


13 Feb 85 SEE 14
FEBRUARY 1985



SECHABA

official organ of the african national congress south africa



AN INJURY TO
ONE SHAREHOLDER
IS AN INJURY TO
ALL SHAREHOLDERS

WE DEMAND
OUR JOBS
BACK

**THE
WORKERS
WILL NOT BE
INTIMIDATED!**

SECHABA

FEBRUARY ISSUE 1985



**P. O. BOX 38, 28 PENTON STREET, LONDON N1 9PR
UNITED KINGDOM. TELEPHONE: 01-837 2012
TELEGRAMS: MAYIBUYE TELEX: 299555ANCSAG**

CONTENTS

ANNUAL SUBSCRIPTIONS:

USA and Canada (air mail only) \$12.00
Elsewhere £6.00

SINGLE COPIES:

USA and Canada (air mail only) \$3.00
Elsewhere £0.50

Send your subscriptions to
Sechaba Publications

P O Box 38, 28 Penton Street, London N1 9PR

Donations welcome

LISTEN TO RADIO FREEDOM

Voice of the African National Congress and
Umkhonto We Sizwe, the People's Army

Radio Luanda

short wave: 40 & 30 m. bands
medium wave: 27.6 m. band
7.30 p.m. daily

Radio Lusaka

short wave: 31 m. band, 9580 KHz
7.15-8.00 p.m. Monday to Friday
10.05-10.35 p.m. Wednesday
10.30-11.00 p.m. Friday
7.00-8.00 p.m. Saturday
Sunday 8.00-8.45 p.m., 17895 KHz

Radio Madagascar

short wave 49 m. band, 6135 KHz
9.30-10.00 p.m. daily

Radio Ethiopia

short wave 31 m. band, 9545 KHz
9.30-10.00 p.m. daily

Radio Tanzania

short wave 19 m. band, 15435 KHz
Sunday, Monday, Wednesday, Friday
8.15 p.m.
31 m. band,
Tuesday, Thursday & Saturday,
6.15 a.m.

□	EDITORIAL:	
□	Repression and "Reforms"	1
□	REFORMS AND REVOLUTION IN	
□	SOUTH AFRICA	
□	By Joe Slovo	3
□	STOP PRESS: APPEAL	12
□	UNITY OF DEMOCRATIC	
□	FORCES:	
□	THE TRANSVAAL STAYAWAY	
□	By Jean Middleton	14
□	DIE GROEP MOER ONS:	
□	COLOURED AND INDIANS	
□	HATE THE GROUP AREAS ACT	
□	By Nyawuza	21
□	COVER CAPTIONS.	
□	<i>Our front cover shows some of the SASOL workers, who, after they had been sacked for taking part in the November stayaway, demonstrated outside the SASOL offices in Johannesburg while a shareholders' meeting was taking place inside. Some of the workers had bought shares in the company, but the police would not allow them into the meeting.</i>	
□	<i>Our back cover shows Billy Nair, leader of the Natal Indian Congress and the United Democratic Front, leaving the Durban Consulate after the sit-in of UDF leaders.</i>	



Repression and »Reforms«

1984 has seen the South African state shaken by mass popular action not witnessed since the days when the ANC was legal. The level of popular action has far exceeded the 1976 uprising, although there have been fewer deaths, owing to the use of more 'sophisticated' control technologies by the police and army. Some of these questions will be discussed in the coming issues of *Sechaba*. The UDF and other organisations have published a useful booklet, *Repression in a Time of "Reform"*, which looks into the events in the Transvaal since August 1984.

What is the character of these "reforms"? A few statistics might help. Between the end of the Second World War and 1979 there was only one treason trial, which lasted from 1956 till 1961, and in which leaders of our movement were accused of treason. But in 1984 alone there were 44 people accused of treason in different trials. More than 20 political organisations have been declared unlawful, and, as the "reforms" progress, the number may increase. The "reforms" saw more than

1 000 people detained during 1984, and over 200 are still in detention. Some are detained under Section 29 of the Internal Security Act, which provides for indefinite detention under extreme conditions of social isolation. Others are detained in terms of Section 28 of the same Act, which provides for a form of 'preventive detention.' Some 1 200 people have been banned, 130 people have been killed in 1984 alone. As for the list of books and publications which are banned, it is so long it might include this issue of *Sechaba*.

What about political trials? It is said that more than 30 political trials, involving 160 people, were scheduled for December. Another 19 trials, involving about 104 people, have already been scheduled for January 1985, and 9 trials, involving 93 people, are scheduled for February. There are 58 political trials due to begin by March — in all, 116 political trials in four months! This is how the regime reacts and responds to our demands. Most of these trials arise from the recent unrest and stayaway, and involve charges of public

violence, attending "illegal" gatherings, possessing banned literature and so on. This is the meaning of the much talked about "reforms."

What is the nature of these trials? To illustrate this we shall take one example. In August, 11 people were arrested and six of them were released. They sought refuge in the British consulate in Durban. Three of them left the consulate in October and were rearrested. Of the five men who were held since August, two were released and three have been charged with treason — hence we call them the "Durban Six."

Another hearing on December 21st was held to rule on a bail application by six defendants, who are meanwhile in the hands of the security police, with all the dangers to their lives that this implies. These are the three who were arrested when they left the consulate, and the other three are leaders of the UDF and the Release Mandela Committee. In other words, the UDF, the Release Mandela Committee, the Natal and Transvaal Indian Congresses, and all the other organisations these trialists belong to, are on trial.

What happened to the other three who were in the British Consulate? By the way, they were unwelcome guests. The apartheid regime announced that detention orders had been lifted on the three. This made Margaret Thatcher and the Home Office to rejoice:

"The situation has now changed fundamentally, and we expect the three to leave at once."

Two of the three, Archie Gumede and Paul David, were arrested. Archie Gumede is a 71-year-old co-president of the UDF. He was one of the accused in the treason trial of 1956-61 that we mentioned before. He has a diabetic complaint.

The original 11 were detained without trial in August under Section 28 of the Internal Security Act, for organising a boycott of the Indian and Coloured elections. The state plans to call more than 150 witnesses in a case that could last 18 months or more. The case will not start before March, which means the eight

could spend up to two and a half years in imprisonment before it is over. Finding 150 witnesses to testify could also mean a campaign of harassment over the next few months, with the security police detaining people left right and centre for interrogation, or bringing reluctant witnesses before magistrates who have the power to order them to make statements on pain of imprisonment. This could also mean the arrest of the UDF leadership, even before the show trial begins.

Some of the charges relate to activities that date back to before the formation of the UDF. The state wants to prove that the UDF is a "front" of the ANC and the Communist Party.

We want to emphasise the UDF is a **front organisation** — its name, United Democratic Front, says it. There is nothing sinister about that. But the UDF is a front of all the organisations affiliated to it, and the ANC and the Communist Party are not affiliated.

Back to the case. Mr I Mohammed, appearing for the accused, asked for bail and said that since the trial might last between 12 and 18 months, at the end of that time, if they are acquitted, they will have spent 25 years in prison. The accused should not be punished before they are convicted. Mr R Suhr, for the state, said the state had been taken by surprise by Mohammed's application and needed time to decide. The hearing was adjourned to January 15th.

This is one case — and there are 115 more coming before the end of March. How many are coming before the end of December? How many more lives will have been lost by then; how many more people will have been detained, injured or maimed? How many books and publications will have been banned ... and people? How many ... ?

These are questions we ask ourselves. The answers are there. **These things will happen as long as we allow them to.**

Let us unite and intensify our efforts in eradicating this obnoxious system. Let us make 1985 a year of higher commitment and involvement in the **struggle against apartheid.**

By Joe Slovo

'REFORMS'

AND REVOLUTION

IN SOUTH AFRICA

Ruth First was killed by a parcel bomb on the 17th August 1982. The Ruth First Memorial Lectures were inaugurated in 1983, and the second of these lectures was delivered in Maputo on the 24th August, 1984, by her husband, Joe Slovo.

It is perhaps clearer today than it was two years ago why they killed her. Her selection as a target was neither capricious nor accidental; it served a need which, with the benefit of hindsight, we can now identify more precisely.

A phase in Pretoria's strategy was coming up for review; the phase of uninhibited military violence against virtually all the neighbouring states. Naked acts of aggression, deliberate economic destabilisation and the creation of vast bandit armies had inflicted serious wounds on the young Southern African states still trying to find their feet in the post-independence era. And Pretoria sensed that they had done enough to create a mood of desperation within these states.

Looked at from the point of view of those bearing the main brunt of racist bullying, the position appeared indeed to be desperate. For while the Reagans constructively engaged on

the side of this thuggery, the rest of the world seemed paralysed. It was neither ready nor perhaps endowed with sufficient resources to stop the thug or to provide the means, economic and military, to enable the victims to do so.

And so many of the ideologues and pundits of Botha's strategic think-tanks began (at around the time of Ruth's murder) to toy with fresh ideas. The stick, they speculated, seems for the moment to have done its job. Those against whom it had been wielded must surely by now have absorbed the lesson that the alternatives before them were (to parody Botha's phrase) to adapt or to continue dying.

Pretoria's policy formulators therefore began to judge that the time was near when a new way could be charted to satisfy South Africa's appetite for economic expansion and domination in the sub-continent and, above all, to spike the guns of the ANC-led liberation forces.

For those charged with preparing the ground for these new tactical options, the elimination of Ruth First must have figured somewhere in the equation.

