



# SECHABA

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Agostinho  
Neto  
President  
People's  
Republic  
of  
Angola

# SECHABA

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## Contents

	Page
<b>FIGHTING TALK</b> Viva MPLA	1
<b>VICTORY IS CERTAIN!</b> Independence Speech by Neto	7
<b>THE BANTUSTAN PROGRAMME</b> Domestic and International Implications	17
<b>THE SUPREMES AND APARTHEID</b> Covering With the Dirty Old Racist Man	31
<b>NUCLEAR CONSPIRACY</b> UN Lights up More Dark Corners	32
<b>ACTION AGAINST APARTHEID</b> OAU-OATUU Declaration	40
<b>BELGIAN-RSA CONNECTION</b> Playing Hide and Seek With Racism	44
<b>ROLE OF FRG INVESTMENTS</b> Looking at Apologist Arguments	49
<b>NEW REPRESSIVE LAW</b> More of Vorster's Draconian Preparations	57
<b>BOOK REVIEWS</b> Kotane's Biography Reviewed by P. Jordan Barclays and South Africa	61

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# VIVA MPLA!

The African National Congress is deeply committed to the cause of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) which, like the ANC, is dedicated to the total eradication of colonialism and racism on our Continent and the defeat of all counter revolutionary forces and their mercenary allies.

Above all the MPLA is fighting to defend the Angolan revolution from new exploiters who desire to take over from where the Portuguese fascists left off. Aided by the armed forces of the South African regime, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and highly paid mercenaries, counter revolutionary elements within the country are attempting to destroy the revolution so that racist South Africa and international monopoly interests who, like maggots, have eaten away at the economic heart the people and the wealth of this rich African country.

## Background

Formed clandestinely inside Angola in 1956, MPLA, despite unbridled repression and terror unleashed against it by the fascist forces of the Salazaar regime launched the armed struggle for independence five years later with an attack on the notorious Luanda prison where large numbers of political opponents of the fascist regime were imprisoned. The attack

on the prison was followed by spontaneous widespread uprisings in Northern Angola. The Portuguese fascists reacted with typical brutality and in the ensuing months, it is estimated, killed 50,000 Angolans.

In the two years following the uprising





MPLA deligently and painstakingly built up its armed cadres for the next stages of the struggle. In 1964, it opened a military front in the Cabinda enclave followed two years later with a front in the east, in the districts of Mozico and Cuando Cubango. Further fronts were opened in 1968, in the north-eastern districts of Luanda and Melange, and the central district of Bie. OAU observers who visited the liberated areas during this period expressed high praise for the MPLA and said that they were impressed with the political and military activity and the extensive reconstruction work undertaken in these areas.

Despite repeated attacks by the Salazaar and later Caetano forces MPLA held its positions and further consolidated the liberated areas. Meanwhile it continued to extend and develop its underground movement in the cities and the countryside.

### **MPLA Takes Over**

It is from these strongly held positions and with the almost total backing of the people of Angola that President Agostinho Neto and members of his Central Committee moved into the capital early last year after the fall of the Caetano regime in Portugal. The entry of Comrade Neto into Luanda was received with wild enthusiasm by the people. Wherever he went he was greeted with cries of: MPLA O POVO! VICTORIA A SERT! (MPLA is the people! The people are MPLA! Victory is certain!)

Addressing a meeting on the occasion of the inauguration of the Provisional Government of Angola on February 4, last year he said the struggle being waged by the MPLA is a struggle that must reach outside the borders of Angola. „We are (also) building victory for other people in Africa, for Zimbabwe, for South Africa, for Namibia, where Africans are still op-

## **ANGOLA: Some Figures and Facts**

Area:	485,000 sq. miles
Population:	5,675,000
White population before independence	350,000
Assimilados	30,000
Main Products:	coffee, sisal, maize, cotton, sugar, oil, diamonds

\* \* \* \* \*

**“As a matter of principle, we accept the membership of anyone irrespective of colour, as long as he can contribute to the revolution ...”**

– President Agostinho Neto in an interview published in August 1975, replying to criticism that MPLA had “too many whites and mulattoes”.

\* \* \* \* \*

In the same interview as above, Dr. Neto said:

**“I reject the accusation that our movement is inspired by Marx or ruled by any outside force. When they ask about our ideology, we say we are progressives interested in real democracy especially for the exploited man. We are interested in social reforms, in economic democracy ... The wealth of our country must be shared by all the people.”**

pressed by white reactionary minorities," he added.

Later in the same speech he said: "We have not completely overcome all the forces in Angola who would like to turn the clock back - we have still not overcome reaction in our country ... We still have to build national unity ..." (See Sechaba Vol. 9 No. 5)

Within three months of this historic occasion, the forces of counter revolution and reaction, led by the FNLA and UNITA, plunged the country into civil war. The MPLA armed the people and in the ensuing months drove the counter revolutionaries out of the capital and by the end of September all but routed them. At this stage MPLA controlled the capital, all major ports, both ends of the stra-

tegic Benguela railway and 12 of the country's 16 provinces.

### SA Racists Invade

Foreseeing this situation racist South African military forces established bases in Northern Namibia in contravention of United Nations resolutions and in violation of the original mandate granted by the League of Nations. Using these bases, racist forces of the South African regime invaded Angola in early September and occupied an area in Southern Angola. The racist Minister of Defence in a press statement issued on September 8, claimed that the troops had been sent to protect the Kunene River Development Scheme and Ruacana Falls hydroelectric

Section of the vast crowd that met the OAU Delegation which went to Luanda recently



installations, which supply power to Namibia. (Both these projects have been consistently condemned both by the MPLA and SWAPO as designed to perpetuate colonial and white racist rule in Southern Africa.) Since then, however, the South African racist forces have openly joined with the local counter revolutionary elements and fighting side by side with them against the legitimate government of Angola as proclaimed by the President of the Republic, Comrade Agostinho Neto on November 11, 1975 after the Portuguese troops evacuated the country.

### **African Reaction**

Reaction on the Continent was generally at first not to side with either the MPLA or the other organisations involved in Angola but to endeavour to bring about unity with the warring factions. However, after the racist South African intervention President Nyerere of Tanzania said, while on a State visit to Britain recently, that the Soviet Union and other socialist countries always assisted the liberation movements in Africa. Now for the first time the United States and other western countries were becoming involved with African liberation movements. Following Dr. Nyerere's statement, a foreign ministry spokesman for the Tanzanian Government announced Tanzania's recognition of the People's Republic of Angola and said, "We cannot any longer tolerate the presence of the offices of the UNITA and FNLA."

He added further, that the FNLA and UNITA "have now betrayed Africa by uniting with South Africa and international imperialism." President Idi Amin, current Chairman of the OAU, who at the beginning stood firmly against siding with any of the movements in Angola, expressed his anger against the South African invasion and called on the racists to get



**"Communist countries always assisted liberation movements"  
— President Nyerere, Tanzania**

out of Angola. Nigeria joined the growing number of African countries in recognising the MPLA as the legitimate government of Angola after the South African invasion. The President of the African National Congress, Comrade Oliver Tambo, condemned the invasion with the following press statement:

'The recent invasion of Angola by South African troops is the most dangerous crisis faced by Africa since the U. S. intervention in the Congo (Leopoldville) and later the invasion of Guinea by fascist Portugal. Then, as now, the forces of imperialism intervened to try to turn back the moment for Africa's liberation and the achievement of genuine independence for its peoples.

South Africa is today the centre of the counter-revolution against Africa. Imperialist designs to obstruct the struggle for

liberation in Angola and the rest of Southern Africa will converge on Pretoria to take advantage of the economic and military strength of the Vorster fascist regime.

For their part, the South African ruling classes have calculated that their own survival as oppressors, exploiters and racists hangs, among other factors, on their ability to reverse the successes of the MPLA in Angola. In their criminal invasion of Angola, they are continuing from where their fascist ally, Caetano, left off. This time they have found new and surprising allies.

The South African regime has a two-pronged strategy for perpetuating imperialist domination in Southern Africa. On the one hand, it maintains violent repression within its domain, and resorts to flagrant military intervention outside its borders; on the other, it uses diplomacy and offers of financial and technical aid to win accomplices or undermine and weaken Africa's opposition to its inhuman policies and expansionist manoeuvres. But the regime's current military aggression in Angola, concurrently with its protestations about 'detente', expose it for what it is – the worst and most dangerous enemy of the people of Africa and a serious threat to world peace and security.

The victories scored by the national liberation movements against Portuguese colonialism in Africa are a tremendous advancement of the struggle waged by all colonially-oppressed peoples and progressive mankind. We are all part and parcel of this struggle for democracy and peace. The African National Congress (S. A.) re-affirms the resolve of the oppressed and exploited people of South Africa to fight for the seizure of power and total liberation in their country, and pledges its full and unqualified support for the MPLA which, with its consistently



**"They are continuing from where their fascist ally – Caetano – left off"  
– O. R. Tambo, President ANC**

anti-imperialist policy and record, serves the best interests of the Angolan people and seeks for them a revolutionary social transformation calculated to ensure the eradication of all colonial legacies.

The ANC calls on the OAU, the African masses, and the progressive and peace-loving peoples of the world to demand the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of all South African fascist troops and neo-colonialist interventionists from Angola. We further appeal for all political and material support for the people of Angola, led by the MPLA, in their heroic struggle against foreign aggression.'

**MPLA O POVO!**

**O POVO MPLA!**

**VICTORIA A SERT!**



---

# Victory is Certain!

Excerpts from a broadcast relayed from 1st May Square in Luanda, where Comrade Agostinho Neto, President of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) read the proclamation of independence at 0.19 hours on November 11, and then addressed the people of Angola

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(Agostinho Neto) Luanda, 11th November 1975. In the name of the Angolan People, the Central Committee of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola, MPLA, solemnly proclaims the independence of Angola before Africa and the world (applause, cheers). The Angolan people and the Central Committee of the MPLA will now observe one minute of silence and hereby declare that the heroes who fell for the independence of the motherland will live for ever (silence; bugle call).

Meeting the people's most profound



MPLA's Neto: "We are progressives interested in real democracy . . . in social reforms, in economic democracy."

aspirations, the MPLA declares our country constituted into the People's Republic of Angola (Republica Popular de Angola). During the period between the signing of the Alvor (Algarve) agreement and the present proclamation, the MPLA alone did not breach the agreements signed. As far as the internal lackeys of imperialism are concerned, we have long since ceased to recognize them as liberation movements (applause, cheers). As far as Portugal is concerned, its constant disregard of the Alvor agreements is manifest, among other ways, by the fact that it has

systematically remained silent over the invasion of our country by regular armies and mercenary forces. This invasion, already known and reported throughout the world, has not even merited a comment from the Portuguese authorities, who indeed exercised sovereignty only in the areas liberated by the MPLA.

### **Fascist International Brigade**

Moreover, our movement is facing on the ground a sort of fascist international brigade attacking the Angolan people. Portuguese reactionary forces are included in this alliance and are taking part in the invasion of the south of the country. Yet the Portuguese Government not only has not attacked them but has indeed tacitly encouraged them by its silence and passivity. Despite the fact that the puppet organizations under orders from the invading army have long since been denounced by the Angolan people and by all the world progressive forces, the Portuguese Government insisted on regarding them as liberation movements and attempted to push the MPLA into solutions which would be tantamount to an act of high treason against the Angolan people (applause, cheers).

Once more we wish to put on record that our struggle was never, and never will be, against the Portuguese people. On the contrary, from today we shall be in a position to cement fraternal relations between two peoples who share historical and linguistic links, as well as the same goal: freedom.

In the Manifesto of its foundation, in December 1956, the MPLA already showed its determination of fighting, by every means possible, for the total independence of Angola. The Manifesto stated that "colonialism will not fall without struggle. It is for this reason that the Angolan people can only liberate themselves through revolutionary war. And this will only be successful with the formation of a front, gathering all anti-imperialist forces in Angola, regardless of the colour of the skin, religious creeds or social positions; it will be victorious thanks to the

formation of a vast Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola."

### **Galvanising Force**

A galvanising and vanguard force of our people, the MPLA heroically began the general armed insurrection of the Angolan people against Portuguese colonial domination on the morning of February 4, 1961.

The long road we trod represents the heroic history of a people who, under the unitary and correct guidance of their vanguard – the MPLA – struggled for the right to be free and independent.

Despite brutal oppression and terror imposed by colonialism to defeat our struggle, the Angolan people, guided by their revolutionary vanguard, irrefutably asserted their African and revolutionary personality.

Based on the principle of unity of all sections of the Angolan people around the political line and clear formulation of its aim, defining its allies, friends and enemies, of the MPLA, the Angolan people finally overthrew the Portuguese colonial regime.

With colonialism defeated and the recognition of our right to independence materialising at this historical moment, the immediate objective of the MPLA has been achieved. Thus, the People's Republic of Angola is new born, embodying the will of the people and the result of the great sacrifices of our fighters for national liberation.

Our struggle is not over. Our goal is to achieve our country's complete independence and build a just society and a new man. The fight we are still waging against the lackeys of imperialism, who shall go unnamed in order not to sully this unique moment in our history, is aimed at expelling the foreign invaders, those people who want to establish neo-colonialism in our country. The complete liberation of our country and all our people from foreign oppression is thus the new State's fundamental concern.

Carrying into effect the aspirations of the broad popular masses, the People's Republic of Angola will, under the guidance of the MPLA, gradually advance

towards a democratic state. With the workers and the peasants forming the nucleus all patriots will be united against imperialism and its agents in the struggle for building a society without exploiters and exploited.

The organs of state in the People's Republic of Angola will be under the supreme guidance of the MPLA, and the primacy of the Movement's structures over those of the state will be assured. However, because of its great vitality and in keeping with the dynamics of the revolution, the MPLA will undergo quantitative and qualitative modifications until finally it will transform itself into a party amidst a vast revolutionary front.

With the proclamation of the People's Republic of Angola, the Popular Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola, FAPLA, are institutionalized as the national army. The FAPLA, the people's armed hand, under the MPLA's firm leadership, are a people's army whose goal is to serve the interests of the most exploited sections of our people. Steeled in the hard struggle of national liberation against Portuguese colonialism, and armed with the revolutionary theory, they remain a fundamental instrument of the anti-imperialist struggle. As the liberating force of the People's Republic of Angola, the FAPLA will have the task of defending the country's territorial integrity, and, as a people's army, will participate in the great tasks of national reconstruction . . .

### **Satisfying People's Needs**

Angola is an underdeveloped country. We ought to be deeply aware of the significance and consequences of this fact. The criteria traditionally employed to define underdevelopment are fully corroborated in Angola. They provide a deep mirror of the Angolan people. But to say that our country is underdeveloped is not enough; it is also necessary to add right now that Angola is a country exploited by imperialism; a country which gravitates around imperialism.

These two components together – underdevelopment and dependence – explain



**Iko Carreira, co-ordinator of MPLA's Higher Defence Council**

why the economy of Angola is so deeply distorted, with a so-called traditional sector and backward regions surrounding the so-called development poles. And they explain injustice in social relations in its full crudeness.

On putting an end to colonialism and determinedly barring the way to neo-colonialism, the MPLA declares on this solemn occasion its firm resolve radically to change the present economic infrastructures, and defines from this moment 9



**Zairean, French and Portuguese mercenaries captured by MPLA**

that the goal of economic reconstruction is the satisfaction of the people's needs. We have a long way ahead of us. We will have to put our economic and administrative machinery fully to work, combating all sorts of parasitism, gradually putting an end to the distortions among the various sectors of the economy in the various regions of the country, so as to build a state of social justice. The economy will be planned to serve the Angolan man but never imperialism. The struggle for economic independence shall be, as a result, a constant element in our strategy.

The People's Republic of Angola will launch increasingly into the industrialization of our own raw materials and even into heavy industry enterprises. However, bearing in mind that most of the Angolan population live off the land, the MPLA has decided to regard agriculture as the

basis, and industry as the determining factor, of our progress.

The Angolan state will thus be able to resolve with justice the issue of the land and will encourage the setting-up of co-operatives and state enterprises in the interest of the peasant masses.

As for private enterprises, even foreign-owned ones, provided that they are useful to the national economy and the interests of the people, they will, on the latter's behalf, be protected and encouraged as laid down in our Movement's broader programme. In its economic relations the People's Republic of Angola will be open to the entire world.

It will accept international co-operation on the unquestionable assumption that the so-called foreign aid shall not be of a conditioned or conditioning character. The long history of the MPLA shows that

as the leading force of the People's Republic of Angola it will never betray the sacred principle of national independence. Our international relations will always be in line with the principle of mutual advantage.

