timely warning. But at whom is it directed? No-one reading his words can be sure whether he writing as a member of the SACP or the ANC. No-one can be sure where MK fits into the equation. Comrade Cronin should not extend his arms to embrace the whole 'movement'. He is a communist and should clearly distinguish between his own party's lack of morality and the moral health of the ANC. However much he may desire it, they are not indivisible. The SACP's moral turpitude is not part of the ANC's development.

There is one form of corruption that white leftists like Cronin choose not to recognise: ideological corruption, where life-style is in contradiction to life-hopes. To regret that he did not have an impoverished extended family reveals Cronin as a charlatan. Poor little rich boy — he wants to make virtue of poverty and oppression.


Poor (sic) Cronin. He cannot face the moral dilemma that his whiteness is an indelible privilege for some time to come.

He would see no virtue in the PAC's insistence that Africans with a settler background should not seek leading positions in their organisation. That does not preclude membership or support from such sources. But Cronin has made big sacrifices and expects big organisational rewards. That is the subjective dilemma he must resolve.

*Costa Gazidis*  
*Cape Town*

Letters under 300 words receive priority. *WIP* reserves the right to edit letters.





PIC: THE STAR

INTERNATIONALISM

## ICFTU bid to end violence

WHEN 27 OF THE WORLD'S TOP trade unionists visited South Africa recently to gather information about the violence, their mission was "not just to condemn or identify the causes ... but to suggest concrete ways to help".

This was according to the delegation's leader and general secretary of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), Enzo Friso. The

*Train violence: International trade unionists hope to help identify what role the state is playing*

ICFTU has 164 national federations affiliated to it from 117 countries, representing some 113 million workers.

After visiting violence torn areas, the ICFTU held its first ever Co-ordinating Committee on Southern Africa in South Africa. The

meeting resolved to assist the struggle for democracy by:

- Pressurising the SA government and employers to ensure that labour laws are up to international standards
- Stationing international labour monitors in South

Africa

- Pressurising the United Nations to provide more observers with a broader mandate, station observers at flashpoints and make their reports public

- Targeting repressive employers for international action

- Mounting a public campaign against the "repressive puppet regimes in the so-called homelands".

"This violence is a new phenomenon," said Friso. "When I visited the country a few years ago, it was not like this. It is aimed at jeopardising democratisation. They want to give the impression that blacks are unable to rule."

Friso added that although Judge Richard Goldstone had told the delegation that there was no evidence of police involvement, delegates were given evidence, particularly in Natal, that the police were involved. Trade unions were a major target and a number of employers connived with anti-democratic forces.

"Although the government has a duty and a responsibility to end the violence, it is unable to do so as some elements within government are involved as they do not want democracy," said Friso.

"Why are people who belong to no political organisation being killed on the trains? Why does the government allow certain people to carry weapons?"

- Kerry Cullinan

POLITICS

## Poll bears bad tidings for ANC

PREDICTIONS THAT THE National Party (NP) might yet run the ANC to the wire in SA's first non-racial election seem less far-fetched in the wake of a new poll commissioned by the Centre for Development Studies (CDS) in Cape Town.

The countrywide survey of potential voting patterns among coloureds shows the ANC lagging far behind its arch rival. A staggering 61.9% of 1 440 respondents said they would vote for the NP in an election, compared to 9%

for the ANC and 7.6% who prefer the Labour Party (LP). In the race for presidency, FW de Klerk does even better: 74% give him the nod, while ANC president Nelson Mandela trails in with 5%.

NP support among coloureds seems to be significantly up on a September 1991 poll by the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) which gave the NP 54% of the coloured vote and pegged support for De Klerk at 61%. Ironically, a recent Omnichek survey found support for De Klerk and his party slipping dramatically among whites.

Among many other surprises, the CDS poll found 41% of the respondents awaited majority rule with "mixed feelings" and a further 22.5% thought it was


a "bad" idea. Only 37% felt "positive" about the prospect of a black president, with 39% registering a "negative" reaction; in contrast, only 7% showed disapproval of a white president.

Those sentiments did not, however, appear to fan out into generalised prejudice: less than one in five respondents said they would feel uncomfortable living next to africans. Other responses revealed a strong sense of group identity but, at the same time, an apparent aversion to political organisations that stress group interests over national ones.

A fraction of respondents said they belonged to a political grouping and only 17% supported one.

- Hein Marais





RECONSTRUCTION

## 'Pact' to redistribute wealth

COSATU'S PROPOSED 'Reconstruction Pact' was aimed at redistributing wealth and strengthening "grassroots organs of civil society", said federation general secretary Jay Naidoo.

Speaking at a conference on economic democracy organised by the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Naidoo said Cosatu saw the pact as the only acceptable option to address the country's economic woes.

Other options involved guaranteeing minority rights, which would see the "majority of the population being held hostage to an elite" or a "corporatist solution involving the government and big business ... and just focusing on saving the jobs of organised workers".

The pact would consist of four main elements, said Naidoo. The first was the creation of jobs. In the short term, this would involve major labour intensive public works programmes.

In the longer term, industries would have to be restructured based on joint government-union-employer commissions to assess which sectors could create wealth and were potentially profitable in the face of international competition. Some "targeted subsidisa-

tion" would be necessary.

The second element would be "human resource and development" to increase the country's skills base. This would involve "effective affirmative action programmes", said Naidoo.

The third element would be a "social wage", which would involve establishing policy on wage levels and extending social



Jay Naidoo

services to the broader population.

The fourth aspect would involve extending rights to all people. "Society has to have a countervailing force to empower and protect its

people," said Naidoo. Women and workers needed particular protection, he added.

Money to finance reconstruction could be

obtained by restructuring the public sector. A task force of the National Economic Forum (NEF) had been set up to look into this. In addition, pension and provident funds could yield R150-billion.

Unless there was an appropriate institutional framework and appropriate policies to address reconstruction, and state resources were redirected to meet the needs of the majority, there will be continued confrontation, concluded Naidoo. □

— Kerry Cullinan

MEDIA

## Working on a different Agenda

WATCHING TELEVISION NEWS could be a whole new experience from April this year. A new board of control, paving the way for a 'new generation' of announcers, could transform the content and presentation of programmes broadcast by the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC).

The state-appointed board's term of office expires at the end of March, and the Campaign for Independent Broadcasting (CIB) — an alliance of trade unions and media groupings — is trying to ensure public participation in selecting the new governing body.

The CIB has proposed the following process:

- The selection of an inde-

pendent 'appointment panel' to appoint the new board.

- Organisations and members of the public will then be able to send nominations for the board to this panel.
- The panel will publish the names of nominees and conduct public hearings at which nominees will be questioned.
- Once the hearings have been completed, the appointment panel will announce the names of the new board.

The stumbling blocks so far seem to be the state's reluctance to have the process overseen by a team


of judges, and its opposition to public hearings.

But campaign organisers are working on a tight schedule: according to its proposals, the appointment panel should have been in place by February 15, and must have drawn up a short-list of prospective board members by March 1.

Some within the CIB are already looking at new newsroom staff and even new announcers for programmes like Agenda who could be brought in at short notice.

The urgency is obvious: the state broadcaster is an incredibly powerful political weapon. And restructuring the SABC is vital if elections are to be anything like free and fair. □

— Chris Vick







## FOCUS ON THE ECONOMY



# Trying to side-step a

*Are we headed for a new Two Nation society? Where a non-racial minority enters the magic circle of privilege — and the rest are locked out on the margins? Very likely, warns **MIKE MORRIS**, unless the left wakes up to the crisis at hand*

**T**HE CARDS ARE stacked in favour of a new constitutional system that will accord formal political equality and shun racial criteria. Soon, if disaster does not intervene, SA will no longer be typified by the exclusion of africans from the circles of privilege and power.

Apartheid divided SA along racial lines into 'two nations': on the inside were whites (and with tricameralism, to some extent, many in-

dians and coloureds), on the outside were africans. This framework of privilege is now doomed.

But the new order will not automatically yield a socially and economically unified society.

Powerful forces are leading us 'towards a new Two Nation society, a 50% solution that will allow some South Africans to embrace opportunity and privilege, but banish the rest to the margins. The process by which some are included and the rest excluded

will not be based on simple racial principles of apartheid. The effects, though, will be socially traumatic and politically disastrous.

It is inevitable that the constitutional issues should dominate the current political agenda. Yet our society is today a web of social and economic fault lines — cracks and contradictions that are often the sources of social tension and societal eruptions. If we continue to ignore them, and instead place all the emphasis on political and consti-

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Mike Morris warns of the gap between rich and poor getting wider and wider 6


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Economist Samir Amin's ideas on ensuring a strong post-apartheid economy 10

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Claudia Manning looks at the vital role to be played by those on the fringe 12





## 50% solution...

tutional issues, we risk a rude awakening one less than fine day in the future. We are standing in the shadow of a decisive question: can a new process of inclusion and exclusion be avoided in a post-apartheid SA?

### The Great Lockout

Until very recently, inclusion and exclusion occurred quite transparently — with whites 'inside' and blacks 'outside'. In graphic terms apartheid can be described as a system of fortifications and pathways that controlled access to privilege and opportunity largely — but not exclusively — on the basis of race.

For whites (and to a limited extent Indians and coloureds) it was a distorted form

of social welfarism. If you were allowed into that sanctum of opportunity, you gained access to a range of social benefits — health care, education, unemployment insurance, urban infrastructure, job protection, housing and other subsidies and more were laid on by the state at little personal cost. Africans were, as a rule, excluded from that domain.

The 1980s saw major departures from classic apartheid as reforms were introduced to adjust or refine the system. Still, race remained the basis for inclusion and exclusion.

The key issues now confronting us revolve around FW de Klerk's willingness to abandon apartheid. This project is

aimed at constructing a broader basis for inclusion/exclusion. Class rather than race will determine *who's in* and *who's out*.

This is not some master conspiratorial plan dreamt up in the small hours of panic. Our society is being pushed along this path by powerful social and economic forces. Instead of trying to shore up a new form of apartheid, De Klerk was astute enough to fashion a strategy that tail-streams behind these forces:

- Strong affection for a trickle-down economic model. Wealth creation becomes the sole way to revive the economy and state-sponsored redistributive measures are elbowed off the stage. The rich get richer while the poor chew on the looped promise that better days are forever around the next corner.

- Structural adjustment programmes that restructure access to health care, welfare, education etc are already underway — implemented not by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), but by the current state.

- The skewed conglomerate character of the SA economy will probably remain. Unless conglomerates are unbundled through competition mechanisms, necessary industrial strategy policies are likely to reinforce their power.

- Black capital is being assimilated through joint ventures and will be hoisted on board (just as English capital did to its Afrikaner counterparts in the 1960s).

- Rapid recruitment of a black managerial elite due to the emphasis on affirmative action.

- Political and institutional structures are being deracialised and a political elite of black representatives and officials will be incorporated into them alongside their white

counterparts.

- Intense differentiation is occurring between employed workers and those who are unemployed or who work outside the formal economy, particularly marginalised women. The low growth rates in the manufacturing and mining sectors is resulting in workers hanging onto their jobs for dear life.

- We are seeing wage gaps widen — and deepen — as more skilled manufacturing workers step into new bargaining structures.

- The black middle class is moving out of the old townships into well-off urban residential centres. Meanwhile inner city accords are having the effect of guarding those zones against 'encroachment' by marginalised sectors such as shanty town dwellers.

- In the old working class townships, the state is handing over more and more home ownership to long-standing tenants. This deepens the social and economic disparities between township residents with mortgage security and those stuck on the shanty town rim.

- The majority of shanty town residents are experiencing little change in terms of access to housing, infrastructure and public transport; instead they are consigned to zones of worsening urban violence.

- In the agricultural economy there is pressure to limit land reform schemes and assign marginal land to homelands. Meanwhile, the neoliberal agenda dictates the dismantling of marketing boards, but dares not tamper with cooperatives which remain the principal centres of institutional power for large commercial farmers.

- In general, and this holds for all the major negotiating partners, issues of redistribution are increasingly subordinated to those of growth, while the



poor and women are marginalised further at a distressing pace.

These are some of the ingredients of a new 50% society. Many of these forces are part of an international trend and difficult to stop; some are necessary. Taken together they form a set of powerful socio-economic forces that are restructuring the basis of inclusion/exclusion of post-apartheid SA.

One of the alarming problems, however, lies with the broad left's inability to confront these trends. And the main culprit is the political legacy inherited from the decades of struggle against apartheid.

### Right place, Wrong time?

By the 1980s the anti-apartheid struggle pivoted on the principle that overthrowing the existing institutional order was essential.

And it was propelled by the belief that *revolution was feasible*. The national liberation struggle was pictured as a confrontation between the excluded and the oppressive nations. The aim was to overwhelm the latter, sweep aside its racist institutions and erase its practices. The new society would thus begin with a clean slate, full plate and purified state.

Apartheid's racial inclusion / exclusion bore similarities to colonialism. Adopting 'internal colonialism' as a revolutionary analysis meshed well with models of decolonisation in Africa and socialist revolutions in Eastern Europe, Cuba, Vietnam, USSR and China. The influences of the revolutionary texts of anti-colonial struggle were evident. All these elements converged in a fixation on that explosive event: the seizure of power.

Since apartheid couched reality — life itself — in terms of inclusion / exclusion, it was no surprise then that the opposition proceeded along paths marked by principles that similarly bisected the world along 'us' and 'them' lines. The conception of the struggle as one of 'external confrontation' found concrete shape in the slogans and practices of armed struggle, insurrectionism, ungovernability, people's power, non-collaboration, boycottism, non-participation, etc.

With the exception of some activists influenced by trade union struggles, much of the left consequently inherited from the 1980s a tradition that shunned effective struggle within institutions. Many within it are still dizzy with the notion

## We can either strive to create a One Nation South Africa or allow a divided Two Nation society to emerge behind our backs

that *bona fide* leftism can be equated with militancy, armed struggle, 'popular' violence — Bisho, as an attempted action replay of 1986, underscores Karl Marx's famous dictum that history repeats itself as farce the second time around. They are still battling to come to terms with a different conception that can equip them to deal effectively with the tasks of negotiation and the web of social and economic fault lines that crisscross SA.

### Social forces

These reflex strategic conceptions are wholly unsuited to the tasks that clutter the democratisation process. History has landed us in a new ball game — the problem is that it's tough trying to play a good game of cricket if you are all geared up for rugby.

The old social forces have not been decisively defeated, with the institutions of old swept aside. Rather, this transition is about the inclusion of the opposition into existing institutions still inhabited by the same old social forces and people (albeit with different agendas but still with major power).

The negotiations process is not about a government negotiating its surrender because it was defeated by superior force. It is not about an already cemented nation poised on the brink of decolonisation or the seizure of power. It is about a political struggle to forge a new nation and new alliances that can ensure the broadest basis of social consent. The opposition is not sweeping aside the old institutions of state power. It has to try and shape the terms on which it is incorporated into the state as a new ruling group. It has to extend and thereby transform state institutions so that they will cover new constituencies and new aspects of social life.

Transformation is on the cards but it will not involve the creation of new revo-

lutionary institutions. And no amount of 'revolutionary' and 'militant' huffing and puffing will magically do that trick. Rather, the new is to be fashioned from within the womb of the old.

### Hobbled

Those that call themselves the orthodox left and those that wish to stress equity (for they are not the same thing) are severely hobbled. The discussion about transition remains framed basically in terms of constitutional and political issues. The social and economic fissures are underplayed or misinterpreted.

Furthermore, activists have been taught to view the struggle in ways that are at odds with the requirements of the transition.

Disoriented by the current process and obsessed with a politics that bears all the hallmarks of religious purity, there is a strong tendency to answer practical problems with glib moralising.

Many activists who portray themselves as 'critics' of the current process are firing off strategic slogans of the 1980s at the ANC leadership, and denouncing it as elitist. They miss the point. The tendencies propelling us towards a 50% solution lie outside the current bilateral political negotiations, but in the downplaying of the social and economic fault lines in our society. Leave aside the hypocrisy of people who themselves have often shown scant respect for democracy; still, denouncing the elitism of negotiators and their betrayal of past slogans only deflects attention away from the inappropriateness of their own inherited strategic perspective.

The basic challenge is to forge a more equitable social order that softens inherited hostilities and social divisions. Forever politicising the SA crisis will not equip us for this task. The conflict is fundamental: Will the new society perpetuate the highly divisive social elitism of the past, but on a more non-racial basis?

Or will it tend towards a more egalitarian system that strives to muffle inherited frictions by redistributing resources and institutional power. The latter requires social and economic policies that construct a new grand coalition of classes centering on the middle strata, but try to include the marginalised masses rather than fence them out.





*Far out: Life on the street has become the norm for hundreds of thousands of people living on the fringes of society.*

Political activists have tended to devote little time to social and economic issues, apart from (until very recently) espousing the magical powers of nationalisation. There was an assumption that, once the constitutional issues were sorted out, the dozing SA 'economic giant' would lumber to its feet and cart us off to the land of promise. In short, the crisis was seen as primarily political, not economic.

Nowadays the matter of economic growth has come to the fore — but in a way that still marginalises *redistribution*. The accelerating slide of the economy and the clear irritation of European and US powers with the style and pace of the transition has eroded the separation between political and economic issues. ANC leaders finally seem alert to economic issues, although it was not left forces who placed distribution on the agenda, but ironically, last year's shock briefing by finance minister Derek Keys. This new concern is consequently peppered with statements about restabilising the economy and ensuring growth. There is a real danger of flipping from militant rhetoric into conservative convention.

This dovetails with an emerging line

from state, capital and international agencies. They see a specific political role for redistributive policies: economic growth will not occur without a political settlement, and long-term peace and stability demands policies that can restore the political and social conditions for economic growth. The reasoning is that limited redistribution can keep the lid on a potential social and economic explosion.

#### **Political accessory**

Redistribution is thus viewed as a political accessory that can be tagged onto the measures aimed at restoring economic growth; it is not seen as being integrally connected to — in fact part and parcel of — long-term sustainable growth.

This has some risky implications. For a start, it encourages the view that redistributive strategies are unproductive and expensive welfare measures designed to cool social tempers. Their role in stimulating the economy and reshaping the parameters of post-apartheid society is radically underplayed. They become necessary evils, rather than the basis for creating a new set of social alliances, a new era of economic growth and the bedrock for social stability in post-apar-

theid society. Consequently, redistributive measures are likely to be abandoned as soon as the powers-that-be decide that stability has been achieved.

Notwithstanding a new sensitivity towards economic priorities in the ANC, and a shift away from radical free-marketism by capital and the NP, the forces shaping the new 50% society are still being strengthened. If they are to be countered, attention must be focused on the socio-economic fault lines that split society. Alternative economic policies and a new strategic perspective have to be encouraged. Leftism has to be rescued from the exponents of armed struggle and ultra-militancy. We should learn to differentiate ourselves politically on the basis of our social and economic perspectives and not simply according to the combativeness of our rhetoric. Democratisation is also a struggle to extend institutional functions, structures and power based on developing new working relationships even with the forces of old. It is not merely an all-out assault on existing institutions. Redistribution has to be made an integral part of a growth strategy, and its role in constructing a new broad social basis of consent must be appreciated.

The concerns of a range of social forces — not only capital and the organised working class — have to be dealt with. The marginalised majority in the urban and rural areas have to gain access to opportunities and resources they were denied under apartheid. In short the redistribution of opportunity, infrastructural resources, access to productive activity and institutional power is a crucial component of such an alternative.

We are not well-equipped to tackle these issues. Our political experiences of the immediate past are inadequate to the tasks, and our intellectual heritage is based on inappropriate conceptual dictums.