They knew her as an internationally 3

respected scholar, writer and radical campaigner, whose work lent great prestige to the liberation movement in which she was so active. But more than this — she was increasingly devoting her considerable talents to help lay bare the real and undeviating historic mission of South Africa's ruling class both within the country and in our sub-continent. And she was inspiring this work in what they venomously called Marxist Mozambique, and in a study centre which focused on Party and state cadres; a study centre whose dynamism and vigour were beginning to influence researchers and scholars from an increasing number of institutions of learning in Southern Africa. Her last project, the UNESCO-supported seminar, was testimony to this.

The growing influence of this work, both inside and beyond Mozambique, must have seemed to the racist planners to have been at least marginally relevant to the kind of reception which they could expect to a future shift in their tactical emphasis. In the theoretical scheme of things which Ruth tried to promote there was no place for the expectation that you could get any change from a bargain with Pretoria. In this sense she was in their way. And so someone among them ordered the parcel to be prepared, and went off to have his dinner.

On an occasion such as this the most apposite tribute one can pay to Ruth's memory is to reflect on a few concepts of the South African struggle whose pertinence has been underlined by contemporary developments.

In troubled times, theory and basic concepts are also at high risk as potential casualties, and need to be jealously guarded. I have selected a few of the concepts which have a fundamental bearing on our perspectives of struggle, and I have been influenced in my selection by the fact that of late some questioning voices are being raised about aspects of our strategy; voices which **have** to be taken seriously since they come from friends and brothers. The theses I propose touching on and arguing for tonight are the following:

★ Firstly, that the Botha regime is not a re-

formist regime bent on a retreat from apartheid. On the contrary, it has gone further than any previous regime in South Africa's history in an advance towards the implementation of the essentials of apartheid.

★ Secondly, that while, historically, political control of the country has shifted from an externally based to an internally based ruling class, the colonial status of the Blacks has, in substance, been maintained (albeit in different forms) from 1910 until now.

★ Thirdly, that the immediate struggle in South Africa is not just against apartheid or merely to achieve civil rights, but is a struggle for national liberation in the full meaning of that term.

★ Fourthly, that the element of revolutionary violence (as an integral part of the political struggle) is an imperative imposed on us by South African reality and that, like every other similar struggle, it of necessity implies both an external and internal factor, and

★ Fifthly, that the dramatic advance and massive impact of the ANC-led liberation movement in the post-Soweto period is a tribute to the strategic and tactical approaches, and that the situation created by this impact is forcing Pretoria and its Western friends to probe for other ways to cope with the ANC.

Let me now say a little more on each of these interconnected themes.

It is a measure of the sophisticated quality of South Africa's public relations machine that Botha and his colleagues are occasionally talked about, even in some well-meaning circles, as if they were a bunch of secret liberals who, if given half a chance, would break with apartheid altogether. One thing is clear. This illusion is not shared by those in South Africa (and they are in the vast majority) who are at the receiving end of Botha's dispensation.

We will say a little more about the reforms in a moment. But we should be clear that the least important reforms (which sometimes attract the most attention), such as allowing a Black to actually share your park bench, your restaurant, your football field, and perhaps even your bed, are part of a larger package

deal. It is a package deal made up, in the main, of items which are designed to imprint race domination finally and irreversibly into South Africa's social fabric.

Botha has proved to be a most efficient sales representative of this package deal. It is extremely important to understand what is actually being sold. What is actually being sold is the South African version of the Hitlerian final solution.

In terms of this, over half of the African population have already been proclaimed foreigners in the land of their birth, with perhaps less political rights and less rights to freedom of movement than the Turkish *gastarbeiter* has in West Germany. Botha the reformer has put new energy into the resettlement programme which, in the last two decades, has uprooted, transported and dumped into the veld over four million African souls — virtually the size of the total White population.

The very foundation of apartheid — the Bantustan creations and the fragmentation of South Africa (with one of the fragments, covering 87% of its area and 99% of its riches, going to the Whites) — has been pursued by the Botha regime with more vigour than by any of their predecessors.

It is under Botha that the door of access by Africans to central state power has been slammed with a deadening finality.

It is through the duet of Botha and Malan (in pursuit of apartheid's total strategy) that every surrounding country has felt the blows of military intervention and the chaos of bandit armies created and sustained by them. And it is during their time that Black political opposition has felt a heightened level of brutality.

It is only if words lose all conventional meaning that we can describe the Botha regime as one which is straining at the leash to move away from apartheid. It is in fact straining at the leash to be left in peace to take apartheid (in its real meaning) to its ultimate conclusion.

How then do we explain what is generally referred to as the reforms? Are they merely cosmetic? More time would be needed to reflect exhaustively on the complex mosaic of

the reforms and the social needs and tendencies which they express. But, in brief, they must not be seen either as flowing from the same set of causes or as having the same significance.

Some reforms are indeed cosmetic and represent gestures to placate embarrassed allies or (as for example in the sporting arena) to cope with international isolation.

Other reforms are designed to co-opt Black collaboration, particularly from the middle strata, and (as in the case of the new constitutional dispensation) to break the unity of the Black opposition.

Yet other reforms are the achievements of people in bitter class and national struggles, as for example in the trade union field.

Some reflect the new type of labour needs of sectors of the ruling class which are poised to break into the technological age.

Nevertheless, the fact remains that the reforms do touch on the daily lives of sections of our people. In so far as they are won in struggle, in so far as they create tensions within a power bloc made up of segments who do not benefit in exactly the same way from the exploitation of the Blacks, in so far as they attempt to create false expectations in order to divert classes and communities away from the real issue — in so far as all this is so, we cannot demagogically dismiss the whole process as cosmetic and leave it at that.

It is, however, one thing to be sensitive to the impact of the reforms on the unfolding of the day-to-day struggle, and quite another thing to encourage the illusion that we have a regime in South Africa which has the potential to break with those ingredients of apartheid which constitute its real essence. Indeed, it is precisely because apartheid has been rooted so firmly in the recent period that steps can be contemplated which would have met with more universal revulsion and opposition from the White community, especially its Afrikaner section. Before fragmentation had reached such an advanced level with the creation of the Bantustans, the defence of White cohesion had to be carried out in communities which, although segregated, were sharing common

urban and rural territory. The pressures for a common South African society were not yet counterbalanced with its institutionalised creation of a dozen separate so-called countries. In these circumstances, among the early lines of defence of the purity and cohesion of the White laager were institutions which prevented inter-race mobility, such as the Immorality Act, the Mixed Marriages Act and so on. These mechanisms no longer play the same important role as they previously did in perpetuating White exclusiveness.

One further point needs to be emphasised. What Botha thinks, says, or believes in is of some interest and importance. But at the end of the day, what counts decisively is what he does, and, more especially, the economic aspirations he represents at the political level.

In short, Botha (and I refer to him as a shorthand for the state and its basic apparatus) has acted, and can be expected to continue to act, in broad conformity with the interests of the ruling class.

Just as there is no abstract socialist society unrelated to its specific historic origins, so there is no capitalist society which conforms precisely to the model described in *Capital*.

In general, capitalist exploitation and race domination are not symbiotically linked. They can exist without one another. But in every phase of South African capitalism, from its emergence to its stabilisation and to its growth and development, race and class have been inextricably and inseparably joined together. Primitive accumulation in South Africa involved internal national conquests and dispossession. The creation and consolidation of cheap labour reserves were virtually completely colour-based. And today not only does the race factor continue to play a dominating role at the level of the relations of production, but also the very survival of the ruling class — its continued monopolistic hold on the land, mines and other means of production — depends upon maintaining and even reinforcing the mechanisms which guarantee White race political control and domination. That is why even the Oppenheimers, with all their enlightened talk against the excesses of apart-

heid, do not show a readiness to eliminate the Bantustans and to risk the immediate grant of full political and economic rights to the indigenous people.

The great divide between liberal and radical analysis in South Africa has always been a liberal belief that race discrimination is an obstacle to capitalist development, and that, in time, racist practices will be inevitably eroded by capitalist economic forces. The last two decades have demonstrated more clearly than before that this thesis is a false one. It is during this period that we have witnessed the most dramatic advance in the South African economy, and it is also during this period that we have witnessed the most intense application of the worst features of apartheid and race discrimination.

It is not only at the level of the ruling class that South African capitalism displays specific features, but also at the level of the ruled (most of whom are working people), who occupy a position which does not conform to the classic situation of the proletariat in European capitalist countries. Even the most superficial



grasp of South African reality will tell an observer that the Black worker suffers from a dual form of exploitation — both as a worker and as a Black. Which brings me to the much discussed thesis on internal colonialism.

I want to start by separating the thesis of internal colonialism from some secondary and perhaps misleading questions with which it is sometimes linked. And the first of these questions is whether or not South Africa is an independent, sovereign state.

Now I happen to believe that a convincing case can be made out to demonstrate that South Africa is not an independent and sovereign state, and I have read some very learned legal treatises in support of this proposition. There are no doubt other lawyers who would contest this conclusion. But whichever side you opt for in this debate, you must surely agree that independence and sovereignty do not dispose of the political and social question whether the existing South African state is a legitimate representative of the people. Nor does it dispose of the question whether it should be recognised diplomatically, and associated with as a normal part of the comity of nations.

Zionist Israel, Pinochet's Chile and Batista's Cuba would all be described by most lawyers as sovereign and independent states. Does this have a bearing on whether you recognise them diplomatically, whether or not you join in the world campaign to isolate them, or whether you have the right to support the revolutionary opposition in a struggle which involves violence? In other words, the issue of sovereignty and independence has very little bearing on the political and social obligations of world democratic forces. The fact that this is so has been evidenced in this country by Mozambique's recognition of the PLO as the diplomatic representative of the people of Palestine over which Israel rules as an independent and sovereign state; a state which is justly shunned by most of Africa.

