

SEPT 1988



SECHABA

official organ of the african
national congress south africa



Sechaba and other ANC publications are obtainable from the following ANC addresses:

Annual Subscriptions:

USA and Canada (air mail only): institutions \$30; individuals \$25

All other countries £12

Please make cheques payable to:

Sechaba Publications c/o ANC PO Box 38 London N1 9PR

ALGERIA

5 Rue Ben M'hidi Larbi
Algiers

ANGOLA

PO Box 3523
Luanda

AUSTRALIA

Box 49 Trades Hall
4 Goulburn Street
Sydney NSW 2000

BELGIUM

25 Rue de Conseil
1050 Brussels

CANADA

PO Box 302
Adelaide Postal Station
Toronto
Ontario M5C-2J4

CUBA

Calle 21A
NR 20617
Esquina 214 Atabey
Havana

DENMARK

Landgreven 7/3 t.h.
1301 Kbh Copenhagen K

EGYPT

5 Ahmad Hismat Street
Zamalek
Cairo

ETHIOPIA

PO Box 7483
Addis Ababa

FRANCE

28 Rue des Petites Ecuries
75010 Paris

**GERMAN DEMOCRATIC
REPUBLIC**

Angerweg 2
Wilhelmsruh
Berlin 1106

**GERMAN FEDERAL
REPUBLIC**

Postfach 190140
5300 Bonn 1

INDIA

350KP Thacker Block
Asian Games Village
Siri Fort Road
Khel Gaon Marg
New Delhi-110049

ITALY

Via S. Prisca 15a
00153 Rome

JAPAN

Square-House Shin-Nakano
Room 105
4-38-16 Honcho Nakano-Ku
Tokyo

KENYA

PO Box 40432
Nairobi

MADAGASCAR

PO Box 80
Antananarivo

NETHERLANDS

468 Prinsengracht
Amsterdam
GU2 6AT

NIGERIA

Federal Government
Special Guest House
Victoria Island
Lagos.

NORWAY

PO Box 6765
St Olavs Plass
N-0130 Oslo 1

SENEGAL

26 Avenue Albert Sarraut
PO Box 3420
Dakar

SWEDEN

Box 6183
S-102 33
Stockholm

TANZANIA

PO Box 2239
Dar es Salaam
PO Box 680
Morogoro

USSR

Kropotkinskaya 10
Moscow

UNITED KINGDOM

PO Box 38
28 Penton Street
London N1 9PR

UNITED STATES

801 Second Avenue
Apt 405
New York NYC 10017

ZAMBIA

PO Box 31791
Lusaka

SEPTEMBER 1988

SECHABA

ISSN:0037-0509

Volume 22 No 9

CONTENTS:

EDITORIAL

The Solution of the Regional Conflict in Southern Africa 1

MANDELA REFUTES BROWN'S CLAIMS

Statement by Mandela's Lawyer, Ismail Ayob 2

THE REVOLUTIONARY ARMY

By Ronnie Kasrils 3

BLACK UNIVERSITIES AND THE LIBERATION STRUGGLE

By A Z April 10

STATEMENT OF THE NEC OF THE ANC 15

CENTRE PAGE

Freedom March in Britain 16

THE MANDELA CONCERT

By Mike Ketchum 18

APARTHEID DENIES FREEDOM TO THINK

By F S Maqethuka 21

LETTER TO THE EDITOR 25

REVIEW ARTICLES 27

LISTEN TO RADIO FREEDOM

**Voice of the African National Congress
And Umkhonto We Sizwe, the People's Army**

Radio Lusaka

Daily 7.00 pm:
Wednesday 10.15-10.45 pm:
Thursday 9.30-10.00 pm:
Friday 10.15-10.45 pm:
Short wave 31mb 9505 KHz
Sunday 8.00-8.45 am:
Short wave 25mb 11880 KHz

Radio Luanda

Monday-Saturday 7.30 pm:
Sunday 8.30 pm:
Short wave 31mb 9535 KHz
and 25 mb

Radio Madagascar

Monday-Saturday 7.00-9.00 pm:
Sunday 7.00-8.00 pm:
Short wave 49mb 6135 KHz

Radio Ethiopia

Daily, 9.30-10.00 pm:
Short wave 31mb 9595 KHz

Radio Tanzania

Monday Wednesday Friday 8.15 pm:
Tuesday Thursday Saturday 6.15 am:
Short wave 31mb 9750 KHz

The above are South African times

THE SOLUTION OF THE REGIONAL CONFLICT IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

The military and political defeat of Portuguese colonialism in 1974/75 changed the balance of forces in Southern Africa. Apartheid felt more threatened. The racists became more aggressive. They invaded Angola and the Angolan government asked for assistance from Cuba.

This story is well-known: the racists ran out of Angola faster than they entered.

Since then, however, the apartheid troops have still been attacking Angola causing untold misery and irreparable damage. Even Botha himself, the President, entered the occupied territory more than once. Apartheid has been committing a triple crime against the people of Namibia: colonising Namibia, using it as a launching pad against Angola and nurturing, feeding, training, financing and deploying UNITA bandits on Namibian soil. This is to say nothing of the activities of the apartheid-supported MNR in Mozambique, the attacks on the Front Line States and the destabilisation of the whole region. This is the nature of the regional conflict in Southern Africa. Apartheid is the source of the conflict.

But the South African racists blundered at the end of 1987. With their sophisticated equipments, including computers and pilotless planes, they attacked Cuito Cuanavale. The Cuban forces were stationed in Menongue, 200 km from Cuito Cuanavale.

The invasion was massive. Two problems arose: the very existence of the Angolan state was threatened: so were the lives of the Cubans who were far fewer in numbers than the enemy forces. For the second time Angola asked for assistance from the Cubans. There was need for reinforcements. The first task was to stop the enemy advance in Mid-November. MIG 23 pilots helped to achieve air and anti-aircraft superiority over the enemy who became

fearful and began avoiding air combat. They ran for their lives leaving weaponry and ammunition behind. This conflict lasted for six months.

Now this 'wounded beast,' started calling for negotiations — something totally unknown in the vocabulary of apartheid. Cuba which is not seeking a military victory over South Africa but a fair solution, agreed to a negotiation process.

We all know that negotiations are a very delicate and therefore confidential business but there are already indications as to the direction of this process. In the deliberations so far the Cubans have made it clear that the Boers are not withdrawing from Angola and Namibia — they are being pushed out. The implementation of UN resolution 435 on Namibia is crucial in these negotiations.

At the disastrous Congo-Brazzaville meeting they made inadmissible demands and even threats — they wanted guarantees. That was a fiasco of a meeting — a travesty. Now they are introducing a new angle to the negotiation process — the ANC. Meanwhile the Cubans have agreed that the problem of UNITA is an Angolan and American problem which should not feature in these negotiations.

The solution of this regional conflict is also in the interest of the US since alliance with apartheid South Africa hampers its ties with the rest of Africa.

What the Cubans and Angolans did at Cuito Cuanavale was of historic significance for the future of our struggle. When the history of our anti-colonial struggle is written Cuito Cuanavale will be regarded as a milestone.

After 13 years, 13 long years, apartheid has been forced to the negotiating table — with, of all people, communists!

MANDELA REFUTES BROWN'S CLAIMS

Mr Robert Brown is a Black American businessman, known for his conservative views, controversial business dealings and his opposition to economic sanctions against South Africa. He was nominated — of all people — by President Reagan in 1986 to be United States Ambassador to South Africa. He could not qualify. Recently he emerged in South Africa, only to cause a political scandal. The following statement is from Nelson Mandela's lawyer, Mr Ismail Ayob in Johannesburg.

It is in response to claims made by a certain American lawyer, Mr Robert Brown that Mr Mandela had given him rights to the Mandela name and to represent the Mandela's family abroad. The claims are proved as false. The following clarifies:

Mr Robert Brown does not represent the Mandela family's interests in any way.

Mr Brown was given permission by the South African prison authorities to visit Mr Mandela last Saturday July 23rd 1988 for 40 minutes.

At the meeting Mr Mandela firmly rejected the suggestion made by Mr Brown that he be given a Power of Attorney to represent the interests of the family.

Mr Brown had advised Mr Mandela that the family name was being abused by certain persons in the United States for monetary gain.

Mr Mandela was of the view that any matter related to the family would only be dealt with by his organisation, the African National Congress and that Mr Brown's request should be put to Mr Oliver Tambo, the President of the organisation who, Mr Mandela said, was his closest friend and colleague. He advised Mr Brown further

that he would consider any decision made by the African National Congress to be in the best interests of his family.

Mr Mandela was of the view that if the family name needed protection, it could only be protected by the African National Congress with its worldwide infra-structure and only the African National Congress is authorised and empowered to act on his behalf.

Mr Mandela first heard of Mr Robert Brown through a letter addressed to him by the President of Boston University in the United States early in 1987. Mr Brown assisted his daughter Zenani and his son-in-law Thumbumuzi to obtain a scholarship at the university where they are studying at present.

With regard to the world-wide campaign for his release, he has specifically thanked everyone for their wonderful support.

DISCUSSION ARTICLE



THE REVOLUTIONARY ARMY

By Ronnie Kasrils

Ronnie Kasrils has been a member of Umkhonto We Sizwe since it was founded. He recently became a member of the National Executive Committee of the ANC.

Since Umkhonto We Sizwe was first formed, our positions on armed struggle have amounted to:

■ We are committed to a strategy of revolutionary armed struggle to achieve our goal — the seizure of political power and the creation of a liberated South Africa based on the Freedom Charter.

■ Umkhonto We Sizwe is the instrument of the ANC and of our liberation movement, and takes its leadership, direction and command from the ANC.

■ Political policy and strategy determines our military strategy; politics guides the gun.