But we are at a crossroads. We can either strive to create a One Nation SA or allow a divided Two Nation society to emerge behind our backs. If we hark back to the daydreams of the past and fail to develop an alternative vision grounded in the historical realities of the transition then we will be hastening the creation of a new 50% post-apartheid SA. □

*• A former trade unionist, Morris is now senior research fellow at the Centre for Social and Development Studies at the University of Natal.*





cover story

# SA IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC SYSTEM

*World-renowned Egyptian political economist, SAMIR AMIN, argues that only an inward-looking growth path will ensure that a thoroughgoing democracy is built in SA*



*Rural revival: as in Zimbabwe, the rural black population needs support*

**F**ORMAL APARTHEID IS ALMOST OVER, and the long-awaited 'one person, one vote' election is virtually guaranteed. Does this mean SA stands on the brink of a genuine democratic solution?

Much will depend on the 'compromises' achieved in the coming months and on the interpretations of the South African reality that guide those bargaining deals.

SA was always a difficult country to classify: Was it a white settler colony? A 'third world' African country? A developed industrialised country? Actually, the difficulty lay in the fact that SA is a kind of microcosm of the world capitalist system.

Assembled on its territory, one finds features proper to each and all of the 'four' worlds according to which countries can be classified. It has a white population which, in terms of habit and standards of living, belongs to the 'first' (ie advanced capitalist) world. A humorist might observe that the strong 'statist' behaviour of the white minority bears similarities to that of the former 'second' (so-called socialist) world.

The black populations of the townships clearly belong to the modern industrialising 'third' world, and the 'tribal'

peasants in the bantustans do not differ much from the peasant communities of what is now termed the 'fourth' world of Africa.

One can trace the origins of this curious and exceptional situation back several centuries, particularly to the arrival of British industrial imperialism on SA's shores. However, the period following the formal introduction of apartheid deserves special attention.

The years after World War Two were characterised by a process of industrialisation on the peripheries of the global system. Because this process proceeded — inevitably — unevenly and unequally, it split the old 'third' world into a new 'industrialising third world' and what is now called a 'fourth' world (non-industrialised agricultural and mineral exporting countries).

It was within that framework that SA's ruling class pursued its project of improving the country's status in the global system — through an industrialisation process that was strongly protected and supported by the state. Within that framework the apartheid system was perfectly rational. Productive labour was kept cheap; demand was maintained by expanding the income distributed to the

minority 'first' world; exports were increased in order to pay for imports necessary to promote the overall efficiency of industry. Liberal rhetoric that insisted on a basic tension between capitalism and apartheid (as if capitalism has ever been synonymous with freedom and equality!) preferred to lose track of what was really at stake.

In countries on the periphery, one main criterion determined whether the industrialisation process was a success or a failure: did the economy become 'competitive' in global markets?

## Curious mix

In this regard, SA presents a curious picture. Its industry has totally failed to become 'competitive' internationally. Industrial (ie non-mineral exports) are negligible compared to those of, say, Korea or Mexico or Brazil, and they are generally absorbed by the captive markets within the southern African region.

Yet the SA regime benefited — despite its brutality — from unparalleled financial, economic, political and military support from the US, Britain and Western European countries. Only racist prejudice can explain the fact that SA's failure to industrialise successfully has



generally been overlooked by institutions like the World Bank, while similar failures in countries (such as Egypt or Algeria) that tried to industrialise in an atmosphere of hostility from the Western powers are recalled ad nauseum.

SA continues to be almost exclusively a primary product exporter. Simultaneously, the bantustans have remained among the poorest areas of the 'fourth' world, unable to sustain even a minimal survival level.

It is no surprise that negotiators are these days bargaining with one eye fixed on an economy which, most admit, is in dire need of repair. Internal forces and Western powers are exerting strong pressures on the negotiators of the majority to accept a minimal project of 'democratisation' — to 'solve' the political puzzle and not to tinker too much with the economy which, it is presumed, will slowly 'heal' once stability returns.

Meanwhile, the working class is expected to accelerate the economy towards that blessed state of 'productivity' and 'competitiveness'. What a shame! What capital, with the active support of the Western powers, failed to achieve in SA, the working class now has to do as quickly as possible. The reward will be minimal economic concessions to the townships and industrial workers, practically no change in the bantustans, and the maintenance of the inordinate privileges of whites.

Meanwhile, of course, the regime will profit from heightened divisions among the majority which are likely to follow in the wake of this project and capitalise on the dissatisfaction in the bantustans.

The political format for such a 'compromise' will be a kind of 'federal' state (whatever it ends up being called) where much of the decision-making and financial responsibilities will be transferred from the central level to the 'states' or 'provinces'. In that case, even if no geographic area with a white majority can be drawn into existence, there will be 'rich' and 'poor' states. This division will enable the minimal concessions that are required to align a new black political bourgeoisie with the continuation of the system.

None of this is inevitable. A genuine democracy that involves and enables pro-

## WHICH WAY CAN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES GO?

- Several countries have moved into industrialisation and successfully became 'competitive' ... countries of East Asia (with both communist and capitalist political regimes) as well as the major Latin American countries;
- Other countries industrialised but clearly did not become competitive, or required drastic restructuring of their productive systems, income distribution, taxation etc ... SA belongs to this group, along with industrialised Arab countries like Egypt and Algeria;
- Some countries have remained pre-industrial, but succeeded to continue promoting 'traditional' agricultural, mineral or oil exports and appear, therefore, comparatively 'rich' and 'prosperous' ... oil-exporting Gulf countries belong to this group, as did Ivory Coast and Kenya for a while;
- Finally, there are the countries which have failed to keep promoting 'traditional' exports ... the majority of African countries slot in here.

gressive social change is still possible. But that process of change will be long and painful (30 years? 50 years?). And it has to kick off on the correct path no later than now. The conditions for its progress and success are:

- The adoption of a unitary state constitution (whatever local decentralisation this includes) allowing the redistribution of income and investment to occur at national level;
- An immense developmental effort in the backward rural areas and perhaps even support to a long-term perspective of internal redistribution of populations. Such steps are absolutely necessary to create a popular front that unites workers and peasants, and which defeats attempts to divide them;
- An agrarian reform programme in the

rural areas occupied by white settlers, to the benefit of the rural black proletariat. The 'success' of white settlers' agricultural enterprises is far from real. As Zimbabwe attests, this type of agriculture owes its 'success' to the cheapest quasi-slave labour it exploits and the enormous ecological disaster associated with the wasting of land;

- Redistribution of wage incomes to benefit productive workers of the majority (and better social conditions for them, especially in education), which can be compensated for by reducing the parasitic support provided to the pools of inefficient yet 'employed' minority. Given the overall level of development, the economy cannot afford a 'first world' pattern of consumption by a large minority in a country that belongs largely to the 'fourth' world;

- A gradual restructuring of the productive industry. But here we have to be clear about the goals. Should it be to become a competitive exporter as rapidly as possible? I think not. Rather, it should be, firstly, to achieve the changes associated with the redistribution of income: more popular consumption items, greater capacity to establish better productive systems in the rural areas, to meet popular needs in housing and the like, and less wasteful consumption by the minority.

### Postponing the dream

Naturally, this will gradually include changes that improve the capacity of the country to export. But it seems fairly certain that the changes listed here will postpone the dream of global competitiveness for several years at least. Until then, the political economy of genuine democratisation implies what one might call 'delinking', turning the economy inward to ensure that the democratisation process is thoroughgoing and not just cosmetic.

These are the stakes for real democratisation. The alternative is 'opening' the economy more, deregulation, turning it outward no matter how vulnerable it is, and a federal political solution.

I remind readers that these were the two main ingredients of the political economy of Yugoslavia. And they were loudly praised at the time (by the World Bank again!). Today, we witness the results ... □





cover story

# DYNAMO OR SAFETY NET

*Can the informal sector save the day?*

**CLAUDIA MANNING** examines the burgeoning informal sector, and asks whether it is a symptom or part of the solution to the economic crisis

**A**NYONE RETURNING TO SA AFTER A lengthy absence cannot help being struck by city streets that now bustle with evidence of a mushrooming informal sector. Pavements are lined with hawkers, empty lots are transformed into markets; in major centres like Johannesburg and Durban trading continues deep into the night. The contrast with the stoic and regimented city centres of a decade ago is dramatic.

Equally surprising — to the casual eye, at least — are the expectations and responsibilities that various players heap on this sector. Some see in it the promise of a virtual economic rebirth, as budding entrepreneurs 'enter the game', and new employment opportunities are created for the jobless masses. Others view it as a permanent holding tank that promises the marginalised sections of society some — temporary — relief.

There are fears that it allows the state and big business to sidestep their duties to provide social protection to the unemployed. One hears allegations that it might become a type of fifth column in the economy, which big business can use to undermine and evade organised labour.

What no-one disputes is that the informal sector is here to stay, in a big way. The question is whether — and how — it will slot into efforts to hoist the South African economy back onto a growth path. Put differently: is it merely a symptom of crisis or is it part of the solution to that crisis?

The rise of the informal sector as a 'legitimate' part of the economy is relatively new and follows in the wake of ongoing deregulation exercises by the government. Eighteen months ago, it was estimated that this sector contributed around 5% of the overall Gross Domestic Product (GDP); late last year, a Human Sciences Research Council study proposed that six out of ten unemployed South Africans are involved in informal economic activity.

The international debate around this sector tends to pit radical free market theorists against structural analysts. The former see in the informal sector the stirrings of a truly free play of market forces, where individuals challenge the monopoly powers of multinationals or



*Anything goes: Hawkers are a common sight in most South African cities*

states. The latter disagree sharply, and say that the informal sector reflects the economic crises experienced by most developing countries, and confirms the inability of the state to soften the hardships faced by the unemployed. Instead of celebrating the informal sector, they expect policy-makers to address the crises that underpin it.

That quarrel is echoed in SA where the business community applauds the unleashing of entrepreneurial instincts in

the black community. One need simply turn the pages of the financial press to find resounding claims about the importance of the informal sector in the growth of the economy.

The progressive movement ridicules that 'idealism'. People engaged in the informal sector are seen to be driven by desperation to earn some (minimal) income, rather than by some market-triggered impulse to earn profits. The ANC seems to favour increasing assistance to



the informal sector as part of a broader policy to provide social protection for the poor.

Cosatu's position is likely to be more cautious. It is wary of the threat that informal sector actors might pose to the interests of organised workers. For example, the second-hand clothing trade is seen to threaten jobs in the formal clothing industry (see *WIP* 86).

More generally, demands from the informal sector for deregulation endanger the advances of organised workers in the areas of wages, benefits and working conditions. Moves by big business to subcontract work previously done by their own employees to small or informal enterprises have drawn a hostile response from Cosatu, which sees this as a cost-cutting ploy disguised as promotion of the informal sector.

Meanwhile, some analysts draw attention to the difficulties small or informal enterprises face as they try to penetrate or compete in broader markets. They remind that many of the businesses that applaud greater informal sector activity monopolise the markets and determine who gets in and who stays out. The notion that informal enterprises compete freely is ridiculous, they say. They also question the viability and dynamism of informal enterprises in light of evidence that the informal sector is characterised by marginal, unproductive and survival-driven enterprises.

### **Ideological dispute**

The dispute is largely ideological. A thorough analysis of the informal sector reveals that it is neither a purely economic phenomenon (a new group of individuals seeking self-employment rather than wage employment, in pursuit of profit), nor a purely sociological one (poor people compelled by extreme vulnerability).

International experiences show that people enter the informal sector for different reasons. Persons with some human or financial resources might enter in search of profits; those who lack such means or who are trapped in economically depressed areas tend to enter out of desperation. As well, different types of enterprises show different growth potential.

Studies done in several African, Latin

American and Asian countries report that informal manufacturers tend to be much more dynamic than other informal activities. Income and wages in informal manufacturing tend to be considerably higher than in the trade and service sectors — which helps explain the desire of workers in the 'formal' sector to enter the informal sector.

When I interviewed informal carpenters and metal manufacturers in Nairobi last year, they said they were not willing to enter wage employment, despite the fact that many of them were making marginal profits.

Compared to other developing countries, far fewer South Africans appear to enter or remain in the informal sector out of sheer choice. Still, there are exceptions. Durban has a growing number of

## **RAND A BAG! RAND A BAG!**

**MOST OF SA'S INFORMAL ECONOMIC ACTIVITY occurs in the trade and service sectors — retail clothing, footwear, food and other household items, and providing services such as hairdressing, repairs of vehicles, fridges, stoves, television and radio sets, as well as the taxi service.**

**Unlike in most other developing countries, the informal manufacturing sector is profoundly undeveloped. Very little of the goods that are sold in the informal sector are produced 'informally'. Instead, one finds whole sections of the 'formal' manufacturing sectors — especially clothing — orienting their production mainly for sale to informal hawkers and traders.**

**It is through these informal traders and hawkers that an extensive network is set up, penetrating all corners of SA, as well as neighbouring countries. Much of this trade occurs in the larger cities, with hawkers often travelling great distances from smaller towns in search of cheap wares. In both Durban and Johannesburg there are now night-time market-places that cater to traders from all parts of the country and the region.**

small enterprises manufacturing expensive custom-made garments for women, while in Johannesburg small carpenters are producing custom-made furniture for the upper-end of the market and supplying retailers with average quality products. Most of those interviewed echoed the sentiments of the Kenyan manufacturers: they wanted to remain self-employed.

Pigeon-holing the informal sector — as well as its supporters and detractors — therefore does not take us far along the path of understanding its role in the economy.

African experiences indicate that the form and role of the informal sector is shaped largely by a country's level of economic and social development. In Ghana it was central to revitalising the national economy. The structural adjustment programme adopted by the Rawlings government in the 1980s severely tightened access to foreign exchange and created major shortages of spare parts which helped trigger an economic crisis. Informal manufacturers helped save the day: they were instrumental in getting buses, trucks and other transport back on the road, using stunningly creative techniques to repair and even copy scarce parts.

Mauritius achieved an impressive level of clothing exports by subcontracting to small and informal enterprises, with the larger manufacturers contracting micro-enterprises. But a recent International Labour Organisation study revealed that this type of subcontracting has been dropping. Apparently, as the economic scenario improves, subcontracting becomes less attractive to small firms, and they tend to search for other ways to keep growing.

### **Improving competitiveness**

The role of the local informal sector to some extent will be determined by the economic growth strategy adopted by a new democratic government. Advocates of an export-oriented growth strategy want to see an emphasis on improving the competitiveness of industry, so that SA goods can penetrate international markets.

Success will increase the income



generated by exports, along with employment in these newly competitive sectors. The overall effect, hopefully, will be economic growth.

But this implies that uncompetitive parts of our manufacturing base may have to be sacrificed — especially those that survive mainly thanks to government protection. The textile industry and parts of the clothing and domestic consumer goods industries may not be able to survive the pressures of international competition if left unprotected. Some of the workers in those industries may be re-trained and re-employed in other parts of the economy, but thousands will become unemployed — especially if increased competitiveness requires more sophisticated and labour-displacing technology.

Whether or not this is the appropriate strategy is not being debated here — what we can do is assess some of the implications of this strategy for informal sector activity.



*On the streets: The informal sector provides a safety net for the poor in the absence of adequate social welfare*

- Whatever growth path is adopted, we are unlikely to see a substantial drop in unemployment in the short to medium term. So we can expect the informal sector to continue serving as a 'coping mechanism' for the poor, a safety net of sorts that will have to stand in for inadequate welfare support from the state.

- If an export-led strategy is chosen, the ranks of the informal sector will swell, as workers in declining industries lose jobs and are forced to turn to the informal sector as an income generator.

- The character of this sector may well change. Much of the informal sector will remain dominated by survival-driven activities, but it is possible that other segments will become more prominent. The service sector will probably expand, as more blacks become skilled in the auto-repair and servicing sectors, and other market opportunities appear. Most of these enterprises will not grow or be sustainable. But other businesses in the informal sector will serve as incubators for small entrepreneurs, who may successfully accumulate and reinvest capital after spending some time there.

Given the highly concentrated structure of ownership of capital in this country, strengthening the small business sector is crucial.

There is a good chance that the informal manufacturing sector will grow, providing the poor with cheap clothing, shoes, furniture and so on. Informal manufacturers are slowly cornering certain markets

— in Durban, women's pinafores, for example, are almost exclusively produced by them.

Yet sturdy barriers (both institutional and market-related) bar informal and small-scale manufacturers from entering many markets. Given pressures from international institutions, some of these barriers will probably be lowered or removed, thereby improving the prospects of informal manufacturing.

- However, the performance of informal manu-

facturers is closely tied to the influx of cheap imports from China and other East Asian countries. These may flood the markets and make it very tough for informal and small-scale manufacturers to compete. To break into and stay in the market, informal manufacturers will have to identify market niches which are not being serviced by large manufacturers or imports.

At the same time, it is already quite obvious that informal traders benefit from the flow of cheap imports. Both new and

second-hand imported clothing represent an important source of income for informal traders. There is a strong argument not to halt this trade, since it provides the poor with very cheap clothing. But that must be weighed against the impact on the clothing industry and the threat posed to jobs there.

Progressive policy-makers concerned with job creation will have to decide whether to support the interests of clothing manufacturers or retailers. It is a bit of a no-win situation: whatever the decision, the interests of some of the poor (whether in the formal organised sector, or informal traders) will be compromised.

### Exciting challenge

The informal sector represents a puzzling but exciting challenge. Praising it as the solution to our economic crisis is clearly a delusion. A hostile attitude is equally inappropriate, given that the sector comprises large numbers of very poor individuals.

The central task is to confront the crisis which gives rise to the informal sector, and to define various paths out of the crisis. With unemployment likely to keep rising in the short to medium term, a direct response to the informal sector is required.

The distinctions drawn here between various types of enterprises within the informal sector is a first step towards devising appropriate policy responses. Whilst some segments of the informal sector merit the use of economic policy instruments — such as government subsidies etc — which promote greater levels of efficiency, for the large majority of informal sector participants, welfare type support is most appropriate — one possibility of which may be government efforts to increase the social wage.

These measures are clearly vital for the survival of vast numbers of poor people, yet it must be noted that it is the restructuring of South Africa's 'formal' economy which will, in the long term, guarantee the provision of secure and stable jobs and income. □

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# IS NELSON MANDELA FOR REAL?

**T**HE REAL NELSON MANDELA WAS KILLED in prison. Today's Mandela is a look-alike. He was trained for years by the boers and finally presented to the public in 1990. The mission of this look-alike is to pretend to be against the system. But in reality he is working for it.

Pixley, a young truck driver, told me this.

I've only met Pixley a few times — so I'm not sure whether he actually, earnestly, believes what he told me, or whether it was just a sad jest.

Either way, therein lies a story.

Back in 1987 Neil Barnard, then head of the National Intelligence Service (NIS), produced a secret, trail-blazing document. We are not defeating the ANC with our current strategies, Barnard argued. Let us rather unban them, engage their leadership in negotiations, and then prolong the talks. Popular expectations will soar and then plummet as the ANC, in the plain light of day, shows itself to be no more than human. The ANC's leadership, Barnard concluded, will become detached from its one major strength — its mass support.

As Pixley's tale shows, Barnard was not entirely wrong in his expectations. But Pixley's disillusionment can also mark the beginning of a more realistic appreciation of our struggle — an understanding that can go on to prove Barnard absolutely wrong.

It goes to the heart of the question: What is the glue that holds together the ANC-led national liberation alliance?

In the space of a few years, much of what we assumed held us together has gone. In the past three decades the ANC survived a long and often distant exile. In fact, it emerged with its prestige greatly enhanced (an almost unique achievement among exiled liberation movements). But this feat had its mythological side.

Recently still, the leadership of the liberation movement seemed almost God-like in its remoteness, out there in Lusaka or on the Island. Today, it is present amongst us. It is multiple. It is uneven. In fact, we see it sometimes publicly debating and disagreeing with itself.

Our unity as a movement was underwritten, we thought, by the identity of this absent leadership (in whose image, no doubt, we were made). And now not only has the simple identity of this proved to be a false idol, but much of our own inherent and assumed identity is also uncertain.

