

MEETING BETWEEN COSATU/UDF AND ANC HELD IN HARARE ON DEC 1 - 3 1988

A. AGENDA:

1. Assessment of enemy crisis and possibilities for advance by Democratic forces
2. Broad coalition of anti-apartheid forces
3. Natal situation
4. Respective arising on possible NM release
5. A. O. B.

B. ECONOMIC CRISIS AND HOW THE DEMOCRATIC FORCES CAN ADVANCE

1. UDF Presentation and Discussion

The October Local Elections are a dismal failure for the regime. Despite the low poll (approximately 10% of all eligible to vote outside the bantustans), the regime is determined to employ results as a mandate for constitutional reforms.

The Tricameral system crisis continue unabated and for promulgation of laws termed "general affairs" Botha is more and more forced to rely on the Presidential Council. The liberal opposition parties are trying to unite into a single party in the hope of challenging the Conservative Party.

The bantustan crisis continues unabated, civil servants are reacting to the uncontrolled enrichment of ruling clique. Repressive organs are no more reliable, youth refuse to be integrated into vigilante death squads especially in Natal.

2. The current strategy of the regime is not coherent and characterised by various elements like

- a. massive repression aimed at crushing any form of resistance
- b. futile attempt to alienate MDM leadership from the mass of people, as well as coopting some sections into its administrative organs
- c. recently the regime has begun efforts to win the middle ground within the oppressed e.g. hawkers and taxi associations, township upgradings, etc.
- d. some concessions involving the release of political prisoners/detainees, but with heavy restrictions as a rule imposed on key activists further confirming that releases are a result of popular pressure; allusion made to possible release
- d. continued reference to setting up of the so called national statutory council

3. There is general belief that most of the political prisoners would be released especially the Rivonia Trialists. Regime is poised to exploit the process. Seem to hope that releases will drive a wedge within the National Liberation Movement but the masses are convinced that new horizons will open for advancement of struggle and unity across colour /political persuasions.

4. The evolution of the situation demand strengthening UDF/COSATU ce, and promotion of 'political centres' as basis thereof at national and regional level. A common understanding of the aim and objectives of the Anti-Apartheid Conference is an urgent need -

is unity to take an organisational form? Democratic forces need to assess the organisational strength of the regime and its own strength in order to sustain and broaden resistance. Need for a broad consultation before commencing with campaigns or stay-aways. High profile activity only when absolutely necessary.

5. Mobilisation and organisation to be addressed in earnest - avoid characterising any resistance as an indication of existence of organisational structures. Some COSATU affiliates/locals are failing to cooperate with Front structures, instead challenge its political role. The COSATU CEC resolution on allies was never implemented, especially in Natal. A notable tendency to rely on court battle to win worker demands instead of involving them and community in general.

6. ANC's Input by JS :underlined the absence of common approach to revolutionary practise within UDF/ COSATU but emphasised need for strategic approach based on objectiveness. Major points can be summed up as follows:

- * current crisis irreversible because its structural,

- * National Liberation Movement and democratic forces are in a position to advance, present state of weak civil administration is a sign of continued ungovernability. Regime can only be able to rule with Black collaboration.

- * regime's ideological crisis characterised by inability to rationalise status quo. Afrikaner tribal base disintegrating, while social base is transforming.

- * the West is in a dilemma on S.A., PW is unable to secure the country for capitalism and as an imperialist outpost. Determined to pressurise regime, but motivation to be closely monitored: seem poised to act when we are weak/disorganised in order to find accommodation in any settlement.

- * Regime worried over increasing dependence on Blacks to reinforce SADF/SAP. Recent madonnas and defeat in Angola, hitting hard on moral of the army.

- * Unlimited possibilities which can result from Mandela's release.

Further we should bear in mind that Pretoria will always try avenues to extricate itself from crisis especially at political and ideological level. How do we respond to 'crisis management' and response of regime's social base? Does openly assume class interests or simply reactionary stance? These are questions to be addressed to be able to further erode enemy social social base and/or neutralise it.

C. BROAD ANTI APARTHEID COALITION

1. Report by UDF - Head Office

- a. The call for a conference of all anti apartheid forces was made

at the Cosatu Special Congress, its origins lies with UDF/NWC session in 1987. The preparatory committee was composed of the UDF/COSATU through seconding of personnel on fulltime basis. A large spectrum of forces showed interests and expressed readiness to participate. The major themes were:

- i) organisational unity in the face of ever growing repression
- ii) one person, one vote in a democratic South Africa.

b. UDF and COSATU affiliates did not have the same perception of the Conference objectives. The Front saw it as a process towards rooting UDF/COSATU alliance as core for a broad coalition of all anti-apartheid forces within the context of the strategic objectives of the National Democratic struggle. COSATU Head Office shared a similar view but affiliates had their own interpretation especially Numsa, Actuwsa and TGWU. Some regarded it as an event aimed at galvanising forces for possible negotiation with the regime. Never linked it to day to day co-ordination and cooperation on basis of minimum common points of agreement. Others saw conference as creation of an alternative to the UDF.