■ Armed struggle must complement mass struggle, and we seek to combine all forms of struggle: violent and non-violent, legal and illegal.

■ The development of the armed struggle depends on its being rooted among the people — our Umkhonto combatants and organisers must therefore base themselves amongst the people in order to involve the masses in a people's war.

Numerous consequences and tasks flow from this. Our struggle is a most complex

one. Problems have mounted, and have often been shelved owing to the exile years; there is the fact that we are based largely abroad, and lack an underground political base at home. How many of the consequences and tasks flowing from our positions on the armed struggle have not been addressed or tackled, or maybe not even perceived?

This is not simply a problem for the High Command of Umkhonto We Sizwe, but for our entire movement. Anything that relates to our fundamental strategy — seizure of power through force of arms — is a fundamental question for us all, and that includes the leadership and activists of our mass democratic movement at home as well as the various sectors of our movement abroad, whether military or political.

The fact that we proclaimed our armed struggle on December 16th 1961, and that it is still at an extremely low stage of development, must force us to examine the problem areas frankly and critically.

It is certainly true that the blows Umkhonto We Sizwe has delivered to the enemy and the heroic sacrifices of our combatants have played a vital role in inspiring our peo-

ple and popularising the ANC. Yet, despite the tremendous upsurge of mass resistance over the past three years, we were not able to take full advantage of the favourable conditions that materialised. We were unable to deploy sufficient forces at home; our cadres still found big problems in basing themselves amongst our people; our underground failed to grow sufficiently, and our people were left to face the enemy and his vigilantes with sticks and stones. As a result, the incredible mass resistance and the strikes were not sufficiently reinforced by armed struggle.

Put Theory Into Practice

It is therefore clear that, though we have formulated theoretical positions such as "the armed struggle must complement the mass struggle" and "the guerrilla must be rooted among the people," and so on, it is one thing to state the theory and quite another to put it into practice.

It is also clear that most people at home, including people within the mass democratic movement, still regard Umkhonto We Sizwe as some kind of external force that must come and defend them from the vigilantes and destroy the enemy. They do not see themselves as being an integral part of the armed struggle.

Considering these defects, one asks: is it possible that we are incorrect in believing that armed struggle is the way forward? When Govan Mbeki was released from prison, *Die Beeld* gloated that he had had 23 years to ponder on the "incorrectness" of his belief that armed revolution was possible.

The Subjective Factor

This period of township uprisings, which also spilled over into some rural areas and bantustans, has revealed strengths and weaknesses. On the one hand, it has shown the existence of certain objective elements of a revolutionary situation in our country — the ruling class unable to rule in the old way; the oppressed masses not prepared

to live under the old conditions; the heightened mass struggle and general crisis in the country. On the other hand, the situation has revealed our organisational weaknesses, both inside and outside the country — what is referred to as subjective conditions.

History has shown that a revolutionary situation will persist for as long as a ruling class is unable to resolve its contradictions. But a successful revolution is dependent on subjective factors — the mood of the masses, their confidence in the revolutionary movement, and its organisational ability to lead them out of the current impasse to the seizure of power.

When we speak of subjective conditions, we are referring to the presence of revolutionary organisations and their ability to organise and lead the masses in all forms of struggle — armed struggle included. The subjective factor is organisation. It is the existence of a revolutionary party or movement which is capable of providing the correct strategic and tactical guidance, having created the forces and means to carry out the tasks of the struggle. This includes also the political and military readiness of the advanced masses, who become part of the revolutionary army. When the masses fight with stones, it shows the absence of revolutionary organs.

The past three years have shown us how relatively underdeveloped the subjective factor is. To overcome this weakness is the key task of our movement. We have had endless discussions and meetings about how it should be done. We have experimented with different structural forms. Differences of approach exist between military and political organs of the movement. We appear to agree in meetings but differ in practice. Confusion exists among rank-and-file cadres going home as to what structures to create, and between externally trained cadres and those activists who have never left home.

The Seizure of Power: Policy Positions?

In fact, there are extremely few policy positions on how power is to be seized. And this

is central to the problem. For, unless we have a clear vision on how power is to be seized, we cannot effectively address the question of what type of organs are required for such a task. We cannot effectively address the subjective tasks.

What is demanded is a vision of how power is to be seized and a plan for the building of the forces and means to do it. This vision and this plan must be clearly understood by all activists, at home and abroad, within the terms of their tasks and responsibilities, so that all have a clear and common understanding of their own role within the machinery of struggle.

Central to the creation of the subjective factor is Umkhonto We Sizwe. For to achieve our goal — the seizure of political power through our strategy of revolutionary armed struggle — it is necessary to create a revolutionary army.

The main obstacles on the way to power are the South African Defence Force and the South African Police. These obstacles can be removed only through the means of a revolutionary army. At present, Umkhonto We Sizwe is only the nucleus of such an army. It has to be extended and developed to embrace all potential revolutionary forces.

A revolutionary army must be composed and structured in such a way that it can be situated among the masses. The problem facing us is that the bulk of our army is recruited and trained outside the country, and remains there. We face considerable problems in the infiltration and rooting of our combatants inside the country. The enemy understands this, and his security forces work overtime to prevent it occurring. For once we succeed in basing our forces within the country, the armed struggle will merge with the mass struggle, and this will really spell the end of White supremacy.

An ex-Rhodesian farmer who has settled in the northern Transvaal border area said that our land mines, while creating a nuisance, would not really change the situation because we simply run in and out of the country. What caused the problem in Zimbabwe was that the 'terrorists' were living among the people. And one might add that, until Zimbabwean guerrillas learn-

ed how to live among the people, their struggle remained in the doldrums as they engaged in hit-and-run raids in and out of the country.

My contention is that a clear conception of what the revolutionary army could and should be will help solve this problem.

Three Components

Clearly, the revolutionary army is the armed force of the revolution. But we should not see it as a single uniform organ. It could consist of three component parts, each representing different levels of political and combat readiness and different forms of organisational work. It is essential to identify each of these components and have an organisational plan as to how to recruit them, prepare and train them, and bring them into the revolutionary army.

The organised advanced detachment is the nucleus of the revolutionary army. The trained, full-time combatants of Umkhonto We Sizwe are central to it; but they must themselves have different specialisations, be grouped into combat units of various types:

■ Guerrilla units of the countryside, whose size and mode of operation will depend on the terrain. They aim to link up with villagers and farm labourers.

■ Underground urban combat groups based in factories and other work places, and residential areas. They may be combat groups, sabotage units, elimination squads; they may be part-time combatants who work by day and operate by night.

■ Self-defence units, which have already begun to emerge out of necessity as the popular democratic organisations have been forced to defend themselves, their leaders, their homes, offices and meetings from the enemy. Self-defence units can be organised by legal or underground organisations, and can form the basis of a people's self-defence militia. Trained cadres of Umkhonto We Sizwe must merge into these people's self-defence units and lead them.

Creating the advanced detachments is the first necessary step to building the

revolutionary army. For over 25 years we have concentrated on building one element of this core — Umkhonto We Sizwe. This has been done under extremely difficult and problematic conditions, and has been a tremendous achievement, which should not be belittled. Conditions have now developed which give us the possibilities of enlarging Umkhonto. The emergence of self-defence units illustrates this point.

By creating underground combat groups in the urban areas and especially the factories, by developing the self-defence units in towns and villages, by basing small units among the rural people, we will begin to recruit combatants inside the country, among the workers, the women, the rural people and the youth, and overcome the most problematic consequences of having been based externally for so many years. We will no longer be dependent for recruits on those who are prepared to leave the country for training. If we are locally based, the enemy's chances of infiltrating our ranks will be restricted.

Revolutionary Armed People

The development of the organised advanced detachments, from their Umkhonto base, will enable us to root the armed struggle amongst our people within our country. This will enable us to arm our people and realistically prepare and plan for the armed seizure of power.

The revolutionary armed people consist of the most conscious, active elements from amongst the masses, who have shown their readiness to confront the enemy with whatever means are at hand, from stones to petrol bombs and knives, to the building of barricades. These are the street fighters who, in their tens of thousands, have already engaged the enemy in numerous pitched battles. They are not only willing to take up arms; they have been calling for them.

They must be drawn into the revolutionary army. It is the task of the nucleus — the full-time combatants and guerrillas — to recruit, prepare and train them. They must be given military skills and weapons,

and be organised into disciplined fighting units under the organised command and leadership of the advanced detachments, to take part in the armed struggle for political power.

As the armed struggle develops, so more and more activists from among the mass political struggle will be reached and drawn into the ranks of the revolutionary army. In this way, the nucleus — or the vanguard — bridges the gap between itself and the masses, finds ways of arming the people and creating the revolutionary army.

There are also units of the enemy armed forces, elements from within the enemy army and police, who are won over at decisive moments to side with the revolution. It is a vital task to work within the enemy forces, to agitate and politicise soldiers, police, vigilantes and other auxiliary forces of the enemy, in order to show them who the true enemy is, and thus render them ineffective for the purposes of the state. Some sections will be neutralised, while others will be won over. Those who are won over to the side of the revolution bring their arms with them and become part of the revolutionary army.

Discontent Among The Enemy Forces

Recent developments at home show the potential for such work, particularly among Black soldiers, officers and police. Some examples are the Transkei coup; the abortive coup in Bophuthatswana; mutinies among municipal police in Sebokeng and Lekoa; mutinies among Namibian troops on the Angolan border. Clearly there is considerable scope to win over these elements, making the enemy pay the price for utilising Black troops as cannon fodder.

The fact that many White conscripts in the SADF are disaffected creates possibilities of at least neutralising significant sections of the White soldiers and possibly winning some elements over to our side, at the decisive moment. Given the enemy's acute White manpower shortage, the mere neutralisation, at a decisive moment, of

even — let us say — one-tenth of the White conscript army could make all the difference to the balance of forces.

