

201d
15:10 10-10-8864
FINAL

REMARKS BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AT INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS
IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL TODAY
(NAMIBIA)

MONDAY, 3 APRIL 1989

MR. PRESIDENT,
DISTINGUISHED REPRESENTATIVES.

I WOULD LIKE TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING PROVISIONAL REPORT ON
THE DEVELOPMENTS RELATING TO NAMIBIA OVER THE PAST FEW DAYS.

IN A MEETING IN WINDHOEK WITH THE FOREIGN MINISTER OF
SOUTH AFRICA, MR. R. BOTHA, HELD ON 31 MARCH 1989, MY SPECIAL
REPRESENTATIVE WAS INFORMED THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF SOUTH AFRICA
BELIEVED THAT APPROXIMATELY 150 ARMED SWAPO PERSONNEL HAD
INFILTRATED INTO NAMIBIA IN THE PREVIOUS 10-12 DAYS. BETWEEN
500 AND 700 OF SWAPO'S FIGHTING FORCE HAD BEEN MOVED FORWARD AND
WERE DEPLOYED JUST NORTH OF THE NAMIBIAN BORDER APPARENTLY
POISED TO CROSS IT. MOREOVER, APPROXIMATELY 60% OF SWAPO'S
FORCES IN ANGOLA WERE NOW SOUTH OF THE SIXTEENTH PARALLEL. IN
BREACH, HE STATED, OF THE UNDERTAKINGS CONTAINED IN THE GENEVA
PROTOCOL OF 5 AUGUST 1988, SIGNED BY ANGOLA, CUBA AND SOUTH
AFRICA.

- 2 -

SHORTLY BEFORE NOON ON 1 APRIL, MY SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE WAS INFORMED BY MR. LOUIS PIENAAR, SOUTH AFRICA'S ADMINISTRATOR-GENERAL OF NAMIBIA, THAT APPROXIMATELY 50 ARMED PERSONNEL HAD CROSSED THE ANGOLAN BORDER DURING THE NIGHT OF 31 MARCH/1 APRIL, AND THAT INCIDENTS WERE OCCURRING ACROSS A BROAD FRONT IN NORTHERN NAMIBIA, WITH NUMEROUS CASUALTIES. IN THE COURSE OF THE DAY, SEVERAL SUCH REPORTS WERE GIVEN BY THE SOUTH AFRICAN AUTHORITIES TO MY SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE AND THE FORCE COMMANDER OF UNTAG. THEY INDICATED MILITARY ACTION ON A SCALE NOT SEEN IN THE NAMIBIAN CONFLICT FOR SEVERAL YEARS. MY SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE DECIDED TO SEND A TEAM OF SENIOR UNTAG OFFICIALS TO MAKE AN IN-DEPTH EVALUATION AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

LATER THAT DAY, FOREIGN MINISTER BOTHA INFORMED ME OVER THE TELEPHONE THAT HIS GOVERNMENT WAS DEEPLY CONCERNED AND WAS GIVING THE SITUATION URGENT CONSIDERATION. HE SAID THAT IF UNTAG WERE UNABLE, AT THIS STAGE, TO PROVIDE THE NECESSARY SUPPORT TO THE EXISTING POLICE FORCES (SWAPOL) IN ORDER TO CONTAIN THE MASS INCURSIONS, THEN IT WOULD BE NECESSARY FOR HIS GOVERNMENT TO DEPLOY ITS MILITARY FORCES ONCE AGAIN. AS OF THAT DAY, THEY HAD BEEN CONFINED TO BASE UNDER U.N. MONITORING, IN ACCORDANCE WITH RESOLUTION 435. I URGED MR. BOTHA TO SHOW THE UTMOST RESTRAINT IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES, AND TO AWAIT THE EVALUATION OF THE TEAM WHICH WAS ABOUT TO TRAVEL FROM WINDHOEK TO THE NORTHERN AREA. MR. BOTHA AND THE ADMINISTRATOR-GENERAL REITERATED THAT THE EXISTING POLICE FORCES WERE UNABLE TO CURTAIL THE INFILTRATION OF ARMED PERSONNEL, SOME OF WHOM HAD BEEN REPORTED TO BE CARRYING NOT ONLY THEIR PERSONAL WEAPONS.

