

SWA ← (69)  
Angola ← (76)

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SUMMARY NOTES OF A MEETING BETWEEN A SOUTH AFRICAN AND A UNITED STATES DELEGATION ON THE QUESTION OF SOUTH WEST AFRICA : GENEVA, 21 APRIL 1986

South African delegation :    Minister R F Botha  
   Mr P R Killen  
   Ambassador J H A Beukes  
   Mr A L Manley  
   Mr D W Auret

United States delegation :    Dr C Crocker  
   Mr Richard Barkley  
   Mr Robert Cabelly  
   Mr Ashley Wills

MINISTER BOTHA asked dr Crocker on what he thought the position would be after 1 August 1986. It was his impression that whatever happened, the Cubans would not have left Angola by then. This would mean that the pressure would be on South Africa to do something. The Cuban withdrawal question had served both the United States and South Africa well since the advent of the Reagan Administration and should not be ditched. It had not harmed Security Council Resolution 435. He wanted to say that the military agreed basically with this view. There was however another school of thought which saw developments in SWA/Namibia in the light of South African internal problems as well as the shortage of funds which was confronting the country. In terms of this thinking the questions were whether South Africa could get out of South West Africa with honour and not jeopardize the territory's security. A further problem was to do so in a manner which would not allow people inside South Africa to say that South Africa had left South West Africa in the lurch. Furthermore they thought that what one should do was to let the leaders inside the territory get on with it and try and reach some accommodation with SWAPO. It would not be easy to achieve the latter position and all

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unpleasant possibilities which such a scenario brought with it would have to be avoided. There should be no doubt that South Africa did not want to have the red flag flying in Windhoek. The US had to know that it would be attractive to South Africa if the parties inside the territory could do a deal with SWAPO and he was sure that the frontline states would also find such a deal attractive. The Minister said that his own feeling was that South Africa should not ditch the question of Cuban troop withdrawal and with it Security Council Resolution 435. With a new French Government in Office in France, he thought that one should simply carry on.

DR CROCKER said that the Minister had put an important question on the table. He wanted to note that the United States did not see an immediate and an imminent offensive but rather that it had been put back by a month to six weeks. The United States found this to be an interesting development. There was no doubt in his mind that what South Africa and the United States was doing had resulted in getting the other side to think about the price which they would have to pay in this matter. South Africa had put forward a bold proposal which had put Luanda in the spotlight. There was no doubt that Luanda was trying its best to get out of it. One of the ways of doing this was that the MPLA, in conjunction with the Soviets, was trying to create the impression that the US had no further role to play as mediator. This also showed that the Soviets were seeking to play a role since it would formalise its position in Angola.

THE MINISTER remarked that the Soviets obviously wanted to play a role in addition to the military role which they were already fulfilling. It would thus be a politico/military role as opposed to only a military role. The Soviets were no doubt claiming that they had legitimate interests in that part of the world.

DR CROCKER said that if the Soviets were to get a role they would have to discredit the United States as a first step.

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THE MINISTER said that the Soviets were also perhaps worried about what happened if the MPLA were to take Jamba. No doubt expectations in this regard had been raised and if these expectations were not fulfilled there was no doubt that the effort would have been meaningless. There could of course also be other reasons for their hesitancy. There was no doubt that a status quo situation would hurt them and if they were not to proceed they could also easily find themselves in trouble.

DR CROCKER was of the opinion that on the diplomatic front the Soviets would do everything possible to discredit South Africa and the United States. It was his impression that the Soviets could only go up to a certain point but no further. His best advice would be for South Africa and the United States to lie low and to let the dust settle. It would however be important to stay in very close touch.

MINISTER BOTHA said that he perceived a high degree of nervousness in the whole situation.

DR CROCKER asked whether South Africa and the United States were agreed on how to proceed between now and 1 August. He thought that the pressure should be kept up on the diplomatic front and both countries would then make its individual military arrangements in the meantime.

THE MINISTER said that for the time-being South Africa would do nothing. He suggested that the two sides again look at the situation during June 1986.

DR CROCKER asked what South Africa's priorities were and whether a settlement in Namibia was included in its list of priorities.

MINISTER BOTHA said that whatever was being said at the moment was mere speculation. In his view events would determine the future course of action. South Africa and the United States were in a good position to achieve national reconciliation in Angola. The outcome of the offensive was going to be extremely important. It was necessary that both countries stuck to their guns.

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DR CROCKER asked what South Africa was going to do in South West Africa.

MINISTER BOTHA said South Africa would do nothing. It was staying out of developments in the territory. However it would encourage movement and he hoped that Kalangula would come back to the Multi-Party Conference.

DR CROCKER asked what would happen in South West Africa between June and August.

THE MINISTER said that as far as he was concerned dr Crocker need not have any concerns in this regard. He also wanted to re-iterate that the South African Government would not drop the question of Cuban troop withdrawal.

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