We have to move away from simply encouraging Whites to refuse to serve in the SADF, to getting them actively involved in the SADF for purposes of clandestinely organising and agitating from within, no matter how difficult such a task may appear to be. In a lecture on the 1905 Revolution, Lenin remarked that, "it is foolish peacefully to refuse to perform military service." It is necessary to struggle to win over the enemy forces or neutralise them, for revolutionary movements seldom achieve their objectives unless they can convert or weaken the spirit of the soldiers whose duty it is to uphold the existing regime.

Before the Rivonia setback, when we had a strong underground at home, the idea was that the trained cadres of Umkhonto We Sizwe, returning to the country, would be received by the underground network, and fall under it. The logical development would have been a revolutionary army based on that underground.

The Underground And the Army

The underground would have carried out the all-essential political tasks of organising the masses, developing illegal means of propaganda, engaging in all-round vanguard activity. The underground would have been the backbone of our revolutionary forces and army, would have recruited for it and given it leadership. Such an underground would have been clear about the use of revolutionary violence, in which Umkhonto We Sizwe is the main striking force. After all, it was the underground that created Umkhonto We Sizwe in the first place!

The intervening years have seen many problems building up. The lack of such an underground at home, and the presence of a large guerrilla force outside the country, waiting to come to the defence of the people and punish the enemy, has, I feel, clouded our vision. In the most pragmatic sense, the need to deploy cadres of

Umkhonto at home for combat work could not wait on the reconstruction of our internal underground. In the process, this has helped to create a serious imbalance between our political and military structures.

It has not been possible to suspend combat actions and concentrate on the building of the underground network, although it could be argued that greater talent, energy and resources should have been put into redressing the imbalance. For it is incontrovertible that a strong underground presence at home would help solve all the problems we face. We are talking about an underground that can bring the masses into action, that can work for a nation-wide general strike, that can help build and lead the revolutionary armed forces.

Internal Structures

Where an underground structure does not exist, or only partly exists, we must build both the underground structures and the revolutionary army. Such a structure must be capable of organising our people for political work and combat work. For this purpose we must use the best MK cadres as organisers. There is no need to have an artificial division between political work and combat work, as long as we follow the principle that the ANC gives leadership to Umkhonto We Sizwe, and that the structures of the political movement control the revolutionary army.

The political underground and combat forces will grow side by side with the combat forces, falling, of course, under the leadership of the local politico-military committee. Attention will be paid to all forms of struggle, with the activists and combatants ready to show the masses how to raise the struggle to the higher forms of armed struggle. The politico-military committees must guard against both 'leftist' and 'opportunist' tendencies, that is, against employing purely military or purely peaceful and legal forms of struggle.

During the process of developing the revolutionary army, we build our combat units, mercilessly attack the enemy forces, concentrate on eliminating his personnel which he cannot replenish and which is his

Achilles' heel, demoralise his forces, and all the time gather our own strength. We develop from a nucleus to a fully-fledged people's army, waging a people's war.

As to which of the components of the revolutionary army will give us the best results, the likely force, given South Africa's industrial base, will in all probability be the underground combat units based in the factories and townships — the very forces that have reminded us these past years of our people's industrial and urban insurrectionary strength.

Though the fierce repression unleashed by the enemy appears at the moment to have turned the tide of resistance of the past few years, we must bear in mind that mass resistance comes in waves. The struggle ebbs and flows. The people have learned a great deal about their potential strength in this period. We must prepare our forces and means so that, when the next waves of mass struggle rise again to batter the system of apartheid, we are able to ensure that the armed struggle coincides with, and reinforces, the high tide of resistance. The nature of the revolutionary situation that still persists in our country is such that the next waves of struggle will surely reach higher than ever witnessed hitherto.

Building the revolutionary army is the key to creating the subjective conditions of a revolutionary situation. As the forces and means of our revolution become more powerful, so the possibilities of seizing power will materialise.

Developed Strategy

How will power be seized? We cannot say exactly, but we must have a developed strategy. Yet in our policy documents and official statements, surprisingly little guidance is given. One is left with the impression that a combination of mass struggle, strikes and armed blows will somehow create so much pressure on the regime that it will collapse, and our movement will take power. The impression is also created that such a situation might come about through some form of negotiation.

There have been some lively debates,

and some lively articles written, about the role of insurrection. Sometimes it is counterposed to protracted guerrilla struggle, sometimes seen as its culmination. No firm conclusions, however, have yet been drawn in our strategy documents.

I stated at the outset that we need a clear vision of how power may be seized if we are to sort out our organisational problems and structures, as well as motivate our cadres, because structures must be geared to the strategy of seizing power, and that means not only leadership organs but structures at the grassroots.

Armed uprising or insurrection has always been considered by revolutionaries as the main way to seize power. The onset of guerrilla struggles in colonially dominated countries, from the 1950s on, usually resulting in negotiation and national independence, has perhaps created the impression that insurrection is nowadays something far removed from the realm of possibility. Tom Lodge, assessing the military potential of the ANC in *Work in Progress* 50/51, wrote that the importance of guerrilla insurgency "will remain chiefly psychological," and that "the probabilities are against a military-based seizure of power." He is wrong, of course, but can be excused because we have given him no cause to assume otherwise.

Of course, we do not dogmatically claim that the seizure of power by one group from another must entail violence. History shows that a peaceful way is possible. But what is necessary to both — whether violent or peaceful — is the presence of the revolutionary army. The ruling class or group will never give up power voluntarily. If the ruling power in South Africa ever reaches a stage where it is hopelessly divided and is forced to negotiate, it will only be in the circumstances of a major crisis from which there is no other escape, and because of the presence of a revolutionary army.

Powerful Armed Force

On the other hand, the possibility of a national armed uprising of all our people can be open to us only if we have the necessary forces and means to carry out the insurrec-

tion. Every revolution that has to depend on popular support for its ultimate success demands an active revolutionary situation before insurrection can be safely launched. It also needs a movement which has the forces and means powerful enough to overthrow the existing order.

Insurrection is an open armed action taken by certain classes or social forces against the existing political power. It is the highest stage in the revolutionary process — the culmination of the objective and subjective factors at a decisive moment which, if the revolutionary forces are properly guided, leads to the seizure of power.


A successful insurrection requires planning and preparation. Among these preparations are:

- the presence of a political underground;
- the presence of the revolutionary army;
- work within the enemy forces to weaken their effective capacity.

The events of the last three years in our country — more particularly the fighting mood and spirit of our people, the strength of the working class and the urban masses, the rising spirit in the countryside — have reminded us of the insurrectionary energy

of the South African people. The gathering of our forces, so that the subjective elements of our revolution are strengthened, may be protracted, or they may be more rapid than we imagine. If we take advantage of the favourable conditions, and are clear as to what organs we need to create, then it may take a much shorter time than we imagine. Building the revolutionary army, and with it the underground, with the insurrectionary seizure of power in mind, is an objective that can be achieved by planned, purposeful organisational work in a relatively short period of time (such as five years) where the conditions are favourable, and where the revolutionary army is waging the war.

One final point. The revolutionary army is not only the organ for building up the revolutionary forces and for seizing power; it also becomes the organ for defending and guaranteeing the revolution. If power came prematurely, through some negotiated formula imposed by circumstances beyond our control, and we had no revolutionary army at our disposal, we would find our people cheated of real power. So whatever way we look at it, the creation of a revolutionary army is our most crucial task.



We must remember two important facts:

First, the heroic struggles of students at UNITRA, like those at Turfloop, Fort Hare, Ngoye, Western Cape, Durban Westville and Bophuthatswana since the early 1970s, have shown unambiguously that the oppressed have never accepted apartheid gutter education, and will continue to resist it — even if unevenly, given the differing conditions they face — until the green, gold and black flag of liberation flutters in the South African sunshine.

Second, not all the bush colleges started in the years after the infamous Extension of University Education Act of 1959 have become instruments of apartheid. Indeed, one of them, the University of the Western Cape (UWC) stands today as a symbol of resistance. It has been transformed, primarily through student action, into an institution in which the struggle to establish a 'people's university' has made concrete advances. There are sharp limits to what has been achieved, and to what can be achieved, until there is fundamental political change in South Africa, but much more than the so-called 'liberal,' historically White, universities, UWC is being seen as a model for the post-apartheid future.

What is happening at the Black universities is of crucial significance for the liberation movement, in terms both of the strategic aims of creating alternative structures as a stage towards the achievement of people's power, and of challenging and changing the whole basis of social reproduction in education.

Creations of Apartheid

When the National Party came to power in 1948, there were fewer than 1 000 Black students in tertiary education. Half were at the South African Native College, which had been formed in 1916 and later became Fort Hare, and half at the various 'White' universities. In order to promote its apartheid programme, the National Party introduced the Bantu Education Act in 1953, as a blueprint for the future of the schooling system, and followed it up with the Extension of University Education Act in 1959, to extend its control of tertiary education.



Prison-like conditions for all Black university students.

The Extension of University Education Act made provision for a number of 'tribal' colleges for Blacks (largely under the control of the Ministers of Bantu, Indian and Coloured Affairs) and forbade White universities from accepting Black students, except under special circumstances, and only after obtaining permits from Pretoria. The University of Durban Westville was started for Indian students; the University of the Western Cape was set aside for those classified Coloured; the University of the North at Turfloop, for Sotho, Tswana and Venda speakers; the University of Zululand for Zulu and Swazi speakers. Separate legislation turned the University of Fort Hare, where many of our leaders were educated, into a tribal college for Xhosa speakers. Later, more such universities — Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda, Vista — were created according to the designs of apartheid. There are, therefore, nine Black universities in South Africa today.