The question as to what you can actually do on the ground to help destroy Pinochet-type regimes is a question of power and not policy. We must not be tempted to mix up what in principle we should do and what in practice we

have the power to do. A confusion of these two categories can so easily lead to damaging theoretical cover-ups and rationalisations.

So, whether or not you believe that Botha's regime is sovereign and independent, we all surely agree that at any rate it is not the legitimate representative of the South African people. What outsiders can do about that fact is for them a practical rather than a theoretical question.

Another source of confusion stems from the reasoning that you cannot at one and the same time regard a country as sovereign and independent and yet hold that it is practising a form of colonialism against a section of its people.

My first response is — why not? If Britain had handed over to Smith in 1966, which would have made Rhodesia an independent and sovereign state by an act of Westminster, would that have ended the colonial status of Black Zimbabwean people under Smith? Surely not.

Those who are sceptical about the internal colonial thesis should perhaps have another look at the way it is actually handled in the Programme of the South African Communist Party, a programme which, in the best tradition of Marxist methodology, uses basic concepts, not as a dogma, but as a tool to enable it to cope with concrete reality.

The programme spells out the duality of South Africa's socio-economic formation, which has unique features. It actually uses the following words, and I quote:

"South Africa is not a colony but an independent state. Yet masses of our people enjoy neither independence nor freedom ... On one level, that of 'White South Africa,' there are all the features of an advanced capitalist state in its final stage of imperialism. But on another level, that of 'non-White South Africa,' there are all the features of a colony. The indigenous population is subjected to extreme national oppression, poverty and exploitation, lack of all democratic rights, and political domination by a group which

does everything it can to emphasise and perpetuate its alien European character."

The latter face of South Africa (i.e. the social, political and economic status of Africans) is deliberately not described simply as colonialism, for the reason that it does not conform to the classic colonial model. It is described as colonialism of a special type or as internal colonialism. The term might not suit everyone's verbal tastes. But the reality is almost self-evident. It would be an interesting exercise for any of us to sit across the table with a South African Black and convince him that his status as a colonial subject has substantially altered since the shift of political power from London to Pretoria. Every single disability — whether it be access to real political power, ownership of land, the right to free movement and to live and work where a Black man pleases, etc, etc — attaches to him, not as a member of a class, but because he is part of the indigenous, conquered and colonised people. And the ruling class, which is internally based and drawn from the White group, relies, in the first place (like all imperialist ruling classes) on its kith and kin, to whatever class they belong, to "keep the native in his place." The validity of the colonial thesis as an analytical concept has perhaps been reinforced by the process, which is taking place under our very eyes, of institutionalising the colonial status of the Black people through the creation of territorial entities — the Bantustans — which are developing some of the more classical attributes of colonies and neo-colonies.

'Colonialism of a special type' or 'internal colonialism' are, I think, the closest we can come in our search for an accurate description of the South African reality. But it is not merely a desire for analytical delicacy which requires us to grasp this unique reality. A grasp of the institutionalised national oppression which characterises South Africa is the starting point for elaborating the perspectives of our revolutionary practice, and leads to the conclusion that the main content of the immediate struggle is to achieve complete national liberation for the racially dominated and racially exploited Black communities.

The organisation which stands at the head of the alliance and which leads this struggle is the ANC, and its description as a **national liberation movement** is not a careless slip of the tongue; it actually describes correctly the main goal of the immediate revolutionary process, which is national liberation.

The populist slogan of the struggle against apartheid has its place; it helps the world to identify the most extreme manifestation of race domination, and provides a platform which can, on occasions, be shared by a revolutionary and a liberal. This is of some positive value, but only if we understand that, for example, Mrs Suzman and I may both be against apartheid but we are certainly not both for liberation.

Apartheid is, broadly speaking, the post-1948 mechanism for maintaining racial domination. It has specific features which merit careful analysis. But it is necessary to emphasise that it is not apartheid which fathered race discrimination and domination, but the other way about. The struggle against apartheid and against race domination are not the same. We are not engaged in a struggle just to end apartheid; that is to go back to the pre-1948 days when the inferior and colonial status of the Blacks was underwritten by a policy called segregation rather than apartheid. We must therefore be on the alert lest the slogan which concentrated only on apartheid becomes an excuse to denude the struggle of its revolutionary content by restricting it merely to the excesses of the Nationalist regime and therefore keeping it purely within the arena of reformist politics.

What I have said about apartheid applies with equal force to the question of the struggle for civil rights. This is a term which, in the recent period, once again gained currency in the struggle by Black Americans to assert their rights in terms of the US constitution. There are no civil rights which South African Blacks can hope to assert in terms of the South African constitution. It is a constitution which is specifically designed to exclude all Africans (whatever class they belong to) from all political and civil rights. It is a constitution

which creates a power framework which closes the door to even the remotest possibility of an advance by blacks to democratic rights through anything resembling a constitutional process which is implied by the phrase, "struggle for civil rights."

In any case, especially in the South African context, national liberation implies more than formal participation in the electoral processes and more than the replacement of black faces for white ones in the Mercedes Benz!

We cannot talk seriously of ending race domination and leave undisturbed the ownership and control by the existing ruling class of virtually all the means of production — a control which is the real source of its power to exploit and to maintain its domination.

You don't have to be a Communist or a Marxist — you just need to be an honest Black patriot with a justified sense of national grievance — to accept that liberation in our country has little or no meaning without a return of the land and its wealth to the people. And this reality reinforces the conclusion that we cannot restrict the struggle objectives to the bourgeois democratic concept of civil or democratic rights.

There is an inseparable link in South Africa between national liberation and social emancipation. The existence of this link raises important questions which would require more time than is available to us tonight; questions such as the relationship between national and class struggle, the nature of the alliance which constitutes the liberation front, the role and character in the struggle of the different classes which take up positions both in the enemy camp and among the revolutionary forces, the way we conceptualise the link between the different phases (or stages) of the continuing revolution, and so on.

Today I merely wish to stress that the inseparable link between national liberation and social emancipation implies a strategy which must lead to the revolutionary overthrow of the existing ruling class, and the complete dismantling and replacement of its state apparatus.

Does this imply, as it is sometimes crudely put, that we want to drive the Whites into the sea? On this question (as on quite a few others) it has been the fate of the ANC to be fired at from all directions (right and left) for completely opposite reasons.

The PAC split away from the ANC precisely because they accused it of being "charterists," that is, followers of the Freedom Charter, which opens with the words, "South Africa belongs to all who live in it, Black and White." Sections of the black consciousness movement have also accused the ANC of being multi-racial in its alliances and in its organisational structures.

We can say with confidence that there is no organisation in South Africa, either in the White or Black camp, which embraces the kind of advanced revolutionary non-racism which the ANC espouses and practises. Even a cursory examination of our basic policy documents and our public pronouncements will demonstrate that we have always stood for one united democratic South Africa in which all groupings (including the Whites) will participate on the basis of complete equality as individuals and not as racial or ethnic entities.

We do not believe that classes ever commit collective suicide, and we therefore dismiss the illusion that any meaningful advance on the road to liberation can be achieved within the framework of what is known as White parliamentary politics. This does not mean that we are maximalists to the point where we deny significance to all reforms and to events within White politics, some of which (as we have seen) affect the political cohesion of the ruling class. But it does mean that the drive towards freedom and liberation cannot take place within the arena demarcated by the ruling class. In this arena we are completely powerless. All we can hope to do there is to take up our begging bowls and go cap in hand to the bosses of our country.

Which brings me to some questions connected with the liberation movement's policy of revolutionary violence as an imperative part of the mass political struggle.

The attempts, particularly in the West, to

question this policy and to influence the ANC to consider the adoption of a "peaceful road to change" is nothing less than a recipe for submission and surrender of national liberation aims. We must bear in mind that the ANC was declared illegal long before it adopted a policy of armed struggle. If you are a Black man, born and bred in Soweto and other Black ghettos (like 75% of South Africa's Black people) what peaceful road of change is open to you? Is there a single constitutional way forward for the voteless and rightless Africans in the Black urban ghettos and in the neo-colonies of the Bantustans?

The extraordinary impact which the ANC has made both inside and outside the country since 1976 has been precisely as a result of its strategy of combining mass political struggle with revolutionary violence which has, for the first time since the indigenous wars of resistance, inculcated into our people a belief and a conviction that the seemingly all-powerful White state can indeed be dealt with. This factor has, perhaps more than any other, created the psychological and inspirational atmosphere in which the people themselves have made such dramatic advances in the field of mass organisation, trade union struggle, UDF, etc, etc.

There is a new and refreshingly revolutionary arrogance abroad amongst the Blacks, particularly amongst the youth, precisely because they have seen their compatriots abandoning their meekness and showing a readiness to challenge the enemy with weapons it has monopolised for 350 years. It is abundantly clear to us, and even more clear to our enemy, that an abandonment or a weakening of our policy of armed activity will have a most negative effect on the process of mass political opposition, resistance and organisation.

What about the external factor in the military struggle?

The regime's attempts, through external pressures, to spike the guns of the ANC-led liberation movement has demonstrably failed, precisely for the reason that the arena of our struggle is amongst our people, deep inside our country.

It would, of course, be unrealistic to assert that the external factor of this struggle is irrelevant. There has not been a single people's armed struggle in Africa, or elsewhere for that matter, which has not depended in some degree on rear bases in fraternal and friendly countries (FNLA of Algeria — Morocco and Tunisia; PAIGC of Guinea-Bissau — Guinea Conakry; MPLA of Angola — Congo Brazzaville; ZANU of Zimbabwe — Mozambique). One wonders whether we should be sitting here without Tanzania's grant of exclusive and massive external rear base facilities for FRELIMO.

