

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

OBSERVER DELEGATION REPORT:
BRAZZAVILLE TALKS: 25-28 SEPTEMBER 1988

DAY ONE (25.09.88):

1. Meeting: Mr Marti Ahtisaari and Mr Hisham Omayad
15h00 - 16h40, 25 September

Marti Ahtisaari, and later Hisham Omayad, joined us on the terrace on Sunday afternoon.

Both officials were highly satisfied with the talks in Pretoria. Ahtisaari recognised that the purpose had been political, not substantive, the need having been to give the South African State President a political "concession" by the Secretary-General. The assurances on impartiality and economic assistance for Namibia after independence had served this purpose.

Omayad noted that the UN Secretariat had also needed a tangible achievement. Three possible achievements had been defined in his briefing paper for the Secretary-General:

- Agreement on a visit to Namibia by a technical team;
- Agreement on the UNTAG status agreement;
- Agreement by the South Africans not to proceed with second and third tier elections.

The last point was a fall-back, in case nothing else was achieved. It had eventually been removed at Ahtisaari's insistence at a meeting in Paris between Ahtisaari, Farah, Goulding and Omayad, before giving the final briefing paper to the Secretary-General. (Annex A) The UN team had achieved substantially more than it had expected and had returned very optimistic about the future.

Ahtisaari attributed this to the emergence of clear understanding in the Foreign Ministry in Pretoria of the significance of the shift in Soviet policy. He had sought to make clear in 1987 to Van Heerden and Auret that settlement of this issue would make it possible to explore with the Soviets a whole new approach to Southern Africa. This was now understood. He stressed - a little heavy-handedly - how essential it was that progress be made this week in Brazzaville to enable the Soviets to be forthcoming in this regard.

Ahtisaari was not forthcoming when we asked what the MPLA's position was. He noted that he had the impression, after the meeting with Dos Santos, that "they are prepared to be flexible", but would (or could) not be specific. He was interested in Crocker's meeting in Abidjan and enquired if Savimbi was there. He also asked about Savimbi's letter to Reagan.

He noted that Houphouet-Boigny and thirteen Ministers had been at the airport in Abidjan to see the Secretary-General when the plane had stopped to refuel on the way to Pretoria. An Ivorian Minister had remarked that the President had interrupted a Cabinet Meeting, noting that the Secretary-General was a friend of Côte d'Ivoire and that all Ministers should accompany him to the airport. A formal meeting with Houphouet-Boigny was scheduled for the Secretary-General's return on 24 September.

The Secretary-General had met a SWAPO delegation consisting of Nujoma, Hamutenya, Gurirab, Shihepo and Axel Johannes, who acted as secretary, in Luanda. Dr Perez de Cuellar had read out to the delegation the text of his statement on impartiality as delivered in Pretoria. Nujoma's response was that they had accepted that position in 1982 and still abided by it. They, however, expected South Africa to be equally impartial.

The technical team to visit Windhoek will consist of administrative personnel charged to find out about the availability of properties and logistical supplies. Local suppliers will be used wherever possible as this will boost the economy, reduce overall costs - now estimated at \$ 600 million - and permit standardization. Ahtisaari is seeking to reduce costs to about \$ 500 million. Cedric Thornberry will be coming from Ahtisaari's office. Ahtisaari again referred to his need for a large "villa", in the context of his mediating and reconciling role.

Ahtisaari noted that he would not mind the process being somewhat delayed as he was to receive an honorary doctorate from his alma mater on 27 May 1989 - something that would be impossible if elections were to take place on 1 June 1989.

Omayad remarked privately to Cleary that implementation could not begin before the end of February, or the beginning to the middle of March. He referred, revealingly, to the "dry season, so that we can move around in the north". When told that this was relevant in southern Angola but not on paved roads in northern Namibia, he said that the process was already six weeks behind schedule and would be eight weeks behind by the "end of these talks". Then a Security Council session would have to be organized, and the preliminary talks to arrange that could easily take two weeks. Because this would be a breakthrough, "at least thirty Foreign Ministers will wish to speak in the debate". This would necessitate reaching agreement between all of them on a convenient date. He saw no prospect of earlier implementation.

(It is worth noting that the MPLA are known to want a "dry season" date for implementation, so as to be able to move against UNITA with their armour.)

Ahtisaari and Omayad then withdrew as they were to meet the Congolese Foreign Minister at 17h00. Silverman (US Embassy, Pretoria) joined the group for a few minutes before their departure and confirmed the success of the Secretary-General's visit from the American Embassy's perspective.