During the first decade of their existence,

BLACK UNIVERSITIES AND THE LIBERATION STRUGGLE

An article on the University of the Transkei in the February issue of *Sechaba* raised important issues. It showed that UNITRA is in effect a tribal bush college controlled by the bantustan administration in a way that makes a mockery of the idea of a university.

By A Z April

the new institutions were just what their creators wished them to be. They were strictly segregated on the 'ethnic' basis of apartheid, and controlled with an iron rod, by Verwoerdian ideologues, without serious challenge from the small student bodies. The councils were run by government nominees. Only here and there could one find a token Black face, acting in an 'advisory' capacity. At the University of the North, in a historic speech on graduation day in 1972, Ongkopotse Tiro revealed that the advisory council consisted of chiefs who had never been to university. There were only a handful of powerless Black lecturers, and rigid social segregation was maintained on the new campuses.

Struggles of the 1970s

The regime had its own objectives in setting up these apartheid institutions in the 1960s. It wished to enlarge the Black pro-

fessional and managerial class, to administer the bantustans and the segregated Coloured and Indian administrations. Later, in the 1970s, there was a further objective: to provide the increased numbers of skilled Black workers and professionals required for economic growth. This meshed with the strategy used by the regime, of attempting to broaden the base of its support by fostering the development of a Black 'middle class,' which would guarantee political stability.

However, by establishing apartheid institutions, the apartheid state was also opening new fields of struggle between the forces of reaction and those of liberation. As a recent article has underlined, one of the fundamental contradictions of apartheid and Bantu Education was that, by lumping together 'commonly oppressed' people in various areas of life, especially education, it created conditions, and a political platform, for the expression of a racially-based political consciousness. The result was the emergence of the Black Consciousness philosophy, and its organisational arm, the South African Students' Organisation (SASO), among the first generation of students born under apartheid. A wave of militancy swept through the Black campuses in the early 1970s. The number of Black students grew by 200% between 1958 and 1970, and this provided the base for the militant new Black Consciousness generation.

The student struggles at Turfloop and elsewhere in the early 1970s showed the importance of confronting the apartheid enemy at every level. Far from becoming pliant models of submission, as the founders of the bush colleges intended, the students at these colleges fundamentally challenged apartheid education by rubbing the concept, relating student grievances to the wider structures of society, challenging the power relations on the campuses, and articulating alternative visions of a university.

By the mid-1970s, student struggles had succeeded in forcing the state to restructure the way in which it controlled tertiary education. Many of the student demands — for example, the appointment of Black Rectors and the Africanisation of

the universities — found their way into the reports of various Commissions of Enquiry set up and responded to by the state.

At another level, Black Consciousness was spreading from the universities to high school students and others, to fuel the explosion that erupted in Soweto in 1976.

The 1980s and UWC

Undoubtedly, the student struggles on the Black campuses were a major influence on the politics of the 1970s. They fed into, and were shaped by, the aims and strategies of the broad liberation movement, and created new space for student protest, mobilisation and organisation. They demonstrated that the only way forward was through struggle, and that advances could be made, even if conditions were determined by the enemy.

The battles of the early 1970s were those of a specific time, specific conditions and a specific struggle. Today, the Black campuses are reflecting the struggles of a different period, particularly at UWC. The overall struggle has advanced and deepened over the past decade, to concern itself with more fundamental issues of power. The focus of struggle at UWC now, therefore, is how to fundamentally transform an institution that has, in effect, been taken over, rather than to protest about exclusion and racial discrimination in the university — in other words, how to give content to the slogan, "People's education for people's power."

The process of transformation has not been easy. By the end of the 1960s, for example, there was only one Black lecturer on the staff of UWC, and the student body was small and passive. However, the Black Consciousness militancy of the early 1970s soon affected the campus, and the struggles of the time pushed UWC into the next stage of its development.

Advance and Transformation

In the decade after 1975, UWC was gradually transformed from a bush college

into a university proper, and progressives were able to make major advances on the campus. A number of factors were responsible for this: the appointment of the first Black Rector, who, in contrast to those on other campuses, provided space for progressives to operate; intensifying student militancy, as the Western Cape became the focus of widespread school boycotts from 1979 to 1983; the emergence of a core of progressive staff, grouped into the 'Black caucus,' who mobilised successfully around issues such as appointments and Black representation on the councils of the university; legal changes which gave UWC full control over the appointment of its academic staff and the admission of students other than those classified as Coloured. These legal measures opened the way for structural changes which were crucial for the success of any attempt at fundamentally transforming UWC. Since 1983, for example, the number of African students has jumped from 31 to more than 500, making possible the transition of UWC to a non-racial, post-apartheid university.

Thus, by the mid-1980s, in contrast to most of the other Black universities, especially those under the control of bantustan administrations, UWC had undergone considerable change. Its location in a major metropolitan area, experiencing a high level of mass struggle, played a part in its development, as did the social character of its student body — over 85% of UWC students are of working-class origin, compared with 48% in bantustan universities. Militant student politics, characterised by class and exam boycotts, marches, strong organisation and open clashes with the police, had become a permanent feature of campus life. Increasingly, the staff, too, were articulating a vision of the future that harmonised with the demands of the students and the community.

Campus struggles during this period of change, like those in the early 1970s, were closely linked to, and informed by, broader political developments. As mass organisations emerged in the 1980s, students retreated from the position of the previous generation, when students had been seen as a leading force in the liberation movement, and acknowledged more and more

the primacy of community and worker issues. As part of wider political developments, student politics at UWC in the late 1970s underwent an ideological shift from Black Consciousness towards non-racial, 'Congress-type' politics. Throughout the 1980s, the campus has been informed by the politics of the Freedom Charter.

The appointment of a progressive Rector, occurring against the background of the insurrectionary climate of 1985-6, that projected UWC into its present phase.

'Home of the Left'

In 1986, Professor Jakes Gerwel became Rector, as a result of pressure from progressives. He had been schooled in the Black Consciousness struggles of the early 1970s, and then, like many of his generation, had gone on to become a fervent supporter of the 'Congress' position. He immediately stamped his mark. He committed UWC to becoming the "intellectual home of the democratic left" in South Africa, and embarked on a vigorous, self-conscious drive for fundamental change, so that these ideals could be realised. His appointment institutionalised progressive control of the university.

Gerwel and other progressives have taken very seriously the commitment to make UWC a radical university of the future, and constant student pressures ensure it will be maintained. The institution has openly aligned itself with the democratic forces, and set about transforming its structures and teaching practices in order to give content to these aims.

On the political level, it has become an important focus for progressive politics. In the past few years, for example, the campus has hosted the launching rally of the Western Cape regional affiliate of COSATU, the national launch of SAYCO, and big UDF rallies. *Nkosi Sikelel' iAfrika* is sung at official ceremonies, and Dr Allan Boesak and Archbishop Tutu were the special guests at the inauguration of the Rector. In 1988, Desmond Tutu became the new chancellor of the university.

Official identification with the democratic movement is only the tip of the iceberg as

far as political activism on the campus is concerned. Since 1983, students on and off the campus have played an important role in UDF activities in the Western Cape. In 1985 it was students, coming back from the Goniwe funeral in Cradock, who were most vocal in calling for action in solidarity with struggles in other regions of the country. This led to the Pollsmoor March, school and consumer boycotts, and eventually the extension of the state of emergency to the Western Cape. For more than a year, the campus was the scene of constant boycotts, militancy and clashes between police and students.

Support for ANC

During the intense struggles of the mid-1980s, students on the campus also regularly demonstrated open support for the ANC and its ally, the SACP.

At present, no less than nine from UWC, including an alleged commander of Umkhonto We Sizwe, are being charged with 'treason' in the courts of the racist regime, for ANC activity. Many other young lions of UWC have suffered detention, have gone into exile to join the liberation army, or, like Cecil Esau and Quintin Michaels, are languishing on Robben Island for ANC activity. The main square in the university is called Freedom Square, and the newest hostel on the campus has been named by the students the Basil February Residence, in honour of one of the early martyrs of Umkhonto We Sizwe.

Professor Gerwel has on numerous occasions emphasised that the ANC enjoys legitimacy among the oppressed masses, and is central to the future of South Africa. An official university delegation met with the ANC in Lusaka in 1986, and, on his return, the Rector said that he looked forward to the day when the people's leaders would be sitting in the Union Buildings.

People's Education

A major effort is being made to shake off the heritage of conservative and rote learning methods, which were being used to

perpetuate apartheid education. Most faculties are giving serious attention to democratising the teaching process, revising courses and implementing progressive techniques of teaching. Various departments and centres on the campus are involved in projects concerned with people's education, and are otherwise liaising with community groups. Last year, several departments held open days in collaboration with the National Education Crisis Committee and other progressive organisations. People's education has no meaning if it is not seen in the context of people's power, the Rector himself has declared.

Attention is being given to ensuring student involvement in committees and faculties, and a framework has been devised to ensure full and democratic consultation with all the interest groups in the university, including the workers on the campus, and the community.

At present, a vigorous debate is taking place, involving the South African National Students' Congress (SANSCO), the Rector, staff and education leaders, on issues such as the political tasks of academic work, boycotts, accountability and promoting non-sectarianism. In this debate, SANSCO has taken to task a handful of lecturers for voicing ultra-left criticisms while not being "actively involved in the theatre of struggle." A dynamic process is under way, as the institution attempts to break the fetters of the past and to represent and service the oppressed masses rather than the system.

UWC has not followed the course envisaged by its racist founders. Instead, it is taking the lead in defining the future nature and role of universities in South Africa. In rejecting its apartheid roots, it does not seek merely to become another prototype 'liberal' university like UCT or Wits, which are themselves reflections of their White, liberal, monopoly-capital bases, but to become an organically grounded African university of the future, addressing and accommodating the needs and aspirations of the oppressed in South Africa.

