

Eastern Europe wrestling with 'too much history'

Facing up to price of new freedoms



In a rainy Prague: Pieter le Roux, the tour guide, Elsie and Billy Nair, Rolf Freier (Naumann Foundation), John de Gruchy, Wiseman Nkuhlu, George Schleicher (former east German ambassador to Zimbabwe), Alex Boraine and Sarah Pienaar.

Alexis de Tocqueville, the French philosopher, wrote more than a 100 years ago that "the passions which a revolution has roused do not disappear at its close". He spoke of a sense of instability remaining in the midst of the re-established order.

"Desires still remain extremely enlarged, while the means of satisfying them are diminished day by day."

The Iron Curtain has been cut, the Berlin Wall still stands only in a few places - mainly for the benefit of tourists. Chips of the wall that people died escaping over are now on sale in small plastic boxes at the Brandenburg Gate. A short walk away, Hitler's bunker is an unmarked hump in the land that has now been demarcated for develop-

ment by a Japanese automanufacturer and a German multinational. Further on is the site of Goering's Luftwaffe headquarters.

Within a mile in the no-man's land that

Former socialist countries of eastern Europe are learning the hard way that shifting to a market economy does not guarantee democracy. CHARLENE SMITH reports on a recent fact-finding visit to Germany, Czechoslovakia and Hungary hosted by Idasa.



A street market in Prague's town centre.

splits east and west Berlin stands testimonies to two ideologies that repressed and killed millions of people. This part of Europe, "has produced more history than it can bear", says Martin Butora, assistant to President Vaclav Havel of Czechoslovakia.

In October 1989, the Iron Curtain was breached and on November 9 the wall fell. But the instability De

Tocqueville warned of lingers. While the Western media trumpeted that socialism fell in the face of demands for democracy and free enterprise, the reality is less apparent, a

group of South Africans learnt when they visited the three east European countries for two weeks in April.

The 12-member group included academics, trade unionists and representatives of political parties. They attended seminars in each centre and held discussions with a range of political and social leaders.

It is clear that the full consequences of democracy and free enterprise were not understood and that people reacted against a system that had become profoundly unworkable and unjust.

Vladimir Benacek of the Centre for Economic Research and Graduate Education at Charles University in Prague says capitalism cannot be imported from the outside, nor built on the ruins of the old system. "It cannot be copied according to some blueprint outlined in America, Japan, Sweden or Germany. It must be reborn and reinstalled subject to a wide consensus of will." He says the economies of the former Eastern Bloc resemble those devastated by war.

Benacek, and other economists in former east Germany, Czechoslovakia and Hungary

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DEMOCRACY in ACTION



Idasa's goals are:

To promote the development of a democratic culture in South Africa

To address fear, prejudice, anger and other obstacles in the transition to a non-racial democracy in South Africa

To engage influential groups and individuals who may be outsiders to the transition process

To provide, wherever possible, information on critical issues and to explore ways of addressing these

To facilitate discussion of constitutional and developmental issues relevant to Southern Africa

To assist and encourage others to contribute to the attainment of these goals

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
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Civic responsibility?

The launch of the national civics body in Port Elizabeth showed how not to do it. Word has it that not only was the voting rigged – some rivalry between the Eastern Cape and Southern Transvaal regions – but delegates spent much of the first morning of the conference debating the quality of their hotel accommodation.

So long and so heated did this discussion become that speakers who had flown in specifically to deliver papers in the morning session climbed back on their flights in the afternoon not having uttered a word.

– *Three star accommodation maybe, but no stars for organisation.*

A question of language

Speaking to a slightly antagonistic audience in your second language can have its drawbacks. At the Idasa/Ecna conference on media and democracy recently, Calle Badenhorst, NP MP for East London North, went from bad to worse as he attempted to defend his statement that the National Party was also deprived of fair media coverage.

Responding to the gasps and laughs of disbelief, the embattled Badenhorst replied: "There are various levels of depravity."

– *Indeed there are.*

Die groot oorgawe

Die beleg van Mitchell's Plein het weer gewys hoe almal in die media die wêreld vanuit hul onderskeie hoekies sien – en as absolute waarheid aanbied. Na gelang van

Ja-Nee

die koerant wat jy lees, byvoorbeeld, kon die skare wat na FW de Klerk kom luister het vanaf 3 000 tot 10 000 gewissel het. Maar die prys vir melodrama moet seker aan *Rapport* gaan. Die inleiding tot die hoofberig was as volg: "Met 'n reuse 'Viva FW' het bruin Suid-Afrikaners gister hul harte aan pres FW de Klerk gegee."

– *Al gaan die Nasionale Party heelwaarskynlik die kleurling-stem wen, moet 'n joernalis darem seker onthou dat daar in Mitchell's Plein alleen 700 000 mense woon!*

Gun-running in the bad old days

Why is it that security forces operating in the present South African political climate seem so much less effective at curtailing the number of weapons being smuggled into the country than in the bad old days? That was the question Border ANC executive member Marion Sparg put to a National Party MP at a recent Idasa-convened meeting in East London.

You must understand, came the reply, that our borders are vast and it's very difficult to apprehend all potential smugglers. I do understand, replied Sparg, I know just how efficient they were when they stopped us from bringing weapons in!

– *Nothing like the voice of experience to settle an argument.*

Learning the lessons of eastern Europe

The group of South Africans who recently visited Eastern Europe under the leadership of Idasa had many differences of political affiliation and background. However, all accepted that we came from a deeply divided society committed to the transition to a new democracy.

It was with this in mind that we listened attentively to a wide cross-section of people in the former East and West Germany. The striving for unity in that divided society had many lessons for us. In the same way the visit to Czechoslovakia and Hungary gave us a first-hand opportunity to see two adjoining countries with many similarities, but also major differences, in their transition towards democracy.

The experience of Hungary is probably closer to that of South Africa than Czechoslovakia. Firstly because the liberalisation process in that country started back in 1968 and, despite communist rule, it allowed experiments in the economy and enabled people to travel and study abroad, bringing back new ideas and new thinking. In the same way, despite the repression of apartheid, there has always existed a liberal party in parliament, we have always had human rights groups and travel was always possible for a large number of South Africans who could return with insights of freer societies beyond our borders.

There are three distinct areas of change in Hungary which have lessons for South Africa. Firstly, on the political level, a feature of the dramatic changes in Hungary since 1989 was that it was a change from the top. There can be no denying that there has been a shift towards a popular democracy, but the changes were brought about largely by a small group at the top and, in the end, saw a change from one elite to another elite.

In South Africa we must try and avoid top-down change with little or no involvement of ordinary people. For this reason it is extremely important that Codesa II is not postponed because at least there the debates are public and South Africans in general have a far better opportunity to understand and appreciate the different positions taken by different parties.

The second area of change in Hungary is in the economic field. Hungary is experiencing very similar difficulties to those of South Africa in that economic change has not kept pace with political change. The inheritance from their past, in terms of state ownership, bureaucracy, lack of initiative and planned economy, have all left their mark. Prices have increased and wage levels have not been able to match these because of low productivity. From a society of full employment, there is now growing unemployment, reaching eight percent. It is estimated that in the next few months the number of unemployed will reach more than 800 000. Coupled with this there is very little foreign investment and their former markets in the East have simply disappeared. The consequence is that many ordinary Hungarians cannot see economic improvements tied with a shift towards greater political freedom. While most politicians and economists feel that the problem is manageable, they are concerned that unless there is a proper safety net for those who are now unemployed, and unless there is rapid economic growth, political stability could be threatened.

This scenario is all too familiar to South Africans and we were reminded again that unless there is corresponding economic improvement of those who have been deprived for so long, it will be extremely difficult to achieve political stability. With the risk of political instability comes greater dissatisfaction on the ground and that, in turn, is a cycle which contributes very largely to the climate of violence in South Africa. It is simply not good enough to spend a disproportionate amount of time on arguing about the niceties of a constitution whilst ignoring fundamental social and economic problems.

The third area of change which is taking place in formerly East Germany, Czechoslovakia and Hungary is in the sociological area. There is a consensus among many with whom we spoke that one of the consequences of repression is the diminishing of civil society. What is needed in Eastern Europe right now, according to many commentators, is the rebuilding of a civil society and groups of people who will risk, will criticise, will be responsible and will hold the politicians to account.

The newly emerging democracy in Eastern Europe is a tender and fragile plant and needs to be nourished by grassroots organisations which constantly hold on to the fundamental values of freedom, free speech, tolerance and access for ordinary citizens to the political and economic process.

There are many lessons that South Africa can learn from developments in Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and elsewhere. There are, however, these three fundamental truths which need to be underlined: firstly, in terms of the transition towards democracy, the process as well as the goals should be democratic. This means the maximum involvement of people at all levels rather than an elite at the top. Further, there is no time to waste. We cannot afford the luxury of grandstanding, of point-scoring and of accusation and counter-accusation. Political leaders of all parties need to be reminded that they are in the final analysis servants of the people and therefore should serve their best interests. Right now South Africa's best interests lie in a resolution of conflict, the swift movement towards political choices and involvement in the political process.

Secondly, it should be underlined again and again that the best constitution in the world cannot survive civil unrest brought about by deep-seated poverty, grievances and unfulfilled expectations. Economic development and progress must go hand in hand with political change.

Thirdly, in the same way that politicians have an enormous responsibility in the period of transition, so too have community leaders, lawyers, journalists, churches and independent institutes to emphasise and uphold the fundamental human values so that in this time of rapid change South Africa does not make the mistake of simply exchanging one elite group for another and one form of nationalism for another. In South Africa, as in eastern Europe, democracy is fragile and must be nurtured at every level of society.

*Alex Boraine
Executive Director*

BLOEMFONTEIN**SRCs gather in Bloemfontein**

ON May 8 and 9 SRC representatives from tertiary institutions in the Free State will meet at a conference in Bloemfontein to discuss the contribution of student bodies in developing relevant community oriented education in the province.

This event will provide student leaders from different backgrounds with a platform to become engaged in this debate and to establish closer links among themselves.

● The OFS Education Forum's next meeting will be held on May 14 in Bloemfontein.

The forum, which aims to influence policy makers, consists of people who are concerned about proper, equal and accessible education in the region.

Various education departments, teacher and professional bodies, community organisations and the business sector are participating in the forum.

Anyone with an interest in education is welcome to attend.

New moves on Welkom, women

AN INFORMAL workshop on the work of Idasa will be held with some key people in the region in Welkom on May 20.

The visit to Welkom will be concluded with a public seminar in the evening which will be addressed by Dr Van Zyl Slabbert, Idasa's director of policy and planning.

● On May 23 Idasa and the Vista University Women's Association will present a seminar on the role women, can play towards a new South Africa.

Key national figures will engage in discussions with representatives from local organisations.

Konferensie oor ontwikkeling

'N KONFERENSIE oor streeksonwikkeling in die Vrystaat, gereël in samewerking met ander organisasies, vind op 3 Junie by Allemanskraal plaas.

Die doelstellings van die projek is om 'n gesamentlike visie vir ontwikkeling te skep en 'n legitieme struktuur daar te stel om die proses te ondersteun.

PRETORIA**Focus on schools crisis**

IDASA, in conjunction with Lawyers for Human Rights, will host an evening forum on the the topic, "The Present Education Crisis: How Permanent is Model C", at the Holiday Inn on May 18.



Dr Neil McGurk

The forum will take the form of input from two speakers followed by questioning from a panel and the public.

The speakers will be representatives from the Department of Education and Training and the ANC, while the panelists will include a school management committee member, a teacher and representatives from NEPI, Sadtu and the Wits Education Policy Unit. Dr Neil McGurk will chair the forum.

Religion in a new SA

THE EDITOR of *Sojourner* magazine, Jim Wallis, will be the guest speaker at an evening forum on religious freedom to be held at the Holiday Inn on June 2.

Mr Wallis, whose magazine has a Christian orientation and works for justice and human rights in the USA, will be joined by speakers from

political parties. The meeting will be chaired by a representative from the SA chapter of the World Conference on Religion and Peace.

● Population Development will be the topic of a one-day seminar to be hosted by Idasa at the Holiday Inn on June 3.

The issue will be approached from a number of different perspectives such as human rights, women and the politics of population growth.

PORT ELIZABETH**Indaba at Plettenberg Bay**

REPRESENTATIVES of the civic organisations and municipalities of 29 southern Cape towns will meet at Plettenberg Bay on May 8 and 9 for a conference on local government restructuring.

The conference will be preceded by a public meeting on the topic of Codesa in Plettenberg Bay on May 7. Speakers include Prof Kader Asmal of the ANC and Dr Ian Phillips of the University of Natal.