BUT ALSO MORTARS AND ANTI-TANK AND ANTI-AIRCRAFT WEAPONRY. HE EMPHASIZED THAT IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE FOR SOUTH AFRICA TO REMAIN PASSIVE, AND ITS TROOPS CONFINED TO BASE, IN THE FACE OF THESE EVENTS, PARTICULARLY SINCE UNTAG'S DEPLOYMENT HAD BEEN DELAYED.

DURING THE DAY OF 1 APRIL, I AND MY ASSISTANTS WERE IN CONTACT WITH MR. BEN GURIRAB, THE FOREIGN SECRETARY OF SWAPO, WHO IS IN NEW YORK. I INFORMED MR. GURIRAB OF MY CONVERSATION WITH MR. BOTHA AND OF THE REPORTS FROM MY SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE AND THE FORCE COMMANDER OF UNTAG. I URGED HIM TO CONTACT SWAPO HEADQUARTERS AND TO DO WHATEVER HE COULD TO AFFECT THE SITUATION POSITIVELY. I HAD A SIMILAR CONVERSATION WITH THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF ANGOLA.

IT WILL BE RECALLED THAT DISCUSSION IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL RELATING TO A DATE FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF RESOLUTION 435 HAD BEGUN IN DECEMBER 1988, IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE ADOPTION OF THE TRIPARTITE AGREEMENT BETWEEN ANGOLA, CUBA AND SOUTH AFRICA, WHICH HAD ALSO STIPULATED 1 APRIL 1989 FOR THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE TRANSITION PERIOD (DOCUMENT S/20325). THE COUNCIL'S ENABLING RESOLUTION (RESOLUTION 632), HOWEVER, HAD NOT BEEN ADOPTED UNTIL 16 FEBRUARY, WITH UNTAG'S BUDGET BEING APPROVED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON 1 MARCH 1989. THUS, THE SIX TO EIGHT WEEKS' LEAD-TIME, WHICH I HAD REITERATED ON MANY OCCASIONS AS BEING THE ABSOLUTE MINIMUM PERIOD NECESSARY TO PERMIT UNTAG TO BE FULLY EFFECTIVE ON 1 APRIL, WAS, INSTEAD, REDUCED TO FOUR WEEKS. CONSEQUENTLY, THE OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY OF UNTAG IN ITS EARLY PHASE HAD BEEN SEVERELY HAMPERED BY THE

- 4 -

AS-YET LIMITED AVAILABILITY OF, ESPECIALLY, VEHICLES, COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT AND ACCOMMODATION. WHILE, THEREFORE, MY SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE AND HIS SENIOR STAFF, TOGETHER WITH THE FORCE COMMANDER AND HIS SENIOR OFFICERS, WERE EMPLACED IN NAMIBIA ON OR BEFORE 1 APRIL, THE ARRIVAL OF OTHER PERSONNEL NECESSARY FOR THE EFFECTIVE FUNCTIONING OF UNTAG HAS BEEN DELAYED AS RESOURCES WERE NOT AVAILABLE TO MAKE THEM OPERATIONAL. WHILE 280 OF THE 300 MILITARY MONITORS WERE IN PLACE THROUGHOUT THE TERRITORY ON 1 APRIL, THEIR EFFECTIVENESS, ALSO, WAS SERIOUSLY HAMPERED BY THEIR LIMITED MOBILITY AND RESTRICTED ACCESS TO COMMUNICATIONS. IT IS UNLIKELY THAT UNTAG'S REGIONAL AND DISTRICT CENTRES, TO BE SPREAD OUT THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY, WILL BE FULLY OPERATIONAL BEFORE LATE APRIL; AND THE POLICE MONITORS, WHO HAVE A VITAL ROLE TO PLAY THROUGHOUT THE COMMUNITY, WILL ALSO NOT BE FULLY DEPLOYED UNTIL THE SAME TIME. FURTHERMORE, THE THREE ENLARGED BATTALIONS THAT ARE TO BE DEPLOYED WILL NOT BE FULLY EMPLACED UNTIL 20 APRIL.