In this connection I wish to emphasise two points. Firstly, in each of the countries mentioned the struggle was fought out and **won inside their own national territory**, and this assertion remains valid despite the fact that they were helped by outside friends to meet any enemy who (by the way) also depended upon its external allies. So when we assert the imperatives of the external factor for our struggle, this must not be construed as detracting from the obvious objective that it **must grow from inside and engage the enemy inside**.

Indeed the actual reality of the power relationships in Southern Africa has made the ANC more modest than any other liberation movement in Africa in its search for rear base facilities. We have never had nor have we expected to have the kind of rear base facilities which all those movements in Africa to whom I have referred had in territories bordering on their countries.

Much of our strategy has been premised on the fact that even the initial stages of armed struggle could not (in the case of South Africa) depend upon those kind of facilities. In general, the training, arming, infiltration and replenishment of relatively large armed units operating in proximity to friendly borders (which was the pattern of the early phases of almost every single armed struggle in Africa) has never been the basis of our strategy.

We have concentrated on internal growth deep inside the country around a core of trained revolutionary politico-military cadres in both rural and urban areas. We have

deliberately avoided the pattern of using adjacent territory to hit close to the border and to run back.

The second point of emphasis is the special role in our conditions of urban guerrilla warfare and sabotage. This needs to be noted particularly in relation to the existence in our country of a relatively advanced capitalist economy and a working class which is the most important force in our revolutionary process. But above all, our starting point has always been on the political struggle, political organisation and underground leadership. It has always been our objective to work for the creation in all parts of our land of political revolutionary bases out of which people's war will grow and be sustained. And we see organised armed blows against the enemy as playing an indispensable role in stimulating the emergence of such political, revolutionary bases.

In these respects our own struggle perspectives differ in emphasis from most other people's war experiences in Africa. The latter (including FRELIMO) relied on the more classic tradition of launching relatively large military units from neighbouring friendly states which accommodated training and rear base camps and which made possible continuous supply lines of war and other logistical material to the internal forces.

I have kept away from an analysis of the current exciting happenings in widespread areas of South Africa. But let me add one word. Victory may not be around the corner, but events

have demonstrated that the ANC-led liberation front has taken ineradicable root among the people, and that there can be no long-term solution without the ANC. This explains the many-pronged hints of dialogue with the ANC; hints which are coming from various sources such as USA official visitors to Southern Africa, the South African English press, the government-supporting **Die Burger**, Pik Botha and others.

In the first place this is a recognition of the place we have won as leaders of the liberation struggle. But it also spells danger. They are no doubt prepared to talk, but they want to talk to an ANC which is different to the one we know — an ANC which will abandon its internal and international allies, an ANC which will jettison its advanced revolutionary nationalism and agree to work within the suffocating framework of Botha's dispensations. Whilst it is infantile to mechanically reject all dialogue with an enemy, we must frankly state that we do not trust Botha's current dialogue offensive. It is designed to advance and not to compromise his policies.

Comrade Chairman, there is of course no way to compensate for the loss of a person such as Ruth, to whose memory we have dedicated this talk. But when we look at the situation of revolutionary ferment which is developing in our country, it is clear that she has an important place among those whose dedication in life and martyrdom in death will bring the day of People's Victory that much nearer.

Thank you.



ANC and SWAPO

The following statement was issued in Addis Ababa on the 9th January 1985 jointly by the ANC and SWAPO.

Disturbing reports emanating from Pretoria and confirmed by Somalia nationals indicate that the racist South Africa regime and Somalia have reached an agreement providing the racist South African airlines landing and overflight rights on Somali territory. The treacherous agreement was concluded on a recent visit by fascist Pik Botha to Mogadishu.

The Mogadishu regime, being a full member of the OAU, knows very well that since its inception in 1963 the OAU has been striving for the total isolation of the fascist Pretoria regime because of its inhuman apartheid policies in South Africa and its illegal colonial occupation of Namibia.

The oppressed but fighting peoples of Namibia and South Africa, as represented by

their vanguard movements, namely SWAPO of Namibia and the ANC of South Africa, view this clandestine visit and treacherous agreement between Mogadishu and Pretoria as constituting:

★ A gross violation and betrayal, on the part of the Somali regime, of the African cause, particularly of the Front Line States, which are under repeated military and economic aggression by the racist regime, as well as an act of despicable alliance with the butchers and oppressors of the South African and Namibian people,

★ A callous violation of the OAU Charter and the resolutions of the UN and the Non-Aligned Movement, which prohibit member states to maintain any political, economic, cultural or military alliance and collaboration with the Pretoria junta.

APPEAL

Adding insult to injury, it has also been reported that the Barre regime is to provide apartheid South Africa with a military (naval) base at the Somali town of Kisimayu. This unprecedented step taken by the Mogadishu regime constitutes a direct military threat to the countries and people of Africa in general, and in particular the countries and people of the horn of Africa, East Africa and the Indian Ocean islands. At the same time, it demonstrates the Barre regime's acquiescence with the imperialist and notorious United States strategy of ringing the African continent with military garrisons aimed at blackmailing and undermining Africa's sovereignty.

We therefore make an urgent appeal to the OAU, the UN, the Non-Aligned Movement and the Arab League to put pressure to bear on the Barre regime in order to compel it to reverse these reactionary and manifestly anti-

African agreements with the criminal apartheid regime. We also appeal to the brotherly people of Somalia to do all they can to help redirect Somalia to live up to its expectations and responsibility as an OAU and Arab League member, and to scrupulously respect their respective charters and decisions.

It is indeed shocking to note that at a time when the OAU is doing all it can to complete the decolonisation of Africa, and a time when Africans are being killed and maimed in Namibia and South Africa by the Botha regime, an African country should, for whatever excuse under the sun, embrace the sworn enemy of our oppressed peoples.

The agreements signed by racist South Africa and the Barre regime should be opposed and condemned by all freedom-loving and progressive countries of the world with the contempt they deserve.

By Jean Middleton

UNITY OF DEMOCRATIC FORCES THE TRANSVAAL STAYAWAY

The meeting of 10th October, 1984, where the Transvaal two-day stayaway of the 5th and 6th November was first discussed, marked a new stage in intense political activity and bitter resistance. It was convened by the Congress of South African Students (COSAS), which called on student, community and workers' organisations to get together to discuss civic and labour problems and the educational crisis; so though it was called by the students it was not intended to plan student action alone. The trade unions joined in and took a significant part, but the stayaway, when it took place, was not a trade union action alone. The organising committee was later described by the Solidarity News Service, based in Botswana as:

"the greatest unity of democratic and anti-apartheid forces in South Africa in recent years,"

and its chairman, Thami Mali of FOSATU, said of the action that it was:

"the first time in South African history that trade unions and militant organisations have acted in such dramatic concert."

After the first meeting, the delegates went back to their communities to assess their strength there.

During the course of the year, Black residen-

tial areas in South Africa had become battlefields. The township of Sebokeng had, according to press reports, been left in ruins in September, after protest against an increase in the rents and subsequent police repression.

Then, on the 23rd October, 7 000 troops and police moved in, the township was sealed off, and people were arrested on an average of one a minute, during a house-to-house search for (according to the official statements of the regime) "revolutionary and criminal elements." 300 people were charged as a result of this raid, but all except six of these with petty offences. There was an outcry over the use of the army for police duties, and the Progressive Federal Party called for the army to be withdrawn from the townships; police spokesmen claimed that the army was used outside the townships to cordon them off while the police went in.

"Operation Palmiet" — The Final Straw
The police gave the name Operation Palmiet to this brutal and threatening piece of work in Sebokeng, and 'official sources' hinted to the press that there might be more such raids on other townships. Operation Palmiet was probably an important factor when, at the second meeting, a decision was taken to call a stayaway.

The second meeting took place on the 27th

October. At it — and constituting the Transvaal Regional Stayaway Committee — were representatives of 37 community and trade union organisations, formed and strengthened in protest campaigns over the past months: among them the Release Mandela Committee, the Federation of South African Women, the Vaal Civic Association, the East Rand People's Organisation, COSAS, the Federation of South African Trade Unions (FOSATU), the Council of Unions of South Africa (CUSA) the Commercial Catering and Allied Workers' Union (CCAWUSA), the United Mining and Metal Workers' Union of South Africa (UMMWUSA), the General and Allied Workers' Union (GAWU) and the General Workers' Union (GWU). The United Democratic Front as a collective organisation was not involved, though a number of its affiliates took part, and it later issued a statement in support of the stayaway.

In the previous two months there had been three stayaways in the Transvaal, all of them locally based: one in the towns of the Vaal Triangle, one in Soweto and one in KwaThema near Springs. This time, the call went out to all areas in the Transvaal, and the political scope of the protest was wide, so that demands which had grown up in specific campaigns over the year came together in what was to become a massive protest.

The demands were:

- ★ The army and police should be withdrawn from the townships,
- ★ The community councillors should resign,
- ★ The increases in rent and in bus fares should be withdrawn,
- ★ Detainees and political prisoners should be released,
- ★ Dismissed workers should be reinstated,
- ★ General Sales Tax and other unfair taxes should be abolished,
- ★ Democratically elected students' representative councils should be established in schools.

There was a recommendation for people to stay indoors; shops and other businesses were ask-

ed to close. Health workers were exempt from the call.

Between the 27th October and the 5th November there was an intensive organising campaign, with pamphlets and leaflets. Counter-leaflets, opposing the stayaway, were also distributed, and these were popularly attributed to the police (one of them said, "Why don't these people spend the money they are spending on pamphlets on something worthy, like food and clothing for the poor?"). In an attempt to defuse the situation, the Minister of Law and Order, Louis Le Grange, claimed that the "unrest" was dying out, and that it was "calming progressively;" and at the beginning of November the police reported that it was "waning" on the East Rand and in the Eastern Cape.

