

### of promoting diversity in the print media.

Special attention will need to be given to radio and television, whose high costs militate against free entry and open competition. The broadcast media are also more dependent than newspapers on public finance, in the form of licence fees. Where governments are able to determine revenue levels, the media may be vulnerable to political influences.

In Britain, the concept of public financing of the broadcast media combined with independent management and public accountability has worked well. While the Government helps to fund and appoints the Chairman and Boards of both the BBC and IBA (Independent Broadcasting Authority), these bodies regard themselves as representatives primarily of the public. They bear sole responsibility for the editorial content of broadcast.

In Sweden, all radio and television programmes are broadcast by one of four subsidiaries of the Swedish Broadcasting Corporation, which is owned partly by private industry (10%), the press (20%) and popular movements (60%). Popular movements include the churches, consumer co-operatives, adult education groups and the trade union movement. Programming policy is determined by agreement between the government and the broadcasting companies and the programmes must be "impartial, balanced and calculated to satisfy a broad range of tastes". Here again, a Swedish-type model may be more appropriate for South Africa than the British or the commercially-orientated American system.

In common with other Western democracies, the US, Britain and Sweden enjoy high levels of education and literacy, established democratic procedures, an advanced economy and a reasonably fair distribution of wealth. In South Africa the situation is markedly different.

It is perhaps worth remarking here that media freedom is not good in itself; it has value only insofar as it upholds the interests of the society it serves.

Opinions will differ over the true interests of South African society and how the media should serve those interests. There is a school of thought which contends that develop-

ing countries — particularly in Africa — cannot afford the luxury of an inquisitive, adversarial press that holds African societies to liberal Western norms and standards. Some argue that unity is of overriding importance in any emergent African democracy, and that a temporary suspension of democratic values is justified in the early stages. Experience elsewhere in Africa, however, has shown that "development journalism" or "positive reporting only" have invariably resulted in "sunshine journalism", in which the media refrain from publishing what the authorities do not want published. The outcome is always an inadequately informed populace and an out-of-touch, unresponsive government.

Given South Africa's history, it is inevitable that any government in a transitional phase towards an open society will seek to keep control over the various competing economic and political forces. If control over resources is the essence of power in any society, it goes without saying that the State will insist on exercising a degree of control over the media. The media can expect to be curbed in the same way that individuals are curbed — from fomenting revolution, inflaming racial feelings, inciting violence or deliberately giving offence to ethnic or religious minorities. In principle, these restraints are defensible if they are approved by Parliament and applied even-handedly by independent courts, not the governing party.

In addition, it would be prudent for the media in a transitional society to regulate itself — as the press does now — by means of a media council and a code of conduct which holds the media to the highest professional standards in the reporting of racial, religious and other sensitive matters. The broadcast media should also be subject to the media code of conduct, which is not the case at present.

However much one may theorise about media freedom, in practice the media in a post-apartheid South Africa will be as free or unfree as the constitution and the law of the land allows. A truly democratic constitution which safeguards individual liberties, protects freedom of expression and entrenches the rule of law is essential if the media are to function effectively. □

*(Discussion on this article will be welcomed — Editorial Board.)*

by PETER VALE

## INTEGRATION AND DISINTEGRATION IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

A College Lecture at the University of Natal, Pietermaritzburg.

Forty years ago in "Cry the Beloved Country", Alan Paton caught the dilemma of all South Africans with these words: "it is hard to be born a South African." If this article had a subtitle, it would paraphrase this famous statement thus: "It is as hard to be born a southern African."

The country of which Paton wrote, not unlike the South Africa of today, is riven with strife, anger and deep mistrust. It is also a curiously insular country: the narrative is as divorced from the world as it is from Africa. This does not mean that Paton was a parochial writer. Nor does it mean that the novel is not an African one. Rather, the book's

preoccupation is with the South African situation to the exclusion both of southern Africa and Africa within which apartheid plays out. [Paton was not a man without experience of a broader Africa. As the fine vignette, "Travels with my father" by Jonathan Paton<sup>1</sup> suggests, he was keenly interested in exploring the continent.]