IN ALL THESE CIRCUMSTANCES AND UPON THE URGENT AND JOINT RECOMMENDATION OF MY SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE AND THE FORCE COMMANDER OF UNTAG, I AUTHORIZED THEM TO ACCEPT A STRICTLY LIMITED AND TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF THE REQUIREMENT FOR SOME UNITS OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN MILITARY TO BE CONFINED TO BASE, EXPRESSED IN THE FOLLOWING LANGUAGE AGREED BETWEEN THEM AND THE ADMINISTRATOR-GENERAL: -- QUOTE CERTAIN SPECIFIED UNITS, TO BE AGREED, WILL BE RELEASED FROM RESTRICTION TO BASE TO PROVIDE SUCH SUPPORT AS MAY BE NEEDED BY THE EXISTING POLICE FORCES, IN CASE THEY CANNOT HANDLE THE SITUATION BY THEMSELVES. THE

SITUATION WILL BE KEPT UNDER CONTINUOUS REVIEW AND THE MOVEMENT OUT OF EXISTING BASES WILL THROUGHOUT BE MONITORED BY UNTAG MILITARY OBSERVERS. UNQUOTE

IN ADDITION, A TEAM OF SENIOR UNTAG OFFICIALS DEPARTED IMMEDIATELY FOR NORTHERN NAMIBIA TO INVESTIGATE THE SITUATION. THE TEAM, COMPRISING THE DEPUTY FORCE COMMANDER, BRIG. GENERAL DANIEL OPANDE, MILITARY, POLICE AND CIVILIAN PERSONNEL, TRAVELLED THAT NIGHT TO OSHAKATI. IN THE COURSE OF THE NIGHT THEY DISCUSSED ALL ASPECTS OF THE SITUATION WITH THE SOUTH AFRICAN SECURITY FORCES. THEY ALSO INTERVIEWED THE PERSONS WHO HAD BEEN CAPTURED BY THE SOUTH AFRICAN SECURITY FORCES. THE OFFICER COMMANDING SWAPOL TOLD THE UNTAG TEAM THAT THE POLICE ALONE WERE NO LONGER ABLE TO HANDLE THE SITUATION AND THAT THEY NEEDED SUPPORT.

BY THE MORNING OF 2 APRIL, THE NUMBER OF PERSONNEL INDICATED AS INFILTRATORS BY THE SOUTH AFRICAN DEFENCE FORCES WAS SAID BY THEM TO BE 430. AT THE END OF THAT DAY, THE NUMBER WAS SAID BY THEM TO HAVE REACHED APPROXIMATELY 1,100. CASUALTIES WERE ALSO MOUNTING RAPIDLY, SO THAT BY THE EVENING OF 2 APRIL, THE NUMBER OF DEAD AND WOUNDED, ACCORDING TO THE ADMINISTRATOR-GENERAL, WAS MORE THAN 120.

IN BEING INTERVIEWED, THE TWO PRISONERS STATED TO THE UNTAG TEAM THAT THEY WERE THE PERSONS REPORTED TO HAVE BEEN CAPTURED BY THE SECURITY FORCES ON THE PREVIOUS DAY. ACCORDING TO THE REPORT THAT I HAVE RECEIVED, THEY STATED THAT THEY