2. Meeting: Mr Hisham Omayad and (later) Mr Marti Ahtisaari
19h00 - 22h00, 25 September

We met Omayad in the lobby of the hotel after his and Ahtisaari's return from the Congolese Foreign Minister. The Minister had been very pleased with the results of the Secretary-General's visit to South Africa and had undertaken to report on the matter to President Sassou-Nguesso without delay. Omayad expected that the President would receive Ahtisaari and him on 26 September.

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He then turned the conversation to the party's visit to Luanda and noted that outside of the formal meeting with Nujoma he had met with other SWAPO officials. These men had raised three concerns with him, which had in fact also been raised some days before the Secretary-General's visit to South Africa. The UN delegation had, however, elected not to raise these question in the course of the visit to the RSA, believing that the time was not right.

SWAPO's concerns were:

- For the security of their leaders. (The movement had expected the UN to provide personal security for these men, but had been told that this would be impossible as it would then have to arrange it for all political leaders.)
- For their right to bring in their personal effects and "such material as they needed for the election", free of duty and without undue delay.
- That as most large items - Omayad referred to "vehicles" among other things - would have to be brought in through Walvis Bay, there should be no undue interference with these. (Omayad referred to the experience of ZAPU and ZANU in Zimbabwe, where certain material intended for the elections was not available to the Patriotic Front officials until after the election result was announced. He also indicated that Walvis Bay fell outside of the purview of the Special Representative and that he had advised SWAPO that his writ did not run there.)

Omayad asked that we should do what we could, to ensure that SWAPO was accommodated in respect of these items. He was at pains to emphasise that the provisions would, of course, apply to all parties which had people returning from abroad.

We suggested that the parties in the Cabinet could perhaps issue a statement at the appropriate time, indicating that it was their view that all political parties ought to be assured of the safety of their leaders returning to the country to contest elections; and to be permitted to bring in their personal possessions without unduly onerous customs duty. We cautioned that the question of electoral materials was more complex. The UN would presumably not wish its protestations of impartiality to be undermined by the use by SWAPO of propaganda material, vehicles etc. which were produced or purchased with UN funds. Omayad responded quickly by noting that once the principle was accepted, there would of course have to be negotiations among the parties and with the Administrator-General and the Special Representative, to establish the scope of the concession.

He suggested that this could be one of the matters to be addressed at the conference of all parties which we had raised in August and which had been discussed further last week in Pretoria when the Cabinet had met the Secretary-General.

He then noted that, after giving the matter considerable thought, he and Antisaari had concluded that the "conference" or "meeting" should be arranged after the commencement of implementation. They had thought that the AG and the SGSR could call all the parties together around a table to discuss the elections and the matters concerned

therewith. We suggested that, in order to prevent the possibility of SWAPO's refusing to participate, it might be better if the first meeting were to be convened by the SGSR alone. Omayad indicated that this was Ahtisaari's preference and that he had intended to do so, if possible.

We emphasised how important it was that the conference, whether arranged before or immediately after implementation, should begin as early as possible, to avoid unnecessary tensions or clashes. When we referred to PLAN weapons' caches in Owambo, Omayad immediately noted that SWAPO accused the SWATF of storing weapons in the same way. Our response was that it made little difference who was accusing whom of what; the possession of automatic weapons by either side would greatly raise the risk of fighting breaking out. Tensions had to be diffused at an All Party Conference.

The discussion then turned to the procedure between the present date and the date of implementation. Omayad foresaw the Secretary-General's report's making clear:

- (i) That the Constitutional Principles of 1982 formed part of the UN Settlement Plan;
- (ii) that the UN and UNTAG would be scrupulously impartial as between the parties;
- (iii) that national unity or reconciliation between all Namibians was essential to the growth of a successful nation.

(He envisages this last point being incorporated in the concluding section of the report, which will represent the Secretary-General's "last opportunity to address the Namibian people before their independence". He made clear, however, that he could not guarantee what form the language would take, as the Secretary-General personally scrutinised all language used in his reports on Namibia and made such changes as he saw fit.)

We proposed the inclusion of language indicating that the SGSR would make all appropriate efforts to bring about reconciliation between the parties in the period leading up to the elections and suggested that this would then give him a mandate to play the role we foresaw in the All Party Conference. Once the Constitutional Principles were incorporated formally in the settlement package, moreover, the first meeting could serve as an occasion at which all parties would formally commit themselves to abide by the principles, as part of the procedure of registration for the elections. This would provide for a natural progression to the next phase - one in which the parties reached agreement among themselves on the meaning of the principles, eliminating misapprehensions about each other's intentions.