These statements, however, were not borne out by events, for throughout the country tension remained high and repression continued. At the end of October the police used batons and tear gas on a crowd of 300 people waiting to hear election results at Dannhauser in Natal; teargas, birdshot, rubber bullets and sjamboks were used on young people in Tembisa in the Transvaal and Gwosh and Kwabuhle in the Cape; there were reports of more deaths and more arrests.

Some attempt had been made to placate the Black students. Strict guidelines on the use of corporal punishment had been issued, schools had been given permission to elect SRCs, the age limit — much resented — had been abolished. There was still no suggestion that the quality of Black education should be improved, and no talk of extra money being allocated for it, so these changes were clearly cosmetic, and the students, it seems, were not deceived. Le Grange suggested that the "unrest" might die down once the schools closed, implying that the students had been entirely responsible for it. He was proved wrong.


An Historic Action

The response to the stayaway call was tremendous, and the action an historic one. Radio Freedom, the voice of the ANC from Addis Ababa, broadcasting on the 9th November,




6 500 Sasol workers summarily dismissed 6 November 1984


WORKERS IN DEFIANCE




In Brakpan rush hour meant empty bus ranks.



T MOOD!



Sharpeville



The highway between Soweto and Johannesburg totally empty except for police vans on their way to Soweto.

called it a:

"resounding success ... a victory scored in the face of a massive police and army presence in the townships."

FOSATU and the UDF claimed a stayaway rate of 65% to 95% in different areas. About ten days later, the Association of Chambers of Commerce estimated that the response to the call had been between 75% and 100% in the main industrial centres of the Witwatersrand. The stoppage in Atteridgeville — a centre of protest since the beginning of the year — was said to be almost total. The huge parastatals, SASOL and ISCOR, stopped working. Solidarity News Service estimated that over half a million workers took part. Estimates of the number of students who stayed at home ranged from 250 000 to 400 000.

Observers later made comparisons with the great stayaways of the fifties. It is worth recalling that in the days of the Congress Alliance, SACTU and the other Congresses worked hand in hand, so that then, as today, organisation at the factory gates complemented and reinforced organisation in the communities.

The police moved in with Casspir armoured vehicles, and by Tuesday the army had been deployed on the East Rand, while residents set up road blocks of rocks, burned-out buses, burning tyres, old cars and dustbins. The Chemical Workers' Industrial Union (CWIU) claimed that at SASOL two Hippo personnel carriers filled with police had driven into an assembly of about 6 000 workers during a union meeting on the Tuesday morning. *The Sowetan* of 8th November reported seven dead in Tembisa, six in Ratanda, four in Katlehong, two in Atteridgeville, one in Duduza, and one in Alexandra.

At this time, the people also showed their anger against the local community councillors, those detested symbols of the regime, and two councillors' homes in Tembisa were set alight. In an article in the *Sunday Times* of 18th November, Allister Sparks reported that by that time seven community councillors were dead, and others had resigned or had fled, so

that only four out of 22 councils were still functioning.

Sackings At Sasol

Most employers seem to have treated the two days as leave — paid or unpaid — but there was some victimisation, and both CCAWUSA and the Food and Beverage Workers' Union threatened legal action on behalf of those members who had been sacked. By far the worst victimisation was that at SASOL II and III, branches of the parastatal organisation, where, on the Tuesday morning, the entire morning shift (the bulk of the work force) was dismissed, and the rest of the workers given an ultimatum to return to work during the course of the day, while police in armoured vehicles surrounded makeshift pay points. In all, 6 000 SASOL workers were sacked, and for some, at least, who were interviewed by the press, it was their first job after a long period of unemployment. The general secretary of the CWIU said that the union had informed the SASOL workers that they were exempt from the call to strike, but that they had nevertheless insisted on observing it. He spoke of the:

"pent-up anger and frustration"

of the Black SASOL workers, and said that to them the plant meant:

"danger, arduous working conditions, barracks-like hostels, racial oppression, rumours of men killed in accidents during the night and whisked away, and generally a very oppressive environment."

The action SASOL took against the workers seriously disrupted production at the plant. 1 000 new workers were employed almost at once, but that was only a sixth of the number needed; and untrained as the new workers were (it takes eight months to train a SASOL worker) it is clear that they must have been an ineffective work force. The CWIU claimed that security functions at the plant had been taken over by the police so that security staff could be freed to take part in production, but the management denied this. At all events,

before two weeks had passed, the management had invited the sacked workers to re-apply for their jobs, saying that such applications would be sympathetically considered if the workers could satisfy the company that they were victims of 'intimidation.'

Power In Our Hands

In an interview with the *Financial Mail* of the 16th November, Thami Mali said of the stayaway:

"It has ... shown that we have power in our hands. It showed that we can bring the machinery of this country to a standstill."

Spokesmen of the regime had been making threatening statements around this time. Louis Le Grange had issued a warning to political activists not to cry if they got hurt. The Minister of Home Affairs, F W De Klerk, had said the government would not allow "destabilising actions" in any area, and told an employers' union meeting in Cape Town:

"South Africa cannot afford to allow its labour and economic spheres to become a political battlefield ... strong action will be taken against instigators, arsonists and radicals ... order shall be maintained."

On November 8th came the arrest of leaders of six organisations that had been involved. On the 12th November, *The Citizen* newspaper, in its usual role as mouthpiece of the regime, reported that the police were "working round the clock" to establish who had been "responsible" for the action. Before another week was up, the number of those arrested had risen to 20; all leading members of organisations that had openly endorsed the stayaway.

Reports of resistance and repression continue — a raid on Tembisa in the middle of November, which the police described as an "anti-crime swoop," a boy of eight injured by a stray bullet, a baby almost killed by tear gas, more than 20 people injured (some in the eye) by police birdshot in Port Alfred, a man killed in Graff-Reinet, thousands arrested in rent raids in Sebokeng and so on. The list is a long one.

The Regime and Big Business Disagree

The regime has not been able to conceal its dismay at the arrival of a new stage in the struggle. South African employers' organisations and other spokesmen of big business have also shown their perturbation, for what they call 'industrial peace' is a safeguard for their super-profits. There is some disagreement, however, over what methods should be used to preserve the situation in which Black workers are exploited to produce these profits. The Association of Chambers of Commerce, the Federated Chamber of Industries and the Afrikaanse Handelsinstituut have all condemned the detentions of leaders of the stayaway as harmful to "harmonious and productive" labour relations.

While Pretoria seems likely to adopt a tactic of harassing the trade unions, others are recommending strategies for capturing them. The Centre for Investigation of Revolutionary Activities at the Rand Afrikaans University held a conference at the beginning of October, entitled, "South African Trade Unions: Revolution or Peace?" The labour adviser to the Anglo-American Corporation told this conference that trade unions could act as powerful agents for reform. Professor Nic Wiehahn, director of the School of Business at the University of South Africa, said that South African trade unions had become "politicised" in "socialism and communism." He went on to say:

"It is thus necessary that we politicise our trade unions in the anti-socialist and anti-communist ideologies."

English-Language Press Comments

It is interesting at this point to look at some of the editorial comment in the South African English-language press about that time. *The Citizen* of the 9th November, predictably, defended the policy and actions of the regime:

"the radicals ... pose a challenge to the government, which will force it to respond with drastic action to prevent the situation from getting out of hand ... It cannot allow the economy of the country to be disrupted."

Other papers took a different line. The Cape

Argus of the 14th November called for an investigation into the causes of the unrest. The Sunday Times of the 11th November went further:

"the times ... demand from government bold moves to redress genuine Black grievances."

The *Sunday Tribune* of the same date was most forthright of all. It said:

"The answer is simple: Blacks want a meaningful say in the future of the country. White decisions imposed on Blacks still continue, but should have been stopped years ago when even the densest politician realised the homelands policy was a disaster."

So far, in spite of all these calls upon it, the answer the regime has made to the situation is to intensify the repression, and to do this it is recklessly spending money it doesn't have, gambling all it can borrow on a desperate throw. Gold prices have fallen, drought has once again caused a failure of the maize crop, the motor industry is in recession. South Africa is (according to a report in the *Rand Daily Mail* of 19th November) heavily in both long-term and short-term debt overseas and finding it more and more difficult to raise foreign loans, because of:

"a combination of a deteriorating economy and recurring reports of unrest in Black townships."

In spite of this, the regime is continuing to make expensive gestures like the sacking of the SASOL workers, has promised a significant increase in the number of police and is preparing for a show treason trial of the leaders of the stayaway. An army that only a couple of years ago once told a batch of conscripts that there was no money to pay them, and sent them home, is now mounting costly operations in support of huge raids by the police in townships throughout the country.

Who Shall Wield Power in South Africa?
Pretoria may very well be experiencing some fear and apprehension about its future relations

with the United States. The Reagan administration has — in the case of El Salvador — shown that it has no scruples about continuing to arm and support governments that are manifestly unpopular with the people, but it is also capable of withdrawing its support in favour of more 'moderate' governments, prepared to introduce cosmetic 'reforms.' At this rate, it may soon tell the Botha administration to adopt more 'reforms' or go, to make way for an administration more obedient to the advice of the employers. Botha is caught between the growing dissatisfaction of overseas banks and investors, and the strong *verkrampte* element in his constituency at home, and his dilemma is growing sharper.

There is another possibility that is now closer than ever before: that of having power in South Africa pass into the hands of the people themselves. Thirty years ago this year, the Freedom Charter first proclaimed that:

"South Africa belongs to all who live in it, Black and White, and no government can justly claim authority unless it is based on the will of all the people."