BELONGED TO SWAPO ARMED UNITS AND THAT THEY HAD BEEN TOLD BY THEIR REGIONAL COMMANDERS TO ENTER NAMIBIA. EACH SAID THAT HE HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED NOT TO ENGAGE THE SECURITY FORCES, EVEN IF HE SAW THEM, BECAUSE A CEASE-FIRE WAS TO BE IN EFFECT AND THERE WAS TO BE NO MORE FIGHTING. THE UNIT TO WHICH EACH BELONGED WAS, HOWEVER, TO CARRY WITH IT ALL THEIR ITS ARMS, EVEN ROCKETS AND ANTI-AIRCRAFT DEVICES. ONE HAD ENTERED ALONE; THE OTHER, IN A GROUP OF BETWEEN 40-50 PERSONNEL. ONE SAID THAT HE HAD BEEN TOLD BY HIS DETACHMENT COMMANDER THAT HE WOULD BE INSTRUCTED, IN NAMIBIA, WHERE HE SHOULD GO, SO THAT THE UNITED NATIONS WOULD SUPERVISE HIM AND HIS COLLEAGUES. THE OTHER SAID THAT HE HAD BEEN SENT TO FIND OUT WHETHER THE SECURITY FORCES WERE STILL HUNTING SWAPO FIGHTERS, OR WERE OBSERVING THE CEASE-FIRE. HIS COMMANDER WAS TO JOIN HIM IN NAMIBIA. THEIR PURPOSE WAS THEN TO COME AND ESTABLISH BASES INSIDE NAMIBIA. THE TEAM ASKED THE DETAINEE IF THE BASES WERE "FOR FIGHTING OR FOR PEACE". HE REPLIED THAT IT WAS NECESSARY TO HAVE A BASE INSIDE NAMIBIA AND THAT UNITED NATIONS PERSONNEL WOULD THEN COME AND TAKE CARE OF THEM. EACH REITERATED SEVERAL TIMES THAT THEY HAD BEEN TOLD THAT THE WAR WAS ABOUT TO BE OVER, AND THAT THEY WERE TO ENTER NAMIBIA AND HELP TO ESTABLISH A BASE WHICH WOULD THEN BE UNDER THE UNITED NATIONS. THE WINDHOEK OFFICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS HAS BEEN INFORMED OF THE DETAILS OF THESE CAPTIVES.

- 7 -

IN LIGHT OF THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE SITUATION AND THE DISPARITY BETWEEN THE OBJECTIVES OF THE CAPTIVES, AS CONVEYED BY THEM, ON THE ONE HAND, AND THOSE ATTRIBUTED TO THEM BY THE SECURITY FORCES WHO HAD SEEN THEIR INTENTION AS AGGRESSIVE AND HOSTILE, ON THE OTHER, THE TEAM IMMEDIATELY CALLED ON THE SECURITY FORCES TO EXERCISE THE MAXIMUM POSSIBLE RESTRAINT, WHILE IMMEDIATE EFFORTS WERE MADE TO RESOLVE THE SITUATION. LATER THE SAME DAY, MR. AHTISAARI AND GENERAL PREM CHAND AGAIN MET WITH THE ADMINISTRATOR-GENERAL, ALSO IN THE PRESENCE OF THE GENERALS COMMANDING THE LOCAL MILITARY AND POLICE, AND URGED MAXIMUM RESTRAINT WHILE THE MATTER WAS BEING RESOLVED.

GIVEN THESE DEVELOPMENTS, I HAVE ALSO REQUESTED THE UNDER-SECRETARY-GENERAL FOR SPECIAL POLITICAL AFFAIRS, MR. MARRACK GOULDING, TO PROCEED IMMEDIATELY FROM THE MIDDLE EAST TO THE REGION, AND HE IS DUE TO ARRIVE IN LUANDA ON TUESDAY, 4 APRIL. MEMBERS OF THE TEAM, WHO WENT TO NORTHERN NAMIBIA ON 2 APRIL, WILL MEET WITH MR. GOULDING IN LUANDA. I HAVE BEEN INFORMED BY THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE THAT THE ADMINISTRATOR-GENERAL HAS TOLD HIM THAT SWAPO PERSONNEL ARE CONTINUING TO CROSS THE BORDER IN LARGE NUMBERS, AND THAT THE DEATH TOLL IS RISING HOURLY.