EAST LONDON**Workshop on child abuse**

IDASA'S Border region will host four events in East London over the next few weeks.

An education for empowerment seminar takes place on May 9 and a workshop on child abuse will be held towards the end of May. Other events include a public meeting on conscription on June 25 and a youth interaction event in mid-June.

The Border office also holds regular afternoon and evening meetings on topical subjects, including a monthly meeting on gender issues.

More information can be obtained from (0431) 43-0047.

CAPE TOWN**Stale word games or real talk?**

BY GILLE WEINTROUB

CONFLICT and negotiation are buzzwords in South African right now. All eyes are on Codesa and the negotiation process. The danger of this negotiation process (that everyone has such high hopes about) falling into stale word games is real. Are the concepts behind our understanding of conflict and negotiation outdated?

Conventional negotiations are built around the acceptance that if you win, you must have been right, US-based social scientist and management consultant Prof Jamshid Gharajedaghi told associates of the Institute of Futures Research at a conference in Cape Town recently. This means that winning is about more than results – it becomes a moral obligation and principle – and losing means you were wrong.

Addressing a one-day conference on "Negotiating and Dissolving Conflict in South Africa: Creating a Win-Win Context", Prof Gharajedaghi said conventional approaches to conflict were based on a dichotomy or an either/or arrangement in which parties were locked into a win/lose situation.

"One needs to recognise the multi-dimensionality of the conflict situation," he said. "It's not a question of this or that, but of this and that."

Parties in a multi-dimensional society had to recognise their interdependence in the system. They also had to recognise that they had a choice as to the ends they aspired to, and a choice as to the means they employed to reach those ends.

If parties were able to recognise that they were in pursuit of common ends, the conflict could be converted into competition. Parties had to recog-

nise that the ends they wanted to attain were compatible, although their means of achieving those ends were incompatible.

Prof Gharajedaghi said a coalition amounted to a temporary agreement in which there were common means but incompatible goals. This was a situation of "deadly deferred conflict disguised as co-operation" in which parties were obliged to mislead each other.

Genuine co-operation was a situation in which ends and means were compatible for all parties. The benefits of such a situation were real in that energy could be concentrated on dissolving or redesigning conflict - or finding a way to work around the forces causing the conflict. The concept of power sharing had to be recognised as duplication of power, not abdication. Power, like knowledge, was a spiritual property. "If you give some of your knowledge away, do you lose it?" asked Prof Gharajedaghi.

He said the idea of negotiation should be to change the solution by coming up with a new set of ideas that would satisfy all parties. In conventional negotiations, parties came to the table with preconceived solutions, the achievement of which they equated with success.

However, if the parties came to the table with concerns, they could return to their constituents with an answer to the concern - and that would be recognised as success.

Yet there was no such thing as happily ever after. As soon as problems were solved, there would be other problems. The way to deal with this was to keep on learning.

It was important to recognise that the interests of negotiators could be different from the interests of their constituents.

Gille Weintraub is a journalist with *The Argus*

Mandela meets OFS leaders

By HENNING MYBURGH

Idasa's Free State office was honoured to host Mr Nelson Mandela at a dinner function during his recent visit to the Free State. The function was held to give decision makers in Bloemfontein the opportunity to meet Mr Mandela on a personal level and to discuss the future of the country.

In his address, Mr Mandela explained his views on issues such as the language question, nationalisation and the negotiations process. He emphasised that many blacks had experienced Afrikaans only as the language of the oppressor but

that it was the wish of the ANC that this situation be changed.

Dealing with the negotiation process, Mr Mandela said the aim of participants should not be to beat each other into an inferior situation in the new South Africa but rather to assist each other in building the new nation.

Feedback received about the

event indicates that encounters such as these still play a tremendous role in normalising the political processes in predominantly rural regions like the Free State. In the words of Mr Mandela: "It seems that 50 percent of our problems just solve themselves when we start talking to each other and get to know each other as people."



Mr Mandela with, from left, UOFS staff members Mr Lucius Botes, Prof Alan Bennie, Mr Harold Verster and Prof Koos Bekker.

Idasa initiative on language access

BY KOBUS VAN LOGGERENBERG

The language question in South Africa is directly related to settling social injustices of the past and cultivating a democratic culture in the country.

Although language issues have always been prominent in South African society, the debate has long been dominated by Afrikaner nationalistic thinking, resulting in a narrow focus. However, over the past five years progressive language and cultural actors have re-entered the debate and regained the initiative.

The timely intervention of these actors has resulted in a significant shift in focus from a narrowly defined "language" question to a more broadly defined societal issue. Probably the single most crucial issue now arising is that of access to the goods and services of the nation.

Language actors have, over the past few years, adopted two strategies to address the access problem related to language, the first being language teaching and the second that of language facilitation. Since Soweto '76 the strategy of teaching has dominated, while the strategy of facilitation has only gained momentum over the past two years.

As English is fast becoming the language that dominates in most sectors of South African

society, an adequate control over this language is actually a prerequisite for social mobility.

However, even the most effective language teaching can still not address the overwhelming lack of adequate knowledge and control of English.

What is thus needed is to address the access problem in the short term. Language facilitation (translation and interpretation), specifically at community level, can offer access in the short term.

Idasa's Free State office has initiated a language project to investigate several options of language facilitation to establish what the real impact of language facilitation is on the negotiation process and to find cost-effective ways of dealing with multi-lingualism. The underlying assumption of this project is that the constructive accommodation of multi-lingualism plays a vital role in the cultivation of a democratic culture in South Africa.

Dr Theo du Plessis, a language sociologist from the region, has been contracted as language consultant to head this project. He has been involved in the national language debate for some time and is a specialist in language planning. He will be based in Bloemfontein.

Price of new freedoms

From Page 1

interviewed by the group, have a common refrain: "Full scale privatisation" and finality about "property rights" must be prioritised. Individual freedom has come to the east, but with it comes a high economic cost that threatens the fledgling democracies.

While east Germany is fortunate in having a wealthy twin that is pumping in DM200-billion a year to upgrade the country, it is also angry at the perceived arrogance of the "Wessies" towards the "Ossies" and the difficulties of learning a completely new economic and political culture. Unemployment, previously unheard of, is now climbing.

Dr Gunter Rexdrodt of the Treuhandanstalt which is restructuring the east German economy, and in particular selling, closing down or renovating existing factories, says that industry in the former GDR is so run down and outdated that 99 percent of the factories should have been closed the day after reunification.

'Unclear ownership conditions are leading to a lack of foreign investment'

Instead, they are desperately trying to regenerate industry in east Germany and retraining the workers to operate in an environment where personal ability and competition are barometers of success. It is an enormous task. One problem is the lack of managers - managers from the west, including pensioners, are being paid double to work in the east - but demand outstrips supply.

The redistribution of land is a problem for all former Eastern Bloc countries as an essential base for market economies. There are



Prof Sarah Pienaar and Prof John de Gruchy in front of the Brandenburg Gate.

two million land claims in east Germany alone, which require authorities to search through 15km of property records. Claims are not expected to be processed before 1995.

East Germany allows land claims to go back further than Czechoslovakia or Hungary - to 1929 - to include the claims of Jews who had property removed by Hitler. However, that land was in turn bought by non-Jews who in turn had the land removed by communists - who in their turn rented the land. Whose claim is paramount? Certainly the needs of those who were unable to buy land under communism and who may have occupied property for decades cannot be ignored either.

The German government is using a complicated 1930's formula to work out property taxes. People who opt for the money rather than the land get 130 percent of the 1930 value. Those who get property back pay a levy of a third of the property's market value.

However, according to Wolfgang Stock, a *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* journalist who specialises in the difficulties of reunification, many people do not want the property back because it is in such poor condition. "Seventy percent of east German houses have no central heating, they have stoves in

each room which use brown coal - a serious pollutant."

There has been scant maintenance of many buildings and many would be more valuable demolished, but reunified Germany is keen to stop speculative land deals. Rentals have soared in eastern Germany: "It is easier and cheaper to rent office space in Munich than in Leipzig," Stock says.

In Hungary and Czechoslovakia ownership is even more confused. Stephen Mackay of the Friederich Naumann Foundation in Budapest illustrated the confusion: "The house we rent initially belonged to the owner of a Hungarian brewery. It was expropriated after the war by the communists and became the premises of the Society of Soviet Hungarian Friendship.

"It now belongs to the state. But who owns the state - national or local government? No one knows. A society has been formed to buy the house. It is administered by the former president of the Society of Soviet Hungarian Friendship. Unclear ownership conditions are leading to a lack of foreign investment."

Hungary and Czechoslovakia have issued coupons to enable citizens, under present conditions, to buy or sell property and shares. But the debate on property redistribution or compensation is far from resolved.

Eastern Europe is hampered not only by low productivity and poor merchandise but also by an ancient telecommunications system that seriously hampers development.

More than 50 percent of the telephone switching system in east Germany at reunification was pre-1930. The city of Dresden is still using the first automatic switchboard installed in Germany in 1923.

Last year Germany's Telecom upgraded the existing 300 lines connecting east to west to 40 000 lines - within the next three years east Germany will have the most modern telephone system in the world.

The importance of this to developing industries is illustrated by Stock who says his young friend began a desktop publishing



A Gypsy leader with members of a Hungarian commission on ethnic minorities. Listening to his address are delegation members Siphon Radebe (left) and Elsie Nair.

firm in Leipzig soon after unification – but had to wait 15 months for a telephone. A young journalist in the east Berlin bureau of a Dresden daily newspaper said he only received two copies of his newspaper each week. "They post the newspaper to me, but the postal service is still very poor. We

have no typewriters, no telex, no fax machines, so

we dictate our stories to Dresden, but the phones are very poor too."

Professor Gerhard Wittich, formerly of the School for Economics in east Berlin said the GDR used to be considered the most "solid and best economy in the former Comecon (communist) countries, but compared with west Germany, the delay in economic and technological development and the level of productivity was 20 years". He says this was deliberately masked by official propaganda and manipulation of economic statistics by its former rulers.

The Treuhandanstalt began its task – as did Hungary and Czechoslovakia – by privatising the service sector. This gave ordinary people a chance to enter the new market economy. New shops with neon signs, bright awnings and shelves full of goods are opening all over the east – certainly Budapest makes shopping in Johannesburg drab by comparison.

However, industry is a disaster. A cement factory in Dessau – one of the largest in the world – has already cut its workforce by a third to 1 000, and by next year will have halved it again.

About 70 percent of the construction sector has been privatised and due to reconstruction is booming. However, the entire electronics industry was so backward that it had to be shut down. The traditional tool industry will be retained, but east Germany's hi-tech tool industry is so low-tech and backward that it also faces closure.

In the chemical industry factories are to be upgraded and made safe. Pollution is an extremely serious issue throughout

eastern Europe where buildings are blackened, some forests are devastated by acid rain and, in Prague, nights are often spoiled by the stench in the air.

The textile and clothing industry is so backward and overstaffed that Dr Gunter Rexrodt, a member of the board of the Treuhandanstalt, says that if they can keep 10 percent of the 480 000 workforce after cut-backs, they "will be happy".

Rexrodt said they had liquidated "only 900 companies. If we try to save the companies to save the jobs, then we have uncompetitive companies and worse unemployment. It costs more money in the end".

'In east Germany we have no economy, no land rights, the money is Western and not ours'

However, they are confident that economic parity will be created between east and west this century, and "small economic growth" will be apparent in the next 18 months.

East Germans are earning 60 percent of west German wages and, despite ongoing raises and retraining, they are not expected to reach wage parity until 1994.

East Germany was the most dismal of the three former communist countries visited by the group. Most of the towns looked like Orwellian nightmares. The autobahns were uneven and bumpy, and travelling from the east to the west was like moving from a black and white film into technicolour. There is also none of the enthusiasm and determination to succeed felt in Hungary or Czechoslovakia.

Friederich Heilmann, an east German representative of the Green Party, said he felt like an Australian aborigine. "We have a situation like colonialism. We are like aborig-

ines who live on the fringes of society. They get a lot of money from the government but no real economic power. In east Germany we have no economy, no land rights, the money is Western and not ours. A market economy and democracy is not necessarily congruent."

Hungary, unlike the GDR and Czechoslovakia, changed when its leadership realised the inevitable and initiated the changes. However, Stephan Musto warned that "stable political change requires a working economic system". He said the economy in Hungary had declined over the past two years.

"To change from a centrally administered economy to a free market economy will take five to 10 years – the extent of the challenge can best be understood when you consider it took 400 to 500 years for a market system to establish itself in England and Germany."

