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NOTES OF THE MEETING BETWEEN A SOUTH AFRICAN AND AN
AMERICAN DELEGATION ON 8 FEBRUARY 1985 AT THE
"OU PRESIDENSIE" IN PRETORIA

Delegations:

Republic of South Africa:

Minister R F Botha
Minister M A de M Malan
Dr W van Niekerk
Dr J Roux
Lt-Gen P W van der Westhuizen
Lt-Gen J Geldenhuys
Brig C van Tonder
Dr B G Fourie
Mr P R Killen
Mr D W Steward
Mr A L Manley
Mr J Stauch
Mr D de Wet
Mr S C Cleary
Mr M Spaarwater

United States of America:

Dr C Crocker
Ambassador H Nickel
Mr R Gielbard
Mr W Stadtler
Mr T Carney
Mr P Eicher
Mr E Peachous

MINISTER BOTHA welcomed the American delegation and the opportunity to take stock of the situation in Africa with them. He foresaw a broad agenda of topics:

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- a) Internal development in South Africa.
- b) South West Africa/Namibia: Internal and external aspects.
- d) Position in the rest of Africa.

He suggested that he would present a framework of South Africa's thoughts whereafter the Americans could reply. There were certain aspects which he wanted to discuss with Dr Crocker in a smaller circle.

DR CROCKER agreed with such a procedure.

MINISTER BOTHA then turned to the situation in southern Africa and stressed that the South African Government believed in cooperation in every sphere of human endeavour, economy, health services, transport, food, agriculture etc. South Africa stands ready. Its infrastructures were available to its neighbours. Internally, the new dispensation had created a difficult situation. Various forces were trying to torpedo the recent moves - both on the left and the right spectrum, each for its own political purpose. The new houses have their own views which had led to a difficult week in Parliament. This, however, was an indication of freedom of expression and that the system could work. Rajbansi had indicated that his party was used as a guineapig and as a result could have problems at the next election. The whole thing was holding firm despite all the negative efforts. The question of immorality and mixed marriages were being looked at and there may be no choice but to do away with these provisions. MINISTER BOTHA suggested that the visitors take this further with

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his colleagues Heunis and De Klerk while in Cape Town. He stressed that the perception of "open-endedness" was causing the government a lot of distress. What was needed was time to show the whites that they had a future and the PFP that there was an end to apartheid in sight. "We've got to go ahead. It is only a question of speed and the way to do it." South Africa could not, as was pointed out to President Kaunda, accept a one-party state. It could not accept a state in which private ownership was not possible and where there was no recourse to a court of law. Mugabe was clearly moving towards a typical African position of not allowing an opposition, of creating a one-party state. The USA did not seem to care much about this turn of events. This was no criticism but merely a statement. The USA may have different norms for South Africa's future but "we cannot accept a system clashing with the norms I've indicated". One-man-one-vote was not a viable solution for South Africa's problem and the potential among the whites to fight a revolution should be taken note of.

Turning to the question of disinvestment, MINISTER BOTHA emphasised that it was making things very difficult for South Africa. The impression was gained that some Republican senators wanted to make a break with the President, or to force him to do so, on this issue so that they would not lose votes at a future election. South Africa would do its best to counter these moves, and the Administration should do its bit too, and to make use of the views on disinvestment by the governments of South Africa's neighbours. "The more we change the greater my governments risk becomes inside this country, the more stick we get from the USA."

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What South Africa's enemies desired was not only the total downfall of the whites but of any leader who stood for democratic values. Against that background, the RSA and the USA needed an indepth analysis of the situation even if this may be hurtful at times. "We have had a good run in Namibia, despite some slight differences in respect of our positions on UNITA." The same ought to apply in the case of Mozambique. The Minister could not help but to feel that the US thought that South Africa was not conforming with Nkomati. He stressed that it was a feeling, not based on anything that the Americans had said. It was important to eliminate that feeling from their minds, and to convince the Mozambicans as well that South Africa was no longer aiding Renamo. He therefore wished to make a first proposal:

Was the USA prepared to make available a number of military attachés to join the members of the Security Commission in the investigations of the allegations which Minister Vieira has submitted relating to Renamo's activities from South African territory?