Omayad noted that the members of the Security Council, in passing the enabling resolution mandating the commencement of implementation, might well decide to include an operative paragraph formally incorporating the 1982 principles. Even if they did not, the formal endorsement of the Secretary-General's report would constitute the Council's endorsement of his statement of their incorporation.

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Omayad noted further that the Secretariat was in no hurry to issue the report. The enabling resolution was intended to tie together the agreements regarding UNSCR 435 (1978) and the bilateral agreement between the PRA and the ROC regarding CTW. Until the latter question was satisfactorily resolved, there was no need to issue the report.

Ahtisaari joined us at this stage and proposed dinner. Over the dinner table the conversation was lighter in vein and more general, ranging from the difficulties of life in New York City to the type of accommodation available in Windhoek.

Ahtisaari, like Omayad earlier, adverted to the conference between the parties as stressed, a little emotionally, his determination to proceed therewith after the commencement of implementation. To insist thereon before implementation would be to risk wrecking the whole settlement, he said. We elected to pursue the matter at a subsequent meeting.

Omayad interjected by noting that Ernest Tjirianje (SWAPO's Secretary of Legal Affairs) had suggested that cadres in SWAPO camps in Angola and students at the UN Institute in Lusaka, should be allowed to vote. Omayad had responded that as the South Africans were administering the elections, albeit under UN supervision, this proposal would require SWAPO to open its camps in Angola to South African administration. Tjirianje then abandoned his argument.

Omayad greeted Auret, whom he had not seen since Pretoria, very emotionally, congratulating him on the success of the talks. They agreed to meet for breakfast at 08h00 on 26 September.

The Congolese Ambassador to Luanda came by to pay his respects, as did two members of the US delegation. Just before the end of dinner, a member of the PRA delegation came to the table to advise that General Ndalu would be available for a meeting with Ahtisaari at 08h30 the next morning.

DAY TWO (26.09.88):

1. Substantive Negotiations: USA, RSA, PRA, ROC

At the end of the previous round of talks, the American delegation had produced a "Chairman's Report" on the proceedings, which proposed a withdrawal by Cuban forces from Angola over a period of 24 months. The delegations of the RSA and the PRA/ROC respectively were expected to study this report and provide comments thereon for consideration at the next meeting.

After the arrival of the USA and RSA delegations on Sunday 25 September, a preliminary exchange of views was held that evening. Crocker reported on his meetings in Abidjan with President Houphouet-Boigny and Savimbi. The primary purpose of the meetings had been to patch up the American relationship with Savimbi and to assure him of continued support, both for national reconciliation in Angola and, specifically, for the African initiative in support of reconciliation.

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According to Van Heerden, Crocker noted that Houphouet-Boigny was continuing to promote the African initiative but was not prepared to go public thereon at this stage, preferring that Sassou-Nguesso should do this. Crocker was under the impression that he had succeeded in convincing Savimbi that it was not American duplicity or torpor which was delaying progress with the African initiative.

On the same point, there were strong indications that Sassou-Nguesso was preparing to make a statement on the need for "national dialogue" in Angola, in the course of the talks. We had earlier become aware that Jean-Christophe Mitterand (the son of the French President) was in Brazzaville meeting with the Congolese President, and that he had recently visited Luanda for discussions. Babb (Deputy Director-General: Foreign Affairs) had had discussions with the French Ambassador to South Africa just before the talks and was told that France could not become actively involved in promoting national reconciliation in Angola as it had diplomatic relations with the PRA, and a range of important commercial interests, including new oil finds in Zone 3 of the offshore concession area. It could, however, "whisper the right things in a few ears".

Tangentially, it is also of interest that PRA Deputy Foreign Minister Venancio da Moura arrived in Brazzaville fresh from a tour of Cabo Verde, Côte d'Ivoire and Morocco. The fact that the last two countries are bastions of support for UNITA raises interesting questions about the purpose of his visit.