The Way Ahead

Yet, despite these aims, UWC still has a long way to go before it can become a gen-

uine people's university. The current left political hegemony on the campus is not the successful culmination of a struggle, but can only be regarded as the first step towards more fundamental change. For example, a big residue of conservatism still exists among the teaching staff, particularly in the science faculties. It will take a long time for this historical legacy to be undone. Similarly, the University Council, while supportive of the radical Rector at present, is unrepresentative of the social forces at the university, and will remain so until fundamental political change occurs in South Africa. The university has an increasingly prominent national role, and this fact underlines the importance of the Black universities in future education struggles, and in defining post-apartheid strategies.

The developments at UWC have naturally not gone unnoticed by the regime and its puppets in the tricameral parliament. They have described UWC as a "communist nest," and made a number of threatening noises. Court cases and detentions have revealed close security police monitoring of activities on the campus. UWC was undoubtedly in the minds of the state when it introduced the so-called De Klerk Bill in 1987, with the aim of forcing universities to toe the government line, and putting an end to campus political activity. The university took the government to court and won, and the Bill was withdrawn.

But the threat to UWC and other South African universities is as grave as ever. The Transkei case study provided by *Sechaba*, and the deaths of students at the hands of Buthelezi's impis at Ngoye a few years ago, are just two examples of the determination of the repressive state and its agencies to assert control over the universities, and roll back the democratic gains. It is the duty of the democratic forces, nonetheless, to intensify and extend the struggle at all levels within the universities. Turfloop in the 1970s and UWC at the present stage have shown that the masses can, through struggle, help undermine and transform social structures set up by the state. Without underestimating structural realities, or overestimating the potential for radical transformation, there is a great deal the liberatory forces can do, and still need to do, to take the struggle in the universities forward.

STATEMENT OF THE NATIONAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS

The National Executive Committee of the African National Congress recently met to examine:

- A. The situation in Southern Africa, and
- B. The conduct of armed struggle within South Africa in the past six months.

The National Executive Committee welcomed the progress made in the negotiations aimed at securing the withdrawal of South African troops from the People's Republic of Angola and the achievement of independence for Namibia on the basis of Resolution 435 of the United Nations Security Council.

The agreement reached thus far is a victory for the peoples of Angola and the rest of Southern Africa, and for progressive mankind. It is a product of the struggles and sacrifices of the peoples of the sub-continent and their international supporters. Similarly, the prospect for a just resolution of the conflict in Southern Africa depends on the efforts of all progressive forces to ensure that the Pretoria regime does not renege on the agreement reached or place obstacles in the path of future progress.

In this regard the African National Congress concurs with the positions of the Frontline States as reflected in the resolutions adopted at their most recent summit in Luanda, People's Republic of Angola.

The National Executive Committee further re-affirmed the centrality of the armed struggle in the national democratic revolution and the need to further escalate armed actions and transform our offensive into a generalised people's war. It noted that there has been a significant and welcome escalation of this offensive, in keeping with our perspectives.

However, the National Executive Committee also expressed concern at the recent spate of attacks on civilian targets. Some of these attacks have been carried

out by cadres of the people's army, Umkhonto We Sizwe. Inspired by anger at the regime's campaign of terror against the oppressed and democratic forces, both within and outside South Africa, in certain instances operational circumstances resulted in unintended casualties.

Yet it has come to our notice that agents of the Pretoria regime have been detailed to carry out a number of bomb attacks deliberately to sow confusion among the people of South Africa and the international community, and to discredit the African National Congress.

The ANC hereby underscores that it is contrary to our policy to select targets whose sole objective is to strike at civilians. Our morality as revolutionaries dictates that we respect the values underpinning the humane conduct of war. Any other course of action would also play into the hands of the enemy.

The National Executive Committee also welcomes the decision by scores of young white South Africans to refuse to serve in the racist South African army. This courageous action further underlines the crises facing the militarist ruling clique and reinforces the efforts of all peace-loving South Africans for a future free of racism, oppression and war.

The National Executive Committee accordingly calls on all the people of our country to intensify the revolutionary offensive in accordance with our Movement's perspective as enshrined in the Freedom Charter.

We call on the international community to intensify the campaign for the all-round isolation of apartheid South Africa, and further to muster increased support for the struggling people of South Africa, Namibia and the sub-continent.

Lusaka

August 17th 1988

FREEDOM MARCH, BRITAIN JULY 17TH

The Freedom March, organised by the British Anti-Apartheid Movement, as the climax of the Mandela Freedom At 70 Campaign, began from Glasgow with a send-off by President Tambo, Archbishop Huddleston and the Reverend Allan Boesak and ended at Hyde Park in London, at a mass rally of about a quarter of a million people.



FREEDOM MARCH, BRITAIN JULY 17TH

The Freedom March, organised by the British Anti-Apartheid Movement, as the climax of the Mandela Freedom At 70 Campaign, began from Glasgow with a send-off by President Tambo, Archbishop Huddleston and the Reverend Allan Boesak and ended at Hyde Park in London, at a mass rally of about a quarter of a million people.



THE MANDELA CONCERT

By Mike Ketchum



The Nelson Mandela 70th Birthday Tribute Concert, held on June 11th 1988 in Wembley Stadium in London, was watched not only by a capacity audience of 72 000 but also on television, by close on a billion people in over 60 countries of the world. The writer of this article, a worker for the British Anti-Apartheid Movement, helped to organise the event.

During the ten hours of the Mandela Birthday Concert, the attention of the world was focused, as perhaps never so powerfully before, on the evils of the apartheid regime, and, more especially, on the continued imprisonment of the acknowledged leader of the South African majority, and the thousands of other prisoners who languish in the gaols of Namibia and South Africa.

What an event it was — what a feast! From midday until ten in the evening, some of the

greatest entertainers of the world gave themselves in praise of Nelson Mandela and what he stands for. In the dazzling, non-stop parade were jazz, rock and traditional groups; singers, instrumentalists, dancers, actors, comedians, from Europe, North America and Africa — indeed, there were famous jazz veterans and newer groups from South Africa itself. An American operatic soprano ended the programme.*

The origins of the concert dated back two



years, to 1986, with the formation in Britain of Artists Against Apartheid. The organisers, Jerry Dammers and Dali Tambo, invited a host of artists to take part in a Freedom Festival on Clapham Common, in London. The march to Clapham Common before the concert was supported by 100 000 people representing almost all sections of British society. At the height of the afternoon, 250 000 were gathered on the great green Common to listen to the artists express their solidarity with the people of Namibia and South Africa through their words and music, and to hear the representatives of the ANC, of SWAPO and of the British Anti-Apartheid Movement.

The Freedom Festival took place shortly after the state of emergency was imposed in South Africa. It was a new high point in

mobilising public opinion in Britain. In spite of this, it was not a financial success. The Anti-Apartheid Movement, always short of funds, lost £80 000, was saved from bankruptcy only by an emergency appeal, and was therefore hampered at a time when maximum activity was required.

Towards a Big Event

Artists Against Apartheid followed up the artistic success of the Freedom Festival by organising a series of smaller benefit concerts, which raised money for the ANC, SWAPO, and the AAM; but it was clear that a bigger event was the only immediate answer to the increasing financial demands of the situation. After we had realised that, events moved inexorably forward.

We enquired about the availability of Wembley Stadium. We sought the co-operation of a professional producer, Tony Hollingsworth, who had previously worked with Artists Against Apartheid, as well as with the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament and Amnesty International, and asked him to be involved. We approached artists. The breakthrough came late in 1987, when Simple Minds committed themselves.

The idea behind the event was that money would be raised for the campaigning of the Anti-Apartheid Movement and for a range of agencies which give practical help to the children of Southern Africa, who are suffering from the outrages of apartheid. The budgets were prepared, and a surplus of half a million pounds looked likely.

We decided that the political emphasis of the concert should be on the issue of Nelson Mandela and other South African and Namibian political prisoners. We were able to make a firm booking for Wembley Stadium on June 11th 1988, and started planning a campaign. The Mandela Freedom At 70 Campaign eventually turned out to be the largest the British Anti-Apartheid Movement had ever organised.

Television Coverage

BBC Television expressed interest in televising the whole event live on BBC2, and the prospect of world-wide TV coverage opened up. The political benefits of such media attention were tremendous.

Of course, the BBC was denounced by the extreme right. There were threats of an injunction to stop the coverage. Attempts were made to forbid any of the performers' making 'political statements.' Sections of the British press mounted a campaign of lies about the purposes of the concert. But broad support for the release of South African and Namibian political prisoners prevented the success of any of this. The Botha regime was clearly worried.

Its concern was justified. The excitement generated by the concert led to a heightening of political consciousness.

Membership of the British Anti-Apartheid

Movement doubled in little more than a month. The name of Nelson Mandela is now better known in Britain than those of many British politicians. A Gallup poll in July showed that 70% of British people support the call for Mandela's release, and 58% think the British government should do more to help secure it. The Freedom March, culminating in the demonstration in London, was warmly received throughout the length of the country. Thousands of people have become actively involved in the struggle for the first time.

The funds from the concert made possible the mounting of the great campaign that followed it. The money raised will enable the Anti-Apartheid Movement to pay off its accumulated debts, and allow it to continue its campaigning at a high level. But the concert did much more than raise money. Cultural workers have unique access to the media and to people's attention. In Britain, where many people regard politicians with contempt and cynicism, popular artists may be the only group able to command such attention.

Young people in particular have got to know about the Anti-Apartheid Movement. Many of those present in the stadium on June 11th may have come in the first place to hear their favourite artists. Nobody will have left unmoved as artist after artist paid tribute to the bravery of Nelson Mandela and all the other people in South Africa and Namibia who struggle for a democratic non-racial society. They, and those who watched on television throughout the world, will support that struggle, and take up the call:

Free Mandela!
Free Namibia!
Free South Africa!
Sanctions Now!