FOR ITS PART, SWAPO HAS EMPHATICALLY DENIED THAT IT HAS VIOLATED THE CEASE-FIRE AND HAS STATED THAT IT IS COMMITTED TO HONOURING ITS LETTER AND SPIRIT. IN A PRESS RELEASE ISSUED ON 2 APRIL IN HARARE AND TRANSMITTED TO THE SECRETARIAT SHORTLY AFTER NOON TODAY, SWAPO HAS STATED THAT ITS PERSONNEL WERE ATTACKED

- 8 -

INSIDE NAMIBIA AND RESPONDED IN SELF-DEFENCE. FOR INSTANCE IN OKAHANGE, THE PRESS RELEASE SAYS THAT SWAPO MEMBERS WERE CELEBRATING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 435 WHEN THEY WERE ATTACKED BY SOUTH AFRICAN SOLDIERS. THE SAME RELEASE ALSO SAYS THAT SOME OF THEIR MEMBERS AND SUPPORTERS WERE ALSO KILLED BY SOUTH AFRICAN FORCES IN OTHER LOCATIONS IN NORTHERN NAMIBIA -- FOR INSTANCE, AT OKALONGO AND ANANGHULO AND OKADILA. I HAVE TRANSMITTED THIS PRESS RELEASE OF SWAPO'S TO MY SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE IN NAMIBIA AND HAVE ASKED HIM TO REPORT TO ME ON THE STATEMENTS THAT HAVE BEEN MADE IN IT.

HAVING THUS APPRISED COUNCIL MEMBERS OF THE FACTS AS THEY HAVE BEEN PRESENTED TO US, I WOULD LIKE TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING REMARKS:

FIRST, AS I REPORTED TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON 30 MARCH 1989 (IN DOC. S/20412, ADD. 2), BOTH PARTIES CONFIRMED THEIR AGREEMENT TO ABIDE BY THE FORMAL CEASE-FIRE FROM THE DATE AND TIME EARLIER PROPOSED, I.E., 1 APRIL 1989. THUS, ON 18 MARCH 1989, MR. SAM NUJOMA, PRESIDENT OF SWAPO REPLIED TO ME AS FOLLOWS:

"THIS IS TO ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF YOUR EXCELLENCY'S LETTER DATED 14 MARCH 1989, IN WHICH, INTER ALIA, INDICATED THAT A SIMILAR LETTER WOULD BE SENT TO SOUTH AFRICA, PROPOSING A SPECIFIC DATE AND HOUR FOR THE FORMAL CEASE-FIRE TO BEGIN IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 435 (1978); AND THAT THE CEASE-FIRE COMES INTO EFFECT ON 1 APRIL 1989 AT 0400 HOURS GREENWICH MEAN TIME.

"IN THIS CONNECTION, I WOULD LIKE TO RECALL THAT I SENT A LETTER TO YOUR EXCELLENCY (S/20129) DATED 12 AUGUST 1988, IN WHICH I STATED, INTER ALIA, SWAPO'S ACCEPTANCE OF THE DE FACTO CESSATION OF ARMED HOSTILITIES IN AND AROUND NAMIBIA BETWEEN SOUTH AFRICA AND SWAPO, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE GENEVA PROTOCOL OF 5 AUGUST 1988.

"I ACCORDINGLY HEREBY DECLARE SWAPO'S ACCEPTANCE OF THE TERMS OF THE CEASE-FIRE AS STIPULATED IN YOUR EXCELLENCY'S LETTER DATED 14 MARCH 1989. FURTHERMORE, I WOULD LIKE TO REITERATE SWAPO'S COMMITMENT SCRUPULOUSLY TO WORK IN EARNEST FOR A PEACEFUL AND SUCCESSFUL IMPLEMENTATION OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 435 (1979), LEADING TO THE GENUINE INDEPENDENCE OF NAMIBIA.

"IN THIS CONTEXT, I WISH, ONCE AGAIN, TO URGE YOUR EXCELLENCY TO CONTINUE TO EXERT YOUR BEST EFFORTS WITH A VIEW TO ENSURING THAT VIOLENCE AND INTIMIDATION WOULD BE AVOIDED AT ALL COST.

"ACCEPT, YOUR EXCELLENCY, RENEWED ASSURANCES OF MY HIGHEST CONSIDERATION."

ON 21 MARCH, I HAD RECEIVED THE REPLY OF MR. R. F. BOTHA, FOREIGN MINISTER OF SOUTH AFRICA, WHICH WAS AS FOLLOWS:

"I REFER TO YOUR LETTER DATED 14 MARCH 1989 REGARDING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A FORMAL CEASE-FIRE IN SOUTH WEST AFRICA/NAMIBIA AS FORESEEN IN UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTION 435 (1978).