## The Community

In the 1980s we talked easily of 'The Community'. The notion was not all wrong. It pointed towards a profound



Reality used to be a friend of mine: Crowds greet Nelson Mandela on his release from prison in 1990

*Is it all a plot? Is the real Mandela dead? Did they kill him in prison and train a look-alike to play the part?*



## Nelson Mandela is not a stand-in ...

reality within our struggle — the township, urban and rural.

The insurgent township was our prime revolutionary base. The character, the tactics and strategies, the strengths and weaknesses of our struggle have had everything to do with the township, and 'The Community' living within it. Of course, this community has never been an uncomplicated identity. But when the battle was against a handful of local councillors and izimpimpi, whose petty powers an invading, brutal SAP and SADF attempted to sustain, the identity of the community seemed to be relatively straightforward.

Today, there are other factors at work. External forces now often arrive not in Casspirs, but under the flag of 'development'.

Suddenly, 'The Community' starts to be a complex of partly competing constituencies — match-box homeowners, backyard renters, hostel residents, shack dwellers, and, increasingly, tens of thousands of non-South Africans in the townships — Mozambicans, Malawians, Zimbabweans. All are victims of apartheid, but what they want from development projects is not necessarily the same.

In the 1980s some people warned against the simplistic use of notions like 'The Community', 'The People'. They argued for a more working class approach.

But even 'The Working Class' is not a simple identity. When we think of 'The Working Class', we tend to think of the million and more, mainly semi-skilled, black industrial workers who are Cosatu members.

But as Geoff Schreiner and Adrienne Bird note ('Cosatu at the crossroads', SA Labour Bulletin, July 1992), some 70% of SA's work-force is not unionised, including most unskilled workers, immigrants, rural labourers, those employed in the informal sector, and the millions of unemployed.

Certainly, it is not all wrong to identify the working class with semi-skilled, industrial workers.

This layer of the working class has a critical organisational capacity and a strategic location within the production process. It needs, undoubtedly, to be the core and the cutting edge of the class and broader national liberation struggle. But if Cosatu's main constituency is cut adrift from the community or the people (in some kind of trade-off with big business), then even its own (and the wider working class) interests will be undermined in the long run.

The working class cannot be reduced to this core stratum. This core stratum certainly needs to lead — not by suppressing or denying intra-working class differences, but by unifying them within a broader national democratic struggle.

The easy assumptions of yesterday are complicated in other ways, too.

### Multi-polar world

A few years ago we lived, or so we believed, in a bi-polar world with two super-powers. Ours and theirs. That easy sense of belonging to one major international camp that opposed another also glued us together.

And now, suddenly, we are living in a multi-polar world. We have to locate our struggle in a complex regional and international situation.

Of course, we are not amateurs at this. We could only have helped build a broad, world-wide anti-apartheid solidarity movement by dispensing with a simplistic bi-polar approach. We need to remember this and move forward on the basis of our real international experience. Neither nostalgia, or a despairing opportunism is in order.

Our local conditions seemed equally bi-polar. Once again this gave rise to certain fundamentalist assumptions about ourselves, and about 'Them'. There were two fortresses. You were either in ours or in that of the enemy. Even when we were actively engaged in armed struggle this two-fortress fundamentalism led to serious strategic shortcomings. Our movement, for instance, sadly neglected work







## ... you and I see *ourselves* as stand-ins

within the other side's armed forces.

I exaggerate.

Within our broad liberation movement, fundamentalist notions have always co-existed with other, more practical (but nonetheless principled) ways of thinking and acting. In our daily lives, for instance in the mass democratic movement that emerged in the 1980s, we often thought and practised politics differently.

But somehow that tended to be seen as a stand-in for the 'Real Thing'. Geographically, the 'Real Thing' was always somewhere else — Lusaka, perhaps. Historically, the 'Real Thing' was going to be 'The Moment', the seizure of power.

Reality has dealt a heavy blow to this fundamentalism. But there is still a profound nostalgia in our ranks for its pseudo-certainties.

So how do we build a unified liberation movement capable of carrying through a profound national democratic revolution without the glue of a Leader(ship) that is both 'One' and 'Perfect'? Without being a simple 'Identity' ourselves? Without a 'Big Brother' out there? And without a strategy that focusses on 'The Moment'?

Surely the answer is: Much better.

But first of all we need to think for ourselves. There is no external authority, no blueprint, no historically guaranteed outcome. And achieving that means understanding that unity cannot be achieved by denying real diversities in our leadership, in our ranks, and amongst the people.

Our commitment to multiparty democracy, to independent popular organisation in civil society, and to thorough freedom of speech will be poor if it were simply a belated attempt to 'prove our democratic credentials'.

That commitment needs to be principled and strategic. Multiparty democracy, open debate and autonomous popular organisations of all kinds are precisely the most favourable terrain in which to win a broad unity under working class hegemony for national democratic change.

Unity within and around the ANC is not going to work if it is built purely on sentiment and mythology, on a nostalgia for the old times. It needs to be built around a programmatic perspective that is itself the product of a broad, plural movement. This is why the SA Communist Party and Cosatu have begun to discuss the idea of a Reconstruction Pact that emerges from within the broad democratic movement.

To think pluralistically is also to think more intelligently about the other side. If our unity is built on a complex diversity, so is theirs.

The struggle for a national democratic transformation is a struggle to unify our own diverse interests and efforts and, simultaneously, to pick apart the unity of the white minority power bloc. There are major opponents to any democratisation process. But that opposition is diverse, not monolithic.

The sudden drama of independence (old flag down, new flag up) in many countries to the north of us, masked the complexity of the bitter struggle for ongoing national democratic transformation beyond independence. The picture of decolonisation as 'The Heroic Event' has been terribly disarming and demobilising.

We will not have the benefit here of a sudden and apparently total political change. But we can turn that to our advantage through ongoing mass mobilisation and involvement.

Pixley's sense of disillusionment needs to be put into 'fast rewind'. The present Mandela is, of course, not a stand-in for the 'real' Mandela. On the contrary, it is Pixley, you and I, and millions like us, who have tended to see ourselves as stand-ins.

Now, we need to assume collective responsibility for ourselves.

National democratic revolution is a long historical process of self-empowerment by the (diverse, of course) people themselves. Either that, or it will be not be.

Now is for real. □





*Joe Slovo is best known for his socialist ideals, polemical papers and red socks. After leaving the country in 1963, he became MK chief of staff and SACP general secretary — positions that earned him the National Party's 'Number One Enemy' status. Today Slovo is the Party's chairperson and one of the ANC's chief negotiators*

• Mosito Raphaela asked the questions

**Your first thought this morning?**

After a week of meetings last week and starting a new week with meetings, my first thought was if these meetings can achieve victory, we will be sitting at the Union Buildings.

**If you were Father Xmas, what would De Klerk have received for Christmas?**

A copy of the Communist Manifesto, so that he perhaps begins to understand better what it is all about.

**What or who would you die for?**

Not any one particular person because I would not ask anyone to die for me. But I would be prepared to die, as I have shown in my work for the last 30 years, for the cause, for something that will advance the interest of humanity.

**What do you no longer believe in?**

I no longer believe, in a political sphere, that you can build socialism according to external models. Although there are common features, the question of moving towards socialism has to relate to a specific country with specific background and traditions.

**Is there much difference between social democracy and democratic socialism?**

I believe there is a fundamental difference. There is no example of social democracy ever building a socialist system — not even a distorted socialist system. I don't believe social democracy stands for socialism, as I understand it.

**When last did you read 'State and Revolution'?**

All the way through? (laughs) It must have been some years ago. I have not had time to read it recently.

**Should some form of detention**

**without trial be maintained in a democratic SA?**

I do not believe under any conditions that there should be detention without trial.

**The biggest misconception we South Africans have of ourselves?**

That's an impossible question to answer because the different groups making up the SA community have different misconceptions about themselves. Buthelezi's misconception about himself differs with De Klerk's, and so forth.

**Your favourite joke?**

I tend to go for Jewish black humour. The last one I heard which appealed to me was of two Jews who were about to be executed by the Nazis. One offered the other a cigarette before the execution, and he refused saying: "Abe, don't make trouble."

**Any addictions?**

I was a heavy smoker until five months ago. My addiction now is wanting to go back to it.

**What animal best characterises you and why?**

I have been called a teddy bear, a snake, a hyena. I associate most closely with my spaniel because he is a very affectionate and optimistic animal. He is always expecting me — even if I have let him down from time to time — to take him for a walk.

**Your favourite writer and novel?**

I like mostly Russian writers: Tolstoi and Gogol. The finest book I have ever read is Gogol's 'Dead Souls'.

**Have you danced the Codesa yet?**

No. (Laughs) I have suffered in other ways in Codesa. (Following Codesa 1, there emerged a new township dance



# Joe Slovo

involving shrugging and shaking of shoulders, with the head hung to one side. There are also Codesa 2 and 3 variants.)

**When you are feeling really blue, what lifts you up?**

I find exercise is a help and, in the cultural field, I find listening to classic music helps.

**Your favourite city and why?**

Cape Town. That is where, like nowhere else in South Africa, the most attractive elements of nature come together: sea, mountains and plains.

**Your biggest regret?**

That I never learnt to play a musical instrument quite efficiently.

**What physical exercise do you do?**

I try to swim and walk. I swim quite regularly, a few times a week.

**What do you miss about exile?**

The expectation of coming back ...

**Complete this sentence: If I were a dictator for a day...**

...I would issue a decree for the end of dictatorships.

**What's the toughest thing about being the chairperson of the Party?**

That's very easy. It is trying to keep awake, and being forced to keep awake at meetings. When you are chairing a meeting you have to keep awake.

**Should there be full disclosure of political crimes?**

Absolutely yes, on both sides.

**Your least favourite politician?**

Die Groot Krokodil.

**Your favourite TV interviewer?**

They are, by and large, a sleazy bunch.

On the whole, the one I have least problems with is Freek Robinson.

**What would you change about yourself?**

Many, many things, if I had the power to do so.

**What do you miss most about your childhood?**

The sense of learning, discovery and excitement. Getting to know the world is a very important stimulus.

**Your biggest fear?**

I like that question. My biggest fear is that we will snatch defeat from the jaws of victory.

**Your favourite South African idiom or expression?**

Wat nie doodmaak nie maak vet.

**And cliché?**

More is nog 'n dag.

**Your favourite soccer team?**

I used to support Chelsea in England. I don't know much about local soccer, as I have not had time to follow it.

**What would be your worst job?**

To be a warder in the death cells. It is the most terrible job you can ever have.

**A secret desire?**

I wear my desires on my sleeve.

**Your happiest moment?**

Landing in May 1990 at Cape Town airport from Lusaka, to begin the Grootte Schuur talks.

**What do you feel about homosexuality?**

I believe that each individual has a right to express love and affection in any way that does not affect other people.

**Your favourite place in Africa?**

Maputo. I like the people.

**Who do you reveal your secrets to?**

Some to my wife. And those I cannot reveal to her I reveal to my best friend.

**Should employers be allowed to have workers tested for Aids?**

Not without their consent. People have a right to be consulted.

**When was the last time you used public transport?**

In fact, a few weeks ago in Seychelles. In SA I used to go to work by tram from Doornfontein when I was young.

**What makes you feel guilty?**

Refusing a beggar gives me enormous guilt feelings.

**And accomplished?**

Finishing a piece of writing I am happy with.

**Complete: At the end of the day, I...**

... enjoy a double Scotch.

**Should there be censorship in a democratic SA?**

Not generally. Perhaps those spreading racist propaganda should be censored.

**What do you think of WIP?**

It plays a useful role as an organ of radicalism, in the whole debate among radicals.

**Are you religious?**

No.

**The person you most want to meet?**

It would have been Che Guevara, but now it is too late. To me, he was a universal man who rejected nationalism and patriotism and was prepared to engage in struggle on behalf of anyone, any group in the world. □





# Law of the jungle

*Excerpts from a speech by former Tanzanian president **JULIUS NYERERE**  
on receiving the Simon Bolivar Prize at UNESCO, Paris late last year*

**M**AN MAY NOT LIVE BY BREAD ALONE, BUT HE does live by bread. It represents the right to life, a right which belongs to all — strong and weak, rich and poor. And the defence of that right requires a balance among the other individual freedoms. It requires that economic and social rights be respected equally with civil and political rights, and that the weak and the poor be lent the strength of the community in their own defence and for the enrichment of their own human dignity. The right to vote without the right to eat is meaningless.

Human dignity does require political freedom. But it must be freedom within the framework of civilised social living. Human dignity therefore requires democracy within the community. It requires constant struggle to protect the right of the individual — **all** the individuals — from the temptations of power. And state power is not the only form of power which exists in a society.

Democracy means popular participation in the society's decision-making, and an acceptance of the popular decision by all within the society — the unsuccessful as well as the successful on any issue.

But the manner in which popular participation is organised will need to vary according to the culture (or cultures) within the society concerned and upon the level of economic and social development there.

It is obvious from the unrest throughout the world that no culture is perfect. All need to develop, to grow, and to adapt themselves to the imperatives of modern science and technology. And none is, or can be, static. Each learns from its own experience, and from others.

That is true in Africa, whose cultures tolerated the subjugation and exploitation of women in spite of a strong sense of community. It is true of the cultures which tolerated the subjugation and exploitation of man by man, and whose practitioners pioneered the hydrogen bomb as well as the technology of inoculation against major childhood diseases.

The need to learn and to develop applies also to the cultures which give priority to acquisitiveness over all considerations of justice or man's common humanity. For the co-existence of absolute poverty and opulence is inconsistent with human dignity anywhere — to say nothing



of being inconsistent with peace and harmony in the world. There is no justification for the cultural arrogance which now seeks to impose one political and one economic philosophy on the rest of the world, and to use military and economic might for that purpose.

Within nations a balance has to be found between the rights of the individual, and the duties of that individual within the national community. It is the balance between one's

rights and the rights of others. Upholding that balance is a central task of government in a democracy.

But nations can no longer conduct their affairs on the basis of self-sufficiency or isolation ... The nations of the world are forced into living together. And the question before them — before us — is whether we and our nations live together in a civilised world community or as a collection of warring states where the Law of the Jungle operates.

At the UN General Assembly all nations are represented equally. All can speak; all have one vote. But the small and the weak nations know from experience that using this freedom can be very expensive to the welfare of their people; access to international trade or credit may be denied, or some other sanction experienced. And to be elected to represent a region on the Security Council — the body within the United Nations which theoretically does have real power — can nowadays be a punishment for a developing country. Yemen knows it, Cuba knows it, and Venezuela knows it. All have suffered for positions taken there.

What we now have internationally is world domination by the rich and the technologically powerful nations. We have the Law of the Jungle. This is true economically, culturally and politically. Mankind has to change that position. Together we have to work out and adopt appropriate effective machinery for international democracy.

As long-time victims of scientific, cultural, economic — and sometimes military — domination, the peoples of the developing countries must not give up the struggle. The peoples of the South, and their governments, must constantly and persistently demand for themselves, and for all others, justice, respect and dignity. They must struggle for international democracy as they continue to struggle for national democracy in forms appropriate to their cultures. □





# FINE-TUNING THE GENDER AGENDA

*How best to overcome gender inequalities — by working in isolation, or by developing a broader approach? MICHELLE FRIEDMAN investigates*

**W**E HAVE LEARNT TO automatically incorporate factors like class, race and income levels when interpreting the impact of a development project on a community.

So why do the everyday lives, roles, relationships and household arrangements within a community become 'invisible' or 'irrelevant' when we start up or assess development projects? We end up focusing on the sector — health, housing, education, economics — and somehow forget the real lives of women and men, girls and boys, that stand at the centre of any development process. Somehow, the respective ways in which women and men work in, experience and benefit from the project gets lost in the shuffle.

Internationally, and due to a range of impulses, there is a growing alertness to the relationship between gender and development. On the theoretical front, feminist theories have developed sophisticated understandings of women's status in society and of the factors that shape relationships between women and men. As a result, gender has become an influential concept.

Gender distinguishes, on the one hand, between women's and men's reproductive



*Do it this way: Customary gender relations and roles are being questioned*

PIC: GISELE WULFSOHN, SOUTHLIGHT

abilities (which are based in biology), and characteristics of masculinity and femininity, as well as gender roles (which are socially and culturally determined). Some differences, in other words, are biological and more or less 'fixed' — but many others are 'constructed' by the cultures, religions, history, economics and politics of the society we live in. Gender deals with the roles, attitudes and identities that we *learn* and choose.

On the political front, women's movements have kept up steady pressure for

women's political rights. Various movements now recognise and combat oppression and exploitation on the basis of race, class and sex. Women's organisations have emerged as 'wings' of other political parties and structures. In some cases, they have developed a character of their own. Sometimes women's coalitions have sprung up around particular issues.

Here, in SA, most progressives have directed their energies against apartheid: before we can sink our teeth into 'development', we need 'lib-

eration'. Local feminist theorists have contributed to a critique of the existing situation, and women activists have managed to include 'non-sexist' in the political rhetoric of the left.

The progressive sector, however, has very little experience of starting, managing and learning from its own development projects and programmes. These tended to fall outside the 'formal' economy and had to proceed under the extremely harsh conditions generated by a capitalist, apartheid, patriarchal system. Few of these development efforts specifically addressed women's situations, but they had an inevitable impact on women's lives.

## From WID to GAD

The experiences and studies accumulated internationally during the UN Decade for Women (1975 - 1985) helped highlight that development affects women and men differently. Two dominant approaches emerged to tackle this fact.

The first, **Women in Development (WID)**, aims to gain equity for women in the development process by consciously integrating them into development. Women tend to be treated as an isolated cat-



## The task now is to take these buzzwords and make them an integral part of our efforts to transform society

egory, and development projects become designed to reach women more easily (for instance, by setting up separate women's projects). This approach ignores the sexual division of labour and the distribution and control of income and power within society and the household.

The **Gender and Development (GAD)** approach argues that women are *already* an integral part of development. What needs to happen is that their important roles must be acknowledged and certain inequalities must be corrected. GAD focuses on how unequal power relationships—between men and women, as well as between rich and poor—prevent women from participating fully in development activities. This approach is not only relevant at the level of a development project (as with WID), but also at the levels of macro-economic policy and government bureaucracies.

In other words, the GAD approach insists that we look at how all aspects of society affect women and men's participations in development processes. At the same time, it reminds us that we cannot only focus our minds on those development projects or programmes of progressive non-government organisations (NGOs). We also have to understand the gender implications of different macro-economic policies and examine the consequences of the assumptions about gender buried in such policies (eg that men are always the main breadwinners and that women or mothers will care for children free of charge).

Many development workers that adopt the GAD approach find it useful to distinguish between *practical* and *strategic* gender needs. The former are those needs which men and women identify readily, mainly because they arise from the customary division of labour. They are practical and often respond to an immediate daily concern, such as access to water, shelter, health care and employment.

The *strategic* needs are broader and more long-term. They require that we challenge customary gender relations and imply that the relationships of power and control between women and men be changed. Women might identify such needs as political equality, equal access to employment, equal pay for equal work,

environments free from sexual violence and harassment, and so on. Men might see shared childcare as such a need. (By the way, very little work has been done on men's strategic gender needs.)

Much of the GAD debate is about how to achieve practical needs while working towards meeting strategic needs, like empowerment and structural transformation. It requires strong emphasis on building links between various sectors. And because each context or situation throws up its own set of gender roles and relations, there is no single, blueprint solution. This results in a focus on processes and forms.

### Local advances

Since February 1990, which brought a shift towards reconstruction and development, it has become more possible to work on integrating gender into existing development debates.

Recent months have seen a range of workshops and networking events. These have triggered a debate and a process that promises to put gender firmly on the agenda.

These meetings were organised and facilitated by people working with gender, political and development issues in some or other professional capacity. They have all been influenced by developments in the international arena, and they want to ensure that South Africans benefit from the lessons learnt so painfully elsewhere.