The People's Republic of Angola will devote particular attention to its relations with Portugal, and, because it wishes them to be lasting ones, it will build them on a new basis, free from any traces of colonialism. The present dispute with Portugal will be approached calmly in order not to poison our future relations.

It is evident that, initially, our economy will suffer from a lack of cadres. In order to meet this shortcoming a plan for the rapid training of national cadres will be drawn up, and, at the same time, we shall make an appeal for international co-operation in this sphere.

Our schools will undergo at all levels a radical reorganisation so that they can actually serve the people and our economic reconstruction.

## Our Battlefield

Our people's revolutionary determination to fight man's exploitation by man, and the differences which separate us from the enemy, demand of us a new war of liberation which will take the form of widespread popular resistance and will have to continue until the final victory. In this context, the productive sector becomes predominant as a battlefield and a basic and vital factor in the advancement of our resistance. In order effectively to ensure the support of the glorious FAPLA, the People's Republic of Angola will adopt the measures required to deal with the situation resulting from the invasion of our country. The People's Republic of Angola solemnly reiterates its determination to fight for Angola's territorial integrity, opposing any attempts at dismembering the country (applause). The People's Republic of Angola sees as a priority and a vital and inalienable task the expulsion from our country of the army made up of South African and Zai-

**Killed by counter-revolutionary forces**



rean troops, Portuguese fascists, Angolan puppets and mercenaries who represent the combined forces of imperialist aggression against our country. The People's Republic of Angola proposes to activate and support the establishment of people's power on a national scale. The working masses will thus exercise power on all levels.

The People's Republic of Angola sees as an inalienable patriotic duty to give special assistance and protection to those orphaned and those mutilated in the war of liberation. It will make all efforts to



completely reintegrate into society all those victims of the war.

The People's Republic of Angola shall reassert once more its firm aim to launch a massive anti-illiteracy campaign throughout country, promoting and propagating free education, rooted in the culture of the Angolan people.

The state will set up, on a national scale, an efficient medical and health service aimed chiefly in the rural areas where the peasant masses who have hitherto been denied this right by colonialism.

Another overriding concern of our state will be the abolition of all forms of discrimination based on sex, age, ethnic or racial origin, or religion, and the strict observance of the just principle of equal pay for equal work.

The People's Republic of Angola, under the guidance of the MPLA, shall encourage the emancipation of Angolan women, a right won through their courageous participation in the struggle for liberation.

### **Solidarity with SA Struggle**

The People's Republic of Angola declares itself a lay State, with complete separation between the Church and the State, respecting all religions and protecting all the churches, places and objects of worship and legally recognized institutions. The People's Republic of Angola, aware of its importance and responsibilities in the southern African and world contexts, reiterates its solidarity with all the world's oppressed peoples, especially the peoples of Zimbabwe and Namibia's struggle against racist domination.

The People of Angola, under the orientation of its revolutionary vanguard – the MPLA – express their militant solidarity with the people of South Africa in their struggle against the oppressive racist regime. They assert once more their fighting and militant solidarity with the peoples of Mocambique, Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde, Sao Tome and Principe and with their revolutionary organisations – FRELIMO, PAIGC and MLSTP – comrades



**Agosto Ngangla, MPLA pioneer who was murdered by the fascists before independence for refusing to betray the revolution**

in our difficult times and in our common struggle.

They assert once more their solidarity with the fighting people of Timor, guided by their revolutionary vanguard FRETILIN.

They assert once more their solidarity with the Palestinian people in their just struggle for national rights and against Zionism.

### **From the Cabinda to the Kunene**

Having achieved national independence, the MPLA and the Angolan people wish

to express their heartfelt gratitude for the help rendered by all the friendly peoples and countries to our heroic national liberation struggle (applause). Our gratitude goes to all the African people and countries who remained on our side, to the socialist countries, to the Portuguese revolutionary forces, and to the progressive organizations and governments of Western countries who understood and supported the Angolan people's struggle.

The sovereign People's Republic of Angola will maintain diplomatic relations

with all the world countries based on the principles of mutual respect, national sovereignty, non-interference, respect for territorial integrity, non-aggression, equality, reciprocity of benefits and peaceful co-existence.

The People's Republic of Angola, a free and independent African State, voices its adherence to the principles of the OAU Charter and the United Nations Charter. The foreign policy of the People's Republic of Angola, based on the principle of

**the  
blood  
and  
the  
seed**

Agostinho Neto

We

from far flung Africa  
and above the treachery of man,  
across the majestic and unconquered forests  
across the flow of life,  
which runs anxious, eager and abundant in the  
rivers' roar,  
through the melodious sound of muted drums  
through the eyes of youthful multitudes,  
multitudes of arms, of pain and hope  
from far-flung Africa

beneath the claw  
we bleed from grief and hope, from sorrows and  
from strength,  
bleeding on this earth disembowelled by hoes,  
bleeding with the sweat of forced labour in the  
cotton fields,  
bleeding hunger, ignorance, despair and death  
in the wounds on the black back of a child, on a  
mother, on honesty  
the blood and the seed

from far-flung Africa  
black  
and bright like mornings of friendship  
desirous and strong like the steps of liberty.  
Our cries  
are drums heralding desire  
in the tumultuous voices, music of nations,  
our cries are hymns of love that hearts  
might flourish on the earth like seeds in the sun  
the cries of Africa



total independence observed by the MPLA from the outset, will be one of non-alignment. The People's Republic of Angola will respect its international undertakings, and, equally, the international routes using its territory.

The People's Republic of Angola, a country committed to the anti-imperialist struggle, will have as natural allies the African countries, the socialist countries and all the world progressive forces. Comrades, on this moment when the An-


cries of mornings when the dead grew from the seas  
chained  
the blood and the seed

– see, here are our hands  
open to the brotherhood of man  
united in certainty  
for the future of man  
for right, for peace, for friendship.

From our toes, roses grow,  
perfumed with the river Zaire's tenacity  
and the grandeur of Maiombe's trees.  
In our minds  
is the road of friendship for Africa,  
for the world,

Our eyes the life-blood  
are turned towards hands beckoning love in all  
the world  
hands in future – inspiring faith in the vitality  
of Africa, the human land of Africa  
of far-flung Africa  
regenerating under the sun of hope  
creating bonds of brotherhood in freedom from want  
from the yearning for peace,  
the blood and the seed.

For the future – here are our eyes  
for peace – our voices  
for peace – our hands  
from Africa, united in love.



golan people are covered in glory thanks to the victories and sacrifices of their best sons, we greet in the People's Republic of Angola, our first State, the liberation of our beloved motherland (applause, cheers). From Cabinda to the Kunene, united in the common motherland, in the blood shed in the cause of freedom, we pay tribute to the heroes who fell in five long centuries of resistance, and shall be worthy of their example. We respect the characteristics of each region, of each populational nucleus of our country, for all of us equally offer the motherland the sacrifices its survival demands.

The flag which today flutters here is the symbol of freedom, the result of the blood, toil and tears of our fighting people. It is also the blessed love of the Angolan people.

United from Cabinda to the Kunene, we shall vigorously carry on the widespread popular resistance, and shall build our democratic and popular State. Honour to the new Angolan man; eternal glory to our heroes; the struggle continues; victory is certain; victory is certain (last three sentences echoed by the crowd and followed by applause and cheering).

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# THE BANTUSTAN PROGRAMME:

## ITS DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS

- ***The Bantustan programme in historical perspective***
- ***The ethnic and territorial basis of the Bantustan programme***
- ***The limitations of the Bantustan programme***
- ***The economy of the Bantustans***
- ***The Bantustans as instruments of racist South African foreign policy***

(This document was submitted by the British Anti-Apartheid Movement to the UN and does not necessarily reflect ANC policy)

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In October 1976 a small part of South Africa known as the Transkei is to receive „independence“. With this step the Bantustan policy of the South African government will have taken more definite shape than hitherto, and the international community will have to consider what attitude to take to the fledgling mini-state with its nominal population of just over 3 millions of whom nearly half live outside its borders. Nine other mini-states of the same sort are envisaged, and the process of their creation is in most cases already well advanced. The South African government is thus proceeding, deliberately and with the maximum publicity it can achieve for itself, with the largest partition and fragmentation operation undertaken by the government of a unified country in the twentieth


century. It is anxious to portray this extraordinary undertaking as being consistent with universally accepted principles of the right of nations to self-determination. At the same time it is equally anxious to obscure the fact that the real character of this policy is racist and colonialist, and that its purpose is to ensure the continuing political and economic domination of the racist white minority not only throughout the area of what is now the Republic of South Africa, but also in the unliberated parts of Southern Africa as a whole. The intensified application of the Bantustan programme is now so central a feature of the South African government's apartheid policy that it urgently requires to be seen and understood for what it is. This article accordingly summarises the main features of the programme.

## The Bantustan Programme in Historical Perspective

The political domination (imposed by force of arms) of the African peoples living in South Africa, the expropriation of their land, their confinement to specified areas of land remote from the areas of white settlement and their enforced participation in the money economy through wage-labour – these were the main characteristics of 19th century colonialism in South Africa. The origins of the present-day so-called 'Bantu Homelands' must be sought in the pattern imposed upon the country by colonial conquest and rule. Starting with the British rulers of Natal in the mid-19th century, and developing in different ways in the other British colony (the Cape) and in the two Boer Republics, a policy was implemented of basing the colonial administration on the confinement of the African people

to reserves or locations, from which they were only to emerge to serve the labour needs of the settler economy. This whether it be derived from the metropolitan power abroad or based on the white settler community locally. Having lost their land to the colonists, the Africans at the same time lost control of their political destiny. Conversely, for the whites a monopoly of access to the land both required and was required by a continuing monopoly of political power over the blacks.

These were the historical realities which shaped the early 'reserves' and the policy of segregation in its original colonial form. Thus the basic ideas behind the Bantustan programme, and the geographical configurations which have resulted from them, are deeply rooted in the history of colonialism in Southern Africa and cannot be understood in isolation



from their colonial background. Since the formation of the Union of South Africa in 1910 and, more specifically, since the Natives Land Act of 1913, as modified by the Native Land and Trust Act of 1936, the distribution of the land as between whites and Africans has remained basically the same, with the whites arrogating to themselves some 87 % of the land and confining Africans to the remaining 13 %.

Indeed the Vorster regime has gone out of its way to emphasize that, in designating the boundaries of the 'homelands', it is adamantly determined not to exceed the land allocations fixed in 1936. This continuity of policy demonstrates that the Bantustan programme is not tactical manoeuvre of the South African regime but a long-standing strategy which is an essential condition of the maintenance of white supremacy.

Not just the geographical allocation of land is at stake; it is the very claim to existence of a white-dominated nation-state occupying nearly all the land surface of the whole country as established in 1910, and effectively dominating the rest. (It can be noted in passing that originally under the 1913 Act Africans were to be allocated only 7½ % of the land, and that the price they paid for obtaining an increase in the size of their allocation to 13 % was the loss of their entrenched constitutional right of enfranchisement on the common voters' roll in the Cape). The concomitant of this racist claim is to deny the possibility of African political participation in the 'white state' of South Africa, itself and the denial to the African people of an alternative nation statehood even on the fringe of the 'white state'. Thus successive South African governments from 1936 to today have consistently maintained the basic pattern of land distribution arrived at by colonial conquest, and no less consistently denied to Africans all political rights and all prospects of ever obtaining political rights in the area called 'white South Africa'. In the remaining 13 % tribalism rather than nationalism or nation-hood is to be the basis of statehood, because the very no-

tion of a united African nation poses a threat to the white nation-state.

## Colonialist

The preservation of colonial-type political relationships as a frame-work for the emergence of a modern industrial state has, as indicated, resulted in a high degree of continuity in the racial policies of successive South African governments. Yet the attempted preservation of colonial-type political relationships between white and black the traditional policy, to the extent that the current Bantustan programme of the racist regime is peculiarly a product of the 1960's-evolved to overcome the mounting liberation struggle of the oppressed South African people and to secure the position of the racist regime in a international context which has become increasingly inimical to colonialist and racist ideas and practices.

Before Sharpeville in March 1960, before being excluded from the Commonwealth, and before the strengthening of anti-colonialist forces at the United Nations by the admission of many newly-independent states, South Africa's racist rulers had no intention of carrying out – even within the limits of their traditional policies – a token decolonisation of the African reserves. One of the key official architects of the Verwoerd regime's racial policies, Dr. W. M. Eiselen, wrote in 1959 that "the utmost degree of autonomy in administrative matters which the Union Parliament is likely to be prepared to concede to these areas (i. e. to the reserves) will stop short of actual surrender of sovereignty by the European trustees, and there is therefore no prospect of a federal system with eventual equality among members taking the place of the South African Commonwealth."

Barely two years later, in a major extension of existing policy, Dr. Verwoerd revealed that the Bantustans would be allowed to develop into 'separate Black States' and admitted:

„This is not what we would have preferred to see. This is a form of fragmentation which we would rather not have had if it was within our control to avoid it . . . In the light of the forces to which South Africa is being subjected, there is, however, no doubt as to what must be done in the course of time.”

Two years after that, in 1963, the first legislative steps were taken to launch the Transkei on the path which is leading to its projected 'independence' in 1976. Around the same time, the Bantustan programme was extended to include Namibia<sup>1</sup>, and the Transkei began to be used as an earnest of the good faith of the apartheid regime, both in its general propaganda and more specifically (in the International Court of Justice proceedings at the Hague) to justify its continued domination of Namibia.

Yet for nearly a decade, the Transkei was the only Bantustan to be given even the semblance of democratic forms of self-government (subject always to Pretoria's over-riding control). The acceleration of the constitutional aspect of the Bantustan programme began in 1971; in the subsequent three years, six new legislative assemblies were brought into being<sup>2</sup>. In the early 1960s however, the idea of

independence for the Transkei or any other Bantustan appeared only as a remote possibility to Dr. Verwoerd. Independence was secondary to his main preoccupation – which was to achieve, in his own words, “separation in the political sphere.” He and the other apartheid apologists emphasized that their policy did not envisage the complete separation of the races: blacks would continue to serve the whites in the economic sphere. This dismemberment of the South African economy would rob the whites of the sources of their wealth and privilege. The Bantustans must continue to supply “white South Africa” with labour; indeed, they must be compelled to do so by being made small, fragmentary, overcrowded and underdeveloped.

The idea of a definite timetable for the independence of the Bantustans only emerged in the 1970's when South Africa's growing isolation in Africa and the world compelled the Pretoria regime to give some substance, some measure of concreteness to a policy that was vague and arbitrary. As recently as April 1974 independence for the Transkei was being anticipated by Vorster and Transkeian leaders in terms of a 5-year programme. The haste with which Bantustans are being

### Life in the Bantustans . . .



brought into existence and constitutionally 'developed' is entirely of Pretoria's making. Yet Pretoria retains full control. Even today, only the Transkei has a definite date for independence, and in this respect it is once more evidently serving its long-established function of a testing ground for the Bantustan programme.


In short, the Bantustan programme is in its essentials a vital and integral part of the strategy of white domination in South Africa deriving its principal features from colonial times. At the same time its new contemporary form – the granting of political independence to the apartheid regime to preserve white rule in the post-colonial world. This inevitably gives particular international significance to the Bantustan programme, and requires of the international community a united repudiation of a policy which has long been regarded as fraudulent by the overwhelming majority of the people against whose interests and aspirations it is directed.

\* \* \* \* \*

### **The Ethnic and Territorial Basis of the Bantustan Programme**

The South African government's professed aim is to confer independence on a number of ethnically-based states. Even within its own terms of reference the policy is full of anomalies which reflect the untrammelled arbitrariness of racist white domination. The ethnic basis of the proposed states has been frequently changed in regard to both the number of the homelands and the nomenclature of the so-called 'national units' into which the African people are to be divided. Three examples will illustrate this.

(i) Initially, at the time of the "Promotion of Bantu-Self-government Act of 1959", eight 'national units' were proposed. (Previously the Tomlinson Commission had proposed seven Bantu states). Neither the seven nor the eight included as a separate entity people of the Ndebele tribe. Today, under Pretoria's final proposals for the territorial consolidation of



**"Developing what . . ."  
A. J. Raubenheimer, Deputy Minister  
of Bantu Development**

the Bantustans published in March 1975, a homeland for the South-Ndebele is envisaged, though as yet it has no organs of administration and is literally no more than a geographical expression. (The North-Ndebele are to form part of the North-Sotho homeland of Lebowa, together with the Pedi).

(ii) The people designated as forming the Xhosa 'national units', instead of forming one large national unit of 4 million people, are to be divided between two homelands – the Transkei and the Ciskei. This is largely a projection into the modern world of administrative patterns established by the sequence of colonial conquest: what is now the Ciskei was in the 19th century known as British Kaffraria; it was subjugated earlier than the territories further north of East London which today comprise the Transkei and have formed an administrative unit since 1894.