Hungary is the strongest country economically – and probably politically – of the three nations visited. It receives 60 percent of the Western aid being invested in the former socialist countries, according to Istvan Major, undersecretary of state in the Ministry of International Economic Relations. Last year it received \$1.6bn in new investment money. Since 1989 \$4bn in new investments have found their way to Hungary. Sixty percent of that money has gone into the productive sector and 40 percent to the service sector. However, only about four percent of all economic activity is from foreign investors – compared to 28 percent before the second world war.

Both Czechoslovakia and Hungary have charismatic leaders who enjoy wide popular support and are seen as unifiers – necessary prerequisites for the rollercoaster ride ahead.

Whoever leads the countries of eastern Europe will do well to remember the words of Martin Butora who wrote: "Democracy is not built for the principles themselves, for some Hegelian-like fulfillment of an abstract thesis. It is built for the people. To minimize the possible negative impact of any well intended democratic ideas and procedures means, at least once in a while, to remember with humility who politics and laws should serve."

The group, led by Idasa executive director Alex Boraine, included Prof John de Gruchy (UCT), Prof Gerhard Erasmus (Stellenbosch), Mr Ivor Jenkins (Idasa), Prof Pieter le Roux (UWC), Mr Neo Moikangoa (ANC), Mr Billy Nair (trade unionist and ANC national executive member), Prof Wiseman Nkuhlu (Unitra), Prof Sarah Pienaar (Unisa), Mr Siphon Radebe (National Union of Public Service Workers) and Mr Jasper Walsh (DP).

Charlene Smith is economics editor with the Sunday Times



Leaders of the Young Democrats, a party with membership confined to the under-35s, address the Idasa delegation at their Hungarian headquarters.

RATTLE dem BONES!

The call to forget the past and bury the skeletons of apartheid lingers on. WILMOT JAMES argues that this approach will be fatal for genuine democracy, and suggests a course of action for dealing with apartheid grievances.

FW de Klerk and his supporters have admitted to the failure of apartheid as a political system, but they have yet to acknowledge its cost, let alone specify mechanisms that will address the consequences of its regrettable successes in some key social and personal arenas of South African life.

Political actors currently involved in the affairs of Codesa and the wider constituencies they represent have been urged to forget the past and to "wipe" the "slate" clean in a spirit of "toenadering" and reconciliation. When speaking to various (white) constituencies during the run up to the March 1992 referendum, De Klerk received loud acclamation when he appealed to the public to leave the skeletons of apartheid in the cupboard where they (presumably) belonged.

The "clean slate" phenomenon is worrying in a number of respects. It frees the present government and their supporters from a moral and financial responsibility for actions which they and their predecessors are accountable. Refusing to face up to the consequences of apartheid, the National Party avoids the financial commitments which a mechanism of redress for past injustice might oblige them to meet. In line with its current constitutional proposals which seek to link the allocation of resources for majorities to the veto of minorities, a "clean slate" frees whites from having to pay for such disadvantages as their past privileges have in part generated. Therefore, if we start afresh, from a symmetrical moral bottom-line, blacks would have to fund their liberation from the proceeds of growth and not from redistributing state revenues based as they largely are on the wealth of whites.

It appears short-sighted to try and build a nation on constituencies that harbour unredressed grievances against a party and a leadership they believe have done them great harm in the past. It is likely that this will produce a political order with an unresolved, fragile and weak moral centre, and constituencies that are polarised along traditional racial lines. Observers of democratic societies have emphasised the importance of establishing personal and professional ties



Failure to address grievances will confirm the idea that whites do not care for the welfare of blacks.

that cut across traditional divisions and loyalties. Policies that are blind to historical grievances will reproduce – not erode – the polarisation between oppressor and oppressed, perpetrator and victim, them and us, whites supporting traditional white parties and blacks traditionally black ones. A future democratic society demands that we break from such divisions, so that people do not at every opportunity divide along (the same) racial fault-lines when confronting the crucial questions of the day.

'It appears short-sighted to try and build a nation on constituencies that harbour unredressed grievances'

Keeping the "skeletons in the cupboard" also fires the already wild imagination of those Africanists who hold whites collectively responsible for a history of colonialism, segregation and apartheid. The NP's failure to admit let alone address the people's grievances will appear to confirm the notion that whites have no concern for the welfare of blacks, a disposition rooted, it is argued, in their status as settlers. The Africanist characterisation of nationality does not assist a democratic project either,

for it freezes the population into two irreconcilable racial groups, locked in an ongoing struggle over resources and political power. Cross-cutting solidarities are not only given short-shrift, they are ruled out altogether.

What, then, is the character of the grievances, and in which social processes are they rooted? This society must live with and confront the shame of racial classification, of tearing families asunder, and of criminalising "inter-racial" sex and "mixed" marriages. We are now feeling the consequences of decades of influx control, pass laws, forced removals and group areas in efforts to create a single-revenue base and service-delivery infrastructure for integrated cities.

The business community faces a skewed and uneven skill profile which a history of job reservation, employment discrimination and inferior education had bequeathed. At Codesa, the political problems of homelands loom large. The question of land ownership, distribution and use could become one of the most intractable problems of a post-apartheid South Africa. It bears mentioning, too, that the widespread and vicious repression and political manipulation of the 1970s and 1980s feeds into the unrelenting and tragic violence of the townships today. This list, by no means complete, is a daunting one.

A distinction can be drawn between grievances based on apartheid practices that diminished the spirit and humanity of its victims, and those that also had material and resource consequences. This is not always an easy distinction to uphold, as the dehumanisation of victim populations often had resource implications too. On this admittedly unsatisfactory basis, we can nevertheless appeal to the world of politics to encourage three sorts of practices: firstly, to openly and honestly begin to acknowledge the human consequences of apartheid by promoting the diffusion of information about our past, however ugly it might be. Lest we trip over our own ignorance, and think we can start anew without properly knowing

the old, an informed and enlightened population can begin the difficult but badly needed process of spiritual reckoning. Funding should be allocated so that historians and other interested individuals can take the skeletons out of the cupboards and dissect their meaning and significance.

Secondly, means of psychological, social and resource support for ex-political prisoners and returning exiles can be provided, in order to facilitate their integration into society.

The Human Sciences Research Council and other bodies ought to fund ongoing research into the problems ex-political prisoners and returning exiles face when looking for jobs, a place to stay, opening a bank account and other taken-for-granted needs of modern life.

Thirdly, provision can be made for non-partisan and wide-ranging corrective mechanisms for those individuals who were demonstrably disadvantaged in resource terms by apartheid measures, for example land appropriation, forced removals and group areas. De Klerk's appointment during 1991 of a commission to investigate land claims was certainly a step in the right



Cause of grievance: "open air" schooling in Soshanguve.

'It might just be possible to turn this remarkably destructive society into one of positive energy, growth and democracy'

direction, but other arenas such as group areas require an investigative commission's attention too. In these terms, the opportunity to lodge a grievance and claim redress in resource terms would be of the greatest symbolic importance. I would suggest that these measures are essential and not incidental to the building of a democratic society, for they

celebrate a new honesty in our political lives and draw a grievance-heavy population, who also happen to be the majority, around a common moral hearth. Many people too easily scoff at the old-fashioned sociological notion that a stable democratic society requires a common value system where people, at best, agree that politics and society are good and, at worst, that it is not bad. By converting grievance into praise, it might just be possible to turn this remarkably destructive society into one of positive energy, growth and democracy.

Wilmot James is associate professor and head of the department of sociology at the University of Cape Town.

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Probing the mind of white SA



Whites voted overwhelmingly in favour of reform in the March referendum – but where do they really stand politically? How informed are they and what are their views on democracy and non-racialism? *Democracy in Action* put these questions to Stellenbosch political scientist JANNIE GAGIANO (left).

What would you say is the level of political education and awareness of the average white South African?

It is probably safe to say that the level of political awareness and knowledge is relatively low among whites.

Theoretically we talk of cognitive, affective and evaluative levels of political judgement. One is likely to find relative depth in the affective awareness of most whites – feelings of disapproval, acceptance, hate, rejection and commitment – loosely structured around the symbols, key concepts, ideologies and values of political parties. Mostly this is based on perceptions and feelings, but it is very poorly articulated. For example, people would not be able to tell you much about the ANC leaders or what their policies are, but they DO know that they don't like the ANC.

In a society like ours basic political feelings are usually well ingrained, but not necessarily based on rational grounds, especially with our strong history of in-group legitimisation and out-group delegitimisation. It is typical to be very circumspect, logical and rational in political exchanges with your kinfolk, but to abandon that style completely when dealing with non-members of the group. As soon as you move out of the in-group the values of civility are suspended.

Are we seeing signs that the political transition process is causing whites to become more involved, thinking and active, the big referendum poll being an example of this?

One could argue that the referendum was an extraordinary event and that it would therefore not accurately reflect the true level of

political mobilisation. The high poll was stimulated by the dramatic political choice and the very conscious communication campaign designed around it. If you argue in this way, then the poll was not a reflection of an independent transformation from passive to active.

However, one could say that the whole process of political transition is shifting beacons and giving people a greater awareness of political issues. Ordinary people can no longer depend on the conventional notions because the sources of those ideas are themselves busy changing their validation of those ideas.

The situation is now one of murkiness and confusion. This could stimulate people to become more available for alternative political values, objectives, plans and ideas that are being advocated by the most important agencies of political formulation.

In a sense the referendum caused a type of activism among English-speaking whites: for the first time they felt they could make a decision which could sway things. We saw people who were not citizens taking out citizenship. Symbolically this willingness to play a role in what is happening in the country is very important. It was more evident among English speakers who can now see that politics is no longer an Afrikaner in-group thing. It is this perception of a bigger role that motivated them to act.

What determines the political affiliation of the majority of whites at this stage?

Political affiliation in the sense of support for political parties is in flux at present because the party system itself is in flux. This is caused by the process of moving away from a political dispensation based on racial segregation to one which aims for the formation of a middle class coalition across racial lines,

but with whites well placed. The forces which will determine affiliation is the extent to which a political party can, on the one hand, abandon or redesign racial affiliation and, on the other hand, support middle class values and strategies for the state, society and the economy.

For that reason we find that the National Party and the Democratic Party can agree on certain issues, on a technocratic, first world, middle class-oriented type of economic dispensation. This could become an affiliation force which will attract most of the English-speaking community as well as the majority of Afrikaners.

One could also talk of a shift from racial to class solidarity. We will find that most whites will affiliate to a political party, across racial boundaries, that is anti-populist and anti-socialist and which protects the Western state, a capitalist economy, independent public administration and so on. In other words most whites will be attracted to the NP and elements of the DP.

The Conservative Party will still play on cultural integrity, which is a form of racial integrity in disguise, and it will still get its 30 per cent. But if this support for a middle class strategy is realised in a constitution, the CP could split because many of its supporters still belong to the party because of a false consciousness. They have not yet realised that what is at issue is not culture, but privilege and power. When they discover that their privilege and power will not be lost, they will switch. Success in establishing an anti-populist state will take most of the steam out of whites' fears.

What about a more egalitarian society?

The constitution will allow for equal rights for all people, but the realisation of this depends on the resources of the state. Formally we will have equal rights, espe-



Dr Zach de Beer and Mr FW de Klerk at a referendum meeting in the Cape Town City Hall.

and in this case especially minorities, should have influence on government by the way the polity is organised.

Whites don't think of the composition of the political community in terms of equal citizenship where every person (not a racial or other type of group) aggregate on a majoritarian principle. The notion is that society originally consisted of elements, like language and culture groups, and that all those elements should be accommodated in one way or another – or the preferences, wishes and interests of those people must be considered when a public decision is made. An institutional dispensation must be created which obliges public representatives to consider their interests. So it is not non-majoritarian principle we are dealing with here, it is deliberately anti-majoritarian.

How does this compare with the ANC's position?

There are of course nuances in the ANC position as they have moved through the learning curve, but their basic principle has always been the majoritarian one of democracy, embedded of course in the typical Western type of constitution which equalises membership of the political community through the notion of citizenship. This does not allow for its particularisation vis a vis social class, culture, race or whatever, whereas the things that still seem salient beyond citizenship in South Africa are exactly those.

The ANC are not simple-minded majoritarians, their majoritarianism is ameliorated by constitutional limitations on majority momentum. But whether they are populist majoritarians or constitutional majoritarians will not materially affect the succession of black people to a position of actual domination of the political system.

The ANC of course downplays "black people" as the majority. But then the question arises whether white people perceive blacks as citizens as well, or whether citizenship is more salient, more primal to them than any other ideas of identity.