International donor agencies have also taken the initiative, but this has caused tensions, with locals feeling that they should control the struggle to transform the development process and that external agents should not dictate to them. Because gender is a sensitive and emotional issue—and is often perceived as a Western import—foreigners have to be extremely careful about how they inter-

vene in the local process. Agendas and solutions that emerge from conditions and processes in other places cannot easily be transported elsewhere, especially if the local process is still maturing.

A few organisations have emerged to specifically target women, but they are nevertheless determined to challenge oppressive gender relations. They include the Women's Health Policy Project at Wits University, the Rural Women's Movement (organising women from various communities throughout the Transvaal and northern Cape), the Natal Association for Women's Empowerment (NAWE), and the Women's College in Cape Town. After a long struggle, Cosatu recently appointed a national gender coordinator, as did the National Land Committee. Other NGOs that work with both women and men (in the land, educare and housing sectors) also have begun to consider more seriously how they confront practical and strategic gender needs.

### Key debates and challenges

In the workshops it became clear that the term *gender* is pretty controversial. There is no precise translation for this word in any African language—so it is inevitably laid bare to wide interpretations when translated. Some see it as applying only to the West, or the 'First World.' Confusion also stems from the broad way in which it is used, for example, to encompass related but distinct terms like 'women's rights' or 'equal access to and control over resources'. Some people equate it with feminism, others think that gender has been coopted as a way to sideline feminism.

Beyond this tussle over concepts and meanings, the most common theme at the meetings has turned out to be that of *power and difference*.

People hotly debated whether the level participation and assertiveness (in workshops, the workplace, development projects or personal relationships) accurately expressed the balance of power. Individual relationships with men—and with other women—were scrutinised in an effort to uncover their impact on development processes.

We have a long way to go before we can define more precisely what we want transformed gender relations to look like.



Meanwhile, we are left tense and agitated with the need and desire to *live* differently while remaining bound by structural (and personal) constraints. Acknowledging those pressures, how do we start to bring about the desired changes in our development work? It is a complex matter that yields even more questions.

- How does our behaviour in development, educational or political work reinforce or challenge the status quo?
- How effective is affirmative action in challenging such unequal power relations — especially where tokenism is common?
- How do we overcome systemic obstacles, without losing sight of differences that exist between women and men, as well as between women?
- In what ways can women organise to ensure that development processes stop ignoring our position?
- How do we develop greater organisational power bases that respect differences, but still build unity?
- How do we want to wield power when we achieve it?

### Emerging patterns

Three organising trends have emerged. In the first, women organise separately in political structures, organisations that focus on “marginalised and especially black women” (as Pethu Serote put it in *Agenda* no. 14) and cross-sectoral networks. The second trend joins together women and men who are committed to challenging gender inequality in mixed gender and development forums. The third trend focuses on technical measures to integrate gender concerns into all aspects of development policies, organisations, programmes, planning and practices.

One crucial lesson is that any workshop process or coalition-building exercise has to confront the different views and the sometimes heated emotions that are present because of the differences that exist between us. We experience differences emotionally in our daily relationships and work. They are real and should be acknowledged. Conflicts erupt not only from analytical disputes and rational debates; they are also emotionally based. We might be analytically sophisticated, but when it comes to confronting the

emotional realities of class, race and gender intersections, we have a lot to learn.

Another lesson for development NGOs is that we will all benefit from assessing our own work more seriously. To whom do we deliver services? Which practical and strategic gender needs are being met for women and men? How do we make choices about target groups and methods of working? How much effort is being put into transforming internal power relations within existing organisations?

Three major challenges face those who are committed to a development approach that tackles unequal power relationships, including those of gender. We need to:

- Work with each other in ways which do not ignore differences, but which also confront existing power imbalances — in



*The WID approach: Women are treated in isolated projects*

our meetings, theoretical work, organisations, and in development activities.

- Develop practical methods and skills among a broader base of activists — to deepen insights and translate them into practice.
- Work in ways which reject segmented and isolating views and processes (for example, by building links across different sectors or by facing up to the link between production and reproduction).
- Recognise in our work that gender relations are about relationships between men and women — they do not concern women alone. Men must start working more consciously on how their expressions of masculinity (in personal and organisational relationships, and in social and professional structures) have to change so that we can achieve a more inclusive approach to development.

But several obstacles block the path, with rhetoric and a defence of culture and tradition probably representing the strongest points of resistance.

There are stacks of excuses for not moving beyond rhetoric. Either the necessary skills are lacking or there is not enough time — everything else is always more important or urgent. At the same time, there is a strong sense that questioning and changing existing gender relations is too ambitious an undertaking.

People often invoke culture and tradition to justify arguments that accept the ‘naturalness’ of existing gender relations. The most common refrain is: “In our culture it has always been this way.” Let’s face it, such opinions basically question why we need to bother changing anything at all.

Conceivably, a third point of resistance will confront us once real changes start happening: a conscious backlash.

All in all, the past year has seen a series of important advances. The process of stimulating a commitment to change gender relations, and of integrating that determination into development, has begun in earnest. It has already thrown up a range of lessons that are being incorporated into subsequent initiatives.

The task now is to popularise this process, and to convert *gender and development* from being words that buzz about in workshops and funding proposals, to being an integral concern in our efforts to transform society. □

• This article was influenced by Moser, C., 1989: *Gender Planning in the Third World: Meeting Practical and Strategic Needs*, *World Development*, vol 17, no 11, pp 1799 - 1825.





# AFTER THE EUPHORIA

*What is happening to the southern African dream?*

*Events over the past few months have dampened hopes of a new era for countries in the southern African region, argues **ROB DAVIES***

IT SEEMS LIKE ONLY YESTERDAY THAT SOUTHERN AFRICA APPEARED to be heading for a new era. Armed conflict would be peacefully resolved, the season of violence would end, multiparty democracy would reign supreme and the whole region would be able to promote economic growth and development.

But events of the past several months have raised serious doubts about such euphoria. SA has been plunged into unprecedented levels of violence. Angola's multiparty elections, instead of consolidating the peace process, led to a fresh eruption of armed conflict; both it and Mozambique are in an advanced state of social and economic disintegration. The future of state power there (and in Zaire, and possibly even Lesotho and Swaziland) looks increasingly precarious. Malawi stands on the brink of a catastrophic implosion.

Viewed against the background of the total collapse of state power in Somalia and Liberia, this raises serious questions about where southern Africa is heading. In particular, events in Angola have called into question previous, implicit assumptions that multiparty elections represent a guaranteed route to the non-violent resolution of the region's conflicts.

What went wrong? Why does reality now seem turned on its head?

Part of the answer lies with expectations that were unrealistic. The view that apartheid was the principal cause of instability and insecurity in southern Africa in the 1980s led to the plainly utopian anticipation that the start of constitutional negotiations in SA would automatically end conflict in the region.

## Future conflict

On the contrary, researchers like Thomas Ohlson and Steven Stedman predict that in the foreseeable future southern Africa will be characterised by at least five types of potential conflict. They will include conflicts

- associated with the ending of war and with reconciliation;
- over the distribution of resources;
- Of participation caused by the monopoly of political power by a dominant party;
- of legitimacy;
- over identity, linked to ethnicity.

They have argued also that, as previously dominant forms



*Unity is strength: A passionate plea for peace in Mozambique*

PIC: AIM



of conflict are displaced (or assume new forms), other 'hidden' points of conflict might burst to the surface. Malawi is an example, where conflicts stemming from challenges to a monopoly of political power by an incumbent regime have gathered apace — possibly with implications for the entire region.

Issues of legitimacy and ethnicity have also moved to the foreground, while events in Angola highlight some of the obstacles that will continue to bedevil efforts to end wars that originated in destabilisation policies.

Underlying recent events is the basic reality that the whole of Africa — including southern Africa — remains trapped in an extended economic and social crisis. The final report of the United Nations Programme of Action for African Economic Recovery and Development (UN PAAERD) concluded that Africa was in a worse state in 1991 than it had been five years earlier, despite the provision of some \$128 billion to support International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank-sponsored Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs).

The report found that real per capita income kept falling by an annual average of 0.7%, while rates of illiteracy, mortality and debt all rose. Expenditure on education fell from a continental average of 6% of government spending in 1985 to only 5% in 1990. Expenditure on health fell by a full percent. By 1989 there were 150 million severely undernourished people in Africa — 70 million more than in the mid-1970s. Thirty million more people were unemployed in 1990 than in 1985.

The 'failure' of multi-party elections needs to be examined within that context. That the peoples of African countries enthusiastically desire democratic reform is not in doubt. On the contrary, countries holding multiparty elections register high polls and observers are struck by the willingness of voters to brave long hours under the searing sun as they wait to cast their votes. Nor can there be any doubt that democratisation is necessary both to promote and guarantee fundamental human rights. Moreover, it is the only basis on which the continent can address the social and economic crisis confronting it.

But recent events do call into ques-

tion whether the type of multiparty reform that is currently being introduced can resolve, in a non-antagonistic way, the kinds of conflicts now emerging on the continent.

In November 1989, when the Berlin wall came down, 38 of the 45 independent African states had one-party regimes or were under military or some other form of authoritarian rule. A year later half those countries had announced plans to introduce multiparty systems. Among them were countries of southern Africa. In early 1990, seven of the present ten Southern African Development Community (SADC) member states had one-party or some other form of authoritarian regimes. Two years later, three of them — Zambia, Mozambique and Angola — had introduced multiparty constitutions, while the others had announced plans (with varying degrees of legitimacy) to introduce more political pluralism.

#### External pressure

The case of SA is in many ways an exception to the general trend. Here internal pressures — the demand for one person, one vote — and the inability of the regime to resist such a demand stand out as the major factors that underpin the shift towards 'reform' and negotiations.

In most of Africa, however, although popular pressure for democratic change is often visible, the move towards multiparty systems stems primarily from external — not internal — pressure. Since the end of the 1980s, international financial institutions, the IMF and World Bank, and other donors and creditors have added 'political conditionality' to the list of requirements that gains access to loans and debt rescheduling facilities. The list of African countries required to follow standard economic SAP packages has grown dramatically. Now they also are being instructed to implement political reforms — including a multiparty system — aimed at enabling 'good governance'.

It is worth noting that this insistence is somewhat of a departure from previous practice. In the past, authoritarian regimes — like those of Mobutu in Zaire or Moi in Kenya — were given strong support, on the grounds that 'strong leadership' was essential to push through what were seen as necessary but unpopular economic policy measures.



*A sub-continent in crisis: Violence in South Africa (top); an election that became a civil war in Angola (second and third from top); and ongoing turbulence and war in Mozambique (bottom)*



**Southern Africa  
desperately needs  
democratic reform.  
But there is also a  
serious need to  
reflect on the type of  
democratic reform  
that is required**

Why then the change of heart and the current insistence on multi-party systems? Peter Gibbon has identified two prime factors. The first and less important one was ideological. The West wanted to see its triumph over Soviet style socialism consolidated by a general adoption in all parts of the world of 'western' political models.

**Rolling back the state...**

The second and more significant factor, however, flowed from the overall perspective of the role of the state in creating an 'enabling environment' for structural adjustment. This, as is well known, demands a substantial 'retreat' by the state from the economy. The state should not be involved in production, should reduce the burden of official regulation (ie deregulate) and basically respond to the needs and demands of a non-state entrepreneurial class.

Linked to this was a critique of the typical post-colonial African state, which was seen as having become the principal vehicle for private accumulation in many countries. This led to situations where political power rather than effort became the essential requirement for individual enrichment and this, in turn, fostered excessive 'rent-seeking' by state institutions.

Multi-party systems were meant to be part of the broader process of 'rolling back' the state. Regimes unable to break with past practices would be unseated, checks would be introduced against excessive 'rent-seeking' and the state would respond better to a non-state constituency benefitting from SAPs. The multi-party model was also promoted as the panacea for resolving armed confrontations. The standard formula is well-known by now: warring parties are first prevailed upon to agree to a ceasefire and are then expected to contest multi-party elections.

This might have made sense in the planning rooms of the 'first world'. But too often the model has been adopted in circumstances marked by widening social divisions and inequities (partly caused or deepened by SAPs), declining living standards (particularly among the 'urban poor') and relentless or worsening economic stagnation. And, when introduced as the 'solution' to armed confrontations, it has often not been accompanied by strong support measures -- ceasefire moni-

toring groups sometimes have been weak, and violations have gone unpunished.

In some cases, elections have been held in circumstances where one party retained considerable capacity to destabilise the process if it was not satisfied with the result. Angola shows that movements that assumed their present shapes as creatures of the Reagan doctrine and Total Strategy share a commitment to democratic reform that can best be described as 'conditional'.

It is now clear that, in the period between the Estoril ceasefire and the September 1992 elections, Unita kept arms and men 'in reserve'. If Unita manages to extract significant political concessions by resorting to arms after an election, there is good cause for concern about how Renamo or Inkatha will react if they perform worse than anticipated in elections.

Even where active destabilisation is not a factor, the socio-economic circumstances have been far from conducive to political stability. The 'roll back' of the state has not only meant stamping out corruption and individual accumulation. It has also meant cutting social expenditure, while other measures associated with SAPs (like devaluations and the removal of subsidies) have visibly put pressure on the living standards of the 'urban poor'.... for structural adjustment programmes

In the case of Mozambique, ministry of labour calculations show that before the country embarked on its SAP in 1986, the minimum industrial wage could buy two basic food baskets of eight commodities each. In December 1991 it could buy half that. The number of children dying from malnutrition in Maputo city have risen from around 1.6% of child deaths in the city's hospitals in 1980 to 22% in

1992.

SAPs, moreover, widen social discrepancies, with a minority benefitting from the new funding and support to private entrepreneurs. Simultaneously, governments find they have substantially less space to adopt new — and especially alternative — policies because these are increasingly made subject to external conditions. We have already witnessed one of the 'electoral' effects of this: parties contest elections with basically similar socio-economic programmes that offer voters very little real alternative.

Increasingly, the real question is who will be able to enter the ranks of the privileged minority. And this opens the door to the politicisation of ethnicity, regionalism and so on as contestants jostle for the prize. In addition, the colonial and post-colonial African state was essentially an 'artificial' creation, cutting across linguistic and ethnic groupings, and the sense of nationhood which developed in many cases was never very strong. It is small wonder that in cases of extreme crisis state structures have collapsed.

Southern Africa and Africa desperately need democratic reform. But there is also a serious need to reflect on the type of democratic reform that is required. The right to form and vote for a party of one's choice is clearly a fundamental democratic right. But democratisation cannot be reduced to the introduction of a multi-party system. Ordinary people need to be empowered and space created for effective participation in decision-making processes.

The fact that the political crisis confronting Africa is knotted into the underlying socio-economic crisis cannot be left out of the equation. Africa is being marginalised within the world economy, and orthodox structural adjustment programmes are patently not providing a solution. Africa needs to find and secure the space in which it can develop its own alternatives. Crucially, programmatic alternatives that slot into a long view have to become the stuff of African politics.

Unless and until we can address such issues seriously, we would be wiser not to expect an early end to the season of violence. □

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PIC: MARGARET NOVICKI (AFRICA REPORT)

*Ghana's Jerry Rawlings has come up with the answer to demands for multi-party democracy: Call an election and make sure you win. LENA SLACHMUIJLDER reports on what South Africans should learn from him*

**A** QUICK LOOK NORTH TO Africa's newly 'democratised' states reveals several familiar faces still holding onto power, having swapped their military berets for the snazzy new headgear of the 'president-elect'.

As these leaders beam with pride and soak up the international legitimacy, opposition leaders seem worse off than before the whole 'transition-to-democracy' process they had demanded. A new strategy for securing more power with less criticism seems to have been discovered: Call an election and make very sure you win.

Ghana is a case in point. Flight Lieutenant Jerry John Rawlings' Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) government began the transition process towards constitutional multi-party rule in 1990. All the way up until last year's November 3 election, Rawlings' key strategy was to unilaterally determine the rules of the game.

The timetable for democratisation, the consultative forums organised nationwide to

draw up a new constitution, and the final date of elections were decided unilaterally by the PDNC. Once political parties were legally permitted, their fundraising capacities were restricted. Calls by the opposition for an elected constituent assembly were ignored.

The electoral commission was appointed by Rawlings himself. The lack of multi-party cooperation in drawing up the voter register left the opposition parties with less than one week to inspect the roll for flaws. When they did, they found it so inconsistent that even Rawlings' name appeared twice!

#### **Opposition off-guard**

Unlike in the transition in SA, Rawlings chose to catch the opposition off guard by giving it only four months to transform into official political parties and campaign for their candidates. The opposition also dealt itself a weakening blow by failing to unite. A 'natural' break was along the lines of Ghana's two political traditions — personified in



*Player, manager and referee: Rawlings appointed Ghana's own election commission*

Ghana's first president Kwame Nkrumah and in the subsequent leadership of JB Danquah and KA Busia. However, even within the Nkrumah camp, five separate parties emerged. There simply were not ideological or policy differences severe enough to warrant so many parties.

On top of that, the opposition hardly presented a significant economic, political or ideological alternative to Rawlings. None promised a substantial shift away from the International Monetary Fund's (IMF) structural adjustment programme (SAP), though all

vowed to give it a more 'human face'. Rawlings' populist rhetoric undercut a lot of the political criticism directed against him.

In the parliamentary elections, Rawlings took 59% of the vote, with the National People's Party candidate trailing in with 39%. After months of fragmentation, the opposition parties united to declare that the elections had been rigged. They alleged that opposition supporters had been unable to locate their names on the voters register, that unauthorised persons had been spotted carrying NDC-marked

# HOW TO WIN FRIENDS & INFLUENCE ELECTIONS



ballots, and that voter tallies had not corresponded to the anticipated number of voters in some areas.

The international community disagreed. Both the Commonwealth and the Carter Center teams declared the elections 'free, fair and free-from-fear'. The observers and the NDC admitted to some flaws in the balloting process, but neither conceded that these had favoured any one side. The stream of congratulations for Rawlings further legitimised the elections.

The opposition had initially supported the international observers, but later blamed them for not effectively monitoring all 18 000 polling stations. In protest, the opposition boycotted the December 29 parliamentary elections, allowing Rawlings' party to capture 189 of the 200 seats.

Still, allegations of electoral fraud and a fragmented opposition do not explain fully Rawlings' victory.

When Rawlings as a junior military officer took a public stance in 1979 against government corruption and mismanagement, he endeared himself to the Ghanaian public and to the international left.

### **Economic crisis**

When Rawlings took power by force two years later, he retained some of that 'heroic' image. But an economic crisis soon forced him to add to his radical populist rhetoric surprisingly strong relations with the IMF and World Bank, which viewed Ghana as an African 'guinea-pig' for their SAPs. Rawlings skilfully exploited these institutions' eagerness to turn the country into an SAP showcase, and extracted huge loans at generous terms. New resources and infrastructures were introduced into rural areas, thereby strengthening Rawlings' political base there.

By 1992, the Ghana's IMF-directed economy was being hailed as a classic structural adjustment success. The currency had been devalued to promote exports, and the growth rate had reached 5%. One academic commented that Rawlings was able to apply the often harsh requirements of the SAP precisely because he held an iron grip on power.

Still, Rawlings cultivated mass appeal, especially in the rural areas. He

gained favour with the chiefs, promoting 15 to paramount status in 1988, and projected a public image that epitomised "simplicity and naturalism", as his party's press secretary puts it. Many Ghanaians of mixed race identify with Rawlings, whose father is Scottish. At the same time, he won 93% of the vote in his ethnic base in the Volta region.

It is difficult to judge Rawlings' true intent in the transition. Clearly, by mid 1990 he was under internal and external pressure to open up the system politically. But is unfair to conclude that Rawlings never intended to move to multi-party democracy. Prior to the presidential vote, his party met three times with the opposition to persuade them not to boycott the vote. That the constitution (which was drafted entirely by Rawlings' supporters) allows for political parties and a free press reflects his basic acceptance of change. His only fear was the bottom-line balance of force: a multi-party system was fine, so long as he stayed on top.