(iii) The 'national units' themselves are figments of the apartheid planners' minds, being but loosely related to the actual social groupings which pre-existed colonial times. The people designated the Xhosa, for example, comprise a large number of Nguni-speaking tribal groups including the Xhosa (properly so-called), Tembu, Bhaca, Mpondo, Mpodomise, Mfengu, and so on. In short the pre-colonial tribal society which has long since merged into the wider South African society of today provides no conceivable basis whatever for the determination of statehood today. Indeed, the invocation of ethnic criteria by the South African government for its Bantustan programme is simply an attempt to cloak the retribalisation of the African people in the respectable garb of the self-determination of nations.

Just as there is no historical justification for the Bantustans, so is there no geographical basis. Presently comprising 113 separate fragments of land, the Bantustans are intended by the South African government (under its final consolidation proposals, to which no timetable has yet been attached) to be reduced to 36, distributed as follows:

KwaZulu	10	Transkei	2
Bophuthatswana	6	Venda	2
Lebowa	6	Swazi	1
Gazankulu	4	Basotho	
Ciskei	3	Qwa-Qwa	1
		Ndebele	1

The largest 'national units' are to have the most fragmented states – 10 frag-

ments for the 4.01 million Zulus (1970 figures), 5 fragments (in two states) for the 3.93 million Xhosas, 6 fragments for the 1.72 million Tswanas. The three national units which are to have unified territories are also amongst the smallest: Swazi – 498,700; South Ndebele – 233,000; and the South Sotho (or Shoeshoe), who number nearly 1½ million of whom barely 10% live in the homeland of Basotho Qwa-Qwa.

As has frequently been pointed out, the Bantustans in general are the least developed areas of South Africa. None of the main cities, no usable port or harbour, no major industries, and hardly any of the mines and mineral wealth of South Africa are to be found in the Bantustans. There is no railway network traversing the homelands, and only some of them have real facilities connecting their fringes to the nearby industrial centres of 'white South Africa'.

In 1970 the average density of the actual population of the Bantustans was 119 per square mile, ranging between 61 per square mile in the arid Bophuthatswana homeland in the north-east to 173 per square mile in KwaZulu. In 'white South Africa', the average density of the actual population (all races) was only 35 per square mile – despite the inclusion of all South Africa's cities in this area.

### The Limitations of the Bantustan Programme

The Bantustan programme must be assessed by other criteria than the premises of the apartheid policy, which postulates that South Africa is not a multi-racial country but a multi-national one. First, the programme offers no political solution to the oppression of the Coloured and Indian minorities who together comprise over ten per cent of the South African people. Apartheid decrees that they may have no place, and certainly no equality, in the white state, but denies them any alternative statehood. Secondly, it offers no solution to the needs of the Africans outside the 'homelands' who comprise between half and two-thirds of the African population. Even



the most optimistic official planners anticipate that for the foreseeable future (which for these purposes stretches well into the next century) there will be at least as many Africans as whites in so-called 'white South Africa'. Within the limits set by the government's proposed aim of making all African labour in 'white South Africa' migratory (as far as this is possible), this large proportion of the South African nation – including the bulk of the labour force in industry, mining and agriculture – is a permanent part of 'white South Africa'. Yet it is to be permanently denied political rights. African migrant workers – migrant as a result not of economic forces but of government policy – are to be treated as 'gast-arbeiters' and foreigners in their own country.

But the principal objection to the Bantustan programme is its fraudulent character. While presented as fulfilling the right of black nations to self-determination, it has throughout its evolution been entirely the creature of the Nationalist Government which alone has determined the scope, direction and timing of the Bantustan programme. African opposition to this aspect of apartheid policy has been considerable – even at times developing into armed resistance. Although this resistance has been crushed, worn down or overridden, it continues. But its suppression has been accompanied by the rapid creation of an administrative elite in the homelands recruited from the ranks of the „traditional“ authorities (as recognised or created in Pretoria) and from the most conservative sections of the intelligentsia. This client class, in particular a few well-known figures, ably assisted by the South African press, provides a very visible and vocal impression of dissent in the homelands which is basically spurious, while the deep popular opposi-



tion to government policy – denied legitimate outlet and constantly suppressed – smoulders largely unseen.

The size\* of the client class in the Bantustans and the volubility of its leading figures have earned it undue prominence. Far from posing a threat to the Nationalist government, this class cannot fulfil the purpose for which it was brought into existence unless it is highly conspicuous. But its activist and 'radical' image cannot belie the fact that it is the creation of the Nationalist government, to which it is fully subordinated. This is a reality which some of its spokesmen admit, and which is borne out by a brief examination of the political institutions of the Bantustans.

Of the ten proposed Bantustans, seven have so far (mid-1975) been given "self-government" in terms of the South African government's policy. That is to say that under enabling legislation passed by the whites-only South African parliament, the white-dominated government has created seven legislative assemblies\* in the Bantustans in none of which is there a majority of elected members.

\* By March 1974 there were 110,600 Africans in government employment in the homelands, making government service by far the major source of employment in these areas.

\* This excludes KwaZulu which also has a Legislative Assembly; but it has no elected element in it yet and no elections have taken place in KwaZulu.

These assemblies comprise a total of 519 members, of whom no less than 326 are nominated (chiefs of various rank, and headmen) and only 193 (37 %) are elected. Even the democratic form of this minority elected element is denied democratic substance by the fact that elections take place in the absence of voters' rolls, of political parties (in several of the 'homelands'), and of guaranteed rights of freedom of speech, assembly and movement, and with a partly absentee electorate dispersed among the millions of Africans living outside the 'homelands' to which they do not officially belong.

This travesty of parliamentary democracy could only be perpetrated in a situation in which

(i) the authentic national political organisations of the African people, the liberation movements, have been outlawed and their leaders and supporters imprisoned,

driven underground and into exile; (ii) the repressive laws of the white parliament and government (Suppression of Communism Act, Terrorism Act, 'Sabotage' Act etc) are fully operative throughout the whole of South Africa, and create a climate of intimidation and repression in which no genuine choice can emerge, still less be exercised.

The homeland governments have a range of powers more limited than most local government authorities in a country such as Britain. Their largest-spending department is usually education; and besides such functions as the regulation of roads, irrigation, stock control, forestry, land allocations etc they also perform minor judicial functions and, in the more advanced Bantustans (eg the Transkei and Bophuthatswana) control some magistracies and police stations, as well as health facilities. All major aspects of govern-

**Forced out of the towns on to the barren wasteland in the Bantustan**



ment-security, foreign relations, defence, labour, regulation of finance and currency, commerce and industry, railways and postal services, etc – are the preserve of the Pretoria regime. Against this background it is not surprising that the 'homeland' legislative assemblies seldom sit for more than one or two months in the year, that their legislative programmes are in the main insignificant, and their role on the actual government of the African people of South Africa is peripheral.

The utter subordination of the 'homeland' governments to Pretoria is clearly demonstrated in two further respects. All the Bantustans rely on Pretoria for 65–85 % of their revenue, and there is no prospect of this dependence being significantly reduced in the foreseeable future. Furthermore, virtually all the senior administrative posts in the Bantustans are occupied by white officials seconded and paid by the South African government. Although the 'Africanisation' of the Bantustan administrations is proceeding, it is proceeding slowly. In 1974 there were still 1.472 white officials in the Bantustans and the significance of this fact will be readily grasped when it is borne in mind that a fundamental rule of South African government policy – that no white person shall work under the authority of any black person – is applied to the Bantustans as rigidly as it is elsewhere in the Republic. (When necessary, as in the Transkei health department in 1973, Pretoria intervenes in appointments to impose compliance with this rule.) Thus although the number of these officials is shrinking, their concentration in the top echelons will continue.

### **The Economy of the Bantustans**

In recent years South African government spokesmen have clearly indicated that economic viability is not regarded as a precondition for the independence of the Bantustans. In other words, they are to begin life as mini-states in a condition of economic subordination to South Africa – from which they will never escape. If the Bantustans were capable of pro-



viding employment and wealth sufficient to support the 'national units' allocated in them, they would cease to be pools of migrant labour supplying the apartheid economy of 'white South Africa'. It is therefore an essential condition of their existence that they are, and remain, undeveloped, reliant on the export of manpower for bare survival.

This dependence and lack of viability have been amply documented and main facts need not be repeated here. It will suffice to quote the words of one of the 'homeland' leaders, Dr. C. Phatudi of Lebowa, addressing a recent seminar in London to encourage British investment in South Africa and in the 'homelands' in particular. Speaking of the circumstances that shaped the present position of the 'homelands' he said:

„We became vast reservoirs of labour for the industrial and mining sectors of the Republic of South Africa.

We are omni-dependent on the Republic of South Africa for all of the electrical power consumed in these territories as well as for most of our water requirements. We are also absolutely dependent on the Republic for our transportation requirements as well as every aspect of telecommunications, postal and the like.

We have been dependent upon the Republic's banking facilities and commercial organisational infrastructure. Further, we are dependent upon the Republic to supply the vast portion of the required health services, hospitals and surgery facilities ...

If you add to this pattern of dependence the considerably high disparity in the level of development, socio-economic development, demographic explosions and in pure economic power between the territories and our white-ruled neighbours, you will understand why we have been dismissed as a hostage or client state".

He then added – unconvincingly in view of the facts – that:

„This is a view which regrettably prevailed and which is fiercely resented by all my compatriots.“

Agriculture is the main economic activity of the homelands, and the apartheid regime makes much of the alleged climatic and topographical advantages of these areas for agricultural purposes. Such propaganda must be compared with the fact. Maize, the staple diet of the African population, is grown both in the 'homelands' and on 'white' farms. Average yields in the 'homelands' have for many years remained around 3.5 bags per hectare, falling to less than 1 bag in drought years (as for example in the Ciskei 1968–70). In various parts of the Transvaal, however, 'white' farms produce from 14–17 bags per hectare, in poor years, to over 30 bags per hectare in good years. The Transkei, often projected in official literature as a verdant paradise, is in fact a parched and overcrowded rural slum. It has to import nearly as much maize as it produces. If, as may be expected, the Transkei is typical of all the Bantustans in this respect, then none of them is even self-sufficient in food.

Practically all the mineral-rich parts of the country have been carefully excised from the Bantustans. What remains in them is (aside from the large platinum mines in Bophuthatswana) insignificant in relation to South Africa's total mineral output. And what there is of it in the 'homelands' is owned and controlled by whites.

Even the development corporation established by the government to promote economic progress in the 'homelands' has served white interests rather than black.

Investment Corporation has invested R77 Million worth of capital – R43 million of it in white-owned enterprises, R20 million in Corporation-owned enterprises and only R14 million (18 %) in African-owned enterprises.

So confident is the South African government of its economic hegemony in the Bantustans in the future that, in 1974, under the second Bantu Laws Amendment Act, it empowered the Minister of Bantu Affairs to guarantee capital repayments and interest payments on any loan negotiated by a 'homeland' government.

### **The Bantustans as Instruments of Repression**

A new and revealing aspect of the Bantustan programme is the growth of the repressive powers and apparatus of the state in these areas. The Pretoria regime has readily conferred upon the 'homeland' leaders powers of the type it itself possesses in abundance, and which guarantee that the rule of law will be non-existent in the 'homelands' when they become independent.

The KwaZulu government already has powers of detention without trial in respect of some of its districts, and the Ciskei has sought similar powers. The Cankulu government has prohibited teachers, students and public servants from participating in politics. In 1974 the Ciskei government successfully requested the South African government to banish one of its opponents, an attorney, to a remote part of the homeland, and has declared its intention to squash dissidents 'like bugs'. The Transkei government not only still has the emergency regulations introduced by the South African government in 1960 (Proclamation 400, allowing for detention without trial and severe control over meetings etc), but also, in August 1974, armed the Health Minister Chief Moshesh with special emergency powers to deal with opposition in his district.

One of the most important of the new measures is the Second Bantu Laws Amendment Act No 71 of 1974 which empowers the 'homeland' governments to assume extensive banning powers similar to those in the Suppression of Communism Act. Although these powers duplicate existing repressive legislation, their creation is obviously intended to establish from the outset a climate in which active opposition in the homelands to the governments approved by Pretoria will be treated as illegal or at least subversive.

No less sinister are the recently revealed 'rehabilitation centres' in the 'homelands'. To these camps pass law offenders, 'idlers', and 'undesirables' from the urban areas may be sent for corrective training entailing up to 3 years' detention with compulsory labour of up to 56 hours a week. The first two such centres, in Lebowa and the Ciskei, are already under construction – by prison labour. It is not yet clear precisely what purpose these centres are to serve. They could turn out to be forced labour camps, and/or they may be chiefly intended to detain political opponents, especially those who have already served prison sentences. (Section 29 of the Bantu Urban Areas Act has an 8-point definition of a 'idle' African and an 11-point definition of an 'undesirable' African. One of the latter regarded as political in character.)

Two features of these institutions need special attention. One is that under the sweeping terms of the existing legislation virtually any African can be sent to such a centre – whether or not he or she has committed an offence. The other feature is that the centres, although situated in the 'homelands', will be controlled by the Department of Bantu Affairs, i. e. by Pretoria.

Another new development in the Bantustans is their use by the South African government as military outposts – auxiliaries of the armies of white domination. Typically the Transkei is setting the lead in this respect, and the first batch of Transkeian volunteers is already being

## **Black »Diplomats«**

The following so-called Information Officers have been appointed by the Transkeian Bantustan to serve in racist South African embassies in selected western countries:

T. Letlake, New York  
L. D. Sawula, New York  
T. F. Matshoba, New York  
D. S. Koyana, London  
A. L. Socikwa, London  
K. M. Mdleleni, Paris  
C. Mankotywa, Paris  
F. Qaba, Bonn  
V. D. Lila, Bonn  
M. Njisane, Pretoria

Two of these are methodist ministers and well known among the people as agents of BOSS. They are Socikwa and Lila.

Letlake was a former member of the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) who was in exile until he sold out to the racists and was allowed to return to the country by his racist masters.

trained by instructors of the South African Defence Force. As in other respects, effective control and leadership will remain in white hands.

No review of the Bantustans could be complete without mention of their use by the apartheid regime as dumping grounds for the 'superfluous appendages' of migrant workers in white areas. Over a million Africans have already been uprooted in the course of this resettlement programme. At least half a million more are to be resettled in terms of the government's final land consolidation proposals. The economic function of the Bantustans as reservoirs of cheap labour for

the apartheid economy is underlined by this inhuman operation – the scale and intensity of which show no sign of abatement after more than a decade of incalculable suffering and dispossession.

### **The Bantustans as Instruments of South African Foreign Policy**

As indicated above, the transformation of the Bantustan programme in the early 1960s from one of limited local self-government to a programme aiming at eventual independence was forced upon the South African government by its new isolation in the period of decolonization. The precipitate rush to realize this programme in the 1970s has manifested itself in, and as a result of, a period of increased isolation for the apartheid regime stemming from its intransigence not only in regard to domestic racial policies, but also in respect of its illegal occupation of Namibia and the extension of the Bantustan programme to Namibia, and its support for the illegal rebel regime in Rhodesia (Zimbabwe).

In an attempt to break out of its isolation on the African continent, the South African government has in recent years sought to 'normalise' its relations with independent African countries as a first step to gaining African acquiescence to the perpetuation of its apartheid policies. At the same time, the Vorster government has sought to deepen the involvement of the major Western Powers in the apartheid economy and to draw closer to them in strategic relations, thereby overcoming the political restraints which make it difficult for the Western Powers to enter into the closest and most open alliance with South Africa of the sort the apartheid regime would undoubtedly prefer. In both the African and Western spheres of its foreign policy, the South African government has projected the Bantustan programme as its alternative to the policies advocated by the liberation movements, by the Organisation of African Unity, by the United Nations and by anti-apartheid

movements and other progressive organisations throughout the world.

In doing so, Pretoria has found its traditional allies actively willing to help – not least by giving official recognition and publicity to the persons installed by Pretoria in positions of authority in the Bantustans. In recent years, the first significant exercise of this kind appears to have been the invitation from the United States government of Chief Buthelezi to conduct a two-month tour of the United States in April-June 1971 – barely a year after Chief Buthelezi's installation as chief executive officer of the Zulu 'territorial authority'. In October of the same year, Chiefs Mantanzima, Buthelezi and Mangope spent three-and-a-half weeks in Britain as guests of the British government, and there after two weeks in West Germany as guests of the Federal government. Since then, most of the Bantustan leaders have spent at least 2–3 months, each year visiting the United States, the Federal Republic of Germany, Britain, Switzerland, Holland and other Western countries. In addition, Chief Buthelezi has visited several African countries, including those most directly involved in the Southern African conflict and some of those most sympathetic to the Vorster regime's policies of dialogue and detente.