* Penguin Books, London, have published an A4 size Nelson Mandela Concert Book, with messages from Winnie Mandela and Trevor Huddleston, a foreword by Mary Benson, and many colour photographs. Part of the proceeds go to the Anti-Apartheid Movement, and part to agencies concerned with relief work for those in Southern Africa who suffer the attacks of the racist regime.

Cape Times

TUESDAY, JUNE 21, 1988

**BOTHA'S
STATE OF
NATION
ADDRESS**



Journalists picket in Cape Town to protest at government curbs on the media in South Africa.

APARTHEID DENIES FREEDOM TO THINK

By F S Maqethuka

We are witnessing the concerted efforts of the apartheid regime to silence the democratic institutions of our country. Particular attention is also directed at the press organs that are challenging the racist national oppression of our people. These efforts must not go unchallenged!

We can view journalism as an expression and an integral part of the specific historical development of communication in a society. Looking at journalism in that light we are then capable of understanding its role in society and determining it historically as an element of the superstructure. Under the

conditions of South Africa as an antagonistic class society with social divisions, this means journalism, as a means of mental production, is determined by the economic structure of that society. Marx and Engels put this in the following words:

*"The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas: The class which has the means of production at its disposal, consequently also controls the means of mental production, so that the ideas of those who lack the means of mental production are on the whole subject to it."*¹

In this way, the economic ruling class of our country attains an intellectual dominant power by structuring its journalism and formulating its functions and tasks in such a way that ruling power is preserved, strengthened, developed and defended against the oppressed and exploited masses. This also explains why the media of the democratic-minded forces are not only restricted by political structures and laws introduced and maintained by the apartheid regime. The media's lack of freedom is also based on the monopoly ownership of South Africa's economic system, and the structures of ownership and control within the mainstream commercial media.

Poisonous Propaganda

It was the Department of Information of the apartheid regime which stated in its 1977 report that:

*"The very nature of the onslaught against South Africa is such that a military confrontation would be inevitable if the propaganda war were to be lost. In fact, should this war be lost, the chances of a successful military counter-offensive would be considerably reduced."*²

Magnus Malan attempted to define this more clearly:

"It is nations, not armies that wage war ... The military struggle is important but when the battle for the soul of the people is lost, everything is lost. Insurgent

*forces have no hope of success without the aid of the local population."*³

If we keep in mind the fact that Radio RSA alone (excluding all other services of the SABC and the rest of the South African information and propaganda effort) is budgeted at R16m, and that the information industry is growing from strength to strength daily, then we shall recognise the seriousness of the above assertions and the importance which the regime and the ruling class attach to the struggle of winning the hearts and minds of our people. The Bureau for Information planned in 1987 that it would have branches countrywide, all of them linked to the secretive Joint Management Centre (JMC). At present each JMC, sub- or mini-JMC has three committees, with a communications committee as one of them.

This committee disseminates misinformation while keeping township residents "informed." Through controlling the media they extol the benefits of "peace and stability". Black councillors and other stooges are lauded and opposition forces are discredited. Much of the poisonous propaganda in the form of false pamphlets, leaflets and so on emanates from this committee.

The Structure of the Media Serves Apartheid

The very structure of the media pinpoints quite convincingly the endeavours of the enemy to win our people on to their side. The South African media are dominated by two giants; the first — run by, and fiercely loyal to the apartheid regime — accounts for nine out of ten radio listeners and TV viewers. The second, made up of four commercial media corporations, similarly dominates the print news media.

Only three of the country's two dozen racially and linguistically targeted radio stations are not directly controlled by Pretoria through the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC). All three, two are owned by Bantustan governments. (Radio Bop—Bophuthatswana; Capital Radio—Transkei; Radio 702—Bophuthatswana).

All three broadcast to audiences deter-

mined by Pretoria. Four of the country's five TV stations are run by SABC. The fifth, broadcasting, by agreement, only "entertainment", is controlled by the four print media groups.

Print media ownership is concentrated in the hands of four press groups. Three of these, Argus, Times Media Limited (TML) and Nasionale Pers are owned or controlled in turn by Anglo-American Corporation and Sanlam, the giants, respectively of "English" and "Afrikaner" capital. "English" capital dominates in Argus and TML while "Afrikaner" capital is dominant in Nasionale Pers. Anglo and Sanlam also own or control, through their press or other subsidiaries, the country's paper industry cartel, its three print media distribution networks, and the national news agency wire service. The fourth of the print media giants, Perskor, is equally tied into "Afrikaner" capital, through effective control by Rembrandt Corporation and Volkskas Bank.

Argus Newspapers, the biggest of the four, accounts for more than 55% of all the daily newspapers bought in South Africa. This therefore means that the major organs of the South African media are controlled by the South African bourgeoisie or the apartheid state which serves it. The news coverage and analysis generally provided by this Press is subject to the imperatives of capitalist profitability and a racist-colonial mentality plus a perceived need to avoid confrontation over affairs of state.

South African Media Inhibited

Prior to the declaration of the state of emergency on June 12th 1986, the South African media, including the "English" press, was already severely legally inhibited in what it could publish. These limitations on the right to publish and inform are contained in over a hundred statutes, most of which contain vague and technical provisions which are difficult to interpret or understand. This vagueness is no accident:

"Statutory control of the media is not predominantly about law, but about politics and political conflict. For years,

government legal advisors have deliberately drafted legislation which is both vague and all-encompassing. This has the effect of forcing publishers into self-censorship or timidity, precisely because certainty on the law cannot be achieved. In addition, it allows government to act selectively and arbitrarily in laying charges, using the legislation as a political weapon." ⁴

The most important of these statutes are the Defence Act, the Police Act, the Prisons Act, the Internal Security Act and the Publications Act. However, a vast array of other laws lie at the regime's disposal should it choose to attack sections of the media, and further limit the right to publish. In terms of the Defence Act, no person may publish information relating to the composition or activities of the South African Defence Force (SADF); any statement relating to a member or activity of the SADF to prejudice or embarrass the government in its foreign relations; any secret information relating to the defence of South Africa.

In terms of the Police Act no person may publish anything untrue concerning any action by the police without having reasonable grounds to believe it is true. In a prosecution the state does not have to prove that the allegations made are untrue; rather an accused has to establish that he or she had reasonable grounds to believe that the allegations were true. Under the Prisons Act, no one may publish any false information about the behaviour or experience in prison of any prisoner or ex-prisoner concerning the administration of any prison. Again the accused has to establish that he or she had reasonable grounds to believe that the information published was true.

In terms of the above three Acts, no person may publish photographs or sketches of military premises or installations, certain persons in police custody, or any prison or prisoner. The three acts effectively remove the most obviously repressive institutions of South African society (police, prisons and defence force), from ongoing public scrutiny and monitoring. These institutions of repression involve the state's legal right to utilise violence and coercion as a means of government and control. They are

known worldwide for their excessive brutality, racism and anti-democratic activity. Yet in South Africa, it is precisely these institutions which are made immune from investigation by the press.

The Internal Security Act, which incorporated sections from a number of Acts, including the Terrorism and Riotous Assemblies Acts prohibits publication of speeches or statements of people who are, for example, prohibited from attending gatherings, or who are on a consolidated list drawn up by the Minister of Law and Order; material which would cause feelings of hostility between different races; notices advertising a prohibited gathering.

In 1974 the Publication Act was introduced to "provide for the control of certain publications or objects, films and public entertainment." In 1974 the Publication Act was introduced to "provide for the control of certain publications or objects, films and public entertainment." The Act gives substantial censorship powers to the directorate of publications and a secret committee system under its jurisdiction to ban publications for distribution or for possession and distribution. These bans may apply to a single edition, or to all future editions of a public publication. The directorate of publications may also order a publication not to be published before material has been submitted to, and approved by, the directorate.

In the Publications Act, the definition of "publication" excludes newspapers produced by members of the National Press Union (NPU). As far as newspapers and magazines are concerned, this Act is directed at the alternative press. Unlike much of the censorship machinery, the Publications Act provides for appeals against decisions taken by the directorate and its committees.

A publications Appeal Board, sitting in Pretoria, has been used by a number of publications, and on many occasions banings have been set aside. The Appeal Board adopted a more judicial approach to the question of censorship. It can therefore be hypothetically stated that the latest round of emergency regulations issued against the media was introduced precisely because the regime was unhappy about the way the Appeal Board was functioning

and the manner in which some progressive publications were able to create greater space for their activities.

The Alternative Press And The Regime

The subjugation of the "English" press to the regulations of the regime can be attributed to the fact that within this press there were spaces for intervention. In a situation of deepening crisis such as the one in our country, the more far-sighted members of the ruling class can experience as urgent a need for information as any other segment of our society. Elements also sometimes formulate "liberal" notions of freedom — however inconsistent these liberal protestations may be with other aspects of their political activity. Furthermore, at times of mass upheaval, the reportage of the struggle for national liberation can itself be commercially profitable.⁵

Nevertheless, this press by virtue of the politico-economic interests it is linked to cannot play a revolutionary role. It is also no wonder that members of the NPU are bound by the Council's constitution and its code of conduct. The disciplinary function of the Council essentially amounts to a form of self-censorship. It is what has generally become known as an alternative press in South Africa that poses a serious threat for the apartheid regime. In the next issues of *Sechaba* I shall elaborate on some of these problems.

References:

1. Marx and Engels: *The German Ideology*.
2. *RSA Department of Information Report* for the period January 1st to December 31st 1977, p.4
3. Quoted in Madi Gray: *Press Under Pressure: Militarisation and Propaganda in South Africa*, Stockholm, 1985, p.1
4. Collinge, Mabuza, Moss, Niddrie: *The South African Media: Current Restrictions and Future Potentials*, Johannesburg, 1987, p.1
5. cf Barrell, Howard: *From Fringe To Formative Intervention in the South African Press*, pp.11-12.