All the necessary facilities will be provided by the SADF and the American observers could lay down the requirements for such a monitoring task. If the USA would not see its way open to do it, would it have any ideas as to how this serious problem could be addressed. Could the Swiss, Zairians or any other country act as observer. The fact was that something had to be done about the allegations to eradicate their belief that the South African military establishment was supporting Renamo.

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MINISTER BOTHA continued to talk about Mozambique's economic development. So far everyone has been inclined to say that the economy did not function because of the civil war. The fact, however, was that even if the war were to end, the economic decline would continue unless President Machel would institute reforms. They had to listen to the IMF which was best placed to provide assistance. The present structure did not have the machinery to handle investments etc. It is not for South Africa to tell President Machel to stop corruption and to plan his economy properly. South Africa could help and would continue to do so. South Africa was concerned that unless something happened soon the marxist hardliners may succeed in getting rid of Machel. Moscow would come back and in a spiteful way say to the Mozambicans "we told you so". This could lead us on a conflict course with serious consequences and would put the USA in a difficult position as well. South Africa want peace and economic development in Mozambique.

MINISTER BOTHA stressed that assistance to Renamo came from other countries. Would it be possible for the USA to talk to Fernandez and the other Renamo leaders. It was difficult for South Africa to persuade them and to turn down some of their requests. They needed something more from Machel. They were prepared to accept him as President but he just needed that initial key to open the door. Maybe the USA and Portugal could act as guarantors to assist in greater assurances to Renamo that they would not be "strung-up" if they co-operated. Despite these problems, MINISTER BOTHA did not think that the position was all that

desperate in Mozambique. The RSA and the USA had a sort of understanding with each other on this. However, while South Africa was still prepared to e.g. take more Mozambican labour despite its own unemployment problems, things like the threat of disinvestment, prohibition of advertisements for tourism in the USA, arms embargo etc. reduced South Africa's means, despite the fact that "we aim for the same thing".

Turning to the situation in South West Africa/Namibia, DR VAN NIEKERK pointed out that the RSA had contributed during 1984 R318 million in direct grants to the SWA-budget, R250 million to customs and excise, contributions to the defence and railway budget. It was of utmost importance to get the country economically viable. Fishing by foreign vessels in SWA-waters amounted to about 1 million tons of fish last year which was worth some R500 million. He mentioned the Kudu gasfield which held some prospects and provided figures on education which showed a marked improvement on the previous year. Politically it was important to note that one could not put a political process in a vacuum - "to put it into a deepfreeze and take it out when it suited one". It has its own momentum.

MR SEAN CLEARY than briefed the American delegation on the highlights of the last four months as far as the MPC's political activities were concerned. He mentioned inter alia the resolution of October 1984 in which the MPC objected to the continued loss of life, the "one-man government", and the continued bias on the part of the UN in favour of SWAPO. The MPC's call for a constitution to

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be drawn-up before elections and for a "Bill of Rights" to be guaranteed in a constitution were mentioned as well as the proposal/invitation to all political parties to participate in a conference were highlighted, as was the call by the MPC on all parties of the conflict to reach a cessation of hostilities. Should that not happen, the MPC would hold further talks with the South African Government. Since 15 January 1985 the MPC General Assembly was in session to deliberate on these aspects. The South African attitude was that until the MPC came up with a firm statement, it was hypothetical to take a stand but it appeared that the South African Government may be approached in March/April.

DR VAN NIEKERK returned to Sam Nujoma's statement of February in Lusaka in which he said that SWAPO's military activities would be stepped-up. Since the beginning of the year, SWAPO had been responsible for 6 bombs on civilian targets. It was hoped that police investigations would result in the culprits being convicted in court. A further aspect worth noting was that the Lutheran Church of America was giving South West Africa a lot of problems.

MINISTER BOTHA informed the US delegation that the MPC wished to see the State President who would consider sympathetically any suggestions to improve the interim government (which the present one was too), but he would not agree with suggestions which would clash with South Africa's international commitments.