But Alan Paton is not alone in his neglect of Africa. South African literature is largely devoid of an interest in the region and in Africa itself. In English there are some exceptions. Ezekiel Mphahlele's novel "Chirundu" is set in Zambia, and both Nadine Gordimer (Guest of Honour) and J. M. Coetzee (Waiting for the Barbarians) have written

novels which play off in fictitious southern African countries.

Except for three moments — the controversial work of Sangiro (which was concerned mostly with wild life), Else Joubert's troubled work on Angola and Madagascar and the recent and exciting "grensliteratuur"<sup>2</sup> — Afrikaans literature, too, is devoid of an African context.

### LITTLE ATTENTION

Given the magnitude of the challenges which face this country, literary introspection is not surprising. However, **apartheid's** tentacles have spread widely, and too little attention — within our national debate — is paid to southern Africa. None of the serious newspapers, for example, has a specialist commentator on the region. Our universities also appear singularly uninterested in the region, and in its 100-million inhabitants. Despite a strong academic tradition known as "Regional Studies", no South African university has a fully-developed unit, institute or centre devoted specifically to the study of southern Africa. A cursory glance at the graduate theses accepted at South Africa's universities reveals that students in the humanities and social sciences are not much interested in the topic. Within our national psyche, **apartheid** and its innumerable sins is brooded upon in an inward — almost lonely — fashion.

These thoughts hope to draw attention to the regional context of the **apartheid** issue. Its central argument is that **apartheid** is at the very nub of relations — political, economic, security — between the states of southern Africa. Without an understanding of **apartheid's** role in the region, there is no explaining its past, present and future and no understanding of the forces for integration and disintegration.

The discipline of International Relations has many enemies and this lecture will not be defending the indefensible. Nonetheless, it is convenient to develop a few academic points — some will call them theoretical, some whimsical — in order to site the discussion in a broader framework. These thoughts are culled from the academic study of international relations and will be flagged under the headings: geography, political economy, integration.

After teasing these out, the discussion considers a number of disparate issues around which the debate on southern Africa turns, and isolates two separate frameworks for integration in the region. In a concluding section, Namibia's potential position in the region is considered, and some nervous conclusions drawn.

### GEOGRAPHY

More than any other factor, geography sets the parameters of the topic. The countries of southern Africa are tied-bound to each other in the same way as are Canada and the United States, or France and Germany. True, the geographical distances are greater in the former, and considerably less in the latter. The essential point is that the various rivers — the Komati, the Caledon, the Molopo, the Limpopo — which divide the countries of southern Africa do so falsely. As an example, the floods which devastated large parts of Natal in recent years have had their equivalent in Mozambique, Swaziland and parts of Zimbabwe. There has, however, been no serious reporting of these in South Africa nor, in most cases, any effort to share the terrific burden which these countries have faced in the aftermath.

These rivers have become fundamental barriers: Berlin Walls over which each side of the southern African divide stares across at the other. So, while the region's inhabitants share the same weather, fruits and vegetation, walls of water breed fear and suspicion, angst and loathing.

The sub-continent is also geographically remote from other areas of the world. Only modern means of travel — particularly in the air — have brought it within striking distance of the rest of the world. But it is not a backward region. Its configuration is dominated by a powerful and technologically superior state, South Africa: a state which is politically at odds with its neighbours. Any reasoned deliberation on the region, therefore, is dominated by South Africa's role as an integrating and disintegrating factor.

It is politically unwise and academically unsound not to offer some qualification of this claim. While it is true, borrowing the American aphorism, that when South Africa sneezes the region catches cold, resistance against the bug can be (and frequently is) taken. It is a mistake to believe that the other states are only passive actors: strong resistance and independent actions can (and do) take place. While these tend to be symbolic, they are able to draw attention to the effects of **apartheid** in the region. There is no better example of this than to trace how it is that Mozambique's plight has been internationalised. This has consequences for Pretoria's behaviour, as we shall see.

### POLITICAL ECONOMY

The political economy of the region strongly explains existing patterns of dependency. Consider the railway network which was implanted to ensure the safe, cheapest and most-efficient movement of the region's most valuable commodity — gold — to major world markets. It snakes up from the Cape, through the spine of the sub-continent and ends at the edge of the Congo River. As a result, it draws the sub-continent southwards through its great industrial heartland, the Witwatersrand, to the ports of Durban and Port Elizabeth (and, to a lesser extent, East London and Cape Town). This north-south axis strongly contrasts with the general east-west pattern of colonial settlement in Africa. So it is that Mozambique has three separate rail systems, but no means of transporting goods from the north of the country to the south.