The availability of the Bantustan leaders as free-ranging emissaries of the South African government's Bantustan programme has created a new dimension to South Africa's foreign policy. The importance of this new dimension does not so much lie in the fact that for the first time black spokesmen are travelling abroad to advocate the racial policies of the apartheid regime: it lies rather in the fact that these spokesmen are able to gain admittance to and achieve acceptability in influential circles in the West-Christian, financial and commercial and intellectual – where the South African government itself has long been unable to achieve any credibility for its policies by conventional diplomatic means.

Furthermore, in these important opinion-



**Bantustan functionaries selling their souls to racism**

making circles, these spokesmen are now able to solicit participation in the economic development of their 'homelands', and to oppose policies directed at the isolation of apartheid South Africa on the grounds that such policies will harm those whom they are intended to help. In such circles there is often no, or insufficient, awareness that the Bantustans are not and cannot ever become independent nation states comparable even with independent African countries like Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland (with which they are sometimes misleadingly compared). The fact that the Bantustans are themselves only nationally-linked fragments of land, all comprising part of the territory of South Africa and closely enmeshed in the economy of that country, is often lost sight of.

Consequently, the problem of the socio-economic development of these areas is often seen as being similar in its essentials to general development needs in the

Third World, whereas the reality is that South Africa is an industrialized country and that the backwardness of the 'homeland' areas is directly attributable to the apartheid policies of successive South African governments.

As we have seen, the backwardness of the Reserves is due to grossly unfair and unilateral land apportionment on a racial basis; to the exclusion of all main industrial and mining centres from them; to the resettlement in them of millions of African men, women and children from 'white South Africa' – in short, to their well-established function as reservoirs of cheap labour in the apartheid economy. Against that background it is blatantly hypocritical of the Vorster regime to present itself – as it does – as being engaged in the largest development programme in the Third World, if not in the whole world. And it is more than hypocritical of it to be pretending to seek to engage governmental and non-governmental resources from



the developed world in this farcial development programme. The overnight conversion of the South African government to enthusiasm for this policy stems from its realization that the projection of the Bantustans internationally would provide it with an important new means of legitimizing the foreign capital inflows which have been so crucial to South Africa, both economically and politically, in the past decade. This was the main strategic consideration which prompted the South African government in 1973 to overturn a long-standing detail of policy and to open the 'Bantu-homelands' to foreign investment.(3)

Faced with this new development, the international community needs to inform itself of the realities of the Bantustans and to exercise great vigilance so as not to accept in the light in which it is now presented a racist policy which in its former manifestations has been overwhelmingly repudiated by world opinion. In particular, organisations and bodies which feel a special moral responsibility towards oppressed Africans and seek practical ways of relieving their sufferings, need to avoid taking steps which might encourage the South African government to continue in its present line of approach to the 'homeland' areas and relieve it of the overall responsibility it has assumed for the welfare of South Africans of all races. Moreover, at governmental level it is becoming imperative for the United Nations to respond to the demand of the African states, made at the extraordinary session

of the Council of Ministers of the OAU in Dar es Salaam in April 1975 and reiterated at the Kampala summit in August, for the rejection of the whole Bantustan programme. The relevant part of the Resolution on South Africa adopted then called on all UN member states to desist from establishing any contacts with the homeland 'leaders'.

Only this approach, carried out as part of the wider campaign for the isolation of the apartheid system in all spheres – political, military, economic, cultural and scientific, and sporting – provides a realistic and meaningful basis for a solution to the problem of apartheid, and for solidarity with the struggle of the people of South Africa against it.

## Notes

(1) The extension of the Bantustan programme to Namibia was initiated by the Verwoerd regime through the appointment of the Odenaal Commission in 1962. The Commission duly recommended the fragmentation of the country into 1 white and 10 black parts, and in 1968 a major legislative innovation was made, giving effect to these proposals, in the form of the "Development of Self-government for Native Nations in South West Africa Act".

(2) First came the creation of "territorial authorities" (the final stage of the Banu Authorities plan introduced by the Nationalist government in 1951) in the Ciskei (November 1968), Bophuthatswana (December 1968), Lebowa (August 1969), Venda (October 1969), and KwaZulu (May 1970). Then in 1971 the Bantu Homelands Constitution Act was passed to enable Pretoria so transform these "territorial authorities" into legislative assemblies, thereby inaugurating the phase of self-government leading up to independence. The difference between the two stages lies in the introduction in the later stage of a minority elected element.

If the Transkei is to be typical of the whole Bantustan programme, then it appears that independence will be conferred upon Bantustan 'governments' whose legislatures will still comprise a majority of *ex officio* members.

(3) The 'homelands' have been neglected by both government and private capital. The South African government's current budget



(1975/6) allocates a total of R381.9 million (on Revenue and Loan Account) to expenditure on Bantu Administration and Development — by no means all of which will go on development as such. This represents only 5.9 % of all government expenditure for this period.

Official figures released in August 1974 disclose that there are only 116 South African firms, employing 11,249 Africans, that have established undertakings in the 'homelands'. There are also 11 foreign firms, employing a total of 2,195 Africans.

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## **The Supremes and Apartheid**

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The New York Amsterdam News, reputed to be America's largest weekly, published a hard-hitting attack against the Supremes, one of America's leading Black singing groups, in their issue of October 15, with the adjoining cartoon.

The reason for this attack was the acceptance by the group to perform in apartheid South Africa. Despite a widely circulated advertisement distributed not so long ago by the American Committee on Africa and signed by some of the biggest names in show business calling for a cultural boycott of South Africa, this group which is among the top money-earners in the business chose to accept the trip to a land where their own Black brothers and sisters are denied the right to enjoy such enjoyment unless the performance is in their segregated ghettos.

As the Amsterdam News states: "... the fact is that the South African regime is the prime colossus of racism in the world today, fanatically devoted to a policy of absolute domination — via physical, psychological and economic rape and exploitation by a white minority — over millions of Black Africans, and to the absolute denial of all basic rights of humanity to these millions."

And we ask as does James L. Hicks writing in the same issue of the News: "How much Black pride should one have where money is concerned?"

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Following our recent exposure of West German co-operation with racist South Africa in the nuclear field (See Sechaba, November/December, 1975 issue) the sub-committee (of the United Nations Special Committee Against Apartheid) on the Implementation of UN resolutions and Collaboration with South Africa, has published the following study exposing recent developments in this field by other western countries, notably the United States, Britain and France . . .

# International Nuclear Conspiracy with Racist South Africa

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South Africa has spent years of research and millions of rands on gaining possession of advanced nuclear technology, and has obtained substantial foreign technical and other assistance for this purpose. An extensive long-term research programme was initiated in 1959, under the auspices of the Atomic Energy Board, and comprehensive research facilities were established at Pelindaba, near Pretoria.

In April 1971, following the disclosure that South African scientists at Pelindaba had developed a unique process for the enrichment of uranium, the Government established the Uranium Enrichment Corporation (UCOR) as a State corporation to undertake research and development with the stated objective of making South Africa an independent manufacturer of enriched uranium for its own energy needs as well as for export.

UCOR was charged with the erection of a pilot plant for the production of enriched uranium at Pelindaba.

Two important announcements made in the first part of 1975 showed that South Africa had moved considerably closer to its goal. On 7 April 1975, the Prime Minister, Mr. B. J. Vorster, disclosed in the House of Assembly that the first part of the pilot plant had been brought into operation successfully. He stated:

"The new South African process has therefore not only been proved in practice but it also enables us to proceed with confidence with the erection of a large-scale plant with a view to the marketing of a large portion of our uranium supplies in enriched form for commercial purposes."<sup>1</sup>

The science correspondent of the London Daily Telegraph commented:

"South Africa's announcement has given rise to speculation as to whether she has discovered a short cut to producing an atomic bomb.

Uranium is enriched in the isotope U 235. With high-level enrichment, it can be used for bombs. At low levels it is suitable for nuclear power station fuel. In practice each plant has to be designed to produce one or the other.

Mr. Vorster's statement indicates that the pilot plant has been designed to produce civil-grade material. Nevertheless the process does 'open the door' to producing weapons-grade uranium, should there be the intent, and it is conceivable that bomb-grade material has been produced already."<sup>2</sup>

Subsequently, on 11 June 1975, the South African Minister of Mines, Mr. P. G. J. Koornhof, announced that South African

scientists had successfully commissioned a pilot plant at Pelindaba to produce uranium hexafluoride – the “feed material” for the enrichment plant. This meant that South Africa was now in a position to do the entire enrichment process without having to depend on outsiders<sup>3</sup>


In announcing the completion of the first stage of the enrichment plant, Mr. Vorster claimed:

“That this achievement could be reached without any assistance from foreign countries inspires enormous confidence for the future scientific and technological development of our country.”

Speaking at the European Nuclear Conference in Paris a few weeks later, Mr. A. J. A. Roux, Chairman of UCOR, stated that a total of 234 South African companies had been involved in constructing the plant.<sup>5</sup> The plant, which involved an investment of about R100 million, has reportedly about 90 per cent “local” content.<sup>6</sup>

### **Misleading**

These statements and figures, however, are misleading in many ways. The United States corporation Allis Chalmers designed and built the research and test reactor which is at the heart of the research center at Pelindaba. A report by the American Committee on Africa in New York gave the names of eight other United States organizations which have been involved in research at Pelindaba. United States nuclear engineers were sent to South Africa to supervise the initial stages of the reactor, and scores of South African scientists have received extensive training in the United States. Among these was Dr. W. L. Grant, who was credited by Mr. Vorster as having been one of the inventors of the South African enrichment process.<sup>8</sup> South African nuclear physicists are also known to have been trained in France, reportedly at the expense of the French Government.<sup>9</sup> In addition, under a 20-year agreement for co-operation in the peaceful uses of atomic energy concluded with South Africa in 1957, the United States Atomic Energy Commission is supplying highgrade uranium to fuel the research reactor at Pe-



## **THE NUCLEAR CONSPIRACY**

**FRG collaborates  
to strengthen  
Apartheid**

**African National Congress  
of South Africa  
Information Department**

lindaba.<sup>10</sup> Following a protest by Congressman Les Aspin, a member of the Armed Services Committee of the House of Representatives, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission confirmed in April 1975 that by the end of 1974, 83.6 pounds of enriched uranium had been supplied to South Africa under the agreement, and a license had been issued for the supply of a further 42.5 pounds.<sup>11</sup> The spent fuel elements from the reactor are re-processed in the United Kingdom under an agreement with the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority of November 1970<sup>12</sup>

Despite South Africa's claim that its enrichment process is “unique” there appears to have been substantial co-operation with the Federal Republic of Germany in its development (now confirmed by the ANC in its publication – The Nuclear Conspiracy – Ed.) In his speech at the Paris conference, Dr. Roux confirmed that South Africa's process was an aerodynamic one, of the same basic type as the “jet-nozzle” process under development at the Institute for Nuclear Processing Techniques, a Government agency, at

Karlsruhe, Federal Republic of Germany. It was disclosed in 1974 that several South African scientists had visited the nuclear research laboratories at Karlsruhe. Research at Karlsruhe has had the financial and technical assistance of Essener Steinkohlen Elektrizität AG, an industrial group in the Federal Republic of Germany which is reportedly planning to invest in South Africa's enrichment plant.<sup>13</sup>

It also appears that South Africa has benefited from foreign assistance in the development of its hexafluoride plant. Dr. Roux had disclosed in 1970 that research for the process had been carried out by South African scientists and industrialists in collaboration with "overseas interests", and that South Africa had now reached the stage where it needed no foreign assistance to erect such a plant.<sup>14</sup> Moreover, although the names of South African companies involved in the construction of the pilot plant at Pelindaba have not been disclosed, these are very likely to include a number of subsidiaries of foreign companies and local companies with foreign holdings. It was reported, for instance, that the South African subsidiaries of Siemens and Krupp, the companies in the Federal Republic of Germany, had been connected with research at Pelindaba. The United States companies IBM and Foxboro Corporation are reported to have provided some of the technological equipment.<sup>15</sup>

Foreign involvement is likely to continue to be substantial in the development of South Africa's enrichment process on a commercial scale. On 11 June 1975, Mr. Koornhof announced that UCOR had established a company under the name of ISASA to deal with the building of a large-scale uranium enrichment plant, and that a final decision would be reached within a few months.<sup>16</sup> The Uranium Enrichment Amendment Act was passed in September 1974 to allow private investment in the venture. In April 1975, Mr. Roux disclosed that negotiations were under way for the establishment of the plant as an international venture. The plant would require an estimated investment of R910-million and would have

a capacity of 5,000 tons a year of enriched uranium with a development potential of up to 10,000 tons. It was expected to come into operation by 1984, and to reach full production by 1986.<sup>17</sup>

### Weapons-Grade

Apart from its potential significance for the production of weaponsgrade uranium (a possibility which the South African regime claims it eschews at this point), the enrichment plant is of major importance to South Africa for economic as well as political and strategic reasons.

First, self-sufficiency in the production of enriched uranium is expected to contribute considerably to South Africa's self-sufficiency in meeting its energy needs, thus lessening the impact of an international boycott of petroleum supplies, at least in the long run. Dr. J. W. L. De Villiers, Vice-President of the South African Atomic Energy Board, disclosed recently that the Board was planning to step up its fuel development programme, and that the current oil situation was one of



the most important considerations for an accelerated nuclear power programme. He stated that the introduction of nuclear power meant that South Africa could reserve its coal for the petrochemical industry and for the gasification of coal and production of liquid fuel.<sup>18</sup>

From an economic point of view, South Africa stands to gain substantially from the export of enriched, rather than crude, uranium since the value added in the process is over 200 per cent. The plant is expected to bring in at least R250-million a year and possibly much more, thus contributing to bridge South Africa's chronic balance of trade deficit.<sup>19</sup> It is also expected to provide a stimulating effect on South African industry, fostering the creation of new manufacturing potential and expertise.<sup>20</sup>

Beyond the more immediate economic and other advantages of the proposed plant, it is clear that the South African regime hopes to take advantage of its position as a major producer of uranium, and eventually of enriched uranium, to involve the major industrialised countries more closely in the apartheid economy and thereby to strengthen their vested interest in support of the status quo in South Africa. South Africa is at present the second largest producer of uranium outside the Socialist states, after the United States, with about 25 per cent of known reserves.<sup>21</sup> In addition, since enriched uranium is at present produced only in a handful of industrialised countries, South Africa expects to become a major supplier, taking advantage of a reported gap between production and demand of at least 6,000 tons per year by 1985.<sup>22</sup> South African officials have claimed that their enrichment process is considerably cheaper than existing ones, thus placing them in a very competitive position on the world market.<sup>23</sup>

In an interview with the Johannesburg Star, Dr. Roux gave four main reasons for South Africa's need to co-operate with foreign interests in the development of the enrichment plant. The first was the financial aspect. The high cost of the plant would make it difficult to raise the necessary capital in South Africa alone,

particularly in view of the other large development projects under way. Secondly, with partners who were themselves consumers of enriched uranium, the marketing of the product, would be greatly simplified and assured. Thirdly, partner nations would ensure the existence of the very large industrial capacity needed for a plant of the proposed size. Dr. Roux gave as the fourth reason South Africa's wish to share its technology with countries which in the past had provided it with assistance in its research and development.<sup>24</sup>

The proposed enrichment plant has already aroused considerable interest abroad. An agreement was concluded in 1974 between UCOR and STEAG (Federal Republic of Germany) to carry out a joint feasibility study for the construction of the plant. The study was successfully completed in early 1975, and STEAG was expected to invest substantially in the project.<sup>25</sup> The Minister of Mines, Dr. Koornhof, was reported to have discussed South Africa's enrichment process in recent talks with the Economic Affairs Minister of the Federal Republic of Germany, and to have offered to supply enriched uranium to meet any shortage that may arise in the Federal Republic's stocks of fissile material.<sup>26</sup>

In an interview with *The Star* in June 1974, Dr. Roux had revealed that further overseas interests were involved in the project beside STEAG, but declined to identify them.<sup>27</sup> A report in the *Daily Telegraph* of London mentioned France besides the Federal Republic of Germany; it was reported subsequently that a high-level French Government mission which visited South Africa in April 1975 had discussed the possibility of receiving enriched uranium as part-payment for the supply of a nuclear power reactor for the proposed Koeberg station.<sup>28</sup> Press reports have indicated that Iran has contracted to buy enriched uranium from South Africa for two nuclear power plants to be supplied by France.<sup>29</sup> South Africa also hopes to sell its enriched uranium to Japan, since Japan already obtains 43 per cent of its crude uranium requirements from South Africa. In 1973, talks

were held between the head of Japan's atomic energy programme and members of the South African Atomic Energy Board.<sup>30</sup>