LETTER TO THE EDITOR

Dear Comrade

The October elections are unique to South African practice in that they are parallel elections. That is, two separate exercises are taking place at the same time — one for White representatives to the racist, controlling organs of local government and the other for collaborators with the Black administrative organs set up to perpetuate White colonialist domination.

This means that the liberation forces should have two approaches in setting the pace to dominate the apartheid election game:

- to mobilise and co-ordinate Black activity in making the apartheid administrative organs unworkable, while at the same time strengthening and defending the emerging organs of people's power;
- to invade the thinking in the White laager with ideas on the question of a democratic South Africa.

It goes without saying that the issue of a full-scale boycott of this exercise must top the agenda. But the call not to vote must go hand in hand with intense activity. Anti-election meetings should be part of daily life, complemented by house-to-house canvassing. Where meetings of the liberatory forces are proscribed, meetings of collaborator candidates should be invaded with demands for a boycott, and demands that the collaborator candidates withdraw from the elections.

Such activity should revolve around the call for the strengthening of the organs of people's power.

It is possible that under certain circumstances people may be forced or terrorised to vote: for example, in rural local authorities, armed farmers' commandos may take agricultural workers to the polls by the lorry load. With this in mind, people should develop the idea of spoiling their ballot papers by writing on them, "I vote for the organs of people's power."

Ways must be found to penetrate the White electorate. Use can be made of the postal services, for instance. The real facts must be hammered into the thick walls of ignorance, prejudice and greed which isolate the thinking of the mainstream of the White laager from the realities facing our country. It must be driven home that apartheid and continuing White control cannot solve the problems of the country, and indeed, serve only to multiply the problems and anxieties are confronting the White population as a whole.

The apartheid state seeks to ensure the functioning of its Black administrative structures through the undisguised terrorism of army units and militarised police in the townships, as well as through the terror of the murder squads and the armed anti-liberatory Inkatha bandits.

Certainly, increased people's actions rejecting the local authority structures and apartheid collaborators, as well as the struggle to consolidate and extend the organs of people's power, will be countered with greater aggressive state terror.

Hand in hand with the people's boycott of the local authority elections, counter-elections to the organs of people's power, possible strikes and consumer boycotts, door-to-door canvassing, must go the armed defence of the organs of people's power, as well as the armed defence of the people's resistance and liberatory activity. Such armed defence would, in practical terms, mean a sharpening of the armed struggle.

The approach of the liberatory forces to the voters in the White-controlled organs of local government, and those solicited and terrorised to elect collaborators to Black administrative functions, has a common denominator — that is, to give rise to broad, country-wide discussion on how to fashion the organs of non-racial local

government based on the principles of the Freedom Charter. Such organs logically presuppose the conditions of a democratic non-racial South Africa.

Such discussion and seeking for consensus cannot help but serve to stimulate liberatory thinking, and stimulate the struggle for bringing about the prerequisites for the conditions in which there can be genuine elections to non-racial democratic organs of local government. Discussion envisaged above should encourage future local, regional and national conferences of representatives of organs of people's power, representatives of those struggling for the establishment and consolidation of organs of people's power, and representatives of those White voters who have come close to, or are germinating, the idea of real non-racial democratic organs of local government. (The KwaZulu-Natal *In-daba* should come in for special attention in this framework.)

It is reported that the ANC is bringing out

a blueprint of how a future South Africa, based on the principles of the Freedom Charter, would look. The October elections offer a fertile opportunity to distribute this publication as widely as possible to voters both in the Black and in the White election exercises. To the White voters, an appeal should be added — let us get together and talk about this, let us reason together, let us find real democratic solutions to our problems to secure a peaceful South Africa for the well-being of all its inhabitants.

In short, we should influence thinking to strengthen the organs of people's power, further develop the people's organs of defence, and get everyone talking and thinking about government at all levels, constituency boundaries and voters' rolls. Let all the people govern together, and let each flower of local government bloom in non-racist democratic soil.

Comradely greetings
BZ



REVIEW ARTICLES

ANC HISTORY FOR ACTIVISTS

Francis Meli: *South Africa Belongs to Us — A History of the ANC*, Zimbabwe Publishing House, 1988.

There have been many studies devoted to the history of the South African struggle, and that of the African National Congress in particular. But *South Africa Belongs to Us* is unique. It is written by an actor in that history. Francis Meli is very clear that his is a partisan work. He has set out to write a book that is popular, and he attempts "to transform theoretical knowledge into mass consciousness."

While the preface is used to underline the importance of early African resistance to the imposition of colonialism, the author's thematic narrative opens at the end of the 19th century. The sources of inspiration for the birth of the African National Congress are rooted in the emergence of new social forces in South Africa. The significance of the development of the nucleus of the African working class is underlined. Early forms of worker organisation were evident in the mining industry, and beyond. While they were limited and unco-ordinated, their significance lay in the fact that: "they were the earliest protests by Black workers ..." (p.6)

In 1905 alone, more than 3 585 complaints were made at pass offices along the gold reef.

The influence and leadership of missionary-educated Africans was the key to this period of resistance. Meli is intent on shattering the much-repeated theme that this stratum was essentially reformist. While objective conditions placed clear limitations on them, the early Christian converts are shown to have played an essentially progressive role. Through the independent churches and the African press,

new forms of expression and organisation took shape.

We are not served up a romantic view of these individuals and the ideas they espoused. Tendencies of both collaboration and resistance are dealt with. But one is left with a sense of pride in the achievements of such men as Nehemiah Tile, Tiyo Soga, Sol Plaatje, John Langalibalele Dube, and others. The first part of the book includes a number of biographies of these leaders, which give a fascinating insight into their talent and initiative.

The People's Experience

The formation of the ANC is not, however, recorded as the result of the endeavour of individuals. Meli emphasises that its establishment was due to the people's experience, with their leaders playing a responsive role. The first National Executive Committee reflected the need for an alliance between the peasants and the young intelligentsia. In 1912, the working class was still in the process of formation. These leaders also had their limitations, but the author insists that:

"... one of the greatest contributions to our struggle nevertheless remains: by forming the ANC, they established African political opinion as an autonomous factor in its own right in South Africa." (p.40)

Many histories of our struggle have dealt with the early years of the ANC's formation by stressing a 'cap in hand' attitude on the part of the leadership. Meli addresses the question: was the ANC reformist during this period? He argues both for an under-

standing of the objective constraints on its leaders and for an appreciation of the fact that deputations and appeals were part of African traditional custom. While the ANC was not yet able to confront the need to challenge White power directly, we are drawn to see the birth of some progressive factors in those days of deputations to the 'mother country.' The roots of the international solidarity movement are to be found during this period. The distinction between appealing to the British Government and Crown and addressing the British people was already recognised at this time in the history of our movement.

South Africa Belongs to Us covers South African history up to the 1980s. The transition of the ANC into a mass-based revolutionary organisation, and its forging of alliances with progressive class and national forces in South African society are more familiar territory for the reader. Meli traces the dynamic relationship between national and class struggle in the later chapters of his book, showing the limitations and achievements of nationalist, socialist and trade union leaders during the inter-war period.

What Has to Be Done

The ideological offensive taken by the ANC, through its African Claims document and the Manifesto of the Youth League after the Second World War, is shown to the

reader against the background of a maturing of both economic and social forces in South African society. The book outlines the mass campaigns of the 1950s, the great alliance forged and expressed by the Xuma-Dadoo-Naicker pact, and the eventual turn to armed struggle.

The latter part of the history of the ANC is not dealt with in such detail, nor given the same weight of analysis as is the early period. In his preface, Meli warns the reader that constraints upon his time, as well as security considerations, have made his endeavours: "... a pointer — or a little more than that — to what has to be done."

Certainly, the last part of the book would have benefited from more primary research, in the form of interviews with some of the participants in the events recorded. We must hope that time will one day allow for our historians to devote themselves entirely to this work, but, as Meli points out, this will only happen in a free South Africa.

This is not an 'official history' of the ANC, as the author emphasises. But it is a history seen from the inside, and written in a form that avoids the pitfalls of the many academic treatises devoted to the subject. Bourgeois academics are certainly going to find it lacking in what they would term 'objectivity.' But I believe that activists will read it avidly, and it will generate much discussion within the movement and beyond. In so doing, the book will achieve the purpose of its author.

HR

PARTNER OF THE REGIME

Mzala: *Gatsha Buthelezi — Chief with a Double Agenda*, Zed Books, London.

This book is timely. It deals lucidly, critically and in detail with one of the most intriguing enigmas of our time — a Black political character who has become world-famous, but not because of his identification with

the liberation struggle in his country. His fame is due rather to his relentless opposition to the basic tenets of the liberation struggle, his substantial and enthusiastic contribution to, and solidarity with, those forces, both in South Africa and abroad, that are inimical to that struggle.

Mzala has given his readers enough

historical evidential material to nail the colours of this rather maverick political animal firmly to the mast of his real profession.

For the liberation movement, taken as a whole, there are fundamental truths that emerge. One is that it is sheer folly to hope, wish or expect that someone whose political philosophy and practice are rooted in the system that the progressive forces are seeking to eradicate and replace with its antithesis can somehow be made, through friendly persuasion, to see the error of his ways, abandon the evil road, and come back to the fold to share our agonies and embrace our aspirations. That is a wistful, forlorn hope. It is of the same order as the wish that a leopard could change its spots.