"YOUR EXCELLENCY WILL RECALL THAT IN MY COMMUNICATION TO YOU ON 8 AUGUST 1988, I CONVEYED TO YOU THE ACCEPTANCE OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE GENEVA PROTOCOL BY THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT. I ALSO CONFIRMED, IN TERMS OF THE PROVISIONS OF PARAGRAPH 5 OF THE PROTOCOL, THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT'S COMMITMENT TO ADOPT THE NECESSARY MEASURES OF RESTRAINT IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN THE EXISTING DE FACTO CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES.

"IN ADDITION, I WISH TO CONFIRM THAT THE DE FACTO CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES SHOULD BE FORMALIZED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AND NOT LATER THAN 04H00 GREENWICH MEAN TIME ON 1 APRIL 1989."

MY SECOND REMARK IS THIS. THE MOUNTING TOLL OF NAMIBIAN AND SOUTH AFRICAN CASUALTIES, AT THE VERY MOMENT WHEN THE LONG-DELAYED INDEPENDENCE PROCESS HAS AT LAST COMMENCED, IS ESPECIALLY TRAGIC. ON THE BASIS OF INFORMATION SO FAR AVAILABLE TO IT, UNTAG IS OF THE VIEW THAT SWAPO HAD INFILTRATED ARMED PERSONNEL AND MATERIAL INTO NAMIBIA AROUND THE TIME OF THE

CEASE-FIRE. UNTAG, HOWEVER, FEELS THAT THIS INFILTRATION MAY NOT HAVE OFFENSIVE INTENT, BUT INSTEAD MAY BE AIMED AT THE ESTABLISHMENT OF SWAPO CAMPS INSIDE THE TERRITORY, WHICH SWAPO WOULD THEN REQUEST UNTAG TO MONITOR. SWAPO, FOR ITS PART, HAS EMPHATICALLY DENIED ANY INFILTRATION AND HAS STATED THAT ITS SUPPORTERS INSIDE NAMIBIA HAVE BEEN ATTACKED. IF THE INTEGRITY OF THE SETTLEMENT PROPOSAL, WHICH TOOK MANY YEARS OF DIFFICULT NEGOTIATION TO CONCLUDE, IS NOT RESPECTED BY ANY PARTY, THEN THE PEOPLE OF NAMIBIA WILL AGAIN BE THE PRINCIPAL SUFFERERS. IT IS THEREFORE MOST NECESSARY FOR ALL CONCERNED TO EXERCISE THE MAXIMUM RESTRAINT AT THIS TIME, AND TO ADVANCE AND REINFORCE PRACTICAL ARRANGEMENTS TO IMPLEMENT EACH AND EVERY ASPECT OF THE SETTLEMENT. THIS IS A MATTER OF THE GREATEST ^{political} HUMANITARIAN URGENCY, IN VIEW OF THE GRAVE SITUATION NOW EXISTING ALONG PARTS OF THE NORTHERN BORDER OF NAMIBIA.

I WILL OF COURSE KEEP THE COUNCIL INFORMED OF DEVELOPMENTS.

* * *

CONFIDENTIAL
VERTROUOLIK

VERSENDINGSNOMMER
NVN0451

+DOKUMENTNOMMER.

89NVN04510BB

VERSENDINGS/AFHANDELINGSVOORRANG

ONMIDDELLIK

+KODES.

D-G MIN 257 SWA

+LEERNOMMER.

9/1/14/3 8/2/3

+SEKERHEIDSKLASSIFIKASIE.

VERTROUOLIK

+DATUM.

19890403

+AFSENDER.

NVN

+ONTVANGER VIR AKSIE.

DIRG

+ONTVANGER TER INLIGTING.

MINR DSWA WINDHOEK (MR VON HIRSCHBERG) WASHINGTON LONDEN

0A45 SK2

+ONDERWERP/VERRYKING.

SECURITY COUNCIL: INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS

+INHOUD.