Turning to the question of disengagement, MINISTER BOTHA said that Angola had not replied to South Africa's sugges-

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tions of November 1984 despite the fact that the matter was raised on various occasions in the JMC. This has left us with the firm impression that the Angolans do not want the JMC to move to the border. South Africa had recently again suggested dates for a ministerial meeting but had received no reaction. The situation was becoming difficult. The Minister had had occasion last year to cancel important visits to Africa because of possible meetings with the Angolans which did not come off. There were a number of important aspects which had to be taken into account: Savimbi was stronger than Renamo. He had substantial, proven support inside Angola. How could Dos Santos agree to Cuban withdrawal under these circumstances. South Africa was concerned about the high costs for it in South West Africa/Namibia and about the ongoing war in Angola. South Africa could not stop UNITA fighting the war - the best it could do was to persuade Savimbi to go for a negotiated settlement.

MINISTER BOTHA then stressed that one had to look beyond the present efforts to bring about Cuban withdrawal. What was the position if it were not possible. Were there not certain risks involved in carrying on too long. There were signs that the media and the public had reached salutation points. What were the American views on this and what were their hopes of overcoming these problems? There was no doubt that the USSR's commitment in Angola was higher than that in Mozambique, in terms of military equipment, manpower but most of all reputatio. There was a heavy Soviet involvement in Angola. Was it possible to move both sides to a conference and to involve other African leaders

to assist with this? Summing-up the situation referring to South West Africa/Namibia and Angola, MINISTER BOTHA made the following points:

1. Internally, we were looking towards an interim government with more powers.
2. South Africa was prepared to move its forces to the border, once it had established whether SWAPO was continuing with its Southward thrust and how serious it was. Obviously, the JMC could not move if it were to be a major threat.
3. The Cubans had to get out of Angola. If this could not be achieved over the medium term, e.g. 12 months, the USA and SA, would have to seriously look at this question again.

MINISTER BOTHA then made a few brief remarks on the situation in Southern Africa. In Zimbabwe it was noticeable that Mugabe seemed to have cutdown on his more vociferous exchanges. Trade and transport were going well. Yet he feared that Mugabe was up to something and that he may try to use the trick to accuse South Africa of interfering in his planned elections. He may then use this to kick-out our representative or to turn on someone inside his government. Nevertheless, relations were better than ever since Mugabe had come to power.

As regards Swaziland, the main problem remained the family issue with Buthelezi, who had adopted an unreasonable approach. The impression gained from President Reagan receiving Bishop Tutu and Chief Buthelezi was that they

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were the people who informed him on South Africa and to advise him on what he should do in this country. This created some difficulty for the South African Government. Yet Buthelezi's visit was good to counteract Tutu's meeting with the President. Although he did not agree with all Buthelezi had said, overall he had acted very responsibly. The South African Government would give high-level consideration of how to treat him in future as leader of the largest ethnic group in the country.

Turning to Lesotho, the Minister was concerned that Jonathan would not go through with the Highlands Water Project. He was also worried about attempts to rig the forthcoming elections. It would be most useful to have someone to verify them. Lesotho had imported some Russian landmines and other armaments like armoured cars. There continued to be practical problems in this connection, as well as with the day to day running of relations. The Minister got on well with the new Foreign Minister of Lesotho and by and large relations were quite good.

Botswana, however, was causing serious concern because of stepped-up ANC activities there. Bophuthatswana had sent a delegation to Gaborone to talk to them about this aspect. Maputo wanted other countries bordering on the RSA to sign similar agreements (like Nkomati), for obvious reasons. The new Foreign Minister in Botswana was more practical and realistic and South Africa made some suggestions as to how Botswana could be assisted to curb this problem of the ANC. If it does not get solved, South Africa would have to do something which in turn may lead to Botswana taking it

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to the Security Council. The USA may be able to make an input here.

As far as the rest of Africa was concerned, MINISTER BOTHA said that relations with French-speaking Africa were going as well as could be expected. The Comores had informed him that the Russians were very keen to open a Mission there but that they had refused. Approaches on a non-political level were recently made to the Seychelles. There was an interesting project of a round-flight by SAA involving Mauritius, the Seychelles, Comores back to Johannesburg. There was tremendous potential for tourism on the East coast of Africa. The US delegation was asked if the USA could not do more in Somalia. Mogadishu was a bit better since the Russians had left, but much assistance was needed to stop the Ethiopians. Relations with Morocco continued to be quite good.

Concluding his briefing, MINISTER BOTHA felt that the new dispensation was proving itself; that the guidelines by the State President opened-up new hopes for dialogue with the blacks; that the Soviet Union could be pushed back in Angola and elsewhere in Africa and that South West Africa/Namibia remained a headache, as well as US actions in Africa.