As transport pivots on South Africa so do multiple other factors: financial markets, industrial capacity, health care and veterinary expertise to mention four. These (and others) give South Africa a huge comparative advantage in the immediate geographic setting. It is costly and difficult for outside powers to compete against South Africa in its backyard. The unhappy experience of the Soviets in southern Africa over the past decade provides an immediate and sobering example of the costs (and resulting anguish) of trying to match South Africa's immediate gravitational pull.

The spin-off is mutually-reinforcing: as wealth begets wealth, so dependencies beget dependencies. In southern Africa, South Africa's centrality and the accompanying importance have been profitably reinforced. This has deepened during the two decades since the wave of national self-rediscovery which commonly is called "independence". The withdrawal of any competitors — the British, the French, even colonial Portugal — which might seriously challenge South Africa's domination of the region, immeasurably strengthened South Africa's position.

This analysis is obviously generalised and exaggerated. Individual states have managed to prosper (some, like Botswana, even flourish), in spite of South Africa. These are exceptions but, even in these cases, South Africa has touched salient parts of the country's development. [In Botswana's case, De Beers has been a major factor in the development of the profitable diamond industry.] The point about wide-ranging abstractions is that they give some form and order to the array of circumstances we see about us. In this way they constitute the beginnings of a theory about developments in the region.

## INTEGRATION

Although a concern for abstractions has been central in the academic study of international relations, it has been largely an unsuccessful endeavour. However, one area in which some progress has been made is in trying

**to explain how and why states cease to be wholly sovereign, how and why they voluntarily mingle, merge and mix . . . as to lose their factual attributes of sovereignty. . . .**<sup>3</sup>

Thus it is that integration (between states) seeks to reverse the cohesive force of the nationalism, giving states and their citizens greater access to a wider experience, wider resources within the community of states. This process (and theoretical speculation on it) has reached an important plateau in Europe with the development of the European Community, which will be fully integrated into a common market in 1992.

The potential for a common market in southern Africa has been the source of considerable speculation. Given the geography and the region's political economy, this is not surprising; an economic unit exists with South Africa at its centre. A series of regional-wide bureaucracies which might manage integration have also been in existence since the beginning of the century. The most important of these are the Southern African Customs Union and the now defunct Southern African Monetary Union. Therefore, the instruments for ensuring the successful economic integration of the region are in place.

The states of southern Africa are joined, therefore, by more than their geographic proximity. Extensive transport links, migrant labour, and industrial dependencies underpin an organic unity. On the departure of British colonialism — which provided the region's early glue — why was it that some form of integration did not take place?

**Apartheid** rule and South Africa's refusal to accede to international demands for the independence of Namibia profoundly threaten individual states: these present serious obstacles to integration. [For the record South Africa's support for the late Rhodesian cause was also a source of considerable annoyance to its immediate neighbours.] In more recent times, their security has also been deeply disturbed by South Africa's destabilisation of the region.

The sub-continent is thus divided by the one state, South Africa; the only state which — all things being equal — could ensure the success of its integration.

The focus now shifts to a discussion of the salient factors involved in integration and disintegration in the region.

## DOMINATION AND INSECURITY

South Africa dominates the region. No other state — nor coalition of states — possesses either the economic, military, or technological power of the minority-ruled state.

But the region's most powerful state — South Africa — is chronically insecure: it is an insecurity bred from a domestic political base which is constantly threatened.

For Pretoria, the future of minority domination rests on tinkering with the domestic edifice to ensure that the state (as presently constituted) is not threatened from within or without. Therefore, there is a strong link between the South African government's need to restructure the domestic racial/political dynamic, and wider regional and international issues. While the illegitimacy of the **apartheid** state is *sui generis*, all indications are that only purposeful negotiations which enjoy the support of the majority — as has happened elsewhere — can terminate it. [The question of how one determines the majority is crucial, but is really the topic for another discussion.]

Anguish has been added to this sense of illegitimacy by the inculcation — for more than a decade — of simple-minded anti-communism, and the perceived immediacy of a Soviet-inspired assault on South Africa from its neighbours. The consequential cycle of fear and deep paranoia, was compounded when three of its neighbours — Mozambique, Angola and Zimbabwe — became independent under avowedly Marxist-Leninist governments.