## Nuclear Power Station

Dr. R. L. Straszacker, Chairman of the South African Electricity Supply Commission (Escom), a State corporation, announced in February 1974 that South Africa's first nuclear power plant would be built at Koeberg, near Cape Town.<sup>31</sup> The plant, which is now estimated to require an investment of R600 million, will house two reactors with a total generating capacity of between 1,600 and 2,000 MW. The first of these reactors is scheduled to come into service by 1982, and the second a year or two later.<sup>32</sup> The plant is part of an ambitious drive initiated in the early 1960's to make South Africa self-sufficient in its electrical energy needs through the creation of a sub-continental power grid stretching from the Cabora Bassa dam in Mozambique to Cape Town – a distance of some 2,500 km – and including a "mix" of generating capacity, ranging from hydroelectric stations to thermal coal-fired stations and nuclear generators. Koeberg will be the first of a number of nuclear power stations to be built in the Eastern and Western Cape Province to meet South Africa's growing energy needs: it is expected that by the year 2000 between 15 and 25 per cent of South Africa's installed generating capacity will be in nuclear stations.<sup>33</sup>

The decision to build a nuclear power station, delayed several times for technical and economic reasons, was finally reached on the basis of several considerations. South Africa's rapidly rising consumption of electrical energy (more than doubled in a decade) and the new needs stemming from the intensified industrial and mining developments in the Western Cape, in particular the Sishen-Saldanha project, made the rapid development of substantial additional electric power necessary. At the same time, the international fuel crisis and the embargo on oil

supplies to South Africa imposed by the Arab producers in October 1973 convinced the Government of the necessity to speed up its self-sufficiency programme by promoting the development of nuclear energy while at the same time freeing part of its coal reserves for use in an additional oil-from-coal plant. Rising prices of coal on the world market made it desirable to increase the quantities of coal available for export and, by narrowing the cost ratio between a coal-fired station and a nuclear station, made the plant an economically more attractive venture.<sup>34</sup>

Finally, the development of uranium enrichment at Pelindaba would ensure future supplies of the necessary fuel for the nuclear station, although reliance on foreign supplies of enriched uranium would be necessary in the first stages.<sup>35</sup>

## Tenders

Nevertheless, the building of a nuclear power plant will require massive involvement of foreign capital and equipment. Commenting on the decision to proceed with the plant, *The Star* of Johannesburg noted that Escom would be forced "to raise huge sums of money, much of it overseas, to form international construction consortia and to import nuclear technology on a large scale."<sup>36</sup>

Foreign interest in the project has been considerable. Sixteen companies in the United States, the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy, Switzerland and Japan reportedly replied to Escom's initial letter of intent, expressing interest in submitting tenders.<sup>37</sup>

In March 1974, D. R. L. Straszacker announced that Escom had finally sent invitations to tender to nine companies. He stated that the contract would be on a turnkey basis, with a single contractor responsible for the entire plant.<sup>38</sup> Outline tenders were received from five manufacturers by October 1974; in April 1975 Escom invited final tenders from three consortia in France, Switzerland and the U.S.A. It was reported that the final



contractor would be selected in early 1976, with construction to begin shortly thereafter.<sup>39</sup>

While the names of the companies which were invited to tender have not been disclosed, press reports have indicated the names and nationalities of some of these. They included the Kraftwerke Union AG, the joint nuclear subsidiary of Siemens and AEG Telefunken (Federal Republic of Germany), and the State-owned company Electricité de France, which was reported to have co-ordinated a joint offer by three private French companies.<sup>40</sup> A high-level French Government mission which visited South Africa in April 1975 was reportedly charged with finalising a contract for the construction of the station.<sup>41</sup> Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (Japan) reportedly sent a mission to South Africa in September 1973 to discuss the project with Escom officials.<sup>42</sup> Four United States reactor producers – Westinghouse, Combustion Engineering, General Elec-

tric, and Babcock and Wilcox – were also reported to be interested.<sup>43</sup> Two United Kingdom consortia, British Nuclear Design and Construction Ltd., and British Nuclear Power Company, as well as an unnamed Canadian company, were also mentioned in the press.<sup>44</sup>

Since the first part of the power plant is scheduled to come into operation by 1982, while the uranium enrichment plant will be commissioned in 1984, South Africa is dependent on outside supplies of enriched uranium for the initial charges of the reactor. It was reported that the United States Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) had signed a contract with Escom in early 1974 for enrichment services for up to 2,000 MW. Under the contract, South Africa would send processed uranium to the AEC's laboratory at Oak Ridge for enrichment into the "freed material" for the reactor, as well as the burnt fuel for reprocessing. In April 1975, however, it was disclosed that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission had halted all licenses to bring uranium into the United States in the course of an overall policy review. Also blocked were all export licenses for nuclear reactors. Escom officials, however, expressed faith that the agreement would eventually be followed through.<sup>45</sup>

## Uranium Mining

Foreign involvement in South Africa's uranium production has been considerable since the beginning. The mining of uranium in South Africa was developed after the Second World War, in response to the needs of the Western Powers for their accelerated nuclear weapons production. The United States of America and the United Kingdom assisted South Africa in research and development of the technology necessary to recover uranium from gold-bearing ores. They financed the programme and bought South Africa's total output of uranium for many years. With foreign assistance, South Africa's production grew from 44 tons in 1952 to a peak of 6,400 tons in 1959, earning South Africa an estimated

R1,000 million in twenty years.<sup>46</sup> Because of uranium discoveries in the United States and changes in the weapons programme, the United States ceased buying South African uranium in 1966, after purchasing approximately 43,000 tons at a value of \$1,000 million.<sup>47</sup> South Africa, however, has continued to sell uranium to the United Kingdom and to a number of other countries including the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Switzerland, and Japan.<sup>48</sup>

As a result of over-supply on the world market, South Africa was forced to cut back her production after 1959, until it was about 3,800 tons in the early 1970's. While 27 mines were capable of supporting production, only 11 were in operation by 1973, when the international price of uranium had sunk to a low of \$6 per pound. The world-wide search for new energy sources after the oil crisis of 1973, by raising the price of uranium and creating expectations of a shortage of supplies by the mid-1980's, rekindled interest in uranium mining in South Africa. South Africa is believed to have about one-fourth of the world reserves of low-cost uranium, i. e. recoverable at less than \$10 per pound.<sup>49</sup>

## Controversial

Most of South Africa's uranium is mined as a by-product of gold, and foreign interests have substantial holdings in the gold mining companies. Foreign interests have recently invested in prospecting for, and developing, new sources of uranium. Reports on uranium exploration activities are classified under the Atomic Energy Act, so that only sketchy information is available about them.

One of the most important and most controversial projects undertaken by foreign interests is the Rössing uranium mine near Swakopmund, in Namibia. The mine is owned by the British conglomerate Rio Tinto Zinc, in partnership with the South African Industrial Development Corporation and the Compagnie Francaise des Pétroles. It will involve an investment of R100 million and will be developed into

one of the biggest open-cast mines in the world. Work on the mine started in 1970 and is expected to be completed by 1976/1977. The production target is about 1,000 tons a year, or almost one-fourth of South Africa's present uranium production. Uranium from Rössing will be sold to the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Agency under a contract signed a few years ago in spite of strong opposition by several anti-apartheid and other groups in that country. Compagnie Francaise des Pétroles will also receive part of the uranium in return for its stake in the project. There have also been reports that uranium from Rössing may be sold to the Federal Republic of Germany, although Urangesellschaft, a company in the Federal Republic which had originally intended to invest in the project, pulled out in 1972 as a result of pressure from the Federal Government.<sup>50</sup>

It was reported in August 1973, that "uranium fever" was raging around Beaufort West, in the Cape Province, following substantial discoveries made by United States mining companies. The report stated that intensive prospecting in the area had been carried out by Union Carbide and Utah Mining, and that two other American mining firms, Newmont and U.S. Steel, were seeking areas to begin prospecting. According to press reports, the presence of radio-active materials in the area had been indicated by mineral surveys carried out by United States space satellites.<sup>51</sup>

The *Financial Mail* of 20 June 1975 reported that the United States company Exxon had joined the race for uranium in the Cape Province, and had taken options on land between Beaufort West and Oudtshoorn, expanding its prospecting team in the area. While refusing to give details on the operations, the company's director of mineral exploration stated that thought was already being devoted to ways of financing and operating an eventual project, and that partnership with one of South Africa's mining houses was being considered.

Foreign interests are also involved in uranium extraction at the copper mine at Palabora. The mine is owned and ma-



naged by Rio Tinto Zinc (United Kingdom), in partnership with Newmont Mining Company (United States), the South African Industrial Development Corporation and other South African interests. About 150 tons of uranium a year are recovered at this mine through a special process developed by the company in conjunction with the South African Atomic Energy Board and the National Institute of Metallurgy.<sup>52</sup>

#### Footnotes:

- <sup>1</sup> House of Assembly Debates (Hansard), April 1975, cols. 3601-2
- <sup>2</sup> Daily Telegraph, London, 8 April 1975
- <sup>3</sup> House of Assembly Debates (Hansard), 11 June 1975, col. 7967
- <sup>4</sup> House of Assembly Debates (Hansard), 7 April 1975, col. 3601
- <sup>5</sup> Financial Times, London, 25 April 1975; Rand Daily Mail, Johannesburg, 25 April 1975.
- <sup>6</sup> The Star, Johannesburg, weekly airmail edition, 8 June 1974.
- <sup>7</sup> Africa Today, New York, August - September 1965
- <sup>8</sup> Information Service of South Africa, New York, Business Report, 26 March 1965; South African Scope, February 1965; Hearings before the Sub-Committee on Africa of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, United States House of Representatives, Part 2, 12 November 1971, p. 53.
- <sup>9</sup> South African Information Service, Pretoria, 9 April 1965.
- <sup>10</sup> Hearings before the Sub-Committee on Africa . . . , op. cit., p. 41
- <sup>11</sup> Washington Post, 14. April 1975.
- <sup>12</sup> The Star, Johannesburg, weekly airmail edition, 5 December 1970.
- <sup>13</sup> Financial Times, London, 23 April 1975; Rand Daily Mail, Johannesburg, 23 April 1975; Wall Street Journal, 6 May 1974.
- <sup>14</sup> Rand Daily Mail, Johannesburg, 24 October 1970.
- <sup>15</sup> Ruth First, "Foreign Investment in Apartheid", Unit on Apartheid Notes and Documents, No. 21/72, October 1972; Southern Africa, New York, June 1975.
- <sup>16</sup> House of Assembly Debates (Hansard), 11 June 1975, col. 7967.
- <sup>17</sup> Financial Times, London, 23 April 1975; Rand Daily Mail, Johannesburg, 23 April 1975.
- <sup>18</sup> The Star, Johannesburg, 6 September 1974.
- <sup>19</sup> House of Assembly Debates (Hansard), 11 June 1975, col. 7966.
- <sup>20</sup> Ibid., col. 7967.
- <sup>21</sup> Financial Mail, Johannesburg, 11 April 1975.
- <sup>22</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>23</sup> South African Financial Gazette, Johannesburg, 11 April 1975; Financial Times, London, 25 April 1975.
- <sup>24</sup> The Star, Johannesburg, weekly airmail edition, 18 June 1974.
- <sup>25</sup> Rand Daily Mail, Johannesburg, 23 April 1974; South African Financial Gazette, Johannesburg, 11 April 1975; Financial Times, London, 23 April 1975.
- <sup>26</sup> The Star, Johannesburg, weekly airmail edition, 26 April 1975.
- <sup>27</sup> Ibid., 18 June 1975.
- <sup>28</sup> Daily Telegraph, London, 8 April 1975; South African Financial Gazette, Johannesburg, 11 April 1975.
- <sup>29</sup> Rand Daily Mail, Johannesburg, 21 November 1974.
- <sup>30</sup> Ibid., 13 February 1975, 24 September 1975.
- <sup>31</sup> Ibid., 11 February 1974.
- <sup>32</sup> South African Digest, Pretoria, 20 June 1975; Standard Bank Review, London, March 1974.
- <sup>33</sup> South African Financial Gazette, Johannesburg, 15 November 1974; The Star, Johannesburg, 12 March 1974.
- <sup>34</sup> The Star, Johannesburg, 12 March 1974.
- <sup>35</sup> South African Financial Gazette, Johannesburg, 15 February 1974.
- <sup>36</sup> The Star, Johannesburg, 11 February 1974.
- <sup>37</sup> South African Financial Gazette, Johannesburg, 17 December 1971.
- <sup>38</sup> The Star, Johannesburg, 6 March 1974.
- <sup>39</sup> Sunday Times, Johannesburg, 23 March 1975.
- <sup>40</sup> Rand Daily Mail, Johannesburg, 29 June 1974 and 14 February 1975.
- <sup>41</sup> Reuter, from Cape Town, 11 April 1975; South African Financial Gazette, Johannesburg, 11 April 1975.
- <sup>42</sup> The Star, Johannesburg, weekly airmail edition, 13 April 1974.
- <sup>43</sup> Financial Mail, Johannesburg, 29 November 1974; Hearings before the Sub-Committee on Africa . . . , op. cit., p. 68.
- <sup>44</sup> South African Financial Gazette, Johannesburg, 25 September 1970.
- <sup>45</sup> Financial Mail, Johannesburg, 29 October 1974 and 11 April 1975. The AEC has similar agreements with about thirty other countries.
- <sup>46</sup> Africa Bureau, London, Fact Sheet No. 39, October 1974.
- <sup>47</sup> Hearings before the Sub-Committee on Africa . . . , op. cit., p. 69.
- <sup>48</sup> Southern Africa, London, 13 March and 12 June 1967; 15 August 1970; Financial Times, London, 23 July 1970.
- <sup>49</sup> South African Financial Gazette, Johannesburg, 23 February 1973; Financial Mail, Johannesburg, 6 June 1975.
- <sup>50</sup> Financial Times, London, 23 July; Observer, London, 3 August 1970; Financial Mail, Johannesburg, 21 May 1971; The Star, Johannesburg, weekly airmail edition, 9 February 1972, 30 June and 17 November 1973; South African Financial Gazette, Johannesburg, 11 April 1975.
- <sup>51</sup> Die Burger, Cape Town, 25 August 1973; South African Financial Gazette, Johannesburg, 31 August 1973.
- <sup>52</sup> The Star, Johannesburg, 8 August 1973.

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**All-African  
Trade Union Movement  
decides on . . .**

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# **ACTION AGAINST APARTHEID**

**The following is a declaration of the OAU-OATUU (Organisation of African Trade Union Unity) adopted at a Symposium held in Dar-Es-Salaam last year**

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We, the representatives of the constituent National Centres of the OATUU Labour Symposium in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, from 21 to 25 April, 1975, having examined the problem of the working and living conditions of African workers in the territories still under colonial and/or racist regimes in southern Africa, are convinced of the evils of apartheid and colonialism as characterised by the following conditions, and the need to take concerted action against them.

The system of apartheid with its colonial overtones has been condemned as a crime against humanity by the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the International Labour Organisation (ILO) and other international organizations.

In spite of this condemnation, the apartheid, racist and colonial regime of South

Africa continues to implement and enforce the evil system with increased ruthlessness.

In spite of the fact that the United Nations General Assembly has terminated the racist regime's mandate over Namibia, rather than withdraw from Namibia and grant independence to the territory, the racist regime is intensifying in the territory both the systems of apartheid and Bantustans.

Recent overtures from the racist and colonialist regime have given independent Africa the impression that the régime wishes to co-operate in finding a solution to the problem of granting independence to Zimbabwe, yet clandestine arrangements are being made for rebel Smith to supply cheap and forced African labour to the racist régime to replace African workers who are going back to Malawi, Lesotho, Botswana, Swaziland and Mozambique.

The evil system of apartheid is gaining strength because of the continued economic, military and political support it is receiving from the Western countries particularly United States of America, Britain and France and their allies. Without this support the system of apartheid could not survive.

Regrettably, much against the decisions of the OAU to which they are parties, a number of OAU Member States continue to be trading partners of southern Africa and thus to sustain the obnoxious system of apartheid.

While some of these countries sell and buy goods to and from South Africa, others still provide transit facilities to commercial flights as well as docking facilities for vessels to and from South Africa.

The racist régime's recent overtures of détente are a calculated move to deceive Africa and the world into believing that apartheid South Africa is liberalising its abhorrent domestic policies. The following official statement of the racist régime's policy makes this clear: "It is true that there are Blacks working for us. They will continue to work for us for generations . . . But the fact that they work for us can never . . . entitle them to claim poli-

tical rights. Not now nor in the future . . . Under no circumstances can we grant them those political rights in our territory, neither now nor ever."