Citizenship is a legal status, an abstract notion of an individual's political identity considered more important than others. One finds citizenship realised under conditions where questions of national identity have already been resolved. But when the definition of citizenship is still subject to competing definitions associated with particularisms – race, language culture, etc – one must first resolve that problem. If you put the cart before the horse, then the fight over what is meant by citizenship is informed by different notions of identity.

cially first generation rights which protect accumulated privilege and sets civil society in a relatively autonomous position to the state. Second generation welfare rights? Where does the state get to give? I do not foresee a populist democratic state being established here because that really converts to the official capitulation of the white and corporate sectors which have been very well organised up till now.

They are adamant that they will not capitulate to populism, but they are capitulating to international pressure. So what must they do now to satisfy the international community? They must desegregate society and the state. They are playing on public order based on a strong and well organised state administration and on economic growth. Both these have implications which confront populist democracies – nationalisation, socialism, rapid Africanisation of the civil service. Constitutional limits will be placed on the political occupation of representative points in the system.

Would it be correct to interpret the referendum results as whites having voted for a non-racial future? What do you think non-racialism means to most whites?

If a non-racial future means accepting that you cannot control and organise society along racial lines via the state, then I would say to a large degree whites have accepted that. But if it means that the white community is also comfortable with the political empowerment of black people then I would be very cautious.

That idea is actually a threat to non-racialism in the white mind. To whites, political equalisation with the implication of the succession of blacks to a position of domination in the political system is not an idea commensurate with non-racialism – although that sometimes is what gives non-racialism

its meaning to blacks.

When it comes to "social" non-racialism there is a residual belief among whites that this prospect is far off. They do not see blacks as a social threat, blacks will have to rely on their own resources to achieve social parity with whites. This is not perceived of as an immediate threat that will generate some form of status anxiety among whites. There is a certain degree of confidence that if the state is not exposed to black domination the social position of whites will be secure.

One will probably find that this proposition recedes in plausibility as one moves down the socio-economic ladder. Historically lower class whites have of course depended on the state to reproduce their status in society.

So what we have is an acceptance of non-racialism but not a commitment to the idea that the differences between races are not real or do not matter for whites any more. In a certain sense it is a supreme act of collective repression when whites talk of non-racialism. It remains a factor in our template of thought. Why would there suddenly have been a massive shift in that? That was how we were brought up.

What interpretation do most whites give to democracy?

They still have the idea that a political dispensation can only be thought of as democratic if it preserves a right to influence and an actual sphere of influence for white people.

The underlying rationale of consociationalism, which reflects an anti-majoritarian notion of democracy, would be the practical everyday sort of view you would find among opinion-makers (meaning those people who tell whites what democracy is and whom whites are prepared to believe).

The idea is anti-majoritarian. Everyone,

An Idasa conference on the theme of "Democracy" held late last year drew a critical reaction from the editor of the journal of the Institute for Contextual Theology, Albert Nolan. Writing in the ICT's journal, *Challenge*, he compared the Idasa event to a recent conference hosted by the ICT on the same theme and criticised the emphasis on tolerance which emerged from the discussions as an issue with which whites seemed pre-occupied. He argued that when talking about democracy among black South Africans the emphasis was on addressing the structural inequalities in society. Below are some of the central aspects of Albert Nolan's article, along with three responses by Idasa's Western Cape staff.

ALBERT NOLAN

"For me the star of the Idasa conference was a Nigerian, Prof Claude Ake. He opened the proceedings by declaring that the word 'democracy' had been trivialised. Everyone claimed to be supporting democracy, no matter what their values, interests or ideologies might be. Democracy was no longer a threat to the power elites in the world because it could be made to mean whatever anyone wanted it to mean.

"The conference succeeded in exposing various myths about democracy, nation-building, civil society, ethnicity and about what we might expect from a democratic society. There was a measure of disagreement about these and other issues, but the overall assumption seemed to be that the greatest obstacle to democracy in South Africa today is tolerance.

"Speaker after speaker referred to the perceived high levels of intolerance in South Africa and to the urgent need to educate peo-

An obsession with tolerance?



Democracy conference: C.

Grassroots

DAVID SCHMIDT
Regional Director

ple in the virtues of tolerance...

"Much was also made of the need for a 'culture of democracy', but I soon came to realise that what most speakers and participants really meant was a 'culture of tolerance'.

"I have no argument with the general importance of tolerance in human relations, but the question in my mind throughout the Idasa conference was: why does everyone keep coming back to this problem of intolerance? There must be a reason for it. My question was no doubt influenced by the fact that during four days of intense discussion on democracy at the ICT conference the week before, nobody had made any reference to the issue of tolerance! At this earlier conference the principal obstacles to a democratic future for South Africa were thought to be the concentration of economic power in the hands of a few, the control of the media by monopolies and the role of the security forces...The only conclusion I could draw was that the two different perceptions of what constituted an obstacle to democracy were based upon two different kinds of fear and mistrust.

"...The Idasa conference spoke about democratic freedom as tolerance, the ICT spoke about it as an end to oppression by other forces and powers..."

Call for tolerance essential

VINCENT WILLIAMS
Regional Co-ordinator

Albert Nolan's suggestion that the call for political tolerance, so strongly emphasised at the Idasa "Democracy" conference, could be viewed as a tactic of the ruling (or potential) elite to maintain the status quo, is a valid one indeed. Tolerance does imply a certain degree of acceptance, and there are undoubtedly those elements who use it in exactly this way.

To imply, however, that tolerance necessarily means ignoring the fundamental legacies of apartheid (economic inequality, media monopolies, the role of the security forces etc.) is to conflate the democratic process with democracy as an end result.

What we are engaged in at the moment (Codesa, the National Peace Accord and so on) is the infantile stages of the democratic process. The purpose of the democratic process is essentially to create the necessary

In considering the place of tolerance in the political debate, it is "democratic tolerance" that is the critical concept.

"Democratic tolerance" involves an acceptance that the legal democratic process is the mechanism whereby disputes and conflict in society get resolved.

It does not imply that economic inequality, an unaccountable security apparatus or media monopolies are to be tolerated. It does imply that they should be opposed in a legal, peaceful manner.

It seems to me that all the major political actors have accepted, at least in theory, the centrality of this democratic tolerance. It is this acceptance that drives Codesa with its consensual paradigm and that underpins the National Peace Accord.

It seems clear at the same time that the absence of democratic tolerance at grassroots level poses the most severe threat to our transition. The gap between the national processes and what is happening on the ground is epic. The slaughter continues.

There is a Hasidic parable that captures our great political challenge:

"Imagine a rare bird at the top of a tree. To reach it, people form a human ladder, thus allowing one of them to climb to the very top. But those at the bottom cannot see the bird and therefore lose patience and go home. The ladder falls apart, and up there the rare bird has flown away."

If the fruits of democracy are not manifest in the lives of people on the ground at the very least in the form of an end to the violence, the rare bird of democracy will have passed us by.

Democratic tolerance is about a change of attitudes for it has never been a dominant

Empowerment buzz at media festival

By MOIRA LEVY

Media and democracy – not only the name of the festival held in Grahamstown on April 10 to 12, co-hosted by Idasa and the East Cape News Agency. It also turned out to be the message that underpinned the weekend's proceedings.

A common theme underlying the speeches, the plenary debates and the informal discussions at the pub or over meals was the principle that an effective, free media is a cornerstone of any democratic society – the two cannot be separated.

The festival brought groups together for the first time. Journalists sat down with community press officers to thrash out difficulties and preconceptions. Community newspapers from isolated towns identified common objectives and set in motion plans for co-operation.

The commercial press outlined its plans for assisting the alternative press through a trust fund, and said it already administered aid by printing the independent papers at reasonable rates and selling advertising.

The festival combined conventional conference proceedings with "hands-on" skills workshops. Small-group training sessions ran overtime as delegates produced their own radio and TV programmes, screened slogans onto T-shirts and tried their hand at creating posters and pamphlets.

A comment overheard from a student delegate summed up the spirit: "Now I know I can do it, I know how to do it, I know it can be done."

"Empowerment" was the buzzword. The workshops, run by the National Media Trainers Forum, aimed to equip delegates with a sense of what they could achieve in making their voices heard – through the commercial media or by producing their own media.

The aim of the festival was to build a "media consciousness" in the region and an understanding of the centrality of media in building a democratic society.

Joel Netshitenze, editor of the ANC's

journal, *Mayibuye*, opened the festival with an outline of the ANC's model of a future media dispensation.

He cited the need for anti-trust legislation to tackle the legacy of inequality created by the huge monopolies who are now in control of the media.

He also said the ANC did not see the need for censorship; the rights and responsibilities of journalists would be prescribed by the constitution, the courts and a bill of rights.

But he cautioned that addressing the questions of press freedom and ownership was in itself not sufficient. There was also a need for affirmative action to redistribute resources, for example through taxation and state subsidies, to ensure a voice for those who do not have one. "Even this is not sufficient. You can't say people have the right to watch TV if they don't have electricity... We need to encourage debate and a culture of reading and knowledge of current affairs."

"We need to encourage people to take



Rory Wilson, Calle Badenhorst and Joel Netshitenze

advantage of the new freedoms, otherwise those who have always had rights and resources will be the only ones who act on them.

"We cannot postpone media freedom to some distant future."

In plenary session the commercial press squared up to the alternative press. Rory Wilson, managing editor of the *Sowetan*, urged the alternative press to target a specific readership and market itself.

"The commercial press seeks to make money. Up to 80 percent of our revenue



(centre) with Nelson Mandela and Nthato Motlana.

untouched

concept of our political map. The leadership of the organisations and institutions of our society have a profound responsibility to educate their supporters and employees in this as a matter of urgency. Within the Peace Accord, it is clear that some political leaders have not given this the necessary commitment.

At the same time, it is clear that structural issues are very relevant. Until fair, unbiased and sympathetic policing becomes the norm and until the perpetrators of violence are systematically brought to justice, preaching "democratic tolerance" in some areas will fall on stony ground. Likewise, if some political groupings have no reasonable access to putting their viewpoints through the media, do not expect them to renounce their right of recourse to violence. Nor does the culture of democracy flourish in a squatter camp.

The inequalities and power imbalances of our society are urgent issues to address. But let us address them in the context of democratic tolerance.

A confusion of means

ERIKA COETZEE
Regional Co-ordinator

By comparing the central themes of "two very different conferences" on democracy, Albert Nolan juxtaposes two ways of talking about obstacles to the process of transition in South Africa.

At first glance, the one seems to be characterised by a vocabulary of intangibles: attitudes, values, the spirit in which political interaction takes place. The second appears

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Empowerment buzz

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comes from advertising. If we did not have adverts we would have to rely on subsidies...there is a link between commercial independence and editorial independence.

"You cannot produce a newspaper on an editorial idea alone," he said.

Thami Ntenti from the ANC's Department of Information and Publicity, queried the fairness of commercial dictates. Those who have something to say but lack the resources to say it should still have the right to publish, he said, even if they cannot survive in the marketplace.

There were calls to dismantle the huge media monopolies that own almost all the country's newspapers, but Wilson cautioned that some of the newspapers would not survive without the backing of the mother companies.



Marion Sparg: more crusading journalism

Call essential

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structures and mechanisms by which the legacies of apartheid can be addressed, and it must recognise the fact that we are a multi-cultural society and that divergent views abound.

It is futile to expect that economic justice, control over the security forces and the elimination of media monopolies can be achieved when the structures of our society are geared towards exactly the opposite.

What comes to mind is the two-stage theory which was the subject of heated debate in the mid-1980s. "First we take power and then we create an egalitarian society."

Yes, democracy must address the legacies of apartheid, but unless we can achieve consensus as to how this is going to be done (the purpose of the democratic process), the call for political tolerance (preparedness to engage constructively with those holding opposing views) remains essential.



Gavin Stewart, of Rhodes University Journalism Department, in the chair during the opening session of the conference

The editor of *South*, Guy Berger, added that the alternative press made use of the printing and distribution resources of the monopolies.

Across the spectrum, from the ANC to the National Party, speakers echoed the need to redistribute ownership and control of the SABC, partly by introducing an independent broadcasting authority.

Leslie Xinwa of Radio Transkei said there would still be a need for a state broadcaster in the future, but it would have to be fundamentally restructured.

And speakers, Gabriel Ugoiti of Bush Radio and Libby Lloyd of *Speak* magazine, said the time had come to open the airwaves to community radio, which was the voice of ordinary South Africans speaking for themselves.