2. Discussions revealed existence of a number of political tendencies within COSATU. A special CEC addressing the Anti Apartheid Conference observed that unions whose views are rejected, tend to report in a biased manner to membership, creating impression that CEC decisions are views of Head Office.

* invitations extended to middle ground forces and organisation outside the democratic fold was viewed as expression of UDF and COSATU failure to consolidate own base.

* invitation to NACTU was seen as departure from a resolution not to have dealings with it; while others expressed concern on limited number of delegates allocated NACTU to the detriment of worker unity.

* different characterisation of the concept of a Front. A view was expressed that the process aimed at creating three levels of a Front, necessary in South Africa viz :

- a. broad alliance type
- b. democratic front
- c. grouping of forces directly victims of apartheid repression UDF/COSATU.

3. ANC Input:

a. Underlined that convening of conference aims at bringing together forces not necessarily agreeing on everything. Its strength would be on how far it succeed to weaken the opposing side.

b. Point at issue is mobilisation of forces for change(not necessarily revolutionaries, although component part). Need to accept all those opposed to the regime but differing on long term objectives, e.g. opposition to bantustanisation, effects of Group

areas, Job Reservation to economic development, Labour Relations Act.

c. Unity of the democratic core in an alliance of Anti-Apartheid forces is essential. If differences exist, leadership, can be explained by other forces. The ability of the core to generalise popular aspirations, allow mass active participation. Core can provide leadership through striving for acceptance by all parties:

- * continued engagement of own membership in action
- * active defence of interests of other parties in the coalition
- * adherence to democratic practice and consultation
- * education of own membership on policies of front/alliances and clarity of purpose as well as ideological conviction.

The NLM and democratic forces need the broad coalition to accommodate the various potential forces outside the mainstream struggle.

4. Issues further arising:

- * the Conference organisers are failing to take advantage of forces activated and brought closer during preparatory process. The aim was to build a powerful movement by opposition forces on a minimum programme (loose alliance).

- * a flexible approach but differentiated to forces, and sectors involved. Need for permanent/restructured mechanism of liaison between core parties i.e. UDF/COSATU.

- * identification of issues which will contribute to development of coalition/front at local to regional levels.

- * constant debates on the strategic objective to facilitate common understanding.

- * need to convene the conference once more either through the church, Mabuza or others.

- * prospects of convening a similar conference with ANC outside.

- * re-convening of the Preparatory Committee and examining how mobilised or sympathetic forces can be utilised.

D. NATAL SITUATION (CONFLICT)

Inkatha still continues with its killings. Empumalanga about 70 people died last month. In Pinetown the conflict is everywhere even at factory level. In Pietermaritzburg Inkatha has changed its strategy by having hit squads. Warlords exist and are killing people.

The agreement signed by COSATU and Inkatha excluding the UDF and the people bearing the brunt has created lots of tensions. Some felt that COSATU has undermined the alliance and ignored to look

at how reliable Inkatha is and how far they can rely on the agreement.

Rev Jennings was invited to the meeting to explain the role of the church. The church had been approached by the youth to facilitate peace talks. The stand of the church was to:-

- a. support initiatives already underway
- b. work out ways of providing skills in conflict handling through negotiation and mediation.
- c. act in cooperation and not in competition.

The next meeting to finalize input on the role of the church will be on 20th Jan. 1989.

In summary it was agreed that:-

- * violence should end
- * negotiations be reopened
- * the alliance between UDF and COSATU be strengthened
- * political work be intensified to win over the membership of Inkatha
- * our organisations be strengthened, the youth and leadership be properly organised
- * organised self defence units be strengthened
- * other forces (church, business) be won over
- * the issue be nationalized and joint campaigns be organised
- * role of ANC be discussed - whether it should meet Inkatha or not.

E. PERSPECTIVE FROM NM POSSIBLE RELEASE

1. Reasons

- * Internal struggle and advancement of struggle forced the government to consider his release.
- * ANC enjoys more credibility and support inside despite restrictions on press
- * Sanctions and isolation of regime have begun to have effects
- * Strategy of the regime to cause splits, confusion and possibly a crisis by releasing political prisoners and not unbanning ANC
- * Regime trying to rescue the constitutional reforms

2. Implications

- * Regime trying to survive international pressure
- * Regime trying to neutralize the leadership

3. Climate

- * The release will generate enthusiasm
- * Revitalize demoralized comrades
- * Ordinary people will view the release of NM as heralding our liberation day