We quote again Thami Mali:

"We cannot go back now. Our duty is to step up resistance and create an ungovernable situation."

When asked, the days before he was arrested, "What will you call for?" he replied:

"The minimum demands of the people are contained in the Freedom Charter. Of course, the people will have to come forward and lay these out. But even if such a call is made, it cannot be to the Transvaal Regional Stayaway Committee. There are leaders of the people of South Africa and there are leaders of the workers of this country ... The leaders of the people have been gaoled for life: Nelson Mandela and others, and there are leaders of the people in exile. Those are the people government should talk to, not us."

By Nyawuza

DIE GROEP MOER ONS— COLOURED AND INDIANS HATE THE GROUP AREAS ACT

Comrade Zola Nqini was a leader of the ANC who was murdered by the fascist hordes of the apartheid regime in the 1982 Maseru raid. Zola was always in his element when it came to a discussion on the Freedom Charter. In his characteristically deep voice he would laugh and say in Xhosa:

"I Freedom Charter ithi yiba yilento uyiyo" (The Freedom Charter says be what you are).

This is exactly what the racist regime denies us; it is forcing people to lead abnormal lives, pushing them from pillar to post.

The Group Areas Act is a grand design to coerce people into submission; subjugating the people's aspirations and demands for a free, unitary South Africa. Not only is the law an ass but you need to be a chameleon to survive South Africa's contradictory and confusing race laws. Let us take the Orange Free State to illustrate what we mean.

The letter of the Ordinance introduced in 1890 and adopted by the Provincial Administration after Union in 1910 read as follows:

"No Arab, Chinaman, Coolie or other Asiatic Coloured person, except a Cape Malay, may settle or remain in the Free State for longer than two months without Government permission."

This explains Mr Singh's "survival" as the head of the only Indian family living in that

province. The key to Harry King David Kalyian Singh, an Indian businessman, who lives in Bethlehem despite the law banning Indians from the Orange Free State is "adaptability."

Mr Singh's parents came from India to work on Natal's sugar plantations. He is Hindu and worships at his local Dutch Reformed Church. Indian "in his heart," he was forced to have himself "reclassified Coloured" in order to house his family in Bethlehem's Coloured township, Baaken Park, when it was proclaimed Coloured. Now he wants to be "reclassified Indian," a move bound to cause bureaucratic headaches, more so that the official 1980 census states that there are no Indians in the Free State.

But Mr Singh is an "exception" — at least in the Free State. Born in the Free State village of Ladybrand in 1927, he settled in Bethlehem in 1946, and in 1954 married a Coloured woman, Jean Wilson. They have three children, all of whom are classified Indian — the two daughters are married in Natal!

The family history is firmly rooted in the Free State — Mr Singh's grandfather left the Natal sugar plantations to help lay the railway between Ladysmith and Harrismith. Mr Singh says that either President Paul Kruger or President M T Steyn gave his grandfather permission, inscribed in black ink on heavy parchment, to remain in the Free State. Charlie Kalyian Singh, Mr Singh's father, lived and worked in Bethlehem for 25 years and is buried there. But his son is not on the official 1980 census — at least not as an Indian.

Zola Nqini might not have known about this case of Mr Singh, but his remark touched on one of the most complicated, hated and hurtful statutes ever enacted in South Africa — the Group Areas Act, which was passed by parliament in 1950.

Who Is Free in the "Free State"?

By the way, the Indians cannot spend longer than 72 hours in the Free State unless they apply for 90-day permits. In other words, Indians are allowed 72-hour transit rights or 90-day permit stays in the province. These are the

transit requirements and residential and property "rights" in the Free State for people of Indian origin.

But it is not only in the Free State that there is legislation restricting Indian residence. The 1927 Act on Indians and Asians in Northern Natal determines that no Indian can enter and live in Vryheid, Utrecht, Paulpietersburg, Babanango or Ngotshe without a certificate of registration.

What about the Coloureds in the Free State? Talking about the Orange Free State one should mention the new techniques to separate African from Coloured. This was an aspect of the new constitutional dispensation, which depended for its success on rigid racial separation of voters. This is how the regime's new-style apartheid formula works:

The first move is made by the Department of Community Development, which is in charge of Coloureds and Indians. Using its powers under the Group Areas Act, it can declare any existing area Coloured. Then it is the turn of the Department of Co-operation and Development (which is in charge of Africans) to step in by removing the Africans concerned to other areas — mostly to homelands. Then they fall under the jurisdiction of the homeland government — all of it fitting neatly into place in terms of the new constitution.

For the Coloureds in the Free State, the new-style apartheid law has plunged them into a catch-22 situation; they are told they cannot have facilities they ask for — such as improvements to schools and houses — unless the areas concerned are declared Coloured "group areas" and that can only be achieved by moving Africans out of the areas. It is said that 13 towns in the Free State are affected by this plan. They include Luckhoff, Philipolis, Springfontein, Edenburg, Trompsburg, Jacobsdal, Rouxville, Smithfield, Bethanie, and so on.

The Group Areas Act

This was not the only legislation introduced to extend residential segregation. But in the minds of the urban people, especially the Coloureds and Indians, people uprooted and "resettled" at "convenient" distances from the



The demolition of District Six

cities, the "Group Areas" epitomised the regime's worst social engineering in the 1950s.

In 1950 residential segregation was nothing new, but with the Group Areas Act and other legislation came a new and rigid exclusion of African, Coloured and Indian people from areas they had lived in for decades near the city centre — now called the CBDs, the Central Business Districts. They could no longer live near their places of work, their transport costs increased, they no longer "enjoyed" the same shopping and recreational facilities, their choice of where they could stay was even further restricted. To make matters worse, housing (long neglected by the local authorities before the Act was passed) became even more of a problem after it became law.

Not that conditions in places like District Six, Sophiatown, Pageview, Newclare, Fordsburg and so on had been ideal. But at least the

residents had chosen to live there, could own property, were near their places of work and shopping facilities, and had access to reasonable public transport. The multi-racial character of these areas in and around the city centre had never been a problem.

The Group Areas Act disqualifies and forbids members of a particular group to occupy the area of another group. This affects housing, sport, and other facilities, employment, business and restaurant facilities. The "desirable" areas are already in White ownership or control — the Whites having had the power or money to acquire them. The Group Areas legislation has enabled Whites to extend their ownership in areas such as the Cape Peninsula, where Coloured and Indian families have lived side by side with them in many of the suburbs of Cape Town.

In 1957 the Group Areas Act came into

operation — having been passed by parliament in 1950. In 1963 the present President P W Botha, then Minister of Community Development in Verwoerd's Cabinet, (the continuity here is relevant) announced the appointment of a four-man committee to investigate the "re-planning" of District Six. Before we discuss District Six and other areas let us examine the implications of some of these laws.

The "Burden of Looking White"

There are many of these laws — the Group Areas Act, the Immorality Act, the Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act, and so on. When there are "loopholes" in an Act they start using proclamations, such as Proclamation 83, which closes the "loopholes" in the Group Areas Act and/or Slums Act. Each Act has a different racial definition.

The minute public scrutiny of physical features people are subjected to in an attempt to determine whether they are Coloured or White is reminiscent of Nazi Germany. The physical features are used to classify people.

Three features usually show that a person is not white: a flat nose, high cheekbones and manner of speech, besides the fact that the "wavy texture of hair," also the colour of eyes and skin, and skin texture, are also diagnostic criteria to indicate "race." But some Coloureds are "generally accepted as Whites." But there are other Coloureds who have "committed the crime of being Coloured," but their burden is that they look White — the "White Coloureds" — this excludes those who are not "obviously White."

The confusion in all this is compounded by the brutality and degradation which is brought about by racial definitions contained in these laws.

The Population Registration Act categorises Coloureds into seven sub-groups:

- ★ The Cape Coloured group,
- ★ The Malay group,
- ★ The Griqua group ("the descendants of early relationships between white traders and Africans"),
- ★ The Chinese group ("persons who are

generally accepted as members of a race or tribe whose national home is in China"),

- ★ The Indian group,
- ★ The other Asiatic group, consisting of Zanzibari Arabs and anyone originating from anywhere in Asia other than China, India or Pakistan,
- ★ The other Coloured group, which means anyone who is not in any of the above groups, and who is neither White nor African.

Besides anything else, the Group Areas Act is one of the most cruel and unjust laws ever imposed on a **voiceless people**; it has broken families, ruined community life and led to untold suffering as in the case of:

District Six

District Six has probably, as a single area, been the worst hit by the Group Areas Act. Of the estimated 8 000 families (some estimates put the figure at 65 000 people) who lived in the area of District Six (proclaimed "White" in 1966) fewer than 1 000 families remain. The rest have been uprooted and moved, mostly to townships on the Cape Flats — where the greatest concentration of Coloured people has been "resettled." This move has, for most of them, meant higher rentals and transport and other living costs. Today District Six is a waste land of broken bricks and rubble. Its people are scattered along the ribbon of new townships, the fine-spun web of their relationships destroyed.

Even efforts by the Departments of Community Development, Foreign Affairs and Information in their booklet, *District Six: The Other Side of the Coin*, published in 1980 and designed to justify the removals, could not hide the facts. In this booklet it is argued that most of the buildings occupied by the Coloured people in District Six were owned, not by the Coloured people themselves, but by White absentee landlords, who extracted rentals from their tenants without doing anything to improve their properties. Does this justify uprooting of whole communities?