Confusion of means

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to speak more concretely: of dominant structures, the distribution of power and access to resources. It is suggested that these two "languages" reflect two different realms of apartheid experience, each extending its own words to express its fear and mistrust.

In one sense this may well be so: it cannot be denied that apartheid successfully blinded the powerful to the most tangible everyday manifestations of racism – and that the disenfranchised must feel patronised by the implication that "tolerance" is all we need in order to live happily ever after. Used in this way, the great call for tolerance indeed becomes an iniquitous power tactic.

However, there is a difference between, on the one hand, taking seriously the intolerance which apartheid has bred and, on the other, proposing that it is tolerance that will lead us to a democratic order. To equate these two is to assume that the only road leading away from intolerance is one of tol-

erance. This may not necessarily be accurate. Marion Sparg of the ANC appealed to the media "for a more crusading, investigating, exposing ethic of journalism. This has been lost in this country. It is the kind of ethic we had in the past, and we need it today.

"Lifting restrictions and telling the press it is free does not mean there is press freedom and media democracy. The media has to start reflecting the reality on the ground," she said.

The idea is not to establish an ANC press, but a free press that reflects the majority of the people, she said.

The message the 170 delegates departed with was that freedom of the press and media democracy would be meaningless if it was not reflected at all levels of society.

Moira Levy is media facilitator with Idasa.

erance. This may not necessarily be accurate.

Intolerance is an active word: it is provocative. There is aggression in the way it excludes and disregards. Many of the obstacles to democracy discussed at the ITC conference – economic, injustice, media monopolies, the role of the security forces – seem to express such intolerance: of poverty and deprivation, of hearing another voice, of fear and brutalisation. It is intolerance that trivialises oppression and keeps the structures of exclusion in place. Tolerance, on the other hand, implies passivity and acceptance. It calls for patience with the status quo, with one another as we are – it pushes change to the back burner. It does nothing to counter and redress the spoils of intolerance.

It seems clear that there is indeed an urgent need to address the intolerance of apartheid. Yet it does not follow that the only alternative is to cultivate tolerance of the present order. Moving away from intolerance can lead us in many directions, including actively bringing an end to oppression in its multiple forms.

BY
SUE VALENTINE

New regions: give less say to politicians

selves or for them to assert a degree of local autonomy.

The reasons for such resistance, said McCarthy, included a fear of loss of control/destruction of

the status quo; a fear of regional separation/regional racism; a fear of exacerbated core-peripheral differences.

In an attempt to address such reservations, McCarthy suggested that such fears could not logically be equated solely with opposition to high levels of regional autonomy.

Turning to the practical problem of defining regions and boundaries to enhance development and reconstruction in South Africa, McCarthy said it was important

that people in a region should identify themselves. The task should not be left to politicians or technocrats.

This might mean that "meaningful" regions, insofar as they meant something to the people living in them, were considerably smaller than those currently being toyed with by the major political parties. They could be the size of a metropolitan area, or the scale of an agricultural subregion of 100km to 150km which had some internal coherence of economic and land usage.

The thrust of regional tier government should be that it was best suited to meeting at least the developmental and environmental challenges of South Africa. Land and resource management were issues which could unite South Africans in a constructive way. However, to do this, regional government structures would need to feel fully responsible for local environmental and developmental management and they should have sufficient funding (possibly regional powers of taxation) to carry out these tasks.

Responses to McCarthy's paper came from Dr Ben Ngubane (Inkatha Freedom Party), Dr Chippy Olver (Corplan - a development group in the Border region), Dr Patrick Maduna (Inyandza National Party, KaNgwane), Mr Alphius Mathebula (northern OFS Forum and also a member of Azapo) and Chief Patekile Holomisa (presi-

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The concept of regional government and a host of related questions came under the spotlight at an Idasa "think tank" held in Pretoria at the end of March.

One issue to evoke sharp debate was that of the nature of the relationship between regional and central government, a question which prompted a range of views from the different political opinions represented at the seminar.

In an address designed to provoke debate, University of Natal (Pietermaritzburg) geographer Jeff McCarthy identified some of the issues confronting those involved in the development of regional government for a democratic South Africa.

The challenge, he said, was how political accommodation, national cohesion and economic reconstruction could be both sensitive to, and in harmony with the complexities of South Africa's regional diversity.

McCarthy said certain questions needed to be asked:

- Which powers and responsibilities should be assigned to what level of government in a future constitution?
- Which boundaries were suitable for local and regional tiers of government?
- What interim measures could be taken with regard to the reform of existing levels of local and regional government?

While regional diversity was a feature of every large state, the legacy of apartheid in South Africa meant that cities, towns, rural areas and regions were all defined, planned and administered as race zones rather than as regions with their own characteristics.

Despite the abolition of apartheid legislation, these apartheid-created zones would not disappear overnight and this would lead to "the temptation to formulate some new, central, post-apartheid planning orthodoxy, and to deploy national resources and decisions accordingly as part of some national effort at political and economic reconstruction", said McCarthy.

He said it was expected that a national effort be made to counteract the decades in



Chief Patekile Holomisa of Contralesa with Mr Alphius Mathebula of the Northern OFS Forum

which the full weight of national policy had been aimed at a racist division of the country. However, McCarthy cautioned against a political centralism that would pre-empt the development of "new, constructive, local diversity in South Africa".

Tackling the problem of the present highly "technicist" approach to demarcating regions in the country, McCarthy said the question of which regions would best suit a post-apartheid South Africa and how or whether they should be professionally or politically devised should be left open.

Throughout the world it was recognised that sound economic development should be based on local comparative advantage. In South Africa this meant that diverse political leadership should be engaged in forging developmental consensus in various areas.

"A programme of local economic reconstruction for the Western Cape, for example, would, of geographic necessity, look very different to one for the Witwatersrand or the Northern Cape. Yet *innovation* in reconstruction will only derive from localities where there is some local autonomy and, therefore, some *incentive* to become innovative."

McCarthy said a "bottom-up" approach to regional government was needed so that people living in the various regions were brought closer to government instead of being alienated from it. Yet the principal political parties were clearly resistant to the idea of allowing regions to identify them-

New Regions

From Page 15

dent of Contralesa).

Dr Ngubane said while Inkatha believed in a single, united South Africa based on the 1910 borders, it also supported regionalism – historically, linguistically and economically.

Restructuring was desirable when addressing the inequalities of the past, but it might be politically and economically expedient to strengthen certain existing structures "to best suit the will of the people and the needs of time".

The IFP believed in devolving power to local communities, but was also committed to integrating all the communities in South Africa "as much as possible".

Regional political autonomy could only be effective if there was regional fiscal autonomy. At the same time, because of the uneven availability of resources, regional and local government would need to be subsidised by the national government.

Dr Maduna of Inyandza affirmed his commitment to a unitary state, but added that appropriate and representative forums at regional level should be developed to ensure thorough debate of issues affecting people in those areas.

Dr Olver argued firmly in favour of a strong central state to address the legacy of apartheid which had been imposed at a national level.

At the same time, however, he said the democratic movement did favour strong regions. There was a strong local and regional tradition throughout the country and political diversity needed to be accommodated in regions too.

Alphus Mathebula rejected the "accommodative approach" to issues which, through its willingness to accommodate all sides and thus dilute differences, left open the possibility that apartheid could re-emerge. Similarly, the "harmonising approach" was to be avoided because it attempted to reconcile the problems rather than eradicate them.

Contralesa president Chief Patekile Holomisa said that when debating possible new regions for South Africa, the homeland boundaries "should not even be considered", although where present regional boundaries did accommodate a homogeneity of people this should not be ignored.

"Traditional leaders can be used constructively or destructively," he said. "They could be employed to promote democracy and the well-being of the people. They should be above party politics, but not out of the political process altogether."

Sue Valentine is Idasa's Media Co-ordinator.

Dogmatic slumber on civil service

BY ALICE COETZEE

The civil service is the machine that runs this country. Openly stating its task as serving the government of the day, it has been the prime administrator of apartheid for five decades.

Now, with the interim government and a new constitution on the horizon, the leopard is being asked to change its spots. Can it do it or must we look for another animal?

Being at the heart of South Africa's bureaucratic machine, Pretoria is also at the heart of the debate and realising this, Idasa's Pretoria office found itself strategically placed to facilitate a debate in March on the future of the civil service during and beyond the transition.

Hans Olivier, general manager of the Public Servants Association (PSA) said that while there was no sign of hysteria among public servants about their future it would be "less than honest" to say there was no concern at all.

He outlined the fears of civil servants, ranging from the fear of the unknown through to specific concerns such as the statement by a political organisation that at least 1 500 top public service posts would have to be carefully scrutinised. This statement, which implied the top echelon could face redundancy, had not been clarified.

"In the event of redundancy, the fear is whether the rights of those affected would be protected and how? I have in mind such issues as pensions, job security, leave credits and the merit principle," he said.

Further, the impartiality of the public service had been attacked. Public servants had been accused of administering an unwanted regime and they feared "some sort of punishment" once a new constitution was in place.

Mr Olivier said he had no doubt that a "vast majority" of PSA members would have "no problem" with the issue of loyalty under an ANC government.

Responding to the fears of the civil servants, Patrick Fitzgerald of the New Public Administration Initiative said people feared the future when they were not part of building it. If public servants could become part of the building of a new South Africa they would cease to fear it, he said.

Stressing the importance of the civil service during the transition, he said the consti-

tution was drafted by lawyers, but operationalised – or not – by the civil service.

South Africa had inherited a caste civil service; white, male, Afrikaner, Christian Calvinists and NP-supporting in its upper echelons. It had suited this group to see the civil service as serving the government of the day and flying the flag of neutrality because it was the same group as the politicians in power.

International thinking about the public service was concerned with multiple accountability, a code of ethics and upholding human rights. South Africa needed to come out of its slumber over many issues and begin discussing the transformation of the civil service among all stakeholders.

Both Chris Fisser, NP MP for Rissik, and the ANC representative, Sindiso Mfenyana, co-ordinator in the secretary general's office, agreed that too little attention had been paid to the civil service.

While Mfenyana called for the restructuring of the civil service away from the "closed shop for whites", he urged that the debate not be confrontational, but take the form of constructive dialogue.

Fisser said South Africa needed a neutral public service, free of discrimination, based on merit and with a commission of administration that would address historical imbalances. He linked affirmative action to enablement while not ignoring merit, competence and experience.

Dirk Mudge, leader of the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance, urged South Africans to learn from the Namibian experience and not compartmentalise its problems. He also warned against easy solutions being offered as election tactics.

"Not much has changed in Namibia, not because the government is unwilling, but because they are faced with the realities of ruling a country which is very different to the tactics used to win an election."

In Namibia, Mudge said, an independent public service commission had been established to ensure a balanced structuring of the civil service. It was responsible for appointing people on merit, taking into account affirmative action for those who were discriminated against in the past. He stressed, however, the need for safeguards against nepotism.

Alice Coetzee is a regional co-ordinator in Idasa's Pretoria office.

'Strukture van oorlewing' veg lustig voort



Daar is tekens dat Afrikaners keelvol is om voorgesê te word deur elitistiese dinkskrums soos die Broederbond en die Ruiterswag. Maar het hierdie Afrikaner-organisasies nog aparte bestaansreg noudat hulle 'n beslissing ten gunste van 'n nie-rassige demokrasie gemaak het? **KOBUS VAN LOGGERENBERG** argumenteer daarteen in hierdie artikel.

Om hom te beskerm teen die ang van die menslike bestaan, die ang van die nie-wees, vir die bedreiging van buite, vir die dood, skep die mens vir hom 'n idee. Die idee word die hoogste norm waaraan hy sy dade meet, waarvolgens hy sy ideale skep. Dit word ook die raamwerk waarbinne die mens homself veilig waan, maar wat hom van sy vryheid en essensiële menslikheid ontnem. Gekerker binne die raamwerk en die skynheiligheid van 'n ideologie of stelsel, word die mens onbewus van die ironie van die lewe: dat juis die dinge waaraan hy krampagtig vasleef hom ontnem word...dat hy wat eerste is, laaste sal wees.

— W A D E K L E R K

Vir die sogenaamde hervormingsgesinde Afrikaners was dit waarskynlik 'n belangrike deurbraak om amptelik van apartheid afskeid te neem – of eerder om waar te neem (en dit gelate te aanvaar) dat die Nasionale Party leiers dit namens hulle gedoen het. Of die afskeid eg en deurleef is, is 'n ander vraag.

Die krampagtigheid waarmee daar nog steeds aan strukture soos die Broederbond en Ruiterswag vasgeklou word (ook deur dié verligte partyleiding), laat 'n mens wonder in watter mate die veranderings wat plaasgevind het uit oortuiging was of bloot die resultaat van pragmatiese oorwegings.