At the first formal bilateral meeting with the USA on the morning of 26.09.88, the RSA delegates presented a detailed, line by line response to the USA Chairman's Report. The essence of this proposal, which sets out the RSA requirements on CTW, is that there should be early total withdrawal northwards and that CTW should begin even before the emplacement of UNTAG. After implementation of UNSCR 435 (1978) has been completed, the proposal, according to Van Heerden, would leave about 5 000 Cuban troops in Angola, restricted with respect to their movement and closely monitored, for the balance of the 24 months, after which period all troops would have been withdrawn.

The PRA/ROC delegation met with the Americans for a long session in the afternoon. Ndalú had indicated to Ahtisaari and Omayad at breakfast on 26.09.88 that they had prepared an extensive "comment" on the American Chairman's Report, and that they proposed that the USA report should serve as the basis for this round of negotiations. The South African pressed the USA delegation to require a specific response from the PRA/ROC delegation, indicating that there had been enough discussion of generalities and principles.

The South African tactic at this round will be to avoid direct face-to-face discussions of their proposal with the PRA/ROC delegation. They intend to use the USA delegation as an interface, a tactic which worked well at Geneva. Current expectations are that the talks will end on Wednesday evening or Thursday morning.

Providing feedback on the discussions in Pretoria on the question of impartiality, Van Heerden noted that he had pressed Ahtisaari and Omayad on two points in particular - the UN Information Kits and scholarships for Namibians. The South Africans had, by his account, required the UN to prepare a list of all the information kits produced, in all five languages, and to advise them of the disposal of these kits. This was being done as a precaution against SWAPO's use of these kits for propaganda purposes in elections. Likewise the UN was being required to produce a list of all students who had received UN-sponsored scholarships, indicating also who their sponsors were. These steps had been taken to make it clear to the UN that the issue of impartiality was not a dead letter as far as Pretoria was concerned.

By the evening of 26.09.88 there had still been no substantive contact between the RSA-delegation and those of the PRA/ROC. NIS Director-General Barnard had had a brief discussion with his Angolan counterpart, but the Angolans had not asked for a bilateral meeting with the South Africans.

2. Peripheral Meetings: Namibian observers

Cleary and Kanguatjivi met for several brief periods with Athisaari and Omayad. Among many other matters of no particular importance, these discussions touched on Ahtisaari's role in the reconciliation process in Namibia. He again stressed the need to begin this after the beginning of implementation, albeit almost immediately after arriving in Windhoek. He spoke of the need to do it "with a certain degree of cunning", the implication being that people should be drawn into the process almost without their noticing it.

We drew attention to the need to defuse tensions right at the beginning, pointing to the existence of significant weapons' supplies in the country, both in PLAN caches and in private hands and warned that a failure to address the need at an early stage could result in bloodshed and instability. Athisaari agreed.

We emphasised the need for the Secretary-General's report to make clear the binding nature of the 1982 Constitutional Principles and to include language to the effect that the SGSR would have a specific role to play in promoting reconciliation. Ahtisaari again agreed.

Omayad noted in passing that Obasanjo (former President of Nigeria and member of the Eminent Persons' Group on the RSA) had been asked by Crocker to engage himself in the search for national reconciliation in Angola. He retained the prestige of a Head of State in Africa but was without pretensions. He had spoken frankly to Dos Santos on the need for reconciliation, on the basis that Nigeria had been through the experience. He regarded it as unrealistic to expect that Savimbi could simply get a job in Luanda, however. Like Ojukwu, he would have to go abroad for a few years before being incorporated into national society.

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3. Other meetings

Ahtisaari and Omayad had expected to be called to see the Congolese President but no call came. (It appears likely that the President was focussed on his initiative in favour of "national dialogue" in Angola and his meetings with Jean-Christophe Mitterand.)

The breakfast meeting between Ndalú, Ahtisaari and Omayad was likewise unsubstantial, with Ndalú indicating that the dining room was not a good place for serious matters and proposing to make another arrangement in his suite later in the day. Ahtisaari passed up an invitation to dine with the Americans outside the hotel, in order to be available to the Angolans for this follow-up meeting.

Omayad briefed Pachievierra (PRA Ambassador to the UN) on the talks in Pretoria. Both he and Ahtisaari regard Pachievierra as a great improvement on Figueredo, whose family had been rewarded for their financial contributions to the MPLA by Figueredo's appointment.

Cleary and Kanguatjivi were unsuccessful in their attempts to locate Hamutenya and Gurirab in Brazzaville. No-one was aware of their whereabouts and they were not booked in at their usual hotel or at the conference hotel.