Parenthetically, a remarkable feature of modern history is how the struggle for national liberation in South Africa (and elsewhere in southern Africa) was distorted by the Cold War. Successive Nationalist Party governments have succeeded in portraying minority rule as an integral part of Western opposition to Communism. All western crusades are thus the responsibility of South Africa's minority. In turn, efforts to overturn the order were seen as motivated and driven by the Soviet Union. [Rhodesia is a good example, incidentally.] Conservatives in the West are still attracted to this view of South Africa's reality although a shift from fundamentalism to pragmatism in the United States may change this. As a result, South Africa's ruling minority has enjoyed the protection of the West for the 40 years it has practiced **apartheid**.

Informed by this interpretation of its plight, South Africa sees itself at the vortex of a confrontation between the so-called East and the self-styled West. In this conflict, South Africa's political and economic systems (and the various attempts to "reform" them) are neutral. The country is an innocent victim in a much larger conflict between two irreconcilable ideologies, a contest known as the Cold War. Politics, this reasoning suggests, is imported to "disrupt orderly government and progress".

## DESTABILISATION

In response to the perceived and real threat to its security, Pretoria's strategic planners — led by the South African Defence Force [SADF] — have energetically sought to destabilise its neighbours. Military action against these states has seen support for dissident armed factions in Mozambique, Angola, and it is rumoured, Zimbabwe, and military raids into these, and other, countries. In so doing, South Africa became known as the bearer of a secondary malady which — in its magnitude and scope — threatened to eclipse **apartheid** itself. This virus is known world-wide as regional destabilisation.

An important discussion underpins this claim: who makes regional policy? This question should not be glossed over, because it goes to the centre of the region's prospects for peace in the wake of President P. W. Botha's faltering grip on power. Strong evidence suggests that the military and

the police — under the generic title, the securocrats — have enjoyed unrivalled control over the past decade. Southern African history has been profoundly affected by this situation. The effects of their decisions (and their immediate consequences) on the peoples of southern Africa have been devastating as a number of authorities have claimed.<sup>4</sup>

But will this ascendancy last beyond P. W. Botha? The complex maze of joint management committees, some with regional links, are testimony to the influence which the securocrats enjoy. On the surface, the failure of Magnus Malan, in particular, in the succession stakes indicates that the securocrats may be a spent force. However, more thoughtful analysis suggests, given the magnitude of the crisis facing the country and the accompanying entrenchment of their power, that their influence will not simply be overturned by the change in leadership of the National Party.

### ECONOMIC ACTION

If military action is one pillar of South Africa's destabilisation of its neighbours, the other is economic. South Africa is able to exert considerable pressure on the region's transport network, for example. On several occasions it has drastically disrupted the flow of trade to, and from, the majority-ruled states and has also threatened to repatriate foreign workers whose remittances are important sources of revenue for their home economies.

Reliance on regional destabilisation to ensure domestic security has been costly for South Africa. The country has been branded with compounding endemic problems: spreading an untenable security situation in a region in the grip of serious economic reversal.

This has brought down the wrath of two sympathetic governments — Mrs Thatcher's and President Reagan's. Both were driven by different considerations, however. The former as a means to head-off sanctions; the latter in the wake of the early setbacks in the policy of Constructive Engagement. The accumulative effect was the same — destabilisation drew extensive international pressure and, in its wake, South Africa has had to reconsider its regional options.

This brings us to Pretoria's preferences for the region.

### ANARCHY

There is a line of reasoning which suggests that **apartheid** is best served by anarchy. As the strongest economic and military power and the most threatened, South Africa can use and manipulate sheer chaos to protect her best interests, the survival of the minority. Unhindered by competitors, the South African state can institute a client here, a surrogate there, and demolish them at will. In the end, the sheer power of the South African magnet draws clients ever closer, making them even more dependent.

Although attractive, unbridled machiavellian strategy has severe diplomatic limitations and is costly. To be fully effective, the target states (or surrogates) must be placid so that no counter-vailing pressure can be realised. As has been argued, the states in the region have an independence axis-appeal to the international community.