In Cape Town, the Group Areas Act has left its mark on areas such as Simonstown, Kalk Bay, Caledon, Firgrove, Elsies River, Tram-



This Indian family had been ordered to leave Sophiatown.

way Road in Sea Point, School Street in Noorder Paarl and in Wynberg. In Woodstock and Salt River, portions of the area are declared Coloured and others proclaimed White, while still others are being "converted" from a White to a Coloured group area, and a portion of the White group area located to the north-west of Greatmore Street in Woodstock is "held in abeyance for the time being," that is, it remains White while decisions are being taken.

A Community Is More Than Houses

This Act has the effect of tearing to pieces the social fabric created over the years by communities such as that in the former District Six. The racist authorities seem to think and believe that a community is merely a lot of houses and people located in certain areas — but the real

basis of a community is in the relationship, both interpersonal and intergroup, within the houses and among those people; over the years an in-built set of disciplines, a code of conformity evolves through these interrelationships.

What the Group Areas Act has done is to remove people from these circumstances; from these sets of values and these codes of living they have conformed to as a community. The result is indiscipline, discord, ill-will, insecurity and resentment.

Taking District Six from the Coloured people and giving it to the Whites has cost the regime more than R55 million so far. This includes the cost of demolition of houses, the administrative machinery to find alternative homes as well as interest on the capital expen-



This Indian family is shown in a resettlement camp after having been evicted under the Group Areas Act.

diture. The depopulation of District Six — for this is what it amounts to — has contributed to the stagnation of the central business district (CBD), and the city retailers have lost a lot. It is said that over a period of 15 years a total of 96 houses in District Six will be demolished to make way for a Whites-only Technikon (this area has been re-named Zonnebloem).

Before I forget, District Six has a rich history. Some say it started off shortly after

the arrival of Jan van Riebeeck in 1652 — an unfortunate date! Anyway, it was in District Six — so named in 1867 — that the Khoi-Khoi and freed slaves set up home, and where Coloured people made their first appearance. In 1901 the suburb was struck by bubonic plague, and it was burned to the ground. It was quickly rebuilt, and eventually came to be considered one of the most congested areas in the country. It served as one of the cradles of South

African culture — the birthplace of that jolly and colourful event known as the Coon Carnival, and a place where folk songs like — guess what — *Daar Kom die Alabama* had their origin.

Shebeens nestled next to 12 churches, four mosques, 17 schools, four community centres and a training college.

When District Six was declared a slum and was destroyed in 1966 and re-zoned for White occupation, an historic part of Cape Town, a warm, close-knit community, was destroyed, says Mrs Naas Ebrahim. People sobbed and cried in the streets. They lost their identities, their heritage — the place where many of their families had lived for generations. What is worse, they had no say; they were powerless, they thought.

Pageview and Lenasia

Pageview, Sophiatown, Newclare, Fordsburg — these were places where, as Johannesburg underwent its rapid industrialisation, people of all races settled. The city council fell in with this trend, and established an African township, Western Native Township, next to Newclare.

But the shortage of housing soon led to overcrowding and slum conditions in most of these areas — shanty towns sprang up and families crowded into one or two rooms. As the city grew, White, predominantly Afrikaans, suburbs were established around "black spots" in the west, and the Whites started clamouring for the removal of the Blacks.

Until 1948 — when the Nationalists came to power — the City Council did not heed these calls because there was nowhere else to house these people. In 1950 the Group Areas Act was passed, and in 1954 the Native Resettlement Act resulted in the Western Areas Removal Scheme. "Slum clearance" resulted in the destruction of Sophiatown, Martindale, Newclare and Pageview. Blacks were suddenly homeless.

The ANC organised protest meetings and resistance campaigns, and the people vowed never to move. Popular songs such as *Ons Pola*

Hier ("We Are Staying Here") emerged. But in the end, the people had no choice.

By 1956 Johannesburg had been divided into various "group areas." The Coloured and Indian residents of, among others, Pageview (Vrededorp), Fordsburg, Doornfontein, Ophirton, Burgersdorp, Marshallstown (which includes Ferreirastown), Malay Camp, Albertsville, Claremont and Jeppe, had to start, however unwillingly, new lives in their "group areas."

A Brutal Triumph

There was not enough housing, there was overcrowding, and facilities were poor. The situation was aggravated by the social problems — juvenile delinquency, crime and the breakdown of marriages. Many people of vastly different backgrounds had been dumped together in areas they did not want to be in. Friends and neighbours were split up; Black landowners lost their rights to freehold tenure and — to many the bitterest of all — Sophiatown was declared "White" and re-named "Triomf" (signifying the "triumph" of the regime in destroying what it regarded as a hotbed of Black radicalism).

The Coloured people were restricted to Bosmont, Coronationville, Newclare (formerly a multi-racial area), Western (or Westbury and formerly Western Native Township) and later to Eldorado Park and Riverfield.

The Indians were moved to Lenasia (the Rand's biggest Indian concentration) and Africans to South Western Township (Soweto).

Even today many families are still trying to recover from the financial losses they suffered.

In Pageview a small group of residents still cling to their homes. Their future hangs in the balance. For the 64 families remaining in Pageview — already 1 000 families have been forcibly moved out to Lenasia — all that stands between them and removal to Lenasia is a temporary interdict.

The methods used for removing the Indian people were not that all gentlemanly — to say the least. The *Sunday Express* of 17th June 1984 reported how the home of A M Cassim,

67 years old, was destroyed without his knowledge:

"The first inkling he got that his house was being demolished was when a friend telephoned him at work to say, "They are breaking your house down."

Mr Cassim rushed home and asked what was going on:

"A man told me they were throwing me out — that was the first I knew of it."

Pageview — where a viable Indian community has lived for 80 years — was granted freehold title by parliament in 1938. The suburb was proclaimed a "White group area" in 1956 as part of the regime's policy to create "White spots" and "Black spots."

The R18 million used by the Johannesburg City Council for the building of the Oriental Plaza in Fordsburg could have been invested more fruitfully in upgrading the area, including the bazaar-type 19th century street shops, which were closed by the Department.

In Pageview there are four mosques, five primary schools, a temple, seven major community halls, two local libraries, a teachers' training school, a private nursery school, five Indian cinemas, an Indian-owned hotel, a sports field, a crematorium and a clinic.

But there is a hitch for the authorities — in terms of Islamic law and custom, the site of a mosque may not be used for any other purpose.

On the other hand, Lenasia has nothing — no tarred roads, no electricity or recreational facilities. Lenasia, in the meantime, has more than 7 000 people in need of homes.

Whilst they were busy "cleansing" Johannesburg, a new problem arose. Mayfair became a "mixed area," partly because Indians were pushed out of adjacent Pageview, where they had lived and traded since the turn of the century. Pageview was declared "White." The Indian community uprooted, their homes bulldozed, it was ordered that they should live in Lenasia, some 30 km from the city centre. Hundreds of families who were unwilling or unable to find housing there spilled over

"illegally" into the eastern part of Mayfair. Pageview and Mayfair had to change status by executive decree — Pageview from Indian to White and Mayfair from White to Indian.

This is not the end of the story. In Pageview at present are a few "besieged" White families in their new houses — victims in a quite different way. Whites are uneasy about living with Indians.

Facts and Figures

The suffering of our people cannot be adequately portrayed in "facts and figures." It means pain, suffering, humiliation, incurable wounds and death. But we shall have to give "facts and figures" — if, for nothing else, to make the situation visually (as opposed to emotionally) graphic. But before we do that let us take a few examples of the victims of the Group Areas Act — they are so many we cannot exhaust them.

A school building rejected by the Whites because of heavy traffic from a neighbouring highway has been "offered" to Chinese children. The Chinese Kuo Tin School has occupied the premises of the former Brampton Primary School in Sandton's Bromley Park. The Chinese had been granted a permit by the Department of Community Development to move into what was previously an exclusively White area.

A Jeffreys Bay fishing boat was wrecked after a group of Coloured fishermen — who believed they would be prosecuted if they landed on a section of Jeffreys Bay beach, which they understood to be reserved for White bathers — chose a more dangerous beaching site. The livelihood of Port Elizabeth's Coloured community relies upon fishing.

The *Rand Daily Mail* of the 23rd June 1984 reported that officials of the Department of Community Development locked a Durban Coloured woman and her tiny children into a flat for 23 hours. Mrs Bernadette Collins, aged 24, of Wentworth, was locked in the flat because she refused to vacate the premises, which the family occupied "unlawfully."

The *Sunday Times* of 26th April 1981 reported that in Durban's new multi-million



Mrs Dhana Naidu protests at being evicted from her home in Pageview, Johannesburg.

rand Central and Berea Road Station, desperate passengers arriving at the spanking new station step straight into an amazing muddle. White passengers at the front of the train have to hobble down the length of the platform to get to a White loo. Black passengers in the rear coaches have to brave the ordeal to reach relief at their facilities opposite the engine. Embarrassment and inconvenience all round.

This is a small sample of the brutality of apartheid. Let us come to the figures.

Re-Shuffling of Thousands

In 1981 it was reported that about 600 000 people throughout South Africa (Coloured, Indian

and White, about 375 000 of them from the Coloured community, mostly in the Western Cape) had been moved from their former homes to other residential areas since the Group Areas Act has been in force. This is something like 75 000 Coloured, 36 000 Indian and 2 300 White families. In the Cape alone more than 31 000 families, or about 155 000 people, had been removed from their homes in terms of the Group Areas Act. Of this total, only 195 families were White and 1 506 Indian. Another 3 300 families in the Peninsula were to be moved.

In 1982 the figure had risen to 80 053 Coloured families and 38 472 Indian families, and

the figure for Whites remained the same. And in 1983 there was another increase of 8 632 families moved, over the figure for 1982.