DAY THREE (27.09.88):

1. Substantive Negotiations: USA, RSA, PRA, ROC

The day was spent in bilateral meetings between each side - RSA and PRA/ROC - and the USA delegation. After each party which had provided comments had delivered these to the USA delegation, the USA draftsmen prepared a synthesis paper containing new approaches, which came to be known as the Brazzaville Protocol. This paper was presented to the RSA and the PRA/ROC delegations for consideration overnight, the purpose being to enable the delegations to respond with a new set of comments on the following day.

Neither side was particularly happy with the new synthesis paper. The Americans, however, felt that some progress was being made.

2. Peripheral Meetings: Namibian Observers

2.1 Meeting with Omayad and Ahtisaari 12h00 - 13h30

Cleary and Kanguatjivi met with Omayad for lunch. Omayad had just been briefed by the Congolese Ambassador to Luanda on the most recent African developments.

Ivorian Foreign Minister Simeon Ake had travelled to Brazzaville and was meeting with President Sassou-Nguesso on the question of national reconciliation in Angola. If - and this was an essential precondition, according to Omayad - the quadripartite talks passed off successfully - it was planned that there should be a meeting between Sassou-Nguesso, Mobuto and Bongo in Gabon immediately thereafter, at which the basic principles of national reconciliation would be hammered out.

A meeting involving a wider group of African participants - Mugabe, Kaunda, Dos Santos, Chissano and possibly Savimbi - as well as the three Heads of State who planned to meet in Libreville, was then planned for Lusaka on the same topic. This second meeting was intended to look like one convened by the regional states most directly involved. Côte d'Ivoire would take a back seat in all of this, although it would be intimately involved in the planning.

Omayad expressed deeply felt irritation at Crocker, who he feels, is keeping the UN in the dark on these negotiations. He assumes that Crocker, having just come from Côte d'Ivoire, was aware of these developments when he briefed Ahtisaari and Omayad on 26.09.88, but did not disclose the details. While Crocker expects Ahtisaari to keep him fully informed on all aspects of the negotiations with which the UN is involved in this regard, he does not reciprocate.

According to Omayad, Ahtisaari is regarded by the Cubans, SWAPO and the MPLA as being too close to Crocker and yet Crocker "does nothing for Marti in return". Omayad remarked that the one thing that all partners to the talks have in common is distrust of the Chairman. He also remarked bitterly that: "Crocker had better hope that Bush wins, because if Dukakis does and he goes back to Georgetown and phones to ask what is happening in these negotiations, I will bang the phone down in his ear."

Ahtisaari had been invited to join Van Heerden for lunch. When Omayad was asked to join them he refused pointedly, professing to have a prior engagement with Cleary and Kanguatjivi, although no such arrangement had been made. He was sufficiently irked by developments in general to say that he did not plan to inform Ahtisaari of the Libreville and Lusaka meetings.

Over lunch the conversation became somewhat more relaxed. Omayad discussed the award of contracts to (black) Namibian small businessmen during UNTAG's presence in the territory and suggested that he would rule that ten per cent of all contracts should be so awarded. He asked Kanguatjivi to prepare a list of such businessmen who could be approached to tender.

(President Botha had called on the Secretary-General to have the technical team visit the RSA to meet the Chamber of Commerce there for the purpose of securing RSA tenders for materials and services required by UNTAG. Cleary had proposed to Omayad that the team should first exhaust Namibian possibilities before exploring those which existed in South Africa.)

Omayad asked Kanguatjivi how he saw the procedure after the adoption of a constitution by the Constituent Assembly until independence. In the exchange which followed, it became clear that Omayad favoured the Constituent Assembly's converting itself into a government after adoption of the Constitution, without a second set of elections, inter alia because the UN had made provision for the emplacement of UNTAG for twelve months only!

The Congolese Ambassador to Luanda drew Omayad away from the table for a while at the end of the meal. When Omayad returned he said that the South Africans had referred to violations of the cease-fire and MPLA attacks against UNITA, particularly along the Benguela Railway, in the course of their meeting with Sassou-Nguesso that morning. According to the Ambassador, the MPLA were seriously concerned at SWAPO's behaviour. They suggested that SWAPO was responsible for the cease-fire violations and were irritated by SWAPO's absence from Brazzaville.

Both the Congolese and the MPLA had wanted a meeting between SWAPO and the South Africans in this round and had expected Hamutenya and Gurirab to be in Brazzaville. Their absence was a serious source of concern. According to Omayad, he suggested that a message be sent to Dos Santos, requesting that he order SWAPO to travel to the Congo.