Hoe is dit moontlik dat mense wat op die oog af so 'n radikale politieke ommekeer geïnsieer het hulleself nog steeds kan tuisvoel binne dieselfde organisasies wat nie alleen die beskermers van die apartheidsideologie was nie, maar inderdaad ook deur hierdie ideologie gebaar is?

Die belangrikste en die mees omstrede kinders van die apartheidsideologie is waarskynlik die Afrikaner Broederbond en sy jeugvleuel, die Ruiterswag. As dinkstrum vir die Afrikanervolk moes hierdie organisasies die beginsels en die strategieë uitwerk vir die handhawing van die vryheid, selfstandigheid en eie identiteit van die Afrikaner. Deur middel van hul wye invloedseer (openbare frontorganisasies soos die FAK, Rapportryersbewegings en individue in prominente posisies) is baie

gedoen om die Afrikaner se posisie in die openbare en ekonomiese wêreld te verstewig. By die volk is die indruk geskep dat die leiers inderdaad in beheer is en dus vertrou kan word met hulle toekoms.

In die proses het daar egter 'n paar dinge gebeur. In die eerste plek is die debat binne die Afrikaanse geleedere beperk tot 'n klein uitgesoekte groepie. Die res wat (om welke rede ookal) nie gekwalifiseer het nie, moes van hieraf bloot voorgesê word – die gevolg was dat baie Afrikaners in hulle denke onmondig gebly het.

En omdat die standpunte en debat tussen die Broeders/Ruiters nooit in die openbaar getoets is nie, het hulle onaantasbaar sterk geword in die oortuiging van die korrektheid van hulle denke en hulle vermoë om dit te laat geld. Binne die outokratiese kultuurmilieu van die Afrikaner het die "gewone volk" dit ook gelate aanvaar dat die "volksleiers" vir hulle dink en optree. Ook die Ruiterswag het hom in dié opsig die leiding van die Broederbond dienswillig laat welgeval.

'Die Broederbond en Ruiterswag het bygedra tot 'n houding onder baie Afrikaners dat daar iewers mense is wat van beter weet en die regte besluite sal neem'

Die ironie is dat waar hierdie organisasies hulle juis ook vir die bevordering van die Afrikaanse kultuur moes beywer, alle bewegings binne die Afrikaanse kultuur (op literêre terrein, uitvoerende kunste en musiek) juis buite hierdie organisasies (en dikwels in protes daarteen) plaasgevind het. Johannes Kerkerrel en sy trawante is sprekende voorbeelde hiervan.

Die feit dat daar geleidelik 'n al hoe groter

gaping tussen die NP-leierskap en hulle volgelingen ontstaan het, kan in 'n groot mate toegeskryf word aan die paternalistiese en outokratiese besluitnemingsprosesse binne die Afrikaanse kultuur en politieke laer. Die Broederbond en die Ruiterswag het veral bygedra tot 'n houding onder baie Afrikaners dat daar iewers mense is wat van beter weet en dat hulle die regte besluite sal neem. Hulle het hulself die reg aangemagtig om as 'n betreklike klein groepie vir 'n lang tyd die politieke denke van die Afrikaner te manipuleer.

Vir die eerste keer in 'n lang tyd wil dit egter nou lyk of baie Afrikaners vertroue veloor het in die Broeders en, ironies genoeg, lyk dit of baie van die weerstand teen die regering in 'n groot mate eerder protes is teen die Broederbond en dit wat ervaar word as eensydige besluitneming. Verskeie uitsprake (en optredes) verlede jaar deur veral boere bevestig die groot mate van suspisie wat daar jeens die Broeders bestaan.

Die probleem is nie soseer dat die Broeders en Ruiters verkeerde of swak besluite geneem het nie. Die meerderheid mense in Suid-Afrika is dankbaar oor die veranderings wat plaasgevind het – veranderings wat in 'n groot mate hulle oorsprong in die Broederbond en Ruiterswag gehad het. Verskeie beleidsdokumente van die Broederbond en Ruiterswag wat in die verlede onder die aandag van die pers gekom het, beklemtoon die noue verband tussen Broeder en regeringsdenke. Die probleem lê eerder in die proses van besluitneming wat basies eksklusief is.

Hervorming is basies op die Afrikaner afgeforseer deur leiers wat besluit het dit is nou in die politieke belang van die volk (ter wille van oorlewing) dat dit moet gebeur sonder dat die volk deel gehad het aan die ontwikkeling van 'n morele basis vir die "nuwe" Suid Afrika. Die voorsitter van die Broederbond, prof Pieter de Lange, stel dit

baie blatant in 'n onderhoud met *Sarie* (12 Junie 1991): "Daar is in 1985 besluit om die beloofde land - die 'Nuwe Suid Afrika' - te betree." Die Ruiterswag sê in 'n ope brief in *Rapport* van 25 Augustus 1991 dat die "Afrikaner se leefruimte slegs deur vrede verseker kan word".

**'Of daar ooit in die eie gelede-
dere genoegsaam oor die
morele basis vir hervorming
besin is, is egter
te betwyfel'**

Of daar ooit in die eie gelede-
dere genoegsaam oor die morele basis vir her-
vorming besin is, is egter te betwyfel. Die
volk is in elk geval nooit hierby betrek nie en
dit as sodanig is waarskynlik die grootste
obstruksie vir entoesiastiese Afrikaner deel-
name aan die onderhandelingsproses.
Gharajedaghi, in sy boek *Prologue to National
Development Planning*, stel dit as volg:

"Sometimes, in the rush to effect reform,
laws are passed before moral conversion has
taken place, as has often been the case in the
struggle for human rights...Laws that do not
have widespread moral support are at best
slow to take effect and at worst are ignored
or perverted. Only a morality-based human
rights movement can support political action
that, if successful, culminates in legal
reform."

Waarop kom dit alles neer? Die regering,
Broederbond en Ruiterswag het (inderdaad)
afskied geneem van apartheid. Vir die
Afrikaner laat dit net een van twee keuses: of
hy hou vas aan sy tradisionele groepsbe-
nadering (noem dit apartheid/partisie/
volkstaat/eie groepsgebiede), of hy word
deel van en beywer hom vir 'n nie-rassige
demokrasie. Die Ruiterswag het hom verlede
jaar in die openbaar, in 'n ope brief aan Dr
Treurnicht, tot 'n nie-rassige demokrasie
verbind. Is dit dan nie logies om te verwag
dat diegene wat vir 'n nie-rassige
demokrasie kies ook finaal van apartheid en
die organisasies/strukture/denkwyse wat
apartheid gedien het, afskied behoort te
neem nie?

Kortom, 'n nuwe benadering beteken
nuwe spelreëls. Eksklusiwiteit, geheimhoud-
ing en intellektuele inteling moet plek maak
vir openheid, nuwe alliansies, vir 'n
inklusiewe benadering; waar die oplossing
nie vooraf uitgewerk en dan afgedwing
word nie, maar juis in die hitte van die
oorgesprek saam ontdek word.

Dit beteken nie dat die Afrikaner hoef op
te hou om te wees wat hy is nie, maar dat hy

homself nuut sal definieer en organiseer as
Afrikaner oppad na 'n demokratiese, nie-ras-
sige toekoms. Die enigste eerbare en effek-
tiewe rol vir die Broederbond en die
Ruiterswag in die nuwe Suid Afrika is om,
noudat hulle 'n beslissing ten gunste van 'n
nie-rassige demokrasie gemaak, die vol-
gende logiese stap te doen: om hulleself in
die openbaar te ontbind en ooreenkomstig
die nuwe spelreëls te begin organiseer as
Afrikaners vir 'n demokratiese toekoms.

Willem de Klerk het reeds in dié rigting
begin praat in sy gereelde rubriek in *De Kat*
waar hy voorstel dat die Broederbond in die
openbaar ontbind en 'n nuwe openbare
Afrikaner-belangegroep in die lewe roep om
gemeenskaplike nie-politieke belange te
bevorder.

Die joernalis Hans Strydom wat die
bedrywighede van die Broederbond in
die sewen tegerjare openbaar gemaak
het, het verlede jaar ook daarop gewys dat
die organisasie 'n anachronisme geword het:
"De Klerk sal van die Broederbond ontslae
moet raak. Hoe kan 'n nuwe grondwet
opgestel word deur lede van 'n organisasie
wat op alle vlakke diskriminerend is? Hulle
is nie net diskriminerend ten opsigte van
kleur nie, maar ook ten opsigte van taal, van
geloof en afkoms. Daar is nie meer plek vir
so 'n geheime organisasie nie."

**'Om van Afrika te wees,
beteken om jou
lotsverbondenheid
met al Afrika se
mense konkreet
te maak'**

Lourens du Plessis, regsgeleerde van
Stellenbosch, het by geleentheid ook die
omvang van die verandering wat nodig is,
uitgespel: "Om van Afrika te wees beteken
nie bloot om 'Afrika' as 'n begrip en/of plek
te aanvaar en lief te hê nie. Dit beteken
eerder om jou lotsverbondenheid met al
Afrika se mense 'konkreet te maak' en te
bewys deur, afgesien van die offers wat dit
mag verg, met oorgawe van die toekoms
gemene saak met hulle te maak. En dit is iets
waaraan die witmense in hierdie land nog
behoorlik gewoon sal moet raak."

**Kobus van Loggerenberg, 'n voormalige
Ruiterswag, is Idasa se streekkoördineerder
in die Vrystaat.**

*(Die Broederbond en die Ruiterswag het nie
gereageer op versoeke om kommentaar
te lewer op die artikel nie.)*

Open schools: problems and possibilities

**The opening of South African
schools is an important move in
the dismantling of apartheid.
NAZIR CARRIM explores some of
the issues in this process.**

Although there are varying degrees to
which state schools in South Africa
are actually open to all, the process of
deracialising education has begun. In this
sense, the opening of these schools has cre-
ated useful spaces, which if explored, can
yield important lessons for a future post-
apartheid education system.

In October 1990, the then Minister of
Education and Culture in the House of
Assembly, Mr Piet Clase, announced that it
would be legally possible for white state
schools to enrol black pupils. Mr Clase
offered white state schools three models to
choose from:

- Model A which allowed the school to close
down as a state school and reopen as a
private school.
- Model B which allowed the school to
remain a state aided school but allowed to
enrol black pupils.
- Model C which allowed the school to be
semi-private and semi-state aided.

All of these models were subject to the
same conditions which included that: the
cultural ethos of the school remained intact;
51 percent of the school population
remained white; the management councils
of schools were responsible for the admis-
sion criteria of the school; and, the state bore
no responsibility for any costs or changes
incurred because of black enrolment.

At the end of 1991 a fourth model, Model
D, was announced. This was similar to
Model B, but placed no restriction on the
number of black pupils that could be admit-
ted.

Although these options may be seen as
part of the De Klerk government's reform
initiatives, they must also be seen in the light
of declining white enrolment rates and the



The first day of the new school year at a Johannesburg school.

consequent threat of closure for many white schools.

The under-utilisation and closure of white state schools was a major embarrassment to the De Klerk government since the situation in black schools was, as it still is, characterised by overcrowding, lack of facilities and buildings and no books. The De Klerk reform initiatives provided the political climate to open white state schools to all races.

By the beginning of 1992, between 30 and 40 percent of white schools around the country had voted for the Clase models. Of these, more than 98 percent had opted for Model B and less than 2 percent for Model C. The percentage poll of those schools that had voted ranged from 80 to 98 percent.

Now, in 1992, all white state schools have been asked to vote again to consider Model C (even if they voted for Model B) or to remain as they are.

Underpinning the rationale for the conversion of white state schools to Model C is economics. The government has argued that it cannot continue financing white education as it has in the past and Model C would pass the costs of school maintenance and administration onto parents, leaving the state to pay teachers' salaries only.

The adoption of Model C would also have the effect of minimising the African pupil enrolment rate at white state schools by making them unaffordable to most African parents. It is estimated that school fees at Model C schools would be between R1 200 and R1 500 a year per child, whereas previously, parents were paying between R450 and R650 per child.

Well before these changes in white state schools, schools reserved for and administered by the House of Delegates (HOD) and House of Representatives (HOR) began enrolling pupils from other races as early as 1985. This coincided with the "people's education" movement when these schools were also subject to repression during the State of Emergency.

Since the Clase announcements, there has been a marked increase in African enrolment at HOD and HOR schools. Between 1990 and 1991, it increased by 89 percent to 2 226 percent. Due to already high student numbers, however, HOD and HOR schools have only been able to offer a limited number of vacancies for African pupils.