Underlying that notion was his legitimate fear that if the balance of power shifted, he could be tried for the murder of several senior generals whom he had ordered executed after 1981 coup. An unambiguous indemnity clause for all who served the PNDC took care of that fear.

Has the boycott of the parliamentary elections posed a dilemma for Rawlings? It would seem not. In his inaugural address, he denounced the boycott, saying that it was motivated purely by a desire to escape a more humiliating defeat.

A senior NDC official called the opposition a "media hype" that would "soon wither away", and claimed that Rawlings had won precisely because people liked the way things have been going in Ghana for the last 11 years. Why sack a winner?

Because the opposition lacks a role in parliament, the ground is being cleared for a struggle in the courthouse. The judicial branch — subjected to large-scale intimidation and arbitrary arrest over the past decade — will become the barometer of Ghanaian democracy.

Protection of basic human rights, such as freedom of expression, association and a free press, are set to become permanent features of the society. While

this can be seen as a victory for the opposition (who campaigned on such issues), the bottom line is that democracy has arrived because Rawlings' constitutionally mandated power is now more solid and legitimate than before.

Other African countries have undergone transitions not unlike Ghana's.

In Kenya, the opposition dealt itself a crippling blow by splitting. Cameroon's Paul Biya remains in power, thanks to massive electoral fraud and the subsequent repression of key opposition leaders. In Nigeria, electoral fraud during an attempt at presidential elections last August became one of the many factors that



*Civvy street: Rawlings in unfamiliar pose — without his military uniform*

delayed voting by another year.

In all those cases, leaders led their countries into transitions while trying to cling to power. They aimed for varying degrees of actual change — Rawlings wanted a multi-party system plus personal power, Biya may grip the strings of power until his death.

They hold some handy lessons for SA as it heads for the vote. It is important that a close watch is kept on who controls the style and pace of the transition. Effective and credible election monitoring is essential. And groups that are serious about attaining political power must get serious about unity.

We also see that a transition process can continue for an extended period without — or indeed precisely to prevent — substantial change. Hopefully, SA's leaders not need be reminded of this. □





# THE GHOST OF ANGOLA

*Is there life after elections? The Angolan reversal looms over elections due this year in Mozambique and South Africa.*

**JOSEPH HANLON** lists five lessons that can hold disaster at bay

**N**OW THAT JONAS SAVIMBI HAS BEEN allowed to kick over the chess board because he lost the game, what are the prospects for elections elsewhere in southern Africa? Will Renamo, Inkatha and the white right view the ballot and the bullet as interchangeable, and turn to violence if they don't like the outcome of a free and fair vote?

Angola's traumatic experience holds some important lessons which can reduce the chances of electoral losers holding their countries to ransom.

Some commentators have said that the Angolan disaster could have been averted by a bigger United Nations (UN) force that actually ran the elections. But they miss the point. Angolans ran their elections themselves, and they ran them well. Let's face it: in Chicago even dead people vote.

But the UN did make a mess of Angola. As observers, they were like the (in)famous three monkeys which hear, see and speak no evil. When Unita began to violate the peace accord and failed to send its soldiers to assembly points, the UN watchdog failed to bark.

And that is the first lesson: **local and international observers must follow the peace process closely and loudly denounce all violations they encounter.** The second lesson is linked. **Elections cannot be held while independent military forces exist.** Unita was allowed to keep a very large 'police' force; in the days preceding the election heavily armed Unita men flaunted their weaponry in Luanda and other cities. Military and police forces must be brought under control before, not after an election. A UN monitoring force can be very useful on that front.

Angola's third lesson is that the election **must be fair and it must be seen to be fair.** Because the Angolan election process was transparent and self-checking, Jonas Savimbi's charges of fraud were never accepted. Party agents from the MPLA and Unita (and other parties if they wished) were present at every polling station. Those agents stayed with the ballots and the ballot boxes for two nights — and they participated in the count.

At every polling station agents could prevent fraud. Each agent received a copy of the local totals, signed by all other party agents. Thus it was possible for parties to have independent counts. Other controls included dipping voters' right index fingers in ink that really was indelible, so that it was immediately obvious who had voted. The Angolan elections were expensive, but they worked.

The remaining lessons involve the losers. In every election someone loses. Savimbi went back to the bush because, when it transpired that he was not going to be moving into the president's office, he had no contingency plans and nowhere else to go. **All contestants have to consider what happens to them if they lose,** and secret deals must be made in advance to ensure acceptable jobs or payoffs for the losers.

That advice has a tacky, undemocratic feel to it. But we are not dealing with just another in a long string of elections. In Angola, Mozambique, SA and Lesotho these are the first elections after long and bitter struggle. It is unrealistic to expect hardened fighters to give up easily.

The final lesson is that **losers must be forced to accept their defeat.** Most of the key figures in

this region have enjoyed foreign backing. If they feel backing will continue even if they lose, there is obviously little point in accepting defeat. It is essential that, before the election, all outside backers must state publicly that their clients must accept the outcome.

By looking north of its borders, SA can learn some valuable lessons that will help prevent its historic election from being destroyed by the losers. □

• *Joseph Hanlon was an election observer in Angola and is the author of Mozambique: Who Calls the Shots?*







# TROPICAL THATCHERISM

## *Marketing misery in Latin America*

*The Brazilian president resigns in disgrace — and the country he's supposed to have catapulted into the First World is heading for the Fourth.*

**KEN SILVERSTEIN**

*looks at what went wrong in Brazil, and what seems to be going wrong in many Latin American countries*

IN HIS BOOK *MEMORY OF FIRE*, Eduardo Galeano tells the story of Guatemalan dictator Justo Ruffino Barrios, who in 1877 stole the collective lands of indigenous communities and opened the way for vast coffee plantations. The planters grew rich; the Indians were pressed into peonage — all this was done, Barrios explained, “to modernise the country”.

Today in Latin America, Barrios's intellectual heirs can be found among the zealots of neoliberalism, those leaders who, over the past five years, swept to power promising ‘modernisation’ via such free-market reforms as privatisation, deregulation, austerity and reduced tariffs and trade barriers. The recent impeachment of Brazilian President Fernando Collor de Mello has jolted that ideology. His disgrace represents the failure of the system he promoted. For in Brazil, as in other Latin countries — notably, Mexico, Argentina and now, most strikingly, Venezuela — neoliberalism is not so much distorted as it is defined by an explosive mixture of gross official corruption, economic fragility and social despair.

Of course, Collor did have a special flair for corruption. The influence-peddling scheme he mounted with his

former campaign treasurer, Paulo Cesar Farias, extorted millions of dollars from businessmen who later received government contracts. Farias collected the funds and deposited more than \$5 million into an account belonging to Collor's secretary, who paid the President's personal bills. Farias also provided the First Lady with a \$20 000 monthly shopping allowance, bought Collor a private car and paid out millions for such decorations to their Brasilia mansion as a garden with a ten-foot artificial waterfall, a swimming pool and a man-made lake stocked with fish imported from Japan.

Meanwhile, the man who promised to catapult the country into the First World left it heading for the Fourth. Brazil is suffering the worst recession in its history. Since Collor took office in 1990, companies have gone bankrupt or filed for protection from creditors at a rate of more than five per day, millions of people have lost their jobs and new *favelas* have sprung up in major cities to house the refugees of his bold reforms. Even “the tiger of inflation”, which Collor pledged to “slay with a single shot” is on the loose. Although it fell sharply during Collor's first months in office, inflation has been rising ever

since. Today 40 000 cruzeiros (now worth only about \$4) buys a modest dinner of chicken, rice and beans; back in 1989, when Collor launched his campaign, that would have paid the rent on a two-bedroom apartment for more than a decade. Wages have not kept pace, and the minimum salary earned by half the population, is the equivalent of \$25 a month, a historic low. Collor has since resigned.

In Brazil the lessons of this episode were spelled out by Acting President Itamar Franco, who promised at least to slow his predecessor's free-market reforms, saying, “Modernity cannot be restricted to wealthy sectors while the rest of the population faces hunger, desperation and illness”.

In the First World, however, Collor's failure is considered the exception to a Latin ‘economic miracle’ that has resulted in generally lower inflation, moderate Gross National Product (GNP) growth, the inflow of foreign capital and booming stock markets.

But behind the rosy screen? Wherever the neoliberal agenda reigns, corruption flourishes, as the destruction of the public sector either eliminates regulatory bodies or inhibits them from policing businesses and national leaders. In making its case for im-





On strike: Argentine workers organised a general strike in protest against economic policies

FIG: SOUTH MAGAZINE

peachment, Brazil's Congress stated that Collor's reforms "opened profound fissures in the structure of the state and in its technical body".

Much the same has happened in Argentina, with similar results, as President Carlos Saul Menem has had to fire more than a score of top officials, including half his Cabinet, because of scandals. Menem's close friend and private secretary, Miguel Angel Vicco, was demoted after his dairy company sold putrid, radioactive milk powder to a government program for the poor. The President's sister-in-law and appointments secretary, Amira Yoma, is allegedly involved in laundering drug money. Meanwhile, Menem has stacked the judiciary and regulatory agencies with hacks, so not a single official has been charged with any crime.

In Mexico, President Carlos Salinas de Gortari has done nothing to combat political fraud since stealing his own election in 1988. His Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) continues to rig elections, and the paternalistic

'Solidarity' public works program is flagrantly used to prolong the PRI's sixty-three-year hold on power. Nearly one-third of Solidarity's 1991 budget was spent in the 45 days before that year's elections.

Corruption in Venezuela under Carlos Andres Perez helped ignite the abortive coups there in February and late November, as military officers rebelled against a system in which well-heeled senior ministers imposed austerity measures while looting the treasury and accepting bribes from private interests. Perez's appointees have been denounced for abuses involving billions of dollars, with the President himself unable to account for a \$17 million shortfall in his personal security fund. No one has been arrested, and in mid-September the government suspended a radio call-in program after listeners endorsed the assassination of crooked officials.

#### Privatisation

The bond between neoliberalism and corruption is nowhere so clear as in the priva-

tisation of state companies. Auctions in Argentina have been riddled by irregularities, with the government selling off the national telephone company, ENTel, and airline, Aerolineas Argentinas, at cut-rate prices. In *I Rob for the Crown*, Argentine journalist Horacio Verbitsky writes that public monopolies were converted into private ones; as a result, the cost of international phone calls and domestic air fares skyrocketed by world standards. Verbitsky also suggests that \$80 million in expenses in the airline deal, charged as "costs associated with the sale", were bribes to public officials. It doesn't help that 80% of Economy Minister Domingo Cavallo's salary is paid by a private foundation that receives donations from businessmen.

In Brazil, the first four companies auctioned off, including the profitable Usiminas steel plant, had an estimated value of \$5 billion. They were sold for \$1.5 billion, of which more than 99% was paid in 'rotten currencies' — old government bonds and certificates worth virtually noth-

ing but accepted at face value. In the end, the government received just \$10 000 in solid currency for the four companies — the price of the cheapest Brazilian car. And in the country's first privatisation, the sale of Sao Paulo State's VASP airline, the 'buyer' was, according to federal investigators, a front for Collor and Farias.

On the macroeconomic front, positive indicators cannot mask the many danger signs. Reduced trade barriers and tariffs are theoretically designed to allow Latin countries to import capital goods to 'modernise' their economic infrastructure and thus compete in world markets.

Of course, Latin countries are in no condition to engage in such a contest, as the market system, at the national and international levels, tends to favour the strongest. With an enormous edge in technology and efficiency, First World countries, especially the United States, have had the lion's share of the benefits from less restrained commerce. Since the neoliberals began their reforms, Latin America has become the fastest-growing market for US exports. At the same time, the US and Europe continue, quite rationally, to protect their own noncompetitive sectors. First World farm subsidies totalled some \$300 billion in 1990, costing developing countries more than \$50 billion in export revenues. 'Voluntary' quotas established by the US government have hit Latin American steel, textile, shoe and cement produces especially hard.



## Where the neoliberal economic agenda reigns, corruption flourishes

The results are bleak. Between 1990 and 1992, Latin American (including Caribbean) exports were up 5%, to \$127.5 billion, while imports jumped by 71% to \$132.1 billion. The \$4.6 billion deficit was a turnaround from a surplus of \$27.8 billion two years ago. The worst-hit nations are those that have gone furthest in implementing the neoliberal model. "Thus far, 'free trade' has been a one-way street", said Jose Marcio Camargo, a Rio-based economist.

### Uncorking the champagne

How has this played out on the ground? While the rich uncork the champagne, the average citizen has been pushed to the edge, as the neoliberal approach seeks only to restart growth, without concern for redistributing wealth. Much has been made of the increase in regional GNP, which is expected to average 3% this year; less well noted is that per capita income will rise by only 1.3%. The Washington Post last year applauded Latin leaders for making the tough choices to spur growth even if it meant "short-term pain for millions of people". But apart from its monumental cynicism, such an observation ignores the fact that competing in the international economy necessarily implies wretched salaries and social inequalities for Latin workers — not only in the short term but as a matter of economic strategy.

Furthermore, because 'modernisation' involves the shift to high-tech labour-saving equipment, high-paying employment opportunities are unlikely to increase significantly even if growth, where it has occurred, proves to be sus-

tained. "Massive firings are not a passing phenomenon", said Brazilian economist Ricardo Bielschowsky. "The adjustment in course is structural, [and] the renewal of economic expansion ... will occur with very little additional employment in industry."

The wreckage is evident. In Venezuela, which has the fastest growing economy in South America — GNP up 9.2% last year — the real value of salaries plunged by 50% during Perez's first two years in office. Half the population has only enough money to eat once a day, and mothers who live in slums must dilute their children's milk. A Miami Herald story published shortly before the second coup attempt said that international economists were "puzzled by Venezuela's generalised malaise because this oil-rich country is the economic star of the Americas". Such observers must have been surprised to see thousands of people pour into the streets of major cities to support the failed uprising and demand an end to IMF-guided policy.

### Street children

In Brazil, more and more children have been forced onto the street to beg, steal and work as prostitutes. Andrea

dos Santos, a 17-year-old girl who works Marrecas Street in downtown Rio, said, "It's not a good life, but if I don't do it, I don't eat". Her earnings help support her family, who live in a favela on the city's outskirts. They are against what I do, but they accept it," she said. "I make more money than my parents".

In Mexico, the real value of the minimum wage has been dropping steadily, and last year was worth only 42% of its 1980 value. Hundreds of farm workers recently seized a union building to protest low wages and terrible conditions. The government newspaper, *El Nacional*, reported in October that more than one-quarter of the infant population suffers from serious malnutrition.

In Argentina, a wage freeze combined with sharp increases in basic food prices and utility rates has spread misery in a country that once bragged that none of its citizens went hungry. The Health Minister, Julio Cesar Araoz, admitted that one third of the population lives in poverty. More than 50 pensioners have committed suicide this year in the wake of Menem's ruthless slashing of retirement benefits. The President had attacked retirees who protest against his policies, saying, "If they're so capable of mobilising, they could better use that energy to work."

Chile, whose experiment in free-market reforms is older and even more revered by the First World than that of the other countries, has made no progress on the poverty front, and General Pinochet's successor, Patricio Aylwin, has not significantly reversed the decline in public services for the lower classes. In mid-October,

hundreds of doctors at government hospitals in Santiago resigned to protest low wages and a shortage of personnel, equipment, beds and medicine. As economics professor Aristides Torche told the *Dallas Morning News*, "Seven years ago, Chile had 5 million poor people, and it still has 5 million poor people. Our great solution is not as great as we thought it was". And conditions are just as bad elsewhere.

Neoliberalism, with its mixture of tropical Thatcherism and crass corruption, has produced serious political crises in half a dozen countries, most notably Venezuela and Peru. This is entirely predictable, since with few exceptions Latin America's current leaders promised populist reform and once in office did exactly the opposite.

Teodoro Petkoff, a leader of Venezuela's Movement Toward Socialism, says neoliberal 'modernisation' has led to the "survival of the fittest, the stronger massacring the weaker, who, unfortunately, are the majority. No society can be healthy if it accepts, consciously and deliberately that a considerable number of its members live in misery". The neoliberals and their intellectual sponsors have a far different definition of success: business profits, happy shareholders and a BMW for the lucky few able to indulge in the import spree. In their discourse of modernity they are just as cynical, just as cruel, as Guatemala's Barrios was 115 years ago. □

•Silverstein is a journalist based in Rio de Janeiro and the co-author of *Without Fear of Being Happy: Lula, the Workers Party and Brazil*.





# THE ART OF BEING BLACK

**A**ROUND THE MIDDLE OF 1988 I visited the painter Gerald Sekoto at the old age home for artists where he was living outside Paris.

At the time, there was a lot of talk about reinventing South African art, rediscovering lost traditions, traditions which apartheid had either suppressed or denigrated in the interests of white hegemony.

We, the self-appointed 'progressive' art historians of the moment, were going to topple the Pierneefs and Van Wouws from their pre-eminent positions in the art history of SA. We were going to expose them as artificially elevated (though perhaps unconscious) lackeys of white supremacist ideology and replace them with the scorned and ignored representatives of 'people's culture'.

In some ways it was a noble and entirely valid project. In others it was naive and quixotic.

Whatever, this was where Sekoto came in. The 'self-exiled' pioneer of the so-called township style, he had already been earmarked as the 'father of black South African art'. His was the art of the future.

A similar kind of thinking was circulating in ANC exile circles at the time, and representatives of its cultural unit in London were negotiating with Sekoto to buy up his entire output. The idea was to triumphantly install it as the core of a national art collection when the party finally came to power. I do not know what became of these dealings, except that by 1988 they were somewhat deadlocked — with Sekoto selling off work he

*Black artists are often unsung heroes in their own communities. Is it because no-one knows about them — or are they just painting for a white world?*

**IVOR POWELL** investigates



**JACKSON HLUNGWANE**  
*Prophet, counsellor and artist*

did not have and the ANC not actually paying for any. A healthy exercise in reality training seemed to have developed.

Certainly my own encounter with Sekoto was just that. His small room was littered with the instruments of art making — palettes, brushes, tubes of paint, sketchbooks, canvasses. Everywhere was evidence that intense creative activity had been suspended briefly.

But something was wrong with the picture. When you looked a little closer you saw that dust lay on everything, you noticed the oil paints were caked hard on the palette. This was a museum exhibit (or perhaps a psycho-tableau) entitled 'The Artist at Work', not the real thing at all. Later Sekoto admitted it had been five years since he had made any paintings. But he "was feeling things anew", he hastened to add. "If I were free I feel I could dig in right away."

Strange. Even stranger, and more disturbing for the would-be praise singer of Sekoto, was the work set up on the easels, hung on the walls, strewn everywhere.

There were images of the Seine river exactly like any other — still trapped in the stranglehold of that visionary moment when, about 100 years earlier, the Impressionists first really *saw* the Seine. There were a couple of unremarkable Parisian street scenes, a few reasonably competent sketches from windows — strictly the stuff of postcard art.

But there was one truly shocking picture. It was, or so Sekoto claimed, one of his last pieces, dated 1983.

The painting is indisputably Sekoto,



its style reminiscent of his 'township' work of the 1940s. It shows the archetypal white boss, pipe in mouth, looking laconically on as black workers toil away in a line, wielding picks and shovels against the resistance of hard earth. The worker figures, common in paintings of this kind, are stripped of individuality and expression. They melt into the kind of undifferentiated mass which Hendrik Verwoerd had in mind when he spoke of blacks as "hewers of woods and drawers of water".

The picture exemplifies 1940s or 1950s protest art. It is the kind of picture that prompts critics to write about the injustices and dehumanisation of apartheid, but end their discussion with references to the dark, threatening, vengeful cloud suggested by the rendering of the workers. Sekoto more or less invented this genre while the clouds of SA's apartheid future gathered on the horizon.

It had been a powerful image.