There is evidence to suggest that the reversal of South Africa's fortunes in southern Angola reveals the limitations on how far she can play the role of region's spoiler. Moreover, if the SADF has broken its ties with the Mozambique National Resistance Movement, Renamo (a point to which

we will return), then seemingly South Africa is unable to fully control its clients. In certain situations — Angola is a good example — might not the Unita tail be wagging the South African dog, to the latter's embarrassment?

Although regional anarchy makes sense in sheer power terms, indications are that external pressure on South Africa over destabilisation has generated counter pressure: Pretoria seems to have slowed the tempo of destabilisation.

There are two less overtly offensive strategies which Pretoria uses to defend, protect and extend its regional interests. Both require closer elucidation because they suggest ways in which Namibia's evolving role in the region may play out. The first can be called "co-option" and the second "incorporation".

### CO-OPTION

Co-option hopes to draw neighbouring states closer by offering economic largess in return for guarantees on the security of the minority. To wit: the effective policing of the African National Congress [ANC]. The trade-off is clear — South African money (or the promise thereof) is exchanged to shore up **apartheid's** lack of legitimacy.

This strategy has been partially successful. In March 1984, South Africa signed the Nkomati Accord with Mozambique which called upon both parties to respect the security concerns of the other, and committed each to increased economic co-operation. It has since become evident that the SADF (or elements within it) did not intend to abide by the arrangement and continued — and may well continue<sup>5</sup> — to apply military and support assistance to the MNR.

As a result, the agreement is in tatters and the relationship between Pretoria and Maputo has sharply deteriorated from more heady days. Although the South African and Mozambican Presidents agreed to resuscitate co-operation at Songo mid-September, 1988, South Africa's credibility was seriously impaired by the violation of the Nkomati Accord.

President Robert Mugabe's recent claim, for example, that South Africa's credentials in the Angolan settlement were under question, could follow from Pretoria's failure to keep its word in regional affairs. South Africa continues, however, to impress upon her neighbours a desire for them to enter non-aggression pacts — in other words, to become co-optive partners.

### INCORPORATION

The second strain, "incorporation", aims to develop tight, controlled links between South Africa and the target state. Although this strategy closely links domestic and regional issues, it has been ignored in the literature.<sup>6</sup> It relies on South Africa's immediate access to resources — especially lines of credit — through a maze of inter-leading and inter-linking structures which converge in two pseudo-international institutions, Secosaf<sup>7</sup> and the Development Bank of Southern Africa.

While the facades of both suggest neutrality, the entire edifice is **apartheid**-defined. The structure stands in a line of schemes which have their roots in the "Constellation of Southern African States" which was first suggested by the then Prime Minister John Vorster in 1976.

Despite the quite obvious political bias of these structures, Secosaf's General Secretary recently claimed:

"South Africa, Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and

Ciskei, together with Secosaf, are concentrating on socio-economic development issues. Political posturing, which to a large extent typifies the UN and the OAU, is absent. This does not mean that political considerations do not play a role in our structure. The national aspirations of each State are, of course, important."<sup>8</sup>

A benign aim of incorporation is to draw together the elements of the South African state which existed before **apartheid** fragmented the country: in Deon Geldenhuys' phrase, "putting together what apartheid has put asunder." In so doing the fiction of homeland independence is maintained and the hope held out that, indeed, these states might gain limited international recognition. This is an important political proviso: states must act as equals. So targeted states must co-operate as full partners with the so-called TVBC states, Transkei, Venda, Bophuthatswana and Ciskei.

The motive underpinning incorporation is clear: an acceptance of the South African state and a concomitant recognition that it has urgent and legitimate security concerns. This infers, furthermore, that the South African security establishment has unfettered access into the target country, and that it will exercise this right when necessary.

There are some suggestions that at least two governments in southern Africa, those in Mbabane and Maseru, are being courted to participate in this scheme. The former case is clear-cut, the Lesotho Highlands Water Scheme is being financed by the Development Bank of Southern Africa. The evidence in Swaziland is less certain and, arguably, will fully evolve.

For states drawn to this type of relationship the risks are high: links with **apartheid** will severely damage their international standing. On the other hand given geography and the difficulty which other states have in projecting power into southern Africa, Pretoria often offers the only hope of economic salvation.