Besides these sad conditions in South Africa, colonialism still persists in Namibia and Zimbabwe, imposing on the African workers there intolerable and inhuman living and working conditions such as the denial of the right to organize, freedom of association, collective bargaining, the right to strike, the principle of equal pay for equal work, denial of family life, of suitable jobs because of the job reservation policy, of good housing, social security, occupational health and safety, workers' education, to mention but a few.

### Programme of Action


Accordingly, it is necessary that the recent decision of the OAU Council of Ministers at its Ninth Extra-Ordinary Session be reinforced by the following programme of action against apartheid and what re-

mains of colonial occupation and exploitation in Africa.

The OATUU will mobilise the African workers by co-ordinating the efforts of its constituent national centres to:

- Form national trade union action committees to stir up national public opinion and initiate practical actions against the white racist régime of South Africa, this may be reinforced by organizing activities of a regional character (i. e. seminars on specific aspects of the struggle against colonialism and apartheid);
- Ground, refuse to load and unload aircraft bound for or from South Africa;
- Refuse to handle vessels to and from South Africa (i. e. loading and unloading vessels);
- Pressurize their governments to discontinue the granting of any air and sea facilities to aircrafts and vessels to and from Africa; generally to implement all economic sanctions and to cease all contacts with, including immigration to apartheid South Africa;
- Identify multi-national companies and

Illiterate worker learning to use the tools of exploitation



others which are operating in their respective countries and which collaborate with the régimes and to bring pressure to bear on them to cease such collaboration. The OAU will assist in this exercise; and

- Render all possible assistance – financial, material and moral – to liberation movements in their struggle for political and economic emancipation.

Furthermore the OATUU is to follow the work and activities of the trade union movements which have representatives outside the territories under those régimes and to keep the OAU and the Member States adequately informed thereon. Those OAU Member States which have not yet done so are to implement the organisation's resolutions calling on all Member States to apply economic sanctions against racist and minority régimes. To this end, the Administrative Secretary-General of the OAU is to ensure that the Vigilance Committee, recommended by the 9th Extra-ordinary Session of the Council of Ministers, is set up and put to work without delay, and includes representatives of the liberation movements and the OATUU.

The OAU Committee of Twelve on Oil

Embargo and Afro-Arab Co-operation is to examine the possibility of setting up regional or Pan-African oil distribution companies to facilitate the oil embargo against the racist and minority régime. African Governments are to treat trade union action directed to isolating racist and minority colonial régimes as part of total African struggle against apartheid and colonialism and not normal industrial action intended to disrupt the national economy.


There are to be no dealings whatsoever between the independent African countries and the puppet Bantustan chiefs as substitutes for the authentic leaders of the African peoples in South Africa and Namibia. The only dialogue to be recognized and entertained by the OAU, OAU Member States and OATUU is that between the authentic representatives of the African majority (that is the liberation movements). In the light of this, the whole concept of balkanisation of Namibia and South Africa is to be rejected by independent Africa and the OAU.

For those African countries on the threshold of independence, the OATUU and OAU Member States are to render every possible assistance to the workers there to enable them to achieve unity and to contribute constructively to the national development effort.

In view of the fact that all the Trades Union Centres in the OAU Member States have become members of the OATUU, and in view of the need for trade union action against apartheid and colonialism to be co-ordinated with the work and activities of the OAU Co-ordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa, the present OATUU Anti-Apartheid Committee is to be enlarged and is to coordinate its activities with those of the Liberation Committee.

At the international level, the following actions are to be taken:

- National Trade Union centres are to use all available trade union international forums at all times as befits the occasion to ceaselessly condemn and isolate the racist minority régime of South Africa for its continued inhuman policy in South Africa itself as well as in Zimbabwe and





**In a SA mine, African machine operators with a white supervisor drill holes for dynamite charges in goldbearing rock more than a mile under the surface. The wage ratio between average white and black earnings in the mining industry is 20:1**

Namibia, and to urge other trade unions in Europe, Asia, Latin America and North America to do the same;

- The OATUU is to set up and send a team to Western and North American countries to solicit the support of the trade unions in those countries to prevail on their respective governments to cease any trading and other economic relations with the racist and minority régimes and to terminate the migration of their nationals to South Africa, Zimbabwe and Namibia;

- National trades union centres are to condemn countries such as the United States of America, Britain, France and others at international gatherings for their political, economic and military

support which they give to the apartheid régime and to organize actions against them;

- The African members to the ILO Conference are to introduce a resolution which will enforce resolutions adopted by the International Labour Conference from 1963 to 1973. Members of the ILO Governing Body are to be charged with the responsibility of ensuring the full implementation of the resolution when adopted; and

- The African stand on sporting relations between the racist and minority régimes on the one hand, and non-African countries on the other, should be maintained and where and when necessary strengthened.

# BELGIAN-SOUTH AFRICAN CONNECTION

by Ernest GLINNE  
Member of Parliament – Belgium

In analysing our relations with the Republic of South Africa, it is necessary to underline three important items:

- the Belgian-South African cultural agreement of 1954;
- the agreement of 25. 5. 1965 on the mutual admission of physicians to medical practice;
- the financial aid to emigrants.

Finally, it is necessary to bear in mind that while Belgium does not sell any FN arms to South Africa, these same arms are made on the spot near Pretoria, under licence, in a plant reproducing the FN pattern; and it is also necessary to review the manifold economic and financial interests vested by Belgium in the country of apartheid.

## The Belgian-South African Cultural Agreement

It was signed by South Africa and Belgium in 1954, and the 20th anniversary of this agreement was celebrated at the Castle of Ham in the presence of several Flemish political figures, including Mme De Backer, Minister for Dutch culture, and Mr. Van de Kerckhove, Minister for Institutional Reforms. When questioned in the Francophone Cultural Council about the

Belgian-South African cultural agreement, Minister Van Aal made the following statement concerning the above-mentioned celebration and the presence there of two members of the government: "If the Department of French Culture refused to be associated in any way whatsoever with the celebration of the 20th anniversary of this Belgian-South African agreement, this bears relation with the preoccupations you have just expressed"<sup>1</sup>.

In my opinion, this statement proves that, in analysing the Belgian-South African cultural agreement and the reasons for its existence, account must be taken of the linguistic affinity felt by some right-wing Flemish circles towards the "Suidafrikaanders". Thus, for example, within the framework of this agreement, several missions were sent to South Africa. On no occasion did a French speaking member of parliament participate in such delegations, the latter being always composed solely of Dutch speaking MPs. However, it is necessary to stress that no Flemish socialist deputy ever went to South Africa in such a context, the policy of apartheid being irreconcilable with culture as we conceive it and no linguistic affinities could serve as an excuse for legitimising the racist policy of the South African government. The cultural agreement which,

in fact, is of very little concern to the French speaking part of the country thus remains in force due to the pressure exerted by some Flamish nationalist circles who, in extreme cases, will not hesitate to defend the policy of apartheid itself.

What is the present situation regarding the implementation of the agreement?

I recently put a question to the Minister for foreign Affairs and Cooperation in Development, Mr. Van Elslande, on: "the relations of Belgium with the oppressive regimes of Southern Africa and on the advisability to denounce the Belgian-South African cultural agreement, particularly because this agreement is applicable in Namibia, a territory the occupation of which by the South-African Republic was declared illegal by the United Nations and the International Court of Justice"<sup>2</sup>. In his answer, Mr. Van Elslande clearly stated that the agreement can in no circumstances apply to the Namibian territory: "... "Therefore, in my view, the South African government is not entitled to take any measure for the application in the Namibian territory of international agreements, particularly the one signed with Belgium."

As to denouncing the agreement, the Foreign Minister did not speak so firmly: "... "As to the question put by Mr. Glinne at the end of his speech, namely whether the agreement itself, which applies also to the territory of the South African Republic, should not be denounced, I personally do not think that it is absolutely necessary to do so.

"I can remind the honorable member and parliament as a whole that, in much more dramatic circumstances, we maintained cultural agreements with some countries in which the rights of the majority of the population were threatened. It is not absolutely necessary to denounce a cultural agreement, it can be put in abeyance"...

The debate on the cultural agreement resulted in two motions being put: one, moved by Mss. Brouhon and Geldolf (socialists) running as follows:

"The House,  
after hearing the question put by Mr.

Glinne considering that the government ought to denounce the Belgian-South African cultural agreement, proceeds with its agenda";

another one moved by Mss. Swaelen, Bila and Evers, reading as follows:

"The House,


after hearing the question put by Mr. Glinne and the explanations given by the Foreign Minister, puts it on record that the government will remind the South African government that the cultural treaty does not apply to Namibia, and also urges the government to firmly oppose the apartheid regime".

In the event, the House passed by a majority vote the motion signed by Mss. Swalen, Bila and Evers in its meeting of Thursday, November 14th.

The socialist group voted against (minus 3 abstentions), while the communist group abstained, and gave the following grounds for this abstention:

"My group (Van Geyt) did not vote for the motion the wording of which it deems too weak. It did not vote against because the motion urges the government to undertake energetic action against apartheid"<sup>3</sup>.

My request for explanations put to the Ministers for National Education and for French Culture on December 3, 1974, before the Cultural Council of a French cultural community, about this same cultural agreement, resulted in the following motion being unanimously passed by the



Cultural Council in its meeting of December 17, 1974:

"The Cultural Council of the French cultural community, after hearing the request for explanations on the Belgian-South African cultural agreements put by Mr. Glinne, expresses its strong wish that in the near future a bill should be introduced for the application of Article 59 bis, § 2, 30 of the Constitution. It recommends in any case that as from now no application should be made of the Belgian-South African cultural agreement as far as the French cultural community is concerned. So we can come to the following conclusion:

The Belgian-South African cultural agreement of 1954 does not apply to the Namibia territory; as to its application in the territory of the South African Republic, it is still valid in theory and in practice, although the Foreign Minister is considering putting it in abeyance for the whole of the country; the majority of the Dutch speaking community still wants the agreement to be implemented, whereas for the French community this is out of the question.

Let me finally remind you that Piet Vermeulen, National Education Minister, refused to implement the educational and scientific clauses falling under his competence as a protest against the policy of apartheid. This official action on the part of a member of the government clearly shows that it is possible to denounce or completely freeze the agreement if only the necessary political will is there.

### **The Medical Agreement of May 25, 1965**

This bilateral agreement signed in Capetown on May 25, 1965, and put into force on August 8, 1970, aims at enabling Belgian physicians to be admitted to medical practice in South Africa without any restriction, and South African citizens who have qualified as physicians in South Africa to practice under the same conditions in Belgium. It provides for a minimum of


5 physicians to be admitted for registration in each calendar year in either of the two countries, each party to the agreement being however entitled to register a greater number of physicians from the other country.<sup>4</sup>

Just like the Belgian-South African cultural agreement, it is clear that the medical agreement cannot apply to Namibia, and yet this treaty still retains the provision which allows for its application in this territory by virtue of its first article: "by the phrase 'South Africa' is meant the Republic of South Africa and any territory falling under the jurisdiction of the Republic of South Africa on the date of signing of the present agreement". Now, on this date, i. e. May 25, 1965, the General Assembly of the U. N. had not yet dispossessed South Africa of its international mandate over the territory.

So, there is need to be quite clear on this matter.

When questioned about this agreement and its field of application, the Foreign Minister answers to the following effect:<sup>5</sup> To the question whether it is accurate to say that apart from the EEC countries, the South African Republic and Zaire are the only countries with which Belgium has signed an agreement on the unrestricted mutual admission of physicians and to the question as to how the preferential treatment given to the South African Republic can be justified, the Minister answers that the agreement is essentially different from the freedom to set up practice, adopted at EEC level because it limits the number of beneficiaries: in signing an agreement with South Africa, the Belgian government was moved by a desire to ease the way for legalising the situation of a number of Belgian physicians who had left the Congo after it had become independent and settled in South Africa. As to the fields of application, the Minister reasserts the position taken by the Belgian government in the Security Council when it made clear that it no longer recognised the authority of South Africa over Namibia. Therefore, the South African government is not entitled to take any measure aiming at the application of international agreements in the Namibian territory. And fi-





## Financial Aid to Belgian Emigrants (7)

The statistical data of the Emigration Service of the Belgian Foreign Ministry include only those people, Belgians, foreign or refugees, who emigrate through the intergovernmental Committee for European migrations (ICEM) and who receive, in the case of Belgians, financial aid from the Belgian government.

Within this framework, the number of Belgians who emigrated to South Africa in the years 1964–1974 stands at 3.423<sup>8</sup>. According to the figures given by the Belgian government in reply to a written question put by G. Cudell and myself, a majority of the Belgians who emigrate to South Africa are of Flemish origin<sup>9</sup>. From 1961 to 1973, 2.360 Dutch-speaking Belgians emigrated to that country through the ICEM, while the number of French-speaking people stood at 1.241. Since 1963, the proportion of Belgians choosing South Africa to emigrate to has been increasing. In the last few years, no other country has been receiving so many Belgian emigrants.

In 1968, The General Assembly of the U. N. passed a resolution calling upon the whole world not to promote emigration to South Africa. In 1975, a report issued by the Europe-Third World Centre (White Immigration into Southern Africa) reveals that most European governments provide the emigrants to South Africa with financial aid.

When questioned about this, the Belgian Foreign Minister gives the following reply:<sup>10</sup>

- Belgium abstained when the aforesaid resolution was passed;
- the resolutions of the General Assembly have no compelling force;
- since the South African government decided in 1974 to stop resorting to the ICEM for organising the transport of emigrants, as from January 1, 1975, the Belgian government no longer gives any material aid to people emigrating to South Africa.

Which, in other words, means that Belgium has never observed the position of

nally, being of the opinion that the agreement in no way favours the policy of apartheid to which the Belgian government objects, this government considers that it is neither useful nor necessary to make use of Article 9 of the medical agreement which provides for the denunciation of this agreement.

Once more, the Belgian government is practising the policy of the ostrich. For the figures are clear:

According to the W. H. O. report<sup>6</sup>, among the Blacks of South Africa, there is only one physician to 44.000 Africans, one for 6200 Coloureds, one for 900 Asians, as against one physician for 400 Whites.

It seems clear to me that if the South African authorities recruit physicians from outside, partly to work among the Black population, their aim is to slow down by the same proportion the training inside the country of Blacks and to bring the fees and general conditions of medical practice within the rules of apartheid. Thus, the medical agreement concluded with South Africa directly contributes to maintaining a profoundly unjust health and medical service which apartheid tends to perpetuate.

It must therefore be denounced if Belgium is to be self-logical.

the United Nations regarding emigration to South Africa and not until a unilateral decision was taken by the South African government did the Belgian financial aid to emigrants come to an end.

## Conclusion

These are three important aspects of our official relations with South Africa. In each case, the least one can say is that the Belgian government's attitude is ambiguous: Declarations are made opposing the policy of apartheid, but in practice, nothing is done that could cause any embarrassment to the Pretoria government. How can this attitude be explained? It cannot be denied that the Belgian industrial and financial circles have big interests in South Africa. A striking parallel can be drawn with Chile: the advantage of some financial and industrial groups negates the fair words of the democrats when the time comes to climb down from the stratospheres of principles and become practical and concrete . . .

## Financial and Economic Links With South Africa

In the last few years, most of the big Belgian banks have increased their financial relations with South Africa. Thus, the Societe générale de Banque, the Banque Lambert, the Kredietbank, the Banque de Bruxelles and le Crédit général de Belgique have manifold interests in South Africa.<sup>11</sup> These banks are directly engaged in the financing of commercial exchanges between Belgium and South Africa, or they take part, through the big international consortiums which they belong to in the financing of loans to the South African government or to state-controlled industrial enterprises.

Do not let us forget either the part played by the transport companies, such as Sabena and the Compagnie Maritime Belge, who contribute to promoting the development of tourism with South Africa.

role played by the Belgian-South African Chamber of Commerce, founded in 1956; its very name speaks for itself and makes any comment superfluous. Let us indicate that its offices are in Antwerp and that its chairman is the present president of the House of Representatives.

As the writers of the booklet "White immigration in South Africa" state in their conclusions, there is no doubt that such relations contribute to maintaining a climate favourable to emigration to South Africa.

As for me, I would like to add that only the international solidarity of all progressive people, systematically organised against the interests of the world of finance and industry, can put a halt to the activities that aid and abet the injustices still prevailing in many countries. South Africa in this regard is only one example, but it is a particularly shameful one.