In 1983 it seemed deeply, mournfully, pathetic. The SA it captured with such poignancy no longer existed. Post-1976 SA was radically transformed. Sekoto made the painting during the heyday of militant youth protest; the dark cloud he was depicting had long since burst into a violent flood.

Before leaving, however, Sekoto really had what it takes to serve as the legitimate 'father of the new South African Art'.

His paintings from the 1930s and 1940s remain among the most convincing, memorable and authentic images of urban black experience to come down to us. His moody palette, his jiving line, his subtle modulations of tone and syncopated colour all work convincingly together to evoke the smoky, diffused atmospheres of township life. But they do more. Remarkably, because in these paintings Sekoto typically worked with broad strokes and seldom approached his characters close-up, they powerfully evoke personalities and psychology, and speak eloquently of the conditions of life he explores.

They are more than a historical record of township life: they amount to passionate sociological testimony. This is insider painting, deeply felt, closely observed, surely expressed.

#### And then?

Then the bitter irony. Success came in the art markets of SA. And, borne aloft on acclaim, Sekoto winged his way out of the ghetto and off to the art capitals of the world.

#### Nothing of real value

Thereafter, except for a few paintings produced on visits to West Africa and a few sketches of fellow inmates made during an interval in a mental institution after an alcohol-related psychotic episode, Sekoto produced nothing of real



*Gerard Sekoto: Once removed*

artistic value. His talent could not, or at least did not, survive the loss of his South African subject matter, his anger, his community.

Sekoto's case is touching and dramatic. But it is not unique. In fact, it follows a basic logic that is implicit in the condition of urban black South African artists in general.

Let us take a step backwards and sideways. When you study traditional or tribal African art forms, one of the first points made is how powerfully the artistic traditions are rooted in the life of a society. Art making both sustains and is sustained by the customs, usages and belief systems of the particular social grouping. Indeed the study of such African art is predicated on and defined by precisely those relationships between artistic form and social structure. The 'meaning' of these bodies of work is uncovered through a largely anthropological process.

One can observe a similar function and set of assumptions about the role of art in the work of artists like Jackson Hlungwane. He continues to work in a rural and largely traditional context, though it is, to be sure, fragile and laden with encroaching westernisation.

Within his society Hlungwane is as much a prophet, bearer of truths and a counsellor as he is an artist. His giant temple excavation (named Jerusalem) was conceived as a sacred place for the men of his village and the surrounding areas. He later started a similar complex,

## 'Most artists are just loafers'

I once asked a friend (who lives in an East Rand township and is politically plugged-in but totally uninvolved in the art world) what he felt was the general perception in the townships of art making as a profession.

He thought a little, then answered: "I think most people think of artists as loafers".

I thought of Mbokoto, the village where Jackson Hlungwane lives and where he is without doubt the most respected and spiritually important resident for miles around, and wondered what a person there would have answered. Or what one of Noria Mabasa's neighbours would have said, or the inhabitants of the village where Doc Phutuma Seoka has his arts and crafts

shop and where he promenades daily through the dusty streets as a dignitary.

Noting my consternation, my friend explained. He said there was a widespread perception, especially among activists, that most artists were sell-outs; that they did not contribute to the life of the community; that people never saw their work because it was hardly ever exhibited in the townships; that they tended to live in a white world and left the townships (physically or spiritually) as soon as they got exposure.

Of course, he was speaking in breathtaking generalisations. But in many ways this is an issue where generalities are decisive.





PIC. GEORGE HALLET (SOUTHLIGHT)

from South Africa, his art became remote and distant

Canaana (Canaan), for the women. Hlungwane and his art *function* within his society. And, perhaps more important, his imagery and iconography are identical with his teachings. He acts as a kind of magician and shaman; when he works in wood he is doing no more than embodying ideas and images that are part of the mythology and notions of his society. His art interprets the lived world, and feeds back into it.

### Western art

We return to the question of traditional or tribal African art and the essentially anthropological way in which it is studied and understood. Why should it be subjected to a set of 'rules' different to that are brought to bear on western art? Why do we study western art for clues about the consciousness of a particular artist, but explore African art for evidence of a group's consciousness? Why are we more interested in what is *typical* about African artistic production, while we are drawn to the *specific* and *deviant* features of western artefacts?

The answers tell us a lot about the conceptual and ideological imprints of power and colonialism. Western thought about African art forms has had the effect of driving wedges between itself and African culture. It takes the 'traditional' African artwork (though it might have been made only yesterday) out of the present and treats it as though it were a relic — or, and this amounts to the same thing, as though it were somehow located

outside of time. Hence the fetish of age, usage and weathering associated with such tribal artefacts.

But, as recent scholarship makes clear, the traditional art of Africa was never static: change has merely been suppressed by the way in which the art has been interpreted. Similarly, there is abundant evidence that the individual touch of the artist and the aspects introduced by his or her intelligence do in fact signify the work of art in a traditional context. In many recorded cases artmakers were sought out from communities hundreds of miles away to perform particular commissions.

So internally the rules were not that different. The question is external and arises out of the discrimination applied by western thought.

### Cultural museums

Until at least the late 1970s, museums enshrining cultural production were sharply divided into two types. One was the art gallery in which work relating to or emerging out of the western 'art' tradition was housed. Here you would find Pierneefs, Coetzers, Irma Sterns and, generally, some Sekotos, Ezrom Legaes and others representing black 'township' artists working in a basically western tradition.

Then you had the 'ethnographic' museum. The Duggan Cronin collection in Kimberley is (or used to be — perhaps it has been embarrassed into changing its exhibition approach) a fine example.

Along with examples of artwork and architectural styles, craft and decorative clothing, you would find relatively life-like sculptural 'specimens' of the people who produced the work. Rather like displaying under glass a cocoon beside the impaled moth which produced it. Art was treated as scientific curiosity, not as meaningful productions of the human spirit.

The point is that by the time black 'artists' came on the scene in this country (books on the subject seldom go beyond the turn of the century) there already was no such thing as 'black art'; it had been denigrated, reinterpreted as something else, made mute and hazy. By the same token, Africans producing works of art were buying into the visions and realities guiding western hegemony. In important ways, their practice became disconnected from the art making of their ancestors and even their tribal peers, and from the practices and identity of their society. They were in a very real sense donning European spectacles when they put brush to canvas, pen to paper, or even chisel to wood.

This might sound awfully abstract and controversial, but it holds a concrete and immediate set of implications. These arise palpably from the simple fact that the market for black art in SA is and has always been a white one. Where it does spill over it does so (in equally problematic ways) into markets overseas, based mainly in international centres of liberal conscience like Sweden, West Germany, the UK and the Netherlands. *There is not any market to speak of in the townships* Barring a few exceptions, the work of urban black artists is not and never was made for the community in which it was produced.

This is not an uncommon situation; art markets are almost always based in the affluent and privileged sectors of society, and there will almost inevitably be a degree of alienation between the buying public and the artist class. What makes it peculiar, however, is the nature of the divide in SA and the extent of the alienation which pertains. And even more peculiar is the fact that African art as a living tradition was destroyed even *before* a market for black artists existed.

Why, how, and to what effect will be the subject of the second part of this article. □





# BLOOD BROTHERS

*BROTHERS BORN OF WARRIOR BLOOD: ETHNICITY AND POLITICS IN SOUTH AFRICA* By Gerhard Mare, Ravan Press, Johannesburg (R22-40, 121 pages) Reviewed by **PAUL FORSYTH**

**I**N A WORLD BESET BY ETHNIC RESURGENCE and conflict, the desire to understand the phenomenon of ethnicity is more pressing than ever.

The BBC recently tried to make sense of ethnicity and nationalism by broadcasting a programme that shared its title — 'The Invention of Tradition' — with that of an eight-year-old book edited by Eric Hobsbawn and Terence Ranger. Thanks to Gerhard Mare, however, we in SA are fortunate to have a more contemporary examination of ethnicity at our disposal. Indeed, circumstances have compelled South Africans to move to the forefront in the discussion of ethnicity and its role in society.

Mare describes his book, *Brothers Born of Warrior Blood: Ethnicity and Politics in South Africa*, as a contribution to the debate on ethnicity in SA, and warns that it is not intended as a definitive text. Its main strength lies in the fact that it originates in an analysis of SA history and politics. By providing theoretical discussion followed by a detailed case study of the strident and assertive mobilisation of Zulu ethnicity, *Brothers* examines this phenomenon not simply in the abstract, but in the context of lived realities that have very real political implications.

*Brothers* exposes many myths that surround ethnicity. Mare shows that it is not a primordial reality or simply 'out there', floating in the political atmos-

phere and somehow always available for political exploitation. Ethnicity is animated by the political process. In this process the past becomes crucially important in defining the meaning and expression of ethnic identity.

Mare uses the term 'politicised ethnicity' to indicate that ethnicity is neither necessarily value-laden politically, nor does it entail political manipulation or conflict. He rejects the notion that ethnicity is either the mere instrument or product of apartheid; people possess ethnic identities which are important in social, cultural and political respects. However, in Natal, where ethnicity has been rewarded politically, the result has been a strong anti-democratic tendency where, as Mare notes, "ethnic social identities and ethnic group consciousness have been tied inextricably to violence".

Zulu ethnicity has been mobilised in the service of the political project of Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi and Inkatha since the 1970s. This ethnic awareness stemmed from the history of the region and from the experience of conquest and colonialism. The existence of this identity allowed Buthelezi to manipulate it in a politicised form. Effectively, Buthelezi has established himself as the ideologue who defines what Zulu identity consists of, and what it means to be a Zulu. The political conflict and violence which started in the 1980s effectively between Inkatha and the ANC has served to define

a political notion of Zulu identity.

Buthelezi has promoted politicised Zulu ethnicity through the institutional structures of the KwaZulu bantustan, as well as through various alliances with regional business and political interests. Politicised Zulu ethnicity is therefore central to the current process of regional restructuring; indeed, it is arguably a central feature of the transition.

## Regional restructuring

The political impetus towards regional restructuring in the Natal/KwaZulu region was revealed in the early 1980s with the report of the Buthelezi Commission, subtitled 'The Requirements of the Region'. The formation of the Joint Executive Authority in 1987 was a first concrete step towards consolidating Natal and KwaZulu politically and administratively. The Indaba proposals had effectively canvassed support for and granted credibility to this project in wide-ranging quarters. The Joint Services Board Act in 1990 provided for the placement of a bureaucracy with real fiscal powers.

The envisaged scenario has always been one of strong regional government in the context of a federal constitution. This will involve either a very substantial devolution of powers from central government to Natal province and KwaZulu, or their appropriation by the latter. Joint administration will take place from Pietermaritzburg and Ulundi.





PHOTO: GRAEME WILLIAMS (SOUTHLIGHT)

*Buthelezi and King Goodwill Zwelithini: Buthelezi has mastered 'politicised ethnicity'*

**Buthelezi has established himself as the ideologue who defines what Zulu identity consists of and what it means to be a Zulu**

The mechanisms for this, including the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly, the Joint Executive Authority and the Indaba, were carefully put in place during the 1980s. The argument for this degree of regional secession has also been constructed over many years. In conjunction with economic and planning rationales, the promotion of Zulu ethnicity and of Zulu distinctiveness allows Buthelezi and others to claim that Natal/KwaZulu requires a specific form of regional government and administration.

In an ethnically homogenous region like Natal/KwaZulu, the conflict has emerged along ideological political lines. However, explanations of political conflict as having ethnic origins or as the manifestation of the Zulu 'nation' do seem to convince a credulous media and public. The more prolonged, intense and bloody the fighting, the greater credence and credibility is given to Buthelezi's insistence that it is he who holds political solutions.

**Ethnic rewards**

Mare notes that ethnicity has intertwined with violence in SA and that neither the abolition of apartheid or the creation of a centralised post-apartheid parliament will

change this. He suggests that one answer to the 'problem' of ethnicity is to avoid rewarding it in political terms. Other social group identities are not specifically catered for outside constitutional and individual rights. Why should ethnicity receive special rewards, whether in the forms of constitutional settlements or territorial concessions?

SA history has been shaped by attempts to establish, promote and institutionalise ethnic and group identities. The anti-apartheid response to ethnicity has generally been to deny that it is 'real' or 'authentic'. In the struggle against apartheid, ethnicity was often seen as false consciousness or as a device invented to keep people apart. Recently, at a conference on ethnicity and conflict in Natal, the Nigerian political analyst Claude Ake commented that he found the refusal to

accept the existence of ethnicity and ethnic identities quite disturbing. It represented a denial of reality, he said. His point was posed well, but it failed to impress the mainly South African audience.

As we stumble through the debris of apartheid, the need for creative, clear, focused and illuminating analyses of our society is patent. SA is a massively complex society with daunting political problems. If we are to overcome them we must try to look clearly and honestly at the kind of society we live in and are trying to change. We cannot afford to cling to notions of primordial identity, notions that entail the surrender of rationality.

Now, with the possibility of meaningful change still present, the great significance and purpose of Buthelezi's ethnic politics begins to emerge strongly. Ethnicity and regionalism have been revealed as close cousins.

The unveiling of Buthelezi's federal constitutional proposals should have come as no surprise to the ANC spokesperson who described them as a "bolt out of the blue".

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*The 'lame duck' — a character in one of the many scenarios put forward by the corporate sector, and which bear a strong resemblance to the conclusions in a new book on economic growth. The duck stars in the recently-released Mont Fleur Scenarios*

# A LAME DUCK

**W**HERE DOES THIS COLLECTION OF papers on the South African economy come from? At one level this question is easily answered. The papers have been written and edited by teachers of economics at the University of Cape Town whose work received financial support from the Chairman's Fund of Anglo-American. More could be said about the political, ideological and methodological standpoint from which the chapters have been written, but before offering some thoughts on that issue there is a far more worrying question which needs to be asked: Where do the editors of this book think it is going?

The majority of the chapters fall disastrously between two stools; they could not be recommended either to undergraduate students of economics nor to the lay-reader interested in policies to promote growth in the South African economy. Those without formal training in economics might shudder (or otherwise express disgust) when confronted

*ECONOMIC GROWTH IN SOUTH AFRICA: SELECTED POLICY ISSUES* Edited by Iraj Abedian and Barry Standish, Oxford University Press, Cape Town 1992. Reviewed by **JOHN SENDER**, Professor of Economics, University of the Witwatersrand

with the following sentences:

"The experience terms ( $e$ ) and ( $e^2$ ) have coefficients  $b_2$  and  $b_3$ , which are anticipated to be positive and negative respectively in order to rationalise the concave age-earnings profiles which can be observed in reality". (p165) and

"Additionally, if unrecorded money-lending takes place in isolation from the banking system, the authorities will have to take the effects of disintermediation

into account when working on interest-based policy measures." (p192)

At the same time, those who have been exposed to some training in economics will not be impressed by the lack of scholarly care and the downright sloppiness with which so many arguments are presented. There are far too many places where data sources are not cited, the units of measurement on the axes of graphs are missing, abbreviated references are made to journal articles which cannot be followed up because they do not appear in the bibliography or the index, the titles provided for graphs/figures are misprints or incomprehensible and broad generalisations and assertions are unsupported by theoretical or empirical argument.

The introductory and concluding chapters contain examples of each of these failures and, in addition, are unlikely to be enjoyed by any young economist who resents being patronised, who knows without being told that the "government contribution to GDP is not the



same as government expenditure" (p24).

However, three of the book's nine chapters may be recommended to undergraduate students of economics without hesitation. They use data carefully and have an up-to-date and wide-ranging coverage of the relevant literature, as opposed to the narrow, dated and ideologically biased coverage offered, for example, by the chapter on monetary policy. These are the chapters on foreign exchange policy (which makes a convincing case for exchange controls), the chapter on education and economic growth (which highlights the main economic issues and comes to useful and suitably cautious policy concerning priorities in educational investment) and the chapter assessing the relevance of the industrial strategy followed by the Newly Industrialised Countries for South African policy, which provides some pointers concerning both the limits to effective intervention by a democratic state and the obvious requirements for such intervention.

#### **Doubtful accuracy**

The chapter on the 'informal' economy is also carefully written and scholarly, but its authors admit that 'when it is realised that estimates of the extent and variety of unrecorded economic activity are of doubtful accuracy, the policy implications become clouded' (p194). They nevertheless devote several pages to a cloudy and finally uninteresting discussion of the policy implications of the existence of this unrecorded activity.

Unfortunately, even some of the chapters which can be recommended require a (mental) health warning before they can be considered entirely suitable for consumption by undergraduate economists. The methodological framework, from which they rarely depart, is 'orthodox' or neoclassical economics as taught and practised in the majority of British, US and South African universities. Within such a framework, the aggregate production function approach to the analysis of economic growth, crude versions of comparative advantage theories of international trade and simplistic rational choice

or 'economics' models of politics continue to be applied uncritically. True, some policy issues can be debated within such a framework (as shown by Archer and Moll's use of rates of return calculations for investment in human capital), but the readers of this book receive far too little exposure to alternative and competing analyses of the determinants of investment and the rate of capital accumulation. They are likely to emerge with the impression that by reading World Bank publications, the Development Bank of South Africa's journal and edited volumes of the work of a few economists with established positions in South African universities, they will know most of what they need to know.

They will not have been told that neoclassical orthodoxy is and always has been a very poor framework for analysing growth and radical structural shifts in real economics. They might even believe that Merle Holden's views on trade policy or the De Kock Commission's views on monetary policy are definitive.

The editors' concluding recommendations on how to achieve growth are as unconvincing as they are unoriginal. Their modest claim to have delivered a 'bold and wholesome economic reform strategy' (p230) can be dismissed out of hand. Readers who skim through *Business Day* or have been exposed to the corporate sector's public relations exercises known as 'scenario plans' will have seen almost all of this before:

- The employment problem can be alleviated by extensive deregulation and promotion of small business.
- The monetary authorities need autonomy to pursue, irrespective of social and economic costs, the goal of price stabilisation through high interest rates as the means of controlling the money supply.
- Economic growth depends on the country's ability to attract foreign

capital and generate domestic savings.

- Fiscal policy should continue to comply with IMF conditions so that IMF loans can be obtained.
- Continued state ownership or further nationalisation of industry will confound economic growth.

#### **Ignored contents**

In reaching these conclusions the editors are prepared to admit (in a footnote) that they have ignored the contents of some of the chapters of their book. This is obviously the case. In particular, the economic policies adopted in South Korea and Taiwan, which are briefly described in Black's chapter on the basis of the publications of Amsden and Wade, should have dented the confidence with which they prescribe the tired old orthodoxies listed above.

Finally, if you are concerned with poverty in South Africa, with the growth of employment and incomes in the agricultural sector where the majority of the poor are living, this is certainly a book to avoid. None of the chapters discuss growth in this sector or the wages of these people. Even as a guide to current academic/liberal orthodoxy it is pedestrian and incomplete; one might reasonably have expected the odd paragraph extolling the 'sophistication' of South Africa's financial sector, the 'optimality' of the investment outcomes achieved by the Johannesburg Stock Exchange and dynamic benefits stemming from the pyramid structure of our conglomerates. Perhaps some other economists teaching at UCT will fill these gaps? □







# Left Behind

## LEAVE A MESSAGE AFTER THE BLEEP

Was a time when liberation — that interlude of thrills and hopefulness between colonialism and neo-colonialism — actually lasted longer than an eyeblink.

By the time the moment rolled around for Namibia, though, the New World Order was a fact of life — making the interval, well, less than dramatic. Still, one improvises: flags change, anthems are altered, airports rechristened, street-names updated. Victory is a matter of both substance and symbols.

In Windhoek, however, someone overlooked the telephone directory, often a veritable index of the old order. So, close on three years after independence you can still let your fingers do the walking to the letter *K* and find phone numbers for one the most brutal counterinsurgency units ever unleashed on the sub-continent: *Koevoet*. Six listings, actually, all the way from *commander* to *morgue*.

The good news is that each of the numbers just rings and rings and rings ...