BERIGNOMMER

NVN0451

BELANGRIKHEID

BAIE BELANGRIK

NAAM VAN BEAMPTTE/DEPARTEMENT

AMBASSADEUR/AA

SLEGS VIR/DEPARTEMENT

1. MY FAXNO.:262 DD 3 APRIL 1989 CONTAINS THE TEXT OF THE PROVISIONAL REPORT READ TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL (SG) AT THE INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS WHICH BEGAN THIS AFTERNOON AT 18H30.
2. AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE MEETING THE PRESIDENT, MR A BELANOGOV OF THE USSR, READ OUT THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT:

"MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL HAVE HEARD THE PROVISIONAL REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE SITUATION IN NORTHERN NAMIBIA. THEY ARE GRATEFUL TO HIM FOR THIS REPORT. I HOPE IT WILL BE CONSIDERED URGENTLY BY MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL IN CONSULTATION WITH THEIR GOVERNMENTS.

IN THE MEANTIME, AS PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, I WOULD LIKE TO STRESS THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE TERRITORY. I DEEPLY REGRET THE LOSS OF LIFE AND CALL ON ALL PARTIES TO EXERCISE MAXIMUM RESTRAINT. IN MY VIEW, THE INTERESTS OF INDEPENDENCE OF NAMIBIA REQUIRE FULL CO-OPERATION OF THE PARTIES WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND HIS SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE AND SCRUPULOUS RESPECT FOR THE AGREEMENTS RELATING TO THE SETTLEMENT PLAN. THE FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 435 (1978) IS IN THE INTERESTS OF ALL THE PEOPLE OF NAMIBIA, AND THE MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL ARE DETERMINED THAT IT SHOULD BE IMPLEMENTED SUCCESSFULLY. THEY FULLY SUPPORT THE EFFORTS OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO RESOLVE THE PRESENT CRISIS.

CONFIDENTIAL
VERTROUWLIK

3. ACCORDING TO INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM THE UNITED KINGDOM PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE THERE WAS A MOVE IN THE COUNCIL TO TAKE NO ACTION TONIGHT AND SIMPLY TO REFER THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S STATEMENT TO GOVERNMENTS FOR COMMENT. THE UK, SUPPORTED BY FINLAND AND CANADA, ARGUED THAT A STATEMENT WAS ESSENTIAL AND AS A RESULT THE SOVIET PRODUCED THE ABOVE OF WHICH THE UK DELEGATION SAYS THAT IT WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE SENTENCE AT THE END NAMELY FULL SUPPORT FOR THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S EFFORTS. THIS SENTENCE THEY BELIEVE WAS ESSENTIAL AS IT UNDERROOTS THE ARGUMENTS THAT THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE AND HIS TEAM ARE BIASED IN FAVOUR OF SOUTH AFRICA - AN ARGUMENT THAT IS BEING DEPLOYED BY SWAPO AND ITS SUPPORTERS.
4. ETHIOPIA AND ALGERIA OBJECTED TO THIS SENTENCE, BUT WERE FORCED TO JOIN THE CONSENSUS. THE NON-ALIGNED MEMBERS TRIED TO KEEP THE DISCUSSION AS LOW KEYED AS POSSIBLE. THE AFRICANS ARE TAKING A STAND OF SUPPORTING SWAPO IN PUBLIC ALTHOUGH THEY ARE WELL AWARE THAT IT HAS MADE A FOOL OF ITSELF.
5. WE HAVE POINTED OUT TO THE UK THAT THE COMMENT IN THE SG'S REPORT (SEE PAGE 11) CONCERNING THE UNCERTAINTY OF ANY OFFENSIVE INTENT DID NOT DETRACT FROM THE FACT THAT CROSS BORDER MOVEMENTS WERE ILLEGAL UNLESS THEY TOOK PLACE WITHOUT WEAPONS IN CERTAIN DESIGNATED POINTS. SWAPO COULD NOT HAVE FAILED TO BE AWARE OF THIS. WHATEVER THE REASON, IT WAS A VIOLATION OF THE IMPLEMENTATION PLAN, HENCE OF RESOLUTION 435. THE UK DELEGATION INDICATED THAT IT DREW ATTENTION TO THIS POINT DURING THE MEETING. WE HAVE ALSO POINTED OUT THAT THE FACT THAT HEINGOB WAS FOUND AMONGST THE CASUALTIES IS A PRACTICAL REFUTATION OF SWAPO'S CLAIM THAT THE FORCES ENGAGED BY SWAPO WERE ALREADY RESIDENT IN THE TERRITORY.
6. MEMBERS HAVE BEEN ASKED TO CONVEY THE REPORT TO THEIR GOVERNMENTS FOR CONSIDERATION AND THE PRESIDENT PROPOSES TO HOLD BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS THROUGHOUT THE DAY TOMORROW (4TH APRIL), WHEREAFTER THE COUNCIL WILL DECIDE WHAT FURTHER STEPS TO TAKE. IT IS ALSO AWAITING A FULLER REPORT FROM THE SG AS HE PROMISED IN HIS STATEMENT.
7. IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, A MEETING OF THE COUNCIL IS NOT EXPECTED TOMORROW UNLESS THE EMOTIONS DISPLAYED BY AMBASSADOR ZUZE OF ZAMBIA (WHO IS ALSO PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL OF NAMIBIA) GET THE BETTER OF HIM. HE HAS INDICATED THAT ZAMBIA WILL REQUEST AN URGENT MEETING OF THE COUNCIL IN ORDER TO CONDEMN SA AGGRESSION. HIS COLLEAGUES ARE SAID TO BE ENDEAVOURING TO DISSUADE HIM, MOST NOTABLY THE ZIMBABWEANS, BUT WE SHALL NOT KNOW UNTIL TOMORROW WHETHER THEY HAVE BEEN SUCCESSFUL.