Like their white counterparts, Coloured and Indian schools have also stipulated conditions which dictate when and how many African pupils may be admitted. These conditions include:

- African pupils can only be enrolled at HOD/HOR schools once all eligible Indian and Coloured pupils have been admitted;
- the cultural ethos of HOD/HOR must be kept in tact;
- neither the HOD/HOR are obliged to provide any assistance to African pupils which may be necessitated by such enrolments, whether such assistance be financial, for transport or support programmes.

African pupils are also subject to entrance examinations which have included standardised intelligence quotient (IQ) tests, language proficiency tests and mathematical ability tests. These tests have been applied in all white state schools and in about 60 percent of HOD schools and 30 percent of HOR

schools. Teachers at these schools are also finding it difficult to teach in a multi-racial, multi-cultural classroom. Their difficulties have ranged from teaching in English to pupils who have English as a second language, to African pupils lacking the basic conceptual skills in subject disciplines, particularly mathematics and science. Another problem is the level at which to pitch lessons due to the different abilities in any one class.

Many teachers have requested workshops to equip them with the skills needed to cope with such problems. This is significant because it illustrates the fundamental challenge facing South African teachers, most of whom have been trained under apartheid to teach in apartheid schools.

Overall, the African enrolment rates at white state, HOD and HOR schools have not exceeded 10 percent of total pupil enrolment.

Due to the low numbers of African pupils at these schools, African pupils are not only experiencing difficulties in their academic work, but also in their socio-cultural experiences at school. In addition, African pupils are also obliged to adapt to, or even to adopt the dominant culture of their schools and their socio-cultural background is marginalised.

Due to these feelings of alienation and low levels of authentic inter-racial experiences, the mode of opening at these schools may be termed assimilationist.

This assimilationism is structurally imposed because the opening of schools occurs within the framework of still existing apartheid legislation – the National Education Policy Act of 1967, the Indian Education Act of 1965 and the Coloured Persons Education Act of 1963 – which govern the policies of white state, HOD and HOR schools.

This legislation prevents these schools from opening to all pupils in a multi-cultural and/or anti-racist manner.

No matter how imperfect, though, the opening of these schools has created useful spaces which can be explored.

Once the new constitution for the country has been drawn up, it seems that South African schools will be able to transcend their current problems and develop a truly non-racial and democratic educational system for South Africa.

Mr Carrim lectures in the Education Department at the University of the Witwatersrand.



New Democracy Training Centre staff members Vino Subramoney and Lufuno Nevhutala with Alice Coetzee (centre) of the Pretoria office.

New training staff

THE TRAINING Centre for Democracy, based at the Johannesburg office, is expanding as courses and programmes get under way.

Vino Subramoney has been appointed as administrator of the centre. Two tutors have also been employed to develop

courses and assist organisations that want to devise their own programmes.

Lufuno Nevhutala, a former lecturer in education and head of residence at Giyani College of Education and Marie-Louise Strom a lecturer in French at Rhodes University.

Course highlights new areas for action

FORTY-FIVE high school leaders from Alexandra township descended on the Ipelegeng Centre recently for a course in democratic leadership.

The Alex Education Co-ordinating Committee had arranged with Idasa to run a course which would help them be more effective student representatives in their schools.

The students, ranging in age from 16 and 21, came from the four schools in Alex.

All were committed to a programme in which they explored concepts of leadership, learnt committee and planning skills and developed an awareness of some of the issues involved in negotiation.

Despite their youth, a number of the students have already had experience of negotiations with government departments and have leadership roles within the community.

The programme was run by staff from Idasa's Training Centre for Democracy together

with co-ordinators of the AECC. The course was jointly designed with the AECC and the students themselves.

While the programme was positively received, it became clear that there are a number of areas where the Training Centre can focus in future.

Despite being articulate and highly politicised, the students lack basic skills in writing and in critical analysis of their own programmes. They understand resistance politics but have very little vision of what they as an SRC could do within the school itself.

The present trend towards negotiations and the creation of a new society eludes them still as they face violence in their streets and deprivation in their schools. We are sure that they are not alone amongst high school students in this and will be putting together a programme which could be used by schools in other townships.

Paul Graham
Programme Director

Training Centre for Democracy gets going

Idasa's Training Centre for Democracy, based in Johannesburg, is a first for South Africa. Using informal adult education strategies, it aims to take the institute's current workshops, seminars and conferences a step further and offer more in-depth training in the philosophy and practice of democracy. MORIA LEVY reports

DEMOCRACY, negotiations, consultations, participation? South Africans encounter these terms daily; seldom can they find out what they mean.

While progress towards elections, transitional government and a new constitution is gaining momentum at a national level, on the ground ordinary South Africans are being left behind. That is where the Training Centre for Democracy steps in.

The first training programme, launched last month (March), brought the concept of democracy into the classroom.

It was a first for most participants. Said one at the close of a Cape Town workshop: "We don't normally talk about these issues. It is important to communicate with our colleagues and say things we don't normally say."

For another the highpoint was the realisation that all South Africans, black and white, share the same fears and hopes. "It cleared up my misconceptions," she said.

"We are not stupid or uneducated people. But we are naive... Fear is the biggest obstacle in the way of all South Africans coming together."

For the 22 people facing each other around the table at the workshop, this was a groundbreaking event. The consensus

was that for the first time ideas they had not understood before were made clear, and the role they could play in building democracy was discussed.

The Training Centre for Democracy launched its first programme with a country-wide workshop series. The aim was to translate the concept of democracy into something that can be practised - in the home, the workplace and the broader society.

The first workshop programme was a response to a request from a multinational company to put all of its more than 500 employees, "from the gardener up", through the training programme.

Idasa Programme Director Paul Graham said, "we explain to people that democracy is not one thing, it is a complicated process. People have to define democracy for themselves."

Included in the programme are discussions and lectures on democracy, proportional representation and participation. Participants have an opportunity to discuss their fears and concerns for the future and raise their questions about the current constitutional changes.

It is hoped that the Johannesburg office can be converted into a school for democracy so that training projects can be held on the premises.

New face in Free State office

GARDIOL van der Linde has joined Idasa's Bloemfontein office as a projects organiser, bringing years of experience as an office administrator.

A member of the executive committee of the Free State Voluntary Aid Bureau, Gardiol

has been involved as a volunteer in a range of community upliftment projects, including "We Care", an organisation that brings together destitute children of all races for educational fun weekends and life skills workshops.

Myeni lashes out at communists

THE INFLUENCE of communists in current and past struggles was raised when Mr Musa Myeni, of the Inkatha Freedom Party's central committee, addressed the monthly Future Forum hosted by Idasa's Natal office.

Speaking to some 60 guests on the role of the Zulu king at Codesa, Mr Myeni said the ANC's national executive committee had more communists than nationalists and that communists dominated the Codesa working groups.

He claimed that in the 1950s leading communists like Joe Slovo and Mac Maharaj had "sat down and drafted what is today known as the Freedom Charter to counter the African claim that Africa belongs to Africans". This statement drew sighs and gasps from the audience as the Freedom Charter was a collective effort and Mr Maharaj was obviously too



Musa Myeni

young to have participated in the process.

Mr Myeni went further to say that through the years communists had consistently tried to destroy the order of tribal leadership. "His Majesty the Zulu king is not asking anyone to be part of the political administration of the country, but he is reminding everyone that he has a role above politics that he must play in the drafting of the new constitution for South Africa."

He mentioned several examples of other African countries

where hereditary leaders played a major role in this area.

"What makes South Africa different is that the struggle for liberation in South Africa has been fought alongside communists. Communists are the biggest enemies of traditional structures and orderliness."

There was sharp reaction during question time from prominent Zulu-speaking ANC members in the audience. They argued that while they respected their king, they were not sure whether he should be relegated to the level of commoners and participate in debates that are politically flavoured as he might find himself exchanging words with them. Mr Myeni responded that the king would not participate in such debates himself, his delegates would.

Paul Maseko
Regional Director

Codesa, Ciskei issues draw crowds

OVER 800 people braved the rain to attend an Idasa public meeting on Codesa in East London in March. Although national political issues were dealt with, the audience turned discussion to local issues, particularly the situation in Ciskei.

The participants were interviewed by Dr Van Zyl Slabbert of Idasa on Codesa and the implications of the referendum results for negotiations.

Mr Mohamed Valli Moosa of the ANC said the referendum had shown that the majority of whites were ready for democracy and he hoped that negotiations could now speed up.

Prof Carel Boshoff of the Afrikaner Volkswag said more than a million people had voted for secession in the referendum and it could therefore not be ignored as an option.

Responding to a question on how Codesa would unfold over the next 12 months, Mr Moosa said white minority rule and bantustans would cease to exist by then. Codesa 2, he said, was the "threshold to an interim government" and before Christmas there would be free and fair elections.

Maj Gen Bantu Holomisa of Transkei cautioned the ANC against becoming involved in an interim government and ending up "driving around in big black cars".

Ms Dene Smuts of the Democratic Party suggested that a fund be set up to provide parties with campaigning finance otherwise elections could not be free and fair.

During question time Ciskei representative Hans Kaiser came under fire over security legislation in the homeland which prohibits meetings of more than 20 people.

Chandré Gould
Regional Co-ordinator

Vrystaat-boere en Hani vind mekaar

IN 'N POGING om die moontlikheid van 'n toename in geweldpleging in die Vrystaat te verminder, het Idasa se Bloemfontein-kantoor onlangs 'n gespreksgeleentheid gereël tussen Chris Hani en Essop Pahad van die ANC (en die SAKP), en lede van die SAP, insluitende die streekkommissaries, genl IT Calitz.

Aangesien die moorde op wit boere en hulle gesinne in die omgewing een van die faktore is wat aanleiding gegee het tot die behoefte aan hierdie gesprek, het boere ook die geleentheid gekry om mnr Hani en mnr Pahad te ontmoet. Beide gesprekke is in 'n gesindheid van welwillendheid gevoer en het besonder bemoedigende resultate opgelewer, ook in terme van toekomsbeplanning oor die kwessies wat aangespreek is.

Mnr Hani het die feit bek-

lemtoon dat geweld nie slegs tot die boeregemeenskap beperk is nie, maar dat swart woonbuurte en ander gebiede ook deurloop.

Van die polisie se kant is daar 'n versoek gerig dat die ANC op gemeenskapsvlak mense sal aanmoedig om die polisie by te staan in hul pogings om misdaad te voorkom. Mnr Gregory Dichaba van die ANC het 'n versoek gerig dat die polisie meer begrip moet toon vir massa-optrede en hulle daarvan moet weerhou om geweld te gebruik, soos wel twee dae voor die gesprek op een van die kleiner dorpe gebeur het.

Mnr Hani het die boere die versekering gegee dat die ANC geen verskuilde of openlike agenda het om mense op plase te vermoor nie en dat misdadigers wat AK47-gewere gebruik meestal nie MK-lede is nie aan-

gesien die wapens oral op onwettige wyse bekom kan word.

'n Verskeidenheid ander kwessies is ook aangeraak.

Van die boere se kant is die ANC-vertegenwoordigers se afwysing van die Zimbabwe-styl van hantering van grondkwessies verwelkom.

Daar is saamgestem oor die gedagte dat produktiwiteit 'n fundamentele kwessie is en dat georganiseerde landbou deel moet wees van samesprekings oor ekonomiese beleid vir die toekoms.

Braam Viljoen het ten slotte genoem dat 'n Idasa-konferensie, waarby boereverenigings, sakekamers, plaaswerkersunies en swart boere betrek sal word, met die oog op die uitwerk van so 'n beleid, reeds in 'n beplanningstadium is.

Kobus van Loggerenberg
Streekkoördineerder

Students workshop challenges

THE ESCALATION of violence at the new resettlement areas and disruptions of classes at high schools in Soshanguve during the first weeks of February brought both parents and community leaders to a point of despair.

In an effort to normalise the situation at schools in particular and to promote a culture of learning and teaching, Idasa was requested to facilitate a workshop at the College for Continuation Training (CCT) in April. SRC representatives from 11 high school attended, as well as observers from a range of community and political organisations.

Alice Coetzee of Idasa, gave an input on aspects of democracy and how it could be made practical. She was followed by Jack Mokobi, former president of the Transvaal College of Education's SRC, who in a strongly motivated speech said SRCs, which used to give



Soshanguve students at the workshop

“muscle and power” to pupils’ struggle for a better education system, were being turned into “a weapon of self-destruction” by many students.