## SYMPATHY FOR THE DEVIL

Years ago the American radical Noam Chomsky doused his country's pretences by announcing that the United States was, in effect, run by one party with two wings — the Democrats and Republicans — that differed largely at the level of nuance.

A harsh judgment on the world's oldest and, shall we say, most *thumping* democracy? Well, judging by some of the praise sung for Bill Clinton at his inauguration in January, change in the US has indeed become a pretty relative matter. How else to explain the chairperson of Sony Pictures Entertainment's decision to capture the drama of the Clinton presidency with the comment, "This is the first time a president has been younger than Mick Jagger"?

## GRAVY TRAIN LEAK SHOCK

OK, so we'll hold off on quips about Lost City not being all it's cracked up to be etc. Though we must insist on keeping our place in the queue to comment on the irony that nature itself should so swiftly have intervened to add authenticity to Sol's grand ode to kitch in the bush.

If you haven't followed reports of the unscheduled refinements added by flood rains to the R830 million resort, read on. Heavy rains cracked the Royal Staircase ("No! Not the *Royal* staircase?!"), the swimming pool leaks and several waterways are (were?) damaged. No problem. According to Sun International MD Ken Rosevear, "It is merely buildings settling in." Or is that *caving* in? Of course not.

Actually there is weighty moral to these flippancies. Remember all the hype about the great "risk" Kerzner took

with Lost City, how hundreds of millions of rands were put on the line for this *dream*, blah-bloody-blah?

Well, sorry to wake you up, but the complex was built on the basis of huge tax concessions extended by the Bop musclemen in Mmabatho. Matter of fact, *whatsisname's* Sun International is reportedly able to write off 120% of building costs against future tax payments. The standard write-off in the rest of SA is a paltry 5%. Some risk this was. Good news is that we barbarians at Left Behind are now finally beginning to understand why the free market is called *free*.

When polemics reach this point some voice usually pipes up: "Well, at least it created hundreds of sorely needed jobs in a terribly depressed homeland." Lost City created an estimated 800 jobs and a further 5 000 people were engaged in the construction; OK, add a few hundred now that the buildings are "settling in" and round it off at 6 000. R830 million divided by 6 000? Each job cost R138 000 of taxpayers' money. Between you and us, we'd prefer a cheque for said amount. Since that's out of the question, we're left imagining what that kind of money could do in the informal sector. Just a thought, you know?

## MEMORIES OF FIRE

When Left Behind learnt recently of a new surge of fear and loathing in the corridors of Shell House we didn't know whether to laugh or cry. Word was that detention cells had been discovered in sections of the skyscraper.

Rumours spread like wildfire. Had Mbokoto — "The boulder that *crushes*", remember? — risen again to stalk the coffee rooms for truants and layabouts, whip some respect for the 9-to-5 way-of-life into latecomers, sniff out substance abusers and sow up loose mouths?

The mood, we are told, registered somewhere between nervousness and mild panic — evidence, if any is still needed — that Mbokoto had left deep imprints on the organisational psyche.

Anyway, this story has a happy ending. Turned out that the cells dated from the early 1980s when the building was used as a temporary court while the Supreme Court (a few blocks away in Pritchard Street) was being renovated.

Official word is that the cells have remained in disuse ever since. Still, latecomers nowadays are said to be sneaking to work much more stealthily than before.

## OFF THE WALL

Piet "Pinochio" Koornhof's well-publicised embracing of non-racialism has driven at least one graffitti wiseass back to the walls. Spotted in Jo'burg was this comment: "Piet Koornhof bak bruinbrood."



# Reconstruct

A Work In Progress/New Era supplement

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PHOTO: GRAEME WILLIAMS (SOUTHLIGHT)

*The IDT's vision? Toilets, taps, but not a cent for housing*

## IDT faces uncertain future

THE INDEPENDENT Development Trust (IDT) has been wracked with controversy since it was set up with a R2-billion government grant in March 1990.

The money was raised through the sale of strategic oil reserves. Jan Steyn from the Urban Foundation was appointed to chair the trust. Professor Wiseman Nkhulu, a close ally of Kaiser Matanzima during his days as rector of the University of Transkei, was recently appointed Steyn's successor.

For many, the IDT has been seen as the government's attempt to define the development agenda, forge social contracts and win votes by improving conditions experienced by the country's poorest residents.

There have been a variety of different responses to the IDT from progressive groupings. Progressive NGOs in the Western Cape have boycotted the trust, while in Natal 'progressive' professionals are on the IDT's pay roll as consultants (earning from R163 an hour).

SA National Civic Organisation (Sanco) president Moses Mayekiso recently criticised the IDT's 'market oriented policies'. He said Sanco "rejects — and calls for a moratorium on — the half-hearted site-and-service schemes of state institutions such as the IDT". Instead, everyone should "receive a decent, affordable dwelling", says Mayekiso.

However, it has generally been impossible for poverty-stricken communities to ignore the IDT. Instead, many communities have attempted to negotiate better development terms with the IDT — with varying degrees of success.

The ANC and other progressive formations also have ongoing national meetings with the four portfolio heads — Ben van der Ross (housing); Len Karlsson (health, rural and community development); Merlyn Mehl (education) and Len Konar (job creation) — in a bid to influence IDT policy.

However, the future of the IDT becomes more unclear the closer we get to elections. Even the state has begun to distance itself from its own creation. Last year another R500-m was raised for housing by the sale of more oil.

But instead of the money being channelled through the IDT, the bulk of it went to bantustan governments and the houses of delegates and representatives. Insiders say the government was punishing the IDT for failing to win ANC support for an aborted \$100-m foreign loan.

Since then, the IDT has been negotiating for a slice of this year's housing budget. But it appears that much of this will be channelled through the National Housing Forum instead.

The IDT has tried to follow the World Bank's development philosophy and practices, but even the Bank has attacked the IDT capital subsidy for potential profiteering. ■

### Focus on the IDT

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#### CONTRIBUTIONS

Reconstruct was initiated by the Urban Sector Network to raise issues related to urban development. Contributions should be sent to: Kerry Cullinan, Reconstruct, PO Box 32716, Braamfontein 2017.



# Face to face

**BEN VAN DER ROSS**, the IDT's housing director and **IAN PALMER**, the manager of the capital subsidy programme, speak to **KERRY CULLINAN** about some of the hurdles they face and the progress they have made

## **How many projects have benefitted from the IDT's capital subsidy scheme?**

Palmer: IDT received 404 applications for 640,000 sites. After an intensive assessment process, the board of trustees agreed to enter into negotiations on 108 of these. The number has since been narrowed down to 104, representing 109,842 sites.

## **How has violence affected the IDT's work?**

Palmer: An underestimated achievement of the scheme has been the success of local level negotiation. Organisations with an interest in a project have to negotiate the implementation of the project and sit together on committees to deal with issues such as site allocation.

People have been very committed to working together at a local level. I think it has made a difference that something tangible is delivered once agreement has been reached.

That is not to say that violence hasn't affected our work. In Zamdela and Phola Park, for example, development was disrupted at a critical time by people who wanted to control the projects. However, these disruptions have generally been manageable, with no loss of life.

## **The IDT has been criticised for imposing its own view on communities of how black people should live by insisting on standard sites and individual ownership. How would you respond?**

Palmer: There is acceptance within IDT that the original document was too prescriptive regarding level of service. As projects have developed, the levels of services, site size etc. have been open to

negotiation.

What we have not been flexible with, however, is individual ownership. The IDT board feels that the right of a person to own his or her home, is particularly important.

## **But some communities want land transferred to a community trust, as they say individual ownership could make the sites targets of 'downraiding' (site owners being bought out by wealthier people or land speculators).**

Palmer: Here one is talking about the complex issue of individual rights, in contrast to communal rights. The debate is linked to a further one about whether you can constrain a person from selling what is theirs.

There is a concern that people may want money urgently and sell to downraiders. However, if selling is too strictly controlled, people with genuine reasons for selling could be prevented from doing so.

At the same time, I respect that people need advice and maybe a limited degree of protection. We have gone through this in Wattville, where it has been agreed that the housing body has the first right to buy a site if someone wants to sell. (See Page 8)

## **Most IDT projects are on cities' outskirts. This is said to perpetuate the structure of apartheid cities where poor black people are pushed on to the margins. How can this be addressed?**

Palmer: The capital subsidy scheme was not intended to solve all SA's housing problems. The IDT decided to focus on site and service projects, as part of what was expected to be comprehensive hous-

ing subsidy arrangements to be introduced by the government. This meant it was not possible for the subsidy to be used in many inner city locations.

When the IDT was set up, there was limited land designated for low income housing and the Group Areas Act was still in effect.

There was considerable pressure on the IDT to deliver, so the status quo regarding land identification had to be accepted and the best projects selected. Many projects are not in ideal locations. However, many are well located such those in as Alexandra, Wattville and Tembisa.

## **Some communities feel they are 'penalised' for taking time to plan the development that they want, as they do not get interest from the subsidy while planning takes place. Is this a fair criticism?**

Palmer: Here I think we need to understand the economic principle of a capital subsidy. This is a fixed amount available to an individual household to purchase property, payable when the property is received by them. The arrangement is simple to understand and administer.

The fact that interest is not allowed to accumulate, does face developers and communities with a compromise between the 'product' and 'process'. But with the subsidy as a fixed sum, there is a great incentive to deliver.

Perhaps one of the difficulties faced by communities is lack of capacity, partly due to lack of skills and finance. Should the scheme continue, I believe that these aspects should receive greater attention.

## **Is there any way that IDT projects can**



# with the IDT

## be exempted from VAT?

Palmer: IDT does not believe that a project should have to pay VAT as this means that the government is giving money as a subsidy, then taking some back as tax. However, several discussions with the government to get projects exempted from VAT have been unsuccessful.

At the same time, the subsidy is not a handout. People are not being given a site, but money to buy a site. As soon as money is put into individual hands, those individuals have to pay VAT on what they buy.

## Does the IDT intend encouraging community participation by channelling some of the grant money to community training?

Van der Ross: Capacity building has caused the IDT great concern. One of the reasons why the IDT has not been able to spend money as quickly as it might have liked is the low absorptive capacity of communities. Lack of experience, training and opportunity has resulted in a dearth of local institutional capacity. For this reason, our major programmes encourage training or at least job creation.

More recently, we have addressed the issue in a more structured way through a consolidation programme. People from communities will be trained to manage consolidation processes in all projects. The training programme will start early this year and extend over two years.

Regional School Building Trusts are also being set up throughout the country to enable communities to manage responses to their plight themselves.

## The IDT's consolidation programme has been criticised as inadequate and too focused on consultants. How would you respond?

Palmer: IDT recognises that the best it could achieve was to facilitate consoli-


dation. Consultants are being used to maintain continuity and ensure that the consolidation process gets under way.

However, the focus of consolidation is on 'consolidation officers', who are trained to provide advice and support to communities to achieve consolidation. These officers are appointed through community structures and funded by the IDT. A network is also being established to support them and

have some input from a wide range of contributors, including political parties.

There are no immediate plans to involve political parties in fundraising for the IDT, but we are aware that future large scale fundraising will have to be conducted on a co-operative and co-ordinated basis.

However, we have to achieve a balance between co-operation and making ourselves vulnerable to inappropriate



Phola Park: Violence disrupted the project

provide assistance relating to the wider aspects of development: establishing schools, clinics, creches etc.

## How does the IDT interact with the major political players? Are there any plans to involve political parties more in some aspects of the IDT's work, such as fundraising?

Van der Ross: From its formation, the IDT has maintained dialogue with the major political players. But the IDT views its independence from political pressure from any direction as being one of its most significant features.

We try to avoid direct working relationships with political parties. However our philosophy is to work on an inclusive basis so all our major projects

pressures. A good example is the National Housing Forum. The IDT is underwriting the cost of its administration, but the forum is independent of the IDT and owned entirely by its members, which include all major extra-parliamentary political parties.

## What are the IDT's plans for the future?

Van der Ross: The IDT took a strategic decision early last year to become a permanent institution. It believes that, as an independent development funding agency, it has an ongoing role to play and that the expertise and experience it has built up should be available to South Africa, particularly in the transition and post-transition periods. ■



# Zilweleni drives its own upgrade

In a small settlement in Southern Pinetown, residents are doing it for themselves. **SPENCER HODGSON** reports

DECADES OF insecure existence as an informal settlement have forged the determined community of Zilweleni ("We are struggling"). In 1989, the Zilweleni Residents' Association (ZRA) marshalled the weapons of rent and consumer boycotts and successfully resisted eviction by two landowners seeking high returns on the formal land market.

Valuators, who ignored the informal settlement, had raised unrealistic expectations in the landowners, who wanted R50 000 per hectare or R570 000 for the total area.

Aspiring to upgrade and secure the settlement, the ZRA approached the Built Environment Support Group

(BESG) for help. Achieving a successful upgrade rested on the ZRA's ability to effect a community buy-out of the land and to access development capital. The ZRA and BESG decided to apply to the IDT to develop 185 sites, subject to the land being available.

The IDT approved the application in principle, and negotiations for the land began in earnest. The ZRA's basic negotiating position was that the community could neither pay for the land nor be evicted. The land could also not be sold to other buyers because of the community's presence.

Through the IDT scheme, the landowners had a unique

opportunity to sell. But not all the IDT subsidy of R7 500 per site could be spent on buying the land, as this amount had to cover the installation of basic services. Finally the landowners accepted R182 000.

At the same time, the ZRA negotiated the development of adjoining land owned by the Pinetown borough. The borough also applied to the IDT to develop 250 sites.

## Community as developer

The ZRA then had three choices for implementation. It could appoint a private developer, the borough of Pinetown, or do it themselves. After discussions, it resolved to set up the Zilweleni Devel-

opment Trust (ZDT). This is entirely community based and accountable to the civic. Five trustees were appointed from the community. The trust then assumed full responsibility as developer and contracted BESG as project manager.

The IDT's insistence on releasing subsidies only at the end of the project, once sites were transferred to individuals, posed problems for the ZDT. It could not get bridging finance from the IDT. The private sector also regarded the trust, which had no track record or collateral, as a high risk.

Eventually bridging finance was secured from the Joint Services Board (JSB), Natal's equivalent of a Regional Services Council. To secure this, the ZDT had to agree that the IDT subsidy would be transferred directly to the JSB.

The project is nearly finished. Roads are beginning to take shape and taps are sprouting. The trust manages two bank accounts, effects all payments and scrutinises every transaction related to the project budget.

The trust's stature and confidence has grown as it has been forced to rise to the challenges of being the developer. It holds the land until the transfer of sites, liaises with the ZRA and the community, jointly organises vari-

PHOTO: KERRY GULLMAN



Work in progress: Zilweleni residents build their own toilets





Zilweleni: From unemployed to entrepreneur

ous committees to establish allocations policy, processes applications and mediates site boundaries.

### Tenure headaches

Allocations policy has been shaped by private tenure, a requirement of the IDT subsidy. Concerned by the threat of individuals being bought out by outsiders, the community initially proposed that single men over 25 and single women over 30 should qualify for sites. The logic was: "Single men who marry will remain in Zilweleni, while women who marry will join their husbands elsewhere and sell their sites. Single women over 30 are unlikely to marry".

However, after the ZRA prevailed on the community for gender equality, it was agreed that men and women over 25 should be eligible for sites. But the initial proposal reveals the community's anxiety and the need for alterna-

tive tenure arrangements.

Another problem raised by individual ownership is the fact that a number of residents are "illegals" from neighbouring states, who do not qualify for a subsidy. One old man from Malawi who had lived in Zilweleni for over 10 years was arrested when he approached the home affairs department for an ID document. Frantic efforts prevented his deportation. In most cases, this problem will be overcome by allocating sites to other family members.

The organic link between the ZDT and the community was demonstrated early in the project when the ZDT directed BESG to solve the problem of obtaining water for each site, rather than using the road standpipes originally planned. The community is currently served by one tap and was determined to avoid the tensions associated with standpipes.

The limitations of the budget had to be overcome by reducing expenditure on pit latrines and other items. Disposing of waste water from each site proved more difficult and involved joint meetings with various authorities to establish the feasibility of local soakaways. Though an imperfect solution, the authorities eventually yielded to the will of the community.

### Locals employed

The ZDT opted to take direct responsibility for constructing the pit latrines to ensure more development funds are absorbed into the community. Ten unemployed residents were trained to set out, line and erect the latrines. They were also taught basic contracting skills, and the ZDT has entered into labour-only contracts with each contractor, each employing three labourers.

BESG supervises the construction and the ZDT has signed another contract with community members for the maintenance and security of the materials store. At the end of the project, the tools used


will be sold to contractors for a nominal amount. Pinetown has agreed to use the same system on the adjacent development, giving contractors another 250 latrines to build.

The ZDT is also negotiating a joint venture between the civic and conveyancer to handle sales administration. R100 has been allocated per site, and this has enabled the ZRA — which would have to do the work anyway — to make some money.

The new township will be called Singobile ("We have won"). But not all members of the community have benefited from the two IDT projects. Another private landowner has yet to be bought out, and the civic has applied to the JSB to develop another 250 sites on this land. The new undertaking has been designated Phase 4 of the ZRA's programme. Phase 5 is housing, as people cannot be expected to live in pit latrines.

Empowerment is sweet and potent; it creates new opportunities and sweeps away obstacles. ■

• *Spencer Hodgson works for BESG.*



Home sweet home: The children of Zilweleni





*A brighter future: Murals have blossomed on the walls of Amatikwe's new clinic*

# Tribal land transformed

Amatikwe is the first IDT project in a tribal authority.

**A SPECIAL CORRESPONDENT** reports on the residents' trials and triumphs

IN OCTOBER 1983, Trevor, an engineer, received a call from the department of co-operation and development to attend a meeting regarding an urgent project in KwaZulu.

The following morning, a posse of consultants was instructed to begin planning Amatikwe, a small corner of the Qadi tribal area, as a priority. Nine years later in July 1992, the contractor moved on to site.

Amatikwe Village is situated 18km from Durban's Golden Mile. Nestled in a sleepy valley, it is easy to forget that this is the last stop in KwaZulu before the dense shack settlements of Inanda, Besters and Bambayi.

Prior to the current development, the area was devoid of all but the most basic services — one gravel road, two boreholes and one emergency tap. Some 180 families occupied the project site, their land tenure rights restricted to verbal approval from the Qadi Tribal Authority (TA).

The Amatikwe Development Committee was elected by the community in 1983, following a meeting with government officials from both KwaZulu and

the RSA. At the same time, the TA set up its own development arm, the Qadi Management Committee, incorporating members of the Amatikwe Committee, to oversee the whole process.

The years that followed saw a succession of government departments and development bodies in charge of the project. Frustrated by the total lack of progress, the TA appointed an outside adviser, George Antoni. This new addition to their side in the form of an experienced engineer marked a turning point in the development of Amatikwe.

As the planning had already been done, (though major changes were to follow) the next step was to locate funding. Loan finance was unacceptable to the community primarily because most residents had insufficient income to cover the repayments. Numerous bodies were approached, but little progress was made. Finally an application was submitted to the IDT.

## **Land tenure**

The IDT initially expressed several reservations about the Amatikwe development, their primary concern being the

absence of any meaningful form of land tenure — the provision of land tenure being a cornerstone of IDT policy.

But regardless of IDT philosophy, the people of Amatikwe were bound by KwaZulu legislation that provides land tenure only if an area is administered under Proclamation R293 — where an area is excised from its TA and put under the control of the Department of the Interior. Having seen R293 in action — in KwaMashu, Ntuzuma and Umlazi — the community was not happy at the prospect of its implementation in Amatikwe. With this rejection of R293, the only land 'tenure' available was a "Permission to Occupy" (PTO) certificate, which gives no legal rights to the land occupied.