The Regime Encourages Other Illegitimacies

Another lesson to be drawn from Mzala's book is that the history and traditions of a people can be distorted and prostituted by those who know how precisely to serve those interests that are antagonistic to the aims of those who are battling for freedom. While actually engaged in acts of collaboration with the fascists of South Africa, and with capitalism in general, in the suppression of the African people, Gatsha Buthelezi drapes himself in the finery of the glorious traditions of resistance which were the hallmark of the great patriots of the past, whose attributes, victories and titles he appropriates by a process of usurpation, and for a different cause.

The book is also a timely reminder that the South African regime is not only itself illegitimate, but also encourages other illegitimacies. It will foment, aid and abet acts of hooliganism and criminality directed against the liberation struggle, and protect, by legal and other means, the perpetrators of these acts; it will bring to its 'justice' the victims themselves, quite often with the aid of, or at the instigation of, the criminals themselves, its partners in these felonious acts. Such travesties reflect the very nature of the beast — a police state based on racism, and functioning at the

behest of capitalism.

But there are heartening indicators as well. In spite of the brutality that has been unleashed upon them, our people continue to fight on for their birthright. The spirit of resistance remains unabated. Everywhere in the country the freedom fighters are closing ranks, and are prepared to lay down their lives in pursuance of the right to self-determination and the enjoyment of democratic rights of citizenship. No sacrifice is too much for them. In this, they are following in the footsteps of their forebears. They are engaged in a real struggle, not a phony one, not a bogus, dumb charade. As Mzala puts it:

"The true link between the wars of resistance of earlier times and modern endeavours to grapple with the enemy is symbolised, not by the leopard-skin regalia often worn by those whom the apartheid regime allows to address meetings, even during a state of emergency, but by continued loyalty to the ideals of the total and genuine liberation of South Africa and all the sacrifices that such a stand entails."

There is another hopeful sign. The regime has made devilish attempts to balkanise the country and pulverise the people into tiny tribal atoms, in order to divide and rule them with the menacing assistance of powerful and determined collaborators who batten on the miseries of the people and relish the perquisites of authoritarianism. But the fighting people across the country are moving, inexorably, in a different direction; they are establishing democratic structures at different levels, and are forging ahead and building national unity on this basis. The retribalisation scheme does not, and will not, work. Hence the viciousness of those who have a vested interest in it.

Politics of Collaboration Do not Wash with the People

Mzala's book is also a powerful rebuttal of the oft-proclaimed myth that Gatsha Buthelezi is leader of 6 000 000 Zulus, who

are loyal to him and support his collaborationist activities. The organisational and ideological polarisation of the population in Natal is a clear indication that these claims are a blatant lie, and must be rejected with contempt. Not only are the people there divided on political lines, but this Gatsha Buthelezi is leader of factions that do not scruple to murder those who do not subscribe to his brand of politics, be they Zulu, Xhosa, Indian or whatever. His politics of chauvinism, collaboration and the 'market place' do not wash with the people.

In this connection, and only on this special occasion, it is apposite and instructive to mention that the demolition exercise on this unique personage is carried out by a man who comes from the same cultural background, and whose knowledge of, and respect for, the history of his people is manifestly beyond reproach. Mzala must be congratulated on the fact that he is prepared to confront some of those areas in our political history that some people would rather not mention, certainly not in public. This is not to say that the explanations given are always satisfactory, but the very fact of raising the issues at all is in itself a welcome index of intellectual honesty.

Dummy Councils

This writer is a student of history and political economy, who uses a method of political analysis that requires him at all times to adhere to its rigorous scientific principles in his handling of the phenomena that come under his microscope. It is a very useful weapon of political analysis. To a great degree he does obey the strictures of his calling, both in this book and elsewhere in his writings. But, unfortunately (perhaps humanly), he sometimes throws away the essential tools of his trade at a crucial moment. That inevitably loses him his moorings. For example, his facile justification of the role of the Members of the Native Representative Councils (MNRCs) could give comfort to the quislings in the tricameral parliament in Cape Town, who can claim to be even closer to the heart of things than the MNRCs could

ever be. It also leads him to make astounding comparisons, intended to underscore the perceived differences between the dummy institutions of those days and the present refurbished ones. In this way, the writer is able to condone a political act that is patently indefensible by any objective test.

It is difficult to sympathise with Mzala when — almost *ex cathedra* — he avers that:

"... the NRC and the bantustans were, and are, different institutions at different periods created for different purposes."

This untenable position propels him to further state categorically that:

"... the essential purpose for which the bantustan system exists is the provision of labour for the economy of White South Africa."

Yes, but surely White South Africa, with its position of dominant economic and political power, has always regarded Blacks as a source of cheap labour, put there for its convenience and to minister to its economic requirements.

Supply of Cheap Labour

Thus, over the years, the White rulers of South Africa have evolved a 'native policy' which, among other things, herds the Africans, wherever they are, in reservoirs of easily available cheap labour. To this end, they have employed various and varied stratagems and methods of regimentation and control to make sure that this supply of cheap labour continues to flow into the kitchens, the factories, the mines and farms of White South Africa. They have also consistently made sure that this labour remains outside the body politic of those institutions, access to which alone would guarantee the Africans the possibility of themselves determining how to run their own lives in their own country. The mechanisms and techniques may be different in form at different times, but these are merely strategic adjustments, often dic-

tated by the exigencies of the moment, including the responses of the oppressed. The purpose remains the same — to maintain, entrench and perpetuate the *status quo*.

It is, of course, possible to make academic distinctions between one dummy institution and another. But that kind of exercise, that palpable subterfuge, is best left to those who would wish to obfuscate the issues. The writer's duty, on the other hand, as decreed by his chosen position, is to unmask the aims and purposes of capitalism, however disguised.

The truth is that there was nothing glorious about the exit of the illustrious gentlemen in question from the stage of the NRCs. Frustrated and insulted by the Smuts regime, which already had its own blueprint for apartheid in the shape of the 1936 Report of the Native Affairs Commission, they sulked away and adjourned *sine die* until they were effectively sacked in 1951, when the Bantu Authorities Act was passed. At no time during the intervening period did they go back to the people whose support they had canvassed and mobilised so successfully, to tell them that the institution they had lent their colourful support to had, in fact, through participation, been proved to have been a monstrous fraud from the beginning. A statement of the historical fact in this way should not in any way detract from or diminish the contribution that these pioneers in the liberation struggle did otherwise make. It is a mark of courage to admit mistakes.

This brings me to another sensitive area that Mzala ventures upon. It is the somewhat bizarre relationship between Gatsha Buthelezi and the African National Congress, including some top leaders. In this context, Oliver Tambo's frank admission is to be preferred:

"I have dealt with Chief Gatsha Buthelezi at some length because, although his efforts are doomed to fail, in a way he is our fault. We have not done, and are not doing, sufficient political work among the millions of our people who have been condemned to the bantustans."

This way of looking at the problem and articulating it opens the door to new vistas.

Criticism and Self-Criticism Give Life to the Struggle

Criticism and self-criticism make possible a healthy review of organisational, tactical and strategic positions, which can only help to give the struggle a new momentum, new vigour, freshness of life, and add an impetus to the dialectical process of development, thus avoiding stagnation and decay. A diagnosis of the source of the fault has implicit in it a corrective message.

Important also is the point the writer makes about attitudes to the chiefs. The liberation movement cannot and does not condemn all chiefs simply because they are chiefs. It is the part they play in our political life that matters. It is the policeman-chief who has to be shunned like the plague. We could, indeed, say the same thing about the intellectuals. It is the policeman-intellectual who is geared to betray his people. Where the two are rolled into one, then we have a truly devastating combination.

However, I think the writer is inclined to be too generous in his assessment of the late King Sabata Dalindyebo of the Tembu. It is right, of course, to applaud his return to the fold after losing the battle against Matanzima, who was the favourite of the apartheid regime at what was, for it, a critical juncture. But a careful look at the history of the development of tribal authorities in Sabata's own area does not suggest that he had always been against the system. He certainly was not cast in the same mould as the Joyis.

All in all, this is a book that I would strongly advise everyone involved in the liberation struggle, and those who support it, to read and discuss. There is much vital material here, and in the age of *glasnost* we should all take healthy advantage of the opportunity it provides for open discussion of all issues, including those that the writer himself has not touched upon.

Perhaps the greatest merit of the book is its resonant ring of authenticity throughout, and its blend of scholarly expertise with a dynamic search for a unified and revolutionary perspective in South Africa.

Livingstone Mqotsi

1989



THEY DID THAT WE MAY BE FREE
Nobanda Kogant
SERIALS AND PERIODICALS
PUBLISHERS

M	T	W	T	F	S	S
					1	2
3	4	5	6	7	8	9
10	11	12	13	14	15	16
17	18	19	20	21	22	23
24	25	26	27	28	29	30

APRIL

SLIMLINE DIARY

One week to an opening, 16-page section on the ANC, includes ANC National Days, Symbols, the Freedom Charter, National Anthem including the music, Namibia and the Frontline States, a map of South Africa and the Southern African region, photographs of Presidents of independent Southern African States and the leaders of ANC and SWAPO.

£3.95 including p&p (UK)

1989 CALENDAR

The liberation struggle in South Africa takes many forms. The hope and pain of the people and their striving for freedom and human dignity is vividly portrayed by ANC artists in their original works in this unique, full colour calendar, A-3 size with a page per month. Each page has the work of two artists. Order now, and ensure delivery from mid-September.

£5.50 including p&p (UK)

Anti-Apartheid organisations and groups, trade unions and student organisations may enquire about bulk orders from ANCSA Merchandise

TO: ANCSA MERCHANDISE

PO Box 881 London N7 8QW United Kingdom

Name:

Address:

.....

Post Code:

Please send me copies at £5.50 each of the ANC 1989 CALENDAR

Please send me copies at £3.95 each of the ANC Slimline Diary

I enclose the amount of £ to cover the cost, including p & p.