### ATTEMPTS TO RESIST

But southern African states themselves have attempted to resist South Africa's pressure: how successful has this been?

There have been several regional efforts to establish formal security arrangements outside of South Africa's direct sphere. One grew out of the initiatives taken by southern African states to assist in the elimination of white-minority rule in what is now Zimbabwe. Following majority rule, this collaboration turned to the problem of reducing economic dependence on South Africa. In 1979, the Southern African Co-ordination Conference (SADCC)<sup>9</sup> was established. The primary stated goal of SADCC is defensive — to limit South Africa's capacity to inflict economic hardship on its neighbours. A more illusory goal is the promotion of equitable economic integration between its members.

The choice of the adjective "illusory" is deliberate. From this analysis, it is obvious that the weight of South Africa's economy can (and does) induce havoc with such plans. It is easy for South Africa to play the SADCC states off against each other. This raises serious doubts about the capacity of SADCC to achieve integration without the participation of the region's strongest economy, South Africa's.

It also presents an interesting theoretical problem: the process of integration implies a surrender of sovereignty

between those involved in the process. In the SADCC's case the stated intention is in defence of sovereignty (against South African violations). Was SADCC's hope of integration doomed from the beginning?

South Africa's military incursions in the region have also generated discussion amongst SADCC members on closer military co-operation. At the September, 1986, Summit of the Non-Aligned Movement, held in Zimbabwe, a security fund for southern Africa was established. This represents the first joint military response to South Africa's regional policies. In addition, several outside powers — notably Britain — have indicated a willingness to provide military assistance to frontline states. Zimbabwe's reported determination to purchase sophisticated fighter aircraft is an additional indication of the desire to counter South Africa's more bloody regional goals.

There are, therefore, two frameworks for integration in southern Africa: one is located in the frontline and focusses on SADCC. A second, sponsored by South Africa, has two strands, both aim to tie neighbouring states closer to the security requirements of minority rule.

### NAMIBIA

How will the independence of Namibia play in the process of integration and disintegration in southern Africa? To this we now turn.

It is helpful to begin in the air because the inability of the SADF to match what their opponents could put into aerial combat put Namibia back on the independence track on the lines outlined in United Nations Security Council Resolution 435. The resulting setback at Cuito-Cuanavale set in train a process which was unthinkable 18 months ago: Pretoria's willingness to abandon its 78 year grip on the contested territory of Namibia. Costs obviously also played a role: especially given that the joint Cuban-Soviet forces were able to counter South Africa's traditional hold on regional affairs.

It needs to be emphasised that Cuito was a failure of a wider strategic game, even if it was not a reversal in the sense of a battlefield defeat. History is replete with examples of well-equipped, well-motivated armies which have failed because generals or — more correctly — the politicians behind them, were unsure of a strategic objective.

South Africa's goals in Angola were uncertain and, over time, untenable. They relied for their international acceptability on the Reagan Doctrine which was the product of a naive, zealous and ideologically-driven Administration, as the Hearings on Colonel Oliver North will certainly reveal. South Africa's objectives meshed comfortably with Reagan's world view, but Pretoria itself was not able to identify what it might do (or from where it would get support) if the SADF actually took Luanda. Washington, for its part, began to question the desirability and efficacy of supporting Unita, when it became obvious that South Africa — not the Soviet Union or the Cubans — was the font of regional stability. With this, South Africa's goals collapsed: a settlement in "south-western Africa" followed.

Those who have tracked the discussions on the peace process will immediately detect no mention of the growing disillusionment with the war at home (a perspective which, incidentally, I have also used<sup>10</sup>) and no hint of the changing power relations between the bureaucrats and the securocrats. These events were the consequences — rather than the causes — of the failure of South Africa's strategic objective.

## AFTER THE ELECTION

Whatever the mathematical mix after the election, Swapo will govern Namibia. Given the organisation's roots and the long years of patronage which they have enjoyed from the frontline states, there is little doubt that Namibia will become a fully-fledged member of SADCC. It will be drawn into the political cause of weakening South Africa's hold on the frontline states. Like other states in the region the new government will not find this easy.

Two additional draglines make Namibia's frontline goals even more troublesome. First, that country is more closely integrated into South Africa than any other southern African state. The tie has been unencumbered by the "international" formalities which have marked relations between South Africa and the other states of the region. Any attempt to sever the economic links between South Africa and Namibia will be like trying to separate, say, Natal from the rest of the country.