After lengthy negotiations with the IDT, a compromise was reached, thanks to a piece of legislation which has yet to be promulgated — the KwaZulu Land Tenure Act. If and when this Act comes into effect, it will allow for the conversion of PTOs into freehold title. Having procured written assurance from KwaZulu that that would occur in Amatikwe as soon as the Act is promulgated, the



IDT agreed to fund the project.

One final step remained before the IDT agreement could be signed: the formation of a legal body to act as the developer. A trust was formed incorporating members of the Amatikwe Development Committee and Qadi Management Committee and was strengthened by the inclusion of outsiders including a lawyer, an architect, a city councillor and several businessmen.

This body, the Qadi Management Trust, became the developer of Amatikwe. The trust is chaired by the inkosi (chief) of the Qadi tribe, the first inkosi in KwaZulu to allow a formal development on tribal land.

Amatikwe was originally planned to accommodate some 1,600 residential sites of 400m<sup>2</sup>. However, the community wanted to safeguard their semi-rural lifestyles, mainly because most black urban developments around Durban do not present an enticing vision of urban life. After consulting with the project manager, AMV Project Managers, the site size was increased to 1000m<sup>2</sup>. Each site is now sub-divisible without the need for further planning.

### Allocations

The allocation process has been criticised by some IDT consultants who refer to it as undemocratic. However in their drive for ideologically correct procedures, they seem to have overlooked that residents wanted to express some their own traditions. Site allocation is primarily controlled by the Amatikwe Development Committee, though all residents must be approved by the TA.

Allocations are based on three main categories:

- Residents' children ready to set up their own homes are first priority.
- People who left the area — after the TA prohibited new building in 1985 in anticipation of the development — but now want to return are next in line.
- As Amatikwe lies squashed between ANC-dominated Inanda and the Inkatha stronghold of Umzinyathi, and has members from both groups, to allocate sites to strangers was felt to be asking for



*Locals lay down water pipes*

trouble. Preference is given to newcomers recommended by an existing resident.

A point which causes considerable distress to one of the IDT's consultants is the role played by the TA. The TA is the only authority in Amatikwe and can impose certain conditions, such as whoever wants to reside on tribal land must get the inkosi's permission.

The political leanings of the tribal authority are rather obvious. But while the TA would prefer to fill Amatikwe with its own kind, thanks to the trust and some of the inkosi's advisers there has been no detectable discrimination on political grounds.

The project is now halfway through. Roads are complete, most occupied sites sport a tap and the first electricity poles have begun to sprout. Mountains of forms have been completed and the construction liaison committee has its hands full dealing with endless problems.

The local builders start on the community centre soon, using blocks produced by the Abalindi Old Age and Children's Home next door. The Qadi Management Trust is searching for funds to develop the neighbouring area to prevent possible divisions created by sur-

veyors' pegs.

Soon all the earthmovers and engineers will be gone. The files on KwaZulu's first IDT development will be closed and life in the village will return to normal.

But the departure of the contractor marks the start of a new challenge: running an area that has no administration.

Some form of administration is urgently required for soon water meters will tick away, the TA will receive a substantial bill and no one will have the authority to charge residents.

Amatikwe is destined to become the guinea-pig for a new administration act — the Amakhosi Act. This allows the TA to retain control over the administration of new towns that do not fall under R293. KwaZulu civil servants hope to have the act ready by April.

Maintaining the roads and water reticulation in Amatikwe appeared to be a greater problem. After being referred from one KwaZulu department to another, the project managers came up with the only solution — if no one will do it for you, you have to do it yourself.

A local maintenance plan was devised with the help of the contractor (Stefanutti and Bressan) and the consulting engineers (BS Bergman & Partners). Five locals were trained in maintenance while projected cash flows and equipment lists were prepared. In December last year, these proposals were accepted by KwaZulu officials.

Barring unforeseen disasters, the maintenance crew will begin work in April — collecting refuse, fixing roads and water pipes. The monthly rate, payable by all except those in dire need, will be about R5 a month. The crew will not only provide permanent employment for several locals, but it will also give the community control over the upkeep of their land.

Thanks to the IDT and KwaZulu eventually agreeing to change their sacred rules, a small step has been taken. But the project only provides the bare essentials. Let us hope that the emergence of a modified SA will allow big-



Tamboville is a community housing project being jointly developed by the Wattville Concerned Residents' Committee and the Benoni town council. **PLANACT** reports on the community's dealings with the IDT



WHEN THE Wattville community invaded land in 1991 and named the newly 'proclaimed' residential area Tamboville, it was more than a bold statement about 'apartheid housing'. For the civic, it became the basis upon which the terms of engagement on the housing question have been defined ever since.

The community's goals, objectives and actions have been reinforced in engagements with the IDT, despite contesting the IDT's definitions. This is a record of the community's experiences in the IDT-defined framework for dealing with the housing crisis.

The application to the IDT was made almost a year after the invasion in June 1991. By then, the community had concluded an agreement with the Benoni town council (BTC) to jointly develop the land, and had been through months of participatory planning and implementation processes. Many decisions, such as the framework for decision making, the settlement layout and engineering options, had already

## Wattville's struggle for community control

passed through various stages in the community.

In fact, the process had reached a stage that made the civic question whether the IDT was an appropriate body to request funds from. At the time, there was much debate within many civics as to whether to apply for IDT funds. The IDT's establishment was seen as undemocratic. Democratic organisations had little or no representation on the IDT and procedures for project approval were not transparent.

Having met almost every criteria defined by the IDT, the civic motivated for funding. The decision to support the project was then left to people who had virtually no experience of the community development process the civic had had for the past year.

Community members had seized land and so de-

finied new forms of control. They had to contest the way in which the available resources were to be controlled. For the civic, development was embodied in the concept of collective democratic control. It had to demonstrate that collective action and decision-making could deliver goods *and* build a democratic organisation.

### Integrated development

The civic recognised the need for an integrated, comprehensive development programme. This was underpinned by the need to build organisational capacity to engage in development beyond resistance. The civic now had to develop the capacity to meet multiple sets of objectives and interests in the community.

Much of the approach of the IDT failed to recognise:

- that it was critical to build strong representative organisation that could effectively engage in development;
- that the approach had to understand the complexities of the transitional context;
- that any development response had to be integrated and not piecemeal and ad hoc;
- the act to invade the land was a broad community decision and therefore benefits had to be collective.

The application to the IDT requested funding for those who already had been allocated sites and those on the waiting list. For the community it was important to maintain unity. The funding obtained was to establish mechanisms and institutions that would begin to meet the broadest needs.

Residents also saw housing as more than a serviced site. While it was understood





*Permanent roots: Residents trade their shack for a solid home*

The Benoni town council's (BTC) participation in the project as a joint partner has been extremely difficult, but it has been an important learning experience for the civic and council.

For the civic, the partnership and the technical services of the council has reduced the cost of servicing the development. But the IDT interpreted this as a 'hidden' subsidy. The IDT was also concerned that a private developer could have been more efficient and that this was a more costly serviced site.

But the civic had bridging finance and relatively better interest rates than other projects. Additional cuts into the final subsidy — eg VAT, inflation, conveyancing and professional fees — were reduced as a result of the council's involvement.

The BTC-civic's joint technical committee also allowed the civic to build up its skills in a forum designed to ensure informed decision making.

The civic's contribution to the project — reporting back and workshops, meetings, seminars and on site assistance — has been recognised as a key to the success of the project. No IDT funding has been made available for this costly aspect of projects. Community participation is seen as essential and yet no funding had been made available to secure its success.

By locating the project within the existing city, some innovative thinking around the integration of the city has occurred. The civic has coined the phrase "building the city

from below".

The BTC's involvement is a 'radical' innovation at local government administration. It has also put Benoni's responsibility for housing and project implementation squarely on the negotiating agenda. The crucial questions of upgrading of services are constantly explored and have to be negotiated.

The IDT subsidy fails to address this question. Upgrading and service provision are effectively handed over to the community. In effect, this means condemning these areas to becoming urban slums. To date, civics have poured energies into under-serviced communities just to sustain development. An example of this is the amount of energy the civic puts into resolving disputes over shared toilets and taps.

Although the BTC is reluctant to set large sums aside for upgrading, maintenance and operations, it recognises its responsibility and ability to use tax revenues and resources for such purposes.

There was quite a debate with the IDT over a suitable mechanism to release part of the residual area for further development and to provide financial assistance to those with serviced sites.

While all IDT processes are defined in community terms, benefit is seen as individual. However, the community has been able to secure a mechanism that ensures the immediate IDT beneficiaries do not lose their subsidy benefits by deferred payment.

A community development trust has been devel-

oped to act for different community initiatives. This was done to ensure the relative accountability of a trust to the community interest and also not to compete with community driven initiatives.

This issue fed in with the desire in the community to reflect community control over the land. In order to protect the land for the community, it was felt that the land had to reflect communal ownership. Tenure options negotiated with the IDT resulted in the recipient having a restricted title.

All benefits of freehold title are extended, but people also have protection from downward raiding and security in the event of financial difficulty.

The restrictive title means that, should a person choose or need to sell their land and house, first option will go to the Housing Association being established. Thus the property remains affordable and in community hands.

The BTC has accepted this principle and will negotiate the basis of its financial support. This option far outweighs the 'weak' protective option offered by the IDT: "if you sell, you will never receive another subsidy".

In recent months, the community has been trying to evaluate its engagement in the development process.

The issues we have raised are some of the points we think need to be put down before proceeding to engage in further rounds of talks about housing subsidies.

• *Planact* is an advisor to the *Wattville Concerned Residents' Committee*. ■

that there was not enough money to build a wonderful neighbourhood, there was a desire to set in place the mechanisms to assist in incrementally improving the living environment and continuously allow others access to land and housing.

It was recognition of development as a process rather than as a series of completed events. In our view, the IDT realised the lack of sustainability of its approach much later and attempted to address this through the consolidation proposals.

The IDT was reluctant to commit itself to funding the third part of the project because the land had not yet been secured. For the civic and the community, this was an early blow to sustaining the momentum and keeping the community united and focused.

The IDT chose not to pressurise the Local Authority (LA) to provide more land. Now that the LA has finally provided more land, the IDT has indicated it is not in a position to support further development.



# KwaZulu leans on the IDT

KwaZulu's insistence that official structures are the only channel for development is hampering projects. **KERRY CULLINAN** investigates

THE IDT is encountering serious problems in KwaZulu, which insiders have blamed on the homeland administration's belief that it should be the only channel for development.

Severe tensions have arisen between KwaZulu officials and community structures such as civics, which has resulted in projects being held back in many areas.

Ironically, the IDT's Finance Corporation continues to lend millions of rands to the parastatal KwaZulu Finance Corporation despite the problems.

There are seven IDT projects in KwaZulu: KwaMashu Unit C, Umlazi 27 CC, KwaNgezi, Madadeni, Ngwelezana, Qadi and part of Besters' Farm. However, developers have complained that red tape has made it extremely difficult to get some of the projects off the ground.

The major stumbling block appears to be KwaZulu's insistence that local councillors and tribal authorities alone should be in control of the development process. This goes against the IDT's requirement for community participation in projects.

In some cases, local representatives of KwaZulu have reached agreement with community structures about the development process only to go back on their word after having been pulled into line by Ulundi. KwaZulu's interior minister, Steven Sithebe, has made it clear that his administration will not recognise civic organisations, let alone work with them.

In Stafford Farm near Newcastle, development efforts ran into severe difficulties in mid-1992. The Newcastle Residents' Association (Nera) even requested the IDT to suspend the project after a bitter clash

between KwaZulu on the one hand and Nera, the ANC, Cosatu, Nactu, the PAC, NECC, Cosas, Sadu and sports and church bodies on the other hand.

According to a letter sent to IDT housing director Ben van der Ross by Nera official M Cele, "the (KwaZulu) minister of interior (Sithebe) is the stumbling block to the whole (development) process".

Cele claimed people were being forced to join Inkatha "in order to qualify for development" and the development steering committee comprised only of Inkatha, councillors and KwaZulu government representatives.

"We fail to understand why the minister of the interior is opposed to the involvement of other organisations (in the development project), and this creates suspicions and gives the impression that he wants to use the IDT for his own benefit," said Cele.

Since then, the parties involved have been able to reach some agreement and the developer is playing a major role in mediating between the 'official' KwaZulu structure and community organisations.

Another IDT project at Ngwelezana near Empangeni has also battled to get off the ground. Although parties

involved are tight lipped about the problems, sources indicate that once again community organisations are being excluded from the process.

Another serious problem is the fact that KwaZulu has introduced a levy to be paid by all people who come to own a site in the homeland. The levy varies from R200 to R1,000, depending on the level of services on the individual's plot.

The levy was gazetted in November 1991 and replaces the development endowment policy, whereby developers were required to pay some R1,000 to the local council before they could proceed with development.

Although the homeland government appears not to be enforcing the levy yet, its introduction is a slap in the face of the IDT, which had succeeded in persuading KwaZulu to waive the endowment for IDT projects.

If enforced, the levy will create a grave dilemma for developers, who only have R7,500 to develop each site. Site owners, who have to earn less than R1,000 a month to qualify, cannot afford the levy. Thus the developers will be forced to budget a portion of the allocated money to pay the levy. But the better the services, the higher the levy (for example, if a site has water, the levy

is R650). So developers would also have to downgrade the services to ensure that the levy is not too high.

Given the KwaZulu government's recent hardening of attitude towards rival organisations and its desire to 'go it alone' in a virtually independent Kwa-Natal, development is likely to become more difficult in the homeland.

At the end of the day, the poorest residents of KwaZulu will be the ones to suffer most. ■



Pipe dreams: KwaZulu blocks development

PICTURE BY THE STAR



# Housing forum edges forward

KEHLA SHUBANE looks at the history of the NHF and its attempts to deal with the housing crisis

THE NATIONAL Housing Forum (NHF) is working hard to produce plans to alleviate the crisis in housing. However, many obstacles have to be overcome - like ensuring that the voice of disenfranchised communities is not drowned by established interest groups.

The forum's launch in August 1992 marked the culmination of efforts that started a year earlier at a meeting of stakeholders in the housing field. That meeting had been convened by the Independent Development Trust (IDT) and the Development Bank of SA (DBSA) to consider what could be done in relation to developing the hostels.

The IDT and DBSA had been approached by several people and groups for help with development aid to the hostels. At the time, the hostels had become the epicentre of violence which had erupted in Southern Transvaal.

At the meeting, it was argued that hostels were part of a broader housing problem which could be resolved within a developmental framework. The scope of the meeting was then expanded to look at housing in general.

However, the hostel question was recognised as urgent. A working committee was set up to look into what could be done in the short term to hostels to reduce the violence. This committee drew up a document entitled "A Short Term Guideline to Hostels", which sought to guide interventions in the hostels. This was adopted by the plenary.

Another working committee was set up to decide how the initiative could be taken forward. Representation was drawn from Sanco's forerunner, the National Interim Civic Committee, Co-satu, Nactu, the Building Industries Federation of SA (Bifsa), DBSA, IDT, Ur-



ban Foundation (UF), ANC, Azapo, PAC, Inkatha, the SA Co-ordinating Committee on Labour Affairs (Saccola) and the government. This committee drew up the Founding Agreement that provided the basis for the formation of the NHF.

The government withdrew before the NHF was constituted, as it considered the forum to be an interim government by stealth in the housing arena. It did agree, however, to embrace the hostel guidelines.

At the same time, the representation of business in the forum was expanded to include the Association of Mortgage Lenders, the Life Officers Association, the construction industry and the building supply industry.

The Founding Agreement was then signed by all groups except Nactu, which had experienced problems in sending a representative to all the meetings preceding the launch.

To date, the NHF's most visible achievement has been to bring together some of the important stakeholders in

the housing industry. There is implicit understanding that acceptable housing solutions must encompass both technical and political factors.

Housing is not simply a technical problem about delivery and how this can be facilitated, but it also entails constituencies creating an appropriate housing policy environment. This is a break from the past, where disenfranchised communities were assumed to be passive consumers of houses delivered by largely white-controlled stakeholders.

The "Hostel Guidelines" is also an important achievement. While some groups may oppose the guidelines, they are a starting point for opinion making on how to tackle the hostels.

The NHF prefers to see its activities geared towards producing plans on housing, rather than policies.

Participants are presently negotiating plans for the housing environment. But the plans are not expected to be comprehensive, as the area is vast and differences have to be resolved within the forum. The government of the day will then have to decide how these plans become policy.

At the same time, individual participants are not precluded from negotiating with other parties inside and outside the forum on housing matters.

In conclusion, the NHF will have to look at how to end existing inequalities. A great deal still has to be done to improve the participation of blacks. Women, particularly black women, also have to be more visible. There is also a real danger that established interests will dominate the NHF's proceedings. ■

*Although Shubane is an NHF office bearer, the views expressed in this article are his own and do not represent those of the NHF.*



# Tenants take over council housing

**PETER LUSH** reports on how some tenants in Britain manage housing estates owned by local authorities

ferent from most other co-operatives as it is for single people in shared accommodation. Council housing is usually for families, and single people battle to find accommodation.

The co-op developed in the 1970s, when the area was due to be demolished. Local residents campaigned against the demolition, but no repairs were done and the houses became very run down. In 1975, tenants and squatters formed the Carol Street Residents' Association.

After many negotiations, the council agreed to repair the north side of Carol Street and eventually gave the co-

op a five-year license to repair the south side. This was funded by the government's Housing Corporation.

In 1982, the co-op campaigned to retain the Carol Street houses permanently. In December 1983, the council made the CSC Camden's first tenant management co-op. Since last year (1992), Carol Street tenants have been recognised as permanent tenants.

In the meantime, in 1981 the co-op took on another row of rundown houses in Royal College Street. The CSC was given a five-year license to run the Royal College Street houses, which were 200 years old and needed a great deal of repairs. The license ran out in 1989. At present, these houses are being run on a short-term basis.

## Structure

The CSC is run through monthly general meetings of tenants. The annual general meeting elects the co-op officers and sub-committees, approves accounts and approves any changes to co-op rules.

The 11 co-op officers meet once a month and make recommendations to the general meeting. Portfolios include a chairperson, secretary and a rent officer. The CSC also employs a fulltime co-ordinator, who runs the office, helps to organise meetings, prepares reports and oversees maintenance work.

Four sub-committees deal with allocations, development, finance and maintenance. Their tasks are as follows:

- "Allocations" deals with people who apply to join the co-operative and develops policy on allocations.
- "Development" looks at how to expand the co-op.
- "Finance" does some of the bookkeeping, helps the treasurer and draws up the budget.
- "Maintenance" deals with standard maintenance and complaints. It also monitors the co-op's maintenance budget and programme.

*•Peter Lush is co-ordinator of the Carol Street Housing Co-operative.*

**MOST RENTED** housing in Britain is owned by local authorities. However, tenants have formed tenant management co-operatives (TMC) to manage the housing they rent from the local authority.

These TMCs developed out of a law passed by the Labour government in 1975, which allows local authorities to hand over management of housing estates to TMCs.

The Conservative government of the 1980s encouraged TMCs, in the hope that they would lead to the sale of estates to co-operatives. They assisted tenants wishing to set up TMCs, by paying their consultants' fees and providing office accommodation.

## Starting a co-op

To start a co-operative, tenants set up a Friendly Society, a non-profit company. All tenants wanting to join the co-operative become members of the society. They then negotiate a management agreement with the local authority, with the help of a consultant.

Tenants can choose various levels of responsibility. Some take over almost all management responsibilities and employ their own staff.

Some co-operatives are run by monthly general meetings, with sub-committees to take responsibility for certain areas of work. Others elect a management committee which runs the co-operative, and calls general meetings once or twice a year.

The local authority usually pays the co-operative management and maintenance allowances, based on what they spend on similar properties in the area. The TMC then pays the rents to the council.

## Carol Street

In many cases, run-down estates have been transformed by the formation of a TMC. The Carol Street Co-operative (CSC) is one such example.

The CSC is based in an area of London called Camden Town. It is dif-



*House-proud: A Carol St tenant cleans up*



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