## Notes:

<sup>1</sup> Cultural Council of the French cultural community - Request for explanations put by Mr Ernest Glinne to the Ministers for National Education and French Culture - Meeting of December 3, 1974 of the Cultural Council - Verbatim report.

<sup>2</sup> House of Representatives - Questions put by Mr Glinne to the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation in Development - Meeting of November 6, 1974 - Verbatim Report.

<sup>3</sup> House of Representatives - Minutes of the sitting of Thursday, November 14, 1974

<sup>4</sup> See Booklet: "White immigration in South Africa - the policy and practice of Belgium - Committee against Colonialism and Apartheid, Waterloo, 1975 - pages 48 sqq.

<sup>5</sup> Bulletin No 38 of the questions and answers in the House - July 22, 1975

<sup>6</sup> W.H.O. - Health Implications of Apartheid in South Africa - Notes and Documents No 5, 1975

<sup>7</sup> See also the booklet: White immigration in South Africa - the policy and practice of Belgium - page 6 sqq.

<sup>8</sup> Bulletin No 25 of questions and answers of April 22, 1975, question No 98.

<sup>9</sup> Bulletin No 2 of questions and answers of November 12, 1974

<sup>10</sup> Bulletin No 25 of questions and answers in the House, of April 22, 1975, question No 98

<sup>11</sup> White immigration in South Africa - the policy and practice of Belgium - page 57 sqq.

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# THE ROLE OF WEST GERMAN INVESTMENTS IN APARTHEID

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In recent months much has been said and written in the F. R. G. on the subject of the nuclear collaboration between the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and racist South Africa. While large sections of the German public viewed the dangers inherent in this co-operation with concern, there has been some growing difference of opinion about what to do about the Federal Republic's increasingly heavy investment in Apartheid. A number of opinions have been put forward.

Some, like Dr. Lothar Lahn, head of the political department of the Foreign Ministry in Bonn, say that in expectation, "one day, participation in the supreme power of the State by the Black and mixed part of the population is attained, it needs in my opinion, not only normal relations but good, if not even friendly relations". He later added: "Not rupture or freezing of relations, but expansion. Not sanctions,

threats, delimitation, but advise, assistance, co-operation and closer contacts".<sup>1</sup>

Others like, Ambassador Baron Rudiger von Wechmar, permanent representative of the F. R. G. in the Special Political Committee of the United Nations, say that if a complete economic boycott against South Africa was accepted, the possible impact of such an economic boycott on the Black population, whose interests are at stake, and, the risk of the White South African minority being forced, through isolation, into an attitude of defiance will make life for the Black population even more difficult".<sup>2</sup>

Both Ambassador Wechmar and Dr. Lahn among many other apologists for investments in Apartheid South Africa, while condemning the system, say the Federal Republic's investments in South Africa play a reforming role, and to quote Am- 49

bassador Wechmar again: "My government has repeatedly urged German Companies operating in South Africa to set a good example by adjusting wages for Black and White workers, thus making a practical contribution to the gradual elimination of apartheid. I have reason to believe, he adds, that this appeal has not gone unheeded".<sup>3</sup>

And the adjunct of this argument, voiced many times even by some Liberals, is that increased foreign investment leads to a more rapid rate of economic growth; that by causing a shortage of skilled labour the colour bar in industry stands in the way of this growth, and that the greater the pressures for growth the more rapid the erosion of the colour bar.

These arguments pose the South African situation as a conflict between the ideology of apartheid – racism and economics on the one side, and on the other a war in which the logic of economics must win. The implication of this approach is that if investments can play a reforming role, then the more investment the more reform. And of course business can then, not only reap high profits, but also do good work.

The purpose of this article is to consider these themes, not to provide an exhaustive canvas by any means, but to point to one or two particular arguments.

### **Extent of Involvement**

Firstly, it is important to recognise the full extent of Federal German involvement in South Africa.

Federal German direct investment in racist South Africa has increased from 240 million Rand in 1956 to 1,6 Billion Rand in 1974.<sup>4</sup>

Most of this investment is being channelled to the Steel, Chemical and other sectors of the heavy industries. The Chairman of the Federal Union of German Industries, Hans Gunther Sohl, in a press

conference in Johannesburg of November 5, 1975, said that the Federal Republic of Germany was already obtaining 40 % of its uranium from South Africa and Namibia.

He added that South Africa ranked third after the U. S. A. and Japan as an overseas market for their exports<sup>5</sup> and the Federal Republic ranked second as South Africa's market for its products.

Sohl further said that the F. R. G. was leading in the supply of material for the construction of South Africa's power stations and that Federal Germany was going to increase the capacity of these power stations from their present supply of 14,000 kilowatts to 60,000 by the year 2000. He said that despite opposition, the Federal Republic was going to intensify and expand their economic relations with South Africa.<sup>6</sup>

A consortium of West German Banks led by Deutsche Bank have invested 3,600 million DM. in ESCOM and ISCOR – the State owned Electricity Supply Commission and Steel Corporation.<sup>7</sup>

In 1975, Siemens invested 21 million Rand in their subsidiary – Siemens South Africa (Pty.) Ltd., for the purpose of expanding their production in South Africa. This year alone Siemens dismissed over 400 workers from its various factories in the Federal Republic.

Salzgitter, Degussa, Volkswagen, Uranengesellschaft and other major German companies have also expanded production in South Africa.

It is noteworthy that the Federal Government holds more than half the shares in Urangesellschaft, 20 % in Volkswagen and 100 % in Salzgitter.<sup>8</sup>

The latest trade figures between the Federal Republic and South Africa at the end of October 1975 are as follows<sup>9</sup>:

Imports from South Africa:

1,013 million 873 thousand DM.

Exports to South Africa:

1,693 million 376 thousand DM.

It is simple to see why there is such a high level of investment. Federal Germany



montage by Christer Themptander

earns more profit from direct investment in South Africa than from any other overseas area, because of South Africa's cheap labour policy.

With Federal German investments in South Africa on such a high scale it would seem an obvious enough approach to defend such investments at all costs. One such defence is, of course, that companies investing in South Africa should pursue a more liberal wage and employment policy. This approach makes the dubious assumption of the role of Capital in relation to Labour, assuming that Capital should play a unique role in South Africa

of guarding the interests of Labour where there is clearly the classic conflict of interest between Capital and Labour.

But what the approach misses – in fact evades – is an understanding of the why's and the wherefores of the cheap wage structure and the colour bar in South Africa. Can this feature be easily rectified with the right kind of pressures in the right places or, on the contrary, is it the very bedrock of the apartheid system? Two points needs to be dealt with. What kind of system is apartheid, and is it reformable? Is it changing under pressure of economics?

## **The Apartheid System**

It is important to emphasise that apartheid, far from being an obstacle to growth, is the cause for the phenomenal rate of growth of the South African economy. This is because apartheid is a set of laws and control mechanism for the maintenance of a cheap labour system.

One could, no doubt, document the story in a great deal of detail. What is important is the Characterisation of this system. One can see it as a special form of colonialism – an internal or domestic colonialism, using colour (black for the colonised and white for the coloniser) as the differential. So one virtually has two societies, one for the coloniser and one for the colonised, integrated within a com-

mon system. The basis of the exploitation of the African colonised majority runs along the familiar colonial pattern: the alienation of the land of the African peasantry; the ruin of its subsistence economy; a system of forced controlled labour, largely migrant and above all cheap, which results in the super-exploitation of the Black working class; a gigantic apparatus of control, led by the pass laws, to keep this mechanism running; the denial to the black work force of trade union rights and the right to share in collective bargaining, etc. This had produced a system of industrialisation built on the system of cheap labour, with the African reserves maintained to help pay the reproductive costs of African labour and take the cost of services off government and white employers.

**Moved out of the cities ... this is the Bantustan reservoir of cheap black labour to ensure the high returns foreign investors get from SA.**



So it is essentially an integrated system. One cannot separate land poverty from migrant labour, or migrant labour from cheap labour, or low wages from the use of the Bantustans as the ostensible agricultural base of this working force which is part peasant, part proletariat. Neither can one separate employment practice on mines and in industry from government policy and industrial and labour legislation: they draw upon one another, and grow out of one another. And this is the reason why it is just plain silly to speak, as the S. A. United Party opposition does, of ending "petty" apartheid. Apartheid is apartheid, and one cannot ease policy controls if one wants a bonded labour force, and one cannot maintain this intensity of labour exploitation without a bonded labour force.

At one time it seemed that industrialisation should lessen the scale of migrant labour. Certainly the rate of urbanisation seemed to point to this need. (If one treats apartheid as the simple separation of the races – and this is a wrong and misleading view – then apartheid looks like collapsing because of the rate of African urbanisation.)

But cheap controlled labour is such an integral part of the system that the regime has forcibly extended the migrant labour system to manufacturing. Even in the sixties, the boom years for the South African economy, one had<sup>(1)</sup> the tightening up of the pass laws and urban control,<sup>(2)</sup> the use of border industries – moving industry to the African reserve population rather than the other way about and thus intensifying the exploitation of the African labour force, and<sup>(3)</sup> the horrific resettlement camps to skim off surplus urban populations.

Here then is the first flaw in the reform-through-investment argument:

**The boom years have been since the end of the War; these have been the years of the greatest repression of the Africans, the intensification of apartheid as a system.**



### The Effect on Wages

According to the Rand Daily Mail, Johannesburg, the following figures show the wage differentials between white and black:

		Afri- cans	Whites
Mining:	1973	R 27	R 405 pm.
	1974	R 67	R 598 pm.
Manu- factu- ring:	1973	R 67	R 376 pm.
	1974	R 100	R 486 pm.

Calculations appear to indicate that the per capita income of Africans has fallen and that Africans are poorer than they were ten years ago; and certainly they are worse off compared with whites ten years ago.

### The Industrial Colour Bar

The industrial colour bar has caused some stresses and strains. A long term pre-



**FRG Chancellor Schmidt with RSA Minister Schoeman. Strengthening Apartheid to overcome racism?**

diction has found that if the economy continues to grow at the rate of 5.8 per cent per annum, by 1980 South Africa will be short of half a million skilled workers. Immigration makes up part of this deficit but nothing like all of it.

In the last few years there have been fairly frequent reports in the press to the effect that the government is easing up on prohibitions on African labour and allowing it to move into categories formerly preserved for whites.

There are several ways in which this is happening:

(1) In the border areas Africans are being allowed to move into job categories that they do not fill in the older industrialised areas, but at lower rates of pay. Industrial legislation does not apply in the border areas.

(2) There is the process of dilution or frag-

mentation of white skilled jobs. The best instance is in the iron and steel and engineering industry. The 150,000 African workers in the industry were not represented when the new agreement was negotiated between employers and unions. The white unions agreed to the fragmentation of their skilled jobs in return for a closed shop guaranteed at the top, and considerable wage increases. The agreement revised work schedules and re-defined jobs resulting in the fragmenting and down-grading of a number of semi-skilled categories. One description of the process reads:

"One part of a skilled artisan's work is given to a less skilled individual who as a result can be paid slightly more than he received as a pure labourer. In this way we have helped to create a large force of semi-skilled workers whose pay is substantially less than the skilled worker".<sup>10</sup> Take two cases, those for automatic machine minders and the manual pressing



job. Automatic lathes and drilling machines were turning out work previously done by a skilled artisan at the rate of 44c an hour, but now the manufacturers are getting the same job done for 11<sup>1</sup>/<sub>2</sub>c an hour. There are two consequences immediately arising from this sort of situation:

- (a) the white worker gets a leg up into better paid categories – as the South African Financial Mail commented – on the back of the black man, and
- (b) the manufacturers are cutting costs by savings on their labour costs.

White artisans on the railways gained, in May 1970, heavy wage increases of up to 24 % of their existing rates in return for the concession that the administration engage more blacks in traditionally white-held jobs. So the railways are employing Africans as shunters but calling them marshalls and paying them less than the white shunters.

Job dilution is going on at a rapid rate in the building industry, in motor assembly plants, in the post office and, as has been shown, in the engineering industry and on the railways.

And on the mines:


Commenting on the situation in the mines, the Economics Editor of the **Financial Mail** wrote, "Looking ahead, mine managements believe that the only way to keep their wages bill under control will be to further increase the ratio of black to white workers. Plainly with black wages so much lower than white ones, the managers are on to a good thing".<sup>11</sup>

And the President of the Chamber of Mines stated, "We would ask the white mineworker to take a step or two up the ladder of responsibility and to allow the non-white to do the same; the white man would assume a supervisory role and would release to the non-white the remainder of the tasks he formerly carried out . . . Obviously since the blacks would be doing only part of the operations previously carried out by whites they would not need to be paid the same".<sup>12</sup>

### **Floating the Colour Bar**

This process is called "floating the colour bar upwards". In fact it is nothing new for

**Siemens exchange personnel in RSA**



the colour bar to shift. If you look at the pattern from 1921 onwards, you see that whites have consistently moved upwards into managerial administration and supervisory jobs, and the proportion of Africans doing semi-skilled work has grown. The requirements of the economy have changed, and so it has not needed such a large unskilled African labour force, but a larger proportion of semi-skilled labour. But this does not mean that the colour bar is broken. Colour differentials remain in the kind of work allocated and the rate paid. The occupational distribution is altering, but African labour remains substantially cheaper, and the wage gap between black and white is not growing smaller, but wider. And the basis of the system remains: poverty induced by land laws; the exploitation of the African population as a whole; restriction on education, training and opportunity; trade under repression, etc.

A new report by a Church-sponsored Economics Commission in South Africa has made exactly this point: that though the colour bar is shifting, wages remain discriminatory. The report calls for the scrapping of migratory labour and the industrial colour bar, and also of the pass laws and prohibitions on African residence in the towns.<sup>13</sup>

## Conclusions

What one is arguing is not that labour in South Africa should not press its claims, nor that business should not be indicted for its foul labour practices. It is that isolated reform, however well-meaning, is a deceptive and misleading notion as long as the South African system as a whole remains unchanged.

Racialism has not been an impediment to exploitation in South Africa; on the contrary, it has been an essential function of it and has deepened its effectiveness. It is the very underdevelopment of the African sector of the economy, the colonised part, which is the basis of the development, prosperity and privilege of the dominant and developed white part. And if

this particular and peculiar form of underdevelopment within a developed economy has grown out of this kind of system, then real development and change will require the radical restructuring of the society, the mechanism of exploitation.

In fact, the point has been made in some studies that if British or American business decided overnight to pay an equal wage for equal work, this might in the long run rebound to the disadvantage of African workers, and produce unemployment. This is because of the possibility that any disturbance of the cheap labour system will lead to the greater mechanisation of industry, and African workers will invariably be the first to be fired.

The whole history of white politics and white power in South Africa is one of the manipulation by the State to protect the whites from being supplanted or threatened by Africans. So, isolated reform will be limited in its efficacy, and even abortive, without profound change. It is for this reason that we in the ANC call for the complete isolation of South Africa – a call that has found a ready response at the UN and many other international and national, governmental and non-governmental organisations.

<sup>1</sup> Speech at a Scientific Colloquium on the "Conflict in Southern Africa", held in Munich in June 1975.

<sup>2</sup> Statement to the U.N. Special Political Committee, under Item 53, "Policies of Apartheid of the Government of South Africa" – October 21, 1975.

<sup>3</sup> *ibid*

<sup>4</sup> South African Financial Mail, October 4, 1974.

<sup>5</sup> Handelsblatt, Dusseldorf, page 6, November 6, 1975.

<sup>6</sup> *ibid*

<sup>7</sup> Financial Mail, October 4, 1974 and a Secret document from the S.A. Embassy in Cologne.

<sup>8</sup> Afrika Post, Gossian, November 5, 1975.

<sup>9</sup> South Africa: Economic Statistics, circular for November, 1975 issued by the West Berlin Chamber of Industries and Commerce.

<sup>10</sup> The South African Connection, by Ruth First, Christabel Gurney and Jonathan Steele.

<sup>11</sup> *ibid*

<sup>12</sup> *ibid*

<sup>13</sup> *ibid*

# New Repressive Law

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"There is growing evidence that South Africa is shifting into a new era of security legislation in which members of parliament and not the courts will decide the 'guilt' of certain organizations" (London Observer, June 8, 1975).

Prime Minister John Vorster has announced he will introduce legislation this year to create a permanent security commission, consisting of six Nationalist and six opposition members of parliament. Cabinet Minister Marais Steyn acknowledged that under such a setup breaches of law would "from time to time be inevitable."

South Africa's Minister of Justice pointed out that judicial methods were not always satisfactory because people who needed to be restricted could be found innocent in a court of law. A Nationalist MP added, "We are dealing with crimes of the spirit, with view-points related to the undermining of the state".