Lunch break.

DR CHESTER CROCKER opened the afternoon session by complimenting Minister Botha on a most impressive analysis of the situation in South and southern Africa which gave his

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delegation a most valuable insight into the South African perspective. Referring to the American domestic scene, he said that it has witnessed a partly spontaneous, partly manipulated movement directed against the RSA, President Reagan and his policy vis-a-vis South Africa and also directed in favour of change in this country. There were those three distinct elements of the campaign. Much of it must be seen in the aftermath of a failed political coalition which received a heavy defeat in the recent election. The South African position gave them a free ride to bring about legislative punitive measures. Allied to that was a group with a left-wing agenda seeking polarisation and confrontation. This was anathema to the Administration. To this group progress is always inadequate even before it was announced. It was against any compromise. The multinationals were one of its main targets. The third group involved in this movement was most important. It involved the people, the legislators who had to take a position. They represented the majority in the House of Representative and the Senate. Most of them do not know South Africa at all, they are looking for inputs. It was very difficult to predict how this would develop. A series of legislative measures would be put on the agenda. "We must try and influence these punitive methods." He wanted to convey the President's official stance to the South African delegation:

1. He is convinced that his policy towards South Africa is right.
2. That quiet policy is ill-understood all over and the US will make it clear that it really is.

3. The Administration will fight the legislative battles.

The distortions of outside static must, according to Dr Crocker, be minimised. The US took courage from the SAG being a strong government. South Africa also had to get credit for what goes on in this country.

MINISTER BOTHA thanked Dr Crocker for these remarks, where upon the latter continued with his analysis of the broader international climate. "We have opportunities to shape events in Africa." The widely held impression that their policy was changing, weakening was not true. He foresaw the scenario as follows: For another year the Soviets would be plodding on preparing for yet another succession. We would rather have them plodding in the USSR than having to deal with a dynamic young leader. The USSR would continue to take advantage of our own failures. The impression of the static position gives them an opening which we have to do something about.

The Cubans were trying to insinuate themselves into the confidence of the USA. This was not going to happen. There was limited business on bilateral issues. Castro was feeling the heat in southern Africa. The train was starting to move in Angola and he wants to be on that train. The casualties and costs were rolling further. "Therefore we must play our cards right and continue to shape events." He again referred to the danger of the impression of a lack of movement which gave the others opportunities. Nyerere had been sidelined but was back again. This had to be borne in mind.

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DR CROCKER continued to say that there had been significant developments behind the scenes. "I would argue that Zaïre is the most important strategic country in Africa." Mobutu's leadership had amazingly held-out despite all odds. He had introduced the most rigorous austerity programme on the advice of his Western donors and the IMF. He was in a solid position, also as far as his security was concerned. The ex-Katangans were no longer a threat and he had more air mobility than previously. He felt bolstered by his relationships with the USA, France, Belgium and South Africa. The logic of what we were doing in Angola was driving him into that equation.

The Angolans, on the other hand, were uncertain about Zaïre, mainly because the Russians and Cubans have been feeding Dos Santos with "lots of garbage", like a South African invasion into Angola from Zaïre. The present meeting between Mobutu and Dos Santos was important and would emphasise the dynamics of the political and diplomatic situation which would push Zaïre into a position with respect to Angola.

When looking at Africa in general, the USA was preoccupied by the economic collapse of Africa. DR CROCKER explained that the USA was responding by pumping \$1 billion aid to Africa. 50% of all food going to Africa came from the USA. Looking at the longer term approach regarding development, it would give the USA more of an influence in Africa. It was, however, essential for "strings" to be attached to aid. African governments had to get off the

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backs of their people, farmers had to be liberated etc. The USA was putting conditions on the aid programmes. As far as Somalia was concerned, the USA was providing \$30 - \$40 million military assistance, on condition it was not used in the Ogaden (where the Ethiopian military superiority was overwhelming). \$60 million food aid was also given to Somalia. The Ethiopians were facing a crisis of dramatic proportions. They were not able to feed their people but were also, as an act of policy, starving their people. It had to be assured that food aid would go to the people who needed it.

MINISTER BOTHA thanked Dr Crocker for his most interesting remarks and felt that a vast ground had been covered during the last two days. He was very happy with what had been achieved.

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