CONFIDENTIAL
VERTROUWLIK

COMMENT

WHILE THE SG'S REPORT COULD FROM OUR VIEWPOINT HAVE BEEN STRONGER, IT IS CLEAR THAT THERE WAS INFILTRATION. WHATEVER THE REASON IT IS A CONTRAVENTION OF SWAPO'S UNDERTAKINGS INCLUDING THE MOST RECENT ONE ON THE CEASE-FIRE. ANGOLA IS FULLY AWARE OF THE SITUATION (SEE MY TLX NVN0447) AND SHOULD BE AMENABLE TO PRESSURE FROM OUR SIDE IN VIEW OF THE CONSEQUENCES FOR IT OF THE FAILURE OF THE PRESENT IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS. THERE IS NO DOUBT TO OUR MIND THAT THE ANGOLANS ARE FULLY AWARE OF THE RISK IF SWAPO IS NOT BROUGHT INTO LINE. IN THIS REGARD NUNOMIA'S VISIT TO ONGIVA IS A USEFUL CARD FOR US TO PLAY, BEARING IN MIND THAT WE MUST NOT COMPROMISE THE SOURCE OF THIS INFORMATION.

YOU MAY WISH TO ASK CERTAIN BILATERAL MISSIONS TO APPROACH FOREIGN MINISTRIES URGENTLY WITH A VIEW TO THEIR DELEGATIONS BEING INSTRUCTED TO REACT POSITIVELY AND COME OUT STRONGLY AGAINST SWAPO. THEY WILL OF COURSE BE TOLD THAT THERE IS NO WAY IN WHICH A RESOLUTION INCLUDING SUCH CONDEMNATION WILL RECEIVE MAJORITY SUPPORT OR CONSENSUS OBTAINED FOR SUCH A STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT.

IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES THE MOST FAVOURABLE SCENARIO WOULD BE FOR THE COUNCIL TO REITERATE ITS SUPPORT FOR THE SG AND HIS SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE, BY CALLING ON ALL PARTIES TO EXERCISE MAXIMUM RESTRAINT AND ABIDE BY THEIR COMMITMENTS; IN OTHER WORDS A VIRTUAL REPETITION OF THE PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT. WE UNDERSTAND THAT THIS STATEMENT HAS ALREADY BEEN DENOUNCED BY SWAPO TO THE PRESS.

DATUMTYDGROEP
19890403/2000

FINDE

KOMMENTAAR DEUR HK