2.2 Meeting with Omayad and Leonard Ipemba, SWAPO Representative in Congo Brazzaville

2.2.1 SWAPO Detainees:

Omayad raised the question of the Parents' Committee and the persons detained by SWAPO in the course of a conversation in the afternoon. He asked in an over-elaborately, casual manner what ought to be done about the Parents' Committee.

We explained that these were simple people concerned about the fate of their children and relatives. Kanguatijivi explained his personal experience with his son. What was galling and inexplicable was the fact that neither SWAPO nor the UN responded to these concerns. We pointed out that Hamutenya and Gurirab had themselves announced in London at the beginning of 1986 that SWAPO was holding over 100 "spies" and noted that with the degree of human rights' interests in this question in Amnesty International, the ISHR and parliamentary circles, it seemed clear that it was in SWAPO's own interest that the matter be dealt with as soon as possible, inter alia so that whatever unpleasant shocks there might be, were as far removed in time as possible from the electoral period.

Omayad sought to deflect the matter, indicating that SWAPO could not be "a state within a state". The Secretary-General had raised this matter with the Angolans, he said, as well as, previously, with the Zambians. He suggested that with the South Africans and the Angolans in Brazzaville, the South Africans might raise it with the PRA delegation.

We responded that this was a human matter and not a technical one. Simple people, many of whom thought of themselves as SWAPO members, were worried sick about the disappearance of their children. After the assassination of Shafooli in Zambia, several families had written to the UNHCR in fear of their lives, asking to be transferred to a European country.

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This was not something that the UN should be deflecting with technical niceties; it was a minor human tragedy. Moreover, it was in SWAPO's own interest that the boil be lanced as soon as possible

Omayad again took refuge in technicalities, granting that the human element ought to be addressed, but pointing out that the settlement plan made provision for the release of all "political prisoners". There was provision, he reminded us, for an international panel of jurists to decide who was a political prisoner and who a criminal. This would resolve the issue if SWAPO claimed that these people were criminals.

We pointed out that applying the principle that he had advanced - viz. that SWAPO could not be a state within a state - the movement was not in a position to dispense criminal justice and sentence persons to terms of imprisonment. While expressing confidence that the panel of jurists would reach the proper findings, we re-emphasised that it was in the joint interests of the UN, SWAPO and the relatives of those detained or missing - as well as the detainees themselves - that the matter be addressed and resolved without delay.

2.2.2 Leonard Ipembu:

While we were discussing this question with Omayad, Leonard Ipembu, SWAPO's representative in Brazzaville, came over to greet Omayad. After the introductions, we spoke briefly about the fact that Hamutenya and Gurirab had not arrived in the Congo. According to Ipembu, the MPLA delegation had said that they had not arrived at the airport in Luanda. Ipembu claimed to have heard nothing further of them. Although friendly and pleasant, he would not sit down, saying that he had to meet someone else. He promised to return, however, and did so after about 90 minutes.

On his return he said that Hamutenya and Gurirab had now arrived and checked in at the Olympic Palace Hotel. After some discussion about when they should meet Ahtisaari and Omayad, he joined us for a while and chatted inconsequentially. He has been in Brazzaville just over a month and is still finding his way in French, having had only some exposure to the written form of the language before arriving in the Congo. He was hesitant to characterise the Congolese reaction to the Secretary-General's visit to Pretoria when Omayad asked him to, noting that with his bad French and limited exposure, he might not do it justice. He said that he believed, however, that everyone saw "something happening". We endorsed this, saying that at no time in the past decade had there been as much movement.

He has been out of Namibia for 14 years. Kanguatjivi joked that one was not of age until one had been in exile for 20 years. In response to Ipembu's question about the persons he had been with, he mentioned Hamutenya and Gurirab, Dar es Salaam, New York and Philadelphia. Having received a positive response to his enquiry of Cleary if he too was Namibian, he remarked that he was pleased to be among his countrymen. Before leaving to another appointment, he agreed casually that we would meet on 28.09.88.

3. Other Meetings (27.09.88)

3.1 Ahtisaari was approached by the Cubans for the first time in the course of the talks. According to Omayad, he (Omayad) had suggested to the Cuban Ambassador in New York that he tell his delegation to contact them, "as they are the only ones who don't speak to us".