Secondly, because the relationship has been so integral, Namibia is more vulnerable than any other state to Pretoria's direct pressure. Agony is added to this by South Africa's first-hand understanding of that country which is unrivalled in any other decolonisation experience.

The real choice before the new government in Windhoek will be to balance these latter functional interests against their instinctive sympathy towards the frontline. It will not be an easy choice to make.

Namibia will become both a formal member of the Southern African Customs Union and a member of SADCC. With Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland, Namibia will officially have a foot in both southern Africa's two camps.

The country's independence, however, needs to be judged on a wider canvas, because it holds out real hope for the liberation of the entire sub-continent. The decision by Pretoria to jettison its commitments to that country represent the first time in 41 years that the Nationalist Party has surrendered territory by negotiating — not with itself or its puppets — but with the international community.

1. *Reality*, Vol. 20, No. 4 (July, 1988), pp. 15-16.
2. See Wilhelm Liebenberg, "The storie van die Grensverhaal", *Optima*, Vol. 36, No. 4 (December, 1988), pp. 182-187.
3. E. B. Haas, "The Study of Regional Integration: Reflections on the Joy and Anguish of Pretheorizing", *International Organization*, Vol. 24, 1970, p. 610.
4. See, for example, Joe Hanlon, "Beggar your neighbours: Apartheid Power in Southern Africa", London, Catholic Institute for International Affairs in collaboration with James Currey, Indiana University Press, 1986. Also see Francis Wilson and Mamphela Ramphele, "Uprooting Poverty: The South African Challenge", Cape Town, David Philip, 1989.
5. *Die Burger*, 1 March, 1989, p. 13.
6. For an exception, see Marie Muller, "Multilaterale sameweking in Suide-Afrika", *Politikon*, Vol. 15, No. 1 (June, 1988), pp. 90-104.

This itself was the function of the deepening rapprochement between the Superpowers which is an event of truly historic significance. This agreement to co-operate over Namibia offers a hint — no more — that Washington and Moscow could agree to manage the South African dispute. If consensus can be reached with other major powers — particularly, Britain — then a negotiated end to the other hurdle to integration, **apartheid** itself, may be closer than we dare think.

## OPEN THE WAY

Do not read into this that peace will come to the country or that the regional integration will immediately follow. The negotiated end of **apartheid** may open the way to tackle micro-issues — like those in Pietermaritzburg — or macro-issues — like the important debate on redistribution — which have resulted from **apartheid's** wanton destruction. If this happens, the prospects for the region developing purposeful institutions aimed at securing economic (and, perhaps political) integration appear brighter.

This is why the example effect of Namibia<sup>11</sup> is important and urgent. If things go badly and the peace process under SC Resolution 435 turns to chalk, South Africa's own transition looks far more stony and the region's divides will be further exacerbated.

By omission Alan Paton cast South Africa in a calm, tranquil sub-continent; a sea without storms. Today, southern Africa is caught in a paradox: deepening economic interdependence is accompanied by political and diplomatic conflict which frequently involves cross-border violence. The effects of this structural contradiction are felt throughout southern Africa, throughout the international community. It is not surprising, therefore, that many consider southern Africa to be caught in one of the great storms of our times.

Those who live here ignore the resulting tempest at their peril: the non-racial democracy for which our people yearn will certainly be part of southern Africa's grim failure, or at the forefront of the prosperity its peoples so richly deserve.

7. SECOSAF — Secretariat for Multilateral Co-operation in Southern Africa. Seen, by its proponents as "(B)asically, . . . a southern African United Nations . . ." SECOSAF — Secretariat for Multilateral co-operation in Southern Africa, Annual Review, '88/'89, p. 1.
8. *Ibid.*
9. *Comprising Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe.*
10. See Peter Vale, "Diplomacy and Delusion: The Bothas in Search of Africa", *Reality*, Vol. 21, No. 1 (January, 1989), pp. 16-19.
11. In a recent essay I have expanded further in this theme: see Peter Vale, "Beyond the Bend: South Africa, Southern Africa and Namibian Independence", *International Affairs Bulletin*, Vol. 12, No. 2, pp. 25-34.

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