- * Will push for unbanning of ANC

4. Objectives

- * Make SOE unworkable
- * Further the aims of the ANC
- * Leaders to unify all sections
- * Opportunity to be used to set political agenda and dictate terms for possible negotiations/settlement

5. Ways and means

- * To build the broadest front
- * To build core with reception structures and committees
- * Ensure leaders not only projected as leaders of the oppressed people but also of the misguided people
- * Strengthen alliance and launch massive campaign for the release
- * Dictate pace at which regime must move
- * Effort be intensified to neutralise puppets
- * Ensure linkage of this campaign with the trials in progress eg Delmas and all other political prisoners and detainees

6. Development

- * Ruling block has lost control - Boksburg, Brakpan, and Pretoria
- * The plot discovered to assassinate Botha
- * Anxiety generated by the right wing
- * The action of the regime - reprimanding the CP and considering international recognition and acceptance.
- * Release of HG - (attempt to neutralize the comrades). PAC leader not generated much excitement. The regime with the support of liberal press like Tom Lodge and Patrick Laurence is trying to project image of PAC and water down ANC.

7. Areas

Cape, Transvaal, Natal

To have in these regions (as priority) structures built to guide and channel process to receive comrades.

8. During discussion it was felt that the timing factor is beyond our control. The character of response should not only include preparedness but more action to demand release. Campaign for NM release should be intensified. All avenues be explored to sustain impact of release. Release be seen as direct product of struggle and not as a gift or change of Botha regime. Strategies be developed to create mass upsurge and legalize banned organisations. Overcome leadership crisis through reorganisation at grassroot level. Be able to adopt new tactics. Action be coordinated and guided.

F. CLOSURE

1. ANC remarks

Meeting taken place in a short space of time and as a result some crucial issues not addressed. Justice has been done to the tasks set. Had listened to one another, exercising comradeship, democracy and front policies. Meeting has been prime manifestation of the revolutionary democratic core. Everyone will leave enriched by the discussions and by one another.

Raw material be moulded to force which will lead to people's victory. Prime commitment is to work for situation in which all people emerge united as never before.

2. Response of delegation from home

Meeting has been successful. Appreciate the openness and constructive criticism to build our own selves. Hope to have follow-up inside the country. Thanking with gratitude the contribution from the ANC.

G. LIST OF PARTICIPANTS AT THE HARARE CONSULTATION

- | | |
|-------------------------|---|
| 1. Sidney Mufamadi | Assistant General Secretary |
| 2. Jane Barret | TGWU - General Secretary |
| 3. Mike Roussos | SARHWU - Propaganda and Information Chief |
| 4. G. Mantashe | NUM - National Organiser |
| 5. D. Ngcobo | CAWU - President |
| 6. B. Ngidi | CAWU - COSATU Local Co-ordinator(PMB) |
| 7. J. Naidoo | CCAWUSA - National Education Co- ordinator |
| 8. Monde Mditshwa | NEHAWU - National Organiser |
| 9. Rod Crompton | CWIU - General Secretary |
| 10. D. Rule Thathe | FAWU (Co-ordinator) Regional Organiser |
| 11. Poppie Kganare | CCAWUSA General Secretary |
| 12. Alec Erwin | NUMSA (Co-ordinator Education Officer) |
| 13. J. Copelyn | ACTWUSA General Secretary |
| 14. J. Ernstgen | SAMWU General Secretary |
| 15. M. Xulu | NUMSA Treasurer |
| 16. Malachia Ndou | PPWAWU President |
| 17. Elias Banda | ACTWUSA National Organiser |
| 18. Bernie Fanaroff | NUMSA National Secretary |
| 19. Dan Mohapi | NUWCC General Secretary |
| 20. Thabadiana Mofamadi | POTWA NEC |
| 21. Maffie Nhlapo | SADWU Information Secretary |
| B. UDF | |
| 22. Jeff Molapo | NEC/Head Office |
| 23. Mluleki George | NEC/Border Region |
| 24. Ace Maeashula | MEC/OFS Region |
| 25. Peter Moleko | FRYCO/Second President |
| 26. T.M. Manyoni | UDF/OFS General Secretary |
| 27. G. Padi | Soweto Civic(Committee Member) |
| 28. S.Dereck Masoek | SANSCO (Transvaal) Vice President |
| 29. Lisa Seftel | UDF (White affiliate) National Co-ordinator |
| 30. P. Zondo | NOW Administrator |
| 31. Jerry Ndou | SAYCO(National Working Committee) Finance Secretary |
| 32. Confidence Moloko | Education Front/Head Office |
| 33. Sandy Africa | UDF(REC) Assistant Secretary |
| 34. Shoots Naidoo | UDF(REC) Natal Civic Representative |
| 35. Athol Jennings | Natal Churches(Invited for discussion on Natal only) |