Ahtisaari spent much of the afternoon going over the mechanics of UNSCR 435 (1978) with the Cuban delegate and remarked later that it was amazing how little they know. He called Omayad to explain the UNSC's position on Walvis Bay - as defined in UNSCR432 (1978). It appears that the Cubans are concerned about the possibility of RSA troops being massed in the enclave during elections.

3.2 The South African and USA delegations met President Sassou-Nguesso; the RSA delegation in the morning and Crocker and the US Chargé d'Affaires in the evening. After the US meeting Ahtisaari and Omayad were received by the President just after 22h30. Sassou-Nguesso was not very specific about the details of his initiative in this meeting, but expressed optimism about the way things were proceeding. Omayad indicated that Crocker had now shared with the UN observers the information that the talks would have to be over by 29.07.88 to permit bilateral talks between Mobuto and P.W. Botha to occur in Zaire on 30.09.88, followed by the meetings in Franceville and, hopefully, Lusaka thereafter. Omayad was markedly more optimistic about a positive outcome after returning just before midnight, than he had been earlier in the day.

DAY FOUR (28.09.88)

1. Substantive Negotiations: USA, RSA, PRA, ROC

Both delegations (RSA and PRA/ROC) presented their comments on the synthesis paper to the USA in the course of the day, the RSA at 11h00. The USA negotiators then set about preparing a second synthesis, which was presented to all the parties together at the only Plenary Sessions of this round, late on Wednesday afternoon.

The RSA delegation had originally expected the Plenary Session to result in a statement of how much ground had been covered and recognition that the gap had been further narrowed. In fact, however, all parties decided to take the second synthesis paper, which firmly establishes two years as the time frame for implementation and proposes dates and schedules, as a working document for consideration overnight.

Each party will then present its reaction and comments to the RSA on 29.09.88, with a view to reaching agreement in the course of the day. The RSA delegation delayed its departure from 09h00 on 29.09.88 and expressed the determination, in private, to take back an agreed proposal ad referendum to the South African government. By late evening, small group bilateral meetings between the RSA and PRA delegations were taking place. Ndalú initiated this process by visiting Van Heerden, and a number of other "expert meetings" were organised.

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A measure of the positive spirit obtaining that evening was the fact that the Cubans, as well as Ahtisaari and Omayad, were booked on the evening flight to Paris on 29.09.88. The Americans likewise appeared optimistic. The PRA delegation, which had been pessimistic and suspicious of the RSA's intentions earlier in the day, was reporting by about 19h00 that the negotiations were back on track, with the South Africans "back in the mainstream". One near upset was occasioned by the Cubans giving a news conference in the course of the morning, calling the RSA's intentions into question and stating that they had never accepted the linkage between UNSCR 435 (1978) and CTW. By late afternoon, however, the Cubans were indicating privately that their remarks had not been intended to refer to the conduct of the RSA delegation in the negotiations, but rather to the accusations levelled against Cuba and the PRA regarding the "alleged" offensives against UNITA.

The impending meeting of the UN Security Council on the Tenth Anniversary of UNSCR 435 (1978) also cast a shadow over the talks, with the South Africans expressing great concern about the effect of a negative resolution, the text of which was available in Brazzaville by midday. Efforts were being made all round to have the resolution withdrawn, with the South Africans indicating privately that they would be prepared to accept a statement by the African or Non-aligned groups, if this was necessary, but not a resolution.

By about 21h00 no finality had been reached. The indications from New York were that the Non-aligned group was still refusing to withdraw its resolution, while efforts to have them do so, including a meeting between the UN Secretary-General and Mugabe, were continuing.

2. Peripheral Meetings: Namibian Observers

2.1 Meeting with Silverman (US Embassy)

Silverman joined us on the morning of 28.09.88 to review the situation. We observed that both sides seemed uneasy with the proposal put to them by the Americans the night before. Silverman said that he felt that that was as it should be; had one side been satisfied and the other dissatisfied, that would have concerned him more.

We suggested that the talks were in a "chicken and egg" phase and noted that it was difficult to see how either side could accept a compromise along the lines of what was on the table, until the parties had formulated a joint position, perhaps in Gabon and Lusaka, on "national reconciliation/dialogue/reconstruction" in Angola. Silverman agreed that this was the problem which everyone confronted at this stage and said that the Americans hoped that the parties could reach the point in this round of agreeing in principle to sign a compromise document, provided that their expectations were met in the reconciliation talks to follow.