“We all know that the situation at our high schools is tenuous at best. There is a total breakdown of discipline, no or little effective teaching and enthusiasm, and courage to learn has died completely. There is evidence that the SRCs are very much part of the problem,” said Mr Mokobi.

“To add insult to injury there are constant clashes and frictions between SRCs and teaching staff, SRCs and students, and SRCs and parents. This

situation retards academic progress and most of our time is wasted in trying to resolve disputes at the expense of effective learning.”

Mr Mokobi said SRC approaches and strategies sometimes defeated the aims and purposes of their actions. “We are saying that any action we take as SRCs representing our students should be well calculated to serve our purposes without much self-damage.”

He called for co-operation with PTAs and local education co-ordinating committees to address the education crisis. “We need to begin to depoliti-

cise our education and our schools now,” he added.

“Depoliticising education does not mean that the youth should not be politically involved. We even encourage the youth to affiliate to various youth wings of political organisations. This helps to instil party political discipline, a sense of political direction and loyalty to the organisation.”

Mr Mokobi said the success of this workshop would be measured by the extent to which the proposals were implemented on the ground. Among the visible signs should be a return to normal learning and teaching, and projects and campaigns to promote a positive attitude towards the school.

In a message of support from Mamelodi, L J Ramokhoae, chairperson of the SA Democratic Teachers Union branch, said the workshop was a very promising initiative. The Mamelodi teachers felt encouraged by the Soshanguve high schools SRCs’ move to formulate a common understanding of their role as student leaders.

Paul Zondo
Regional Co-ordinator

Development oriented city govt needed

THE FIRST of a series of Idasa seminars to further the local government debate in the Cape Peninsula left participants with no illusions about the magnitude of the developmental and political challenges lie ahead.

The panel of speakers gave the audience, representing most of the stakeholders in the Peninsula, a comprehensive picture of the national debate on local government and progress made in other regions.

Mr Thozamile Botha of the ANC reiterated the need for a national framework to drive the process of restructuring. He called for a national conference on local government restructuring, saying that Codesa was unsuitable for this purpose as many key stakeholders were

not represented in that forum.

Ms Vanessa Watson, director of the Urban Problems Re-



At the seminar... Wilson Sidina (Civics Organisation of the Western Cape) Barend Hendrickse (ANC) and M Siyolo (PAC).

search Unit, argued that an appropriate system of city government could reduce the worst effects of the urban crisis resulting from rapid growth and slow economic development. This, she said,

would require a local government system which was development orientated rather than control orientated, and had the capacity to identify those critical minimum actions which could bring maximum benefits.

Public affairs consultant Helen Zille presented an overview of the positions and strategies of some of the key players in the Peninsula, concluding that these were currently largely irreconcilable and mutually exclusive.

While the Cape Provincial

Administration and most of the white local authorities supported transition in the framework of the Interim Measures Act, all the community-based actors supported a “nationally driven” approach. Ms Zille said a metropolitan-wide negotiating forum seemed unlikely at this stage, but possibilities did exist for negotiations on service-delivery and related issues.

She cautioned that the Western Cape could, even when a national framework was in place, continue to experience polarisation between many existing local authorities eager to retain their autonomy and organisations supporting strong, redistributive metropolitan government.

Crucial for women and for peace

COLONELS AND CADRES: WAR AND GENDER IN SOUTH AFRICA by Jacklyn Cock, Oxford University Press, 1992.

By DEIRDRE MOYLE

A war resister went away from the first meeting between members of the South African Defence Force and umKhonto weSizwe in Lusaka in 1990 with an interesting anecdote.

At the start of the Idasa-sponsored talks, the war resisters – due to one of the many ironies of South African political life – took on the role of facilitators between the two “enemy” parties in order to get the meeting going. Later during informal discussions out of session, and much to their horror, the war resisters found themselves excluded as the “men of war” on both sides relaxed and got down to the pleasurable task of debating the merits of different rocket systems and armaments.

“Colonels and Cadres” is about the opening of that kind of space for discussion and debate on the subject of gender.

In a country marked by great divides, the identities that come into play first in South Africa are usually along the often monolithic axis of race and class.

But the issues are certainly not as clear as black and white. Between and behind those two obvious identities lurk a myriad of others that play out in a complex discourse of interest and experience.

Cock, a Wits university sociologist, has chosen to take gender identity within the context of the militarisation of South African society. This militarisation, she argues, has a profound effect on gender identity and relations as it constructs a powerful and contradictory discourse around women. It allows women to participate in the military, but rarely fight. It allows women to be set up as the noble reason for waging war, but at the same time conquering weakness (as seen as the eternal internal feminine) is the inner battle of every soldier.

To get into this debate, Cock starts with, sadly, the weakest chapter in the book. Her detailed argument to state the case that South Africa is in a “twilight state of war” reads rather like heads of legal argument.

From there she separates the discussion across the enemy lines through a series of interviews that look at the so-called “protectors” – the SADF – and then whom they are protecting – white women. Across the divide are the opponents of apartheid – the resisters

and MK. The experiences of women in both the SADF and MK have remarkable parallels, which give powerful weight to Cock’s argument that the military constructs gender relations in a profound way that cuts across the ideological terrain. From there it is a short distance to argue that gender relations need to be changed away from the “protector” and the “protected” in order to avoid the risk of war.

Her interviews with the women in the SADF are particularly interesting. On one level they give some insight into an area that hasn’t been given that much coverage, but also the colonels come across as very open. While this does raise the question of one’s own assumptions (and perhaps prejudices), obviously Cock was also taken by it. In one of the rare personal descriptions of an informant Cock refers to the first woman brigadier as “an extremely likable, articulate and honest woman”. On the other hand, the interviews with the women in MK are less interesting and generally more ideologically rote. Their criticisms and difficulties in MK are guarded and hastily justified.

The technique of using informants as the basis of the book gives good descriptive and, in many cases, new detail. But I found two aspects of it irritating. The informants were not identified except for some basic bio-

graphic information. But in many cases they were identifiable. For example, how many 75-year-old women are there on the President’s Council? Making the reader work out the informant’s name distracts from the book and becomes a sub-plot of trivial pursuit.

This raises my second point. Cock does not give any account of her methodology so one doesn’t know the criteria she used in selecting her subjects. For purely descriptive information this is not problematic, but Cock runs into problems on the few occasions that she does generalise from her informants.

Part of the avoidance of the issues around methodology could have been that the book wasn’t targeted clearly in terms of its market and so slips between a sociological text and a more popular overview. While this makes the book read a bit unevenly, it certainly does not detract from it and the very real issues it raises.

For women these issues are urgent as they are caught in a splintered and contradictory image of themselves...as “damned whores and God’s police”. For South Africa, these issues are crucial if we want to find a way of settling differences without immediately raising guns.

Deirdre Moyle is the chief sub-editor on the *Cape Times*

Letters

A little patience needed?

I wonder whether Dr Karel Roskam (author of “Racist Parties – what fate? in your last issue) is aware that for most of its 80 years the ANC has been a racially defined organisation?

He writes, rather loosely, that “over the years the ANC held the view that racist organisations should be prohibited in a democratic South Africa”.

In 1959, while living in East London, I applied to join the ANC through its Port Elizabeth office. They replied that it was not their policy to enrol “European” members and referred me to the Congress of Democrats, their partners in the multi-racial Congress Alliance.

My information is that not until 1985, at

its Kabwe Conference, was ANC membership opened to others than blacks.

Does this suggest that, while not encouraging them, we should have a measure of patience with other organisations which are trapped in a racial mould – rather than banning them.

Rev Rob Robertson
Observatory, Cape Town

HSRC close

With regard to your paragraph, “so much for statistics” in the column *Ja-Nee*, please note that a comparison of the HSRC survey results and the referendum results reveals that the HSRC results are, with three exceptions only, within 5 per cent of the actual referendum results.

Robbert van der Kooy
Manager Media and Publicity, HSRC

About dream horses and REAL hopes...

Through the early morning mist swirling like tear-gas, I saw a white horse in the lush green field next to the school where I taught. A young boy stood talking animatedly to this magnificent creature. For a magic moment the world was transfigured and it was no longer a time of war. I imagined the boy riding that mythical horse beyond that mad and ugly time.

I walked closer and the mist thinned. The horse was tired and grey and already its eyes bore the mark of death of a lifetime of hard labour pulling the scrap dealers cart. The wire halter around its neck left its bloody mark.

A metaphor for our age. The sordid tacky reality of so many magnificent dreams laid bare.

A police van stood outside the school gates. It was the winter of 1985. The festival of mass rallies that was the first phase of the school boycott on the Cape Flats had turned dark. The increasingly vicious police action found its violent response.

Every day the barricades would burn on the highway next to the school. The half bricks would smash into commercial vehicles. The Casspirs would roar up and the game of hide and seek cum life and death with the 30 or so boys belonging to the school "action squad" would begin.

The students lined the school corridors to the beat of Michael Jackson's "Killer" blaring out from a ghetto blaster as they watched the action. The adrenalin rush, the orgy of action, the spiral spinning ever faster towards an inevitable conclusion.

One Monday in September 1985 towards midday, a farm lorry disengaged itself from the jam of vehicles piling up some 100 metres from the barricade. It drove slowly towards the burning tyres. The boys on the road rushed back into the school yard. They had seen the farmer pointing a shotgun out of the window of this vehicle before. A lone figure could not get back through the hole in the fence in time. A shot went off. The slight figure staggered and fell. After an age of silence a score of screaming children rushed out and picked him up carrying him above them with his arms outstretched like on a cross. He was pronounced dead at the day clinic. At the boy's home later I remember his mother saying "He was a good boy," over and over again.

To every death its meaning. It is the essence of our humanness that we seek to attach some significance to a death to affirm life. But for me, then, I could see no meaning whatsoever.

The boy was 16 years old and had dropped out of school some time before. He was not political. He had no job. He came to the school one morning to jorl with his friends and ended up on the wrong road at the wrong time with a stone in his hand.

The inquest found that the farmer who did the shooting was not culpable for the death. The lawyers representing the family did not attend because they had mislaid the file.

During the following year the naive political idealism of 1985 faded into the past and the gangster graffiti systematically covered the "viva ANC"s and "long live MK"s.

There was a girl who would walk the school corridors with a sad and desperate look. She had been the bright girl of her Std 7 year. She had walked with a swagger. She had hung out with

main guys of the joint SRCs and would lead the freedom songs. Now she wandered the school, sometimes strutting into a classroom to criticise the relevance of what was taught. She was the accusing angel, the grim reminder of the betrayal of youthful idealism and bravery.

"Nobody can tell that girl nothing," rang the complaints in the staffroom. She never finished Std 8. During that long dark year, three boys in the Std 7 class next to mine were killed in gang-related violence.

Today we stand on the brink of democracy. The older generations gradually reasserted their authority and the role of youth in the political dynamic became increasingly marginal. The 12 to 18-year-olds will not have the vote in the new South Africa. This is as it should be. Yet. The township youth only moved into the political sphere because society did not care for them. We face that problem still.

A language is emerging. It talks of the Lost Generation or Dealing with the Youth Problem. It is not a constructive language. At best it is static and fatalistically pessimistic. At worst it has a racist core, a stereotype assumption of this huge mass of uneducated, unemployable, embittered, violent black youth with nothing to offer but trouble.

The on-going revolt of the youth of the townships unleashed in Soweto 1976 in all its bravery and comradeship, in all its viciousness and terror, was the decisive factor in bringing us to where we are now. It was that which fuelled all the other pressures that pushed us to negotiation. It came with its terrible price in blood and blighted lives. We do have a damaged society. The young have suffered most. But humanity has the power to recover from the worst traumas. The human spirit lives on, it enables us to transcend all horrors.

When I ask today about whether that death on the highway was utterly futile, this I understand. That it was through so many futile deaths that the possibility was created of building a society where the young don't need dream horses to grasp real opportunities.

It is in building such a society that so many deaths without meaning will find their significance and we can all begin to live fully again. There is no alternative. We must impose a meaning on what, perhaps, has none. We must draw strength from the nameless, faceless pain. We must also remember.

The boy who died that Monday in September six years ago was named Moegamat Ebrahim. Long live Moegamat Ebrahim and all those forgotten thousands who died in so many violent and sordid ways.

The girl? She walked up to me the other day in the civic centre. She was there with a delegation of workers from her factory to protest against working and health conditions. "The struggle for the new South Africa must continue," she said with a huge ironic smile and she was again the bright sparkling person I had once known. And then she looked sad.

"But you know," she said, "I wish I didn't have to work in the factory."

David Schmidt is regional director of Idasa in the Western Cape.

BY DAVID SCHMIDT