This move is obviously aimed at denying people access to the Courts . . . it will be nothing but a bunch of white politicians appointed by white politicians – all from the allwhite parliament – to prosecute all political opponents. In other words it will be a permanent Schlebusch Commission whose recommendations on the South African Christian Institute is dealt with in this Article.

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## **The Schlebusch Commission**

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Since 1948 when it came to power, the South African Government has persecu-

ted, harassed and terrorised organisations and individuals who oppose it. It has used all methods: torture, blackmail, imprisonment, banishment, murder and smear. This time its victim is the Christian Institute.

On July 4, 1972, the racist government decided to appoint the "Commission of Inquiry into Certain Organisations" which, because of the name of its chairman, became known as the "Schlebusch Commission". The terms of reference of this Commission were set out as follows:—

1. To inquire into and, taking into account the evidence, memoranda and exhibits which were submitted to the Parliamentary Select Committee on Certain Organisations, report on:—

a) the objects, organisation and financing of the National Union of South African Students, the South African Institute of Race Relations, the University Christian Movement, the Christian Institute of Southern Africa and any related organisations, bodies, committees or groups of persons;

b) the activities of the aforementioned bodies, organisations, committees or groups of persons and the direct or indirect results or possible results of those activities;

c) the activities of persons or in connection with the aforementioned organisations, bodies, committees or groups of persons and the direct or indirect results or possible results of those activities; and  
d) any related matter which comes to the notice of the Commission and which in its view calls for inquiry.

2. To make recommendations if, in view of 57



the Commission's finding, it appears to be necessary to do so.

From the outset it was clear that the Commission was expected to do a "thorough job". A striking feature about this Commission's composition is that the United Party served on it and thus identified the so-called "Opposition" with the Government.

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### **Commission At Work**

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The Commission worked diligently; in December 1973 the Report on NUSAS – a massive document of 641 pages including numerous appendices – was delivered to the Government and published in August 1974. It is important to note in this connection that even before the Report was published, the racist Government presented to Parliament in February 1974 the so-called "Affected Organisations Bill" which proposed a law which forbids any organisation or individual who is declared "affected" to receive funds from overseas. The Bill became an Act in March 1974. In November 1974 the Commission completed its investigations on the activities and affairs of the Christian Institute. Now we know that the Christian Institute is an "affected organisation" because it has been declared one!

It is not our aim to reproduce the contents of the Report of this Le Grange Commission (named after the Chairman who took over from Alwyn Louis Schlebusch); our immediate concern is the thinking behind the Le Grange/Schlebusch Report. According to the "Ecunews Bulletin" (June 4th, 1975), the mouthpiece of the South African Council of Churches the Government view of this action was contained in a broadcast in the news-commentary of the South African Broadcasting Corporation which demagogically stated:

"The Christian Institute is not being found guilty as already being suggested, merely of criticising the Government of this country. Nor would its guilt lie if it were the purely ecumenical body it professes to be in obtaining funds from abroad. Nor for

that matter, does its guilt lie in being politically orientated.

The unanimous condemnation of the Institute rests on the finding that the Institute is basically a political body using foreign funds to promote aims which endanger the very state itself".

Die Transvaaler, a Nationalist mouthpiece, stated that the Christian Institute was receiving 90 % of its funds from "enemy countries" and Die Vaderland took the matter a step further by linking this to the expulsion from the Ned. Geref. Kerk of two of the senior executives, Dr. Beyers Naude, the Director of the Christian Institute and Rev. Roelf Meyer, the Editor of the Institute's journal, Pro Veritate.

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### **Organised Smear**

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This organised smear, with the active participation and connivance of the so-called "Opposition" has been condemned by many churches inside and outside the country and by leading church figures including Dr. Beyers Naude.

One of the charges against the Christian Institute is that it is no longer active in ecclesiastic matters only but is also "moving into the social and political spheres". It is further alleged that Dr. Naude, former Moderator of the Ned. Geref. Kerk has, after falling out with his own church, turned to the outside world for support and now stands in opposition to the "existing order and all that goes with it" and his defiance is leading to a "church-state confrontation". Dr. Beyers Naude's other 'crime' is his good contacts with NUSAS, South African Council of Churches and – this makes his 'crime' even worse – his relations with independent African Churches especially those which preach Black Theology, Black Power and Black Consciousness. These churches which preach 'social liberation' and not 'personal redemption' have been influenced by the now banned and exiled Dr. Basil Moore who is described by the Report as "the father of Black Theology in South Africa". The Report goes on to accuse

the Institute of committing the 'crime' of working closely with the World Council of Churches, an organisation which has – according to the Report – experienced a shift in power since 1961 “when the Russian Orthodox Church was admitted as a member”.

The Report then quotes extensively from Pro Veritate the organ of the Christian Institute, which is accused of spreading the “Social Gospel”, the “Gospel of the Leftists”. Pro Veritate is accused of propagating in a disguised form and ‘behind the shield of this respectability of Christian Theology’, ideas and objectives of “MARXISM” and these find expression in the attack on Apartheid and a demand for a “radical change” in South Africa – something which is interpreted by an unnamed “expert on Communism” as ‘Neo-Marxist’.

This Christian journal is being attacked not only for supporting black aspirations, especially the “Hammanskraal Resolution”, but also for its own activities e.g. the Bible Study circles. The Report has this to say on this:—

“... these so-called Bible Study circles leave no doubt that they are intended to be a propaganda campaign against the existing order on the one hand and to promote the ecumenical idea on the other. Furthermore, the Black man is to be made aware that he has the right to oppose the existing order and to rebel against it. In the light of these objectives it is not surprising that Bible Study discussions are often dominated by social and political questions rather than a discussion of the scriptures”.

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### **Black Christians - a Dynamic Force**

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The Report of the Le Grange/Schlebusch Commission on this young Christian Institute – it was created in 1963 – is full of faults and distortions, half-truths and in-

ventions, malicious lies and ridiculous assertions.

The truth of the matter is that Vorster's Government and the Dutch Reformed Church – Dr. Koot Vorster, the Prime Minister's brother is a former Moderator of the N. G. Kerk – are afraid of the growing popularity of the Christian Institute among the Black masses. This growing popularity explains the frank utterances and militant positions taken by its Director Dr. Beyers Naude, whom the Boers can never forgive for the 'crime' of 'deserting' the Broederbond in the '50s. Dr. Naude's stand is an expression of a slow but important process of polarisation within the “granite wall” of white domination. It is our revolutionary duty to widen the crack. This small body of deeply concerned Christians committed no crime at all, all that they fought for was “racial justice”. Even this is too much for Vorster. The World Council of Churches commented ironically:—

“The present action to harass the Christian Institute is a clear indication of the fact that the so-called detente with Independent Africa implies increased repression of all those forces like the Christian Institute which are working for Racial and Social Justice”.

This incident of the Christian Institute shows the hollowness of Vorster's boast that his regime is a Christian regime as if countries in this world are divided between Christian and non-Christian. It also shows how the South African racists shiver at the thought of having to face people who are imbued with the genuine Christian ideals propagated by the World Council of Churches – an organisation which supports our movement and has as senior officials people who were persecuted by Vorster.

It is important for our movement to draw the necessary lesson from this incident: the Christian Community in South Africa is a dynamic force which, if mobilised, could contribute tremendously in strengthening our united front of all patriotic and democratic anti-imperialist forces led by the African National Congress.

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## »MOSES KOTANE: SOUTH AFRICAN REVOLUTIONARY«.

By Brian Bunting.

Inkululeko Publications,  
39 Goodge St., London W1.  
£3.00 and \$8.00

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Moses Kotane turned seventy on August 9th of last year. For fifty two of those years he has occupied a leading role in the South African liberation struggle. It is a fitting tribute to this indomitable freedom fighter that this year saw the publication of his biography.

In 1905, the year Kotane was born, the last embers of African resistance to conquest were finally extinguished in the Bambatha Rebellion which was crushed in 1906, bringing to a close a long and bitter chapter of South African history. The defeat of Bambatha inaugurated a new era in South Africa. White colonizer and Black colonized no longer confronted each other as two distinct societies but were inexorably drawn into a common society linked by innumerable bonds to an international economic system. 1905 also opened a new chapter in world history. Imperial Japan had dealt Tsarist Russia a crushing blow at Port Arthur, signalling the twilight of the myth of white superiority and European world hegemony. Its immediate effect was the 1905 Revolution, the 'dress rehearsal' for the great October

revolution which gave birth to the first socialist state. The little village where Kotane was born knew almost nothing of these momentous events which were to shape and determine the destiny of one of its native sons.

Bunting's biography of Kotane (Moses Kotane: South African Revolutionary. Inkululeko Publications). picks up the story of his life in a small village in the northern Transvaal, follows the young man on his travels, which take him to White-owned farms, the mines and finally to the bustling heartland of industrial South Africa, the Reef. It was here, at the age of twenty-three, that Kotane became politically conscious and joined the African National Congress. His thirst for political knowledge and understanding was not satisfied by the bombastic speeches he heard from ANC platforms at the time and his search led him to the Communist Party. He joined the ranks of the CP endowed with two assets which were to be a source of strength over the years: his keen and questioning mind and a sense of discipline imparted to him by the strict Protestant upbringing he had received from his parents. In the space of ten years he rose from an untutored recruit to the General Secretaryship of the CP, a position he has held ever since.

Kotane's political career spans five decades of our national liberation struggle and is characterised by the interaction between the national and socialist movements. It is a story rich in both conflict and harmony, acrimonious internecine arguments and mutual enrichment through an ideological cross fertilization. Bunting tries to convey the spirit in which these events were played out by numerous quotations from contemporary journals and the main protagonists in them. He recounts all the major debates which

# BOOK REVIEWS

have preoccupied the movement since 1918. Kotane played a seminal role in all of these since he entered politics, and his contribution to them has often been crucial in the options the movement has chosen.

When Kotane joined the ANC and the CP in 1928, important changes were afoot in both organisations. James Gumede the newly elected ANC president had adopted a militant anti-imperialist platform and was seeking an alliance with the left. The CP had revised its perspective on revolution and South Africa and adopted the national liberation of African people as its foremost goal. Both organisations were keen to develop closer links with each other. To the detriment of both, this projected alliance was wrecked by the old guard of the ANC leadership who feared both the radical nationalism espoused by Gumede and the CP's advocacy of socialism. It took years of patient work by Kotane and his comrades to rebuild this unity, as often as not, by going over the heads of the conservatives and appealing directly to the masses. Their efforts finally bore fruit in the post war years when a new generation of militant nationalists came into the leadership of the ANC.

The trade union struggles of the thirties, the war against fascism and the upsurge of anti-colonial movements in the post war years, infused new blood into the liberation movement and helped to broaden its vision. Four trends dominate this period: the resurgence of militant nationalism; the tendency towards greater unity of all the oppressed national groups; the growth of internationalism and the integration of communism into the mainstream of the national liberation movement. These new trends were tested in the heat of struggle during the campaigns of 1950 and 1952 and were finally given programmatic ex-

pression in the Kliptown conference which adopted the Freedom Charter. As most people are familiar with the course of events after this historic convocation I shall not burden this review with the details.

However, a vital area of this history, which has been hidden from public view until now, is the founding and development of the Communist underground after the Suppression of Communism Act. Reasons of security still shroud the details, but the little light Bunting sheds on it gives us some idea of the tenacious efforts that contributed to the first public statements in 1960. This section of the book contains valuable lessons from which all sections of the movement could benefit. By the time the ANC was banned, the alliance that Gumede and the CP had tried to build thirty years earlier had come into full flower. The conservative victory in 1930 had proved but a temporary setback. The jointly shared trials and tribulations of struggle, the patient work of militants in the teeth of often stubborn resistance, produced a solidarity firmly implanted among the oppressed peoples. Moses Kotane's contribution to this achievement is outstanding.

It is a basic premise of revolutionary historiography that the struggle for human liberation in reality has assumed many forms. Before we can judge any struggle either positively or negatively, we must first decipher its essential aspects which may lie hidden behind its surface features. Those struggles which extend the area of human freedom and possibilities are part of the liberatory process. Those that restrict freedom and circumscribe human possibilities, even though radical in appearance, are essentially reactionary. It is this premise that governs the distinction revolutionaries draw between repres-



sive and liberatory violence; between repressive and liberatory nationalism. It is in this light that one must judge the white workers' struggles which culminated in the 1922 Miners' Strike. Despite the revolutionary rhetoric of its leaders, the workers defense squads and action councils these threw up, the main thrust of these struggles was the defense of privileges obtained at the expense of the Black workers, and in the case of the 1922 Strike, to debar them from certain occupations. By their struggles the white workers had forced upon the political representatives of capital, both foreign and South African, the recognition that it was not possible to govern without their cooperation. After the 1924 general elections they extended such cooperation in return for higher wages, job protection and supervisory authority over the Black workers.

Side by side with the white workers movement had grown the national movements of the oppressed led by western educated intellectuals, small businessmen and professionals. The character of the national movements was in large measure determined by the ambivalence of the oppressed communities and the political elite within them. This elite were the proteges of British imperialism which had sponsored them as a counter weight to the traditional leaders during the nineteenth century. After the destruction of traditional society, both the colonial government and the local white regime began to perceive them as the chief threat to white domination. All the racially discriminating clauses in South Africa's land laws and the constitution were aimed primarily at retarding the development of this class and to prevent it from consolidating its position either in the economy or in the body politic. It was from this privileged stratum that the mass of urban Blacks learnt the

skills of modern political organisation which gave rise to an independent Black workers movement. The left wing of the white workers movement imparted socialism to this Black workers movement. Moses Kotane, in his person, merges these two currents of the liberation movement in South Africa. During the 1920s the Black working class was as yet an untutored mass undergoing its initiation at the mills, mines and forges of capitalism. Though it had acquired enough strength to be a serious force in the political arena, it was not strong enough to give leadership to the national movement. In the fifty years which have elapsed since 1922 it has acquired the political knowledge and skill to do so. We can with confidence predict that this class will be the decisive factor in the liberation of South Africa and that it will leave its imprint on the future society.

Though Bunting's work is commendable it has its faults, one of which I shall touch on briefly. Large chunks of Kotane's life are treated in the most cursory fashion. We are told nothing of his term at the Lenin School though this must have been a profoundly formative experience; Moses Kotane courts, marries, has two sons, divorces, courts again and remarries - this is covered in two paragraphs? We are given no idea how he spends his time between the committee meetings, public speaking engagements and conferences. Indeed, his only leisure seems to be football! Even that, merely as a spectator! As a result, even though the authors' informants repeatedly assure us of Kotane's personal warmth and humanity, the received image is that of a no-nonsense professional revolutionary. Surely, even the best revolutionaries do not live by politics alone.

Z. Pallo Jordan.

## BARCLAYS AND SOUTH AFRICA

by Martin Bailey,

20p (+ postage),  
Third World Publications,  
138 Stratford Rd, Birmingham.

Barclays has long been under attack for its role in supporting South Africa's apartheid system. The Haslemere Group and the Anti-Apartheid Movement have therefore commissioned a pamphlet on 'BARCLAYS AND SOUTH AFRICA' which was launched at a lively press conference in London recently.

Barclays, the largest bank in South Africa, has been operating in the country for fifty years. The bank claims that it acts as a 'liberalizing' influence in reforming apartheid from within. But 'BARCLAYS AND SOUTH AFRICA' – with the results of detailed research – reveals the ways in which the company is in fact helping to prop up racial oppression:

- Less than 2 % of the bank's clerical staff are black Africans in a country where this group represents over 70 % of the population.
- At the time of the House of Commons'

investigation in 1973 – almost half a century after Barclays began its operations in South Africa – some wage levels for the bank's cleaning staff were below the subsistence level.

- Barclays is actively promoting British trade and investment with South Africa. This increases Britain's stake in the apartheid system.

- Barclays operates in Namibia – and recognises the South African administration which is illegally ruling the territory.

- The Rhodesian branches of Barclays have been actively involved in violating UN sanctions over the last decade. Head office in London claims that it is unable to exercise control over its Rhodesian branches – yet a detailed examination of the evidence suggests that headquarters has made little effort to pressurise its Rhodesian branches to uphold UN sanctions.

- Barclays' South African subsidiary is engaged in transferring funds, on behalf of its customers, to and from Rhodesia. The bank's London head office is therefore acquiescing in – and profiting from – the breaking of UN sanctions.

Barclays Bank has therefore become an integral part of the apartheid system. Consequently the liberation movements of South Africa and Namibia have all issued statements calling for the bank's withdrawal. The publication of 'BARCLAYS AND SOUTH AFRICA' will strengthen the 'Boycott Barclays' campaign and is expected to result in considerable pressure on the bank to pull out from South Africa.

**MPLA**  
**A VITÓRIA**  
**É CERTA**