Silverman also enquired whether TGNU Ministers would be making "more trips" into Africa to press for the conference proposed in the Cabinet's Aide Memoire. (Simeon Ake had told both the Americans and

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the UN Secretary-General's party about the brief visit of Ministers Kozonguizi and Shipanga to Abidjan.) We said that we were sure that the Cabinet would do what was necessary to secure acceptance of the concept. If the US were, however, to guarantee that the conference would take place, less would be required of the Cabinet. Silverman laughed knowingly.

2.2 Meeting with McKinley (US State Department)

McKinley came to enquire if we had yet traced Hamutenya and Gurirab. When we told him where they were, he said that the US would be attempting to put pressure on them to have the UNSC resolution tabled in New York, at SWAPO's urging, withdrawn.

We noted that Omayad was seeking to do the same thing but that such pressure as the USA and the PRA could jointly bring to bear, would presumably help.

2.3 Meeting with Omayad and Ahtisaari

Omayad joined us after his breakfast with PRA Ambassador Pacheviera. He was depressed again after his elation of the previous evening and noted that the PRA and the ROC delegations felt less optimistic than the USA team and the Congolese. They distrusted the RSA's motives, were complaining that they did not know if the RSA delegation had even accepted the principle of a 24 month timetable and were concerned at the manifest conflict between Crocker's posture as mediator and the interest of the USA in securing a particular outcome inter alia, by means of their support of UNITA.

It was obvious that Omayad feels closer to the PRA and the Cubans, than to the other parties. His dislike for the Americans, and Crocker in particular, is well established, but his identification with the PRA had not been as clearly shown in the past.

The PRA were particularly concerned by a reference to UNITA in one document given to them. Omayad was unsure whether this had been prepared by the RSA or the USA delegation. Omayad felt that to refer to UNITA in the course of these talks did constitute, as the PRA suggested, a violation of the Governor's Island principles, which defined the dispute between UNITA and the MPLA as an internal matter.

Ahtisaari by contrast, is more pragmatic, less wedded to principle. He is markedly more positive about the contribution being made by the Americans and less focussed on the African manoeuvre in the background.

Both Ahtisaari and Omayad were deeply concerned at the attempts to force a debate and a resolution in the Security Council on the 10th Anniversary of UNSCR 435 (1978). Recognising that the occasion could not pass unnoticed they had agreed to a statement, but had sought to avoid a meeting of the Council. SWAPO had insisted, however, and prevailed. Omayad had pressed Pacheviera to have Dos Santos contact Nujoma and ask him to have the resolution withdrawn. Omayad feared that the internal parties would seek to address the Council and be refused, thereby undoing everything the

Secretary-General had achieved on the question of impartiality. SWAPO's response had been that impartiality did not become a question until implementation had commenced.

Both Ahtisaari and Omayad were scathing about the role of the Council of Namibia and Bernt Carlsson in particular. According to Omayad the Council, not knowing what was happening at present was simply trying to be seen to be doing something on the 10th Anniversary of UNSCR 435 (1978). Ahtisaari noted that the Council had asked what it could do to assist implementation; his answer had been: "Keep quiet!"

Ahtisaari also observed that the UN had been receiving numerous offers of assistance with implementation from those on the periphery of the question of Namibia for many years. Even Carl Mau - former General Secretary of the Lutheran World Federation - had offered his services

3. Other Meetings

The South African and USA delegations saw President Sassou-Nguesso privately and separately.

Ahtisaari spent some considerable time consulting with the Cuban Vice Minister.

Having made one unsuccessful effort to locate Hamutenya and Gurirab at the Olympic Palace, we elected not to pursue the contact in the course of this visit. The tensions surrounding the UN Security Council debate made it unlikely that much of the substance could be achieved and we judged that the time was not right to pursue the concept of a conference or formal meeting further. We met briefly with Ipemba and a young assistant at the conference hotel, however. Nothing beyond pleasantries transpired.

Despite the commitment that they were to meet with Ahtisaari and Omayad on 28.09.88, Hamutenya and Gurirab did not do so. Another tentative meeting was set up for 29.09.88.

By the end of the day arrangements had been finalised for the meeting between PW Botha and Mobuto Sese Seko in Zaire. The meeting in Gabon (Franceville) between Mobuto Sese Seko, Sassou-Nguesso and Bongo also seemed likely to take place, although no confirmation could be obtained about its status now that the talks in Brazzaville were continuing for another day. No specific information on the status of the Lusaka meeting was available. Most delegates seemed to believe that the process was adequately on course, however.

WINDHOEK

29 September 1988