The Coloured people, especially the working people, have been the hardest hit by the Group Areas Act removals, comprising more than half the people moved. But if one considers the size of the Indian community in South Africa the "facts and figures" tell us that the Indian community does not come second.

If the impression is created here that only the working people have suffered "slum clearance" and so on, this has to be rectified. Indian traders were most hit, with 2 535 businesses being forced to change premises against 187 Coloured and 54 White businesses. Most of these evictions have been in the Transvaal towns.

The injustice and discrimination, or, if you like, inequality, of treatment even in the removals and evictions can be seen from the fact that, since the inception of the Act, 448 "group areas" had been proclaimed for Whites (who have suffered less), 313 areas for Coloureds and 116 for Indians. This involved 749 866 hectares for Whites, 95 128 for Coloureds and 50 535 for Indians.

Skelm Reform

"Skelm reform" means sly reform. Our people have come to realise that the regime's bag of tricks contains some nasty surprises. In 1976 the regime appointed the Cillie Commission, which investigated the country-wide uprising and found out that the Group Areas Act had caused a general feeling of dissatisfaction amongst Blacks. The 1976 Theron Commission on the Coloured people confirmed this. This was the period of the Riekert "reforms." In recent articles Professor Erika Theron has called for the repeal of the Group Areas Act. She has been joined by a prominent Coloured member of the Commission, Professor van der Ross, Rector of the University of the Western Cape, a Coloured university.

In November 1981 the regime appointed a four-man committee which would investigate the Group Areas Act and related legislation, such as the Slums Act, the Separate Amenities

Act, the Community Development Act, the Housing Act, proclamations and regulations issued in terms of the Acts and related ordinances.

Before the committee even started, two controversies which threatened to wreck it erupted.

Firstly the committee was lily-white — the members being Mr Justice Jan Strydom, head of the Committee, S W van Wyk, Chairman of the Group Areas Board, the statutory wing of the Department of Community Development, and G F Smalberger, retired Chief State Law Adviser, while the secretary is P D McEnery, chief director of the Department of Community Development. The appointment follows a recommendation by the President's Council, that a technical committee under a judge "familiar with the Group Areas Act" be appointed to investigate the Act and related legislation. The judge was J Strydom. Who is he?

The Strydom Scandal

Strydom's past shows that he was interned in Gangspan with John Vorster in 1941, after allegations that he had crossed the border into Mozambique illegally. In November 1941 he was transferred to Koffiefontein, where he remained until he escaped in 1943. Strydom has been on the Windhoek (Namibia) Bench for eight years, after serving at the Pretoria Bar for 23 years, after his application for admission was unsuccessfully opposed in 1951.

He was the subject of an investigation by the Windhoek Bar after a public controversy over a number of judgments involving right-wing Whites. At the time of his appointment to lead this committee, the Bar Council was considering whether to take the rare step of publicly criticising a judge. Considerable pressure was brought to bear through the Administrator-General of South-West Africa (Namibia), Danie Hough, to have the judge transferred from the South-West Africa (Namibia) Division of the Supreme Court. He was extremely harsh in his judgments against Blacks, and extraordinarily lenient in crimes of violence by Whites.

This is the man who is supposed to be "familiar with the Group Areas Act"!

The second point of controversy was the terms of reference of the committee. According to Pen Kotze, the Minister of Community Development, the terms of reference had been framed:

"in the acceptance and maintenance of the principle that the South African community can best be ordained and served on a basis of the traditional way of life of residential separation according to the principles of healthy, orderly community formations and development and without detracting from the existence of own townships, own urban and rural areas and own community life for the various population groups."

It was obvious from the outset that this committee was set up with a view to making recommendations about amendments/adaptations/consolidation/rationalisation, and streamlining of these Acts in the light of identifiable deficiencies, problems, areas of friction, and discrepancies in relation to the implementation of the aforementioned laws. This was in line with the rhetoric of P W Botha, who, since he came to power in September 1978, has been talking about "reforms" and "improvement" of apartheid laws. But this is not what the Coloureds and Indians want; they want the repeal of **all** apartheid laws.

The Strydom Committee of Inquiry into the Group Areas Act tabled its report in parliament early in 1984. There are many recommendations which were made by this committee. Among other things, the committee recommended that a landlord should be entitled to forcibly evict tenants without a court judgment or order. If the landlord allowed illegal tenants to occupy his property, a court could order that the land/property be forfeited to the State — in other words, the onus for eviction should be placed firmly on the landlords.

Although Chinese people will be able to live and work as Whites, the Committee recommended that in future a Chinese man who marries a woman of another race group will be

deemed to be a member of the group to which that woman belongs. And so on and so forth.

Then a Select Committee, chaired by Minister of Community Development Pen Kotze, was appointed on March 5th 1984 to consider the Strydom report. This select committee has recommended "in the meantime" that legislation be formulated to do away with certain "restrictions" contained in the Group Areas Act. It appears that the thinking behind this is that segregation should not be extended to the economic sphere.

Although the regime had "reservations about certain of the committee's recommendations," for example the repeal of the Group Areas Act, the Select Committee seems to have "struck a balance." This is the road which led to the Group Areas Amendment Bill, which is being discussed in parliament. The emphasis here is on "amendment." The law needs to be "amended" because some Whites are against the "element of compulsion" in the Act, and prefer "local option" to be the determining factor; they are against "hurtful discrimination."

It should be stated that even this "amendment" is not a result of the goodwill of the racists. The fight of the Coloured and Indian people — especially the youth — in 1976 and 1980-81 in particular, led to some problems within the ruling circles. A former Minister of Community Development, Marais Steyn, was forced to back down in the Nationalist caucus and withdraw a bill intended to create "grey" (that is, racially mixed) areas. He wanted to "reform" the Act, and the "conservatives" within his own "study group" regarded this as an end to morals. He was sent to London as ambassador to the United Kingdom.

Identity Discovered

In 1984 the number of prosecutions under the notorious Group Areas act was very low. This had more to do with the pending Indian and Coloured elections for the tricameral parliament — the Coloured elections on the 22nd August and the Indian elections on the 28th. The regime was not prepared to crack down

in case it jeopardised the elections, which were crucial to the success and credibility of the new constitution.

There was another problem: any heavy-handed action against the Coloureds and Indians would result in support for the United Democratic Front. This is a problem for them — not for the Coloureds and Indians.

The Coloured population in the Cape has suffered tremendously under the "tot system" of paying part of the Coloured workers' wages in daily rations of cheap wine. This is "economical" we are told, and it also ensnares the work force. The result is alcoholism (mass drunkenness) which became and remained endemic. It is not that they drink so much, they drink to get drunk — not only the Coloureds. This is accompanied by violence. It is escapism. It was perhaps for these reasons that the Freedom Charter specifically mentioned the "tot system" as one of those evils to be abolished.

But the situation is not all that gloomy. There is a commitment amid social integration, a passionate concern in this **psychologically ravaged community as it discovers a cause and an identity, in the idea that it is — after all — a Black community.**

A political revival is taking place, fired by anger. Bitterness runs deep. Bitterness is a product of socio-economic effects. Apartheid has generated bitterness and hatred towards the Whites in general and the government in particular; it has also given rise to rootless crime-oriented youths.

Most political organisations, especially the ANC, are banned because "politics for Blacks" is outlawed at the top. But grassroots activity is increasing. Movements have emerged to fight for a better deal on transport, housing, electricity, rents, rates, fares and the like. Coloured and Indian journalists have started newspapers to publicise community matters. Women's organisations and groups have started creches and nursery schools to keep children off the streets. They even help the unemployed, and fight cases where workers have been fired illegally. Some of these organisations link up with trade unions in "community action" projects.

People are finding themselves, gaining a sense of identity and purpose, and the activities of the ANC and especially the actions of Umkhonto We Sizwe are crucial in this regard.



**SECHABA
and other
ANC Publications
are obtainable
from the following
ANC Addresses:**



ALGERIA

5 rue Ben M'hidi Larbi
ALGIERS

ANGOLA

PO Box 3523,
LUANDA

BELGIUM

9c Rue de Russie, 1060
BRUXELLES

CANADA

PO Box 302, Adelaide Postal
Station, TORONTO,
Ontario M5C-2J4

CUBA

Calle 21a NR 20617
Esquina 214 Atabey,
HAVANA

EGYPT

5 Ahmad Hishmat Street,
Zamalek,
CAIRO

ETHIOPIA

PO Box 7483,
ADDIS ABABA

GERMAN DEM. REP.

Angerweg 2, Wilhelmsruh, 1106
BERLIN

GERMAN FED. REP.

Postfach 190140
5300 BONN 1

INDIA

Flat 68 – Bhagat Singh Market,
NEW DELHI – 1

ITALY

Via S. Prisca 15a
00153 ROME

MADAGASCAR

PO Box 80
TANANARIVE

NIGERIA

Federal Government Special
Guest House, Victoria Island,
LAGOS

SENEGAL

26 Avenue Albert Sarraut,
DAKAR, Box 34 20

SWEDEN

PO Box 2073, S – 103 12,
STOCKHOLM 2

TANZANIA

PO Box 2239 DAR ES SALAAM
PO Box 680 MOROGORO

UNITED KINGDOM

PO Box 38, 28 Penton Street,
LONDON NI 9PR


UNITED STATES

801 Second Avenue, Apt. 405
NEW YORK, NYC 10017

ZAMBIA

PO Box 31791, LUSAKA

BILLY NAIR PEOPLE'S LEADER



***'The courage
and struggle of
the oppressed
can never be
crushed by oppression and we will win
liberation regardless of government action.'***

**ARCHIE GUMEDE, BILLY NAIR, PAUL DAVID
British Consulate, Durban, 12 December 1984.**